<DOC> [109 Senate Hearings] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access] [DOCID: f:33836.wais] S. Hrg. 109-823 RENEWING THE TEMPORARY PROVISIONS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS AFTER LULAC V. PERRY ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS of the COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ---------- JULY 13, 2006 ---------- Serial No. J-109-98 ---------- Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary RENEWING THE TEMPORARY PROVISIONS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS AFTER LULAC V. PERRY S. Hrg. 109-823 RENEWING THE TEMPORARY PROVISIONS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS AFTER LULAC V. PERRY ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS of the COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JULY 13, 2006 __________ Serial No. J-109-98 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 33-836 WASHINGTON : 2007 _____________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ÿ091800 Fax: (202) 512ÿ092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402ÿ090001 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JON KYL, Arizona JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware MIKE DeWINE, Ohio HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JOHN CORNYN, Texas CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois TOM COBURN, Oklahoma Michael O'Neill, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Bruce A. Cohen, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN CORNYN, Texas DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California TOM COBURN, Oklahoma RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois Ajit Pai, Majority Chief Counsel Robert F. Schiff, Democratic Chief Counsel C O N T E N T S ---------- STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS Page Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas........ 2 prepared statement........................................... 211 Feingold, Hon. Russell D., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin...................................................... 15 Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts.................................................. 1 Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont, prepared statement............................................. 272 WITNESSES Avila, Joaquin G., Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, Seattle, Washington............................. 11 Carvin, Michael A., Partner, Jones Day, Washington, D.C.......... 9 Clegg, Roger, President and General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity, Sterling, Virginia................................ 4 Ifill, Sherrilyn A., Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, Baltimore, Maryland.................... 6 Perales, Nina, Southwest Regional Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, San Antonio, Texas............... 8 Thernstrom, Abigail, Senior Fellow, The Manhattan Institute, and Vice-Chair, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Lexington, Massachusetts.................................................. 13 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS Responses of Joaquin Avila to questions submitted by Senator Cornyn......................................................... 27 Responses of Michael Carvin to questions submitted by Senator Cornyn......................................................... 45 Response of Roger Clegg to questions submitted by Senator Cornyn. 49 Responses of Sherrilyn Ifill to questions submitted by Senator Cornyn......................................................... 50 Response of Nina Perales to questions submitted by Senator Cornyn 61 Responses of Abigail Thernstrom to questions submitted by Senator Cornyn......................................................... 62 SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, William Samuel, Director, Department of Legislation, Washington, D.C., letter.......................... 72 American Jewish Committee, Richard T. Foltin, Legislative Director and Counsel, Washington, D.C., letter................. 74 Asian American Justice Center, Karen K. Narasaki, President and Executive Director, Washington, D.C., letter and statement..... 75 Avila, Joaquin G., Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, Seattle, Washington, statement and attachment... 103 Carvin, Michael A., Partner, Jones Day, Washington, D.C., statement...................................................... 135 Clegg, Roger, President and General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity, Sterling, Virginia, statement..................... 144 Collet, Christian, University of California, Journal of Politics, Irvine, California, manuscript................................. 175 Editorials and articles concerning renewing the temporary provisions of the Voting Rights Act, list...................... 218 Friends Committee on National Legislation, Ruth Flower, Senior Legislative Secretary, Washington, D.C., letter................ 224 Harris, Fredrick C., Associate Professor of Political Science and Director, Center for the Study of African-American Politics, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, letter........... 226 Ifill, Sherrilyn A., Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, Baltimore, Maryland, statement......... 228 Ivory, Rev. Elenora Giddings, Director, Washington Office, Presbyterian Church (USA), Washington, D.C., letter............ 240 Keyssar, Alexander, Matthew W. Stirling, Jr. Professor of History and Social Policy, Chair, Democratic Institutions and Politics, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, statement....................................... 242 Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Jon Greenbaum, Director of the Voting Rights Project, Washington, D.C., statement...................................................... 250 Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Wade Henderson, Executive Director, and Nancy Zirkin, Deputy Director, Washington, D.C., letter......................................................... 269 League of Women Voters of the United States, Kay J. Maxwell, President, letter.............................................. 271 Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, John Trasvina, Interim President and General Counsel, Los Angeles, California, letter............................................. 275 National Association of Latino Elected Officials, Washington, D.C.: Arturo Vargas, Executive Director, May 9, 2006, letter....... 277 James Thomas Tucker, July 2006, survey....................... 279 National Black Law Journal, Glenn D. Magpantay and Nancy W. Yu, Vol. 19, Number 1, 2006, article............................... 312 National Congress of American Indians, Joe A. Garcia, President, Washington, D.C., letter and resolution........................ 344 National Council of Asian Pacific Americans, Washington, D.C., letter......................................................... 349 National Council of La Raza, Janet Murguia, President and CEO, Washington, D.C., letter....................................... 351 Oliver, Dana M., General Registrar, Salem, Virginia, letter...... 353 Pamintuan, Rudy, Chair, President's Advisory Commission on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, Washington, D.C., letter...... 356 Perales, Nina, Southwest Regional Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Los Angeles, California, statement...................................................... 357 RenewtheVRA.org: joint statement.............................................. 361 James Blacksher, Edward Still, Nick Quinton, Cullen Brown and Royal Dumas, June 2006, report............................. 365 Rosenberg, Steven L., County Attorney, County of Augusta, Virginia, Verona, Virginia, letter............................. 403 Sinclair-Chapman, Valeria, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, letter.. 405 Thernstrom, Abigail, Senior Fellow, The Manhattan Institute, and Vice-Chair, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Lexington, Massachusetts, statement and attachment........................ 407 United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), Alan Reuther, Legislative Director, Washington, D.C., letter................................................... 419 Verizon, Ivan Seidenberg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, New York, New York, letter..................................... 421 Wal-Mart, H. Lee Scott, President and Chief Executive Officer, Bentonville, Arkansas, letter.................................. 422 Watts, J.C. Jr., June 21, 2006, letter........................... 423 Williams, Roger, Secretary of State, State of Texas, Austin, Texas, letter and attachment................................... 424 Yale Law Journal, Alvaro Bedoya, 115:2112, 2006, article......... 429 APPENDIX Additional submissions and citations for Voting Rights Act Reauthorization................................................ 464 RENEWING THE TEMPORARY PROVISIONS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS AFTER LULAC V. PERRY ---------- THURSDAY, JULY 13, 2006 U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Cornyn, presiding. Present: Senators Cornyn, Kennedy, and Feingold. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS Senator Kennedy. [Presiding.] We will come to order. The Chairman and other members are expected here momentarily, and then there are going to be some votes that are coming up, so the Chairman will have to deal with that. But we will get started, and I would ask consent that my comments appear after the Chair, and I also have a statement by the Senator from Vermont, Senator Leahy, and I ask that that be made part of the record. I hope that today will conclude our hearings on the reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act. We have built a strong record justifying the renewal of the Act's key expiring provisions--Section 5, Section 203, and the Federal observer provisions. Voting this bill out of Committee and moving it to the floor for consideration by the full Senate is essential. The importance of Act to minority voters and to our Nation's promise of democracy demands action, and I am hopeful that the full Senate can pass this bill before the August recess in time for the 41st anniversary of the signing of the Act, which we will celebrate on August 6th. The Supreme Court's decision in LULAC v. Perry that the Texas Congressional redistricting plan discriminated against Latino voters in violation of Section 2 of the Act is strong evidence in favor of reauthorization. The Court found current discrimination against minority voters in a jurisdiction covered in its entirety under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The decision is a vindication of minority voting rights and another indication that voting discrimination persists today in some parts of the country, including at the State level. The Court made several significant findings. It found that polarized voting exists throughout the State. Anglo