U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

AVIATION SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING

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Thursday, April 23, 1998

Federal Aviation Administration McCracken Room 10th Floor 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C.

The meeting of the AVIATION SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE commenced at 9:45 a.m., pursuant to notice.

APPEARANCES: ASAC Committee Members:

Rear Admiral Cathal Flynn, Chairman Aviation Security Advisory Committee Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security

Mr. Anthony Fainberg
Designated Federal Official

Mr. John Daly
Department of Transportation

Ms. Susan Rork
Air Transport Association of America

Mr. Charles Rasner Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. Kevin P. Cummings
U.S. Customs Service

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APPEARANCES (Cont.)

- Mr. Robert Hutnick Immigration and Naturalization Service
- Mr. John Tomlinson Secret Service
- Mr. Edward J. Driscoll
 National Air Carrier Association
- Mr. Bob Monetti
 Victims of PanAm Flight 103
- Mr. Alvy Dodson ACI North America
- Mr. Hal Salfen
 International Airline Passengers Association
- Mr. Steve Alterman
 Cargo Airline Association
- Mr. Paul Hudson Aviation Consumer Action Project
- Mr. Robert Nicholson
 Allied Pilots Association
- Mr. Hovav Frenkel Aviation Security Contractors Association
- Ms. Deborah McElroy
 Regional Airlines Association
- Mr. Andrew V. Cebula National Air Transportation Association
- Mr. Steve Luckey
 Airline Pilots Association
- Mr. Duane McGray
 Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network
- Mr. Robert Martin
 U.S. Postal Inspection Service

APPEARANCES (Cont.)

Also Appearing:

Mr. Craig Ulmer Secret Service

Mr. Dennis Schafer Capt. Robert Cox Airline Pilots Association

Mr. Jay Huber
Maryland Aviation Administration

Mr. Mike Mostow Mr. Bill Stover Cardkey Systems

Mr. Douglas R. Laird BGI

Mr. Glenn P. Johnson, Jr.
Ms. Carole G. Johnson
 Victims of PanAm Flight 103

Mr. Todd M. Freyman Mr. Thomas Smerczynski TASC, Inc.

Mr. Jerry Wright
Air Line Pilots Association International

Col. Dale Landis
Department of Defense

Mr. Rick Lazarick Mr. Ron Polillo Mr. Daniel Boyce Ms. Rebecca Tuttle Mr. Don Cotton

Mr. Kris Mason Mr. Karl Shrum Federal Aviation Administration

APPEARANCES (Cont.)

Mr. John J. Wojtowicz USDOT/Volpe Center

Mr. Frederick F. Muntz InVision Technologies

Mr. Michael Bollinger

Ms. Cathy Helm U.S. General Accounting Office

Mr. Al Graser American Association of Airport Executives

Ms. Sharan Sharp U.S. Department of Transportation

Ms. Jean Morrison
America West Airline Security

Mr. Dick Doubrava Delta Air Lines

Mr. Alex Kerr FedEx

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PROCEEDINGS

(9:45 a.m.)

OPENING REMARKS

RADM FLYNN: I would ask the FAA people other than the people right at the center table who are seated, please, to give up your seats to people from outside the FAA who are here who do not have seats. Everyone has got a place to sit? Okay.

Good morning, welcome to you all, to the meeting of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. Let me remind you that these microphones are purely for the purpose of recording the session. They do not amplify voices. So if you wish to be heard, do just recognize that the acoustics in this room are nearly perfect, but not quite. We don't even have a microphone up here at the podium to help in projecting voices. Oh, we do? Okay, so there is one there. So if you wish to project, and certainly when you're giving presentations, it would be good to use that.

INTRODUCTIONS

RADM FLYNN: I want to make some introductions of some new representatives on the ASAC. Mr. Hovav Frenkel is representing the Aviation Security Contractors Association.

MR. FRENKEL: Right here.

RADM FLYNN: I'm told that Chief Duane McGray has replaced Chief Erolman on ALEAN, is that correct? Good, welcome.

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Mr. Paul Hudson has replaced Robert Devito for
   ACAP.
             Mr. Hal Salfen has replaced his son, Marty
   Salfen, for the International Airlines Passengers
   Association.
                 Welcome.
              Well, I should tell you that Rear Admiral Burt
   Kinghorn has become the S-60, the job of Director of
   Intelligence and Security in the Department, replacing Rear
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   Admiral Paul Pluta, who has gone on to a job that in the
   Coast Guard they think is a very good job, so we
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   congratulate Paul Pluta on doing that. We'll miss him and
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   look forward to working with Admiral Kinghorn.
             Robert Nicholson from the Allied Pilots
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   Association and Mr. John Tomlinson from the Secret Service,
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   welcome to you all.
             Now, so that we can record the actual members who
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   are present here, I'd like to go around the table recording
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   the members of the ASAC who are actually in attendance.
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   I'll start with myself. Cathal Flynn, Associate
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   Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, FAA, and
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   Chairman of the ASAC.
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22
                             Tony Fainberg, Director of the
             MR. FAINBERG:
   Office of Policy and Planning in Aviation Security, and
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   Designated Federal Official of the ASAC.
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25
             MR. POLILLO: I'm Ron Polillo. I'm the security
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   equipment integrator of Product Team League, and I'm also
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sitting in for Paul Polsky from the Tech Center.
             MR. HUTNICK: I'm Robert Hutnick from the
   Immigration and Naturalization Service.
             MR. DODSON: I'm Alvy Dodson. I'm Chairman of
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   the ACI North America Public Safety and Security Committee.
              MR. GRASER: Al Graser from the Port Authority of
   New York/New Jersey and representing AAAE as the chairman
   of the Safety Security and Technical Committee.
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             MS. McELROY: Debbie McElroy, Regional Airline
   Association.
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             MR. DRISCOLL: Ed Driscoll, National Air Carrier
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   Association.
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             MR. ALTERMAN: Steve Alterman, Cargo Airline
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   Association.
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             MS. RORK: Susan Rork, Air Transport Association.
             MR. CEBULA: Andy Cebula, National Air
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   Transportation Association.
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             MR. HUDSON: Paul Hudson, Aviation Consumer
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   Action Project.
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             MR. LUCKEY: Steve Luckey, Chairman of the
   Airline Pilots Association, National Security Committee.
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             MR. MONETTI: I'm Bob Monetti with the Victims of
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23
   Pan Am Flight 103.
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             MR. FRENKEL: Hovav Frenkel, Aviation Security
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   Contractors Association.
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             MR. MARTIN: Bob Martin, Postal Inspections
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Security Group, Postal Inspection Service.
             MR. SALFEN:
                           I'm Hal Salfen with the
   International Airline Passengers Association, and former
   chairman of the Air Traffic Conference.
             MR. McGRAY: Duane McGray, President of the
   Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network.
             MR. TOMLINSON: John Tomlinson, U.S. Secret
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   Service.
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             MR. RASNER: Charles Rasner, FBI.
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             MR. CUMMINGS: Kevin Cummings, U.S. Customs.
             MR. DALY: John Daly, Associate Director for
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   Security Policy in the Office of the Secretary of
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   Transportation.
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             RADM FLYNN:
                           I note that there are some missing
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             Is there anybody around the outside of the room
   members.
   who represents or is a member of those organizations where
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   the chairs are vacant, over there on my left?
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   are, you are welcome to come up and identify yourselves.
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19
             Let me give the standard announcement.
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   meeting of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee is
   being held pursuant to a notice published in the Federal
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   Register on April 7, 1998. The agenda of the meeting will
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   be as announced in that notice, with details as set out in
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   the handout, which is at your places.
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              The FAA Designated Federal Official, Tony
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   Feinberg, is responsible for compliance with the Federal
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Advisory Committee Act. It is his responsibility to see to it that the agenda is adhered to and that accurate minutes are kept. The Designated Federal Official also has the responsibility to adjourn the meeting should he find it necessary to do so in the public interest. In other words, if there is riotous conduct or anything of the like.

Placards for the member organizations are set out on the main table. Only one representative from each organization may sit at the table, participate in discussions and vote on matters put to a vote by the Chair. Other representatives of member organizations should channel any remarks they have through the organization's main table representative, except as requested to do otherwise by the Chair.

Let me say that this Chair will interpret that leniently, that if any member around this table should want to have a member of the organization elsewhere present in the room speak, then please just indicate who that person would be and as speaking for your organization.

When addressing the Chair, please identify yourself to facilitate keeping accurate minutes.

The meeting is open to the public, but members of the public may address the committee only with the permission of the Chair, which should have been arranged by giving advance notice concerning the scope and duration of the intended presentation. The Chair may entertain public $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

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comment if in the Chair's judgment, doing so will not disrupt the orderly progress of the meeting, and would not be unfair to any other person. Members of the public are welcome to present written material to the committee at any 5 time. Now, my understanding is that although we don't have a written request, that we do have a verbal request from the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee to 8 make a presentation, a brief presentation. I would suggest 9 that we ask the representative from the American Arab Anti-10 Discrimination Committee to make such presentation now, if 11 12 the representative is present. 13 Ms. Letty Mulchani? Okay, that person isn't 14 present. If the person should join the meeting later, 15 we'll take it up at that time in a way that would least inconvenience the progress of the meeting. 16 One other note before we go into this. 17 understanding that this is the birthday of a distinguished 18 19 representative from the Air Transport Association. Happy 20 Birthday, Susan. 21 MS. RORK: Thank you. 22 (Applause.) REVIEW OF MINUTES 23 RADM FLYNN: We should review the minutes of the 24 25 last meeting. The last meeting was that long ago, July 23, 26 1997. We haven't had a meeting since then? AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC. NATIONWIDE WASHINGTON-METRO FAX

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The minutes have been, as usual, provided to the
   members of the Association. Are there any changes to the
   minutes that were presented that anyone wishes to propose,
   or are there any comments on the minutes?
 5
              (No audible response.)
                           Then I would ask for someone to
              RADM FLYNN:
   propose the adoption of the minutes of that meeting.
8
              PARTICIPANT:
                            So moved.
9
              PARTICIPANT: Second.
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              RADM FLYNN: Those in favor?
              (Chorus of Ayes.)
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12
              RADM FLYNN: Okay, we have adopted the minutes of
   the meeting of July 23, 1997 as they were provided to the
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   members of the committee.
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              We are now going to have a series of reports.
   would encourage discussion of those reports and questions
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   to the presenters, because these matters are of importance.
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    They follow from the baseline working group or the White
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   House Commission, and so by all means, we welcome
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   involvement of committee members in the discussion.
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              The first one, on vulnerability assessments, will
   be presented by Mr. Rick Lazarick of the FAA. Rick?
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                     VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS
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              MR. LAZARICK: Thank you and good morning.
                                                           I'd
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   probably be loud enough without it.
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             RADM FLYNN:
                           Not quite. You need to speak up a
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little bit more.

MR. LAZARICK: Thank you very much for the opportunity to address this group. As some of you are aware, and all of you will be, I'm in involved with the White House Commission recommendation on airport vulnerability assessment, which was funded by Congress just about a year ago this month. What I am going to report on to you today is a little bit about how we have gone about doing it and where we are.

