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Session Organizer: Ann Phillips, Political Economy Policy Analyst, PPC, USAID Panel: Claire Ehmann, Desk Officer, Office of CAR, E&E; Stephen Giddings, Chief, POSE, AFR/DP; Oliver Wilcox, DG Advisor for the Middle East and North Africa, ANE; Krishna Kumar, Senior Policy Analyst, PPC, DEI Tuesday, August 31, 2004 9:00-11:00 Ann Phillips, Political Economist and Policy Analyst, Policy and Program Coordination Bureau, provided an overview of the Muslim world and general guidelines for outreach programs. Claire Ehmann, Desk Officer, Office of Central Asian Republics in the Europe and Eurasia Bureau, briefed the audience on Muslim outreach programs in Europe and the Religion, State, and Society Strategy in Central Asia. Stephen Giddings, Chief of the Policy Outreach, Strategy, and Evaluation Division in the Africa Bureau Development Planning, examined innovative ways that the Bureau has tried to engage Muslim sub-Saharan Africa. Oliver Wilcox, Democracy and Governance Advisor for the Middle East and North Africa in the Asia/Near East Bureau discussed Muslim outreach in the democracy and governance sector. Krishna Kumar, Senior Policy Analyst, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, Center for Development Information and Evaluation, presented findings from a study that he and Boston University Professor Robert W. Hefner conducted in Indonesia of the Asia Foundation’s program on Islam and Civil Society. Ann Phillips, Political Economy Policy Analyst, PPCAnn Phillips began by trying to define and capture the enigma of the “Muslim world,” the need for which, according to Phillips, became more immediate for the U.S. after the attacks of September 11. She described it as a shorthand term for a set of regions that comprise countries whose populations have a Muslim majority. Though the term is widely used in government agencies and in the private sector, many people resent the assumption inherent in “Muslim World” that Islam is the defining characteristic of every country found therein—an assumption that is often incorrect. There are currently 1.3 billion Muslims located in five regions of the world: sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Europe and Eurasia, South Asia, and East Asia. USAID has missions in 27 of the 49 countries that have more than 50 percent Muslim population. USAID assembled several indices in order to better understand the scope of the Muslim world and, most urgently, the significance of Islam in the performance of “Muslim” countries. Phillips displayed several graphs of aggregate Muslim world data including national income variation, Muslim/non-Muslim democracy and governance disparity (the greatest disparity was found in political rights, the least disparity in economic freedom), and results from two Pew Global Attitudes surveys that compared Muslim and non-Muslim countries’ view of the U.S. (See PowerPoint Presentation (1.9mb ppt) for graphs.) She also presented Muslim/non-Muslim country scores by region in rule of law, corruption perception, and civil liberties. When the data was examined by region, the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim countries in some regions, like sub-Saharan Africa, was negligible (within the margin of error). In addition, upon examining the Europe and Eurasia data, Phillips remarked that the difference between Muslim and non-Muslim countries along the range of indices is similar to what would have been found in the Soviet era when Islam did not play a significant role. Because the results changed in going from aggregate to regional Muslim/non-Muslim data comparisons, Phillips pointed to skepticism regarding Islam’s influence on these indicators. (See PowerPoint Presentation (1.9mb ppt) for graphs.) In addition to obtaining empirical data on the Muslim world, USAID sought out existing scholarship and commissioned scholars to conduct studies in education, economic growth, governance, and philanthropy. Phillips highlighted important results of these studies.
First, in the education study, survey data suggested that
many Muslims prefer more than a purely secular education for
their children. Second, the economic growth study indicated
that poor governance, not Islam is the major deterrent to
economic growth. Third, in the governance study, three of
the primary findings were: The U.S. government has identified two major goals with
respect to its engagement in the Muslim world: (1) enhancing
domestic security and (2) promoting moderation among Muslims.
