<DOC>
[105th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:53367.wais]
IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY:
WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY PURSUANT TO H. RES. 581:
APPEARANCE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
__________
NOVEMBER 19, 1998
__________
Serial No. 66
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Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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_______________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
Wisconsin BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERROLD NADLER, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
STEPHEN E. BUYER, Indiana MAXINE WATERS, California
ED BRYANT, Tennessee MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
BOB BARR, Georgia ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER B. CANNON, Utah
JAMES E. ROGAN, California
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARY BONO, California
Majority Staff
Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., General Counsel-Chief of Staff
Jon W. Dudas, Deputy General Counsel-Staff Director
Diana L. Schacht, Deputy Staff Director-Chief Counsel
Daniel M. Freeman, Parliamentarian-Counsel
Paul J. McNulty, Director of Communications-Chief Counsel
Joseph H. Gibson, Chief Counsel
Rick Filkins, Counsel
Sharee M. Freeman, Counsel
Peter J. Levinson, Counsel
John F. Mautz, IV, Counsel
William E. Moschella, Counsel
Stephen Pinkos, Counsel
George M. Fishman, Chief Counsel David P. Schippers, Chief
Mitch Glazier, Chief Counsel Investigative Counsel
John H. Ladd, Chief Counsel
Raymond V. Smietanka, Chief Counsel Susan Bogart, Investigative
Laura Ann Baxter, Counsel Counsel
Daniel J. Bryant, Counsel Robert S. Hoover, Counsel
Cathleen A. Cleaver, Counsel John C. Kocoras, Counsel
Vince Garlock, Counsel Berle S. Littmann, Investigator
James W. Harper, Counsel Stephen P. Lynch, Professional
Susan Jensen-Conklin, Counsel Staff Member
Debra K. Laman, Counsel Charles F. Marino, Counsel
Blaine S. Merritt, Counsel Jeffrey J. Pavletic, Investigative
Nicole R. Nason, Counsel Counsel
Glenn R. Schmitt, Counsel Thomas M. Schippers, Investigative
Jim Y. Wilon, Counsel Counsel
Albert F. Tracy, Investigator
Peter J. Wacks, Investigator
Diana L. Woznicki, Investigator
Minority Staff
Julian Epstein, Minority Chief Counsel-Staff Director
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority General Abbe D. Lowell, Minority Chief
Counsel Investigative Counsel
David G. Lachmann, Counsel Sampak P. Garg, Investigative
Cynthia A. R. Martin, Counsel Counsel
Henry Moniz, Counsel Steven F. Reich, Investigative
Stephanie J. Peters, Counsel Counsel
Samara T. Ryder, Counsel Deborah L. Rhode, Investigative
Brian P. Woolfolk, Counsel Counsel
Kevin M. Simpson, Investigative
Counsel
Lis W. Wiehl, Investigative
Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
HEARING
Page
November 19, 1998................................................ 1
OPENING STATEMENT
Hyde, Hon. Henry J., a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary.......... 2
WITNESS
Starr, Hon. Kenneth, Independent Counsel, Office of the
Independent Counsel, Washington, DC............................ 14
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Barr, Bob, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Georgia: Prepared statement.................................... 138
Bryant, Ed, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Tennessee: Prepared statement.................................. 129
Gallegly, Elton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
California: Prepared statement................................. 104
Goodlatte, Bob, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Virginia, Claims of Government Misconduct...................... 116
Jackson Lee, Sheila, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Texas: Prepared statement................................... 125
Starr, Hon. Kenneth, Independent Counsel, Office of the
Independent Counsel, Washington, DC: Prepared statement........ 43
IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY:
WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1998
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room
2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Henry J. Hyde; F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr.; Bill McCollum; George W. Gekas; Howard
Coble; Lamar S. Smith; Elton Gallegly; Charles T. Canady; Bob
Inglis; Bob Goodlatte; Steve Buyer; Ed Bryant; Steve Chabot;
Bob Barr; William L. Jenkins; Asa Hutchinson; Edward A. Pease;
Christopher B. Cannon; James E. Rogan; Lindsey O. Graham; Mary
Bono; John Conyers; Barney Frank; Charles E. Schumer; Howard L.
Berman; Rick Boucher; Jerrold Nadler; Robert C. ``Bobby''
Scott; Melvin L. Watt; Zoe Lofgren; Sheila Jackson Lee; Maxine
Waters; Martin T. Meehan; William D. Delahunt; Robert Wexler;
Steven R. Rothman; and Thomas M. Barrett.
Majority Staff Present: Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., general
counsel-chief of staff; Jon W. Dudas, deputy general counsel-
staff director; Diana L. Schacht, deputy staff director-chief
counsel; Daniel M. Freeman, parliamentarian-counsel; Joseph H.
Gibson, chief counsel; Rick Filkins, counsel; Sharee M.
Freeman, counsel; John F. Mautz, IV, counsel; William
Moschella, counsel; Stephen Pinkos, counsel; Sheila F. Klein,
executive assistant to general counsel-chief of staff; Annelie
Weber, executive assistant to deputy general counsel-staff
director; Samuel F. Stratman, press secretary; Rebecca S. Ward,
office manager; James B. Farr, financial clerk; Elizabeth
Singleton, legislative correspondent; Sharon L. Hammersla,
computer systems coordinator; Michele Manon, administrative
assistant; Joseph McDonald, publications clerk; Shawn Friesen,
staff assistant/clerk; Robert Jones, staff assistant; Ann
Jemison, receptionist; Michael Connolly, communications
assistant; Michelle Morgan, press secretary; and Patricia
Katyoka, research assistant.
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law Staff
Present: Ray Smietanka, chief counsel; Jim Harper, counsel; and
Audray Clement, staff assistant.
Subcommittee on the Constitution Staff Present: John H.
Ladd, chief counsel; and Cathleen A. Cleaver, counsel.
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property Staff
Present: Mitch Glazier, chief counsel; Blaine S. Merritt,
counsel; Vince Garlock, counsel; and Debra K. Laman.
Subcommittee on Crime Staff Present: Paul J. McNulty,
director of communications-chief counsel; Glenn R. Schmitt,
counsel; Daniel J. Bryant, counsel; and Nicole R. Nason,
counsel.
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Staff Present:
George M. Fishman, chief counsel; Laura Ann Baxter, counsel;
and Jim Y. Wilon, counsel.
Majority Investigative Staff Present: David P. Schippers,
chief investigative counsel; Susan Bogart, investigative
counsel; Thomas M. Schippers, investigative counsel; Jeffrey
Pavletic, investigative counsel; Charles F. Marino, counsel;
John C. Kocoras, counsel; Diana L. Woznicki, investigator;
Peter J. Wacks, investigator; Albert F. Tracy, investigator;
Berle S. Littmann, investigator; Stephen P. Lynch, professional
staff member; Nancy Ruggero-Tracy, office manager/coordinator;
Patrick O'Sullivan, staff assistant; and Heather McLaughlin,
staff assistant.
Minority Staff Present: Julian Epstein, minority chief
counsel-staff director; Perry Apelbaum, minority general
counsel; Samara T. Ryder, counsel; Brian P. Woolfolk, counsel;
Henry Moniz, counsel; Robert Raben, minority counsel; Stephanie
Peters, counsel; David Lachmann, counsel; Anita Johnson,
executive assistant to minority chief counsel-staff director;
and Dawn Burton, minority clerk.
Minority Investigative Staff Present: Abbe D. Lowell,
minority chief investigative counsel; Lis W. Wiehl,
investigative counsel; Deborah L. Rhode, investigative counsel;
Kevin M. Simpson, investigative counsel; Steven F. Reich,
investigative counsel; Sampak P. Garg, investigative counsel;
and Maria Reddick, minority clerk.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN HYDE
Mr. Hyde. Pursuant to notice, I now convene the committee
for a hearing pursuant to House Resolution 581, the resolution
which the House adopted authorizing an inquiry into whether to
recommend impeachment of the President of the United States.
The Chair intends to recognize himself for 5 minutes and the
ranking minority member for 5 minutes. Each member may be
permitted to place an opening statement into the record. After
the two opening statements, my own and the ranking member's,
the Chair intends to recognize the witness, the Independent
Counsel, Mr. Starr.
Without objection, after Mr. Starr's presentation, the
Chair will recognize minority counsel, Mr. Lowell, for 30
minutes to question the witness, majority counsel, Mr.
Schippers, for 30 minutes to question the witness, and
subsequent to questioning by committee counsel, each member
will be recognized to ask questions under the 5-minute rule.
Subsequent to members' questions, the President's counsel will
be recognized for 30 minutes to question the witness, and the
Chair recognizes Mr. Delahunt, the gentleman from
Massachusetts.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a motion at
the desk.
Mr. Hyde. The Clerk will report the--why don't you read it,
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. I move the counsel to the President be
recognized for two hours to question the witness.
Mr. Hyde. Well, the Chair states that Mr. Starr is here to
help us adduce and understand the facts. The hearing today is
not a trial, nor is it White House vs. Ken Starr or Republican
vs. Democrat. Rather, the hearing today is another step in our
attempt to carry out our constitutional duty to determine
whether facts exist which indicate that the President of the
United States committed an impeachable offense. If this
committee and the full House determine the President has
committed an impeachable offense, a trial may be held in the
Senate.
With this in mind, the Chair believes the time allotments
for questioning are eminently fair. As far as giving the
President an opportunity to present his version of the facts, I
would first ask the President and his counsel to respond to the
81 questions we submitted to him two weeks ago. This will go a
long way to helping us gather and understand the facts involved
in this matter.
Furthermore, the President has a standing invitation to
come before this committee for any amount of time and present
us with his version of the facts.
As I compute the timing for questioning the witness, the
Democrats, including the President's counsel, have 140 minutes
of questioning time; the Republicans, 135. The Democrats are
permitted two separate counsel, that is to say the Democrat
members, Mr. Lowell and the President's counsel. We have one.
Our counsel will get a half-hour, Mr. Lowell will get a half-
hour, Mr. Kendall will get a half-hour. So I do not see any
imbalance there.
Mr. Lowell, the Democratic counsel, will go before any of
the elected members at Mr. Conyers' request, and I am happy to
grant that. The President's counsel will have unlimited time to
present his witnesses at the end of our hearings when they are
ready to do so.
So the rule that we are operating under, which is the same
rule that was used in the Rodino era, Rule IV of the
impeachment inquiry rule, specifically states that the
President's counsel may question any witness subject to
instructions from the chairman respecting the time, scope and
duration of the examination.
So, with that statement, the gentleman's motion is denied.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman is not recognized for that purpose.
Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman, point of order.
Mr. Hyde. What is the point of order?
Mr. Frank. The point is the gentleman from Massachusetts
made a motion. The Chair spoke to the motion and denied under
the rules the right of the gentleman who made the motion to
respond to it. I make the point of order that the gentleman is
entitled to his recognition.
Mr. Hyde. I am sorry, I was distracted. What is the point
of order?
Mr. Frank. The gentleman made a motion. The Chair
recognized the gentleman to make a motion. The Chair then spoke
to the motion and is now denying the maker of the motion the
right under our rules to speak to his own motion. The gentleman
has a right under our rules to be recognized to speak to our
motion.
Mr. Hyde. I recognize the gentleman. Go ahead. I have ruled
on the gentleman's motion.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The committee has
given the Independent Counsel a full two hours to present his
version of the facts, a version which most Americans are
already fully familiar with. At the same time, the majority has
seen fit to give the President's counsel all of 30 minutes to
question Mr. Starr. This is meant to be the President's sole
opportunity to confront his accuser during these proceedings.
Mr. Hyde. Would the gentleman yield for just a second?
Mr. Delahunt. I will not yield. I submit this is a grave
disservice, not only to the President but to the integrity of
these proceedings. It is a complete and unwarranted departure
from the precedents of this House. During the Watergate
hearings of 1974, President Nixon's counsel, James St. Clair,
was given all the time he needed to respond to the evidence and
cross-examine witnesses.
This is as it should be. We are talking about the
impeachment of the President of the United States, a grave
constitutional moment in our national history.
I know that some members of the Watergate Committee argued
that the President's counsel, Mr. St. Clair, should be given
limited time to speak, but those views were wisely overruled in
the interests of fairness and decency.
President Clinton is entitled to the same consideration and
respect shown to President Nixon on that occasion, no more and
no less. The record of the Watergate hearings makes clear that
at no time was Mr. St. Clair given a time limit for his
presentation or his examination of witnesses.
Is there any legitimate basis for a different rule today?
The majority may point out that the Watergate testimony was
heard in closed session while today we sit before the cameras
and the American people. Yet that being true, it is more
important, not less, that the President be given a full and
fair opportunity to respond to the charges that are being
leveled against him. They may argue, as they did in a recent
letter to the White House, that the President and his counsel
are here, and I am quoting, ``only as a matter of courtesy and
not of right.''
In other words, ``be glad that we are letting you testify
at all.'' With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, if the goal is
justice, this cannot be a satisfactory response.
A 30-minute presentation is especially inadequate when one
considers that Mr. Starr has been preparing for weeks a
presentation that the White House saw for the first time last
night. According to news accounts, the witness has spent the
better part of the past several weeks conducting videotaped
practice sessions. The President's counsel has had all of 16
hours to prepare his response.
Precedent has been abandoned at almost every turn. We
rushed to release Mr. Starr's transmittal within hours of its
receipt before any review by this committee or the President's
counsel. We posted thousands of pages of secret grand jury
testimony on the Internet and we abdicated our responsibility
to make an independent examination of the facts before voting
to commence an impeachment inquiry.
Let us do this right. I urge support for the motion and
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman has made a point that the President
needs more time to present--you said ``present.'' He will be
given all the time in the world to present, unlimited time.
Today's hearing is to hear from Judge Starr and to question
him.
Mr. Watt. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. I don't yield for any points of order. I would
like to make my statement.
Mr. Watt. I thought you had already made your statement,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. I know that is what you thought. But you couldn't
possibly know when I am through with my statement or not.
Mr. Watt. Under the rules under which we are operating, Mr.
Chairman, we don't know anything about the process. We had
regular order at one point. I am asking for regular order. I am
requesting regular order. Regular order is we get 5 minutes to
address this issue. The Chairman has already had his 5 minutes.
Mr. Hyde. I want to tell this committee, and especially the
Democrats, I had a meeting with Mr. Conyers and Mr. Frank a
couple of days ago, and I suggested I would be very liberal
with the gavel, and if Mr. Kendall is on a line of questioning
that he deems pertinent, I don't intend to shut anybody off.
Now, you are disrupting the continuity of this meeting with
these adversarial motions.
Mr. Watt. We are disrupting a railroad, it seems like, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Buyer. Regular order.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman will observe decorum, and I would
appreciate it if you would speak when you are recognized. I
have not recognized you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman. I would like a point of
information, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate being recognized for a
point of information.
Mr. Hyde. Now, I am trying to be cooperative. I said I
would be liberal in giving people time and I recognize Mr.
Frank.
Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. We did have that
meeting and you accommodated one of our requests particularly
in terms of the order, and you did say you would be with regard
to Mr. Lowell, we talked about it, not on a strict gavel. But I
did think with regard to the President's counsel request, we
were not authorized to speak entirely for that. We could speak
for our counsel. It does seem to me there is a reasonable
difference of opinion here and we ought to vote on it. I don't
think it will delay the committee process. Have the vote and we
will decide it.
Mr. Conyers. I call for a record vote.
Mr. Frank. We did accept the assurance with regard to Mr.
Lowell, but not with regard to the independent party of the
White House.
Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman, I call for a record vote.
Mr. Hyde. Very well. The record vote is on the motion----
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Just a moment, Ms. Jackson Lee, I have got to
recognize Mr. Nadler. Mr. Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, before
we vote, I would like to speak to Mr. Delahunt's motion. I
appreciate the Chair's comments, but the fact is that as of now
today is the only noticed day for a hearing of this committee.
We have been noticed that some witnesses will be called for
depositions. But as of today, Mr. Starr is the only witness
that we are aware of before the committee considering the
impeachment of the President. As such, given any consideration
of fairness and equity, the President's counsel and for that
matter the Democratic committee counsel should have as much
time as they request. There should not be a time limit on it.
The President's counsel requested 90 minutes. That should
be without question granted. If he asked for 5 hours, that
should be granted. We have requested an hour for our counsel,
and I don't know what assurances have been given, but I heard
the Chair say 30 minutes. That should be an hour.
The fact is Mr. Chairman, your calculation of 135 minutes
and 140 minutes is inaccurate, Mr. Starr is going to sit here
for 120 minutes and tell us why the President ought to be
impeached in his opinion and he is entitled to do that. But you
add to that the other time, one side is going to have 260
minutes and the other side is going to have 135 minutes.
Now, I really suggest if the President of the United States
asks that this committee in its one day of scheduled hearings
should have 90 minutes to cross-examine Mr. Starr, that is the
least that can be asked. I have looked at lists of questions
and subjects which Mr. Starr's report and frankly his statement
that we got last night raises some obvious questions. There is
a lot more than can be addressed in 30 minutes there. The
Constitution guarantees the right of anyone who is accused of
any wrongdoing, and fundamental fairness guarantees the right
of anyone, to have the right to confront the witness against
him. Mr. Starr is the only witness.
Frankly, that right ought not to be limited to 30 minutes.
So, I support Mr. Delahunt's motion and I hope that in the
interests of fairness, because, you know, this proceeding must
not only be fair, it must be seen to be fair. If we end up----
Mr. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Nadler. I want to recognize Ms.
Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. I would like to take
this opportunity for a point of information and also to speak
briefly to the motion of Mr. Delahunt.
First of all, I think it would be well to clarify the point
that the President's counsel stands as the President's counsel.
The Democrats and the Democratic counsel of the House stand
separately in their responsibility to the impeachment process.
So to collectively add up numbers to suggest that we have in
total some 200, 100, 5 minutes, whatever it may be, Mr.
Chairman, I would respectfully disagree. For instance in the
St. Clair representation of Mr. Nixon, he had an unlimited
amount of time, because it was distinct under the Rodino
Watergate Committee. This committee alludes to the fact that
they had a separate responsibility from the House Democrats.
And I respect that, because ultimately, with my colleagues I
must vote up or down on articles of impeachment.
Secondly, let me say, Mr. Chairman, in terms in the context
of justice in America, we have always argued that justice is
blind, but we have never argued that justice is gagged. You
cannot have the defense in a courtroom sitting gagged and bound
without any opportunity to refute the accused's overwhelming
opportunity to speak. We allow a defense of the accused in the
courtroom. And I respect the procedure of this very awesome and
somber occasion. But I cannot for the life of me understand,
Mr. Chairman, why we would gag and bind the counsel for the
White House, the counsel for the President. When we did it with
the Chicago 7, we never recovered from the tainted process. I
certainly don't equate this with that, but I would argue that
we should never repeat history and gag the defense counsel on
this particular issue.
So, I would ask with all due respect that we recognize that
the President's counsel is the President's counsel, the House
is separate, and we should allow each their time to speak. I
would ask that we vote for Mr. Delahunt's motion.
Mr. Hyde. The Chair would like to suggest to the
gentlewoman with respect, the Chair doesn't intend to bind and
gag anybody.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Anybody.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate that. I would like for us to
go ahead and approve the motion by acclamation.
Mr. Hyde. I didn't hear the end. You want a motion by
acclamation?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would ask both Republicans and Democrats
to support Mr. Delahunt's motion of fairness by acclamation,
taking up the point that the chairman just made that he has no
intention to gag and bind the voice of the counsel of the
President of the United States. I would ask that we accept his
motion by acclamation, both Republicans and Democrats. I yield
back my time.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Point of Order, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Mr. Chairman, the entire purpose of this
meeting here today is to get Mr. Starr's testimony and to ask a
reasonable amount of questions of Mr. Starr to find out why he
did what he did and why he reached the conclusions that he did.
Having a couple of hours of parliamentary haggling relative
to the procedure of today's hearing I think denigrates the
dignity of this hearing. I have great confidence in the
fairness of Mr. Hyde. Mr. Hyde has presided over this committee
in an extremely fair manner for the almost 4 years that he has
served as chairman. I think that the complaints that we are
hearing from the other side of the aisle insinuate that Mr.
Hyde will not conduct this hearing fairly. I don't think that
there are any facts in evidence that Mr. Hyde is not going to
conduct this hearing fairly. I think we should vote down the
motion, we should get on with Judge Starr's testimony, the
questions that will be asked by the various counsels, and see
how it goes. But the people over on the other side of the
aisle, I think, are saying that this is going to be a railroad
before the whistle even blows and the train leaves the station.
Let's hear what Judge Starr has to say, conduct a dignified
hearing, and let's get to the merits of this issue rather than
who gets to talk how long.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman, notwithstanding that Maxine
Waters is our fairness cop, I move for a vote on the pending
motion.
Mr. Hyde. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered. The Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Sensenbrenner.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Sensenbrenner votes no.
Mr. McCollum.
Mr. McCollum. No.
The Clerk. Mr. McCollum votes no.
Mr. Gekas.
Mr. Gekas. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Gekas votes no.
Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Coble votes no.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith votes no.
Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. Gallegly. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly votes no.
Mr. Canady.
Mr. Canady. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Canady votes no.
Mr. Inglis.
Mr. Inglis. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Inglis votes no.
Mr. Goodlatte.
Mr. Goodlatte. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte votes no.
Mr. Buyer.
Mr. Buyer. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Buyer votes no.
Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Bryant votes no.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot votes no.
Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Barr votes no.
Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins votes no.
Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Hutchinson. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Hutchinson votes no.
Mr. Pease.
Mr. Pease. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Pease votes no.
Mr. Cannon.
Mr. Cannon. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Cannon votes no.
Mr. Rogan.
Mr. Rogan. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Rogan votes no.
Mr. Graham.
Mr. Graham. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Graham votes no.
Mrs. Bono.
Mrs. Bono. No.
The Clerk. Mrs. Bono votes no.
Mr. Conyers.
Mr. Conyers. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers votes aye.
Mr. Frank.
Mr. Frank. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Frank votes aye.
Mr. Schumer.
Mr. Schumer. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Schumer votes aye.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Berman votes aye.
Mr. Boucher.
Mr. Boucher. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Boucher votes aye.
Mr. Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler votes aye.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Scott votes aye.
Mr. Watt.
Mr. Watt. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Watt votes aye.
Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren votes aye.
Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee votes aye.
Ms. Waters.
Ms. Waters. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Waters votes aye.
Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Meehan votes aye.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt votes aye.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler votes aye.
Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Rothman votes aye.
Mr. Barrett.
Mr. Barrett. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Barrett votes aye.
Mr. Hyde.
Mr. Hyde. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Hyde votes no.
Mr. Chairman, there are 16 ayes and 21 noes.
Mr. Hyde. And the motion is not agreed to. The Chair
recognizes himself for 5 minutes for purposes of making an
opening statement.
This morning we commence our second public hearing in
fulfillment of the mandate imposed on us in House Resolution
581. While the business of impeachment is rare, and happily so,
it becomes necessary from time to time when circumstances
require that it be exercised as a constitutional counterbalance
to allegations of serious abuse of presidential power. It is
part of the series of checks and balances that exemplify the
genius of our Founding Fathers.
Throughout our history, we have had a number of impeachment
inquiries, but this one represents a historical first. Never
before has an impeachment inquiry arisen because of a referral
from an Independent Counsel under Section 595(c) of the
statute. For that reason, we have no precedent to follow on the
involvement of the Independent Counsel in our proceedings.
However, it seems both useful and instructive that we should
hear from him, since he is the person most familiar with the
complicated matters the House has directed us to review.
We are holding this hearing to learn the facts surrounding
this situation, including those in the referral that Judge
Starr sent us September 9, 1998, and to determine whether those
facts justify our voting on articles of impeachment. Everyone
should understand how this process works. Under the
Constitution, the House of Representatives has the sole power
to make accusations, known as articles of impeachment. They may
do so by a majority vote. If the House makes such accusations,
they are then sent to the Senate for trial. The Senate may
convict by a two-thirds vote. Our Founding Fathers wisely
determined that one Chamber should accuse and the other should
judge.
We began our work on November 9 at the hearing when we were
enlightened by the testimony of two panels of outstanding
academics about the history and nature of the impeachment
process. Today the search for the truth continues as we turn to
the underlying facts, and as we begin that search we turn to
one person, Judge Starr, who has a comprehensive overview of
the complex issues we face.
I thought we should have that overview before we hear from
other witnesses. As we announced earlier this week, we will
hear from other witnesses in live hearings and in depositions
as we move towards a final resolution. In addition, we have yet
to hear from the President, and I can assure my colleagues if
and when the President would want to testify, he may have
unlimited time to do so. In any event, we are hopeful that the
pledge of cooperation we received from his attorneys will soon
be fulfilled.
Let me repeat my new year's resolution. It is my fervent
hope we will be able to conclude this inquiry before the new
year turns. I am hopeful that all members will bear this in
mind as we conduct this search for truth with all deliberate
speed.
There are many voices telling us to halt this debate, that
the people are weary of it all. There are other voices
suggesting we have a duty to debate the many questions raised
by the circumstances in which we find ourselves, questions of
high consequence for constitutional government. David Broder,
writing in the Washington Post yesterday, suggested that in our
hearings ``we will define as a Nation the standard of honesty
we are going to impose on our President.''
What is the significance of a false statement under oath?
Is it essentially different from a garden variety lie, a mental
reservation, a fib, an evasion, a little white lie, hyperbole?
In a court proceeding, do you assume some trivial
responsibility when you raise your right hand and swear to God
to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?
And what of the rule of law, that unique aspect of a free
society that protects you from the fire on your roof or the
knock on your door at 3 a.m.? What does lying under oath do to
the rule of law? Do we still have a government of laws and not
of men? Does the law apply to some people with force and
ferocity, while the powerful are immune? Do we have one set of
laws for the officers and another for the enlisted? Should we?
These are but a few questions these hearings are intended
to explore. And just perhaps when the debate is over, the
rationalizations and the distinctions and the semantic
gymnastics are put to rest, we may be closer to answering for
our generation the haunting question asked 139 years ago in a
small military cemetery in Pennsylvania, whether a Nation
conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all
men are created equal can long endure.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of
this committee, Mr. Conyers, for 5 minutes for his opening
statement.
Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman and my colleagues on the
Judiciary Committee, we meet today for only the third time in
the history of our Nation to take evidence in an inquiry of
impeachment against a President of the United States.
Today's witness, Kenneth W. Starr, wrote the tawdry,
salacious and unnecessarily graphic referral that he delivered
to us in September with so much drama and fanfare, and now the
majority members of this committee have called that same
prosecutor forward to testify in an unprecedented desperation
effort to breathe new life into a dying inquiry.
It is fundamental to the integrity of this inquiry to
examine whether the Independent Counsel's evidence is tainted,
whether conclusions are colored by improper motive. In short,
it is relevant to examine the conduct of the Independent
Counsel and his staff or where their behavior impacts directly
on the credibility of the evidence in the referral.
For example, the committee must determine whether Mr. Starr
improperly threatened witnesses if they would not provide
incriminating evidence against the President of the United
States, whether Mr. Starr's partisan interests affected the
collection and presentation of evidence, and whether Mr. Starr
himself violated the law by leaking uncensored grand jury
material to humiliate the President.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, contrary to the
views that have been expressed by Chairman Hyde in letters to
me this week, these are not collateral issues at all. They go
to the very heart of Mr. Starr's referral. To turn a blind eye
to these issues is to continue an unfair and partisan process.
Now, no one defends the President's conduct, but even
Republican witnesses at our hearing only last week testified
that even if the alleged facts are proven true, they simply do
not amount to impeachable offenses. The idea of a federally
paid sex policeman spending millions of dollars to trap an
unfaithful spouse, or to police civil litigation would have
been unthinkable prior to the Starr investigation.
Let there be no mistake, it is not now acceptable in
America to investigate a person's private sexual activity. It
is not acceptable to force mothers to testify against their
daughters, to make lawyers testify against their clients, to
require Secret Service agents to testify against the people
they protect, or to make bookstores tell what books people
read.
It is not acceptable for rogue attorneys and investigators
to trap a young woman in a hotel room, discourage her from
calling her lawyer, ridicule her when she asks to call her
mother. But the report suggests, I am sorry to say, that is
precisely how Kenneth W. Starr has conducted this
investigation.
An Independent Counsel must do justice both in the specific
matter he is investigating and to the system of justice as a
whole. While an Independent Counsel can and should pursue a
case with vigor, I and many others believe that Mr. Starr has
crossed that line into obsession.
When I talk about obsession, sir, I wonder why Mr. Starr
encouraged Linda Tripp to continue to betray and entrap her
young, unsuspecting friend, and to allow her to continue her
illegal tape recordings without court approval? And when I talk
about obsession, I wonder why Mr. Starr ignored his ethical
obligations and failed to disclose his involvement in the Paula
Jones case, which could have disqualified him from this point
of the investigation.
Is it just coincidence that even before he was appointed
Independent Counsel Mr. Starr was already in contact with
lawyers for Paula Jones? Is it just coincidental that Mr.
Starr, until recently, drew a $1 million a year salary from his
law firm that represents the tobacco industry which is fighting
President Clinton's effort to deter teen smoking?
Is it just a coincidence that this Independent Counsel
accepted a prestigious job at a university funded by one of the
President's most persistent and vocal critics, Richard Mellon
Scaife?
Is it just a coincidence that the Independent Counsel
failed to provide this committee with important exculpatory
evidence in his referral, casually glossing over the central
part of Monica Lewinsky's testimony, when she clearly stated
that ``no one promised me a job; no one asked me to lie about
her relationship with the President?
Perhaps Mr. Starr will persuade us not to be concerned
about these matters. But he surely carries the burden of
showing us and the American people that these things did not
affect his fairness nor his impartiality.
Nor do I understand why Mr. Starr declined to provide the
Democratic members of the committee with copies of documents
that we have repeatedly requested. Mr. Starr even says that the
President should be impeached because he invokes privilege, but
he is quick to raise the privilege argument when questioned
about his own conduct, and did so this week when Democrats
sought documents concerning his conduct.
Over the course of this investigation, the Independent
Counsel complained publicly, and still does, that a lack of
cooperation was impeding his investigation, and yet he has now
afforded members of the committee the same treatment about
which he has complained. This causes us to question Mr. Starr's
motives and to lack confidence in his referral.
His conduct over the past week has only reinforced my
doubts. On Friday, Mr. Starr shipped two new boxes of documents
to us and announced an indictment dating back to events
occurring before Bill Clinton was even President, pre-1992.
On Tuesday, the same day that our Republican colleagues
suggested that they might want to expand this impeachment
inquiry, contrary to the chairman's stated desire to close it
down, Mr. Starr shipped four new boxes of documents to us, and
last night we learned that Mr. Starr now sees fit for this
committee to consider Whitewater or other alleged improprieties
that he did not see fit to mention in his referral. The sense
of desperation in the face of a failed impeachment inquiry is
palpable.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss in my duties if I
did not observe that to date our committee process has not been
bipartisan nor fair. All this committee has done since
September 9 is to, in a partisan matter, dump salacious grand
jury material on a public that does not want it. It was you,
Chairman Hyde, who said this process could not proceed unless
it was bipartisan. We need to do better than 11th hour
unilateral decisions to subpoena witnesses having little to do
with the underlying referral. We need to do better in offering
the President a full and fair opportunity to participate in
these hearings. We have many questions about the way you have
conducted your investigation, Mr. Starr. Fairness dictates that
the committee and the American people learn whether you have
created a climate for the purpose of driving a President from
office who has twice been elected by the people of this great
Nation.
Mr. Hyde. I thank the gentleman.
Today our witness is Judge Kenneth W. Starr. On August 5,
1994, the Special Division of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit appointed Judge
Starr to investigate what has become known as the Whitewater
matter. Since that time, Attorney General Reno and the Special
Division added several other matters, including the White House
Travel Office and the FBI files matters, to Judge Starr's
jurisdiction. After his submission of evidence, they further
added what has become known as the Lewinsky matter.
Judge Starr has a Bachelor's Degree from the George
Washington University, a Master's Degree from Brown University,
and a Juris Doctor Degree from Duke University. He then clerked
for Judge David Dyer of the United States Court of Appeals for
the 5th Circuit and Chief Justice Warren Burger of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
After serving on President Reagan's transition team, Judge
Starr served as counselor to Attorney General William French
Smith from 1981 to 1983. In 1983, President Reagan nominated
him to serve as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia and he was confirmed by the
Senate.
Judge Starr served on the D.C. Circuit until 1989, when
President Bush nominated him to be the Solicitor General of the
United States. As Solicitor General, Judge Starr was
responsible for representing the United States before the
Supreme Court.
In November 1993, Democrats on the Senate Ethics Committee
chose him to serve as a hearing examiner to review Senator
Packwood's diaries for relevant information. Since August 1994,
Judge Starr has conducted the investigation of Whitewater and
the other matters that have been assigned to him by Attorney
General Reno and the Special Division. That investigation has
led to the conviction of 14 persons, including a sitting
Governor of Arkansas in two separate cases, the former number
three person in the United States Department of Justice, and
two former business partners of the President. Six other
indictments are currently pending in the courts.
More pertinent to today's hearing, Judge Starr's
investigation has led to the first ever impeachment referral
under section 595(c) of the independent counsel statute. That
referral has given rise to the impeachment inquiry we are now
conducting.
With that, Judge Starr, would you please rise so that I may
administer the oath.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Hyde. Thank you. Let the record reflect the witness
responded in the affirmative. Mr. Starr, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH STARR, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, OFFICE OF
THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Starr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this
opportunity to be before the committee.
Mr. Hyde. Would you pull the mike up?
Mr. Starr. I was just told to push my mike away.
Mr. Hyde. By a Democrat, I am sure.
Mr. Starr. The person did not identify his affiliation in
saying that. But this is my first opportunity to publicly
report on certain issues and aspects of our work, and I look
forward to doing so and seeking to assist the committee.
I appreciate both the seriousness of the committee's work
and the gravity of its assignment. I have reviewed the
statements made by the 37 members at the October 5 hearing, and
any citizen who watched that hearing would have been impressed
by the depth and the breadth of the discussion that day.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for interrupting Judge
Starr, but, Judge, could you pull the mike a little closer.
Mr. Starr. Yes, I will keep pulling.
So I appear before you today in the wake of your own
hearings, both on October 5 and in the hearings to which the
Chair just referred, with great respect and awareness of the
difficulty of your task.
As you know, in January of this year and as the chairman
indicated, the Attorney General of the United States petitioned
the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for
this jurisdiction, the panel that oversees independent
counsels, and, at the Attorney General's request, the Special
Division granted authority to us to investigate whether Monica
Lewinsky or others committed Federal crimes relating to the
sexual harassment lawsuit brought by Paula Jones against the
President.
Our office conducted a swift yet thorough investigation. We
completed the primary factual investigation in under 8 months,
notwithstanding a number of obstacles in our path.
The law requires, as the chairman indicated, an independent
counsel to report to the House of Representatives substantial
and credible information that an impeachable offense may have
been committed.
On September 9, pursuant to our statutory duty, we
submitted a referral and we submitted backup documentation to
the House, as Mr. Conyers has noted, and I am here today at
your invitation, in furtherance of our statutory obligation.
Let me say at the outset that I recognize that it is the
House of Representatives and not an independent counsel which
enjoys the sole power to impeach. My role today is to discuss
our referral and the underlying investigation.
Let me then begin with an overview. As our referral
explains, the evidence suggests that the President made false
statements under oath and thwarted the search for truth in
Jones v. Clinton. The evidence further suggests that the
President made false statements under oath to the grand jury on
August 17 of this year. That same night, the President publicly
acknowledged an inappropriate relationship, but maintained that
his testimony had been legally accurate.
The President also declared that all inquiries into the
matter should end because, he said, it was private.
But shortly after the President's August 17 speech,
Senators Lieberman, Kerrey and Moynihan stated that the
President's actions were not a private matter. In our view they
were correct. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the President
repeatedly tried to thwart the legal process in the Jones
matter and in the grand jury investigation. That is not a
private matter. The evidence further suggests that the
President in the course of those efforts misused his authority
and his power as President and contravened his duty to
faithfully execute the laws. That, too, is not a private
matter.
The evidence suggests that the misuse of Presidential
authority occurred in the following 10 ways:
First, the evidence suggests that the President made a
series of premeditated false statements in his civil deposition
on January 17, 1998. Those are statements under oath. The
President had taken an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth. By making false statements under
oath, the President, the Chief Executive of our Nation, failed
to adhere to that oath and to his Presidential oath to
faithfully execute the laws.
Second, the evidence suggests that apart from making false
statements under oath, the President engaged in a pattern, a
pattern of behavior during the Jones litigation, to thwart the
judicial process. The President reached an agreement with Ms.
Lewinsky that each would make false statements under oath. He
provided job assistance to Ms. Lewinsky at a time when the
Jones case was proceeding and Ms. Lewinsky's truthful testimony
would have been harmful. He engaged in an apparent scheme to
conceal gifts that had been subpoenaed from Ms. Lewinsky. He
coached a potential witness, his own secretary, Ms. Currie,
with a false account of relevant events.
Those acts constitute a pattern of obstruction that is
fundamentally inconsistent with the President's duty to
faithfully execute the law.
Third, the evidence suggests that the President
participated in a scheme at his civil deposition in which his
attorney in his presence deceived a United States district
judge in an effort to cut off questioning about Ms. Lewinsky.
The President did not correct his attorney's statement. A false
statement to a Federal judge in order to shortcut and to
prevent relevant questioning is an obstruction of the judicial
process.
Fourth, the evidence suggests that on January 23, 1998,
after the criminal investigation had become public, the
President made false statements to his Cabinet and used his
Cabinet as unwitting surrogates to publicly support the
President's false story.
Fifth, the evidence suggests that the President, acting in
a premeditated and calculated fashion, deceived the American
people on January 26, and on other occasions, when he denied a
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
Sixth, the evidence suggests that the President, after the
criminal investigation became public, made false statements to
his aides and concocted false alibis that these government
employees repeated to the grand jury sitting at the United
States courthouse. As a result, the grand jury here in
Washington received inaccurate information.
Seventh, having promised the American people to cooperate
with the investigation, the President refused six invitations
to testify before the grand jury. Refusing to cooperate with a
duly authorized Federal criminal investigation is inconsistent
with the general statutory duty of all executive branch
employees to cooperate with criminal investigations. It also is
inconsistent with the President's duty to faithfully execute
the laws.
Eighth, the President and his administration asserted three
different governmental privileges to conceal relevant
information from the grand jury. The privilege assertions were
legally baseless in these circumstances. They were inconsistent
with the action of Presidents Carter and Reagan in similar
circumstances, and they delayed and impeded the investigation.
Ninth, the President made false statements under oath to
the grand jury on August 17, 1998. The President again took an
oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth. The evidence demonstrates that the President failed to
adhere to that oath and thus to his Presidential oath to
faithfully execute the laws.
Tenth, the evidence suggests that the President deceived
the American people in his speech on August 17 by stating that
his testimony had been legally accurate.
In addition to these 10 points, it bears mention that well
before January of 1998, the President used governmental
resources and prerogatives to pursue his relationship. The
evidence suggests that the President used his secretary, Betty
Currie, a government employee, to facilitate and to conceal the
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President used White House
aides and the United States Ambassador to the United Nations in
his effort to find Ms. Lewinsky a job, at a time when it was
foreseeable, even likely, that she would be a witness in the
Jones case. And, the President used a governmental attorney,
Bruce Lindsey, to assist his personal legal defense during the
Jones case.
In short, the evidence suggests that the President
repeatedly used the machinery of government and the powers of
his high office to conceal his relationship, to conceal the
relationship from the American people, from the judicial
process in the Jones case, and from the grand jury.
Let me turn, then, to the legal context in which these
issues first arose. At the outset, I want to emphasize that our
referral never suggests that the relationship between the
President and Ms. Lewinsky in and of itself could constitute a
high crime or misdemeanor. Indeed, the referral never passes
judgment on the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The
propriety of a relationship is not the concern of our office.
The referral is instead about obstruction of justice, lying
under oath, tampering with witnesses, and the misuse of power.
The referral cannot be understood without appreciating this
vital distinction.
This case or matter thus raises the following initial
question: Is a plaintiff in a sexual harassment lawsuit
entitled to obtain truthful information from the defendant, and
from associates of the defendant, in order to support her
claim? That should be easy to answer. No citizen who finds
himself accused in a sexual harassment case or in any other
kind of case can lie under oath or otherwise obstruct justice,
and thereby prevent the plaintiff from discovering evidence and
presenting her case.
Paula Jones, a former Arkansas State employee, filed a
Federal sexual harassment suit against President Clinton in
1994. The President denied those allegations. We will never
know whether a jury would have credited the allegations. We
will also never know whether the ultimate decisionmaker would
have found that the alleged facts, if true, constitute sexual
harassment. When the President and Ms. Jones settled the case
last week, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in St. Louis was
still considering the preliminary legal question whether the
facts, as alleged, could constitute sexual harassment.
After the suit was first filed in 1994, the President
attempted to delay the trial, or more broadly the proceedings,
until his Presidency had concluded. The President claimed a
temporary Presidential immunity from civil suit, and the case
proceeded through the court of appeals to the Supreme Court of
the United States. At oral argument, the President's attorney
specifically warned our Nation's highest court that if Ms.
Jones prevailed, her lawyers would be able to investigate the
President's relationships with other women as is common in
sexual harassment cases. The Supreme Court rejected the
President's constitutional claim of immunity and did so by a 9-
to-0 vote. The Court concluded that the Constitution did not
provide such a temporary immunity from suit.
The idea was simple and powerful: No one is above the law.
The Supreme Court sent the case back to trial with words that
warrant emphasis. These are the words of our unanimous Supreme
Court: ``Like every other citizen who invokes'' the district
court's jurisdiction, Ms. Jones, the words of the Court again,
``has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims.''
After the Supreme Court's decision, the parties started to
gather the facts. The parties questioned relevant witnesses in
depositions. They submitted written questions. They made
requests for documents.
Sexual harassment cases are often ``he said-she said''
kinds of disputes. Evidence reflecting the behavior of both
parties can be critical, including the defendant's
relationships with other employees in the workplace.
Such questions can be uncomfortable, but they occur every
day in courts and law offices across our country. Individuals
in those cases take an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth. And no one is entitled to lie under
oath simply because he or she does not like the questions or
because he believes the case is frivolous, or that it is
financially motivated or politically motivated. The Supreme
Court has emphatically and repeatedly rejected the notion that
there is ever a privilege to lie. The Court has stated that
there are ways to object to questions. Lying under oath is not
one of them.
During this fact-gathering process, Judge Susan Webber
Wright in Little Rock followed standard principles of sexual
harassment cases. Over repeated objections from the President's
attorneys, the judge permitted inquiries into the President's
relationships with government employees. On January 8, 1998,
for example, Judge Wright stated that questions as to the
President's relationships with other government employees, in
the words of the judge, ``are within the scope of issues in
this case.''
In making these rulings, Judge Susan Webber Wright
recognized that the questions might prove embarrassing. She
stated in her words, ``I have never had a sexual harassment
case where there was not some embarrassment.'' She also stated
that she could not protect the parties from embarrassment.
Let me summarize the five points that explain how the
President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, what was otherwise
private conduct, became a matter of concern to the courts. This
is critical to fully understand the nature of the committee's
inquiry.
One: the President was sued for sexual harassment in
Federal court, and the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
in that case that the case should go forward.
Two: The law of sexual harassment and the law of evidence
allow the plaintiff to inquire into the defendant's
relationship with other women--with women in the workplace,
which in this case included the President's relationship with
Ms. Lewinsky.
Three: Applying those settled legal principles, Judge Susan
Webber Wright repeatedly rejected the President's objections to
such inquiries. The judge instead ordered the President to
answer the questions.
Four: It is a Federal crime to commit perjury and obstruct
justice in civil cases, including sexual harassment cases.
Violators are subject to a sentence of up to 10 years
imprisonment for obstruction and 5 years for perjury.
Five: The evidence suggests that the President and Ms.
Lewinsky made false statements under oath and obstructed the
judicial process in the Jones case by preventing the court from
obtaining the truth about the relationship.
At his grand jury appearance, the President invoked a
Supreme Court Justice's confirmation hearings as a comparison
to his current situation. The President's use of the analogy
did not fit the facts in the Monica Lewinsky case, however. But
the President's having raised the analogy, let me make it more
fitting to the case here.
Suppose that there is a nominee for a high government
position. Assume that in the confirmation process, there is an
allegation of sexual harassment. Suppose that several women
other than the accuser who have worked with the nominee testify
before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Suppose that the nominee
then confers with one of those women ahead of time, and that
they agree that they will both lie to the Senate Judiciary
Committee about their relationship. Assume further that they
both do lie under oath about their relationship, and suppose
further that a criminal investigation develops and the nominee
again lies under oath to the grand jury. If that were proved to
have happened, what would the Senate Judiciary Committee do?
Suppose that the lying under oath and obstruction of
justice occurs in a sexual harassment suit brought against the
nominee. Suppose further that the false statements and the
obstruction continue into a subsequent criminal investigation.
What would this committee do with compelling evidence of
perjury and obstruction of justice committed by, for example, a
sitting Justice of the Supreme Court in a sexual harassment
case in which he was the defendant?
Those hypotheticals, which track the facts of this case,
put in sharp relief the issue that is before this committee.
Let me again stress that it is this House, the House of
Representatives, and not an independent counsel, that has the
sole power to impeach, but I am suggesting that the
consideration of our referral be focused on the issues that are
actually presented by the referral.
Let me turn next to the essentials of the referral. That
will include the specifics of Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the
Jones case and the President's actions in response to that
involvement.
The key point about the President's conduct is this: On at
least six different occasions from December 17, 1997, through
August 17, 1998, the President had to make a decision. He could
choose truth, or he could choose deception. On all six
occasions the President chose deception, a pattern of
calculated behavior over a span of months.
On December 5, 1997, Ms. Jones' attorneys identified Ms.
Lewinsky as a potential witness. Within a day, the President
learned that Ms. Lewinsky's name was on the witness list.
After learning this, the President faced his first critical
decision. Would he and Monica Lewinsky tell the truth about
their relationship, or would they provide false information,
not just to a spouse or to loved ones, but under oath in a
court of law?
