Op-Eds

Outsiders Can't Build a Nation for Bosnia

by Laurel Miller and Deborah Isser
(First published by the Balkan Invesigative Reporting Network in December 2005. Reprinted with permission.)

Ten years after the warring parties and international negotiators signed a peace agreement for Bosnia in Paris, the country remains a feeble democracy marked by deep ethnic cleavages. The peace agreement, known as the Dayton Accords, was an outstanding diplomatic achievement: it ended a brutal war that killed over 100,000 people and forced over two million others from their homes. But the subsequent implementation of the agreement has exposed all the weaknesses - and the slowness - of "nation building." An important lesson of ten years of international effort to mend Bosnia's fractures is that outside help only works at the margins. Bosnia will not be a normal state capable of securing a future in the European Union until its own people lead the way.

What has happened in Bosnia since the world's gaze shifted elsewhere? The results of a decade of nation-building have been mixed. Bosnia certainly looks a lot better, but can hardly be said to stand on its own feet.

On the plus side of the ledger, Bosnia has been remarkably peaceful: not a single foreign soldier deployed to keep the peace has been killed in hostile action, and there have been no major out-breaks of violence. Physical repair of the country has proceeded well. Nearly all refugees and internally displaced persons who have sought to reclaim their property have been able to do so. Local courts, albeit with foreign help, are beginning to take on corrupt politicians and war criminals. Key reforms needed to pave the way to eventual EU membership have been adopted in areas including taxation, public administration, and defense. And political leaders of all sides recently endorsed the idea of reforming the Dayton constitutional structure - until now considered untouchable.

But Bosnia is not yet a functioning state with proven ability to resolve conflict through political means and provide services for its citizens without international oversight. Under Bosnia's convoluted constitutional structure, all positions of government authority are apportioned ethnically and each ethnic group can block government decision-making. The same parties that fought the war are still in power, and while the discourse is far more civil now, politics remain almost entirely ethnic-based. Not one significant political or economic reform has occurred absent heavy international pressure, often in the form of threatened removal of obstructionist officials. The "High Representative" of the international community who oversees the nation-building effort has, in fact, removed 161 officials from office, and - ruling by fiat - has imposed legislation that the parliament would not adopt. Government in Bosnia is dysfunctional, and progressive citizens who have sought to penetrate political structures or create bottom-up movements are disheartened and disengaged.

Could Bosnians nonetheless manage Bosnia now without the constant international intervention that currently prevails? Government could limp along, and it is unlikely ethnic violence would soon resume if the international overseers packed their bags today. However, there are worrying signs for the longer term. Ethnic division is becoming more and more entrenched. Neither Bosnian moderates nor international actors have yet effectively challenged the nationalist forces that retain their grip on Bosnia. Schools are segmented based on ethnicity, with three different and nationalistic versions of history taught, and small linguistic differences among the three communities magnified into separate "languages." Religious leaders have become increasingly entangled in Bosnia's ethno-politics. Today's children are growing up more divided than ever.

Even considering such portents, ten years on from a devastating war, it is possible to judge the glass either half empty or half full. But certainly those who forged the peace a decade ago anticipated more progress by now. Three basic reasons account for the lack-luster nation-building scorecard: The international community has not yet figured out how to do nation-building very well, there is a limit to how much building of other people's nations foreign actors can achieve, and Bosnian politicians have failed to exert effective leadership.

Methodologies for international efforts to create democratic governance, reform security services, and develop civil society are in their infancy. Techniques for transforming dynamics such as ethnic nationalism that produced the conflict have yet to be mastered. At the same time, even well-planned and implemented efforts by outsiders will, at best, be supportive of the efforts of a nation's leaders and civil society to create the institutions and habits of democracy. Political will to implement government reform and popular will to rebuild the social fabric can be encouraged and reinforced, but no alchemy can simply produce those essential ingredients. So far in Bosnia, such will has been in too short supply.

Ten years of nation-building in Bosnia shows above all else that there is no clear tipping point or turning point or crucial moment, there is just a long, hard, imperfectly organized and led slog.

The views expressed here are not necessarily those of USIP, which does not advocate specific policy positions.