REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR JOHN D. NEGROPONTE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON, D.C.
11:30 A.M. EST
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2006
"INTELLIGENCE REFORM: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES"
MR. NEGROPONTE:� (Applause.)� I've got to get myself
properly provisioned here, so just bear with me for a moment.
����������� Thank you very, very much, Tom, for that warm
introduction.� And he's already disappeared!� (Laughs; laughter.)� I noticed
him hesitating a bit during his remarks.� And he told me what I thought was a
kind of a good joke about a speechwriter who didn't particularly like one of
the people that he had been writing for.� And when the guy was giving the last
speech of his life and he went to open his book and he saw one piece of paper
and it said on it, "You're on your own."� (Laughs; laughter.)�
����������� I also want to thank Cas Yost and Frank Hogan
for the honor that you are bestowing on me with the Jit Trainor Award.� I'm
flattered to think that I have exemplified some of the qualities of dedication
and loyalty that Jit Trainor exhibited in service to Georgetown University.�
Dedication, loyalty and service certainly are the values that animate Georgetown,
which in so many ways influences this capital, and certainly has influenced
me.� If I tried to remember all the times that I have visited this campus,
whether to teach here, as I did in 1987, or for the colloquiums and the
seminars, I couldn't do it.� Georgetown University has been part of my life for
a very long time.
����������� Looking out into this audience, I see friends
and colleagues who would say the same thing.� There are people here today who
served with me during Vietnam, throughout the Cold War, and then into what we
used to call -- for lack of a better term -- the post-Cold War era.� Was it really
an era?� Can an era be over so fast?� We were in it when I left the government
in the 1990s to work at the McGraw-Hill Companies for four years, but when I
came back as United States ambassador to the United Nations in September 2001,
it was gone.�
����������� What has replaced the post-Cold War era?� That's
a difficult question to answer because life and history seem to be moving so
fast.� We live in a world that is full of conflict, contradictions and
accelerating change.� Viewed from the perspective of the director of national
intelligence, the most dramatic change of all is the exponential increase in
the number of targets we must identify, track and analyze.� Today, in addition
to nation states with hostile intentions, we are focusing on terrorist groups,
proliferation networks, alienated communities, authoritarian leaders and
narcotraffickers.�
����������� Today I would like to talk about a few of those
threats and challenges to our nation -- global terrorism, Iraq's struggle to
build its democracy, and nuclear proliferation in the cases of Iran and North
Korea -- and then describe what we in the intelligence community are doing in
response.� President Bush has characterized the ongoing transformation of our
intelligence community as the most dramatic reform since the days of President
Truman.� I hope the threats that I detail for you will substantiate why such a
major reform effort is not only imperative, but urgent.
����������� First, the global jihadist threat.� Entrenched
grievances such as corruption and injustice, and the slow pace of economic,
social and political change in most Muslim-majority nations continue to fuel
the global jihadist movement.� Global jihadists seek to overthrow regimes that
they regard as apostate and to eliminate Western influence in the Muslim world,
although most of their targets and victims are fellow Muslims.
����������� The movement is diffuse and subsumes three very
distinct types of groups and individuals.
����������� First and foremost, al Qaeda, a weakened but
resourceful organization.
����������� Second, other Sunni jihadist groups, some
affiliated with al Qaeda, some not.
����������� And third, self-generating jihadist networks and
cells.
����������� Working closely with our allies and friends, we
have killed or captured most of the leadership behind the 9/11 attacks.� But my
colleagues and I still view the global jihadist terrorist movement, which
emerged from the Afghan-Soviet conflict in the 1980s but is today inspired and
led by al Qaeda, as the pre-eminent threat to our citizens, homeland interests
and friends.