Eleven months ago, the President made his decision. At
approximately 2 o'clock in the morning on December 17, 1997,
the President called Ms. Lewinsky at her Watergate apartment
and told her that she was on the witness list. This was news to
Ms. Lewinsky. And it bears noting that the President, not his
lawyer, made this call to the witness.
During this 2 a.m. conversation, which lasted approximately
half an hour, the President could have told Ms. Lewinsky that
they must tell the truth under oath. The President could have
explained that they might face embarrassment, but that as a
citizen and as the President, he could not lie under oath, and
he could not sit by while Monica did so. The President did not
say anything like that.
On the contrary, according to Ms. Lewinsky, the President
suggested that she could sign an affidavit in the case and use,
under oath, deceptive cover stories that they had devised long
ago to explain why Ms. Lewinsky had visited the Oval Office
area. The President did not explicitly instruct Ms. Lewinsky to
lie. He did not have to do so. Ms. Lewinsky testified that the
President's suggestion that they use the preexisting cover
stories amounted to a continuation of the pattern of concealing
their intimate relationship. Starting with this conversation,
the President and Ms. Lewinsky understood, according to Ms.
Lewinsky, that they were both going to make false statements
under oath.
The conversation between the President and Ms. Lewinsky on
December 17 was a critical turning point. The evidence suggests
that the President chose to engage in a criminal act to reach
an understanding with Ms. Lewinsky that they would both make
false statements under oath. At that moment, the President's
intimate relationship with a subordinate employee was
transformed. It was transformed into an unlawful effort to
thwart the judicial process. This was no longer an issue of
private conduct.
Recall that the Supreme Court had concluded that Paula
Jones was entitled to an orderly disposition of her claims. The
President's action on December 17 was his first direct effort
to thwart the mandate of the Supreme Court.
The story continued: The President faced a second choice.
On December 23, 1997, the President submitted under oath a
written answer to what lawyers call interrogatories, as the
committee knows. The request stated in relevant part: ``Please
state the name of Federal employees with whom you had sexual
relations when you were President of the United States.'' In
his sworn answer, the President said, ``None.''
On December 28, the President faced a third critical
choice. On that day, the President met Ms. Lewinsky at the
White House. They discussed the fact that Ms. Lewinsky had been
subpoenaed for gifts she had received from the President.
According to Ms. Lewinsky, she raised with the President the
question of what she should do with the gifts. Later that day,
the President's personal secretary, Betty Currie, drove to Ms.
Lewinsky's Watergate home. Ms. Lewinsky gave Ms. Currie a
sealed box that contained some of the subpoenaed gifts. Ms.
Currie then took the box and stored it under her bed at home.
In her written proffer on February 1, 4 weeks after the
fact, Ms. Lewinsky stated that Ms. Currie had called her to
retrieve the gifts. If so, that necessarily would have meant
that the President had asked Ms. Currie to call. It would
directly and undeniably implicate him in an obstruction of
justice. Ms. Lewinsky later repeated that statement in
testimony under oath. Ms. Currie, for her part, recalls Ms.
Lewinsky calling her, but even if Ms. Lewinsky called Ms.
Currie, common sense and the evidence suggest some Presidential
knowledge or involvement, as the referral explains.
Let me add another point about the gifts. In his grand jury
appearance in August, the President testified that he had no
particular concern about the gifts in December of 1997 when he
had talked to Ms. Lewinsky about them. And he thus suggested
that he would have had no reason to take part in December in a
plan to conceal the gifts. But there is a serious problem with
the President's explanation. If it were true that the President
in December was unconcerned about the gifts, he presumably
would have told the truth under oath in his January deposition
about the large number of gifts that he and Ms. Lewinsky had
exchanged. But he did not tell the truth. At that deposition,
when asked about whether he had ever given gifts to Monica
Lewinsky, and he had given her several on December 28, the
President stated, ``I don't recall. Do you know what they
were?''
In short, the critical facts to emphasize about the
transfer of gifts are these: First, the President and Ms.
Lewinsky met and discussed what should be done with the gifts
that had been subpoenaed from her. Second, the President's
personal secretary, Ms. Currie, drove later that day to Ms.
Lewinsky's home, or apartment, to pick up the gifts. Third, Ms.
Currie then stored the box of gifts under her bed.
Meanwhile, the legal process continued to unfold, and the
President took other actions that had the foreseeable effect of
keeping Ms. Lewinsky on the team. The President helped Ms.
Lewinsky obtain a job in New York. His efforts began after the
Supreme Court's decision in May of 1997, at a time when it had
become foreseeable that she could be an adverse witness against
the President. These job-related efforts intensified in
December 1997 after Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness
list.
Vernon Jordan, who had been enlisted in the job search for
Ms. Lewinsky, testified that he kept the President informed of
the status of Ms. Lewinsky's job search and her affidavit. On
January 7, 1998, Mr. Jordan told the President that Ms.
Lewinsky had signed the affidavit. Mr. Jordan stated to the
President that he was still working on getting her a job. The
President replied, ``Good.'' In other words, the President,
knowing that a witness had just signed a false affidavit,
encouraged his friend to continue trying to find her a job.
After Ms. Lewinsky received a job offer from Revlon on January
12, Vernon Jordan called the President and said, ``Mission
accomplished.''
As is often the situation in cases involving this kind of
financial assistance, no direct evidence reveals the
President's intent in assisting Ms. Lewinsky in her job
efforts. Ms. Lewinsky testified that no one promised her a job
for silence. Of course, crimes ordinarily do not take place
with such explicit discussion. But Federal courts instruct
juries that circumstantial evidence is just as probative as
direct evidence, and here the circumstantial evidence is
strong. At a bare minimum, the evidence suggests that the
President's job assistance efforts stemmed from his desire to
placate Ms. Lewinsky so that she would not be tempted under the
burden of an oath to tell the truth about the relationship.
Monica Lewinsky herself recognized that at the time, saying to
a friend, ``Somebody could construe or say, 'Well, they gave
her a job to shut her up. They made her happy.' ''
And given that the President's plan to testify falsely
could succeed only if Ms. Lewinsky went along, the President
naturally had to be concerned that Ms. Lewinsky at any time
might turn around and decide to tell the truth. Indeed, some
wanted her to tell the truth. One of her friends, for example,
talked to Ms. Lewinsky about the December 28 meeting with the
President. The friend stated that she was concerned because, in
her words, she ``didn't want to see Monica being like Susan
McDougal'' and did not want Monica, the friend's words, ``to
lie to protect the President.'' Needless to say, any sudden
decision by Ms. Lewinsky to tell the truth, whether out of
anger at the President or simple desire to be law-abiding,
would have been very harmful to the President. That helps to
explain his motive in providing job assistance.
In mid-January, Ms. Lewinsky finalized her false affidavit
with her attorney, who sent it to Judge Wright's court in
Little Rock. The affidavit falsely denied a sexual relationship
with the President. It essentially recounted the cover stories
that had been discussed during that middle-of-the-night
conversation on December 17.
Let me turn to the President's January 17 deposition. Some
have suggested that the President might have been surprised or
ambushed at the deposition. Those suggestions are wrong. The
President had clear warning that there would be questions about
Monica Lewinsky. She had, again, been named on the December 5
witness list. On January 12, just 5 days before the deposition,
Ms. Jones's attorneys identified Ms. Lewinsky as a trial
witness. In response, Judge Wright in Little Rock approved her
as a trial witness. Two days later, on January 14, the
President's private attorney asked Ms. Lewinsky's attorney to
fax a copy of the affidavit. During the deposition itself, the
President's attorney stated that the President was, in his
words, ``fully familiar'' with the affidavit.
At the outset of his January 17 deposition, therefore, the
President faced a fourth critical decision. Fully aware that he
would likely receive questions about Ms. Lewinsky, would the
President continue to make false statements under oath, this
time in the presence of a United States district judge who
would be presiding at the deposition?
At the start of the deposition here in Washington, Judge
Susan Webber Wright administered the oath. The President swore
to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
As his testimony began, the President, in response to a
question from Ms. Jones's attorneys, stated that he understood
he was providing his testimony under penalty of perjury.
The President was asked a series of questions about Ms.
Lewinsky. After a few questions, the President's attorney Mr.
Bennett objected to the questioning about Ms. Lewinsky,
referring to it as, in his words, ``innuendo.'' Mr. Bennett
produced Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit. Mr. Bennett stated to
Judge Wright that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit indicated that, in
Mr. Bennett's words, ``there is absolutely no sex of any kind
in any manner, shape or form.'' Mr. Bennett stated that the
President was ``fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.''
During Mr. Bennett's statements, the President sat back and let
his attorney mislead Judge Susan Webber Wright. The President
said not a word to the judge or, so far as we are aware, to his
attorney.
Judge Wright overruled Mr. Bennett's objection. The
questioning continued. In response, the President made false
statements not only about his intimate relationship with Ms.
Lewinsky, but about a whole host of matters. The President
testified that he did not know that Vernon Jordan had met with
Ms. Lewinsky and talked about the Jones case. That was untrue.
He testified that he could not recall being alone with Ms.
Lewinsky. That was untrue. He testified that he could not
recall ever being in the Oval Office hallway with Ms. Lewinsky
except perhaps when she was delivering pizza. That was untrue.
He testified that he could not recall gifts exchanged between
Ms. Lewinsky and him. That was untrue. He testified, after a
14-second pause, that he was not sure whether he had ever
talked to Ms. Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be
asked to testify in the lawsuit. That was untrue. The President
testified that he did not know whether Ms. Lewinsky had been
served a subpoena at the time he last saw her in December 1997.
That was untrue. When his attorney read Ms. Lewinsky's
affidavit denying a sexual relationship, the President stated
that the affidavit was ``absolutely true.'' That was untrue.
The evidence thus suggests that the President, long aware
that Ms. Lewinsky was a likely topic of questioning at his
deposition, made not one or two, but a series of false
statements under oath. The President further allowed his
attorney to use Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, which the President
knew to be false, to deceive the court. The evidence suggests
that the President directly contravened the oath he had taken,
as well as the Supreme Court's specific mandate in which the
Court had stated that Ms. Jones was entitled, like every other
citizen, to a lawful disposition of her case.
As my referral outlines, the President's deposition did not
mark the end of his scheme to conceal. During his deposition
testimony, the President referred to his secretary, Betty
Currie. The President testified, for example, that Ms. Lewinsky
had come to the White House to see Ms. Currie, that Ms. Currie
had been involved in assisting Ms. Lewinsky in her job search,
and that Ms. Currie had communicated with Vernon Jordan about
Mr. Jordan's assistance to Ms. Lewinsky. In response to one
question at the deposition, the President said he did not know
the answer and ``you'd have to ask Betty.''
Given the President's repeated reference to Ms. Currie and
his suggestion to Ms. Jones's attorneys that they contact her,
the President had to know that Ms. Jones's attorneys might want
to question Ms. Currie. Shortly after 7 p.m. on Saturday,
January 17 of this year, just 2\1/2\ hours after the deposition
had concluded, the President attempted to contact Ms. Currie at
her home. The President asked Ms. Currie to come to the White
House the next day, which she did, although it was unusual for
her to come in on a Sunday. According to Ms. Currie, the
President appeared concerned, and he made a number of
statements about Ms. Lewinsky to Ms. Currie. The statements
included:
``You were always there when she was there, right? We were
never really alone.''
``You could see and hear everything.''
Ms. Currie concluded that the President wanted her to agree
with him when he made these statements. Ms. Currie stated that
she did, in fact, indicate her agreement, although she knew
that the President and Ms. Lewinsky had been alone, and that
she could not hear or see them when they were alone.
Ms. Currie further testified that the President ran through
the same basic statements with her again on either January 20th
or the 21st.
What is important with respect to these two episodes is
that at the time the President made these statements, he knew
that they were false. He knew he had been alone with Ms.
Lewinsky; he knew Ms. Currie could not see or hear everything.
The President thus could not have been trying to refresh his
recollection, as he subsequently suggested. That raises the
question: Is there a legitimate explanation for the President
to have said those things in that manner to Ms. Currie? The
circumstances suggest not. The facts suggest that the President
was attempting to improperly coach Ms. Currie at a time when he
could foresee that she was a potential witness in Jones v.
Clinton.
The President's next major decision came in the days
immediately after January 21st. On the 21st, The Washington
Post reported the story of Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with the
President. After the public disclosure of his relationship with
Ms. Lewinsky and the ongoing criminal investigation, the
President faced a decision. Would he admit the relationship
publicly, correct his testimony in the Jones case, and ask for
the indulgence of the American people? Or would he continue to
deny the truth?
For this question, the President consulted with others.
According to Dick Morris, the political consultant, the
President and he talked on January 21st. Mr. Morris suggested
that the President publicly confess. The President replied,
``But what about the legal thing? You know, the legal thing?
You know, Starr and perjury and all.'' Mr. Morris suggested
that they take a poll. The President agreed. Mr. Morris called
with the results. He stated that the American people were
willing to forgive adultery, but not perjury or obstruction of
justice. The President replied, ``Well, we just have to win,
then.''
Over the next several months, it became apparent that the
strategy to win had many prongs. First, the President denied
the truth publicly and emphatically. Second, he publicly
promised to cooperate with the investigation. Third, the
President deflected and diverted the investigation by telling
aides false stories that were then related to the Federal grand
jury here in Washington. Fourth, he refused invitations to
testify to the grand jury for over 6 months. Fifth, his
administration delayed the investigation through multiple
privilege claims, each of which has been rejected by the
Federal courts. Sixth, surrogates of the President attacked the
credibility and the legitimacy of the grand jury investigation.
Seventh, surrogates of the President attempted to convince the
Congress and the American people that the matter was
unimportant.
The first step was for the President to deny the truth
publicly. For this, political polling led to Hollywood staging.
The President's California friend and producer Harry Thomason
flew to Washington and advised the President that the President
needed to be very forceful in denying the relationship. On
Monday, January 26, in the Roosevelt Room, before Members of
Congress and other citizens, the President provided a clear and
emphatic public statement denying the relationship.
The President also made false statements to his Cabinet and
to his aides. They then spoke publicly and professed their
belief in the President.
The second step was to promise cooperation. The President
told the American people on several television and radio shows
on January 21st and 22nd that, in his words, ``I'm going to do
my best to cooperate with the investigation.''
The third step was the President's refusal to provide
testimony to the grand jury, despite six invitations to do so,
and despite his public promise to cooperate. Refusing
invitations to provide information to a grand jury in a Federal
criminal investigation, and one authorized by the Attorney
General of the United States, and one in which there is a high
national interest in prompt completion, was inconsistent with
the January promise of the President to cooperate, and with the
general statutory duty of all government officials to cooperate
with Federal criminal investigations.
As a fourth step, the President not only refused to testify
himself, but he authorized the use of various governmental
privileges to delay the testimony of many of his taxpayer-paid
assistants. The extensive use of governmental privileges
against grand jury and criminal investigations has, of course,
been a pattern through this administration. Most notably, the
White House cited privilege in 1993 to prevent Justice
Department and Park Police officials from reviewing documents
in Vincent Foster's office in the days after his tragic death.
In the Lewinsky investigation, the President asserted two
privileges, executive privilege and a government attorney-
client privilege. A subordinate administration official,
without objection from the President, claimed the previously
unheard of privilege that was called the protective function
privilege. The privileges were asserted to prevent full
testimony of several White House aides. They were asserted to
prevent the full testimony of sworn law enforcement officers of
the Secret Service.
In asserting executive privilege, the President was plowing
headlong into the Supreme Court's unanimous decision 24 years
ago in United States v. Richard Nixon. There the Supreme Court
ruled that executive privilege was overcome by the need for
relevant information and evidence in criminal proceedings. And
thus it came as no surprise that Chief Judge Norma Holloway
Johnson of this district rejected President Clinton's effort to
use executive privilege to prevent disclosure of relevant
evidence.
In asserting protective function and government attorney-
client privileges, the administration was asking the Federal
courts to make up one new privilege out of whole cloth, and it
was asking them to apply another privilege in a context in
which no Federal court had ever applied it before. Thus, it
again came as little surprise that the Federal courts rejected
the administration's claims. Indeed, as to the government
attorney-client claim, the D.C. Circuit and the district court,
like the Eighth Circuit a year ago, stated that the President's
legal position not only was wrong, but would authorize, in the
court's words, ``a gross misuse of public assets.'' The Supreme
Court refused to grant review of the cases notwithstanding the
administration's two strongly-worded petitions for certiorari.
This point bears emphasis: The administration justified its
many privilege claims by claiming an interest in protecting the
Presidency, not the President personally, but that
justification is dubious for two reasons. First, Presidents
Carter and Reagan waived all government privileges at the
outset of criminal investigations in which they were involved.
The examples set by those two Presidents demonstrate that such
privileges in criminal investigations are manifestly
unnecessary in order to protect the Presidency. Second, these
novel privilege claims were quite weak as a matter of law.
And that raises a question: What was it about the Monica
Lewinsky matter that generated the administration's
particularly aggressive approach to privileges? The
circumstantial evidence suggests an answer: delay. Indeed, when
our office sought to have the Supreme Court of the United
States decide all three privilege claims at once this past
June, the administration opposed expedited consideration.
Not only did the administration invoke these three losing
privileges, but the President publicly suggested that he had
not invoked executive privilege, when, in fact, he had. On
March 24, 1998, while traveling in Africa, the President was
asked about executive privilege. He stated in response, ``You
should ask someone who knows. I haven't discussed that with the
lawyers. I don't know.'' But White House counsel Charles Ruff
had filed an affidavit in Federal court before Judge Johnson
only 7 days earlier in which he swore that he had discussed the
assertion of executive privilege with the President, and that
the President had approved its invocation.
After Chief Judge Johnson ruled against the President, the
President then dropped the executive privilege claim in the
Supreme Court, and then in August, the President explained to
the grand jury why he had dropped the claim. The President
stated, ``I didn't really want to advance an executive
privilege claim in this case beyond having it litigated.''
But this statement made to the grand jury was inaccurate.
In truth, the President had again asserted executive privilege
only a few days earlier. And a few days after his grand jury
testimony, the President again asserted executive privilege to
prevent the testimony of Bruce Lindsey. These executive
privilege cases continue to this day. Indeed, one case is now
pending in the D.C. Circuit.
When the President and the administration assert privileges
in a context involving the President's personal issues, when
the President pretends publicly that he knows nothing about the
executive privilege assertion, when the President and the
administration rebuff our office's efforts to expedite the
cases to the Supreme Court, when the President contends in the
grand jury that he never really wanted to assert executive
privilege beyond having it litigated, despite the fact that he
had asserted it 6 days earlier and would do so again 11 days
afterwards, there is substantial and credible evidence that the
President has misused the privileges available to his high
office. And the misuse delayed and impeded the Federal grand
jury's investigation.
The fifth tactic was diversion and deflection. The
President made false statements to his aides and associates
about the nature of the relationship, as we have seen, with
knowledge that they could testify to that effect to the grand
jury sitting here in Washington. The President did not simply
say to his associates that the allegations were false, or that
the issue was a private matter that he did not want to discuss.
Instead, the President concocted alternative scenarios that
were then repeated to the Federal grand jury.
The final two tactics were related: to attack the grand
jury investigation, including the Justice Department
prosecutors who serve in my office, to declare war, in the
words of one Presidential advisor and ally; and to shape public
opinion about the proper resolution of the entire matter. It is
best that I leave it to someone outside our office to elaborate
on the war against the office, but no one really disputes that
these tactics were employed and continue to be employed to this
very day.
This strategy proceeded for nearly 7 months. It changed
course in August after Monica Lewinsky reached an immunity
agreement with our office, and the grand jury, after
deliberation, issued a subpoena to the President.
The President testified before the grand jury on August 17.
Beforehand, many in Congress and in the public advised that the
President should tell the truth. They cautioned that the
President should not lie before the grand jury. Senator Hatch,
for example, stated that, ``So help me, if he lies before the
grand jury, that will be grounds for impeachment.'' Senator
Moynihan simply stated that perjury before the grand jury was,
in his view, an impeachable offense.
The evidence suggests that the President did not heed this
senatorial advice. Although admitting to an ambiguously defined
inappropriate relationship, the President denied that he had
lied under oath at his civil deposition. He also denied any
conduct that would establish that he had lied under oath at
that deposition. The President thus denied certain conduct with
Ms. Lewinsky and devised a variety of tortured and false
definitions.
The President's answers have not been well received.
Congressman Schumer, the Senator-elect who won, stated that
``it is clear that the President lied when he testified before
the grand jury.'' Congressman Meehan stated that the President
engaged in a ``dangerous game of verbal Twister.'' Indeed, the
President made false statements to the grand jury, and then
that same evening spoke to the Nation and criticized all
attempts to show that he had done so as invasive and
irrelevant. The President's approach appeared to contravene the
oath that he took at the start of the grand jury proceedings.
It also disregarded the admonitions of those Members of
Congress who warned that lying to a grand jury would not be
tolerated. It also discounted Judge Susan Webber Wright's many
orders in which she had ruled that this kind of evidence was
relevant in the Jones case.
And thus ended the over 8-month journey that had begun on
December 5, 1997, when Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on the
witness list. The evidence suggests that the 8 months included
false statements under oath, false statements to the American
people, false statements to the President's Cabinet and his
aides, witness tampering, obstruction of justice, and the use
of Presidential authority and power in an effort to conceal the
truth of the relationship and to delay the investigation.
Given the serious nature of perjury and obstruction of
justice regardless of its setting, it is obvious that the
actions of the President and Ms. Lewinsky to conceal the truth
warranted criminal investigation. Let me explain how the
investigation came to be handled by our office rather than by
the Department of Justice, or by some other independent
counsel. That explanation is straightforward.
On January 8, an attorney in our office was informed that a
witness, who was Linda Tripp, who had been a witness in prior
investigations in our office, had information that she wanted
to provide. A message was conveyed back that she should provide
her information directly. Ms. Tripp called our office on
January 12. In that conversation and later, she provided us a
substantial amount of information.
Let me pause here and emphasize that our office, like most
law enforcement agencies, has received innumerable tips about a
wide variety of matters over the past 4 years, from Swiss bank
accounts to drug smuggling. You name it, we have heard it. In
each case, we must make an initial assessment, whether it is a
serious tip or a crank call, as well as an assessment of
jurisdictional issues.
We handled the information from Ms. Tripp in this same
manner. When we confirmed that the information appeared
credible, we reached out to the Department of Justice, as we
have done regularly during my tenure as Independent Counsel. We
contacted Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder within 48 hours
after Ms. Tripp provided us information, and we found him
appropriately at a basketball game in the evening hours of that
day. The next day we fully informed the Deputy Attorney General
about Ms. Tripp's information, about Ms. Tripp's tapes and the
questions concerning their legality under State law. About the
consensual FBI recording of Ms. Tripp and Ms. Lewinsky. About
the indications that Vernon Jordan was providing employment
assistance to a witness who had the potential to harm the
President, a fact pattern that we had seen in the Webster
Hubbell investigation, which I shall describe presently.
We discussed jurisdiction. We noted that it is in
everyone's interest to avoid time-consuming jurisdictional
challenges. We stated that the Lewinsky investigation could be
considered outside our jurisdiction, as then constituted. We
stressed that someone needed to work the case: The Justice
Department or an independent counsel.
Later that evening, the Deputy Attorney General telephoned
and reported that the Attorney General had tentatively decided
to assign the matter to us. Before her decision was final, we
reviewed the evidence in detail with two experienced career
prosecutors in the Justice Department. One senior Justice
Department prosecutor listened to portions of the FBI tape, the
consensual recording. The Attorney General made her final
decision on Friday, January 16. That day, through a senior
career prosecutor, the Attorney General asked the three-judge
Special Division to expand our office's jurisdiction. The
Special Division granted the request that day.
In short, our entry into this investigation was a standard,
albeit an expedited, procedure.
Seven months later, after conducting the factual
investigation, and after the President's grand jury testimony,
the question we faced was what to do with the evidence. The
chairman referred to Section 595(c) of the independent counsel
statute, which requires an independent counsel, investigating
possible crimes, to provide to the House of Representatives, in
the words of the statute, substantial and credible information
that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.
This reporting provision suggests a statutory preference
that possible criminal wrongdoing by a President be addressed
in the first instance by the House of Representatives. It also
requires an analysis of the law of impeachment. You have had
hearings on that subject, but let me say that as we understood
the text of the Constitution, its history and relevant
precedents, it was clear to us that obstruction of justice, in
its various forms, including perjury, may constitute grounds
for an impeachment, the language of the statute.
Even apart from any abuses of presidential authority and
power, the evidence of perjury and obstruction of justice
required us to refer the information to the House. Perjury and
obstruction of justice are, of course, serious crimes. In 1790,
the first Congress, sitting in New York, passed a criminal law
that banned perjury. A violator was subject to 3 years'
imprisonment. Today, Federal criminal law makes perjury a
felony punishable by 5 years' imprisonment.
In cases involving public officials, courts treat false
statements with special condemnation. United States District
Judge Royce Lamberth, here in Washington, recently sentenced
Ronald Blackley, the former chief of staff to the former
Secretary of Agriculture, to 37 months imprisonment for false
statements.
The District Court, Judge Lamberth, stated, in his words,
the Court ``has a duty to send a message to other high level
government officials that there is a severe penalty to be paid
for providing false information under oath.'' Although perjury
and obstruction of justice are serious Federal crimes, some
have suggested that they are not high crimes or misdemeanors
when the underlying events concern the President's private
actions.
Under this theory, a President's obstruction and perjury
must involve concealment of official actions. This
interpretation does not appear in the Constitution itself.
Moreover, the Constitution lists bribery as a high crime or
misdemeanor and if a President involved in a civil suit bribed
the judge to rule in his favor, or bribed a witness to provide
favorable testimony, there could be no textual question that
the President had committed a high crime or misdemeanor under
the plain language of Article II, even though the underlying
events would not have involved his official duties.
In addition, virtually everyone agrees that serious crimes,
such as murder and rape, would be impeachable even though they
do not involve official duties. Justice Story, in the last
century, stated in his famous commentaries that there is not a
syllable in the Constitution which confines impeachment to
official acts. With all respect, an absolute and inflexible
requirement of a connection to official duties appears, fairly
viewed, to be an incorrect interpretation of the Constitution.
History and practice support the conclusion that perjury in
particular is a high crime and misdemeanor. Perjury has been
the basis, as the committee knows, for the removal of several
judges. As far as we know, no one has questioned whether
perjury was a high crime or misdemeanor in those cases. In
addition, as several of the scholars who appeared before you
testified and to whom the chairman referred, perjury seems to
have been recognized as a high crime or misdemeanor at the time
of the founding of our republic. And the House Manager's report
in the impeachment of Judge Walter Nixon, for perjury, stated,
``It is difficult to imagine an act more subversive to the
legal process than lying from the witness stand.''
Finally, I note that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
include bribery and perjury in the same guideline, reflecting
the common sense conclusion that bribery and perjury are
equivalent means of interfering with the governmental process.
For these reasons, we concluded that perjury and obstruction of
justice, like bribery, may constitute grounds for an
impeachment.
Having said that, let me again emphasize my role here. We
had a judgment to make, but whether the President's actions
are, in fact, grounds for an impeachment or some other sanction
is a decision in the sole discretion of the Congress.
A final point warrants mention in this respect. Criminal
prosecution and punishment are not the same as or a substitute
for congressionally imposed sanctions. As the Supreme Court
stated in a 1993 case, ``the Framers recognized that most
likely there would be two sets of proceedings for individuals
who commit impeachable offenses, the impeachment trial and a
separate criminal trial. In fact, the Constitution explicitly
provides for two separate proceedings. The Framers deliberately
separated the two forums to avoid raising the specter of bias
and to ensure independent judgment.''
Our task over the past several years has involved far more
than simply the Lewinsky matter. The pattern of obstruction of
justice, false statements and misuse of executive authority in
the Lewinsky investigation did not occur in a vacuum. In August
1994----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I seek a ruling of the
Chair. Mr. Chairman, I seek a ruling of the Chair.
Mr. Hyde. Well, all right. I take it the gentlelady has a
point of order?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. State your point.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully raise this
point of order with the understanding that we have not received
nor are we receiving any referral on the issues dealing with
Madison Guaranty, Whitewater, Travelgate or Filegate and, in
fact, as I understand, there is an announcement today that the
findings of guilt against the President on the issues of
Travelgate or Filegate do not exist, referred to in pages 46
and 47 of the statement of Mr. Starr.
I therefore ask, Mr. Chairman, whether Mr. Starr's remarks,
as he begins them at this point, are germane, and secondly,
whether or not the President is being denied his Fifth
Amendment rights by lack of notice and a denial of liberty by
not having been noticed of any presentations being made on
Whitewater, Madison Guaranty, Filegate and Travelgate. I
believe Mr. Starr's remarks are now out of order and I believe
that there should be a ruling that his remarks are not germane
and, that if he proceeds he will be denying the President and
any other parties the constitutional right of due process and
the Fifth Amendment.
And, Mr. Chairman, as you well recognized, I raised the
question when we began some 2 or 3 months ago, as to whether or
not this committee would abide by the constitutional provision
of the Fifth Amendment. I offered an amendment to that point. I
was told by the Chair at that time that under the Rules of the
House we would be guided by the Fifth Amendment, and I believe
that the due process rights of the President and other parties
are being denied with the representations that Mr. Starr is
about to make. I would ask the Chair for his ruling.
Mr. Hyde. Well, the Chair overrules the gentlelady's point
of order and the witness will continue.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chair.
Mr. Starr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I had said that it was in August of 1994 that I took over
the Madison Guaranty investigation from Robert Fiske. Over the
ensuing years, I have essentially become Independent Counsel
for five distinct investigations: For Madison Guaranty and
Whitewater, for Foster-related matters, for the Travel Office,
for the FBI files matter and for the Lewinsky investigation, as
well as for a variety of obstruction and related matters that
arose out of those five major investigations.
A very brief overview of those investigations may assist
the committee in its assessment of the President's conduct.
First, some statistics. The chairman noted that the
investigation has resulted in the conviction of 14 individuals,
including the former Associate Attorney General of the United
States, Webster Hubbell, the then sitting Governor of Arkansas,
Jim Guy Tucker, and the Clintons' two business partners, Jim
and Susan McDougal.
We are proud not only of the cases that we have won but of
our decisions not to indict. To take one well-known example,
the Senate Whitewater Committee sent our office public criminal
referrals on several individuals. The committee stated in its
June 21, 1996, public letter that the testimony of Susan
Thomases was particularly troubling and suggests a possible
violation of law. But this office did not seek charges against
her.
Apart from indictments and convictions, this office has
also faced an extraordinary number of legal disputes on issues
of privilege, on jurisdiction, substantive criminal law and the
like. By my count at least 17 of our cases have been decided by
the Federal Courts of Appeals, and we have been fortunate in
prevailing in all 17. One privilege case arising in our Travel
Office investigation went to the D.C. Circuit, where we
prevailed by a 2-to-1 decision, and then to the Supreme Court,
where we lost by a 6-to-3 decision.
We had to litigate in the courts as our investigation ran
into roadblocks and hurdles that slowed us down. It is true
that the administration produced a great amount of information,
but unlike the prosecutors in the investigations involving
Presidents Carter and Reagan, we have been forced to go to
court time and time again to seek information from the
executive branch, and to fight a multitude of privilege claims
asserted by the administration, every single one of which we
have won.
In sum, the office where I serve has achieved a superb
record in courts of law of significant and hard fought
convictions, of fair and wise decisions not to charge, of
thorough and accurate reports on the Vincent Foster death and
the Monica Lewinsky matters, of legal victories in various
courts. We go to court and not on the talk-show circuit, and
our record shows that there is a bright line between law and
politics, between courts and polls. It leaves the polls to the
politicians and the spin doctors. We are officers of the court
who live in the world of law. We have presented our cases in
court and with very rare exception we have won.
The center of all of this, the core of our Arkansas-based
investigation, was Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan. Madison
was a federally insured savings and loan in Little Rock,
Arkansas, run by Jim and Susan McDougal. Like many savings and
loans in the 1980s, Madison was fraudulently operated. Mrs.
Clinton and other lawyers at the Rose Law Firm in Little Rock
performed legal work for Madison in the 1980s. Madison first
received attention in March 1992, when a New York Times report
raised several issues about the relationships between the
Clintons and the McDougals in connection with Madison Guaranty.
Federal bank examiners examined Madison in 1992 and 1993,
and the regulators sent criminal referrals to the Justice
Department, and the Justice Department then launched a criminal
investigation of Madison Guaranty in November 1993. In part,
because of the relationship of the Clintons to the McDougals,
Attorney General Reno appointed Bob Fiske in January 1994. I
was appointed Independent Counsel in August 1994 to continue
the investigation.
Madison exemplified the troubled practices of savings and
loans in the 1980s. The failure of the institution ultimately
cost Federal taxpayers approximately $65 million. Congresswoman
Waters put it this way in a 1995 hearing: ``By any standard,
Madison Guaranty was a disaster. It gambled with investments,
cooked the books and ultimately bilked the taxpayers of the
United States.'' Madison, she went on, ``is a metaphor for the
S&L crisis.''
The McDougals' operation of Madison raised serious
questions whether bank funds had been used illegally to assist
business and political figures in Arkansas, such as Jim Guy
Tucker, the Governor to be, and the then Governor, Governor
Clinton. As to the Clintons, the question arose primarily
because they were partners with the McDougals in the Whitewater
Development Company. The Whitewater Corporation initially
controlled and developed approximately 230 acres of property on
the White River in northern Arkansas. Given Jim McDougal's role
at the center of both institutions, and given Whitewater's
constant financial difficulties, there were two important
questions: Were Madison funds diverted to benefit Whitewater?
If so, were the Clintons either involved in or knowledgeable of
that diversion of funds? Those questions were not idle
speculation.
In early 1994, a Little Rock judge and businessman, David
Hale, pled guilty to certain unrelated Federal crimes. As part
of his plea, David Hale told Mr. Fiske's team that he had
received money as a result of a loan from Madison in 1986 and
that his company loaned it to others as part of a scheme to
help some members of the Arkansas political establishment.
One loan of $300,000 went to Susan McDougal's make-believe
company, which she called Master Marketing. Based on our
investigation, we now know that some $50,000 of the proceeds of
that loan went to benefit the Whitewater Corporation. David
Hale stated that he had discussed the Susan McDougal loan with
then Governor Clinton, including at a meeting in 1986 with Jim
McDougal and the Governor.
In August 1994, when I first arrived in Little Rock and,
building on Mr. Fiske's work, we devised a plan. First, based
on the testimony of David Hale and others, as well as
documentary evidence, we would take steps, if appropriate, if
the evidence warranted, to seek an indictment of Jim and Susan
McDougal and others involved in what clearly appeared to be
criminal transactions. If a Little Rock jury convicted the
McDougals or others, we would then obtain their testimony and
determine whether they had other relevant information,
including, of course, whether the McDougals possessed
information that would either exonerate or incriminate the
Clintons as to Madison and Whitewater matters. This approach
was the time honored and professional way to conduct an
investigation.
We garnered a number of guilty pleas in my first year. One
was from Webster Hubbell, who had worked at the Rose Law Firm
and was knowledgeable about its work with Madison, including
that of Mrs. Clinton as a lawyer at the Rose Firm. In addition,
Robert Palmer, a real estate appraiser, pled guilty to
fraudulently doctoring Madison documents to deceive Federal
bank examiners. Three other associates of McDougal pled guilty
and agreed to cooperate.
In August 1995, a year after I was appointed by the Special
Division, a Federal grand jury in Little Rock indicted Jim and
Susan McDougal and the then sitting Governor of Arkansas, Jim
Guy Tucker. The case went to trial in March of 1996, amid
charges by all three defendants and their allies that the case
was a political witch-hunt. Some predicted that an Arkansas
jury would never convict the sitting Governor. These
expectations were heightened when Governor--excuse me, when
President Clinton was subpoenaed as a defense witness in
Governor Tucker's trial.
The President testified for the defense from the Map Room
of the White House. During his sworn testimony, the President
testified, as a defense witness, that he did not know about the
Susan McDougal loan, nor had he ever been in a meeting with
Hale and McDougal about the loan. He also testified that he had
never received a loan from Madison. This was important
testimony. Its truth or falsity went to the core issues of our
investigation.
On May 28, 1996, all three defendants were convicted; Jim
McDougal of 18 felonies, Susan McDougal of 4 felonies and
Governor Tucker of 2 felonies. Governor Tucker announced his
resignation that day.
After his conviction, Jim McDougal began cooperating with
our investigation. We spent many hours with him, gaining
additional insights and facts. He informed our career
investigators and prosecutors that David Hale was accurate.
According to Jim McDougal, President Clinton had testified
falsely at the McDougal-Tucker trial. Jim McDougal testified
that he had been at a meeting with David Hale and Governor
Clinton about the Master Marketing loan, and Jim McDougal
testified that Governor Clinton had received a loan from
Madison. Jim McDougal said on one of the first sessions with
our office, following his conviction, that the President's
trial testimony was, in his words, at variance with the truth.
In late 1997----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.
Mr. Hyde. The gentlelady, I would appreciate it if she
wouldn't interrupt, but go ahead and state your point.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
appreciate the need for us to proceed, and to proceed fairly.
That's all I am asking for.
Mr. Hyde. I am sure you do.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I have stated earlier my
objections to the direction of the testimony. Frankly, I raise
again the question of germaneness with respect to
representations related to Whitewater, Madison Guaranty and due
process, Mr. Chairman. I think this testimony is inappropriate.
There is not an attempt to cover up, but I do not have before
me a referral from Mr. Starr or any of his deputies on the
question of Whitewater, Filegate or Travelgate. Mr. Chairman,
this testimony is not germane and it is a denial of due
process.
Mr. Hyde. I thank the gentlelady. This committee hearing is
being conducted pursuant to notice, pursuant to House
Resolution 581. That resolution directs the committee to, and I
quote, ``investigate fully and completely whether sufficient
grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise its
constitutional power to impeach William Jefferson Clinton,
President of the United States of America.'' That is the wide
open range that we have given ourselves in this resolution in
contradistinction to the Democratic resolution which wanted a
narrow inquiry. That very issue was debated and voted on.
So the gentleman's, the witness', testimony is perfectly
germane and consonant with House Resolution 581 and, therefore,
the gentlelady's point of order is overruled and the witness
will continue.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I would like to appeal the
ruling of the Chair.
Mr. Bryant. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Would you consult with your ranking minority
member and see if----
Mr. Bryant. Mr. Chairman, I would like a vote on that
ruling.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would make my objection.
Mr. Bryant. I would ask for a vote on that.
Mr. Hyde. Please, we are trying to move along, and I
appreciate the----
Ms. Jackson Lee. In the sense of comity, Mr. Chairman, I
withdraw my desire for a vote.
Mr. Bryant. I just asked for a vote, that's all.
Mr. Hyde. I am going to deny my friend Mr. Bryant's
request, and then you and I can struggle over the noon hour.
But I would like to move ahead. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, is my objection registered?
Mr. Hyde. Indeed it is registered, twice.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Hyde. We will register it every half-hour, if you would
like.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Hyde. The witness will continue, please.
Mr. Starr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In late 1997, we, in our office, considered whether this
evidence that I have just described, justified a referral to
Congress. We drafted a report. But we concluded that it would
be inconsistent with the statutory standard because of the
difficulty of establishing the truth with a sufficient degree
of confidence. We also weighed a prudential factor in reaching
that decision. There were still two outstanding witnesses who
might later corroborate or contradict the McDougal and Hale
accounts: Jim Guy Tucker and Susan McDougal.
In 1998, we were finally able to obtain information from
Governor Tucker. It had taken 4 long years to hear from the
Governor. He pled guilty in a tax conspiracy case, and he
ultimately testified before the Little Rock grand jury in March
and April of this year, but he had little knowledge of the loan
to Susan McDougal's fictitious company and the President's
possible involvement in it. He did shed light on the overall
transactions involving Castle Grande and Madison. Importantly,
as to one subject, Governor Tucker exonerated the President
regarding long-standing questions whether the President and
Governor Tucker had a conversation about the Madison referrals
in the White House in October 1993. The Governor exonerated the
President.
The remaining witness who perhaps could shed light on the
issue was Susan McDougal, and therein lies a story that has
caused literally years of delay and added expense to the
investigation.
Because the proceeds from the fraudulent loan that Susan
McDougal received had benefitted the Clintons, the proceeds
were used to pay off obligations of the Whitewater Development
Company for which the Clintons were potentially personally
liable, Susan McDougal was subpoenaed to testify before the
grand jury in Little Rock in August 1996. She was asked several
questions going to the very heart of the investigation,
including these: Did you ever discuss your loan from David Hale
with William Jefferson Clinton? To your knowledge, did William
Jefferson Clinton testify truthfully during the course of your
trial?
Susan McDougal refused to answer any questions. District
Judge Susan Webber Wright, in Little Rock, then held her in
civil contempt, a decision later upheld unanimously by the
United States Court of Appeals in St. Louis.
The month of September 1996 was thus a crucial time for our
office in its attempt to obtain Susan McDougal's lawful
testimony.
On September 23, 1996, just two weeks after Ms. McDougal
had been found in contempt by Judge Wright, President Clinton
was interviewed on PBS. The President said, ``There is a lot of
evidence to support,'' his words, various charges that Susan
McDougal had made against our office, but the President cited
no evidence.
The President's comments can reasonably be described as
supportive of Ms. McDougal's decision to disobey the Court
order. So far as we are aware, no sitting President ever has
publicly indicated his agreement with a convicted felon's
stated reason for refusing to obey a Federal court order to
testify. Essentially, the President of the United States, the
Chief Executive, sided with a convicted felon against the
United States as represented by United States District Court
Judge, now Chief Judge, Susan Webber Wright, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and our office.
The President was also asked in the interview whether he
would consider pardoning Ms. McDougal. The President refused to
rule out a pardon.
The President's answers to these questions were roundly
criticized. A New York Times editorial captured the point well,
stating that the President's remarks undercut a legal process
that is going forward in an orderly way.
A separate area of our original investigation concerned the
Rose Law Firm's work in 1985 and 1986 for Madison. It appeared
that Rose may have assisted Madison Guaranty in performing
legal work concerning a piece of property known alternatively
as IDC, or Castle Grande, which involved McDougal, Madison
Guaranty and fraudulent transactions. The complicated real
estate deal known as Castle Grande was structured to avoid
state banking regulatory requirements and involved violations
of Federal criminal law.
Grand jury subpoenas were issued in 1994 and 1995 to the
Rose Law Firm and to the President and to Mrs. Clinton, seeking
all documents relating to Madison and Castle Grande. We
ultimately learned that Mrs. Clinton had performed some legal
work related to Madison's Castle Grande/IDC transactions, but
the whole issue remained partially enshrouded in mystery as our
office and the Senate Whitewater Committee investigated the
issue in 1995.
The problem was that some of the best evidence regarding
Mrs. Clinton's work, her Rose Law Firm billing records and her
time sheets for 1985 and 1986 at the Rose Firm, could not be
found. The missing records raised suspicions by late 1995 and
became a public issue. Webster Hubbell and Vincent Foster, Jr.,
had been responsible, during the 1992 campaign, for gathering
information about Mrs. Clinton's work for Madison Guaranty, yet
the billing records could not be found. The Rose Firm's work
for Madison Guaranty could not be fully pieced together. The
Rose Firm no longer had the records.
On January 5, 1996, the records of Mrs. Clinton's
activities, her legal work for Madison, were finally produced
under unusual circumstances. The records detail Mrs. Clinton's
work on a variety of Madison issues, including the preparation
of an option agreement that Madison Guaranty used to deceive
Federal bank examiners as part of the Castle Grande deal. After
a thorough investigation, we have found no explanation how the
billing records got where they were or why they were not
discovered and produced earlier. It remains a mystery to this
day.
Then in the summer of 1997, a second set of these billing
records was found in the attic of the late Vincent Foster,
Jr.'s house in Little Rock. The time sheets for Rose's work in
1985 and 1986 for Madison Guaranty have never been found. We
should note that Webster Hubbell may have additional
information pertaining to Castle Grande, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, that we have been unable to obtain. Mr. Hubbell
was at the Rose Law Firm at the relevant time in 1985 and 1986.
He gathered information about the Madison Guaranty issue in
1992 and his father-in-law was involved in the Castle Grande
deal.
Two other important facts suggest that Mr. Hubbell may have
additional information. First, on March 13, 1994, after a
meeting at the White House where it had been discussed that Mr.
Hubbell would resign from the Justice Department, then Chief of
Staff Mack McLarty told Mrs. Clinton that, in his words, ``we
are going to be supportive of Webb.''
As this criminal investigation was beginning in 1994, under
Bob Fiske and then later my office, Mr. Hubbell received
payments totaling nearly $550,000 from several companies and
individuals. Many were campaign contributors. These individuals
had been contacted through the White House Chief of Staff, Mr.
McLarty, and others. In June, 1994, during a week in which he
made several visits to the White House, Indonesian businessman
James Riady met with Webster Hubbell and then wired him
$100,000. One of the individuals who arranged for Mr. Hubbell
to receive a consulting contract was Vernon Jordan. The company
that Mr. Jordan convinced to hire, to engage Mr. Hubbell, was
MacAndrews & Forbes, the parent company of Revlon. This is the
same company that hired Monica Lewinsky upon Mr. Jordan's
recommendation.
As he was destined later to do with Monica Lewinsky, Mr.
Jordan personally informed the President about his, Mr.
Jordan's, assistance to Mr. Hubbell.
Most of the $550,000 was given to Mr. Hubbell for little or
no work. This rush of generosity obviously gives rise to an
inference that the money was essentially a gift. And if it was
a gift, why was it given? This money was given despite the fact
that Mr. Hubbell was under criminal investigation for
fraudulent billing and was a key witness in the Madison
Guaranty investigation.
Second, as is known to the public, on certain prison tapes
while Mr. Hubbell was in prison, he said to his wife, ``I won't
raise those allegations that might open it up on Hillary.''
On another tape, Mr. Hubbell said to White House employee
Marsha Scott that he might have to roll over one more time.
