

AVIATION SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING

Lt. General Michael A. Canavan, Chairman

Federal Aviation Administration

800 Independence Avenue, S.W.

MacCraken Room

Washington, D.C. 20591

Thursday, June 21, 2001

10:05 o'clock a.m.

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P R E S E N T

LT. GENERAL MICHAEL A. CANAVAN, CHAIRMAN

JAN BRECHT CLARK, FAA DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL

ASAC MEMBER REPRESENTATIVES:

National Air Transportation Association  
Department of State  
Regional Airline Association  
Airline Pilots Association, Int'l.  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Air Transport Association of America  
Department of Transportation  
U.S. Secret Service  
American Assoc. of Airport Executives  
Airport Council Int'l., North America  
Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network  
Immigration and Naturalization Service  
Cargo Airline Association  
Victims of Pan Am Flight 103  
National Air Carriers Association, Inc.  
FAA Office of Aviation Security R & D  
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association  
Aviation Consumer Action Project  
Air Courier Conference of America  
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

REPORTED BY: ANNE E. CASTELLOW, CVR, NOTARY PUBLIC

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1                                   P R O C E E D I N G S

2                   CHAIRMAN CANAVAN:   Okay, I'd like to welcome  
3 everyone today.  As we've mentioned in the past, we're  
4 committed to doing this now once a quarter.  The next -  
5 - just to let you know, the next ASAC meeting will be  
6 in September.  But again, welcome to -- welcome to this  
7 committee today.

8                   I have to formally read this announcement:  
9 This meeting is being held pursuant to a Notice issued  
10 by the -- through the Federal Register on June 6, 2001.  
11 The agenda for the meeting will follow much of what  
12 was announced in that Notice.  The details of changes  
13 are set out in the handout.

14                   The FAA Designated Federal Official, DFO, Jan  
15 Brecht-Clark, to my right, is responsible for  
16 compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, or  
17 FACA.  It is her responsibility to see to it that the  
18 agenda is adhered to and that the accurate minutes are  
19 kept.  The DFO also has the responsibility to adjourn  
20 the meeting should she find it necessary to do so in  
21 the public interest.

22                   Placards for the member organizations are set  
23 out at the main table.  Only one representative from  
24 each organization may sit at the table, participate in

1 discussions, and vote on matters put to a vote by the  
2 Chair. Other representatives of member organizations  
3 should channel any remarks they have through the  
4 organization's main representative, except as requested  
5 to do otherwise by the Chair.

6 In addressing the Chair, please identify  
7 yourself to greatly facilitate keeping accurate minutes  
8 and so the reporter knows who's speaking. The meeting  
9 is open to the public, but members of the public may  
10 address the committee only with permission of the  
11 Chair, which should be arranged by giving advance  
12 notice concerning the scope and duration of the  
13 intended presentation.

14 The Chair may entertain public comment if, in  
15 his or her judgment, doing so will not disrupt the  
16 orderly process of the meeting and will not be unfair  
17 to any other person. Members of the public are welcome  
18 to present written material to the committee at any  
19 time.

20 Now, for the purpose of the record of the  
21 meeting, I would like to go around the table so that  
22 each member can identify themselves and their  
23 organization, and I'll start to the right.

24 MS. CLARK: Jan Brecht-Clark, FAA, Office of

1 Aviation Security Policy and Planning.

2 MR. EDWARDS: I'm Gary Edwards, Special Agent  
3 in charge of the U.S. Secret Service Capital Hill and  
4 Interagency Liaison Division.

5 MR. MORRIS: I'm Carter Morris with the  
6 American Association of Airport Executives.

7 MR. LOMAX: Al Lomax, Kansas City, Chairman  
8 of the ACINA Public Safety and Security Committee.

9 MR. MCGRAY: Duane McGray, President of  
10 Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network.

11 MR. HUTNICK: I'm with Immigration and  
12 Naturalization Service.

13 MR. KERR: Alex Kerr, Cargo Airline  
14 Association.

15 MR. MONETTI: Bob MONETTI, from the Victims  
16 of Pan Am Flight 103.

17 MR. PRIDDY: Ron Priddy, National Air Carrier  
18 Association.

19 MR. POLSKI: Paul Polski, FAA Office of  
20 Aviation Security Research and Development.

21 MR. HOLT: Keith Holt, Aircraft Owners and  
22 Pilots Association.

23 MR. BERGMAN: Mike Bergman, Bureau of  
24 Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.

1 MR. KENNEDY: David Kennedy, National Air  
2 Transportation Association.

3 MS. MCELROY: Debbie McElroy, Regional  
4 Airline Association.

5 MR. LUCKEY: Steve Luckey, Chairman, National  
6 Security Committee for the Airline Pilots Association.

7 MS. WRIGHT: Beverly Wright, Federal Bureau  
8 of Investigation.

9 MR. DOUBRAVA: Dick Doubrava, Air Transport  
10 Association.

11 MR. UNDERWOOD: Jim Underwood, Department of  
12 Transportation.

13 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: I'd like you to note that  
14 this time -- that this is Mike Bergman's last ASAC;  
15 he's retiring. And Mike, I just want to thank you --

16 MR. BERGMAN: Thank you.

17 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: -- for all the good work  
18 that you've done in this committee and for this  
19 association. Thank you very much. I wish you the  
20 best.

21 MR. BERGMAN: Thank you. You're welcome.

22 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: At this time the first  
23 order of business is a review of the minutes of the  
24 meeting of April 19th, 2001. We received one

1 correction from Rear Admiral Underwood, and the record  
2 will reflect that change. Let me open it to members.  
3 Is there any discussion of the minutes of the meeting  
4 of April 19th, 2001?

5 (No response.)

6 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Okay. The first order of  
7 business today will be a review of the rulemaking  
8 activities. Mr. Karl Shrum of Civil Aviation Security  
9 Office of Policy and Planning will now address the  
10 status and timeliness of the various rulemaking and  
11 other ongoing initiatives in Civil Aviation Security.  
12 Karl.

13 MR. SHRUM: When lastly I told this memorable  
14 tradition of reporting rulemaking status --

15 (Laughter.)

16 MR. SHRUM: -- the folks over in the  
17 department had embarked on a review of all impending  
18 rulemakings under new administration and that review  
19 has been completed. Parts 107 and 108, the Airport  
20 Operator and Aircraft Operator Security Rules went to  
21 OMB last week. Shortly after them, Screening Company  
22 Certification and the Security of Checked Baggage Rule.  
23 We've talked to the folks over in OMB. They  
24 expect to move 107/108 fairly quickly. They did, after

1 all, pass it to the Federal Register for publication  
2 back in January before it was pulled back for review.  
3 They're also concerned that we're past the May 31  
4 deadline for the Screening -- Congressionally mandated  
5 deadline for the Screening Company Certification Rule,  
6 so that's going to have high priority.

7 We would expect probably final action,  
8 clearing it to the Federal Register, within say three  
9 to four weeks. So my working assumption has been to  
10 take all the dates based on May 31, advance that to  
11 July 31 as the kick-off date so to speak for everything  
12 that flows from these rules.

13 The Airport and Air Carrier Compliance  
14 Programs currently is on the desk of the Chief Counsel.

15 We expect that to be sent up to the Administrator's  
16 office and passed to OST, hopefully, next week or  
17 certainly shortly thereafter.

18 As I briefed you last time, the bulk of what  
19 flows from these rules, the nine-tenths underwater of  
20 the iceberg, is in the security programs. We have the  
21 new Screening Company security program, consolidating  
22 all the screening requirements that would be carried  
23 out by the to-be-certificated screening companies.

