

# Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking



**UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE**

**A Summary  
of Completed  
Grant Projects**

**Volume 5**

# **Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking**

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**A Summary of  
Completed Grant Projects  
1995-98**

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## CONTENTS

Introduction	v
1. Arms Control: Weapons of Mass Destruction	1
2. Arms Transfers from the Former Soviet Union	7
3. Small Arms Proliferation	11
4. United Nations Peacekeeping	18
5. Ethnic Conflict	28
6. Europe and the Former Soviet Union	33
7. Middle East	39
8. Asia	45
9. Latin America	47
10. Africa	52
List of USIP-Supported Works Cited	57



## INTRODUCTION

Over the past twelve years, the United States Institute of Peace has given 1,065 grants to support a wide range of projects to promote better management of international conflict. While many of these grants have supported training, education, and peacemaking, a large portion have supported research and policy analysis. Directors of these projects have produced over 190 published books, 160 book manuscripts, and 290 monographs and articles. Many of these publications have made significant contributions to the field of international relations and to policy discussions relating to international conflict. Many have also gained wide public exposure.

To broaden their dissemination and to increase public awareness of these publications, the Institute periodically prepares compilations of summaries of these works. This compilation is the fifth in the series. Earlier this year the Institute published another report, *Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking*, by Anne-Marie Smith. The report extracts some of the key insights from these grant products over the past ten years.

Also prepared by Anne-Marie Smith, this volume of *Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking* provides summaries of eighty grant products, mostly books and book manuscripts, that were completed between 1995 and 1998. As indicated in the table of contents, these summaries are grouped by geographic region and by topic, including arms control, small arms proliferation, United Nations peacekeeping, and ethnic conflict.

We hope this report will expand readers' awareness of recent publications relating to the management of international conflict, as well as recognition of the range and importance of the research and policy analysis undertaken with Institute financial support.

DAVID SMOCK, DIRECTOR  
Grant Program

## I. ARMS CONTROL: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The end of the Cold War has substantially reshaped the issues of arms control. Although arms control is no longer focused primarily on the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, neither is it a Cold War anachronism. The control of weapons among all nuclear states remains important, with new attention devoted to the destruction of some nuclear weapons, disposal of nuclear materials, and prevention of smuggling. The control of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction is an increasing concern. Developing nations are raising the issue of access to militarily relevant technology. Grantees of the United States Institute of Peace have examined a number of arms control issues, identifying lessons learned from past efforts at arms control and defining the arms control challenges that will characterize a post-Cold War world.

EDWARD J. LAURANCE AND  
SARAH E. MEEK

*The Role of Conventional Arms  
Buildups in the Outbreak of Conflict:  
Developing Early Warning and  
Preventive Measures*

Monterey, Calif.: Program for Arms  
Control, Disarmament, and Conversion,  
Monterey Institute of International  
Studies, July 1996

Before reviewing material on arms control, it is interesting to consider observations made by Edward J. Laurance and Sarah E. Meek of the Monterey Institute of International Studies about arms buildups. In *The Role of Conventional Arms Buildups in the Outbreak of Conflict: Developing Early Warning and Preventive Measures*, Laurance and Meek examine the relationship between conventional arms buildups and decisions to go to war. They find that

arms buildups can result in a variety of outcomes, only some of which are negative. . . . Some [arms buildups] are benign, taking place more for domestic political or economic reasons, prestige, inter-service rivalry and a host of other demand factors not related or leading to armed conflict. Additionally, arms exports have historically served to provide a balance of forces which leads to mutual deterrence (p. 8).

The dilemma, of course, is that some arms buildups do play a major role in the outbreak, conduct, and termination of armed interstate conflict. Laurance and Meek identify an emerging international norm that the accumulation of excessive and destabilizing arms is unacceptable. The challenge for both national and international policymakers is to determine when an arms buildup is destabilizing and to develop the political will and multilateral mechanisms to prevent it from leading to conflict.

Laurance and Meek then pose the question of how the international community might organize itself to prevent wars that occur as a result of arms buildups while still recognizing the sovereign right of states to defend themselves through such buildups. They advocate a number of measures, including practicing unilateral restraint in arms exports; making foreign

assistance conditional on recipient behavior in defense spending and arms purchases; providing development credits in exchange for disarmament; and increasing the transparency of arms transfers, perhaps through a registry at the United Nations. Seeing new opportunities for arms control, Laurance and Meek suggest a variety of flexible, pragmatic, incremental measures toward the control of destabilizing arms buildups and the prevention of international conflict.

Even when there is international agreement on the need for arms control, the processes of negotiating and then verifying specific arms control agreements can be very complex. Grantees of the Institute who have participated in or analyzed such agreements offer the lessons and insights they have gained from experience.

RICHARD SPEIER

*"The Missile Technology Control  
Regime: Case Study of a Multilateral  
Negotiation"*

November 1995

In a work that will be a superb resource for anyone studying government bureaucracy as it affects arms negotiation or any other governmental task, Richard Speier tells the tale of the negotiation of the missile technology control regime in the 1980s. Speier's manuscript, "The Missile Technology Control Regime: Case Study of a Multilateral Negotiation," is a frank examination of the competition, cooperation, strategizing, and maneuvering that went on within the U.S. bureaucracy and between it and its negotiating counterparts. As a principal negotiator in the Department of Defense, Speier is well placed to provide a detailed account of the missile control regime negotiations and to reflect on their import for the negotiating process in general.

Speier's account attends to the influence of bureaucracy in the negotiation process itself, examining interagency disputes over both content and authority, noting differences in substantive concerns, negotiating style, and the handling of sensitive information. One of the sharpest contrasts Speier perceives concerns the weight of political constraints upon arms negotiations. In Speier's assessment,

The State Department view of political constraints was one that met skepticism in many quarters of the Defense Department. Political constraints are not like a brick wall that crushes you if you crash into it. Political constraints are more like bad weather, changing with time and capable of being circumvented while you travel to your destination. In fact, the physical metaphor of a "constraint" is misleading. Far from being physical limits, political constraints are instructions given to negotiators or opinions held by those negotiators. Both can be changed by sweet reason or by dealing with people other than the negotiators themselves. Of course, these two views of negotiations did not break in a simple fashion at the Potomac River divide between the two agencies (p. 45).



From the lessons he draws from his own experience, Speier offers some guidelines for future negotiations on arms control and international security. His recommendations include a clear and supportive chain of command, a no-agreement option (no agreement being preferable to one that legalizes controls that are too lax), a clear objective, rules that can be implemented effectively, skepticism about political constraints, thorough staff work to find legal and technical data (as Speier notes, "it was an easy step from controlling the data to controlling the agenda"), attention to human limitations (for example, jet lag), and careful management of publicity. Speier concludes, "A negotiation is not a set-piece process of presenting a position and receiving a reply. There are more complex sub-negotiations, with new arguments and new channels of influence appearing and disappearing. To the extent possible, these need to be watched and dealt with before they undercut your negotiating objectives" (p. 78).

GEORGE L. RUECKERT

*On-Site Inspection in Theory and Practice*

Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, Institute of World Affairs, 1997

Once negotiations, in all their complexity and delicacy, are complete and an arms control agreement enters into force, there is then the task of verifying compliance. In *On-Site Inspection in Theory and Practice*, George Rueckert of the University of Wisconsin examines comprehensive on-site inspection (OSI) regimes initiated by the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces in 1987. Subsequent agreements, such as the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, expanded further upon accepted means of verification.

Rueckert discusses the basic procedures of OSI (transportation to site, viewing restrictions, right to use inspection equipment, handling and reporting of ambiguities) and their complement in national technical means (NTM). Within the category of NTM are photographic reconnaissance satellites; aircraft-based systems (radar and optical systems); antennas for collection telemetry; and intelligence gathered by means of electronic, laser, and infrared technology. While the primary responsibilities for gathering and analyzing data through OSI and NTM fall to the Department of Defense, a number of other agencies in the executive branch also play important political and operational roles. These include the National Security Council, the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Departments of Energy and Commerce, and the intelligence services. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the oldest global multinational on-site inspection body.

While warning that cheating may always occur despite verification procedures and that comprehensive OSI regimes should not lead to a false sense of security, Rueckert notes many benefits from advanced OSI practices:

By permitting the on-site presence of trained inspectors and the use of specialized verification equipment to help verify compliance with the provisions of an agreement, they increase the chance that illegal actions will be discovered, and complicate and significantly raise the costs of cheating. They also contribute in a major way to military openness and transparency in the areas where they are applied, reducing the possibilities of misunderstanding and mistakes in interpreting military actions. In addition, the verification regimes containing OSI establish important internationally recognized norms that provide a stronger legal and political basis for a concerted response by an individual country or collectively by the international community should violations be found (p. 223).

**BRUCE D. LARKIN**

*Nuclear Designs: Great Britain, France,  
and China in the Global Governance  
of Nuclear Arms*

New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction  
Publishers, 1996

While substantial attention has been paid to arms negotiations and verifications between the superpowers, the arms control policies of other nuclear states merit careful review, particularly in the new post-Cold War context of the absence of bipolar rivalry. In *Nuclear Designs: Great Britain, France, and China in the Global Governance of Nuclear Arms*, Bruce Larkin of the University of California at Santa Cruz analyzes nuclear politics in three “minipowers”—Great Britain, France, and China. Each has invested substantial political and economic capital in developing the industrial and military capacities needed to become nuclear states. As none possess the massive conventional capabilities of the United States or Russia, nuclear weapons are proportionately more important to their sense of military security. Nuclear disengagement and disarmament can only be achieved by consent, including that of these three nations; therefore, their arms policies constitute an important backdrop to U.S. and Russian arms control measures.

Larkin considers the costs and risks of nuclear weapons, noting that simply holding them is not a cost-free practice. He discusses public health hazards; environmental harm; budgetary costs; increased risk of nuclear attack; and dangers of accidental detonation, unauthorized diversion or detonation, and unauthorized use in civil war. Larkin balances these costs and risks against threats and fears, not only fear of attack or subjugation, but also fear among politicians of exclusion from office if they take politically unviable positions on nuclear weapons.

As Larkin examines the domestic political context of Great Britain, France, and China, he finds ample support for the nuclear status quo among governments, political parties, civil society, and public opinion. On the



other hand, Larkin also notes that “[t]he need to explain national nuclear programs in a Europe of common security compels Britain and France to entertain a discussion which otherwise might not take place” (p. 250). In China, the future of nuclear programs may depend on whether there will even be a public political debate on nuclear weapons, or whether the issue will remain exclusively in the hands of the Communist leadership.

As Larkin reviews the nuclear politics of these three nations, his central question is, “If the institutional and pragmatic skills exist to design and sustain the *management* of existing nuclear weapons without unauthorized use or nuclear war—as advocates of holding nuclear weapons insist—would it be any more difficult to design and sustain a regime in which nuclear weapons were prohibited?” (pp. xv–xvi; emphasis in the original). Larkin explores the alternatives to maintaining the nuclear status quo—undertaking disengagement (which would include impediments to prompt use, withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons, and force reduction), or abolishing nuclear weapons altogether. Abolition, he suggests, might be much easier to verify than disengagement: “The ingenuity which has achieved nuclear weapons and subjected them to social organization and control can also achieve the verification reassurance required to maintain an abolition regime. . . . Moreover, an abolition regime would be profoundly simpler to sustain than a regime which permitted some nuclear weapons and prohibited others” (p. 310). Nonetheless, from his analysis of nuclear politics in Britain, France, and China, Larkin comes to the conclusion that disengagement, while lacking the virtues he sees in abolition, would be far better than continuing the nuclear status quo. Larkin writes,

Disengagement responds to the fear that the future might bring some deadly challenge to which nuclear weapons alone would be the sufficient response. Disengagement permits “hedging” but not “brandishing,” and incorporates additional multilateral safeguards against unauthorized use. A disengagement regime would satisfy some, but not all, of the intense commitment to maintaining nuclear weapons which is evident in all of the nuclear weapons states (p. 313).

**MICHAEL L. MOODIE**

*The North, the South, and Arms Control:  
A Future Fault Line?*

Alexandria, Va.: Chemical and Biological  
Arms Control Institute, 1996

Expanding the geographical focus further, Michael Moodie of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute considers arms control issues of concern to the developing world. In *The North, the South, and Arms Control: A Future Fault Line?* Moodie examines differences between developed and developing nations as to the priorities of their post–Cold War security agendas. There has long been substantial divergence on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation. Many developing

nations have objected to policies of nonproliferation as promulgated by developed industrial nations, arguing that these policies deny them the legitimate national security capabilities already possessed by the North. There are also differences regarding the value of transparency and confidence-building measures. Developed nations tend to see transparency positively, as ameliorating potential conflict by demonstrating that a state has nothing to fear from the military planning, preparations, or acquisitions of a potential adversary. To developing nations, however, transparency potentially exposes vulnerabilities. If others know just how weak they are, attack may be more likely; secrecy can serve deterrence. A third major sticking point concerns the diffusion of dual use technology. From the 1950s through the early 1970s, Moodie points out, defense research was the engine of technological development, leading to spin-offs for civilian use. Now the situation is the reverse. By denying militarily relevant technology to developing nations, the developed nations may also be depriving them of access to technology that is central to their technological, scientific, and economic development. Thus, while Moodie continues to see arms control as a valuable policy tool, he notes that its traditional dynamics are confounded not only by the end of the Cold War, but also by the substantial differences in the security agendas of developed and developing nations.