����������� The London and Madrid bombings demonstrated the
extent to which European nations in particular are both vulnerable to terrorist
attack and could be exploited operationally to facilitate attacks on us.�
Unfortunately, al Qaeda will attempt high-impact attacks for as long as its
central command structure is functioning and affiliated groups are capable of
furthering its interests.� Although an attack using conventional explosives
continues to be the most probable scenario, al Qaeda remains interested in
acquiring chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or weapons.
����������� Ultimately, more than the acts of global
jihadists, the debate between Muslim extremists and moderates will influence
the future terrorist environment, the domestic stability of key United States partners and the foreign policies of Muslim governments.
����������� The global jihadists are adding urgency to a
debate within Islam over how religion should shape government.� Growing
internal demands for reform in many Muslim countries are also stimulating this
debate.� In general, it appears that Muslims are becoming more aware of their
Islamic identity, leading to growing political activism, but increased
political activism does not necessarily signal a trend towards radicalization.
����������� Most Muslims reject the extremist message and
violent agendas of the global jihadists.� Indeed, as people of all backgrounds
endorse democratic principles of freedom, equality and the rule of law, they
will be able to couple these principles with their religious beliefs, whatever
they may be, to build better futures for their communities.� In the Islamic
world, increased freedoms will serve as a counterweight to a jihadist movement
that only promises more authoritarianism, isolation and economic stagnation.
����������� The threat from extremism and anti-Western
militancy is especially acute in Iraq.� This is a difficult struggle.� In
looking at the year ahead, I'd like to offer a balance sheet approach.� Let me
begin with some of the challenges that pro-democracy Iraqis face before turning
to encouraging developments.
����������� First, the challenges.� Iraqi Sunni-Arab
disaffection is the primary enabler of the insurgency and is likely to remain
high in 2006.� In addition, the most extreme Sunni jihadists, such as those
fighting with Zarqawi, will continue to attack Iraqis and coalition forces
regardless of positive political developments.
����������� Iraqi security forces require better command and
control to improve their effectiveness.
����������� Although Kurds and Shi'a were accommodating to
the underrepresented Sunnis in 2005, their desire to protect core interests
such as regional autonomy and de-Ba'athification could make further compromise
more difficult.
����������� And lastly, prospects for economic development
in 2006 are constrained by the unstable security situation, insufficient
commitment to economic reform on the part of the government, and corruption.
����������� But there are important encouraging developments
in Iraq as well.
����������� The insurgents have failed to consolidate any
gains from their attacks.� To the contrary, they have not been able to
establish any lasting territorial control.� They were unable to disrupt either
of the two national elections held last year or the constitutional referendum.�
They have not developed a political strategy to attract popular support beyond
their Sunni Arab base.� And they have not shown the ability to coordinate
nationwide operations.
����������� In addition, Iraqi security forces are taking on
more demanding missions, making incremental progress towards operational
independence, and becoming more capable of providing the stability Iraqis
deserve and the economy needs in order to grow.� Despite obvious efforts by
Zarqawi's organization to use attacks on Shi'a civilians to bait them into
attacking their Sunni countrymen, the vast majority of Shi'a have shown restraint.�
And perhaps most importantly, large-scale Sunni participation in the last
election has provided a first step towards diminishing Sunni support for the
insurgency.
����������� After global jihadist terrorism, the ongoing
development of weapons of mass destruction constitutes the second major threat
to the safety of our nation, our deployed troops and our allies.� We are most
concerned about the threat and destabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation,
but we are also concerned about the threat from biological or chemical agents,
which could have psychological and possibly political effects far greater than
their actual magnitude.
����������� The time when a few states had monopolies over
weapons of mass destruction is fading.� Technologies, often dual-use, move
freely in our globalized economy, as do the scientific personnel who design
them.� It is more difficult for us to track efforts to acquire those widely
available parts and production technologies; yet the potential danger of
weapons of mass destruction proliferation are so grave that we must do
everything possible to discover and disrupt it.
