

Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking

Volume 7

**A Summary of
Projects Completed by
Grantees and Fellows
1996–2001**

Anne-Marie Smith



United States Institute of Peace
Washington, D.C.

First published February 2003

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UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20036-3011

Phone: (202) 457-1700
Fax: (202) 429-6063
E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org
Web: www.usip.org

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Introduction

This volume of *Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking* summarizes eighty-four projects funded by the U.S. Institute of Peace's Grant Program, or completed by senior fellows in the Institute's Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace, between 1996 and 2001. There are four thematic sections—"Ethnic Conflict," "Weapons and Warfare," "Peace Processes," and "Looking to the Future"—followed by regional sections on Africa, Asia, Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Latin America, and the Middle East.

The subjects summarized in the first thematic section, "Ethnic Conflict," remain pressing issues for those concerned with peacemaking, and the twelve projects summarized here cover a great range of approaches: Some share stories and oral histories from workshops with victims. Others present the reflections of diplomats and negotiators who have been involved in fashioning peace agreements. Practitioners articulate and evaluate new methodologies for approaching the resolution of ethnic conflict. Scholars examine the interaction between ethnic politics and development assistance. Comparative studies analyze patterns in ethnic conflict around the world and over time.

Weapons and the ways they are used are always changing. In the section on "Weapons and Warfare," grantees and fellows monitor progress toward disarmament generally around the world and in specific postconflict situations. Scholars construct links between the different disciplines of military history and security studies. Other observers consider the weapons potential of the ongoing revolution in biotechnology and whether we are witnessing a revolution in military affairs. Some authors evaluate past efforts against proliferation, others assess the shape of future programs.

"Peace Processes" is devoted to summaries of fellows' works that explore the different stages and modalities involved in bringing together opposing sides in a conflict, as well as the myriad influences that facilitate—or destroy—such processes.

In the final thematic section of this volume, grantees and fellows look to the future of peacemaking on many levels. Some seek to inform and engage citizens in a public discussion on future U.S. foreign policy directions. Others plot future strategies for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) struggling to respond to a stream of complex humanitarian emergencies. New international institutions that will have a profound impact on international criminal justice are beginning to take form. At the abstract level of international systems, global communication continues to shape and be shaped by our use of new technologies.

These four sections and the material presented under the five regional headings represent the diverse output of Institute grantees and fellows. The present work joins the previous six volumes of *Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking* in providing summaries of this output. Through these summaries, readers can gain an overview of the entire range of experiences and approaches to peacemaking that have been examined by grantees and fellows, and identify those studies that will be of further interest to them.

JUDY BARSALOU, DIRECTOR
GRANT PROGRAM

JOSEPH KLAITS, DIRECTOR
JENNINGS RANDOLPH PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

1. Ethnic Conflict

The 1992 Mayhew Talks, like the 1991 Brooks Talks before them, did not yield significant progress toward resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, according to David Bloomfield, “the uneasy cross-table relationship, the personal chemistry between participants, developed significantly. Coming out of the Mayhew talks, every party had gained significant further understanding of each other and of the process of negotiating, whether or not they were happy with that new knowledge” (p. 147).

Bloomfield’s account of the Mayhew Talks is detailed, recounting daily dilemmas, characterizing individual players, and supplying appendixes of subcommittee reports and initial drafts of documents. He compares the different dynamic of work done in plenary sessions and subcommittees and examines the tempests over such mundane matters as seating arrangements and order of speakers. In particular, Bloomfield considers the significance of the agreed-upon structure of the talks, which were to occur in three “strands.” The first addressed the power-sharing structure for the devolved government of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. The second concerned the negotiation of North-South cooperative structures, and the third was to devise a new Irish-British treaty to replace the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. These strands were understood to follow the “banking principle”—that is, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” meaning that any partial successes in earlier strands would not be implemented until full agreement had been reached in all three. And that success eluded those taking part in the talks. Bloomfield quotes one participant:

What we tended to do in the process was we’d come up against an obstacle and we’d set it aside and move on to the next challenge. . . . Always in the hope that in the discussion of the next agenda item or the next issue, there would be a greater sense of co-operation and commonality among the parties which might then improve the prospects of revisiting obstacles that held up progress. But instead all we were doing was building up a backlog of obstacles that we never really got over. Yes, we were stockpiling obstacles (p. 189).

As the final deadline approached, Bloomfield observes that the delegates were “more interested in maneuvering to avoid blame for the collapse of the talks rather than in any last-minute breakthrough” (p. 140). The closing document of the Mayhew Talks was sparse. Bloomfield quotes another participant: “[T]here was a strong feeling that very little should be said, because anything that might be said would be so easily turned into a stumbling block on resumption” (p. 182). The fact that resumption was presumed was perhaps the one success of these talks. In Bloomfield’s otherwise discouraged summation:

There had been a learning process. There had been familiarization. There had been clarification of positions. There had been “chemistry lessons.” There had been symbolic breakthroughs. But there was never a meeting of minds. Twice in two years now [Brooke 1991, Mayhew 1992], the politicians had set down to negotiate toward a settlement, and failed spectacularly to get within miles of that goal (p. 145).

**DAVID
BLOOMFIELD**

“Developing Dialogue
in Northern Ireland:
The Mayhew Talks,
1992”

Department of Peace
Studies, University of
Bradford, West Yorkshire,
UK, 2000

SCOTT A. BOLLENS

*On Narrow Ground:
Urban Policy and Ethnic
Conflict in Jerusalem
and Belfast*

Albany, N.Y.: State
University of New York
Press, 2000

"A city," writes Scott Bollens, "is a site where belligerent peoples come together—if not due to intergroup competition over urban space, then to the economic interdependence inherent to urban living" (p. 6). In ethnically divided cities, urban planners and policymakers operate without the technical legitimacy they are usually presumed to hold elsewhere. Bollens compares the different strategies and outcomes of urban planning in Jerusalem and Belfast, arguing that their short-term achievement of control or equilibrium may undermine the chances for long-term ethnic peace.

In Jerusalem, Israeli policymaking has created a city that is functionally and psychologically divided, where Jews and Palestinians live as "intimate enemies." Through such measures as land expropriation, restrictive zoning, distribution of urban services, and demographic planning, Israeli policymakers have "penetrated and diminished Arab land control . . . [and thereby deepened] polarization because the disenfranchised Arab minority views the planner as a guardian and perpetuator of disputed political structures" (pp. 71, 95). In Bollens's view, Israeli policymakers

have created a landscape conducive to Israel's sole political control. Yet, at the same time, this landscape is an urban fabric of vulnerable interfaces and interethnic instability. From the Israeli perspective, the buffering effect of its political unification may be overcome by the inflammatory effect of its interface geography. Political unification may be solidified at the expense of security. . . (p. 168).

Faced with the sectarian territorial segregation of Belfast, urban planners have pursued neutral policies, treating the Catholic and Protestant populations of the city similarly despite their qualitatively different needs and shifting demographics. While Protestant sections of Belfast suffer outmigration, social depletion, and physical deterioration, Catholic areas are overcrowded and underserved. On such policy issues as housing, land use, and spatial development, planners have condoned existing patterns of segregation and containment, manifest in the "peacelines" or fences physically separating the two communities. In the short term, such barriers may provide some sense of community and individual security, meeting the policymakers' goals of equilibrium and containment of violence. In the long term, however, they strengthen the city's dysfunctional rigidities and compartmentalization, which are ultimately conducive to intergroup conflict.

How would Bollens approach urban planning in ethnically divided cities? He suggests that "[g]enuine and moral authority in a multiethnic city honors the centrifugal tendencies of ethnicity within integrative institutions and processes of city building and administration capable of appealing to the cross-communal and social-psychological needs of each group" (p. 169). From his analysis, he proposes eight principles for urban policymakers to consider: Explosiveness will characterize ethnically divided cities until root causes of the conflict are resolved; neutrality is not necessarily fair; separation breeds contempt; an ethnic group under perceived threat has psychological as well as objective needs; the goal of urban policy should be accommodation, not assimilation; genuine political leadership seeks accommodation, but divisive political gamesmanship is easy and rewarded; majoritarian democracy does not fit with contested cities and states; and "[a]n essential step in effectively addressing ethnic divisions is a difficult and easily deniable one—that there exists a problem of which I am a part" (p. 343).

Contributors to this volume consider how identity politics interacts with institutional avenues for addressing ethnic grievances and constitutional means for protecting minority rights. They build on the observation that “who fights about what, and how different sorts of disputes get handled, are culturally patterned features of social living” (p. xv).

In “Overcoming Wilsonianism: American Conflict Resolution and Ethnic Nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,” John D. Nagle, Frederic S. Pearson, and Mark Suprun argue that Americans tend to see their experience as both exceptional and exportable. They therefore aim to transfer their own views about the equality of citizens to other settings, ignoring the distinct cultural bases of others’ identities. In particular, they charge that Americans have failed to grasp the ethnic nature of citizenship as it is conceived in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The authors suggest that “solutions to ethnic conflict lie in creative approaches to channeling group loyalties and defusing fears, rather than the imposing or injecting of foreign ideas about state, institutions, and society” (p. 34).

Mitja Zagar considers ethnicity in the former Yugoslavia in his chapter, “Yugoslavia, What Went Wrong? Constitutional Development and Collapse of a Multiethnic State,” faulting the lack of adequate constitutional and legal mechanisms for managing ethnic relations and conflicts. While official instruments asserted multiculturalism, he says, this did not correspond to social reality, and the international community’s subsequent emphasis on multiparty elections has not been constructive. “In an environment without multiparty political traditions,” Zagar writes, “politicians and political parties used ethnicity and reinterpreted ethnic myths to mobilize people for their political programs” (p. 145). Zagar concludes that “constitutions and legal systems can be successful in resolving internal conflicts only if they are accepted, followed, and supported by the people” (p. 146).

This report defines intercommunal interactive conflict resolution as

any process whereby a third party facilitates unofficial and private discussions among influential members of communities involved in identity-based conflict. . . . The focus of such efforts [is] typically not settlement, but rather long-term relationship building and option gathering. Participants involved are normally unofficial influentials in their respective communities in order to facilitate transfer of ideas into the political process and more rapid political change (p. 6).

The goal of the report is to develop methodology to evaluate such initiatives, particularly how change at the microlevel—such as a participant’s attitudes—is connected to long-term structural transformation. The authors recommend case reporting that would present information on such topics as learning, empathy, attitude change, new leadership, networking, and reforms in political structures.

**SEAN BYRNE AND
CYNTHIA L. ERVIN,
EDS.**

*Reconcilable
Differences: Turning
Points in Ethnopolitical
Conflict*

West Hartford, Conn.:
Kumarian Press, 2000

**TAMRA PEARSON
D’ESTREE, JOSHUA
WEISS, MONICA
JAKOBSEN, AND
LARISSA FAST,
WITH NATHAN
FUNK**

“A Framework for
Evaluating Intergroup
Interactive Conflict
Resolution”

Fairfax, Va.: George
Mason University,
Institute for Conflict
Analysis and Resolution,
February 28, 2000

MILTON ESMAN
AND RONALD J.
HERRING, EDS.

*Carrots, Sticks, and
Ethnic Development:
Rethinking Develop-
ment Assistance*

Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2001

This book proceeds from the observation that international development assistance and ethnic politics interact reciprocally. Aid and policy advice have distributive consequences that may follow ethnic dividing lines; aid is allocated and administered in a political context including ethnic grievance; broad conditionality requirements (as over human rights or poverty alleviation) are apt to cross paths with ethnic politics. In conceiving and designing development assistance that would not exacerbate ethnic conflict, one major drawback is the insistence of the international aid community on dealing with an aggregate. The relevant unit of analysis is the nation: its growth rate, its self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs, its supply of electricity. “Imagining this economic person [the nation] as the object of policy obscures internal differentiation experienced by real people on the ground, but it is central to the abstraction of development discourse,” writes Ronald J. Herring (p. 17). He further observes that “the cognitive frame of development agencies—of aggregate phenomena defined by growth rates in GNP [gross national product]—elides differential distributions of insecurity and opportunity, differences that may be perceived in ethnic terms and thus productive of ethnic conflict” (p. 166).

Case studies from Kenya, Sri Lanka, Russia, and Ecuador explore these issues. In some instances, aid agencies were concerned and attentive to the effects of aid on ethnic differences, but were nonetheless unable to take effective action—because they were outmaneuvered by recipients, internally divided, or unable to act in concert with other aid providers.

No single action on the part of development agencies will guarantee that there are no negative consequences to aid in ethnically divided societies. This is the case because the costs and benefits of any aid project depend not only upon the content and design of that project, but also on the response of people affected. And the specific response—acceptance, adaptation, rejection, mobilization, or resistance—cannot be entirely known in advance. Writing on Ecuador, Alison Brysk remarks that

development assistance buffers some economic changes, accelerates others, and produces various social side effects. But none of these economic changes leads directly to conflict; in every case, the social impact of economic change is conditioned by the *response* of ethnic communities to market forces. . . . Development programs that treat “the market” as an empty space inhabited by impersonal social forces and interchangeable individuals—instead of human communities with different identities, opportunities, and resources—may end up turning that marketplace into a battlefield (pp. 212, 231).

To avoid conflict and ensure peaceful coexistence, to achieve equity or rough distributional justice, or simply to do no harm to any ethnic community, Milton J. Esman recommends that development professionals “reach beyond technical rationality, beyond macroeconomic variables, to the actual structures, values, and political dynamics of the societies in which they intervene” (p. 235).

The Minorities at Risk Project has built a database of more than two hundred ethnopolitical groups around the world since 1945. In the current study, project director Ted Robert Gurr considers trends in ethnic conflict over the past decade. His findings are “conditionally positive” (p. xv).

In the latter half of the 1990s, the comprehensive data indicate that ethnopolitical conflict subsided in most regions of the world. Gurr acknowledges that this finding is contrary to common wisdom and explains that although the number of conflicts declined, “subjectively they received far more public attention—precisely because they challenged the emerging norms of recognition for group rights and peaceful accommodation of communal conflicts and the comforting assumption that the ‘international community’ is capable of guaranteeing local and regional security” (p. 281).

Gurr attributes the recent decline in ethnic warfare to three factors. First, the initial disturbance caused by the demise of the Soviet Union has passed; there are fewer opportunities for ethnopolitical activists to exploit. Second, states have improved their capacities for managing ethnic conflict; democratic elites in particular are apt to employ strategies of recognition, pluralism, and group autonomy. Finally, international coalitions and organizations have been more willing to take preventive or remedial action in ethnic conflicts, prompted by greater media attention, public concern, and the activism of nongovernmental organizations.

Gurr cautions that complacency would be the wrong response to the current trends in ethnic violence worldwide, which may be only a temporary lull. Grievances persist and will continue to enable mobilization, especially given the demonstration effects of successful identity movements. States’ strategies of conflict management are not uniformly successful. New democracies in particular face challenges, as they generally lack the resources or institutional means to resolve conflict. Established democracies, on the other hand, are “glacially slow in reducing the historical legacies of discrimination and cultural restriction . . . [and] have the highest average level of economic discrimination of any type of polity and about the same level of political discrimination as the new democracies” (p. 175). Actors in an international intervention frequently leave the scene too quickly, failing to sustain the political and material support that are imperative to prevent a renewal of conflict.

Nonetheless, Gurr identifies an emerging regime of “managed ethnic heterogeneity” (p. 277) featuring three basic elements: the recognition and active protection of collective rights, democratic governance that provides institutional means to secure these rights, and commitment to the principle that disputes are best settled by negotiation and mutual accommodation.

With reference to some one hundred and fifty riots in fifty countries, Donald Horowitz examines the genesis, meaning, and demise of deadly ethnic riots. The breadth of the study encompasses cross-national patterns in the targets, participants, organization, leadership, and contexts of this type of violence.

Horowitz characterizes deadly ethnic riots as a “bizarre fusion of coherence and frenzy” (p. 2). They exhibit intense sadism—such as mutilations, which are far more labor-intensive than mere killing—yet they also exhibit calculation, including plotting and trapping.

TED ROBERT GURR

*People versus States:
Minorities at Risk in the
New Century*

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace
Press, 2000

DONALD L. HOROWITZ

The Deadly Ethnic Riot

Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2001

“Violence of this kind,” he concludes, “is better described as lucid madness than as blind fury” (p. 124).

Targets of ethnic riots tend to be powerful groups in vulnerable moments, rather than weak scapegoats. Riots are usually preceded by rumors of grotesque aggression inflicted by the target group. The shocking nature of the rumored action breaks down the norms that usually inhibit violence. “The enormity of acts depicted in rumors,” Horowitz writes, “helps explain why ethnic riots are not more common. The usually operative restraints are overcome only by acts of this magnitude” (p. 85). He further observes that “belief in the hostile intentions of the target group is an important facilitator of riot activity, as it can be in international warfare” (p. 79).

Participants in ethnic riots are ordinary people—not criminals, deviants, or marginals. To Horowitz, this fact suggests that the violence is socially acceptable or approved. “If it did not have legitimacy and social support,” Horowitz writes, “otherwise respectable people would not participate and, perhaps more important, could not resume ordinary life, free of social sanction, after the fact. The ordinariness of the mob is testimony to its reflection of the norms and feelings of the group from which it springs” (p. 265).

Leaders play an important role in this type of violence, but not necessarily as instigators. Looking over his wide array of cases, Horowitz perceives that “[m]uch of the time, the function of leadership in riots is probably to convey in understandable code, over a long period of time, the community’s sanction for the violence, rather than to engage in strategic and tactical planning. . . . Leadership is a matter of legitimation rather than of motivating and organizing people for violence, of sending moral signals rather than dominating an environment and inducing people to do what they might prefer not to do” (p. 267).

Deadly riots can come to an end even when ethnic conflict persists. Horowitz attributes the absence of deadly ethnic violence in some Western countries to the growth of civic identities and other cleavages (religious, class, regional) that compete with ethnic identities. Professionalization of police may be another factor, as are the integrative effects of an external threat and shared superordinate goals. Attitude change and increasing intergroup contacts are also important. Horowitz points to “a new orthodoxy of tolerance” in the United States, through which “the declining legitimacy of ethnic antipathy eliminated support for the deadly ethnic riot” (p. 563).

CVIJETO JOB
 “Yugoslavia’s Ruin:
 Can Anything Be
 Learned? A Personal
 Inquiry”

Washington, D.C.:
 Woodrow Wilson
 International Center for
 Scholars, 2000

Former Yugoslav diplomat Cvijeto Job asks, “Given that Yugoslavia, as it was, became untenable, did it have to perish in quite the horrific way it did?” (p. 12). His answer explores the country’s constitution, ethnic relations, and nationalist elites. His proposals for the future call for commitment from both local and international actors.

In its preamble, the Yugoslav constitution guaranteed a right to self-determination to “peoples.” “Peoples” were never defined, nor were criteria, conditions, or procedures for pursuing self-determination ever established. Job surmises that the phrasing remained ambiguous because “the framers never intended it to be taken literally” (p. 155). There were thus no constitutional means to manage the country’s centrifugal tendencies.

Another important force in the splintering of Yugoslavia was ethnic hatred, expressed in chauvinist mythologies, demonizing stereotypes, and persistent bigotry. Job notes the constant competition and scorekeeping between Yugoslavia’s constituent republics in the

1960s and 1970s: Which republic had received more federal funding for highways? To which ethnic group did the country's UN representative belong? Which republic had the prettier coastline? Job's own father expressed "his disillusionment and disgust with the whole nationality thing" by giving his identity as "Tanganyikan" (p. 19).

Manipulation by elites is a further factor in Yugoslavia's violent end:

The massacres and acts of genocide did not arise spontaneously, with ordinary people suddenly running amok. The mass crimes were prepared by organized and criminalized states, perpetrated by their military and paramilitary outfits and gangs, encouraged, defended and tolerated by the highest institutions of state, society, academia and church—all in the cause of murderous nationalist programs. . . . [Ethnic hatred was] culpably exploited by both anti-communist and non-communist chauvinist establishments and émigré circles, and by those Communist leaders who cynically or genuinely turned nationalist (pp. 51, 63).

Job is critical of the Dayton Peace Accords, whose provision he sees as sustaining "ethnopolitical gridlock," although he acknowledges that at the time of his writing, it was too early to judge. Job is concerned that, regardless of formal agreements, indoctrination in ethnic hatred is ongoing in churches and schools. "No one," he writes, "was ever ex-communicated for ethnic cleansing or defrocked for preaching hate or effectively justifying the murder of the innocents on the other side" (p. 386). According to Job, political opposition has also not included opposition to such ethnic hatred. He asserts that Serbs, for example, protested against the Milosevic regime for what it was doing to Serbs (including economic misery, corruption, and police oppression), but not for what it had done in Kosovo, Vukovar, Sarajevo, or Srebrenica.

Job concludes that Yugoslavs cannot transform themselves, their culture, and their institutions on their own, and he calls for greater foreign involvement, including military intervention. Aware that the U.S. public is typically pictured as unwilling to undertake lengthy foreign engagement, he calls on Congress and other leaders to persuade them otherwise. Next steps would include establishing a truth commission, encouraging apologies from civic organizations and respected individuals, defining alternatives to the present form of governance, considering how churches should react to crimes committed in their name, and massively revising textbooks so that current ethnic hatreds are not instilled in the next generation. In Job's view, "Yugoslavia's experience, at a calamitous cost to its peoples, can serve as an almost perfect textbook case of how not to go about self-determination" (p. 111).

This anthology results from an educational program devised to teach about peace and conflict resolution in the former Yugoslavia. It discusses such topics as civic rather than ethnic nationalism and basic concepts of conflict management, such as distinguishing people from the problem. One contributor observes that "Serbia is defeated in the battle for big Serbia, militarily and morally" and concludes that this defeat creates an opportunity for democratization.

The collection also includes portions of women's oral history. Several recount their opposition to Slobodan Milosevic melting away during the international bombing campaign, in fury and defiance of international actors who would forcefully tell them how to vote or whom to support. One activist recalls having participated in attacks on the government-controlled television station—but then defending that station once it became a

DRAGAN POPADIC,
ED.

*Introduction to Peace
Studies*

Belgrade: n.p., 2000

target of international forces, with a feeling of “that’s *ours*, no matter how bad it is.” Another expresses her confusion as she watches neighborhood children play war games against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. She does not want her children to play such games, but neither does she want them excluded by not participating.

PROTECTOR

*Pismo Bez Adrese/A
Letter Without Address*

Sarajevo: n.p., 2000

Protector, a nongovernmental organization in Sarajevo, has collected accounts of mutual assistance that occurred during and despite ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The five stories presented here were gathered during workshops conducted in eight towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were among many submitted that recount empathy, generosity, and solidarity across ethnic and religious divisions.

The stories recount such events as a Catholic priest donating church money to rebuild a Muslim school, or an interethnic couple—never formally married “for fear of hurting our dearest ones”—who make a point of marrying after the conflict. In another story, the narrator goes to a prison camp to bring food to his former neighbor who is detained there. As they part, the detained one asks, “Why do you cry? You are not within the wire.” The storyteller explains, “He was within a small wire, and I was within a bigger wire.” This and several other stories end with reunions and pledges to rebuild together.