I know there are several people around the room who are personally involved in the activity. I apologize for the fact that I am repeating a lot of things to you, but several other people in the room have really not had much exposure, and this is a great opportunity for the exchange of information among a wider group of people than I normally get a chance to present to.

As I mentioned, this is one of the funded recommendations from the White House Commission. The funding was a two-year funding of five and a half million dollars to go out and do quantitative vulnerability assessment.

Now, several people have asked the question, there are vulnerability assessments done by consortiums, there are vulnerability assessments being done by the FBI and FAA combined. Is this one of those? No, it is not. It is a completely independent effort. It is different $\frac{AMERICAN\,REPORTERS,\,INC. }$

from those efforts, in that the direction we were given was to use a quantitative method. They refer to it in the language of the recommendation initially as to use Sandia-like models, which was an assess model, very quantitative, very repeatable.

So what we have done is attempted to follow that guidance. Our objective for this two-year effort was to complete vulnerability assessments in as many major airports as we could. We were going to use a variety of different methods, and using contractors from several diverse backgrounds to try to determine what is the best approach to use for a public access facility like an airport. Those vulnerability assessments that have been done in the past have been done for military and Department of Energy facilities, which had a significantly different security approach than airports do. A lot of the tools that have been developed have been developed for those.

So we are using some of those tools, and we're also using some processes that have been proven in the public sector, public domain, public access buildings, and trying to see what fits the airport environment the best.

We did stipulate at the very beginning that this is not a regulatory inspection. The airports that we are using have all volunteered, and they were all told that this is not a regulatory inspection and we do not intend to institute punitive action as a result of anything that we $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS,\ INC.$

find. If we find something, we'll tell you about it and we expect you to fix it, but we don't expect to punish you as a result of this.

Just briefly, what I would like to do is capture a couple of terms I'm going to use to make sure that we are all talking the same language.

Vulnerability assessment is what we were told to do. That basically says, look at your facility and determine how likely the adversary, the terrorist, would be at success at his particular mission if he attempted to do it. That is a big question, if he attempted to do it. So vulnerability says, he's going to try; therefore, how vulnerable are you?

The bigger picture and one that we keep in mind as we are doing this, is the concept of risk assessment or risk management. That says, if the adversary is successful, how much of an asset will he knock out, what is the value of what he is doing, or the loss potential to the airport.

Also, there is this likelihood of attempt. Is this particular threat that you are looking at more or less likely to occur in your airport than somewhere else? So all of those ingredients factor into an overall risk assessment, which is what the airport really does every day. They look at their security, they look at their risks, they do things to improve their security and reduce AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

their risk in a balanced fashion.

Now, what I'd like to do is quickly describe what the contractors that I have are doing for me, and then I'll tell you who is doing what and where.

Basically, vulnerability assessment takes on four stages of activity. The first one is planning and coordination. We have been very strict about the fact that, when you're going out to do vulnerability assessments at airports, you have to do it by the rules. We'll let you make the rules yourself. Write them down and we'll approve them, but you have to follow them. There has been a high degree of coordination between the FAA, the contractors and the FAA local people at the airports.

So once these plans are developed, distributed, we go to the airports and we brief the airport on what is going to be happening when the on-site activity begins. We find that there are several points of coordination and feedback that are very vital.

This is the first one, where the airports are given a detailed description and a chance to ask questions about what the process is.

The next step and the second major step is onsite assessment, the one everybody thinks of when you hear about vulnerability assessment. Basically, the contractors go out, based on the plan that they have laid down, and generally conduct interviews, do observations, collect $\underline{AMERICAN\,REPORTERS,\,INC}.$

information, and in some instances conduct small-scale tests to evaluate the current counter measures, current security system at the airport. Before they leave, they are bound by our rules to provide an out-briefing on their findings to the airport personnel, which is the second stage of feedback.

Then typically we leave for a month or so and take their data and do analysis, using the tools, the automated quantitative tools that they have brought to the table with them. Their output of that is two fundamental things, a vulnerability assessment quantitative value, and a set of either security upgrade elements or sets of elements that are proposed as being effective against the particular scenarios that have been analyzed.

These are in the form of -- let's call them recommendations to the airport. They are not recommendations saying you should do it, they are saying recommendations -- if you want to mitigate the risk of this particular scenario, this would be the way to do it.

This is also put into a formal written report.

These written reports are ones approved by the FAA, are distributed throughout the airport by airport control. The airport security coordinator determines who gets these reports. These are control 191 type of reports.

In addition to that after these final reports, we are going to conduct an oral final briefing, so that $\underline{ AMERICAN\,REPORTERS,\,INC.}$

everyone who has had a chance to see these reports can ask questions about the results and the proposed countermeasures in an open discussion.

So that is what we're doing. The way we started out was, the FAA decided to standardize a series of threat scenarios. There are 16 of them that we defined. In all 16 of those cases, the target was restricted to passenger aircraft or passengers in the terminal. We recognize that there are other targets at an airport, but because our scope of responsibility is limited to that region, we have limited our 16 scenarios to those particular targets.

We covered a series of threatening actions, bombings, highjackings and armed attacks on the terminal. We had explored many of what you might call common vectors. We are looking at checked baggage, cargo. We are looking at the carry-on, passenger screening process. We are also looking at services, whether it be cleaning or fueling or whatnot of the aircraft. We are looking at perimeter penetrations, and we're also looking at insider threats. There are also some with collusion with a terrorist outsider and an insider.

There are several things we did not include.

That includes vehicle bombs, chem-bio attacks, standoff weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and cyber attack, all of which are being studied by other organizations outside of this project.

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When given the responsibility to go out and conduct these, we organized what we called a three-phased approach. It turned out to be three different contracting methods. I will go ahead and describe to you those three phases, and I will also describe to you the method that we are using to identify the superior practices. We have assembled what we call a blue ribbon panel, actually national laboratory experts, to assist in the evaluation of this process.

First of all, the first phase, we had a known contractor, a pair of known contractors, and an existing contract vehicle through ITOP. We directly contracted through directed procurement with Abacus Technologies to do the airports of Detroit and Denver. We also contracted with Seidson Engineering Associates, the co-authors with Sandia of the assess model that was spoken of in the recommendation, and they were assigned to do Orlando and Newark.

The current status of that is that on-site activities at Denver and Detroit have been completed, and we are in the data analysis phase with them. The Orlando on-site has also been completed, and a draft analysis report is currently into the FAA for review. And Newark Airport is in progress. The on-site activities have been broken up over several weeks. Some of them have been completed and a few more are still pending.

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Switch to phase two now. Phase two was a

competitive award out of the tech center. We conducted a competitive contract award. We had altogether I guess 12 bidders; five of them were awarded contracts.

The companies and the airports that have been assigned. BDM Federal has Atlanta and Boston. Batelle in Columbia, Ohio, has Cincinnati and Louisville. SAIC is performing at Miami and Jacksonville. CTI is performing at San Juan, and Lockwood Green from Oak Ridge is conducting theirs at Colorado Springs.

This group of contractors represents a collection of commercial providers with a tremendously varied background in experience, but all have proven methodologies in vulnerability assessment.

The status of those five contracts. Atlanta has been completed on-site, and a draft report has been submitted. Similarly for Cincinnati and Louisville, they are at the draft report stage. Miami as well has been completed, the on-site, and the draft report is in for review.

Jacksonville, the site plan for that has been completed and approved. The San Juan general plan has been completed and approved, and the site plan is in development. For Colorado Springs, the general and site plans have been completed and approved. So we have made substantial progress on that front.

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Shifting to phase three. We had one other federal agency that had the ability to perform like a contractor. The Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center in Fort Wanime, which is the reorganization for the Department of Defense for physical security, has been brought, let's say under contract by way of EMIPR, to do assessments at Seattle and San Francisco.

In their case, the Seattle Airport has been completed, and they have submitted an interim findings report. Their analysis is still in progress. San Francisco will begin their on-site on the 27th of April for a four to five week period. That brings you up to date on all 14 airports.

Just to summarize quickly, we are expecting five final reports in the month of May. Then in June, July, August and September, we will have all the remaining ones, so by the end of this fiscal year we will have completed the 14 assessments that have been currently assigned.

Our intention then is to have an evaluation of these processes performed by the blue ribbon panel that I mentioned earlier. The blue ribbon panel has been assembled. It is chaired by the FAA and its members are from the National Lab, Sandia, New Haven, Argon, Oak Ridge, as well as the Army Corps of Engineers. They represent a series of people with both security backgrounds, modeling backgrounds and a variety of other related disciplines.

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They are acting on our behalf as advisors and evaluators.

The first step in their activities is, we are developing a series of criteria to, let's say, score or grade the results of the first round of airports. We have a very structured evaluation process that we are agreeing upon in May, and then we will use that during the months from May through September and come up with an effectiveness value.

In effectiveness, we are looking at it from a couple of viewpoints, mostly, how useful is the information that is in these reports to the airport planners. In order to gain that insight, we have developed a survey form that we are going to give out to the airport security coordinators, soliciting from them -- it's going to take a half hour or 45 minutes to fill this form out, but we really need the information.

It's going to ask them, how difficult was it for you to support the process? How much were they asking for, was it hard information to get? How much information that is in the report is of value to you? Can it help you do your planning process? Just to get a detailed feel for how the airport feels about the results that they were given.

user, it is useless. So we are very aware of the need to satisfy the end user, and the end user in this case we picture as being both the FAA agents locally and the airport security coordinators, the people that are actually doing the security planning.

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That form of feedback I have emphasized over and over again. We have promised that we will tell the airport what we did and what we found. In return, we are asking for feedback that says, how did you like it. I think that is the most important feedback that we can get.

I'd like to just summarize a few general observations. I can't give you details of, so-and-so did such-and-such. I'm not going to air dirty laundry here; it's not the forum for it. But I'd like to mention that we did solicit volunteer airports. We had 29 airports stand up and say, we would be glad to do this. As a result, maybe by that good fortune, we have had extraordinary cooperation from all the airports that we have gone to. The local FAA people have been excellent and the airports themselves have donated their time willingly and sometimes anxiously, trying to forward the process and learn something from it. So it has been extraordinarily good cooperation, and I think that that has allowed the process to go forward, not only smoothly, but productively.

We have put a tremendous amount of emphasis on pre-coordination. We have also emphasized trying to be AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

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non-interfering, getting information requests out and information returned so that you don't ask questions over and over again to people. We have tried to minimize the amount of disruption, and I think that has worked very, very well.

I might add that the organizations that have been selected have all acted very professionally, and that has of course improved the process, because the airports have accepted them as doing a good job with the proper emphasis.

Just a couple of findings that I can share with you from the eight or nine airports that have been completed on site and the five reports that I have had a chance to see.

One overall observation that most of these reports are telling me is that regulatory compliance at these airports is clearly present. These people are doing everything that they are told to do, to the largest extent. There are individual exceptions, where someone might not get challenged immediately if they are on the AOA. The site of rules do vary somewhat from airport to airport, not the rules so much, but the implementation of it, and the challenge practices do become noticeably different at different airports.