However, these two goals may be contradictory; for example,
security requirements often limit the government’s ability
to do effective outreach. Also, Phillips pointed out that
radical Islamists often represent the strongest opposition
group against repressive secular governments. Regional Examples of Outreach EffortsClaire Ehmann, Central Asian Republics, E&EClaire Ehmann explained that half of the countries in Europe and Eurasia have Muslim majorities. Due to the Soviet Union’s legacy of religious intolerance, two negative consequences have befallen this region: (1) some governments continue to deny people religious freedom and try to control religious messages (2) there is a dearth of well-trained Islamic scholars in the region who can effectively counter extremist propaganda from foreign groups. Most of the programs geared toward Muslim society in this region do not address Islam itself, but try to promote democracy and political, economic, and social opportunities that will reduce the allure of extremist messages. For example, in Albania, USAID is starting a new religious tolerance program that brings together religious leaders and journalists. The program trains them in promoting tolerance and in conflict-resolution skills. Also, in Bulgaria, there is an ongoing USAID effort targeted toward Muslim minority youth to reduce school drop-out rates and improve economic opportunities for young people. Ehmann also discussed the Mission-developed Central Asia Religion, State, and Society Strategy. Its purpose is to engage Muslim communities in the region to reduce the risk of Central Asia from becoming fertile ground for terrorist organizations. The strategy seeks “to integrate independent and credible Islamic leaders into USAID’s development activities” and “to create ‘cognitive dissonance’” by challenging negative perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. The strategy includes bus tours, modeled after a successful program in Bangladesh, whereby credible Islamic leaders learn about USAID development projects. There have been four tours thus far—Shymkent, Kazakhstan; Osh and Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan; and Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Ehmann concluded by calling attention to preliminary findings learned from these initiatives. On the positive side, USAID found a reservoir of pro-American sentiment and cooperative and responsive religious leaders in these areas. However, USAID found that radical Islamic groups are also quite successful at spreading their extremist message through programs that target the poor, women and the young. Stephen Giddings, Sub-Saharan AfricaThe USAID Africa Bureau has designed and implemented a variety of Muslim outreach programs across the spectrum of countries in sub-Saharan Africa with significant Muslim populations.. Muslim sub-Saharan Africa stretches from the Atlantic Ocean coast to the Indian Ocean coast and includes 15 countries with Muslim populations totaling 150 million people. Given the great variety of Islam in this region, USAID has no centralized approach to dealing with Muslim African world in sub-Saharan Africa . Instead, USAID encourages bureaus to tailor programs according to the specific needs of the area. Giddings highlighted some of the local Muslim outreach programs within the Bureau, including education, media outreach, and conflict resolution programs. In East Africa, the Education in Marginalized Communities Program (targeting area populations that are predominantly Muslim) works to increase the partnership between schools and communities, to improve school management, and to better relationships between parents and school officials. It also engages in curriculum development and teacher training, including targeting critical reading skills, and endeavors to increase girls’ enrollment. In West Africa, in Mali, USAID sponsors a community schools initiative that involves the collaboration of madrasas, government-funded, and community-funded schools. In what is called the ‘cluster approach,’ teachers and administrators from schools located reasonably close to each other, be they Koranic, community or government run, meet and discuss problems and open up their teaching approach to more participatory methods and more creative classroom instruction. USAID Muslim outreach programs have also enlisted Muslim organizations to facilitate HIV/AIDS outreach programs. In the Kaduna region of Nigeria, Muslim leadership and the local government approved a USAID-sponsored popular film advocating abstinence that would later be disseminated throughout the entire country. USAID has also cooperated with local Muslim leaders in conflict-resolution activities in Senegal, Nigeria, and Mali (Northern Mali Strategy) and with National Union of Muslim Women’s Association of Mali to sensitize women to their political rights and increase to their role in politics. Finally, USAID Missions in several countries support the secular activities/broadcasts (with careful attention to laws concerning the separation of church and state) of Muslim radio stations as well as messages/programs promoting tolerance on public radio stations. USAID/Mali was even asked to provide Internet connections for a mosque. Oliver Wilcox, Middle East and North AfricaOliver Wilcox focused on Muslim outreach in the context of democracy and governance programs in the Middle East and North Africa. However, he began his discussion by telling the success story of an intervention in Bangladesh centered specifically on Muslim outreach. During a pilot phase, Bangladeshi imams (Islamic prayer leaders) were taken on bus tours and received exposure to development issues, such as health, basic education, human trafficking, and local governance. The Islamic Foundation in Bangladesh (made up of 5,000–6,000 Bangladeshi imams) has approached USAID and requested that this program be institutionalized. The institutionalization of this program is now in the process of being developed. It is assumed that the training components involved in the pilot program will be integrated in the continuing education curricula of Islamic Foundation Centers, which total eight across the country. Wilcox pointed out the tangential nature of Muslim outreach in the democracy and governance (DG) sector. For example, DG’s political party work has incorporated Islamist parties or Islamist members of parliament in Afghanistan (since March 2002), in Morocco, in Yemen, and in Algeria (a non-presence country, though USAID-funded message development and constituent outreach included Islamist parties). The reasons for Islamist participation in these programs