voters in Texas generally vote for different candidates than minority voters. We know that redistricting boundaries and altering election rules in such cases has been used to undermine the voting rights of minorities. And Section 5 provides a needed remedy for such practices. The Court also found that the State has a long, well- documented history of discrimination against Hispanics and African-Americans in voter registration, voting, and otherwise participating in the electoral process. The 2003 redistricting in Texas was another chapter in that history. The State shifted 100,000 Latino voters from a district where they were on the verge of electing a candidate of their choice to another district in which Latinos already controlled election outcomes. As Justice Kennedy states, ``In essence, the State took away the Latinos' opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it.'' Justice Kennedy found evidence that Texas had intentionally diluted the voting strength of Latino voters because of their ethnic background and in violation of the Constitution. Such evidence of intentional discrimination is obviously very significant with respect to the constitutionality of extending Section 5 of the Act. Even Justice Scalia said, ``We long ago upheld the constitutionality of Section 5 as proper exercise of Congress's authority under Section 2 of the 15th Amendment to enforce the Amendment's prohibition on denial or abridgment of the right to vote.'' As Justice Scalia emphasized, Section 5 applies only to jurisdictions with a history of official discrimination. In fact, the Texas redistricting plan should never have been before the Court. If the Attorney General listened to the advice of career attorneys in the Civil Rights Division, he would not have approved the Texas plan under Section 5. As Justice Souter said, the Attorney General should have objected because the State failed to offset the elimination of a district in which African-American voters had demonstrated an ability to elect a candidate of their choice under the previous plan. That is why Chief Roberts was moved to say, ``It is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race.'' As long as State and local election officials continue to discriminate against minority voters, laws like Section 5 will be needed to protect minority voters. We will hold up. We will have a moment or two recess here while Senator Cornyn arrives, and then we will hear from Senator Cornyn and the panel. We thank the witnesses for their patience. Most of them have some familiarity with this process. I would indicate to them that their testimony is very important and we will have a good opportunity to review it carefully here on the Committee. [Recess 2:38 p.m. to 2:55 p.m.] STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS Senator Cornyn. We will reconvene. Welcome to each of you. I ask you indulgence as the Senate has four stacked votes, and so we will get started here. I will get started. I know Senator Kennedy was here and delivered his opening statement, but if you will hang in there with us, we will get this done in the best form we possibly can. On behalf of the Chairman, let me say welcome to this eighth and likely the last in a series of a number of hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on reauthorizing the temporary provisions of the Voting Rights Act, provisions that are scheduled to expire about 1 year from now, in the summer of 2007. Few issues are as fundamental to our system of democracy and the promise of equal justice under law as are our voting rights. It is precisely for this reason that it is appropriate that we continue to engage in a thorough review of the Act and that we continue to work collectively to ensure that the Act is reauthorized with due consideration of the requirements of the Constitution and recent guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. As we continue to explore the many issues raised by reauthorization of the expiring provisions, I am concerned we may not be as clear as we need to be about what we are discussing. Many, I think, may be under the false impression that if Congress does not act, the Voting Rights Act will expire. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact, the Act's core provision, that is, Section 2, its prohibition on discrimination with respect to voting, applies nationwide and is permanent. What concerns me further is that the current draft rewrites significant portions of the existing Voting Rights Act. Unfortunately, in my opinion, in a way that may well have the effect of further injecting partisan politics into the noble pursuit of guaranteeing voters access to the ballot box. This concern of mine and of numerous scholars was heightened by the Supreme Court's recent opinion in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, the Texas redistricting case, a heavily anticipated decision handed down about 2 weeks ago. The Court upheld virtually all aspects of the Texas redistricting plan, requiring that a single district be redrawn, although the ripple effect is unknown at this point. I believe the Court was right to uphold the bulk of that plan, because whatever one thinks of partisan gerrymandering, it has long been the case that legislatures will seek to maximize party interests when establishing districts for voting. And until we come up with a better objective system, partisan gerrymandering will always be a reality of redistricting. As one of my former colleagues told me, he said, ``You can't take politics out of politics.'' And this is true whether it is a Democrat- or a Republican-led remapping. But it is disturbing when an Act that was designed to ensure voters that voters have full access to the ballot box has become a vehicle for partisan maneuvering. That is why I fear that the current rewrite of the Voting Rights Act will do that, that we are continuing this, in the words of Chief Justice John Roberts, sordid business of divvying up people by race. Only now we are perpetuating it under the cloak of protecting voting rights. I believe we should take great caution in this exercise. We have an esteemed group of scholars with us today, and I look forward to hearing from each of you about your opinions on the topics I have mentioned and the Voting Rights Act generally. Roger Clegg is President and General Counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity in Sterling, Virginia, and he has extensively researched and written on legal issues raised by our civil rights laws. Next, Professor Sherrilyn Ifill, from the University of Maryland Law School in Baltimore. Professor Ifill has previously served as Assistant Counsel at the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, where she litigated various Voting Rights Act cases. Nina Perales, from the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, is also with us today. Ms. Perales is the Southwest Regional Counsel for MALDEF in my hometown of San Antonio, Texas. Michael Carvin is a partner with the law firm of Jones Day here in Washington, D.C. Mr. Carvin specializes in constitutional, appellate, civil rights, and civil litigation against the Federal Government. He has argued cases in the U.S. Supreme Court and virtually all Federal appeals courts. Professor Joaquin Avila is an Assistant Professor of Law at Seattle University School of Law in Seattle, Washington. Professor Avila was previously Managing Director and head of Latin America for Lehman Brothers, where he developed and implemented strategic plans for the region. Last, but certainly not least, we have Abigail Thernstrom, who is joining us for the second time. Ms. Thernstrom is the Vice Chair of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, and she has written extensively on race relations and voting rights issues. Ms. Thernstrom, thank you for returning to be with us again. I would especially like to thank Chairman Specter, as well as Senator Brownback, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights, for scheduling this important hearing, and I am delighted to chair it today. As I said a moment ago, this is going to be a little helter-skelter, but we will do the best we can and in a way that allows me to get back and cast votes on the stacked votes before us. But until then, Mr. Clegg, let's start with you, please. We will ask you to keep your opening statement to 5 minutes, and then we will proceed with questions. Thank you. STATEMENT OF ROGER CLEGG, PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL, CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, STERLING, VIRGINIA Mr. Clegg. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. In my full written statement, I discuss at some length why I think Section 5 and Section 203 should not be reauthorized, indeed why I think doing so would be unconstitutional, and why the Bossier Parish decisions and Georgia v. Ashcroft should not be overturned if Section 5 is reauthorized. But in my oral statement this afternoon, I would like to focus specifically on the divergence between what the Voting Rights Act was supposed to be and what it has become, and that divergence is in many ways dramatized by the Supreme Court's recent decision in LULAC v. Perry. Section 5 has diverged from its original purpose in several ways. The first way is that there really is no longer any rhyme or reason in which jurisdictions are covered and which ones are not. After several decades, we would expect to need to update the trigger mechanism, looking at more recent elections or more recent records of voting violations. Another way Section 5 has diverged from its original stated purpose is even more disturbing. It is not being used to stop racial gerrymandering. It is being used to require it. Sometimes that motivation is overtly racial. The Voting Rights Act is being used to foster segregation in voting districts, and it is being used to try to ensure something like racial proportionality in legislatures. But at least four of the Justices in Perry acknowledged that, while generally the reapportionment there was about politics, not race, what racial gerrymandering did take place was required by the Voting Rights Act. It is also disturbing to see a voting rights statute twisted into a partisan political device, and this abuse is committed by both parties. For instance, in Texas, Republicans did not aim to dilute anyone's voting power because of race. They were focused on people's voting power because of party-- not always a particularly noble focus but one that is as old as Elbridge Gerry at least. Still, the Democrats wanted to stop them, and so they tried, with some success, to use the Voting Rights Act to do it. Likewise, in Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Democrats were not trying to hurt black voters or help them, per se. They just wanted to try to win more seats for Democrats. But their efforts were challenged under the Voting Rights Act because it was the tool at hand. Incidentally, the same kind of abuse can also happen in ways that do not involve gerrymandering but do involve other voting practices or procedures