24 The Aircraft Operators security program,



1 which would be the oversight responsibilities retained  
2 by aircraft operators which, of course, is the new term  
3 we use in the Part 108 rewrite. Also would include  
4 changes that would derive from particularly the rewrite  
5 of 107 -- excuse me, 108 -- also some items that carry  
6 over from Part 107. And to a much lesser extent, we've  
7 incorporated some material to implement portions of the  
8 Checked Baggage Rule. Foreign Air Carriers security  
9 program will be, again, the oversight responsibilities  
10 retained by the aircraft operator. In this case, we  
11 have to continue to use the term, "foreign air carrier"  
12 because that's the way the rule reads. There was no  
13 corresponding rewrite of Part 129.

14           The Indirect Air Carrier program began the  
15 oversight responsibilities. There will be other minor  
16 changes, but they're minimal. The Airport Operator  
17 security program will not be a new security program,  
18 but a series of amendments, about eleven all told,  
19 ruling out most of the major changes that we've made  
20 over the years, plus what's needed to implement Part  
21 107. So, apart from that, these will be proposed  
22 amendments for comment.

23           The advanced time line that I used last time,  
24 based on May 31 to July 31 -- comment period on these

1 programs for 120 days would run it through the end of  
2 November. Then we would anticipate issuing the final  
3 programs probably around March of next year. The rule  
4 would take effect 90 days after July 31st, would be  
5 October 31, further 90 days for the screening companies  
6 to apply for a provisional certificate, would run  
7 through the end of January. And of course, ultimately,  
8 when the five-year certificate requirement takes effect  
9 for the screening companies, that would be a year from  
10 the date of the original certificate, or not later than  
11 January 31st of '03.

12 And we're working up a detailed time line of  
13 all the requirements to be implemented to affect the  
14 rules, not necessarily just regulatory requirements,  
15 but the training and other activities involved. And  
16 we'll be presenting that to General Canavan next week.

17 And once the rules are issued, we would of course  
18 share that with all concerned.

19 Any questions?

20 (No response.)

21 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Okay, Karl, thank you.  
22 Now this 107/108, as a lot of you know, is something  
23 like about a ten-year-old effort, so we think it's  
24 going to come out this time. We'll see.

1 (Laughter.)

2 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Next on the agenda is Mr.  
3 Art Kosatka. ACS Policy and Planning will speak to us  
4 regarding several ongoing efforts that could have a  
5 direct on civil aviation security.

6 MR. KOSATKA: I've pretty much got the same  
7 four things that I always talk about, but there is some  
8 news on several of them. The recommended security  
9 guidelines for planning, design, and construction, you  
10 all know about. I mentioned also the RTCA standards  
11 work coming up, the terminal planning AC, and the cost  
12 impact survey that we mentioned two ASACs ago, but  
13 which are of course -- which was hung up by the 107  
14 delay.

15 The security guidelines for airport planning,  
16 design, and construction are complete. Literally, two  
17 days ago, I finally got the final copy back. It was  
18 indeed complete, as I told you last -- late last year,  
19 but the delay has been sufficiently long that we came  
20 up with a couple of new things to add into it. For  
21 example, we added a section on the ARGUS EDS, which you  
22 all are aware of. The earthquake in Seattle taught us  
23 a little lesson to put in something on seismic, so  
24 there's a goodly section on seismic stuff, including

1 about half a page of the various codes to meet.

2           The delay also gave the authors of the  
3 Security Screening Checkpoint section the opportunity  
4 to expand that section by about four pages and there  
5 are a number of good recommended security screening  
6 point designs in the document which is expanded on. So  
7 it's a whole lot more useful information. And of  
8 course doing all that sort of stuff with the document  
9 required us to reformat it and mess with the table of  
10 contents and pagination and that sort of stuff. But  
11 it's ready and as soon as 107 hits the street, this  
12 thing will be right behind it. And just a reminder,  
13 it's not an AC; we went to a lot of trouble to make  
14 sure that it wasn't 191 stuff, that it's not an AC.  
15 It's recommendations, guidelines, suggestions, that  
16 sort of thing, but not an AC.

17           This one is an AC. If you haven't played  
18 with it before, it's a rather lengthy document. It's  
19 an old document; it goes back 30 years, the original  
20 version. And it's been amended several times in the  
21 intervening 30 years, but I believe in going through  
22 it, I think I found three places in it where it says,  
23 "Oh, yeah, don't forget security." So there is a  
24 rewrite of this thing beginning, and it's a rather

1 extensive rewrite. They're planning to do it in three  
2 independent documents; an overview, some sizing data,  
3 and some reference detail on specific documents. And  
4 we specifically want to get security in there as its  
5 own topic. That's one of the reasons that our office,  
6 ACP-100, is participating in it.

7 I won't go into a lot of detail. I just  
8 wanted to give you a feel for why it's of interest to  
9 the security community. Everything they're talking  
10 about right now is based on the IATA levels of service;  
11 the queues, the hold rooms, bag claim areas, quarters,  
12 the lobby, all the places that you're interested in  
13 security design.

14 Again, I won't go into detail, but those are  
15 the levels of service that they're discussing. And for  
16 example, when you get into queues, that's how it  
17 translates into what you're looking at in queues. And  
18 the better half of the meeting two weeks ago was  
19 talking about the notion of time in queue, whether --  
20 which is more important, the time the passenger spends  
21 in a queue, or the space that he has while he's waiting  
22 in the queue. And there's a lot of other design  
23 considerations for security; the e-ticketing kiosk --  
24 what do you do when a guy checks in with his bags

1 there, that sort of thing, where they're located, how  
2 it affects curbside check-in. So we'll be looking at  
3 all that sort of stuff; e-ticketing, curbside.

4 And if you're interested in playing this  
5 game, there's the guy at Volpe Institutes, Zale Avis.  
6 There's his phone number. It's an open forum, it's co-  
7 sponsored by FAA and the Airports Consultants Council.

8 And this is the guy you need to talk to if you'd like  
9 to start sitting in on those. It'll be about a two-  
10 year effort.

11 The RTCA standards. I've mentioned these  
12 before. They were first published in 1996, but we're  
13 just going back -- we've already formed a new committee  
14 which meets -- I forget, I'll tell you in a second here  
15 -- but we've got it on the chart. July 10th, one  
16 o'clock to five o'clock, downtown. This document is  
17 specifically geared toward the technological standards  
18 of access control systems. We're not necessarily  
19 rewriting it. We think it just needs updating,  
20 specifically in electronic, computer networking, that  
21 sort of thing. And we're going to add a section on the  
22 use of biometrics and access controls.

23 So, it shouldn't be too long an effort, but  
24 we are going to take a look at every bit of this and

1 make sure it's updated properly. If you'd like to get  
2 involved in that, there's information at [www.rtca.org](http://www.rtca.org).

3 Chris Wilkinson, who's Chairman of the ACC Security  
4 Committee, is chairing this effort, and that's how to  
5 get a hold of him. In either of the efforts, the AC or  
6 the RTCA, if you don't want to get a hold of them, just  
7 give me your business card at the end of the meeting  
8 and I'll make sure you get on the list.

9 Finally, the cost survey. I mentioned this  
10 before as well; this is simply the requirement. OMB  
11 clears a rule -- 107 in this case -- every three years.

12 Not for the substance of the rule, but for the cost  
13 burden that's imposed on the industry. Technically,  
14 107 expired on May 31st. There hasn't been a full cost  
15 burden review since 1975. And again, it's on the cost  
16 impact, not on the substance of the rule.

17 So, what we did is we now have the current  
18 107 on an interim clearance until the end of this year.

19 So we will be sending out, as soon as the rule is out,  
20 right behind it, there'll be a cost survey, and we have  
21 until November 1st to submit the cost data back to OMB.

22 So I'll be getting out to most of the members of ASAC  
23 with that cost survey as soon as 107 is out.

24 Any questions?

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1 (No response.)