����������� With respect to Iran's nuclear program, our
concerns are shared by many nations, by the International Atomic Energy Agency
and, of course, Iran's neighbors.� These concerns have increased since last
summer because President Ahmadinejad has made numerous unacceptable statements
since his last -- since his election.� Hard-liners have regained control of all
the major branches and institutions of government, and the government has
become more effective at repressing the nascent chutes of personal freedom that
had emerged earlier in the decade.
����������� Iran conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment
program for nearly two decades in violation of its International Atomic Energy
Agency Safeguards Agreement, and despite its claims to the contrary, we assess
that Iran seeks nuclear weapons.� While Tehran probably does not yet have a
nuclear weapon and probably has not yet produced or acquired the necessary
fissile material, the danger that it will do so is a reason for immediate
concern.� Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
Middle East, which Tehran views as an integral part of its strategy to deter,
and if necessary, retaliate against forces in the region, including United States forces.� The integration of nuclear weapons into Iran's -- Iranian ballistic
systems would be destabilizing beyond the Middle East.
����������� Like Iran, North Korea threatens international
security and is located in a historically volatile region.� Unlike Iran, North Korea claims to have nuclear weapons already, a claim that we assess is probably true.� Pyongyang sees nuclear weapons as the best way to deter superior United States and South Korean forces, to ensure regime security as a lever for economic
gain and as a source of prestige.� Accordingly, the North remains a major
challenge to the global nonproliferation regimes.� We do not know the
conditions under which the North would be willing to fully relinquish its
nuclear weapons and its weapons programs, nor do we see signs of organized
opposition to the regime among North Korea's political or military elite.
����������� Each of the three challenges I have discussed
today is affected by the accelerating change and transnational dynamics that
are the hallmarks of the 21st century.� Jihadist terrorism, the struggle
between freedom and extremism, and WMD proliferation are all subject to the
powerful force of globalization, which moves people, goods, ideas, weapons,
technologies, solutions and problems in a nonstop torrent across borders and
boundaries.� As a direct result, collecting, analyzing and acting on solid
intelligence have become increasingly difficult.
����������� To meet these new challenges, we need to work
hand in hand with other responsible nations, but we also have a lot of work to
do at home.� The powerful critiques of congressional committees, the 9/11
commission and the WMD commission, framed by statute in the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and taken to heart by the dedicated
professionals of our intelligence community, have gotten us moving in the right
direction.
����������� In the last nine months, we have begun reshaping
the cultures of United States national intelligence and begun the arduous
process of deeply integrating our considerable resources.
����������� With respect to global terrorism, we have
strengthened the National Counterterrorism Center, given it new mandates and
authorities, and put it in a central role to ensure that terrorism-related
information is properly coordinated and moved on to those who need it to ensure
our safety.
����������� The transnational threat of terror means that
our diplomats, our combatant commanders, our governors and our police chiefs
all have a legitimate and compelling claim on the most accurate, comprehensive,
timely intelligence that the 16 agencies of the intelligence community can
produce.
����������� Beyond the National Counterterrorism Center, we have worked with the Department of Justice and the FBI to help create and fund and
integrate the FBI's new National Security Branch into our overall
counterterrorism effort.� And we have also cooperated with the Department of
Homeland Security in strengthening their Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
led by Mr. Charlie Allen, the most experienced intelligence professional in the
United States government.
����������� In terms of Iraq, we have an effort under way
that integrates stateside capabilities with our presence on the ground in that
country.� This is a complex undertaking that requires close cooperation with
our commanders in support of coalition efforts.
����������� One particular threat to our troops, Improvised
Explosive Devices, is a substantial concern, as it accounts for approximately
one-half of American casualties.� We are highly focused on it.� But as with
combating terrorism, not all of our intelligence effort is directed at tactical
challenges.� Intelligence has an important role to play in offering broader
strategic assessments that shed light on political, economic, social and
cultural factors.
