Agency for International Development
Bureau for Food for Peace and Private Voluntary Assistance
Washington, D.C.
July 31, 1985
Table of Contents
I. Summary
This paper provides a background discussion of the potential
disincentive effects of food aid on the recipient country's
domestic production and marketing. It also presents guidelines to
strengthen country Team analyses supporting the "bellmon
determination" made by the Secretary of Agriculture. this
determination must conclude that, at the time of export of PL 480
commodities, local facilities will be adequate to store the
commodities and no substantial disincentive to domestic
production and marketing will result. The determination is
required for all food aid programs - Titles I, II and III.
The purpose of this paper is to insure that there is
sufficient information for the Secretary of Agriculture to make a
"Bellmon" determination. It's anticipated that
substantial disincentive issues will be found in only a few
countries. Thus, for most countries, analyses should include only
enough information and data to show that substantial
disincentives aren't likely to occur. As many missions already
submit sufficient analyses, little if any additional analysis
beyond what is now being done will be required.
Present Bellmon reporting procedures will continue. However,
Missions requesting PL 480 programs will also report annually in
their "Action Plan" submissions if the volume of food
aid or any other factors lead the Country Team to suspect the
possibility of substantial disincentive effects attributable to
food aid. If disincentive effects are suspected, the Country Team
should indicate that ta detailed analysis will be completed prior
to the fiscal year the commodities will be shipped. This will
allow time to complete the analysis and identify appropriate
self-help measures or other corrective actions without unduly
delaying PL 480 negotiations.
If a country has been identified as needing more detailed
analysis because of possible disincentive issues, country Teams
are encouraged to undertake the analysis in conjunction with the
CDSS/CDSS Update preparation when possible. If PL 480
negotiations are to be used to encourage policy changes, these
should be fully discussed in the CDSS/CDSS Update.
The paper is organized as follows: Research findings are first
discussed which indicate the conditions characteristic of
disincentive situations. Next, the paper outlines analytical
requirements and describes the information to be include in the
analysis. Ways are then suggested for designing food aid programs
to produce "incentive effects" and minimize
disincentiveeffects on local agricultural production and
marketing. The paper concludes with a listing of specific
criteria for judging the adequacy of storage and handling
facilities. 1/
The analysis required depends upon the relative share of PL
480 food aid to total staple food consumption. As the proportion
rises, the potential for possible disincentive effects rises and
the level of analysis should increase. Where the proportion
approaches 10 percent or more over the past five years, a
thorough examination may be required. Statement in the annual
Action Plan Regarding the disincentive question should include
reference to this percentage.
It's recognized that other variables in addition to the volume
of food aid bear on whether PL 480 food aid will have a positive
or negative impact on local agricultural production. Such
variables might include the extent to which food consumption is
commercialized, the timeliness of food aid (and commercial
import) arrivals, the price elasticities of demand and supply,
the ability of low income households to acquire food, and the
degree of substitution among different food commodities. Thus,
there may be situations where even though the PL 480 food aid is
minor, disincentive effects may still occur. In such cases, more
detailed analysis is encouraged.
In addition to strengthening the Bellmon Determination, the
analysis should be useful in preparing the Mission's country
development strategy, assessing the host country's agriculture
sector, developing a policy dialogue, defining self-help measures
and identifying local currency uses. The increasing integration
of food aid with non-food aid broadens the relevance and
importance of the analysis, especially for those country programs
where increased food and agricultural production are primary
objectives.
II. Background
Since the early 1960's, considerable controversy has arisen
over the potential disincentive effects of food aid on local
agricultural production and marketing. Congressional concern
about disincentives resulted in the 1977 Bellmon Amendment,
Section 401(b), to Public Law 480. Congress' special concern over
the adequacy of food storage and handling facilities in PL 480
recipient countries was also addressed in this amendment.
Section 401(b) of PL 480 requires that before PL 480 food aid
can be supplied, the Secretary of Agriculture must determine
that:
- adequate storage facilities are available in the recipient
country at the time of exportation of the commodity to prevent
the spoilage or waste of the commodity, and
- The distribution of the commodities in the recipientcountry
will not result in a substantial disincentive or interference
with domestic production of marketing in that country.
Posts have complied with the amendment by submitting data,
analyses and findings based on examinations of these concerns
prior to PL 480 food shipments.
Although the Bellmon Determination has been a feature of food
aid programming since 1977, analyses supporting the Bellmon
Determinations have varied in quality and content. This guidance
responds to the need for specific criteria to judge potential
disincentive effects and the adequacy of storage facilities. It
is also consistent the USG's priority for increasing the
developmental impact of PL 480. 2/
III. The Disincentive Issue
Critics concerned over the potential disincentive effects of
food aid argue that the increase in food supplies provided by
food aid:
1)depresses prices received by host country farmers, and
2)causes inadequate host government agricultural policies.
Together these lead to decreases in food production from what
otherwise would have occurred.
In addition to this basic argument, critics charge that food
aid may cause a change in eating habits that creates a permanent
dependency on food imports. This occurs by shifting demand from
domestic to imported foods which can't be competitively produced
at home.
Lastly, critics are concerned that food aid may act as a
disincentive when it fails to reach those most in need. It's
pointed out that low income groups spend a high proportion of any
incremental income or other resource transfer on food. Therefore,
when food aid is targeted to these groups, its potential price
depressing effect is offset by the demand of the poor for food.