2 MR. KOSATKA: Thank you.

3 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Next on the agenda is Ms.  
4 Bonnie Wilson of the Airport Council International,  
5 North America, who will address the group on the  
6 efforts to address the threat of WMD, or weapons of  
7 mass destruction, and bio-chemical threats, and the  
8 need for the security community to be prepared.

9 MS. WILSON: Thank you. Thank you very much.  
10 It's not a new issue for us, most folks have heard  
11 about this either through novels or TV or movies or  
12 even real life experiences. Emerging diseases are  
13 developing in a natural environment as well as in the  
14 laboratory and both are a threat to the health and  
15 safety of air passengers. Also to other people, but  
16 frankly I'm only concerned about air passengers and  
17 people in my terminals for the time being.

18 What we know and when we know it.  
19 Unfortunately, like with most things, we find out a lot  
20 of information about what we don't know when things are  
21 happening. Our concern is that we need to get ahead of  
22 this game and have an awful lot more information. We  
23 have some resources that will help us to define the  
24 actual risks associated with reported events. It's not



1 exactly clear who can tell us what and it's not exactly  
2 clear who to call when. What we can do is get as much  
3 information as possible as events occur.

4 And again, dealing with the press and the  
5 panicked passengers and the public safety staff, et  
6 cetera, with a list of "possible" phone numbers is not  
7 exactly what we think the best plan should be.

8 We did an excellent exercise and I thank  
9 everyone who participated from the FBI and from the  
10 airport community and from S-60 and FAA, and also from  
11 Health and Human Services. At my Spring committee  
12 meeting, we went through a couple of scenarios of  
13 likelies, probables, maybes, and found out that there  
14 were significant gaps in our ability to deal with  
15 threats, whether they're real or imagined.

16 What's likely to happen? Introduction of  
17 either a chem or a bio weapon. It's not as easy as the  
18 novels and the movies and the newspapers might make it  
19 sound, but it could happen. The FBI was extremely  
20 helpful in describing the type of relevant information  
21 they could provide to first responders. There's an  
22 awful lot of theory about how you would introduce a  
23 biological weapon into a closed space, but the FBI can  
24 tell you whether the individual who's standing in your

1 aircraft with a vial full of green liquid and says,  
2 "This is Anthrax," whether that's realistic or not.  
3 How it's produced, how it's transmitted, and how it's  
4 transported to humans is information they do have, if  
5 you get a hold of them and they can sort of give you  
6 some idea of what you're likely to be dealing with.

7           But the FBI does not act as the first  
8 responder at the airports. The air carriers, in most  
9 cases, if it's an on-board issue, are first responders,  
10 and they work in conjunction with the FBI. They can  
11 talk to the airport tower, et cetera, and try to figure  
12 out what they're dealing with, but again, once the  
13 plane's on the ground, you bring in an awful lot more  
14 players as well.

15           Just because I can and it was fun, I added as  
16 many really awful things to the scenario as we possibly  
17 could to bring almost everybody at this table into the  
18 issue. Because I was allowed to write the scenario, I  
19 said we had an aircraft that was operated by a non-U.S.  
20 flight carrier who was intended to come to Washington  
21 Dulles, but was diverted, because of passenger health,  
22 to Boston. We had unattended minors on board the  
23 aircraft. We also had folks who did not speak English  
24 and were using a language that was somewhere from

1 Eastern Europe, but no one could decide what it was.

2           So, at that rate, once we put the plane on  
3 the ground, we had an individual who was sick and  
4 obviously had some sort of hemorrhagic fever. I was  
5 required to explain it to one of my members by saying,  
6 "Look, the guy's bleeding from the eyes, all right."  
7 We had the little kids. You had people leaving and  
8 greeting in Dulles, but the plane was in Boston. Then  
9 we said, "Well, how are we going to get them cleared  
10 through INS and Customs?" Amazingly enough, I don't  
11 think anybody in the room thought that putting on a  
12 biohazard suit to go in and check paperwork was going  
13 to be an option.

14           So, there is an awful lot of room for an  
15 awful lot of players. Just being humorous at this  
16 point, but in reality, there are things that you have  
17 to do and everybody has a role and a mission in  
18 responding to an incident of this nature. And what  
19 we're interested in is finding out where we have gaps  
20 in understanding those roles and missions.

21           So, here's what could happen. You have  
22 somebody get sick and you requested emergency landing.

23        You could have somebody call in and say, "Hey, I  
24 happen to know that an individual on the aircraft

1 that's coming to your airport, which shall remain  
2 somewhere in New York, has Ebola virus. And by the  
3 way, they're on a foreign flight carrier." And how are  
4 you going to deal with that? The State Department  
5 needs to be called.

6           There's the threat of a release. It's called  
7 "entry authorities," either biological or chemical.  
8 Somebody could ship to foreign pals. They do it all  
9 the time with bombs now -- this is tomorrow. Chemical  
10 release is detected within the facility or in the  
11 aircraft. This happens at my airports all the time.  
12 Usually it's badly packed cleaning materials.  
13 Sometimes it's burnt food, sometimes it's just a weird  
14 smell and nobody knows what it is, but it's making  
15 people sick. I don't know if you've ever had the  
16 privilege of having the carpets cleaned in your office  
17 when you stay late at night, but all of a sudden you  
18 sort of feel like doing this (indicating) under the  
19 desk. You know, it's little stuff but sometimes it's  
20 real and it's hard to tell one from the other.

21           Okay, in a naturally occurring event, you  
22 need to contact the local health authorities. We know  
23 that. Who are they? Who else do you have to contact  
24 if it's an international flight, or if it's a domestic

1 flight? Where do the roles and responsibilities break  
2 down within CDC and Public Health? Who have they  
3 delegated their authority to? So you have a question  
4 of jurisdiction and who has the jurisdiction to prevent  
5 somebody who's a possible carrier from going out into  
6 the community? What kind of information will you find  
7 yourself being held responsible for collecting on all  
8 of your passengers and/or people in your terminal? And  
9 who can help you do that and what is it they're looking  
10 for?

11 And of course you have the threat. If threat  
12 calls, you call the FBI. They help you as much as they  
13 can, but again, you have some practical realities of  
14 what you're dealing with and the biggest practical  
15 reality for all of us will be the aftermath, because  
16 we'll all get to answer to somebody about what we  
17 didn't do at the time of the crisis.

18 So, ACI-NA's Public Safety and Security  
19 Committee says this is the right form in our lines  
20 because we have all the right players. And anybody who  
21 would be interested to help us do some key activities,  
22 do a gap analysis. What do we know, what don't we  
23 know? Who has jurisdiction over what step of the  
24 process? Can we write it down, tell everybody where

1 our resources are, how and when you apply them, when  
2 you have to apply them, who you can call.

3 Put it into some sort of very non-regulatory,  
4 just helpful, guidance, recommendations, data,  
5 intelligence, anything we can give you. Good phone  
6 numbers, 800 numbers, who can you call, who should you  
7 call. If no one's on the other end of the phone,  
8 what's your next call to make? Put it all together,  
9 write it up in something in like, a notebook, and hand  
10 it out to everybody.

11 We're proposing this is done through an ASAC  
12 working group or a task group, I'm not really sure -- I  
13 have a Green Book somewhere, I could figure out what  
14 the real term is -- which would include anybody in the  
15 industry who has the potential to be involved in a  
16 situation like this, and put that forward as a  
17 recommendation for this group to decide on.

18 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Comments?