BARRY H. STEINER

“The Varieties of
Collective Preventive
Diplomacy: Great
Power Approaches to
Intrastate Ethnic
Conflict”

Department of Political
Science, California State
University, Long Beach,
Calif., July 1998

In this study of great power diplomacy, Barry Steiner draws on eight case studies of intrastate ethnic conflict dating from 1820 to the present. He examines instances of collective intervention, collective insulation, and attempts at preventive diplomacy or preemptive engagement. As a rule, he finds that the great powers are more sensitive to each other’s strategic positions than to the interests of the primary ethnic antagonists.

Great powers fear the unilateral action of their rivals. Collective action to address ethnic conflict has taken different forms. Some cases have involved collective conciliatory action, such as diplomacy to discourage the involvement of other states, the provision of competent administrators and public security officers, and blockades or limitations on the flow of arms. Steiner reports that such efforts have a mixed record of success: “[T]he usefulness of collective conciliation directed to small power ethnic conflict is severely limited,” as it is hard to provide sufficient disincentives for antagonists who want to fight (p. 137).

Other cases have involved collective coercion, which has its own set of problems: “Great power solidarity was far better positioned than was unilateral action by any one major state to coerce a primary ethnic antagonist, but the effort to construct a coalition affording such solidarity allowed and encouraged display of major state differences impeding that coalition” (p. 153).

Among the policy prescriptions for enhancing preventive diplomacy, Steiner recommends strengthening early warning regimes, relaxing the preoccupation with early collective intervention in local conflict, preserving options for independent behavior, and avoiding making great power consensus an objective for its own sake. He concludes that “rising regional linkages between states do not undermine this study’s basic finding that early interventionist preventive diplomacy is at best a very delicate, high-risk endeavor” (p. 340).

The “Tree Model,” developed by the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction at the University of Virginia’s School of Medicine, brings a psychoanalytic understanding of collective identities to efforts at unofficial diplomacy between antagonistic communities. Vamik Volkan, one of the originators of this method, explains that “[a]lthough the shared anxiety involved in each conflict has a basis in political, economic, and legal issues, each has also become ‘psychologized’ and involves the large-group identities and rituals of the opposing sides. And it is precisely these psychological aspects that so often thwart official diplomatic efforts toward effective communication and lasting solutions” (p. 148).

The Tree Model requires several years of engagement and a neutral interdisciplinary facilitating team. It begins with a period of diagnosis, including “psychodynamic interviews to understand the internal world” of local participants and identifying sources of anxiety for the large groups of which they are members. Volkan explains that collective identity is one part of an individual’s core identity, the loss of which is terrifying. When identity is threatened, the unconscious creates resistance and defense mechanisms such as projections, displacements, or reversal of affect. With awareness of such dynamics in large groups under stress, “one can begin to make sense of tactics that may otherwise seem irrational or out of proportion” (p. 152).

These findings are coupled with a thorough understanding of the political, economic, legal, and military elements of the conflict. A psychopolitical dialogue is then established, entailing four-day workshops held three times a year over the course of two or three years. The same thirty to forty participants, with similar numbers from each side of the conflict, meet with an interdisciplinary team of neutral third-party facilitators, including historians, political scientists, diplomats, and psychological clinicians. The workshops consist of small group meetings, with only occasional plenary sessions and ample opportunity for informal social interaction.

During the workshops, facilitators attend to unconscious resistances to change, shared and unconscious mental defense mechanisms that obstruct the possibility for change, resolution, and reconciliation. From their years of work, the developers of this method can anticipate certain dynamics. An example is the competitive listing of traumas, which can be lengthy and frustrating but also necessary, as they serve to strengthen participants’ hold on their ethnic identities. Volkan explains:

If participants do not feel secure in their ethnic identities, they will have real difficulty negotiating more realistically with the “other” when the time comes. . . . Mutual recognition of one another’s suffering creates a favorable atmosphere for progress in negotiation because underneath there is a mutual verification of each other’s group identity (p. 170).

Facilitators have utilized this model in Estonia, Romania, Kuwait, the Balkans, Turkey, and Greece. Volkan discusses the experience in Estonia in detail, illustrating the nature of the work and its objective of building institutions to support peaceful coexistence between, in this case, Estonians and members of the country’s ethnic Russian community; examples of such institution building included interethnic community centers and development projects, as well as new editions of standard textbooks and kindergarten curricula that aim at more inclusiveness. Participants have become community leaders, run for political office, and founded nongovernmental organizations. These initiatives have gained official support in the form of grants and the attention of a wider local audience. Yet Volkan clarifies that it can be counterproductive to include top leaders as workshop participants, as

VAMIK VOLKAN

“The Tree Model: A Comprehensive Psychopolitical Approach to Unofficial Diplomacy and the Reduction of Ethnic Tension”

Mind and Human Interaction 10, no. 3 (2000)

they may be subject to political pressure; individuals at a lower level of public authority, while still being influential, may be freer to change their attitudes and opinions. The goal is always to extend the impact. "If one begins at the top, eventually one will need to spread insight and activities downward to the community level. If one begins on the local level, one will need to find ways of communicating results and insights to higher political echelons" (p. 204). The psychopolitical dialogues between antagonistic groups are not meant to substitute for official diplomacy but, rather, to "create an atmosphere where official diplomacy can have greater success" (p. 148).

2. Weapons and Warfare

Appropriate use of information technology can be critical in peace support operations; yet, writes Donna Boltz, such operations “hardly have begun to take advantage of advanced telecommunications capabilities, information systems, and broadcast media” (p. 22). Boltz identifies several challenges in the use of information technology.

Equipment compatibility among the various actors involved in peace support operations is key: “One of the greatest obstacles to effective information is the introduction of multiple communication systems without an overarching strategy toward interoperability” (p. 7). Incompatible systems obstruct the timely transmission of critical information. They can also generate feelings of exclusion and resentment among those with the less sophisticated information technology, further weakening cooperation.

Often, peace support operations will require innovative applications of existing technologies, rather than the creation of entirely new devices. Global Information Systems, for example, can be used to plot on a single map an immense variety of information from a great number of sources that is crucial to refugee resettlement. Such displays may include information on minefields, unexploded ordnance, potable water, housing status, lines of communication, spheres of paramilitary control, ethnic expulsions, and refugee returns. “This information-sharing mechanism,” writes Boltz, “drives agencies to collaborate in order to develop a complete picture of their common zone of activity” (p. 11).

Technology that is crucial in wartime may also be central to peace support operations, if handled appropriately. Boltz reports that a military commander in a 1996 peace support operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina chose to give a demonstration to the different faction commanders of how an unmanned aerial vehicle works, thus letting them know that all their movements would be perceived in real time, without deployment of soldiers, with great accuracy and high resolution. The transparent use of this technology, the opposite of how it would be used in wartime, functioned as a deterrent in the context of this peace support operation.

Boltz encourages developing appropriate responses to the fact that the same information technology that will be useful in a peace support operation will also be available to actors in the conflict and to the media. A decisive information campaign, for example, can counter propaganda, censorship, and disinformation. In dealing with the media, designated spokespersons “must be given information, guidance, and license to respond to and inform reporters on the scene” (p. 20).

In Boltz’s assessment, “[a]lthough information technology is not the answer to all the challenges of peace support operations, it can go a long way toward improving how actors communicate in, monitor, train for, and explain them” (p. 23).

DONNA G. BOLTZ

Information Technology and Peace Support Operations: A Relationship for the New Millennium. Virtual Diplomacy Series, no. 13

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, June 2002

**BONN
INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR
CONVERSION**

*Conversion Survey
1999: Global
Disarmament,
Demilitarization and
Demobilization*

Baden-Baden,
Germany: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999

The high hopes for disarmament and a peace dividend following the close of the Cold War have been tempered over the past decade. As reported by the Bonn International Center for Conversion, “Complications with conversion, disappointments about the pace of peace processes and disarmament, and the continuations of old and outbreak of new disputes and conflicts have contributed to the slowing down of the disarmament and conversion dynamism of the early 1990s” (p. 14).

To compute its “Conversion, Disarmament and Demobilization Index,” the Center marshals four sets of data: military expenditures, aggregate index of holdings of selected weapons systems, armed forces personnel, and employment in arms production. The Center generates this index for every country in the world and then discusses changes over time and among regions. This report also presents further information from around the world on such issues as the reorientation of military research and development, demobilization, base closures, and surplus weapons disposal.

The Center acknowledges that disarmament is following a course of contradictory trends rather than unilinear development; nonetheless, it finds encouragement in recent events. “It must be emphasized,” the Center notes, “that behind the noisy headlines of the many conflicts, there exists a string of positive, often silent achievements. Clearly, in total, the 1990s balance sheet of disarmament and conversion is positive” (p. 13).

MALCOLM DANDO

*The New Biological
Weapons: Threat,
Proliferation and Control*

Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner, 2001

The ongoing revolution in biotechnology presents a Faustian bargain: It promises entirely new capacities to heal and cure, together with unheard of new powers to harm and destroy. Malcolm Dando is concerned with the latter, examining the potential for “quite radical new means of violence, coercion, and subjugation that would have profound consequences for the future direction of human society and civilization” (p. 157).

Dando reports on the stunning growth in knowledge in biotechnology, including the mapping of the human genome, understanding of the nervous system, and functioning of “bioregulators.” With this knowledge, as with others, comes the possibility of manipulation—for good or, as Dando emphasizes, for ill. Peptides, for example, are natural substances produced by the body that control mood, consciousness, temperature regulation, sleep, and emotions. If administered in abnormal amounts or in an unnatural way they can induce a variety of adverse effects: fear, fatigue, depression, change in blood pressure, pain, or death. Only extremely small quantities are needed and they take effect in fractions of a second. Human cognition, development, reproduction, and inheritance could also be manipulated. Other possibilities include the creation of microorganisms resistant to antibiotics, vaccines, and therapeutics, or immunologically altered microorganisms able to defeat standard identification, detection, and diagnostic methods. The development of weapons to genetically target particular ethnic groups is yet another possibility. And while the Human Genome Project has received the most attention, the genomes of staple crops and vital livestock animals are also being studied and becoming subject to manipulation.

What are the current protections against misuse of this knowledge? Dando reports that “[n]uclear weapons are subject to the relatively robust Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime, and chemical weapons to the strong, recently agreed Chemical Weapons Convention. But most biological weapons are controlled only by the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which currently lacks any effective verification mechanism” (p. 2). A protocol added to the Geneva Convention in 1977 prohibits the use

of weapons “of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” “Unfortunately,” Dando notes, “it has historically been difficult to reach agreement on how to define ‘superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’” (p. 88). Dual use presents another challenge: Any lab working on the therapeutic use of biotechnology breakthroughs could easily convert to military purposes. The biotechnology industry in the United States opposes strengthening the verification protocol of the BTWC because doing so could “allegedly put important commercial proprietary information at risk” (p. 149). Dando concludes that “[t]he main protection we will have against the use of new biological weapons is the same as in the past: the norm accepted widely in the international community that such weapons are totally unacceptable”—a norm that has not recently shown revolutionary progress (p. 159).

This study from the Bonn International Center for Conversion compares attempts to collect small arms following civil war and violent strife in Central America, West and Central Africa, and the Balkans. The editors emphasize that it is too early to specify best practices; there is not yet sufficient experience or evaluation. Nonetheless, these studies provide material for comparative discussions and learning.

A “Goods for Guns” program in El Salvador was conceived, implemented, and substantially funded by the private sector, aiming to create a climate more conducive to business and requiring less costly security. Vouchers for a variety of consumer goods were offered for weapons relinquished, which were collected, rendered unusable, and stored for incorporation into an eventual peace monument. The Archbishop’s Human Rights Office in San Salvador declared it a positive but inefficient program, pointing out that legal imports of new pistols, revolvers, rifles, carbines, and semi-automatic rifles surpassed the number of weapons collected. The lack of restraints on the legal arms market is a crucial contextual factor in any program of disarmament. Both El Salvador and Guatemala have pro-firearms groups launching campaigns with such slogans as “thieves and murderers prefer unarmed victims” (p. 46).

In Mali, an attempt at disarmament was built into postconflict peacebuilding. Some three thousand weapons were collected from ex-combatants and incinerated in a dramatic “Flame of Peace,” despite the army’s reluctance. In return for weapons, communities were provided with development assistance. The Central African Republic had a different experience. Rebel soldiers were disarmed but not their adversaries. Public security did not increase. The collected weapons were not destroyed but, rather, diverted by government supporters.

Albania experienced massive looting of its military depots in 1997. Very little was initially returned. A simple buy-back program was considered infeasible, not only for lack of funds but because of its inflationary potential, given the scale of the problem. Subsequent disarmament programs sought to address the need to increase public security as a key factor in gaining the participation of arms-holders. With the involvement of international organizations, a program was devised to link weapons collection to community development and security objectives. In the pilot program, village meetings were held to ascertain priorities for local projects—including road rehabilitation, street lighting, police vehicles, and improved communication technology—which were provided in return for the collected weapons. International funding was made conditional on the weapons’ destruction,

**SAMI FALTAS
AND JOSEPH DE
CHIARO, EDS.**

*Managing the
Remnants of War:
Micro-Disarmament as
an Element of Peace-
Building*

Baden-Baden,
Germany: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001

which the Albanian government was hesitant to do initially. Evaluations of the program are critical of the low number of weapons collected relative to the amount spent on the project. Its defenders point out that the development goals that were achieved are of inherent value, regardless of the weapons collected: better local policing, safer towns, access to remote areas, and villages taking greater responsibility for development, security, and arms control.

Reviewing these and other cases, the editors conclude that the greatest lesson in microdisarmament thus far is the imperative of attending to the context of any weapons collection program. In the aftermath of violent political conflict, weapons collections should occur in the context of demobilization, reintegration, reconstruction, and development. In peacetime, when disarmament is undertaken to improve public safety, it should be accompanied by “efforts to improve law enforcement, reinforce the rule of law, develop communities, and provide economic opportunities” (p. 229).

**ROBERT E.
HARKAVY AND
STEPHANIE G.
NEUMAN**

*Warfare and the
Third World*

New York: Palgrave, 2001

Warfare and the Third World aims to bridge the “interdisciplinary chasm” that Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman perceive between traditional military history and security studies (p. xi). The former examines tactics, conduct of war, and weapons but lacks a conceptual base, while the latter is concerned with international relations theory, quantitative methods, and formal modeling but is ignorant of the conduct of war. To connect the two, Harkavy and Neuman have developed a matrix. One axis deals with the level of military analysis: grand strategy, theater strategy, operations, tactics, and weapons technology. The other presents the spectrum of types of war: all-out conventional interstate war; limited conventional interstate war; and high, medium, or low low-intensity conflict (including guerilla war, revolutionary war, insurgency, civil war, and ethnic war). Using the matrix, an analyst can focus explicitly on a particular facet of warfare—tactical aspects of a small-scale ethnic war, for example, or grand strategic features of large-scale conventional wars.

With this framework, Harkavy and Neuman present and analyze data of an immense variety—warfighting capabilities, military budgets, size of armed forces, military geography, terrain types, weather, ethnography, arms resupply, relation between size of theater and population density, unity of command, force structures, demarcation between civilians and combatants, and so forth. An appendix provides further information on the distribution of major ongoing armed conflicts from 1986 to 1998 regarding location, identity of combatants, and numbers of deaths.

Harkavy and Neuman devote significant attention to two further issues. They recognize an important role for culture in shaping many features of a fighting force, such as endurance, effectiveness, level of acceptable losses, patterns of command, weapons design, strategies, and doctrines. Yet they acknowledge difficulty in specifying such a cultural role: “Based on existing evidence, that *culture* matters seems indisputable. How much it matters, in what context, under what conditions, has been more difficult to determine and, in the end, may prove to be an insoluble, unanswerable puzzle” (p. 254, italics in original). They conclude that analysts should be wary of using their own cultural maps when studying conflict in another culture.

Security assistance also receives extended attention. In this area, Harkavy and Neuman construct a matrix comparing regions of the world by type of security assistance (politi-

cal, economic, direct military, indirect military). They note an overall decline in transparency since the end of the Cold War, with quantitative and qualitative data on security assistance becoming ever more difficult to obtain. They also note the proliferation of new sources of aid, such as nongovernmental organizations, diaspora communities, and cross-border ethnic groups. Private military companies, “a new form of mercenarism,” have become significant providers of security assistance in the 1990s (p. 285), engaging in a range of activities, such as military training, commercial security protection, investigation, military analysis, logistical support, procurement, combat, postconflict support, risk analysis, and kidnap response. In another appendix, Harkavy and Neuman provide data on arms deliveries to combatants by major suppliers from 1991 to 1996.

Revolutions in military affairs (RMAs) “are created by a combination of technological breakthrough, institutional adaptation, and warfighting innovation. They are not emergent properties that result accidentally or unconsciously from a cumulative process of technological invention. For this reason, the RMA debate matters” (p. 24). So argues Michael O’Hanlon as he engages in the debate over whether an RMA is about to transform armed conflict.

As presented by O’Hanlon, the current RMA hypothesis rests on four technological premises: Improvements in computers and electronics (information processing, communications, robotics) will make possible major advances in weapons and warfare; sensors will become radically more capable, making battlefields “transparent”; land vehicles, ships, rockets, and aircraft will become drastically lighter, faster, more fuel efficient, and more stealthy, making combat forces far more lethal and rapidly deployable; and new types of weaponry (space weapons, directed energy beams, advanced biological agents) will be developed and deployed. These premises lead to two major conclusions: If properly exploited and integrated into military organization, tactics, and operations, these technological trends will result in a full-blown revolution in military affairs, comparable to the introductions of the blitzkrieg and aircraft carriers in the 1930s and nuclear weapons in the 1940s. Further, U.S. adversaries, including those less technologically advanced, will also make use of RMAs’ innovations (such as antisatellite weapons, new mines, weapons of mass destruction, and computer viruses) and the United States must move, analysts warn, to meet these challenges to its military superiority.

O’Hanlon contends that only the first technological premise of RMA is essentially correct; the second and third are either incorrect or vastly overstated, while the fourth cannot be evaluated. He therefore finds the two conclusions to be highly improbable, certainly regarding their speed and scope. The historical record also feeds O’Hanlon’s doubts: Remarkable changes have occurred (satellites, stealth, precision-guided munitions, advanced jet engines, night-vision equipment) without provoking a revolution. Furthermore, looking over military engagements of the past decade (the Gulf War, Somalia, Serbia, Kosovo), O’Hanlon notes that the first was the most successful—not what one would expect if technology and tactics were changing at a revolutionary pace.

From this analysis, O’Hanlon must caution against pursuing the RMA agenda. Its opportunity costs would be tremendous. What, he asks, of funding for current operations, training, and readiness? What about pursuing peace in the form of overseas deterrence, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, or other forms of global engagement? Furthermore, he

**MICHAEL
O’HANLON**

*Technological Change
and the Future of
Warfare*

Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution
Press, 2000

points out, to decline to fund RMA is not to be complacent or to lack vigilance; judicious innovation would be ongoing. Rather than trying to buy a revolution whose technological underpinnings are unproven, O'Hanlon advocates initiating such a revolution through ideas, time, and information. "At many stages in a defense transformation process," he counsels, "the key to success is patient, gradual, and rather inexpensive research and experimentation" (p. 31).

**HENRY D.
SOKOLSKI**

*Best of Intentions:
America's Campaign
Against Strategic
Weapons Proliferation*

Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 2001

Henry Sokolski's thesis is that any nonproliferation program is only as good as the strategic assumptions on which it rests. Evaluating the effectiveness of five U.S. nonproliferation initiatives—the Baruch Plan of 1946, Atoms for Peace during the Eisenhower administration, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, subsequent proliferation technology control regimes, and later counterproliferation programs—Sokolski finds them wanting. Rather than generating yet another initiative built on a transitory strategic insight, Sokolski proposes a different approach.

An example of flawed strategic outlook is found in the Atoms for Peace program, which, according to Sokolski, "fueled more proliferation than it curbed" (p. 4). The initiative took shape from the U.S. assessment that the Soviets could destroy the U.S. military-industrial mobilization base by attacking one hundred cities using thousands of bombs. The strategic orientation of this stark threat assessment informed the design of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was to receive fissile material from the world's nuclear states to fuel peaceful nuclear power projects worldwide. The more a state's nuclear power grew, the more fissile material it would have to contribute. This mechanism would ensure that no state ever diverted enough material to construct offensive nuclear weapons to knock out another state. While noting weaknesses of the program—the egregiously loose safeguards of the IAEA, the sharing of civilian nuclear technology that could readily be used for military purposes, or the fact that alarms would sound only after a massive amount of weapons-grade material was diverted—Sokolski has a more profound criticism: The designers of Atoms for Peace misunderstood the strategic threat the United States faced. Rather than attack one hundred cities with thousands of bombs, the Soviet Union could cripple U.S. military capacity by destroying the strategic bases that housed its nuclear weapons—a task requiring scores rather than thousands of bombs. Such a strategic insight would yield a different nonproliferation program, as is seen in subsequent initiatives. But these too, according to Sokolski, were marred by the limitations of their own strategic assumptions.

How can such mistakes be avoided? Sokolski urges less reliance on transitory strategic assessments: "Certainly, given past shortcomings in anticipating the implications or duration of strategic trends, there is little reason to believe that we will now suddenly get it entirely right" (p. 109). He urges instead that the United States pay less attention to emerging strategic military developments and more to political, economic, and social trends that he sees as more certain: growth in real wealth, liberal democratization, and demilitarization in an increasing number of nations. Sokolski concludes that "[t]he next campaign against proliferation, if it is to succeed, cannot treat all nations alike. It must have a much clearer stake in promoting liberal democracy over those regimes that are hostile to such self-rule" (p. 11).

What are the challenges of weapons proliferation to be faced in the next century? Contributors to this volume identify several threats and propose a range of solutions.

In “What Strategic Weapons Proliferation Will Demand of Us,” Henry Sokolski recommends specific steps to improve the current situation: rendering nuclear weapons material unusable—not merely separating the warheads from delivery systems; decreasing production of weapons-usable material; investing in the development of non-nuclear energy; easing restrictions on immigration of scientists to the West; enhancing missile defense; and encouraging regime change in rogue states. He further proposes major changes in the system of international inspections, scrapping the “least common denominator inspection standards” of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and developing tougher inspection practices that nations would use to inspect their rivals. “The advantage of this approach,” writes Sokolski, “is that such ‘bilateral’ inspectors would have a clear, national self interest in detecting possible violations (as opposed to the current situation where the IAEA and other organizations worry that violations might disrupt the harmony needed to secure continued support for the agency’s promotion of nuclear activities)” (p. 61).

Victor Golinsky also examines shortcomings of current nonproliferation initiatives. In the chapter “Nuclear Proliferation After the Indian and Pakistani Tests,” he calls for a much stricter international system of control over all nuclear explosives, civilian and military. Crucial to this system is that it be uniform, making no distinctions between the nuclear haves and have-nots. “Support for strict and effective bars to nuclear weapons,” Golinsky argues, “could only come on the basis of a uniform standard, applicable to all states, including the current official nuclear states, in both civilian and military spheres” (p. 11).