����������� A key to success for the Iraqi people, for
example, will be bringing all of these factors -- that is to say political,
economic, social and cultural -- together under a constitutional democracy that
is led by an effective national government respectful of Iraq's regional, ethnic and sectarian diversity.
����������� With respect to weapons of mass destruction
proliferation, last summer the president accepted the Silberman-Robb
Commission's recommendation that we create a National Counterproliferation Center.� We have done that.� Ken Brill, a former ambassador to the International Atomic Energy
Agency, has put together a highly qualified staff to carry out the National Counterproliferation Center's role as the strategic coordinator of our
government's counterproliferation analysis.
����������� In addition, we have named mission managers for Iran and North Korea.� These new posts are occupied by senior intelligence professionals whose job
is to make the decisions and take the actions that I myself would take if I
could spend all my time working on a single issue or a single country.
����������� In important ways, our mission mangers for Iran and North Korea represent the theme that I use most often with regard to intelligence community
reform, integration.� Intelligence is a complex business wherein multiple
significant factors, information streams and functions must be brought together
into timely, accurate and objective analysis responsive to our customers'
needs, and that customer set is extensive.
����������� By itself, no single step we take in reforming
and integrating the United States intelligence community will necessarily
enable us to pinpoint the activation of a terrorist plot or identify a ship
carrying WMD-related material or interpret developments in new democracies
under siege.� But the combined steps we take together do enable the United States intelligence community to assure the American people that we are better
prepared than we were in September 2001.� That's the fundamental metric and
mandate legislated both by Congress and by history to which we must respond.
����������� Again, I am gratified by your presence and your
interest, and I'm indebted to Georgetown University for bestowing the Jit
Trainor Award on me.
����������� As I mentioned at the outset, many former and
present colleagues are here today, so I would also to thank them personally for
their friendship and their support over the years.
����������� Thank you very much.� (Applause.)
����������� CASMIR YOST:� Thank you, Ambassador Negroponte,
for a very thoughtful and comprehensive statement.
����������� We're now going to have a period of questions,
and I would ask that if you have a question, please line up at the microphone.�
I should tell you that we have a particular bias in this hall, which is that we
love to see students asking questions, but we will not, of course, forbid other
guests from getting to the microphone.
����������� But we look forward to your questions.
����������� Please.
����������� Q���� Since our lives have been impacted by the
ire felt toward us by Muslim nations or individuals in Muslim nations, will you
discuss the root cause of the enmity so many of these people feel toward the
United States?
����������� Thank you.
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Well, I'm not sure that I'm the
most expert person to address that question.� I think one of the points I was
trying to make in my prepared remarks was that while there is enmity towards
the West in general and towards the United States in particular, there's also a
struggle going on within the world of Islam itself, and that, in some respects,
may even be the more fundamental struggle that is taking place.� But as far as
the roots of enmity towards us is concerned, I think that would be a very long
and almost an entirely different subject to explore.
����������� But I would respond to you as someone who has
served in nine posts -- diplomatic postings abroad, including four
ambassadorships, plus being our representative at the United Nations.� I also
have found in my own personal experience of more than 40 years in government
that there is a great deal of goodwill towards the United States, its
government and its people.� So that when one talks about enmity which might
exist in one place or another, this is quite a complex question, and I don't
believe that it overshadows the fundamental goodwill that exists towards our
country in this world.
����������� Q���� Thank you, Mr. Negroponte.� I am a retired
CIA intelligence analyst, so I am particularly curious to find out what sort of
safeguards, if any, have you introduced to protect the integrity of the
intelligence process and product from being bastardized and prostituted by
policymakers to promote a predetermined policy, as was the case with the
disinformation campaign that George W. Bush and his henchmen launched to lie
this country into its present disastrous war of aggression in Iraq?� Thank you.
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� (Pause.)� (Laughter.)� What are
you gonna do?� (Laughs.)� (Laughter.)