Mr. Hubbell's statements, when combined with the amount of
money he received and the information he was in a position to
know, raise very troubling questions. Mr. Hubbell is currently
under Federal indictment. There is a presumption of innocence
and it would be inappropriate to say more about that at this
time.
Let me add a few brief words about the Travel Office
matter. This phase of our work arose out of investigations by
others of the 1993 firings of Billy Dale and six career co-
workers. As has already been indicated, in comments from a
member, we do not anticipate that any evidence gathered in that
investigation will be relevant to the committee's current task.
The President was not involved in our Travel Office
investigation. As to the status of that investigation, it was
on hold for quite a while, in part because of litigation. The
investigation is not terminated but we expect to announce any
actions and decisions soon.
As to the FBI files matter, there are outstanding issues
that we are attempting to resolve with respect to one
individual, but I can address two issues of relevance to the
committee's work. First, our investigation, which has been
thorough, found no evidence that anyone higher than Mr.
Livingstone or Mr. Marceca was in any way involved in ordering
the FBI files from the FBI. Second, we have found no evidence
that information contained in the files of former officials was
actually used for an improper purpose.
Let me now mention a few words about our personnel, our
process and our reflections. The character and the conduct of
the men and women of our office, largely career professionals
who take their jobs and their oaths very seriously, have been
badly distorted. Perhaps that is inevitable, given the nature
of the issues involved, given the fact that the President of
the United States is the subject of a criminal investigation,
but it is regrettable and so let me offer some truth about our
office.
I will start with our personnel. During the Lewinsky
investigation, my staff has included skilled and experienced
prosecutors from around the country. They have brought an
enormous amount of experience and expertise to the office. My
colleagues during this past year have included a former United
States Attorney--several members of this committee are former
United States Attorneys--the Chief of the Public Corruption
Unit of the United States Attorney's Office in Los Angeles; the
Chief of the Public Corruption Unit of the United States
Attorney's Office in Miami; the Chief of the Bank Fraud Unit of
the United States Attorney's Office in San Antonio; prosecutors
with lengthy experience in the Public Integrity Section of the
Department of Justice; seasoned Federal prosecutors from 10
different States and the District of Columbia; and veteran
state prosecutors from Maryland and Oregon.
The office has also benefitted from the assistance of Sam
Dash, chief counsel of the Senate Watergate Committee, who has
offered great wisdom during my tenure. Professor Ronald
Rotunda, constitutional law scholar from the University of
Illinois, has likewise provided advice on a variety of issues.
The office has received assistance from professors at the
University of Michigan, the University of Illinois, Notre Dame
and George Washington. Moreover, former law clerks for six
different Supreme Court Justices have served on my staff during
the past year.
During the Lewinsky investigation, the office also relied
on many talented investigators with extensive service in the
FBI and in law enforcement agencies, and the FBI laboratory yet
again provided superb assistance to us, as it has throughout
the Madison/Whitewater investigation, with the strong support
of Judge Freeh.
In addition, let me express my appreciation, and it is
great, for the grand jurors who devoted much time and energy to
examining the witnesses and considering the evidence. Those 23
citizens of the District of Columbia have performed an
invaluable service, and I publicly thank them. This is the rare
case where grand jury transcripts become publicly scrutinized,
and as the committee members now know, these grand jurors were
active, they were knowledgeable, they were fair and they were
completely dedicated to uncovering and understanding the truth.
In all of our investigations, difficult decisions have been
taken through our office's deliberative process, and that's
what we call it. That process calls upon each attorney, drawing
upon his or her background and experience, to offer views on
issues in question. This deliberative process is laborious,
sometimes tedious, but it is an attempt to ensure that our
office makes the best decisions it can.
I have drawn upon a vast array of experienced prosecutors
and investigators because I was sensitive to and am sensitive
to the fact that an independent counsel exists outside the
Justice Department and is an unusual entity within our
constitutional system.
Throughout this investigation, we have made every effort to
follow Department of Justice policy and practice and to utilize
time honored law enforcement and investigative techniques. Of
course, with their vast experience in the department and the
FBI, our prosecutors and investigators embody such policy and
practice. Nonetheless, it was often the case during an all-
attorneys meeting that we would repair to the United States
Attorney's Manual to be sure that we had it right.
It is true, and Mr. Conyers' comments raised the issue,
that some law enforcement procedures may not be entirely
comfortable for some witnesses, but the procedures have been
refined over decades of practice in which society's right to
detect and prosecute crime has been balanced against individual
liberty and a balance struck. It was not our place to reinvent
the investigative wheel. Nor is it our place to discard law
enforcement practices that are used every day by prosecutors
and by police throughout the country.
With that, let me be the first to say that the Lewinsky
investigation in particular presented some of the most
challenging issues that any lawyer or investigator could face.
We had to make numerous decisions and to make them very
quickly. Those included factual judgments: Is witness X or
witness Y telling us the whole truth? As one of my prosecutors
has frequently said, we can deal with the truth but we cannot
deal with lies. Only give us the truth. And we have to make
that assessment. Strategic choices: Do we provide immunity to
Ms. Lewinsky in order to obtain her testimony? Is it
appropriate to subpoena the President? Legal decisions: Do we
accept the assertion of executive privilege for Bruce Lindsey
or do we go to district court to challenge it? What about the
Secret Service privilege, and historic constitutional
judgments? What is the meaning of Section 595(c) of this
statute, the independent counsel statute, and how do we prepare
a referral that satisfies its requirements? It had never been
done before.
Major decisions during the Lewinsky investigation have not
been easy, and given the hurricane-force winds swirling about
us we were well aware that no matter what decision we made,
criticism would come from somewhere. As Attorney General Reno
has said, in high profile cases like these, not referring to
this case but in high profile cases, you are, in her words,
damned if you do and damned if you don't. So you had better
just do what you think is the right and proper thing.
We also attempted to be thorough, but we did not invent
that approach, being thorough with the Lewinsky case. To take
just one previous example, in investigating matters relating to
the death of Vincent Foster, Jr., we were painstaking in
examining evidence, in questioning witnesses and in calling
upon experts in homicide and suicide. We were criticized
throughout that investigation for being too thorough, for
taking too long, but time has proved the correctness of that
approach. After an extensive investigation, the office produced
a report that addressed the many questions that confronted the
difficult issues. It laid out new evidence and it reached a
definitive conclusion.
Over time, the controversy over the Foster tragedy has
dissipated, because we insisted on being uncompromisingly
thorough, both in our investigation and in our report. After
the Attorney General and the Court of Appeals assigned us the
Lewinsky investigation, the office again received criticism for
being too thorough. But the Lewinsky investigation could not
properly be conducted in a slapdash manner. It was our duty to
be meticulous, to be careful. We were. And in the process, we
uncovered substantial and credible evidence of serious legal
wrongdoing by the President.
Some then suggested, and it has been suggested this
morning, that the report we submitted to Congress was too
thorough. But bear in mind, we submitted the referral, as we
were required to do, to the House of Representatives and not to
the public. And we must respectfully dispute the suggestion
that a report to the House suggesting possible impeachable
offenses committed by the President of the United States should
tell something less than the full story. The facts, the story,
are critical. They affect credibility. They are necessary to
avoid a distorted picture, and they are ultimately the basis
for a just conclusion.
As a result, just as the jurors found the details of
specific land deals critically important in our trial of
Governor Jim Guy Tucker and of the McDougals, just as the
Supreme Court of the United States includes the details of
grisly murders in its death penalty cases, so, too, the details
of the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky became
relevant. Indeed, they became critical in determining whether
and the extent to which the President made false statements
under oath and otherwise obstructed justice in
Jones v. Clinton, in both that case and then again in his
grand jury testimony. And as you know, by an overwhelming
bipartisan vote, the House immediately disclosed our referral
to the public. But I want to be clear, as a matter of fairness,
that the public disclosure or nondisclosure of the referral and
the backup materials was a decision that our office did not
make and lawfully could not make. We had no way of knowing in
advance of submitting the referral, and we did not know,
whether the House would publicly release both the report and
the backup materials; would release portions of one or both;
would release redacted versions of the report and backup
documents; would prepare and release a summary akin to Mr.
Schippers' oral presentation; or would simply keep the referral
and backup materials under seal just as Special Prosecutor Leon
Jaworski's submission in 1974 remained under seal.
As a result, we respectfully but we firmly reject the
notion that our office was trying to inflame the public. We are
professionals and we were trying to get the relevant facts, the
full story, to the House of Representatives. That was our task
and that is what we did.
In fact, the referral has served a good purpose. There has
been virtually no dispute about a good many of the factual
conclusions in the report. In the wake of the referral, for
example, few have ventured that the President told the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth in his civil case and
before the grand jury. A key reason, we submit, is that we
insisted, as we have in our other investigations, that we be
exhaustive in the investigation and that we document the facts
and conclusions in our report.
I want to be absolutely clear on one point, however. Any
suggestion that the men and women of our office, with whom I am
privileged to serve, enjoyed or relished this investigation is
wrong. It is nonsense. In at least three ways, the Lewinsky
investigation caused all of us considerable dismay and
continues to do so. First, none of us has any interest
whatsoever in investigating the factual details underlying the
allegations of perjury and obstruction of justice in this case.
My staff and I agree with the sentiments expressed by the
chairman in the November 9 hearing when he said, ``I would like
to forget all of this. I mean, who needs it?'' But the
Constitution and the criminal law do not have exceptions for
unseemly or unpleasant or difficult cases. The Attorney General
of the United States and the Court of Appeals Special Division
assigned us a duty to pursue the facts, and we did so.
Second, this investigation has proved difficult for us
because it is centered on legal wrongdoing by the President of
the United States. The Presidency is an office that we, like
all Americans, revere and respect. No prosecutor is comfortable
when he or she reports wrongdoing by the President. All of us
want to believe that our President has at all times acted with
integrity and certainly that he has not violated the criminal
law.
Everyone in my office therefore envies the position years
ago of Paul Curran, who was the distinguished counsel appointed
by Attorney General Griffin Bell to investigate certain
financial transactions involving President Carter. Mr. Curran,
by his account, received complete cooperation from President
Carter, found no wrongdoing by the President and promptly
returned to private life. Mr. Chairman, I would like to do the
same.
Third, this investigation was unpleasant because our office
knew that some Americans, for a variety of reasons, would be
opposed to our work. But we would not, could not, allow
ourselves to be deterred from doing our work. As I have said,
our office was assigned a specific duty by the Attorney General
and the Special Division to gather the facts and then, if
appropriate, to make decisions and to report the facts as
quickly as we possibly could. In the end, we tried to adhere to
the principle Congressman Graham discussed on October 5. Thirty
years from now, not 30 days from now, we want to be able to say
that we did the right thing.
At the end of the day I and no one else was responsible for
our key decisions, and my background warrants a very brief
note, if you will indulge me. The chairman was kind enough to
indicate as much.
I began my legal career in 1973 as a law clerk, first for a
judge, Judge David Dyer, on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
who passed away earlier this year; and then for 2 years for
Chief Justice Burger. Following clerkships, I was in private
law practice in Los Angeles and Washington. After William
French Smith took office as Attorney General in January 1981, I
served as counselor to the Attorney General from 1981 to 1983.
In that capacity, I experienced firsthand the varied and
difficult judgment calls that the Attorney General faces every
day, whether it was dealing with the aftermath of the attempted
assassination of the President or selecting a Supreme Court
nominee, in that case Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. I took away
from that experience an admiration that has continued to this
day for the career Justice Department lawyers and prosecutors
and the law enforcement officials who toil without fanfare, and
for whom the guiding principles are fairness and a respect for
the law.
In 1983, President Reagan nominated me, and the Senate was
kind enough to confirm me, as a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for this circuit. I became a colleague on a
court with truly great judges, from J. Skelley Wright to
Antonin Scalia, from Ruth Ginsburg to Robert Bork, and tackled
the issues that come before the D.C. Circuit. This included
issues as diverse as the constitutional right of a military
serviceman to wear a yarmulke, a right I supported in vain, and
the right of a newspaper to be free under the First Amendment
from the threat of liability under the libel laws.
In 1989, I accepted appointment as Solicitor General of the
United States and was confirmed by the Senate. The Solicitor
General, as you know and have pointed out, is the lawyer who
represents the United States in arguments before the Supreme
Court. A distinguished predecessor before whom I was privileged
to argue, Justice Thurgood Marshall, often stated that being
Solicitor General was the greatest job a lawyer could have, bar
none.
Justice Marshall was right. As Solicitor General, I had the
privilege of arguing 25 cases before the Supreme Court on
behalf the United States. The arguments covered the spectrum of
our law, whether flag burning is a protected right under the
Constitution, other issues, and whether the Senate's decision
to convict and remove an impeached judge is subject to judicial
review.
While I was Solicitor General, my overarching goal was to
run an office faithful to the law and not to political or
ideological opinion, and I think the record shows that I did
just that.
In 1993, I left my second tour of duty in the Justice
Department and returned to private practice and teaching
constitutional law. In the period before I was named
Independent Counsel in August 1994, I was not, however,
completely absent from public service.
In late 1993, I was asked by the Senate Ethics Committee,
chaired at the time by Nevada Senator Richard Bryan, to review
Senator Packwood's diaries as part of the Ethics Committee's
investigation and to resolve various issues pertaining to those
diaries.
Every person is, of course, deeply affected by his or her
experiences, but for my part, my experience, is in the law and
in the courts. I am not a man of politics, of public relations,
or of polls, which I suppose is patently obvious by now. I am
not experienced in political campaigns. Rather, as a product of
the law and of the courts, I have come to an unyielding faith
in our court system: our system of judicial review, the
independence of our judges, our jury system, the integrity of
the oath, and the sanctity, yes, the sanctity of the judicial
process.
The phrase on the facade of the Supreme Court, ``Equal
Justice Under Law,'' the description inside the Justice
Department's corridors, in the Attorney General's own chambers,
``The United States wins its point when justice is done its
citizens in the courts,'' those are more than slogans. They are
not slogans. They are principles that the courts in this
country apply every day. Our office saw that firsthand in the
trial of Governor Jim Guy Tucker, of Jim McDougal and Susan
McDougal. A juror said afterwards that they fought hard for the
individuals' liberty, but they were overwhelmed by the
evidence.
It is our judicial process that helps make this country
distinct, and my background, my instincts, my beliefs, have
instilled in me a deep respect for the legal process that is at
the foundation of our Republic.
President Lincoln asked that, in his words, reverence for
the laws, ``reverence for the laws, be proclaimed in
legislative halls and enforced in courts of justice.'' Mr.
Chairman, members, I revere the law. I am proud of what we have
accomplished. We were assigned a difficult job. We have done it
to the best of our abilities. We have tried to be both fair and
thorough.
I thank the Chairman, I thank the committee and the
American people for their attention.
Mr. Hyde. Thank you very much, Judge Starr.
[The statement of Mr. Starr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kenneth Starr, Independent Counsel, Office
of the Independent Counsel, Washington, DC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this opportunity to appear
before the Committee and to provide information relating to the
committee's inquiry into possible impeachable offenses by the President
of the United States. This is my first opportunity to publicly report
on certain issues related to our investigation. I look forward to doing
so and assisting the Committee.
i. introduction
I appreciate both the seriousness of the Committee's work and the
gravity of its assignment. I have reviewed the statements made by the
37 committee members in the October 5 hearing. Any citizen who watched
that hearing would have been impressed by the depth and breadth of the
discussion that day, and proud of the diligence with which members of
this committee are approaching this extraordinarily difficult and
unwelcome task. I appear before you today, therefore, fully recognizing
the solemnity and importance of this process.
As you know, in January of this year, Attorney General Reno
petitioned the three-Judge panel that oversees independent counsels to
authorize our Office to investigate whether Monica Lewinsky or others
committed Federal crimes relating to the sexual harassment lawsuit
brought by Paula Jones against President Clinton. Our Office conducted
a swift yet thorough investigation. We completed the primary factual
investigation in under eight months, notwithstanding a number of
obstacles in our path.
The law requires an independent counsel to report to the House of
Representatives substantial and credible information that may
constitute grounds for an impeachment. On September 9, pursuant to our
statutory duty, we submitted a referral and backup documentation to the
House. I am here today at your invitation in furtherance of our
statutory obligation.
I recognize that the House of Representatives--not an independent
counsel--has the sole power to impeach. My role here today is to
discuss our referral and our investigation.
ii. lewinsky investigation
A. Overview
Let me begin with an overview. As our referral explains, the
evidence suggests that the President made false statements under oath
and otherwise thwarted the search for truth in the Jones v. Clinton
case. The evidence further suggests that the President made false
statements under oath to the grand jury on August 17.
That same night, the President publicly acknowledged an
inappropriate relationship, but maintained that his testimony had been
legally accurate. The President also declared that all inquiries into
the matter should end because, he said, it was private.
Shortly after the President's August 17 speech, Senators Lieberman,
Kerrey, and Moynihan stated that the President's actions were not a
private matter. In our view, they were correct. Indeed, the evidence
suggests that the President repeatedly tried to thwart the legal
process in the Jones case and the grand jury investigation. That is not
a private matter. The evidence further suggests that the President, in
the course of these efforts, misused his authority and power as
President and contravened his duty to faithfully execute the laws.
That, too, is not a private matter.
The evidence suggests that the misuse of Presidential authority
occurred in the following ten ways:
First. The evidence suggests that the President made a series of
premeditated false statements under oath in his civil deposition on
January 17, 1998. The President had taken an oath to tell the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. By making false statements
under oath, the President, the Chief Executive of our Nation, failed to
adhere to that oath and to his Presidential oath to faithfully execute
the laws.
Second. The evidence suggests that, apart from making false
statements under oath, the President engaged in a pattern of behavior
during the Jones litigation to thwart the judicial process. The
President reached an agreement with Ms. Lewinsky that each would make
false statements under oath. He provided job assistance to Ms. Lewinsky
at a time when the Jones case was proceeding and Ms. Lewinsky's
truthful testimony would have been harmful. He engaged in an apparent
scheme to conceal gifts that had been subpoenaed from Ms. Lewinsky. He
coached a potential witness, his own secretary Betty Currie, with a
false account of relevant events.
Those acts constitute a pattern of obstruction that is
fundamentally inconsistent with the President's duty to faithfully
execute the laws.
Third. The evidence suggests that the President participated in a
scheme at his deposition in which his attorney, in his presence,
deceived a United States District Judge in an effort to cut off
questioning about Ms. Lewinsky. The President did not correct his
attorney's false statement. A false statement to a federal judge in
order to prevent relevant questioning is an obstruction of the judicial
process.
Fourth. The evidence suggests that on January 23, 1998, after the
criminal investigation had become public, the President made false
statements to his Cabinet and used his Cabinet as unwitting surrogates
to publicly support the President's false story.
Fifth. The evidence suggests that the President, acting in a
premeditated and calculated fashion, deceived the American people on
January 26 and on other occasions when he denied a relationship with
Ms. Lewinsky.
Sixth. The evidence suggests that the President, after the criminal
investigation became public, made false statements to his aides and
concocted false alibis that these government employees repeated to the
grand jury. As a result, the grand jury received inaccurate
information.
Seventh. Having promised the American people to cooperate with the
investigation, the President refused six invitations to testify to the
grand jury. Refusing to cooperate with a duly authorized federal
criminal investigation is inconsistent with the general statutory duty
imposed on all executive branch employees to cooperate with criminal
investigations. It also is inconsistent with the President's duty to
faithfully execute the laws.
Eighth. The President and his Administration asserted three
different governmental privileges to conceal relevant information from
the federal grand jury. The privilege assertions were legally baseless
in these circumstances. They were inconsistent with the actions of
Presidents Carter and Reagan in similar circumstances. And they delayed
and impeded the investigation.
Ninth. The President made false statements under oath to the grand
jury on August 17, 1998. The President again took an oath to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The evidence
demonstrates that the President failed to adhere to that oath and thus
to his Presidential oath to faithfully execute the laws.
Tenth. The evidence suggests that the President deceived the
American people in his speech on August 17 by stating that his
testimony had been legally accurate.
In addition to those ten points, it bears mention that well before
January 1998, the President used government resources and prerogatives
to pursue his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. The evidence suggests
that the President used his secretary Betty Currie, a government
employee, to facilitate and conceal the relationship with Monica
Lewinsky. The President used White House aides and the United States
Ambassador to the United Nations in his effort to find Ms. Lewinsky a
job at a time when it was foreseeable--even likely--that she would be a
witness in the Jones case. And the President used a government
attorney--Bruce Lindsey--to assist his personal legal defense during
the Jones case.
In short, the evidence suggests that the President repeatedly used
the machinery of government and the powers of his Office to conceal his
relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the American people, from the
judicial process in the Jones case, and from the grand jury.
B. Sexual Harassment Law
Let me turn, then, to the legal context in which the Lewinsky
issues first arose. At the outset, I want to emphasize that our
referral never suggests that the relationship between the President and
Ms. Lewinsky in and of itself could be a high crime or misdemeanor.
Indeed, the referral never passes judgment on the President's
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The propriety of a relationship is not
the concern of our Office.
The referral is instead about obstruction of justice, lying under
oath, tampering with witnesses, and misuse of power. The referral
cannot be understood without appreciating this vital distinction.
This case raises the following initial question: Is a plaintiff in
a sexual harassment lawsuit entitled to obtain truthful evidence from
the defendant, and from associates of the defendant, in order to
support her claim? That should be easy to answer. No citizen who finds
himself accused in a sexual harassment case, or in any other kind of
case, can lie under oath or otherwise obstruct justice and thereby
prevent the plaintiff from discovering evidence and proving her case.
Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, filed a federal
sexual harassment suit against President Clinton in 1994. The President
denied those allegations. We will never know whether a jury would have
credited Ms. Jones's allegations. We also will never know whether the
ultimate decisionmaker would have found that the alleged facts, if
true, constitute sexual harassment. When the President and Ms. Jones
settled the case last week, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was
still considering the preliminary legal question whether the facts as
alleged could constitute sexual harassment.
After the suit was first filed in 1994, the President attempted to
delay the trial until his Presidency was over. The President claimed a
temporary Presidential immunity from civil suit. The case proceeded to
the Supreme Court. At oral argument, the President's attorney
specifically warned our Nation's highest Court that if Ms. Jones won,
her lawyers would be able to investigate the President's relationships
with other women, as is common in sexual harassment cases. The Supreme
Court rejected the President's constitutional claim--and did so by a
nine to zero vote. The Court concluded that the Constitution did not
provide such a temporary immunity from suit.
The idea was simple and powerful: No one is above the law. The
Supreme Court sent the case back for trial with words that warrant
emphasis: ``Like every other citizen who invokes'' the District Court's
jurisdiction, Ms. Jones ``has a right to an orderly disposition of her
claims.''
After the Supreme Court's decision, the parties started to gather
the facts. The parties questioned relevant witnesses in depositions.
They submitted written questions. They made requests for documents.
Sexual harassment cases are often ``he said-she said'' disputes.
Evidence reflecting the behavior of both parties can be critical--
including the defendant's relationships with other employees in the
workplace.
Such questions can be uncomfortable, but they occur every day in
courts and law offices around the country. Individuals take an oath to
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. And no one
is entitled to lie under oath simply because he or she does not like
the questions or because he believes the case is frivolous or
financially motivated or politically motivated. The Supreme Court has
emphatically and repeatedly rejected the notion that there is ever a
privilege to lie. The Court has stated that there are ways to object to
questions; lying under oath is not one of them.
During the fact-gathering process, Judge Susan Webber Wright
followed the standard principles of sexual harassment cases. Over
repeated objection from the President's attorneys, the Judge permitted
inquiries into the President's relationships with government employees.
On January 8, 1998, for example, Judge Wright stated that questions as
to the President's relationships with other employees ``are within the
scope of the issues in this case.''
In making these rulings, Judge Wright recognized that the questions
might prove embarrassing. She stated that ``I have never had a sexual
harassment case where there was not some embarrassment.'' She also
stated that she could not protect the parties from embarrassment.
Let me summarize the five points that explain how the President's
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--what was otherwise private conduct--
became a matter of concern to the courts. This is critical to fully
understand the nature of the committee's inquiry.
One. The President was sued for sexual harassment, and the Supreme
Court ruled that the case should go forward.
Two. The law of sexual harassment and the law of evidence allow the
plaintiff to inquire into the defendant's relationships with other
women in the workplace, which in this case included President Clinton's
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
Three. Applying those settled legal principles, Judge Susan Webber
Wright repeatedly rejected the President's objections to such
inquiries. The Judge, instead, ordered the President to answer the
questions.
Four. It is a federal crime to commit perjury and obstruct justice
in civil cases, including sexual harassment cases. Violators are
subject to a sentence of up to ten years imprisonment for obstruction
and up to five years for perjury.
Five. The evidence suggests that the President and Ms. Lewinsky
made false statements under oath and obstructed the judicial process in
the Jones case by preventing the court from obtaining the truth about
their relationship.
At his grand jury appearance, the President invoked a Supreme Court
Justice's confirmation hearings as a comparison to his current
situation. The President's use of the analogy did not fit the facts in
the Monica Lewinsky matter, however. The President's having raised the
analogy, let me make it more fitting to the case here.
Suppose that there is a nominee for a high government position.
Assume that there is an allegation of sexual harassment. Suppose that
several women other than the accuser who have worked with the nominee
testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Suppose that the nominee
confers with one of those women ahead of time, and that they agree that
they will both lie to the Judiciary Committee about their relationship.
Assume further that they both do lie under oath about their
relationship. And suppose further that a criminal investigation
develops and the nominee again lies under oath to the grand jury. If
that were proved to have happened, what would the Senate Judiciary
Committee do?
Suppose that the lying under oath and obstruction of justice occurs
in a sexual harassment suit brought against the nominee. Suppose
further that the false statements and obstruction continue into a
subsequent criminal investigation. What would this committee do with
compelling evidence of perjury and obstruction of justice committed by,
for example, a Justice of the Supreme Court in a sexual harassment suit
in which he was the defendant?
Those hypotheticals--which track the facts of this case--put in
relief the issue before the committee. Let me again stress that the
House, not an independent counsel, has the sole power to impeach. I am
suggesting that consideration of our referral be focused on the issues
actually presented by the referral.
C. The President's Actions: December 5--January 17
I will next turn to some of the essentials of the referral. That
will include the specifics of Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the Jones
case and the President's actions in response to that involvement.
The key point about the President's conduct is this. On at least
six different occasions--from December 17, 1997, through August 17,
1998--the President had to make a decision. He could choose truth, or
he could choose deception. On all six occasions, the President chose
deception--a pattern of calculated behavior over a span of months.
On December 5, 1997, Ms. Jones's attorneys identified Ms. Lewinsky
as a potential witness. Within a day, the President learned that Ms.
Lewinsky's name was on the witness list.
After learning this, the President faced his first critical
decision. Would he and Monica Lewinsky tell the truth about their
relationship? Or would they provide false information--not just to a
spouse or to loved ones--but under oath in a court of law?
Eleven months ago, the President made his decision. At
approximately 2:00 a.m. on December 17, 1997, he called Ms. Lewinsky at
her Watergate apartment and told her that she was on the witness list.
This was news to Ms. Lewinsky. And it bears noting that the President--
not his lawyer--made this call to the witness.
During this 2:00 a.m. conversation, which lasted approximately half
an hour, the President could have told Ms. Lewinsky that they must tell
the truth under oath. The President could have explained that they
might face embarrassment but that, as a citizen and as President, he
could not lie under oath and he could not sit by while Monica did so.
The President did not say anything like that.
On the contrary, according to Ms. Lewinsky, the President suggested
that she could sign an affidavit and use--under oath--deceptive cover
stories that they had devised long ago to explain why Ms. Lewinsky had
visited the Oval Office area. The President did not explicitly instruct
Ms. Lewinsky to lie. He did not have to. Ms. Lewinsky testified that
the President's suggestion that they use the pre-existing cover stories
amounted to a continuation of their pattern of concealing their
intimate relationship. Starting with this conversation, the President
and Ms. Lewinsky understood, according to Ms. Lewinsky, that they were
both going to make false statements under oath.
The conversation between the President and Ms. Lewinsky on December
17 was a critical turning point. The evidence suggests that the
President chose to engage in a criminal act--to reach an understanding
with Ms. Lewinsky that they would both make false statements under
oath. At that moment, the President's intimate relationship with a
subordinate employee was transformed into an unlawful effort to thwart
the judicial process. This was no longer an issue of private conduct.
Recall that the Supreme Court had concluded that Paula Jones was
entitled to an ``orderly disposition'' of her claims. The President's
action on December 17 was his first direct effort to thwart the Supreme
Court's mandate.
The story continued: The President faced a second choice. On
December 23, 1997, the President submitted under oath a written answer
to an interrogatory. The request stated in relevant part: ``Please
state the name . . . of [federal employees] with whom you had sexual
relations when you [were] . . . President of the United States.'' In
his sworn answer, the President stated ``None.''
On December 28, the President faced a third critical choice. On
that day, the President met with Ms. Lewinsky at the White House. They
discussed the fact that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed for gifts she
had received from the President. According to Ms. Lewinsky, she raised
the question of what she should do with the gifts. Later that day, the
President's personal secretary, Betty Currie, drove to Ms. Lewinsky's
Watergate home. Ms. Lewinsky gave Ms. Currie a sealed box that
contained some of the subpoenaed gifts. Ms. Currie then stored the box
under her bed at home.
In her written proffer on February 1, four weeks after the fact,
Ms. Lewinsky stated that Ms. Currie had called her to retrieve the
gifts. If so, that necessarily meant that the President had asked Ms.
Currie to call. It would directly and undeniably implicate him in an
obstruction of justice. Ms. Lewinsky later repeated that statement in
testimony under oath. Ms. Currie, for her part, recalls Ms. Lewinsky
calling her. But even if Ms. Lewinsky called Ms. Currie, common sense
and the evidence suggest some Presidential knowledge or involvement, as
the referral explains.
Let me add another point about the gifts. In his grand jury
appearance in August, the President testified that he had no particular
concern about the gifts in December 1997 when he had talked to Ms.
Lewinsky about them. And he thus suggested that he would have had no
reason to take part in December in a plan to conceal the gifts. But
there is a serious problem with the President's explanation. If it were
true that the President in December was unconcerned about the gifts, he
presumably would have told the truth under oath in his January
deposition about the large number of gifts that he and Ms. Lewinsky had
exchanged. But he did not tell the truth. At that deposition, when
asked whether he had ever given gifts to Monica Lewinsky, and he had
given her several on December 28, the President stated ``I don't
recall. Do you know what they were?''
In short, the critical facts to emphasize about the transfer of
gifts are these: First, the President and Ms. Lewinsky met and
discussed what should be done with the gifts subpoenaed from Ms.
Lewinsky. Second, the President's personal secretary Ms. Currie drove
later that day to Ms. Lewinsky's home to pick up the gifts. Third, Ms.
Currie stored the box under her bed.
Meanwhile, the legal process continued to unfold, and the President
took other actions that had the forseeable effect of keeping Ms.
Lewinsky ``on the team.'' The President helped Ms. Lewinsky obtain a
job in New York. His efforts began after the Supreme Court's decision
in May 1997--at a time when it had become foreseeable that she could be
an adverse witness against the President. These job-related efforts
intensified in December 1997 after Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the
witness list.
Vernon Jordan, who had been enlisted in the job search for Ms.
Lewinsky, testified that he kept the President informed of the status
of Ms. Lewinsky's job search and her affidavit. On January 7, 1998, Mr.
Jordan told the President that Ms. Lewinsky had signed the affidavit.
Mr. Jordan stated to the President that he was still working on getting
her a job. The President replied, ``Good.'' In other words, the
President, knowing that a witness had just signed a false affidavit,
encouraged his friend to continue trying to find her a job. After Ms.
Lewinsky received a job offer from Revlon on January 12, Vernon Jordan
called the President and said: ``Mission accomplished.''
As is often the situation in cases involving this kind of financial
assistance, no direct evidence reveals the President's intent in
assisting Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Lewinsky testified that no one promised her
a job for silence; of course, crimes ordinarily do not take place with
such explicit discussion. But federal courts instruct juries that
circumstantial evidence is just as probative as direct evidence. And
the circumstantial evidence here is strong. At a bare minimum, the
evidence suggests that the President's job assistance efforts stemmed
from his desire to placate Ms. Lewinsky so that she would not be
tempted--under the burden of an oath--to tell the truth about the
relationship. Monica Lewinsky herself recognized that at the time,
saying to a friend, ``Somebody could construe or say, `Well, they gave
her a job to shut her up. They made her happy.' ''
And given that the President's plan to testify falsely could
succeed only if Ms. Lewinsky went along, the President naturally had to
be concerned that Ms. Lewinsky at any time might turn around and decide
to tell the truth. Indeed, some wanted her to tell the truth. For
example, one friend talked to Ms. Lewinsky about the December 28
meeting with the President. The friend stated that she was concerned
because she ``didn't want to see [Monica] being like Susan McDougal''
and did not want Monica ``to lie to protect the President.'' Needless
to say, any sudden decision by Ms. Lewinsky to tell the truth, whether
out of anger at the President or simple desire to be law-abiding, would
have been very harmful to the President. That helps to explain his
motive in providing job assistance.
In mid-January, Ms. Lewinsky finalized her false affidavit with her
attorney, who sent it to Judge Wright's Court. The affidavit falsely
denied a sexual relationship with the President and essentially
recounted the cover stories they had discussed in their middle-of-the-
night conversation on December 17.
Let me turn to the President's January 17 deposition. Some have
suggested that the President might have been surprised or ambushed at
his deposition. Those suggestions are wrong. The President had clear
warning that there would be questions about Monica Lewinsky. She had
been named on the December 5 witness list. On January 12, only five
days before the deposition, Ms. Jones's attorneys identified Ms.
Lewinsky as a trial witness. In response, Judge Wright approved her as
a witness. Two days later, on January 14, the President's private
attorney asked Ms. Lewinsky's attorney to fax Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.
During the deposition itself, the President's attorney stated that the
President was ``fully familiar'' with Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.
At the outset of his January 17 deposition, therefore, the
President faced a fourth critical decision. Fully aware that he would
likely receive questions about Ms. Lewinsky, would the President
continue to make false statements under oath--this time in the presence
of a United States District Judge?
At the start of the deposition, Judge Susan Webber Wright
administered the oath. The President swore to tell the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth. As his testimony began, the
President, in response to a question from Ms. Jones's attorneys, stated
that he understood he was providing his testimony under the penalty of
perjury.
The President was asked a series of questions about Ms. Lewinsky.
After a few questions, the President's attorney--Mr. Bennett--objected
to the questioning about Ms. Lewinsky, referring to it as ``innuendo.''
Mr. Bennett produced Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit. Mr. Bennett stated
to Judge Wright that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit indicated that ``there is
absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape, or form.'' Mr.
Bennett stated that the President was ``fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's
affidavit.'' During Mr. Bennett's statements, the President sat back
and let his attorney mislead Judge Wright. The President said not a
word--to the Judge or, so far as we are aware, to his attorney.
Judge Wright overruled Mr. Bennett's objection. The questioning
continued. In response, the President made false statements not only
about his intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, but about a whole
host of matters. The President testified that he did not know that
Vernon Jordan had met with Ms. Lewinsky and talked about the Jones
case. That was untrue.
He testified that he could not recall being alone with Ms.
Lewinsky. That was untrue. He testified that he could not recall ever
being in the Oval Office hallway with Ms. Lewinsky except perhaps when
she was delivering pizza. That was untrue. He testified that he could
not recall gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and him. That was
untrue. He testified--after a 14-second pause--that he was ``not sure''
whether he had ever talked to Ms. Lewinsky about the possibility that
she might be asked to testify in the lawsuit. That was untrue. The
President testified that he did not know whether Ms. Lewinsky had been
served a subpoena at the time he last saw her in December 1997. That
was untrue. When his attorney read Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a
sexual relationship, the President stated that the affidavit was
``absolutely true.'' That was untrue.
The evidence thus suggests that the President--long aware that Ms.
Lewinsky was a likely topic of questioning at his deposition--made not
one or two, but a series of false statements under oath. The President
further allowed his attorney to use Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, which the
President knew to be false, to deceive the Court. This evidence
suggests that the President directly contravened the oath he had
taken--as well as the Supreme Court's mandate, in which the Court had
stated that Ms. Jones was entitled, like every other citizen, to a
lawful disposition of her case.
D. The President's Actions: January 17-21
As our referral outlines, the President's deposition did not mark
the end of the scheme to conceal. During his deposition testimony, the
President referred to his secretary Betty Currie. The President
testified, for example, that Ms. Lewinsky had come to the White House
to see Ms. Currie, not him; that Ms. Currie had been involved in
assisting Ms. Lewinsky in her job search; and that Ms. Currie had
communicated with Vernon Jordan about Mr. Jordan's assistance to Ms.
Lewinsky. In response to one question at the deposition, the President
said he did not know the answer and ``you'd have to ask Betty.''
Given the President's repeated references to Ms. Currie and his
suggestion to Ms. Jones's attorneys that they contact her, the
President had to know that Ms. Jones's attorneys might want to question
Ms. Currie. Shortly after 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, January 17--just two
and a half hours after the deposition--the President attempted to
contact Ms. Currie at her home. The President asked Ms. Currie to come
to the White House the next day, which she did, although it was unusual
for her to come in on a Sunday. According to Ms. Currie, the President
appeared concerned and made a number of statements about Ms. Lewinsky
to Ms. Currie. The statements included:
``You were always there when she was there, right? We were never
really alone.''
``You could see and hear everything.''
Ms. Currie concluded that the President wanted her to agree with
him when he made these statements. Ms. Currie stated that she did in
fact indicate her agreement--although she knew that the President and
Ms. Lewinsky had been alone and that she could not hear or see them
when they were alone.
Ms. Currie further testified that the President ran through the
same basic statements with her again on January 20 or 21.
What is important with respect to these two episodes is that at the
time the President made these statements, he knew that they were false.
He knew he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He knew Ms. Currie could
not see or hear everything. The President thus could not have been
trying to refresh his recollection, as he subsequently suggested. That
raises the question: Is there a legitimate explanation for the
President to have said those things in that manner to Ms. Currie? The
circumstances suggest not. The facts suggest that the President was
attempting to improperly coach Ms. Currie, at a time when he could
foresee that she was a potential witness in Jones v. Clinton.
E. The President's Actions: January 21-August 17
The President's next major decision came in the days immediately
after January 21. On the 21st, the ashington Post publicly reported the
story of Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with the President. After the
public disclosure of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and the ongoing
criminal investigation, the President faced a decision. Would he admit
the relationship publicly, correct his testimony in Ms. Jones's case,
and ask for the indulgence of the American people? Or would he continue
to deny the truth?
For this question, the President consulted others. According to
Dick Morris, the President and he talked on January 21. Mr. Morris
suggested that the President publicly confess. The President replied
``But what about the legal thing? You know, the legal thing? You know,
Starr and perjury and all.'' Mr. Morris suggested they take a poll. The
President agreed. Mr. Morris called with the results. He stated that
the American people were willing to forgive adultery but not perjury or
obstruction of justice. The President replied, ``Well, we just have to
win, then.''
Over the next several months, it became apparent that the strategy
to win had many prongs. First, the President denied the truth publicly
and emphatically. Second, he publicly promised to cooperate with the
investigation. Third, the President deflected and diverted the
investigation by telling aides false stories that were then relayed to
the grand jury. Fourth, he refused invitations to testify to the grand
jury for over six months. Fifth, his Administration delayed the
investigation through multiple privilege claims, each of which has been
rejected by the Federal courts. Sixth, surrogates of the President
attacked the credibility and legitimacy of the grand jury
investigation. Seventh, surrogates of the President attempted to
convince the Congress and the American people that the matter was
unimportant.
The first step was for the President to deny the truth publicly.
For this, political polling led to Hollywood staging. The President's
California friend and producer Harry Thomason flew to Washington and
advised that the President needed to be very forceful in denying the
relationship. On Monday, January 26, in the Roosevelt Room, before
Members of Congress and other citizens, the President provided a clear
and emphatic public statement denying the relationship.
The President also made false statements to his Cabinet and aides.
They then spoke publicly and professed their belief in the President.
The second step was to promise cooperation. The President told the
American people on several television and radio shows on January 21 and
22 that ``I'm going to do my best to cooperate with the
investigation.''
The third step was the President's refusal to provide testimony to
the grand jury despite six invitations to do so and despite his public
promise to cooperate. Refusing invitations to provide information to a
grand jury in a Federal criminal investigation authorized by the
Attorney General of the United States--and one in which there is a high
national interest in prompt completion--was inconsistent with the
President's initial January promise to cooperate and with the general
statutory duty of all government officials to cooperate with Federal
criminal investigations.
As a fourth step, the President not only refused to testify
himself, but he authorized the use of various governmental privileges
to delay the testimony of many of his taxpayer-paid assistants. The
extensive use of governmental privileges against grand jury and
criminal investigations has, of course, been a pattern throughout the
Administration. Most notably, the White House cited privilege in 1993
to prevent Justice Department and Park Police officials from reviewing
documents in Vincent Foster's office in the days after his death.
In the Lewinsky investigation, the President asserted two
privileges, Executive Privilege and a government attorney-client
privilege. A subordinate Administration official, without objection
from the President, claimed a previously unheard-of privilege that was
called the protective function privilege. The privileges were asserted
to prevent the full testimony of several White House aides and the full
testimony of the sworn law enforcement officers of the Secret Service.
In asserting Executive Privilege, the President was plowing
headlong into the Supreme Court's unanimous decision 24 years ago in
United States v. Nixon. There, the Supreme Court ruled that Executive
Privilege was overcome by the need for relevant evidence in criminal
proceedings. And thus, it came as no surprise that Chief Judge Norma
Holloway Johnson rejected President Clinton's effort to use Executive
Privilege to prevent disclosure of relevant evidence.
In asserting protective function and government attorney-client
privileges, the Administration was asking the Federal courts to make up
one new privilege out of whole cloth and to apply another privilege in
a context in which no Federal court had ever applied it before. And
thus it again came as little surprise that the Federal courts rejected
the Administration's claims. Indeed, as to the government attorney-
client claim, the D.C. Circuit and the District Court, like the Eighth
Circuit a year ago, stated that the President's position not only was
wrong but would authorize a ``gross misuse of public assets.'' The
Supreme Court refused to grant review of the cases notwithstanding the
Administration's two strongly worded petitions.
This point bears emphasis: The Administration justified its many
privilege claims by claiming an interest in protecting the Presidency,
not the President personally. But that justification is dubious for two
reasons. First, Presidents Carter and Reagan waived all government
privileges at the outset of criminal investigations in which they were
involved. The examples set by those two Presidents demonstrate that
such privilege claims in criminal investigations are manifestly
unnecessary to protect the Presidency. Second, these novel privilege
claims were quite weak as a matter of law.
And that raises a question: What was it about the Monica Lewinsky
matter that generated the Administration's particularly aggressive
approach to privileges? The circumstantial evidence suggests an answer:
delay. Indeed, when this Office sought to have the Supreme Court decide
all three privilege claims at once this past June, the Administration
opposed expedited consideration.
Not only did the Administration invoke these three losing
privileges, but the President publicly suggested that he had not
invoked Executive Privilege when in fact he had. On March 24, 1998,
while travailing in Africa, the President was asked about Executive
Privilege. He stated in response: ``You should ask someone who knows. .
. . I haven't discussed that with the lawyers. I don't know.'' But
White House Counsel Charles Ruff had filed an affidavit in Federal
court only seven days earlier in which he swore that he had discussed
the assertion of Executive Privilege with the President and the
President had approved its invocation.
After Chief Judge Johnson ruled against the President, the
President dropped the Executive Privilege claim in the Supreme Court.
In August, the President explained to the grand jury why he dropped it.
The President stated: ``I didn't really want to advance an executive
privilege claim in this case beyond having it litigated.''
But this statement--to the grand jury--was inaccurate. In truth,
the President had again asserted Executive Privilege only a few days
earlier. And a few days after his grand jury testimony, the President
again asserted Executive Privilege to prevent the testimony of Bruce
Lindsey. These Executive Privilege cases continue to this day; indeed,
one case is now pending in the D.C. Circuit.
When the President and the Administration assert privileges in a
context involving the President's personal issues; when the President
pretends publicly that he knows nothing about the Executive Privilege
assertion; when the President and the Administration rebuff our
Office's efforts to expedite the cases to the Supreme Court; when the
President contends in the grand jury that he never really wanted to
assert Executive Privilege beyond having it litigated--despite the fact
that he had asserted it six days earlier and did so again eleven days
afterwards, there is substantial and credible evidence that the
President has misused the privileges available to his Office. And the
misuse delayed and impeded the Federal grand jury's investigation.
The fifth tactic was diversion and deflection. The President made
false statements to his aides and associates about the nature of the
relationship--with knowledge that they could testify to that effect to
the grand jury sitting here in Washington. The President did not simply
say to his associates that the allegations were false or that the issue
was a private matter that he did not want to discuss. Instead, the
President concocted alternative scenarios that were then repeated to
the grand jury.
The final two tactics were related: (i) to attack the grand jury
investigation, including the Justice Department prosecutors in my
Office--to declare war, in the words of one Presidential ally--and (ii)
to shape public opinion about the proper resolution of the entire
matter. It is best that I leave it to someone outside our Office to
elaborate on the war against our Office. But no one really disputes
that those tactics were employed--and continue to be employed to this
day.
F. The President's Actions: August 17
This strategy proceeded for nearly 7 months. It changed course in
August after Monica Lewinsky reached an immunity agreement with our
Office, and the grand jury, after deliberation, issued a subpoena to
the President.
The President testified to the grand jury on August 17. Beforehand,
many in Congress and the public advised that the President should tell
the whole truth. They cautioned that the President could not lie to the
grand jury. Senator Hatch, for example, stated that ``So help me, if he
lies before the grand jury, that will be grounds for impeachment.''
Senator Moynihan stated simply that perjury before the grand jury was,
in his view, an impeachable offense.
The evidence suggests that the President did not heed this
Senatorial advice. Although admitting to an ambiguously defined
inappropriate relationship, the President denied that he had lied under
oath at his civil deposition. He also denied any conduct that would
establish that he had lied under oath at his civil deposition. The
President thus denied certain conduct with Ms. Lewinsky and devised a
variety of tortured and false definitions.