19 MS. WRIGHT: Beverly Wright, FBI. Thank you,  
20 Bonnie, for really accurately reflecting in your slides  
21 the role of the FBI from the Weapons of Mass  
22 Destruction Operations Unit. The FBI also has a  
23 National Domestic Preparedness Office which  
24 participated on that panel, and they have some

1 completely different responsibilities ahead of an event  
2 that happens and I think that they could be very  
3 helpful in briefing, possibly, the group here. Even I  
4 cannot articulate everything that they do and what  
5 their roles are, and they could in fact be changing.  
6 So, it might be -- my recommendation, if we would, if  
7 the committee would consider a briefing at the next  
8 ASAC meeting, from the NDPO.

9 We had -- some people at this conference were  
10 at your meeting, but I for one would like to hear it  
11 again, because that was actually the first time I heard  
12 an NDPO briefing. And that was the first time they had  
13 probably given it to the airport community. And now  
14 they're much more well versed in what the concerns are  
15 and could do a presentation and everyone could see what  
16 they do. And potentially then evaluate the goals of  
17 the task group or the working group or whatever.

18 So, I don't know how exactly I would propose  
19 that, but I would only ask the committee, maybe they  
20 could consider that. Because I don't know if we would  
21 be considering forming a task group at this immediate  
22 moment, but there's a lot of information out there  
23 still, I think, in more depth we would like to hear.

24 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Okay, why don't you invite

1 them? You're invited.

2 MS. WRIGHT: Okay. I believe we have two  
3 representatives here.

4 MALE VOICE: NDPO accepts.

5 MS. WRIGHT: NDPO accepts the invitation to  
6 brief.

7 (Laughter.)

8 MS. WRIGHT: We wanted them to -- we did want  
9 them to see the presentation and see what the concerns  
10 were again, so they could be fully prepared to do that.

11 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: I think if we hear that  
12 presentation, and they can have as much time as they  
13 need, and then from there decide what we want to do as  
14 a group next.

15 MS. WRIGHT: Okay. Very much appreciated.  
16 Thank you.

17 MR. MCGRAY: Duane McGray, ALEAN. The Nunn-  
18 Luger legislation that was passed a number of years ago  
19 has set up procedures for training to be done and I  
20 think, initially, 122 cities have gone through the  
21 training and responsibility has been placed with nine  
22 agencies. I know the Public Health Service, DOD, FBI,  
23 a number of different agencies have been involved in  
24 this. There has already been a lot of training done in



1 a lot of municipalities on how to deal with these kinds  
2 of issues, particularly as they would relate to an  
3 incident in an airport terminal because they become  
4 part of a local network.

5           So, and another issue, a side issue to this  
6 is, and you alluded to it, is the biggest problem we've  
7 seen so far is not a terrorist act, but those cases --  
8 I know Dallas had a situation a few years ago where  
9 they had an aircraft coming in from London that had a  
10 person that was very ill that had come out of Bophal,  
11 India, during the plague over there. And as soon as  
12 the airplane got on the ground, it was sealed until the  
13 CDC in Atlanta got people from the local office in  
14 Dallas to clear and verify that we didn't have a  
15 contamination that was going to infect, you know,  
16 Dallas.

17           So, there's already been a lot of work in  
18 some of these issues and some groundwork has already  
19 been laid. I just throw that out for discussion,  
20 especially with the Nunn-Luger legislation.

21           CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: You're right. Yeah. I'm  
22 familiar with those first responders and I think what  
23 we'll have as part of our briefing is we'll have --  
24 part of that briefing will be what's currently in the

1 United States in terms of where they're at, their  
2 response time, and what exactly they do, and what kind  
3 of equipment they have. So, we'll take that on.  
4 That's a good point.

5 I was in Orlando, I don't know, five or six  
6 weeks ago, and they had the tabletop exercise and they  
7 had all the right people from the airport at this  
8 exercise. And they thought it was going to be a  
9 highjacking. And one hour out, they announced that --  
10 or actually, they thought it was a highjacking, but it  
11 really turned into an unruly passenger who was going  
12 into final convulsions from dying from the Ebola virus.

13 He was a Doctor Without Borders, coming out of Central  
14 Africa going to Orlando to speak at a medical  
15 conference. He was going to present a presentation on,  
16 you know, this illness.

17 So anyway, he dies. There's another doctor  
18 on board that kind of confirms that they think this is  
19 what he died from. And then it was the frame, "Well,  
20 what do you do now?" And it was excellent because,  
21 well, it took them a while to figure out who was in  
22 charge. Because they wanted to have different people  
23 in charge during different parts of the operation and  
24 of course that's not the way you want to do it. But

1 they had the right people in the room, in terms of  
2 police and the medical folks and the State folks.

3           And you know, calls to the CDC, putting the  
4 airplane somewhere, do you quarantine everyone, who  
5 else did he expose throughout the aviation system when  
6 he transferred planes in London, for instance, or  
7 Paris, who did he -- the people that he flew out of  
8 Africa with, where did they go? You know, because  
9 they're contaminated.

10           So, you know, it was one of these things.  
11 And they did it for about four hours and a lot of the  
12 issues that Bonnie talked about, they talked about.  
13 Because it went initially from a crisis action, because  
14 you have a plane there and where does it go. Well,  
15 maybe if we get a vote and we kind of figure out later  
16 on who's the best airport to take this airplane? Who's  
17 really ready to do it? Well, that's where the plane  
18 should go.

19           And the second thing, you get into the  
20 consequence of management, and that is, how do you take  
21 care of all these people in terms of further  
22 contamination. Is there hospitals that they go to.  
23 It's a big issue and it's the same issue that this  
24 country's wrestled with for years, if we ever had a

1 nuclear explosion or a massive chemical or biological  
2 attack in one of our big cities. Because we're really  
3 talking now about thousands of casualties. And this is  
4 just a -- this is a much smaller version, but I think  
5 we have to deal with it within our civil aviation  
6 system, how to come up with solutions for this, because  
7 it's going to happen.

8           And just like your case, that person from  
9 India had a problem. And maybe what we ought to do is  
10 get a hold, we'll get a hold of Dallas and ask them how  
11 they dealt with that situation. What did you do? What  
12 did you learn from it? And what would you do in the  
13 future? That could be a good baseline there. But I  
14 think it's a good effort to look into.

15           So, next week -- or next September, if no one  
16 has any objections, we'll have the FBI report. We'll  
17 have a quick briefing on the Nunn-Luger legislation of  
18 these -- they call them RAID teams, I think R-A-I-D --  
19 where they're at, what their training is, what their  
20 capabilities are. Because it's the first responders  
21 that usually end up being casualties. During the Tokyo  
22 bombing of the -- or the chemical release in Tokyo  
23 years ago, a lot of the initial casualties, added  
24 casualties, were the first responders. So we've got to

1 figure out how you protect them. Yes?

2 MR. BERGMAN: The Attorney General hosted or  
3 sponsored a major exercise sometime ago, which of  
4 course the FBI was greatly involved in, and most of the  
5 other agencies -- fire departments, FEMA, and some of  
6 the other things. And I think a lot of the say,  
7 weaknesses or shortcomings -- of course it was more  
8 directed toward terrorism issues, but same kind of an  
9 issues. And a lot of these issues have already been  
10 bedded and are probably available. And I think your  
11 suggestion about telephone numbers for immediate  
12 communication are probably the most important. Who has  
13 the appropriate contamination suit, et cetera.

14 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Do you remember what that  
15 exercise was called, Mike?

16 MR. BERGMAN: TOP OFF, I think

17 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: TOP OFF, yeah, okay, I  
18 know. Okay, we'll talk to those folks too and see what  
19 came out of that. Okay.

20 MS. WILSON: I just have one last question.

21 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Yes.

22 MS. WILSON: Does the airport that gets  
23 designated have a vote about whether they get  
24 designated?

1 (Laughter.)