����������� First of all, the answer is, a lot.� I mean,
among the lessons learned from -- I think some of the lessons learned from 9/11
started being applied almost right away in terms of connecting the dots.� With
respect to the WMD issue, I think that a lot has been done in terms of -- let's
just list some of the steps.� Encouraging alternative analysis.� Making sure
that the president's daily brief incorporates analyses from a variety of
agencies.� We've enlisted and engaged, for example, the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research a lot more in pieces that
are prepared for the president's brief.�
����������� Red cell analyses, where you look at alternative
interpretations to some particular conventional wisdom.� Let's say the
conventional wisdom on a particular subject is X, and everybody starts getting
maybe too comfortable with that analysis.� We say to ourself, well, let's just
take that proposition and see if we can get a group of smart analysts to try to
prove the reverse.
����������� So I think we've now got an official in the --
within our Directorate of National Intelligence with responsibility to serve as
an analytic ombudsman, and as a deputy for analytic integrity; happens to be a
professor from this university.� And I hired as my deputy for analysis Dr.
Thomas Finger, who was the director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
at the State Department.� And as you may recall, they were the ones who took
the dissenting view to the National Intelligence Estimate in 2002 on Iraq.
����������� So I honestly believe that we've done a lot to
assure the integrity of our product.� We won't rest on our laurels.� We'll
continue to strive to improve in that area.� But I think we've done a lot.
����������� Q���� Ambassador Negroponte, I have two quick
questions.� First off, I'd like to thank you for advocating, during your tenure
at the U.N., the fair treatment of Israel in that body.
����������� My first question is what, if any, interest has
your office taken in congressional hearings this week on whistleblowers in the
intelligence community?� Those hearings have addressed the need to protect
whistleblowers against retaliatory action such as the revocation of
clearances.� And I'd like to hear that steps are being contemplated by your
office in this regard.
����������� And the second question is, there are certain
procedural impediments that are facing analysts at the National
Counterterrorism Center.� And let me give you two examples.� For example, FBI
analysts cannot locate a member of their -- a CIA counterpart.� There is no
connectivity between the two branches.� For example, if an analyst wanted to
look up their counterpart in an office -- in a particular office, they have to
go through their boss; there's no direct connectivity.�
����������� And the second example is that the FBI analysts
aren't pushed raw intelligence, you have to go into a database and pull the
intelligence out of the database using search terms, as opposed to other
branches of the intelligence community, such as INR --
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Are you in the intelligence
community?
����������� Q���� Yes, sir.
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Oh, okay.
����������� Q���� -- where the intelligence is actually
pushed to you --
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� It sounds like you know an
awful lot.� I was just -- (laughter; laughs) --
����������� Q���� A little bit.� So the FBI actually spent
$120 million to try to get a system up that pushes raw intelligence to the
analysts.�
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Right.
����������� Q���� And the FBI still does not have such a
system.
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Okay.
����������� Q���� I'd like to know that you're aware of some
of these challenges that are facing --
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Yeah, I certainly am.� But you
-- there are a lot of questions in there.
����������� But let me first of all, on the question of
whistleblowers, there's whistleblowing and there's whistleblowing.� And there
are procedures under the statute for people going to the inspector general of
their agency and raising through an established procedure problems or issues
that one might identify within one agency.� And I think we're all in favor of
those rights and obligations being both protected and carried out, so I don't
think we have any problem with appropriate whistleblowing.
����������� But there are some things that are defined as
whistleblowing that are tantamount to or are outright unauthorized, improper
and possibly illegal leaking of classified national security information to the
press, and that's not proper and not appropriate.� And if somebody commits
those kinds of offenses, they deserve to be punished for that.
����������� So I think it's important that that distinction
be made.
����������� With respect to connectivity of -- of officials
or analysts of different agencies, I think one of the major thrusts of our
reform effort is to assure better integration of our intelligence, starting
with the military and foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence.� We've
got to create a seamless transition between those bodies of intelligence so
that we can effectively pursue our targets.