I think the other thing that stands out is that the scenarios that we picked, some of them are very difficult to stop, because there are no regulations in $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

place to stop them. For example, someone driving up to the front door of the terminal with several armed folks who walk in and shoot the place up. We don't have a lot of requirements to prevent that or a lot of safeguards against it. Insider threats can be very devious, cargo -- we knew ahead of time, we've been told before where the tough points are.

What is happening is, as people go through these processes and they put the numbers in and they turn the crank, true enough, the highest vulnerabilities are the predictably highest vulnerabilities. That is mostly heartwarming, in that it is intuitive, it makes sense, and chances are that is a degree at least of validation that the process is at least in the right ball park.

I guess at this point, what I would like most to do is entertain questions. I see some of you have been involved in this process before on both sides. Go ahead.

RADM FLYNN: Before you do, FAA people -- it is clear that these people are not going to be attending, so by all means, sit down. There are seats other seats around here. I'm a little concerned that you took what I said initially a little too literally.

MR. LAZARICK: Any questions?

community are.

One thing I noticed throughout your talk was that you will be giving feedback to the airport community. I would like to request that the airline community also receive feedback. I don't know that that was an intentional omission on your part, but if it was or was not, I think that we play an integral part in this three-legged stool, with FAA and the airports. So I'd like you to speak to that if you would, please.

MR. LAZARICK: Sure, that's absolutely true. For those who have been in attendance at the meetings, the introductory briefings, the out briefings and whatnot, the attendance is very broad. It always includes at least the primary air carriers. It normally includes the contracted security help, as well as the law enforcement and of course the airport management, airport operations and things like that.

I unfortunately have used the term airport like a system, and it includes everything that is there. I don't mean to imply that it is the airport authority. I was speaking of airport kind of in whole.

The scenarios that we spelled out kind of cross the boundaries. They are 107 and 108 style, and in fact, some of them combine responsibilities. Part of the path that an adversary might take would be a 107 responsibility, and then it crosses over into 108. So we haven't attempted

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to isolate the two organizations. We have tried to treat security as a whole, treat the airport as a system, and involve all the interested and affected parties.

So I'm sorry that my terminology might have misled you, but I really didn't mean to imply that. I meant to treat the airport as a system, because that is really the way we are analyzing. We are analyzing the entirety, how it works together, rather than looking at any of the individual component parts.

But thank you for asking that question, because it is important for everyone to understand. Yes, sir.

MR. HUDSON: Paul Hudson, Aviation Consumer

Action Project. Can you say what proportion of the major

airports are covered in your assessments?

MR. LAZARICK: Yes, sir. We are doing nine Category X airports and five Category 1 airports with the current FY 97-98 funding that we received. We have intentions, and have money earmarked in the '99 budget, and hopefully continuing to move forward with additional airports, with the selected contractor or contractors who prove to have the most cost effective process. Of course, that decision will be made with the assistance of a blue ribbon panel, and that decision won't be made until October or beyond, but that's our intention.

Now, the next good question is, how many more are you going to be able to do. The answer to that really $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

depends upon what process we pick. There is a tremendously wide range of prices to go with these wide range of methodologies, almost a factor of five, from lowest to highest. So the answer to the question is, somewhere 5 between five and 15 airports that we're going to do with 6 the next round of money. But we are focusing on X's and 8 1's, if that helps to answer the question. MR. HUDSON: Also, are you including any foreign 9 airports that have many passengers going to the U.S.? 10 11 MR. LAZARICK: No, sir, this is exclusively a 12 domestic analysis at this point. Yes, sir. 13 MR. DODSON: Alvy Dodson, ACI North America. 14 Rick, I'd like to ask a question regarding -- many of us 15 have been through a lot of these surveys and assessments over the years. How do you see this as being different 16 from what we have done in the past? What is the direction 17 that this is taking? Is it going to replace some of the 18 19 various agencies throughout the years that would come in 20 and do two or three surveys a year? Where do you see this 21 qoinq? 22 That's a really good question. MR. LAZARICK: In fact, I meant to mention something along that line. 23 24 I think the distinction that this particular 25 analysis brings is that it is a more scientific, it is a 26 more quantitative, it's a more analytical, it's a more AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

automated process. As a result, it should be more repeatable.

Assessments that are done by expert judgment, every time you do them, will be dramatically different, based upon which expert's judgment you're using. This being a little bit more analytical is likely to be -- maybe not purely repeatable, but certainly more highly repeatable than purely opinion based methods.

Then the next point that needs to be made is, it is our intention to use the information we gain from this review and analysis of the tools that are being used -- our long-term objective is to find a tool or develop what needs to be developed to have a tool that would appropriately be used in the hands of the FAA agents and the airport security coordinators locally on site, their hands on, and to get that out into the field for their use on a continuous basis.

That would eliminate the need for other agencies to have to come in and do it, and in fact, has the potential if the consortium adopted that style and the tool was provided, could merge certainly any consortium local activities with this one.

Also, we are looking for the potential -- and I'm not going to say it has to happen -- we are looking at the potential that the FBI-FAA joint vulnerability assessment and this one could merge somewhere downstream, if we can $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, INC.$

prove that they are accomplishing the same objective.

At this point, it is not entirely clear that that will happen, but we are keeping a close eye on the opportunity, because we realize that multiple -- and sometimes almost simultaneous vulnerability assessments can be confusing and it can be time consuming, and we don't wish to continue to proceed in that direction.

I can't assure you right now that we will find a point of merger in the very near future, but we are certainly focusing on trying to do that.

RADM FLYNN: Mr. Monetti.

MR. MONETTI: Bob Monetti from the Victims of Pan Am Flight 103. I know I misheard what you said, Rick, because it sounded like the vulnerabilities that seem to be consistent are the ones we haven't made laws against. We haven't made rules that say the airports and airlines have to deal with certain threats. Are you saying that we are fighting terrorism by regulation?

MR. LAZARICK: I'm not sure I would put it in quite those terms. I think that we have certainly emphasized certain vectors in our regulations, and our largest activity investment and our largest degree of control would be in those areas.

Therefore, if one postulates a scenario that bypasses those particular activities, the likelihood of it being analyzed as more vulnerable is clear and intuitive.

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That was what I was trying to say. Any implications beyond that are too political for me, and I prefer not to go But I think it is clear that there are vectors that are identified even in the commission report as being say 5 less secure than others. That was what my message was there. quantitative method actually seems to be verifying some of those intuitive reasonings that have been published in the 8 9 past. 10 Are there any other questions? 11 (No audible response.) 12 MR. LAZARICK: If not, I thank you very much. You can always reach me at the FAA Technical Center, if 13 14 there are any questions. I'd be glad to discuss it with 15 you in the future. Thank you very much. 16 Thank you, Rick. RADM FLYNN: The next item on the agenda is the status of ASAC 17 working groups. We have six working group reports. 18 19 first is on the cargo baseline working group, and Becky 20 Tuttle of our Office of Policy and Planning will give a status report on the progress of that group. 21 22 STATUS OF ASAC WORKING GROUPS 23 CARGO MS. TUTTLE: 24 The cargo baseline working group is 25 chaired by Ed Badaloto. The group has not met since the last ASAC meeting. The plan is to convene that group once 26 AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

the proposed changes are issued. That encompasses four programs that are being amended. I spoke to the program manager and we are expecting those to be out for comment in approximately two weeks.

Also, the Public Education Working Group, they

have met twice since the last meeting, and we discussed more air carrier presence at that time. I'd like to thank Susan from ATA and Debbie from RAA for participating in that, and we're going to be meeting this afternoon. I just wanted to point out that we have two new chairs for that, Mr. Hudson and Mr. Salfen.

RADM FLYNN: Questions about the cargo working group or the ACSSP and indirect air carrier program changes? The foreign air carrier program? Any questions about that? I'll let the -- Tony, do you intend to put those up for comment?

MR. FEINBERG: Well, as Becky said, within two weeks. The thing is supposed to be being passed around now.

RADM FLYNN: Okay. Consultation working group,
Susan Rork.

CONSULTATION

MS. RORK: Thank you. The mission of the Consultation Working Group of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee was to evaluate and determine if the Federal Advisory Committee Act, FACA, could be amended to $AMERICAN \,REPORTERS,\,INC.$

permit airlines to meet with the FAA to provide technical information prior to FAA issuing security directives.

After extensive deliberations that lasted one year, the working group determined that legislation to amend FACA was not a valid option at this time. The conclusion was reached after studying a proposal to form a technical operations steering group, which FAA would convene when needed to provide the agency with technical and operational information.

The FAA stated that this type of group could not meet without public notice in the Federal Register, which we all know requires a minimum of three days advance notice and 15 days to get into the Register. Given the unpredictable nature of security threats, such a system would not provide any benefit to the FAA or the industry.

An exemption to FACA for national security reasons similar to the exemption granted to the Central Intelligence Agency was also studied. However, again, it was concluded that this exemption would be extremely difficult to obtain.

A third proposal considered by the working group was to seek a similar exemption, as provided in the Omnibus Consolidation Appropriations Act of 1997, which allows for consortias of government and industry representatives to meet to provide advice on matters relating to aviation security. However, after consultation with the Department

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of Transportation's legal staff, it was concluded that the
   exemption would not apply to security directives.
             Thus, the Consultation Working Group continues to
   support improved communications between the FAA and the
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   industry, and we do recommend that the ASAC authorize us to
   develop a list of common aviation security terms and
   definitions. This list would be used in rulemakings,
   airport and airline security programs, security directives
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9
   and information circulars. The working group believes that
   such a list would enhance the comprehension level for all
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   aviation security policy for both the FAA, the industry and
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   its contractors, and we are requesting ASAC's authority to
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   continue meeting to develop that list.
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             RADM FLYNN: Any comments or questions?
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              (No audible response.)
                           Thank you very much, Susan.
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             RADM FLYNN:
             PARTICIPANT: Do we vote on that?
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18
                           To adopt the report of that working
             RADM FLYNN:
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   group?
                            To allow them to continue to meet
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              PARTICIPANT:
   to develop the list of common terms.
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             RADM FLYNN: All right. The motion is to
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23
   continue the Consultation Working Group chaired by Ms.
24
   Susan Rork to continue the work in developing a glossary of
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   terms to be used in regulation, including emergency
26
   regulation.
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Would someone propose that?
              MR. ALTERMAN:
                             So moved.
              MR. DRISCOLL:
                             I second.
              RADM FLYNN: I'm sorry, was there any discussion
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   about that before I --
              (No audible response.)
              RADM FLYNN: Okay. Moved, second. Those in
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   favor?
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              (Chorus of Ayes.)
10
              RADM FLYNN:
                           Those against?
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              (No audible response.)
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              RADM FLYNN: Okay, your group continues.
                                                        Did we
   need that on the Cargo Baseline Working Group, anything on
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   that?
          I think that we have already said that what we need
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   to do is give everyone an opportunity to look at these
   changes when they come out for comment and meet at that
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17
   time.
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              The next, Captain Steve Luckey, Chair of the
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   ASAC's Employee Recognition and Utilization Working Group,
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   will give an update on the progress of that group.
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               EMPLOYEE RECOGNITION AND UTILIZATION
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              CAPT. LUCKEY: Thank you. The purpose of our
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   group primarily is to recognize that employees are indeed
   an asset. So much of the efforts being made in the
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   aviation security arena at this time are becoming very
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   costly, and what we have managed to do by hardening the
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target is to index; the threat goes up and then all the technology needed to confront it goes up, and we've gotten ourselves into a position right now obviously of being very, very cost conscious and very expensive in our efforts in combatting terrorism and providing airport security.