If, instead, the food ends up in the hands of more well-to-do
consumers, the freed income is usually spent on non-food
consumptions. In this case, critics argue that a disincentive
effect results because additional demand for food is not created
to offset the potential price depressing effect of the additional
food supply.
A review of the development literature suggests that food aid
has had far less disincentive effects upon food production than
critics claim. 3/ On the price disincentive issue,
empirical studies show that in a number of countries, including some of the
larger recipients in the 1960's, food aid either had no
disincentive effect or the disincentive effect was offset by
incentive effects on other crops. In some cases, the food aidwas
only partly additional to normal commercial levels,4/and the
effect on market prices for locally produced grain was not
significant. In other cases, the potential disincentive effect
was offset by policy interventions which created additional
demand for food among low-income groups or supported incentive
prices for producers with sales proceeds of the food aid.5/
The literature does not reflect a consistent, rigorous
definition of what constitutes an adverse "policy
effect" attributed to food aid. Broadly defined, this effect
occurs when food aid encourages or enables the recipient
government to neglect agricultural production and investment.
More specifically, this neglect is often reflected in the
relatively low share of government investment going to
agriculture. In other cases, the effect is the lack of thoughtful
sector planning and programming, inefficient regulations of grain
marketing, insufficient technical assistance to producers, an
unwillingness to permit secure land tenure, or failure to shift
the terms of trade in favor of agriculture when unfavorable and
inappropriate terms exist.
Studies find that while food aid has at times been associated
with inappropriate policies, it is not a cause of them.6/Rather,
a government's decision not to support food and agricultural
development is primarily affected by political and economic
factors that are more influential than the availability of food
aid (e.g., national security, comparative advantage and national
development philosophy.)
The causal link is similarly not clear as regard the effects
of food aid on taste preference changes. Such changes are found
in countries which have not ben significant recipients of food
aid; e.g., the Ivory Coast and Nigeria. Many of the changes are
due to urbanization and gradual modernization, changes in the
relative terms of trade between basic food commodities, and the
association of traditional foods with a low level or
"obsolete" lifestyle. Such taste changes often began
with the higher income groups which did not directly benefit from
food aid. Finally, displacement of local production may not be
harmful if the freed local resources are used more advantageously
in alternative production that promotes growth, employment, and a
more equitable income distribution.7/
Attempts to assess the effectiveness of targeted food aid
programs have focussed mainly on their nutritional impact. Little
attention has been given to measuring the extent to which they
increase the demand for local foods through indirect income
effects.8/ However, in recent years, there has been a
considerable increase in research to assess how low-income
households adjust food acquisition to changes in household
incomes and prices.9/ These studies show large variations in the
marginal propensity to consume calories. Some show that the
proportion of additional income spent on more calories is high.
Others show that in addition to the expanding calorieconsumption,
a considerable portion of additional income is spent on upgrading
the diet; that is, substituting toward more expensive calories or
to protein. Generally, additional income is spent on more cereals
for groups where calorie intake is seriously substandard. For
low-income groups whose basic food needs are being met, the
additional income is more likely to be spent on upgrading their
diet.10/
Thus, the available evidence suggests that the disincentive
effect linked to food aid has occurred in relatively few
countries. However, the possibility for disincentive effects
always exists and sometimes they do occur. Greater assurance
against such occurrences can be best achieved by designing PL 480
programs which minimize disincentive effects or offset them with
positive incentives.
IV. Analytical Requirements
A. Submission of Analysis
Missions requesting PL 480 programs will report annually in
their "Action Plan" if the volume of food aid or any
other factors (see Section IV C) lead the Country Team to suspect
the possibility of substantial disincentive effects attributable
to food aid. These statements should include reference to the
average share of PL 480 food aid to total staple food consumption
over the past five years. There is no need to examine the
country's storage and handling capacity at this time.
If the disincentive effects are suspected, the Country Team
should indicate in the Action Plan that a detailed analysis will
be completed prior to the fiscal year the commodities will be
shipped. This will allow time to complete the analysis and
identify appropriate self-help measures or other corrective
actions without unduly delaying PL 480 negotiations.
If a country has been identified as needing more detailed
analysis because of possible disincentive issues, Country Teams
are encouraged to undertake the analysis in conjunction with the
CDSS/CDSS Update preparation when possible. This would be
beneficial to both efforts by shedding light on important aspects
of agricultural sector policy. If PL 480 negotiations are to be
used to encourage policy changes, these should be fully discussed
in the CDSS/CDSS update.
Present reporting procedures will continue whereby the
analysis regarding both the disincentives and storage and
handling considerations is submitted closer to shipment and
arrival dates. These procedures by program type are as follows:
-- Title I Programs: The analysis should be sent with the
Country Team's recommendations on the recipient country's program
request.
-- Title III and Title II Section 206: The analysis will be
included with the Project Paper (PP).
-- Title II Programs: The analysis is submitted with the call
forward.
-- Emergency Programs: The analysis, which should be tailored
to the dimension of the particular program, will be submitted
with the post's emergency program request. Emergency situations
may not allow time to address the disincentive question in depth.