The President's answers have not been well received. Congressman
Schumer, for one, stated that ``it is clear that the President lied
when he testified before the grand jury.'' Congressman Meehan stated
that the President engaged in a ``dangerous game of verbal Twister.''
Indeed, the President made false statements to the grand jury and then
that same evening spoke to the Nation and criticized all attempts to
show that he had done so as invasive and irrelevant. The President's
approach appeared to contravene the oath he took at the start of the
grand jury proceedings. It also disregarded the admonitions of those
Members of Congress who warned that lying to the grand jury would not
be tolerated. It also discounted Judge Wright's many orders in which
she had ruled that this kind of evidence was relevant in the Jones
case.
And thus ended the over-eight-month journey that had begun on
December 5, 1997, when Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness
list. The evidence suggests that the eight months included false
statements under oath, false statements to the American people, false
statements to the President's Cabinet and aides, witness tampering,
obstruction of justice, and the use of Presidential authority and power
in an effort to conceal the truth of the relationship and to delay the
investigation.
iii. jurisdiction
Given the serious nature of perjury and obstruction of justice,
regardless of its setting, it is obvious that the actions of the
President and Ms. Lewinsky to conceal the truth warranted criminal
investigation. Let me explain how the investigation came to be handled
by our Office rather than by the Department of Justice or some new
independent counsel. The explanation is straightforward.
On January 8, an attorney in my Office was informed that a witness
(who was Linda Tripp, a witness in prior investigations), had
information she wanted to provide. A message was conveyed back that she
should provide her information directly. Ms. Tripp called our Office on
January 12. In that conversation and later, she provided us a
substantial amount of information.
Let me pause here and emphasize that our Office, like most law
enforcement agencies, has received innumerable tips about a wide
variety of matters over the past four years--from Swiss bank accounts
to drug smuggling. You name it. We have heard it. In each case, we must
make an initial assessment whether it is a serious tip or a crank call,
as well as an assessment of jurisdictional issues.
We handled the information from Ms. Tripp in this same manner. When
we confirmed that the information appeared credible, we reached out to
the Department of Justice, as we have done regularly during my tenure
as independent counsel. We contacted Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder within 48 hours after Ms. Tripp provided us information. The
next day, we fully informed the Deputy Attorney General about Ms.
Tripp's information. About Ms. Tripp's tapes and the questions
concerning their legality under state law. About the consensual FBI
recording of Ms. Tripp and Ms. Lewinsky. About the indications that
Vernon Jordan was providing employment assistance to a witness who had
the potential to harm the President--a fact pattern that we had seen in
the Webster Hubbell investigation, as I shall describe presently.
We discussed jurisdiction. We noted that it is in everyone's
interest to avoid time-consuming jurisdictional challenges. We stated
that the Lewinsky investigation could be considered outside our
jurisdiction as then constituted. We stressed that someone needed to
work the case: the Justice Department or an independent counsel.
Later that evening, the Deputy Attorney General telephoned and
reported that the Attorney General had tentatively decided to assign
the matter to us. Before her decision was final, we reviewed the
evidence in detail with two experienced career prosecutors in the
Department. One senior Justice Department prosecutor listened to
portions of the FBI tape. The Attorney General made her final decision
on Friday, January 16. That day, through a senior career prosecutor,
the Attorney General asked the three-Judge Special Division to expand
our jurisdiction. The Special Division granted the request that day.
In short, our entry into this investigation was standard, albeit
expedited, procedure.
iv. referral standards
Seven months later, after conducting the factual investigation and
after the President's grand jury testimony, the question we faced was
what to do with the evidence. Section 595(c) of Title 28 in the
independent counsel statute requires an independent counsel
investigating possible crimes to provide to the House of
Representatives--in the words of the statute--``substantial and
credible information that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.''
This reporting provision suggests a statutory preference that
possible criminal wrongdoing by the President be addressed in the first
instance by the House of Representatives. It also requires an analysis
of the law of impeachment.
As we understood the text of the Constitution, its history, and
relevant precedents, it was clear that obstruction of justice in its
various forms, including perjury, ``may constitute grounds for an
impeachment.'' Even apart from any abuses of Presidential authority and
power, the evidence of perjury and obstruction of justice required us
to refer this information to the House.
Perjury and obstruction of justice are, of course, serious crimes.
In 1790, the First Congress passed a criminal law that banned perjury.
A violator was subject to three years' imprisonment. Today, Federal
criminal law makes perjury a felony punishable by five years'
imprisonment.
In cases involving public officials, courts treat false statements
with special condemnation. United States District Judge Royce Lamberth
recently sentenced Ronald Blackley, former Chief of Staff to the former
Secretary of Agriculture, to 37 months' imprisonment for false
statements. The Court stated that it ``has a duty to send a message to
other high-level government officials that there is a severe penalty to
be paid for providing false information under oath.''
Although perjury and obstruction of justice are serious Federal
crimes, some have suggested that they are not high crimes or
misdemeanors when the underlying events concern the President's private
actions. Under this theory, a President's obstruction and perjury must
involve concealment of official actions. This interpretation does not
appear in the Constitution itself. Moreover, the Constitution lists
bribery as a high crime or misdemeanor. And if a President involved in
a civil suit bribed the judge to rule in his favor or bribed a witness
to provide favorable testimony, there could be no textual question that
he had committed a high crime or misdemeanor under the plain language
of Article II--even though the underlying events would not have
involved his official duties. In addition, virtually everyone agrees
that serious crimes such as murder and rape would be impeachable even
though they do not involve official duties.
Justice Story stated in his famous Commentaries that there is not a
syllable in the Constitution which confines impeachment to official
acts. With respect, an absolute and inflexible requirement of a
connection to official duties appears, fairly viewed, to be an
incorrect interpretation of the Constitution.
History and practice support the conclusion that perjury, in
particular, is a high crime or misdemeanor. Perjury has been the basis
for the removal of several judges. As far as we know, no one questioned
whether perjury was a high crime or misdemeanor in those cases. In
addition, as several of the scholars who appeared before you testified,
perjury seems to have been recognized as a high crime or misdemeanor at
the time of the Founding. And the House Manager's report in the
impeachment of Judge Walter Nixon for perjury stated, ``It is difficult
to imagine an act more subversive to the legal process than lying from
the witness stand.'' And finally, I note that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines include bribery and perjury in the same Guideline (2J1.3),
reflecting the common-sense conclusion that bribery and perjury are
equivalent means of interfering with the governmental process.
For these reasons, we concluded that perjury and obstruction of
justice, like bribery, ``may constitute grounds for an impeachment.''
Having said that, let me again emphasize my role here. Whether the
President's actions are, in fact, grounds for an impeachment or some
other congressional sanction is a decision in the sole discretion of
the Congress.
A final point warrants mention in this respect. Criminal
prosecution and punishment are not the same as--or a substitute for--
congressionally imposed sanctions. As the Supreme Court stated in a
1993 case, ``the Framers recognized that most likely there would be two
sets of proceedings for individuals who commit impeachable offenses--
the impeachment trial and a separate criminal trial. In fact, the
Constitution explicitly provides for two separate proceedings. The
Framers deliberately separated the two forums to avoid raising the
specter of bias and to ensure independent judgment.''
v. the office of independent counsel: 1994-1998
Our job over the past several years has involved far more than
simply the Monica Lewinsky matter. The pattern of obstruction of
justice, false statements, and misuse of executive authority in the
Lewinsky investigation did not occur in a vacuum.
A. Overview
In August 1994, I took over the Madison Guaranty investigation from
Bob Fiske. Over the ensuing years, I have essentially become
independent counsel for five distinct investigations: for Madison and
Whitewater, for Foster-related matters, for the Travel Office, for the
FBI Files matter, and for the Monica Lewinsky investigation--as well as
for a variety of obstruction and related matters arising from those
five major investigations. A brief overview of those investigations may
assist the Committee in its assessment of the President's conduct.
First, some statistics. Our investigation has resulted in
conviction of fourteen individuals, including the former Associate
Attorney General of the United States Webster Hubbell, the then-sitting
Governor of Arkansas Jim Guy Tucker, and the Clintons' two business
partners Jim and Susan McDougal.
We are proud not only of the cases we have won, but also of our
decisions not to indict. To take one well-known example, the Senate
Whitewater Committee sent our Office public criminal referrals on
several individuals. The Committee stated in its June 21, 1996, public
letter that the testimony of Susan Thomases was ``particularly
troubling and suggests a possible violation of law.'' But this Office
did not seek charges against her.
Apart from our indictments and convictions, this Office also has
faced an extraordinary number of legal disputes--on issues of
privilege, jurisdiction, substantive criminal law, and the like. By my
count, at least seventeen of our cases have been decided by the federal
courts of appeals, and we have won all seventeen. One privilege case
arising in our Travel Office investigation went to the D.C. Circuit
where we prevailed 2-1 and then to the Supreme Court where we lost 6-3.
We had to litigate in the courts as our investigation ran into
roadblocks and hurdles that slowed us down. It is true that the
Administration produced a great amount of information. But unlike the
prosecutors in the investigations involving Presidents Reagan and
Carter, we have been forced to go to court time and again to seek
information from the Executive Branch and to fight a multitude of
privilege claims asserted by the Administration--every single one of
which we have won.
In sum, this Office has achieved a superb record in courts of law--
of significant and hard-fought convictions, of fair and wise decisions
not to charge, of thorough and accurate reports on the Vincent Foster
and Monica Lewinsky matters, of legal victories in various courts. We
go to court and not on the talkshow circuit. And our record shows that
there is a bright line between law and politics, between courts and
polls. It leaves the polls to the politicians and spin doctors. We are
officers of the court who live in the world of the law. We have
presented our cases in court, and with very rare exception, we have
won.
B. Madison Guaranty: President Clinton and Susan McDougal
The center of all of this--the core of our Arkansas-based
investigation--was Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan. Madison was a
federally insured savings and loan in Little Rock, Arkansas, run by Jim
and Susan McDougal. Like many savings and loans in the 1980's, Madison
was fraudulently operated. Mrs. Clinton and other lawyers at the Rose
Law Firm in Little Rock performed legal work for Madison in the 1980's.
Madison first received national attention in March 1992 when a New
York Times report raised several issues about the relationship between
the Clintons and the McDougals in connection with Madison. Federal bank
regulators examined Madison in 1992 and 1993. The regulators sent
criminal referrals to the Justice Department, and the Justice
Department launched a criminal investigation of Madison in November
1993. In part because of the relationship of the Clintons to the
McDougals, Attorney General Reno appointed Bob Fiske in January 1994. I
was appointed Independent Counsel in August 1994 to continue the
investigation.
Madison exemplified the troubled practices of savings and loans in
the 1980's. The failure of the institution ultimately cost federal
taxpayers approximately $65 million. Congresswoman Waters put it this
way in a 1995 hearing: ``By any standard, Madison Guaranty was a
disaster. . . . It gambled with investments, cooked the books and
ultimately bilked the taxpayers of the United States. Madison is a
metaphor for the S&L crisis.''
The McDougals' operation of Madison raised serious questions
whether bank funds had been used illegally to assist business and
political figures in Arkansas such as Jim Guy Tucker and then Governor
Clinton. As to the Clintons, the question arose primarily because they
were partners with the McDougals in the Whitewater Development Company.
The Whitewater corporation initially controlled and developed
approximately 230 acres of property on the White River in Northern
Arkansas. Given Jim McDougal's role at the center of both institutions
and given Whitewater's constant financial difficulties, there were two
important questions: Were Madison funds diverted to benefit Whitewater?
If so, were the Clintons either involved in or knowledgeable of that
diversion of funds?
These questions were not idle speculation. In early 1994, a Little
Rock Judge and businessman David Hale pled guilty to certain unrelated
Federal crimes. As part of his plea, David Hale told Mr. Fiske's team
that he had received money as a result of a loan from Madison in 1986
and that his company loaned it to others as part of a scheme to help
some members of the Arkansas political establishment.
One loan of $300,000 went to Susan McDougal's make-believe company,
Master Marketing. Based on our investigation, we now know that some
$50,000 of the proceeds of that loan went to benefit the Whitewater
corporation. David Hale stated that he had discussed the Susan McDougal
loan with Governor Clinton, including at a meeting in 1986 with Jim
McDougal and the Governor.
In August 1994, when I first arrived in Little Rock, we devised a
plan. First, based on the testimony of David Hale and others, as well
as documentary evidence, we would take steps, if appropriate, to seek
an indictment of Jim and Susan McDougal and others involved in what
clearly appeared to be criminal transactions. If a Little Rock jury
convicted the McDougals or others, we would then obtain their testimony
and determine whether they had other relevant information--including,
of course, whether the McDougals possessed information that would
either exonerate or incriminate the Clintons as to Madison and
Whitewater matters.
This approach was the time-honored and professional way to conduct
the investigation. We garnered a number of guilty pleas in my first
year, including from Webster Hubbell, who had worked at the Rose Law
Firm and was knowledgeable about its work with Madison, including that
of Mrs. Clinton. In addition, Robert Palmer, a real estate appraiser,
pled guilty to fraudulently doctoring Madison documents to deceive
federal bank examiners. Three other associates of McDougal pled guilty
and agreed to cooperate.
In August 1995, a year after I was appointed, a federal grand jury
in Little Rock indicted Jim and Susan McDougal and the then-sitting
Governor of Arkansas Jim Guy Tucker. The case went to trial in March
1996 amid charges by all three defendants--and their allies--that the
case was a political witch hunt. Some predicted that an Arkansas jury
would never convict the sitting Governor. Those expectations were
heightened when President Clinton was subpoenaed as a defense witness.
The President testified for the defense from the Map Room of the White
House. During his sworn testimony, the President testified that he did
not know about the Susan McDougal loan nor had he ever been in a
meeting with Hale and McDougal about the loan. He also testified that
he had never received a loan from Madison. This was important
testimony. Its truth--or falsity--went to the core issue of our
investigation.
On May 28, 1996, all three defendants were convicted--Jim McDougal
of 18 felonies, Susan McDougal of four felonies, and Governor Tucker of
two felonies. Governor Tucker announced his resignation that day.
After his conviction, Jim McDougal began cooperating with our
investigation. We spent many hours with him gaining additional insights
and facts. He informed our career investigators and prosecutors that
David Hale was accurate. According to Jim McDougal, President Clinton
had testified falsely at the McDougal-Tucker trial. Jim McDougal
testified he had been at a meeting with David Hale and Governor Clinton
about the Master Marketing loan. And Jim McDougal testified that
Governor Clinton had received a loan from Madison. Jim McDougal said on
one of his first sessions with our Office that the President's trial
testimony was, in his words, ``at variance with the truth.''
In late 1997, we considered whether this evidence justified a
referral to Congress. We drafted a report. But we concluded that it
would be inconsistent with the statutory standard because of the
difficulty of establishing the truth with a sufficient degree of
confidence. We also weighed a prudential factor in reaching that
conclusion. There were still two outstanding witnesses who might later
corroborate--or contradict--the McDougal and Hale accounts: Jim Guy
Tucker and Susan McDougal.
In 1998, we were finally able to obtain information from Governor
Tucker. It had taken four long years to hear from the Governor. He pled
guilty in a tax conspiracy case. When Governor Tucker ultimately
testified before the Little Rock grand jury in March and April of this
year, he had little knowledge of the loan to Susan McDougal's
fictitious company and the President's possible involvement in it. He
did shed light on the overall transactions involving Castle Grande and
Madison. Importantly, as to one subject, Governor Tucker exonerated the
President regarding longstanding questions whether the President and
Governor Tucker had a conversation about the Madison referrals in the
White House in October 1993.
The remaining witness who perhaps could shed light on the issue was
Susan McDougal. And therein lies a story that has caused literally
years of delay and added expense to the investigation.
Because the proceeds from the fraudulent loan Susan McDougal
received had benefitted the Clintons--the proceeds were used to pay
obligations of the Whitewater Development Company for which the
Clintons were potentially personally liable--Susan McDougal was
subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury in August 1996 and asked
several questions at the heart of the investigation, including:
Did you ever discuss your loan from David Hale with William
Jefferson Clinton?
To your knowledge, did William Jefferson Clinton testify
truthfully during the course of your trial?
Susan McDougal refused to answer any of the questions. District Judge
Susan Webber Wright then held her in civil contempt, a decision later
upheld by the United States Court of Appeals.
The month of September 1996 thus was a crucial time for our Office
in its attempt to obtain Susan McDougal's truthful testimony. On
September 23, 1996, just two weeks after Ms. McDougal had been found in
contempt by Judge Wright, President Clinton was interviewed on PBS. The
President said, ``There's a lot of evidence to support'' various
charges that Susan McDougal had made against this Office. But the
President cited no evidence.
The President's comments can reasonably be described as supportive
of Ms. McDougal's decision to disobey the court order. So far as we are
aware, no sitting President has ever publicly indicated his agreement
with a convicted felon's stated reason for refusing to obey a Federal
court order to testify. Essentially, the President of the United
States, the Chief Executive, sided with a convicted felon against the
United States, as represented by United States District Judge Susan
Webber Wright, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, and the Office of Independent Counsel.
The President was also asked in this interview whether he would
consider pardoning Ms. McDougal. The President refused to rule out a
pardon.
The President's answers to these questions were roundly criticized.
A New York Times editorial captured the point well, stating that the
President's remarks ``undercut a legal process that is going forward in
an orderly way.''
C. Madison Guaranty: Mrs. Clinton and Webster Hubbell
A separate area of our original investigation concerned the Rose
Law Firm's work in 1985 and 1986 for Madison. It appeared that Rose may
have assisted Madison in performing legal work concerning a piece of
property (IDC/Castle Grande), which involved McDougal, Madison, and
fraudulent transactions. The complicated real estate deal known as
Castle Grande was structured to avoid state banking regulatory
requirements and involved violations of federal criminal law.
Grand jury subpoenas were issued in 1994 and 1995 to the Rose Law
Firm and to the President and Mrs. Clinton seeking all documents
relating to Madison and Castle Grande. We ultimately learned that Mrs.
Clinton had performed some work related to Madison's IDC/Castle Grande
transactions, but the whole issue remained partially enshrouded in
mystery as our Office and the Senate Whitewater Committee investigated
the issue in 1995.
The problem was that some of the best evidence regarding Mrs.
Clinton's work--her Rose Law Firm billing records and her time sheets
for 1985 and 1986--could not be found. The missing records raised
suspicions by late 1995 and became a public issue. Webster Hubbell and
Vincent Foster had been responsible during the 1992 campaign for
gathering information about Mrs. Clinton's work for Madison. Yet the
billing records could not be found. The Rose Firm's work for Madison
could not be fully pieced together. The Rose Firm no longer had the
records.
On January 5, 1996, the records of Mrs. Clinton's activities at
Madison were finally produced under unusual circumstances. The records
detailed Mrs. Clinton's work on a variety of Madison issues, including
the preparation of an option agreement that Madison used to deceive
federal bank examiners as part of the Castle Grande deal. After a
thorough investigation, we have found no explanation how the billing
records got where they were or why they were not discovered and
produced earlier. It remains a mystery to this day. Then, in the summer
of 1997, a second set of these billing records was found in the attic
of the late Vincent Foster's house in Little Rock. The time sheets for
Rose's 1985-86 Madison work have never been found.
We should note that Webster Hubbell may have additional information
pertaining to Castle Grande--whether exculpatory or inculpatory--that
we have been unable to obtain. Mr. Hubbell was at the Rose Firm at the
relevant time in 1985 and 1986, he gathered information about the
Madison issue in the 1992 campaign, and his father-in-law Seth Ward was
involved in the Castle Grande deal.
Two other important facts suggest that Mr. Hubbell may have
additional information. First, on March 13, 1994, after a meeting at
the White House where it had been discussed that Mr. Hubbell would
resign from the Justice Department, then-Chief of Staff Mack McLarty
told Mrs. Clinton that ``We're going to be supportive of Webb.''
As this criminal investigation was beginning in 1994 under Bob
Fiske and later my Office, Mr. Hubbell received payments totalling
nearly $550,000 from several companies and individuals. Many were
campaign contributors. These individuals had been contacted through the
White House Chief of Staff Mr. McLarty. In June 1994, during a week in
which he made several visits to the White House, Indonesian businessman
James Riady met with Webster Hubbell and then wired him $100,000. One
of the individuals who arranged for Mr. Hubbell to receive a consulting
contract was Vernon Jordan. The company that he convinced to hire
Hubbell was MacAndrews & Forbes, parent company of Revlon--the same
company that later hired Monica Lewinsky upon Mr. Jordan's
recommendation. As he was destined later to do with Monica Lewinsky,
Mr. Jordan personally informed the President about his assistance to
Mr. Hubbell.
Most of the $550,000 was given to Mr. Hubbell for little or no
work. This rush of generosity obviously gives rise to an inference that
the money was essentially a gift. And if it was a gift, why was it
given? This money was given despite the fact that Mr. Hubbell was under
criminal investigation for fraudulent billing and was a key witness in
the Madison Guaranty investigation.
Second, as is known to the public, on certain prison tapes while
Mr. Hubbell was in prison, he said to his wife: ``I won't raise those
allegations that might open it up to Hillary.'' On another tape, Mr.
Hubbell said to White House employee Marsha Scott that he might ``have
to roll over one more time.''
Mr. Hubbell's statements--when combined with the amount of money he
received and the information he was in a position to know--raise very
troubling questions. Mr. Hubbell is currently under federal indictment,
and it would be inappropriate to say more about that at this time.
D. Travel Office
Let me add a few brief words about the Travel Office matter. This
phase of work arose out of investigations by others of the 1993 firings
of Billy Dale and six career co-workers. We do not anticipate that any
evidence gathered in that investigation will be relevant to the
committee's current task. The President was not involved in our Travel
Office investigation.
As to the status of that investigation, it was on hold for quite a
while, in part because of litigation. The investigation is not
terminated, but we expect to announce any decisions and actions soon.
E. FBI Files
As to the FBI files matter, there are outstanding issues that we
are attempting to resolve with respect to one individual. But I can
address two issues of relevance to the Committee's work. First, our
investigation, which has been thorough, found no evidence that anyone
higher than Mr. Livingstone or Mr. Marceca was in any way involved in
ordering the files from the FBI. Second, we have found no evidence that
information contained in the files of former officials was used for an
improper purpose.
vi. the office of independent counsel
A. Staff
Let me now mention a few words about our personnel, about our
process, and about our reflections on this investigation. The character
and conduct of the men and women of our Office--career professionals
who take their jobs and their oaths very seriously--have been badly
distorted. Perhaps that is inevitable given the nature of the issues
involved in this case and the fact that the President of the United
States is the subject of a criminal investigation. But it is
regrettable. And so let me offer some truth about the Office.
I will start with our personnel. During the Lewinsky investigation,
my staff has included skilled and experienced prosecutors from around
the country. They have brought an enormous amount of experience and
expertise to the Office. My colleagues during the past year have
included a former United States Attorney; the Chief of the Public
Corruption unit of the United States Attorney's Office in Los Angeles;
the Chief of the Public Corruption unit of the United States Attorney's
Office in Miami; the chief of the bank fraud unit of the United States
Attorney's office in San Antonio; prosecutors with lengthy experience
in the Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice; seasoned
federal prosecutors from ten different States and the District of
Columbia; and veteran state prosecutors from Maryland and Oregon.
The Office also has benefitted from the assistance of Sam Dash,
Chief Counsel to the Senate Watergate Committee, who has offered great
wisdom throughout my tenure as independent counsel. Professor Ronald
Rotunda, constitutional law scholar from the University of Illinois,
similarly has provided important advice on a variety of issues. The
Office also has received assistance from professors at the University
of Michigan, the University of Illinois, Notre Dame, and George
Washington. Moreover, former law clerks for six different Supreme Court
Justices have served on my staff during the past year.
During the Lewinsky investigation, the Office also relied on many
talented investigators with extensive service in the FBI and other law
enforcement agencies. And the FBI Laboratory yet again provided superb
assistance, as it has throughout the Madison/Whitewater investigation.
In addition, let me express my great appreciation for the grand
jurors who devoted much time and energy to examining the witnesses and
considering the evidence. Those 23 citizens of the District of Columbia
have performed invaluable service, and I publicly thank them. This is
the rare case where grand jury transcripts become publicly scrutinized,
and as you now know, these grand jurors were active, knowledgeable,
fair, and completely dedicated to uncovering and understanding the
truth.
B. The Process
In all of our investigations, difficult decisions have been taken
through our Office's deliberative process. The process calls upon each
attorney--drawing upon his or her background and experience--to offer
views on issues in question. This deliberative process is laborious,
sometimes tedious. But it is an attempt to ensure that our Office makes
the best decisions it can. I have drawn upon a vast array of
experienced prosecutors and investigators because I was sensitive to--
and am sensitive to--the fact that an independent counsel exists
outside the Justice Department and is an unusual entity within our
constitutional system.
Throughout this investigation, we have made every effort to follow
Department of Justice practice and policy and to utilize time-honored
law enforcement techniques. Of course, with their vast experience in
the Department and FBI, my prosecutors and investigators embody such
policy and practice. Nonetheless, it was often the case during an all-
attorneys meeting that we would repair to the United States Attorney's
Manual to be sure we had it right. It is true that some traditional law
enforcement procedures may not be entirely comfortable for some
witnesses. But the procedures have been refined over decades of
practice in which society's right to detect and prosecute crime has
been balanced against individual liberty. It was not our place to
reinvent the investigative wheel. Nor was it our place to discard law
enforcement practices that are used every day by prosecutors and police
throughout the country.
C. Decisions During the Investigation
With that, let me be the first to say that the Lewinsky
investigation, in particular, presented some of the most challenging
issues any lawyer could face. We had to make numerous difficult
decisions--and often had to do so quickly. Those included factual
judgments (is witness X or witness Y telling us the whole truth?),
strategic choices (do we provide immunity to Ms. Lewinsky in order to
obtain her testimony? Is it appropriate to subpoena the President?),
legal decisions (Do we accept the assertion of Executive Privilege for
Bruce Lindsey or do we go to court to challenge it? What about the
asserted Secret Service privilege?), and historic constitutional
judgments (what is the meaning of Section 595(c) of the independent
counsel statute and how do we write a referral that satisfies its
requirements?).
Major decisions during-the Lewinsky investigation have not been
easy. And given the hurricane-force political winds swirling about us,
we were well aware that, no matter what decision we made, criticism
would come from somewhere. As Attorney General Reno has said, in high-
profile cases like these, you are damned if you do and damned if you
don't, so you'd better just do what you think is the right and fair
thing.
We also attempted to be thorough. But we did not invent that
approach just for the Lewinsky case. To take just one previous example,
in investigating matters relating to the death of Vincent Foster, we
were painstaking in examining evidence, questioning witnesses, and
calling upon experts in homicide and suicide. We were criticized during
that investigation for being too thorough, taking too long. But time
has proved the correctness of our approach. After an extensive
investigation, the Office produced a report that addressed the many
questions, confronted the difficult issues, laid out new evidence, and
reached a definitive conclusion. Over time, the controversy over the
Foster tragedy has dissipated because we insisted on being
uncompromisingly thorough both in the investigation and in our report.
After the Attorney General and the Court of Appeals assigned us the
Lewinsky investigation, the Office again received criticism for being
too thorough. But the Lewinsky investigation could not be properly
conducted in a slapdash manner. It was our duty to be meticulous, to be
careful. We were. And in the process, we uncovered substantial and
credible evidence of serious legal wrongdoing by the President.
Some then suggested that the report we submitted to Congress was
too thorough. But bear in mind that we submitted the referral, as we
were required by statute, to the House of Representatives, not to the
public. And we must dispute the suggestion that a report to the House
suggesting possible impeachable offenses committed by the President of
the United States should tell something less than the full story. The
facts, the story are critical--they affect credibility, they are
necessary to avoid a distorted picture, they ultimately are the basis
for a just conclusion. As a result, just as the jurors found the
details of specific land deals critical in our trial of Governor Jim
Guy Tucker and the McDougals, just as the Supreme Court includes the
details of grisly murders in its death penalty cases, so too the
details of the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky became
relevant--indeed, critical--in determining whether and the extent to
which the President made false statements under oath and otherwise
obstructed justice in both the Jones v. Clinton case and then again in
his grand jury testimony.
As you know, by an overwhelming bipartisan vote, the House
immediately disclosed our referral to the public. But I want to be
clear that the public disclosure or non-disclosure of the referral and
the backup materials was a decision our Office did not make--and
lawfully could not make. We had no way of knowing in advance of
submitting the referral, and we did not know, whether the House would
publicly release both the report and the backup materials; would
release portions of one or both; would release redacted versions of the
report and backup documents; would prepare and release a summary akin
to Mr. Schippers' oral presentation; or would simply keep the referral
and backup materials under seal just as Special Prosecutor Jaworski's
submission in 1974 remained under seal. As a result, we respectfully
but firmly reject the notion that our Office was trying to inflame the
public. We are professionals, and we were trying to get the relevant
facts, the full story, to the House of Representatives. That was our
task. And that is what we did.
In fact, the referral has served a purpose. There has been
virtually no dispute about a good many of the factual conclusions in
the report. In the wake of the referral, for example, few have ventured
that the President told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth in his civil case and before the grand jury. A key reason, we
submit, is that we insisted--as we have in our other investigations--
that we be exhaustive in the investigation and that we document the
facts and conclusions in our report.
D. Reflections
I want to be absolutely clear on one point, however. Any suggestion
that the men and women of our Office enjoyed or relished this
investigation is wrong. It is nonsense. In at least three ways, the
Lewinsky investigation caused all of us considerable dismay--and
continues to do so.
First, none of us has any interest whatsoever in investigating the
factual details underlying the allegations of perjury and obstruction
of justice in this case. My staff and I agree with the sentiments
expressed by Chairman Hyde in the November 9 hearing when he said ``I'd
like to forget all of this. I mean, who needs it?'' But the
Constitution and the criminal law do not have exceptions for unseemly
or unpleasant or difficult cases. The Attorney General and the Court of
Appeals assigned us a duty to pursue the facts. And we did so.
Second, this investigation has proved difficult for us because it
centered on legal wrongdoing by the President of the United States. The
Presidency is an Office that we--like all Americans--revere and
respect. No prosecutor is comfortable when he or she reports wrongdoing
by the President. All of us want to believe that our President has at
all times acted with integrity--and certainly that he has not violated
the criminal law.
Everyone in my Office therefore envies the position years ago of
Paul Curran, the distinguished counsel appointed by Attorney General
Griffin Bell to investigate certain financial transactions involving
President Carter. Mr. Curran received complete cooperation from
President Carter, found no wrongdoing, and promptly returned to private
life. I would like to do the same.
Third, this investigation was unpleasant because our Office knew
that some Americans, for a variety of reasons, would be opposed to our
work. But we would not, could not, allow ourselves to be deterred from
doing our work. As I have said, our Office was assigned a specific duty
to gather the facts--and then, if appropriate, to make decisions and
report the facts as quickly as we possibly could. In the end, we tried
to adhere to the principle Congressman Graham discussed on October 5:
30 years from now, not 30 days from now, we want to be able to say that
we did the right thing.
E. The Independent Counsel
At the end of the day, I--and no one else--was responsible for our
key decisions. And my background thus warrants brief note.
I came to this job as a product of the judicial process, of the
courts. I began my legal career in 1973 as a law clerk, first for Judge
David Dyer on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and then for 2 years
for Chief Justice Warren Burger. Following my clerkships, I was in
private law practice in Los Angeles and Washington, during which time I
worked on all manner of litigation matters--civil, administrative, and
criminal.
After William French Smith took office as Attorney General in
January 1981, I served as Counselor to the Attorney General from 1981
to 1983. In that capacity, I experienced firsthand the varied and
difficult judgment calls that faced the Attorney General every day--
whether it was dealing with the aftermath of the attempted
assassination of President Reagan or selecting a Supreme Court nominee,
in that case Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. I took away from the
experience an admiration that has continued to this day for the career
Justice Department lawyers, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials
who toil without fanfare, and for whom the guiding principles are
fairness and respect for the law.
In 1983, President Reagan nominated and the Senate confirmed me to
be a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. I became a colleague on a Court with truly great
Judges--from J. Skelley Wright to Antonin Scalia, from Ruth Ginsburg to
Robert Bork--and tackled the important and intricate issues that came
before the D.C. Circuit. The cases included issues as diverse as the
constitutional right of a military serviceman to wear a yarmulke (a
right I supported in vain) and the right of a newspaper, in that case
The Washington Post, to be free under the First Amendment from the
crushing threat of liability under the libel laws.
In 1989, I accepted appointment as Solicitor General of the United
States. The Solicitor General is, as you know, the lawyer who
represents the United States in arguments before the Supreme Court. A
distinguished predecessor, Thurgood Marshall, often stated that being
Solicitor General was the greatest job a lawyer could have, bar none.
Justice Marshall had it right. As Solicitor General, I argued 25 cases
before the Supreme Court. The arguments covered the spectrum of our law
including whether flag burning is a protected right under the
Constitution, whether there is a constitutional right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment near the end of one's life, and whether the
Senate's decision to convict and remove an impeached Judge is subject
to judicial review. While I was Solicitor General, my overarching goal
was to run an Office faithful to the law, not to political or
ideological opinion. And I think the record shows that I did just that.
In 1993, I left my second tour of duty in the Justice Department
and returned to private practice and teaching constitutional law. In
the period before I was named independent counsel in August 1994, I was
not completely absent from public service, however. In late 1993, I was
asked by the Senate Ethics Committee, chaired by Nevada's Democratic
Senator Richard Bryan, to review Senator Packwood's diaries as part of
the Ethics Committee's investigation.
Every person is, of course, deeply affected by his or her
experiences. For my part, my experience is in the law and the courts. I
am not a man of polls, public relations, or politics--which I suppose
is obvious at this point. I am not experienced in political campaigns.
As a product of the law and the courts, I have come to an
unyielding faith in our court system--our system of judicial review,
the independence of our judges, our jury system, the integrity of the
oath, the sanctity of the judicial process. The phrase on the facade of
the Supreme Court ``Equal Justice Under Law,'' the inscription inside
the Justice Department building, ``the United States wins its point
when justice is done its citizens in the courts,'' are more than
slogans. They are principles that the courts in this country apply
every day. Office saw that firsthand in the trial of Governor Jim Guy
Tucker, Jim McDougal, and Susan McDougal. A juror said afterwards that
they fought for the defendants' liberty, but were overwhelmed by the
evidence. It is our judicial process that helps make this country
distinct. And my background, my instincts, my beliefs have instilled in
me a deep respect for the legal process that is at the foundation of
our Republic.
President Lincoln asked that ``reverence for the laws . . . be
proclaimed in legislative halls and enforced in courts of justice.''
Mr. Chairman, my Office and I revere the law. I am proud of what we
have accomplished. We were assigned a difficult job. We have done it to
the very best of our abilities. We have tried to be both fair and
thorough.
I thank the Committee and the American people for their attention.
Mr. Hyde. The committee will stand in recess until 1:45
p.m., and I would ask everyone to remain in the room in their
seats until Judge Starr has exited the room. It will just be a
few seconds. We will see you back at 1:45 p.m.
[Whereupon at 1:03 p.m. the committee recessed to reconvene
at 1:45 p.m. the same day.]
Mr. Hyde. The committee will come to order. I would
appreciate it if we could get the doors closed.
The Chair now recognizes minority counsel, Mr. Lowell, to
question the witness for 30 minutes.
Mr. Lowell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, Mr. Starr.
Mr. Starr. Good afternoon, Mr. Lowell.
Mr. Lowell. Chairman Hyde has again this morning announced
his desire to conclude the inquiry by the end of this year.
With that in mind, it appears that you may be the principal
witness that the committee hears and that yours will most
certainly be the primary evidence considered.
Given this, Mr. Starr, isn't it true that on September 25,
1998, without any request by this committee to do so, you sent
the committee a letter which agreed that once questions about
your conduct were raised, those questions were not incidental
or tangential, but they were ``appearing to bear on the
substantiality and credibility of the information you provided
to the House in our referral.''
Mr. Starr. Well, Mr. Lowell, the letter, and I believe I am
recalling the one that you are speaking to, we have had a lot
of correspondence back and forth, as you know. But the letter,
if my recollection serves me, goes to the circumstances with
respect to the events of the evening of January 16th, and there
were certain allegations being made about the circumstances by
which we approached Ms. Lewinsky, what was said and the like,
and that is what we were talking about or what we were
addressing in that letter, if it again is the letter you are
indicating.
But may I take, I must say, gentle issue with the idea that
this [indicating referral] is not the information that is
before you. This is the information, and the supplemental
materials and the appendices reflect the hard work of the grand
jury who has evaluated the witnesses. I am the Independent
Counsel. My colleagues and I have gathered the information.
But, no, a witness not in the sense of a fact witness,
except to the extent, obviously, that members want to inquire
into the activities of our office, and I am obviously going to
try to be responsive.
Mr. Lowell. If you look at tab 1, Mr. Starr, of the exhibit
book in front of you, just so that we are clear, indeed it is
the September 25th letter in which you write to the committee
and state that the conduct, in this case, of how you dealt with
Ms. Lewinsky, goes to the substantiality and the credibility of
the evidence you sent. That is the letter; is it not?
Mr. Starr. Yes, it is.
Mr. Lowell. With that in mind, Mr. Starr, the Members and I
have a series of questions that, as you indicated, will
elucidate the substantiality and the credibility of the
evidence.
To begin with, in your testimony, and if you look at your
testimony, it would be on pages 31 and 50, you acknowledged
that you had a number of choices to make with respect to
sending a referral to Congress. To quote from your morning's
testimony, you stated that one of the questions you needed to
decide was ``what to do with the evidence.'' And then you said
we needed to decide ``how do you write a referral?''
You recall your statements with those choices, correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Lowell. With respect to the choices you made, Mr.
Starr, you have to agree, I take it, that there are substantial
differences between the referral that you sent to Congress on
September 9, 1998, and the one that was sent by Watergate
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski, to whom you referred, in
1974. You would not, would you?
Mr. Starr. I am not sure I understand.
Mr. Lowell. You would agree your methodology, the
procedures and the decisions that you made, differed
substantially to the ones that he made 24 years ago?
Mr. Starr. Well, I understood the question. The answer is
yes in that our referral--your question had a number of
elements, so I want to be precise. Our referral did indeed
differ, and if I may explain why.
Mr. Cox and then his successor Mr. Jaworski were dealing
not in an environment controlled by a law, and the assurance I
want to give this committee is that we studied the law, namely
595(c), very carefully. Mr. Cox, Mr. Jaworski never had
occasion to look at 595(c) because it did not exist.
So we examined that law, we examined the background, and we
went through the process that I described this morning, and we
determined, for example, that with respect to some of the
matters, that in my effort to provide assistance to the
committee, some of the events with respect to the Whitewater
investigation, we were not satisfied in December of 1997 that
that information that we had at that time, standing alone, met
the threshold.
That has been what has governed us, and indeed, if I could
just add this, the statute was framed in terms of grounds that
may constitute grounds for an impeachment. The very language
that Congress used suggests to me a process of judgment, and we
came to a judgment as opposed to the situation absent the
statute with respect to Mr. Jaworski in 1974.
Mr. Lowell. On that point, Mr. Starr, as I understand it,
and I think in referring to the differences, this is how Mr.
Jaworski's report has been characterized by Federal Judge John
Sirica, who reviewed it in order to send it to Congress. Judge
Sirica wrote, Mr. Jaworski's report draws no accusatory
conclusions. It contains no recommendations, advice or
statements that infringe on the prerogatives of the other
branches of government. It renders no moral or social
judgments. It is a simple and straightforward compilation of
information, and it contains no objectionable features.
This is how your report has been described: It is a report
that marshals and characterizes the information into an
aggressive piece of legal advocacy. It is one where there are
few of the factual assertions left to speak for themselves. In
short, it is a document with an attitude. It is notable for its
failure to acknowledge that there might be more than one way to
view at least some of the evidence.
That was from the Supreme Court reporter of the New York
Times, Linda Greenhouse, on September 12, 1998.
It cannot be your testimony, is it, Mr. Starr, that the
595(c) background material that you cite to this committee,
which was involved in reviewing that statute that you
mentioned, required you to make the accusations, conclusions,
in short, have a referral with an attitude, is it?
Mr. Starr. My opinion of the statute or my reading and
interpretation of the statute, Mr. Lowell, is that I am called
upon to establish the reason that in the Independent Counsel's
view the matters that I send before you may constitute a
grounds for impeachment. That is a very serious and weighty
matter, and we approached it in a very serious and weighty
manner.
I have the highest regard for the late John Sirica. I
served with Judge Sirica. But he was addressing, in all
fairness, a totally different set of circumstances, because--
and it may be we have different interpretations of the statute.
But with respect to any particular reporter's evaluation or
description, I stand behind this referral, and I am sure there
will be questions about it.
What we tried to do in this referral was to assemble in an
organized form, rather than sending you simply truckloads of
unorganized information; give it coherence, and then it is your
judgment. And, thus, if it is the judgment that this referral
has not, in fact, stood the test of your close examination, did
we get the facts wrong, then, of course, you should come to
your own judgment and your own assessment.
But this reflects, just so the committee knows, the views
of some of the most experienced prosecutors in the country. I
stand behind it because it is mine. I stand behind each word of
it. It is my ultimate judgment.
But this is a professional product, it is not the product
of one single person.
Mr. Lowell. Whether it be your judgment, Mr. Starr, or the
judgments of your entire staff, one thing I think you will
agree with is that it was your and your staff's decisions to
include the words ``premeditated,'' ``concocted false alibis,''
``deceived,'' ``pattern of obstruction,'' ``lying under oath,''
``perjury,'' which words you will never find in the report of
Leon Jaworski when he was reporting the same kind of evidence
to the Congress 24 years ago. Aren't I right about that?
Mr. Starr. I don't think that--I have not reviewed all of
the material that Mr. Jaworski delivered, and I am not taking
issue with the fact that this document is no doubt in many
respects different than the very kind of environment and legal
standard under which Mr. Jaworski was operating.
But, Mr. Lowell, if I am going to--speaking through my
voice--but if our office is going to inform the House of
Representatives that there may be substantial grounds for an
impeachment, that is so weighty, that is so serious that you
need to have the benefit of our judgment and our assessment of
the facts informed by our watching the witnesses, listening to
the grand jury and the way the grand jury reacted to witnesses,
the assessment of the grand jury, and then to give you our
judgment. But obviously this body is entirely at liberty to
reject this referral as not being substantial or credible. It
is entirely your judgment.
One of the points I did try to make in the opening
statement is, I believe, and you may disagree, that I was
called upon to give you my judgment and my assessment, and I
have done that. But it is the responsibility of the House of
Representatives to use this [indicating referral] to the extent
that it wants, to discard it, to do whatever it thinks is
necessary to come to its judgment as to whether there should be
any proceeding, some sort of proceeding, or not.
This is a tool. This is only a tool for you to use as you
see fit. But I don't think that it is fair to criticize my
office for not following a pattern that was not governed by a
statute, and Mr. Jaworski is not here to tell us what he would
think if he went through the same process under the statutory
regime that our professional colleagues went through.
Mr. Lowell. Let me conclude this area, because you invited
it. I know Mr. Jaworski----
Mr. Starr. I am sorry. I am having a little bit of trouble
hearing you.
Mr. Lowell. I am sorry. You have raised something that I
think bears some note when you were talking about Mr. Jaworski
not being here, but he did leave us his words. And these are
the words that Mr. Jaworski left us. I think you must have
known this when you were considering what to do with your
referral. In talking about his decisions, the way you have
talked about your decisions, in talking about how to send
material to Congress, about the grave and serious matter of
Presidential wrongdoing, Mr. Jaworski wrote as follows.
Mr. Barr. Can we have counsel identify the document?
Mr. Lowell. I am sorry, you can find this in tab 4 of the
exhibits in front of you. I apologize, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Starr. Tab 4.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Lowell.
Mr. Lowell. Mr. Jaworski, who left us his words said, ``the
central key to the entire success was not accusing anyone. What
we did is simply carried forward what the facts were, passed
them on, not making an effort to interpret them, not making any
sort of an effort to construe them or to say what we thought it
showed, and let it be completely nonaccusative.''
So we don't have Mr. Jaworski, but we do have his words,
correct?
Mr. Starr. Absolutely. And if I--I am sorry, may I just
comment in light of your quotation?
Mr. Lowell. Go ahead.
Mr. Starr. We did go through an evaluative process, as I
described, and while we did not have the benefit of Col.
Jaworski, except that which he has left us, I do think it is
important for the committee to know that in light of the sober
judgment, you are free to disagree with that judgment, but it
is our professional judgment that the President engaged in
abuse of his authority with respect to executive privilege. We
were guided by Sam Dash, who had very strong views on that, who
expressed those views, and who felt that we had to use certain
kinds of language that I think, Mr. Lowell, and I respect your
views, you would disagree with.
Mr. Lowell. I would like to move to an area that will, I
hope, reflect to the members some of the other choices you had
to make about the evidence.
As I understand your testimony this morning, after the 4
years and however many dollars you have now spent, your
testimony confirms apparently that your office has not and is
not sending an impeachment referral to the Congress on what has
been affectionately or not so affectionately called Travelgate,
nor on what has been called Filegate, and I think on page 141--
--
Mr. Starr. I'm sorry?
Mr. Lowell. Page 141 of your testimony, you are not sending
a referral on the original Whitewater land deal, and pointed
out in some of your investigation you have now learned that
former Governor Tucker actually exonerated the President on
some of the questions that you had.
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Lowell. The referral you sent then, Mr. Starr, refers
apparently only to the issues about the Paula Jones case and
the questions of the President's conduct in dealing with that
case. That is correct; is it not?
Mr. Starr. The referral itself does. We do, of course--if I
may, the referral does in other respects indicate the ties that
we saw to earlier phases of our investigation and why we, in
fact, were choosing to assess this.
But you are quite right both with respect to the two
matters you indicated, as well as the specific testimony by
Governor Tucker, that those matters will, in fact, not be
coming to you.