David Rapoport considers the perceived threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by religious and other terrorists. In “Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse,” he suggests such threats are exaggerated, including those highlighted by experts who may have a professional interest in their overstatement. Rapoport points to the twelve failed attempts by Aum Shinrikyo in Japan to use chemical and biological weapons. States that have used such weapons, such as Iraq in its war with Iran, have not gained clear military advantage thereby. Rapoport considers conventional wisdom that Iraq failed to use chemical weapons in the Gulf War because the United States has nuclear weapons. He proposes a different explanation: that Iraq recognizes that chemical weapons are not effective on the battlefield. Rapoport cautions that misreading the threat of biological and chemical weapons could result in an enormous waste of resources: “[H]ow much should one spend for remote possibilities, when other perhaps more pressing and certainly more real dangers exist?” (p. 25).

In “Counterproliferation: A Critical Appraisal,” Thomas Mahnken charges that the Pentagon has emphasized “the acquisition of technology to protect U.S. forces against WMD [weapons of mass destruction] threats over the development of concepts and organizations to allow them to remain effective on a contaminated battlefield” (p. 77). Existing guidelines offer broad statements about the threat of weapons of mass destruction and detailed instructions for donning protective gear but “offer no guidance on how to shield aircraft, large groups of people, or supplies against contamination; decontaminate air base taxi ways and ramps; or handle contaminated cargo and casualties” (p. 79). As yet, Mahnken finds that U.S. armed forces have failed to come to terms with the impact of weapons of mass destruction on military operations.

**HENRY SOKOLSKI
AND JAMES M.
LUDES, EDS.**

*Twenty-First Century
Weapons Proliferation*

Portland, Ore.: Frank
Cass, 2001

In the final essay in this volume, Peter Feaver addresses the supposed gulf between policymaking and academic theorizing. In “Proliferation Theory and Nonproliferation Practice,” he insists the gap “is neither true nor necessary, nor conducive to good policy or good scholarship” (p. 168). Rational policymaking depends on theory: It works from correlative and causal relationships, identifying antecedents and consequents. Theorizing is improved by working out policy implications that may reveal flaws in a theory or its presentation. Feaver explores this dynamic by contrasting pessimistic and optimistic theories and policies of nonproliferation and concludes that “[t]he policy-theory gap, then, is quite simply this: good policy makers use theory implicitly while good political scientists use theory explicitly” (p. 172).

3. PEACE PROCESSES

H*erding Cats* captures some of the difficulties of multiparty mediation—endeavors encompassing “simultaneous interventions by more than one mediator in a conflict, interventions by composite actors such as regional organizations or contact groups, as well as sequential mediated interventions that again involve more than one party” (p. 10). The volume seeks lessons from a wide range of actors involved in mediating some two dozen conflicts around the world. Among the many issues contributors address are the comparative advantages of different mediators and mediating institutions; the most effective time for mediation over the course of a conflict’s “life cycle”; and special concerns, such as how to manage “handing off” to a subsequent mediator and how to minimize a “harmful cacophony of competing incompatible messages” (p. 148). As the editors observe, “when more than one mediator is involved in a conflict, there is clearly a need not only to time and sequence interventions so that the right mix of skills and resources is being brought to bear on the parties in conflict, but also to ensure that interventions by different parties are pursued consistently and coherently over time in order to move the parties to an agreement” (p. 39).

For many of the contributors to this volume, experience in multiparty mediation has revealed paradoxes that theory might not have predicted. In “Multiparty Mediation in Northern Ireland,” for example, Paul Arthur identifies one such paradox: “[T]he increase in the number of actors at the negotiation stage can impose a lack of coherence as well as additional points of leverage” (p. 477).

An ill fit between a conflict and a mediator can be as problematic as too many mediators. In “Canada and the Crisis in Eastern Zaire,” Gordon Smith and John Hay recall that Canada was welcomed by African states as a disinterested and well-intentioned mediator. Yet as a “middle power,” its actual capacities were inadequate to the task of leading a multinational force. Thus, “the geopolitical specifics of such emergencies might sometimes disqualify [the UN Security Council’s permanent five] powers from directing humanitarian intervention, and the political and military demands of multinational force formation and management tend to disqualify everybody else. This is not a comfortable paradox” (p. 102).

In “Burundi: A Case of Parallel Diplomacy,” Fabienne Hara remarks on the notable success of a private nongovernmental organization to restart stalled negotiations. But, she asks, “Can the Sant’Egidio-sponsored accord be taken seriously by the warring factions if no serious commitment exists on the part of the international powers to enforce a cease-fire? The political independence and the flexibility enjoyed by agents of parallel diplomacy are their strengths but also their Achilles’ heel” (p. 150). She further poses the question of whether “having private agents become de facto representatives of the international response presents the grave danger of eroding the responsibility of states to intervene” (p. 151).

Robert A. Pastor addresses the challenge of combining mediation and coercion in “More and Less Than It Seemed: The Carter-Nunn-Powell Mediation in Haiti, 1994.” Pastor wonders why the combination is so difficult, particularly for democracies, and answers that the “democratic peace” inhibits democracies from attacking those who do

CHESTER A.
CROCKER, FEN
OSLER HAMPSON,
AND PAMELA AALL,
EDS.

*Herding Cats:
Multiparty Mediation in
a Complex World*

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace
Press, 1999

not directly threaten their security interests. And yet negotiation is also made difficult by the “logic of war”—that is, by the careful demonization of adversaries since “[i]t’s hard to persuade a nation to risk its children’s lives and to murder others unless the other side is evil. The problem is that once a people are convinced that they face a heinous enemy, it is hard to entertain serious negotiations. . . . The democratic connection is both solution and problem on this issue” (p. 521).

CHESTER A. CROCKER, FEN OSLER HAMPSON, AND PAMELA AALL,
EDS.

Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001

The almost fifty essays in this comprehensive volume span conflict management around the world, presenting a massive amount of informed reflection and analysis: some with insight into what has failed, others with a struggle to specify exactly why an intervention succeeded, most with caution to not make a situation worse, and many with an articulation of new challenges. The volume’s five sections begin with the sources and the context of conflict, mainly at three fundamental analytical levels: system, state, and society. A section on intervention strategies examines both military and nonmilitary approaches, while also questioning the wisdom of intervention in the first place (as opposed to letting a war be played out to a definitive end) and asking if “limited partial intervention” is an oxymoron. The third section addresses negotiation and mediation, looking at the changing field of conflict resolution, different stages of negotiation, and the range of participants. Institutions and regimes of security, including the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and nongovernmental organizations, are the topics of the fourth section. The fifth sections turns to the challenge of postconflict peacebuilding, mapping the challenges peculiar to implementation, consolidation, and reconciliation.

Turbulent Peace does not pretend to deliver a tidy set of “best practices.” Indeed, Chester Crocker admonishes, “[s]tudents and practitioners alike have to do their homework case by case while remaining cautious about abstract formulas and relearning the value of apparently pedestrian notions such as good judgment, operational competence, enhanced attention to coordination of diverse efforts, awareness of the vital importance of the implementation phase in peacemaking, and—not least—the centrality of leadership” (p. 230).

On the other hand, the pursuit of best practices remains worthwhile, especially if the only alternative is having to rely on key individuals, which raises another paradox, as Nicole Ball explains: “High-caliber, experienced individuals are critical to the success of peacebuilding; the right people can often overcome significant institutional and organizational deficits. At the same time, too much continues to depend on individuals. The failure to incorporate good practice into ongoing activities is undermining the international community’s efforts to support the transition from war to peace in many parts of the world” (p. 733).

JOHN DARBY

The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001

In *The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes*, John Darby intersperses his own analysis of violence with profiles of peace processes in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Spain, Israel, and South Africa prepared by other contributors. Darby points out that although peace processes have identifiable stages (prenegotiation, cease-fire, negotiation, and postsettlement peacebuilding), they rarely proceed in a predictable sequence. He identifies five criteria central to peace processes: Protagonists negotiate in good faith, all key actors are

included, negotiations address central issues in the dispute, force is not used to achieve objectives, and negotiators remain committed to a sustained process.

Once underway, a peace process may be threatened by state violence, by militants in the community, and by the emphasis of a particular issue during negotiations. Those in charge of a state's security apparatus may be suspicious of cease-fires and reluctant to dismantle their organizations or relinquish resources. Militant groups often disintegrate during peace processes: While some members are willing to participate in negotiations, others are intransigent spoilers, while still others seek personal advantage in the situation. Violence in mixed communities often rises during peace processes; the suspension of a military campaign does not suspend underlying hatreds. Further, a power vacuum usually appears on "the street" before police reform is accomplished. Finally, a number of violence-related issues that are not negotiable during warfare—such as the release of prisoners, the decommissioning of illegal weapons, police reform, and victim compensation—demand attention.

Darby also notes that while violence in these different forms can derail peace processes, there are also moments when violence can be a catalyst for peace. Several factors determine whether or not a relapse into violence has a constructive effect, including quality of leadership, cohesion of groups in negotiation, and timing. When these factors are attuned, an atrocity "not only provokes universal condemnation but also galvanizes popular reaction against the perpetrators." In such a situation, a peace process "creates a mechanism for connecting anger to the political process" (p. 99). Crises created by violence during a peace process may "enable the middle ground to find its voice at a time when the voice of moderation could make a difference" (p. 100).

"Like sand castles in quicksand," writes Fen Osler Hampson, peace agreements are prone to dissolve. What factors can strengthen them? Hampson devotes his attention to five cases in which third parties, and particularly the United Nations, have been involved in solidifying peace settlements. The five cases provide ample opportunity to examine several factors at work, including the structural characteristics of the conflict, changing dynamics of regional or systemic power relationships, and the range of issues covered by the peace settlement, as well as the role of third parties. Hampson's detailed analysis of the successful peace settlements in Namibia and El Salvador, partial success in Cambodia, and failures in Cyprus and Angola lead him to recognize the paramount importance of skillful and durable third-party intervention.

Third parties facilitate conflict resolution in a number of ways during the prenegotiation, negotiation, and implementation phases of peace settlements. They can help to modify adversaries' perspectives, build trust, identify alternatives, suggest strategies, package and sequence issues, offer guarantees, provide side payments, threaten penalties or sanctions, and serve as observers and monitors. Perhaps the most crucial service third parties can perform is to foster a conflict's "ripeness" for resolution. "Ripeness," asserts Hampson, "is a cultivated, not inherited, condition" (p. 210). He argues that ripeness is extremely elusive, subject to deterioration and, "[t]o the extent that [it] exists at all, it must be cultivated through a combination of carrots and sticks that are brought to bear on the conflicting parties themselves" by third parties (p. 23).

**FEN OSLER
HAMPSON**

*Nurturing Peace: Why
Peace Settlements
Succeed or Fail*

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace
Press, 2001

Hampson's summation of the peace process in Namibia perhaps best conveys his vision of successful third-party intervention:

[T]he prospects for achieving a durable peace settlement depend ultimately on the interests and perceptions of the parties to the conflict; the methods, skills, and timing of the intervention by mediators; "cultivated ripeness"; and a reconciliation process that is sustained during implementation by third parties that can perform a variety of functions that help ensure the parties' continued commitment to the peace process. To perform these functions effectively, however, third parties must have staying power, resources, and a commitment to the peace process itself (p. 86).

Hampson also offers a caution. While skillful and properly executed third-party interventions can strengthen prospects for a durable peace settlement, "[t]he converse is also true. Clumsy and poorly timed or badly executed interventions can raise tensions and undermine the goals and objectives of the peace agreement and peacemaking process" (p. 13).

**BRUCE W.
JENTLESON**

*Coercive Prevention:
Normative, Political, and
Policy Dilemmas.*
Peaceworks, no. 35

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace,
October 2000

"One of the key lessons of the first decade of the post-Cold War era," asserts Bruce Jentleson, ". . . is that while coercion rarely is sufficient for [conflict] prevention, it is often necessary" (p. 9). To make a convincing argument for coercive prevention, Jentleson addresses three dimensions: normative, political, and policymaking.

Does coercive prevention transgress the norm of sovereignty? When a sovereign state neglects its responsibilities toward its populace, or directly violates the rights of its populace, international intervention may be the normatively correct response. Jentleson asks that we conceive of sovereignty as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. Sovereignty as rights anchors one end of the continuum, with "sovereignty as responsibility" at the other. "[W]hether state consent is a requirement for international intervention," Jentleson writes, "is the critical midpoint" (p. 21).

Turning to politics and the domestic acceptance of coercive intervention, Jentleson is confident that the United States has a "pretty prudent public" and doubts the common wisdom of a "Somalia syndrome" that will accept no casualties among U.S. forces engaged in such interventions. Reviewing recent engagements, Jentleson argues: "To the extent that the American people perceived the principal objective of coercion as restraining aggressors who were threatening the United States, its interests, or its allies, they were more likely to support the use of force than when the principal objective was to engineer internal political change, as in many Third World interventions during the Cold War" (p. 25). He concludes that if the cause is legitimate and coercive means are likely to be effective, there will be political support for preventive intervention.

Coercive prevention, if it is normatively valid and politically supported, also requires sound policy. Jentleson urges that force be considered for early use and not only as a last resort. As guidelines, he proposes that deployments should be implemented quickly, that mandates include the authority to use force if necessary to achieve objectives (and not only for self-protection), that troops be sufficient in number and suitably armed, and that command be unified. Jentleson also advises effective coordination with diplomatic and political actors and initiatives, including nongovernmental organizations.

GADI WOLFSFELD

The News Media and Peace Processes: The Middle East and Northern Ireland.
Peaceworks, no. 37

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace,
January 2001

Considerable attention has been directed toward the role of the media in conflict—the so-called CNN effect. What of the role of the media in peace processes? Gadi Wolfsfeld compares the impact of the media in Northern Ireland, which played a largely positive role in the Good Friday Agreement, with its impact in Israel, where the media has had a primarily negative role in the Oslo peace process. Through his content analysis of news stories and editorials, interviews with journalists and politicians, and examination of coverage of particular terrorist attacks, Wolfsfeld identifies four questions useful in assessing the media's role: Are the media shared by both sides of a conflict? Does elite consensus support the peace process? How numerous and intense are crises? Is sensationalism a dominant news value?

In Northern Ireland, Protestants and Catholics share one language and one media. Media executives, editors, and journalists therefore address one large audience and adopt “a political perspective acceptable to both sides of the conflict” (p. 37). The peace process in Northern Ireland has also received substantial elite and popular support. While there have been numerous setbacks, the media have not generally exploited them. In the 1998 bombing at Omagh, the most destructive attack carried out in Northern Ireland, media coverage contributed to turn this event into an impetus for the peace process rather than its demise. Journalists in Northern Ireland also tend to be aware of the dangers of sensationalist news coverage, as when militants “play to the cameras.” Wolfsfeld quotes one journalist who was “both vivid and succinct: ‘Sensationalism can cost lives’” (p. 40).

The situation in Israel offers a profound contrast. Israelis and Palestinians live as separate communities, speaking different languages and getting their news from separate media. Elite consensus on the peace process is lacking. Ironically, Wolfsfeld found substantial consensus among journalists in favor of the peace process. Their personal political commitments, however, were overridden by professional interests. As one reporter told Wolfsfeld, “[T]he person who is going to promote me is my editor, not Shimon Peres” (p. 24). Sensationalist media coverage has turned “every debate into a shouting match and every setback into a disaster” (p. 23). In Wolfsfeld's assessment, commercialism can be a determinant in media coverage in Israel. As earlier partisan newspapers have been replaced with purely commercial ventures, “the battle over audience share appears to overshadow concerns about social responsibility” (p. 42). Sensationalist coverage cannot only amplify tension but also encourage it, as opponents learn they must be deviant or extremist in order to gain media attention.

Wolfsfeld concludes that sensationalist news media “make a problematic peace process much worse” (p. 42). To improve the situation, he offers recommendations to policymakers, the media, and the public. He encourages policymakers to emphasize a long-range perspective and lower expectations for immediate gains from peace processes. While media cannot choose to be shared, they can encourage interaction—as through joint meetings of editors or hiring reporters from rival communities. An ethics of “peace journalism” could also be fostered if journalists were encouraged to adopt norms that minimize the risk of escalating conflict and to use analytical frameworks developed in the field of conflict resolution. Newspapers could also include “peace sections” to explore progress—just as health sections cover not only disease but also prevention, treatment, and cure. Finally, Wolfsfeld urges readers, and particularly organized peace groups, to put the nature of media coverage of peace processes on the public agenda.

4. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

MICHAEL BRYANS,
BRUCE D. JONES,
AND JANICE GROSS
STEIN

*Mean Times:
Humanitarian Action in
Complex
Emergencies—Stark
Choices, Cruel
Dilemmas.* Report of
the NGOs in
Complex
Emergencies Project

Toronto: Program on
Conflict Management
and Negotiation, Centre
for International Studies,
University of Toronto,
1999

How are humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) “to cope with a fundamental dilemma—doing good work in the face of those who would do evil” (p. 4)? It was never an easy task, and it gets harder all the time. From their study of “complex emergencies”—humanitarian relief operations made more hazardous when factions try to capitalize on the chaos and relief supplies—in post–Cold War Africa, Michael Bryans, Bruce D. Jones and Janice Gross Stein highlight a few important factors. The first are the states who have not only abrogated their responsibility or lost any capacity to govern, but who also prey on their own people—a situation worse than many natural calamities: “Earthquakes don’t pursue their victims or attack their rescuers” (p. 7). In many conflicts and complex emergencies in contemporary Africa, control over civilian populations is itself a strategic objective of war, as the populace becomes a source of economic extraction, a military shield, and a bargaining chip. Those who would help or protect such victimized populations are never seen as neutral: “unprotected ‘neutrality’ in circumstances that are fundamentally predatory is a highly political stance” (p. 28).

The attempted neutrality of humanitarian NGOs in Africa is unprotected from the host country’s predators because after the initial response, the international community usually withdraws its interest and refuses to maintain security, leaving NGOs in a “security vacuum.” Under such circumstances, how are humanitarian NGOs to fulfill the ethic of “do no harm,” when, for example, humanitarian relief is hijacked to provide resources for further conflict, or when refugee camps become havens in which *genocidaires* regroup? In such circumstances, perhaps the goal constricts to “doing the least harm.”

Toward that goal, the authors offer three suggestions. The first is for NGOs to enhance their political analysis and policy development skills to better understand the political context and dynamics of the emergencies they seek to redress. Second, they ought to consider hiring private, voluntary, independent security forces. If security is no longer provided as a “public good,” perhaps it is time to pursue its private acquisition. And a third suggestion is that NGOs should define the thresholds (seizure of relief supplies, refusal of local authorities to register refugees, obstruction of access) that will signal the time to withdraw, recognizing that there are situations when the humanitarian ethic compels disengagement rather than involvement.

*Defining Our Role in
a Changing World:
A Discussion Series
on America’s Future.
Choices for the 21st
Century Education
Project,*

Providence, R.I.: Thomas
J. Watson Jr. Institute for
International Studies,
Brown University, 1998

Intended for use by Americans participating in reading and discussion series at their local libraries and community centers, *Defining Our Role in a Changing World* seeks to inform and engage citizens in a public discussion about the identity of the United States as a nation and its proper role in the world. The text encourages participants to deliberate on the values, goals, and long-term directions of U.S. foreign policy.

The chapters in this volume address six challenges facing the United States: peace, environment, trade, relations with China, the Middle East, and immigration. Each chapter provides key concepts, background information, and selected case studies. In addition, each chapter presents four possible future policy orientations: a future that ascribes to the

United States a special responsibility to lead the world; a future that takes the world as it is and acts above all to maintain U.S. stability and security; a future that foresees a cooperative and interdependent world to be attained with U.S. support of international institutions; and a future in which the United States turns inward and lets the rest of the world fend for itself. The chapters present viewpoints from supporters and critics of each of these possible four futures regarding the different policy issues. Questions and exercises invite participants to identify their concerns and select among the possible futures for U.S. policy, with the goal being that “[b]y learning together, listening respectfully to one another, weighing alternatives, and making difficult choices about competing values,” Americans can forge a public voice regarding the future direction of the nation (p. vi).

Accompanied by appendixes providing documents, drafts, organizational charts, and prescribed procedures, Nadya Leila Sadat presents an account of the 1998 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose creation she has been directly involved in. The chief purpose of the ICC is to combat impunity for international crimes, to deepen relevant international legal norms, and to provide institutional redress specifically against four crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. Unlike the International Court of Justice, which has jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes between states and international organizations only, the ICC has jurisdiction over individuals. As a judicial body independent of the United Nations system, the ICC will operate in complementarity with national courts; that is, national courts will remain the primary vehicle for international criminal law enforcement. The ICC will step in where national legal systems are unwilling or unable to proceed.

While the ICC represents a major step forward in international criminal law, its founders have formally expressed reservations about the court’s jurisdiction. Throughout negotiations and in the final documents themselves, supranationalism and sovereignty vie for prominence. For example, while Sadat finds the prescriptive and adjudicative aspects of the court to be quite strong, she laments its feeble enforcement powers, which she sees as potentially undermining the efficacy of the court. The ICC will have no supporting police force or subpoena power. It will lack any means to compel the appearance of witnesses or the execution of arrest warrants, and it will not be able to seize bank accounts or government documents. Though states were willing to cede some prescriptive and adjudicative independence to the ICC, they insisted on maintaining sovereign control over enforcement within their territories.

The definitions of the four crimes under which it will try defendants also bear witness to the struggles that went into the creation of the court are. Here, standard formal terms were carefully eschewed in favor of neutral language, enabling the avoidance of bias toward any particular legal tradition. While it facilitated negotiations, it left much open to interpretation. Sadat expects this language to be equally comprehensible—but also equally confusing—to all. After much debate, the definition of the crime of aggression was simply deferred to subsequent preparatory commissions to deliberate, reflecting the complexity and divisiveness surrounding the concept. Extensive complex procedural rules for challenging the court’s jurisdiction were also specified, in another step that may limit the court’s ability to fulfill its mission. In Sadat’s assessment, “The equivocations of the text underscore the fragile consensus that brought the states of the world together in Rome to

**LEILA NADYA
SADAT**

*The International
Criminal Court and
the Transformation of
International Law:
Justice for the New
Millennium*

Ardsley, N.Y.:
Transnational Publishers,
Inc., 2002

approve the treaty; indeed, it suggests that while states agree to the establishment of the court in principle, and even to its jurisdiction in theory, they are not willing to make the concessions to international cooperation that are needed to make the court a success in practice” (p. 254, manuscript).

MAJID TEHRANIAN Majid Tehranian distinguishes several analytical levels of communication technologies and their potential impact.

*Global Communication
and World Politics:
Domination,
Development, and
Discourse*

Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner, 1999

The capital-intensive macromedia (print, telephony, broadcasting, satellites, computers, fiber optics, and a rushing array of their offshoots) have privileged the power centers more than ever before in human history. . . . By contrast, the labor-intensive traditional and interpersonal communication networks and the micromedia (mimeographing, copying machines, audio and video cassette recorders, transistor radios, fax machines, personal computers, modems, and electronic networks) have provided channels for counter-hegemonic projects of cultural resistance, political revolution, and autonomous development (p. 2).