����������� And as far as -- I mean, part of it is a human
problem, but part of it is -- and a cultural problem, which we're trying to
break down.� And I think the National Counterterrorism Center is actually a
step in the right direction in that regard because it locates people from the
FBI, the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security and others.
����������� And then the other part is a technological
problem of enhancing the connectivity between all of these agencies, and we're
working hard on that as well.� And I think you're going to see progress in the
months and years ahead on that.� We've just appointed a chief information
officer, a Senate-appointed position, in the directorate of national
intelligence, Major General Dale Meyerrose, who used to have the same job at
NORTHCOM as chief of information there.� I expect important things -- important
results from his efforts.
����������� I'd mention one example of an improvement, I
think, to better integration of the intelligence community is a new system that
we call ARC, an Analytic Resources Catalog, where we have embarked on a project
to try to catalog all analysts in different categories of endeavor throughout
the community so that ultimately what you ought to be able to find is if you
want to know who in the community is analyzing the subject of Iraq, you should
be able to call up the database of all analysts on the subject of Iraq, no
matter what agency they are in.� So this is the kind of connectivity we're
trying to encourage.
����������� Q���� Thank you.
����������� Q���� Ambassador, good afternoon.
����������� First of all, I'm honored to be here and
congratulations on your Jit Trainor Award.
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Thank you.
����������� Q���� I'm here as a parent.� My son is a student
here at the School of Foreign Service.
����������� My question is, based on your experience in
Mexico -- as we know, there is a very strong possibility that Mr. Lopez Obrador
just might become the next president of Mexico.� And how do you see that
affecting our relationship, as tense it is, between U.S. and Mexico right now?
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Well, I'll tell you one thing I
learned as being ambassador, spending more than four years in Mexico -- one comments
on politics in Mexico with great care.� (Laughter.)� That was the first lesson
I learned.
����������� Secondly, you're right.� There's going to be a
very important election in that country this coming July.� And there are
candidates from the three major parties.� There may be others, I'm not aware.�
And we're going to have to see what the outcome is.
����������� My own view -- this is my own judgment -- is if
you look at the history of U.S.-Mexico relations over the past 60 or 70 years,
that whatever the ideological or political persuasion of the Mexican incumbent,
there has been a tendency to place priority on the bilateral relationship over
other considerations, so that -- it's hard to look back at a period where
relations between the United States and Mexico have actually been bad.� Usually
-- and if you look at the range of activities that take place between the two
countries, whether its border affairs, investment, North American Free Trade
Agreement, the fact that there's so many hundred million border crossings a
year and so forth, I would expect that no matter which candidate gets elected
you'll see many, if not most, of all of those activities continue forward.
����������� Q���� Thank you.
����������� Q���� Ambassador Negroponte, again, thank you on
behalf of everyone here and congratulations on the Jit Trainor Award.� I am a
-- I think I'm your first student -- second-year grad student at the School of
Foreign Service, and I'm not in the intelligence community, so I'm going to ask
a broader question.
����������� Could you try to explain what you or the Office
of the DNI -- what kind of criteria you use in the decision to create the
mission managers as well as the centers in the effort to integrate the
intelligence community?� In other words, I know it's not as simplistic as
looking at the threat matrix and making the top two centers the next two major
mission managers to integrate the information, but why -- what criteria might
you use to develop a mission manager for China?� At what point do you decide
one of these mission managers should be built-out into a center?
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Of course the centers are
pretty much bricks and mortar, aren't they.� They National Counterterrorism
Center is an institution with several hundred people in it.� We have a National
Counterintelligence Center which has got about 50 or so people.� And the
National Counterproliferation Center also has 60, 70 people in it.� I did not
-- and those -- those were pretty much suggested to us by the Robb-Silberman
report.
