USAID/OTI Indonesia Field Report
August 2002
Program Description
The Office of Transition Initiatives in Indonesia seeks to assist, accelerate, and secure the process of reform and democratization in this large island nation. Following thirty years of corrupt autocracy under former President Suharto, in 1999 Indonesia inaugurated the first freely elected government in the country's history. This milestone, while very positive, unleashed social, economic, and religious tensions throughout the archipelago that ultimately consumed the Presidency of Wahid, resulting in his impeachment by the Parliament. The parliament then elevated Vice-President Megawati SukarnoPutri to the Presidency, and named Hamzah Haz the new Vice President.
OTI programs in Indonesia focus on some of the country's most difficult regions and issues. The aim is to assist in resolving dangerous regional crises that undermine Indonesia's ability to move forward. Using tools that vary from media support to governance to reconstruction, OTI targets conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution in crisis areas that have national resonance. Also, OTI works on the civilian side of the civil/military equation to support security sector reform.
Country Situation
Akbar Tanjung, Speaker of the House as well as Golkar Chairman, was found guilty of "misuse" of over $4 million dollars of public funds and sentenced to three years in prison. However, he has refused to step down and is appealing the sentence. Parliament is divided on the issue, and the Golkar party is fighting to support their Chairman. Should Akbar lose the appeal and be forced to serve time it is likely that other public scandals would come to light in a political quid pro quo.
The economy and the Rupiah have been stable during August, although growth is sluggish and industrial production is down from a year ago. A much higher growth rate will need to be achieved to return to the relative prosperity of the pre-1998 period.
OTI Highlights
Maluku
The month of August was very quiet throughout the province. People continued to cross over into each other's neighborhoods and business transactions were brisk. The flow of traffic between Ambon City, Passo and Tulehu continued to increase and the number of vehicles with mixed Christian-Muslim passengers also grew. In addition, there is some discussion of Tulehu once again becoming a mixed port, i.e., Christian, Muslim and mixed vessels departing from this point for Seram and the Lease Islands, but this had not yet happened. The greatest uncertainty facing the province at present is whether or not the upcoming governor's race will become a trigger for renewed violence. There is widespread discussion of a postponement of the election until after the holiday season. To date, no final decision has been made.
During August, Baku Bae continued to facilitate dialogues between community and security forces with regard to securing neutral zones and reopening the remainder of the main road on Ambon Island. In addition, Baku Bae's poll of public opinions, concerns and suggestions about reopening this route was nearing completion at the end of the month. The grant to IMC for construction materials in the rehabilitation of Masohi General Hospital came to a close this month. The impact to the community has been immediately felt - surgeries for both Christian and Muslim patients are now possible for the first time since the hospital was damaged by the conflict. This collaborative effort between many donors, the local government and the military has been widely regarded as a success.
ICMC continued its program of working together with intending returnees, community members and government in addressing removal of barriers to returns in 15 communities on Seram Island. The program is an outgrowth of the OTI-funded Informed Decision-Making program implemented through ICMC earlier this year. In addition, OTI has funded Mercy Corps to work alongside ICMC to address other barriers to return that are not being covered by the government or ICMC's program.
OTI grantee MOCDA began its work with select NGOs on building advocacy skills with regard to the regional budget formulation process in addressing the implementation of the Malino Declaration. This grant complements funding to another local NGO partner, LPPM, who last month carried out a workshop for local legislators to strengthen their capacities in strategic planning and analysis of the regional budget process.
North Maluku
The bomb blasts in Tobelo sub-district during mid-July raised serious concerns that the relative peace over the last two years in the province could be at risk. Acting-Governor of North Maluku (as Civil Emergency Authority) announced in July that travel restrictions would be imposed on all outsiders who have no legitimate business in the province. The Governor's office declared that no travel restrictions were being placed on international humanitarian relief agencies.
In August, Tobelo town and the surrounding areas are reported calm and stable. Both Moslem and Christian enjoy freedom of movement. Military troops have been deployed to the area and the route between Galela and Tobelo is being strictly patrolled. The incidents in Tobelo, however, have resulted in many recent returnees going back to Ternate or Galela and there has been little movement of IDPs in the area as a result of these attacks.