Mr. Lowell. Mr. Starr, part of the word, the key word, in
your title ``Independent Counsel,'' is ``independent''?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Lowell. Part of being ``independent,'' I think you
would agree with me, is being free of conflicts of interest
that might bias your investigation, correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Lowell. And as I understand it, your testimony this
morning indicated that on January 15, 1998, the Office of the
Independent Counsel met with Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder to discuss your jurisdiction over the matter that has
now been presented in the referral. Am I right about that?
Mr. Starr. I believe the date is correct, yes. Our contact
with the Department and those initial meetings was with the
Deputy Attorney General.
Mr. Lowell. In your testimony, Mr. Starr, you stated, and I
quote, on page 30 of your testimony, that you ``fully informed
the Deputy Attorney General about the matters under
investigation.'' I take it it was because they had to make a
decision about jurisdiction, correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes. We were there to discuss jurisdiction.
Mr. Lowell. The independent counsel law, as you explained
to the committee on pages 29 and 30 of your testimony,
indicated that at the day that you were making your
presentation, the Attorney General had a choice as to whether
to recommend that you conduct the investigation or to give that
responsibility to someone else. Isn't that also true?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Lowell. In that case, I suspect that you and your
office would have provided the Deputy Attorney General and the
Attorney General all of the information that she and he would
have needed to make that important choice; am I also correct
about that?
Mr. Starr. Well, certainly that which in our judgment was
relevant to the decision, by all means.
Mr. Lowell. Mr. Starr, though, isn't it then true that, in
fact, neither the Deputy Attorney General nor the Attorney
General had the facts that they needed because not once in any
presentation you or your office made to them about the material
that you were now asking their jurisdiction over, that you did
not ever mention the substantial contacts that you had already
had in the Paula Jones case, the very subject about which you
were seeking authority to investigate?
Mr. Starr. Mr. Lowell, let me address two aspects. You were
asking about the jurisdiction, and then let me come to the
Paula Jones contacts that I had.
We did not go to the Department, Mr. Lowell, to say we must
have jurisdiction. We took to the Department an issue, because
we view the Department as that entity of government to whom we
look, to the Attorney General of the United States ultimately,
to make jurisdictional decisions. And I was not in attendance
at the meetings, but I can give you my impression or
understanding, and I will make this very brief.
We made it very clear that there was--the information we
had was that there was inchoate criminality, which is a fancy
way of saying something is afoot. It is breaking now. It is
fast-moving, and we need to bring this to your attention, and
you make the determination. We think there is a jurisdictional
justification for what we have done thus far, but we think
there are serious jurisdictional issues.
Now, it will be the Attorney General's decision.
Now, what should the Attorney General have been informed?
Mr. Lowell. Can I go over those with you? If you would turn
to tab 5 of the book, I think you and I and the members will be
able to go through the issues that we might either agree or
disagree the Attorney General should have been informed about.
Mr. Starr, on that page you will see that it appears that
neither you nor any of the officials in your office told the
Attorney General that before you became the Independent
Counsel, your law firm, Kirkland & Ellis, was actually
contacted to represent Paula Jones and eventually helped her
attorneys to find the lawyers she chose. That was not mentioned
to the Attorney General that day or at any other time you were
seeking jurisdiction or asking her about jurisdiction, was it?
Mr. Starr. Well, you are assuming that I had the benefit of
all of this information.
Mr. Lowell. Whether your law firm had been asked?
Mr. Starr. Yes, in terms of--because I certainly had had
personal communications with Mr. Davis, but I would have to
reconstruct what others may have done in other offices. It is a
large law firm. So if I could just say what I, in fact, knew at
the time that this activity was under way, the reaching out to
the Attorney General when these events were first unfolding,
was that I had, in fact, been contacted by, among others, Mr.
Davis with respect to an amicus brief or some participation on
the constitutional immunity issue in 1994, and those had been
publicly reported. It was all in the public domain. I indeed
debated that very issue against Lloyd Cutler and Susan Bloch.
Mr. Lowell. I am sorry to interrupt you. The question I
asked, and I am sorry to do it, was not whether you had had
contacts with Mr. Davis, which had been reported at some
earlier point, I asked whether you had or any of your office
members told the Attorney General that your law firm that you
were still a member of and getting a salary from had indeed
been sought out to be Paula Jones's lawyers. I understood you
to say you might not have known that.
My question is you told me that Richard Porter, your
partner, did not inform you that he had been asked to consider
representing Paula Jones and had, in fact, assisted her in
getting the attorneys she ultimately chose. Is that what you
are saying?
Mr. Starr. Well, my best recollection is no. I know Richard
Porter, I have had communications with him from time to time,
but in terms of a specific discussion with respect to what the
law firm may be doing or may not be doing, I am not recalling
that specifically, no.
Mr. Lowell. You do recall, though, that it was a matter
that you admit that on at least six occasions, you personally
had had conversations with Paula Jones's attorneys over legal
issues in the Paula Jones case.
Mr. Starr. I am not sure. I had had conversations with
them, just as I had conversations with others, including them,
and I think the record of these proceedings should reflect
that.
If I could be permitted, my position on the constitutional
immunity that the President enjoyed was very clear and was
open. I was contacted before I was appointed as Independent
Counsel by Bob Fiske. Bob Fiske was the Independent Counsel in
Little Rock, Arkansas, and Mr. Fiske asked me whether I would
be willing to consider writing an amicus brief on behalf of the
Office of Independent Counsel, which, of course, he was
appointed to by the Attorney General. And we had conversations,
but no final decision was made, but he engaged me in
discussions with respect to that. We talked about the issues
and so forth.
So, Mr. Lowell, I want to make a point: It did not occur to
me, that issue with respect to constitutional immunity, it just
did not occur to me, and fault me for my inability to issue
spot. That is what we do in the law, we try to spot issues. But
I never spotted the issue that my conversations with Bob Fiske,
Gil Davis, my debating Lawrence Tribe on National Public Radio
had the foggiest connection with issues that were unfolding at
the time. Fault my judgment, if you will, but it just, frankly,
did not occur to me, as I think happens to a lot of us in life,
that you just don't view that as relevant information.
And, if I may say so, especially since my position had been
so well-known and including the contacts with Ms. Jones's
attorneys, who reached out to me with respect to the
constitutional immunity issue solely, exclusively, the only
thing I would say in response to your question----
Mr. Lowell. I am going to be cut off, Mr. Chairman, from
time.
Mr. Starr. You said six conversations, and you made a very
specific point, and I am not trying to interrupt you, but you
made a specific point, and I think it is only fair to say I
don't know whether there were six conversations. I know there
were several, but they were only conversations, and it never
ripened--I am talking about with Mr. Davis--and it never
ripened into an arrangement, an agreement, to the best of my
recollection, to do anything because of the circumstances that
then occurred.
Mr. Lowell. To use your phrase, did it not occur to you
that you should tell the Attorney General, who was making a
decision about whether you were an independent counsel, that
your law firm, Kirkland & Ellis, in addition to being asked to
be Paula Jones's attorney, was providing legal advice, free
legal advice, to a conservative woman's group called the
Independent Women's Forum, who were thinking about
participating in the Paula Jones case itself? Did that not
occur to you either?
Mr. Starr. Well, again, it is not whether it occurs or not.
I did have discussions with I think it is called the
Independent Women's Forum as to whether they would, in fact,
file an amicus brief again, strictly on the constitutional
issue, not taking a position on the merits.
But the President, through his very able lawyers, had
raised a very important question: Does the President of the
United States enjoy immunity? Everyone was talking about it,
and no one was talking about it particularly quietly. It was a
matter of vigorous debate. And the fact that I had these
discussions had all been, to the best of my knowledge, part of
the public domain, that is to say, they were reported, and by
virtue of that, I do think it is unfair, I really do, to
suggest that someone should, when circumstances were moving so
quickly, go do a Nexis search, making sure that everything is
in the public domain and the like, especially under
circumstances that were not only fast-moving, but it was very
clear that what we were investigating were serious crimes of
perjury that had nothing to do with the constitutional immunity
of the President.
Mr. Lowell. Mr. Starr, are you suggesting that when you
told the Deputy Attorney General that he had to move with haste
because this investigation was fast-moving, that you had no
responsibility to also inform the Attorney General about these
contacts that you and I are talking about which might make the
Attorney General, as you pointed out, have a choice to make
between giving the investigation to you or giving it to
somebody whose independence, bias, and involvement in the case
was not questioned?
Mr. Starr. Well, I utterly disagree, with all respect, with
your premise that to be involved on an issue of civil law and
constitutional law in any way suggests a predisposition more
generally. I would take the position that the President of the
United States does not enjoy constitutional immunity from suit
regardless of who the President is. It has nothing to do with
the identity of the occupant of the office. It has everything
to do with what the Presidency is, and the nature of our
relationship to one another as individuals and whether we are
all equal under the law.
So it did not occur to--and one factual correction: You
suggested in your conversations--I did not have conversations
with the Deputy Attorney General. They were by others in my
office who were reporting to the Deputy Attorney General on the
information that was coming to us and then saying, ``what is
your judgment? We are looking to you for guidance, and, more
than that, we are looking to you for a decision.'' And these
issues did not, in fact, arise.
Mr. Lowell. Did they, to your knowledge, then, Mr. Starr,
on that night where you were asking the Attorney General to
make a decision whether you were the Independent Counsel she
was looking for, tell them that while you were the Independent
Counsel and still a member of your firm, your law firm obtained
a nonpublic affidavit in the Paula Jones case and then sent
that affidavit on to the Chicago Tribune, and that, Mr. Starr,
happened while you were the Independent Counsel and a member of
your firm? Wasn't that something the Attorney General should
have known?
Mr. Starr. I don't know--I am not saying she should not,
but these are judgment calls that one makes, and it also
assumes, shall I say, a computerlike ability to recall each and
every thing that has ever occurred or information that has come
to you.
And so, let me say this: The fact of my involvement with
the Jones matter, my personal involvement as opposed to what
issues one or more members of my firm may have been involved
in, I think was known publicly and thus did not occur to me as
something that was appropriate or was something that I focused
on. As to whether I should have focused on it, you may come to
a different judgment.
Mr. Lowell. Mr. Chairman, it appears to me that my
questions, as short as I am going to try to make them, might
elicit answers that are a little longer than I expected. I was
hoping I would get the committee's indulgence.
Mr. Hyde. I will tell the gentleman that when your time is
up, I will grant you another 30 minutes.
Mr. Lowell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is about to happen,
I thought.
Mr. Starr, while we are on the subject of the Jones case, I
think it is now, from the material you sent to Congress, pretty
clear that your office did absolutely nothing to stop Linda
Tripp from meeting with Paula Jones's attorneys to help them
set up for the January 17 deposition of the President, and the
fact is, is it not, that you had the power at that moment and
the reason at that moment to forbid her from having those
meetings, but your office chose not to do so. Isn't that right?
Mr. Starr. That is, I think, an unfair characterization.
That is to say it is once again assuming that there was
information as to communications that she may or may not have
been having. We did not--to the best of my knowledge, we did
not have any information that she was, in fact, communicating
with the Jones attorneys, and indeed the record will show we
began working almost instantly at cross-purposes with the Jones
attorneys in order to protect this investigation. And we
actually told Ms. Tripp when it became obvious that she was
talking to someone in New York, who apparently in turn was
talking to someone at Newsweek, that she did have to protect
the confidentiality of these matters that were ongoing.
Mr. Lowell. I would like to get to the date, though, and
see if you and I can agree that there was a moment that you had
not only the motive, but you also had the ability to stop her
from doing what we now learned she has done. You went to see
the Deputy Attorney General on January 15. Prior to that, on an
occasion or two, your officials in your office had met with
her, and when you went to see the Deputy Attorney General, it
is true, is it not, that one of the things that you told him,
or your office told him, was that this was likely to start
getting leaked; that there was a reporter that was onto this
investigation and he needed to move quickly; isn't that a fact?
Mr. Starr. Yes. We made--it is my understanding that we
made the Deputy Attorney General aware that there was a
reporter from Newsweek. We had not known about that initially
when the information first came to us, but it became very
quickly apparent that there was, in fact, a Newsweek reporter
who was on the story, unbeknownst to us. So, yes, we said to
the Deputy Attorney General, this is another factor, this is
another consideration, and I believe--I don't know, but I
believe that that was brought to the Attorney General's
attention.
Mr. Lowell. So you knew that there were press people onto
the investigation, and at the same time you also knew that
Linda Tripp had illegally obtained information that she needed
some form of immunity for, and, in fact, in your meeting with
her, your officials said to her, we will give you immunity for
giving us that illegally-obtained information. That happened,
too, before you met the Attorney General, right?
Mr. Starr. Well, with respect to Federal offenses, we were
aware that there might be an issue under Maryland law, but
obviously we could not confer immunity that she might have with
respect to State law. And what we did know is that this was a
witness who told us a very important fact. She said, I was a
witness in the Whitewater--excuse me, the White House Travel
Office investigation, and I have additional information that I
did not give you, and she was being asked, Mr. Lowell, to
commit perjury.
And so, yes, we moved very quickly, and there was a very
important reason for moving very quickly to bring it to the
Attorney General's attention through the Deputy, which was that
a witness who was involved in one of our ongoing investigations
was being asked to perjure herself and otherwise participate in
unlawful activity.
Mr. Lowell. If I could put these steps together, Linda
Tripp came to your office with information, that is a correct
fact; you were worried that there was somebody talking to the
press that required the Attorney General to act quickly, that
is a fact; you knew that Linda Tripp had obtained information,
including the very tapes that provided the evidence that you
sought to get permission to investigate from the Attorney
General, and you didn't put those three things together to say
to her, and, by the way, we are worried about the press? You
were worried enough about it to ask the Deputy Attorney General
to move quick. You are saying you didn't tell Linda Tripp not
to be talking about that stuff to anybody?
Mr. Starr. No, I think that is an unfair characterization.
We did, in fact, promptly tell her--and events were moving very
quickly--within a short time when it became evident to us,
because things are not immediately evident when matters are
first developing, and so you have to assess the facts. So, when
it did become evident we instructed her. It is my understanding
that my colleagues who were dealing with her, who were
experienced, career prosecutors, made it very clear that she
should stop communicating with someone who we felt was, in
fact, or at least potentially was, a source for Newsweek. And
indeed it is my understanding that the witness in question
proceeded to change her phone number so that she could, in
fact, carry out our desire, our instruction, which was--and we
had no interest, Mr. Lowell, we had no interest in this matter
being made public. We had no interest whatsoever in doing
anything other than our duties as honorable prosecutors to
bring information to the Attorney General, let her assess it,
and let her make her judgment as to whether it should be
investigated, and, if so, by whom.
Now, you can say, you should have told her X, Y and Z, and
I would say that is Monday-morning quarterbacking.
Mr. Lowell. It is not exactly Monday-morning quarterback,
Mr. Starr. If you will turn to tab 16, you will see the
agreement that you actually engaged Ms. Lewinsky herself in
when you decided to give her immunity, as your officials had
already indicated to Linda Tripp on January 12th that she would
be getting immunity for her taping, and you will notice in tab
16 that it wasn't Monday-morning quarterbacking for you and
your officials to give Monica Lewinsky not only immunity, but
to make a condition of her immunity that she not talk to
witnesses, that she not disclose information, and, in fact,
that she not do the things that you now know Linda Tripp did.
Why didn't you put the same restriction on Linda Tripp?
Mr. Starr. What you see is the result of a very careful
discussion, negotiation, with very able lawyers. This was not
done--the immunity agreement that you have before you was not
prepared under exigent circumstances with things moving so
quickly. We did have to move quickly, in our judgment, with the
information that came to us from Ms. Tripp.
So one handles different situations in a variety of ways.
But I relied on my professional prosecutors to come to a
judgment about what should, in fact, be done and how it should
be done, and to--in fact, when it became, as I say, evident
that there was an issue, I think they brought it promptly to
the Deputy Attorney General's attention and also sought to take
what they viewed at the time--these are judgment calls----
Mr. Lowell. You are not suggesting to the committee that
while it might have taken a lot of time to negotiate the actual
clauses of an immunity agreement with Ms. Tripp, that on the
day that she said she was in trouble and asked for immunity,
your people could have not said to her, well, if these tapes
are illegal, don't give them to anybody, don't talk to anybody
about them, keep them to yourself. You didn't need an immunity
agreement to tell her that?
Mr. Starr. Well, I think that is right, because one of the
things--and I should clarify that what we entered into with Ms.
Lewinsky, and I think this does need to be clear, was a
transactional immunity agreement. She was going to enjoy
immunity from prosecution. What we were giving Ms. Tripp at the
time was something that was much more limited, an act of
production kind of immunity. At least that is my understanding,
that we were at that point in our discussions with her, simply
saying give us the information, because she had come to us with
very serious allegations, and--we didn't ask her to come in,
she came in, she comes in, she provides this very serious
information that raised potentially very serious offenses, and
we wanted, in fact, to gather information as quickly as we
could that would either corroborate or disprove the truth of
that.
So the decision that was being made initially was what we
call act of production immunity.
Mr. Lowell. I am understanding you. I am also understanding
you to say you are not contesting on the day she came in, you
had the conversation, she showed you the tapes or told you
about the tapes, you did have the authority to give her
immunity and the authority to tell her not to talk. You did the
first. You didn't do the second, did you?
Mr. Starr. Well, I would have to double-check to see
exactly what we did tell her, but, no, what I am trying to make
as clear as I possibly can is what we were saying to Ms. Tripp,
you have given us this remarkable information, allegations.
They are extraordinarily explosive, they perhaps go to the
President of the United States. We need backup. And she was
coming to us as a witness, and this information was not, at the
time that it was first coming to us, in the public domain.
So we took the steps that we thought--my colleagues who
were making these decisions on the spot took the steps that we
did. But if the suggestion is that we wanted her to go public,
the suggestion is absolutely wrong.
Mr. Lowell. I think you misunderstand my question. I could
well understand why people in Linda Tripp's position and your
staff working with her didn't want the investigation to become
public. But I can also understand why Linda Tripp wanted the
information she had to go into the Paula Jones camp, and I can
understand that you had the authority to stop that, but didn't
do it.
Mr. Starr. But what we did do, Mr. Lowell, in fairness, and
this isn't the glass is half full versus half empty, what we
did once it became clear that there was a following by the
Jones lawyers of our investigation and the subpoenaing of
witnesses in our investigation, we took prompt remedial action.
We went to Judge Susan Webber Wright and we said, stop it.
Please have them stop it. And that is extraordinarily
important, because that is what action we took deliberatively
as opposed to under the exigencies of the time.
Mr. Lowell. Under the exigencies of the time, one last
question. You are not suggesting that you and your staff that
were talking to Linda Tripp and then going to see the Deputy
Attorney General were not aware that on that following
Saturday, January 17th, the President of the United States was
already noticed for his deposition? You are not telling us
that, are you?
Mr. Starr. No, we did know that, and indeed the Deputy
Attorney General and then the Attorney General of the United
States, Mr. Lowell, knew that there were serious allegations.
This was days--several days--before the deposition. The
deposition was on Saturday, the 17th. The Attorney General made
her decision knowing the information that we had, and we were
transparent. We shared the information, Mr. Lowell, that we had
fully with the Justice Department.
Our concern----
Mr. Lowell. The information you had about what Linda Tripp
gave you, not the information that you had about the Kirkland &
Ellis involvement.
Mr. Starr. Yes, I am sorry. The information that had come
to us with respect to the investigation we shared fully with
senior career prosecutors at the Justice Department operating
under the direction of the Deputy Attorney General, and she
then, the Attorney General, made her decision that the matter
should, in fact, be investigated. So that was the first
judgment; and secondly, that the Department of Justice did not
want to do it.
Mr. Lowell. Let me turn our attention to some of the other
aspects of gathering evidence, because I know many people will
have additional questions.
I know you don't disagree that independent counsels,
although not in the Department of Justice, are required under
the rules and under the law to follow the law that applies to
Federal Justice Department officials, prosecutors and
investigators. I know you have said as much in your speeches,
that you are bound by the same rules with very few exceptions,
correct?
Mr. Starr. The statute speaks specifically to the question
of the applicability of DOJ policies and practices and says to
the fullest extent practicable.
Mr. Lowell. This morning you told the committee that, and
this is on 49 and 50 of your own testimony, we have made every
effort to follow the Department of Justice practice and
policies, to utilize time-honored law enforcement techniques,
and even on occasion that you and your staff, to use your
phrase, would repair to the U.S. Attorney's manual for
guidance. You stated that this morning.
Mr. Starr. I did.
Mr. Lowell. With these statements in mind, I would like to
turn to the issue of your involvement with Monica Lewinsky on
the first occasion that you had that meeting, because so much
of the evidence that the Congress has received comes from that
first incident.
It is true, I take it, Mr. Starr, that when press accounts
of your interaction with Monica Lewinsky first arose, you made
a statement to the press on January 23, 1998, responding to
those allegations, and you can find that statement to confirm
its date on tab 20.
Mr. Starr. Tab 20.
Mr. Lowell. Do you see that?
Mr. Starr. I do.
Mr. Lowell. You made that statement on January 23rd; isn't
that a fact?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I believe that is correct. This is dated
January 24th, but I think it would have been the preceding day.
Mr. Lowell. Mr. Starr, in your testimony this morning you
talked about the President's ability to provide misinformation,
and you also said that one of the concerns of your office was
that the President and his lawyers, on page 52 of your
testimony, didn't give a ``distorted picture'' of the facts.
With your own quotes in mind, I would like to ask, don't
you think your statement to the press, to the Congress and to
the American people gave a very ``distorted picture'' of the
facts of the night and the day that you first confronted Monica
Lewinsky?
Mr. Starr. Well, I think not, and we can obviously discuss
it.
Mr. Lowell. Let's do that line by line, because it will be
short, but I think it will be elucidative.
If you look at the first line of your press statement, it
states, ``Monica Lewinsky consented to meet with several FBI
agents.'' Do you see your statement?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I do.
Mr. Lowell. In Monica Lewinsky's sworn testimony, which, if
you like, you can follow in tab 21 to compare it back and
forth, she testified under oath that she was there to have
lunch with Linda Tripp. She was then accosted by agents who
flashed their badges at her. She asked to see her attorney. She
was told that was not such a good idea. She was then asked to
go upstairs to discuss how much trouble she was in, and then
she reluctantly went upstairs to meet with your staff.
Do you think your statement that Monica Lewinsky consented
to meet with several agents doesn't distort the picture of what
really happened that day?
Mr. Starr. Well, I think it was consensual. That is, we
made it clear that she was not under arrest and that she was,
in fact, at liberty to make a decision as to what she wanted to
do.
Mr. Lowell. If you look at the second line of your press
statement, you said, ``during the five hours while awaiting her
mother's arrival, Ms. Lewinsky drank juice and coffee, ate
dinner at a restaurant, strolled around the Pentagon City Mall
and watched television.'' Do you remember making that statement
to the press?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I do.
Mr. Lowell. But your statement to the press, Mr. Starr,
doesn't include the fact that Ms. Lewinsky swore to that she
was scared and crying a lot of the time. When she asked to see
her attorney, ``she would not be able to help herself with her
attorney there,'' she was told. She was threatened to going to
jail for ``27 years''; that she was not there for the 5 hours
that your press statement says, but was there for over 10
hours; and that when she asked to call her mother to discuss
what you were discussing with her, your deputy Jackie Bennett
said, ``You are 24. You are smart. You are old enough. You
don't need to call your mommy.''
That wasn't in your statement to the press that day, was
it?
Mr. Starr. No, it wasn't, Mr. Lowell, and let me explain
what press statements are designed to do. This was not designed
to provide a verbatim transcript of commentary. They are
designed to respond to what we were, in fact, being accused of
or charged with. And what we were being accused of and charged
with was improper conduct with a witness.
Now, the facts of the matter are these: We did, in fact,
use a traditional technique that law enforcement always uses.
We were waiting patiently for her mother to arrive. She chose
not to make a decision before her mother arrived. And at the
conclusion of her time with us, she had established a legal
relationship which we fully recognized and always honored, and
she and her mother indicated--I was not there, but I am told
they indicated their appreciation for the way in which she was
being treated.
Now, this press statement was in response--this was in
response, Mr. Lowell, to allegations that she was being
subjected to the kinds of conditions that would overbear the
will. We then--and the purpose of this was to say, here is, in
fact, material that the public should, in fact, know, and all
of this is absolutely true.
Mr. Lowell. When you say the public should have known that,
and you state in your press statement that ``she was repeatedly
told she was free to leave,'' and that she did so several
times, do you not think it would have not been a less
``distorted picture,'' to use your words, to know when she left
the room she was followed by agents, and that she swore under
oath that she ``felt threatened that when she left, she would
be arrested''? Don't you think that completes the picture a
little bit?
Mr. Starr. I think her perception was incorrect. We made it
clear to the witness that she was, in fact, free to leave. The
Ritz Carlton, shall I say, is a fairly comfortable and
commodious place. We will show you, I am sure you have them,
telephone records that indicate she reached out to Mr. Carter,
her attorney, in a totally different matter. She called her
mother. She, in fact, went for a walk. She had--she went to a
restaurant and the like, and all these were important, because,
Mr. Lowell, what the office was being accused of was somehow
overbearing her will.
And she didn't need to make a decision, because here is the
other side of the picture. She was encouraging others to join
her in committing perjury. She was, as the information came to
us, a felon in the middle of committing another felony.
Mr. Lowell. She wasn't likely, after being brought up to
your room for 10 hours, to be committing any felonies anymore
after that, was she? You said you needed to do this because she
was in the middle of committing a felony. You don't think she
was going to leave the hotel room, go back and continue to do
that which you brought her to the hotel room to do? You can't
be meaning that?
Mr. Starr. Of course, we did not know; we had no way of
knowing what she was going to do. What we did do was this: We
had a consensual recording. We shared the results of that
consensual recording with the Justice Department. We informed
the Justice Department of what our intention was at the Ritz
Carlton. We then proceeded in a very professional way. And then
we were being met, as is not atypically the case, with charges
of improper conduct.
We then said we should respond to that, especially when--
and this doesn't speak to that either--we were going to the
conditions of confinement as opposed to whether we had
communicated with the Justice Department. There was nothing in
here about the Justice Department knowing that we were going to
go, have exactly this kind of encounter to ask this individual,
``Are you willing to help us?'' We viewed her as culpable. But
in discussions with the Justice Department, the culpability, we
thought, might be outweighed by the culpability of others.
Mr. Lowell. As you have delivered to this committee the
principal evidence that the committee is going to get, and as
you have agreed with me that the choices you have made bear on
the substantiality and credibility, my questions were trying to
go to whether or not when you make statements, when you provide
information, you provide the complete picture, not just whether
Ms. Lewinsky was about to commit a crime. But I think you and I
have established some of the facts that I want the committee to
understand.
One last point about your statement. Your statement to the
press, as you alluded, indicated that when she was done with
this ordeal--I am sorry, when she was done, she told the
agents, and I think you said ``they thanked the FBI agents and
attorneys for their courtesy,'' but you didn't put in that, and
you didn't put in your referral that she thanked them for their
courtesy after, quote, ``They told me they were planning to
prosecute my mother for the things that she had said she did.''
You didn't include the notion in your report to the press or
even in the material in the referral that is later in the
transcripts that part of her courtesy to her mother was
threatening her prosecution, and that wasn't there either.
Mr. Starr. Mr. Lowell, the information that we had
suggested that her mother may have been involved in serious
activity, in serious criminal offenses. That was an issue, and
she wanted to reach out to her mother to discuss the questions
with her mother. We honored that. And no, I don't think that
one would expect, if you are talking about the press release as
opposed to the referral, that a press release, which is
responding to charges by her lawyers, that when she was being
held, I don't want to put words in their mouth. But the
substance of what was being conveyed by the very loquacious Mr.
Ginsburg was that she was being held incommunicado. That was
wrong. It was unfair to us, unfair to our agents, it was unfair
to the Justice Department. But you don't see anything in the
press release about the Justice Department either.
The purpose of this press release which you have identified
as tab 20, and you have been kind enough to underscore it, was
to respond to specific allegations, and I see you do not
include the allegations to which we were responding. I think in
order to fairly assess this you would have to say, what was it
that the Independent Counsel's office was having to respond to?
What we were responding to were allegations that were utterly
unmeritorious.
Mr. Lowell. Those allegations to start with were that you
were overbearing, that she wasn't free to make a decision on
her own, she was put in a position where her judgment would be
questioned, and you are saying to the committee that the facts
as sworn to by Ms. Lewinsky don't bear on whether or not those
allegations were indeed exactly accurate?
Mr. Starr. Oh, Mr. Lowell, surely you don't think that a
witness is going to say, ``Thank you, law enforcement, for
finding out that I am in the middle of committing a felony.''
Surely you are not going to say, surely you are not going to
take the position that the witness should say, ``Oh, I can't
imagine why you are asking me any questions. I can't imagine
why you are bothering me.''
The reason that she was being approached, Mr. Lowell, was
that she was trying to get Linda Tripp to commit perjury, and
since you have inquired about this, her mother had made it
clear that she was willing to help finance an operation for
Linda Tripp so she could leave the jurisdiction and thereby
avoid being confronted in the Jones deposition. That is what
this was all about. So you are focusing on a press release as
opposed to a court document.
Can I say one other thing? In fairness, in fairness, the
issues with respect to our conduct that evening have been
litigated. You can ask obviously all of the questions that you
want, but usually, if a witness believes that he or she has
been mistreated, if her rights have been violated, there is a
place to go, and it is called the courthouse. And that is where
these issues have been resolved, and they have been resolved
favorably to us. We conducted ourselves professionally.
Mr. Lowell. I take it sitting here today you are completely
satisfied that the picture of your involvement with Ms.
Lewinsky, as you stated to the American people and the effects
it had on the evidence, were accurately depicted in the press
statement you made, even given the full sworn testimony of Ms.
Lewinsky and her mother. You are satisfied about that?
Mr. Starr. About this press statement being----
Mr. Lowell. About----
Mr. Starr. No, no, because this was written from--and
perhaps I have been inartful in my response. This was a
response to specific allegations being made by her attorney. It
was not based on an interview of Ms. Lewinsky. We had no basis
for knowing, in terms of our talking with Ms. Lewinsky, what
her perception was. We couldn't. Her lawyer declined to allow
us, and we honored that, once she engaged Mr. Ginsburg. So the
mission or the purpose of this press statement was simply to be
as responsive as we should be at the time.
Mr. Lowell. Just so that the record is clear, Mr. Ginsburg
is the lawyer you keep referring to. We know from the evidence
that she contacted Mr. Ginsburg only after her mother arrived
about however many hours later in the middle of the night, and
the very first thing she said when approached by your agents in
the lobby was, I want to talk to my attorney, Frank Carter. You
don't mean to suggest to the committee that you and the agents
and the people in your office were encouraging her to talk to
her lawyer between the time that she was first accosted and the
time that she got on the phone with Mr. Ginsburg. You are not
making that statement, are you?
Mr. Starr. That is correct. We would not encourage someone
who was involved in felonies, as we thought at the time, to in
fact reach out to a lawyer, especially a lawyer who had
assisted her in crafting a perjurious affidavit. Why would we
possibly do that?
Mr. Lowell. Well, one reason would be because the rules of
the Department of Justice, the law of the land as decided by
the Supreme Court and the Code of Federal Regulations require
it.
Let me turn your attention to tab 23. On tab 23, as I
understand it, Mr. Starr, one of the people that were in the
room asking questions of Monica Lewinsky was a deputy of yours
by the name of Michael Emmick, is that right?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Lowell. Michael Emmick came from the Department of
Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles, California, and
had had the opportunity 3 or 4 years before the Monica Lewinsky
incident to give a speech or give a presentation to the
Department of Justice about what the law requires, and this is
what Mr. Emmick said about questioning a witness represented by
counsel. He said, ``It is rarely okay to contact the person,
find out about representation, and ask if he is willing to talk
anyway,'' and then Mr. Emmick went on to state, ``It is never
okay to continue to ask questions after the person has said he
wants his attorney there.''
In light of what the transcripts show happened that night
to Ms. Lewinsky, it appears, does it not, Mr. Starr, that the
deputy involved violated his own words in his effort to get Ms.
Lewinsky that night?
Mr. Starr. No, because you are assuming something and you
are, with all respect, incorrect. She was not represented for
purposes of this analysis, and the reason that she wasn't, and
you may disagree with this, but here is our analysis, and our
belief that her rights were not violated has been upheld by the
district court. Let me approach it this way. If one has a
bankruptcy lawyer, one cannot--one cannot say if an FBI agent
comes up to one, well, I am represented by, or the FBI agent
must assume that I am represented by, or the person is
represented by the bankruptcy lawyer.
The point is, there is a very clear distinction in the law,
and in the rules of ethics between civil matters and criminal,
and Mr. Carter was representing her in the civil matter.
Mr. Lowell. When she--I realize up to that point she had no
criminal problems, she only had civil problems which she had a
lawyer for. So you're saying it is the prosecutor who tells a
witness whether or not she or he has the right to call a
lawyer, based on the prosecutor's decision as to whether or not
the matter is civil and criminal in the prosecutor's view of
how the proceedings are going to go. Do you think that is what
the law states?
Mr. Starr. Well, I think the prosecutor has to make a
judgment as to whether the nature of the representation is
civil or criminal so that the person does have to know whether,
in fact, the party is a represented party. That is a judgment.
Now, even if you disagree with that, Mr. Lowell, let me say
these two things very briefly. One, she did, in fact, call, or
we sought to call Mr. Carter's office from the Ritz Carlton.
That is a very important fact. She did, in fact, reach out to
his office. Also, we tried to get her to reach out to legal aid
so that she could have counsel. She later got, of course, Mr.
Ginsburg. So the idea that she was not in fact permitted the
opportunity to try to consult with counsel is incorrect.
Mr. Lowell. Mr. Chairman, I am on my last area of
questions, and I would appreciate the committee's indulgence.
Mr. Hyde. How much more time do you anticipate?
Mr. Lowell. I know my questions take 5 or 10 minutes, the
answers always take twice as long. I suspect----
Mr. Hyde. You ask such complicated questions.
Mr. Lowell. Mr. Chairman, I have one more area to get into
and I would appreciate the committee's indulgence to get there.
Mr. Hyde. Well, I will yield you 5 more minutes and see
what you can do in 5, and I will ask Mr. Starr if you can be
concise, although I am enjoying your answers myself.
Mr. Lowell for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lowell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the end, Mr. Starr, you have said that these are serious
matters that the committee has to consider, and that you have
come here today and you presented again what you deem to be the
evidence and the conclusions in your referral. I just want to,
if I can, with you and with the committee's indulgence, go
through the principal charges that you made in bringing this
matter before the committee.
In the first matter you say that in your referral, in your
testimony today that the President lied under oath on a variety
of occasions having to do with the Paula Jones case. I noticed
on pages 8 and 9 of your testimony, you spoke about Judge
Webber Wright's rulings in the Paula Jones case. But in your
testimony you did not also include, did you, that Judge Wright
had ruled as to Monica Lewinsky's significance in the Paula
Jones case, that it was quote, ``not essential to the core
issues in the case.'' She ruled indeed later on that the
evidence, quote, ``simply was not essential to the core
issues'' of whether Paula Jones was the victim of a quid pro
quo sexual harassment, and she finally threw out the case on
the grounds that Ms. Jones had not proven what the law
requires.
I wanted just the record to be complete that when you
talked about what Judge Webber Wright had ruled in your
testimony, you never mentioned that on three occasions Judge
Wright made rulings indicating that the significance of
whatever it was between Monica Lewinsky and the President did
not bear on her decision. That's a fact, isn't it?
Mr. Starr. Well, I disagree with the characterization of
what she ruled, and I refer, and I will simply refer to her two
opinions, including her analysis under Rule 403 under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. I don't think that is a fair and
accurate characterization of what she ruled. We may have a
different opinion of how she adjudicated the matter.
Mr. Lowell. And as to the issue of the false affidavit
which you state was something the President was complicit in,
to the extent that it was a ground for impeachment, your
evidence also includes, does it not, Mr. Starr, that Ms.
Lewinsky gave you a statement in which she said, quote,
``neither the President nor Mr. Jordan or anyone on their
behalf asked or encouraged her to lie,'' and you can find that
in tab 35.
Mr. Starr. Tab?
Mr. Lowell. Thirty-five.
Mr. Starr. Thirty-five, thank you.
Mr. Lowell. You are aware that she has made the statement
that way by now I assume, right?
Mr. Starr. Yes, yes.
Mr. Lowell. You also must be aware that she also said that
she offered to show her affidavit to the President, but he
didn't even want to see it. You are aware that that's the
testimony she has given as well, correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Lowell. You must also be aware that she explained to
you that the President and she had obviously used cover stories
from the beginning of their relationship long before she was
ever listed as a Paula Jones witness. You are aware of that as
well, aren't you?
Mr. Starr. Yes. And our referral makes that point clear.
Mr. Lowell. As to the issue of whether or not she was given
a job in some way to keep her happy, you know that the evidence
that you sent Congress includes the fact that the job search
for her began long before she was listed as a Paula Jones
witness, correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, absolutely. We make that clear in the
referral.
Mr. Lowell. And you are also aware that she told the
President in July, months before the Paula Jones----
Mr. Starr. In July of?
Mr. Lowell. 1997.
Mr. Starr. Yes, thank you.
Mr. Lowell. Months before the Paula Jones case was an issue
that she was going to look for a job in New York.
Mr. Starr. Yes, she did.
Mr. Lowell. And you are aware as well that it was Ms.
Tripp, not the President, Ms. Tripp, who suggested to Ms.
Lewinsky that she bring Vernon Jordan into the process. You
know the evidence says that, don't you?
Mr. Starr. I am aware of the evidence with respect to that,
but yes, go right ahead. I am sorry.
Mr. Lowell. You are aware as well that the evidence you
sent Congress indicates that on that crucial issue, as others
have stated and I have no doubt will state again, Ms. Lewinsky,
unequivocally, even though never asked the question, stated to
you that no one ever asked her to lie, no one promised me a job
for her silence. You understand that she swore to that as well?
Mr. Starr. Yes. Mr. Chairman, may I respond? I am trying to
be brief, but Mr. Lowell, as you also know, at page 174 of our
referral we specifically say, Ms. Lewinsky has stated that the
President never explicitly told her to lie.
Mr. Lowell. And you say explicitly. I would say that Ms.
Lewinsky's statement that quote, ``no one told me to lie, no
one offered me a job for my silence,'' is not equivocal, would
you?
Mr. Starr. I would say that it is utterly incomplete and
grossly misleading. We tried to capture that, and I am of
course staying right now with respect to the--her
representation with respect to ``no one told me to lie.'' Her
entire testimony is to the effect, and I think this is a fair
characterization of it, is that the cover stories were in fact
going to continue, that that was the understanding. But yes, no
one explicitly said, you know, ``you will lie,'' using the L
word. Rather, it was ``we will continue with cover stories''
which were not true.
Mr. Lowell. I have one last question, Mr. Starr, given the
limited time.
Mr. Hyde. I am going to have a surly bunch of Republicans.
Mr. Lowell. This is my last question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Go ahead, ask your last question. Please, go
ahead.
Mr. Frank. Didn't you feed them?
Mr. Starr. It was a very short lunch break.
Mr. Hyde. Did I hear Schumer here?
Mr. Lowell. Mr. Starr, I don't have the time to get into
the complete areas, but I will ask you the last question. It is
the one I started with.
When you suggested to the committee that what you did, the
choices you made have to be looked at to determine the
substantiality and the credibility of the evidence, I want to
ask you whether or not you don't now see, based on the things
that we have discussed, that the manner in which you decided to
write the referral as one with attitude, your contacts between
you, your law firm and Paula Jones' attorneys, the questions
that have been raised about whether or not you got into this
case with proper jurisdiction, the way you dealt with Monica
Lewinsky and the evidence that came from that, Judge Johnson's
orders, which some others will talk to you about, about whether
your office has been responsible for leaks, and the
contradictions in the evidence between your referral and the
statements you agree are in the evidence, doesn't that
undermine the substantiality and credibility of the evidence on
something as weighty as impeaching a President of the United
States?
Mr. Starr. Mr. Lowell, nothing that you have said, and with
all respect, what you have done is go into characterizations as
opposed to dealing with facts. The facts are as we have found
them to be, and not one of your questions suggests that the
President was not involved in serious offenses that it is now
your responsibility to evaluate. In terms of the letter, I
believe with all due respect that you have overread the letter.
I do think if there were any suggestion that we had compelled a
confession from her on the evening of January 16, that would go
forcefully and powerfully to whether any such statement by her
should be used. But Mr. Lowell, she was treated in such a way
that she did not make a statement to the officers.
Mr. Lowell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Thank you.
We will now move to the members' questioning, and the Chair
recognizes under the 5-minute rule, and we will try to adhere
to it, but again I will be liberal, but I would like you to
make your questions concise.
Mr. Sensenbrenner.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me say that the clock does not run slower on this side of the
table as apparently it does over on the other side.
I was struck, Mr. Chairman, that for the first hour plus,
Mr. Lowell's questions completely avoided and evaded the
principal charges that have been in your referral, Judge Starr,
and only after his second extension in the last 5 or 6 minutes
did he get to the charges that specifically allege misconduct
by the President of the United States.
I would hope that during these proceedings, the rule of law
is not on trial. That is something that has served our country
well for over 200 years. The rule of law I think is paramount,
and with the rule of law goes the notion that everybody stands
before the law equally, whether they be President or pauper,
whether they be powerful or poor.
So having said that, let me ask you, Judge Starr, whether
you believe that there is any difference in the law of perjury
and the law of making false statements to a grand jury, just
because they happen to relate to sexual matters.
Mr. Starr. There is not, Mr. Sensenbrenner. As I have tried
to indicate in the opening statement, as we have indicated in
the referral, perjury is extraordinarily serious business. It
is insidious. The courthouse cannot operate if perjury is
allowed to either be excused or to be minimized. And why should
we in fact go through the process of saying, there is an oath?
We want you to tell--we want your honesty. That is what we ask
in court. We want your honesty. And it does not matter whether
the issue has to do with sexual harassment, or bankruptcy, or
the criminal law. It is all dreadfully serious, and in my
reading, I know that there is scholarly commentary to the
opposite effect, perjury would, in fact, have been viewed as an
impeachable offense at the time of the founding of the
republic. And courts from that time on have taken perjury as
extraordinarily serious, regardless of the kind of case.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Judge Starr, folks back home have come
up to me and said, why don't you drop this whole impeachment
thing because everybody lies about sex, and the President ought
to have the opportunity to lie about sex just like everybody
else.
I am concerned about the impact of that attitude if it ends
up being adopted around the country, on a lot of essential
protections that the law provides, particularly for women. For
example, every sexual harassment suit is about sex. That is of
its very nature. And much of our litigation, both civil and
criminal, of domestic violence has at least some element of sex
involved in it. If people can perjure themselves in court about
sex, don't you think that that makes our sexual harassment laws
and our domestic violence laws less meaningful and in many
cases unenforceable?
Mr. Starr. Yes. It certainly makes them, I agree fully that
it would make them less meaningful, and it would certainly make
it much more difficult to enforce if we did not take acts of
perjury or obstruction seriously in this particular category of
case.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. I have one further question, which has
been referred to before. There are some that have said that the
testimony about Monica Lewinsky and the President's civil
deposition in the Paula Jones case was not material as a result
of an order which you obtained from Judge Wright right after
the expansion of your jurisdiction into the Lewinsky matter.
Could you please describe what that order did and why you
sought it and what its effect was on those allegations of
perjury and false statements that you made in your referral,
relative to the Jones civil deposition?
Mr. Starr. Yes. Number one, we tried to put a stop quickly,
immediately to the Jones lawyers' efforts to notice depositions
of witnesses in our grand jury matter. Mr. Chairman, may I
just--I will make this very brief.
Mr. Hyde. Surely. There is more a restriction on the
questioner than the questionee.
Mr. Starr. You may regret that, because I----
Mr. Hyde. Please.
Mr. Starr. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. But we
went to the judge and the judge--and we asked for a stay of
discovery, and the judge in response to our request for a stay
then went on to determine, under an analysis that I was trying
to describe to Mr. Lowell's apparent irritation, rule 403, but
it was the issue that Judge Wright was wrestling with, which is
a weighing or balancing process, and she determined that this
evidence, although possibly admissible, should be excluded
because of the dangers to the criminal justice process, I mean
her order should speak for itself, and I shouldn't be
paraphrasing the judge's order.
The point is, she responded to our concern when we were
trying to vindicate the integrity of our criminal justice
investigation. But that has no--I am sorry. That was point one.
Point two: that had no effect whatsoever on materiality, which
was the second part of your question, because that is a legal
concept that fortunately is very consistent with common sense.
Materiality is measured at the time that the statement is made.
It doesn't matter what eventually happens in the lawsuit.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you very much.
Mr. Starr, it is very clear under this process which many
of us did not agree to that trying to question you for 5
minutes is an ambitious and hopeful undertaking that doesn't
quite achieve our objectives.
Would you be willing to respond to additional questions
that might be put to you in written form should time run out on
us?
Mr. Starr. We are trying to be as helpful as we can, so if
there are written questions, depending on the Chair's ruling,
whatever the Chair determines is appropriate.
Mr. Sensenbrenner [Presiding.] Without objection, Members
may submit written questions for the record. I would like to
establish a deadline for the questions and for the responses by
Judge Starr so that the questions and answers may be included
in the record before our authority runs out.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. What deadline would the gentleman from
Michigan suggest?
Mr. Conyers. I don't have one right now, but could we agree
on one very shortly? A week.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay. Without objection, questions shall
be submitted in a week, which happens to be Thanksgiving, and
the responses within a week. Is there objection by members of
the committee? Hearing none, so ordered.
Mr. Rogan. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object. If
I may address the reservation? My only concern at this point is
that the request as phrased by my friend from Michigan
theoretically could be an invitation to an open-ended
encyclopedic presentation of questions to Judge Starr that
neither he nor his office will have the appropriate amount of
time to respond. I am assuming that if questions are propounded
to Judge Starr's office----
Mr. Conyers. Could I allay my friend from California's
problems and his reservation by saying that all I seek is a
full record so that no member will be denied the answer to a
question that was asked within the 5-minute rule on an inquiry
on the impeachment of a President of the United States.