include: Other DG programs in the Middle East that have dealt with Muslim outreach include expanding women’s awareness of their legal rights in Morocco, an anti-domestic violence program with a legal reform advocacy component in Jordan, and a civic education program in Asia and Middle East that focuses on the learning process (getting away from memorization in schools and asking students to solve concrete problems in their communities). These programs are likely to broaden and deepen in part due to successes and consequent increased funding from the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and USAID. Wilcox concluded his presentation by bringing attention to
some remaining challenges for DG programs: Krishna Kumar, Islam and Civil Society (ICS) in IndonesiaKrishna Kumar presented the study that he and Robert W. Hefner conducted for PPC. The study was summarized in a paper titled “Engaging Muslim Civil Society for Promoting Democracy and Pluralism: An Assessment of the 'Islam and Civil Society Program' in Indonesia.” This report presents the findings of an assessment of the Asia Foundation’s (TAF) program on ‘Islam and Civil Society’ (ICS) in Indonesia. Funded by USAID since its inception in 1997, the program involves collaboration with Muslim leaders and organizations to support democracy training and civil society development. Using the symbols and vocabularies of Islam, the program encourages the development of a politically secular Indonesia based on the values of freedom, religious tolerance, and pluralism. Thus, the program seeks to promote the twin objectives of the U.S. foreign policy of strengthening democracy in the largest Muslim country and of engaging Muslim leaders and organizations in fight against extremism and terrorism. The Development Evaluation and Information Office of Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination undertook an in-depth assessment of the program during February- March, 2004. The purpose was not simply to assess the nature, achievements and shortcomings of the program but also to draw policy and programmatic lessons that can be applied in other Muslim or predominantly Muslim societies. Program Activities Having begun with twelve partners, the ICS program today works with 32 institutions and organizations, ranging from large mass organizations, like the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, to Muslim universities and small non-governmental groupings. Its ongoing activities include civic education, democracy training through mosque and peasantran networks, pluralism and tolerance initiatives, media, gender equality and policy reform. Civic education has been a central component of the program since its inception. Its eight current partners are engaged in a wide range of activities including seminars, meetings and civic education at institutions of higher learning. With the support of the program, State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta and the private Muhammadadiyh University in Yogyakarta have developed courses in civic education reaching out to tens of thousands of students every year. The curricula materials and pedagogical techniques used in these programs are of high quality. ICS activities also seek to encourage and to promote democratic values in classical Islamic academies (pesantren) and mosques, which are the only sources of civic education that many Indonesians receive. The current four projects in this area undertake many activities ranging from conducting workshops for students, training for religious preachers to the distribution of flyers on democracy and human rights in mosques after Friday prayers. As the program expanded, TAF and its partners realized that it was not sufficient to promote values of religious pluralism and tolerance, but also necessary to mainstream the pluralism and variety of approaches within the rich Islamic tradition. As a result, the program has undertaken many activities to raise awareness about pluralism within the Islamic community. For example, one partnering organization, the Paramadina Institute, supports Muslim scholars re-examining Islamic jurisprudence for the purpose of showing its compatibility with democracy and human rights. The program has also supported the establishment of the International Center for Islam and Pluralism which aims to promote scholarly exchanges between Indonesian Muslims and Muslim scholars in other parts of the Muslim world. The program has focused on mass media, and its 10 partners have undertaken many media activities aimed at an array of age groups, social classes, and regions. One of its successful activities is “Islam and Tolerance,” a radio talk show, which is relayed by 68 networks of 40 radio stations in 40 cities. The partnering institution, Institute for Studies on the Free Flow of Information–Liberal Islam Network, also provides half-page columns based on the talk show to more than 100 newspapers every week. The program also supports a monthly and a magazine which examine contemporary issues from a liberal, Islamic perspective. In addition, several other radio talk shows, seminars, and training activities are undertaken under the auspices of the program. The ICS component on ‘Islam and Gender’ works to support gender equality, women’s political participation, and nonviolence, with target audiences ranging from women preachers to listeners on radio programs. One partner, Fatayat, the young women’s corps of Nahdlatul Ulama, has established 20 domestic violence counseling centers and women’s advocacy centers. Another, Puan, aims to educate male and female pesantren leaders on Islam and violence against women. Still others sponsor meetings and seminars and talk shows for general audiences. Finally, several ICS partners are engaged in policy advocacy and