The Internet more specifically is among the “mesomedia,” together with the World Wide Web, journals of opinion, and scientific and professional periodicals. While the macromedia facilitate globalization and the micromedia empower resistance on the periphery, the mesomedia link communities of affinity in a global civil society.

In any particular case, the impact of media is undetermined. Tehranian’s thesis is that communication has multiple possible effects.

Communication can act as a process of free and equal exchange of meaning, development of epistemic communities, and advancement of social solidarity, and hence of peace and harmony among individuals and nations. Conversely, however, communication can also systematically distort perceptions by creating phantom enemies, manufacturing consent for wars or aggression while stereotyping and targeting particular ethnic groups or nations into subhuman categories (p. 2).

Thus while each technology has specific characteristics, “it is the social mediations, constructions, and applications of technologies that ultimately determine their social effects” (p. 81). Tehranian argues that to ensure an open process with interactive and dialogic communication in the future, a pluralism of structures and discourses must be maintained.

5. AFRICA

T*The Path of a Genocide* addresses many aspects of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, from the role of the media in creating it to the performance of international actors responding to it. Radio, the primary means of communication for Rwanda's mostly rural population, was used to incite hatred, broadcast misinformation, and coordinate the tragic slaughter of close to a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu by most of the country's Hutu ethnic majority. In this mission, state-owned Radio Rwanda was joined by Radio Television Libres de Mille Collins (RTL), a privately owned station established in 1993 with help from Radio Rwanda. In the chapter on "Hate Radio in Rwanda," Frank Chalk speculates that the RTL may have been established precisely to evade the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord which barred the government and the Rwanda Patriotic Front from inciting violence and sponsoring hate propaganda. Despite appeals from human rights and humanitarian aid groups, international actors with the power to do so refused or refrained from closing the stations, jamming their frequencies, or effectively countering their broadcasts. Chalk also notes the absence of broadcasts from such entities as the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), the U.S. Voice of America, or the British Broadcasting Service, as well as the refusal of the UNAMIR to jam the Rwandan stations because it would amount to an "offensive operation" in violation of its mandate. Appeals to the U.S. Defense Department were also to no avail, as concerns were raised about violating the national sovereignty of states experiencing domestic conflict and their citizens' rights to free speech.

Media outlets in the United States displayed their own shortcomings regarding the genocide. In "Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage," Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus argue that coverage was misleading, "encouraging the mistaken belief that the slaughter in Rwanda was a simply an extension of 'ancient tribal hatreds,' rather than a planned, politically inspired genocide. There are fewer rational responses to irrational behavior, such as a presumably spontaneous massacre" (p. 226). They also find that the coverage shifted rapidly from genocide to the refugee situation and the easily filmed spectacle of camps filled with "the dead-in-waiting."

To be sure, the response of the international community, and specifically the performance of the United Nations, is considered deeply flawed; mobilization of troops and resources was extremely slow. In "U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda," Turid Laegreid notes the circular negotiations as African nations were willing to commit troops if equipment and logistics were provided by the West. He reports that African nations wanted information on support before deciding on the number of troops, while the United States wanted information on the size of the force before it would decide on the level of support. Although a standby roster of peacekeepers had recently been established at the United Nations, it was of little value. Laegreid reports that "the only function [the roster] had in reality was to get a quicker no from member states" (p. 246).

**HOWARD
ADELMAN AND
ASTRI SUHRKE,
EDS.**

*The Path of a
Genocide: The Rwanda
Crisis from Uganda to
Zaire*

New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Press, 1999

CHRIS ALDEN

Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State: From Negotiations to Nation Building

New York: Palgrave, 2001

“The international community’s need to snatch success from the jaws of what increasingly seemed to be impending disaster,” argues Chris Alden, “had spurred it on to employ a series of unprecedented measures to ensure a favourable outcome to the peacekeeping mission in Mozambique” (p. 66). In *Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State: From Negotiations to Nation Building*, Alden examines the changing nature of the project of reconstituting a state and the limitations and sustainability of such a project.

With its enormous commitment of resources in Mozambique, what did the international community achieve? Noting that there is dispute over what was accomplished in Mozambique and to whom credit is due, Alden offers these assessments. In terms of conflict resolution, the seventeen-year war came to an end; however, the disputing parties were largely bought rather than brought to the negotiating table—a reflection both of the willingness of the international donor community to use funds in this way and of the true nature of the conflict. Demining and disarming were not a success. Criminality among former combatants is a serious problem.

Regarding governance and democratization, Mozambique has held two national elections, yet Alden argues that “[t]he international community’s focus on institution building and the ‘end points’ of democracy (elections) was a poor substitute for addressing the central concerns of power, legitimacy and authority in postconflict states” (p. 109). The peace settlement solidified the two main parties, while “[l]ost in the international concern for the two parties were arguably more genuinely peaceful representatives of Mozambican interests” (p. 66). Power remains centralized. In civil society, nongovernmental organizations depend on foreign funding and are more accountable and connected to their donors than to the local population.

Economic reconstruction appears to be an impressive success in terms of structural adjustment, privatization, foreign investment, and growth. The growth, however, is limited to the capital of Maputo, having no impact on the vast majority of rural Mozambicans. Corruption is rampant, and the politics of patronage has been renewed. Privatization largely enriched former members of government. Alden asserts that

by strengthening the capacity of the economic bureaucracy without adequately reinforcing the regulatory environment and mechanisms of government accountability, the international financial institutions have essentially enhanced the discretionary power of bureaucrats and increased business dependency on them. The result of this being, of course, to undo the very substance—the breakdown of state centered patron-client networks—of a key objective of the economic restructuring programme. In the absence of a modern legal framework and functioning judiciary, the promotion of privatization and concomitant belief in the emergence of a class of local entrepreneurs seems either hopelessly naïve or a deliberately misleading policy (p. 119).

Alden focuses on many questions regarding state construction in the African context: What kind of state is the international community attempting to construct in Mozambique and elsewhere in Africa? Will it remain hostage to the need to sustain this success, given its debacles elsewhere in Africa? And what does all this mean for ordinary Mozambicans? Alden writes of the country’s

ever deepening dependency on international support, be it in the form of technical assistance or direct financial transfers through investment or debt relief, at every step of the way and in virtually all aspects of its affairs. With donor money servicing the debt, international

consultants designing government policies, international NGOs or private firms providing personnel to oversee the implementation of policies, international development agencies providing cash to run the national elections and, finally, everyone from foreign investors and tourists to a tiny local elite as the primary beneficiaries of these developments, one is left to wonder what is the role for ordinary Mozambicans in their own country? (p. 99).

B Babu Ayindo, Sam Gbaydee Doe and Janice Jenner present *When You Are the Peacebuilder: Stories and Reflection on Peacebuilding in Africa* as an aid in conceptualization, not a how-to manual. Their conviction is that only through their own stories will Africans be able to construct a culture of peace. Too often, they lament, inspiration and guidance for peace-makers come from a great distance and do not speak of or from an African experience. The authors remedy this situation by collecting stories—both indigenous folktales and accounts of recent events in Africa—and organize the material into chapters devoted to specific dimensions of peacebuilding: power, peace and justice, nonviolence, transformation, reconciliation. Each chapter includes a few stories, questions, and suggested exercises to help deepen reflections on the stories, followed by a brief commentary.

The collection is crafted to provoke dialogue and turn the attention of African peace-builders to their own relevant traditions and experiences. The authors acknowledge that the process is in itself problematic, given the incompatibilities of African traditions and Westernization, and of Islam and Christianity. “One way of resolving much of the conflict we face,” they suggest, “is by building a strong identity as African people, being conscious and proud of our history. It calls for a deep sense of our ability to create history rather than be objects of it. We must believe we are able to create culture—a culture of peace, in contrast to the culture of violence we have created in the past decades” (p. 16).

**BABU AYINDO, SAM
GBAYDEE DOE,
AND JANICE
JENNER**

*When You Are the
Peacebuilder: Stories
and Reflection on
Peacebuilding in Africa*

Harrisonburg, Va.: Conflict
Transformation Program,
Eastern Mennonite
University, 2001

In “Somalia War and Peace,” Raha Janaqow argues that the warlords who have controlled Somalia in recent years are in many ways similar to colonialists: They aim to extend their own rule as a means of accumulating wealth, they send their wealth abroad, they have no common interests with the Somali population, they rule by dividing, and they do not risk their own lives or the lives of their families. Pursuing the “perpetual spoils of unwarranted carnage,” warlords are oblivious to the plight of their own people (p. 40). Add to this their incompetence and mismanagement and, Janaqow concludes, “Somalis regard present leaders as worse than colonialists” (p. 31).

Building peace in Somalia will be a difficult task. Recent warfare in the country has wrought immense destruction of infrastructure—including wells, reservoirs, communication technology, and electrical generation—which will increase the costs of reconstruction. Extensive circulation of counterfeit money is another difficulty. So is the proliferation of small weapons, as violence has come to be seen as the means of first resort to resolve conflict. Meanwhile, traditional restrictions on violence that prohibit the wartime killing of the elderly, nursing mothers, infants, religious elites, and the blind have been abandoned.

Janaqow believes that Somali civil society is beginning to get organized. He cites the formation of the Pressure Group, a nongovernmental organization with members from different social groups which meets to discuss such topics as the failure of regional admin-

**RAHA M.
JANAQOW**

“Somalia War and
Peace”

Nairobi, Kenya: SAACID,
2000

istration, the best means for the international provision of political and economic assistance, and the possibility of foreign intervention. In 1999, the Pressure Group conducted a poll in Mogadishu in which 920 respondents indicated their preferences for future leaders. The majority favored a member of the Islamic Court, followed by traditional elders, and then business people. Armed faction leaders came in last.

RICHARD JOSEPH,
ED.

*State, Conflict, and
Democracy in Africa*

Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner, 1999

Trends in economic policy, democratic politics, and ethnic mobilization are among the many topics addressed in this volume on contemporary Africa. Contributors engage in both empirical and conceptual debates, with most agreeing that it is increasingly difficult to generalize about Africa.

Economic globalization on the continent is a controversial topic. Is it really occurring, and what are its consequences? In the chapter on “Crisis Management and the Making of ‘Choiceless Democracies,’” Thandika Mkandawire argues that globalization is indeed occurring in Africa, although in a different form than elsewhere. International financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are primary forces of economic globalization in Africa because private capital inflows and foreign direct investment are extremely small. The structural adjustment programs advocated by these institutions, Mkandawire claims, greatly restrict the economic policy options of democratic governments, rendering them *choiceless* democracies. “The rigid prerequisites, the inflexible, built-in positions, and the proliferation of cross-conditionalities of structural adjustment programs,” he writes, “all force decision makers into a take-it-or-leave-it corner, ruling out dialogue or creative political compromises within society at large” (p. 124). While he values technical prowess, Mkandawire argues that “insulated technocracies” prevent public scrutiny and debate, excluding unions, parties, parliaments, and even government ministers.

In “Globalization and African Democracy,” Nicolas van de Walle provides a different view. He argues that globalization is far less advanced than generally assumed, and that it is stagnant, if not declining, in Africa. He points out that trade as a percentage of African gross national product has remained the same as thirty years ago, and that its composition—export commodities in exchange for manufactured goods—has been the same since the colonial era. De Walle also challenges the concept of choiceless democracies, arguing that even members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development display little policy convergence. The danger for Africa, in de Walle’s estimation, is marginalization:

[I]nternational market forces represent less of a threat to democracy than does the present situation of progressive delinkage from the world economy, which has been driven by two decades of “nonreform,” economic crisis, and state decay. Engaging the world economy would be healthier than economic stagnation riddled with patrimonial politics, but more or less sustained by international aid (p. 115).

Several contributors assess democratic transitions and practices. John W. Harbeson, for example, is critical of disproportionate emphasis placed on initial elections. In “Rethinking Democratic Transitions: Lessons from Eastern and Southern Africa,” he suggests that “establishing the fundamental rules of the game is at least as valuable as elec-

tions in the early stages of the democratization process” (p. 53). Michael Bratton and Daniel N. Posner also assess electoral politics in “A First Look at Second Elections in Africa, with Illustrations from Zambia.” They see a decline in electoral quality as incumbents manipulate electoral and constitutional rules and disqualify rivals. Electoral rules deteriorate even as efficiency of polling procedures—of concern to international observers—improves. Crawford Young offers similar observations in “The Third Wave of Democratization in Africa: Ambiguities and Contradictions”:

The emergence of “semidemocracies” in a number of countries entrench practices associated with liberalization (freer press, better respect for human rights, open contestation), while forcing political rules that make alternation improbable. One might add, in the African case, that semidemocracy is probably sufficient to deflect international system pressures for more complete political opening, particularly if macroeconomic management earns external approbation (p. 35).

In “Ethnic Politics in Africa: Change and Continuity,” Marina Ottaway addresses ethnic politics, on the rise in Africa as it is elsewhere around the world. While raising the possibility of ethnic strife, the openly ethnic nature of some political parties may “help the process of democratization in the long run by making these parties more sensitive to the demands of particular constituencies” (p. 311). Judgment of ethnic political parties thus remains open, as do questions of identity and self-determination. “Government by the people,” Ottaway writes,

requires a definition of the people and thus raises issues of identity. From a democratic point of view, the answer that ‘the people’ is the haphazard assemblage of human beings corralled into existing international boundaries by nondemocratic colonial powers is not very satisfactory. . . . African states may eventually have to face the reality that the colonial boundaries that were once acceptable to their political elites are not acceptable to their populations (p. 316).

In *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*, a dozen contributors analyze prospects for security and the resilience of sovereignty in a post-Cold War world. In many ways, the Cold War exacerbated conflicts in Africa by internationalizing disputes and providing enormous amounts of military materiel. In Terence Lyon’s chapter, “The International Context of Internal War: Ethiopia/Eritrea,” he notes that “[i]n principle the superpowers wanted conflict reduction because it lessened demands from clients for ever-increasing assistance and because regional conflict always risked escalation into superpower conflict.” Nonetheless, he continues, “Moscow and Washington made maintaining ties to their clients the first priority and conflict reduction a clear second” (p. 90).

With the end of the Cold War, is there a potential for regional organizations to undertake peacemaking in Africa? In “The Organization of African Unity, State Sovereignty, and Regional Security,” Solomon Gomes warns of the continuing dilemma of balancing a commitment to conflict resolution with the principle of noninterference in sovereign states. Other writers are concerned about how to handle conflict management when there is no functioning state. In “The Involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia’s Peacekeeping,” Margaret Anderson Vogt questions whether it is “right to insist on the concept of nonin-

**EDMOND J. KELLER
AND DONALD
ROTHCHILD**

*Africa in the New
International Order:
Rethinking State
Sovereignty and
Regional Security*

Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner, 1996

terference in the face of complete breakdown of central authority” (p. 171). Denis Venter also raises the question in “Regional Security in Southern Africa in the Post-Cold War Era,” underscoring the breadth of the concept of security to include not merely a state’s military might but also the population’s food security, job security, resource security, economic development, and respect for human rights—which the state itself may violate.

Several contributors evaluate the regional peace initiative of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In “ECOMOG, Liberia, and Regional Security in West Africa,” Robert Mortimer concludes that this Nigerian-dominated multilateral force is “a classic study of competing national interests in the West African subregion” (p. 162). To Vogt,

The ECOMOG experience has proven that, contrary to the arguments raised against the formation of an African High Command, it is not impossible for African states to mobilize and launch military operations to deal with collective security problems. . . . However, ECOMOG also confirmed some of the worst fears of the skeptics. . . . [Nigeria’s dominant role] created the impression that it had a vested interest in the outcome (p. 167).

What new role might the United States play? Will promoting democracy and respect for human rights become the major objectives in post-Cold War Africa? Peter J. Schraeder is doubtful. In “Removing the Shackles? U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa after the End of the Cold War,” he points to U.S. silence following the Algerian army’s nullification of the first multiparty elections since that country’s independence. This act of omission, he writes, “seems to indicate that containment of Islamic fundamentalism is at least one security objective that overrides the preference for democratization” (p. 200). As it moves beyond Cold War concerns, Schraeder urges the United States to “resist the urge to replace one set of shackles (anticommunism) with yet another (anti-Islamic fundamentalism)” (p. 202).

**RICARDO RENE
LAREMONT, ED.**

“Peacekeeping,
Demilitarization, and
Development in
Africa.” Papers for
International
Conference on
“Regional
Peacekeeping,
National
Demilitarization, and
Development in
Africa”

Papers for this conference on peacemaking in Africa (held June 7–11, 1999 at the Bellagio Study and Conference Center in Lake Como, Italy) examine many cases of conflict and search for routes toward peace, looking within the continent and elsewhere. In “Lessons for the Transition to Democracy in Africa: The Experience of the Military in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Nigeria, and Algeria,” Ricardo Rene Laremont and H. S. Galadima describe transitions from military rule as they occurred in three Latin American countries. While each had particular characteristics, they had in common the military’s eventual realization that remaining in power exposed their institution to public criticism for policy failures. Hence, for the sake of their institutional interests and prestige, each exited from power. Their departures included compromises, such as amnesty for past crimes and continued control over the military budget, force size, and promotions—compromises that “while highly unusual and even unacceptable from a democratic perspective, reflect the realities entailed in transitions from military governments” (p. 31).

Is this model apt for the military in African nations? While Latin American militaries may be motivated by an understanding of institutional prestige, military power in Africa hardly appears to be headed in the same direction. Laremont and Galadima limit their comparison to Algeria and Nigeria. Yusuf Bangura, however, would seem to doubt that even African militaries’ “professionalization” would incline them to protect the institution by exiting from political power. In “Strategic Policy Failure and State Fragmentation:

Binghamton, N.Y.: State
University of New York,
Institute of Global
Studies, 1999

Security, Peacekeeping, and Democratization in Sierra Leone,” Bangura comments that “Nigeria is a perfect example of a country where professionalization has improved the skills and capacity of the military to overthrow governments” (p. 15).

In “Pluralism, Ethnicity, and Militarization,” Crawford Young describes a different pattern. He sees a third of African states “embroiled in . . . conflict patterns whose common thread is the loss of the monopoly of military means by the state” (p. 20). Young and others comment on the deterioration of the formal, predatory nature of military might and the militarization of society in many African nations. Young points out that military coups have been replaced by insurgencies, and while both are

armed displacement of incumbents, there are profound differences in impact. The military instrument normally remains intact with a coup, even if the leader is not the commander. An insurgent military victory results in the dissolution of the existing army. Army fragments dissolve into the periphery, often taking their weapons with them (p. 20).

This is one piece of a “larger social pathology”: the use of violence as the primary means for dealing with conflict. In “Civil War, Peacekeeping, and the Great Lakes Region,” Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja suggests that one reason for the failure of many efforts at peacemaking is the inability to provide a viable alternative to militarism for young people. In a similar vein, Hussein Adam observes in “The International Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, 1992–1995” that “the mismanagement, pillage of resources, brutal military repressions, and abuses by dictatorial regimes [have] left the majority of the population without a stake in the system” (p. 3).

The conference also devoted considerable attention to the effort by the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene in Liberia. In “The Impact of ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia: Effect on Demilitarization and Democratization,” Ellen Johnson Sirleaf argues that the military intervention should be understood as the absence of any other institutionalized mechanism for conflict resolution, rather than as a triumph of regional initiative. Author W. Ofuately-Kodjoe is also critical. In “The Impact of Peacekeeping on Target States: Lessons from the Liberian Experience,” he reviews internal disputes within ECOMOG, extensive looting by its forces, and the lack of neutrality of its dominant member, Nigeria. In Ofuately-Kodjoe’s estimation, “The most significant consequence of ECOMOG participation in the civil wars has been the prolongation and spreading of war” (p. 27). J. Isawa Elaigwu offers a different assessment in “The Impact of Peacekeeping on Intervening States: Nigeria’s Experience.” Elaigwu writes that “[t]hroughout the seven years of the Liberian conflict, Nigeria provided leadership, troops and financial support. . . . Eventually, peace was restored and democratic elections were held in Liberia making the ECOMOG operations in Liberia one of history’s most successful cases of modern peacekeeping” (p. 7). Elaigwu also finds that

Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping has enhanced the professional competence of the Nigerian military. . . . Politically and militarily, Nigeria has acquired experience in conflict management and resolution as it engaged in peacekeeping operations around the globe. It has brought these experiences to bear on the management and resolution of a number of domestic conflicts [in Nigeria] (p. 11).

**ANN MOSELY
LESCH**

*The Sudan: Contested
National Identities*

Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1998

Analysts have classified Sudan's 26 million inhabitants into more than 50 ethnic groups subdivided into 570 peoples. Their collective struggle over the definition of a single national identity continues to drive conflict in Sudan, the largest country in Africa. In *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, Ann Mosely Lesch describes competing visions of a cohesive Arab-Islamic state and a pluralist state with equality for all before a secular legal system. The division is only very roughly between an Arabized and Muslim north and a more indigenous and varied south. There is great variation throughout, despite the government's effort to impose its vision of a uniform and exclusivist Islamist regime. Lesch notes that many Muslim Africans "think that their ethnicity and particular forms of Islamic practices are denigrated and suppressed by the current ruling elite" (p. 3). The government's "homogenizing zeal," she writes, "has caused a strong backlash among Muslims" (p. 211). Non-Muslims, faced with systematic legal discrimination, suppression of autonomous institutions, and exclusion from government, remain steadfastly opposed to the homogenization. According to Lesch, "The more the government in the north seeks to Arabize and Islamize the country, the more African peoples react against that pressure and deepen their counteridentities" (p. 213).

The conflict remains entirely polarized. The government, based in the north, insists upon an Islamist regime and will not permit the south to secede. Forces in the south call for a united secular Sudan, with self-determination as their fall-back position. Efforts at foreign mediation from regional and international actors have been peripheral, limited by the actors' lack of clout or credibility. "In the absence of internal political will," Lesch writes, "foreign mediation [has been] at best irrelevant and at worst damaging, by reinforcing polarity or assisting one party" (p. 186).

**PRINCETON N.
LYMAN**

*Partner to History: The
U.S. Role in South
Africa's Transition to
Democracy*

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace
Press, 2002

As U.S. ambassador to South Africa from 1992 to 1995, Princeton N. Lyman faced a particular challenge. As South Africa pursued its transition from apartheid, Lyman knew that the correct role for the United States was to offer support and encouragement but leave the direction and ownership of the process entirely in the hands of South Africans. Such a strategy, Lyman notes, "is not a recipe for passivity, for a policy of inaction. Rather . . . it can involve the most intense diplomatic efforts, the most dynamic programming of resources, and the mobilization of a broad array of supportive elements to bring pressure on the participants" (p. 267).

Among the tasks Lyman engaged in was rallying support among the recalcitrant, particularly in encouraging all parties to participate in the national election and abide by its results. The United States also played a vital role in providing expertise and training. On such issues as federalism versus central authority, affirmative action, amnesty for human rights violators, power sharing, electoral systems, and antitrust policies, the United States provided seminars, workshops, scholarships, and educational travel to build leadership capacity. Support was also provided for community-based groups involved in conflict resolution and violence mediation. Elections were facilitated through voter training and election observers.

