March 2006 | Peaceworks No. 57
Robert L. Rothstein
How Not to Make Peace: "Conflict Syndrome" and the Demise of the Oslo Accords
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Summary
The failure of the Oslo Accords has been attributed to a variety of factors, including deficiencies
in the accords themselves, failures of implementation, and the play of domestic politics.
These are all critical factors that describe what happened, but they do not explain why each
side behaved as it did--that is, why each side made choices that would only increase the
likelihood of the accords' failure. To understand why each side behaved as it did, we must first
understand the "conflict syndrome" that affected the negotiating and decision-making
process--a syndrome that is, to varying degrees, present in many protracted conflicts. While
the conflict syndrome is never the sole cause of failure in any given peace process and does
not affect every conflict in the same way, the significant role it often plays in perpetuating
conflict is frequently ignored or undervalued.
Conflict syndrome consists of a set of attitudes, assumptions, and beliefs that become embedded
over decades of bitter conflict and are difficult to unlearn even if some kind of peace
agreement--or exploratory truce--has been signed. The individual elements of the syndrome
are familiar, but, taken as a whole, they exert a powerful influence on most peace processes
and inform the choices each side makes. Thus, distrusting the opposite side's motives by
default, cheating for fear of being cheated, making only tentative concessions that can easily
be revoked, and asking the other side to prove its good faith by making large initial concessions,
among other things, generate a peace process that can easily become a "race to the
bottom." This implies that the stop-and-go, on-and-off, crisis-driven peace processes in the
Middle East and elsewhere should not be taken as aberrations: they are the norm that should
be anticipated and planned for.
This argument has clear policy implications. Premature ceremonies on the White House lawn
and inflated rhetoric that raises expectations too hastily need to be avoided. The search for
quick solutions and "last negotiations" is likely to lead to a return of bitter discord. To solve
the Middle East conflict, a carefully calibrated peace process--described herein as "gradually
accelerating incrementalism"--is needed. Architects of such a process must recognize that
elements of the conflict syndrome still persist in the Middle East and will for years to come,
that high-risk/high-gain negotiating strategies in such a context are bound to fail, and that
demands for stricter compliance with commitments can and should increase as the process
begins to provide both sides with tangible evidence that it can produce mutual benefits and
is worth preserving.
About the Author
Robert L. Rothstein is the Harvey Picker Distinguished Professor of International Relations
(Emeritus) at Colgate University. He has written or edited nine books and some eighty articles
and has been a past fellow of the United States Institute of Peace, the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Foundation.
He has also received several research grants from the U.S. Department of State and the United
Nations. His most recent book, jointly edited with Moshe Ma'oz and Khalil Shikaki, is The
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Lessons of Failure.
Of Related Interest
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