## 2. ARMS TRANSFERS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Arms transfers can take many forms, from export under the careful control of states to illicit trade. Soviet successor states are particularly challenged to develop and implement sound export control policies as they try to cope with the legacy of a vast military arsenal and associated industrial infrastructure, within a politically volatile context. A further distinct concern about this region of the world is unofficial arms transfers—that is, smuggling—particularly of nuclear materials.

IAN ANTHONY, ED.

*Russia and the Arms Trade*

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998

In *Russia and the Arms Trade*, several authors from the former Soviet Union assess policies and trends in arms transfers, with attention to economic, political, and strategic factors. Elena Denezhkina writes that during the Soviet period, “the effectiveness of defense enterprises was not judged in terms of their earning money but rather in terms of how efficiently they were able to meet deadlines and fulfill targets established by the central planning authorities. Performance was the key to future financing and development but it was not measured according to market principles” (p. 124). Indeed, the market was of little relevance to exports, which went to Soviet allies and client states. Major General Yuri Kirshin notes that during the Soviet period, political and ideological factors were of greater concern than economic factors in conventional arms transfers. Although politics and ideology were primary determinants of arms transfers, the Soviet economy also benefited from arms exports. According to Ian Anthony, these arms would have been produced anyway for Soviet security, and surpluses were then sold. Anthony notes that it is difficult to precisely assess the real value of such sales, as costs and prices were set by administrative decision in a command economy.

Following the demise of the Soviet Union, all the successor states have encountered new dilemmas in security and arms trade policies. In Russia, notes Sergey Kortunov, security and commercial interests are often in conflict, as when a weapons plant is privatized, thereby removing strategic capacity from state control. According to Kortunov, “The effort to find rules which balance the principle of a free-market economy with strict control over exports by the executive authorities is . . . new to Russia. . . . Russia has just embarked upon the path of searching for such a balance” (p. 100).

Peter Litavrin sees the need not only for a clear export control system, but also for Russian state support in promoting arms exports. He advocates one central state entity for coordinating all activities in the field of arms

exports. Kirshin seconds this proposal, noting that a state monopoly over arms exports would reduce the competitive outbidding that has resulted in manufacturers selling arms below cost. In interviews with designers and directors of weapons plants, Denezhkina often heard that while the centralized Soviet system was rigid and bureaucratic, it was certainly characterized by clear-cut laws and rules regarding relations among different levels in the overall hierarchy. The current situation, by contrast, has many chaotic elements. State decisions can be arbitrary, and there is a lack of agreement or cohesion on macroeconomic policy for the defense industry. Indeed, there is substantial contradiction between the main pieces of legislation governing this area and disputes between the Duma and the Ministries of Defense, Economy, Industry, and Finance. One immediate problem is that the government fails to pay for its orders. Some arms manufacturers then lack the resources to start production on foreign orders, or they simply shut down, causing interruptions in the supply chains for other arms manufacturers.

**GARY BERTSCH, ED.**

*Restraining the Spread of the Soviet Arsenal: NIS Nonproliferation Export Controls, Status Report*

Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia, Center for International Trade and Security, 1997

Another study, *Restraining the Spread of the Soviet Arsenal: NIS [Newly Independent States] Nonproliferation Export Controls, Status Report*, edited by Gary Bertsch of the University of Georgia, considers the arms control and trade situation in other successor states. The report identifies several elements of an export control system: licensing system, regime adherence, training, customs authority, penalties, control lists, bureaucratic process, import/export verification, and information gathering and sharing. The report then evaluates the formal export control systems of all fifteen successor states, finding Russia to have the most extensive system and Tajikistan the least. The report notes that having a proper export control system on paper does not necessarily guarantee effective implementation, and that the poorest states with the weakest export controls may also have no weapons or military materiel to export.

**RENSSELAER W. LEE III**

*Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe*

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998

A very different concern addressed by Rensselaer W. Lee III of Global Advisory Services in *Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe* is the black market in nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union. Lee argues that while all the preconditions for nuclear smuggling are present (supply, corrupt or desperate managers, and financial and logistical mechanisms), the observed reality is not as bad as media headlines would suggest. In his research, Lee found that what little nuclear material is available on the black market is

unusable, militarily inconsequential, or in his phrase, “radioactive junk for sale” (p. 15). Lee finds little evidence of involvement by organized crime, and the amateurs who are engaged in nuclear smuggling are often entrapped by police sting operations. Further, the number of criminal nuclear transactions in the West has dropped perceptibly since the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, Lee finds substantial reason for concern and proposes a number of policies the United States could pursue to strengthen the security of nuclear materials.

While organized crime in Russia has received considerable international attention, most instances of nuclear smuggling have been too poorly planned and chaotic to have been run by crime professionals. The nonweapons quality of most smuggled substances also indicates a lack of professionalism; if organized crime were involved, it would locate precisely what is needed for bomb making. Further, most pathways for smuggled material have been east to west, seeking buyers in Europe. A professionally organized smuggling system, by contrast, would probably be transporting nuclear materials or components southward and eastward, catering to aspiring nuclear states or to terrorist organizations in the Middle East and South Asia. Finally, Lee notes that there is more profit, fewer risks, and simpler technology for organized crime in banking manipulations and ruble-dollar exchanges.

The amateurs who have been involved in nuclear smuggling tend to be employees of nuclear enterprises. This sector has been downsized enormously. Its shrunken workforce has experienced not only great declines in salaries (or nonpayment for months at a time), but also a substantial loss of prestige. Employees are stealing because of economic desperation and also in anger at their loss of social status. The illegal nuclear trade that originates in nuclear complexes tends to be supply driven, as employees take advantage of their access to fissile materials, then seek buyers for their stolen goods. “As a rule,” Lee writes, “nuclear thieves commit the crime on their own authority, not in response to a specific order (*zakaz*) from an outside buyer or trader” (p. 111). In many cases, apparent buyers have ultimately been revealed to be undercover police officers or security agents engaged in sting operations. According to Lee, “police and security services largely create the black market that they are charged with suppressing” (p. 44). Behind such police provocation or entrapment, Lee sees bureaucratic and political motives, as agents try to demonstrate rapid investigative successes and thereby make a case for expansion of their powers or budgets.

Nevertheless, the principal underlying origins of the trade—collapsing economics, escalating crime and corruption, and waning central government control over the nuclear sector—remain essentially unchanged in Russia and the other countries that make up the Newly Independent



States. Conceivably, more adroit and sophisticated smugglers are operating surreptitiously in today's nuclear marketplace, managing a shadow traffic in nuclear materials and components that is far more lethal than the traffic detected by the constabularies of Central and Western Europe. Indeed, some of Lee's findings suggest that the modalities and routes of this shadow market already are established and that prospective buyers include both rogue states and more pro-Western countries that covet nuclear weapons programs.

Even without police entrapment or the involvement of professional criminals, many characteristics of the Newly Independent States dispose them to nuclear smuggling. One concern is the unsuitability of old security systems for new security challenges. "In the Soviet era," Lee writes, "nuclear-materials security focused on preventing outsiders from penetrating or spying on the nuclear complex, not on deterring knowledgeable insiders from hijacking radioactive and fissile materials from the enterprises and institutes" (p. 27). Tightly guarded frontiers and secret cities are no longer so imperative, while the poor quality of basic safety systems (fences, metal detectors, simple monitoring devices, updated inventories) has become a paramount concern. Lee therefore sees a need for much greater attention to and international assistance for the protection, accounting, and control of nuclear material. While this issue has received support in the U.S. Department of Energy and among members of the U.S. Congress, it is somewhat delicate politically, as the Russians have charged that the West is imposing its particular type of control systems, with the result that all contracts have to go to Western firms.

Beyond the specific control of materials, there is a further need to improve the economic prospects of nuclear workers and the professionalism of security and judiciary agencies in the Soviet successor states. Lee calls for such measures as comprehensive, broadly targeted, equitably distributed salary support for nuclear workers; conversion and retraining assistance; and much better U.S. cooperation with and support for law enforcement in Russia, including training for police, prosecutors, security officials, and customs officers. Lee notes that Western nations have been more inclined to offer economic help than to assist in the development of law enforcement. He attributes this fact in part to the perception that police and customs officials are prone to corruption, unlike educated white-collar scientists and managers—a baseless prejudice, in Lee's view. Overall, Lee writes, the success of any initiatives to deter and control nuclear smuggling "ultimately hinges on progress in stabilizing . . . economies [in Soviet successor states] and in developing effective governing institutions and criminal-justice systems in the new states—a process that could take years" (p. 12).

### 3. SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION

While weapons of mass destruction have long dominated international arms control efforts, there is growing awareness of the threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of small arms. Particularly once out of the control of regular armed forces, supplies of small arms can be quite destabilizing. Their ready availability can increase the likelihood of the outbreak of violent conflict, the renewal of violence in postconflict societies, and the rise in banditry and organized crime in any setting. Although there are no international instruments to control either production or trade in small arms, proliferation of these weapons is rapidly gaining international attention.

#### DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT

*Managing Arms in Peace Processes:  
Haiti • The Issues • Liberia • Nicaragua  
and El Salvador • Somalia • Training*

Geneva: United Nations Institute for  
Disarmament Research, 1996

#### DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT

*"Managing Arms in Peace Processes:  
Regional Peacekeeping in  
Southern Africa"*

1996

#### GLENN OOSTHUYSEN

*Small Arms Proliferation and Control in  
Southern Africa*

Johannesburg: South African Institute of  
International Affairs, 1996

The Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR) Project of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has produced a number of studies on this topic. The series, entitled *Managing Arms in Peace Processes*, includes a volume on the general issues and individual volumes on Somalia, Liberia, Nicaragua and El Salvador, Haiti, and training. A further volume on regional peacekeeping in Southern Africa is in manuscript form. Glenn Oosthuysen has authored *Small Arms Proliferation and Control in Southern Africa* for the South African Institute of International Affairs. While small arms proliferation is a problem in many regions of the world, the phenomenon has received particular attention in Africa, and the discussion here will refer to African cases.

## Characteristics

The category of small arms includes such weapons as pistols, rifles, assault rifles, light and medium machine guns, grenades, mortars, and mines. The profile of small arms is different from that of major weapons systems in every respect. Small arms are easy to use and require little training. They tend to be technically simple, suitable for reverse engineering and local production, and are almost devoid of obsolescence. Small arms require little maintenance, rarely break down, and are quite durable. Being small and light, they are easily concealed, transported, and smuggled. A large cache of such weapons can be broken up and individual pieces distributed and hidden. Small arms tend to change hands many times, becoming impossible to trace or register. They are widely available and also very cheap. In Uganda, an AK-47 rifle is said to equal the price of a chicken; in Angola, a bag of corn. Small arms are held and traded by a range of actors, from national armed forces to irregular militia, militant groups, ex-combatants, smugglers, criminals, and regular citizens.

International efforts at arms control have been directed at weapons of mass destruction and major weapons systems, while the proliferation and transfer of light weapons has been overlooked until recently. Why? Christopher Smith, in the DCR Project's "Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Regional Peacekeeping in Southern Africa," offers two reasons. One is that standard strategic thinking has tended to focus on the significance of concentrated firepower rather than its diffusion. Further, on a completely practical level, small arms flows have been all but impossible to map and measure. Researchers and policymakers have relatively few reliable data on production (including by small workshops), sales (legal or covert), or usage. A third reason is identified in the DCR Project's *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Training*, concerning the lack of relevance often accorded to weapons in postconflict situations by the international community:

The reasons why weapons themselves are not the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders it harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process (p. viii).

Despite this benign view, small arms can have a devastating impact on postconflict situations.

## **Sources and Flow of Small Weapons**

Oosthuysen notes that the accumulation and distribution of weapons in Southern Africa “has been fueled by various conflicts: the struggle for independence from colonial rule; Cold War superpower proxy wars; internal conflicts; full-scale civil wars; and apartheid-state-sponsored regional destabilization” (p. 38). The initial major influx of weapons was during the Cold War. At that time, as Virginia Gamba notes in her introduction to the DCR Project’s “Regional Peacekeeping in Southern Africa,” “superpower proxies on the African continent were flooded with weapons meant to defend the interests of their allies in Europe and elsewhere” (p. ix). In the 1970s, the commercialization of the international arms market increased dramatically. As the armed forces that were originally procuring the arms could neither afford nor assimilate advanced military technology, acquisitions consisted predominantly of light weapons.

A more recent factor in the proliferation of small arms comes from the aftermath of UN peacekeeping missions that have failed at disarmament (discussed in chapter 4). Once weapons are introduced into a region, they remain even after a conflict is over. They then become available for the next conflict, which is more likely to occur in part because of that availability. Oosthuysen writes the following about Southern Africa:

The years of conflict and war have transformed the region into a small arms bazaar. Many, if not most of the weapons which were used in the numerous liberation and post-independence wars in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa are no longer in the hands of the authorities. As a result there is a flourishing regional black market trade in these weapons. . . . The decades of armed conflicts have left millions of landmines, automatic rifles, firearms and ammunition, unaccounted for and in the hands of clandestine groups or individuals (p. 38).