Mr. Rogan. I thank my colleague for his clarification. My
assumption, Mr. Chairman, is that in requesting unanimous
consent, it comes with an assumption reasonableness, and if
there is a problem with Judge Starr being able to answer in a
timely fashion, he would be able to notify the committee and we
would be able to review the questions.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Absolutely. And the acting Chair would
request that members funnel their questions either through
Chairman Hyde or Ranking Minority Member Conyers, rather than
firing them off directly to Judge Starr.
Mr. Conyers. Exactly. I thank you for the order.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Chairman, I think we should ask, for
unanimous consent, what exactly are we being asked for
unanimous consent on? I am not sure I understand. To allow
written questions to the Independent Counsel and he has to
answer them within a week?
Mr. Conyers. A week, yes.
Mr. Barr. I object.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Objection is heard.
I have held your 5 minutes, so the gentleman is recognized
for 5 minutes now.
Mr. Conyers. Well, we just went through a process for which
we had, I thought, agreement. What we are doing here then,
ladies and gentlemen, is saying that within a 5-minute period,
16 members have 5 minutes, including Mr. Starr's response, to
ask him anything that they want. I think that this is patently
unworkable, and all I suggested was an additional method of
communicating with Mr. Starr in writing, sir.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Well, if the Chair can respond to that,
the Rules of the House of Representatives in these instances
provide for recognition of members for 5 minutes apiece, and
the Chair at the beginning of this hearing today said that
members would be recognized under the 5-minute rule.
So far, there have been only two people who have spoken,
Mr. Lowell who received two extensions, and yours truly, who
got his questions in within 5 minutes.
Now, I don't think we want to be staying here until
midnight. I would hope that the 5-minute rule which seems to
have worked well for decades can be adhered to, and members can
be concise.
So again, I will move the clock back to zero, and the
gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Conyers. All right. It is clear to me that some Members
do not want a full and open discussion with the witness, the
only witness here today.
So let me just propose--no, I was going to my questions,
but I will yield to you if you would like.
Ms. Waters. No. It is just that the chairman is back, and I
am not sure that he was privy to your request.
Mr. Hyde [Presiding.] Have you yielded to her? Because this
is your time. Okay. That's all right. You want to submit
written questions to the witness?
Mr. Conyers. That's the only point, sir.
Mr. Hyde. Well, I have no objection, if he has no
objection, but I would like them--they would be returned when
we hear from the President. How's that? A simultaneous return
of questions. Is that a good idea?
Mr. Conyers. Well, I don't know if we should condition our
questions to Mr. Starr on whether the President and his counsel
have chosen to answer whatever questions you have with him.
Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Conyers. I yield, yes.
Mr. Nadler. I would simply point out that the request for
the ability to submit written questions is made on behalf of
Members of the House on this side, and presumably the other
side of the aisle. We have no control over whether the
President testifies, it is up to him, and the two subjects are
separate.
Mr. Hyde. You do see the fairness, though.
Mr. Nadler. No, I don't. I don't see the fairness, frankly.
Mr. Hyde. You don't.
Mr. Nadler. If the President testifies, it is his
determination in this proceeding. The ranking minority member
suggested that it would be helpful to the members of this
committee in ascertaining the facts and in having a full and
fair proceeding that we have the opportunity to submit written
questions in addition to 5 minutes. I think that is reasonable,
but it is either reasonable or not reasonable, regardless of
what the President chooses to do in his own capacity.
Mr. Conyers. Well, Mr. Nadler, I thank you very much. The
chairman has made it clear that conditionally, we can send Mr.
Starr questions. The other--another member on the other side
has made it clear that he doesn't want any questions and
answers whatever in writing. So I think the point has been
made. I would like to just go ahead and try to utilize my
questions and answers within the period of time that I have.
Mr. Starr, I am concerned about the potential conflicts of
interest between your public position of seeking to impeach the
President and your private position representing numerous
clients whose agendas are aligned directly against the
President. Can you assure this committee that you will provide
for our information a complete list of the clients in your
distinguished law firm, or the law firm that you were a member
of, that you have represented since accepting the position of
Independent Counsel?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you very much.
Mr. Conyers. I am particularly interested in, of course, in
the matters with the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company,
General Motors, Hughes Aircraft, United Airlines, Bell
Atlantic, and a number of others. But thank you so much. I can
go to a second question.
The grand jury leaks. In reviewing your statements
concerning this subject, we have two reports. I can ask you
about them now; you didn't mention them in your reference to
us.
Namely, once in the Washington Times you were quoted as
having said, ``The release of any investigative information by
a member of this office or any other law enforcement agency
would constitute a serious breach of confidentiality.''
This summer it became clear that your office had spoken to
reporters on background developed by a different standard
telling Stephen Brill, ``nothing improper about leaking if you
are talking about what witnesses tell FBI agents.'' This to me
is quite important. Is there a distinction or a compatibility
with both of those statements, sir?
Mr. Starr. Yes, in this sense. I will be very brief. We
have responded in detail to the article that you mentioned, and
I would be happy to provide that to you. I think it is all laid
out there. My position is this: we do not issue or release that
kind of information. That is our position.
Now, what does the law reach? The rule of 6(e) is an issue
that I am sure we will be discussing later today.
Mr. Conyers. Yes. Well, and the 5-minute rule, we may or
may not discuss it. I mean that's the problem.
Doesn't your sense of fairness in the courts extend to
congressional hearings where you have 16 members with 5 minutes
to ask and be answered questions? Isn't that--doesn't that
strike you as somewhat constricting, somewhat limiting,
somewhat hard for us to take advantage of your appearance
before us as the witness of the day?
Mr. Starr. Mr. Conyers, I do not want to speak to the Rules
of the House. Let me answer--may I answer 6(e), because I
gather that my answers do not count against your time quite in
the same way. But I will be guided by you.
Mr. Conyers. Well, let me ask you about the Travelgate and
FBI files, which you did not mention the exoneration of the
President in your reference.
Why--did you include any exculpatory information in your
reference, and why didn't you put it in there instead of
putting it in your statement here?
Mr. Starr. We put the statement--you are right, we did not
include that in the referral because of my view of what the
referral was supposed to do. What I viewed this invitation as
being was to try to--because I was invited, and pursuant to
that invitation, we reflected on what is the information that
you might need, because we had been told, Mr. Conyers, by the
Congress, you know, don't hold things back. If you have
information that could be relevant, provide it. And that is
what we have in fact been trying to do.
Now, if there is a sense that we are providing too much
information, we will be guided by that, because we are trying
to be helpful.
Mr. Conyers. Well, I thank you very much for that response.
Finally, sir, the failure to rule out pardon of Susan
McDougal, is that a very strong or personally-held sentiment on
your part? We had President Bush pardon 6 defendants in Iran
Contra, and I was a little bit dismayed that you would deem fit
to blow out of proportion the fact that the President refused
to comment on the possibility of pardoning Ms. McDougal. Did I
read more into that about your attitude about her than I ought
to have?
Mr. Starr. No, Mr. Conyers, I think you read it fairly and
accurately, and you might very well have a different view that
my view is quite wrong, but our view at the time was that the
President did not help the situation of our trying to get to
the truth as quickly as possible by his comments. But that is
your judgment. We have brought that to your attention for you
to assess, and if it is your judgment that that is not an
appropriate matter to consider, or your judgment is different,
obviously, it is your judgment that controls and governs here.
Mr. Conyers. Well, I am glad to know that that is the case,
that I still have my judgment intact. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
I might say on the 5-minute rule, that is pursuant to the
Rules of the House, and the Republicans get 5 minutes just like
the Democrats, so there is an equal burden. We have been
extremely generous in questioning, and I don't intend to shut
anybody down, but I hope the seating arrangement suits you.
That's about all that hasn't been complained of today, and I
just hope it's okay. We will change it if you want.
Mr. Frank. Could we get hassocks, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Hyde. Hassocks. Very good. I like that.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum.
Mr. McCollum. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Starr, I am sure in light of that, you should be
fully aware that Chairman Hyde keeps the time. You answer the
questions as fully as you want when we ask them. We will get
our bell rung, but don't worry about your bell.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Mr. McCollum. Let me ask you a couple of things just to
follow up quickly. At any time, did you ever represent anybody
in the Paula Jones sexual harassment case?
Mr. Starr. No. Well, I shouldn't be so quick. I did not
ever represent Ms. Jones or even seriously contemplate anything
other than a role with respect to the constitutional immunity
issue. But I believe, and I can check this but I will just give
you my belief, that my firm did, in fact, represent the
Independent Women's Forum.
Mr. McCollum. Right. But you never personally represented
anybody in the Paula Jones sexual harassment litigation, per
se?
Mr. Starr. Not per se.
Mr. McCollum. That's all I wanted to clarify. You engaged
us very fully on the immunity issue during your complete
testimony.
I have another question that is related. I heard you
describe this morning a compelling picture of President
Clinton, a compelling picture of him acting in a cold,
calculated, methodical, well thought-out method; a scheme, if
you will, to lie under oath, to commit perjury, if you will,
with regard to his involvement with Ms. Lewinsky before the
Jones case, in the Jones case in the deposition, and before the
grand jury, to convince Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie to
also commit perjury, lie under oath in that Jones case; to work
to get others perhaps, but certainly in concert with him, to
conceal and not produce the gifts that you mentioned in a
subpoena situation in the Jones case where they were subpoenaed
of Monica Lewinsky; and to try to get Monica Lewinsky a job in
at least, it appears from circumstantial evidence you
described, in a compelling way, in large measure because the
President wanted to keep her from turning on him, and to keep
her from going ahead and telling the truth at some point.
Now, that is a picture you painted. It was very compelling.
Now, the latter part interests me. Section 201 of Title
XVIII of the United States Code is the bribery section of the
code and it reads in part, ``Whoever directly or indirectly
gives, offers or promises anything of value to any person for
or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or
to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing
or other proceeding,'' et cetera.
Couldn't a reasonable person, Judge Starr, listening to
what you described, particularly with regard to the job offer
of the circumstantial evidence the President has of obstructing
justice in that instance as you described it, couldn't a
reasonable person, a reasonable member like me, conclude that
there may as well as being obstruction of justice, there may be
an act of bribery the President committed in this case? Could I
not conclude that as well?
Mr. Starr. Well, Mr. McCollum, I would not want to join in
a particular judgment beyond that which we have set forth in
the referral. But you will obviously go through your analysis.
I think on the other side of the equation, the circumstances
when the job search began and so forth. But I have frankly not
taken the specific issue you have identified, and it is a fair
issue, through the kind of elements analysis that a lawyer and
a prosecutor would need to do.
So I think in fairness, I would say I would just want to
examine that question more closely before opining on it.
Mr. McCollum. When you actually--you testified this
morning, all of that went through my mind, I pulled out the
statute book, I have walked through it, and while you didn't
allege it and you are not here today, it seems pretty darn
clear. I think that is important, because in the context of
this picture you are painting of the President, you are
painting perjury and bribery, as you said, of the same whole
cloth. We are dealing with a similar pattern and an involvement
overall that is very grave.
I would like to conclude with a question that clarifies and
gets you to amplify one other thing that Mr. Sensenbrenner
asked you about regarding the issue of perjury itself. In this
particular case, a number of our colleagues on this panel have
suggested that because the Paula Jones case was dismissed and
ultimately settled, or because there was, indeed, a throwing
out by the judge, albeit appealed, of the underlying question
of whether or not there was any relevance to the testimony
about other people being sexually harassed as being relevant to
that case, that somehow, therefore, if the President lied in
that case, it is immaterial.
Now, you started to say something about that. I don't think
you really fully put the nail into this, and I would like for
you to tell us, in your judgment, based upon what you presented
us today, were the elements of perjury present when the
President lied under oath as you have described it in that
Paula Jones case and, particularly, was materiality present?
Mr. Starr. Materiality is not affected. It is a totally
bogus argument to suggest that because the lawsuit is
eventually settled or dismissed that an act, let's call it
perjury, we have said, you know, a false statement under oath,
that is the way we presented it to you. That is simply and
utterably and demonstrably wrong as a matter of law.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. McCollum. May I just clarify one thing, Mr. Chairman?
The false statement under oath you presented and the way
you described it with all of the elements there, you have
described all of the elements of perjury; have you not, Judge
Starr? You may have distinguished it the way you presented it,
but aren't all the elements there you just described?
Mr. Starr. I am not quarreling with what you just said.
Mr. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Frank.
Mr. Frank. Mr. Starr, Judge Johnson has found 24 instances
of prima facie violation by your office of rule 6(e). That is
not determinative of whether or not they happened, but I
thought I would ask you. Are you aware of any member of your
staff who, in fact, committed a violation as defined by Judge
Johnson? Are you aware of in those 24 instances whether or not
a member of your staff in fact was guilty of what Judge Johnson
has found to be a prima facie violation?
Mr. Starr. We do not think that we have violated 6(e) at
all.
Mr. Frank. Specifically on the 24 instances, because you
may differ with the report about how you define 6(e), but as
she defined 6(e), are you aware of any member of your staff who
committed a violation as she defined it?
Mr. Starr. Well, with all respect, I think that is an
unfair question, and the reason I do----
Mr. Frank. All right, then I will withdraw it. Mr. Starr,
you are the expert on unfair questions. If you tell me it is an
unfair question, I will withdraw it.
Let me ask you again, did anybody on your staff, to your
knowledge, do the things which Judge Johnson has included in
her list of the 24 items? Understanding that you may think that
if they did, they weren't violations, but did anybody on your
staff give out that information on any of those 24 instances?
Mr. Starr. There are a couple of issues or instances in
which we issued a press release where we do have--you know, we
clearly issued a press release with respect to certain matters.
But may I say this. I am operating under a sealed litigation
proceeding, and what I am trying to suggest is, I am happy to
answer as fully as I can, except----
Mr. Frank. To the extent that you can't answer under this
particular proceeding, it is sealed at your request to the
extent that it is sealed at all. That is, Judge Johnson granted
a motion for an open procedure. You appealed to the circuit
court, and they closed it up, so if you didn't object, nobody
else will. If you didn't do anything, why not just tell us if
it is wrong factually. On the other hand, you are going to say
well, you successfully got the circuit court to seal it, so I
suppose I can't do much, but I don't understand why you don't
just tell us.
Mr. Starr. Let me make very briefly these points. We
believe that we have completely complied with our obligations.
Mr. Frank. That wasn't my questions.
Mr. Starr. Under 6(e).
Mr. Frank. My question is, Judge Johnson set it forward,
and they did this. They could differ as to the law. I am not
debating the law, I am trying to elicit a factual response.
Mr. Starr. The second point that I was trying to make is
that I am operating under a sealed proceeding.
Mr. Frank. Sealed at your request, correct?
Mr. Starr. No, Mr. Frank. It is sealed by the Chief Judge
based upon her determination of----
Mr. Frank. She granted a much more open proceeding and you
appealed that and got a circuit court to severely restrict the
procedure on the grounds that hers was too open. Isn't that
true?
Mr. Starr. Congressman Frank, what she did was to provide
for a procedure that didn't provide quote, ``openness,'' it
provided for an adversarial process, and this is all in the
public domain. But from this point forward, no, she is the
custodian and the guide with respect----
Mr. Frank. Would you ask her to release that? I think this
is severe for public interest in dealing with this leak
question. It goes to the credibility of a lot of what you have
done. Would you then join, maybe everybody would join, maybe
the White House would join, and others, in asking Judge Johnson
to relax that so we could get the answers publicly, because I
think there is a lot of public interest, legitimate interest in
this.
Mr. Starr. I am happy to consider that, but I am not going
to make, with all respect, a legal judgment right on the spot
with respect to appropriateness----
Mr. Frank. Well, then let me--I just have a couple other
questions.
You say in page 9 of the referral that 595 says, suggests
that you send us information based on a referral as soon as it
becomes clear to you. That is what bothers me about the FBI
file on Travel Office issues. You say on page 47 of the
testimony, our investigation found no evidence that anyone
hired by Mr. Livingstone or Mr. Marceca was involved. When did
your investigation determine that?
Mr. Starr. Well, under 595(c)----
Mr. Frank. Excuse me. That is a simple, factual yes, Mr.
Starr. When did you determine that, that nobody hired by either
Mr. Livingston or Mr. Marceca was involved.
Mr. Starr. We determined that some months ago.
Mr. Frank. Okay. Well before the election. You also have
with regard to the Travel Office a statement that the President
is not involved. When did you determine with regard to the
Travel Office that the President was not involved? That is just
factual, Mr. Starr. When?
Mr. Starr. It is not a date certain. We have no information
with respect to----
Mr. Frank. I will take a date ambiguous. Give me an
approximate.
Mr. Starr. First of all, there is an investigation that is
continuing, and as of this date of reporting, we do not have
any information----
Mr. Frank. Let me just say, here is what disturbs me
greatly. You say on page 9 that yes, you should send us this
information. Before the election you sent us a lot of
information about the President that was to his discredit in
some cases, and you found it very derogatory in other cases.
You also have been studying for far longer than the Lewinsky
case the FBI and the Travel Office. You tell us that months ago
you concluded that no--that the President was not involved in
the FBI files and you have never had the evidence you developed
in the Travel Office, yet now, several weeks after the election
is the first time you are saying that.
Why did you withhold that before the election when you were
sending us a referral with a lot of negative stuff about the
President and only now, despite your saying that the statute
suggests you tell us as soon as possible, you give us this
exoneration of the President several weeks after the election?
Mr. Starr. Mr. Frank, what we have tried to do is be
responsive to Congress, which has said, provide us with
information, and is there any other additional information that
would be useful----
Mr. Frank. Why didn't you tell us before the election about
this, according to your reading of the statute?
Mr. Starr. Congressman Frank, the reason is because what we
provided you in the referral is substantial and credible
information of possible potential offenses. The silence with
respect to anything else means necessarily that we had not
concluded----
Mr. Frank. In other words, don't have anything to say
unless you have something bad to say. You concluded in the FBI
file, your conclusions about the FBI involving the President,
why didn't you tell us?
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired. However, I
would yield to the witness such time as you need to answer the
many questions Mr. Frank has put to you.
Mr. Starr. Well, again, there is a process question. The
purpose of this referral was to provide you with what we had
found substantial and credible information. That is point one.
And the FBI files and the Travel Office matter were not
relevant to the 595(c) substantial and credible information in
terms of providing this to you for you then to determine, do
you want any additional information.
The final point I would say is we still have an
investigation, as I indicated, underway, and with respect to
both FBI files, we have indicated that, and the Travel Office.
I have drawn a distinction between the two matters, but I am
reporting to you so you know that as of this time we do not
believe that there is any information in either of those
matters, Congressman Frank, that would be relevant to you.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Gekas.
Mr. Gekas. I thank the Chair.
Isn't it true, Judge Starr, that you did release before the
election, months before the election, what amounts to the
exoneration of the President with respect to the Vince Foster
matter; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Gekas. Months before the election. Let me ask you this:
in what form did you exonerate the President? What formal step
did you take in the Vince Foster matter to end that case? Did
you report back to the Attorney General?
Mr. Starr. In that particular instance, we issued a report,
we filed it with the Special Division, and then made the report
public so that it could address what we saw as these lingering
questions with respect to the cause of death. It was a suicide
by Mr. Foster.
Mr. Gekas. You felt comfortable in exonerating the
President?
Mr. Starr. Oh, yes.
Mr. Gekas. Mr. Conyers, my friend John Conyers from
Michigan, went through a litany of tremendous clients that your
law firm represents. In fact, when I finish my tour in
Congress, I would like to talk with you. But may I ask you
this: was your law firm--were you a part of that law firm that
represented these clients when you exonerated the President in
the Vince Foster matter?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Gekas. Were these clients still on the books of your
firm when you came to the conclusion that there was no
connection in the Filegate matter to the President?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Gekas. Was your law firm and you involved in these
tremendous clients that were mentioned at the time that you
made a decision that there is probably no connection in
Travelgate directly on the President?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Gekas. I thought you answered that.
I am disturbed about something, though, that I found right
from the first moment that I reviewed your referral, and that
was the emphasis you put on with respect to the, what you would
characterize as the misuse of executive privilege by the
President. On page 204 of your--of this version of the
referral, you make a separate allegation that the President's
actions were inconsistent with his constitutional duty to
faithfully execute the laws, and you put in there that he did
so, did fail in that regard because he continuously used
executive privilege.
The first thing that I thought was, and I have not been
disabused of it since then, is that the mere assertion by the
President of a right like that, even if it objectively could be
said that he knew what the result would be ultimately by the
Supreme Court or appellate courts, I do not find that
automatically or prima facie, or even now at this latter stage
of the proceedings, to be something that the President should
debited on this case. But then my mind was settled a little bit
when you said in your testimony that even apart from the
matters concerning executive privilege and the like, you did
feel very strongly about the questions of perjury. And just
like many of us, it is going to be very difficult for us to set
aside that deep emotional feeling that we have about the
construct of law enforcement and the judicial system in our
country. I can set aside any abuses of power if they are called
that with respect to the assertion of executive privilege, and
I ask you now, didn't you sort of prioritize in that regard
when you said, setting apart the questions of executive
privilege, you too feel strongly about perjury as an element in
your referral.
Mr. Starr. Yes. Congressman, I would say these things. One,
we believe the issues with respect to false statements under
oath and the like are very serious, and the facts are there for
you to evaluate, and you are evaluating those. With respect to
the abuse of power, it is a judgment call, and you have come to
at least your tentative judgment, obviously, as I said, to
Congressman Conyers. It is now your prerogative to come to your
own considered judgment as to what is right. May I say very
briefly on executive privilege, I do think that it is an abuse
of a very important constitutional principle for such a special
principle, executive privilege, which I strongly believe in,
and I defend the concept of executive privilege, to be invoked
with respect to the nonofficial activities of the President of
the United States. I think it is improper. But it is your
judgment that controls, and not mine.
Mr. Gekas. I ask unanimous consent for 30 seconds.
Mr. Hyde. Without objection, much.
Mr. Gekas. Without much objection.
But can we not come to the conclusion in evaluating the
executive privilege asserted by the President that he might
have felt on any one of them where he exerted it that to give
him the extreme benefit of the doubt, that he felt that the
office of the presidency had to be protected, even in mundane
or so, they are matters which you find could be a misuse of
power?
Mr. Starr. I am sure that is the view of the President, and
we came to a different view, but as I say, it is now your
judgment.
Mr. Gekas. I yield back the balance of my nontime.
Mr. Hyde. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair will declare a very short recess until 5 minutes
after 4 to give everyone a little stretch. And if you will
please wait and let Judge Starr leave the room first, and then
we will be back at 5 after 4.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Hyde. The committee will come to order. A couple of
little commentaries, if I may. When you watch a football game
on Saturday or Sunday, you notice they have a 2-minute warning
and these scheduled interruptions. Well, now congressional
committees have the same situation. We have to give a 2-minute
warning to the network television, and so that is why we seem
to be suspended up here doing nothing. We are waiting for the
appropriate time.
The Chair would like to announce we are going to finish
this evening. Some of you may be wondering how long we are
going to go. I have no idea, but rather than come back
tomorrow, we are going to do the job today. So I plead with my
fellow members, if you have to ask a question, I hope it is a
burning issue with you and not something just of idle
curiosity. I am looking at you, Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. I am not idle. Will we take a supper break?
Mr. Hyde. No, we won't take a supper break. We will go
straight through. We will keep the jury locked up without food
and water. Right? You may send out for pizza.
There will be a meeting after Judge Starr has completed his
testimony. We will then have a full meeting of the committee to
do some business on subpoenas. So just be advised.
Mr. Frank. Can we have a walk around the Mall?
Mr. Hyde. If you are walking around the Mall, I would want
two police officers.
It is now a--well, a mixed pleasure to ask the Senator-
elect from the great State of New York and one of our very
valuable members, whom we will miss, Charles Schumer, to
interrogate--question our witness. Mr. Schumer, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will miss you
and this committee, not so much today, but for many of the
other things that we have done together.
Today, Mr. Starr, today after nearly 5 years of
investigation, we conduct today's impeachment hearing having
just received boxes of new documents from your office
concerning Webster Hubbell, and have just learned from the
chairman that we will be voting on deposing new witnesses
involving the Kathleen Willey matter.
Mr. Chairman, I would say this to all of us on this
committee: Maybe we should hang a sign outside the Judiciary
Committee that says, ``Out to lunch, gone fishing.'' We were
out to lunch because we are so far afield of what the American
people want us to do. We have gone fishing because despite a 5-
year fishing expedition, which has yielded nothing more than
allegations revolving around a tawdry sex scandal, this
committee is still trying to bait the hook.
What has disturbed me about the twists and turns of this
investigation and these proceedings is that instead of seeking
justice, too many are intent on winning the war. So when there
is not enough evidence for impeachment, you bring in John
Huang's name or Kathleen Willey to prop up the case. And I say
to my Republican colleagues that the irony is that the harder
you try to win the war, the more you lose the hearts and minds
of the American people.
Now, for Mr. Starr, the OIC has basically made three
allegations against the President, three types of allegations:
Perjury, obstruction of justice, and abuse of power, all
stemming from the President's admitted improper relationship
with Monica Lewinsky.
To me, as I have said, and you have stated in your report,
it is clear that the President lied when he testified before
the grand jury not to cover a crime, but to cover embarrassing
personal behavior. And as I have said before, the President's
actions deserve to be punished, not as a political denouement,
but because what the President has done is a serious matter
that cannot go unanswered.
However, it is clear to me that if this case, as it seems
to be, and as it seems clear to me, is only about sex and lying
about sex, that it will never be found impeachable by Congress.
Nor should it be.
As I interpret the Constitution and the Federalist Papers,
an interpretation that is diametrically opposed to yours, Mr.
Starr, it is obvious that this does not reach the standard of
high crimes and misdemeanors as set forth in the Constitution.
The innate and sound wisdom of the American people that
lying about an extramarital affair should not lead to the
removal of a duly-elected President from office is far more in
keeping with the Founding Fathers' visions of impeachment than
your legalistic arguments, Mr. Starr.
So thus, it seems to me that if the charges of abuse of
power and obstruction of justice lack compelling evidence, then
the vast majority of Americans and a strong majority in this
House will not vote for impeachment.
So I would like to ask you a few questions on the
obstruction charge--charges. I am not asking you about abuse of
power because that has already been rejected out of hand by
even the President's harshest critics in the Republican Party.
And I am going to ask you three sets of short questions for you
to answer together, and that will be the end of my questioning,
so you will have the rest of the time to answer.
First, on August 20, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky testified that,
``No one ever asked me to lie, and I was never promised a job
for my silence.'' That was in response to a question by a grand
juror.
Let me ask you, again, because I know Mr. Lowell asked
this, but I didn't find the answer adequate, why wasn't this
statement directly included in your 455-page referral to
Congress, not in a footnote and not paraphrased? Isn't that
relevant, trenchantly relevant information, about what we are
doing? And if you are so dispassionate about simply producing
the facts, why wouldn't you have included the statement
verbatim and in quotes, particularly on a matter as important
as impeachment?
Second, regarding the Lewinsky job search, if the President
and his staff began to find Monica Lewinsky a job sometime
after December 5, 1997, the date she first appeared on the
witness list, that might lead one to your conclusion that there
was an attempt to influence her testimony. But since the job
search began more than 18 months prior, doesn't that cast into
serious doubt an obstruction argument?
You are assuming that once the White House knew of the
deposition of Lewinsky, their reason for getting her a job
totally changed; when it seems at least as logical that the
reasons remained the same, mainly that they wanted to get her
away from the White House for the obvious--same reason that
they did before they knew of any deposition.
And again, shouldn't we set an impeachment bar high enough
so that a 50/50 proposition like this does not set off a
constitutional crisis?
And third and finally, on January the 18th, the President
had the conversation with Betty Currie. Isn't it true that on
that date, she was not listed as a deposition or a trial
witness in the Jones case or any other case?
For obstruction or subornation, the President would have to
know that she was to be called as a witness. There is another
logical reason that he didn't want Betty Currie to talk about
this. He may not have wanted the press to know. He may not have
wanted his family to know.
Mr. Hyde. Can you wind up, Mr. Schumer?
Mr. Schumer. Yes. And again, given the weighty matter of
impeachment, shouldn't there be more evidence than just your
surmise that the President knew that Currie would be called as
a witness? It is your answers, Mr. Starr.
Mr. Starr. Senator-elect and Congressman Schumer, question
one, we did supply the information. The reason that you are
having, of course, these questions with respect to the referral
is because we produced everything that was relevant to your
assessment of Ms. Lewinsky. And I stand by what we said on page
174 of the referral. I think it is fair, in light of our
assessment, but your assessment, of course, may very well be
different with respect to that one item.
Mr. Schumer. I asked why you didn't put it in the report,
in full, fully quoted?
Mr. Starr. Because we do not think that that is consistent
with the truth, and it would be misleading to say, in our
judgment, and I understand you may disagree with this, but we
specifically said at page 174, not in a footnote, Ms. Lewinsky
has stated that the President never explicitly told her to lie.
If one finds that inadequate, then one finds it inadequate.
It is your judgment. But we were holding nothing back. The
referral contains the information. You have also the grand jury
transcripts.
I will be very brief. With respect to the December 5, 1997,
matter, and again this is an assessment of facts, our
professional assessment of the facts included such significant
things as a great stepping up of the efforts to get her a job,
especially once the witness list issued. And the referral
speaks to that in fairly elaborate detail and how Mr. Jordan
became very active in that effort.
Again, it is our assessment of the facts.
Mr. Schumer. There could be a reasonable assessment the
other way, I presume?
Mr. Starr. Well, I have come to my assessment based upon my
colleagues', who are professional prosecutors, assessment of
the facts.
Mr. Schumer. Is it beyond a reasonable doubt?
Mr. Starr. By no means is that our standard, because----
Mr. Schumer. Thank you.
Mr. Starr. --as you quite rightly note, the question is
substantial and credible.
And with respect to Betty Currie, I would simply guide the
Congress again, the House again, to the substance of the
President's testimony and how she was injected into the matter
by the President in his testimony, and we think that does
have----
Mr. Schumer. With all due respect, sir, that doesn't answer
my question----
Mr. Starr. I am sorry.
Mr. Schumer. --which is not how she was injected or what
the substance was.
Please, Mr. Chairman, because he didn't answer my question
directly.
But how did you come to realize that the President knew
that she would be called as a witness when there was no mention
of it at that time? Is this just surmise, or do you have any
factual evidence that the President knew that she would be
called as a witness?
We understand he wanted her not to tell the truth, but we
don't know to whom. Where is your evidence?
Mr. Starr. The evidence is not that she was on a witness
list. You are quite right, she was not on a witness list, and
we have never said that she was. What we did say is that the
transcript of the President--of the President's January 17
deposition shows that he was injecting Betty Currie into the
matter and saying--may I finish?
Mr. Hyde. Sure.
Mr. Starr. And saying specifically, you will have to ask
Betty. That raises----
Mr. Schumer. But nothing to do with the legal proceedings,
sir, and that is the heart of subornation.
Mr. Hyde. All right. The gentleman's time has finally
expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Starr, you have become the bull's eye of the target
upon which several aspiring political gunslingers have fired.
A recent AP story quoted a Democrat member of this Congress
saying the House Judiciary Committee Republicans are looking
for a way to wiggle out of this mess.
Now let me get this straight. President Clinton was
involved in illicit sexual affairs in the White House with a
young intern of tender years. President Clinton subsequently
assured all America that he did not have an improper
relationship with that woman.
President Clinton, continuing his denial, spoke
untruthfully in a deposition or interrogatory and before a
Federal grand jury, causing perjury to rear its ugly head. And
for all this, you are the bull's eye of the target, and the
House Republicans are trying to wiggle a way out of the mess.
I obviously missed class that day because as I review my
material and notes, common sense and reality are conspicuously
absent.
Judge Starr, if one-half of the unfavorable comments
leveled at you are true, you probably should be keelhauled. I
am inclined to dismiss most of them, and as evidenced by your
demeanor today, I think most of that trashing was probably just
that, trashing.
Now, I will admit I am not happy with the cost of this
investigation, but some of that must be attributed to the
President's delaying and deceptive and evasive tactics.
Let me go to page 21, Judge Starr. That is what you
referred to earlier, where it says the facts suggest that the
President was attempting to improperly coach Ms. Currie at a
time when she was not a potential witness.
Shouldn't the word ``not'' be deleted there?
Mr. Starr. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. In fact, I think
the corrected version, which should have come up this morning,
should make it clear that she was a potential witness.
Mr. Coble. Very well. I am sorry. That should read she was
a potential witness?
Mr. Starr. Yes. And I must say, because you have been kind
enough to raise that, I would just say in response to issues
about potential witnesses, that Federal law is clear that these
prohibitions against importuning and coaching a witness do
indeed go to a potential witness.
Mr. Coble. And I think the word ``not'' does appear in many
of these of our scripts.
Mr. Starr. I apologize for that.
Mr. Coble. Judge Starr, what evidence did you find to
support your conclusion that President Clinton's action
involved public misconduct as opposed to private misconduct, A?
And B, what evidence, if any, is there that President Clinton
breached the public trust?
Mr. Starr. Congressman, I will be as brief as I can. In
terms of the public nature of the conduct, it seemed to me, as
I sought to set out both in the referral and this morning, that
the key is that this was no longer--and I respectfully
disagree--but it is not my judgment that governs here--I
respectfully disagree with the suggestion that this is ``lying
about a private sexual relationship.'' Rather, this is the
integrity of the judicial process.
These are courts we are now talking about. These are
judges, and a district judge is sitting and presiding. And that
is, it seems to me, what made that dimension of it very public.
But the other aspect, which we do enumerate in counts or
grounds 10 and 11 which are before you, is that, in a variety
of ways, the President used the powers and influence of the
Presidency to carry out this continued effort to deny and to
delay, including, I believe, and this goes back to an earlier
comment, when one looks at the pattern of activity that we
summarize in grounds 10 and 11, one will see a course of
conduct that I believe does, in fact, go to your point--both of
your points.
Mr. Coble. Chairman Hyde, it can be done in 5 minutes. The
red light has not yet illuminated, and I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. Hyde. I thank the gentleman.
The distinguished gentleman from Los Angeles, Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have read the referral, and I have listened to the
testimony. With one possible exception, Judge Starr has
answered the 595(c) issues that I had concerns about, and I
would like to reserve the balance of my time at this point.
Mr. Hyde. I am sorry?
Mr. Berman. I would like to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Hyde. You certainly may.
Well, you say he can't, but I am going to let him do it. He
is a good man. We will let him do it. But I have a short
memory.
The gentleman from Texas, Lamar Smith.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Starr, your friends know you to be a dedicated
husband and father and an individual of impeccable integrity.
On a professional level you have served with distinction as a
U.S. circuit court judge, as Solicitor General of the United
States, and as an advisor to the Senate Ethics Committee. Those
qualities of personal integrity and professional respectability
haven't changed, but the rules of engagement have.
As a practicing attorney, you are accustomed to legal
procedures that put you on an equal footing with the other
side, but as Independent Counsel you were prohibited from
commenting publicly on the details of the case, even as you
were unfairly savaged on a daily basis. So I understand why you
welcome the opportunity today to testify and to respond to our
questions, as you have done so well.
Judge Starr, during your investigation, the President
claimed executive privilege to withhold information from you
and prevent witnesses from testifying. While his claims were
ultimately overruled by the courts, they did cause long-term
delays and, in fact, as you said, obstructed your
investigation.
Executive privilege only allows the President to protect
national security secrets. It cannot be used to interfere with
a criminal investigation. Since President Clinton and his
lawyers knew the law, they also knew that their claims of
executive privilege were not legal.
President Clinton's claims were thrown out by the courts,
but not before they delayed your investigation by many months
and perhaps over a year. Meanwhile, the White House complained
that your investigation was taking too long.
In short, the President took executive privilege, which is
supposed to safeguard our country's national security, and
misused it to obstruct the investigation. As you said in your
opening statement, this is arguably an abuse of power.
Judge Starr, my first question is this: In your referral,
you said the President had a pattern of invoking and then
withdrawing executive privilege to delay your investigation.
Could you give us examples of this?
Mr. Starr. Yes. The President would, in fact, through his
attorneys, invoke executive privilege with respect to one or
more witnesses, and when we would take the issue to litigation,
I will be very specific, the President invoked--or the witness,
I should say, but had to do it at the direction of the
President, namely Nancy Hernreich. Nancy Hernreich does not
carry on, by her own admission, a policy role at the White
House. She does have an important function at the White House.
She manages the Oval Office operations. It is a very important
function, but that is not the kind of function that the
principle of executive privilege was meant to protect.
When we then, shall I say, called the lawyers on that, then
it was withdrawn. That has happened to us before. It happened
to us in the Arkansas phase of the litigation as well.
Moreover, as we point out, the President told the grand
jury on August 17 that he had no interest in this, and I am
roughly paraphrasing here, having the matter litigated. So it
was as if it was to preserve the Presidency and Presidential
prerogative.
The history, when one then analyzes the facts, does not
support that conclusion.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Thank you, Judge Starr.
Another question: President Clinton told the American
people several times that he supported the public release of
the court documents he used to claim executive privilege. Is
that accurate?
Mr. Starr. The answer is, partially--I would want to review
the facts because I want to be fair, but there was, in fact,
not, shall I say, a ready willingness to allow, for example,
public access to the executive privilege hearings and so forth.
So I don't want to be condemnatory, but I would say that the
President did not show a strong interest in having this
released quickly.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Judge Starr, a few minutes ago, counsel
for the committee read an excerpt from a book written by Leon
Jaworski. Let me read some other words that Leon Jaworski wrote
in a book called The Right and the Power, which was about his
experience as a special prosecutor during the Nixon impeachment
proceedings.
``No government office, not even the highest office in the
land, carries with it the right to ignore the law's command any
more than the orders of a superior can be used by government
officers to justify illegal behavior. . . . There was evidence
that the President conspired with others to violate 18 United
States Code, page 1623, perjury, which included the President's
direct and personal efforts to encourage and facilitate the
giving of misleading and false testimony by aides. . . . For
the number one law enforcement officer of the country, it was,
in my opinion, as demeaning an act as could be imagined.''
Do you think that passage from Leon Jaworski's book has
application to the case at hand?
Mr. Starr. I do. My own view is Colonel Jaworski, were he
here, would say, it is your judgment, but these matters are
serious and clearly deserve to be analyzed in terms of the
importance to our system of truthfulness and taking the oath of
office seriously and the oath of a witness seriously. And, yes,
I do think that Mr. Jaworski, were he alive today, would say,
if lying to the American people is grounds for impeachment, as
he thought it was, I believe, he would say lying under oath is
as well. But, again, it is your judgment.
Mr. Smith of Texas. Thank you, Judge Starr.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Boucher.
Mr. Boucher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Starr, while you were not a witness to the facts which
are at the base of your investigation and also your September
referral to the House, I note that for a number of years you
served as the Solicitor General of the United States and in
that capacity represented the United States Government in a
variety of cases before the U.S. Supreme Court.
I know a number of those cases, during that period,
involved constitutional issues. So, in my opinion, that
experience well qualifies you to answer questions on some of
the broad matters of constitutional dimension that it will now
be the responsibility of this committee to consider.
Since your referral was received by the House in September,
there has been a great deal of discussion about the importance
of the rule of law and about the importance of the principle
that no individual, including the President of the United
States, should be above the law.
It has also been suggested by some that the rule of law is
only observed and that principle only honored if it is found
that the President has committed a criminal offense while in
office; that he must then be impeached and removed from office.
But my readings on the Constitution suggest that impeachment
was never intended to be a punishment for individual
misconduct. Instead, it was intended to protect the country. It
was designed to advance the public interest and to remove a
Chief Executive whose conduct was so severe that it
fundamentally impairs the functioning of his Presidential
office.
Punishment for the individual can occur in the normal
course and through the normal functioning of the criminal
justice process.
So I have three questions for you. I will pose these, and
then you will have the balance of the time in which to provide
your answer.
First, Mr. Starr, do you believe that the President would
be vulnerable to the criminal law process for whatever crimes,
if any, he may have committed while in office after he leaves
the office? Would he be subject to the criminal law process
after he leaves the office, assuming that the statute of
limitations for that particular conduct has not expired at the
time that an indictment is brought?
And in answering that question, I would refer you to the
provisions of Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution, which
states as follows: Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not
extend further than to removal from office and disqualification
to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit, under
the United States. But the party convicted shall nevertheless
be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and
punishment according to law.
And I would assume from that language that there would be
no doubt that the President would be subjected to the normal
criminal justice process once he leaves office, and I would
appreciate your concurrence or, if you choose, difference with
that conclusion.
Secondly, am I correct in assuming that the Federal
criminal statute of limitations for the perjury and the other
offenses that are stated in your September referral is 5 years,
and, therefore, that the statute will not have expired by the
time this President leaves office in the year 2001?
And third, if you agree that the President could be
subjected to the regular process of the criminal law upon his
normal departure from office in 2001, just as any other person
could be subjected to that process, would you not also agree
that in subjecting the President to the criminal law process,
the rule of law itself would be well served? And that would
also well serve the principle that no person, including the
President, is above the law?
So there are three questions that I have for you.
First, is a President subject to criminal prosecution when
he leaves office for offenses committed while in the office?
Secondly, would there be sufficient time within the statute of
limitations for prosecution of the perjury and other offenses
suggested in your referral of September after the President
leaves office? And third, does not that process well serve as a
complete assurance that the rule of law will be fully observed?
Your answers, please.
Mr. Starr. As to question one, I agree with your reading. I
think the plain language suggests exactly that, that the
Framers did intend for there to be separate proceedings. And I
also agree with your comment, if I could just add this, that it
was not intended to be a sanction in the sense of the criminal
law serving the deterrent purposes and the like that the
criminal law, at its best, is designed to serve.
I also would answer yes to your second question, in terms
of our--my reading, I should say, of the statute of
limitations.
In terms of rule of law values, I certainly think that
there is strength in the proposition that no person should be
above the law, but I would also say that there is a fundamental
fairness question, in my mind, charged as I am as an
independent counsel, with opining in any way that could be
interpreted as sort of a call as to what the appropriate
disposition would be of a particular matter.
I know what my duty is. One may disagree with my reading of
my duty, but it was to send you this.
And then I think in terms of fundamental fairness to all
the individuals involved, one simply has to assess that after
this body has done its duty and reached its judgment. But it
would be, I think, wrong to answer that it would be right to
vindicate the rule of law for criminal charges to be returned.
I think that before we--let me be very--may I, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Hyde. Please, go ahead.
Mr. Starr. Before we ever seek an indictment, we engage not
only, and I would hope any prosecutor's office would do that,
in a very careful assessment of the facts, the elements of the
offense and the like. We go through each of the elements. We
look at the witnesses and the documentary evidence and the
like, and then we have to satisfy, following Justice Department
standards, whether it is more likely than not that a fair-
minded jury would convict based on these facts, with the
witnesses--and we take the witnesses as we find them--beyond a
reasonable doubt?
Those are judgment calls that I hope that you will excuse
me, in terms of fairness, in not speaking so directly to in
terms of your third question.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Starr, this has been a long day, and we still have a
long way to go before it is over, so I really appreciate your
effort to address all of the concerns of this committee and
thank you for being here.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Mr. Gallegly. I would like to speak briefly to the
credibility of some of the witnesses that you interviewed
during the course of the last several months. Several key
witnesses provided important testimony under oath before the
grand jury. In numerous instances, their version of events
conflicted with the testimony of the President.
Given your observation of the witnesses and your evaluation
of the corroborating evidence, please assess the truthfulness
of the witnesses, specifically Monica Lewinsky, Betty Currie
and Vernon Jordan.
Mr. Starr. It is with some reluctance that I answer this
because of fundamental fairness concerns, but let me say this:
With respect to Ms. Lewinsky, I think she desperately does not
want to hurt the President, and at the same time she has a very
considerable memory, a recollection, a memory bank of relevant
facts that is quite significant.
With respect to Betty Currie, as the----
Mr. Hyde. Would the witness withhold for a moment?
Those questions are tough questions. I wonder if it isn't
awkward for the witness to assess.
Mr. Gallegly. Perhaps if Judge Starr would prefer that I
visit another area.
Just as we speak, I was handed this pass-out that
apparently is being handed out in the hall. There is actually
no attribution, but I assume it is from our colleagues and
friends on the other side of the aisle, and it references
contradictory evidence as it relates to----
Mr. Barrett. Would the gentleman yield? I don't have a copy
of that, so I don't know that we have received it.
Mr. Gallegly. Okay. Well, I will see that we get a copy of
it.
Mr. Barrett. I have never seen that document.
Mr. Gallegly. I will be happy to do that. I am not going to
ask specific questions relative to this document other than
that there is something being handed out contradicting that the
President made an attempt to hide evidence of the gifts that he
may have presented to Miss Lewinsky. I ask that this be made a
part of the record of the hearing.
But briefly, Judge Starr, if we could revisit the Jones
deposition, the President was asked whether he had ever given
any gifts to Ms. Lewinsky. Does the evidence gathered indicate
that the President gave false or misleading testimony when he
answered, ``I don't recall''? I think that would address this
handout that we are receiving.
Mr. Starr. Yes. Our assessment, and this was an assessment
shared by the very experienced and career prosecutors, was that
the events of December 28, 1997, must have been so clear and
vivid in any reasonable person's recollection that the
President would naturally have recalled that on January 17,
1998, less than 1 month later, given the nature of the events,
which are undisputed, of what happened during that Oval Office
visit by Ms. Lewinsky to the President over the holiday period.
So the recollection was so clear--or the events were so
clear that to suggest that one doesn't recall a Rockettes'
blanket and the like, the various gifts that were shared
between the two, just, in our view, defied credulity,
especially in light of the fact that we did have testimony,
which is now before you, that the President is blessed with one
of the most powerful memories that many people who have come in
contact with a wide variety of people have ever seen. So we are
told the President's memory is extremely strong.
Mr. Gallegly. Judge Starr, would you say that it would be
reasonable to say that it might be selective recall?
Mr. Starr. Well, I don't like to get into characterization,
but I would simply say--I would not resist such a
characterization.
Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to
participate and yield back the balance of my time. I would like
this to be made a part of the record of the hearing.
Mr. Hyde. There is some objection to that. Can we discuss
that?
Mr. Gallegly. That's fine.