So what was proposed was the fact that we could take employees and, realizing that every individual that is on an airport is actually a human sensory detector device -- represents an aggregate sensory perception of all the things that you see and hear and touch and smell -- they are all out there, and a lot of people see all these things, but they really haven't in the past done anything about them. Of course, this is also from a cost conscious perspective, a very reasonable approach to aviation security.

So what we have done is -- and I believe we met a couple or three times, we're going to meet again tomorrow, hopefully we can tie this thing up for the most part tomorrow. After being chartered March 26, 1997, we have taken the categories and we have roughly broken them down and identified 20 different potential categories of employees at the airports in the country.

We have grouped them approximately according to either their areas of responsibility or their where they work, what they see, who they answer to, et cetera.

There's a lot of overlap, obviously, in these employee $AMERICAN\ REPORTERS,\ INC.$

groups; they are not all going to be an autonomous individual.

So what we've done is we've taken these groups, we have assigned it to the individuals on the committee, and we will be reporting back tomorrow with respect to what areas of responsibility there are, their resources, the areas they have access to and what they see, and methods of training them, formatting them. In other words, what we're trying to do here is get a culture shift and a paradigm change.

This is quite a challenge. We've been trying to do this in this industry for a long time. I think it can be done. I think it's just a matter of getting the team concept out there and getting people motivated appropriately.

So we have been interrogating and interviewing people throughout the country in the various areas. It is one of the assets of being a pilot or a flight attendant: you can get around and do many of the things that are very expensive to do otherwise, and it's right there, so we take the time to do it.

It has been interesting. Some of the more acutely aware things that are frequently overlooked is the fact that people don't challenge frequently. They see people out there and they just don't do it. We have asked them why they don't, and surprisingly enough, they are

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afraid to do it. They just are flat afraid to go up and talk to somebody.

This is as much of a problem as it is in conditioning these people. Their fears are based on the unknown, primarily, but I think with a little formatting and training, we can overcome some of these fears. Even if you can't, they can have an alternate method to exercise their sensory detection capabilities. That is, just simply have a point of contact. If they don't want to make the challenge, they can get somebody that will.

Although pilots being in a supervisory or command position, we don't look at challenging as being much of a challenge, for want of a better word, but it's just something that you ordinarily do in your daily job description. But that is not the case for people who are working on the ramp. It's easy to overlook their fears.

So what we have done is we're coming up with recommendations for forms of communication. Some of them may be just a simple thing of having a runner, just telling another employee, all the way up to the point of having some kind of a device, either a cell phone or a radio. All these guys run around now with radios on the ramp, et cetera, or have a telephone around, or they can contact someone in the supervisory arena or whatever. I'm not going to get into the details of it.

The other thing we are looking at is, how do we $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

motivate these people, how can we get them going, how can we utilize them, how can we best motivate them to do the job. Rather than get into the details of the report, this is kind of a progress update on what we're doing.

I think in the interviews that we have had we've been very successful in finding out that people really are eager to do what we want them to do.

A point in fact, not to take up too much time, but I fly a 747-400 aircraft with over 400 passengers on it internationally. We have a system of inspecting aircraft when they come in, and of course, being a \$150, \$160 million airplane, they don't let it sit on the ground very long. So it comes in from one flight, and they have a group of people, probably numerically about 20 people, young people who get on the aircraft, and they literally tear it apart. They go from one end of the aircraft to the other. They take every seat cushion out, they look under it, they look where the life vests are, they look overhead. They crawl all over the airplane, opening every door, looking in every nook and cranny, and they actually do a good job.

I took the opportunity here a couple of months ago, I was in Detroit and got on the aircraft early, and got on the PA while these people were making their search and I said, when you get done, I'd like you to come up front in the first class section and I'd like to talk to *AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

you for a little bit. And of course, this had never been done. Most of these people are very temporary, very short-lived and very unmotivated people for the most part. They don't get very much recognition.

So I had them sit in the seats when they were all done, and we had time to do this. I addressed them, and I said, you know, I just want to take the opportunity to thank you for what you're doing because I want you to realize that you are the last line of defense here. This is where the rubber meets the road; this is where the threat actually is. Although you people may not think your job is really important, we feel that it is very important, and I just want to take the time to thank you for it.

I had a picture from the Hughes Tech Center with some of the explosives testing that we do on hardened containers, and I passed that around to them. When I came to work the next time, their supervisor met me when I came in to go on the next flight to Tokyo, and she said, I can't tell you what you did. She said, that little five-minute or 10-minute presentation that you made to these people just completely changed their whole attitude. They just were full of questions, and they were just eager. She said, it just did a tremendous turnaround of their mindset or their paradigm.

It didn't take anything, it certainly didn't cost anything. This is where I'm coming from. This is an $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

actual example that just happened a couple of weeks ago.

If we can get this awareness out there, this is the purpose of this committee, is to utilize these people. They are there, they are already in place, they don't cost anything. By categorizing them and getting the pride and the recognition in there that they need to do, I think we're going to have something here that is really beneficial to what we're all trying to do in this room. It is not restricted by compliance; we have a lot of flexibility and a lot of latitude to employ this resource directly at the threat.

I think from the time that a car pulls up in front of the airport to the guy that checks the bags, he gets to look in the trunk, he gets to look in the car, but really, he's not formatted, he's not aware.

This isn't an expensive thing. I'm not talking about taking these people and putting them in a room and making them watch a video for three or four hours, or do something. All I'm talking about is making them aware and having them provided with the tools and resources and the awareness training and the direction and the guidance to consummate their visual capabilities and let them know that they are a key factor in the overall mosaic that we're trying to have here at the airport security program.

Thank you.

RADM FLYNN: Could you stay just in case we have *AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.*

some questions?

CAPT. LUCKEY: Sure.

RADM FLYNN: Questions?

MR. McGRAY: A comment. Duane McGray, Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network.

A number of airports are now involved in community oriented policing, and the community is the airport for us. A number of airports now have implemented airport watch programs, similar to neighborhood watch programs. They meet monthly and do recognition for people who have done the things that you just talked about. Many of them are implementing programs where they do similar inspections as the FAA does, where they go out on the ramp, tuck their badge away, and the first person to challenge them. the next meeting of the airport watch meeting that employee is recognized, given maybe a gift certificate for a meal at a restaurant, and given a plaque and recognized publicly at the meeting and everything. Those programs are being very successful in a number of airports.

I just throw that out for consideration, if you were not aware of it.

CAPT. LUCKEY: Yes, that's true. We have looked at several of these. Minneapolis has a \$50 reward, and they give it out and they post the guy's picture in the airport rag.

We are actually going down after this meeting, $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

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Bob Koch and I are going down to the ALEAN convention in
   Tampa. We're going to be down there working with those
   people for about three days in very similar programs.
   Thank you.
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             Any other comments or questions that anyone has
   about the program?
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             RADM FLYNN: Could you cover the membership of
8
   the working group, Steve?
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              CAPT. LUCKEY: The roster, I don't know, let's
10
   see.
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             RADM FLYNN:
                           That's okay.
12
             CAPT. LUCKEY:
                             I have it back in my -- Debbie and
   Susan and several of the others are on the working group.
13
14
   We're going to meet tomorrow about 10 o'clock, by the way.
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             RADM FLYNN: Well, to all of you who are involved
   in this, may I express appreciation, because it is very
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   important work and on the part of many of you it falls
17
   within the category of other duties, not assigned, that you
18
19
   pick this up and do it. It is very much at the heart of
20
   improving security.
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              I would like to congratulate you, Steve, for your
   chairmanship of this group, and all the members of the
22
23
   group for doing good work on it.
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              CAPT. LUCKEY: Thank you very much, sir.
25
   answer to your previous request, Jerry Wright, our staff
26
   engineer, staff coordinator at ALPA; Mr. Craig Williams,
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Mr. Ron Priddy; Ms. Rebecca Tuttle; Mr. Karl Shrum; Mr. Glen Johnson, Candice Kolander and Debbie McElroy is on it, Susan Rork. Have I missed anyone? RADM FLYNN: Well, thanks to you all. Thank you, 5 Steve. Pete Falcone of FAA is the chair of the Airport Categorization Working Group, and he'll give a report on 8 this effort. AIRPORT CATEGORIZATION 9 10 MR. FALCONE: Thank you, Admiral Flynn. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm circulating to the 11 12 members of the ASAC the briefing package that I prepared on 13 the subject. I think there's enough for the members in 14 attendance, maybe several extras. I'm Peter Falcone. As chair of the ASAC working 15 group, I'd like to present an update on the status and the 16 activities of the working group. 17

This ASAC subcommittee was constituted last year to examine what is an internal FAA security policy that addresses the security classification of U.S. airports. The actual details of the current aviation security classification are contained in the air carriers security program. I can say that as such that it is sensitive security information.

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I can say however that the purpose of aviation security classification derives from the fact that in the AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

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early '70s the issue of law enforcement support to screening checkpoints required that FAA develop a method for categorizing based on volume of persons and passengers passing through checkpoints a method of classifying the airports on the basis of size and size of operations. So that is the background.

This issue arose because members of the ASAC had approached FAA a year ago -- we have passed the one-year anniversary of this issue -- because airports were being changed, the categorization was being changed, apparently to the dissatisfaction of both the airport and the air carriers who were affected.

We haw come together and we have looked at the issue as a group. We have had several meetings. The perceived benefits of recategorization I'll review with you as discussed and debated by the working group.

If we re-order our current methodology based on a system that is quantitative, as you have heard Rick Lazarick refer earlier, we want to use quantitative methods, we can introduce more objectivity. We will eliminate what is now in place at most airports, where a factor which varies from two to seven is -- a multiplier is applied to the numbers of air carrier enplanements. For example, the air carriers report, their actual enplanements, and then the airport operator applies a factor of two or seven times that number, which gives us a AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

tremendous range, and it is very subjective and confusing,

I might add, to many people.

One of the issues that we have debated is that there could be a reduction and thus a simplification of our current system -- reduction of the number of security categories.

We have placed greater emphasis in our meetings on the necessity of dealing with threat to civil aviation security. Today the current system is based largely on numbers, with the exception of the category X airport classification, which requires additional special consideration.

We have also taken into account the need to develop a method by which the airport operators and the air carriers and the FAA can debate at a local level issues and resolve challenges to proposed changes in airport classification. That does not necessarily exist today. As I mentioned at the outset, it is an internal FAA policy that we operate. It has not been more than 20 years old, and as such it has not been one that is rooted in the current genre of partnership, a nice way of saying that it is almost a one-way operation out there. We want to change that.

We also would like to factor in greater contributions by the local airport community and especially the airport security consortia.

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The general goal of this work group is to increase responsiveness to changing conditions. We have talked about the changing airport and air carrier industry. We need to make sure that we are responsive to those changes in our internal polices as well. And also to provide for better allocation and management of security resources, both ours in FAA and the industry's.