Therefore, even after the request is approved, country Teams are
encourage to give further consideration as to whether immediate
or longer term disincentive effects are likely, and if so how
they might be avoided.
Country Teams must complete a Bellmon determination analysis
before each PL 480 agreement, or amendment adding commodities, is
signed. In addition, the analysis for multi-year agreements and
amendments must be updated annually. Supporting data and analysis
(See Section IV D) should be sent as an annex to PPs or as
attachments to Title I requests, Title II call forwards and
emergency requests.
B. Determination Recommendation
If a positive disincentive determination is recommended and
approved, it will continue to apply to the current fiscal year.
However, the analysis assessing the adequacy of storage and port
handling facilities must be updated for each purchase
authorization or periodic call forward issued under the
agreement.
The Secretary of Agriculture is responsible for making the
determination and has delegated the authority for reviewing the
supporting analysis and recommending the determination tot he
General Sales Manager of the Exports Credit Program Area od
USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service. Comments and issues may be
raised through the interagency review process by other members of
the DCC Subcommittee on Food Aid (AID, State, OMB, Treasury and
Commerce) and presented to USDA for consideration. On the basis
of the Country Team's analysis and the USDA/EC review, a
recommendation for a formal determination is made to the General
Sales Manager. If the General Sales Manager concurs in the
findings, a standard reporting letter is sent tot Congress. The
letter includes the General Sales Manager's determination and
indicates the basis of the determination.
If changed circumstances suggest the possibility of an
unfavorable determination at any time after an agreement is
signed, the analysis should be updated and revised. Such changed
circumstances might include congested port conditions, an
unexpected drop in local prices due to a better than forecast
harvest, or the sudden imposition of unwarranted government price
controls.
If a negative determination is recommended because substantial
disincentive effects are likely to result, the program can't
proceed until appropriate actions are taken to preclude these
effects from occurring. Similarly, if inadequate storage
facilities are the basis for a negative determination, the
storage problem must be addressed before food shipments can
begin.
If consultation with the recipient government doesn't result
in adequate corrective action, termination of PL 480 assistance
would be considered. If a purchase authorization (PA) has already
been signed, shipments under the PA will be honored. However,
before signing another PA or a new agreement, satisfactory
changes to eliminate or offset any storage or disincentive
effects must be negotiated.
Monitoring for possible disincentive effects after an
agreement is signed is particularly important for the Title III
and Title II, Section 206 programs. These programs can span
several years under one agreement. Country Teams should therefore
update the analysis each year in conjunction with the annual
program review.
C. Level of Analysis
The specific criteria outlined in Section V below provide a
framework for assessing the potential disincentive effects of
proposed food aid programs. A standard narrative report format
may be used with sections addressing the disincentive areas
outlined below. Alternatively, a question-answer format may be
used. In either case, narrative responses as opposed to yes-and-
no type answers are required.
The depth of analysis needed will depend upon the relative
significance of PL 480 food aid as measured by the proportion of
PL 480 food aid to total staple food consumption. Although the
Bellmon Amendment relates directly to PL 480 food aid, Country
Teams must keep in mind the possible impact of total food aid
flows in undertaking the disincentive analysis.
Where the PL 480 proportion is minor, the potential for
disincentive effects is slight. In these cases, findings and
conclusions regarding each disincentive are can be briefly
discussed. Sufficient data and analysis should be included in the
responses to show that substantial disincentives aren't likely to
occur.
As the proportion rises, the potential for possible
disincentive effects rises and the level of analysis should
increase. If the proportion has been above 2 percent over the
past 5 years, Country Teams should be alert to the possibility of
disincentive effects. Where the proportion approaches 10 percent
or more, a more thorough examination may be required.
The analysis should follow the outline of the guidance
presented in Section V below and be supported by rigorous
economic analysis to the extent possible. Where it's found that
PL 480 food aid isn't a cause of disincentives but is
nevertheless associated with existing policies11/, Country Teams
are encouraged to consider self-help measures which help
alleviate or offset the disincentives.
It's recognized that other variables in addition to the volume
of food aid influence whether PL 480 food aid will have a
positive or negative impact on local food production. Such
variables include the extent to which food consumption is
commercialized, the price elasticities of demand and supply, the
ability of low income households to acquire food, and the degree
of substitution among different food commodities.
Thus, there may be situations where even though the PL 480
food aid is minor and the policy climate is appropriate,
disincentive effects may still occur. For example, food aid may
arrive at a period of unexpected surplus or food aid may have an
unusually strong effect on prices because only a small proportion
of production is commercially marketed. In such cases, more
detailed analysis is encouraged.
Country Teams without technical staff to undertake the more
detailed analyses can request such assistance through AID/W and
USDA.
A recent survey of 99 developing countries found that in
1977-78, cereal food aid (from all sources) as a percent of total
staple food consumption was as follows:
Percent |
No. of Countries |
0-2% |
58 |
2-5% |
23 |
6-10% |
10 |
more than 10% |
7 |
data unavailable |
1 |
|
|
Total: |
99 |
These figures show that the volume of cereal food aid as a
proportion of total cereal consumption is relatively small in
most developing countries (Huddleston, 1982). Countries with food
aid comprising more than 10% of total staple food consumption
included Sri Lanka, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Mauritania,
Guinea-Bissau, and Somalia. Countries in the 6% to 10%
categoryincluded South Korea, Bangladesh, Jamaica, Haiti,
Lebanon, Tunisia, Gambia, Lesotho, Fiji, and Mauritius.