Lyman disagrees with the characterization of South Africa's transition as a "miracle," if that means it is impossible to generate or approximate it. Rather, he argues, the lesson is that if South Africa can successfully transform itself, then surely others can also. From his years as ambassador, Lyman identifies several essential tasks for outside supporters during

such transitions. A key responsibility, he argues, is to build capacity for peace, which is a long-term project requiring continuity, patience, and ample resources: “Heavy investment in indigenous capacity, at both the grassroots and the senior levels, can make a substantial difference” (p. 265). Some have argued that fostering such leadership may be futile in decidedly authoritarian countries, or that enlightened leadership may be ineffectual without powerful liberation movements. Lyman counters that “it is also true that liberation movements that come to power without these skills to draw on may prove ineffective in governing and are likely to drift toward being autocratic” (p. 265).

Lyman also underscores the fact that outside facilitation requires a steady and substantial supply of resources. Throughout *Partner to History*, Lyman recounts his frustrations with the lack of resources and the regulations that restricted use of funds—such as legislation preventing official U.S. funding to any organization receiving funding from the South African government. In the case of providing training for the electoral commissions, this regulation was clearly counterproductive and not the intended result. Lyman recalls a number of times in which funding was creatively supplied via different agencies, such as the U.S. Information Agency and the U.S. Agency for International Development. He also expresses appreciation for the role played by a variety of private foundations in training and fostering leadership. Such outside support not only helped South Africa achieve the end of apartheid without civil war, Lyman contends, but also laid the foundation for the postapartheid era and “set in motion the preparations that would enable a new government to begin with maximum effectiveness” (p. 77).

In *This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria*, Karl Maier provides a portrait of corruption and venality at every level of Nigerian society, from kleptocratic governments to violent and vengeful villages. Oil wealth has led to greed and the theft of perhaps billions in revenues. Living standards continue to deteriorate as per capita income plummets. The oil-rich Niger Delta region is plagued with severe environmental problems, and most of the rest of the country exemplifies Malthusian crises. Ethnic and religious tensions are escalating, with the possibility of full-blown secessionist movements. The younger generation lacks both education and hope for the future.

Maier foresees three possible paths for Nigeria. One would require “Herculean efforts by the current administration to throttle corruption and mismanagement, strengthen the judiciary and parliament, and revive the economy, giving confidence to foreigners and Nigerians alike to invest in the economy.” The second scenario is one of muddling along,

with a civilian government lurching from crisis to crisis, the economy remaining gripped by stagnation, and the legitimacy of the state in constant question. Nigeria would continue to bleed away its abundant natural and human resources, living standards would spiral ever downward, sporadic religious and ethnic clashes would claim more lives, and the remnants of the professional class would follow millions of their country men and women to positions abroad.

This third option is disaster: “the civilian administration would fail to deal with Nigeria’s myriad social and economic problems, opening the door to a return of military dictatorship. This could spark an outbreak of ethnic and religious violence not seen since the Biafran civil war and possibly leading to the breakup of the country” (p. 300). Maier finds little reason for optimism. In his estimation, there are “simply too many problems, too

KARL MAIER

*This House Has Fallen:
Midnight in Nigeria*

New York: Public Affairs,
2000

much anger, and too little time” (p. 301). He therefore recommends that the international community undertake preventive diplomacy, constructing a multilateral partnership to relieve Nigeria’s foreign indebtedness and rebuild the nation’s educational system.

**SUSAN COLLIN
MARKS**

*Watching the Wind:
Conflict Resolution
During South Africa’s
Transition to Democracy*

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace
Press, 2000

In the early 1990s, negotiations toward ending apartheid in South Africa were threatened by widespread violence. The National Peace Accord was established in 1991 as a means to stem that violence. The twenty-six signatories to this pact included the principal political parties and organizations; government and security forces; leaders of the homeland areas; and business, trade union, traditional, and church leaders. The National Peace Accord, which was organized at the local, regional, and national levels, provided an alternative forum for resolving political and community conflicts and a means of defusing violence. Through an array of conflict resolution techniques—monitoring, facilitating, mediating, building trust, and responding to crises—the National Peace Accord helped to stem the violence so that multiparty elections could be held successfully.

Susan Collin Marks participated in the National Peace Accord in the Cape Town region. In *Watching the Wind*, she recounts her experiences with and perspective on the pact. Her discussion includes profiles of a great range of peace workers across the country, including an Afrikaner cleric, a member of parliament from the National Party, a community activist from the African National Congress (ANC), a former inmate of the notorious Robben Island prison, and a white police officer. These were the people, she writes, who “quietly made the blueprint work on the ground” (p. 37).

Marks acknowledges that peace in these cases is not always a readily available option:

You can fight or you can talk. The choice is sometimes yours. More often it is dictated by political expediency, economic pressures, and societal norms. The Inkatha Freedom Party migrant laborer from the heart of kwaZulu-Natal working in the mines outside Johannesburg can no more choose negotiation with ANC townsfolk and stay alive than the Afrikaner farmer in the Northern Transvaal, bastion of frontier Afrikanerdom, can express liberal views about blacks without being branded a traitor (p. 155).

As she sought to expand the options for peace, Marks came to value particularly the effect of monitoring: “People behaved differently in the presence of credible outsiders. The political organizations and the security forces in particular responded to the presence of monitors with astonishing changes in behavior, moderating what they did and how they did it. . . . [A]s the peace process progressed, all the parties, including the security forces, began to request a monitoring presence to ensure that their activities were not misinterpreted or misrepresented” (pp. 67, 70). Marks comes to the conclusion that “[t]he power of bearing witness cannot be overstated” (p. 106). Through her work with the National Peace Accord, Marks also came to witness “[c]onflict resolution spread as an agent of change on a mass scale” (p. 10).

In *The South African Truth Commission: The Politics of Reconciliation*, U.S. foreign service officer Dorothy Shea explores and evaluates the dynamics of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The premise of Shea's study is clear: "To the extent that other societies can learn from the South African experience, it would be useful to consider not only *how* South Africa measured up, but *why*" (p. 45). In the course of answering that question, she explores the political dynamics and inevitable politicization surrounding the TRC. She identifies as the TRC's "most significant innovation" its decision not to offer broad amnesty for all perpetrators of gross human rights violations but, rather, to allow individuals to apply for amnesty on the condition of full disclosure for their politically motivated acts, omissions, and offenses (p. 13). Some debates on the TRC process are not yet concluded. The issue of reparation continues to raise many questions: how to determine a price, how to raise the money, how to justify the opportunity costs for all the development work and rebuilding that needs to be done, whether reparations should be individual or communal, and whether they should be directed as much to victims of impoverishment as of abuse.

One issue that particularly engages Shea's attention, as it has other commentators about truth commissions, is whether such commissions too narrowly focus on particular crimes than on the overall context. On the one hand, she notes that South Africa's TRC interpreted "gross human rights violations" in a way that "precluded ex post facto criminalization of legally sanctioned apartheid activities that violated the rights of the majority of the population, such as mandatory carrying of pass books and forced removal of populations" (p. 51). On the other hand, she acknowledges that the TRC also conducted some institutional and thematic hearings precisely so as to

avoid the pitfall of looking at specific cases of human rights abuse in isolation. [These hearings] also allowed the TRC to highlight the institutional and societal legacies of apartheid, such as vast and egregious disparity that still exists between rich and poor. Finally, the thematic approach permitted the TRC to get away from a strict victim-perpetrator approach to address the role of beneficiaries of apartheid as well (p. 21).

These observations lead Shea to suggest that "to the extent that there is a significant portion of the population that passively benefited from the policies of the former repressive regime, future truth commissions would do well to avoid focusing on victims and perpetrators to the exclusion of beneficiaries" (p. 75).

Among the factors that were conducive to the overall accomplishments of the TRC, Shea identifies a critical mass of support among those with political and military power, a strong civil society with such skills as investigating and compiling data, a strong and independent media to enable public scrutiny, a functioning judicial system that could threaten prosecution of those refusing to apply for amnesty, and leadership with great moral integrity.

As its most enduring accomplishment, Shea credits the TRC with "providing a remedy to the persistent ignorance and denial in South Africa about apartheid-era atrocities." After two years of daily press coverage of TRC hearings, "it is no longer possible for the average South African credibly to deny the nature and extent of the gross human rights violations that took place under the old regime and during the country's transition to democracy. This in itself is a remarkable achievement" (p. 6).

DOROTHY SHEA

The South African Truth Commission: The Politics of Reconciliation

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000

ROTIMI T. SUBERU

*Federalism and Ethnic
Conflict in Nigeria*

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace
Press, 2001

Why does federalism appear to be so dysfunctional in Nigeria? Rotimi Suberu's study points to several problematic aspects of its practice. A key problem is excessive centralization. Local governments are entirely dependent on centrally collected oil revenues. The federal government gets a disproportionate share, and the distribution of the remainder is subject to intense contention. This structure of revenue distribution has led to fierce competition to win control of the center.

Revenues are allocated through a supposedly neutral system of proportionality: Each state's share is determined by the size of its population. This method of distribution, however, has vastly politicized Nigeria's census-taking. Census exercises have become fierce ethnic and regional contests, complete with temporary migration and widespread fraud. "Political acceptability, rather than statistical accuracy or demographic reliability, clearly remains the most important determinant of the fate of the census in Nigeria" (p. 169).

Another consequence of Nigeria's system of sharing revenue is the multiplication of states, which now number thirty-six. The principle has been to create states of roughly equal population, so that national resources may be distributed equitably. The process, however, has engendered "the fragmentation of existing units" into ever weaker entities and the concomitant increase in power at the center (p. 15). The primary beneficiaries of new state creation are the elites, who can take advantage of "the proliferation of political posts and the multiplication of bureaucratic opportunities" (p. 81).

Struggles over the distribution of revenue, resources, executive positions, and civil service jobs, Suberu contends, amount to a " 'cake-sharing' psychosis" in Nigeria (p. 138). A host of proposed reforms—such as no consecutive presidential terms, rotation of the presidency among different ethnic regions, or multiple vice presidents—promise little progress toward true power sharing. In Suberu's judgment, these reforms give "relatively little attention to mass-based ethnic concerns, while giving such overriding consideration to the distribution of political offices among sectional elites" (p. 186). He concludes that "Nigeria may never overcome the pathologies that vex its federal system until it begins to utilize federalism not as a mechanism for processing the allocative conflicts of a fundamentally overcentralized state but as an instrument for promoting genuine institutions and processes of self-rule, shared rule, and limited rule in both the polity and the economy" (p. 206).

**ERNEST E.
UWAZIE, THELMA
JOHNSON, PATRICIA
MALBERG, AND
DANIEL YAMSHON**

The "Alternative Dispute Resolution Resource Manual"—compiled for use in African nations—brings together excerpts of a range of training materials dealing with alternative dispute resolution, including sections on such topics as mediation, active listening, developing agendas, negotiating strategies, and needs assessment. Role-play exercises and simulations are also included. A bibliography suggests other resources.

"Alternative Dispute
Resolution Resource
Manual"

Sacramento, Calif.: Center
for African Peace and
Conflict Resolution,
California State
University, 1999

6. ASIA

Timothy Austin's title refers to a rural Philippine tradition of sitting under a banana tree when resolving disputes according to community norms and practice. That practice generally sought to enable conciliation rather than establish culpability. Village elders mediated to help disputants resolve their differences and continue to live together. Community cohesion was the paramount concern.

Austin reports that this traditional method of dispute resolution received a degree of official recognition in 1978. Before gaining access to the formal court system, disputants are required to make an initial attempt at resolution through these traditional methods. In the midst of recent challenges of insurgents across the archipelago, police are even less available to be engaged in neighborhood disputes, which has created more opportunities for community justice. Austin suggests that small communities characterized by face-to-face interactions and reciprocal obligations are amenable to these forms of social control.

"Asian values," according to proponents, elevate social harmony and collective well-being over a Western insistence on individualistic rights.

Is the Asian way a real alternative that has sufficient distinctness and moral weight to compete with liberal democracy? To ask a more bluntly skeptical question: Is it anything more than the ruling establishment's attempt to perpetuate its power by taking advantage of people's resentment against the Western World? (p. 29)

This is how Inoue Tatsuo frames the debate in Joanne Bauer and Daniel Bell's *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights*. Tatsuo and other contributors to this volume explore issues of the universality of human rights, the cultural basis of rights, and the potential for devising an "overlapping consensus" to defend rights, although those rights are conceived differently.

In reply to Asian rulers' assertions that authoritarianism is instrumentally justified because it promotes economic success and therefore collective well-being, Amartya Sen contends there is no connection. Indeed, he writes, "one of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famines in the world is that no substantial famine has ever occurred in any country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press" (p. 92).

Tatsuo further argues that to insist on separate Asian values is to repeat the error of earlier Orientalists who were convinced of Asian "essentialism." The Asian values position also depends on the concept of sovereignty and, therefore, on the norm of noninterference in Asian nations' affairs. Yet sovereignty is surely a Western concept, and Tatsuo asserts that to insist on sovereignty while rejecting human rights is both a moral and a logical contradiction.

Considering the historical origin of rights in the West, Jack Donnelly notes that they arose in the West in response to intrusive states and the indignities of free market capitalism. Now, "Asian individuals, families, and societies face the same threats from modern markets and states that Western societies do, and therefore need the same protections of human rights" (p. 69). Further, societies on both sides of the Pacific will face similar novel

TIMOTHY W. AUSTIN

Banana Justice: Field Notes on Philippine Crime and Custom

Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999

JOANNE R. BAUER AND DANIEL A. BELL, EDS.

The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights

New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999

challenges from the reconfigurations brought about by globalization and perhaps can recognize mutual concerns and forge cooperative means to handle them.

Several authors point to alternative bases for human rights in other cultural and religious traditions—Islamic, Confucian, and Buddhist. They also note the heterogeneity of these traditions and the potential for multiple interpretations and change. Abdullaha A. An-Na'im argues that "all cultures have a certain degree of ambivalence that allows for contesting prevailing perceptions and seeking to replace them with new or formerly suppressed conceptions through an internal discourse within the terms of reference of the particular culture and in accordance with its own criteria of legitimacy" (p. 158). Considering disputes that have involved states declaring groups or individuals to be apostates, An-Na'im writes that ". . . in every case, those in control of the state could be judged by some other Muslims as 'deviationist,' the outcome depends on who is in political power, not who is the most knowledgeable and conforming to the 'true teachings of Islam'" (p. 164).

In pursuit of respect for human rights around the world, what is the next step? Rather than offer a single universal project, Charles Taylor proposes an "overlapping consensus" which he explores with reference to reformist Thai Buddhism. Through a genuine and unforced consensus, "different groups, countries, religious communities, and civilizations, although holding incompatible fundamental views on theology, metaphysics, human nature, and so on, would come to an agreement on certain norms that ought to govern human behavior. Each would have its own way of justifying this from out of its profound background conception" (p. 124). This view foresees convergence on the substance of human rights, in spite of differences in form. The process of reaching such a consensus is not to abandon traditions—indeed, obliterating traditional identities could be profoundly alienating and disorienting, feeding backlashes and fundamentalist resistance. Rather, a process of reaching overlapping consensus proceeds through mutual respect and mutual learning. "[W]orld convergence," Taylor suggests, "will not come through a loss or denial of traditions all around, but rather by creative immersions of different groups, each in their own spiritual heritage, traveling different routes to the same goal" (p. 144).

**GARY K. BERTSCH,
SEEMA GAHLAUT,
AND ANUPAM
SRIVASTAVA, EDS.**

*Engaging India: U.S.
Strategic Relations with
the World's Largest
Democracy*

New York: Routledge,
1999

This edited volume, the result of a year-long project on relations between India and United States, includes chapters on the broad strategic setting of that relationship, non-proliferation issues, and the regional context.

In "India-U.S. Foreign Policy Concerns: Cooperation and Conflict," Kanti Bajpai identifies a number of factors that bode well for sustained cooperation, if not harmony and partnership between the two nations. Bajpai points to shared interests, such as geostrategic, as both countries are concerned about stability in Asia and an unhindered supply of oil from the Persian Gulf (which supplies India with one-third of its imports); economic, as India needs U.S. trade, investment, and technology, while the United States pursues the Indian market; common social challenges, such as drug trafficking and disease and epidemic control; and the new political significance of Indian expatriates as a potential voting bloc. Other factors, however, obstruct cooperation, such as nuclear proliferation, which is a major source of disagreement between the two nations. Relations between India and Pakistan and between the United States and Pakistan further complicate Indo-U.S. ties. Disputes over Kashmir and charges of human rights violations must also be

resolved for the Indo-U.S. relationship to improve. A final sticking point is economic differences, as India considers U.S. child labor laws, safety standards, and ecological certification as economic protectionism.

Milind Thakar addresses the dispute over Kashmir in “Coping with Insecurity: The Pakistani Variable in Indo-US Relations.” Thakar argues that Pakistan, with its various ethnic and sectarian divisions, lacks any robust concept of its own identity—other than not being India. Thus Pakistan has feared that “secular, democratic India (a reverse image in these respects of Pakistan for most of the last fifty years) would succeed in breaking the glue that holds a fragile national identity together” (p. 227). This dynamic has found its focus in Kashmir, whose possession Pakistan considers to be vital for symbolic as well as practical reasons because “by virtue of being the only Muslim-majority state in India possession, [Kashmir] defies Pakistan’s *raison d’être* and reinforces Indian secularism” (p. 227). Thus far, Pakistan has insisted that settling the Kashmir question is a precondition for improved relations with India.

The editors close with a warning that continued “suboptimal” cooperation between India and United States may have negative consequences well beyond their bilateral relationship. They conclude that “[i]t would be a pity indeed if the world’s greatest democracy, in its quest for a new paradigm of collective enterprise, were to choose to marginalize the support and cooperation of the world’s largest democracy” (p. 269).

Before the events of September 11, 2001, and the U.S. response, Stephen Cohen labeled the region encompassing India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan “one of the most dangerous places in the world” (p. 301). Cohen’s study of contemporary India provides background for that and subsequent assessments.

He begins by recalling India’s strengths: “Although imperfect and punctuated by an authoritarian ‘Emergency,’ its democracy has survived and is thriving under conditions of enormous social, economic, and geographical diversity. Indians clearly have a talent for political accommodation and management that is sorely lacking in many other parts of the world” (p. 3). But its weaknesses are many. India’s economic development has been very slow and insufficient to meet the needs of its burgeoning population. The political system is plagued by corruption and administrative mismanagement and may not be able to resolve a number of regional and linguistic-based separatist movements.

Of great import to international observers is India as a nuclear power. Cohen finds substantial domestic debate but no consensus on India’s nuclear status following its 1998 testing of five nuclear devices. Some see nuclear weapons as essential to India’s economic development and political status. Others oppose all nuclear weapons but can find some value in their possession if it provides leverage for demanding their elimination around the world. The government’s position has been that such weapons would deter a nuclear attack by another nuclear-armed state; the Indian government has committed itself to no first use. Cohen, however, cites the judgment of an Indian military analyst that the country currently lacks the ability to provide an effective nuclear deterrent or real nuclear war-fighting capability; yet by going nuclear, it “has greatly increased the possibility that it will become the target of a nuclear-armed opponent” (p. 183).

Cohen finds the organization of India’s foreign policy decision-making peculiar: It entails little interagency collaboration and effectively excludes the military. “In no other

STEPHEN P. COHEN

India: Emerging Power

Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution
Press, 2001

middle or great power,” he writes, “is the military’s advice so detached from political and strategic decisions” (p. 77). Much of India’s security may depend not on its own decisions but on those of its adversaries. Cohen considers a scenario of conflict with Pakistan and suggests that

[t]he security of India in relation to Pakistan depends not on the quality of the *Indian* nuclear force or the rationality of an *Indian* decision-making system, but on the integrity of *Pakistan’s* chain of command. Indian lives and security ultimately rest on the calculations of the least reliable link, the least informed decision-maker, the most extremist general, and the most rabidly anti-Indian politician, who find themselves in Pakistan’s decision-making system (p. 184, emphasis in original).

Another area of international concern is the principle of humanitarian intervention, which India has trouble supporting. Following intervention in Kosovo, Cohen reports that India was left wondering if Kashmir might also become the focus of intervention and if international actors would support self-determination for that territory. Some see India’s drive for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council as an effort to position itself to veto any unwelcome UN action on Kashmir. One factor complicating India’s attainment of a permanent Security Council seat is that it could be attributed to its nuclear status and thus encourage other countries to pursue their nuclear ambitions.

Cohen recommends that the United States treat India as a “rising power,” including supporting its candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council on the condition that the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir is “on the road to resolution.” He suggests that this offer might provide an incentive to resolve the dispute, while making it clear that India could not acquire a seat “merely to gain a veto over international initiatives on Kashmir” (p. 311).

RALPH A. COSSA

“The U.S.-DPRK
Agreed Framework:
Is it Still Viable?
Is it Enough?”
Occasional Paper

Honolulu: Pacific Forum
CSIS, April 1999

In 1994 the United States and North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) signed the Agreed Framework with the objectives of controlling nuclear proliferation, normalizing relations, and enhancing security on the Korean peninsula. In 1999, Ralph Cossa assessed various tasks contained within the Agreed Framework and developed a report card, accompanied by appendixes of a chronology of events and many relevant documents.

Cossa evaluates the tasks outlined in the Agreed Framework, beginning with progress on the replacement of North Korea’s nuclear reactors. The United States is to provide light-water reactors to replace North Korea’s older, more hazardous graphite-moderated models and to supply heavy fuel oil to supplement energy needs, while North Korea is to freeze construction of and eventually dismantle its reactors. Noting that there is no indication that North Korea is not taking its responsibilities seriously, Cossa thinks that progress on this task merits a grade of B+.

The second task of normalizing U.S.-DPRK relations would include reducing barriers to trade and investment, opening liaison offices, and eventually upgrading bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level. The United States calls on North Korea to cease developing, deploying, and exporting offensive ballistic missiles, help to recover the remains of U.S. soldiers, reduce the threat posed by conventional forces, stop supporting international terrorism, and undertake reforms addressing domestic human rights issues. Noting the difficulty in specifying what constitutes sufficient progress on this task, Cossa gives it a

grade of C-. North Korea asserts that the United States has failed to reduce barriers to trade, as promised; prospects for ambassadorial relations are slim.

For the third task—peninsular peace and security—positive steps have been taken in such areas as food aid and separated families. Other issues show little progress. North Korea is not yet fully implementing the 1991 Denuclearization Agreement; the United States will not move further until North Korea is in full compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), including verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Cossa thus assigns a grade of C-.

The fourth task addresses nuclear nonproliferation specifically. North Korea “suspended” its announced intention to withdraw from the NPT but has not enacted the treaty’s obligations on safeguards. On this task alone, Cossa believes that the entire Agreed Framework could fail. He delivers a grade of C for this task and for progress on the Agreed Framework as a whole, finding it satisfactory but not exemplary.

Cossa concludes with many suggestions for all the actors involved. For the United States, he underscores continuing its current role:

Some have argued that the United States must pursue a more “balanced” policy toward the Peninsula in order to serve as an “honest broker” between the South and North. I strongly disagree! The United States is, and must be seen (and portray itself) unambiguously as the Republic of Korea’s foremost ally (p. 36).

