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Roger P. Winter, Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID

Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
July 09, 2003

Chairman Smith and members of the Committee, thank you on behalf of USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios for the opportunity to testify today about this important report, "Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2002-2003." As Assistant Secretary Craner has said, the report is the product of a lot of hard work by our colleagues around the world. But it is the result, particularly, of the leadership and dedication of Assistant Secretary Craner and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and of the Congress under the leadership of this Committee.

Although it addresses only 92 of the countries, indeed the 92 with the most human rights abuses, this report represents the first effort to gather publicly the programs from across the entire spectrum of U.S. Government institutions that support democratization across the globe. This accounting evidences the broad participation of U.S. Government departments and agencies in the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights, which lie at the heart of our foreign policy. We are a profoundly democratic nation, and we have supported freedom abroad from our very beginning as a nation. The extension of liberty, both political and economic, and in particular the promotion of democracy and human rights, is a high priority for President Bush and for Administrator Natsios. To reflect that priority, Administrator Natsios created an entirely new bureau, the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, which I am honored to lead. This new Bureau is designed to address the vexing -- and closely related -- problems of non-democratic government, human rights abuses, failed and failing states, and the conflicts and humanitarian disasters that result.

In conjunction with our State Department colleagues and through the work of our grantee and contractor partners, our efforts to promote democracy are broad and substantial. The fiscal year 2003 democracy budget managed by USAID is over $700 million, supporting programs in nearly 100 countries. We are proud of the results these efforts have brought, yet mindful, as this report documents, of how much still remains to be done. There are new challenges to democracy in the world. Our significant achievements cannot be maintained without studying those challenges, and developing new priorities that respond to them. So let me address: first, the components of our programs and some of our accomplishments; second, the challenges we face; and finally, the new priorities USAID is establishing to meet these challenges.

Democracy programming in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is not new. Going back at least to human rights activities in Central America twenty-five years ago and expanding dramatically with subsequent administrations, democracy and human rights assistance has now become a key element of USAID's programs. It is impossible to secure human rights without democratic governance, and no government that abuses human rights can ever be considered wholly democratic. The rule of law begins with, and is based on, respect for human rights. Independent media and free and fair elections are the hallmarks of a country that respects human rights.

Our national commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights is bi-partisan, and derives its support not only from the Executive Branch but from Congress as well. Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for that support. Together with State Department regional and functional bureaus, and with other departments of the U.S. Government as well, USAID is programming more money for democracy in more countries than ever before, indeed more than four-and-a-half times as much today as ten years ago. We promote democratic practices and values not only because it is the right thing to do, but also because we have learned that, without addressing the political aspects of change, other development programs cannot succeed.

The last quarter century has created a record of accomplishment, some of which is discussed in this report. But it is important to note that, as required by the Congress, the report is a one-year snapshot. It does not purport, therefore, to reflect the full breadth or depth of U.S. Government programming in the promotion of democracy and human rights. To understand even that limited picture, however, it is important to understand the wider context of which it is a part.

First, USAID democracy programming can be categorized into four mutually reinforcing sectors: civil society; elections and political processes; the rule of law; and democratic governance. The first two categories work primarily outside governments, while the latter two work primarily with governmental institutions. Second, we shape our programs to the specific conditions of the countries we assist. No two programs are identical, although there are some common themes. It is our missions abroad that ensure the strategic coherence of our programs and their relevance to the conditions of these countries. Third, we work primarily through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and contractors, both American and local. The accomplishments to which I refer are due to the direct assistance those partners provide.

In repressive regimes, where we do not generally work with government institutions, USAID's ongoing assistance to civil society, democratic opposition groups, and the media keeps lit the torch of democratic hope, generates pressure for reform, and provides something of an incubator for alternative, democratic leadership. For example, in Belarus and the Central Asian Republics, our assistance is largely responsible for sustaining independent NGOs and the media. Quick action in 1998 prevented the Government of Uzbekistan from shutting down independent radio stations. In Burma and Cuba, whose dismal conditions are discussed in the report, USAID provides lifeline assistance to human rights activists and opposition groups.

As an important part of our non-governmental assistance, USAID alone has granted over $250 million to independent media outlets worldwide since 1992. For example, in Burundi we helped establish two new radio stations which broadcast, country-wide, timely accurate news and programs to support the peace process. The point is to create alternatives to the "hate-radio" which played such an important role in exacerbating ethnic conflict and in fomenting the 1993 massacres.

A great deal of public attention tends to be focused on elections, even though less than 10 percent of USAID's democracy and governance budget last year was used to support political parties and elections. I say this to dispel a common public misconception that, for the U.S. Government, democracy is synonymous with elections and that most of our democracy assistance goes to supporting elections. I do not intend at all to understate the importance of elections. Free and fair elections are essential to democracy whose fundamental principle is that people have the right to choose and replace their governments and to establish their public policy. Elections are necessary for democracy, but true democracy is more than just elections.