## **Impacts of Proliferation**

The proliferation of small arms in Africa is considered both a cause and an effect of violent conflict and of weak or failed states. As their availability has expanded beyond national armed forces to various irregular militias and militant groups, small arms have served to sustain violent intrastate conflicts and increase their humanitarian costs. In the DCR Project's "Regional Peacekeeping in Southern Africa," Peter Batchelor observes that small arms proliferation "has not only prevented the successful resolution of many of the region's intrastate conflicts, but has the potential to undermine and ultimately frustrate the post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction and peace building that is so desperately needed in all the countries of Southern Africa" (p. 40).

A further peril of small arms stems from the nexus between their proliferation and rising crime. Several grantees of the United States Institute of Peace discuss crime as a threat to public security on a national scale. This is again linked to the aftermath of a peace agreement. Too often, ex-combatants are able to keep their weapons, relying on them for a new, criminal livelihood. Describing the situation of ex-combatants, Oosthuysen writes,

Feeling abandoned by their former political masters, the lure of organized crime and gangsterism, which provides its own riches, power and respect could be seen as an irresistible and natural substitute for many. Similarly, those ex-combatants who have had to wait months and even years before reporting for integration and demobilization, have long since found alternative ways of life. These factors, in the context of the wide scale availability of arms accumulated in the course of decades of militarization, have facilitated not only the rise in crime, gangsterism and violence, but continue to perpetuate it through further demand for small arms (p. 8).

In addition to direct costs and damage, pervasive crime also has hidden social opportunity costs. As Batchelor notes, "The high levels of crime and violence, which are fed by the presence of small arms, also have significant opportunity costs, in that the governments have to spend increasing amounts of public resources on the police and defense (border patrols), thereby reducing the amount of resources available for other forms of government spending, such as education and health" (p. 76).

Oosthuysen expands further upon some of the political and economic ramifications: "The proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa has both immediate and long-term developmental consequences stemming from the rising levels of violent crime, continuing political violence and instability, banditry, loss of investor confidence and capital flight. Any of which could be decisive obstacles to the consolidation of democracy and sustainable development in the region" (p. 38).



## Policy Responses

How can the international community respond to the proliferation of small arms? Standard arms control measures are not applicable. A limitation on production or export licenses works when there are only a handful of producers worldwide—as in the case of sophisticated jet fighters, for example. Such a measure cannot be applied to the innumerable small workshops using standard materials—fertilizer, bicycle frames, trucks' steering housings—to produce weapons. Control of spare parts is likewise inapplicable. Smith notes that an aging F-5 jet fighter requires “an inventory of 60,000 spare parts to remain operational, [while] an AK-47 has only sixteen moving parts” (p. 6). The widespread distribution of small arms also makes any form of recall inconceivable. Attempts at buying back the weapons have not proved effective. Oosthuysen addresses the unwillingness of both criminals and law-abiding citizens to relinquish illegal firearms:

Voluntary reward programs and amnesties have enjoyed little success. This is due to two factors: lack of opportunities for income-generation other than crime and feelings of personal insecurity. Often the rewards and opportunities afforded people who hold illegal weapons far outweigh the incentives offered for giving them up. Without the creation of opportunities for employment and advancement in the economic mainstream of a country, people will continue to seek financial reward in the illegal second economy. With this comes continued demand for the tools of the trade—small arms. Alternatively, people fearing attack from either criminals or political opponents, choose to hold on to legal weapons to defend themselves and their families (p. 108).

Any arms control techniques require domestic enforcement; however, the states where small arms proliferation is at its worst frequently lack enforcement capabilities. Regardless of the political will to implement arms control, the relevant institutions—military, police, customs—are generally ineffective. According to Oosthuysen, “Widespread corruption, lack of accountability on the part of officials, limited manpower, training and operational resources are just some of the factors which mitigate against effective controls being implemented by these states” (p. x).

A general commitment or political will to undertake small arms control also cannot be presumed. In South Africa, where implementing institutions are relatively strong in comparison with neighboring countries, many citizens reject the notion. Given high crime rates, some assert that weapons possession is their surest defense against criminals. The slogan of the South African Gunowners Association is “Rather have a gun and not need it, than need a gun and not have it.” Tightened controls on legal licensed firearms

are opposed on the grounds that it is illegal weapons that are used to commit crimes—although Oosthuysen points out that the main internal sources of illegal firearms are the theft or loss of firearms in legal possession.

Oosthuysen's policy proposals for confronting small arms proliferation cover a broad range of state, civil, and private sector measures. His suggestions include the following:

- Teach conflict resolution in schools “to reverse the decades of militaristic and revolutionary culture, instilled in youth during the apartheid and Cold War era.”
- Strengthen technical measures such as weapons detection technology.
- Improve transparency, consistency, and public participation in the arms export decision-making process.
- Tighten the granting of licenses by requiring training in firearms skills, instruction in legal rights and responsibilities, on-site inspection of weapons storage facilities, and greater control of ammunition sales.
- Improve policing of illegal firearms by hiring more police, increasing resources available to firearms investigation units, and expanding search-and-seizure operations to recover weapons.
- Reinstall metal detectors and parcel searches at shopping malls and businesses.
- Make border controls more effective by imposing a penalty against those who cross international borders illegally, inspect incoming cargo, provide resources and technology for such inspections, and formalize agreements with neighboring states regarding repatriation and extradition.

Oosthuysen acknowledges the substantial costs such measures would entail and calls for an expanded role for the private sector in implementing them. This expanded role should not, however, shift the basic responsibility for public security from the state to the private sector. “A country's security cannot and should not become privatized. In fact this responsibility is an integral part of the ‘social contract’ between state and society. If government reneges on this element of the ‘contract,’ it should not be surprised when society in turn fails to maintain its ‘contractual’ responsibilities. What hope then for small arms control?” (p. 111).

The United Nations is also seen as having a degree of responsibility for small arms control. As Virginia Gamba writes in her introduction to the DCR Project's “Regional Peacekeeping in Southern Africa,” “[I]f part of the problem of the proliferation of light weapons in Southern Africa is due to ineffective disarmament efforts during multinational peacekeeping operations, part of the solution might lie in a more effective use of regional

peacekeeping forces to ensure border controls aimed at reducing this flow” (p. x). The tasks for the United Nations include effecting arms embargoes; disarming combatants; providing cash, land, or training in exchange for weapons; and destroying and disposing of weapons. Such measures can be seen in their larger context in the assessments of UN peacekeeping missions discussed in chapter 4.

## 4. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

### DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT

#### *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues • Training*

Geneva: United Nations Institute for  
Disarmament Research, 1996

### DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT

#### *"Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Regional Peacekeeping in Southern Africa"*

1996

Peacekeeping missions of the United Nations have changed substantially since their inception in the 1940s. Early "first-generation" peacekeeping missions aimed to terminate armed conflict. Military observers would be placed between opposing armies, with their consent, pending political settlement of their dispute. Peacekeeping missions monitored truces and cease-fires and provided buffer zones while political negotiations were pursued. So-called "second-generation" peacekeeping missions, which date from the late 1980s, are far larger in scope, addressing underlying causes of conflict and aiming for a permanent peace. To the traditional military assignments are added political, economic, and social tasks, including conducting and monitoring elections, overseeing the reform of the judiciary, creating new police forces, providing humanitarian relief, repatriating refugees, reestablishing agriculture and public infrastructure, and promoting free press and independent radio stations.

This shift in UN peacekeeping has many ramifications. It raises questions of sovereignty and of UN involvement in domestic affairs. The issue of consent among all the parties also becomes central, especially as that consent may decay over the course of these extensive missions. The administration and management of complex second-generation peacekeeping missions have an important impact on the outcome of these missions. The DCR Project has studied some of the implications of second-generation peacekeeping and evaluated some peacemaking missions in its series *Managing Arms in Peace Processes*. The DCR Project's Virginia Gamba frames the project's findings within the basic distinction between first- and second-generation peacekeeping. As she notes in her introduction to *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Training*, "Before and since the Cold War, the main objective of the international community when taking action has been the maintenance and/or recovery of stability. The main difference between then and now, however, is that then, the main objective of global action was to maintain stability in the international arena, whereas now it is to stabilize domestic situations" (p. vii).

For discussion and bibliography on second-generation peacekeeping, see *Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).

## Orientation and Training

The changes in peacekeeping generate serious challenges in conceptualizing the overall peace mission and the role of the United Nations. The conduct of missions will differ substantially depending upon the orientation of mission members toward consent or the use of force. Stephen John Stedman contributes the article “Consent, Neutrality, and Impartiality in the Tower of Babel and the Frontline: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s” to the DCR volume, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*. Stedman notes a distinction between different nations’ approaches to peacekeeping. Countries with considerable pre-1989 peacekeeping experience (such as Finland, Sweden, and Norway) “maintain an approach to peacekeeping today that mostly echoes the concerns, concepts, and lessons of pre-1989. Likewise the two countries with the most idiosyncratic doctrines—the United States and France—had little pre-1989 peacekeeping experience. Nor has a lack of experience contributed to the humility of these new contributors” (p. 40). When nations participating in a peacekeeping mission are in agreement, as in the missions for El Salvador and Mozambique, the missions have been relatively successful. When participating nations have disagreed, as in missions for Somalia and Bosnia, this has contributed to their failure. As Stedman writes, “When key contributing states differ on such issues as the importance of consent, the efficacy of force, and the need for impartiality and neutrality, the result is likely to be an incoherent and ineffective peace operation” (p. 51).

Those differences are also reflected in the handling of the training of peacekeepers. The DCR Project found immense disparities in resources and training standards throughout the world. Military members of a peacekeeping force need training not only for military combat, but also to control crowds, administer humanitarian relief, validate the compliance of accords, negotiate, manage refugee flows, disarm and demobilize combatants, establish and administer the rule of law, interact with civilians, and coordinate their efforts with those of other actors. Civilian members of peacekeeping missions also require special training, although what is available is varied, generally inadequate, and involves no joint training with military personnel. The latter fact may contribute to a lack of cooperation on the field, regardless of other challenges facing peacekeeping missions.



## Disarmament

The disarmament component of UN peacekeeping missions is also receiving substantial attention. Successful disarmament has important postconflict implications—not only for the recurrence of armed conflict between militias, but also for the availability of weapons for other conflicts or for criminal activity. Nonetheless, according to the DCR Project, in many missions “the establishment of short-term peace took priority at the expense of disarmament” (p. x), notes Virginia Gamba in the introduction to “Regional Peacekeeping in Southern Africa.”

While disarmament may include many straightforward tasks—organization of cantonments, registration, collection and control of weapons, observation and reporting of compliance, and investigation into violations—it is rarely a straightforward process. The most significant element in a process of disarmament is the continued consent of the parties. Fred Tanner contributes the article “Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament” to the DCR Project. Tanner notes that while consent to disarmament may be given at the strategic level by the leaders of forces, UN peacekeepers may encounter refusal at the tactical level as they try to disarm combatants. Tanner identifies three factors that cause consent to erode. First is the security dilemma. If combatants fear that disarming will leave them vulnerable to attack, they may renege on earlier agreements. Second, economic concerns are an issue, particularly if disarmament can be used to bargain for greater concessions or compensation in the form of land, tools, or job training. A third factor is anticipated electoral loss. Those who consented to disarmament initially may go back on their agreement if they see themselves losing in postconflict elections. Coercive disarmament may be necessary where consent is withheld. Coercive disarmament is not used against aggressors, writes Tanner, “but against non-compliant forces who may act with or without hostile intent against the peacekeeping force” (p. 190). Coercive disarmament brings particular risks, especially that the peacekeeping force will become a *de facto* party to the conflict.

While Tanner explores the differences between consensual and coercive disarmament, he is also aware that the distinction is often not so clear: “A close look at the various cases of disarmament in conflict resolution indicates that it is neither conceptually nor operationally possible to establish where consensual disarmament stops and where coercive disarmament begins. There is a grey area in between” (p. 196). Further research appears to be necessary on this issue. As Tanner notes, “Extensive evaluations of U.N. peace operations have been unable to provide conclusive answers as to whether missions with coercive authority are more or less successful than operations based solely on consensual disarmament” (p. 169). Tanner

concludes that there is a place for a degree of coercion, or “compellance,” within an overall consensual framework of a peacekeeping mission: “[T]he strategy of compellance represents an alternative to passivity and consternation of peace support forces faced with the eroding consent to disarmament programs. Compellance is a show of force within the confinements of peace support missions that operate under the strategic consent of the parties. Thus, enforcement of weapons control is conceivable from the bottom-up, whereas consent must be preserved at any price from the top down” (p. 203).

Grantees have evaluated several UN peacekeeping operations in great detail. The unsuccessful missions in Somalia and the more successful missions in Mozambique and Cambodia provide lessons for future peacekeeping operations.

## Somalia

HUSSEIN M. ADAM AND RICHARD  
FORD, EDs.