Papua
Two Americans and one Indonesian from the Freeport mining operation in Papua were killed in a carefully planned ambush, which has sent shock waves throughout the province. The TNI and Police contend that Papuan separatists carried out this attack. Successful conclusion of the ongoing investigation is essential to reassure the population of the province.
OTI is continuing to support the implementation of the Special Autonomy law for Papua as the best way of addressing local grievances and averting more overt conflict.
Central Sulawesi
The security situation in Central Sulawesi in the month of August remained poor despite a second round of peace talks organized by the Central Government by Minister of Peoples' Affairs, Jusuf Kalla. Several incidents, including a bomb explosion in Palu have occurred this month, resulting in many casualties and damage to houses (including temporary housing), schools and other public facilities. The international NGOs in the area halted their activities for several weeks and have just returned to the area.
Aceh
Despite the political and security uncertainties, the situation in Aceh was relatively stable in August compared to the previous month. A number of killings occurred, including during Independence Day celebrations on August 17, and cases of intimidation and abductions were reported. The GOI Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs made a second visit to the province, ostensibly to seek input from regions not covered during his July visit. This time the Minister addressed a proposal to form a new province made up of three regions in Central, Southwest, and West Aceh. Just days before the Minister's visit, Anthony Zinni, a facilitator for the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Center, visited Aceh to help revive the stalled peace talks. On August 19, the government announced a revised policy for Aceh. The government would step up military and political pressure on GAM, giving them until December to accept Special Autonomy as a prerequisite for future dialog. It also demanded that GAM abandon its stated aim of independence or face the brunt of Indonesia's military might. This revised policy drew sharp criticism from numerous figures, both in Aceh and in Jakarta.
The Geneva peace talks between GOI and GAM scheduled for September have officially been postponed, although there are ongoing efforts in Europe to push the dialogue process ahead. Statistics published this month by the Aceh Legal Aid Foundation (LBH) confirmed what observers here have known for months, namely that violence is significantly on the rise in the province. In the first half of this year (January to August 2002) 974 people have been killed, and thousands more injured, abducted, or tortured. Informal reports to USAID in Aceh indicate that pay-offs by the very highest levels of local government are similarly on the rise, most recently in the form of media silencing and a combination of financial appeasement and intimidation of 'government-unfriendly' NGOs. Indeed, local press reports are noticeably less critical of the governor and local government than even a few weeks ago.
In spite of the instability in political and security situations in Aceh in August, OTI continued its operational support for the HDC Banda Aceh-based District Monitoring Teams on Security Matters and Public Information Unit, Peace through Dialog. In addition, OTI also funded Yayasan Ukhuwa to hold public discussion and hearing on draft Qanuns, Phase II.
West Timor
During August there continued to be a relatively high level of refugee returns from West Timor to East Timor, with a total of 4,785 people repatriated via the official IOM channel. Given the August 31 cut off of GOI repatriation payments of R750,000 to returning families, it is expected that in September the number of returning refugees will fall off dramatically. Although there is still no accurate assessment of refugee numbers in West Timor, unofficial figures place the total refugee population at roughly 35,000 people. It appears likely that with the passing of the August 31 deadline for GOI payments there will be renewed emphasis on resettling within Indonesia the remaining East Timorese refugees. There is a general feeling that these remaining refugees are not interested in being resettled outside of West Timor and that there is a possibility of discord in West Timor as the GOI pushes to resolve issues related to this residual refugee population. As of August 31 OTI/Indonesia is no longer funding grants in West Timor and is not planning to do any further programming in the area. This is due to the overall resolution of the IDP question.
Civilian/Military
The month of August saw some progress in institutional military reform. Constitutional amendments passed by the Assembly (MPR) during its annual session terminated the Armed Forces' representation in the MPR, which was originally scheduled to end in 2009. With the new regulations in force, TNI will leave both Parliament and Assembly in 2004. Even more significant was the MPR's decision to allow direct presidential elections by 2004, replacing the election through the Assembly usually decided by inter-elite politicking. This package of reforms will reduce TNI's formal involvement in national politics, but does little to address the real political power base of the military, namely its territorial command structure. TNI will remain an important player in politics, and with more and more funds and political power shifting to the regions, TNI will be well placed to access the economic infrastructure of the regions. This access will, in turn, maintain TNI's financial independence from central budgeting mechanisms, and allow the military to operate as a semi-autonomous entity.