2 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Well, what I'm saying is,  
3 you know, first of all, you have to be able to handle  
4 this situation. But that doesn't mean that every major  
5 airport has to have the same capability. I mean,  
6 sometimes you get into resource issues. But if you  
7 look at our nine regions, for instance, there may be  
8 one airport in each one of those regions that will have  
9 this capability. So if a plane -- so you can divert  
10 that plane there. Yes, those officials know what to do  
11 with it, they know how to respond to it, they've had  
12 some type of training. Or maybe that's where the RAID  
13 teams are located within, so it's kind of co-located,  
14 so they're involved in it also. Or sometimes you may  
15 end up just landing on your airport and you don't even  
16 know it. But anyway, we can work through all that.

17 MR. UNDERWOOD: Jim Underwood, DOT. I'd just  
18 like to thank Bonnie and ACI for hosting their  
19 conference in Kansas City and for Al hosting that  
20 conference as well. The one thing, and I think it's  
21 borne out here by all the comments that are made, there  
22 is a lot of information that's available in this area.  
23 Some of it is of general nature and I think what the  
24 suggestion is to make it more specific to the aviation

1 industry and to the airports and air carriers so that  
2 there's a better plan. And all the ideas and the  
3 knowledge that is out there can be consolidated so that  
4 we don't have to kind of hit it at the last minute.  
5 Thank you.

6 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Yes.

7 MR. LUCKEY: Steve LUCKEY, Airline Pilots  
8 Association. General, I think the Tokyo incident has a  
9 lot of key -- a lot of examples in it that are very  
10 good, both pros and cons, of why it worked and how it  
11 didn't work and how bad it could have been. I think if  
12 someone could give us a fairly objective brief on the  
13 intricacies of that particular incident, we'd learn a  
14 lot from it.

15 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Sure. And they use  
16 dispersion, aerosol dispersants, in the subway system.  
17 That's how they did it. Some worked, some didn't.

18 MR. LUCKEY: Right.

19 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: I forget the number of  
20 dead. They had several thousand --

21 MR. LUCKEY: Seven dead, 200 injured.

22 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Yeah, and then several  
23 thousand people affected by it.

24 MALE VOICE: It could have been a lot worse.

1                   CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Yeah.

2                   MR. MCGRAY: Duane McGray again from ALEAN.  
3 One of the things that I think is important is that  
4 under the Nunn-Luger training scenarios that are done,  
5 you have to do tabletops and you have to do live  
6 exercises involving chemicals and biohazard attacks.  
7 And what happens is they go into communities and they  
8 do this training and they get involved in the  
9 scenarios, but quite often they forget to bring in  
10 local airports' involvement in it.

11                   And if you do get -- we did it, we did a  
12 tabletop of a biohazard and we did a live exercise in  
13 Nashville for a chemical attack, and we were very much  
14 a part of it because things like EOD now, as part of  
15 the redstone training, everybody has to go through an  
16 extra week to deal with the fact that most of these  
17 chemical agents are propelled through an EOD device and  
18 they are responders to these things.

19                   We were in the middle of an exercise and our  
20 EOD team got called away -- the city's EOD team -- got  
21 called away to a real life event and the airport's EOD  
22 team had to take over and handle the event, at a  
23 downtown event. As a result of all of that, our  
24 airport got several thousand dollars of additional



1 equipment that was paid for by the Federal Government  
2 that would not have been available to us had we not  
3 demanded that the airport be part of the city's Nunn-  
4 Luger training and exercises.

5 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Thank you. Thanks,  
6 Bonnie.

7 MS. WILSON: You're welcome.

8 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: The next item is what we  
9 call "The Common Strategy" and Mike Morse of ACS  
10 Operations will give us an update on this.

11 MR. MORSE: Good morning. I don't have any  
12 slides, so I just want to make a few verbal remarks on  
13 the subject. A number of you in this room have been  
14 working with me on this project, piecemeal, for  
15 sometime. And for those of you that are in that  
16 status, I'm sure this will be a bit repetitive.

17 But we wanted to bring the ASAC and General  
18 up to speed on this project. What I'm doing is  
19 coordinating efforts to update what's called "The  
20 Common Strategy." Many of you are probably already  
21 aware of what "The Common Strategy" is. It's a body of  
22 agreed-upon principles, doctrine, if you will, between  
23 FAA and FBI, and also between the Federal Government  
24 and certain elements of the industry that are concerned

1 with what happens in the case of a highjacking.

2 Key players, of course, are the crew members  
3 aboard the aircraft, the air traffic control folks that  
4 may be in contact with the aircraft, FBI negotiators,  
5 or other law enforcement elements of FBI, or local  
6 responders that may come to the scene, and few others.

7 But these are all key elements of the system  
8 of how we respond to a highjacking and we need to have  
9 this common strategy for how we approach what we'll do  
10 in that case.

11 In addition to "The Common Strategy" being  
12 the name of the doctrine, it is also the name attached  
13 to some training materials that have been updated a  
14 number of times over the years. The last update was  
15 approximately ten years ago, even though the doctrines  
16 involved go back much longer than that. Those training  
17 materials are out of date. They appear obsolescence  
18 because they have old cockpits and old aircraft in  
19 them.

20 Our review of the principles involved suggest  
21 that for the most part the doctrine that's been used in  
22 the past is sound and we'll be continuing that. There  
23 won't be any big changes there, maybe a little fine  
24 tuning. That fine tuning will come about as a result

1 of the fact that we're taking into account some of the  
2 modern innovations in aircraft. Systems like ACARS  
3 that really weren't in effect ten or fifteen years ago  
4 -- which is, by the way, unless you're familiar with it  
5 already, the system involves the ability to do text  
6 messaging from the cockpit back to the company or other  
7 ground recipients. This sort of thing was not  
8 considered in the past, so it will be considered in the  
9 new articulation of the strategy.

10 But the primary upshot of this is these new  
11 training materials for use with cabin crew and cockpit  
12 crew. We applaud the efforts of various airline  
13 companies in the last few years who have updated some  
14 training materials on their own in this area. However,  
15 we need a high degree of standardization so that FBI  
16 and FAA and local first responders know this and all  
17 have the same understanding of what's going to happen.

18 And so the air traffic folks are prepared to hold up  
19 their end of the deal on how the communications will  
20 take place between the aircraft and the ground.

21 So, there is clearly a need for new  
22 standardized materials. We hope that the industry in  
23 general will join us in supporting and endorsing this  
24 effort. We're getting good support from several of the

1 airlines, from ATA. FBI has been a real champ in  
2 working with us closely on this over the last few  
3 months. We have one airport that's volunteered itself  
4 as a location for FEMA. I'm going to be approaching  
5 another one in the next few days.

6 We are looking to have two different  
7 scenarios in the training materials. One scenario will  
8 involve a single deranged individual and will be more  
9 or less of a typical stateside highjacking of the past.  
10 The other scenario will be one involving a team of  
11 highjackers with a higher degree of sophistication and  
12 training. And that scenario will more replicate what  
13 we've faced in some of the international highjackings  
14 abroad in recent years.

15 And we expect, like I say, to do filming and  
16 do the bulk of the work on this before the end of this  
17 fiscal year. And we hope to have some new training  
18 materials out in the Fall.

19 A number of you, like I say, have already  
20 been involved in working with me on this. Several more  
21 of you I'll be contacting over the next few weeks,  
22 because we really do need the flight attendants, we  
23 need RAA as well ATA, clearly, on board. And so forth  
24 and so on. ALEAN, you may -- oh, there's about a half

1 dozen of you in here that I'll be talking to  
2 separately.

3           Because some aspects of the doctrine are  
4 sensitive and are not publicly releasable information,  
5 I can't promise to answer all of your questions in this  
6 forum, but to the extent I can, I'll be glad to take  
7 questions now or make appointments to talk to you  
8 outside the meeting.