*Mending Rips in the Sky: Options  
for Somali Communities in the  
21st Century*

Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997

DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT  
RESOLUTION PROJECT

*Managing Arms in Peace Processes:  
Somalia*

Geneva, United Nations Institute for  
Disarmament Research, 1996

The UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) are generally considered an unmitigated disaster. Their many goals—peacekeeping, disarmament, humanitarian relief, and political reconciliation—often worked at cross-purposes. For example, the concentration of relief workers and humanitarian aid protected those workers from attack by local armed bands and facilitated food distribution, but dislocated the population that came for food and aid and severed their connection with their land, livelihoods, and kin. Moreover, declaring General Mohamed Fara Aideed a fugitive and offering a bounty for information leading to his arrest was a signal failure. In *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, the DCR Project concludes that this action was a “painful reminder of the memories of slavery and, not surprising, [the bounty offer] bonded Somalis together to resist ‘foreign invasion’” (p. 102).

The sheer size and bureaucracy of the UNOSOM missions also generated problems. The volume *Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century*, edited by Hussein M. Adam and Richard Ford, includes a chapter by Charles Gesheker which summarizes a host of problems and the sour relations they engendered:

The U.N. was hampered by bureaucratic bickering, overt hostility toward Somalis, poor political intelligence, and misguided attempts to rehabilitate warlords into political leaders and then later by efforts to imprison them. Somalis wondered if the U.N. was an occupation force that intended to turn the country into a trusteeship run by foreign experts and young westerners. . . . As few Somalis got U.N. jobs, many charged that UNOSOM suspiciously resembled the Siyad regime by intercepting funds from abroad. Somalis around Mogadishu viewed the U.N.’s multinational bureaucracy that was backed by armed forces who fired on civilians, as the “New White Warlords,” just another faction siphoning off money. Eventually, even American military officers adopted the Somali view of the U.N. bureaucracy as a “self-licking ice cream cone” (pp. 82–83).

The UNOSOM missions failed blatantly in their main goals of establishing a central government and a system of law and order—to the detriment not only of Somalia but of the image of the United Nations in the eyes of the international community. As the DCR Project concluded in *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, “Not only was the U.N. unable to restore hope in Somalia, its scurried exit from a stateless society without an organized army . . . crushed hopes regarding the ability of the world body to meet credible threats to international peace and security” (p. 101).

MARK SHAW AND JAKKIE CILLIERS,  
EDS.

*South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa*,  
2 vols.

Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for  
Defence Policy, 1995

There were some isolated successes. Another study on peacekeeping, *South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa*, edited by Mark Shaw and Jakkie Cilliers of the Institute for Defense Policy, includes an article by Lieutenant Colonel Martin Rupiah on the experience of the Zimbabwean contingent in Somalia for the UNOSOM II mission. The contingent felt it had inadequate advance information about many aspects of its mission—everything from the availability of potable water to the diversity of religious belief in Somalia. It also found, however, that prior experience in the bush war in Rhodesia was highly relevant to the Somalia deployment. For all the failures of the mission as a whole, the Zimbabwean contingent did experience some successes, and became particularly aware of the dynamic nature of their relations with the local population. At first it was distrusted by the local community, but each small success on its part engendered greater trust on the part of the community, and the cooperation thereby gained (such as information on bandits, ambushes, and mines) became very helpful in its next stage of action.

An account of one particular aspect of the operations of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) reveals the difficult relations among different national contingents within any UN mission, as well as between any contingent and the local population. In Rupiah's account,

Children in the area where the ZNA operated followed UNITAF [Unified Task Force, a UN-empowered, U.S.-led multinational force] patrols begging for food and snacks that were usually part of the ration packs of First World forces. However, for the ZNA, surviving on a workman's "rat-pack," these luxuries were absent. When the children failed to procure any "goodies," they became aggressive, throwing stones and harassing the patrols continually. In exasperation, it was suggested that the establishment of a school might get the children off the streets and stop them from pestering the patrols. When this idea was broached with trepidation to the Elders Committee, the commanders were pleasantly surprised at the enthusiasm of parents who proceeded to implement the idea with a minimum of delay, much to the relief of the soldiers (1: p. 116).

This incident suggests the resentments that may be latent between differently endowed national contingents. It also underscores the importance of good relations and cooperation with the local population. In this instance, the ZNA's activities were hindered not by committed armed combatants rejecting a peace plan but by children throwing stones. The account also draws attention to how little public infrastructure UN troops can expect to encounter when deployed into a situation of conflict—not only roads and bridges, but even schools may be lacking. Regardless of superb efforts at management of complex second-generation peacekeeping missions, such obstacles can continue to obstruct success.

## Mozambique

The UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique, ONUMOZ, is credited with much greater success. That success was built in part on the failure of the UN peacekeeping mission in Angola, where fighting was resuming even as the mission for Mozambique was being planned. In part, it would appear, no amount of planning or coordination would have led to peace in Angola. The parties to the conflict there were both committed to and capable of continuing the violence. Nonetheless, the scale of the fiasco was a sharp defeat for the United Nations and had a direct effect on its subsequent engagements.

RICHARD SYNGE

*Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992–1994*

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997

In *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992–94*, Richard Syngé considers the impact of the experience in Angola on the mission for Mozambique. According to Syngé, the failure of UN peacekeeping in Angola persuaded the UN Security Council of the need for a much more substantial and comprehensive mission in Mozambique. Following “the catastrophic aftermath of the Angolan elections . . . [the international community] could ill afford a further conflagration in Southern Africa,” notes Syngé. “The Angola precedent fed directly into planning for Mozambique” (p. 30). The ONUMOZ mission was therefore a much larger undertaking than earlier efforts in Angola.

ONUMOZ was successful in many respects, including stopping the parties from returning to conflict, organizing elections, reestablishing a democratic political structure, and resettling refugees and displaced populations. The mission’s achievement in demobilization was particularly notable, but here credit goes also to the war-weary nation and to the parties to the conflict, whose ranks were ready to stop the conflict. Indeed, when demobilization met with logistical or political obstacles, it was often the combatants themselves who insisted on its continuation. They staged protests, mutinies, and riots, demanding immediate demobilization whenever this process stalled. Syngé gives considerable credit to the actions of soldiers from both sides of the civil war, “whose desire to rejoin civilian life was the most effective limitation on the parties’ chance of returning to war” (p. 112)

Despite its overall success, however, the UN mission in Mozambique did suffer some shortcomings. One of the greatest was the failure to undertake effective disarmament. Syngé notes that “The collection of weapons clearly had a lower priority than other aspects of the peace process, and

ONUMOZ units were given neither the responsibility nor the means to oversee comprehensive disarmament until demobilization was drawing to a close” (p. 109). This failure in disarmament had implications not only for Mozambique but for its neighbors as well. “ONUMOZ clearly missed the opportunity to reduce the millions of weapons at large in Mozambican society,” writes Synge. “Crime levels in Mozambique continued to be disturbing after ONUMOZ departed. The easy availability of AK-47 type weapons fueled a flourishing cross-border trade in South Africa and other countries, with an impact upon security and stability throughout the region” (p. 112).

The immense size of ONUMOZ contributed to its important achievements—but also ultimately to its failings. The disparity in resources between the well-endowed peacekeeping mission and the nation of Mozambique generated resentment. While Mozambique could not tax ONUMOZ, it did refuse all exemptions requested for nongovernmental organization imports of medicine, seed, tools, vehicles, and computers. Synge also argues that the scale of ONUMOZ may have had a detrimental effect on Mozambique’s capacity to manage its own problems and long-term development needs. Determined to prevent another failure like that experienced in Angola, the UN had crafted a mission that was as far-reaching and comprehensive as possible and that therefore “tended to be invasive and destabilizing to, rather than creative and supportive of, the shaky structures of the Mozambican state and society” (p. 145). Synge notes that from December 1993 to December 1994, ONUMOZ and the international community “effectively displaced the normal functions of government. The short-term priorities of that period diverted attention from Mozambique’s longer-term requirements for social and economic reconstruction and ironically—and perhaps inadvertently—derailed the government’s own efforts to reform and restructure the state and economy. The undermining of the already weak authority of the state spurred corruption and further weakened the capacities of state agencies” (p. 149).

In Synge’s assessment, by the end of the peacekeeping mission Mozambique “had increased rather than shaken off its dependence on international financial and humanitarian assistance, and the voices of ordinary Mozambicans were in danger of being drowned out by the agendas of international development agencies” (p. 165).

From his assessment of many discrete components of ONUMOZ, Synge is left with a few fundamental questions on the need for and impact of such a large peacekeeping mission:

One of the most persistently difficult questions to answer relates to the actual need for an operation of the ambitious size, scope, and expense of ONUMOZ, which cost at least \$700 million, to resolve the political, military, and humanitarian problems of a poor country with a national gross domestic product of only \$1.5 billion. . . . By the time it was withdrawn, ONUMOZ had come to be seen by many as a sledgehammer employed to crack a relatively small nut, and its disengagement was broadly accepted and welcomed by both its paymasters and its beneficiaries (p. 12).



## Cambodia

INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDIES  
OF SINGAPORE AND THE UNITED  
NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR  
TRAINING AND RESEARCH

*The United Nations Transitional  
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC):  
Debriefing and Lessons*

London: Kluwer Law International, 1995

DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT  
RESOLUTION PROJECT

*Managing Arms in Peace Processes:  
Training*

Geneva: United Nations Institute for  
Disarmament Research, 1996

The United Nations has been involved in peacekeeping operations in many regions of the world. While it can be hard to draw lessons across different types of conflict in different geopolitical contexts, there is always a concerted effort by the UN to evaluate the experiences and assess the impact of its missions. An international conference held in Singapore in 1994 was organized by the Institute of Policy Studies and the UN Institute for Training and Research to identify lessons gained through the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) peacekeeping mission. Conference papers addressed a variety of issues, including the Paris Agreement peace accord, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) role in the peace process, UNTAC's military component, refugee repatriation, civilian police operation, protection and promotion of human rights, election monitoring, legal perspectives, and the information/education program. The conference papers and recommendations are contained in the volume *The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): Debriefing and Lessons*. The lessons deemed applicable in any peacekeeping situation include the need for (pp. 45–53):

- a sound peace plan, conceptually sound and appropriately detailed;
- early deployment of staff and resources to maintain and build confidence among the parties to the agreement;
- clear and achievable operational goals;
- streamlined administrative and budgetary procedures;
- improved financing and logistical efficiency of peacekeeping operations;
- ongoing support from the parties to the conflict; and
- highly qualified and appropriately trained personnel.

For all efforts to learn the general lessons, there will always be a need to pay attention to the particular. The UN's DCR Project, while seeking general lessons, also observes that "it is understood that all UN peace operations are unique in nature, environment, modus operandi and other characteristics. Consequently, the lessons learned in one particular operation are not fully transferable to another mission. In late 1989, Mr. Cedric Thornberry, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, stated to a visiting Australian General that 'we would not even apply the Namibia blueprint to Namibia today, let alone to Cambodia'" (p. 32).

Perhaps the last word goes to the compilers of *UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons* when they note, "the use of preventive measures still remains the most pertinent tool at the disposal of the United Nations, and should continue to be applied even throughout a peace-keeping mission" (p. 45).

## 5. ETHNIC CONFLICT

To study ethnicity, at this time, is to study ethnic conflict, although a current debate over ethnicity turns on that very question: whether the basic source of ethnic conflict is primordial hatreds inherent in the possession of any ethnic identity; or according to an instrumentalist view, whether elites are "ethnic entrepreneurs" who mobilize people around their ethnic differences to serve the elites' own ends. A third perspective, that ethnicity may be one of a number of potentially positive factors in politics, has also emerged. But at present, the study of ethnicity is the study of ethnic conflict, trends in such conflict, and the responses to and means of resolving such conflict.

For discussion of these three views and bibliography, see *Advances in Understanding International Peacekeeping* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).

### MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP

#### *World Directory of Minorities*

London: Minority Rights Group  
International, 1997

The *World Directory of Minorities*, produced by the London-based Minority Rights Group, provides a comprehensive resource for such study. It is intended for use by policymakers, the media, educators, refugee agencies, human rights organizations, and the United Nations. The volume contains profiles and information on the contemporary situation of minority groups worldwide, with entries covering over 200 states and independent territories. Each profile provides a general description of the country accompanied by information on languages spoken, religions practiced, population statistics, gross national product, and UN Human Development Index ranking. This is followed by a description of each minority group within the country, including its history, socioeconomic indicators, and political and legal standing. Each entry also provides a selected bibliography and lists minority-based and advocacy organizations with contact information. An essay by Patrick Thornberry discusses current legal standards on minority rights. Basic documents and key international instruments on minorities and indigenous peoples are provided in an appendix.

K. N. O. DHARMADASA, ED.

*National Language Policy in Sri Lanka*

ICES Occasional Papers, no. 6. Kandy,  
Sri Lanka: International Centre for  
Ethnic Studies, 1996.

