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USAID Information:
External Links:
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Haiti
Please note: All linked documents are in PDF format
| Objective |
SO Number |
FY 2004 |
FY 2005 |
FY 2006 |
| Economic Growth |
521-001 |
1,449 |
15,558 |
|
| Health Systems |
521-003 |
22,783 |
20,000 |
19,320 |
| Education |
521-004 |
3,500 |
6,253 |
|
| Democracy and Governance |
521-005 |
3,600 |
37,869 |
38,000 |
| Streamlined Government |
521-006 |
44,512 |
5,000 |
12,000 |
| Hurricane Recovery |
521-010 |
|
34,081 |
|
| PL 480 Title II |
|
30,470 |
37,703 |
32,529 |
| Transition Initiatives |
|
|
|
30,000 |
| Transfers |
|
10,820 |
|
|
| Total (in thousands of dollars) |
117,134 |
156,464 |
131,849 |
|
The Development Challenge: Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. The per capita annual income is less than $400 and 80% of the population lives in poverty. Unemployment and underemployment remain major problems; more than two thirds of the labor force do not have formal jobs. Less than half of Haiti's population has access to potable water services, and only 4% of the rural population has electricity. With only 2.5 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants, Haiti's infant mortality rate (79 per 1,000 live births) is the highest in the hemisphere, and life expectancy is only 52 years. The adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is 5.6%, the highest in the hemisphere. The literacy rate is 52%. Approximately 65% of children between the ages of five and twelve attend school, but only 25% of them complete 6th grade. Forty percent of Haiti's schools have no actual buildings.
Political unrest beginning in November 2003 led to the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on February 29, 2004, and the establishment of an interim government under Prime Minister Latortue and President Alexandre in March. In April, the Interim Government of Haiti (IGOH) signed a pact with most of the country's political parties and civil society groups which called for elections by the end of 2005. Ensuring that these elections will be free and fair and strengthening the current IGOH to facilitate a peaceful transfer of power are immediate priorities for Haiti.
The IGOH inherited an economy in a state of collapse. The political upheavals of the past two decades have caused serious damage to the fragile Haitian socioeconomic base. The manufacturing sector was depleted during the pre-Aristide embargo, shrinking 40% during that time. By 1994, inflation had risen to 50% per year. Inflation peaked again in the months preceding Aristide's departure, as international reserves fell to dangerous levels. Political violence caused property damage estimated at 5.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004. Compounding the economic downturn caused by the political crises, an active hurricane season destroyed entire villages in the southeast, Artibonite, and northwest regions, leaving thousands homeless, the local economies in shambles, and the IGOH's ability to respond with limited capabilities and resources. After shrinking 3% between 1990 - 2002, per capita GDP shrank 4.7% in 2004. Outside observers continue to remark on the ability of the society to endure successive natural and man-made disasters. Resilience is aided by remittances from Haitians living abroad (estimated at $900 million per year) which dwarf the contributions from international donors. In addition, nongovernmental organizations, charitable, and faith-based organizations continue to provide essential financial support to the Haitian population.
The IGOH has shown a strong will for reform; however, faced with limited capacity, weak institutions, and a tradition of corruption, progress continues to be slow. The executive branch is hampered by the absence of a sitting, elected legislative body and thus can only legislate through executive decree, which limits the breadth of its ability to legitimately make changes. Cabinet members have pledged that they will not run for political office during the upcoming elections which, while preserving their integrity in the eyes of the international community, lessens their power over an entrenched civil service, long dependent on systems of personal patronage.
There are some positive indicators to counter-balance the grim picture painted above. Three months after the installation of the Interim Government, the currency stabilized. Haitian exports rose by more than 10% in FY 2004, showing the potential for economic growth. The International Monetary Fund is predicting a growth rate of 3% for 2005 and 2006.