The working group has met quite a number of times since last July. Our last meeting was April 1; it was a full day session hosted by the Airports Council International, a very productive meeting.

The group has also been given an options paper or staff paper produced by FAA, and has developed a preliminary recommendation. We are by no means prepared to present today a new method for classifying airports. The group would like to meet further. So I would suggest if there is a motion, that this group will need an extension of its charter in order to accomplish its goal.

Although the group has not articulated the actual process, there is a basic formula that has been concluded. The formula includes serious consideration of the threat issue. It is prominent. A number, a weighted factor of 55 percent at minimum has been suggested as the number that should be the significance of this.

Next, the operational aspect, passenger enplanements, plus or minus 35 percent, and then plus or $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

minus 10 percent for local input to include FAA Associate
Administrator Flynn.

Factors for enplanement, what we have agreed upon in terms of definition, enplanement includes international, domestic. We would also consider the differences between originating and online transfer of passengers and basically how one airport's volume would relate to the overall national enplanement figures. As an example, what percentage would JFK represent out of the total U.S. picture.

Factors, definitions under threat consideration. The threat would be as determined by the FBI and the U.S. intelligence community. The mix of the fleet, of the aircraft fleet actually serving the airports, the geographic location of the airport and whether it is a port of entry having international operations and other geopolitical considerations.

So we have not come to the point where we have a technical document for consideration, but this is the work thus far. I would invite other members of the group to add or detract from these comments, or questions.

RADM FLYNN: Mr. Graser.

MR. GRASER: As a member of the group - Al Graser, American Association of Airport Executives -- one of the things I think that Pete focused on is the group from its initial meeting and especially at the last two $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

meetings, focused on one of the major ingredients -- and it probably would be higher if we had a way of really focusing on it -- is the basis of the threat information and what the specific threat might be.

One of the things that I think this group and working with the intelligence community and everything that is going to be essential in the future is to as best we can start defining down from an international to a national to a local threat, to give us more of a basis of establishing finite definitions of what the categories would be.

So I think that is why we weighted it at 55 percent. If we had more comfort in what the specific threats might be, I think our percentage might even be larger.

RADM FLYNN: My reaction to that os that it seems to me that it might be possible on the basis of such things as the aircraft mix, the nationality of aircraft operating at the international airports, and then some factors having to do with the presence of certain entities in the immediate locality of the airport, that might be able to make some differentiation with regard to a handful of airports, a relative handful of airports, that might be able to say that with regard to certain cities and then the makeup of the traffic at certain airports, that might be able to say that there are some 20 or 30 of the 450 regulated airports that stand out in some way.

I wonder if that wouldn't lead us back to where we are with category X. Then, having gone from that number of airports, I wonder if the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community is going to be able to be helpful in making distinctions with regard to the rest of the airports. I would invite Mr. Rasner of the FBI to comment.

MR. RASNER: I think we have spoken at a categorization meeting, and I still think this is a little higher than it should be. There are a lot of factors that go into these categorizations.

I've been reading over the previous categorization, and felt that there wasn't a whole lot wrong with the old system. We probably need to in our next categorization meeting readdress this issue.

RADM FLYNN: I have no particular argument with 55 percent, 45 percent, whatever number people come up with in the group. But I would urge you all, and urge the Chair, Pete Falcone, to come to some understanding with regard to categorization soon.

I think this is one where you just have to apply your best judgment to it, that there isn't a nice sort of table that you can go into and find numbers on it.

by the rest of us to come up with something, with the assurance that we are not going to pick over your judgments too much on it.

Give it the best shot you can, because it really is a matter of what you think you know about this country, what you think you know about this industry, and what you think you know about the possible thinking of terrorist groups.

All of that is pretty imponderable when you add it all up together. So try to come to a decision that the rest of us in the ASAC can look at and adjust our categories and move on with it.

MS. McELROY: Debbie McElroy with the REA. As someone who has participated on this, and also as representing many of the airlines that are serving some of the airports where the change in categorization became a point of great contention, we did -- as Pete mentioned, the day-long meeting had a quite thorough discussion of all the issues. Unfortunately, the FBI could not attend that day, and we didn't have the benefit of their information.

But we firmly believe, as the Gore Commission brought up and as has been discussed here, that threat has to be the primary factor. We recognize that the FBI has some limits, but we also recognize that there is a civic significant amount of government money and federal resources going into vulnerability assessments and threat AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

assessments. We think that as we get more information on that and more analytical tools are developed, that perhaps we will be able to do this from a more analytical perspective in terms of the categorization.

So we look forward to having the FBI's participation at the next meeting. I very much appreciated the earlier presentation from the Tech Center, because I had not been aware of many of these studies. I think through all of the efforts that your staff and others are doing, that we will be able to accomplish what you're looking for.

RADM FLYNN: Thank you, Debbie. For the FBI, by all means, the rest of you disagree with this, but I don't think we're going to put your findings with regard to threat under an electron microscope. I mean, we recognize that there is, again, a fair amount of uncertainty with regard to estimating the intentions and capabilities of possible attackers.

So again, we would encourage the FBI to give it the best shot you can, and recognize that this it is going to have pluses or minuses on it, and we're going to work within a range of comfort with regard to the designation of these airports.

there is no doubt about it. But as we heard from one of the earlier speakers today, the unpredictable nature of the security threat is present. It is a very fluid and very mobile threat. We have to be aware of that in the categorization of these airports. RADM FLYNN: Yes, but FBI needs to either say, look, the threat is uniform and ubiquitous, or it is

somewhat different in some places than in others. there is something to be said for the latter proposition, that there is more of a threat at some places than others, and give the working group the benefit of your best judgment with regard to that, with the assurance that nobody else knows anything more about it than you guys do.

> MR. DODSON: Alvy Dodson from --

With the possible exception of Alvy RADM FLYNN: Dodson.

(Laughter.)

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I would just like to -- I notice in MR. DODSON: Pete's report, Pete, it's mentioned throughout this the security consortia. I would just ask that your group be aware that there are different levels of involvement of security consortia at the various airports.

There are some airports that do not even have a security consortium. To prominently say that they are going to lead or direct some of these things, I just think that that ought to be kept in mind, because some of them AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

NATIONWIDE WASHINGTON-METRO FAX(800) 929-0130 (703) 330-5126 (703) 330-4721 are very, very active, but some of them are not at all.

So I don't know where that puts things in relation to what you're working on, but I think the committee ought to keep that in mind.

MS. McELROY: And I think we tried to do that too, Alvy, but we really thought it was important that since so much emphasis by the Gore Commission and the FAA has been on the importance of local consortia where they exist, we really wanted to highlight their input because they do provide critical information.

MR. GRASER: I think we tried to focus on -- and maybe it is just a change of words -- where it says local input. I think that is what we were focusing on. It would be local inputs such as consortia, APA committees, whatever, whatever the local input would be, to flavor whatever the categorization decision would be.

RADM FLYNN: And I think we're almost at the point of having the advisory circular out that will help the formation of additional consortia.

May I say for the ASAC that we urge this committee to come to closure on this categorization before our next meeting? Because there are a lot of things that are very hard to do; this one isn't particularly easy, but it seems to me that it is one where the working group ought to be able to close this up and come with their recommendation as to how to group airports by the next $\frac{AMERICAN\,REPORTERS,\,INC.$

meeting, particularly if the next meeting is as distant from this one as this was from the last.

I would suggest that we take a break. Frequently there is value in these meetings and the meetings at the sidelines. Let's return at 11:15.

(Recess.)

RADM FLYNN: Our next topic is the universal access system, and Karl Shrum has been chairing that group. I call on Karl to give us an update on the working group's progress.

UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYSTEM

MR. SHRUM: The universal access system task force has been at it four years now. The way I kind of summed things up a the meeting yesterday was that either there is light at the end of the tunnel, or I'm due for a neurological exam.

The technical part of it is done. Congress appropriated the two million. We built it. It works. We have learned some things along the way. There were some additional considerations in translating the test program at a few airports into a true system-wide implementation.

The result of all this has been a series of documents. The initial standards we set for the test program, the test program report, and most recently we have developed a concept of operations and a set of functional requirements for a central database.

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The cannon, so to speak, for the U.S. test program has been completed. We are at the stage where we can reproduce and disseminate these documents as information, and intend to do so, to airport operators, their carriers. But these aren't true standards in the sense that a couple of years back we developed a series of standards for automated access control systems through RTCA Special Committee 183.

At the time that we wrapped that work, we left a placeholder in the document, intending at this stage to go back and insert as an appendix -- at any rate, that is the format it is in now -- standards for a universal access system in the RTCA document. One of the conditions we stipulated in development of the RTCA standards is that they would be compatible with the universal access system.

So we intend to reactivate that work group, add to the standards as necessary, complete them to incorporate the necessary standards for a universal access system.

The second half of our charter, apart from the test program, was to develop an overall implementation plan. The bulk of yesterday's meeting was a discussion of a proposal, which at this stage is still conceptual, to actually implement UAS on a true system scale. Tentatively we are talking about perhaps the 25 largest hubs, and involving about 80 air carriers. But there is a significant difference between a test program on a few AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

airports and a true system implementation. If the implementation is less than systemic, we haven't really achieved our goal.

The key question in all of this, of course, is funding. This whole project was undertaken because the initial industry attempt to develop a transient crew security system went under during the recession for lack of airline resources. It is quite apparent in today's climate that the funding again will not materialize within the industry. Even if funding is appropriated at the federal level, if this funding is within the existing appropriations for aviation, we would have competing interests. For example, UAS would have to compete for AID money with runways, or UAS would have to compete with F&E money for new control dollars, these kinds of considerations.

So the proposal was for the industry to seek an appropriation from Congress for the initial cost, in other words, to install it, to establish the central database. Thereafter we would identify -- or, having identified, I should say, an operator of the central database, there would be -- the proposed implementation would be for industry to seek an appropriation from Congress.

Of course, in the year of the balanced budget, there really is no such thing as new spending. You've got to take something from one rice bowl and put it in another. $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

But the intent is that, for example, we would appropriate the necessary funds by deleting, to use one example, Bosnian war relief, as opposed to funds earmarked for the aviation system. Some of you may recognize that quite recently there was a huge chunk of AIP funds that were earmarked for Bosnian war relief, until that situation was corrected.

Thereafter, having identified the central database, that database would be maintained through a system of user fees charged to the airlines. This, as I said, was a conceptual proposal. Before anybody, for example, seeks an appropriation, we need to get more precise and better vetted cost estimates.

This is difficult. There is a wide range of variability between various airports, types of systems, vendors and ultimately, of course, the actual price of the system is negotiable. But what we need is the most defensible estimates and some reasonable assurance that the funding requested is (a) adequate, and (b) is not on the other hand excessive.

Further, before we present this implementation plan to prospective participants, we would have to make some determinations as regulatory policy. For example, the question of ramp movement would affect, for example, who would participate in the system or how many access points you might need.

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We formed a subgroup to address those questions, principally regulated parties, airports, air carriers and of course, including pilot representatives. This situation is somewhat complicated by the fact that we are in the midst of rulemaking on 4107 for the fundamental airport security regulations.