efforts to professionalize the operations of Muslim political parties. For example, a Jakarta-based NGO, Desantara, conducts hearings, legislative research, and direct advocacy for religious minorities. The Institute for Social Institutions Studies runs programs to help Islamic parties to improve their platforms by focusing on substantive needs rather than formalistic issues like the implementation of Islamic law. Program Impacts Probably, the most important contribution of the program is that it has expended a national dialogue on the issues of democracy, human rights, and gender equality. A cross-section of the people—students, Islamic leaders, women, and even the informed public—are participating in it. What is still more encouraging is that the issues of democracy, pluralism, and tolerance are being discussed with reference to Islamic theology, practices, and symbols, as well as the problems and challenges facing contemporary Indonesian society. The program has also contributed to the strengthening of institutional capacities of many of its partners. The financial and technical support provided by the program to its partners has enabled them to develop innovative projects, acquire new expertise, and even secure resources from other organizations. Many organizations have grown over time. Although their growth cannot always be attributed to their partnership in the program, there is little doubt that it has helped. Finally, the program has facilitated formal and informal networks among 32 Muslim organizations that have begun to see themselves as an emerging force committed to building a pluralistic, democratic country. These organizations often share their ideas, people, and resources. They help each other in many ways. Within this large network, there are several sub-networks—one on Islam and gender rights, one that plugs pro-democracy Islamic media into mainstream media, and one that facilitates cooperation among Islamic educational institutions. For example, when a pro-polygamy campaign was begun by Islamist groups in Indonesia, the Islam and gender network mobilized a multi-pronged media attack, publishing columns in the nation's largest daily newspaper, having ICS partners speak against polygamy on Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, or JIL) radio show, and also on a national TV station in Yogyakarta. Lessons for Replication Four pre-conditions: 1. The existing political system should allow the civil society, the media and political groupings to engage in discussions of public policy issues. Soeharto’s Indonesia was not a free society, but the regime did not prohibit public discussion of major policy issues. Although there has been some liberalization in countries such as Jordan and Morocco, most of the Middle Eastern countries do not permit even limited political freedom. They directly and indirectly control civil society organizations and political parties. In such countries, programs like ICS cannot be initiated and implemented. However, there are many other Muslim countries, such as Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Niger, or even Pakistan, where similar programs could be launched on a modest scale. 2. At least a section of the credible religious leaders should be committed to democracy and pluralism and willing to take the initiative to promote them. Indonesia has enjoyed a legacy of mass Muslim civil society organizations whose leaders largely subscribe to the vision of a pluralistic, democratic Islam. Most of them were educated in secular social sciences or other fields with a loosely “civic” orientation. In most Muslim countries, the leadership of Islamic civil society organizations is in the hands of conservative religious leaders, with little exposure to secular education and no commitment to democracy and pluralism. Such leadership cannot be expected to sponsor and support programs for the promotion of democracy and human rights in their societies. 3. The country should have a well-established intermediary organization(s), which enjoys the trust of local Islamic leaders and organizations as well as of USAID, to initiate and manage the program. The success of ICS program also depends on the experience, expertise, and reputation of the Asia Foundation. It enjoys an impeccable reputation among religious and political leaders in Indonesia. It also has a proven record of managing international projects, which has endeared to it USAID. Such intermediary organizations are needed to provide a buffer between USAID and recipient Muslim religious organizations. While USAID should be assured that its funds would be managed and accounted prudently, Muslim religious leaders and organizations must be confident about the motives underlying assistance. Indonesian experience indicates that an established intermediary organization can protect recipient Islamic organizations from being accused of being pawns in the hands of a foreign power. Suitable intermediary organizations are difficult but not impossible to locate. For example, the American Universities in Beirut and Cairo may perform such intermediary functions if USAID were to launch a civic education program in Middle Eastern countries. 4. USAID and the American embassy should be totally committed to the program and be prepared for the risks involved in working with Muslim civil society organizations. USAID in Indonesia enjoys the unquestioned support of the American Embassy for the Muslim Civil Society program. Both USAID and the Embassy have been aware of the risks involved in working with Muslim religious leaders, who do not necessarily share USAID’s vision in international arena. The essential point is that USAID should have a long-term strategic vision for engaging Islamic leaders that is shared and supported by the U.S. embassy. Both should realize that many of the leaders and organizations who would receive USAID funds might disagree with USAID policies and programs. Moreover, some of them might even turn against USAID. Unless USAID and the embassy are both willing and able to take risks, and even face failure, USAID should not design and support such initiatives. Program Design 1. The program should be owned and managed by indigenous groups and leaders. In Indonesia, program partners own the program. They plan and implement their own activities. They decide what they will do and how they will do it. The Foundation plays only a supportive role. Local ownership, while promoting commitment and initiative, also deflects the criticism that program partners work for a foreign power. The ICS model seems most suitable in the present political climate in Muslim countries which harbor serious misgivings about U.S. intensions. 