The USAID Program: USAID moved quickly to help restore essential services to Haiti following the uprising against Aristide. The first act was to get the electricity system operating again in Port-au-Prince. Recognizing the importance Haitians place on educating their children, USAID moved swiftly to help schools reopen by setting up a fund to subsidize the price of textbooks throughout the country. USAID health programs have grown to the point where 90% of the children in USAID project zones are now fully immunized, and a program that furnishes anti-retroviral medication to HIV/AIDS victims has begun. USAID has provided key personnel and technical assistance to the Prime Minister and key ministries. A new training program for judges and prosecutors has been initiated. USAID has expanded its community radio program to help government ministries strengthen their public outreach efforts. USAID has put almost 30,000 people to work cleaning up debris and clearing drainage ditches. In addition, USAID's microfinance program has helped more than 90,000 microentrepreneurs expand their businesses. USAID is also sponsoring a major food assistance program for children and has supplied over $11 million in response to the devastating flood in Gonaives.
Following the formation of the IGOH, the United States pledged $230 million for two years for Haiti, of which USAID is managing $143.5 million of programs, begun in FY 2004. This more than doubled the Haitian foreign assistance package for FY 2004. USAID ramped up its ongoing development programs mid course and obligated the funds within a very short timeframe (by September 2004), as follows: a) institutional support for the IGOH ($45.1 million); b) health ($32.1 million); c) humanitarian assistance ($30.3 million); d) disaster response and emergency food assistance ($13.5 million); e) economic growth ($12.3 million); f) democracy and governance ($6.4 million); and g) education ($3.7 million).
In addition to assisting the IGOH to restore essential services, USAID's program in Haiti is focused on restoring and sustaining a climate of peace and security, revitalizing Haiti's tattered economy, improving management of natural resources, improving health and education services, and improving conditions for democratic processes, including free and fair elections. Tropical storm reconstruction programs are currently underway. Transition Initiatives resources are being requested for FY 2006 to ensure that USAID can respond more rapidly to changing conditions, as often happens in Haiti.
Other Program Elements: In May 2004, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) initiated a two-year, $7 million Haiti Transition Initiative to work in conflict-prone communities in Port-au-Prince, Petit Goave, and St. Marc. The program involves quick, highly visible, small projects designed to restore citizen confidence in the political process, build cooperation between the government and citizens, and empower citizens and government to address priority community needs. Following Tropical Storm Jeanne, OTI assisted the Ministry of Public Works to restore a clean water supply and clear drainage canals. This project is expected to benefit 10,000 people by improving sanitation, diminishing the risk of malaria, and reducing vulnerability to future flooding.
Haiti is a focus country under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. FY 2005 funding will be provided from the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative under the policy direction of the U.S. Global AIDS coordinator. The FY 2006 HIV/AIDS request for this country is contained in the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative account justification. For further details please see the Department of State FY 2006 Congressional Budget Justification.
The Haiti/Dominican Republic Cross-Border Development and Conflict Prevention Program is managed by the USAID Mission in the Dominican Republic in coordination with the mission in Haiti. This two-year program works to develop viable economic activities and reduce socioeconomic tensions among communities along both sides of the border.
Other Donors: Donor coordination became an important priority immediately upon the establishment of the Interim Government. Even before the July 2004 international donors conference in Washington, USAID and major international donors created a framework for cooperation. Currently, a small, effective Donor Steering Committee exists to coordinate international assistance. The Committee oversees subgroups in 20 sectors, each led by a representative from the Interim Government and a donor nation. The United States is the largest donor and has the lead in the private sector development subgroup and a significant role in most of the other sector subgroups.
In July 2004, more than $1 billion of donor assistance was pledged for 2004 and 2005. The United States and Canada were the principal bilateral donors in 2004, followed by France, Germany, Japan, Taiwan, Spain, Switzerland, Greece, Norway, Mexico, and Ireland. The activities of these countries complement USAID's programs in democracy, economic growth, education and health. Multilateral assistance and loans come primarily from the Inter-American Development Bank (roads and schools), the European Union (health, water, disaster relief), the World Bank (implementation of Haiti's Poverty Reduction Strategy), the World Food Program (food security), and other UN agencies.
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