At the opposite end of the continuum from this comprehensive volume of worldwide scope, is a series of articles produced under the auspices of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES) in Sri Lanka. While their focus is quite precise, addressing language policy in South Asia and particularly Sri Lanka, they nonetheless offer observations of wider import. In *National Language Policy in Sri Lanka*, K. N. O. Dharmadasa discusses language as a crucial feature of ethnic identity and a salient factor in intergroup conflict. Language becomes politically relevant in certain spheres of action. "Among the gamut of functions of language in society," Dharmadasa writes, "the crucial ones generally regarded as justifying state policy decisions are administration, justice, and education. Other functional areas such as hearth and home, friendship, religion, mass media and the like are generally not regulated by the state" (p. 7). Official language policy in the areas of public administration, courts, legislation, and education have been part of the ethnic turbulence in South Asia in recent decades.

TED ROBERT GURR

*"People versus States: Ethnopolitical  
Conflict and Accommodation at the End  
of the 20th Century"*

1997

Ted Robert Gurr assesses the trends in ethnic conflicts and their settlement, carefully analyzing worldwide statistical data on politically active ethnic groups in the last few decades. His conclusions may come as a surprise. Gurr's "People versus States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and Accommodation at the End of the 20th Century" follows upon his earlier study *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993). In the latter volume Gurr argues that the perceived recent upsurge in ethnic violence is conventionally but often erroneously attributed to the end of the Cold War. Examining data from 1945 to 1989, Gurr reports that the rise in ethnic conflict actually began shortly after World War II and was the result of factors such as group discrimination, expansion of state power at the expense of national and indigenous minorities, and communal rivalries in postcolonial states.

In his most recent manuscript, Gurr examines data from 1945 to 1997. The analysis confirms a gradual long-term increase in ethnic violence from the 1940s to the 1970s, followed by a sharp escalation in the 1980s. Ethnopolitical protest, rebellion, and intercommunal conflict then reach their global peak in the early 1990s, followed by a gradual decline. To Gurr, the data suggest that a sea change in ethnic conflict is under way, with significant declines in most world regions (ch. 1).

Gurr tentatively attributes these changes to several factors, including an increase in civil and international capacities for managing ethnic conflict.

He sees an emergent regime of “managed ethnic heterogeneity” consisting of “a widely accepted set of principles about intergroup relations, a repertoire of strategies for institutionalizing the principles, and agreement on civil and international policies for responding to ethnic crises and conflict” (ch. 5). At a time when to discuss ethnicity is to discuss ethnic conflict, Gurr sees the possibility of a different future, although it will be challenged by persistent ethnic wars in parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Gurr writes, “The upsurge in ethnopolitical conflict in the late 1980s and early 1990s prompted many creative efforts to contain conflict. The irony is that most observers have been so preoccupied with the dynamics of escalating conflict that they have overlooked the countervailing tendency to find solutions” (ch. 7). Whether the trend toward accommodation continues, he cautions, depends on the sustained engagement of regional and international organizations.

#### MICHLA POMERANCE

*The United States and the World Court  
as a “Supreme Court of the Nations”:  
Dreams, Illusions, and Disillusions*

The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,  
1996

One area in which some have sought solutions is through international adjudication. In *The United States and the World Court as a “Supreme Court of the Nations”*: *Dreams, Illusions, and Disillusions*, Michla Pomerance assesses prospects for resolution of problems such as ethnic conflict through the adjudication of an international court. She faults early advocates of such a court for failing to distinguish between the judicial function of adjudicating disputes and that of law development. Pomerance summarizes their errors this way:

In their anxiety to reach the promised land of a world ruled by law rather than by the sword, these early enthusiasts largely failed to absorb the lessons of America’s own Civil War: that the justiciability of interstate disputes was premised on the previous forswearing of interstate aggression and on a firm consensus sustaining the prevailing constitutional arrangements; and that, while the Supreme Court might build upon, and further extend, an already existing sense of unity, it was powerless to create it or to prevent its dissolution by formidable centrifugal political forces. Only in ordinary times were “political” interstate disputes transformed into “routine litigation”; in extraordinary times, even “routine litigation” could be transformed into highly charged “political” disputes (p. 396).

Having oversold the idea of an international court as an alternative to war, early advocates reaped public disappointment and disillusionment. In Pomerance’s view, the World Court has become less contentious only because it receives relatively little attention. And this fact, writes Pomerance, may be to its benefit: “Perhaps the issue’s very non-salience today affords the luxury of the kind of dispassionate reflection on the past which

can make present discussions more meaningful and the resultant decisions more sagacious” (p. 3).

PAYAM AKHAVAN

*“Justice in the Hague, Peace in the  
Former Yugoslavia? An Essay on the  
United Nations War Crimes Tribunal”*

1997

**P**ayam Akhavan produces a quite passionate reflection on international adjudication that is no less sagacious in “Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? An Essay on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal.” Akhavan’s analysis of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established by the UN Security Council in 1993, addresses the utility of such courts, the social functions of criminal justice, the relationship between punishment and deterrence, the assignment of individual and collective responsibility, and the possibility of forging a “shared truth” across ethnic enmities. Akhavan sees the purpose of the ICTY as helping to transform what he describes as “an international culture of impunity for the political elite.”

In Akhavan’s account, deterrence is directed not so much at the individual offender as to society at large. This view is especially relevant in the wake of mass violence, when bringing every perpetrator to justice may not be possible—but may also not be necessary to achieve deterrence. According to Akhavan, criminal law conveys not only factual information about punishments risked, but also information about any society’s morally acceptable behavior. Punishment of an individual offender then becomes a means of expressing society’s reprobation. A successful legal system conveys this reprobation and inculcates its laws so thoroughly that it creates “unconscious inhibitions” against committing a crime and generates “habitual lawfulness.” The most effective legal system, then, is not that which punishes the most offenders, but that which has few offenders to punish because the laws have deterred their offenses. Quoting other legal scholars, Akhavan recalls that much of law “is a codification of existing mores . . . [which] reflects, rather than imposes, existing order” (p. 10).

Akhavan applies this idea to the extensive discussion concerning the large role of political elites in Yugoslavia who politicized and manipulated ethnic identities. These elites, he argues, are the immediate but not the ultimate targets of the ICTY. Specific punishment of them works toward the larger goal of establishing effective general deterrence by inculcating a culture of habitual lawfulness “such that persecutions and atrocities do not present themselves as a real alternative to peaceful multiethnic coexistence” (p. 9). From this different understanding of law, Akhavan’s reply to Pomerance would be that the ICTY and other tribunals like it are not powerless before the status quo. Rather than being dependent on preexisting consensus, they can contribute to forging or transforming that consensus:

An effective ICTY would become a decisive message of social disapproval in cynical elite circles and the world community opinion at large, that massive human rights violations will not be tolerated. Over time, as a culture of deterrence takes hold, the "political reality" will be that punishment awaits those who foment ethnic hatred and genocide. In the long run, it is such "lofty" moral ideals that will establish the foundation for lasting international peace and security (p. 98).

Akhavan is not sanguine about the achievement of this effect. Making a legal decision is not equivalent to creating habitual lawfulness. To have this effect, the ICTY's proceedings and decisions must be widely distributed and broadcast. Just as the media, via misinformation and propaganda, were crucial to the elites' politicization of ethnicity and their campaign of inter-ethnic violence, so too will the media be pivotal in making the ICTY's finding part of public discourse. It is in this regard that Akhavan sees the ICTY's limitations. Information about ICTY proceedings is not readily accessible. The state monopoly of the media continues. Information sometimes appears in independent newspapers, but they have very small circulations. The Open Society Fund has provided satellite coverage of some of the proceedings—but this coverage is available only to those wealthy enough to own a satellite dish and also able to digest the "raw material" of simultaneously translated court proceedings from a different criminal trial system.

While other commentators doubt that the ICTY can have any practical value, Akhavan is convinced of its utility, while recognizing the obstacles in its way. He calls on the international community to commit resources to disseminating the ICTY proceedings, as well as to arresting those who have been indicted. Even with its current limitations, however, Akhavan sees the ICTY as an important step in transforming an international culture that has permitted elites to get away with mass murder:

The ICTY is a phenomenal development by the sorry standards of State practice in international law. Idi Amin, Mengitsu, Pol Pot, Sadaam Hussein, and a litany of other mass-murderers living without fear of punishment underscore the tragic culture of impunity which has prevailed in the international arena for so long. . . . In addition to its mandate with respect to the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY is potentially a significant contribution to the development of international order (p. 11).



## 6. EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Countries in the entire region are undergoing change as they explore the possibilities contained within greater integration, recent independence, and altered strategic relationships. Countries are searching for new international instruments to intervene in conflict and punish its perpetrators. Long-standing political forces are re-creating themselves, and old elites are learning new strategies as they try to stay on top of changing societies. Grantees of the Institute consider these many trends, examining parallels with earlier periods, identifying lacunae in policy analysis, and defining likely future trajectories.

With the end of the Cold War and the 1990 reunification of East and West Germany, many expected substantial changes in German security policy. In Germany's external environment, the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc and of the Soviet Union itself eliminated many of the security threats Germany had faced for years. Internally, despite its initial costs, reunification was seen as augmenting Germany's already substantial powers. From a realist perspective, Germany's security policy was predicted to become far more aggressive and assertive. The realist approach, which has dominated the study of security affairs, attributes great significance to a state's position within the international system and to its relative power. States are seen as rational unitary actors attempting to maximize their security and selecting among policy choices on the basis of cost-benefit calculations. A realist approach accords little significance to either international institutions or domestic factors in determining a state's security policy.

JOHN S. DUFFIELD

*World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*

Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998

In *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*, John Duffield challenges both the theoretical approach and the policy predictions of realism. He suggests that international institutions and domestic political culture deserve much greater weight in the analysis of security policy formation.

International institutions, including international organizations, laws, treaties, and regimes, can constrain state behavior and provide opportunities to address security concerns. The "dense network of European security institutions in which Germany has been enmeshed," writes Duffield, provided ample multilateral forums and resources for responding to any security issues (p. 5).

Political culture has cognitive, evaluative, and affective components; is a property of collectivities rather than individuals; and is highly stable. It is likely to have the greatest impact on policy formation at times when



the international setting is ambiguous and complex—as is Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War. According to Duffield, the content of Germany's political culture is characterized by antimilitarism (seeing the use of force as ineffective, disadvantageous, or counterproductive) and multilateralism (strong international institutions being a goal as well as an instrument of security policy). For policymaking, the political culture as manifested in the attitudes of elites is most relevant. Duffield explains that reunification did not substantially alter German political culture because East Germans constitute only 20 percent of the population and their role in forming security policy is disproportionately smaller.

With attention to the role of international institutions and political culture, Duffield identifies external and domestic sources of German security policy and examines partisan positions, court decisions, and political debate on such issues as the size and mission of the armed forces, their deployment out of area, and international recognition of constituent parts of the Yugoslav federations. Probably the most controversial of Germany's recent security decisions was its advocacy of international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 despite strong opposition from the European Community, the United States, the United Nations secretary general, and peace envoys in Yugoslavia. Contrary to how this policy decision is commonly portrayed, Duffield sees evidence of great restraint, reticence, and continuity on Germany's part. He argues that German leaders made an extensive effort to work within the European Community and other international bodies to resolve the situation and that it was "only in this context of unsuccessful efforts to find a solution through multilateral institutions that the option of recognition began to look increasingly attractive, and even imperative" (p. 188). Germany had come to the conclusion that only international recognition could deter further attacks on the breakaway republics by the Yugoslav army, that failure to extend recognition would suggest that the Serbs could change borders by brute force and thus encourage further violence, and that it was morally bankrupt to deny self-determination to the Balkan republics when Germany had so recently championed East Germans' exercise of that right. Thus, despite common depictions of German policy during the episode, Duffield finds evidence of committed multilateralism and antimilitarism in this policy decision. According to Duffield, German security policy will continue to be characterized by continuity and moderation, as would be predicted from Germany's involvement in international institutions and the content of its political culture.

On the prominent role of domestic factors in the formation of security policy, see also Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).

JEAN-FRANÇOIS BERGER

*The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the  
ICRC and the Conflict in Croatia  
(1991–1992)*

Geneva: International Committee of the  
Red Cross, 1995

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is less interested in theoretical approaches to security policy than in their immediate outcomes. In *The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC and the Conflict in Croatia (1991–1992)*, Jean-François Berger attends to issues of international law as they directly affect the possibility of providing emergency aid in humanitarian crises. The Geneva Convention, for example, is understood to apply in situations of war between nations but not to internal conflicts. In the early 1990s, the Yugoslav federal government considered the violence in the Balkans an internal matter, while Croatia deemed it an international conflict. “These positions,” Berger notes, “did not leave much room for compromise” (p. 25). Nonetheless, in meetings convened by the ICRC in Geneva in 1991, representatives from the Yugoslav conflict managed to come to enough of an agreement to permit humanitarian assistance. Berger writes that the agreement reflected

a willingness to solve humanitarian problems which took priority over political considerations such as the legitimacy of the parties represented. In this respect, it should be noted that the final clause of the agreement stipulates: “The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict.” . . . This breakthrough meant that in actual fact the parties were negotiating on equal terms on a tacit basis of recognition of belligerence (p. 27).