D. Supporting Data
Attachment A provides an example of data format that may be
useful to Country Teams in preparing their analysis. At a
minimum, Country Teams should include a summary price data table
such as the one included as Attachment B. commodity data should
be included for each PL 480 commodity provided and its close
substitutes. When a cereal commodity is being provided, data for
all major locally produced and imported cereal staples should be
examined.
With the exception of the price statistics, much of the data
will likely have already been compiled by the Country Team in the
preparation of other documentation such as the CDSS, ABS,
agricultural attache reports, sector analyses, PL 480 agreements
and project papers. Data may also be found in local government
reports, World Bank and other donor studies, and other secondary
sources in the country.
If price data are unavailable and/or unreliable, posts should
consider ways in which PL 480 resources and possibly Development
Assistance resources can be used to strengthen the recipient
country's food data collection and reporting capacity. 12/ Under
such data constraints, Country Teams should still make their best
efforts, using estimates, to undertake the price analysis.
V. Disincentive/Incentive Analysis
The suggested disincentive/incentive analysis begins with a
brief description of the economy and the agricultural sector.
Special attention is given to identifying the country's
comparative advantage in the agricultural sector. The following
aspects of disincentive effects are then examined, taking into
account the influence of other donor food aid and commercial
imports: prices, government policies, taste preferences and
targeting of distribution. Lastly, the analysis examines the
extent to which PL 480 incentive measures might offset any
possible disincentive effects.
The intent of the analysis is to insure there is sufficient
information for the Secretary of Agriculture to make a
"Bellmon" determination. A negative determination
should be made when the Country Team concludes that the PL 480
food aid is a major contributor to agricultural disincentive
effects and it isn't possible to negotiate self-help measures
that alleviate the disincentives sufficiently to permit a
positive determination. IF a negative determination is believed
warranted, Country Teams should follow the procedures outlined in
Section IV B.
An outline of the suggested analysis would appear as follows:
Outline: Suggested Disincentive/Incentive Effects Analysis
- Agricultural Sector Overview
- Price Effects
- Government Policy Effects
- Administered Prices
- Marketing
- Agricultural Development and Investment Policies
- Changes in Food Consumption Patterns
- Distribution Effects
- Food Aid Incentive Measures
- Attachments: Supporting Data Worksheets
A. Agricultural Sector Overview
An understanding of the country's economic structure and
development potential enables the analyst to better judge
government policy and resource allocation decisions, and their
relevance to possible disincentive effects.
A basic consideration is whether or not the country produces
what it's best suited to produce in terms of its comparative
advantage. This bears significantly on the disincentive/
incentive question as to whether food aid has a disincentive
effect.
In some cases a food self-sufficiency approach may be
warranted. In others, the potential for food production may be
limited but should be developed with an appropriate balance
struck between dependence on food imports and locally produced
foods. In still others, extensive production of a food crop may
not make good economic sense; indeed it may be appropriate to
increase food imports and reduce dependence on domestic food
production. The overview should indicate the appropriateness of
the strategy taken with respect to the near term (1-5 years) and
the long term.
If the country has a comparative advantage in the production
of the same or closely substitutable commodity as that supplied
as food aid, the potential for disincentive effects on the
locally produced commodity is greater. On the other hand, if the
country doesn't have a comparative advantage in these
commodities, the potential for disincentive effects is much less.
The country should produce those commodities which offer greater
production and income potential to the nation and the farmer.
Where an alternative commodity is encouraged, food aid should
have a net neutral or net positive effect on agricultural
production and farmer welfare.
Even where the country produces cash as opposed to food crops,
consideration should be given to the impact on food availability
and consumption. In these cases, food aid programs can include
self-help measures to strengthen the country's food
security system, improve food access, and support nutrition
programs.
B. Food Needs and Price Effects
Price depressing effects attributed to food aid can occur
either through an excess of supply in an uncontrolled price
system or through the support of low producer prices in an
administered price system. This section examines food needs and
the possibility of food aid price disincentive effects due to
excess supply. The following section, "Government Economic
Policy," considers price disincentive effects in terms of
government-administered price systems.
Food aid can depress domestic food prices if it adds to normal
supplies rather than meets a shortfall. This may occur if there
are serious miscalculations in production shortfalls; food aid is
provided even though it is not justified in some years; or
because the arrival of food aid may be out of phase with the
recipient's production cycle.
To determine if food aid imports are excessive, the analyst
should examine past trends as well as current and projected
differences between domestic production and consumption of the
locally affected commodity. Supply and demand data should be
presented as follows:
- actual data for each of the past five years for which
actual data are available;
- estimated data for the current year and for earlier years
for which actual data are unavailable; and
- projected data for years beyond the current year that
food aid will be requested.
Use of historical time-series data extending beyond five years
is encouraged to establish more reliable bases for projecting
trends.
The following considerations should be taken into account in
determining which local commodities will be affected by the PL
480 commodities:
- First, consider the impact the food aid commodity may
have on close substitutes produced and marketed locally.
