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STATEMENT BY

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UNITED STATES ARMY

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Thank you Chairman Meehan, distinguished members of the committee, it is my pleasure to appear before this committee today and give my testimony on the Police Transition Team and the work of our Soldiers in Iraq and at the US Army Military Police School in support of the Police Transition Team efforts.

I entered the Army in 1976 as a Military Policeman (MP), Private, and moved through the enlisted ranks to Staff Sergeant, Squad Leader and Section Chief. In 1982, I attended Officer Candidate School and was commissioned a 2LT in the Military Police Corps. My assignments were typical and included company command of a division MP company; command of an installation detention facility; an assignment as Battalion Executive Officer that included a tour in Bosnia with the initial deploying elements; an assignment on the Joint Staff in the Counternarcotics Division of the J3; battalion commander, 793d MP Battalion in Germany that included a deployment with the first elements into Kosovo in June 1999; command of the 42d Military Police Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA that included duties as installation Provost Marshal and included a deployment to Iraq November 2004-November 2005. I am currently the Assistant Commandant of the MP School at Fort Leonard Wood, MO where we train all military police.

In my battalion's tour in Kosovo, we were charged with re-establishing the Kosovo Police force and worked hand in hand with the UNMIK police. We also worked extensively in controlling two of the major border crossing sites in our area of operations. Terms such as Rule of Law, Transition of Primacy, and police partnership programs were in use. Additionally, there was a distinct need for judicial, penal and police or law enforcement synchronization and mutually supporting efforts.

In Iraq, my brigade was initially responsible for supporting US Army forces mainly in Baghdad and Mosul in an attempt to stabilize and build the Iraqi

Police as well as the responsibility for securing Camp Cropper and the People's Mujahadeen of Iran (PMOI) in Camp Ashraf Iraq. At the end of our deployment, my brigade was responsible for the Police Partner Program (P3) that we developed and implemented throughout Iraq, to include coordination with the British efforts in Southern Iraq. This P3 program was the precursor of today's current Police Transition Team efforts. We could field, in the beginning, approximately 70 Police Partnership Teams.

With our experiences in Kosovo, and now in Iraq, we observed that the dismantled government had released all criminals and mental institution patients, property records were destroyed or moved, and Organized Crime, insurgents, former regime elements, and local political/tribal groups were vying for power and control of the populace. We also, as a collective coalition body, military and otherwise, struggled with how much and how soon authority to the developing government should be transferred. We observed that there were many seams throughout the area of operations and our areas of responsibilities were not aligned with the Iraq Police's areas of responsibilities; essentially, we had a very decentralized policing effort and there were seams throughout the country of which criminals and other elements were operating.

My first day after the transfer of authority, I went to a squad leader in West Baghdad and I asked—as new brigade commander in theater, what can I do to help you (the squad leader) in your mission. In a few minutes, the squad leader described that we could continue to train Iraqi police in all the basics, but what would really help was to fix the police headquarters at district and province level. The next day, in East Baghdad, I asked an MP platoon leader, from a different unit and working for a different Brigade Combat Team (BCT), the same question and she gave me nearly verbatim the same response as the squad leader. Within a week, my leadership and I surmised we had two significant obstacles to overcome—shortage of the required numbers of Military Police to “train” the Iraqi Police, and we were not fully going to have an effect unless we addressed training and partnership experiences with every echelon of the Iraqi Police (IP) system.

With the January 2005 elections quickly approaching, I laid out to MG Chiarelli, the 1st Cav Division Commander and his ADC, then BG Jones a partnership plan that had our brigade headquarters partnering with the Baghdad Police Chief, our two battalions in Baghdad partnering with the two IP Directorates, and my company commanders partnering with the District Police Headquarters and the squads and platoons partnering with police stations. This gave us synchronization (for policing) in our area of operations.

What really made our partnership different is that we brought to bear all the assets available in MP battalion and brigade staffs. While I was working with the Police Chief, my personnel or human resources staff worked with the Iraqi Police on recruiting, pay, assignments, and other personnel actions. My S2 or Intelligence Section, worked with the IPs on police intelligence and crime analysis. My S3 or Operations Section worked with the Iraqi Police headquarters on establishing operations centers and began helping them plan future operations. My S4 or Logistics Section worked daily with the logistics folks. My battalions used their staffs in the same partnership fashion with their Iraqi Police Counterparts. We tied in very closely with the efforts of the Maneuver commanders, CPATT, and MNSTC-I as we set about the police training team efforts.

Today, you will find more than 230 Police Training Teams (PTTs) that cover down on over 310 police stations and the numbers are growing. PTTs target police in-service training, emphasize rule of law, and work diligently to effect police administration, logistics, maintenance, police intelligence and operations, jail operations, and Force Protection. PTTs are tailored to the specific IPS echelon of command being worked, location, threat, and other related requirements.

A recent step the US Army Military Police School just completed was the establishment of a Police Transition Team Training Support Package (PTT TSP). The TSP sets the conditions for the incoming PTT elements to understand the most recent policing dynamics in Iraq, familiarize with the latest procedures and reports they will assume, and therefore reduce the transition time in theater.

This transition time, the time to get acquainted to the battlespace—the procedures, personalities and challenges has always been a critical time. During the transition period, momentum can be lost and seams can develop that allow insurgents or other groups to gain momentum and take the initiative. The TSP is a five day course where units who are going to Iraq to conduct a PTT mission, send their key leaders to. The key leaders take information and training materiel back to their units to train their Soldiers for deployment. The base TSP was developed from key personnel and experts that had just returned from Iraq. We then worked closely with the current elements in Iraq to get the latest forms, the latest procedures, and the latest challenges to the units so they can train their personnel and reduce that transition time while enhancing their effectiveness once on the ground.

The Iraqi Police stations must have the capability to operate under the rule of law construct; capable of apprehending, processing, and supporting investigations, adjudication, and incarceration. Building the effectiveness of the triad; the penal, judicial and law enforcement systems will ensure achievement of community security and community trust.

In conclusion, the challenges continue to be the environment, the groups vying for population control (organized crime, criminals, insurgents, terrorists groups, political/tribal parties), the number of PTTs, and the numbers of interpreters with each PTT. This partner program is the best chance for success, but will take time. It is an extensive effort under trying circumstances. There are a great majority of Iraqis and Iraqi police who are forever grateful for our efforts and are trying to effect change. You see it in their efforts and you see it in their eyes.

I'd like to thank this committee for your time and interest in the Police Transition Team program and will be happy to answer your questions.