TSA Administrator Kip Hawley's Oral Testimony on Improving Aviation Security
Testimony & Speeches
Before The United States House Of Representatives
Committee On Oversight And Government Reform
November 15, 2007
- Click here to download a printable version of Kip Hawley's full written testimony before the U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on November 15, 2007. (PDF, 51 KB)
Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and members of the Committee. I would also like to thank you for having this hearing and drawing attention to these issues. I particularly appreciate the work of the Chairman and the Ranking Member and their staffs, along with my colleagues from the GAO, to protect sensitive information. I think this is, as Mr. Mica mentioned, an extraordinarily important issue that we deal with openly and transparently.
The videos that we saw a minute ago and the play on the television are noteworthy and certainly get your attention. I think the key point is there are vulnerabilities in every system of security. And that what we're engaged in is risk management.
As we look at risk management, we look at an IED [Improvised Explosive Device] that would have the capacity of taking an airplane down. There are many steps, including making the bomb, getting components through, perhaps assembling them. Many various steps.
We look at the whole system. The 19 layers of security that Mr. Mica mentioned and that I put in my opening statement are like numbers in a combination lock. If you find one number to a 19-number combination, you have one number.
What we've done is identify and understand the vulnerabilities in our system—and there are vulnerabilities. We then put in place other layers to compensate for them. I'd like to just give a quick summary.
In August of 2005 (I came on the job in July 2005), we identified and looked at the vulnerabilities. We looked at the technology vulnerabilities. We looked at the people vulnerabilities. And we looked at our strategy vulnerabilities. We identified that we had work to do in all three areas.
We needed to dramatically upgrade the technology that we have at checkpoints, [with the goal] of eliminating the possibility of bringing on IED components—not the assembled bomb, but the components. That is a much more difficult task. So, we retrained the entire TSA workforce with professional bomb tests directed at that threat, and changed our protocols to require us to train and test to the standard of IED components.
To put these tests in context—and I appreciate the GAO's work; their tests are done for good purpose and they yield valuable information. But it is important to stay focused, not get panicked by looking at one particular number in that combination lock and worry about the whole system.
There are issues that need to be addressed and I welcome discussing them.
But to put it in context: If the number of tests that the GAO did were measured in miles, there are 38 tests—that would be roughly here to Baltimore. The Office of Inspector General has done roughly 200 tests. This is in a three month period of this year. That is approximately from here to Philadelphia. And in a three month period at TSA, we do 225,000 tests. These are physical tests with actual bomb components going through with real people at the checkpoint.
That's the equivalent of going around the world eight times.
So I think on the trip to Baltimore one can learn interesting things. But what we do every day and the 225,000 tests we do over three months—that's over a million a year—gives us very focused information on what we know terrorists work on. We know their capability. We focus our efforts on what will actually take down a plane, as opposed to what might severely damage it, and we work backward from there – each one layer.
I mean, my pen can do severe damage. We look at what might bring a plane down and work backward from there – each one layer. So yes, there are vulnerabilities in technology. I'll address what we're doing about those.
We've put aside a significant amount of money to buy new AT machines – new checkpoint carry-on machines – and we've announced a purchase of 250 already in October. We expect to double that using FY08 funds, should the Congress appropriate that money and the bill be signed. In ‘08 we expect to move the number up to 500.
To give you an idea, there are about 2,500 lanes in the United States, or about 500 checkpoints. This is a very significant technology upgrade that we'll be deploying in '08, the first significant technology upgrade since the 1970s on carry-on luggage. It is in progress; we identified it early and now fortunately it's being deployed.
On the strategy, we identified in 2005 that we are too checklist-oriented. Our TSOs [Transportation Security Officers] are looking to find a certain number of prohibited items and pull them out of bags. They're not thinking ahead. As Mr. Davis mentioned, we have to go on offense. We can't sit back at the checkpoint looking through a prohibited items list and fishing out people's objects. We have to be aware that terrorists change their techniques. When we move one direction, they'll find a way around it. We have to be nimble. We have to play offense. That's why we do so many of these other IED-component tests at our checkpoints every day, every shift, at every airport. It is the crux of what we do.