For example, if wheat/wheat flour is being supplied,
other common food grains such as corn, sorghum, rice,
etc., which are seen by consumers as substitutes for
wheat/wheat flour should be included in the analysis.
Similarly, the local incentives for all oilseeds must be
examined if PL 480 soybean oil is to be supplied.
- Second, consider product differentiation. For example,
certain types of U.S. sorghum or corn may be less
desirablethan the local variety with the latter
commanding a price premium in the market. Such price
differences should be recognized in comparing the food
aid commodity and the local product.
- Lastly, consider alternative uses the PL 480 commodity
may have. For example, it may be used for food and
non-food purposes or solely for non-food consumption;
e.g., for livestock feed or for industrial uses. In these
instances, the analysis should indicate the extent to
which the commodity is used for food as opposed to such
other purposes. The supply and demand analysis and the
disincentive effects analysis should take into account
both food and non-food uses.
The analysis of variations in production and consumption
trends should indicate past maximum food import needs and suggest
projected needs. To determine the influence of food imports on
prices, production costs and deflated domestic prices of the
locally affected commodity should be compared with import levels
and import prices (valued at realistic exchange rates).
Correlations between high food import levels and low domestic
prices can suggest excessive import levels.
The share of PL 480 food aid to total domestic consumption is
important in indicating the potential food aid has for causing
price disincentive effects. The analyst should calculate the
percent of each PL 480 food aid commodity provided to total
domestic consumption of the same or substitutable commodity for
each of the past five years. If this proportion has been 2% or
more over the past five years, have there been any unusual
movements in inflation-adjusted price trends that would indicate
U.S. food aid has led to substantial declines in food prices? On
the other hand, without U.S. food aid, would domestic food prices
tend to rise above normal levels suggested by the trend analysis?
To comply with Section 103(c) of PL 480 and the FAO Principles
of Surplus Disposal, the analysis should show that the U.S. food
aid will fill an unmet need and will not displace usual
commercial imports or disrupt normal trade patterns.
C. Government Policy Effects
Section III above described ways in which policy effects can
adversely affect food and agricultural production. These effects
can be divided into three main areas: pricing, marketing, and
agricultural development and investment policies. When
disincentive effects are found, Country Teams should consider
further the extent to which these are the result of poor
government or PL 480 food aid.
Administered Prices
To promote local food production, the farmer must receive
a pricewhich covers production costs and provides an
incentive profit. When host governments price and distribute
substantial quantities of food below this level, disincentive
price effects on locally produced food will likely result.
If administered prices are a major concern, identify the
key actors and agencies involved in establishing prices.
- Are pricing decisions based on reliable data and
sound technical analysis of the costs of production,
producer returns, regional prices and landed cost
prices of imports (CIF, most competitive commercial
source, plus duties and unloading charges)? If the
foreign exchange rate is over- or under-valued, local
currency prices should be shadow-priced to reflect
the disequilibrium. Is there evidence that any
significant difference between landed cost price of
imports and domestic prices has affected local
production?
- Are producer prices announced sufficiently in advance
of the planting season to affect farmers' planting
decisions?
- Will PL 480 food aid provide significant support to
an administered price system having disincentive
effects on local production and marketing?
Conversely, will PL 480 food aid support an
administered price system having incentive effects or
help move the pricing system toward greater use of
market forces to determine prices?
Marketing
Substantial government interference with marketing occurs
when food aid is sold and distributed through public
marketing institutions which cause excessive curtailment of
private sector trade. That is, parastatal operating margins
are set and subsidized at levels below those at which private
traders can compete. Official margins should be set to permit
private trade and at the same time maintain price stability.
The analysis should indicate if substantial quantities of
commodities are distributed through a public marketing
agency.
- If so, is the institution efficiently managed and
operated on a financial self-sustaining basis? How do
official wholesale prices for food compare with free
market wholesale prices for comparable, locally
produced foods and with the landed cost of commercial
imports?
- If publicly marketed food imports are subsidized, is
there evidence that these have caused or may cause
substantial interference with private sector trade?
If yes, roughly how much?
- Will PL 480 food aid strengthen
monopolistic/monopsonistic official food
organizations to the detriment of private marketing?
Agricultural Development and Investment Policies
A government receiving substantial food aid may give lower
development and investment priority to its agricultural
sector if food is readily available at relatively little cost
from the donor community. In some countries, a major
development thrust to increase food production may not be
warranted if comparative advantage suggests that
self-reliance through trade is a better strategy. However,
whatever limited potential there is to improve food
productions should be developed if it's economically and
technically realistic to do so. The following questions
should be considered in assessing development and investment
policy efforts:
- Does the government have a development objective of
largely domestic food self-sufficiency or of reliance
on trade?
- If so, is this objective reflected reasonably in
macro-economic policies such as realistically valued
foreign exchange rates, domestic terms of trade which
are neutral toward or favor agriculture, and
development policies which include infrastructure and
research support for agriculture? If a
self-sufficiency approach is being pursued, does it
deserve support and have any chance of success?
- If a food through trade approach is being pursued, to
what extent does potential for the country to produce
its own food suffer? Is this potential being
insufficiently exploited because of the trade
dependence?
- What proportion of government recurrent and capital
budget expenditures have been allocated to
agriculture in each of the past three years? Are the
level and trend of these expenditures consistent with
stated government food and agricultural policies?