Mr. Hyde. Thank you.
Mr. Gallegly. I would withdraw that request, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Prepared Statement of Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California
Mr. Chairman, today we have a chance to begin the important process
of testing the allegations of possible impeachable offenses by
President Clinton that were contained in Judge Kenneth Starr's referral
to the House in September. Judge Starr comes before us this morning to
give a full airing of the evidence he believes constitutes impeachable
offenses by the President. All members of the Committee, the Republican
and Democratic attorneys, and the White House attorneys have an
opportunity to challenge and scrutinize Judge Starr's version of events
and rationalization for bringing these matters before the House.
Today is an important step in the process, but it's important to
note that the process will not end today. I am concerned by those who
seemingly have already made up their minds as to the President's guilt
or innocence, or whether any acts he may have committed rise to the
level of impeachable offenses. We sit as a de facto grand jury. Our job
is to hear all of the evidence, analyze all of the evidence, and then,
and only then, through due deliberations should we reach our
conclusions. Similar to the duty of grand jurors, if, at the end of
inquiry, the facts do not support the charges, the President should be
fully exonerated. On the other hand, if the facts support the
allegations, we have a duty to move forward. However, either conclusion
must be grounded on the facts and on the truth.
We must ensure that whatever we do will stand up to historical
scrutiny, for what we do in the next few weeks is likely to be used as
a model in the future. How we comport ourselves, and how we resolve the
question of whether or not to impeach the President, will have
implications for our political system and for our nation for many
generations to come.
The issues before us are very serious. In its October 8 vote, the
House directed this Committee to fully explore the allegations that the
President committed perjury, witness tampering, obstruction of justice
and abuse of power. Any additional information we are gathering is
directly related to those core issues. If we fail to consider that
information, we fail in our duty to give the evidence a full, fair and
impartial hearing.
I look forward to the day when we can put this matter behind us.
Until then, our Constitutional duty requires us to concentrate on the
facts, not the political spin of the moment.
Thank you.
Mr. Hyde.The distinguished gentleman from New York, Mr.
Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
Mr. Starr, we all agree on the paramount importance of the
rule of law. Now, section 594 of title 28 of the U.S. Code
requires an independent counsel to comply with the written or
other established policies of the Department of Justice.
Section 77.5 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations
states in relevant part, and I quote, ``an attorney for the
government may not communicate or cause another to communicate
with a represented party who the attorney for the government
knows is represented by an attorney concerning the subject
matter of the representation without the consent of the lawyer
representing such party.''
And I would point out that with respect to Monica Lewinsky,
her attorney was Frank Carter, who is a criminal as well as a
civil attorney, who ran the public defender's program in the
District of Columbia's criminal courts for a number of years,
and the subject matter of the representation, he was the one
who developed the affidavit in the Paula Jones case, which was
one of the subjects that you were going to question her about,
which was the subject of the investigation.
Now, these regulations are intended to ensure that a
person's right to counsel is respected. Under this policy, your
office never should have contacted Monica Lewinsky directly on
January 16th without the consent of her attorney Frank Carter.
I have two questions. My first question, but I will ask you
to withhold until my second is asked, is why did your office
violate the law and the Justice Department guidelines by
contacting her directly on January 16th since your answer to
Mr. Lowell's question is obviously not correct, given what I
just said about Mr. Carter's representation in the Jones affair
and his being a criminal attorney?
Second, under the Justice Department guidelines for all
Federal prosecutors, it is unethical to keep criminal suspects
from calling their lawyers. The evidence suggests that Lewinsky
was told by your office not to contact her counsel and that
your office, in fact, suggested that her immunity deal was
contingent upon her not contacting him.
Here are some excerpts from Lewinsky's grand jury
testimony:
``Lewinsky: I said I wasn't going to talk to them without
my lawyer. They told me that if my lawyer was there, they
wouldn't give me as much information, and I couldn't help
myself as much. So that----
``A Juror: Did they ever tell you that you could not call
Mr. Carter?
``The Witness: No. What they told me was that if I called
Mr. Carter, I wouldn't necessarily still be offered an immunity
agreement.
``A Juror: Sounds as though they were actively discouraging
you from talking to the attorney--to an attorney.
``The Witness: Yes.
``A Juror: Is that a fair characterization?
``Yes.
``Independent Counsel: Well, from Frank Carter----
``The Witness: From Frank Carter, who was my only attorney
at that point. I didn't have another attorney, and this was my
attorney for this case so----
``A Juror: And this is the attorney who had helped you with
the affidavit?
``The Witness: Yes.
``And the affidavit wasn't even filed yet.''
The right to counsel was not a trivial issue here. Lewinsky
points out in her grand jury testimony that when your office
confronted her on January 16th, her affidavit had not yet been
filed in court. It was not, in fact, filed until 4 days later
on January 20th.
Isn't it a fact, sir, that had you allowed Ms. Lewinsky to
contact her attorney Frank Carter on January 16th, he could
have withdrawn the affidavit or amended it prior to filing it
in court and in that way substantially weakened any criminal
case against her? And isn't it a fact that the effect and
perhaps the real reason for your office telling Ms. Lewinsky
not to contact her counsel on January 16th was to prevent his
withdrawing or amending it--was to prevent his withdrawing or
amending her affidavit and thereby substantially weakening the
criminal case against her and subsequently against the
President?
In other words, isn't it likely that if you had not
violated the law, one of the foundation stones of all the
alleged crimes in the Monica Lewinsky affair would never have
occurred?
Mr. Starr. Congressman----
Mr. Nadler. That's my second question.
Mr. Starr. You did ask what I took to be several questions,
but I have to disagree with the premise. I disagree strongly
with the premise.
Mr. Nadler. Which premise?
Mr. Starr. We did not violate the law, and if I might
explain why. And it has been litigated, if I could answer.
Mr. Hyde. Yes.
Mr. Starr. These very issues, which you have very clearly
stated, have been argued in a court of law. The Chief Judge of
this district has addressed these issues with respect to
whether there was a denial of counsel.
Good lawyers can come up with good arguments. I don't know
a single lawyer----
Mr. Nadler. Can you tell us why this was not a denial of
counsel?
Mr. Starr. She concluded, based upon all the facts, that
her right to counsel was not violated.
Mr. Nadler. Excuse me. Eleven hours later, after she was
held for 11 hours after your people told her that if she
contacted Mr. Carter, that the immunity deal would not be on
the table, after your people told her incorrectly that he was
not a criminal attorney, after it was made very clear that she
had better not keep him, she then----
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Nadler, you had a 5-minute question.
Mr. Nadler. You don't think that was intimidation?
Mr. Hyde. Would you let him answer?
Mr. Starr. Congressman, I disagree, with all respect, with
virtually every premise that informed----
Mr. Nadler. Let me ask one one-sentence question.
Mr. Hyde. No, just a moment. Now be fair. Let him answer
your question, will you? You don't have time for another
question.
Mr. Nadler. That's why I wanted to ask it before he
answered.
Mr. Hyde. I know that's why you wanted to ask it.
Mr. Starr. Well, if I could be very brief. You stated a
number of things, and, with all respect, they were virtually
all incorrect. And let me begin by saying, to the extent that
your concerns are, and anyone should be concerned with respect
to issue of denial of counsel, the issue has been litigated, as
I was just about to say, and resolved adversely to Ms.
Lewinsky.
She had very active lawyers. They knew how to make
arguments. That is where we argue these things, in court. She
lost, for reasons that I tried to explain in terms of my
colloquy with Mr. Lowell.
But let me also say, because there has been a number--and
you began, as I recall your comments, with DOJ policy. Now, Mr.
Nadler, the assurance that I want to give you is that we
consulted with the Justice Department about the procedure that
we were going to employ prior to the time that we engaged in
the procedure, and the procedure that we engaged in is what law
enforcement does all the time.
As I said this morning, it is not our job to reinvent the
investigative wheel. We followed traditions and traditional
practices, and that is what we did in this instance. The
Justice Department knew what we were going to do, and they knew
specifically about the Frank Carter issue.
Mr. Nadler. They knew you were going to threaten her not to
keep Frank Carter as her attorney?
Mr. Starr. I again disagree respectfully with the premise.
What we--I will be very brief. What we put before Ms. Lewinsky
was a choice. She had committed felonies. She was involved in
the middle of committing additional felonies, and we said to
her, you will be of assistance to us, or you have the potential
to be of assistance to us, if you become a complete cooperating
witness. Now, you have the right, and as I said earlier today
in a colloquy--we, in fact, placed a phone call to--we, in
fact, placed a phone call to Mr. Carter's office that evening.
We scrupulously and assiduously abided by right to counsel. But
we also had reservations at the time about Mr. Carter. We don't
have those reservations anymore. I want the record of this
proceeding to be absolutely clear. Mr. Carter was an unwitting
participant in drafting a perjurious affidavit.
But, Congressman Nadler, we did not know that at the time.
We knew he had been engaged by Mr. Jordan, and we were looking
into and telling the Justice Department, here are the issues
that we want to look into. We want to see, is there something
here that may involve criminality at a very high level? And we
informed the Justice Department. We abided by Justice
Department practice and policy. The issue was litigated, and
the Chief Judge of this district has adjudicated the matter and
has determined that there was no deprivation of the right to
counsel.
To me, it seems to me, that matter should be viewed as
closed in terms of the legality of the process.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Canady.
Mr. Canady. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Starr, I want to thank you for coming today. I
appreciate your testimony. As I have listened to the questions
this afternoon, and as I have observed the response to your
referral and the response to your investigation over the course
of this year, and actually prior to this year, I have been
reminded of something a lawyer said about 2,000 years ago.
Giving advice to other lawyers, he said, and I paraphrase, if
you don't have an argument, abuse the other side.
Lawyers today, I think, are all familiar with advice that
if the facts are against you, argue the law. If the law is
against you, argue the facts. And if the law and the facts are
against you, just argue like the devil. And I think what we are
seeing here----
Mr. Hyde. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Canady. I would be glad to.
Mr. Hyde. I think the punch line on that is beat up on the
lawyer.
Mr. Canady. That's a variation on the same theme.
And I think what we are seeing here is a desperate attempt
to get away from the facts of the case against the President.
Now, I understand that because I find that the facts are
particularly compelling. I think your referral sets forth, in
great detail, a pattern of calculated and sustained misconduct
by the President of the United States, and I understand why the
President's friends would instinctively react to defend him.
But what is going on in attacking your investigation is not
right. It is not consistent with respect for the rule of law,
and I believe that the attacks that have been launched against
you are without substance. They don't have merit. And even if
we could accept, for the purpose of argument, that some of
these attacks have some merit, it is obvious that they do not
bear in any way on the reliability or the credibility of the
facts of the case against the President.
Now, if someone could show me evidence of misconduct that
actually went to the credibility of the evidence, if they could
show me that the evidence was not reliable because of
misconduct, and they could prove the misconduct, I think that
would be appropriate for us to consider.
But we are not hearing that. What we are hearing here is
just a grab bag, anything that occurs, to try to undermine your
credibility. And, of course, this committee's process has been
attacked in the same way.
Any time we come to the point of talking about the facts of
the case with respect to the conduct of William Jefferson
Clinton, some people cry, ``Unfair.'' I think it is fair to
talk about his conduct. I think that is what we need to focus
on. I think that is our responsibility. And it would be a
dereliction of our responsibility if we allowed ourselves to be
diverted from that fundamental task that has been given to us
by the House of Representatives in the resolution that they
adopted.
So that I make by way of a general comment about what is
going on. And I am struck by the concern that has been
expressed about due process, and I think we should all be
concerned about due process. I think that is very important.
But I must ask, where is the concern for due process in a
person who lies under oath in a deposition? Where is the
concern for due process in a person who withholds evidence and
attempts to encourage others to withhold evidence? Where is the
respect for due process in someone who coaches a potential
witness? Where is the concern for due process in the whole
course of conduct, which you have outlined in your referral,
with respect to the President of the United States?
I see a stunning lack of respect for the due process of law
in the conduct of the President of the United States, as it is
set forth in your referral, and for which we seem to have no
rebuttal, no significant rebuttal, offered.
I want to know if there is going to be a rebuttal offered
to these facts. So far we are not hearing that, and so far in
the questions that are being directed to you, the focus is not
on the facts of the case. Occasionally they will touch on that.
But the focus is on other things diverted to--designed to
divert attention from the facts of this case.
Now, I felt compelled to say that because this is a process
that needs to be on track, and all of us need to focus on the
critical questions here: Did the President of the United States
lie under oath in his deposition? Did the President of the
United States lie to the grand jury? Did the President of the
United States obstruct justice? And did the President of the
United States engage in an abuse of his office in the way that
you have outlined?
Now, there is not time for you to respond to that and that
is not really meant as a question to you. It is meant as an
observation of where this proceeding should be going and on the
attempts that are being made to divert this proceeding from its
proper goal.
Mr. Hyde. I thank the gentleman. His time is up.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have to first note that the
witness today--Mr. Chairman, I first have to note that the
witness today is the prosecutor in the case. Most prosecutors
begin their presentations in court with an admonition that what
they say and what defense counsel says is not evidence.
Evidence will be heard from witnesses.
As Mr. Conyers has said in his opening remarks, many of us
have questions involving prosecutorial misconduct, illegal
leaks, conflicts of interest, questions which are relevant to
our oversight responsibility of the Justice Department and
independent counsel, but irrelevant to the question of shall
the President be impeached, which is the issue at today's
hearing. So I would hope we don't have to discuss the
unfairness and absurdity of basing an impeachment of the
President of the United States on a presentation from the
prosecutor and a review of written statements, many of which
were not under oath, and none of which were subject to cross-
examination.
So the fairness of these proceedings continues to be an
issue. Fairness was an issue when we didn't give the President
an advanced copy of the report so his response could appear on
the Internet along with the allegations. Fairness was an issue
when we voted to begin the inquiry of impeachment before we had
had the hearing on what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Fairness was an issue when we were denied the opportunity to
take depositions so we could properly prepare for today's
hearings. And you can see how difficult it is to get the--use
the 5 minutes effectively when you don't know what the answers
are. Fairness is an issue when the scope of the inquiry was
expanded one night before the evidentiary hearing. So fairness
has always been an issue.
Mr. Chairman, I do want to thank you and Mr. Canady for
finally convening a hearing on the history and background of
impeachment so at least now we have a framework within which to
review the allegations before us. That hearing was necessary
because we heard from 400 historians and received a letter from
400 constitutional authorities, and another letter from 200
constitutional law professors, which warned us that not one of
Mr. Starr's allegations constituted an impeachable offense.
We heard discussion today about the rule of law. At the
hearing, we heard that the Constitution restricts our legal
authority to impeach the President to those offenses which
constitute treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors. At the hearing, we dealt with issues such as the
historic difference between impeachment of judges and
impeachment of Presidents. We addressed the question of when
perjury can constitute an impeachable offense and when it
should not constitute an impeachable offense, and we worked to
evaluate a standard for impeachment and specifically considered
whether the commission of a crime which would violate the
presidential oath to faithfully execute the laws, whether that
could be an appropriate measure.
At our hearing, the entire first panel of witnesses,
including the majority of which were invited by the
Republicans, agreed that the phrase ``treason, bribery or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' does not cover all felonies, and
that is that the Constitution does not give Congress the
authority to remove a sitting President based on the standard
that he committed a crime and therefore failed to faithfully
execute the laws.
Remember, as my colleague from Virginia said, that the
President will be subject to criminal prosecution after he
leaves office. But they all agreed that we do not have the
legal authority to remove the President based on Mr. Starr's
suggestion that he failed to faithfully execute the laws.
So the rule of law restrains our impeachment authority to
consideration of treason, bribery or other high crimes and
misdemeanors, and therefore at the hearing, both Democrats and
even many Republican witnesses, raised serious questions about
our constitutional authority to use any or all of the charges
as a basis for presidential impeachment.
Mr. Van Alstyne, a Republican witness, described the
allegations as low crimes and misdemeanors and further said the
impeachment pursuit of Mr. Clinton may well not be particularly
worthwhile. When I asked the entire second panel about the
Starr referral, count 11A, executive privilege, the clear
consensus on the panel was that the executive privilege charge
was not an impeachable offense. For example, Mr. Cooper, a
Republican witness, said that I do not think that invoking
executive privilege even frivolously, and I believe it was
frivolous in this circumstance, but I do not believe that
constitutes an impeachable offense.
So, some have said that none were impeachable offenses, but
there is a clear consensus that at least some of the
allegations are too flimsy to pursue. This sentiment was
reflected in majority counsel's presentation last month which
left out some of the allegations, the chairman's suggestion we
should focus on two or three allegations, and several
Republican members of this committee----
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Scott. May I have 30 seconds. Several members of this
committee would have raised allegations that are actually worth
pursuing. It is absurd to participate in fact finding when some
allegations may well be dropped even if they are determined to
be true. That is why I joined Ranking Minority Member Conyers
in a letter requesting that we call an end to the confusion and
determine which, if any, of the allegations before us even, if
true, might constitute an impeachable offense. Unfortunately,
that request was denied and now we have the situation in which
we have an open-ended, never ending committee in search of high
crimes and participating in the spectacle of having the
prosecutor serve as our witness.
Mr. Hyde. Are you awaiting an answer? Was that rhetorical?
Mr. Scott. It was rhetorical.
Mr. Hyde. Do you have anything you need to respond to that?
Mr. Starr. No, I understood Mr. Scott's dissertation.
Mr. Hyde. It was an interesting lecture.
The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis. I wonder if
you would be kind enough to yield to me very briefly.
Mr. Inglis. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. I just want to sort of respond to what my friend
from Virginia said. I don't characterize your office as an
independent prosecutor. You are not a prosecutor, you are
Independent Counsel. As a matter of fact, you have just given
the President a pass on Filegate, on Travelgate, on all sorts
of things, Whitewater. So as far as I am concerned, that is
what an independent counsel should do, find where people are
guilty, find where they are not guilty, and announce it. Let
the chips fall where they may.
Insofar as judges, we impeach judges also for perjury. We
impeached Judge Claiborne. I participated in that, all the way
through to the Senate floor. We impeached him for perjury. We
impeached Judge Nixon for perjury. When you say judges are
different, they have a different standard, I direct you to the
Constitution that says the President, Vice President and all
civil officers, that is judges, shall be removed from office on
impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other
high crimes and misdemeanors. I can tell you in the Judge Nixon
case and in the Judge Claiborne case, it was perjury. Now, if
perjury could get a Federal judge off the bench and the country
can survive with a corrupt judge here and there, how much more
one worries about the one man who is head of the executive
department, the whole executive department, Commander-in-Chief,
and all of that?
So I just think that is a response that I would like to
make to the gentleman. I thank the gentleman for yielding to
me.
Mr. Scott. I would ask the gentleman's time be restored
after the 30 seconds.
Mr. Hyde. You want 30 seconds? If the gentleman doesn't
mind----
Mr. Scott. I would ask that the full time be restored.
Mr. Watt. It never started anyway.
Mr. Scott. I think one of the questions we dealt with was
the circumstances underlying the behavior. For example, some of
the allegations, some of the people that were convicted or
impeached for perjury, the perjury was lying about bribes and
other serious and grievous abuses of their official powers. So
I think I would like to continue the discussion, which I can't
do in 30 seconds, but I think that was the reason we had the
hearing, to flesh out all of those underlying situations.
Mr. Hyde. All right. I thank Mr. Inglis. You get 5 minutes.
Thank you.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Starr, I have
two things to thank you for, and then two things to ask you
about. First of all, the two thank you's.
As I have read and actually heard some of the things that
various political figures have said about you, it makes me
wonder why anyone would be willing to accept an appointment
like you have accepted. Really it shows I think the tremendous
service that you do to the country, and I certainly appreciate
the fact that you have been willing to come out of a very
successful law practice, to spend time doing this.
Like you pointed out in your testimony, you would like to
get back to private life. For people like you willing to serve
our country in this way, it really is wonderful service, and we
all should thank you. I hope that over the years, somehow all
of that is forgotten, all of these things that have been said
about you.
I understand people wanting to defend the President, but
they need not attack the accuser. They need not attack the
prosecutor, the special Independent Counsel that is appointed
here. As Mr. Canady was saying, that undermines the process, it
seems to me.
So first of all, thank you for your work.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Mr. Inglis. Second of all, thank you for your very
passionate defense of the rule of law in the last three
paragraphs of your testimony. I think it is just a very
eloquent statement that I hope is studied for years to come in
law schools and other schools in our country, because truly it
is a great and passionate statement on the importance of the
rule of law.
That gives rise to my questions. We had a hearing here
recently, and there is some discussion about this point, about
what constitutes an impeachable offense in the context of
whether there is a violation of the rule of law. It seems to me
the rule of law has at least two components. One is an
adherence to due process and the second is the adherence to the
equal application of the law, which is something you expounded
on in the last three paragraphs. I know there are some people
that would say perjury is not an impeachable offense. We heard
a rather erudite discussion of that a week or so ago, and a
very sophisticated view that perjury is not an impeachable
offense.
Let me ask you, I think we know these things about the
President. We know who the President is. The question is who
are we? We know that the President has admitted to lying. He
admitted to lying under oath.
If he were here, I think he would say he has not
technically committed the crime of perjury because it was not a
material fact.
Mr. Canady I believe it was elicited some response, no, it
was Mr. Gallegly, elicited some responses to you about the
deposition testimony.
Let me ask you about the grand jury testimony. In your
mind, were those material facts that the President was
testifying to in the grand jury testimony, and are the elements
of perjury met in the referral on the point of the testimony in
the grand jury situation?
Mr. Starr. Well, Congressman, again, I have been somewhat
reluctant to go all the way to say in light of the purpose of
the referral, to say that all elements of a crime have been
satisfied. But let me say that in my own judgment, although
this is a jury question, materiality the Supreme Court has held
is a jury question, but I certainly think a reasonable person
could very reasonably conclude that the elements were in fact
present in the grand jury testimony by virtue of, as we have
tried to outline in the referral, the number of statements that
we believe were knowingly untrue, I think that is a reasonable
conclusion to reach.
Again, our mission or our responsibility in submitting this
referral was to say that there is substantial and credible
information that an impeachable offense may have been
committed, and that, of course, is the state of the record as
it comes to you. But, yes, I do think that a reasonable juror
could come to that determination.
Mr. Inglis. Let me ask, as to the rule of law and the issue
of whether perjury is an impeachable offense, I gather from
your testimony, and you would restate here, that in your mind
perjury is an impeachable offense?
Mr. Starr. Yes. I think with all due respect to scholarly
commentary and the like, that perjury is not only an
impeachable offense as a matter of theory and doctrine, and as
a matter of common law--I think it is demonstrable at common
law that it was viewed as a high crime or misdemeanor--but also
as the chairman has indicated, the very practice. So the common
law of the Congress of the United States suggests that it is in
fact an impeachable offense, because judges have been removed.
The offense is the despoiling and the attack on the
integrity of the judicial system. The response may be on the
other side, well, we want to find out what the perjury is about
and we will take some perjuries more seriously than others, and
that is a view, I will say as a former judge, any judge worth
his or her judicial salt would say, ``Not in my court.''
Witnesses tell the truth. It doesn't matter what the underlying
subject matter is. Once you are in court under oath, you tell
the truth. That is the way judges look at the world, and
perhaps that is why no judge being subjected to impeachment for
perjury has dared suggest don't worry about it, it is not an
impeachable offense.
It is. It has been viewed that way by this very body.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from New York.
Mr. Nadler. I don't know if this is a point of order or a
point of information, but I will ask the indulgence of the
Chair. Mr. Chairman, a few moments ago in response to my
questions Mr. Starr referred to the court's rulings in In re
Grand Jury Proceedings and In re Sealed Case, which he
characterized as the judge okaying the propriety of what they
had done in the subject matter we discussed.
These cases are in the possession of the committee under
seal, and I would like to be able to talk publicly about them,
and I would like to be able to know publicly whether Mr. Starr
correctly or incorrectly characterized this. So I would like to
know, since Mr. Starr has now referred to them and
characterized them, whether they are no longer under seal, and
if they are still under seal I would like to move that they no
longer be under seal.
Mr. Hyde. I understand they are still under seal.
Mr. Nadler. I would ask that the committee change that
status.
Mr. Buyer. Object.
Mr. Hyde. Objection has been heard.
Mr. Nadler. I didn't ask for unanimous consent. I made a
motion, I think.
Mr. Hyde. Well, I think it takes unanimous consent to take
something out----
Mr. Canady. I make a point of order that the motion is not
in order.
Mr. Hyde. I understand. If the gentleman has something to
say, I want to hear it. We will talk about it later. It is
really not your turn. You are not recognized for purposes of
removing things from under seal.
Mr. Frank. Parliamentary inquiry. We are going to have a
session later to vote on subpoenas. Would it be in order to
make that then?
Mr. Hyde. Yes, it would.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from North Carolina will not hold
against me the fact that Mr. Nadler intervened. I yield to the
gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. Watt. I wanted to make a parliamentary inquiry before I
start the 5 minutes. I have some questions to ask Mr. Starr
about information that has been given to the committee and has
not been released to the public.
If I ask questions about that, would I be in violation of
the rules?
Mr. Hyde. The Parliamentarian tells me you can ask the
question, but you can't refer to the material.
Mr. Watt. Okay.
Mr. Hyde. I don't know how you do that.
Mr. Watt. I will tread very lightly.
Mr. Frank. I think it means you don't say you are referring
to the material. You just ask the question.
Mr. Watt. I will tread very lightly, and if the chairman
thinks I am outside the bounds, I am sure somebody will call it
to my attention.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
Mr. Starr for coming over. I enjoyed your speech very, very
much.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Mr. Watt. Let me just be clear on one thing though about
this. On pages 55 to 57 of your testimony, you give us
information that clearly is within your personal knowledge.
That is your biographical information. I was following you
through the rest of this, and I think it has been implicitly
said, but not explicitly said, is it correct that you don't
have personal knowledge of anything that is related--I mean,
you have got some opinions, you have reviewed the stuff. I
respect those. But as far as personal knowledge and your
knowledge of this information as a person, I take it you would
say you don't have any personal knowledge?
Mr. Starr. In the main, you are absolutely right,
Congressman Watt.
Mr. Watt. Thank you.
Mr. Starr. Could I--I am sorry.
Mr. Watt. Let me go back then briefly to a point Mr.
Gallegly raised, and I don't want to get into the credibility,
you assessing the credibility of witnesses, because as the
chairman pointed out when Mr. Gallegly tried to get you into
that, that is not a place that you need to be, that is really a
place for us, I take it, to assess the credibility of witnesses
who know the facts.
Would you agree that the credibility of the President and
Betty Currie and Monica Lewinsky would be important for us to
evaluate in this committee in any respect?
Mr. Starr. Yes, Congressman Watt, it does seem to me----
Mr. Watt. Then if you agree with that, there are a couple
of things that you failed to include in your referral that seem
to me to bear very directly on the credibility of Ms. Lewinsky,
and these are the issues that I was concerned about because
they are not public yet.
Mr. Starr. I see.
Mr. Watt. One is the testimony of a woman who works as a
vice president apparently at Revlon, a woman by the name of
Nancy Risdon, who said to your interviewers during her
statement that Ms. Lewinsky had told her that she had lunch
with Hillary Clinton the previous week and that Mrs. Clinton
had offered her help in finding an apartment in New York.
Are you familiar with that?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Watt. You didn't send that information over with your
referral. I take it that would have a major bearing on the
credibility of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, at least it would for
me if she made that kind of representation, which I think is
just completely off the reservation, so to speak.
Mr. Starr. May I respond?
Mr. Watt. I am going to give you a chance to respond. I
want to ask the other one. The second occasion which you failed
to give us in your referral was the interview of a woman named
Kathryn Proffitt, who testified that Ms. Lewinsky had
exaggerated to her the depth of her relationship, Ms.
Lewinsky's relationship, with a young man at the Department of
Defense. You are familiar with that, Mr. Starr?
Mr. Starr. I am not familiar with that specific item----
Mr. Watt. You take my word that it is in the information
you sent over.
Mr. Starr. I am not quarreling with that.
Mr. Watt. That seems to me also would go directly to the
credibility of Ms. Lewinsky as a witness. Yet neither one of
those pieces of information was included with your referral. I
am wondering how you went about picking and choosing the
things. I mean, the chairman has referred to you as an
independent counsel, not an independent prosecutor. There is
some question about that. But what I am concerned about is why
didn't we get the information that we need to make the kind of
credibility judgments as members of this committee, a full
evaluation of credibility from your office when you made this
referral?
Mr. Starr. Congressman Watt, I believe that you do have the
information and we might assess the information, the relevancy
of it, differently. Let me be very specific.
Ms. Lewinsky made it quite clear that she knew how to lie.
She was encouraging others to lie. She also says, and this is
in the referral----
Mr. Watt. So now you are impeaching your own witness now. I
take it what you are doing, you have called her a liar on a
couple of occasions, but a substantial portion of your case,
isn't it, Mr. Starr, is based on the credibility of Ms.
Lewinsky. She told you, this is the second time you have done
that today, I would say, she told you under oath at the grand
jury that nobody asked her to lie and nobody offered her a job
in exchange for anything. You say that's a lie, you think she
was lying then, so how are you picking and choosing what you
believe from Ms. Lewinsky? And isn't that our job as members of
this committee?
Mr. Starr. I can answer with one word: Corroboration. She
is vastly corroborated with her phenomenal memory. When she
would say I was with the President of the United States, she
could identify a phone call coming in with a Member of Congress
with a nickname, she could recall a phone call coming in from
someone from Florida who was a sugar grower, and tie it to a
specific date. That gives you corroboration that the event that
she is giving----
Mr. Watt. What kind of corroboration would you have with a
witness who says, ``nobody asked me to lie?''
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Starr, thank
you for appearing before the committee today. I think it is
very helpful to the committee and the American people to have
the opportunity to hear you respond to the questions from the
other side regarding the conduct of this investigation. I agree
wholeheartedly with the gentleman from Florida that they have
not focused on the substance before this committee, which is
whether or not the President of the United States committed
offenses, including perjury, obstruction of justice, abuse of
power and tampering with witnesses that may be impeachable
offenses if proven to be true.
I do think it is important to let people know how this
investigation was conducted. Nonetheless, I think that it is
important that we return back to those issues, and I would, Mr.
Chairman, ask that an excerpt from the Congressional Record in
1986 as a part of Judge Claiborne's impeachment trial in the
Senate be made part of the record.
Mr. Hyde. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
claims of governmental misconduct
Claiborne has urged the Senate to permit him to call several dozen
witnesses ranging from prosecutors and investigators to the trail judge
in his criminal proceeding. He contends that their testimony will
reveal a vendatta which led to his conviction, and an unwillingness of
several dozen Federal judges to expose its illegality out of fear that
public opinion would questionwhether the vendetta issue was a mere
subterfuge erected to protect a fellow jurist.
Even assuming all of Claiborne's allegations of governmental
misconduct to be tyrue, the same conclusions as to his conduct obtain.
No individual claim or combination of claims can or should detract from
the conclusion that he willfully submitted false income tax rewturns in
1979 and 1980. The Senate need go no further than it already has in
assessing the merits of these claims. Although Claiborne views thes
theories as the overarching issue in this proceeding, he is mistaken.
His contention seems to be that but for a vast conspiratorial
vendetta, his innocence would have been proven or the charges would
never have been brought. Claiborne contends that full consideration of
his claims on this score leads to several conclusions which will
exonerate him. specifically, he suggests that Federal prosecutors
pursue him so relentlessly and unscrupulously that they bargained for
perjured testimony from a known criminal and spearheaded an illegal
burglary of his home in search of inculpatory evidence. He claims that
exculpatory evidence was withheld and that witnesses were either
intimidated or unfairly coached. If accurate, these claims warrant
serious scrutiny and I have cosponsored legislation to establish a
special subcommittee to investigate the issue further. If the claims
have merit, steps should be taken to rectify the wrong. Remedial
measures, however, will in no way abrogate the finding that Claiborne
engaged in impeachable conduct.
He further asserts that he could not have had the requisite willful
intent, given the predisposition of Federal prosecutors; that claim
rests on the notion that no one whose every move is under intense
scrutiny by Federal prosecutors would willfully violate the law or
knowingly submit such faulty tax returns. This assertion is untenable,
given the clear findings regarding Claiborne's conduct.
Claiborne alleges that sympathy for prosecutors and fear of public
criticism led several dozen Federal judges to gloss over his defenses.
He points to two dissenting appellate opinions in his case suggesting
that some of the members of the reviewing panel may have rendered their
decision without fully examining the . . .
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As many may recall,
in 1986 Judge Claiborne, a Federal judge, was under
investigation. This committee voted out articles of impeachment
against him which were adopted by the full House of
Representatives and he stood trial in the Senate. During that
trial, he raised as a defense some very serious charges of
prosecutorial misconduct, far, far more serious than anything
that has been raised by folks on the other side of the aisle
today, including that the prosecutor spearheaded an illegal
burglary in his home, that exculpatory evidence was withheld,
that witnesses were unfairly coached, and other serious
charges.
During the trial of that matter, one Senator reviewing
these serious matters, in fact stating that if the claims have
merit, steps should be taken to rectify the wrong; also noted
that remedial measures would in no way abrogate the finding
that Claiborne had ngaged in impeachable conduct.
The Senator who made that statement is now the Vice
President of the United States, Senator Al Gore, and I think it
is important to note that in a sense of bipartisanship and in a
sense of seeking justice and in a sense of upholding the rule
of law, that that same type of demeanor and that same type of
search for the truth should lead us today.
Judge Starr, do you know what Judge Claiborne was charged
with, what his impeachable conduct was?
Mr. Starr. Tax offenses is my recollection.
Mr. Goodlatte. Actually my understanding is it was perjury
and lying under oath.
Mr. Hyde. Would the gentleman yield? It was signing a false
income tax return.
Mr. Goodlatte. Lying under oath.
Mr. Hyde. Yes.
Mr. Starr. I stand corrected.
Mr. Goodlatte. I thank the chairman. I would like to look
at the obstruction of justice issue if I may, Mr. Starr. You
have indicated that the evidence that you have gathered shows
that the President tried to aid in obtaining a job for Ms.
Lewinsky in order to prevent her from telling the truth in a
judicial proceeding arising from a civil rights claim of sexual
harassment in which she was the named defendant. There are
those who have said, including some here today, on the other
side of the aisle, that the President's efforts could be
interpreted as merely helping an ex-intimate or ex-friend
without concern for her testimony. I don't think you have been
given the full opportunity to indicate why it is that you come
to the first conclusion, rather than the second. I would like
to give you that opportunity now.
Mr. Starr. Yes, thank you. The effort to provide a job for
her did, as has been noted, begin early on, an effort to assist
her in a possible United Nations job. But Ms. Lewinsky made it
very clear that she was not interested in that U.N. job and she
in fact turned it down even though Ambassador Richardson
offered it to her.
She then made it quite clear that she wanted a job in the
private sector. The early efforts with respect to that project
did not go well. They did not go quickly in November of 1997,
after she had made her decision, not to seek or not to take, I
should say, the job that was offered to her by Ambassador
Richardson.
After that point, the evidence suggests that there was a
significant uptick in activity, specifically by Mr. Jordan, to
find her a job weighing in, including with Mr. Perelman (the
chairman of the board, which was quite unorthodox and unusual,
according to Mr. Perelman's testimony, which is before you),
one of the most wealthy and powerful people in the country.
Mr. Jordan reached out to Mr. Perelman only after it became
clear as of December 5, 1997, that Ms. Lewinsky was on the
witness list. Moreover, Mr. Jordan kept the President informed
by his, Mr. Jordan's testimony, which could not be clearer that
he was keeping the President apprised, not keeping Betty Currie
apprised. His mission was to keep the President of the United
States apprised of activity in two arenas: One, the affidavit,
which was perjurious; and, secondly, the job. And when he
secured the job for her at Revlon after her first interview at
Revlon had not gone well, Mr. Jordan then interceded, all on
behalf of the President's effort to find a place for Ms.
Lewinsky. That second round of interviews resulted in, in fact,
a job, and when it did, or a job offer. When that job offer was
then extended, Mr. Jordan, according to his own testimony,
indicated he called the President of the United States and
said, ``Mission accomplished.''
Now, to us that suggests, in light of the December 5
witness list, her being subpoenaed and the like and the ongoing
conversations with Ms. Lewinsky, that there is reason to
believe that there is a relationship, a connection, between the
job and what she was doing and what it was anticipated she
would do in the litigation itself.
Mr. Hyde. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that this is
one of the most embarrassing chapters in American history.
Certainly the President's sexual misconduct was embarrassing to
him and his family, and it was embarrassing for all of us to be
bombarded with what seemed to be limitless details about it.
But also embarrassing has been the reaction of Congress to the
referral made by Mr. Starr in September.
What we should have done was this: Asked how these
allegations, if true, could destroy our American constitutional
system of government, something Mr. Starr did not address in
the over 450 pages in his report. But it is the central--indeed
it is the only question--that is before Congress, because
impeachment is a constitutional remedy for constitutional
threats.
What have we had instead? We have seen the Independent
Counsel investigating the sex life of the President. We have
seen titillating details leaked to the press, leaks that were
prejudicial and in stark contrast to the evidence
confidentially submitted by the special prosecutor, Mr.
Jaworski, 24 years ago. I would note that Mr. Starr is indeed
prosecutor. Ms. McDougal was not ``counseled'' into a jail
cell.
After we tossed the Independent Counsel's X-rated material
all over the airwaves and onto the Internet, this committee did
hardly anything. The House acted to refer the report to this
committee September 11th. Today, November 19th, over 2 months
later, we are having our first and so far only noticed full
committee hearing where we are hearing our only witness, the
prosecutor. This would never be allowed in a court proceeding
and there are ethical questions in my mind about the propriety
in these proceedings as well.
We have the chief prosecutor testifying as a fact witness.
More than that, we have the prosecutor vouching for one witness
over another. Ignored is testimony by witnesses that favors the
President. Ms. Lewinsky's statement that she was never asked to
lie, that there was no bargain for a job; Ms. Currie's
exculpatory statements. We have cafeteria advocacy. Only those
statements that fit getting the President, not anything that is
exculpatory.
We want to exalt justice and the rule of law, but there has
not been a mention of the intimidation or abuse of witnesses to
get statements damaging to the President. I agreed to listen
this morning to Ms. Sarah Hawkins in my office, and she came in
and she was obviously one of those uncomfortable people who
have been addressed by the special prosecutor's office and she
was repeatedly threatened with prosecution in an effort to get
her to cooperate. Threats that were reinstated after she had
spoken criticism to the press, after being told twice by the
prosecutors that there wasn't evidence to prosecute her. She
lost her business; her career is ruined; her family is hurt.
She never had her day in court, and I wonder about the rule of
law for her.
Much of America believes this investigation is the living
embodiment of what Justice Scalia warned against in his dissent
in the case of Morrison v. Olson, in which the majority upheld
the independent counsel statute. Justice Scalia warned that the
independent counsel could be a foe of the President with a
staff full of refugees from a defeated administration, the
worst kinds of danger of abuse of prosecuting power.
There is no question that the President did not tell the
American people the truth about Ms. Lewinsky. He admitted that.
You allege in the report that he lied under oath. But I note
that you, Mr. Starr, are under oath yourself this morning, and
on page 36 of your testimony you swear that you go to court,
and do not appear on the talk show circuit. This very morning
you appeared on Good Morning, America. Isn't that a false
statement under oath? And shouldn't you be prosecuted for
perjury because of this false statement? Given your answer to
Mr. Inglis, I would think so. However, I would not urge that. I
think that is preposterous. That cannot be what was meant by
the Founding Fathers regarding impeachment.
I wasn't going to ask any questions, but because you are
here and you might have knowledge about this one thing, I do
want to pose three quick questions.
First, when did you first hear any information to the
effect that a tape recording existed of a woman, any woman, who
claimed to have had a sexual contact with President Clinton?
Two, in or about November 1997, did you discuss with any
person the possibility that a tape recording might exist on
which a woman claimed to have had had sexual contact with
President Clinton, yes or no.
Finally, I know we all know that there is an investigation
into leaks from your office to the press. Reporters promise
confidentiality to sources and they are very serious about
that. I am asking you today, will you release the press from
their vow of confidentiality to you and your deputies so this
can be fully investigated.
Mr. Starr. Well, you have asked a number of questions. Let
me go back to----
Ms. Lofgren. Three.
Mr. Starr. Yes. The second question I frankly did not
understand. I honestly just did--I was trying to take notes.
Ms. Lofgren. I will read it quickly. In or about November
1997, did you discuss with any person the possibility that a
tape recording might exist on which a woman claimed to have had
sexual contact with President Clinton?
Mr. Starr. I am not recalling that. The specificity of your
question suggests that there may be information, and I am happy
to respond to information if that is----
Ms. Lofgren. Is there any possibility that the answer is
yes?
Mr. Starr. I have no recollection of it, but I am happy to
search my recollection. This is the first time I think one has
asked me such a question, and you are asking----
Ms. Lofgren. It was possible it was before January then?
Mr. Starr. Yes, but you said very specifically November of
1997, and I will search----
Mr. Sensenbrenner [presiding]. Does the gentlewoman have
information that the Independent Counsel's Office had this
information?
Ms. Lofgren. I have asked these questions, and I think the
gentleman is under oath and he can answer the question.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Does the gentlewoman have information to
this effect?
Ms. Lofgren. I am not a witness.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The witness will respond.
Mr. Starr. I do not have a recollection of that, but I am
happy to now search my recollection and to go back in light of
the specificity of your question and to provide the committee
with information.
Ms. Lofgren. So you would agree to answer that under
penalty of perjury if we followed up with a written request
after you have had time to reflect upon it?
Mr. Starr. Well, I am happy to consider any question, and
if it is viewed as germane to--what is before you, if this is
an effort to try to search my recollection and to see if there
is something that perhaps I am not able to recall--excuse me,
may I answer this question?
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from California will
allow Judge Starr to answer the question without interruption.
Ms. Lofgren. Certainly.
Mr. Starr. I beg your pardon. Now, it does seem to me that
if there is an issue that you view as germane, I am happy to
consider it, and I will evaluate it. I have given you my best
answer now.
Now, with respect to----
Ms. Lofgren. I believe it is germane, and I would like an
answer to the question.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from California asked
Judge Starr three questions. Could she please give Judge Starr
the courtesy of allowing him to answer the questions?
Ms. Lofgren. I would love to get an answer.
Mr. Starr. I have concluded what I need to say. Thank you.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The witness has concluded. The
gentlewoman's time has expired.
Mr. Frank. There was only one answer. There were three
questions.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The witness will respond.
Mr. Starr. What was the first question? I am sorry.
Ms. Lofgren. The first question was when did you first hear
any information to the effect that a tape recording existed of
a woman, any woman, who claimed to have had a sexual contact
with President Clinton?
Mr. Starr. I am unable to answer that question without--I
will have to--you are saying ``any information'' relating to
``any.'' I would have to search my recollection. I am prepared
today for questions that go to this referral, so I will have to
search my recollection.
Ms. Lofgren. We will look for an affidavit on that too. I
think you did discuss the opening and expansion----
Mr. Rogan. Point of order. The gentlewoman's time long ago
expired. Those of us waiting to cross-examine the witness would
appreciate the gentlewoman following the time schedule.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Everybody, regular order. Everybody will
suspend. Does the witness have any furtherance to the questions
that have been posed by the gentlewoman from California?
Mr. Starr. Not at this time.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time has expired. The
gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Buyer.
Mr. Buyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have several thoughts
I would like to convey, and then I have some specific questions
for Judge Starr.
Some of us here have also been prosecutors and some have
served as defense lawyers. We recollect on our own experiences,
but none of us has ever come close, not even close, to the
attacks that have come upon you and your office and your
character and the character of those in your office, by not
only some of my own colleagues that are here, some associates
of the President, some of the President's own criminal defense
lawyers. It is unfortunate, but I suppose it is part of the
process in America. But you have kept your head up high and you
have maintained your intellect here today and I appreciate
that.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Mr. Buyer. There are two things for which I also feel very
strong about as I represent my constituents of Indiana, because
they also take great pride in our heritage. One, that the
Supreme Court has held consistently that no one is above the
law. Secondly, that the courthouse door is open to everyone in
our society. The courthouse in America is not meant just for
the wealthy or the powerful; the courthouse door is also open
to the powerless, to the needy, and to the poor.
So when I look at this case that you have now referred to
Congress, I say that the courts were never meant to be
manipulated by the powerful over the powerless. And what do we
have here in front of us?
We had the most powerful individual on the face of the
Earth of the greatest country this world has ever seen finds
himself as a defendant in a civil rights case. I am amazed to
hear some people who claim that they are true advocates of
civil rights, now somehow claim that it is okay to lie in a
civil rights case.
So what do we have? The President took an oath to
faithfully execute the laws of the land and has a
constitutional duty to do just that. It is alleged that the
President as a defendant in a sexual harassment civil rights
case in Federal court, committed perjury in his deposition
before a Federal judge.
One of my questions to you is did Judge Susan Webber Wright
ever discuss with your office a referral for perjury that was
before her in person? Also the allegations of suborning of
perjury of others, knowing that these government agents would
be witnesses before your grand jury, and repeat these lies.
This lying under oath before the grand jury is very serious.
The tampering with witnesses who also gave testimony before
your grand jury, the obstruction of justice by entering into a
conspiracy with others to hide evidence, does that not corrupt
the legal process? Doesn't that deny the powerless the
opportunity to a fair trial in our system?
I ask that as a question of you. I will keep on going.
Mr. Starr. The courts take----
Mr. Buyer. Can you hold that thought. We also have then the
allegations of the abuse of power by the most powerful person
in our country, by using government resources, his own staff,
the Cabinet, and make these presidential privileges for his own
personal gain because he was a defendant in a civil rights
case, in a civil case, where he could lose money. So he chose
deception and deceit because he wanted to protect his own
wallet and image from further embarrassment.
We had testimony by legal scholars who said impeachment of
judges is also the same as the impeachment of Presidents.