9           That's all I have.

10           CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Having reviewed this, this  
11 latest effort was probably made in the '80s. And Mike,  
12 you had an excellent meeting. We were all down there  
13 at Quantico, Department of Justice, Department of  
14 Defense, Department of State, DOT. But now's the time  
15 to update this thing because our new aircraft has  
16 different -- has better technology on board. We have  
17 to figure out how to deal with that technology,  
18 especially if someone that took an airplane understood  
19 the technology and they could use that technology  
20 against us. So, that's what we're really talking about  
21 here. Now's the time to review this and we're on the  
22 right track and I appreciate everyone's assistance in  
23 this. Yes?

24           MR. LOMAX: Al Lomax, ACINA. I'd like to

1 make sure that the airports have this training material  
2 available when it's released. Is that possible?

3 MR. MORSE: Yes. Something that may be of  
4 interest to you and maybe we can piggyback on your  
5 comment, we see a need probably to produce training  
6 material in one version. Although the same basic  
7 teaching points will occur throughout and the same  
8 scenarios will be used in it. Depending on the demand  
9 for this and the resources it would take, we may either  
10 produce alternative versions of the training materials  
11 on CD or tape that cater to the interests of air  
12 traffic controllers, first responders, FIA, air crew  
13 members, and so forth.

14 But at any cost, to update the training for  
15 the crew members. But as we get into this, we see  
16 that, you know, if it's going to concern air-ground  
17 communications, we need to make sure that the inservice  
18 training for air traffic controllers covers the same  
19 kinds of situations. We may want to do some stop-  
20 action, voice over, and add in some additional material  
21 for them. I'd be glad to talk with you and Duane and  
22 others as to whether or not we might be also able to  
23 make variants of the same training packets that would  
24 be useful for airport local folks too.

1           CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Thank you. Yes.

2           MR. MCGRAY: Duane McGray again from ALEAN.  
3 Just to piggyback with that, I think it's important for  
4 airport police, first responders, because are going to  
5 be the first people on the scene, to at least see what  
6 training and procedures are put in place for flight  
7 deck people and ATCs. Not because we're going to  
8 change anything, but because we'll be more educated and  
9 understand what procedures other people are being  
10 trained on so we can take that into consideration and  
11 understand that as we're responding.

12          CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Good point. Yes.

13          MR. DOUBRAVA: Dick Doubrava, Air Transport  
14 Association. First, I want to express our appreciation  
15 to Mike for the somewhat difficult task of trying to  
16 coordinate this update process. It's clearly something  
17 the industry feels very strongly about and, you know,  
18 we were proud that we were the instigators of this  
19 program when it was first developed. It was Air  
20 Transport Association, with its member carriers and  
21 regional airline associations, was very active in the  
22 development of "The Common Strategy." And clearly we  
23 take a big ownership in it because simply it obviously  
24 affects our aircraft, our passengers, and our crews.

1           And I know that Mike has been making a  
2 special effort to make sure that everybody's included.  
3       And it's just very important for us, as we go forward,  
4 to make sure that clearly that the -- everyone clearly  
5 understands, you know, what the goal here is, to update  
6 the program, make it more current. But clearly, we  
7 certainly have some caution about opening it up to any  
8 new strategies and designs that don't clearly include  
9 the industry in the development of that. And Mike's  
10 been making a big effort on that part, so we look  
11 forward to working with him and with the carriers and  
12 the law enforcement agencies and obviously the FAA, to  
13 make sure that we have a good product and a product  
14 that reflects the changes and the updates that are  
15 necessary.

16           CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Are there any other  
17 questions or comments?

18                           (No response.)

19           CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Okay. Thanks, Mike.

20           MS. CLARK: I have the pleasure now of  
21 introducing one of my staff, Mike McCormick, from the  
22 Office of Security, Policy and Planning. He's going to  
23 make a presentation on the Total Architecture for  
24 Aviation Security. Mike worked very hard with Rick



1 Lauzurik and lots of other folks to develop this tool.

2 It's in response to a recommendation from the National  
3 Research Council. I want to thank you, Paul, for the  
4 time of Rick and other staff to help pull this  
5 together.

6 We think this is going to be a phenomenal  
7 tool to help us in doing planning for future activities  
8 for all of ACS, even though the initial birth of this  
9 project was to help develop ideas and identify gaps  
10 where technology research was required. We think, like  
11 I said, it's going to give us some information just  
12 because of the quality of the product and the depth of  
13 the product, to help us in all of our planning within  
14 ACS. So, with that.

15 MR. MCCORMICK: Thank you very much, Jan. My  
16 name is Mike McCormick. I'm an engineer working in the  
17 Technology Integration Division part of Jan's  
18 organization. And I'm here today to give you a little  
19 of a briefing on what we're calling "The Total  
20 Architecture for Aviation Security." I'm going to go  
21 over a little bit of how the project came about, the  
22 purpose of the project, give you a brief description,  
23 and provide an overview of the analysis method that was  
24 developed by Rick Lauzurik from the Tech Center, and

1 give you a few sample results.

2           It was recommended by the National Research  
3 Council. They had a Panel on the Assessment of  
4 Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security.  
5 That's quite a long name for a panel; they couldn't  
6 even make an acronym out of it.

7           (Laughter.)

8           MR. MCCORMICK: But they came in in December  
9 of 1999 with two recommendations. One was to develop a  
10 total architecture for aviation security, to describe  
11 and assess the security countermeasures for a variety  
12 of threats. And the second was to come up with a  
13 security enhancement factor, or a metric, that we could  
14 score the system with. That report was given to  
15 Congress and we received some inquiries from Congress  
16 on what we were doing about the recommendations. And  
17 consequently, at the same time, the SEIPT was  
18 developing a system architecture plan on their own.  
19 Their plan was strictly looking at the equipment that  
20 they were deploying. Ours is a little bit broader in  
21 scope and they were looking at it from a vulnerability  
22 standpoint. As you'll see later, in our analysis  
23 method we take into account a few other factors.

24           We believe this is going to be a planning

1 tool to identify security needs. It'll be able to show  
2 us some higher risk areas, relative to each other.  
3 It'll enable us to identify and prioritize our R&D  
4 efforts with Paul's program. It'll support our SEIPT  
5 deployment decisions. It'll help identify budget  
6 requirements, not only in the R&D and for SEIPT  
7 deployment, but also in our operations areas. It'll  
8 give us a means to map program improvement over time  
9 and we can use it as a basis for trade-off analyses.  
10 If we want to see what affect deploying one  
11 countermeasure versus another will have, this enables  
12 us to score and to project the reduction in risk by  
13 doing so. And it also can support or identify needs  
14 for regulatory changes and like I mentioned previously,  
15 it supports our operational decisions.

16 We organized the project by these five, what  
17 we call "program areas." Threats coming through  
18 checked baggage, the checkpoint, cargo, and airport --  
19 airport, we included perimeter fence, airport services  
20 such as the catering service and terminal attacks --  
21 and national aerospace system facilities, both manned  
22 and unmanned facilities. It's a threat-driven scenario  
23 approach. We received a list of threats from our FAA  
24 intelligence organization.

1           The principal output of the analysis is a  
2 metric we call "relative risk." We took snapshot  
3 evaluations and we made our baseline 1999 and we  
4 projected through 2004, and then again in 2009, what  
5 our security system would look like and evaluated it.  
6 The 2004 and 2009 security system was based on existing  
7 program plans that were already in existence in our  
8 office, so we just kind of collected all the program  
9 plans for the different program areas that I mentioned  
10 previously, and documented them and then analyzed them.

11           This last bullet here is very important. The  
12 analysis reflects the planned countermeasures will work  
13 as projected. So, if we have an item that's being  
14 designed, it's in R&D, and we plan to deploy it by 2004  
15 and 2009, that device is going to work as we projected.