By allowing citizens to fight for their human rights, further their interests, and resolve their differences through the ballot box, rather than through force, elections provide a device to avoid conflict or to resolve it. Unfortunately, the number of conflicts is growing, and the U.S. Government with its partners is pushing the envelope in finding new ways to manage, mitigate and hopefully avoid conflict and promote human rights. For example, support for political party development in Kosovo helped the nationalist "liberation" force to become a political party. They agreed to work with civilians to develop consensual election rules. On that basis, they participated in elections and ultimately accepted their own electoral defeat. The danger that they would push the elected leadership aside and take power militarily was avoided. A potential civil war, possibly engaging the U.S. forces stationed there, was turned into a peaceful contest for power. In a variety of countries, the promise of elections has helped prevent or end civil wars and produced more representative institutions and more open political systems.

Apart from conflict, our assistance has been instrumental in increasing the number of elections considered free and fair throughout the world, and those elections have sometimes resulted in dramatic political changes. Our elections assistance helped in the peaceful alternation of power in Nigeria in 1999, Peru in 2001, and Kenya in 2002. Last fall, with U.S. help under the Middle East Partnership Initiative, Morocco held parliamentary elections widely regarded as the first free, fair, and transparent elections in its history.

Central to addressing and preventing human rights abuses has been support by USAID, often through the valuable work of our colleagues in the Department of Justice, for legal reform, especially reform of criminal justice systems. Over the past decade, for example, we continued critical support for criminal code reform across Latin America, including Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia. We helped introduce public, oral and adversarial motion hearings and trials where the judge serves as an impartial, independent arbiter of the rules and enforcer of due process rather than as an active investigator or prosecutor. A comparison of today's judicial systems in Latin America with the same systems in the 1980s shows that much has changed for the better, even though much still remains to be done. Prosecutors now direct case investigations and have greater control over police, reducing the likelihood of arbitrary arrests, detentions or police misconduct. The law now limits the duration of pre-trial detention. Defendants less frequently languish in jail without any legal determination of guilt. These programs have helped establish or expand public defender offices in the region, and have trained criminal defense attorneys representing the poor. In general, individual rights have been strengthened, and there is now a procedural embodiment of the principle that the state can be challenged and held accountable.

A key factor in preventing human rights abuses and ending impunity for the abusers is the existence of an independent judiciary that applies the rule of law impartially and effectively. In Central and Eastern Europe, we have helped judiciaries gain greater independence from the executive branch. New courts, such as constitutional courts, and new institutions, such as judges' associations, have been created. As a result of new criminal codes and retrained judges, the twin notions that the prosecution must prove its case and that defendants can be acquitted is gaining ground across the region. In Russia, USAID helped institute jury trials, developed benchbooks for judges and defense attorneys, and supported pilot jury trials. We have seen an increase in acquittal rates in the regions with jury trials, where previously the chance of acquittal was almost zero. These reforms are now being adopted nation-wide by the Putin Administration.

Judges we have helped, particularly those attached to the new constitutional courts, are asserting their independence and are beginning to check executive power. For example, in Ukraine, the Constitutional Court struck down two proposed amendments to the constitution that would have strengthened already-overwhelming presidential powers. In Russia, the courts have overturned government decisions denying registration to religious groups. These changes are fundamental to securing human rights.

Fourth, we have assisted in good governance reforms for years, including support for decentralization, local and national legislatures, and policy reform. More recently, under instructions from President Bush, the U.S. Government has undertaken a coordinated government-wide effort to address global corruption. Since 1995, USAID has been an instrumental, early supporter of the work of Transparency International, the world's leading anti-corruption NGO. USAID has provided sustained financial support for the organization's secretariat in Berlin and has provided technical assistance to a growing number of national chapters, which are now found in over 90 countries around the world.

With help provided under the Americas' Accountability Anti-Corruption Project, nearly every country in Latin America has adopted a financial management model instituting auditing, accounting, and transparency systems that help limit graft, fraud and abuse. The project develops and promotes best practices, improves donor coordination, runs a highly successful anti-corruption website, sponsors networks of NGOs and professional associations, supports courses and pilot projects, and has now expanded its work to municipal governments. In the long run, systemic improvements in practices and oversight -- real institutional reform -- are the means for permanently improving the poor record of corruption in Latin America.

USAID's governance efforts in Africa are younger and have concentrated on support for reformers within government and on the mobilization of public demand for change by civil society organizations. Our multi-year efforts to improve the skills and strength of a range of civil society actors in Kenya, for example, played a critical role in the rebirth of multiparty democracy. That same support has now enabled the new Government of Kenya to draw on capable, pro-reform resources within the country. For example, the new Minister of Justice applauded our early support for the Kenyan anti-corruption movement. In fact, eight parliamentarians with whom we worked on anti-corruption initiatives under the Moi government are now cabinet members in President Kibaki's government, and the executive director of a USAID grantee now heads the President's ethics office.

Notwithstanding our rich record of accomplishments, we also recognize both failures and new challenges, and we are moving to address them. The report documents some of these failures and challenges, especially where human rights continue to be violated. One challenge is the threat posed by failed, failing and fragile states. These states are incubators of violence and instability which often turn domestic life into a search for mere survival and personal security, but which also threaten to spill over borders and infect entire regions. Second, we are challenged by a variety of new urgent priorities such as terrorism, civil conflict and narco-trafficking for which we stand ready to assist, even as we recognize that other agencies may be taking the lead roles. Third, is the challenge posed by the expenditure of resources with insufficient long-term effect.