- If the agricultural sector offers reasonably good
development potential, but budget expenditures to
agriculture for the past 3 years have been low and
food aid has constituted a significant proportion of
total domestic consumption, is there any evidence
that the availability of food aid has weakened the
government's commitment to agricultural development?
- Will the provision of PL 480 food aid, including its
self-help provisions, lead to a lower or higher
allocation of domestic budget resources for
agricultural development?
Food Aid and Disincentives - Cause or Association?
Disincentive situations may occur because of government
development philosophy and policies which would likely prevail
even in the absence of food aid. It's therefore important to
determine whether PL 480 food aid is a cause of significant
production and marketing disincentives or is associated with them
because of strongly subscribed government policies.
- If the analysis finds that production and marketing
disincentives exist, to what extent can they be
attributed to government policies as opposed to the
availability of PL 480 food aid?
- Would the policies prevail and with the same commitment
if food import needs were met on a commercial basis only?
- Over the longer run, are poor policies likely to lead to
a dependence on PL 480 food aid?
- If PL 480 food aid is associated with rather than a cause
of disincentives, how can the PL 480 program (and DA/ESF
programs) be designed to alleviate or offset disincentive
effects?
D. Changes in Food Consumption Patterns
Local food production may be adversely affected by food aid
when it contributes to changes in taste preferences for foods
which cannot be produced locally and which cannot be imported at
costs lower than those of producing and marketing them locally.
On the other hand, where the recipient country does not have a
comparative advantage in food production, the commodity may
provide a less expensive substitute for the locally produced
commodity. In these cases, food aid is a legitimate means for
developing markets for U.S. agricultural products.
- Is the commodity supplied by U.S. food aid produced
locally and part of the normal diet?
- Does accommodating the taste preference through food aid
lie within the country's food strategy and comparative
advantage?
- Will the food aid be distributed to groups that
heretofore have not established a preference for the
commodity supplied? If so, will this be an addition to or
a substitute for locally produced foods?
- If taste preferences are changing, why are they changing?
To what extent are other donor food aid shipments and
commercial imports influential in promoting these
changes?
E. Distribution Effects (Title II Programs)
The need to target the distribution of food aid to the poor is
most easily met through Title II programs. These programs
distribute food free or at subsidized prices to vulnerable
population groups and permit the consumption of food that would
not otherwise occur because of the poor's lack of purchasing
power. In this instance, available evidence suggests that there
won't be any substantial disincentive effects on local food
prices and production because additional demand is created to
offset the additional supply.
On the other hand, when more affluent consumers are the
recipients of food aid they may spend freed income on non-food
items and/or more costly imported foods. In this instance, even
though the food provided is additional, it is less likely to be
offset by additional food demand and price depressing effects can
occur.
The analysis should address the following questions in
assessing the possibility for adverse distribution effects:
- Does the host government have a distribution plan which
targets PL 480 food aid or uses sales proceeds to target
local foods to the poor? Does the host government have
the capability to transport and distribute food to the
poor?
- Is the PL 480 food aid consumed in disproportionately
greater quantities by the poor and is it therefore
"self-targeting"?
- If not, is the food aid sold at a non-subsidized price
and are the counterpart funds used to support policies
favorable to agriculture?
VI. Food Aid Incentive Measures
If examination of the above criteria indicates possible
disincentives to agricultural production or marketing, it may be
possible to include incentive measures in the PL 480 agreement to
change or offset bad policies and still justify a positive
determination. In general, the nature and significance of
incentive measures should be determined by the policy environment
and the Country Mission's capability to promote policy change.
Incentive features can be structured as self-help measures,
projects financed with sales proceeds, components of Food for
Development programs, issues to be discussed through policy
dialogue, and the programming of food aid itself (e.g., as wages,
security stocks, etc.).13 Such measures linked
specifically to increasing local food production might include
the following:
- Improve food sector data collection and reporting
capacity;
- Strengthen agricultural sector policy analysis, planning
and implementation capacity;
- Establish incentive prices for locally produced food
based on landed cost of imports and production costs;
- Assure timely announcement of price adjustments to affect
farmers' planting decisions where prices are controlled
or at least floor prices maintained;
- Support maximum private sector trade and access to
international markets consistent with government goals
for marketing and stabilization efforts;
- Improve management and financial viability of food
marketing agencies; reduce or eliminate food subsidy
programs except for those most in need;
- Upgrade efficiency and effectiveness of food production
and marketing functions including research, extension,
cooperatives, management, transportation, physical
infrastructure, and access to inputs;
- Promote development of private sector food processing
capability which improves nutritional content and eases
preparation of indigenous foods;
- Support development activities and targeted food subsidy
programs (e.g., food-for-work programs) which generate
income and improve the ability of the poor to acquire
food;
- Encourage greater production of low-cost nutritionally
acceptable local foods if they can be grown economically
in order to increase nutritional quality to low-income
groups;
- Increase allocation of recurrent and capital budget
expenditures to agriculture where warranted by sufficient
food production potential.
VII. Food Storage Facilities and Handling Capabilities
U.S. concern over food storage and handling in LDCs was raised
in the March 1977 hearings of the House Committee on
International Relations. Concern was expressed in particular
about food storage conditions in Bangladesh. Substantial amounts
of food had spoiled because Bangladesh and inadequate storage
facilities. This concern over food storage and handling was
concurrent with that over disincentive effects. Consequently,
both are addressed in the Bellmon Amendment.