that are objected to, ostensibly because they are racially discriminatory, but really for partisan purposes. For instance, I suspect that absentee ballot procedures and voter identification and other anti-fraud laws are all challenged sometimes not because anyone really believes that they are intended to be racially discriminatory, but because one side thinks these rules will hurt their voter turnout and their disparate racial impact allows the Voting Rights Act to be invoked for, again, partisan political ends. The good news, Mr. Chairman, is that in 2006 neither party wants to stop anyone from voting because of race. All either party cares about is winning. There is no candidate in either party who would not be thrilled with 100 percent black registration and turnout, so long as the candidate was also confident that those voters would vote for him. The racial polarization that is often the centerpiece of Voting Rights Act litigation is an increasingly incoherent concept. Whites and blacks may frequently vote differently in some jurisdictions, but it is not about race or discrimination. It is just about differences in political opinion on issues like taxes and national defense. But because African-Americans vote so overwhelmingly Democratic, any effects test in the voting area can be readily invoked for partisan purposes, sometimes by one part, sometimes by the other. For instance, for years Republicans have tried, sometimes successfully--although those days may be ending--to use an effects test to pack African-Americans into a relatively few districts, thus bleaching all the other surrounding districts white, with the end result that there are lots of Republican districts and just a few black ones, especially in jurisdictions like the South where the white voters tend to be conservative.Of course, conversely, Democrats in Perry argued that reapportionment aimed at helping Republicans was racially discriminatory. Well, what is to be done? The obvious answer is don't renew Section 5. If Congress insists that it cannot go cold turkey, then at least it should not make Section 5 worse. The two Bossier Parish decisions have modestly limited its scope and its potential abuses. They should not be overturned. I would also put Georgia v. Ashcroft in this category. The current House bill not only overturns Georgia v. Ashcroft but replaces it with a provision that is muddy at best, will lead to years of more litigation, and will have results that its drafters never intended. I would add that the more this provision's meaning is clarified to ensure that it requires the creation of majority- minority districts, the more clearly unconstitutional it will be as well. The case law that has grown up around Section 5 makes its meaning nearly incomprehensible already. Congress should not make matters worse by adding language, the meaning of which its own members cannot agree on. I would also not extend Section 5 or Section 203 for another 25 years. The shorter the extension, the better, especially if Congress changes the statute in ways that might have unintended consequences. I would also try to put in place a better, more objective review mechanism, probably in the statute itself. Congress must undertake a serious, systematic comparison of voter registration and participation rates by race in covered versus non-covered jurisdictions, with an effort to determine the actual causes of any disparities and specifically whether those causes are discrimination, and if there are more limited and effective remedies for any discrimination than the preemption mechanism and an effects test. Above all, Senator Cornyn, Congress should not extend the law and then forget about it and its effects for another 25 years--and then scramble and try to figure out what to do about it in the heat of another election year. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Clegg appears as a submission for the record.] Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Clegg. Professor Ifill? STATEMENT OF SHERRILYN A. IFILL, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAW, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND Ms. Ifill. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify in support of the passage of this bill reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act. I followed the deliberations on this matter in the House and in the Senate with some interest, and I commend both Houses for the deliberate and thorough way in which you have considered reauthorization of the Act. As a former voting rights attorney and now an academic, I have tried to follow the arguments advanced by those who disagree with the continued need for the Act, like Mr. Clegg-- arguments that I believe have been most capably countered by supporters of the Act in the civil rights and academic communities who have appeared before you. But I was particularly interested in appearing at this hearing because I confess to being somewhat intrigued by the name of the hearing: ``Legislative Options after LULAC v. Perry.'' I was intrigued because my reading of the Supreme Court's decision in that case finds nothing that supports altering the existing framework of the draft bill for reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act. To the contrary, the Court's analysis in LULAC, to my mind, strongly supports the bill. I say this for three reasons. First, the Court upheld the district court's finding that voting was racially polarized throughout the State of Texas. This finding and the Supreme Court's recognition of it is significant. It reflects the reality that although this country has come a long way since the Act was passed in 1965, we still, as Congressman John Lewis stated to this Committee, have a great distance to go. When I litigated voting rights cases in the 1980's and early 1990's in Texas, voting was racially polarized. Fifteen years later, this political reality continues to shape and to undermine the ability of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice. Second, the Court in LULAC, in its detailed and local specific analysis of the way in which the dismantling of District 23 violated Section 2 of the Act, demonstrates why the protections of the Voting Rights Act are not limited merely to access to the ballot box, as some would have us believe. In 1965 and again in 1982, Congress explicitly designed the Act to address any means by which a jurisdiction might interfere with the ability of minority voters to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice. Rather than anticipate what those methods might be, Congress, and later the courts in furtherance of Congress' goals, encouraged--and I am quoting--''a searching, practical evaluation of the local political reality and a functional view of the political process''--I am quoting from the Senate report accompanying the 1982 amendments of the Act--to determine whether a violation of Section 2 has occurred. In LULAC, the Court rejected a simplistic numbers game whereby one Latino district, District 23, could simply be swapped for another, District 25. The Court recognized instead that District 23 was dismantled precisely to keep Latinos there from exercising their increasing power in that district. The Court described this action by the State of Texas as ``bearing the mark of intentional discrimination.'' Third, with regard to Section 5, as you know, LULAC v. Perry was not a Section 5 case; thus, the Court's opinion in LULAC offers this Committee no new analysis or insight into the appropriate standard for preclearance under Section 5, the scope of jurisdictions to be covered under Section 5, or the trigger formula for Section 5. In fact, the only pronouncements about Section 5 that I think are of importance for this Committee's work on the reauthorization bill appear in the opinion of Justice Scalia, concurring in part and dissenting in part. In that opinion, the three most conservative Justices on the Court joined with Justice Scalia in reaffirming the constitutionality of Section 5 as a proper exercise of Congress's authority under Section 2 of the 15th Amendment, a power that remains undiminished after City of Boerne v. Flores. Finally, to the charge that the Voting Rights Act fosters segregation, there are myriad factors that have contributed to residential segregation in the United States. Some of them include a history of violence, socioeconomic disparities between blacks and whites, red-lining, and even choice. None of these phenomena were created by the Voting Rights Act, and I would commend certainly a number of studies, including Jim Loewen's ``Sundown Towns,'' Sheryll Cashin's ``The Failure of Integration,'' if one wants to look at the purposes and the causes of residential segregation. The Voting Rights Act instead has encouraged some of the most integrated districts, election districts, that this country has seen in the South. In conclusion, the Supreme Court's decision in LULAC v. Perry, to the extent that it bears on the deliberations of this Committee, reaffirms the importance of reauthorizing the Act, and I would be happy to take any further questions about the decision. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ms. Ifill appears as a submission for the record.] Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. Ms. Perales? STATEMENT OF NINA PERALES, SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNSEL, MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS Ms. Perales. Thank you, Chairman Cornyn. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding the Supreme Court decision in the Texas redistricting case and its implications for the reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act. My name is Nina Perales. I am Southwest Regional Counsel for MALDEF, the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund. MALDEF successfully litigated the Voting Rights Act claim before the Court. I argued the appeal on behalf of the GI Forum before the Supreme Court on March 1, 2006. The LULAC v. Perry decision is a resounding affirmation of the Voting Rights Act and its continued importance in protecting minority voting rights. The Supreme Court decision also helps us understand why we need the protections of the temporary provisions in the face of ongoing discrimination in Texas. The Court found that Texas had violated the Voting Rights Act by diluting Latino voting strength in District 23. As mentioned by Professor Ifill, the Court found racially polarized voting throughout the State and characterized the racially polarized voting in District 23 as ``severe.'' For Texas, the State containing the second largest number of Latinos in the United States, this is the second time a State redistricting plan has been invalidated in this decade for violating Latino voting rights. This decision, although characterized by many as having to do with partisanship, is not about Democrats and it is not about Republicans. Importantly, the record in this case demonstrated that Latinos in District 23 were flexible in their partisan affiliation and had voted in some numbers for the incumbent prior to his losing support in the Latino community steadily over the decade leading up to the redistricting. This Court in this decision was unable to determine a standard for partisan gerrymandering--unable or unwilling, and, thus, this case does not discuss how the Voting Rights Act might or might not be squeezed into a partisan agenda. It simply does not discuss it. The Supreme Court, however, did affirm the rule that political maneuvering--and I believe the Supreme Court understands this can happen from either party--has its limits when it comes to taking away Latino opportunity to elect. This case has unusual and hopefully unique facts because it was a very bad situation for Latinos in District 23. Having grown into the majority, now comprising 55 percent of the registered voters, and having voted very cohesively over the last decade, more and more so against the incumbent, Latinos were divided by the State, pulled out of this district, just at the point at which they were going to unseat the disfavored candidate. The Supreme Court wrote that, Texas ``took away the Latinos' opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it.'' The Court did not have any problem at all overruling the district court in its finding that District 23 was not an opportunity district. The Supreme Court found that it did offer the opportunity to elect. It was not a fuzzy or an amorphous concept, but quite clear, and clear enough for the Supreme Court to handle it and rule that it was an opportunity district based on a local appraisal of the facts there, including the turnout, the election performance, and the registration rates. Finally, I want to mention that the Subcommittee can be reassured by the fact that eight Justices wrote specifically to say that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which was--in fact, there was no Section 5 claim in this case and there could not have been because, of course, those issues are reserved to the Justice Department and the district court in Washington, D.C. But eight Justices still went out of their way to write that Section 5 is a compelling State interest and to uphold or to discuss the Court decisions previously upholding the constitutionality of Section 5, I think that that is--to the extent that LULAC v. Perry does speak to the temporary provisions, it is in a very positive and affirming way. [The prepared statement of Ms. Perales appears as a submission for the record.] Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Ms. Perales. We are going to have to recess for the vote and return shortly, I hope. [Recess 3:17 p.m. to 4:14 p.m.] Senator Cornyn. We will reconvene the hearing. Again, my apologies. Simply unavoidable. Mr. Carvin, we would be glad to hear your opening statement. STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. CARVIN, PARTNER, JONES DAY, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Carvin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. I have been involved in a number of voting rights---- Senator Cornyn. Mr. Carvin, is your red light on? Mr. Carvin. Can you hear me now? Senator Cornyn. I can hear you now. Thank you. Mr. Carvin. Thank you. I was just going to say that I have filed a brief on behalf of the Texas Republican Party in the LULAC case. To cut to the chase, I think the principal relevance of the LULAC case for the Section 5 reauthorization was the case's treatment of so-called influence districts. As you know, Senator, those are districts where minorities are not sufficiently large that they can constitute a majority in a district but they are, nonetheless, sizable enough that they can form a coalition with non-minority voters to elect their candidates of choice. And that issue came up in LULAC in the following way: There was a Section 2 challenge to the failure to maintain or preserve old District 24 where the black population, citizen voting age population was roughly 26 percent, and it was argued that even though they were a minority of the district, they could elect their preferred candidate, who was the white Democratic incumbent, Martin Frost. The Court, I should emphasize, did not resolve explicitly whether or not such claims are ever viable under Section 2, but it did reject the claim, as it was brought relative to District 24, and it did so with language that is in my statement, where at least Justice Kennedy indicated that acceptance of this kind of influence district theory would raise serious constitutional concerns about the Voting Rights Act. That continued a long line of precedent in which all the lower Federal courts, save one, had rejected the continuous efforts of the Democratic Party in the 2000 redistricting cycle to have courts order or require these influence districts under Section 2 and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Those have been uniformly rejected pursuant to the reasoning that the Federal judiciary is not empowered or required by the Voting Rights Act to engage in preferences for one party over another, even if that party is supported predominantly by minorities. In other words, it is an obvious fact that certainly in the African-American community and largely in the Latino community, the preferred candidate of choice is a Democrat. But the courts have rejected the notion that that somehow justifies creating districts where minorities can elect their preferred candidates of choice. The mandate of Section 2 is not to prefer any party, regardless of its demographic composition. It is to ensure that minority voters have an equal opportunity to elect their candidates, no guarantees because of partisan preferences. The relevance of that to the legislation the Committee is considering is that as that theory of partisan preferences and influence districts under Section 2 has been uniformly rejected, I am greatly concerned that the Committee and the Congress is about to revive it under Section 5. And the reason for that is that the language in the Senate and House bills prohibits as retrogressive any redistricting change that diminishes the ability of minority voters to elect their preferred candidates of choice. And as I indicated before, since the preferred candidate of choice is largely Democratic, you will literally have a Federal statute, passed, ironically, by a Republican Congress, which says you cannot diminish the ability to elect Democrats in these covered jurisdictions. This would not just be a requirement that you preserve majority- minority districts because we all know that in the circumstances I previously described, minorities are able to elect their preferred candidates of choice, even if they are not a numerical majority in the district because they can form a coalition with like-minded Democratic voters who are non- minority. We also know, of course, that preferred candidates of choice among the minority community can be either members of that ethnic group or non-minorities. For example, in the LULAC case, Representative Bonilla is a Latino, but as Ms. Perales indicated previously, he was not the Hispanic candidate of choice. You do not look at the ethnicity of the candidate. You look at the voting patterns of the particular ethnic group. So LULAC confirms again that if you have a requirement in the Voting Rights Act that says you cannot diminish the ability to elect a preferred candidate of choice, what you have, in essence, done is prevent dismantling districts like the old District 24 in Texas because that would diminish the ability to elect the preferred candidate. I will also briefly mention the override of the Bossier Parish II case, which is of particular relevance to me because I successfully argued that case in the Supreme Court, and the evil there is that it enables the Justice Department to find discriminatory purpose every time that the submitting jurisdiction does not maximize the number of minority opportunity districts. And after the Georgia v. Ashcroft override, that would not only mean maximizing the number of majority-minority districts, it would mean maximizing the number of the so-called influence districts, which, as you indicated in your opening statement, in my mind injects partisan consideration of favoritism into a statute that is supposed to ensure racial neutrality. And I think that would be a very troubling development, particularly 40 years after the enactment of the first version of Section 5. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Carvin appears as a submission for the record.] Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Carvin. Professor Avila, we would be glad to hear your opening statement. STATEMENT OF JOAQUIN G. AVILA, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW, SEATTLE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON Mr. Avila. Good afternoon, Senator. I would just like to add for the record that even though I would have liked to have been a strategic partner for the Lehman Brothers--I probably would have been better off financially--I have spent most of my time during the past 32-plus years doing nothing but voting rights litigation. And I am now transitioning myself into a teaching career. I am here because I want to just simply state that voting discrimination still persists and it is very pervasive. As a result of my experiences during the past 30-plus years, in Texas from 1976 to 1986, when I was involved with the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, I presented testimony before Congress back in 1981 when it was reauthorizing the 1982 Voting Rights Act Amendments. And in that testimony I presented a very extensive record of voting discrimination. That experience continued when I started to open up my voting rights practice in California, and as a result of that voting rights practice, I have had substantial experience in terms of documenting racially polarized voting, Section 5 violations in Monterey County and in Kings County in California. And the impact of Section 5 has been very dramatic in California. Just to give you one illustration, in Monterey County, California, the Board of Supervisors had submitted a plan for redistricting that had to be submitted for Section 5 preclearance. And as a result of Section 5, we were able to prevent the implementation of a plan that was going to divide and fragment a politically cohesive minority community. And if we did not have Section 5, then we would have had to have litigated under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. And as a result of a letter of objection that was issued by the Attorney General at that time, we were able to prevent the implementation of a plan that had a clear discriminatory effect. It is not just the application of just some draconian law. This had a dramatic impact in Monterey County. It resulted in the election of the first Latino supervisor in over 100 years. That is what Section 5 did in Monterey County. My experiences out there in California also demonstrated that there is a significant issue of noncompliance with Section 5. As a result of the noncompliance, jurisdictions simply refused to submit their voting changes for approval. And, in fact, I was involved in two