OTI has for some time focused its civil-military relations program on increasing budgetary transparency of Indonesia's Armed Forces. In August, OTI sponsored a workshop in Jayapura, Papua, inviting local government officials to discuss their experience with TNI's territorial units and possible concepts to reform them. In no other area is TNI's approach of exploiting the economic resources of the regions to fund its operational costs more obvious than in Papua. Not only does TNI receive substantial funds from foreign companies to secure their business operations, but it also requests financial support from local administrations. These practices have made TNI extremely unpopular in the eyes of the local communities as well as in local government circles. The workshop has underlined that without a radical reform of TNI's territorial command system, it will be impossible to stop TNI from laying its hands on the economic assets of the regions. As a consequence, civilian supremacy over the Armed Forces will remain a largely theoretical goal.
In addressing this issue, OTI also linked up with other offices within the Embassy. The Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) organized a workshop in late August that focused on defense budgeting. OTI was involved in preparing the material and curriculum for the course, which was presented by a mobile training team from the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Navy Post-Graduate School in Monterey, California. Invitees included members of Parliament, the Supreme Auditing Board and the Ministry of Finance.
A. Grants Activity Summary
OTI Indonesia grants, FY02:
Total number of grants FY02: 277
Total grant funds committed: $6,463,922
Grant numbers by sector, FY 02:
Civil Society: 149 grants, $2,762,924
Civilian/Military: 34 grants, $673,670
Community Stabilization: 40 grants, $1,754,987
Governance: 25 grants $685,628
Media: 27 grants, $506,599
Elections: 2 grants, $80,112
Grants in current reporting period: 8 grants, $216,405
Civil Society: 2 grants, $61,972
Community Stabilization: 3 grants, $116,976
Civil/Military: 3 grants, $37,456
OTI Indonesia grants, FY01:
Total number of grants FY01: 261
Total grant funds committed: $5,433,802
Next Steps/Immediate Priorities
Maluku
The willingness of the Maluku governor to grant OTI program development staff a six-month permit to enter Maluku has had a significant positive impact on the ability to develop and carry out further activities. With regard to capacity strengthening and building of public accountability, OTI is following up with assistance to the Malino working groups, the Ambon City legislature, the Ambon municipal government and a forum of Ambon-based NGOs who seek to monitor and evaluate the performance of these groups. OTI will also fund the Maluku Media Center to supplement these efforts through interactive dialogue programs focused on these topics and building the capacity of journalists to cover the issues in a comprehensive and balanced fashion. Activities designed to increase positive interactions between Muslims and Christians are also planned, with a particular focus on supporting those institutions where this increase is proven. Finally, OTI will consider supporting an informed decision-making program through a local partner for IDPs from Haruku. This will represent the first initiative of its kind in areas outside Seram and Southeast Maluku.
Aceh
Although the Aceh environment will likely remain unpredictable in the coming months, OTI will continue its operational support for much of HDC's work and has tacitly agreed to underwrite parts of the all-inclusive dialog process. Other potential activities include a continuing initiative to support public discussions on drafting Qanun, funding support to help revitalize household economies negatively impacted by the conflict, and a number of initiatives focused on the process for the implementation of direct elections in Aceh, such as public polling and civil society discussion forums.
Papua
OTI will continue to assist the Provincial and local governments with the development framework and implementation of Special Autonomy.
Civilian/Military
As many Indonesian participants claimed that they did not have enough concrete information on the off-budget funding resources of TNI, OTI has decided to ask one of its partners to organize a follow-up event to the ODC workshop. The event, to be held on September 17, will feature former MOD Juwono Sudarsono, one of the most outspoken critics of off-budget funding for TNI. Members of Parliament will be invited to discuss the problem with Juwono and to seek possible solutions.
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