In response to these concerns, posts must include, with the
disincentive analysis, a statement attesting to the adequacy of
food storage, handling and distribution capabilities. The
assessment should include three sections reporting on
port,storage and transport capabilities as follows:
A. Port
Facilities - briefly describe adequacy of port physical
facilities in terms of the wharf, warehousing, equipment
(particularly offloading capacity) and maintenance.
Operations - comment upon the efficiency of port operations and management.
Projected Arrivals - note to what extent port
congestion might be a problem at the time of projected PL 480
food aid arrival. Are imports, commercial and concessional,
coordinated and planned to arrive at low points in domestic
supply, but in a smooth fashion?
B. Storage
Describe the adequacy of port, central and regional storage
facilities in terms of structure, capacity and management. Note
specifically the expected adequacy of storage at the time of
projected PL 480 food aid arrival.
C. Transport
Describe the adequacy of transport capabilities - road,
railway and waterway as applicable - with respect to equipment,
operational status and maintenance facilities. Comment in
particular on transport availability at the projected time of PL
480 food aid arrival.
Footnotes 1--Although
this paper focuses mainly on the potential disincentive
effects of food aid, this is not meant to suggest that
food aid storage and handling concerns are relatively
less important. Rather, attention is given to the
disincentives question because it is a more complex
matter warranting further explanation and specific
guidance.
2--U.S.G. approaches for increasing PL 480's
developmental effectiveness are outlined in the recent
U.S. International Development Cooperation Agency Report
to Congress on the Developmental Impact of Public Law 480,
March 30, 1982.
3--Two recent articles which provide particularly
comprehensive examinations of food aid and development
issues are Maxwell and Singer (1979) and Clay and Singer
(1982); see selected references attached.
4--See Abbott (1976, 1979), Abbott and McCarthy
(1982), and Hall (1980).
5--See Dudley and Sandilands (1975) and Mason (1966).
6--Maxwell and Singer (1979) note that ". . . The
weight of evidence seems to favor those who argue that in
many countries food aid is sucked in by poor agricultural
policy rather than itself being responsible for the
vacuum which it fills." This conclusion is reached inter
alia by Witt (1964); Isenman and Singer (1977), and
Merrill (1977).
7--Cases quoted are shifts to cotton production in
Pakistan (Mason, 1966) or to barley in Columbia (Dudley
and Sandilands, 1975).
8--See, for example, the comprehensive survey on
supplementary feeding projects by Beaton and Ghassemi
(1979) and the African case studies by Stevens (1979).
From a national perspective, Title II levels are usually
so insignificant relative to the total food supply that
disincentive effects are not likely to occur. Moreover,
because Title II programs - MCH, school feeding and
food-for-work - distribute food to those with low incomes
who would not otherwise be purchasing sufficient food,
there will be little likelihood that disincentive effects
would occur even at the community level.
9--See, for example, Williamson Gray (1982), Timmer
and Adelman (1979), Pinstrup-Anderson (1976), and Strauss
(1983).
10--See Huddleson (1984), Kennedy and
Pinstrup-Anderson (1983) and Beaton and Ghassemi (1979).
11--The distinction between "cause" and "association" is
discussed on pages 7-8 and 30-31.
13--Technical
assistance from the U.S. Bureau of the Census can be
requested through AID/S&T/DIU to support the
establishment or strengthening of the recipient country's
data collection and analysis capability. Other donors
should also be encouraged to provide technical
assistance, training, etc., as appropriate.
14--The Bellmon Amendment does not require that PL 480
food aid programs include measures to induce incentive
effects. However, their inclusion is consistent with the
developmental thrust of PL 480 and they add a further
measure of assurance that disincentive effects will not
occur. Thus, incorporating incentive effects in the
design of PL 480 programs in encouraged.
|
Attachment A
Local Production and Marketing Disincentives Analysis
Supporting Data
I. Food Supply and Consumption |
19XX
(000 MT)
|
- Total Annual Domestic Needs
- Beginning Stocks
- (Of which security stock)
- Local Production
- Imports
a. Commercial Imports
b. Food Aid
c. (Of which U.S. food aid)
- Exports
- Total Supply
- Consumption (food, feed, indus- trial use, seed and waste)
- Ending Stocks
- (Of which security stock)
II.Food Prices (per kg.) |
19XX
(xx per kg)
|
- Private Sector
- Local Production
a. Farm gate price
b. Internal transport and
handling costs from main producing area to main
consuming area
c. Wholesaler costsx, and profit margins
d. Wholesale price
e. Retail price
- Commercial imports
a. CIF (from most competitive commercial source)
b. Duties
c. Internal transport and handling to main deficit
consuming area, usually the principal cities
d. Wholesaler costs and profit margins
e. Wholesale price
f. (Foreign exchange shadow price)
g. Retail price
h. (Foreign exchange shadow price)
- Public Sector
- Local Production a. Official farm gate price
b. Internal transport and handling costs from main
producing area to main deficit consuming area,
usually the principal cities
c. Operating margins
d. total costs (a, b, &
c)
e. Wholesale price
f. Retail price
- PL 480 Food Aid a. CIF (from U.S. port)
b. Duties
c. Internal transport and handling
d. Operating margins
e. Total costs (a, b, & c)
f. Wholesale price
g. (Foreign exchange shadow price)
h. Retail price
i. (Foreign exchange shadow price)
- Price Differentials
- Free market farm gate price and official farm gate
price (II A 1a and II B 1a)
- CIF price from most competitive commercial source
including duties and internal transport and handling
charges and equivalent official farm gate price (II
a, b & c and II B 1a & 1b)
- Commercial import wholesale price and official
wholesale price for local production (II A 2f and II
B 1e)
- Commercial import wholesale price and food aid
wholesale price (II A 2f and II B 2g)
- Official subsidies a. Local production (II B 1d - II
B 1f)
b. Food aid (II B 2e - II B 2i)
III.Balance of Payments |
19XX
(X-Million)
|
A.Exports
Imports Food a. Commercial
b. Food aid
Net Services and Unrequited Transfers Current Account
Balance Capital Account Balance Overall Balance
IV.Exchange Rate
- A.Official
- Unofficial Shadow Price Rate
xData for all
categories - IIA 1&2, IIB 1&2 - should
also reflect processing costs at stage at which
processing is performed.