In the larger context, agreements of any sort regarding the conflict in Yugoslavia were and continue to be very difficult to reach. Berger speculates on why this is so:

Is it because Europe complacently regarded itself as a continent safe from war since Yalta that attempts at preventive action in Yugoslavia were so insignificant in the early days and became increasingly confused as time went on? The truth is that the outbreak of war on the south-eastern flank of the continent was something so incongruous that it caught political entities and public opinion unawares; in fact, it was not so much the outbreak of the conflict that was surprising, but rather its hyper-nationalistic and manifestly anachronistic nature. The Westerners who were called upon to deal with the political and humanitarian effects of the Yugoslav conflict at its outset felt something new and strange, a certain perplexity and unease, since every one of them realized that war was being waged not somewhere else but quite close to home. . . . At the diplomatic and

**IRENE LYONS MURPHY**

*The Danube: A River Basin in Transition*

Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997

humanitarian level, this impression of ambiguous closeness necessitated a period of adjustment which delayed an effective response commensurate with the real needs (p. 47).

**I**t has been possible, to a degree, to arrange for humanitarian aid within the Yugoslav crisis. Irene Lyons Murphy also notes that there has been international cooperation on transboundary natural resource problems in the same region. In *The Danube: A River Basin in Transition*, Murphy points out that during the entire period of violent conflict in the Balkans, the eleven countries in the basin of the Danube River have been collaborating to establish a framework for its management. Like other international river basins (the Nile and Senegal in Africa, the Mekong in Asia, and the De La Plata in South America), the Danube region needs international instruments to handle collective decisions of riparian countries on such issues as navigation, pollution, and dams. The Danube Convention commits its signators to monitoring and sharing information on their natural resources, creating an accident and early warning system, and establishing a network of facilities in each country to monitor water quality. Murphy observes that

It would be safe to wager a substantial sum of money that the carnage initiated by Serbia in post-Cold War Yugoslavia and its potential dangers for eastern Europe will generate considerably more commentary than the valiant, underfunded, necessary struggle to contain pollution in the Danube Basin that was waged at the same time. Workshop meetings to discuss new legislative standards, improved monitoring, and investments for waste treatment plants were held close to war zones. . . . Firmly entrenched, the agreement to protect the vital resources of the Danube and to guarantee their equitable use across borders could improve the health and well-being of a now endangered population, and at the same time demonstrate the viability of peaceful settlement of regional conflicts (p. 8).

**RICHARD ROSE**

*What Is Europe? A Dynamic Perspective*

New York: HarperCollins, 1996

**I**n *What Is Europe? A Dynamic Perspective*, Richard Rose considers the very slow process of change in Europe. "The fall of the Iron Curtain," Rose writes, "removed an artificial barrier between countries of Europe, but it will take many years to remove the legacy of differences. A continent as full of history as Europe cannot be transformed overnight" (p. 17). With use of a wide array of data on party membership, tax revenue, and car ownership in addition to results from surveys and elections, Rose analyzes current trends in political mobilization, social welfare, and economic integration in Europe. While Rose identifies democracy as a "defining

characteristic" of Europe today, he notes that there is still much to achieve to institutionalize this system of governance. In particular, Rose analyzes the quality of party membership in the context of post-Soviet politics. He claims that communist nations socialized citizens into distrust of governing institutions and that the trust between voter and party that is central to representative democracies will take time to develop. While the free elections conducted in Europe are valid, trusted political parties are the "missing middle" that should link voters to governments. In Rose's view, "People socialized in a party-state are unlikely to trust parties or identify with parties, and their votes will not be an expression of positive commitment. . . . The consequence is a 'floating party system' in which there is a great deal of instability in the names of parties and uncertainty about how those elected can and do represent the views of those who have voted for them" (p. 135).

JOAN BARTH URBAN AND  
VALERII D. SOLOVEI

*Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*  
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997

Parties are also in flux in Russia. Joan Barth Urban and Valerii D. Solovei analyze the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) in *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*. Urban and Solovei undertake their study despite a generally held false presumption that the Communist Party would lose all significance with the fall of the Soviet Union. "If it was commonly thought before *perestroika* that the Soviet order could never really change, it was just as frequently assumed after 1991 that communism in Russia was somehow dead and gone forever" (p. 4). The CPRF is not dead, but its identity and future are not clear. Urban and Solovei discuss the choice that must be made between two incompatible components of the CPRF. One is the conservative socially oriented nationalism identified with Gennadii Ziuganov and rural voters who champion the power and glory of Great Russia and the Orthodox Church. The other is the Marxist-Leninist reformism of communists turned social democrats, advocating closer integration with Europe and following the path of East-Central European nations. Urban and Solovei conclude that the two cannot "coexist in the same organizational home" (p. 192).

MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT

"The Emergence of Kazakstan"  
1997

Kazakstan also appears to be at a crossroads, according to Martha Brill Olcott's "The Emergence of Kazakstan." Olcott notes that Kazakstan's independence was not the outcome of its own political struggle, but rather a condition bestowed upon it by a gathering of Soviet republic leaders. Since then it has been struggling to solidify its political identity and economic system. Olcott points out that Kazakstan began

independence with a fairly diverse economy, development of both manufacturing and agricultural sectors, and a wealth of natural resources. It was considered to be another potential Asian Tiger. Mismanagement and graft are dimming that prospect. Economic growth is proceeding much more slowly than anticipated, assets are being privatized to pay existing debts, and wealth is rapidly becoming concentrated. Politically there is substantial continuity with the Soviet period. "For the most part," Olcott notes, "the only real transfer of power which has occurred in the republic since independence is the assumption by the Soviet-era Kazak elite of the privileges which used to be enjoyed by Moscow's Russian appointees" (ch. 6, p. 9). Nepotism and corruption are widespread. Despite early promise, the future of Kazakstan could be quite bleak. Geopolitical factors will also affect Kazakstan's direction. Olcott draws a possible scenario as follows:

Clasping the spent wealth of the past to themselves, and having no promise of future wealth to hold out to the many poor, the elite could be forced to seek the support of regional protectors, thus turning Kazakstan into a vassal state. The "master" of first choice would be Russia, but if Russia itself is too weak or, less likely, has become too democratic, then Kazakstan's elite would feel pressed to seek the protection even of China, since the alternative would be loss of their own position (ch. 8, p. 18).

## 7. MIDDLE EAST

PAUL SALEM, ED.

*Conflict Resolution in the Arab World:  
Selected Essays*

Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1997

While world attention is often focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict, other conflicts have also taken their toll on peoples throughout the Middle East. Grantees of the United States Institute of Peace writing on the Middle East examine aspects of inter-Arab conflicts and prospects for their resolution, attending to political, cultural, religious, institutional, and diplomatic factors. The ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and the development and evolution of the Palestinian Liberation Organization are also explored. Many grantees define trajectories of conflict into the future; others take advantage of historical hindsight to reexamine past conflicts.

*Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays*, edited by Paul Salem, brings together a number of different views on prospects for conflict resolution. Salem provides an essay critiquing Western methods of conflict resolution from an Arab perspective, pointing out certain underlying assumptions or biases in the Western theories and techniques. He begins by positing peace as a debatable virtue. While a Christian worldview denigrates war and exalts peace over sociopolitical justice or obedience to a strict moral code, peace is not so compelling from an ancient Greek, Babylonian, Roman, Jewish, or Islamic worldview. From a non-Western perspective, war is not inherently shameful, and struggle may be purifying, invigorating, and progressive. Salem also discusses the Western emphasis on the suffering that conflict causes. He traces this emphasis to utilitarianism and the “comfort culture” of the twentieth century: In the West, pain is bad and pleasure (comfort) is good. Elsewhere, good is good and bad is bad, as defined in moral or religious terms with no reference to pleasure or pain. Western notions that pain is isolatable and can be eliminated also may not travel across cultural borders. Salem suggests that in many parts of the world comfort is the aberration, while discomfort and suffering are viewed as the norm. The suffering caused by conflict, then, does not necessarily demand resolution. Achieving justice, maintaining honor, or protecting patrimony may be a much higher priority than eliminating suffering.

Salem also offers insights into the reception of Western conflict-resolution techniques, which also contain certain cultural biases. Western approaches may encourage openness, personalization, and role-playing to appreciate the other party as individuals rather than opponents, and only then to move from that threshold into negotiation. In other cultures, this may be a very disorienting experience, counterproductive to negotiations customarily conducted with ceremony and formal roles. Westerners also tend to be quite acculturated to rule-following: stopping at red lights even



at midnight, carrying a driver's license, paying taxes. In such a context, accepting freshly devised rules for the conduct of negotiation appears reasonable. Elsewhere, new rules may be seen as illegitimate or as an imposition of inappropriate authority; "but we all just agreed" is a legitimating statement only within a historical tradition of contract making. Western conflict-resolution techniques are also generated within the philosophical tradition of Lockean liberalism (directed to protecting what one has—life, liberty, and private property). In negotiations among "haves," all parties to a conflict are presumed to have something to lose, something to preserve, and something to gain. "Negotiating with real have-nots, who have nothing to lose, nothing to preserve, and everything to gain," Salem tells us, "might be quite different" (p. 22).

Another contribution to this volume is Faud Khuri's "The Ascent to Top Office in Arab-Islamic Culture: A Challenge to Democracy." Khuri searches for an explanation of why democracy is not taking root in the Arab world. His answer is the lack of a politically engaged public capable of holding rulers accountable through such methods as open political platforms, free press, free elections of parliaments, and freedom to protest. According to Khuri, Arab socialization patterns inhibit the rise of such a public. In endogamous Arab culture, relationships are turned inward, all socialization is via the family, and secondary professional or political associations are less important. These characteristics of Arab culture, coupled with deliberate state policies to suppress media, political parties, unions, and mass protests, converge in a vicious circle. Without institutions such as these, a politically conscious public will not develop in the Arab world; and without that public, it will be difficult to establish such institutions.

A third contribution in this collection of twenty essays is E. Gregory Gause's "Sovereignty and Its Challengers: War in Middle Eastern Inter-State Politics." In Gause's view, "the generally high level of regional interstate warfare in the post-1945 Middle East stems from the weakness of existing state entities and the strength of transformational challenges to those entities" (p. 197). Unlike European states, which went through a very lengthy period of state formation, Arab states had their sovereignty granted to them by departing Western colonial powers. While the international recognition of sovereignty theoretically assumes a central power capable of exercising domestic control, many Arab states have never been able to assert their dominion over the territories and peoples within their borders. These weak states are then confronted by Pan-Arabism. The agenda of Arab politics, writes Gause,

has been dominated not so much by separatist movements or border disputes . . . but by ideological programs that have advocated the



amalgamation of exiting states into a larger entity. . . . The rejection of the colonial legacy has been based not on the fact that the colonialists got the borders wrong, but that the very idea of borders in this part of the world is illegitimate. Attractive transnational ideologies, based upon Pan-Arabism and Islam, promoted visions of a coherent and powerful Arab (and/or Muslim) entity able to confront the threats posed by the West and by Zionism (p. 203).

While Gause clarifies that Pan-Arabism and Islam are not the only authentic political manifestations of Arab culture, these political programs do “resonate with large sectors of Arab politics” and also “claim a cultural legitimacy based upon their own interpretations of Islamic and Arab history and heritage” (p. 198).

On inter-Arab relations and postconflict reconciliation, see also Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, *Iran–Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), and George Emile Irani, ed., *Reconciliation Processes and the Displaced Communities in Post-War Lebanon* (Beirut: Lebanese American University, 1997).

#### MARK N. KATZ

*Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves*  
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997

Mark N. Katz focuses attention on challenges to states coming from Islamic movements. In *Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves*, Katz develops a framework for examining the spread of revolutions through invasion or emulation (“affiliate revolutions”). He also discerns patterns in the demise of revolutions, including economic failure, military stalemate with states outside the “revolutionary wave,” rivalry within the wave, and general loss of faith in the revolutionary ideology. Katz suggests that the same problems and internal contradictions that contributed to the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist and Arab nationalist revolutionary wave may also come to characterize the Islamic fundamentalist revolutionary wave.

Nevertheless, that wave appears to be expanding today. To the Islamic regimes in Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan may be added revolutionary movements in Algeria, Egypt, and Tajikistan. Smaller Islamic revolutionary movements also exist in Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Iraq, and elsewhere. Katz notes that the three Islamic regimes that have come to power are experiencing some of the same problems as the regimes they replaced: continuing or increasing poverty, decreasing legitimacy, opposition to dictatorial rule, and (in Sudan and Afghanistan) chronic civil war. “There is little reason,” Katz writes, “to think that other nondemocratic

Islamic fundamentalist regimes that come to power will be able to avoid these same problems” (p. 115). On the other hand, there is also little that status quo powers can do to undercut the spread of such regimes. According to Katz,

The status quo powers have only limited ability, at best, to affect the major aspects of nondemocratic revolutionary waves that expand via affiliate revolutions. The success or failure of affiliate revolutions appears less dependent on the quantity of military assistance that embattled status quo regimes receive from the West—or aspiring revolutionaries receive from the central revolution—than on the internal political dynamics within the country experiencing it (p. 135).