16       So we took a best case scenario approach to evaluating  
17 the countermeasures.

18           As I mentioned previously, it's a threat-  
19 driven scenario approach. We received a list of 26  
20 threats from our intelligence organization and FAA  
21 interrogators also. A relative likelihood of  
22 occurrence rating and it's very broad; they couldn't  
23 pin it down to say, "This one is a percentage more  
24 likely than another threat scenario is to occur." So,

1 it was very broad, either A, B, or C rating.

2           And then we took their 26 base scenarios and  
3 developed quite a number of variants to represent  
4 various paths that could be taken by the terrorists.  
5 These are examples of variations within a base  
6 scenario. The terrorist could be identified as a  
7 selectee or not a selectee and we base our  
8 countermeasures on our varying levels of security based  
9 on that. They could be an international or domestic  
10 flight. Again, different security measures apply.

11           We looked at various aggressor paths. He  
12 could be coming over the fence, trying to piggyback  
13 through a gate. The threat could be introduced through  
14 checked baggage or it could be coming through the  
15 checkpoint or he could be trying to deposit the threat  
16 item in cargo. So, there were a number of different  
17 variations within each base scenario.

18           Another variation was the threat type. Was  
19 it a handgun, was it an IED, was it disassembled,  
20 assembled, and where was it hidden, and the method of -  
21 - was it hidden on the body or hidden in carry-on  
22 luggage and so forth. Also, the aggressor method. Was  
23 he coming in passive and trying to sneak through the  
24 system or was he overt. That made a difference in

1 quite a few of the scenarios. And this is a breakdown  
2 of the variations.

3           Again, intel gave us 26 kind of broad threat  
4 scenarios, and we came up with 109 for a large airport  
5 and we came -- we documented what we thought the  
6 typical countermeasures deployed at a large airport  
7 were, and came up with 27 variations for the seven base  
8 scenarios provided by intel for checkpoint. And you  
9 can see down the line here, we had 45 for the various  
10 airport threat scenarios and 9 base scenarios given to  
11 us by intelligence. And then we looked at what was the  
12 specific or what was unique to small airports, and we  
13 came up with an additional 53 variants for the small  
14 airport.

15           Now, this is the -- this is a brief  
16 description of the relative risk equation developed by  
17 Rick Lauzurik. The results are quantitative. We get a  
18 number, but they're relative. They don't mean anything  
19 unless you're comparing them against another relative  
20 number for a different scenario. It includes  
21 components of target attractiveness, which is a rating  
22 of target importance and the consequences. We looked  
23 at fatalities and system down time and provided the  
24 score, depending on what the target was.

1           Also, a relative probability of occurrence  
2 that took into account intel's A, B, or C rating and in  
3 addition, for future countermeasures we planned to  
4 deploy, we scored deterrents, whether or not the  
5 terrorist would be likely to continue to try that path  
6 in the future, given that we have some visible  
7 countermeasures deployed in the future.

8           And then the last variable here is the  
9 probability of success and this is our strict  
10 vulnerability score. If a terrorist is likely to try  
11 this avenue, will they succeed. And this is an example  
12 of the relative risk output. We take target  
13 attractiveness, the probability of occurrence and  
14 system vulnerability, and we get a score for 1999,  
15 2004, and 2009. Again, the measure is dimensionless.  
16 It means something when you take this and evaluate it  
17 against other scores for other threat paths, and  
18 scenario variations.

19           This is an example of the form of the output.  
20 We had 109 worksheets that identified each  
21 countermeasure we were likely to encounter, and then a  
22 rating across 1999, 2004, and 2009, for each of the  
23 countermeasures encountered for that particular threat  
24 scenario. And then we have a tally on the

1 vulnerability from that. We take each of the  
2 individual worksheets and we roll it up for a scenario  
3 score. We weighted each of the individual variations.

4 We came up with a scenario -- for each of the  
5 26 intel scenarios, we have a relative risk score. And  
6 then we could take each of the scenarios and decide  
7 which ones were applicable to the checkpoint, checked  
8 bagged, national aerospace, and cargo, and we have a  
9 vector roll-up. We call the program areas vectors.  
10 And we could actually come up with an overall score for  
11 aviation security for 1999, 2004, and 2009.

12 This is an example of the types of output we  
13 received. Example "X" here is a system that is  
14 improving over time. Our countermeasures were deemed  
15 effective for the particular scenario, and you can see  
16 a drop in relative risk for 2004 and in 2009. We also  
17 saw some examples, like scenario "Y" here, where we  
18 weren't applying countermeasures to address that  
19 particular scenario and the relative risk stays  
20 relatively even across the board.

21 And the last example here, scenario "Z", is  
22 an example of intelligence providing a likelihood of  
23 occurrence say, of C, where it drives down the relative  
24 risk. So this one, example "Z", is an area where we



1 started out with relatively low relative risk and it  
2 stayed that way through 2004 and 2009.

3           And these are some of the examples of where  
4 we saw improvement in the system for the out years. We  
5 found that system testing and inspection, where  
6 industry and the FAA applied emphasis, the test scores  
7 improved. EDS inspection of CAPPs selectees, where  
8 working the SEIPT is supplying equipment to achieve  
9 that and, for some of the scenarios, it drove down the  
10 relative risk.

11           Eventually, 100 percent checked baggage  
12 screening also drove down the relative risk  
13 significantly for the checked baggage vector. For  
14 international flights, we see a layered security or  
15 parallel security of bag-match and EDS inspection. And  
16 at the checkpoint we have the TRX x-ray deployment  
17 along with TIP. And TIP, we hope, will expose  
18 screeners to a wider variety of threat items and  
19 they'll be able to more readily pick up IED components  
20 and weapons.

21           And we're currently working on the screener  
22 company certification rule and we see an improvement  
23 for the screeners and their ability to operate x-ray  
24 equipment and the EDS systems, trace devices, and metal

1 detector screening.

2           In April, we presented the analysis method to  
3 the National Research Council and they gave us a verbal  
4 endorsement that it was what they were looking for. We  
5 plan to update this analysis annually. And we would  
6 like the versions to be reviewed by both the FAA and  
7 the regulated parties, so we'd like industry  
8 participation.

9           And that's my presentation. Do I have any  
10 questions?

11           MR. MCGRAY: Duane McGray from ALEAN.  
12 Speaking as one who is involved in the development of  
13 the SAIC model for building the assessments for  
14 individual airports, I see a lot of similarities.

15           MR. MCCORMICK: Yes. Rick Lauzurik was  
16 involved in that and Rick was instrumental in putting  
17 together our analysis method here.

18           MR. MCGRAY: It kind of looks like that this  
19 is taking the SAIC Individual Airport Model and putting  
20 it into an overall system application. Is that kind of  
21 a fair --

22           MR. MCCORMICK: A lot of work went into it to  
23 adjust it, but the base process is similar to the SAIC  
24 model, although we didn't use their spreadsheet

1 application at all.

2 MR. POLSKI: Paul Polski from the Technical  
3 Center. We evaluated, initially, seven different  
4 models and we cut down to five that we liked very much,  
5 so you'll see a good amount of the SAIC model and the  
6 other models that are all part of this vulnerability  
7 analysis that Rick has been managing.

8 MR. MCCORMICK: Yes, sir.

9 MR. PRIDDY: This was a very good briefing.  
10 Thank you very much.

11 MR. MCCORMICK: Thank you.

12 MR. PRIDDY: I'm Ron Priddy, National Air  
13 Carrier Association. And we would like to see more of  
14 that but really my comments are directed towards Jan  
15 and General Canavan, and that is how you intend to  
16 employ this -- or do you intend to employ it in any  
17 manner other than annual updates, discussions. I mean,  
18 is this going to drive ACSSP changes? Is this going to  
19 drive the agenda of IPT? You know, how do you intend  
20 to use the tool?