����������� I thought it would be a mistake to try to create
too many of either these centers or the mission managers.� I didn't think it
was in our interest to proliferate these institutions, nor -- because, among
other things, I think it would run the danger of sort of cannibalizing too much
of the intelligence community.� If you start dipping in throughout the
community to create these centers, at what point do you -- do you lose critical
mass in these various agencies?� So one has to be careful about it.� One has to
do it with issues that are really of -- on the first order of importance.
����������� And with respect to the mission managers for
Iran and North Korea, they have very small core staff -- 5, 6, 7 people -- and
then the rest of the notion of the center there is virtual.� And that becomes,
of course, easier and easier to do with the assistance of modern technology.
����������� So we decided to keep it very, very limited, and
focused it principally, if you will, on the two main threats; that is to say
terrorism and counterproliferation.
����������� Thank you.
����������� MR. YOST:� We're going to take these three
questions, and then that'll be it.� Thank you.
����������� Q���� Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.� Good
afternoon.� I don't work in the intelligence community, but I am currently
underemployed.� (Laughter.)� I'd like to propose two things for your
consideration.
����������� One, you talked strategically you're trying not
to respond simply to tactical problems.� I would argue that we're still in the
post-Cold War world in one sense.� When I was a student here, we talked about
non-state actors, and the groups that you identified as the greatest danger to
the United States largely would be characterized as non-state actors back in
the '70s and '80s:� narcoterrorists, terrorists of various sorts.� Even if they
have the backing of a state, they're largely non-state actors.
����������� During the Cold War, if a Russian client or an
American client or an allied state attacked the other side, there would be
grave global repercussions.� And there were tight reins on these groups at that
time; they operated in very small areas and didn't touch the larger powers.� In
the post-Cold War era, there's only one power, so there's that lack of check
and balance.� And the one thing we didn't have in strategically important
locations in the Cold War were failed states like Afghanistan or potentially
like Iraq could be if we were to prematurely pull out.
����������� So in the post-Cold War world --
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� I think you're about to ask me
a very difficult question.� (Laughter.)
����������� Q���� -- how does the intelligence community,
possibly in collaboration with other intelligence agencies abroad, attempt to
recreate an environment which we have an operational intelligence?� Remember in
the Bond movies when Russia or the United States was threatened, the two sides
could cooperate.� How do we cooperate in an intelligence sense with our allies
abroad?
����������� And while I'm out in left field, let me say one
thing quickly.� (Laughter.)
����������� MR. YOST:� Very quickly.
����������� Q���� Yes, very quickly.� I understand we're
under time constraints.
����������� One of the problems, it seems, that the -- the
intelligence agencies have faced in this was, going back to the 9/11 report, is
that there is a ton of raw data coming in, classified and unclassified data,
that needs to be sifted through and gone through.� There's a project known as
the (Study ?) Project --
����������� MR. YOST:� We need a question, please.
����������� Q���� Yes.� Well, just the first one, then.� How
do we respond to the need to manage and control what's going on within the
globe in a way that was managed by the two great powers prior to 1989?
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Yeah.� Well, of course, you're
asking really much more of a foreign policy question than an intelligence
question.� But I� guess what I would say, thinking back to my own diplomatic
experience and working at the United Nations -- and you mentioned the word
"failed states" -- it seems to me that we haven't found a substitute
in the international community for the nation state.� And I think stability and
prosperity in this world still depends very much on a system of healthy, viable
and, preferably, democratically and market-oriented network of states around
the world.�
����������� So I think the health of nation states around
the world is really fundamental to lasting peace and stability.� And I think
you're right to mention failed states, as where failed states either exist or
threaten to materialize, those are areas that it behooves us to pay a great
deal of attention to because they can be the source of no end of difficulty and
trouble.
����������� Q���� Thanks for your indulgence.
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Thanks.
����������� Q���� Mr. Ambassador, I want to once again thank
you for your comments and welcome you back to Georgetown.� Congratulations on
your award.