Overall, Cossa finds that the Agreed Framework “remains a viable instrument for U.S.-DPRK cooperation on nuclear-related issues and a potentially useful vehicle for promoting North-South interaction, but in and of itself, is not sufficient to fully resolve all nuclear-related issues, much less bring lasting peace and justice to the peninsula” (p. ix).

Violent ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has continued for many years, militarizing the island to the point where its armed forces per capita exceed those of India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. Foreign intervention has been unsuccessful at resolving the conflict. Negotiations have proved fruitless. Collective actors—local political parties, ethnic and political groups, and so forth—are internally divided, as well as in opposition with each other. That this situation has occurred in Sri Lanka is itself a bit of a puzzle, as K. M. de Silva and G. H. Peiris indicate, because the island is governed through a multiparty democracy with high voter participation in its regularly held elections. This fact leads de Silva and Peiris to speculate that “[w]hat the Sri Lankan experience demonstrates is that a democratic system is not a prophylactic against the eruption of violent ethnic conflict; indeed the Sri Lankan experience demonstrates that resolution of conflicts could be more difficult in a system based on a democratic electorate than in a less democratic one” (p. 3).

The avowed objectives of the Tamil ethnic minority have grown from greater autonomy for the northern and eastern provinces of the island, to converting Sri Lanka to a federal system, to separatism and a new Tamil state. Contributors to this collection point out that most of the island’s Sinhalese majority is opposed to a federation, in part because they fear it would lead to the political disintegration of the island; not all Tamils are in favor of devolution of power. Other proposals have included redrawing boundaries, for example, to create a Muslim-dominated enclave in the northeast, although this proposal is opposed

**K. M. DE SILVA AND
G. H. PEIRIS**

Pursuit of Peace in Sri Lanka: Past Failures and Future Prospects

Kandy, Sri Lanka:
International Centre
for Ethnic Studies, 2000

by Islamic leaders elsewhere on the island. There is as yet no consensus on what path to take.

In his essay “The Federal Option and its Alternatives,” de Silva reviews a number of examples of federalism—in Belgium, Canada, Spain, Nigeria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and Malaysia—and finds them wanting. In his assessment, “[e]xperience suggests that federal systems often accentuate rather than curb separatist sentiment in peripheral units” (p. 215). De Silva endorses instead the creation of heterogeneous institutions with different levels of power, noting, for example that the Scottish parliament and the Welsh assembly do not bear the same level of power and authority within the British system. For Sri Lanka, de Silva calls for greater attention to the structures of municipal and village governance. “Innovative local government institutions,” he argues, “are likely to be a more appropriate means of recognizing ethnic and religious diversity in areas like the Eastern province with its mixed population. Making provision for that diversity through an imaginative scheme of local government bodies could be more effective than boundary changes designed to establish ethnic enclaves whether they be called districts or cantons” (p. 227).

SIDDARTH DUBE

*In the Land of Poverty:
Memoirs of an Indian
Family, 1947–1997*

New York: Zed Books,
1998

Siddharth Dube declares himself baffled by the scale of poverty in India, even many years after independence. He notes that although “many of the most dramatic manifestations of suffering long associated with India—bonded labor, large-scale epidemics, famines—have been largely controlled, this commendable progress is eclipsed by the failure to ameliorate the chronic deprivation and everyday hunger suffered by several hundred million Indians” (p. 3). Part of this failure is economic: Despite planned development, substantial growth, an enormous national economy, and a major industrial sector, India has failed to provide a decent livelihood for an immense portion of its population. It is also a political puzzle. “Why,” Dube asks, “have the sheer numbers of the poor not ensured that India’s parliamentary democracy would work to their benefit? Why has the persistence of mass poverty not emerged as a central political issue?” (p. 4). Dube pursues answers to these questions with reference to the fortunes and misfortunes of one family over three generations.

Among the culprits for India’s pervasive and acute poverty, Dube highlights the lack of significant land reform. There have been many failed attempts. Some were poorly designed, serving only to codify the traditional holdings of landlords. Others have been gutted by loopholes or simply not enforced. Some have benefited small landholders to various degrees but offered nothing to the poorer tenants, sharecroppers, and landless. Other antipoverty measures have been equally unsuccessful. Dube cites studies showing that some 70 percent of funds for antipoverty programs in the 1970s went to administration. In the 1980s, antipoverty programs were unsustainable government spending sprees. Taken together, these various reforms and programs amount to a travesty in Dube’s opinion.

In his view, the political system has offered equally empty promises. Dube sees the Congress Party as being nominally socialist. With a core of urban middle-class leaders, the concerns of the rural poor were never paramount. In the party’s early days, issues of social equity and mobility were considered a distraction from the independence movement. Subsequent opportunities for change were lost, with fundamentally conservative

leaders refusing to pursue economic redistribution or challenges to the immobility of the caste system.

Education is a third area in which Dube sees India as failing its persistently impoverished population. The educational system, while it churns out many graduates, does not provide employable skills. According to Dube, “[t]he [educational] system’s juggernaut-like growth has come at the expense of both the quality of education and relevance to India’s development needs” (p. 142). In the family whose fortunes Dube chronicles, the third generation has a college degree but has never found employment.

Dube finds members of the rural poor to be perfectly capable of assessing their situation, though evidently powerless to change it. He quotes such statements as “We don’t revolt because we are scared of losing what little we have” (p. 183). Dube thus concludes that “[i]n the future, as in the half-century past and in centuries earlier, India is destined to remain the land of hunger, want and suffering” (p. 215).

Contributors to this volume aim to calm the hyperbole that has been generated about potential energy resources in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. While there are oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea Basin, their extent and strategic value have been exaggerated by both international actors and the Caspian states. Putting the energy potential into perspective, editors Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon affirm that “[w]hen considered as a proportion of global production or reserves, the Caspian’s contribution is likely to be less than 3 percent in 2010. . . . The Caspian region will be important to global energy, but no more so than, say, the North Sea” (p. 2).

A major concern for many observers is the potential of oil wealth to wreak havoc on Caspian economies and politics. Several note the malign consequences of sudden income on other oil-rich states. As summarized by Ebel and Menon,

The funds have been used to keep entrenched elites in power, to postpone reforms, to underwrite lavish lifestyles of the privileged, to engage in spending sprees on arms, to build showy and unnecessary projects, and to placate powerful special interests. Among the undesirable consequences have been profligate spending and borrowing, corruption, inequality, repression, and overvalued exchange rates that retard the non-energy sectors of the economies. Energy revenues have not been used to build the foundations for economies with diverse types of productions and sources of income that, as a result, can achieve balanced economic development (p. 12).

Regarding Kazakhstan, Pauline Jones Luong notes this irony:

the modest amounts of rents that it is estimated Kazakhstan will earn [from oil reserves], even with a slight upward trend in world oil prices, is far less than would be achieved through improved tax collection. Taxation is also germane to the future of democracy in Kazakhstan. Without a viable tax system, it is unlikely that Kazakhstani citizens will ever develop the direct and reciprocal relationship with their state that has long been recognized, at least implicitly, as the basis for democracy governance (p. 87).

**ROBERT EBEL AND
RAJAN MENON,
EDS.**

*Energy and Conflict in
Central Asia and the
Caucasus*

Lanham, Md.: National
Bureau of Asian
Research, 2000

RICHARD J. ELLINGS AND SHELDON W. SIMON, EDS.

Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium

Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996

“A vibrant Southeast Asia,” write Richard Ellings and Sheldon Simon, “straddles the twentieth and twenty-first centuries with great reasons for optimism” (p. 3). The reasons include strong economic growth rates, expanding middle classes, increasing intra- and interregional trade, progress toward democratic rule, improved relations among nations in the region, the absence of major military threats, and the modernization of armed forces. Nonetheless there are security issues. The decreased interest of the United States in the region following the end of the Cold War, the assertiveness of China, and the high but differential rates of growth among the nations in the region are sources of concern.

One positive step taken by these nations is establishing a venue for security discussions within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This venue, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), was created in 1994. Within it, members can address immediate challenges, such as the dispute over the Spratley Islands and enforcement of the Law of the Sea Treaty. ARF also enables the consideration of longer-term potential threats to the region. Ellings and Simon assert that in the creation of ARF, the nations of Southeast Asia “have once again shown a remarkable capacity for successful experimentation in diplomacy and international organization” (p. 11).

TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA

The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations.
2 vols.

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998

The dispute between Japan and Russia over possession of the Kurile Islands has very deep roots. Chances of reconciliation were perhaps at their highest with the end of the Cold War and the immense transformations in international relations. Yet no progress has been made. “At a time when the rest of the world was adapting to the end of the Cold War,” Tsuyoshi Hasegawa writes, “the Soviet Union and Japan found themselves unable to shed not merely the legacies of the Cold War, but also the legacies of World War II” (p. 222).

Hasegawa’s two-volume study of this dispute begins with the seventeenth century and brings the story to the present. There are many issues in the disagreement: the geographical identification of just which islands are in dispute; interpretations of two nineteenth-century treaties determining their possession; the immediate aftermath of World War II, when the Soviet Union occupied and annexed the islands (as foreseen in the Yalta Agreement, to which Japan was not a party); and interpretation of subsequent treaties and decisions. Hasegawa explains the Soviet/Russian and Japanese positions on all these issues and examines the countries’ underlying interests and processes of policy formation. He also examines the economic, strategic, and psychological or symbolic value of the islands.

Both countries have had reasons not to resolve the dispute. The Soviet Union preferred not even to acknowledge the existence of the dispute. Possession of the Kuriles was a symbol of national prestige and a reminder of Soviet victory in the Asian theatre during World War II. Further, the Soviets saw adherence to World War II settlements as fundamental to domestic and international stability, and there was reason to fear other irredentist demands if the Kuriles were relinquished. Added to these issues were the substantial strategic value of the islands for the Pacific Fleet and their economic importance. Thus, “the Soviet government consistently took the position that no territorial question existed between the Soviet Union and Japan” (p. 171).

For Japan, prolongation of the dispute was geopolitically useful by helping to contain potential conflicts. Japan used the dispute to build a national consensus in favor of an alliance with the United States. With the dispute near the surface, defense cooperation outweighed economic disagreements with the American superpower. Having the Soviet

Union as a common enemy with China and South Korea helped contain those relations as well. “From this standpoint,” Hasegawa asserts, “it was essential that the territorial dispute not be settled, and this justified Japan’s rigid stance” (p. 545). Neither nation gave their mutual relations high priority, and foreign policy toward the other was crafted largely within their respective diplomatic bureaucracies.

With the changes following the end of the Cold War, both Russia and Japan are coming around to the notion that settling their Northern Territories dispute is in both their interests. He suggests some compromises that could be made—for example, giving sovereignty of the islands to Japan while permitting Russia to maintain its seabed sonar devices and prohibiting warships from outside the region from using the channels. Improved relations between the two could substantially improve economic and political stability in the region and cut through “the spiral of animosities from which neither side has yet been able to extricate itself” (p. 13).

In *Tibet, India, and China: Critical Choices, Uncertain Future*, Rajesh Kadian provides a chronology of Tibetan history, from prehistory through the current period, and includes appendixes of relevant documents dating back to the eighth century. He examines Tibet’s feudal theocratic society, followed by imperial competition between Britain, India, China, and Russia. In the modern period, China was victorious militarily, but Tibet’s status is still in question. China supposedly has “suzerainty” over an “autonomous” Tibet but, Kadian points out, both terms have been left conveniently undefined by those using them.

Indeed, a number of issues need to be addressed, foremost being Tibet’s political status and the respect for the human rights of its inhabitants. These are complicated by delicate international relations and geopolitical concerns. Kadian also identifies serious environmental issues, including the ecological health of major river systems that begin on the Tibetan plateau, grave deforestation, and the possibility of nuclear waste sites. The economy is in poor shape, including a lack of such basic infrastructure as roads, schools, and reliable water supply.

In Kadian’s estimation, a grant of autonomy would be a boon not only for Tibetans but for China as well. He reasons that China would then come under much less international criticism from human rights advocates. With Tibet’s status clear, investors might be more willing to enter the local economy. China would benefit from Tibet’s economic development, as trade would increase markedly. Kadian also suggests that resolving Tibet’s status might point the way toward the resolution of other similar difficulties. He also sees as a likelihood subsequent reunification with Taiwan as another autonomous region. Other potential separatist minorities, like the Uighurs in Xinjiang province, might then also be satisfied with autonomy.

RAJESH KADIAN

*Tibet, India, and China:
Critical Choices,
Uncertain Future*

New Delhi: Vision Books,
1999

NAN LI

From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative Nationalism: The Chinese Military's Discourse on National Security and Identity in the Post-Mao Era.
Peaceworks, no. 39

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2001

In this examination of the contemporary Chinese military “discourse,” Nan Li discerns a major shift “from radical revolutionary internationalism to a post-Maoist conservative nationalism” (p. 13). Li’s source of this military discourse is its professional literature, including the publications of the People’s Liberation Army and commentaries in China’s military newspapers. This literature, which “shapes consciousness on national identity, security, and defense,” has exhibited a major doctrinal change since 1985 (p. 13).

Prior to 1985, class antagonism and revolutionary solidarity were seen as paramount, eclipsing the salience of China’s territorial integrity. Indeed, Li writes, “[d]uring the Maoist period, the sanctity of this border was largely neglected, and small pieces of territory were ceded in order to strengthen revolutionary solidarity and friendship” (p. 31). Part of Changbai Mountain was ceded to North Korea, Burma was given Chinese territories in border agreements in the 1960s, and the Soviet Union was permitted to keep Outer Mongolia.

In the current discourse, nations rather than classes are seen as the central category of identity and the principal actors in international relations, and concern over territorial integrity and the security of borders has increased markedly. Li quotes the new principle of border defense as “fighting for every inch of land and every drop of water” (p. 31). Supporting that principle is a distinct nationalism that is essentially defensive and conservative and has become “a cornerstone of regime legitimacy” in China (p. 7). This nationalism entails not only the physical security of border territories but also their economic development and social stability. Further, the maritime border has become much more important in China’s security calculus, Li discerns, as it seeks to broaden the extent of maritime defense.

This paradigm shift in the thinking of China’s military alters its threat perceptions. Heightened concern for the nation’s territorial integrity underscores sensitivity over Taiwan’s attempts at independence; possible secession movements in Tibet and Xinjiang province; border disputes with India, Vietnam, and Russia; sovereignty over the Spratley Islands; and possible refugee flows stemming from instability on the Korean Peninsula.

What are the implications of this doctrinal change for U.S. foreign policy toward China? Li recommends adopting a “balance of threat” approach—that is, dealing with specific threats rather than broader balance-of-power concerns. Li also advocates reciprocal engagement, which could include joint programs on defense conversion; better transparency of military intentions and capabilities; accident prevention; and debates on security issues and regular meetings of top military personnel, including “education on the functions and role of the military in a rule-of-law-based constitutional setting” (p. 43).

ANDREW S. NATSIOS

The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001

Famine in North Korea in the 1990s was propelled by four forces: unsustainable agricultural practices that emphasized mechanization, chemical inputs, irrigation, and electrification; a precipitous decline in food subsidies from the former Soviet Union and China; Pyongyang’s decision to triage the northeast region by eliminating food subsidies; and the central government’s decision to reduce farmers’ per capita rations, thereby encouraging them to withhold produce from the public distribution system and to work on secret private plots. The complete collapse of the hierarchically organized public distribution system occurred together with the rise of farmers markets, where those with money could purchase food. For those who could not, there was substantial increase in foraging for

wild foods and the consumption of indigestible “substitute foods” such as corn stalks and cobs, pond weed, and bark. Some two and a half million people perished.

Although millions were dying, it was not easy to get direct evidence of the extent of the famine. The North Korean government desperately needed foreign aid but did not want to reveal its internal weakness; therefore, it obstructed standard efforts by aid organizations and other governments to monitor the situation or direct distribution.

In Natsios’s assessment,

North Korea may have appealed for food aid from the UN and donor governments, but it refused to behave according to its mendicant status. It would allow NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and UN agencies just enough access to the country to appear to satisfy donor government insistence on minimum public accountability for distribution of food aid for public relations purposes. But it would not allow enough access for aid workers to determine how many people had died and where the need was most acute so that relief agencies could target food distributions. The North Koreans ensured from the beginning of the relief effort that they, not outsiders, would control the distribution of the food aid (p. 140).

Natsios is highly critical of those who withheld or delayed aid for political purposes. In the United States, for example, there was hesitation to give aid to the enemy. Some in Congress were concerned that any food aid would be diverted to the North Korean military. The Clinton administration also sought to use food aid as a reward for North Korea’s coming to the negotiating table to resolve the issue of its nuclear reactors. When U.S. food aid did arrive, it was too late, was sent to the wrong regions, and had no rigorous controls on its internal distribution. Natsios argues that while moral principles should not determine U.S. foreign policy, they should constrain it. In its handling of food aid to North Korea, “Washington wandered well outside the fundamental moral limits constraining foreign policy” (p. 245).

7. EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

“COMMUNISM’S NEGOTIATED COLLAPSE: THE POLISH ROUND TABLE, TEN YEARS LATER”

Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan, Center for
Russian and East
European Studies,
November 1999

In 1989, when Poland’s socialist government had imposed martial law and made the Solidarity labor union illegal, the government and the union nonetheless came together for roundtable discussions. Topics included the shape of future elections, economic policy, the roles of the senate and president, freedom of association, and, above all, the relegalization of Solidarity. Neither side was sure of what it was initiating, but neither felt it had any good alternatives. Shortly afterward, the Communists were voted out of power. Ten years later, participants and observers of the Round Table met at a conference at the University of Michigan, held April 7–10, 1999, to explore their recollections, discuss their motivations, and share their perceptions of the Round Table as it occurred and as it now appears in the story of Poland’s peaceful transition from communism.

Participating in the Round Table posed risks to both sides. For the opposition, the relegalization of Solidarity came at the price of legitimizing the system by taking part in elections. Many participants had to contend with accusations of collaboration or, at best, naiveté. At the same time, loyalists accused the government of betraying the Communist Party. Mistrust and suspicion characterized the relations between and within the two sides.

Nonetheless, negotiation appeared to all to be the next pragmatic step. Solidarity was convinced that talk was more effective than violence. Zbigniew Bujak, Solidarity leader, Round Table participant, and, later, member of parliament, insisted,

No matter how many times we tried to overcome the other side by armed struggle . . . it turned out that the party apparatus could easily present the opposition as some sort of criminals, armed assailants. And we kept losing. Therefore we figured out that the idea of fighting without violence was the best, and that was our belief, the most successful or effective tool in the fight for democracy (p. 31).

The government had also come to doubt the prudence of violent methods. Furthermore, it was having trouble envisioning Poland’s future. Stanislaw Ciosek, a government participant in the Round Table and ambassador to Moscow (1989–96), recalled the realization of many in the government that

Poland was being left more and more behind the quickly developing world. The Polish worker at that time was manufacturing eight times less in a time unit than his counterpart in Germany, not to mention the lower quality of his work. Our awareness of this also had its impact. . . . Our humiliating conviction that we were worse than others was increasing. . . . We knew that it was necessary to change, that radical changes were needed, but we did not quite know what exactly needed to change and how to introduce those changes. . . . Yes, we agreed on one thing, that we needed a change. And with this frame of mind, we were sitting down at the Round Table (p. 44).

Many participants commented on the weakness of both Solidarity and the Polish government at that time. Aleksander Kwasniewski, who defeated Lech Walesa to become president in 1999, explained,

The Round Table was indeed a paradoxical event in a certain sense. On the one hand, it was caused by weakness. The party was weak, the government was weak, and Solidarity was weak. And the Soviet Union was weak, too. Everybody was weak. On the other hand, it

resulted from the strength of the people who thought that a breakthrough was possible and that it could be done (p. 246).

While Kwasniewski speaks with hindsight, Grazyna Staniszewska—Solidarity activist, participant in the Round Table, and, later, member of parliament—seems to place herself back in the moment when she observes, “I think that if anybody had thought that the system was being dismantled, the Round Table would not have happened at all. Nobody at either side of the table had that kind of awareness” (p. 144).

Why did the Soviet Union lower its military profile through such measures as reducing troops, maintaining a unilateral nuclear test ban, and not pursuing antiballistic missile defense? The standard answers, argues Matthew Evangelista in *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War*, are state-centered—that the Soviet Union retrenched security because of military strategy, adverse economic conditions, or U.S. pressure. Evangelista challenges all three, certainly as predominant causes. In a study that spans from Khrushchev’s premiership through the post-Soviet administration, he finds that Soviet military strategists were arguing for very different policy choices, that economic data does not coincide with the timing of the security changes, and that U.S. pressure typically produced a Soviet counter-reaction. So what explains the changes in the USSR’s military profile? Evangelista directs our attention to the interaction of transnational actors and the structure of domestic politics.

Transnational actors, Evangelista explains, are nonstate agents that interact across national boundaries but do not operate on behalf of a national government or intergovernmental organization. In the case of the arms race, these actors include groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Pugwash Conferences, the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the Palme Commission). Such groups shared information and ideas, devised practical measures for slowing the arms race, coordinated policy initiatives, and also helped establish the ethical norms of the debate.

One would assume that transnational actors are most likely to succeed in democracies, where policy debates are frequent and transparent. To the contrary, Evangelista’s research suggests that in democracies the voices of transnational actors risk being drowned out. Paradoxically, the Soviet Union’s closed system generated different opportunities for success. As Evangelista explains,

[T]he peculiar domestic structure of the Soviet Union—highly centralized, secretive, and authoritarian—made it difficult for transnational actors to gain access to foreign-policy decision-makers. If a transnational actor managed nevertheless to get the attention of the top leadership, and its policy proposals found a welcome hearing, they could be implemented effectively even against the opposition of well-entrenched bureaucracies. . . . The success of transnational actors in getting their preferred policies accepted and implemented depended in part on the quality of their arguments and information. But more important, I argue, was the structure of the Soviet system, which allowed the leadership to promote policies even in the absence of a large coalition to support them (p. 341).

**MATTHEW
EVANGELISTA**

*Unarmed Forces:
The Transnational
Movement to End
the Cold War*

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1999

**TERRENCE P.
HOPMANN**

*Building Peace and
Security in Post-Cold
War Eurasia: The OSCE
and U.S. Foreign Policy.*
Peaceworks, no. 31

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace,
September 1999

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is, in Terrence Hopmann's assessment, "one of the most important but least-known institutions that has been working in the European security field since the mid-70s" (p. xiii). Its membership, which includes the United States, Canada, and all the former Soviet republics, is far broader than that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU). Further, while NATO is essentially a military organization and the EU an economic organization, the OSCE uniquely links the political, military, and human dimensions of security. And it does so with a staff of fewer than 250.

Recent engagements have included four types of conflict management: democratization (in Latvia and Estonia), preventive diplomacy (in Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula), conflict resolution (in Georgia's South Ossetia region and Moldova's Transdniestria region), and postconflict security building (in Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo). Yet, despite a significant record of accomplishment, the organization remains largely unknown. For example:

The OSCE's prominent involvement in implementing the Dayton Accords has gone almost unnoticed in mass media accounts of the peacebuilding process in Bosnia, especially in the United States. Yet the OSCE's fulfillment of the elections mandate and of the arms control and stabilization provisions of the Dayton Accords has perhaps demonstrated most clearly the value of its unique role—namely, linking security issues to the human dimension, especially democratic processes and human rights (p. 36).