21 MS. CLARK: It will be something that we use.  
22 It's information that we'll use in ACS planning and  
23 strategic planning for the allocation of resources. I  
24 see it as being useful, as Mike said, in helping us

1 rationalize budget requirements for our operations, for  
2 our research, for our activities, what we present to  
3 OMB. Now, if we can rationalize, "Hey, we see this gap  
4 here. We don't see any improvement. We know we've got  
5 to address it." In terms of actually driving changes  
6 in the ACSSP, if it gives us information, we're going  
7 to have to go out and do some verification and  
8 validation because it is a rating. We're going to have  
9 to get additional information. It's a tool, it's not a  
10 dictate of activity. It's a tool to give us  
11 information.

12 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: I happen to concur with  
13 that answer. Thank you very much. Yes.

14 MS. MCELROY: Debbie McElroy, Regional  
15 Airline Association. If I'm correct, you've presented  
16 this to the NRC in April, got their buyoff. And do you  
17 have a schedule for when you're going to be briefing  
18 the regulated parties about this?

19 MR. MCCORMICK: Yes. During the development  
20 process, we actually went to the IPT and Ken Klasinski  
21 arranged for us to have two separate briefings to IPT  
22 members. And we've received feedback on the process  
23 and the preliminary results from the SEIPT members. I  
24 don't have a schedule right now to go any further with

1 any other briefings or more in-depth discussion.

2 MS. MCELROY: So you don't intend to do --  
3 because I'm sure you recognize that there are a number  
4 of carriers who aren't on the IPT.

5 MR. MCCORMICK: Yes.

6 MS. MCELROY: So I would encourage you to set  
7 those up.

8 MR. MCCORMICK: Okay. And I would look to my  
9 boss to confirm that and to verify that I should be  
10 scheduling additional briefings.

11 MS. CLARK: We could schedule association  
12 briefings, but Mike's also working on trying to come up  
13 with two versions. One version, obviously, we have to  
14 keep internal because of the sensitivity and the depth  
15 of the information. But we're going to see if we can  
16 come up with an external version that we might be able  
17 to take to the association. So, you get an idea of the  
18 direction that some of these analyses, you know, might  
19 lead us in terms of saying, "Hey, this looks like a gap  
20 and we need to look at it further."

21 Do you have any time frame? I know you had  
22 an initial draft.

23 MR. MCCORMICK: Yes. I would say the  
24 documents are finalized. We have two versions and

1 they're both very sensitive; they were both classified  
2 191, one more so than the other. I think yesterday or  
3 the day before, I received feedback from Quentin that  
4 we should be working on another version. So, I just  
5 had that fed to me and I'm starting to process how can  
6 I make the information available in a less sensitive  
7 manner.

8 MS. MCELROY: Certainly, I'm sure you realize  
9 here, carriers and the airports generally get 191  
10 information, so that wouldn't be an impediment. Okay,  
11 thanks.

12 MS. CLARK: We'll work to set up briefings  
13 and try and make sure that we've got material that we  
14 can bring with us.

15 MR. MONETTI: Mike McCormick, you did a  
16 wonderful job --

17 MR. MCCORMICK: Thank you.

18 MR. MONETTI: -- you just did. What you're  
19 doing, and word "architecture" kind of throws me off,  
20 but what you're doing is like, putting sense to this  
21 thing we've been doing for the last ten years. You're  
22 saying, "Instead of dealing with what's hot at the  
23 moment, why don't we look at the whole picture and  
24 assign a relative weight to it." It's like, great idea

1 ten years later than we could have done it, but better  
2 now than never. Thank you.

3 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Any other questions?

4 (No response.)

5 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Okay, thanks, Mike.

6 MR. MCCORMICK: Thank you.

7 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Okay, at this time I'll  
8 open the floor to the members for any points of general  
9 discussion.

10 MR. MCGRAY: Duane McGray from ALEAN. I just  
11 want to comment how timely and how much I appreciate  
12 the minutes from the last meeting and the presentations  
13 being put out over the email. It was great and I want  
14 to commend everybody in getting everything together so  
15 quickly.

16 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: I think Tom Jensen had an  
17 announcement. Tom?

18 MR. JENSEN: General Canavan, we have a group  
19 of these brochures on the desk outside. This concerns  
20 the Aviation Security Technology Symposium that the  
21 Tech Center is putting on. It's the third one they've  
22 had. They had one ten years ago, one five years ago,  
23 so every five years we have this symposium. And this  
24 time, the National Skies Alliance is co-sponsoring this

1 effort with the Tech Center. And this brochure has all  
2 the information in it. I hope you'll all read that.

3 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: And the dates again are?

4 MR. JENSEN: The dates are November the 27th  
5 through the 30th and it's a two to three-day  
6 conference. It'll be divided into work groups. It's a  
7 very interesting program. I hope you'll all be there.

8 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Thank you. Paul, do you  
9 want to add anything?

10 MR. POLSKI: Paul Polski, Tech Center. The  
11 only thing I'd add is we're expanding on what we did on  
12 the one back in '96. We'll have a piece of every  
13 single equipment that we've developed that's being used  
14 and even some of the newer items. So it's not only a  
15 R&D thing, but a deployment thing and a showing of  
16 equipment thing. We anticipate a pretty good  
17 attendance at the Tropicana Hotel in Atlantic City, New  
18 Jersey.

19 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Thank you. I'd encourage  
20 everyone to go if you have the time. Bob?

21 MR. MONETTI: Bob MONETTI, the Victims of Pan  
22 Am Flight 103. I just wanted to mention the thing that  
23 probably doesn't get a lot of newspaper coverage, and  
24 that is that since the trial and conviction of Mahgrahi



1 and the Libyan Intelligence Service, the civil suit  
2 against Libya, which we launched, oh, five or six years  
3 ago in Washington, is ongoing. And in fact, Libya just  
4 missed the last deadline about a week ago for bringing  
5 witnesses in. The judge gave them another five weeks  
6 to bring witnesses in.

7           The purpose of our lawsuit against Libya is  
8 similar to the lawsuit against O.J. Simpson, is to make  
9 them pay dearly. The best I can figure, the bomb that  
10 blew up Pan Am 103, including the suitcase and all the  
11 clothes, cost less than a thousand dollars. And since  
12 it was an unaccompanied bag, the delivery was free.  
13 The airlines flew it for nothing. So the cost to Libya  
14 of this killing of 270 people and all the publicity  
15 that they got was about a thousand dollars.

16           Our hope is, with the lawsuit, is we can  
17 change the numbers and raise the cost of that bomb to  
18 ten billion and a thousand dollars, in the hopes that  
19 Libya will get the message and other terrorists will  
20 get the message that terrorism isn't cheap warfare, and  
21 maybe they won't do it.

22           So our job is to make all of your  
23 architecture numbers go down, because the beauty of the  
24 target goes down because there's a big price to pay.

1 So we're doing this, not because we want money from  
2 these people. In fact, many people want to donate the  
3 money to Lockerbee to replace the sheep they lost to  
4 the hoof and mouth disease. But we're doing it to make  
5 terrorism expensive.

6 MR. KEMP: Thanks, Bob.

7 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Any other topics for  
8 general discussion?

9 (No response.)

10 CHAIRMAN CANAVAN: Okay. Well, I appreciate  
11 your time today. Again, we'll get the minutes out as  
12 quickly as we can. The next meeting will be on the  
13 20th of September at 10:00 a.m.

14 And this concludes the meeting. Thank you.

15 (Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the above-  
16 entitled meeting was adjourned.)

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