On the one hand, the rewrite would explicitly address UAS and alternative access. On the other hand, some of the finer policy determinations are subject to change.

Having refined and fleshed out this proposal somewhat, we would be prepared to actually draft some correspondence to the airport and airlines, soliciting their participation in the UAS. We need to have some fairly specific information before they can reasonably be asked to make a commitment to participate. It is kind of a chicken and egg problem, because it is difficult to come up with some of the parameters of the system if you don't know who might be participating. But we'll deal with that.

The final consideration is the work group needs to develop some formal recommendations for the full ASAC to consider, approve, and pass to the Administrator for eventual acceptance.

Questions, comments?

(No audible response.)

MR. SHRUM: As I say, it has taken a long time, AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

but we're getting there. Hearing none --

RADM FLYNN: Thank you, Karl. Perhaps, Karl, since you are there, we could ask you to address the status of rulemakings.

RULEMAKINGS

MR. SHRUM: Starting from the top, screening of checked baggage on flights within the United States, aka, CAPS. Mort Downey was briefed on April 16. We are in the final stages of coordination in the Office of the Secretary. The notice of proposed rulemaking would then proceed to the Office of Management and Budget, which must act on it within 60 days.

RADM FLYNN: That rule is the rule that will regulate the security of checked baggage in flights within the United States. As you recall, the direction from the White House Commission was to screen bags initially on the basis of a profile -- the profile is CAPS -- and until such time as sufficient explosive detection systems are in place, to match the bags with the passengers as the security control on checked baggage, again on the basis of the profile CAPS.

So we have now, as of today, a system that is moving to screening passengers with CAPS which will come into effect by the end of this year, with the predominant measure for securing of checked bags at the moment being bag match. That will phase out as the equipment for

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screening checked bags is deployed.
              The regulation is intended to provide the
   regulatory framework and the actual requirements for
   regulated parties to make that happen.
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             MR. ALTERMAN: CAPS would be?
                           Sorry, Computer Assisted Passenger
             RADM FLYNN:
   Screening.
                             I wonder if I could ask the status
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             MR. ALTERMAN:
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   of it again because you went by it quick. Could you do
10
   that one more time?
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             MR. SHRUM: Yes.
                                The process is, of course,
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   there is a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which is issued
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   for comment, which we have drafted. It is coordinated
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   within FAA, then it goes over to the Department and is
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   coordinated within the Department. Ultimately the
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   Secretary approves. It then has to go to the Office of
   Management and Budget. Principally they will look at the
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   cost benefit analysis. It is issued for comment.
18
19
   consider the comments, modify accordingly, and then it
   would be issued as a final rule, perhaps sometime late in
20
   the year.
21
                             At this stage it is at OMB for
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             MR. ALTERMAN:
   their --
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             MR. SHRUM: No, it hasn't cleared the Department
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        We have briefed the Secretary. The folks over there
   yet.
26
   have no significant objections. Like any legal document,
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there is infinite drafting that goes on, edits, comments,
   that kind of thing. But it should be over at OMB very
   shortly.
             RADM FLYNN:
                          Mr. Hudson.
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             MR. HUDSON: Do I understand that CAPS is not
   active now, or are you just speaking of a rule for checked
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   baggage?
              MR. SHRUM: CAPS has been implemented on a
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   voluntary basis by the airlines rather expeditiously.
   is actually in use now. Other airlines are bringing it on
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          Some are in beta test, some will be fully up and
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   line.
12
   running later this year.
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             MR. HUDSON: Can you give us any overall sense of
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   what the status of it is? It is something we are often
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   asked. Like how many airlines are doing it?
             MR. SHRUM: The last I checked, we had three
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   major airlines fully implemented, one in beta test, one is
17
   initiating implementation. This is out of the seven
18
19
   majors.
20
             RADM FLYNN:
                           It is really a question of the
   reservation systems because if you look at it from the
21
   point of view of the aspect of the major airline involved,
22
   it also involves a great number of other users of that
23
24
   reservation system.
25
             MR. HUDSON:
                           I think we anticipate all majors to
   have it online by November, I think, and all but one by
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September. MR. SHRUM: There is one major airline that is in the process of changing their reservation system. will be delayed somewhat until they have completely changed 5 over. MR. DRISCOLL: Driscoll. It is my understanding, based on the prior discussions we've had, that that will 8 not be applicable to chartered transportation. 9 MR. SHRUM: I really can't go into the specifics of the rule, but when the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is 10 published, the treatment of public charters will be 11 12 addressed in that rule. MR. DRISCOLL: In line with what we had 13 14 discussed, I assume. MR. SHRUM: I don't think that what will be in 15 the rule will be a particular surprise to anybody within 16 the industry. 17 18 MR. DRISCOLL: All right. 19 MR. ALTERMAN: Along those lines, and again, 20 without revealing some of the regulations, we expect that air couriers who use the checked baggage function as a part 21 of their business, will that be addressed in this 22 23 regulation? 24 MR. SHRUM: Courier consignments are actually 25 addressed in the security program amendments we mentioned 26 earlier. AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

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MR. ALTERMAN: So that they won't be included in
   this?
             RADM FLYNN:
                           To the extent that something is a
   checked bag, then it applies.
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             MR. ALTERMAN: And sometimes it is with on-board
   couriers.
6
             RADM FLYNN: When it is not, when it is cargo,
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   something else applies.
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             Okay, the rest of the rules, Karl.
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             MR. SHRUM: Okay. The rewrite of FAR Part 107,
   airport security, and FAR Part 108, air carrier security.
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   The Notice of Proposed Rulemakings were issued for
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   comments. We've got about 250 or so in hand total.
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             There were many requests that we consider a
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   Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
                                                 What we have
   done is reopened the comment period and planned a couple
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   more listening sessions, one here in Washington on May 21,
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   another in Nashville on June 4, the day after the AAAE
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   convention down there. Of course, we would have most of
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   the interested parties in one place at one time.
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              The comments to us indicate that the proposal was
   not well understood. What we thought to be reasonable and
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   well considered, generated a lot of profound concern.
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              What we are going to try to do is, through these
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   listening sessions create a better understanding of FAA's
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   intention. For example, in some cases we've got a very
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serious concern generated by what in fact is status quo in terms of what is already in security programs and has been for many years. Ultimately, we still may agree to disagree, but at least we will completely understand the intent of the proposal.

Debbie?

MS. McELROY: Karl, in order to completely inform many of us who work for associations to inform our members about the structure of this, there had been some concern in the past about listening sessions and the structure, so that they didn't necessarily facilitate that understanding of what you had written.

Is it your intent to go over each proposed section or, given what you have understood from the comments, are there certain areas that you are going to provide discussion on as to, this is what we at the FAA meant with this section? How do you plan to do it?

MR. SHRUM: Within the rulemaking process, I can do whatever I can to better explain the intent of the proposal. It would not be appropriate to respond to or attempt to rebut the comments. On the other hand, with the comments at hand, I know what areas need to be addressed. But the session itself would probably be much like the one we conducted in Fort Worth, where I was able to talk fairly freely within the bounds of the actual notice published in the Federal Register. If I get too far afield from that, AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

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expand and amplify, then we get into ex parte
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   considerations, which simply is that anyone affected should
   receive adequate notice.
             MR. CEBULA: Andy Cebula, NATA.
                                               The issues that
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   you discussed in Fort Worth and in these subsequent
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   meetings, are they made a part of the docket? Because
   there are those like me who didn't go to Fort Worth, and it
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   would be --
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             MR. SHRUM: Oh, yes, we actually got a court
   recorder, just like we have here, and the whole thing is
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   put verbatim into the docket.
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             MR. CEBULA: So it is in the docket?
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             MR. SHRUM: Yes.
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             MR. McGRAY: Karl, the two additional meetings
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   then are just an extension of what we have already been
16
   through.
             MR. SHRUM: We're going to reopen the comment
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18
   period.
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             MR. McGRAY: Yes, so there are no changes that we
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   are going to -- that they are briefing us on. There won't
   be any changes until after these sessions are done, right?
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             MR. SHRUM: Yes, we're still dealing with the
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23
   NPRM as it was issued.
             RADM FLYNN: Okay, next.
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25
             MR. SHRUM: Identical security measures for
   foreign air trades.
                         FAA went over to the Department for
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review over a year ago. The current status is that the counsel's office and the Department is drafting a summary of transmittal up to the Secretary to be cleared out of the building to go over to OMB.

Certification of screening companies. We issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, had drafted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. In briefing and coordinating the notice, essentially we came to realize that what we had was a rule regarding the certification process, more than an actual substantive improvements to screening, many of which are currently in the development and deployment stage. A lot of the work relating to human factors, threat image projections, SPEERS in general and computer-based training, was not fully incorporated into the notice.

We decided that if this rule is going to be everything that it should be, those things should be incorporated as they are still under development. We are going to hold off for a time until these things have been demonstrated, because they are the basis for establishing the standards that ultimately would result in certification or decertification. So we don't feel at this point that we are prepared to go to propose the ultimate rulemaking that would result from this whole initiative. It is still work in progress.

Criminal history records checks, principally for *AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.*

screening personnel. We issued a Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking. We have analyzed the comments and are now in the process of drafting a final rule, which would be due out in September if we are to meet the legislative deadline to issue a final rule within 16 months of close of comments on the notice.

One other. We have recently issued criteria for the certificate of EDS, specifically a standard based on detection of detonators. This is work that has been in progress for a long time, finally cleared through the building, and is now out in final.

Ouestions? Comments?

measures rulemaking, as long ago as two years ago, we said that while the rulemaking was progressing, we would engage with the civil aviation security authorities of other nations in a revalidation of the security programs of U.S. carriers at overseas stations, and do that in effect on an airport by airport basis, taking into account the introduction of improved technologies and procedures at those airports in the amendment of the U.S. carrier programs that would result from that process of revalidation.

That work on revalidation is progressing in a number of countries, and we are unwilling to say which ones because on a number of those issues the countries concerned $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

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have asked that we not speculate publicly about the process
   of revalidation of the programs. But it is underway.
              Any other questions about the process of
   rulemaking? Mr. Hudson.
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              MR. HUDSON: Do you have in progress anything to
   mandate installation of explosive detection systems as part
6
   of rulemaking for this year?
                           The checked baggage screening rule
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              RADM FLYNN:
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   includes the means for screening checked baggage. So it is
   more than touched on there. The checked baggage screening
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11
   is an integral part of that rulemaking.
12
             Any other questions?
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              (No audible response.)
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              RADM FLYNN: I'd ask Mr. Ron Polillo, leader of
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   the Security Equipment Integrated Product Team, to give a
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   status report on the IPT.
                       SECURITY INITIATIVES
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18
                 STATUS OF THE SECURITY EQUIPMENT
19
                      INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAM
20
              MR. POLILLO: Good morning. I'll wait a couple
   of seconds here to pass around the handouts.
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22
             RADM FLYNN: Oh, I'm sorry.
                            The first topic I'm going to cover
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              MR. POLILLO:
24
   under the IPT deployment is CAPS, one of the questions we
25
   just recently asked. Some information provided is that
26
   there are seven major computer reservation systems, and
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identified on the list there are the lead carriers. We have multi-host carriers on some of the systems, like Continental, there's five other carriers. With American Airlines and Saber there's 13 other multi-host carriers.

