624
Plea Negotiations with Public OfficialsUnited
States
v. Richmond
|
In United States v. Richmond, 550 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y.
1982),
the court questioned the propriety of using the plea bargaining process to
negotiate the resignation from office of a Congressman. The Criminal
Division
believes that this decision is incorrect on the merits. United States
Attorney
personnel are therefore encouraged to continue to consider voluntary offers
of
resignation from office as a desirable feature in plea agreements with
elected
and appointed public officials at all levels of government.
The Richmond case involved a former Congressman from New
York
who, during 1982, became the subject of a federal criminal investigation.
In an
effort to dispose of his criminal liability, Congressman Richmond
voluntarily
agreed to resign his seat in the Congress and to plead guilty to federal
tax,
narcotics, and conflict of interest offenses. Thereafter, Richmond resigned
his
seat, took appropriate measures to withdraw his candidacy in the 1982
Congressional election, and entered guilty pleas to the aforementioned
charges.
At his sentencing a month later, the judge announced that, in his judgment,
the
resignation and withdrawal conditions of the plea agreement violated the
separation of powers doctrine, and infringed upon the constitutional right
of the
public to select Congressmen of their choosing as articulated in Powell
v.
McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
Although the Criminal Division considers the Richmond
decision
to have been incorrectly decided on its merits, the unusual procedural and
factual setting of the case foreclosed judicial review in the Second
Circuit.
In this regard, the district judge's comments concerning the plea bargaining
issue were made after the plea agreement terms dealing with resignation and
withdrawal from candidacy had been fully performed by Congressman Richmond,
and
without the issue having been otherwise raised by the defendant. Since the
plea
agreement was in all other respects enforced, and since the Court's refusal
to
"accept" the resignation and non-candidacy terms did not demonstrably impact
on
the sentence imposed, the issue was moot and not easily amenable to
appellate
review.
The Richmond case is particularly troublesome from the
standpoint of the orderly and efficient discharge of the Justice
Department's
responsibilities to protect the public from criminal abuse of the public
trust
by high federal officials. It purports to limit, without adequate legal
justification, the latitude of federal prosecutors to reach voluntary
settlements
with defendants in significant corruption cases which equitably address and
protect the important public interests that such prosecutions normally
entail.
[cited in USAM 9-16.001; USAM 9-16.110] | |