����������� I can assure you I'm not a disgruntled member of
the intelligence community, nor do I have a tirade. �I'm an undergrad with an
interest in the intelligence community, so I have two quick questions if you
have time for them.�
����������� One is, for those undergrads and those here who
are interested about a possible career in the intelligence community, what
suggestions you might have for them.� And if you have time after that, relating
to the NSA sort of eavesdropping, the leak of that, how does that truly hurt
us, and what do we do from here?
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Well, on the first question,
thank you for your interest in the intelligence community, and I think that
going to Georgetown you're uniquely situated to avail yourself of the contacts
and the information that is so readily available in this town, because you have
practitioners who come and teach here and lecture here, and you can access the
government quite easily.
����������� But as far as what advice I would have for you,
it's read and learn and absorb as much as you can now, because I believe that
if you do pursue a career in intelligence in the future, you will find that
those academic efforts were extremely beneficial to you; for example, language
and area studies.� I mean, we have a great shortage now of both analytical and
operational personnel with analytic-sufficient training in language and area
studies.� And after a sort of hollowing-out of our national security personnel
in the 1990s, a decline, and then that, combined with the retirement of baby
boomers, there's a lot of demand out there for intelligence professionals.� So
I think that there's some great opportunities ahead.
����������� Q���� Thank you.
����������� MR. YOST:� Last question.
����������� Q���� Ambassador Negroponte, I'm a first-year
masters candidate at the School of Foreign Service.� And as the last
questioner, let me thank you for your words here today and your work on all of
our behalf.
����������� In your last final section of comments, you
talked about intelligence reform, and you mentioned a number of new initiatives
that have been engineered over the last couple of years.� But you also
mentioned the need for cultural shift, which to me implies some change in
attitudes, which I find often the most difficult things to change.� I wonder if
you could speak a little bit about what the obstacles to cultural shift in the
intelligence community have been, and what measures you're taking to address
those.
����������� MR. NEGROPONTE:� Right.� Well, I think the 9/11
commission and the WMD commission and the congressional inquiries into that
touched on a number of those things.� But you remember the issue of connecting
the dots with respect to 9/11 and the talking about the stovepipes of the
community, and how there had not been sufficient communication between them.�
So I think one has to -- I mean, integration is a really important word here.�
You've go to encourage a culture of integration.
����������� An example of one way you can do that -- and
we're working on this -- which is to make it a requirement for people who
aspire to become part of the senior intelligence service to have served at
least one assignment in another agency as a precondition of promotion to those
higher ranks.� So that would be one example of a cultural challenge that is
faced.
����������� There are others as well, but I think probably
the issue of the stovepipes and the willingness to and having an affirmative
attitude towards integrating one's work with other elements of the community is
probably the single most important feature.
����������� One other example of it, of course, is the
question of, domestically, the crossover between intelligence information and
law enforcement information, and the Patriot Act created certain facilities for
the FBI cross-sharing intelligence and law enforcement information that was not
previously part of their culture.� And the creation of the National Security
Branch in the FBI I think is another important example of taking on this
cultural challenge of integrating the intelligence function with the law
enforcement function so that you're not exclusively focused on one or the other
as you try to assess the kind of threats that we might be facing here or
elsewhere.
����������� (To Mr. Yost.)� Okay, Cas, do you want me to
stay here?
����������� MR. YOST:� Yeah.� Let me call on Mr. Hogan to
present the Jit Trainor Award for this year.
����������� FRANK HOGAN:� Ambassador Negroponte, we're
delighted to have you here today.� We're honored to present you with the Jit
Trainor Award for your wonderful, distinguished service to the United States of
America.� (Applause.)
����������� MR. YOST:� Ladies and gentlemen, if we could
have your indulgence for just a couple of minutes and let Ambassador Negroponte
make an exit through the door and down the hall, and then we will release you
from this room.� But if you can give us just a couple of minutes.�
����������� Thank you so much for joining us today.�
(Applause.)
END.
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