The FAA has presented each of the lead carriers with an agreement. It's basically a cooperative agreement. It is a different way of doing business in the FAA.

Normally we would either have a grant or contract, but under the CAPS implementation, the FAA does not have enough funds to fully fund CAPS implementation. Therefore, it is a partnership, a true partnership, with the airlines in the implementation of CAPS. So we have what is called a cooperative agreement.

On February 11th this was presented to all the lead carriers, and Southwest is the only airline so far who has fully signed off and has implemented the agreement. We are in negotiations back and forth with the carriers and their legal staff and the FAA legal staff on the agreements.

Northwest was the air carrier who we developed through grants from the Tech Center the initial CAPS program. They were fully implemented on January 12th system wide. We have also tasked through a contract with Northwest to provide consultation services with the FAA to the other lead carriers in bringing CAPS up on the other six reservation systems.

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United is fully up and running on February 5th, and TWA also uses Worldspan, is up. American has their beta version up and testing and expanding, and we hope to have all seven of the computer reservations systems up in September, and with multiple users on their systems.

On the deployment of the computer CTX 5000 SP, the only certified EDS system, we procured 54 units on Christmas Eve of '96, with a max of 100 units over a two-year period. So the initial buy was for 54. As of the end of March, we factory accepted and tested, and FAA approved and accepted now 44 of those units. So by the end of May or the first week in June or so, we will also have received the last 10 units.

Eighteen of those units are installed at 8 airports for 11 air carriers' use. And then we upgraded three, two in Atlanta and one in San Francisco for United that were initially out under the R&B demonstration project. We have upgraded them now with all the same software and everything as the other 44 units that we have procured. So we now have 21 units at nine airports for 12 air carriers.

We also have one that was shipped to the Tech

Center. It is being used for configuration management and

training, and we also use it to develop our images for

libraries. We have 12 volumes of TIP, trace image

projection images, on the CTX now that we are developing,

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of 250 images per volume, so this way the screeners can't get used to looking at a TIP image. The random selection of these various images and the volumes are loaded by month, so you get a whole new set of images each month.

We have nine units that have been shipped to locations around airports ready for installations coming up. We have 16 units in storage in California, waiting to be shipped out.

Over the next quarter, April through June, we will be installing 21 units, and the last quarter we will be putting the remainder 14 units. These are going into the more complex integrated baggage areas. We are waiting for construction to be done, and new baggage systems installed and so forth.

Some of the initial delays or issues that we had of, first of all, getting some of the units in was, on the envision side, it was a small R&D company that was accelerating into a production company. We had to institutionalize a quality assurance program within their company. This has come a long way, and it is a very good program today. In March we tested five units. All five units passed, so we really increased the quality control program and development of these systems.

The other one is, in order to make sure that systems are running on a daily basis, we had to have a calibration tool. We call it an image quality test bag, $\frac{AMERICAN\ REPORTERS,\ INC.}{}$

where when the units are shipped, a specific bag goes with each unit that has been tested at the facility and is a calibration bag that is then rotated in different positions through the unit each morning when it is fired up, to make sure that it is functioning properly. So that had to be developed.

Then the other thing we ran into was site surveys. In the beginning of our criteria for deployment, that has changed a little bit from the day we started, on how we were going to deploy the CTX 5000's and how the air carriers were going to be using them. Also, the physical location, whether they are going to be in the lobby or they are going to be integrated into the baggage system.

A lot of it was a hold-off on waiting to see how well CAPS was going to be performing, what was the selection rate really going to be, was it multi-digit, single digits, and how could they handle that much bag flow.

So after January, this thing with CAPS, when the air carriers start bringing CAPS on board and starting to realize a real figure for what the select area was going to be, we then started moving out with a more firm location in the airports on where we were installing these equipments.

So the resolution. As I mentioned, we have a much better quality control program. Also, what we did is we accelerated the communications between our integration $AMERICAN \,REPORTERS, \,INC.$

contractors working with air carriers directly on trying to speed up the process of signing off on site survey reports and also site installation plans. Once we determine where the physical site is going to be for the equipment, then we go into the detailed A&E drawings and then submit for air carrier approval then in more detail, and then we go in for the permits with the airport authority and the cities, and go through that process.

So it takes quite a while to get a system in place and get all the approvals, and each city is different. We have them coming up with wanting UL approval and wanting all kinds of other safety things, so it takes a while to go through all the hoops to get all the signoffs for all the permits.

I must say, though, that the air carriers have really been proactive in working with the FAA to get the equipment in there. I have air carriers that raise their hand every time there is another piece of equipment that is available to go in. In fact, I've got a list of cities from some of the air carriers where they would like to see more of them in place now.

On the trace detection equipment, where we are putting them out into checkpoints, we have 253 units out there today at 39 airports for 23 air carriers' use. By the end of June, we'll have 387 out there at all checkpoints at 55 airports. Then by the end of September,

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we should have a total of 489 trace systems employed, not only at the checkpoints, but also co-located with all of the checked baggage screening technology.

On the advanced technologies, these dual energy X-ray type systems and a quantum magnetics UR system. We have procured 10 of the EG&G scans, eight VIVITs, two Hyman systems and two quantum magnetics. All those procurements are in place. We have tested the EG&G. Those units are now built. We have tested some VIVIT systems. As we speak, the Hyman is at the Tech Center, two Hyman systems are being tested over this week and next week. And the quantum magnetics systems will be at the Tech Center in May for testing. The installations of these units will be in June through September. Most of these systems are going to be integrated into the baggage system.

SPEERS, this is the computer-based training of X-ray screeners. We have signed off with the Safe Passage International now on the contract, and we are in process of a public release and notification to Congressmen and Senators, so we're getting very close now to making a public announcement of an award of this system.

It is for a minimum of 15 computer-based training platforms and up to 60 to go into the category one airports. It is Windows DOS-based systems. It will have anywhere from two work stations up to 10 work stations, depending on the number of screeners at the airport. The $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, INC.$

15 is based on a category one airport, of having at least 100 screeners. All 60, based on having enough funding, will be deployed by September.

Any questions? Yes.

MR. McGRAY: Duane McGray from ALEAN. Just a question on the ETD systems. Those seem to be way behind schedule from what we originally had thought we were going to -- the original schedule. Can you elaborate on that?

MR. POLILLO: Yes, the trace detection systems, what the IPT did there, they were all tested first at the Tech Center and assessed as effective from a laboratory environment to see if they could detect various types of explosive material.

These systems, most of them, have been built for forensic purposes, laboratory use; have not really been rigorously operated in an airport environment. So the IPT, the air carriers and FAA, decided to do some operational evaluation and put a number of these units out at the checkpoints, and collect data from both an ongoing performance to see if they drift over a period of time, and what would be the calibration process to bring them back in line, or if they would burn up from the daily use at a checkpoint and that type of a throughput.

From that, the evaluation team on the IPT then presented a report to the IPT on what equipment did meet FAA and IPT requirements from both technical and $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

operational requirements. Then that information was used to then start buying some more units. So that period of time, the holdup was really that operational evaluation and analysis to see which units 5 would really hold up in an airport environment. So now we are moving out, deployment has been well under way, and as I said, we have 39 airports already in place. Any more questions? 8 9 (No audible response.) 10 RADM FLYNN: All right, thank you, Ron. I missed the Carriage of Weapons Task Force 11 12 report. Could we have that report, please? Don Cotton. CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS TASK FORCE 13 14 MR. COTTON: Good morning. I was not here for the initial introductions this morning. 15 I'm Don Cotton. Ι work for Karl Shrum in the Office of Policy and Planning. 16 My comments today are more in line of a special 17 request, as opposed to a truly status report. But let me 18 give you just a few background comments for those of you 19 20 who may be new to ASAC. 21 Karl mentioned earlier this morning about UAS and going for four years. Don't you just hate those committees 22

and work groups that go on for so long? ASAC's Carriage of Weapons Task Force was formally chartered and held its first meeting in January, '92, so we are well beyond the four-year mark. However, there has been some progress, AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

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NATIONWIDE WASHINGTON-METRO FAX(800) 929-0130 (703) 330-5126 (703) 330-4721 several areas of progress made in the last few years.

One of the things that you who are new to the ASAC should know is that the Carriage of Weapons Task Force was formed to deal with a variety of issues relative to weapons on board the aircraft, specifically law enforcement officers flying armed.

Membership of the task force includes representation from pilots' unions, directors of corporate security from the major air carriers, Air Transport Association, Regional Airlines Association, and a variety of agencies and organizations from the law enforcement community.

The task force, after many months of meetings during the '92-93 timeframe, made recommendations for changes that would be incorporated in the rewrite of Part 108. Additionally, the Carriage of Weapons Task Force developed a training package that was intended to be required for all officers flying armed. The training package has been developed, disseminated, and it has been implemented by many, many agencies at all levels throughout the country.

The task force continues to meet to review and resolve issues within its charter. After the initial comment period closed December 1, 1997 for the MPRM 107-108, there were nearly 100 comments received from the law enforcement community.

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Many of these comments, to include letters from heads of agencies, took exception to some of the language in the MPRM that was drafted five years ago. So today, by way of a status report, the real purpose of my appearing on your agenda today and being here right now, is a request from the ASAC. The Carriage of Weapons Task Force requests the approval of the ASAC to convene a special task force meeting during the new comment period to review pending issues that are documented by formal comments during the initial comment period. This will help us to ensure a better product and one that is more likely accepted by all parties involved in this issue.

So Mr. Chairman, members of the ASAC, the task force requests your permission to convene this special meeting of the task force during the comment period to review and resolve some of those pending issues.

RADM FLYNN: Have you gotten counsel's approval on that?

MR. SHRUM: Let me simply say that what would be impermissible under the rulemaking process as an exparte contact between industry and affected parties is perfectly okay under the advisory committee process and whatever recommendations that may result would be included in the document. So for once, process will help us rather than hinder us.

RADM FLYNN: On that basis, can I say without *AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC*.

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objection that we would have that meeting happen? Any
   objection?
             MR. McGRAY:
                           I just have a question.
                                                    Duane
 4
   McGray from ALEAN. It is my understanding that many of the
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   comments that came up in the two public sessions were from
   people who were employees of agencies who were represented
   in the committee in the first place, who made the
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   recommendations for their agencies. Is that not correct?
                           That is correct.
9
             MR. COTTON:
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             RADM FLYNN:
                           Yes, there is a certain amount of
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   dissonance in this, for sure. I think that the meeting
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   that is proposed can resolve some of that.
13
                          Any other questions?
             MR. COTTON:
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             MR. TOMLINSON: I have a question, if you could
15
   educate me.
                The last --
16
             RADM FLYNN: The Secret Service?
17
                              I'm sorry, yes, John Tomlinson,
             MR. TOMLINSON:
   Secret Service.
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19
             Not too long ago, I guess it was in the fall,
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   there was a period where agencies and individuals could
             As Mr. Cotton explained, that took place. Why is
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   comment.
   a second period for comment needed?
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                           It is an extension of the period of
23
             RADM FLYNN:
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   comment because it seems clear to us that there are aspects
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   of the regulation as was proposed that are not sufficiently
   understood, and by having additional listening sessions and
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this session on this particular topic of the working group, those misunderstandings can be resolved before we go forward to draft the final rule.