GLENN ROBINSON

*Building a Palestinian State: The  
Incomplete Revolution*

Bloomington: Indiana University Press,  
1997

Glenn Robinson considers the period of the Palestinian *intifada* to be an “incomplete” revolution. In *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution*, Robinson traces the trajectory of the protest movement in the West Bank, the social and political changes that facilitated its rise, and the conditions by which it was undercut. The traditional accommodationist Palestinian elite in the West Bank was displaced by a counterelite that emerged from the Palestinian university system established in the 1970s. This new elite, better educated and of more modest class origins than its predecessor, sought to build Palestinian self-sufficiency and self-empowerment through such means as agricultural cooperatives, local health centers, and literacy projects, and to build opposition to Israeli policies through such measures as tax boycotts and food distribution committees during curfews. Israel attempted to vanquish the new elite through deportations, encouraged emigration, imprisonment, and extended closures of universities. It sought to obstruct the accomplishments of this new elite by demolishing greenhouses, cutting agricultural water supply, confiscating land, and destroying farm machinery. Simultaneously, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), whose leadership was in exile in Tunis after being expelled from Lebanon by Israel’s 1982 invasion, also sought to block this new elite, which it saw as a threat to its own authority. The PLO not only failed to support grassroots initiatives but discouraged autonomously organized political actions that might build from a separate power base in the West Bank. Robinson writes, “The Intifada . . . was not just an uprising against Israeli occupation; its secondary target was the traditional Palestinian elite” (p. 120).

The new Palestinian elite ultimately succumbed. Its retreat from politics “was a by-product of both Israeli punishment and P.L.O. encouragement” (p. 90). In Robinson’s analysis, “the incomplete consolidation of

power by the new elite epitomized the real but indecisive sociopolitical transformation the Intifada spawned” (p. 93). The Oslo Peace Accords were the final blow, in that “Oslo revived a fiscally bankrupt and politically dying P.L.O. in Tunis and put in power in Gaza and the West Bank a political elite quite removed from the realities of modern Palestine.” Robinson describes the Palestinian Authority now in control of the West Bank as a rentier regime, acquiring its revenues from foreign aid. “Freed from the burden of requiring resources directly from its own society, the Palestinian Authority need not be particularly responsive to its needs” (p. 200). Robinson predicts, “Given its autocratic present, its troubled future, and its structural ability to withstand societal pressures to reform, the Palestinian state will likely be authoritarian well into the future” (p. 200).

**GEOFFREY KEMP AND  
ROBERT E. HARKAVY**

*Strategic Geography and the Changing  
Middle East*

Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment  
for International Peace, 1997

In other Middle Eastern topics, Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy consider the application of new military technology and organization. In *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East*, the authors discuss both the “revolution in military affairs” (or “RMA,” referring to space systems, telecommunication systems, computer architectures, global information distribution networks, and navigation systems) and the “military technical revolution” (or “MTR,” referring to nonlethal weapons, such as computer viruses to destroy an enemy’s command-and-control system, or gels to make roads unusable). The authors see a synergistic effect between the technological development, operational innovation, and organizational adaptation of RMA and MTR. Kemp and Harkavy note that “[o]f all the regions of the world, and particularly those where future combat may be anticipated, the greater Middle East region features terrain that is, relatively speaking, very suitable for the application of MTR-RMA technologies” (p. 226).

**ROBERT B. ABEL**

*The Influence of Technical Cooperation  
on Reducing Tensions in the Middle East*

Lanham, Md.: University Press of America,  
1997

In *The Influence of Technical Cooperation on Reducing Tensions in the Middle East*, Robert Abel also considers the uses of technology, but of a different sort—marine technology to study water salinity, the nutritional value of fish, seafood safety, and aquaculture. The Middle East Regional Cooperation Program (MERC) has been in existence for over fifteen years with funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development and the participation of Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. “Throughout the all-too-brief history of the MERC Marine Program, the workshops have been wonderfully characterized by confrontation, but between disciplines and projects,

never between national delegations. This offers quiet evidence of the value of the MERC process" (p. 153).

RICHARD B. PARKER, ED.

*The Six-Day War: A Retrospective*

Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida,  
1996

A final volume on the Middle East is *The Six-Day War: A Retrospective*, edited by Richard B. Parker. It reports on the 1992 conference held to mark the war's twenty-fifth anniversary and draw lessons for future peace efforts. Representatives from the Israeli, Arab, Russian, and U.S. military, government, and universities, many of whom participated in the 1967 crisis, gathered to discuss what led to the outbreak of the Six-Day War. While the sequence of key events is well established, there are many questions regarding the motivations, intentions, and perceptions of the parties to the conflict. This volume records the discussions of conference participants, including some of the main actors of the period, as they puzzle over the miscalculations, false analyses, missed arguments and confusion that was experienced. Their discussion yielded consensus on the importance of clear communication and better coordination within governments during crises, and the need for a single designated policy spokesperson. At the close of the conference, Bernard Reich, who was a consultant to the U.S. Army chief of staff's task force on the Middle East in 1967, could affirm, "This is probably the first Arab-Israeli conference that I've attended where there has been more light than heat" (p. 301).

## 8. ASIA

LU NING

*Flashpoint: Spratlys!*

Singapore: Dolphin Trade Press Pte Ltd.,  
1995

Avoiding violent confrontation is the key concern in several Asian disputes. Differences over sovereignty in the Spratly Islands and over Taiwan's independence repeatedly threaten the outbreak of violence. Grantees of the Institute examine ways to resolve these conflicts or at least maintain a stable status quo.

Lu Ning assesses the potential for a military confrontation in *Flashpoint: Spratlys!* The Spratly Islands are an archipelago in the South China Sea consisting of 230 islets, sandbanks, and reefs, of which only 36 are above water. These are so small and remote as to be of no practical value. Until the 1970s, their only relevance was to those fishing and navigating in the area. The potential for underground petroleum resources, however, has made them much more prized. Currently, six nations stake claims on the Spratlys: Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In 1988 there was an armed clash in the Spratlys between China and Vietnam. Since then all claimants but Brunei have established a permanent presence. All important insular features have been occupied, and further military action seems unlikely. While all claimants have pledged to resolve the dispute peacefully, Ning characterizes the current situation as one of "quiet but intense rivalry" (p. 166).

Ning examines three possible approaches to resolving this conflict. A military solution is unlikely from a straightforward cost-benefit analysis of the situation. A legalistic approach would have all claimants submit to international adjudication, similar to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which addresses mineral resource exploitation and scientific research. A third option Ning calls a "functional approach." Claimants would agree to share ownership of the Spratlys' natural resources and jointly develop any petroleum reserves, without settling the sovereignty dispute or relinquishing their sovereignty claims. Among the relevant precursors to such an agreement Ning identifies the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian agreement of 1965, the Japanese-South Korean agreement of 1974, the Thai-Malaysian agreement of 1979, and the Timor Gap Treaty between Indonesia and Australia of 1989. Ning views the dispute over the Spratlys as an opportunity "for countries in the region to work for a long-term security arrangement in the post-Cold War strategic environment" (p. 170).



PETER W. RODMAN

*Broken Triangle: China, Russia, and  
America after Twenty-Five Years*

Washington, D.C.: Nixon Center for Peace  
and Freedom, 1997

The post–Cold War strategic environment in Asia is fairly volatile. In *Broken Triangle: China, Russia, and America after Twenty-Five Years*, Peter W. Rodman discusses China’s military and economic expansion and the need to balance it. He sees it as imperative that the United States maintain solid alliances with other nations in Asia “to strengthen other counterweights and reinforce the structure of a regional equilibrium.” He also argues that the United States must maintain its own presence in Asia. According to Rodman, the United States must

be a visible, formidable, consistent, resolute power in the region—above all, militarily. The fashionable cliché, so often uttered by this Administration, that economics has replaced security as the dominant concern in the post–Cold War world, is premature, to say the least. . . . If the United States fails to maintain its position as the preeminent military power in the region, then all other tactical policy prescriptions will avail us not; if we do so, then other tactical policy questions become that much easier. Anyone who raises alarms about China and acquiesces in the gutting of our defense posture should be disqualified from participation in the debate (p. 28).

KAREN M. SUTTER, ED.

*Developments in Taiwan to 2020:  
Implications for Cross-Strait Relations  
and U.S. Policy*

Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of  
the United States, 1996

The Atlantic Council of the United States focuses attention on the relationship between China and Taiwan. Papers from its 1994 conference on this topic are gathered in *Developments in Taiwan to 2020: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy*, edited by Karen M. Sutter. Conference participants noted that even during episodes of military tension, such as the missile firings of March 1996, trade, investment, communication, cultural exchanges, and even unofficial political dialogue have continued to grow between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s status as an independent nation remains a very difficult issue, and a military confrontation looms as a possibility. While it is hard to foresee the situation in the year 2020, conference participants agreed that peace is in the interest of the United States. Any serious military engagement would undermine the peace and stability in East Asia that are central to U.S. political, economic, and military interests in the region.

## 9. LATIN AMERICA

Grantees' recent work on Latin America provides new ways of looking at past military regimes and their ramifications for peace and stability. Another area of attention is relations between states as they face collective challenges, reverse past adversarial relationships, and reform international institutions. Relations between substate actors and international organizations are also a topic of analysis.

WILLIAM STANLEY

*The Protection Racket State:  
Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and  
Civil War in El Salvador*

Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996

In *The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador*, William Stanley analyzes state violence. While more people have died at the hands of their own governments than in international war in the twentieth century, foreign policymakers have largely ignored internal state violence, regarding it as a domestic matter. For their part, scholars in international relations are more apt to look at international conflict, while scholars in comparative politics generally address more benign internal issues such as party formation and voting behavior. Those who do focus on the state, whether from a modernization or a Marxist perspective, tend to view it as a rational unitary actor. State violence is then understood as a rational response to opposition. Yet, Stanley points out, the historical record shows that state violence is often grossly disproportionate to the extent of the opposition and often exacerbates opposition. Further, the state is itself an arena of competing interests. Stanley discards the assumption that the state is a unitary rational actor with enemies it must deter with force, and approaches the situation in El Salvador with new questions.

Stanley argues that state violence in El Salvador was a means of competition for state power. According to his analysis, "the Salvadoran military state was essentially a protection racket: the military earned the concession to govern the country (and pillage the state) in exchange for its willingness to use violence against class enemies of the country's relatively small but powerful economic elite. . . . [M]ilitary leaders used conspicuous violence against civilians from the popular sectors in order to manipulate economic elites and preempt them from challenging the authority of the military." This strategy eventually played itself out after ten years of civil war and over 70,000 dead on both sides. In Stanley's view, "by failing to achieve broader legitimacy and by using extreme and provocative violence against regime opponents, the military helped create an enemy it could not defeat. In the end, the military forfeited its privileges . . . because it failed to defeat the FMLN [guerrillas]" (p. 7).

Stanley sees three important elements to the transformation of politics in El Salvador. The first is the Frente Farabundo Martí Liberación Nacional's (FMLN's) ability to resist the military's violence. This resistance broke the protection racket. The second is the institutional reforms negotiated within the UN-sponsored peace process. Many observers, Stanley notes, have been puzzled that after a decade of civil war

the leadership of the strongest guerrilla insurgency in the Western Hemisphere would lay down their guns at the peak of their military power in exchange for institutional reform—and relatively little else. Indeed, during the negotiations the FMLN placed greater emphasis on such reforms than on socioeconomic restructuring, a strategy seemingly at odds with the Front's historically Marxist ideology. Though the future remains uncertain, . . . [this strategy] may have achieved precisely the political changes the country most needed, breaking the protection racket through force of arms, then securing lasting change in elite civil-military relations through negotiated institutional reform (p. 7).

A third key element in transforming the situation in El Salvador was the formation and electoral success of the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), a political party directly representing the interests of an increasingly diverse business sector:

Until the evolution of ARENA into an effective party of the entrepreneurial classes, the landowners, bankers, merchants, and industrialists of El Salvador remained merely a social and economic elite, without sufficient political coherence, organization, and vision to put forward a project that could achieve popular and electoral legitimacy. As such, they were vulnerable to the ability of the coercive agencies of the state to polarize the political climate, maintaining conditions in which repressive strategies seemed the only means of maintaining order (p. 254).

The end of the protection racket state was brought about by the confluence of the military's failure to defeat the guerrillas, the depth of institutional reform, and the political consolidation of the entrepreneurial sector, all within a context of the end of the Cold War, which made the Left less threatening.

JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, ED.

*International Security and Democracy:  
Latin America and the Caribbean in the  
Post-Cold War Era*

Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,  
1998

The end of the Cold War also eased transitions from other military regimes in Latin America and promoted renewed participation of democratizing nations in international institutions. In a chapter in *International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, edited by Jorge Dominguez, Francisco Rojas Aravena writes on civil-military relations in Chile. He suggests that “[b]y

making the reuniversalization of diplomatic relations less dramatic, the end of the Cold War . . . facilitated Chile's international reinsertion" (p. 86).