Supreme Court cases, involving, again, Monterey County, where you had a series of judicial district consolidations that had occurred from 1968 to 1983 that had not even been submitted. It took two U.S. Supreme Court cases and 9 years of litigation in order for Monterey County and the State of California to comply. Most recently, in additional litigation in Monterey County, the county, in fact, had not submitted for preclearance a series of consolidations of their voting precincts, and it took, again, litigation. Section 5 is very much needed. And, in fact, just on Cinco de Mayo of this year, we had a letter of objection that was issued by the Attorney General against the North Harris, Monterey County Community College District because there was a reduction in voting places. It went from 84 polling places to 12 polling places, and clearly this had a dramatic impact on voter participation in that community college district. And the Attorney General issued a letter of objection. It is just not merely one of these de minimis voting changes. In that particular submission to the Department of Justice, it was consolidated down to 12 voting precincts from 84, and each of the newly consolidated voting precincts in the non-minority area, where you had the least number of Latinos, it was 6,500 voters. In the more heavily concentrated Latino voters in that district, you had 67,000 voters. That is a dramatic impact. That is why Section 5 is needed. And that is why it is needed for an additional 25 years. We have not gotten to the point yet, from 1982 to the present, where we can definitely say that we have addressed and resolved all the issues of voting discrimination and racially polarized voting. That continues to this day. And the primary purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to address problems that started with the founding of this country related to issues of voting. And the purpose of the Voting Rights Act as stated in State of South Carolina v. Katzenbach was to banish the blight of voting discrimination once and for all. And that is what we ask you to do. [The prepared statement of Mr. Avila appears as a submission for the record.] Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, Professor. Ms. Thernstrom? STATEMENT OF ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, SENIOR FELLOW, THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE, AND VICE CHAIR, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LEXINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS Ms. Thernstrom. Thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. The Supreme Court's decision in LULAC v. Perry does indeed have important implications for the debate over the reauthorization of the temporary emergency provisions of the Voting Rights Act. The House bill explicitly protects the ability of minority citizens to elect their preferred candidates of choice. But who qualifies as a candidate of choice? And what does an opportunity district look like? The LULAC appellants argued that Martin Frost was the candidate of choice for blacks, that his district was protected by the Voting Rights Act even though Frost is white, and his district, which was drawn for partisan reasons, was only 25 percent black. The Court rejected that argument, but would it have done so if, let's say, the black percentage was 10 points higher? There are no legal standards either in place or proposed to answer that question. The problem of who counts as a minority representative runs through the infamous leaked Justice Department memo on preclearing the Texas plan. DOJ staff attorneys claimed that the white incumbent in District 29 was, in their words, ``basically Hispanic;'' therefore, that Democratic district was protected by the Voting Rights Act. District 25 as well was represented by a white Democrat deemed ``responsive to minority interests.'' It, too, was a Voting Rights Act entitlement, Justice Department staff argued. While LULAC appellants claimed that Mr. Frost counted as a black representative, the Hispanic incumbent Henry Bonilla, they suggested, was not truly Hispanic because he was a Republican. And the Court did agree that taking too many Hispanic Democrats out of the district had deprived minority voters of electoral opportunity, even though the district remained majority Hispanic. So a Hispanic incumbent in a majority Hispanic district is not really Hispanic, but a white Congressman is described as black by DOJ staff and appellants. Both political parties can play such definitional games to further their partisan interests, and the Sensenbrenner bill, with its dangerously imprecise language, encourages such gamesmanship. Definitional games have long been integral to the Department of Justice enforcement process. Administration critics are charging bias in the enforcement of the preclearance provision--an amusing allegation given the fact that the Justice Department in the 1980's and 1990's used the Voting Rights Act to pursue an ideologically driven agenda in blatant conflict with Supreme Court interpretation of the statutory language. Most pertinent to LULAC, in the 1990's the Justice Department saw purposeful discrimination lurking in every districting plan that contained less than the maximum number of possible majority-minority districts. And, remember, in enforcing Section 5, mere suspicion is sufficient to deny preclearance. This history is relevant to the House bill which would allow objections to electoral changes on suspicion of any discriminatory purpose. Overturning Bossier Parish II, the bill would reinstate the power of the Justice Department to play with charges of illegal purpose, undefined, in order to reject districting plans it does not like, positively inviting partisan mischief. Moreover, such an open-ended definition of discriminatory purposes asks the Justice Department to settle broad questions of electoral equality that are inappropriate for a process of swift administrative review. Resolving such questions requires the specific detailed idiosyncratic knowledge of race and politics in a local jurisdiction that only a Federal district court can obtain in the course of a trial. Where discriminatory intent is suggested, plaintiffs can always bring a 14th Amendment suit. The statutory amendment is unnecessary. Section 5's proposed language cannot be administered like a highway bill. Enforcement depends on unacknowledged normative assumptions. The murky language of Section 2 protection against ill-defined discriminatory results already has courts immersed in what Justice Thomas, echoing Justice Frankfurter, has called ``a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory.'' But at least the project is one in which judges, disciplined by the structure of trials and appeals are engaged. Not so with the administrative of Section 5. The opaque language of the proposed House bill will further empower Justice Department attorneys who make preclearance decisions behind closed doors, who have no need to explain their reasoning, and are almost inevitably driven by normative and partisan convictions, which may vary from one administration to the next. America's racial landscape has fundamentally changed in the last 40 years. The core provisions of the Voting Rights Act are permanent. Basic 15th Amendment rights are secure. The issue today is the reauthorization of the emergency provisions that were constitutionally radical and, thus, initially expected to last only 5 years. What precisely is needed 41 years later? Congress has had the time, could take the time to think about how to answer that question with great care. I realize it is not likely to do so. I still wish it would. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ms. Thernstrom appears as a submission for the record.] Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. We will proceed to a round of questions. Senator Feingold is here, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee. I would be glad to defer to you for any opening statement you would like to make. STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have held several hearings on the Voting Rights Act, both in the full Committee and in this Subcommittee, and we have been fortunate to have several outstanding witnesses participate in this process. I think we have established a solid legislative record for this legislation. That said, I am glad that this is the last hearing. It is time to move to the next stage of the legislative process and to bring this bill before the Committee so that it can continue on to the full Senate, where it is my hope that the Majority Leader will bring it up for a vote before the August recess. The VRA expires in 2007. This law is too important to take up under a ticking clock of expiration. We need to complete the authorization process in this Congress this year. We have a bipartisan and bicameral consensus, and we should move forward. I have to say that I am puzzled by comments by some Members of Congress and critics who continue to argue that certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act are no longer necessary because we are living in a different era and that ``there is no longer racial bias'' in certain areas with a history of discrimination in voting rights. The Supreme Court in LULAC v. Perry, of course, found otherwise. The Court ruled that Texas did, in fact, violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act when it diluted the voting power of Latino voters in District 23. I do not want to take a whole lot of time talking about the decision because I want to get into the question part. But I just want to note that although the Court's decision gives us some indication of how the current Court might rule on future Voting Rights Act cases, it provides no justification for slowing down or holding up consideration of the Chairman's reauthorization bill. Mr. Chairman, that is the only opening statement I want to make. Thank you. Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Feingold. Mr. Clegg, let me start with you. During the course of the discussions and hearings on reauthorization of Section 5 and Section 203, the main expressed concern is that we not pass legislation which will be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge--in other words, be engaged in a futile act insofar as the Supreme Court in applying the constitutional standard to that legislation by which they would judge it. Would you describe for us what you believe, if we were to reauthorize Section 5 in its current form as proposed, what the constitutional challenge would be and your assessment as to whether the Court would indeed uphold it or strike it down? Mr. Clegg. Sure, I would be delighted to. I appreciate the question because actually one of the things that I wanted to clarify, as I was listening to my colleagues' testimony here, is that I do not think that the Perry decision tips the Court's hand on what the justices are likely to do if such a challenge is brought. In fact---- Senator Cornyn. Indeed, if I can interject there, Perry did not involve Section 5. It was a Section 2 case, right? Mr. Clegg. That is exactly right, and even more explicitly than that, Justice Scalia's opinion, which was joined by three other Justices, has a footnote that says, ``No party here raises a constitutional challenge to Section 5 as applied in these cases, and I assume its application is consistent with the Constitution.'' So, he is not saying that it is Constitutional; he is just saying that, because it has not been challenged, he is not going to address that question. As I explain in some detail in my written statement, I think that Section 5, if it is reauthorized, would be constitutionally vulnerable. I think it would be unconstitutional. I think the Court is likely to strike it down, and I think the Court should strike it down. There are basically two ways in which Section 5 is constitutionally vulnerable. One is that it is extraordinarily intrusive in matters that are generally left to the States, and sometimes textually committed to the States. And in addition to that, it uses an effects test, which the Court has said goes beyond Congress's authority under the 14th Amendment and the 15th Amendment. The Court has said that you have to have disparate treatment in order for those amendments to be violated, and that if Congress goes beyond that and prohibits State actions that are not disparate treatment, it can do so only if it is congruent and proportional to stopping disparate treatment. I do not think the record has been made for that here. I think that the problem is compounded by the fact that some States are covered and other States are not. And I do not think that the record that Congress has now supports that discrimination among the different States. I think that what Congress would have to do in order to prevent a successful constitutional challenge is show that the covered jurisdictions have a much worse record than the non- covered jurisdictions when it comes to intentional racial discrimination in 2006; and that the use of a preclearance mechanism and an effects test is essential in order to prevent that intentional discrimination. And I do not think the record has been made to do that, and I do not think you can make that record. Senator Cornyn. We will have a chance to ask more than one round, but let me, before I turn it over to Senator Feingold in 36 seconds here, ask Mr. Carvin: Do you agree with Mr. Clegg's analysis or do you have a different view? Mr. Carvin. No, and as always it was succinctly stated, and with the 26 seconds left, I will just add---- Senator Cornyn. Well, that does not apply to you. That applies to me. [Laughter.] Mr. Carvin. All right. Look, Roger walked through the three factors that are very troublesome. It reverses all the normal principles of federalism. It singles out, apparently on an arbitrary basis, what the voting patterns were in 1968, some States to suffer these special burdens and others to be exempt, for a law that will extend out to 2032--so, literally, you know, 70-odd years past the time that the formula used for triggering was existent. And, of course, the City of Boerne point, which is that you are exceeding the prohibitions in the 14th and 15th Amendments, all rendered constitutionally vulnerable. The one additional point I would add is that I think that the provisions of the bill, Section 5 of the bill, which overturned Georgia v. Ashcroft as well as Bossier Parish II, make it even more constitutionally vulnerable because, after all, you are making the law more race conscious, for the reasons I have identified, more of a partisan preference, and it is very odd. And I do not think the Court will accept the notion that Georgia in 2006 or California in 2006 is subject to greater constraints on its redistricting and voting changes than was Mississippi in 1965. So it is very odd that 40 years into this process, in the face of all the tremendous gains that have been made in the political and electoral landscape, that Congress would actually be ratcheting up the burdens on the covered jurisdictions at this late date. Senator Cornyn. Ms. Thernstrom? Ms. Thernstrom. Could I very quickly comment on that? There is an additional point here. The trigger for coverage rests on the inference of intentional discrimination from the combination of low voter turnout and the presence of a literacy test. That statistical trigger made sense in 1965. It does not make sense today. And, in fact, even in 1970, when the emergency provisions were, of course, reauthorized for the first time, there was no reason to assume intentional discrimination on the basis of low voter turnout and the literacy test in, for instance, Manhattan but not in Queens-- two boroughs in New York. Over the years, the coverage has become increasingly arbitrary. Ms. Ifill. Might I be heard on this, Senator? Senator Cornyn. Sure. I will come back to you, if you do not mind, because I hate to intrude on Senator Feingold's time. So let's turn over to him. We will come back for some more questions. Thank you. Ms. Ifill. Thank you. Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, I have here 17 statements and letters in support of S. 2703 from a wide variety of organizations, companies, and prominent individuals. I ask that they be included in the record. Senator Cornyn. Without objection. Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, I would ask Professor Ifill to say what she would like to say. Ms. Ifill. Thank you. I wanted to comment on just a couple of the points that were made, to first of all comment on the concern that Section 5 reauthorization would be unconstitutional because it violates principles of federalism. The Supreme Court has reviewed on several occasions this claim and this contention, and, in fact, in LULAC v. Perry, Justice Scalia, joined by the three most conservative members of the Court, repeats what the Supreme Court held years ago in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. And what he said in LULAC v. Perry in determining that compliance with Section 5 would constitute a compelling State interest that would justify race- conscious districting, ``We long ago upheld the constitutionality of Section 5 as a proper exercise of Congress's authority under Section 2 of the 15th Amendment to enforce that Amendment's prohibition on the denial or abridgment of the right to vote.'' I read that sentence as making it quite clear that there is no new threat to the constitutionality of Section 5 based on the question of federalism and intrusion into State control. Second, with regard to the use of the effects test and the requirement that when that test is used, it be done so in a way that is congruent and proportional--and as that relates to the question of the States that are covered and the trigger mechanism--it seems to me here that one has to read the Act as part of a whole. The Act requires that there are certain States that, based on the trigger, are covered by Section 5. But the Act also permits States and jurisdictions to bail out if they are able to prove that they no longer engage in discrimination. And it also provides opportunities for jurisdictions to be bailed in through the pocket trigger. And if one reads the entire statute together, then what it looks like is a rational and workable way in which Congress can target the jurisdictions that have the longest and most egregious history of discrimination, a history that in many jurisdictions, as evidenced in LULAC v. Perry, is unbroken as it relates to racially polarized voting and discrimination in redistricting; and then provide mechanisms so that States or jurisdictions can be relieved of their obligations under Section 5, or States or jurisdictions where they should be covered by Section 5 can be required to engage in preclearance. So if one reads it all together, it seems to me it provides a rational and workable scheme that Congress is well within its authority under Section 5 to create--to enforce its obligations under the 15th Amendment. Senator Feingold. Ms. Perales, Professor Ifill anticipated the question I was going to ask you. With all the hand-wringing we have heard about the possible constitutional problems of Section 5, including from Mr. Clegg just now, do you believe that it is an open question at this point in the minds of the Justices on the Supreme Court? Ms. Perales. No, it is absolutely not an open question. I would also like to address with respect to 203, which somehow floated into our discussion of this case, even though this case has nothing to do with Section 203, that there are still, of course, many hundreds of thousands of voters, even just in my State of Texas, who suffer from intentional discrimination as a result and who as a result do not have--did not have the opportunity to learn English--these are native-born citizens-- and who need the bilingual provisions of the Voting Rights Act and for whom, of course, this is perfectly constitutional, and no serious scholar challenges the constitutionality of Section 203. Senator Feingold. Ms. Perales and Professor Ifill, Mr. Clegg stated in his written testimony that, ``The Voting Rights Act has become an instrument for partisan gerrymandering.'' I happen to disagree with Mr. Clegg and was hoping you would please share your views on this characterization. Ms. Perales? Ms. Perales. I would like to address that. Thank you. I know that there is concern about this, and I think some of it arises from confusion by observers about the LULAC v. Perry case. There is confusion about which claims were raised by which appellants, and also which claims were upheld and which ones were not. So I would like to make clear, first of all, that there is nothing in LULAC v. Perry, for example, that creates confusion around the question of who is the preferred candidate of minority voters. This is, of course, very well established in the area of voting rights law. And in this particular case, the Supreme Court ruled that the incumbent in District 23 was not preferred by Latino voters because he only received 8 percent of the support from Latino voters in his district--not a close call, not a confusing question in the least. Similarly, the Court had no problem concluding District 23 was an opportunity district. This is also very well established and not confusing in this case or in any other area. I wanted to add that for Latinos, particularly in the Southwest, opportunity to elect often involves comprising the majority of the district, and so for that reason, the language in the current bill, now transitioning to the bill that you have before you, regarding opportunity to elect the preferred candidate is not language that expands the protection of the Voting Rights Act to influence district. It talks about opportunity to elect, not ability to chime in. And these are important words. They mean something. Opportunity to elect, as I mentioned before, for us often means comprising the majority or--in fact, it almost always means comprising the majority for us, particularly in Texas. It may also mean coalition, but it does not mean--and I am hereby referring to the three categories that were set out in Georgia