The global challenge arising from chaos in failed and failing states is all too clear as we meet this morning. As the President has said in the National Security Strategy, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones." USAID alone provides well over $1 billion every year in humanitarian assistance to deal with crises. These crises are often the result of human failures, not natural disasters. Even when natural disasters strike, their costs are magnified by prior governmental failures. The roots of these failures are well documented in this report.

The people of Sudan, for example, have been living through the longest civil war in the history of Africa, a human tragedy of grand proportions. Since 1989, USAID has spent more than $1.4 billion on humanitarian assistance to ameliorate this disaster. But humanitarian assistance will not solve the governance problem. A just and durable peace is possible only when effective government institutions and processes are responsive to, and benefit all, Sudanese citizens. A unique opportunity exists at this moment, in southern Sudan particularly, to build on indigenous efforts to forge a consensus on democratic governance. In opposition-held areas, our goal is to promote peace, stability, democracy and human rights and to assist the authorities to put into place the basic institutions for effective democratic governance. Over the last two years, we have begun to strengthen courts and judges, local governments, and women's organizations dedicated to local conflict resolution. USAID is the first donor to take concrete steps in this direction. As we move toward the anticipated peace agreement, we are also planning programs, including democracy and governance activities, in areas controlled by the Government of Sudan.

The second challenge -- that of transnational threats -- covers a wide range of problems including narco-trafficking, trafficking in persons, terrorism, and conflict. Terrorism and transnational criminality thrive in fragile or failing states. Poor governance and disrespect for human rights lie at the heart of each of these threats. Beyond the devastating effect on individual lives and communities, moreover, these problems have clear regional, even global, impact. The conflict in Africa's Great Lakes region is only one example.

The attacks on the United States on September 11th catapulted Afghanistan, and its tragic recent history, to the center of the world stage. An Afghanistan on the road toward freedom and prosperity would serve as a powerful victory over those that champion tyranny and terror. We are bringing to bear concrete, practical assistance between now and next summer as Afghanistan adopts a new constitution and elects the first democratic government in its history. In addition, to establish the foundations for sustainable democratic governance, we are helping rebuild the justice sector, secure human rights, and strengthen the ability of the government to develop and implement vitally needed policy reforms.

The third challenge -- too few results for the resources invested -- has been the subject of serious review both within the U.S. Government and internationally. At the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development in spring 2002, governments representing a very wide spectrum of countries, both donors and recipients, rejected the old paradigm of development which emphasized almost exclusively the importance of foreign donors rather than the commitment and performance of recipients. They agreed on a very different approach to development and its financing. They agreed that development is only possible when appropriate policies are truly adopted and the instruments for their implementation are institutionalized. Then, and only then, will the financing for development have the desired results. And when that happens, the major funding will come not primarily from donors but from private investment, both domestic and foreign. Overseas development assistance will therefore always represent a small portion of the development finances. Foreign assistance can play an important part, but it cannot substitute for self-help. Concrete performance is the key to additional funding, overwhelmingly from the domestic and international private sectors.

The President's proposed Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) flows directly from that basic premise. The United States would provide substantial funding to help countries that have put the right policies and institutions into place. Those right policies and institutions are governed by three themes: ruling justly, promoting economic freedom, and investing in people. Countries that have demonstrated performance in these three areas will be eligible for the additional MCA assistance. USAID recently published its own report, Foreign Aid in the National Interest, which supports the same conclusion. More specifically, and more related to our discussions today, the very first, principal chapter of our report is "Promoting Democratic Governance" which of course includes respect for human rights. The evidence is growing, and we are already convinced, that without good governance, little progress will be made or sustained in the other areas.

To address these three challenges, USAID is reexamining its entire approach to development, including democratic governance. As Administrator Natsios recently testified, USAID will concentrate its assistance in five kinds of countries. First, to the extent we are asked to do so, we will work with the MCA countries themselves. Second, we will provide help in the countries that just miss the MCA performance criteria, and we will concentrate on those areas in which that performance falls short. We expect that "ruling justly" will be precisely the area in which help is most needed. Third, we will work in mid-range but basically good performing countries with the clear commitment to reform. There too, our aim is to help them to become MCA-eligible. So our assistance will focus on economic growth and democratic governance. As Administrator Natsios has testified, USAID will reduce assistance to countries in which democratic governance is lacking. This tough-love approach is necessary so that we can provide additional resources where they can be more effectively used to advance development. Fourth are the fragile, failing and post-conflict states where, in addition to our very substantial humanitarian assistance, we will also include governance programs to transition to development and mitigate conflict. Finally, we will of course continue to work in countries of substantial strategic importance to the United States. These are the countries that receive the lion's share of Economic Support Funds, SEED and FREEDOM Support Act funds. Indeed, of the total, worldwide democracy funding this year, 75 percent or more comes from these accounts.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, this report documents tangibly both the failures and challenges we confront and the programs which the U.S. Government has mounted to address them. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and for the support of the Congress in those efforts.

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