Among current threats to stability and security in Latin America, international organized crime—particularly the illegal drug trade—heads the list. Mobile and well equipped with weapons, computers, aircraft, telecommunication technology, and enormous amounts of available cash, the international “narco-Mafia” is beyond the police capacity of any nation to control and may have wide ramifications for peace and democracy in the region. In another chapter of *International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, Paul Buchanan offers this summary of the present situation:

The narco-mafia is not only international in scope but has the ability to deploy armed forces and intelligence networks that surpass those of the police (and sometimes even the militaries) of the countries in which they are located. More insidiously, from a long-term perspective, these organizations are increasingly capable of exercising a dominant voice in national and regional politics. As a result, the scope of their activities exceeds the capacity of local police forces and requires both national and international security cooperation, which makes for a blurring of the line between internal and external threats, police versus military responsibilities, and national versus regional responses to the problem (p. 274).

C. RICHARD NELSON, ED.

*Reversing Relations with Former Adversaries: Lessons and Examples*

Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1996.

While the scale of international crime is presenting new problems, some old problems—such as U.S. relations with Castro's Cuba—still remain. The Atlantic Council's *Reversing Relations with Former Adversaries: Lessons and Examples*, edited by C. Richard Nelson, considers how the United States has managed to reverse its relations with former adversaries—such as the Soviet Union, China, Nicaragua, and Vietnam—when the change in relations has not been caused by military victory. This is not always easy. Burton M. Sapin observes that “[o]ver the past half-dozen years, as the many varied antagonisms of the Cold War have petered out, they have left behind a sticky residue from past threats, tensions, and patterns of hostile interaction that has greatly complicated the business of reversing adversarial relations and moving toward something friendlier and more positively productive” (p. 2). Contributors to the Atlantic Council collection of essays look for lessons that might apply to a rapprochement between the United States and Cuba, a relationship to which Pamela Falk ascribes the label “continuing stall.” “Normalizing” relations between these two countries, Falk points out, will hardly be “normal” considering the antipathies that have characterized their relationship for almost a century (p. 306).

## INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE

### *The Inter-American Agenda and Multilateral Governance: The Organization of American States*

Washington, D.C.: Inter-American  
Dialogue, 1997

In continuing to improve relations among and further the interests of nations in the hemisphere, the Organization of American States (OAS) has a potentially important role to play. A number of issues on the inter-American agenda—such as trade, drug trafficking, migration, environment, and security—are transnational in nature and require interstate collaboration. In *The Inter-American Agenda and Multilateral Governance: The Organization of American States*, the Inter-American Dialogue asserts that the OAS would be the likely “hub” of these intersecting relations. In its fifty years of existence, however, the OAS has gained a reputation for being “inefficient, patronage-ridden, wasteful, and cumbersome—essentially a debating society dealing with irrelevancies and protocol” (p. 13). The Inter-American Dialogue therefore suggests a number of organizational and administrative reforms. Its principal recommendation is to insert the OAS more fully into the process of hemispheric summits, such as those that occurred in Miami in 1994 and in Santiago in 1998. It is the expectation of the Inter-American Dialogue that these periodic meetings of heads of state will become institutionalized and that they will require preparation and staffing. Were the OAS properly integrated into the summit process, it could fulfill this role provided that its personnel were “upgraded in terms of quality, productivity, and wider expertise.” The Inter-American Dialogue foresees this “small, but highly expert, elite cadre of civil servants” as the central secretariat and coordinating instrument for future Summits of the Americas (p. 17).

## ALYSON BRYSK

### *“From Tribal Village to Global Village: International Relations and Indian Rights in Latin America”*

1997

International relations are not only between governments. Substate actors and nongovernmental organizations are also players in international affairs. In her work in progress, “From Tribal Village to Global Village: International Relations and Indian Rights in Latin America,” Alyson Brysk examines linkages between Latin American indigenous groups and various international actors. Brysk notes great changes in the status and political power of indigenous people and argues that these changes cannot be explained at the state level. Rather, she suggests, indigenous groups reached out to international allies precisely because they lacked political access at home. The internationalization of indigenous issues has become much more feasible with indigenous peoples’ increasing contact with foreigners (anthropologists, missionaries, journalists, environmentalists, geologists, biologists, aid workers) and with the internationalization of relevant forums (International Labor Organization, North American Free Trade Agreement, war in Nicaragua). The “collision of the tribal village with the global village” has often had devastating consequences: debt slavery, dis-

case, land seizures, deforestation, oil spills, mercury contamination from gold mining, and flooding from hydroelectric dams. More recently, however, “the international Indian rights network has granted the movement protection and resources, helped it to gain recognition, participation and reform in international institutions, and helped to reshape state policy in several Latin American countries.”



## 10. AFRICA

Grantees have examined many initiatives in conflict resolution in Africa, particularly in the countries of the Horn. While the prospects for resolution of some African conflicts appear grim, grantees also point to the resurgence of traditional indigenous methods of conflict resolution and their innovative adaptation to contemporary conflict, and to international experiments in managing conflict in new ways.

HUSSEIN M. ADAM AND  
RICHARD FORD, EDS.

*Mending Rips in the Sky: Options  
for Somali Communities in the  
21st Century*

Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997

Contributors to the volume *Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century*, edited by Hussein M. Adam and Richard Ford, address historic, political, and economic aspects of the conflict in Somalia, as well as human rights issues, the plight of refugees, and prospects for reconciliation. Several contributions assess UN missions to Somalia, concurring on the failures and negative impacts of these missions.

In his essay "The Death of Somalia in Historical Perspective," Charles Gesheker discusses divisive clan politics, the institutional weakness of the central government, and the rise of warlordism in Somalia. In 1992–93, Gesheker writes, "Somalia became a metaphor for political disorder where over 30,000 Somalis died of starvation, warfare, or disease. Habitat deterioration, a militarized society, and the breakdown of social discipline constituted a culture of war and an economy of death" (p. 65). The United Nations responded with peacekeeping initiatives and humanitarian intervention in its UNOSOM missions. These costly missions are generally seen as failures. Gesheker records the resentment of Somalis at the immensity and bureaucracy of these international efforts. "Somalis around Mogadishu," writes Gesheker, "viewed the UN's multinational bureaucracy that was backed by armed forces who fired on civilians as the 'New White Warlords,' just another faction siphoning off money. . . . [Somalis came to see] the UN bureaucracy as a 'self-licking ice cream cone'" (p. 83).

In his contribution to the volume, UN Special Representative Mohamed Sahnoun is also critical of the UN's bureaucratic inertia and mishandling of aid. According to Sahnoun, "Not only was the UN assistance program very limited, it was also so slowly and inadequately delivered that it became counterproductive. Fighting erupted over the meager food supplied" (p. 309). Maria Brons Garten discusses other shortcomings of the UN missions. In her essay "The United Nations Involvement in Somalia," Garten considers the missions' excessive focus on the capital of Mogadishu. According to Garten, it is a "general tendency in African politics" that

whomever controls the capital is internally in charge and internationally a recipient of merits and recognition which, in return, consolidates the thin power base. The military presence and involvement of UNOSOM in the power-struggle in Mogadishu has therefore exhibited the most damaging results such as complications and prolongation of the civil war (pp. 588–89).

JOHN PRENDERGAST

*“Peace from Below: Local Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa”*

January 1997

In his manuscript “Peace from Below: Local Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa,” John Prendergast concurs with Garten’s judgment:

The failure of the U.N. mission in Somalia is to a large degree the extension of a bankrupt donor policy which for decades supported overly centralized, unsustainable government structures in Mogadishu whose legitimacy came primarily from the barrel of a gun. The UN and donor governments spent the duration of the intervention obsessing over the re-creation of a centralized authority in Mogadishu. This greatly exacerbated the conflict, as competing militias positioned themselves for the potential spoils of a new aid-dependent state. In the process, the vast majority of Somalis and their local institutions have been ignored and further marginalized (p. 142).

Prendergast’s study of conflicts throughout the Horn of Africa leads him to advocate greater attention to local conflict-resolution initiatives, particularly those arising from traditional authorities such as clan elders:

Local conflict management methods often incorporate consensus-building approaches which involve open discussions which provide information and clarify issues. Disputing parties may more likely accept a decision from local mediators employing traditional approaches, rather than from external mediators; an elder’s decision is frequently not considered to entail a loss of face and is backed by social pressure. The end result is, ideally, a sense of unity, shared involvement, and responsibility. Process is extremely important, allowing for a dialogue to be created and nurtured between groups otherwise in conflict (p. 143).

In Prendergast’s view, there is a great need to integrate different levels of conflict resolution, with international initiatives supporting and coordinating with local efforts at peacemaking.

WOLFGANG HEINRICH

*Building the Peace: Experiences of Collaborative Peacebuilding in Somalia 1993–96*

Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 1997

Wolfgang Heinrich has evaluated one experiment creating new structures of governance and authority as part of a peacemaking process. In *Building the Peace: Experiences of Collaborative Peacebuilding in Somalia 1993–96*, Heinrich examines the establishment of district councils in Somalia. At the request of the United Nations, the Swedish Life and Peace Institute (LPI) trained members of these councils

in various aspects of good government (leadership, ethics, resource mobilization), development management (needs assessment), financial management (budgeting, accounting, project planning), and human resource management. Heinrich notes that the district councils were not developed according to a preconceived plan, but rather evolved in response to situations as they arose. While there are therefore no identified indicators of success or failure, the intent was to build a sustainable system of local governance and conflict management.

Heinrich finds some shortcomings in the creation of the district councils. Because LPI had been retained by the United Nations, it was at the mercy of certain UN decisions. Training of councilors, for example, was halted from February 1994 to March 1995 because UNOSOM had decided to concentrate all its efforts on achieving a settlement with warlords and wanted nothing to disturb those negotiations. The councils also had no resources of their own for providing or organizing services to local communities. They therefore lacked a basis for a "relationship of mutuality" with these communities. Relations with other authorities and administrative structures were also not clear. Heinrich finds a lack of "functional integration" between the district councils and other social institutions. At present, there are merely pragmatic arrangements, varying in each locality, between the district council and other elements of social organization including clan elders, police, courts, and nongovernmental organizations. If the district councils continue to evolve and become, as intended, a part of the national administrative system, then Heinrich foresees the emergence of conflicts of interest. For now, while the formation of district councils did trigger violent conflict in some instances, the councils are too weak to be threatening. Heinrich's conclusion is that more effort should be directed toward clarifying relations between old and new structures of governance and institutions of authority.

STEVEN WÖNDU AND ANN LESCH

*"Battle for Peace in the Sudan: An  
Analysis of the Abuja Conferences,  
1992–1993"*

1997

CENTRE FOR THE STRATEGIC  
INITIATIVES OF WOMEN

*The Outcry for Peace in the Sudan*

Washington, D.C.: The Centre for  
the Strategic Initiatives of Women,  
October 1996

HERMAN J. COHEN

*"United States Government  
Interventions in African Internal  
Conflicts During 1989–1995: Seven  
Case Studies and a Transnational  
Analysis"*

January 1997

Steven Wöndu and Ann Lesch address the prolonged conflicts in Sudan between the largely Arabic, Islamic, and economically more developed North and the more African, Christian or traditional, poorer South. Part of what is at stake is who will control the central government. A very important component of the conflict, however, turns on the nature of the state regardless of who occupies the government. The National Islamic Front, which now holds power in Khartoum, insists that a state is a religious entity and that Islamic law should be the basis for legislation. The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement stands for separation of religion and state and demands a secular constitution. The two sides have been unable to reach any agreement or compromise on this issue. Negotiations on any other matters such as power sharing or regional autonomy cannot even begin while the nature of national authority is itself in dispute. In addition to the conflict between North and South, a study by the Centre for the Strategic Initiatives of Women indicates that an intra-South war is also beginning, related to ethnic divisions between Nuer and Dinka and political differences regarding rapprochement with the government in the North.

In "United States Government Interventions in African Internal Conflicts During 1989–1995: Seven Case Studies and a Transnational Analysis," Herman Cohen, the former assistant secretary of the U.S. State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, offers insights into the conduct of and constraints on U.S. policy toward African nations. Cohen underscores the importance of "constant networking within the community of agencies concerned with national security and foreign affairs. . . . This is necessary for all aspects of foreign relations, but it is especially important in the area of conflict interventions which are very complex by their very nature" (ch. 3, p. 80). Cohen's memoir discusses cooperation and disputes among the State Department, Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, U.S. Agency for International Development, Commerce Department, Treasury, and U.S. Congress.

Cohen also addresses shortcomings in diplomacy that may result from an excessive insistence on negotiations. In the case of Rwanda, Cohen identifies policy options that might have prevented the 1994 genocide. Instead of pursuing any of these early options (such as protesting the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by uniformed members of the Ugandan army and the Rwanda Patriotic Front), the U.S. "engaged in our routine act of 'rote diplomacy,' which is to call for a cease-fire and negotiations no matter what. The

Rwanda crisis,” Cohen notes, “taught us that this option can sometimes do more harm than good” (ch. 6, p. 22).

Among the principles that Cohen prescribes for successful American diplomacy in Africa are these: (1) Making good use of the network of U.S. embassies in key African countries is a vital element in an activist approach. (2) Gaining the cooperation of the U.S. national security community is essential. (3) Starting early is better than starting late. (4) Talk to everyone. (5) Bring the multilaterals in early. (6) Give ambassadors maximum leeway.

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