v. Ashcroft--coalition, influence, and majority district. It does not do what Mr. Carvin--disagreeing respectfully with my colleague, it does not do what he says it does. It is a limited fix to a decision that is, in our opinion, not correct. Finally, with respect to Bossier II and the language in the bill, Bossier II, if limited by the language in the bill, would not unleash a frenzy of maximization in redistricting. It would only mean that actions taken with the purpose of racial discrimination would violate Section 5. Again, very limited, and thus, overall, I do not think that any of these measures nor the decision in LULAC v. Perry really does inject partisanship into the Voting Rights Act. And I say that because we did not litigate Democratic claims, we did not litigate Republican claims, and our claims were the only ones that were upheld. Senator Feingold. Professor Ifill? Ms. Ifill. Senator, I have in the last year heard the Voting Rights Act blamed for partisan gerrymandering, residential segregation, people identifying themselves by race, and a whole list of other of society's ills, all of which existed prior to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 in the United States and which continued to exist in the United States but are most certainly not caused by the Voting Rights Act. Earlier, Mr. Carvin said that the Voting Rights Act has now injected race in such a way into a statute that was designed to assure racial neutrality, and respectfully, I disagree. Section 5 was not actually designed to assure racial neutrality. By requiring that jurisdictions submit any voting changes to the Department of Justice or to the D.C. District Court, Section 5 of the Act required jurisdictions to actually make an assessment, to look at race, to determine whether or not a plan that they were proposing would result in the diminution of voting strength, of minority voting strength. It is important to remember that from the outset the Voting Rights Act was explicitly targeted at race. It recognized that the exclusion of racial minorities from full participation in the political process is one of the worst ills in a democratic society. And under Congress's enforcement power under the 15th Amendment, Congress was authorized to take drastic action to address that problem. So the Voting Rights Act is not a race- neutral act. It is a race-conscious act. And then, finally, I would just note with regard to the issue of the districts that were subject to dispute in LULAC v. Perry, I find it quite curious and interesting that several of the districts that were in dispute--District 23 that was dismantled and later District 24--had, it seems to me, the kinds of characteristics that I have heard Ms. Thernstrom over the years and others say we would want in our political system. District 24 was an integrated district with a 50-percent Anglo population, a 25-percent African-American population, and I believe a 20-percent Latino population. The candidate of choice of black voters in that district was a white person--Martin Frost. I thought those were the kinds of outcomes that we wanted to see happen, that we wanted to move away from assuming that black voters had to support only black candidates and white voters only white candidates. District 23, likewise, was a district in which Latino voters did not support the Latino incumbent. Once again, the voters were exercising their political choice not based on race, but based on the interests of their community. And yet those districts are not lauded and held up as the kind of goal that we sought with the Voting Rights Act. But instead those districts are called the result of partisan gerrymandering. Senator Feingold. Professor Avila, I am out of my time, but if you want to just quickly, if the Chairman would permit, make a comment. Mr. Avila. I just wanted very briefly to add that in terms of whether Section 5 is involved with partisanship, well over-- there are about 1,100 letters of objection that have been issued by the U.S. Department of Justice under Section 5 and well over probably around 90 percent of all of those have involved nonpartisan city council races, have involved nonpartisan school district races, have involved nonpartisan special election district, nonpartisan county commissioners. So Section 5 is not about partisanship. It is about providing political access to minorities. Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the additional time. Senator Cornyn. Sure. I would like to get the reaction from each of you to this question. This bill is predicated on election returns in 1964, 1968, and 1972. My question is: Wouldn't it make better sense to determine what the coverage of Section 5 is to base them on elections most recent in time, 2000, 2004 Presidential elections? And I would like for you as part of the question to note that African-American voter registration now in the areas covered by Section 5 exceeds that of the U.S. generally. And, finally, as part of the question, since 1995, the highest percentage of objections sustained to submissions by covered districts, the highest was less than one-half of 1 percent. That is from 1995 to the most current we have. For example, 2005, it was 3,811 submissions and only one objection sustained. I would like to get your reaction, each of you, to both the triggers of those elections predicated on 1964, 1968, 1972, why it does not make more sense to trigger that with 2000 and 2004, and particularly get your explanation as to why you think that coverage under those jurisdictions that are covered by Section 5 where African-American voter registration exceeds that of the Nation generally and what this sort of ratio of objections to submissions, why that makes sense. Mr. Clegg? Mr. Clegg. I think you are exactly right. I think that it makes perfect sense in 2006 to re-evaluate where we are as a Nation in terms of discrimination in voting. I do not believe that there is no longer any discrimination in voting. I do not know anybody who believes that. Of course, there are still instances of racial discrimination in voting. But the question is whether that kind of disparate treatment exists to a degree and in the kind of pattern that supports the approach that was written into this bill 41 years ago. And, therefore, I think Congress needs to look throughout the United States to see whether there is still disparate treatment and to what degree. One thing Congress can look at to determine that is voter registration patterns, but there may be other things that it needs to look at, too. You also need to compare whatever evidence of discrimination you find in the covered jurisdictions--to the extent of discrimination that you find in non-covered jurisdictions if you are going to continue to single out some jurisdictions and not others. And, finally, you need to ask whether the appropriate mechanism for fighting that disparate treatment is the preclearance mechanism because of the federalism problems that it raises, and whether it includes an effects test, because of the constitutional problems that an effects test raises and because of the fact that the use of the effects test has actually encouraged racial discrimination and racial gerrymandering. Senator Cornyn. Professor Ifill? Ms. Ifill. With regard to the trigger, Senator, I think what underlies that question is whether or not one regards the history of egregious discrimination in the jurisdictions that are covered by Section 5 to be relevant, to have continuing relevance to the question of monitoring under Section 5. And I think that most scholars and most litigators in the voting rights area would agree that that history is relevant. The triggers that were found were used to reflect that history of discrimination. Registration can be a symptom of the problem, but registration itself is not necessarily the problem. And so Congress used these triggers as a way of identifying those jurisdictions that reflected through these symptoms that history of discrimination. But it certainly did not suggest that that is the only way and that is the benchmark by which we determine that a jurisdiction has a problem with discrimination in voting. And that is why once again I suggest that it is important to look at the Act as a whole, to recognize that Congress has anticipated both a way in and a way out for jurisdictions that discriminate that are not covered by the preclearance formula and for jurisdictions that are covered by the preclearance formula but that can demonstrate that they do not engage in discrimination. And read as a whole, it seems to me there is nothing wrong with continuing to use the trigger formula that was based on that history of discrimination. With regard to the second question about DOJ objections, I think that the number of objections, really, if you look at that in the abstract, fails to really account for the deterrent effect of Section 5 preclearance, and that is that many jurisdictions respond to the Department of Justice in a variety of ways. Sometimes jurisdictions withdraw the proposed change. In other instances, the Department of Justice asks for more information, and jurisdictions provide that additional information which can result in a change in the plan. And so the whole process, the whole reality that one has to submit the plan for preclearance means that jurisdictions take care and, as I suggest, are required to look at their plans to determine whether or not they are retrogressive, and it is also true that the administration by the Justice Department in reviewing those plans very often results in a change in plans that are submitted or the withdrawal of plans. And without taking into account that information, I think you cannot really read very much from the fact that the number of objections themselves are small. Senator Cornyn. Ms. Perales? Ms. Perales. Thank you. Just briefly, I will do the Southwest spin on this, which is that many of the Southwestern States were brought into coverage under Section 5 through the use of the trigger in 1972. That, of course, is perfectly appropriate, and, in fact, these jurisdictions still merit the supervision of Section 5 as evidenced by the continued discrimination found both by the Justice Department as well as the Court, for example, in Texas, where we have had both a DOJ objection statewide in this decade as well as the Supreme Court finding of discrimination in violation of the Voting Rights Act in this decade. This tells us that the initial trigger is still very useful and very viable. Similarly, with respect to Arizona, Arizona has also had statewide objections this decade and in, I believe, the previous two decades with respect to statewide plans. Finally, with respect to the number of submissions to the Justice Department and how many objections are made, there are still very important objections being made, and even this number of them is making a tremendous difference for minority voters. And as I mentioned, the objections in Texas, the objections in Arizona, which are just the statewide ones that I am mentioning, but also at the local level there are objections that are helping