Hopmann notes the current "jockeying for primacy among the contending [security] institutions, 'institution shopping' among states experiencing conflict, and an attempt by the most powerful states to privilege their preferred institution in the evolving European security institutional structure" (p. 3). Hopmann urges the United States to strengthen the OSCE by such measures as professionalizing the staff of its field missions, extending their duration, and coordinating its conflict-prevention activities with other multilateral institutions. In particular, he writes,

U.S. officials must cease their policy of privileging NATO as the primary pillar of their European security policy at the expense of the OSCE. In fact, NATO and OSCE have different "comparative advantages" that should be mutually reinforcing. The OSCE is a broad-based security organization with inclusive membership, explicit links between military and nonmilitary dimensions of security, and a political role to play in conflict prevention and resolution that cannot possibly be placed by a military alliance like NATO, no matter how it is transformed (p. 48).

**MIKHAIL A.
MOLCHANOV**

"Friends or Foes?
Identity and Culture
in Russian-Ukrainian
Relations"

Victoria, British Columbia:
1999

Mikhail Molchanov examines relations between Russia and Ukraine through the lens of political culture. He asserts that although both are Eastern Slavic and share origins, history, settlement patterns, and psychological profiles, they are two distinct political cultures nonetheless. Ukrainian political culture cannot be characterized as a variant of Russian political culture. Their differences have ramifications for current and future interaction, ranging from specific language policies and military relations to the prospects for coexistence overall.

Even more significant are the differences between what Molchanov describes as the political cultures of the mass and elite in both Russia and Ukraine: "Current policies in Ukraine and Russia are largely based on elite, not mass political culture" (p. 12). Elite culture utilizes imperialism and nationalism to mobilize the masses, who do not themselves

harbor ethnic animosities. Molchanov cites surveys indicating Ukrainian tolerance of Russians, including their skepticism about a Russian threat to Ukrainian statehood, and their willingness to intermarry. He concludes that

[b]oth Russian imperialism and Ukrainian nationalism are ideologies of the elite. Neither may be considered as forming a part of the established political culture of the masses. What we can see here is a profound split between elite and mass political cultures; between officially propagated or officially tolerated ideological discourses, on the one hand, and non-ideological modes of mass behavior, on the other hand (p. 235).

As Maciej Siekierski explains in his preface to this guide, an underground opposition press existed in all the countries of East Central Europe. While the output of periodicals numbered in the hundreds elsewhere, it grew to thousands of titles in Poland.

This guide is an alphabetical listing of all Polish independent publications held by Stanford University's Hoover Institution. The collection includes 2,428 serial titles from 1976 to 1990. More than 90 percent of the collection consists of original issues rather than photocopies. The purpose of the guide is to inform researchers and enable them to access the material.

“Twice in this century, determined and ruthless attempts to implement one or another set of prescriptions deduced from abstract theories in Russia via revolution from above—namely, Marxism in 1917 and neoclassical macroeconomics in 1991–92—have generated a wave of enthusiastic expectations among the masses which were followed by human suffering on a large scale” (p. 10). Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski substantiate the parallels between these two periods through an all-encompassing account of Russia's contemporary history, with a focus on the Yeltsin era and Russia's postcommunist transition. They trace the political fortunes and policy decisions of the Yeltsin administration's officeholders, bureaucrats, commercialized *nomenklatura* (privileged top members of the Soviet Communist Party), and Western advisers through an odyssey of coups, corruption, parliamentary closure, and cabinet shuffles.

What Reddaway and Glinski call “market bolshevism,” or liberal market authoritarianism, consists of the “shock therapy” Russia adopted at the behest of the International Monetary Fund in the early 1990s, with little regard to the country's complex history and conditions. Shock therapy's emphasis on monetarism—unrestricted capital flows, liberalized prices, drastic reductions in public spending, and privatization of the state's economic assets—amounted to “market fetishism,” a sort of irresistible attraction to the notion that if prices, interest rates, and exchange rates were right, production would take care of itself. This notion was coupled with “simplistic behaviorism,” the belief that market stimuli would generate desired results, without planning or attention to the system's lack of legitimacy (p. 238).

Russia's postcommunist changeover occurred in a context in which “*the democratic transformation of society lagged behind the capitalist transformation of the ruling elite*” as the old Communist *nomenklatura* transmuted into Russia's new financial oligarchy (p. 306, emphasis in original). In this process, President Yeltsin was “a satrap of the United

**POLISH
INDEPENDENT
PUBLICATIONS,
1976–1990.
GUIDE TO THE
COLLECTION IN
THE HOOVER
INSTITUTE
ARCHIVES**

Stanford, Calif.: Hoover
Institution Press, 1999

**PETER REDDAWAY
AND DMITRI
GLINSKI**

*The Tragedy of Russia's
Reforms: Market
Bolshevism against
Democracy*

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace
Press, 2001

States and the world financial powers represented by the IMF” (p. 437). Western advisers, for their part, publicly deplored Russia’s growing authoritarianism, “as if completely unaware of any causal links between this political trend and the economic policies that they had advocated” (p. 232).

Though the authors point to several alternatives to market bolshevism, their prognosis is grim and follows historical precedent. In pursuing shock therapy, “Yeltsin followed the Bolshevik pattern of reforms applied by Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Joseph Stalin: He tried to create a privileged class of committed supporters of the regime by rapidly redistributing national resources in their favor at the expense of the majority of Russians and also of the state treasury” (p. 35). The consequences have been devastating, including deterioration of productive capacity, human capital, demographic indicators, systemic legitimacy of the postcommunist order, and democratic participation. In Reddaway and Glinski’s estimation, avoidable mistakes of the recent past have “doomed the Russian body politic to alternate between oligarchy and authoritarianism for the foreseeable future” (p. 244).

RUZICA ROSANDIC

*Grappling with Peace
Education in Serbia.*
Peaceworks, no. 33

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace,
April 2000

Changing the educational system may be a key ingredient in establishing a culture of peace and tolerance in Serbia. As characterized by Ruzica Rosandic, Serbia’s “centralized, politicized school system . . . has an evident investment in perpetuating a cycle of violence from one generation to the next” (p. 12). Rosandic reports that existing textbooks convey the message that relationships between different social groups are, as a rule, conflictual. Yielding is portrayed as a sign of weakness leading to defeat. Force, including violence and armed struggle, is presented as the method to resolve conflicts. Rosandic also reports that teachers tend to see conflicts as zero-sum. They consider conflict management as a process of determining who is guilty, and retribution as the justified outcome. Teaching methods are very traditional, with an emphasis on memorization and repetition; they offer little opportunity for conscious reflection, self-generated change, or the development of autonomy.

Several programs in peace education have been undertaken to alter these patterns. Rosandic reports on seven that were conducted from 1992 to 1998 with funding from UNICEF, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and Save the Children. In these projects, conducted by a number of local nongovernmental organizations and teaching institutions, instruction is interactive: Teachers serve as facilitators, students are actively involved, learning is experiential, and outside personal experience is a valid basis for knowledge acquisition. The programs seek to change the climate of the classroom and perceptions of social environment. They encourage self-expression, personal accountability, appreciation of individual and group differences, and social responsibility. Rosandic describes the programs as teaching not only about peace but “*for peace*” (p. 10, emphasis in original).

Rosandic reports positive reactions from both teachers and children involved in the programs; however, none of the programs offered the opportunity for long-term evaluation. Rosandic concludes that “the rigid Serbian school system resists innovations in general and peace education in particular. . . . Also, the foreign funds that supported these programs are fading, and internal resources are almost nonexistent. These are serious obstacles to further implementation of peace education and to the retention of what has

already been accomplished” (p. 36). Nonetheless, Rosandic places hope in the finding elsewhere that personal factors may outweigh professional factors in encouraging individual teachers who have received training in peace education to “continue to implement what they have learned” (p. 37).

More than ideology, political system, or decision-making structure, it is culture that has the most “dominant and permanent influence on negotiating style” (p. 269). So argue Anna Scherbakova-Vassilieva and Nikolai Sokov in “The Influence of Culture on Russian Negotiating Style.” Russian culture, in their view, is fundamentally dualistic, oscillating between paired extremes: deference to authority versus lawlessness, primacy of the collective versus individual exceptionalism, and messianism that struggles with self-doubt. These antinomies endure throughout Russian history, which has alternated between periods of regimentation and anarchy.

Scherbakova-Vassilieva and Sokov find continuities in Russian culture and negotiating styles across the czarist era, through the Soviet regime, and in the post-Soviet period. While culture is paramount, political system and ideology do play a part. The latter influence negotiating style by giving greater weight to certain cultural attributes, emphasizing some while suppressing others. Once the political regime changes, they write, “other cultural traits which coexisted but may have been dormant at a particular moment in the past assumed greater expression in Russian negotiating style. The main features of Russian culture and culture-generated preferences, however, remained basically intact” (p. 271).

**ANNA
SCHERBAKOVA-
VASSILIEVA AND
NIKOLAI SOKOV**

“The Influence of
Culture on Russian
Negotiating Style”

Monterey, Calif.:
Monterey Institute of
International Studies,
1999

If a line were drawn from Paris to Moscow and another from Stockholm to Rome, W. R. Smyser points out that they would intersect at the Brandenburg gate: Berlin is the center of Europe, the only city in all three geopolitical divisions of Europe—western, central, and eastern. His book, *From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany*, examines relations between the victors of World War II, particularly as these also intersect at the fate of Germany and control of Berlin.

Smyser follows the story from Germany’s postwar division to its reunification, as temporary lines of occupation zones solidified as the Berlin Wall and later were dismantled. “German division,” he writes, “did not emerge full-blown from any master plan conceived in Moscow, London, Paris, or Washington. It emerged from a process of incremental decision-making, where the logic of one action followed the logic of another with a mutual ratchet effect leading to a result that most had not expected” (p. 71). As Smyser recounts power struggles, calibrated confrontations, and barely averted crises, he reveals the internal disagreements of each of the major actors, as well as the profound mutual distrust between them.

A 1963 speech delivered by Chancellor Willy Brandt provides a phrase that, to Smyser, captures something essential about the experience of German reunification. The speech addressed reunification as a foreign policy challenge that could be solved only with the Soviet Union, not without it or against it—the basic assumption underlying West Germany’s *Ostpolitik*. Further, Brandt noted that the East German regime, while despicable, also had to be engaged in hopes of improving the living conditions of East Germans. Such an engagement was described as *Wandel durch Annäherung*, which, Smyser notes,

W. R. SMYSER

*From Yalta to Berlin: The
Cold War Struggle over
Germany*

New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1999

[L]ike many German phrases, . . . cannot be translated into English without sacrificing its delicate shadings. Translated directly, as it usually is, it means “change through mutual approach,” or, with the customary French word, “change through rapprochement.” But the content goes far deeper and can be better expressed as “transformation through mutual accommodation.” It implies that parties or states engaged in conciliation might be profoundly if unwittingly altered in the process (p. 213).

While the phrase was applied to Germany in particular, Smyser speculates that it might also be appropriate for other relations and institutions, and he wonders about the consequences. He concludes: “Neither the West European institutions nor the Russians appear to realize . . . that NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and EU [European Union] expansion across the continent will change those institutions at least as much as it enlarges them. Moreover, as those institutions stretch to the east, they also move the European center to the east” (p. 409).

JANINE R. WEDEL
 “Clans, Cliques, and
 Captured States: How
 We Misunderstand
 ‘Transition’ in Central
 and Eastern Europe
 and the Former
 Soviet Union”

Washington, D.C.:
 George Washington
 University, March 2000

The study of the post-Soviet transition, Janine Wedel argues, devotes too much attention to formal institutions and too little to informal systems, the latter including networks for information or resource exchanges and influence peddling. The common interests of the members of a network are promoted through the concentration of power and resources. When a member of a network holds a position of authority within a state or economic institution, the primary allegiance of that individual is to the network rather than to the public. Such networks interact with the state and become integrated into it; thus the network’s decisions, agreements, and contracts are seen as normal and legitimate. In such a setting, to proceed as though there were a dichotomy between formal and informal systems only distorts the conceptualization of the changes occurring in the former Soviet Bloc.

The pivotal role of informal systems in the post-Soviet transition continues their important role in the Soviet period. “Under communism,” Wedel writes,

the key to state power was its expansionist bureaucracy that monopolized the allocation of resources. In a shortage economy in which demand always outpaced supply, control over resources insured state power. However, state distribution systems and formal bureaucratic procedures were transformed through extensive use of informal social networks. The most important “good” was typically information disseminated through informal networks based on trust: information about who, how, and where was the lifeblood of economic and political survival (p. 5).

During the transition, when many legal, administrative, political, and economic structures are not stable, old systems of social relations, including informal networks, continue to operate and may even be made more crucial to nascent civil society in the countries.

In her research on East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, Wedel finds many instances in which formal and informal become indistinguishable. She finds cases in which a particular clan may control a governmental ministry or agency. In other instances, organized crime supplants functions of the state in providing security, employment, and mediation. State officials may seek help by legal means and by calling on criminal affiliates. Firms are often partially privatized—profits go to board members but shortfalls are covered by the state. Such arrangements exacerbate Soviet patterns of accumulating political power to wield economic clout. They also maximize and institutionalize

deniability: A clan can be blamed when the state is criticized, and the state can be blamed if the clan is attacked.

Neglecting the operation and extent of informal networks “can produce unanticipated and undesired outcomes in reform and foreign aid efforts” (p. 4). Wedel advocates due attention. In particular, she suggests that the donor community choose partners carefully. Partnerships should also be established with a diversity of nongovernmental organizations so that no one monopolizes relations with a donor. She also recommends efforts to strengthen the state and public administration rather than bypass it through relations with informal groups.

What will eventually become the stable borders of Russia? The question, as well as the country, “deserves a much more sophisticated policy than simply the suggestion that an instant European nation-state be created on the ruins of an empire,” writes Igor Zevelev (p. 171). He sees several possible options.

The prospect of building a new state within the borders of the former Soviet Russian republic dominated official policy of the new, independent Russian government in 1991–92. This approach emphasizes civic rather than ethnic identity; indeed, “[t]he problems of Russian ethnic identity and the new Russian diaspora were treated practically as politically insignificant” (p. 69).

Another possibility is ethnonationalism, restoring the “geographical congruence between the state and the nation by, in this case, building the state within the area of settlement of the ethnic Russian people” (p. 53). This process would entail the political reunification of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and northern Kazakhstan. Factors working against such a future include the great diversity of different diasporas and the lack of organization among the diasporans themselves.

A neo-imperialist program, as championed by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, calls for the restoration of the Soviet Union. The appeal of this possibility was substantially undermined by the ongoing battle between the Russian government and the secessionist republic of Chechnya, as any attempt to implement the program is apt to generate further conflict.

A program of hegemony and dominance has also been considered. State building within the borders of present-day Russia would be accompanied by “subjugation of other successor states and the creation of a buffer zone of protectorates and dependent countries around Russia” (p. 73). In this program, Russian diasporas are viewed as a potential instrument of influence and manipulation in neighboring states.

A final option is integrationism. Progress on economic integration between Russia and neighboring states would lead to eventual coordination of defense and other policies, perhaps in some form of confederation of former Soviet republics beyond the Commonwealth of Independent States. “The project,” according to Zevelev, “is very pragmatic, emphasizing economy and security and downplaying more abstract components, such as identity, ethnicity, and nationhood. Supporters of this school of thought maintain that diaspora issues will become obsolete when the post-Soviet space is integrated in terms of economics and security” (p. 74).

It is also possible that none of these options will be brought to fruition. Indeed, in Zevelev’s view, “[a] Russia without clear-cut frontiers may be the only peaceful solution to

IGOR ZEVELEV

*Russia and Its New
Diasporas*

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace
Press, 2001

the Russian question after the breakup of the Soviet empire. Inconsistent and messy relations between Moscow and ethnic republics within the Russian Federation and moderate, though hardly effective, policies toward Russians in the near abroad might be a better solution for security in Eurasia than attempts to shape a clear-cut approach toward nation-state building and the inevitable redrawing of borders” (p. 26).

8. LATIN AMERICA

In the context of postconflict Central America, Alejandro Bendaña argues for a broad vision of reconstruction, avoiding the twin pitfalls of either “a know-nothing improvisational approach” or the alternative of copying a standard recipe. Beyond the technical exercises of demining fields, rebuilding bridges, and fitting prostheses, Bendaña identifies the larger challenge of reconstructing social capital—the networks of trust, reciprocity, and civil engagement that “allow transactions at lower costs and collective action for a wider good.”

In his survey of Central American reconstruction efforts, Bendaña finds several shortcomings. Overall, he criticizes what he sees as the “subordination of the social agenda to the free market” as governments’ options were narrowed by their adherence to structural adjustment programs that severely restricted social spending. This constriction of the social agenda was most evident in the unavailability of affordable credit for demobilized ex-combatants.

Bendaña is also critical of governments’ handling of organized ex-combatants. Although governments repeatedly asserted that they would respond only to civic engagement, in actuality they responded only to threats and pressure. In Nicaragua and El Salvador, Bendaña cites instances in which such strategies as blocking highways, occupying government offices, and taking hostages were rewarded by government concessions to mobilized groups, undercutting those trying to foster peaceful methods of protest and advocacy.

In examining the international relations of indigenous communities throughout Latin America from the 1960s through the 1990s, Alison Brysk discovers that a “convergence of identity politics and globalization has produced a new form of political syncretism that is local but not parochial” (p. 18). Eschewing political parties, corporate interest groups, or guerrilla movements, Latin America’s indigenous peoples have organized via social movements and engaged in symbolic as much as strategic behavior. Through such movements, Brysk writes, indigenous groups have “transformed cultural survival from humanitarian shelter for atavism to a positive valuation of cultural diversity” (p. 61). Their movements are also transnational, not only because indigenous populations straddle national borders but because they interact with counterparts and other social movements around the world, learning “transferable protest repertoires” from groups working on such issues as landmines, environmental degradation, or prison labor. As modernity “has presented indigenous peoples with the unhappy choice between subjugation and assimilation” (p. 51), they are now mobilizing to contest their place in global markets, protect their hold on resources, and maintain their way of sharing those resources. In pursuit of these objectives, indigenous groups directly target international policymakers and institutions, corporations, or foreign publics.

Brysk finds substantial evidence of “the democratizing potential of local-global interactions” as she reviews the efforts of indigenous groups to instigate institutional reforms at

**ALEJANDRO
BENDAÑA**

“Demobilization and Reintegration in Central America: Peace-Building Challenges and Responses”

Managua, Nicaragua:
Centro de Estudios
Internacionales, 1999

ALISON BRYSK

From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America

Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 2000

the World Bank, evict or change the practices of oil companies and other corporations, gain standing in international organizations, and assert more control over decisions that affect their lives (p. 286). Yet there are potential hazards to indigenous mobilization and organization. Internationalization distorts patterns of tribal authority by generating divisions between traditionally designated and internationally recognized leaders. Identity politics and symbolic appeals may attract attention without altering actual resource allocation or equipping indigenous movements to navigate institutional politics. And the very identity that these movements seek to affirm may itself be undercut through the process of that affirmation. Creating a market for artisanal craft, for example, may lead to commercialization of the sacred. Maintaining ownership of tribal lands may require attaining economic viability—as through ranching, which involves clearing the land and thereby destroying the existing ecosystem and the people’s relation to it.

On the basis of her research, Brysk offers several suggestions. She urges international actors—including international organizations and transnational corporations—to buffer globalization by incorporating into all projects an evaluation of indigenous impact and consultation with representatives of the affected population. Standards for proper conduct should be established and monitored. Regarding governmental representation, Brysk encourages the adoption of consociational formulas, such as reserved legislative seats or special districts, as the indigenous are rarely part of traditional elite groups or class-based political parties. For nongovernmental organizations based in advanced industrial democracies, Brysk locates primary responsibility in influencing their own societies to make their governmental and multinational institutions more accessible and more responsive to the representatives of indigenous people and to foster people-to-people connections based on solidarity rather than guilt or the appeal of exoticism.

*Environmental Change
and Security Project
Report.*
Issue no. 7

Washington, D.C.:
Woodrow Wilson
International Center for
Scholars, Summer 2001

This issue of the journal of the Environmental Change and Security Project (ECSP) is extremely wide-ranging. It includes material on water scarcity and hunger as security issues, environmental degradation as a result of violent conflict, a forum on population implosion, and fifteen contributions on projections developed by the U.S. National Intelligence Council in its *Global Trends 2015*. Nineteen books on environment and security are reviewed, and some twenty meetings recently held by the ECSP are briefly reported. Editor Geoffrey D. Debelko acknowledges this tremendous diversity while also pointing to Brazil as the regional focus of this issue. Two feature articles explore environment and security issues in Brazil.

In “Dilemmas for Conservation in the Brazilian Amazon,” Margaret E. Keck traces some recent history of conservation efforts in the Amazon and argues that repeated failures to understand or accommodate domestic political factors have undermined environmentalists’ efforts to protect the rainforest. For example, massive burning of the forest occurred in 1987–88, at a time when a new constitution was being debated—including the possibility of a land reform that would redistribute “unproductive” land. Clearing land is one way of having it designated productive, hence the record-setting level of fires that ceased as that plank of the proposed constitution was abandoned. Keck writes, “Since the source of the spike in Amazonian fire incidence in 1987 was not widely understood, its use thereafter as a baseline for measuring subsequent deforestation in the Amazon was misleading” (p. 38). Keck identifies other instances of international environmentalists’

ignorance of the Brazilian political context and also chides them for aiming to circumvent politicians, whom they tend to see as obstructionists. That circumvention, she suggests, only increases the distrust these politicians feel, reinforcing their sense that international calls for preservation of the Amazon constitute an attack on Brazil's sovereignty.

Thomaz Guedes da Costa also notes Brazil's concern for its sovereignty as contained in the design for the System for Vigilance of the Amazon (SIVAM). In "Brazil's SIVAM: As It Monitors the Amazon, Will It Fulfill Its Human Security Promise?" Guedes da Costa explains that this system of surveillance consists of a complex combination of fixed, mobile, and airborne radar; ground sensors; telecommunication networks; computerized data collection; and information management structures. Still in the preparation phase, the system is meant to achieve several national security goals: preserving Brazil's sovereignty over its territories in that tropical forest region, assisting in law enforcement (particularly deterring illegal flights of narco-traffickers), and providing environmental information for promoting sustainable development and preservation of natural habitats in the Amazon. Guedes da Costa is concerned that the system's preparation has been conducted entirely by the military, with little transparency and scarce input from environmental scientists. "It is uncertain at best whether the well-established security purposes of the project can successfully co-exist with its environmental management possibilities," writes Guedes da Costa. "The major risk is that the program will systematically generate data that may not 'fit' the scientific needs of research programs" (p. 50).