In addition to being more flexible and having better technology, we need to change up what we do. We can't be a sitting duck at the checkpoint with the same processes.
We've added layers. We've added the behavior observation layer. This identifies suspicious behaviors such as you would find with surveillance or pre-attack planning. [These terrorists] are not bringing prohibited items. They're not breaking any laws. They're doing their surveillance, and feel they're protected because we can't get them if they are away from the checkpoint.
Not true anymore.
Step in a U.S. airport, and we have 600 Behavior Detection Officers out there and they will pick you off in a public area.
On top of that we've added the Travel Document Checker—with the support of the Congress, and I appreciate that—to take over the critical point at which travelers show identification. Now we have federal officers checking identity who have a much better understanding and can tie in with the behavior piece.
On top of that we've added our VIPR [Visible Intermodal Protection Response] Teams, which bring in our Federal Air Marshals who are not flying on aircraft. They are now able to move undercover—and overtly—to conduct unexpected patrols everywhere in the airport environment. We also work with our transit partners to help there, too.
On top of that we've added a program at the back of airports where we have the equivalent of a thousand headcount now that we've developed to spend their time in the back side of airports. We're not just sitting at the checkpoint. We're looking at what employees are doing [in secure areas] and what's happening at the fuel pump. We're looking at what's happening at the parking garage. We're looking at who and what is driving into the airport. All of those are additional layers that have been added since 2005.
Along with addressing these vulnerabilities since 2005, we're bringing on new technology like millimeter wave, backscatter, and whole-body imaging, that gets us away from pat downs.
The GAO mentioned enhanced pat downs. We know what that means. The TSA officers know how to do that and can do very enhanced and thorough pat downs. It has not been acceptable to the public. If that is something that we have to do, we will do that. The better answer is millimeter wave or backscatter, which will have privacy protections and will allow people to go through without enhanced pat downs.
Now the most important – the people: Our TSOs. We've trained them. We have career progression now where our employees can move up and enhance their skills. We have a pay-for-performance program. Our attrition is dramatically down. Our attendance is up. And as the people who traveled on August 10 know, our TSOs stood up that day and changed the entire security process overnight. That is not an easy thing to do. It shows a commitment by our security officers.
We know our vulnerabilities. We are addressing them. We need one more thing. That is the support of the public.
Mr. Mica mentioned this and I think it is absolutely critical: we need the passengers back in the game. We are on the same side. And we need your help.
Our officers come to work at 4 a.m. They choose to work at TSA, and they are coming to the airport to protect you. We need your help. This is not something to be gamed. We need you to separate out [items] when you pack your bag and be very clear: Say, here's the components of what I'm bringing on and let the officer quickly assess that it is not a problem.
The more we give clean bags to our TSOs, the less places there are to hide if you are a terrorist.
We ask the public's help on participating, and we ask their help on respect and appreciation for our officers who are doing—I think—a great job. And I have to say, having worked with my international partners, that I believe the Transportation Security Officers we have are the best in the world. The layers of security that we've added are more than other countries. I've been to and had many discussions with a lot of these countries. We work closely to align our security measures.
One last point on 3-1-1. It not only works for us, but it was also adopted by 170 countries around the world. The European Union announced it and followed our lead. We are working together with our partners. We need to partner with our public. We need to partner with our international colleagues. And we need to be very direct in saying, yes, there are vulnerabilities.
We can't be squeamish and say, "Oh my goodness, they've brought some firecrackers through and put it in the trunk of a car." Well, you know what? That's something you face up to and say we need to stop all things. But we have to focus on what truly does us harm.
I appreciate the Committee's time and look forward to answering your questions.