every day, every year helping minority voters participate on an equal footing with others. As Professor Avila mentioned, we cannot discount the widespread noncompliance. There are many, many, many jurisdictions that are simply not submitting their changes and violate Section 5 when they implement them. And, finally, I wanted to give an example of the deterrence effect of Section 5 in the city of Seguin, which is in between Austin, Houston, and San Antonio. The city of Seguin, when they found out that they had a majority of districts in their city council plan that were going to be Latino in the upcoming redistricting, they dismantled one of those districts so as not to have a Latino majority in the city council. This, of course, is nonpartisan elections. When they submitted this plan to the Justice Department, the Justice Department expressed concerns, asked for more information. As a result, that plan was withdrawn and a better plan, one that actually reflected the Latino majority of the city and the five council districts was ultimately submitted. And so this is an example that I can think of from my experience where Section 5 worked exactly the way it should, even though there was not an objection interposed by the Justice Department. Senator Cornyn. Before Mr. Carvin answers, let me just get a quick answer from Professor Ifill and Ms. Perales. If you think Section 5 serves a useful deterrent effect when it comes to discrimination against minority voting, do you support its extension beyond the covered jurisdictions? Ms. Ifill. Well, I simply just do not think it would be possible for the Department of Justice to administer what you are referring to as a kind of nationwide coverage of Section 5. I think it would essentially be the death knell for Section 5. I think it would be impossible to---- Senator Cornyn. Do you think it is desirable if it were possible? Ms. Ifill. I think it makes more sense, frankly, for Congress to utilize a program that is a workable program and one that is based on a history of discrimination in particular jurisdictions, and as Congress has done, to provide the opportunity to expand that coverage where appropriate and to remove that coverage where appropriate. It seems to me that makes the most sense rather than being overbroad. And, of course, being overbroad would naturally run one into a constitutional problem. Senator Cornyn. Ms. Perales, do you agree, or do you have a different---- Ms. Perales. Yes, I do agree. It is not appropriate to expand Section 5 coverage nationwide. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Carvin? Mr. Carvin. Well, that touches on, of course, the fundamental dilemma here, which is nobody is denying that discrimination exists, but what the record makes fundamentally clear is that there is no rational way of suggesting that the covered jurisdictions have more ongoing official discrimination than the non-covered jurisdictions, whatever benchmark or analysis you use--voter turnout, election intimidation. The House report is actually very interesting because I think if you look at it, you will see that the examples they come up with and the analysis they come up with of what people would consider real voting discrimination exists disproportionately, far disproportionately in the non-covered jurisdictions than it does in the covered jurisdictions. So you have to ask yourself whether or not, to go back to the quote that has been bandied about here from Justice Scalia, whether or not there is some rationale of official discrimination which justifies this extraordinary disparate treatment. I cannot understand why Monterey County is viewed somehow in California worse than Arkansas or Oklahoma, and I do not think any rational person could suggest that the problems there are so different in kind that this extraordinarily differential treatment from the Federal Government is authorized. There has been some discussion here of bail-out and bail-in provisions, but we all know that the bail-in provisions are virtually nonexistent, and the bail-out provisions cannot be used because if you have one statewide objection, it basically condemns all the subordinate political jurisdictions to being kept in. If it really is fair to look at circumstances as they exist in 2006 or 2020 or 2030, it would make a lot more sense not to have these relatively meaningless bail-out and bail-in provisions, but have a formula that is tied to some objective benchmark of minority opportunity and voter participation, all of which were proposed in the House and I think should be taken up by the Senate when it comes time to consider the bill. Thank you. Senator Cornyn. Professor Avila? Mr. Avila. Yes, I would like to just say I agree with Professor Ifill's comments with respect to the triggering concerns. I would just like to add with respect to the issue of the number of letters of objection to the number of submissions, as I indicated earlier, there is a substantial issue of noncompliance and it is just not me saying this. In 1968, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission indicated that there was a substantial issue of noncompliance. In 1970, when the Act was reauthorized, Congress again noted in testimony before Congress that there was a substantial issue of noncompliance. In 1975, the same thing occurred. In 1978, you had a GAO report that documented the fact that there was a substantial issue of noncompliance. You had the Supreme Court in Perkins v. Matthew document that there was a substantial issue of noncompliance. In 1982, you had Drew Days, who was the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, testifying before Congress that there was a substantial issue of noncompliance. In 1999 and 1996, the Supreme Court in Lopez v. Monterey County, as I stated earlier, was dealing with judicial district consolidations. They had not been submitted from 1968, so the issue of noncompliance is very significant. We have been doing some initial studies in various counties in California, and there are hundreds of annexations that have not been submitted for Section 5 preclearance. So that might in some part explain why we have this small number of letters of objection. Senator Cornyn. Ms. Thernstrom? Ms. Thernstrom. Well, updating the trigger using simply 2004 turnout would just continue the arbitrary nature of the coverage, and it is arbitrary. Look, in 1965, those who designed the Voting Rights Act knew precisely which jurisdictions needed to be covered, and they designed a statistical trigger to cover those jurisdictions; that is, they knew where you had a literacy test and low voter participation, the combination of black and white voter participation, under 50 percent--they picked the 50- percent statistic very carefully in order to get the right jurisdictions. Where you had that combination of a literacy test and low voter participation, you knew that that low voter participation was an indication of the intentional fraudulent use of literacy tests to disenfranchise blacks. There is no, there never was in interpreting this Act, an argument that low voter participation or participation under the 50-percent mark standing alone was an indication of intentional discrimination. And, indeed, the only reason, for instance, New York was covered in the 1970 reauthorization is because in that low turnout year, three boroughs in New York, but not the other two boroughs, fell just below the 50-percent turnout. So you had this arbitrary coverage. The complaints today about electoral discrimination, the complaints in 2000 and 2004 involved--in 2000, Florida counties that were not covered by the Voting Rights Act; in 2004, States like Ohio, not covered by the Voting Rights Act. I was part of an instrumental team that commissioned studies for the American Enterprise Institute. They are on the AEI website, showing levels of voter participation in the South, showing how high they are, higher than in the North in many States. You know, as Richard Hasen, a law professor who is for the reauthorization of Section 5, has said, ``Bull Connor is dead.'' And the racial landscape in America has changed. This bill does not reflect that. Updating the trigger in an arbitrary manner to 2004 turnout would not reflect that change either. The bill needs to come into conformity with racial reality more than four decades down the road. And four decades in civil rights time, you are talking about a revolution in racial attitudes in this country and the status of blacks, and Hispanics, who were, of course, not covered in 1965. But obviously the revolution has been particularly striking with respect to African Americans. Now, in terms of bail-out possibilities, for the reasons that Mike Carvin just said, bail-out is a joke. And that is the reason why few jurisdictions have indeed bailed out. And as for the deterrent effect, look, yes, lots of States were forced, in order to get the Justice Department off their back in the 1990's, to draw maps that had a maximum number of majority- minority districts that came as close to proportional racial and ethnic representation as possible. I did not think proportional racial and ethnic representation was a value that was built into the Voting Rights Act, but it was what the Justice Department was insisting on. So the deterrent effect, in effect, forced jurisdictions to do what the Voting Rights Act never should have forced them to do, which violates basic American values. If you want to see that story, it is spelled out very nicely by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Johnson. You have to look at the district court opinion as well as the Supreme Court opinion. But it is a disgraceful story, and so I do not buy this whole argument about a deterrent effect, given the standards that the Justice Department has been using, which have nothing to do or not much to do with the actual statute. Senator Cornyn. This has, I know, been a long afternoon for you. We are going to have to wrap it up now because we actually have a meeting of several members of the Judiciary Committee on this subject at 5:15. I am going to have to leave. But we will leave the record open so that those members who were unable to come this afternoon--it has been a particularly hectic day and week. So that is the reason why--not for lack of interest--that people have not been here. We will leave the record open for 1 week for them to submit any additional questions in writing or submit any other materials for the record. Without objection, I am going to put in the record a number of articles, editorials, and statements by scholars and journalists that raise questions about the reauthorization as drafted. In addition, there is a report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights which will also be made part of the record. In conclusion, let me just thank each of you for being here and sharing with us your expertise and point of view. This is enormously important for all the reasons that we have discussed, and we are much better off for having your contribution. Thank you very much. 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