Attachment C
Selected References
Abbott, P. C., "Developing Countries and
International Grain Trade," Ph.D. thesis, June
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA), 1976.
Abbott, P. C., "Modeling International Grain
Trade with Government Controlled Markets," American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 61,
22-31, 1979.
Abbott, P. C. and McCarthy, F. D., "Welfare
Effects of Food Aid," Journal of Development
Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 63-79, 1982.
Beaton, G. H. and Ghassemi. "Supplementary
Feeding Programme for Young Children in Developing
Countries." Report prepared for UNICEF nd the
ACC Sub-committee on Nutrition of the United Nations,
1979.
Clay, Edward J. and Singer, H. W. "Food Aid
and Development: The Impact and Effectiveness of
Bilateral PL 480 Title I Type Assistance."
Institute of Development Studies, University of
Sussex, UK, December 1982.
Dudley, L. and R. J. Sandilands. "The Side
Effects of Foreign Aid: The Case of PL 480 Wheat in
Columbia." Economic Development and Cultural
Change, Vol. 23, No. 2, January 1975.
FAO, "national Food Reserve Policies in
Underdeveloped Countries," Commodity Policy
Studies No. 11, Rome, 1958.
Hall, L. L., "Evaluating the Effects of PL
480 Wheat Imports on Brazil's Grain Sector," American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62, 19-37,
1980.
Huddleston, Barbara. "Closing the Cereals Gap
with Trade and Food Aid," International Food
Policy Research Institute, Washington, D. C., January
1984.
Isenman, P. J. and Singer, H.W. "Food Aid:
Disincentive Effects and Their Policy
Implications." Economic Development and
Cultural Change. Vol. 25, No. 2, January 1977.
Mason, E. S. Economic Development in India and
Pakistan. Harvard University Occasional Papers in
International Affairs, No. 13, September 1966.
Kennedy, Eileen T. and Pinstrup-Anderson, Per;
"Nutrition-Related Policies and Programs: Past
Performances and Research Needs," International
Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D. C.,
1983.
Maxwell, J. J. and Singer, H. W. "Food Aid to
Developing Countries: A Survey," World
Development, Vol. 7, pp. 225-247, 1979.
Merrill, A. K. PL 480 and Economic Development
in Recipient Countries (Washington: National
Security and International Affairs Division.)
Congressional Budget Office, Mimeo, 1977.
Pinstrup-Anderson, Per; de Londono, Norha Ruiz;
Hoover, Edward (1976), "The Impact of Increasing
Food Supply on Human Nutrition: Implications for
Commodity Priorities on Agricultural Research and
Policy," American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 58, No. 2, May, pp. 131-142.
Schuh, G. E. "Food Aid as a Component of
General Economic and Development Policy," Paper
for USAID-RTN Seminar Improving the Developmental
Effectiveness of Food Aid in Africa, Abidjan, August
24-26, 1981.
Stevens, C. Food Aid and the Developing World:
Four African Case Studies, Croom Helm, London
(1979).
Strauss, John (1983), Socio-Economic
Determinants of Food Consumption and Production in
Rural Sierra Leone: Application of an Agricultural
Household Model with Several Commodities, East
Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University, paper
No. 5.
Timmer, C. Peter and Alderman, Harold (1979),
"Estimating Consumption Parameters for Food
Policy Analysis," American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 61, No. 5, pp.
982-987.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Economics,
Statistics and Cooperatives Service. "P.L. 480
Concessional Sales: History, Procedures, Negotiating
and Implementing Agreements," Foreign
Agricultural Economic Report No. 142, December 1977.
U.S. International Development Cooperation Agency,
Report to Congress on the Development Impact of
Public Law 480, March 30, 1982.
Williamson Gray, Cheryl (1982), Food
Consumption Parameters for Brazil and Their
Application to Food Policy, Research Report No.
32, Washington, D. C.: International Food Policy
Research Institute, September.
Witt, L. W. "Development Through Food Grants
and Concessional Sales" in C. Eicher and L. Witt
Agriculture in Economic Development (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1964).