Harvey Kline examines the complex dynamics of violence in Colombia and the attempts by recent presidential administrations to confront it. Immediate sources of violence are threefold: guerrillas pursuing political change, including agrarian reform and substantial change in economic policies; narcotics traffickers expanding their lucrative trade; and paramilitary groups of several stripes—some virtually sponsored by the military, others created as local vigilante groups or private security forces. "Indeed," Kline writes, "Colombian reality was never a two- or even three-actor reality. Rather it was an n-actor reality in which the 'n' was quite large" (p. 192). Violence, from kidnapping to pitched battles, became rampant in the context of a fairly closed political system and weak state with low law-enforcement capability. As political and drug-related violence increased, so did common crime, with the government declaring in the late 1980s that 80 percent of crimes went unreported, and of those reported, 90 percent did not lead to an indictment or conviction.

The long-standing government response to violence was to rely on repression and the use of force, often ineffectually. As Kline reports, two recent presidents, Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986–90) and Cesar Gaviria (1990–94), sought to change that pattern.

With varying degrees of success they attempted political change—amending the constitution to enhance democracy, negotiating with guerrillas, offering plea bargains to narcotics traffickers, and attempting to bargain indirectly with paramilitaries. Kline records an overall failure of these efforts, despite occasional specific successes. He attributes the failures to several factors. The amended constitution did not undertake fundamental social and economic reforms. Negotiations between government and guerrillas were hampered because the two sides embraced different conceptions of peace. Each also thought it could eventually win militarily, but both sides suffered from internal disunity. In dealing

HARVEY KLINE

State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–1994

Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999

with narcotics traffickers, the weakness of the law enforcement system—typified by princely conditions for jailed traffickers—made a mockery of the effort to bring them to justice. In looking to the future, Kline concludes that while Colombia may need more democracy, it also needs more authority, particularly in the form of effective law enforcement.

**TOMMIE SUE
MONTGOMERY, ED.**

*Peacemaking and
Democratization in the
Western Hemisphere*

Miami: North-South
Center Press at the
University of Miami, 2000

This volume gathers progress reports on international and multinational efforts at peacemaking in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, and Ecuador, including political, electoral, and diplomatic-military missions. Authors attend to specific local circumstances which enhanced or hampered success. They point to the importance of balance at every step—such as effective coordination between the peace process with economic priorities, or the calibration of international initiative with local ownership.

In “Under the Best of Circumstances: ONUSAL and the Challenges of Verification and Institution Building in El Salvador,” David Holiday and William Stanley explore the means by which a peace mission balances “the supportive approach required for institutional strengthening with the negative, watchdog approach needed for verification”—both of which were in the UN mandate in El Salvador (p. 55). They note that while “[c]riticism alone can result in alienation and resistance, . . . domestic actors will tolerate considerable criticism if it is paired with useful offers of assistance” (p. 57). Coordination is crucial and, when effective, “Combining institutional strengthening and verification activities can produce positive results that are often greater than the sum of the two individual parts” (p. 58). On the other hand, “Failure to make assistance conditional on shared political criteria . . . contributed to reduced effectiveness of both verification and institution building” (p. 58).

Other authors address the risk of cultivating dependency in the process of electoral missions, if states come to rely on the technical expertise or the legitimating function of outside advisers and observers. In “ONUVEEN: Electoral Observation as Conflict Resolution,” Shelley A. McConnell expands on the Nicaraguan example, noting that

in countries in transition to democracy, where democratic institutions are embryonic, the presence of prestigious international authorities both increases confidence in local institutions that observers monitor and tempts citizens to look abroad for ratification of local authorities’ decisions. Just when emerging democracies need observation the most, they are particularly vulnerable to its negative side effects (p. 130).

9. MIDDLE EAST

In *No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*, Geneive Abdo describes a broad-based groundswell of Islamic piety which, she claims, is quietly transforming the nation. Egyptians from all parts of society are integrating Islam into their lives, even while the state remains preoccupied with religious militants.

According to Abdo, common Egyptians have rejected the Iranian revolution as a model, because its outcome has included isolation, economic failures, and internal power struggles. The Islamic Group in Algeria and the Taliban in Afghanistan hold little appeal because of their extreme brutality. Terrorists associated with Osama bin Laden, she argues, are seen as building a movement united by violence rather than belief, and as fostering no religious community. Within Egypt, the militants who perpetrated the 1997 massacre in Luxor thoroughly alienated the population. By contrast, Abdo argues, common Egyptians are seeking an Islamic order rather than a theocratic state and are willing to be ruled by a mixture of secular law and Shari'a. "The flexible nature of Egypt's revival," she writes, "stands to make a profound contribution to the development of Islamic movements in the twenty-first century and will chart a new course for others to emulate" (p. 9).

In Abdo's view, the Egyptian government seems out of touch with the revival and preoccupied with militants who directly threaten the state. In several disputes over social matters, such as moral censorship, female circumcision, and veiling, the secular views of the state have won in the courts. The state nonetheless appears to accept that these decisions will not be enforced and that the population will continue its religious practice as it pleases. The state is far more concerned with militants, whom it pursues aggressively, frequently within the purview of military courts that lack full due process. As Abdo describes this situation, "Mesmerized by the same alarmist headlines and sound bites that the Western media reserve for deadly Muslim militancy, the secular state has overlooked the far more dangerous threat to its survival that Egypt's grassroots piety has come to represent" (p. 33).

From 1994 to 1998, Israeli and Palestinian officials undertook 148 cooperative public health projects. Israelis and Palestinians joined efforts on projects that involved sixty-seven organizations and approximately four thousand people. A team of Palestinian and Israeli researchers have conducted a study of this cooperation, mapping the projects and interviewing 112 participants. They report on the motivations for participation and the outcomes of these projects, such as training physicians in medical specialties, generating data for policy planning, developing care service models, and providing nonprofit services.

The researchers found that participants were motivated by the desire to improve their professional skills (52 percent of Palestinians). Contributing to peace between Israelis and Palestinians was also a main motivation (53 percent of Israelis and 41 percent of Palestinians). Committed leaders who maintained enthusiasm despite a tense political climate were often mentioned as important to the success of the projects. Symmetry—of work assignments, financing, and responsibility—was considered key to the projects, particularly by the Palestinian participants. Obstacles to these cooperative health projects

GENEIVE ABDO

No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam

New York: Oxford University Press, 2000

TAMARA BARNEA, ET AL.

Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in the Health Field, 1994–1998

Jerusalem: IDC-Brookdale Institute and Al-Quds University, May 2000

included logistical difficulties, limits on travel between the West Bank and Gaza, political tensions, some government opposition, and financial constraints.

Cooperative projects resulted in several outcomes. Participants reported that their attitudes changed as they realized cooperation was possible. This change in perceptions moderated their views of the conflict and enhanced their desire to coexist. Both Palestinians and Israelis felt that they learned about the other, replacing stereotypes and presumptions with direct impressions. Substantial professional development occurred through the transfer of technical knowledge and skills. Health services were also improved, with more than 75 percent of project directors reporting that their health-related goals were achieved. The majority of both Palestinian and Israeli participants were satisfied or highly satisfied with their cooperative projects and expressed an interest in continuing them.

NATHAN J. BROWN

The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf

New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997

Nathan Brown considers three possible standard interpretations of the judiciary as it exists in Egypt and the states of the Persian Gulf: that it is an imperialist cultural imposition, serving the interests of foreign powers; it is a neutral advance of liberalism, regularizing and even limiting authority by establishing the rule of law; or it is an extension of central authority, furthering rather than circumscribing relations of domination. In his research, Brown discovers a situation far messier than these neat analytical categories, but he concludes that the courts are indeed one locus of political and economic domination. The inequality of the courts, he finds, resides not in their bias toward the rich but in the ability of the rich to find extrajudicial means for resolving their disputes.

Brown characterizes Egyptian courts as inundated with civil disputes, many that would be regarded as frivolous or inappropriate elsewhere. Their operations are glacially slow, complex, inefficient, and corrupt. The rich avoid them; the poor use them to pursue concrete objectives (rental leases, back pay, return of furniture, custody) rather than abstract justice. Brown is particularly interested in the popular use of the courts, which he views as instrumental rather than authoritative: Courts are used as one tactic among many, including direct bargaining, family mediation, and a variety of other formal and informal means of dispute resolution. Were the courts used as the first resort, this choice would suggest that they are a central feature of a legitimate order. Were they the last resort, it might indicate that they are viewed with suspicion. But Brown finds that courts are used simultaneously—not alternatively or consecutively—with a number of other tactics. No legitimacy is implied by this widespread instrumental use. Brown concludes that “Egyptian techniques show that the increasing reach of the state apparatus has also increased the options for individual actors in the society” (p. 237). In the Egyptian experience, state and society are not locked in a zero-sum struggle for power and influence. Rather, the Egyptian judicial system has increased the maneuverability of both.

GEORGE JOFFÉ

Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1999

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (EMPI) was established in 1995 at the prompting of the European Union. Its aim is to promote peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean Basin, one instrument of which includes a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area to be established by 2010. The prevailing view is that free trade will enhance regional stability and boost development in northern Africa. Contributors to this volume raise some cautions about that perspective.

In “The European Challenge to North African Economies: The Downside to the Euro-Mediterranean Policy,” Jon Marks identifies several risks to a free trade agreement in the region. He points out that lowering tariff barriers will reduce government revenues, undermining efforts to control deficits. Local manufactures will also not be competitive with European imports and will require a great deal of foreign investment in industrial plant to become so. The EMPI does not address European Union (EU) protections for local farm products, and European farm lobbies remain a dominant force in EU trade policy. Early results of implementing a free trade zone may favor Europe as an exporter of goods and services while North African states suffer from trade diversion. Other aspects of a free trade zone are politically awkward. EMPI extends from Morocco to Turkey, including Jordan (which has no Mediterranean coastline), while excluding Libya (the country with the longest Mediterranean coastline of all). Other contributors doubt that there will be ready foreign investment to a region characterized by decades of slow growth and one of the world’s most intractable conflicts.

George Joffé concludes the volume by warning against the possibility of developing “leopard spot economies” where some industries engage in outsourcing but the general standard of living is not improved and development is not self-sustaining.

Is there a possibility of a rapprochement between Iran and the United States? Might relatively moderate new leadership in Iran generate opportunities for improved relations between the two countries? Regardless of the politics of their relationship, an array of legal structures hinder such a development. In “U.S.-Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws and Regulations,” Kenneth Katzman observes that over the recent decades of U.S.-Iranian hostility, a number of U.S. laws and regulations have been enacted that prohibit virtually all commercial transactions between the two countries and place serious restrictions on other aspects of their relationship. He has provided a compendium of many relevant measures and includes brief introductions to put each one in context. They include statements of U.S. policy contained in speeches by Clinton administration officials; sanctions on trade, aid, and investment (including executive orders and legislation such as foreign assistance appropriations); antiterrorism legislation; secondary sanctions on third countries selling weapons to Iran; initiatives on broadcasting; diplomatic agreements on the release of hostages; UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran-Iraq War; and State Department travel warnings.

**KENNETH
KATZMAN**

U.S.-Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws, and Regulations. Occasional Paper

Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States, December 1999

Four papers in this collection examine Iran’s security concerns, nuclear potential, and political risks of developing that potential. Iran faces some proximal security threats—the unsettled situation in the Middle East and the bellicosity of Iraq among them. To be sure, as Farideh Farhi puts it in “To Have or Not To Have? Iran’s Domestic Debate on Nuclear Options,” the reasons for Iran’s “maintaining a nuclear option rests solidly on the politics of operating in a dangerous neighborhood” (p. 45).

How much headway has Iran made in developing nuclear weapons? In “Iran’s Nuclear Options,” Geoffrey Kemp points out that the intelligence services of the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Israel have confirmed that Iran has a covert nuclear program—although all four have refused to disclose further information to avoid compro-

**GEOFFREY KEMP,
ED.**

Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Options: Issues and Answers

Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, January 2001

mising their intelligence sources. If in existence, such a program would be in violation of Iran's commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). According to Kemp, "The political, economic and strategic costs to Iran of violating its NPT commitments or formally withdrawing from the treaty could be considerable." He therefore suggests that the most prudent policy for Iran would be to continue to "develop the infrastructure for a weapons capability but to avoid crossing the red line in the hope that a more stable regional security environment emerges" (p. 15).

In "Iran's Strategic Environment and Nuclear Weapons," Shahram Chubin also counsels Iran to stay behind that red line, arguing that nuclear weapons would be ill-suited for handling most of Iran's security concerns and would have many disadvantages. The latter include diplomatic reactions to Iran's withdrawal from the NPT; incentives for Turkey and Saudi Arabia to consider their own nuclear programs; the spur to Iraq's nuclear ambitions; and the tremendous costs, which would divert resources away from conventional military capabilities that would be more relevant to meeting Iran's security challenges.

Richard Speier devotes further attention to technical hurdles should Iran try to develop a nuclear program. In "Iranian Missiles and Payloads," he concludes that, given Iran's current technical capacities, nuclear weapons "are likely to be less important Iranian missile payloads than are chemical weapons" (p. 62).

**MANSOOR
MOADDEL AND
KAMRAN
TALATTOF, EDS.**

*Contemporary Debates
in Islam: An Anthology
of Modernist and
Fundamentalist Thought*

New York: St. Martin's
Press, 2000

The organizing principle of this collection of Islamic theological writing is the contrast between the modernism of the late nineteenth century and the fundamentalism of the twentieth century. In their introduction, editors Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof describe the late nineteenth century as a period of critical re-examination of classic Islamic theology, Koranic exegesis, and practical jurisprudence. Writing on such topics as war, heresy, science, and the role of women, Islamic thinkers sought to demonstrate that Islam was consonant with modernity and capable of ongoing change and development. For example, several of the texts excerpted in this volume insist that the Koran permits warfare only in self-defense. Others celebrate diversity of opinion and belief, asserting that it is only through discussion and debate with those holding other positions that one comes to truly know and hold one's own beliefs.

Several writers are critical of the treatment of women. Writing in the eighteenth century, Qasim Amin describes both the veiling of women in Islam and their unveiling in the West as extremes that objectify women. He argues that the treatment of women is largely a matter of tradition, which is merely a human construction that can and should change. He writes,

Some people will say that today I am publishing heresy. To these people I will respond: Yes, I have come up with a heresy, but the heresy is not against Islam. It is against our traditions and social dealings. . . . Why should a Muslim believe that his traditions cannot be changed or replaced by new ones, and that it is his duty to preserve them forever? . . . Can the Muslim contradict God's laws of creation—God who has made change a prerequisite for life and progress, rather than immobility and inflexibility, which are characteristic of death and backwardness? Is not tradition merely the set of conventions of a country defining the special customs appropriate to its life and behavior at a specific time and place? (p. 164)

In the twentieth century, these modernist views declined, while those of Islamic fundamentalism (a term the editors hesitate to use, but for which they find no adequate

replacement) grew. In contrast to the earlier modernists who sought to rationalize Islam, these more recent writers aim to Islamize all social institutions. They pursue political activism in order to seize state power and see political reorganization as a necessary step for Islamization. This all-encompassing vision is articulated by Egyptian Sayyid Qutb who describes Divine Law as including “the regulation of thoughts and views, fundamentals of statecraft, principles of ethics and culture, laws of transactions, and regulations of knowledge and the arts. The Divine code of law circumscribes every angle of human thought and opinions” (p. 198). Regarding war, Qutb maintains that just as there were different stages to the prophet Mohammed’s life, there are different phases of history to which different actions are appropriate—sometime self-defense, sometimes aggression. Declaring otherwise, according to Qutb, is a defeatist attitude.

Qutb also presents a program for dealing with apostates and nonbelievers. If people do not choose to submit to God, he reasons, this only shows they do not have real freedom of choice. It is therefore incumbent upon Moslems to remove any impediments to their acceptance of Islam. “If anyone adopts the attitude of resistance, it would then be obligatory on Islam to fight against him until he is killed or he declares loyalty and submission (p. 227).” In the campaign to spread Islam, “acceptance of which is binding on the entire humanity,” persuasion alone will not be sufficient—if it were, Qutb argues, it would have succeeded by now. Force is therefore required to make achievements in this “stupendous mission.”

In “The Golan: The Road to Its Fall,” Muhammad Muslih presents an interpretation of the relations between Syria and Israel since 1948, particularly regarding the control of the Golan Heights. Muslih perceives a consistent Israeli offensive aimed not only at strategic dominance but also at exclusive control of the waters of the Jordan-Yarmuk river basin and complete access to Golan farmland. He sees the “operational mode” of Israeli action toward Syria as being “a mix of territorial expansion and military escalation” (p. 26). In his view, the tensions and violent conflict that have occurred over the Golan are a result of overwhelming Israeli military superiority, which can only be redressed in the context of larger efforts toward peace in the region. Muslih concludes that “[a]n arms control regime based on reciprocal reductions by all neighbors in the region may provide an alternative to this lopsided military balance, but it is inconceivable to have such a regime outside the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict” (p. 79).

**MUHAMMAD
MUSLIH**

“The Golan: The
Road to Its Fall”

Brookville, N.Y.: Long
Island University, June
1998

Twenty-five years after Egypt and Syria’s 1973 attack on Israeli army positions in the Sinai and Golan, a meeting was convened among former senior officials from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Russia, Syria, and the United States. These officials included cabinet members, ambassadors, intelligence officers, and military commanders, and they were joined by scholars, journalists, and other observers. The meeting was an opportunity to share first-hand accounts, challenge or confirm the record, and explore lingering questions. Participants examined key events in detail, trying to get the record straight and learn each other’s perspectives, motives, and mistakes. Not only were there efforts to clarify misconceptions between different countries, but there were also many occasions when represen-

**RICHARD B.
PARKER**

*The October War,
A Retrospective*

Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 2001

tatives from different branches or offices of the same government were also engaged in trying to fathom the other's behavior.

Conference participants addressed a number of specific questions. Why was there a failure of diplomacy to prevent the war? Why was there a failure of intelligence to predict it? What were the mechanics of conflict management? What went into particular decisions and actions, including the U.S. airlift of materiel to Israel, or the decision to place the U.S. military on its highest peacetime alert? How serious was the Soviet threat to intervene? Could there have been a comprehensive peace plan? Was the opportunity for peacemaking fully exploited?

In the course of their discussion, participants discussed the October War as a failure of both intelligence and deterrence. Many key actors were "prisoners of their own convictions" at that time. Information on Arab mobilization, for example, was simply discounted, because of the low estimation of Arab military capabilities. The initiatives of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, such as expelling Soviet military personnel from Egypt, were also discounted because they were not taken seriously. Strategists were similarly certain that Israel's military superiority provided solid deterrence—that no enemy would attack because it could not win militarily. In this case, however, Israel's military might left its opponents frustrated and hopeless. Egypt and Syria made a military move simply to break the diplomatic deadlock, not necessarily expecting military victory but preferring the risks of war to the burdens of inaction.

This book is an edited transcript of the conference, accompanied by essays by the chairs of the different panels. It also provides a chronology of the war and appendixes of relevant documents, including UN Security Council resolutions, records of the staff meetings of U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger, disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Syria, and subsequent statements.

**MARY ANN
TÉTREAU**

*Stories of Democracy:
Politics and Society in
Contemporary Kuwait*

New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000

"Since the late nineteenth century," writes Mary Ann Tétreault, "the drama of Kuwaiti politics has been played out in a series of attempts by rulers to carve out a space for autonomous action for themselves and countervailing attempts by elites outside the ruling family to limit the public activities in which the rulers can engage without their explicit consent" (p. 219). Tétreault's book brings this story up to date, examining the broadened movement for democratization and an increasing Islamism as these and other factors interacted during and after the 1990 Iraqi invasion.

With attention to different perspectives on citizenship, accountability, and representation, Tétreault studies the impact of the invasion on Kuwaiti proponents of democracy. "In some ways," she writes,

Kuwait was more democratic under Iraqi occupation than it was before or has been since. Part of the reason is because the internal boundaries dividing Kuwaitis into groups were erased by the common experience of occupation. "When Saddam Hussein came [she quotes an interviewee], he treated us equally. He did not kill Sunna or Shi'a: he killed Kuwaitis" (p. 10).

The invasion shifted several aspects of Kuwaiti politics: It destroyed a myth of the diplomatic prowess and bureaucratic skill of the ruling family; it demonstrated to Kuwaitis outside the country that they could achieve a great deal without the involvement of the rulers; and those who stayed in the country "learned they could defy an autocratic regime and survive, that they were capable of enduring and overcoming. . . . [They became] less

intimidated by their government than they were in the past. As so many of them put it, ‘We aren’t afraid of the Sabah [the ruling family]. We survived Saddam Hussein’” (p. 98).

The aftermath of the Gulf War was not a neat unfolding of these developments, however. Tétreault gives an account of the Kuwaiti government manipulating and co-opting the resistance, of returning exiles who considered themselves rescuers, of insiders condemning as weaklings those who left. Other changes occurred in electoral rules and redistricting, styles of political campaigning, and clan and sect identity. Social divisions were exacerbated.

One part of this story is the rise of Islamist movements, which Tétreault describes as

similar to Puritanism in their grounding in popular appropriations of religious authority to curb the powers of states whose capacity for coercion of their domestic populations expanded rapidly in the twentieth century. In Kuwait the political opposition is jointly composed of merchants seeking to ensure the rights—including privacy rights—of civil society, and mass movements reacting against the immorality of an unchecked authoritarian regime (p. 21).

As she examines the interaction of merchants, Islamists, democrats, populists, and institutionalists, Tétreault admits to “an inability to decide whether Islamism is building civil society through new social movements and coalition politics faster than it is destroying civil life by acquiescing to the rulers and mobilizing the streets” (p. 227). She also laments that following liberation, important opportunities for democratization were lost because of “the repeated failures of Islamists and secularists to hammer out unified and principled positions that both groups can support wholeheartedly” (p. 227).

“The mission of Seeds of Peace,” as one of its founders, John Wallach, explains, “is to help humanize a conflict that has thrived partly because both sides have so successfully dehumanized each other” (p. 8). The Seeds of Peace program operates a camp in Maine—a safe, neutral environment—for youth from the Middle East. Each summer, some four hundred Egyptian, Israeli, Moroccan, Palestinian, Qatari, Tunisian, and Yemeni young people are selected by their governments to participate in the camp. The youth share living quarters, activities, sports, meals, and, eventually, friendship. Wallach affirms that the strongest way to break down stereotypes is to make one friend from the other side.

At the core of the program are daily “coexistence sessions” in which participants confront and express their anger and fear, share their stories, begin to see and acknowledge their role in the conflict, and recognize their counterparts as fellow human beings. As one participant put it, the lesson they learn is that “[w]e are not fighting each other; we are fighting the masks of the devil we have painted on each other’s faces” (p. 111). This is not an easy process. Camp sessions are frequently punctuated by crises, which propel the participants further in their mutual exploration. Ultimately, Wallach observes, participants feel empowered and more confident of their ability to express themselves and effect a change.

At the conclusion of the camp session, participants return to their separate environments, which are often hostile toward or distrustful of campers’ experiences. Seeds of Peace has therefore established a network, including e-mail exchange, by which participants can support each other in their efforts to be peacemakers in their own communities. “In this way,” writes Wallach, “the program begins to change not a thousand youngsters, but a thousand communities” (p. 90).

JOHN WALLACH

*The Enemy Has a Face:
The Seeds of Peace
Experience*

Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace
Press, 2000

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