2. The program should engage multiple Islamic groups working on different issues and problems. The ICS program has partnered with different groups. Its partners have launched civic education curricula in Islamic institutions of higher learning; promoted civic education in pesantren and state schools; established women’s crisis centers in cities and towns; published and disseminated highbrow and popular books on pluralism and democracy; and organized meetings and seminars targeted to different audiences. Working with multiple partners is a promising strategy for two reasons. First, it protects the program from abject failure if one or more partners do not perform well. Second, it creates a synergy in which various sponsors of program activities mutually reinforce and help each other. Depending on the local circumstances and interest, the program should seek to engage groups such as women’s religious groups, Muslim youth organizations, Islamic schools and educational institutions, and the interested print and electronic media entities. 3. The program should be designed as an evolving initiative that can respond to emerging opportunities and challenges. One conspicuous feature of ICS program is its flexibility. It is not blue-printed with precise indicators. TAF enjoyed unprecedented autonomy and was able to reorient and redirect the program in the aftermath of the fall of the Soeharto government. The program is able to recruit new partners as opportunities arise and drop old ones when they fail to operate. The obvious lesson is that any Islamic civil society program should enjoy maximum flexibility to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities. They should be able to change and modify their plans, when necessary. Such projects should be free from the regulatory requirements imposed on development programs. Perhaps USAID should either provide grants or sign cooperative agreements with intermediary organizations to ensure necessary flexibility of the planned program. 4. The program should be managed by staff members who possess intimate knowledge of the Islamic traditions in the country and are able to establish rapport with Islamic leaders and institutions. The ICS program in Indonesia is highly staff intensive, as it involves working directly with grassroots organizations. Both TAF and USAID have excellent staff members, who are not only knowledgeable about local conditions in different regions, but are also sensitive to local culture and traditions. In fact, within USAID the program is managed by a local expert who enjoys superb rapport with civil society organizations. Therefore, it is important that at the planning stage, USAID provide for staff members who possess an intimate knowledge of Islamic traditions in the country and are able to establish rapport with Islamic leaders and institutions. Q & A1. What was the main challenge that you all encountered? How much was the evidence of say, Wahhabi, intrusion to in these areas? How much challenge or opposition did they pose to the program?
2. You didn’t mention whether you were dealing with Sunni or Shiite Muslims. I assume you were talking about Sunni Muslims. Have any initiatives been done in the recent past or in the future with relating or with encouraging the center of Sunni learning and outreach, which is the al-Azhar University in Egypt. My understanding is that the Egypt mission in the late 70s and early 80s actually commissioned the al-Azhar University to do several studies to pave the way for specific programs, like child survival and maternal healthcare which are all detailed in the Islamic way, but I am concerned with its being brought out to be very simplistic messages that can be transmitted through various program methodologies. What has been done in Indonesian Islamic universities?
3. I just returned from an assessment mission in the West Bank and Gaza. There we found widespread concerns about the anti-terrorism certification process including American and local Palestinian NGOs. Do you have any advice as to how we can convince local partners of the need for and the merits of signing on to this sort of certification? Phillips: We are very cognizant of the problem. I’ve heard from German development organizations which are concerned that the certification process is turning the landscape over to the more radical groups. Many organizations have subsets of the organizations with very radical political wings. We are talking about it in our interagency groups. If you are interested in giving me more specific examples, I’d be happy to bring that into the discussion. 4. This has been interesting, but very superficial. We do need some kind of workshop. With respect to the few surveys that you mentioned, I don’t think we’ve gotten under the surface as to what are the root causes that are fueling anti-Americanism? We haven’t talked about foreign policy or unemployment. Who would organize a forum in which we can discuss these points? How do educate ourselves before begin to educate others? Phillips: I did mention briefly the economic and social conditions as a factor, but I agree that we have just skimmed the surface. I refer you back to the papers that I mentioned, the studies on economic growth, governance and education in which these issues are discussed more in detail. I mentioned the Zogby poll which show very strong negative view toward the U.S. due mainly to U.S. policy. We are looking at these things in the State/AID working group. We cannot assume that U.S. policy in not part of the picture. You can find the Zogby Poll and Pew Surveys online to see what questions they’ve asked.
To view descriptions for the upcoming 2004 seminars, please click here. |
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