MR. TOMLINSON: I certainly wouldn't take exception to sitting down and working out differences. I guess I was just concerned why, if you are given a period of time in which to comment, and you exercise that opportunity or where you don't exercise that opportunity, you make a decision, and then individuals, whether in this forum or a working group, sit down and work out what comments were received, as opposed to individuals getting a second --

MR. FEINBERG: Maybe I can address that. The driving force behind this is mainly a concern from the airports and air carriers about their parts of those two rules, not on the issue of carriage of weapons.

As you heard earlier, there were and still are a lot of folks in those communities who would very much like to have had a supplementary NPRM. After talking with them, we thought we would give it another try, because we thought many things had not been explained well enough to them.

This is the forum that we are doing that. We are having another couple of listening sessions. In order to have another couple of listening sessions, we have to reopen the comment period. That's why.

MR. TOMLINSON: I understand. Thank you. AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

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MR. DRISCOLL: So there is going to be a
   supplemental --
             MR. FEINBERG:
                             No.
                                  As of now, no.
             RADM FLYNN: Mr. Laird.
             MR. LAIRD: It is particularly bothersome, just
   sitting around this table -- Doug Laird, just speaking as
   an individual.
              It is particularly bothersome, having sat around
9
   this table with Susan Rork and many others for a lot more
   than five years, dealing with this issue of people carrying
10
   weapons on aircraft. I think many people may have
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12
   forgotten in time or lost track of the fact that one of the
   real instigators of this was the lack of uniformity among
13
14
   carriers on the issues of who could carry weapons and how
15
   the rules were interpreted.
              It was literally driving everybody crazy, because
16
   Airline A would do one thing, Airline B another, Airline C
17
   -- it was just chaos.
                          It created all kinds of
18
   unprofessional situations for people.
19
20
             We sat through meetings for year after year, and
   I saw until a couple of years ago when I no longer
21
   participated, that there was consensus around the table
22
   from all the agencies that are seated around this table,
23
   some of which are new faces, that an agreement was reached,
24
25
   and Don Cotton and the crew did a wonderful job of putting
26
   together a training program which was distributed.
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And now if I'm hearing this correctly, there have been a few people who have some dissension that may be different from what their agencies have already agreed to, and we're starting the process all over again. I'm just bothered by it beyond belief.

MR. McGRAY: Well, again -- Duane McGray from ALEAN -- I just want to echo what was just said by Doug. I think that -- you know, I was in Fort Worth, and I reviewed the document, and I think that what is in the revised -- or the rewrite is based on what your committee had come up with from people that represented these agencies.

I guess I don't have a problem with us doing it one more time to soothe some ruffled feathers. But on the other hand, I think that the committee did a good job, and the rule is a solid rule, and the agency representatives made recommendations that went into the rule.

What we've got is we are reacting to some dissonant employees, and I guess I have a little bit of a problem with that.

RADM FLYNN: There may be -- it is within the realm of possibility that there is something in those comments that all of you might say is worth adopting in the final rule. So we have asked for everyone's patience one more time. I ask particularly for Don Cotton's patience in doing this, because we in FAA think that the regulations, as rewritten in the NPRM, indeed did capture accurately the AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

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consensus of people who worked diligently on this over a
   number of years.
             But we have a responsibility to ensure full
   consideration of the factors that are brought to our
   attention before we proceed to the final rule.
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             MR. CUMMINGS: Kevin Cummings, U.S. Customs.
   Might I suggest that if we are to convene this group, which
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   I would agree with, that the primary ASAC person from the
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   agency be let know that there are comments on that area
   from their agency? Because they probably were not filtered
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   through the agency itself in many cases, so that you get a
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12
   truer position of the agency, and you can go back and get
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   the agency as opposed to an individual.
14
             RADM FLYNN: It isn't just agencies; it is
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   associations.
                   So it is associations that --
             MR. CUMMINGS: Well, I mean each one, every one
16
   involved, where there are comments, that you have more of a
17
18
   focused response from the group.
19
             RADM FLYNN: Can we do that, Karl?
20
             MR. SHRUM: All the comments are in public docket
   available to anybody, although we could pass them out as a
21
   basis for discussion.
22
23
             RADM FLYNN:
                           Okay.
24
             MR. COTTON:
                           Any other questions or comments?
25
              (No audible response.)
26
             MR. COTTON:
                           Just to reiterate what has already
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been said, this meeting that has just been requested and approved is not specifically because of comments received -- the decision was made to reopen the comment period, and we would like to take advantage of that to have another 5 meeting. Thank you. RADM FLYNN: Well said, I think. Thank you very much, Don. Yes, Steve. Steve Alterman, Cargo Airline 8 MR. ALTERMAN: 9 Association. Just a quick comment on the 107-108, since we seem to be going back to that, and these public meetings 10 and the listening sessions that are being held. 11 12 I guess what concerns me a little bit is that there were words written on a piece of paper that were the 13 14 proposed rules, and there were comments filed on the basis 15 of what was contained in those rules. What I am hearing now is we're having these listening sessions so that the 16 FAA can tell us what they think those words really said 17 because we all misunderstood what the intent was. 18 19 That is not going to change the words on the 20 So aren't we just extending this process beyond page. belief, because it doesn't matter what the FAA says; if 21 that was the intent, shouldn't the words be changed before 22 23 we get another shot at it? 24 RADM FLYNN: Karl?

MR. SHRUM: The comments didn't resemble the proposal, very simply. In other words, we're getting AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC.

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comments to assumptions, apprehensions, that don't resemble the intent. We want comments on what we really meant before we try and modify a proposal. We don't want to modify a proposal based on a misconception.

MR. ALTERMAN: I guess my problem is, if all the people around this table who are supposedly the security experts in the world thought they meant one thing, how come we're all so confused? And if we are so confused, shouldn't we get another shot at this somehow?

RADM FLYNN: I think that we do need to, for the sake of having clarity in regulations, keep open the idea of a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. I rather think, however, that -- and indeed, that is what is involved in this is a change of words. The question is, should that change of words be in a supplemental or should be just in the final rule.

Our working hypothesis at this moment is that we believe that there can be sufficient good faith understanding of what ought to be changed in the words of that rule through the process of the listening sessions, sufficient explanation and noting again of the positions of affected parties and others, that we can have confidence that the final rule will be that which -- that people have fully understood the intent of that final rule, and that it shouldn't come as an undue surprise to any of the affected parties.

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MR. FEINBERG: I just would like to add something, too. The reason we have administration law courts is because there are questions even when rules are finally promulgated with a great deal of care, presumably, about interpretation. In this case, the comments to us 5 reflected very clearly that people were not thinking we meant what we meant. Now, this happens not only with FAA and this 9 particular rule, but it happens all over the place. that is why there are administrative law judges. 10 are going to try to circumvent that to the degree we can by 11 12 having a further explanatory session. MR. DRISCOLL: Driscoll. In addition to the 13 14 listening sessions and going through those, are you going to accept additional written comments? 15 16 RADM FLYNN: Yes. MR. COTTON: Absolutely. 17 18 MR. DRISCOLL: Okay. 19 MR. SHRUM: Perhaps if I gave a concrete example 20 of the disconnect, you could appreciate where we're coming 21 from. In our proposal, we would make it a violation of 22 23 the FARs to have a deadly or dangerous weapon in a secure 24 area, i.e., the ramp in the vicinity of an aircraft, just 25 like it would be a violation to have a weapon in a sterile

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area downstream of the checkpoint.

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A lot of the comments came back that, you people have to be out of you minds, we can't screen everybody entering a secured area. That never entered our minds.

MS. McELROY: Debbie McElroy with RAA. As someone whose comments reflected that concern, I think that I would somewhat echo was Steve said.

I have carriers who operate in 49 of the 50 states, and we have many different inspectors who perhaps have different views. As was recommended by the Gore Commission, I think all of us would like to see regulations put in clearer language.

So I understand what you're trying to do from the listening sessions, and I applaud you for that, but I would put in a plea that that kind of language is what leads to problems between air carriers and airports and inspectors. So we need to be very careful to ensure that your intent is really clearly reflected in the verbiage that is put out.

RADM FLYNN: That sounds very reasonable, and the sort of thing that we ought to be doing in these listening sessions. We undertake to you that this is not sort of a palliative exercise of some kind, that we really are going to amend the words of those regulations to make them accord with that sort of common sense and reasonable comment.

MS. McELROY: Thank you.

MS. SHARP: I have one thing.

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RADM FLYNN: Sorry, Sharon, please identify yourself.

MS. SHARP: Sharon Sharp, DOT. I think there might be the impression here that at these two additional public meetings FAA might open or self-initiate a discussion of the issues to provide this clarification or explanation.

exclude.

I'm not sure that is how the public meeting will go. I thought that you would probably only respond subsequent to a presentation, is that correct?

MR. SHRUM: It isn't typical, but there is ample precedent, for example, for me to open the session with some kind of explanatory briefing. Again, I have to stay within the parameters of what is addressed in the preamble. I can't come up with is that aren't in the public notice.

On the other hand, for example, as I did in Fort Worth, I can certainly explain what we meant, for example, in terms of reconfiguring access controls to only those areas of the airport where large passenger aircraft are present. That was the first misconception that I wanted to dispense with, is that we are not -- in fact, again, the comments were exactly the opposite of what was intended, that this was going to create turmoil for general aviation and other parties that we were explicitly trying to

Having made that statement, I got much more $AMERICAN \ REPORTERS, \ INC.$

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sensible comments about what we really intended, and comments that we can actually use. As I say, comments on something that we didn't propose, didn't intend to propose, aren't much use to us. We want to make the process work. 5 RADM FLYNN: Let's give it a shot by these things and see what degree of confidence we have in the product 6 that is likely to emerge from that. We'll keep open the possibility of an SNPRM, but recognize that that is going 8 9 to leave us without an updated 107-108 considerably longer than this process of amendment following the listening 10 sessions can -- what is my verb? -- can achieve. 11 12 MR. FEINBERG: It is also possible that by these listening sessions we can eliminate a great number of the 13 14 issues among the community. If we had an SNPRM, that could 15 then be restricted to a much smaller set of issues, and minus those sessions, the rest of the rule could go 16 That is another possible option. 17 forward. 18 RADM FLYNN: We have come to the end of the items 19 on the agenda, and I'll now open the meeting for anything that the members would like to draw to the attention of the 20 21 committee. 22 (No audible response.) SCHEDULING THE NEXT MEETING 23 24 RADM FLYNN: The scheduling of the next meeting. 25 DFO, what do you have to say about that? 26 MR. FEINBERG: Well, 10 months is a long time. AMERICAN REPORTERS, INC. NATIONWIDE WASHINGTON-METRO FAX

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Shall we try for six?

matter was concluded.)

RADM FLYNN: Okay. This being April, that would be October, a meeting in October. We will put out the usual notice on that.

Thank you all very, very much for your time.

(Whereupon, the meeting in the above-entitled

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