Here is another question I have for you. If truth and
fairness are foundations of our justice system, if fairness is
the bedrock of justice, and truth is the water that runs
through it, and we want to make sure that never is the water in
our advocacy of our legal system, polluted by those who seek to
deceive, and if in fact the standard we have to go on, which is
to defend the Constitution, if treason, bribery and other high
crimes and misdemeanors in fact is our standard, is not bribery
of such a felony of wickedness and deceit and willful
corruption to manipulate others is contrary to the legitimacy
of our judicial system, isn't it also polluting then to our
bedrock of fairness and truth, and they are of similar
character of bribery and therefore would warrant the serious
capacity of this impeachment proceeding?
Those are my three questions.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The witness will answer.
Mr. Starr. I believe, Congressman, that perjury does take
the same dimension in our law as bribery, because it is a
corruption of the court system.
In response to your second question, courts do indeed, as I
was starting to say, take the truth very seriously, and they
want the truth. That is the object of the process, so that the
truth will come out, not because it is not the party with the
most clever lawyer, but that the facts will come out. Our
adversary system is based upon the truthful statement of
testimony, under oath, and the compliance with court orders and
the like.
You asked, the first question, and I would prefer with
respect to Judge Wright, to answer any question only in
executive session.
Mr. Buyer. Thank you.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairman very much, and I
thank Mr. Starr for being here, and I acknowledge, Mr. Starr,
and that this has been a long day.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I notice that you went to Duke University,
and just having gone to law school just up the road, at the
University of Virginia. But I have to disagree with some of my
colleagues. Firstly, I want to restate the fact that we are not
here to undermine you. I also would like to repeat the
chairman's notice given that it appears that the President has
been cleared, as to Whitewater, Filegate and Travelgate. I
think that this is an important announcement today.
But I do want to refer you to the words of Congressman
Butler of Massachusetts, who indicated in defining the
impeachable offenses of Andrew Johnson that high crimes and
misdemeanors would be subversive of some fundamental principles
of government and this may violate the Constitution. I am going
to make some comments and then I have a brief question, if you
would indulge me.
I notice that you have brought to our attention your
referral of September 11, 1998. In reflecting on what we are
doing, I have read over and over our late colleague's comments
in 1974, Barbara Jordan, who said my faith in the Constitution
is whole, it is complete, and it is total.
I understand her now even better. She was a child of a
segregated South, and I understand what she meant. Felix
Frankfurter said one who belongs to the most vilified and
persecuted minority in history is not likely to be insensitive
to the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
I ask you, Mr. Starr, do you believe that the President, as
any other citizen, has the privilege of the Fifth Amendment?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I just want a yes, yes. That would go for
Monica Lewinsky and Sarah Hawkins, who happened to have
appeared as a witness or was questioned, is that accurate?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Monica Lewinsky's mother, Mrs. Lewis?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And, of course, Susan McDougal?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. They would be subject to the rights and
privileges of the Fifth Amendment?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. On page 30 of your testimony when you
asked for expanded jurisdiction, on pages 30 and 31, I notice
in that recounting there was not one time that you mentioned
Paula Jones. Yet as I understand it, you had a lawyer at a law
firm that you were associated with. Were you associated with
the firm of Kirkland & Ellis?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Was Mr. Richard Porter associated with the
firm of Kirkland & Ellis?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I note that Mr. Richard Porter was asked
to serve as counsel to Ms. Jones. Now, he did not serve as
that, as I understand. Further, I understand that Kirkland &
Ellis prepared pro bono legal documents for what we call the
Women's Legal Forum, is that correct?
Mr. Starr. With respect to the latter question, yes. Very
briefly----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very briefly, my time is short.
Mr. Starr. That is the area I do have personal information
and knowledge on, with respect to the Independent Women's
Forum.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would simply say just in the answers
that you have given today, and with the understanding of due
process, I would say to you, Mr. Starr, that it seems quite
shocking to me that in the course of seeking expanded
jurisdiction, that you did not include those contacts, although
you noted on the record today, although I thought it was so
widely known that it would not need mentioning. Put yourself in
a courtroom setting where the prosecutor did not divulge
particularly devastating conflict of interest matters to a
defendant, and I think due process will come into play.
Let me quickly move to my next question, keeping in mind
the shortness of my time. Would you tell me, Mr. Starr, are you
a member of the Virginia bar?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I am an inactive member of the Virginia
bar.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you are a member of the Virginia bar.
I am likewise an inactive member of that bar. Have you ever
been or are you a member of the American Bar Association?
Mr. Starr. I am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. With that in mind, let me draw your
attention to the Virginia code of ethics, and might I read it
very quickly. If after undertaking employment in contemplated
or pending litigation a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he
or a lawyer in his firm is to be called as a witness on behalf
of his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of a trial
and his firm. The ABA code of professional responsibility says
in considering ethics, the roles of an advocate and of a
witness are inconsistent. The function of an advocate is to
advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a witness
is to state facts objectively.
A judge for example.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I ask the chairman to indulge me 30
seconds.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The Chair will time the gentlewoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me paint the picture for you. I have
served as a judge. I have been somewhat of a prosecutor on a
select committee on assassinations. You have done a similar
thing. How can you move from the prosecutor's chair to the
judge's chair to the witness chair in any court in America, Mr.
Starr? I cannot believe that any American would perceive any
justice, as the Constitution so says, in having a prosecutor
who acts as a judge and who acts as a witness.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time has expired. The
witness will answer the question.
Mr. Starr. Both my office and myself, personally have, in
fact, complied with applicable ethical codes, and I would be
happy to focus on any specific issue under the Virginia code.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Witness.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas
I would like to thank Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Conyers for
giving me this opportunity to speak on this important subject.
Yesterday, as I walked through the Capitol Building, I begin to
think about this hearing, the November 3rd, election, my responsibility
to uphold the Constitution, and my obligation to my constituents in
Texas. As I turned to leave the building, I saw these words inscribed
on the Capitol's ceiling in black letters, ``Here sir, the people
govern.'' These words were used by Alexander Hamilton to refer to the
House of Representatives at the New York federal Constitutional
ratification convention. This is the people's house and they have
spoken, their voices were heard loud and clear; it's time to put this
divisive issue of impeachment in our past, it's time to prepare for
America's future, it's time to move forward and develop solutions to
America's problems, it's time to focus on healthcare, and it's time to
direct our resources at our children's future.
Unfortunately, there is a small group of individuals who are
hellbent on continuing this divisive course of action under the guise
of ``upholding their Constitutional duty.''
Imagine a justice system where a prosecutor can present charges to
a grand jury, obtain an indictment and then proceed to trial. During
the trial, the prosecutor recognizes that he has a weak case and in
desperation he calls himself as a witness, to testify about the
defendant's prior bad acts and his rationale for charging the
defendant. While testifying, he admits that individually and
collectively, the charges are insufficient to meet the standard of
crime, but he believes the defendant is guilty of a pattern of abuse to
obstruct justice. Certainly, if this incident occurred and we lived in
this state, we would be outraged at the waste of financial resources.
In fact, we would call for this prosecutor to end this charade,
immediately, because his conduct and abusive tactics would emasculate
the system he is attempting to protect.
Additionally, there is the risk that this testimony will not be
objective; the prestige of his office will artificially enhance the
testimony's credibility and the likelihood of confusion on the part of
the jury. United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547 (3rd Cir. 1979).
Furthermore, the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility Rule DR
5-102(A), which states, ``If, after undertaking employment in
contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious
that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on
behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial.
More importantly, this prosecutor's conduct may violate the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 3.7 states, ``A lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial in
which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness.'' The comment
accompanying this Rule states,
The roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent;
the function of an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of
another, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively.
A prosecutor is not just an advocate, he is a ``minister of justice.''
Nowhere in the history of this country's system of jurisprudence have
we allowed a prosecutor to take the witness stand to ``vouch for the
credibility'' of the evidence presented during trial; to do so would be
a miscarriage of justice.
Simply put, an officer of the court is charged with preserving the
public confidence in the process of justice. Ethical Canon 9 states,
``A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety.'' The commentary accompanying this rule states:
Integrity is the very breath of justice. Confidence in our
law, our courts, and in the administration of justice is our
primary concern. No practice must be permitted to prevail which
invites towards the administration of justice a doubt or
distrust of its integrity. Erwin M. Jennings Co. v. DiGenova,
141 A. 866 (1928).
Likewise, allowing Independent Counsel Starr to come before the
Judiciary Committee to testify for 2 hours ``about a pattern of abuse
to obstruct justice'' will eviscerate the purpose of the Independent
Counsel Act. This Act was designed to provide a mechanism to prevent
inherent conflicts of interest which could arise where the Executive
branch of government must supervise or conduct an investigation of an
individual associated with its office.
Richard Porter, a member of Mr. Starr's law firm, Kirkland & Ellis,
was acting in an advisory position for the Paula Jones legal team on
her sexual harassment suit against President Clinton. Moreover, Mr.
Starr contemplated writing a brief in support of the Jones suit prior
to becoming Independent Counsel. More importantly, this information was
not disclosed to Attorney General Reno at the time of his appointment
to this neutral non-partisan post. Mr. Starr had an obligation to fully
disclose his biases, prejudices and any relationships between his firm,
Kirkland & Ellis, and the Paula Jones legal advisors.
The Bible teaches,
For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also. .
. . No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the
one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and
despise the other.
Mr. Starr, you cannot serve the interest of the tobacco companies while
maintaining your ethical obligation under the Independent Counsel
Statute. Under the statute you are permitted to continue your private
law practice; however, working for the interest of tobacco calls into
question your motivation for authoring this salacious referral and your
continuous assault on the Presidency.
The Office of the Independent Counsel was created to promote public
confidence and integrity in the judicial system. Section 595(c)
authorizes the Office of the Independent Counsel to submit a referral
to Congress to guarantee that its findings would not be thwarted by
internal sources within that individual's branch of government. This
concept which is consistent with the separation of powers doctrine was
instituted to prevent unfettered authority in a single branch of
government. Accordingly, each branch is vested with the power to check
and balance the others.
Article I, section 2 of the Constitution grants the House of
Representatives the sole Power of Impeachment, while Article I, section
3, authorizes the Senate to try all Impeachments. Hence, the
Legislative branch is charged with checking the Executive branch.
Impeachable offenses are political, as they relate to injuries done
immediately to society itself. The Framers never intended impeachment
or the threat of impeachment to serve as a device for denouncing the
President for private misbehavior or for transforming the United States
into a parliamentary form of government in which Congress can vote ``no
confidence'' in an executive whose behavior it dislikes. The President
is elected by the people of the United States and it is not the
prerogative nor duty of the House of Representatives to undo that
election because of partisan politics.
It is not the fate of a particular individual that is at stake, it
is not about this existing President, but the institution of the
Presidency and the Constitutional process that must rise above the
arena of partisan politics. The purpose of Impeachment is to curb
breaches and abuses of the public trust. The Framers realized that
impeachment is final and non-appealable.
Professor Charles Black stated in Impeachment: A Handbook, that
impeachment should be invoked only against ``serious assaults on the
integrity of the processes of government and such crimes as would so
stain a President as to make his continuance in office dangerous to the
public order.''
During the impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson, in 1867,
Congressman Butler of Massachusetts, announced the following definition
of impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors,
. . . to be one in its nature or consequences subversive of
some fundamental or essential principle of government or highly
prejudicial to the public interest, and this may consist of a
violation of the Constitution.
Certainly, everyone agrees that the President's conduct was wrong.
In fact, it was morally reprehensible, but it does not rise to an
impeachable level. Impeachment is reserved for serious public
wrongdoing of official acts, not private matters. In 1792, Alexander
Hamilton was investigated by Congress for alleged misconduct. It was
discovered that Hamilton was making financial payments to conceal an
adulterous affair. After Congress heard Hamilton's testimony, it was
concluded that the matter was private, and not impeachable. Similarly,
President Clinton's conduct, although improper, should not be regarded
as an impeachable offense because it was not the product of an illegal
use of power.
Twenty-five years ago, the House Committee on the Judiciary faced a
similar responsibility; the impeachment of President Richard Nixon. The
Constitution imposes a grave and serious responsibility on Congress to
protect its fabric and integrity. It would be a dereliction of duty if
we embarked upon a path that would alter the constitutional threshold
for impeachable offenses.
Today, the Members of the House of Representatives consult no
common Oracle or Starr, but the Constitution. More importantly, we
respect the rights of individual citizens. It's time to move forward,
it's time to put foolishness aside, it's time for America's business.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Judge
Starr. Quickly, let me refer to a column by David Broder in
reference to this ``400 professors of history'' letter. Mr.
Broder says: when academics decide to become activists, they
sometimes bring badly needed wisdom and perspective to a raging
political debate. But when they plunge in heedlessly, they risk
looking ridiculous. He says the House is following the process
set forth in the Constitution. This tenured trashing of
Congress for meeting its responsibility says more about the
state of the history profession than about the law of the land.
I am glad that we can at times today return back to the
facts in this case, and, Judge Starr, I want to commend you for
setting forth a clear, documented, compelling case against the
President. You have provided a road map for us to see how and
when the President chose deception rather than truth at many
important crossroads in our judicial system's search for the
truth.
I must say that I have seen this before, but you mention it
again in your statement. I think one of the most chilling
episodes I think I can imagine in American history occurred
with Dick Morris, and again I will read from your statement and
account of Mr. Morris's testimony. But this is one of the
choices you referred to on page 21 that the President makes.
After the public disclosure of the President's relationship
with Ms. Lewinsky and the ongoing criminal investigation, the
President faced a decision. Would he admit the relationship
publicly, correct his testimony in the Jones case, and ask for
the indulgence of the American people, or would he continue to
deny the truth?
On this question, the President consulted others. According
to Dick Morris, the President and he talked on January 21st.
Mr. Morris suggested that the President publicly confess. The
President replied, but what about the legal thing, you know,
the legal thing, you know, Starr and perjury and all. Mr.
Morris suggested they take a poll. Mr. Morris suggested they
take a poll. The President agreed. Mr. Morris called in with
the results. He stated that the American people are willing to
forgive adultery, but not perjury or obstruction of justice.
And our President of the United States, the chief law
enforcement officer of this country, the one who hires the
Attorney General and 93 U.S. Attorneys who enforce all the
Federal laws against you and me, this President said, well, we
will just have to win then.
That is chilling. That is absolutely scary that we have got
that mentality in the position of being the chief law
enforcement officer. As a former prosecutor, and I know you
have tremendous credentials, I know it frightens me to have
these circumstances existing.
I have two questions for you. I don't know what the answer
is to that, and I think that is one of the reasons we are here
today.
Two questions: I am not going to have the opportunity to
perhaps cross-examine the President, I don't know if he is
going to take our invitation, and I don't know if he is going
to respond, and I don't think it is appropriate that I question
his lawyers here today, but one thing that I have a question
on, on this assertion of privilege they make the claim that
this is private conduct that underlies this, but yet they go
out and file documents asserting an executive privilege claim,
which you and I both know is rooted in the Constitution, and it
is meant to protect presidential communications regarding
official decision making, in other words, public conduct.
Is this not talking out of both sides of their mouth? How
can they assert a privilege for public conduct while saying it
is really private conduct?
Let me get the second question so you can answer them both,
as I will let you have the balance of the time. I have alluded
to the fact that I feel your credentials are impeccable, and
based upon your experience and the experience of the many
prosecutors you have referred to today, it is tremendous, and
based upon all this, I question you, do you have an opinion,
not saying whether or not these are impeachable offenses, but
as to the quality of this case in terms of criminal law
violations? Is it a circumstantial case, but is it a weak case,
or a strong case, or something in between?
Mr. Starr. With respect to your first question on assertion
of privilege, I do agree with you that it is odd, I think it is
irregular, to both contend that this is entirely a matter
involving personal conduct, and at the same time invoke
executive privilege to protect fact witnesses who are being
asked facts with respect to that matter. So I think there is an
incoherence and inconsistency with the position.
With respect to the quality of the case, my own judgment,
Congressman Bryant, is that the evidence is strong.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired. I
think it now is proper to take a 10-minute recess. I would like
to ask the audience to remain in the room until Judge Starr
exits the room and ask the members of the committee either to
stay in the room or not go too far away. The committee stands
in recess until 6:10.
[Recess.]
Prepared Statement of Ed Bryant, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Tennessee
As we embark on this important and solemn inquiry today, we must
remind ourselves of what has brought-us to this point in our nation's
history. We are here to look into allegations that our President has
committed impeachable offenses by lying to a federal grand jury and
obstructed a investigation into his alleged wrongdoing.
There is no one in this room who would deny that our country is
based on trust. The trust we have in our leaders, in our judicial
system and our Constitution is what has made our country prosperous.
Other countries have relied on our system of government to protect them
from those who would break the laws for personal gain.
When allegations of wrongdoing by the President are made, they need
to be investigated for credible evidence. To ensure that process, we
rely on the Attorney General to make the decision for an independent
counsel and a three-judge panel to appoint the right person to begin an
independent investigation.
And what has been brought before this committee is a referral
charging that the chief law enforcement officer of our country, who
took a solemn oath to abide by the laws and by our Constitution, has
committed perjury, obstruction of justice and abuse his power as
President. These are not minor offenses, but rather go to the trust
Americans have in our system of government and the rule of law.
These allegations are not minor offenses. They are a breakdown in
the trust we have in our leaders, our judicial system and the office of
the President. We are now faced with the very real fact that our chief
law enforcement officer can break the very laws he has sworn to protect
for his own personal gain. As a result, we are sending a message to
those who believe in our system of government that we will turn away
from our legal responsibilities to benefit those who break our laws.
Today, I anticipate that my colleagues on the other side of the
aisle will use an old defense attorney tactic by shifting the focus of
attention away from the President and on to the Independent Counsel.
These questions will be brutal and accusatory, but in the end we must
not lose sight of what our duty is in this hearing--to get to the truth
of what the allegations are against the President.
We also must remember that this hearing is to establish the facts
in the case. We have established a fairness that gives the White House
attorneys an opportunity to cross examine the Independent Counsel along
with the Democrats' lead attorney. My hope is that all of the questions
surrounding the referral can be answered and we can quickly come to a
resolution on this matter.
As I said before, we must remember that this is a hearing into
allegations against the President and we must stay focused on that if
there is to be any final conclusion to this matter. What is hanging in
the balance is our system of government and the entire trust our nation
has on our laws.
I thank the chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The committee will come to order. The committee
will come to order, please.
Now, ladies and gentlemen, I would just like to announce
sort of a schedule; things are kind of ad hoc up here. We are
going to finish with the members' questioning under the 5-
minute rule. Then when that happens, we are going to take a
half-hour dinner break. It is unfortunate we just took a break,
but maybe it was fortunate for some of you, but anyway, we
will, at the end of the completion of the members' questioning,
take a half-hour break, and then we will come back, and Mr.
Kendall, I believe, will question Mr. Starr. We will start out
with a half-hour, and then if Mr. Kendall needs more time, as I
suspect, we will be liberal in allowing that so that he can ask
what he wants to ask, or needs to ask, and then Mr. Schippers
will question, if he desires to, and then we will let Mr. Starr
go home with three medals and a Purple Heart. And then we go to
a full committee meeting, but you needn't stay for that,
although God knows you are welcome.
So the next questioner is the distinguished gentlewoman
from California, Ms. Waters.
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, let me just
start, before I get into the areas that I would like to pay
attention to, I would like to help out my friend from
California, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren. She asked you, would you
be willing to release the press from their confidentiality
pledge to you and your office so that we can get the leaks
investigated that are in question.
Mr. Starr. I believe that it would, Congresswoman Waters,
be unwise and inappropriate for me at this time in this
setting, and I am delighted to pursue this in executive
session.
Ms. Waters. That's okay. Your answer today is you would be
unwilling to do that?
Mr. Starr. I believe it would be unwise at this time with
litigation under seal still proceeding, but I am very
respectful of the orderliness of that proceeding, and it seems
to me that that----
Ms. Waters. Okay. I just don't want to take up a lot of
time with it. I just wondered if you would do it or not. The
answer is no.
Mr. Starr. Excuse me.
Ms. Waters. Yes, I understand.
Mr. Starr. At this time, because of the pendency of
litigation----
Ms. Waters. Let me just go on, because I have only 5
minutes. I have been one of your harshest critics, and you know
it. I have been appalled by what I consider the gross
unfairness of the procedure, of the way in which you have
conducted yourself. I have been very critical of my colleagues
on the other side of the aisle because of the way that they
received these referrals and then dumped them into the public
domain without any opportunity for the administration or White
House to review the information, so I make no bones about it. I
think that some of the tactics that have been used are
unacceptable. I think that the moment it was understood that
you were going to remain, for example, on the payroll of your
law firm where you would be representing the tobacco companies,
for example, while the President of the United States had made
them a number one target in his administration for dealing with
trying to discontinue the smoking by youth in our society and
dealing with all of the health risks, and I think that it is
just totally unacceptable that as late as 1995, you were
representing the tobacco interests in your law firm at the same
time that you were working for us.
How long did you work for your law firm representing the
tobacco interests, and how much did it overlap with this
investigation starting with Whitewater?
Mr. Starr. I had two representations. One was an appeal on
a class action, which was in the time frame, Congresswoman
Waters, of 1995 and 1996, and prior to that time, I believe it
was 1994, I would have to reconstruct this, I took on a
specific representation, again an appeal, which, as you may
know, is what I typically do. That was in the 1994 time frame.
The issues that I took on were in one instance
constitutional issues, and the second was a Federal civil
procedure issue.
Ms. Waters. Did you ever feel you were in conflict of
interest by working for your law firm at the same time that you
were working as Independent Counsel?
Mr. Starr. Congresswoman Waters, I did not, and I had
ethics advice, both at the law firm and in the Independent
Counsel's Office, and our effort has always been in our office
to make sure that we are addressing these issues carefully.
Ms. Waters. You do normally seek the advice so that you
will not get into ethical problems; is that right?
Mr. Starr. Yes, we do.
Ms. Waters. Let me just ask you, you did take the oath of
office here today, and you mentioned in your testimony that the
President took the oath of office to tell the truth. However,
when you were asked about how you conducted yourself when you
sought to expand your jurisdiction in this matter, you
literally did not disclose information that may have caused the
Attorney General to rule differently, and what is interesting
about it, the way that you presented it today, when you were
asked very specific questions, you said, I don't recall, I
don't quite remember, I am not so sure, I will have to search
my memory, those kinds of answers. Yet, when the President of
the United States responded in that way, you outright called
him a liar.
Now, am I to assume that your inability to recollect your
involvement--for example, how many hours did you spend on the
brief that you did for the Independent Women's Forum?
Mr. Starr. Congresswoman Waters, the answer to the question
is I did no brief for the Independent Women's Forum, and I also
respectfully, but firmly, disagree with your characterization.
I tried to put before this committee the events with respect to
January of 1998, and why it was that certain things that I had
been involved with, such as the Independent Women's Forum----
Ms. Waters. What did you do for them?
Mr. Starr. I beg your pardon?
Ms. Waters. What did you do for the Independent Women's
Forum.
Mr. Starr. I considered, as I did for Bob Fiske, doing an
amicus brief solely limited to the proposition that the
President of the United States is just like the rest of us in
that as a private citizen he must, in fact, respond in court to
lawsuits against him.
Ms. Waters. You didn't consider that that was possible
information that you should have disclosed to the Attorney
General when you were seeking to expand your jurisdiction?
Mr. Starr. May I respond briefly?
Mr. Hyde. Please.
Mr. Starr. As I indicated, that information with respect to
the Independent Women's Forum was, I believed then and I
continue to believe, publicly reported. What I have indicated
today to the committee is the Bob Fiske inquiry had not been in
the public domain, but I also did not think that was an issue
of relevancy to the Attorney General, even though frankly,
perhaps, I should have thought of that inasmuch as that was the
Department of Justice through Bob Fiske, the Independent
Counsel appointed by the Department of Justice.
Mr. Hyde. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Ms. Waters. Yes, I do believe--Mr. Chairman, I would ask
you for 30 seconds, just one issue I have to get in here about
abuse of power.
There is a whole list of items that I would like to discuss
with you. Much has been said about what happened with Monica
Lewinsky over in the shopping center at the hotel, but there
are some others that I am very concerned about. Are you
familiar with Ms. Steele and what she is alleging about what
you are doing? Did your investigators ask for her tax records,
her bank records, her credit report, her telephone records, and
question the adoption of a child to try and find out whether it
was legal? Did they treat her that way?
Mr. Starr. Congresswoman Waters, the answer to the first
question is--if I have the questions right, you asked a series
of questions. What was your first question? I think the answer
was yes.
Ms. Waters. Tell me about Ms. Steele. What do you know
about her? Did you know your investigators had asked for her
tax records, her banks records, her credit records, telephone
records, all because supposedly she was told something by one
of the targeted witnesses in this case?
Mr. Starr. I now understand the question. We have asked,
through FBI investigators, a variety of questions to
individuals that in the judgment of professional, experienced
investigators have a bearing on the witness's credibility.
Ms. Waters. Did you know she felt abused by you and your
investigators?
Mr. Starr. I am aware that there are issues that she has
raised----
Ms. Waters. Okay, fine. I just wanted to know if you knew.
Finally----
Mr. Hyde. The gentlewoman's time--if you are not going to
give him a chance to answer, your time has expired.
Ms. Waters. Let me just say this. He may take the time to
answer, but there is one more, a 16-year-old boy who was
subpoenaed at school that you sent your investigators to school
to get because you were trying to get his father, and you know
who I am talking about.
Mr. Canady. Mr. Chairman, regular order.
Mr. Hyde. The gentlewoman--really, give Mr. Starr a chance
to answer, and please don't ask more questions.
Ms. Waters. All right, okay.
Mr. Starr. I can be brief. That was in the Arkansas phase
of our investigation. The individual in question we believed
had relevant information. No subpoena, as I understand it, was,
in fact, served, but the agent in question did go to the
school.
In my judgment, that was a misjudgment. I don't think he
should even have gone to the school. But it is my best
understanding that he did not, in fact, effect the service of
the subpoena on the young person there. If I am mistaken, then
I will say this: No, we should not have gone to the school. But
could I add this: We have had in this investigation
jurisdiction granted to us in a wide variety of areas that has
caused--when I took over for Bob Fiske, he had a presence of
about 120 people in Little Rock.
Congresswoman Waters, there may be steps along the way that
you would say, well, why was that particular judgment made?
Gosh, that wasn't a very wise thing to do. And I do think it is
unwise to go to a school. I completely agree with that.
Ms. Waters. What about the 80-year-old grandmother, the
same woman who----
Mr. Hyde. The gentlewoman's time has expired. Will you
please follow the Chair?
Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chabot is recognized.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It seems pretty clear to me that there is a strategy by
Bill Clinton and his allies to demonize anybody who gets in
their way: Paula Jones, Kathleen Willey, Henry Hyde, you, Judge
Starr, this committee, even the press to some extent. It is
everybody else's fault, and everybody else is to blame,
everybody except Bill Clinton, except the President.
Now, in criminal cases, and I think Mr. Canady referred to
this, it is a pretty common practice to do this. If the facts
of the case are against you, if your client is pretty clearly
guilty, put the police on trial; they planted the evidence; the
police are corrupt; they forced your client to sign the
confession--anything to get your client off the hook.
Judge Starr, my question to you is this: How difficult is
it for you as an Independent Counsel to do your job when you
are up against this onslaught, particularly when you are
limited in your ability to defend yourself and to defend the
other prosecutors under you, and to defend your staff in a
public forum; limited, that is, until today?
Mr. Starr. Well, I think it is inherently a challenge, and
I must say that it does, in my judgment, raise questions about
the relationship between the Independent Counsel, the Congress
of the United States, and I am speaking generally, and also the
Justice Department. But I can only give you my philosophy.
I think it is my obligation to follow the rules, and that
is what we seek to do. That is why I reached out and tried to
get the right kind of ethics advice and the like to make sure
that some of these difficult judgments were, in fact, done the
right way. And that is all we can do.
But, for example, we cannot set up a congressional liaison
shop. We just don't have the resources to do that. We can't set
up an effective public information apparatus the way the great
departments of government do.
So I think it is inherently a grave challenge for an
independent counsel to be told, go set up shop, and you are out
there on your own, and we just look eventually to some report
or conclusion and the like, and you are a bit of the Lone
Ranger, as it were, in terms of whether you are part of any
entity or structure. And that is one of the reasons that,
Congressman, what I tried to do was to create mechanisms
whereby we had not only a deliberative process so that the
kinds of issues that are being raised here today we can respond
to and say, yes, we did have a process in place; yes, there
were questions raised about what we did on January 16th at the
Ritz Carlton. We consulted with the Justice Department. We had
experienced prosecutors evaluating it. They were very familiar
with the ethics rules, and they made judgments based upon good
faith determinations of what the appropriate procedures were.
But we had to create that mechanism all by ourselves, and I
tried to do that to the best of my ability.
Mr. Chabot. Early in the investigation of the Lewinsky
matter, President Clinton promised to fully cooperate with the
investigators, stating that he wanted to divulge more rather
than less, and sooner rather than later. How cooperative has
the administration been in your investigation?
Mr. Starr. With respect to this phase of the investigation,
the administration has been uncooperative. To the contrary, it
has litigated numerous issues, although in fairness, in
fairness, I think of the things that we have litigated, and in
fairness, the administration has produced a goodly number of
records and the like, and so I would say at a routine level,
requests for subpoenas or documents and so forth, there
certainly has been that, and I don't want to be unfair about
saying that.
But there is a marked distinction between the cooperation
that we received, for example, in the FBI files matter and the
cooperation, or lack thereof, that we received in this and in
other phases of our investigations. And to me, one of the
markers is the invocation of privileges. It may very well be
that the considered judgment of this body is that any privilege
can be invoked no matter how unmeritorious one thinks it is,
and that that is not an abuse. Perhaps we live in such a
litigious age that that is the new way of doing things.
I disagree with that. I think if privileges are invoked for
the purposes of delay and have the intended effect of delay--
and I think that is what happened here--they lose. I have heard
complaints about the tactics of the investigation, and yet we
go to court. And as I indicated earlier, 17 visits to the
courts of appeals, thus far we have prevailed in each of those.
That sounds like an investigation that is getting it right.
Mr. Chabot. Let me just conclude by referring to your
report towards the end of it where you stated, and I quote,
``given the hurricane force political winds swirling about us,
we were well aware that no matter what decision we made,
criticism would come from somewhere. As Attorney General Reno
had said, in a high profile case like this, you are damned if
you do, and you are damned if you don't, so you better just do
what you think is right, what is the right and the fair
thing.''
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired. I thank the
gentleman.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Starr, as a former judge and appellate
litigator, I am sure you know how important your own
credibility is to the decisions that this committee must make.
The key fact-finding in this investigation has been done
exclusively by you and your deputies. All of the important
grand jury testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Linda Tripp, and
President Clinton was elicited under your direction and never
subject to cross-examination. You and you alone decided who to
immunize and what to investigate. So if your credibility is
tainted by bias or poor judgment on your part, this committee
and the American people must at the very least treat the many
inferences that you draw in your referral with extreme caution,
and must question whether your referral is indeed the whole
story.
What do we see, Mr. Starr, when we look at your personal
involvement in the issues before us? Well, we have heard a lot
of them this afternoon. Among other things, we see that you
consulted with Paula Jones' attorneys at least a half a dozen
times in the summer of 1994 about how to frame an argument
against presidential immunity, something you apparently failed
to disclose to the Justice Department when you sought to expand
your jurisdiction in January of 1998, and something that might
have influenced the Attorney General to appoint someone other
than you to carry out this part of the investigation.
During the same summer, you appeared on PBS's ``News Hour''
to argue against the President's position in the Jones case.
For most of your tenure, it has been indicated here, as
Independent Counsel, you remained a partner in a private law
firm, receiving $1.2 million in salary per year, while at the
same time one of your law partners was leaking an affidavit in
the Jones case to the Chicago Tribune in November of 1997, as
well as steering Linda Tripp to you so that she could entrap
the President without becoming entrapped herself in an illegal
tape recording charge.
You represented the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Company in
1995 class action litigation, a company that had a major stake
in the failure of the Clinton Administration, of its
initiatives to keep kids from smoking, and the Justice
Department's criminal investigation of big tobacco.
You made a commitment in February of 1997 to become the
dean of Pepperdine University's new School of Public Policy, a
school whose creation owes in large part to a $250,000 donation
from a newspaper publisher with a habit of funding anti-Clinton
Administration publications, and also Arkansas-based dirt-
digging operations.
You made a $1,750 contribution to your firm's political
action committee in January of 1995, a PAC that in turn
contributed to four Republican candidates for President who
were running against President Clinton in 1996.
You were hired as a consultant to the Bradley Foundation in
the summer of 1995 on the issue of school vouchers, a
foundation that provides funding to some of President Clinton's
harshest critics.
And now, Mr. Starr, when we read your referral, we see that
you have found the time and the space to specifically mention
that one of the days that the President and Monica Lewinsky got
together was Easter Sunday, but you chose not to include the
critical statement from Ms. Lewinsky's grand jury statement,
quote: ``No one ever asked me to lie, and I was never promised
a job for my silence.''
Mr. Starr, your own ethics advisor, Sam Dash, is on the
record stating that while your conduct in many of these
respects violated no technical legal ethics rules, that
conduct, and I quote, ``does have an odor to it.'' Further, Mr.
Dash said on another occasion, quote, ``I can understand how
responsible reporters and reasonable people could question
Ken's judgment.''
Mr. Starr, in light of these facts and opinions, is it your
position that there is no basis whatsoever for the American
people to question the credibility of your work?
Mr. Starr. My answer is the credibility should be assessed
by the evidence that is contained herein. This is an
elaborately documented----
Mr. Meehan. Excuse me. Mr. Starr, you made inferences, you
are asking us to rely----
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Meehan, your time has expired. Give the
witness some time to answer the long----
Mr. Meehan. But this isn't just about the evidence, this is
about the credibility; wouldn't you agree?
Mr. Hyde. Would you let the witness answer? Please, take
such time as you need, Mr. Starr.
Mr. Starr. Congressman, you may disagree, but what has been
submitted to you is an elaborately documented product of
professional prosecutors. These are professional prosecutors
from around the country, some of whom are on detail from the
Justice Department.
Mr. Meehan. I am a former prosecutor myself.
Mr. Starr. Yes, I am aware of that. With respect to the
practice of law, I think that is a serious question, should
independent counsels do it, and I know my judgment has been
called into question by some. I think Sam was very honest. Sam
said, I just don't think you should be practicing law at all.
May I say this? The statute contemplates that independent
counsels are going to be drawn out of private practice, and I
have lost count, but at one time 17 of the 18 independent
counsels did, in fact, carry on private practice. And if I may
say, that was part of the original understanding that I was
going to continue with my private law practice while giving
this, as I have always sought to do, the top priority.
With respect to issues about the firm, it is a very large
firm with a large number of offices in several cities, and with
a number of lawyers.
Mr. Meehan. But you have a duty under the code----
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Meehan, please. Mr. Meehan, will you please--
--
Mr. Meehan. If you would recognize that----
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Meehan, will you withhold, please.
Ms. Waters. That is why we should have more than 5 minutes.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Chairman, these are complicated issues. You
can't just get to it in 5 minutes.
Mr. Hyde. Have you finished?
Mr. Starr. I think I have concluded my answer, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Thank you.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As the day draws longer, the charges become more absurd. I
think I heard, or maybe I was mistaken, that we were going in
the direction of the last line of questioning with Monica
entrapping the President. Now, there is a rich one. I suppose
that is the same as the President being trapped into perjury.
As a matter of law, is it not well established, Judge
Starr, that there is no such thing as being trapped into
perjury?
Mr. Starr. Yes, that is true.
Mr. Barr. One can never be forced to tell a lie before a
grand jury or a Federal court; is that correct, legally?
Mr. Starr. There is no excuse for telling a lie, you are
correct; I mean, under oath.
Mr. Barr. Let me offer up several presumptions and then ask
you a question.
Let's presume, Judge Starr, that Linda Tripp is a really
nasty person. Let's presume further, Judge Starr, for purposes
of a hypothetical, that Lucianne Goldberg is a crafty
manipulator. Let's presume that Monica is an oversexed
blabbermouth. Let's presume that there really is a vast right
wing conspiracy out there somewhere, maybe at work here today.
Let's presume that Paula Jones really was interested just in
the money. Let's presume that the independent counsel statute
is not a perfect statute, and let's presume that, horror of
horrors, you use tobacco products. Let's presume all of those
awful things.
Would any of that, in your professional judgment, change
the conclusions contained in your referral and in your
testimony today that there is substantial and credible evidence
that President William Jefferson Clinton may have committed
impeachable offenses?
Mr. Starr. It would not change it. The facts have a real
power to them, and it was Justice Brandeis who said, ``facts,
facts, facts; give me facts.'' And that is what we have sought
to do, Congressman, in this referral.
Mr. Barr. You have, and I commend you for standing up to
the nonsense, and that is putting it mildly, that you have had
to put up with today in questions by the other side, and in the
last several years, and I really do commend you for your
ability to stand up in the face of that and stick to the facts
and stick to the law.
Talking briefly about the law, Judge Starr, we are not
limited here in this committee just to what you present to us,
in considering whether or not pursuant to the House resolution
directing that we look into the possible impeachment of William
Jefferson Clinton, to just what you have presented, are we?
Mr. Starr. Not at all. I have a statutory duty, but you
have a constitutional duty.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
I do have one quick question, and then I would like to, if
we could have my paper distributed, please, to the members and
Judge Starr. But before I refer to that, with regard to your
reference to the FBI file case on page 47 of your written
testimony, Judge Starr, has your office interviewed or deposed
Mack McLarty with regard to Filegate?
Mr. Starr. I cannot recall off the top of my head whether
we conducted that particular interview or not. I will say this,
and I can check and again get back to the committee, but my
evaluation and assessment, based on the professional
prosecutors who carried this out, is that it was thorough, but
I have to check to that.
Mr. Barr. I would appreciate it, because your conclusion
there left me a little bit concerned, because I hear a great
deal from the American people of concern about abuse by the FBI
in Filegate, and it is my understanding that there are a number
of people that have not yet been deposed or fully deposed in
that case, and I really would appreciate it if you would check
on that so we don't completely close the door on that.
There is a document which I believe has been contributed.
This is a document that I will introduce into the record with
my written comments, by Jerome Zeifman, the former chief
counsel of the House Judiciary Committee in 1973 and 1974, and
it is rather extensive, and I have no--I am not going to make
you read it today.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bob Barr, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia
Today's hearing may not change a single mind on this committee. We
will spend the day asking Ken Starr questions, some of us motivated by
a desire to learn, others motivated by a desire to score political
points, and others driven by having a few minutes in the ever-shifting
national limelight. When it's all over, those of us who think the
President has committed impeachable conduct will continue to say so.
Those of us who believe the President was the innocent victim of a vast
conspiracy will continue to oppose impeachment.
In many ways, this hearing is a paradigm for the illness ailing our
Democracy. In the days of Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Henry
Clay, and Daniel Webster, television cameras were absent. However, the
words that soared in these chambers made their absence scarcely
noticeable. These men were not forced to reach a distracted and
disinterested public in the instantly vanishing banalities we call
television sound bites. Their words were based on principles that
sprang from their hearts, grew in their minds, and gained acceptance in
the forge of debates that shaped an infant nation.
Unlike the speeches many offer these days, the words of our
predecessors had the power to persuade; because they were based on true
ideas, and on an understanding of government and governing that is all
but lost in most of what happens in the Congress of this last decade of
the 20th Century. Debates mattered, and they actually swayed votes.
Speeches enacted ideas.
What has happened to us? Where has our capacity to think rationally
gone? The report we have read, and that we will discuss today, remains
unrebutted. Think about that. No one is questioning the facts.
What do the facts in this case prove? They prove the President lied
to the American people; and perjured himself before a federal court,
and before a grand jury. They also prove he engaged in an effort to
obstruct justice and tamper with witnesses. These un-rebutted facts
conclusively prove that, as we begin this debate, a prosecutable felon
sits in our nation's highest office.
Additionally, I introduce into the record today a memo written by
Jerry Zeifman, concluding the President has engaged in bribery. Mr.
Zeifman, who served as counsel for Chairman Rodino in the Watergate
hearings, is from a different political party than I am. We probably
disagree on more than 90% of the major political questions. However, we
share a reverence for the rule of law, and a desire to vindicate it.
Sadly, I fear Jerry Zeifman may belong to another--vanishing--
generation of political leaders; a generation willing to put
partisanship aside in order to preserve the Constitution. Another
leader of years gone by put it this way:
Americans are free to disagree with the law but not to
disobey it. For a government of laws and not of men, no man,
however prominent and powerful, and no mob, however unruly or
boisterous, is entitled to defy a court of law. If this country
should ever reach the point where any man or group of men, by
force or threat of force, could long defy the commands of our
courts and our Constitution, then no law would stand free from
doubt, no judge would be sure of his writ and no citizen would
be safe from his neighbors.
These words were delivered to the Nation by President Kennedy on
Sept. 30, 1962. The President made these remarks regarding one of the
greatest moral questions we ever faced as a nation. That question was
whether an American's skin color should void his ability to obtain
equal justice under law. Fortunately for us, we answered that question
the right way, beginning a successful fight for justice that forged the
opinions of many in this room today.
We face the same question today. President Kennedy's words are no
less applicable now than they were then. Bill Clinton may not agree
with sexual harassment laws, but he must follow them. Bill Clinton may
be a prominent person, but that does not give him license to lie in
court.
We have a huge responsibility as a Nation. We can close our eyes.
But when we open them, the problem will still be there, looming before
us with a brooding darkness. We can answer this question the wrong way.
And allow the President to hold his office with the knowledge that he
has committed multiple felonies. Or, we can answer this question the
right way. The only right answer to the question is to respond to
presidential felonies with impeachment. Regardless of whether the
President is ultimately removed by the Senate, we must take this step
in the House, as directed by our Constitution, in order to establish a
precedent that will prevent future Presidents from engaging in similar
conduct.
______
MEMORANDUM to: Bob Barr, Member, House Judiciary Committee
FROM: Jerome M. Zeifman, Former Chief Counsel, House Judiciary
Committee (1973-1974)
DATE: November 18, 1998
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Law and Facts on Bribery as an Impeachable
Offense
preface
As described in chapter 18 of my book, ``Without Honor: The
Impeachment of President Nixon and the Crimes of Camelot,'' in the
summer of 1974 the House Judiciary Committee reported out three
articles of impeachment. As characterized by then-Committee member
William Hungate, the drafting of the articles was ``[a] distillation of
the thought of many members from many areas, and of differing
philosophies.''
As I also described in chapter 18, the actual drafting of the
articles was done by two drafting teams of the members themselves. One
team was comprised of Democrats, headed by Representative Jack Brooks
of Texas and Don Edwards of California. The other was referred to in
the press as the ``Swing Seven'' and was comprised of three
conservative Democrats from the south, and three moderate Republicans.
Although in my book I gave the members of both groups credit themselves
as the draftsmen, Tom Mooney (your present General Counsel) was the
drafting counsel for the Swing Seven, and I the drafting counsel for
the Democrats.
Tracking the language and format of the Nixon articles as closely
as possible, I am submitting for your consideration the text of my
recommendations for a proposed Article of Impeachment against President
Clinton for bribery, which follows:
bribery
In his conduct of the office of President of the United States,
William J. Clinton has given or received bribes with respect to one or
more of the following:
(1) Approving, condoning, or acquiescing in the surreptitious
payment of bribes for the purpose of obtaining the silence or
influencing the testimony of Webster Hubbell as a witness or
potential witness in criminal proceedings;
(2) Approving, condoning, or acquiescing in the use of
political influence by Vernon Jordan in obtaining employment
for the purpose of obtaining the silence or influencing the
testimony of Monica Lewinsky as a witness or potential witness
in civil or criminal proceedings; and
(3) Approving, condoning or acquiescence in the receipt of
bribes in connection with the issuance of an executive order
which had the effect of giving Indonesia a monopoly on the sale
of certain types of coal.
legal authority
Currently, the federal bribery statute, section 201 of the Criminal
Code (Title 18), reaches the giving, receiving or acceptance of
anything of value for contemplated acts by public officials or
witnesses in judicial or congressional proceedings as well as for acts
already performed. The essence of the offense is the giving,
solicitation or receipt of the bribe. The giving, solicitation or
receipt may be accomplished through an intermediary who need not be a
public official. Conspiracy to commit bribery may be a separate
criminal offense (18 U.S.C. 371).
The crime of bribery consists of the voluntary giving or receipt of
benefits in corrupt attempts to influence the actions of public
officials or testimony of witnesses. The crime is completed on the
giving, solicitation or receipt of the bribe itself, and there need be
no delivery of the ``quid pro quo'' in order to convict.
Under section 201 it is not necessary to show the official or
witness who gave, solicited or received the bribe possessed criminal
intent. Under a series of Supreme Court decisions, to obtain a
conviction, it is only necessary to show the official or his
intermediary or the witness gave, solicited, received or agreed to
receive something of value with knowledge that the donor was
compensating him or her for an official act or for testimony (or, non-
testimony) as a witness in a judicial or congressional proceeding.
More recent decisions of the Supreme Court have imposed even
stricter prohibitions on public officials than those in existence at
the time of the Nixon impeachment inquiry. In its 1992 opinion, Evans
v. United States, the Court interpreted section 1951 of the criminal
code (the Hobbs Act), holding:
Passive acceptance of a benefit by a public official is
sufficient to form the basis of a Hobbs Act violation if the
official knows that he is being offered the payment in exchange
for a specific requested exercise of his official power. The
official need not take any specific action to induce the
offering of the benefit. [HE483]
In my view--based on several centuries of impeachment precedents
which I analyzed and published as Chief Counsel to the House Judiciary
Committee during the Nixon impeachment inquiry, as well as Supreme
Court decisions relating both to bribery and the complicity of
government officials in the abuse of political influence--there is now
clearly sufficient evidence already on the public record to impeach
President Clinton for giving and receiving bribes. My understanding of
the facts already on the public record follows.
facts
Bribery Involving Whitewater and Webster Hubbell
When Bill Clinton first ran for President, Whitewater became a
national political issue. On March 8, 1992 during the Democratic
primary campaign, reporter Jeff Gerth of the New York Times revealed
the Clintons had received improper loans and filed false income tax
returns; claiming deductions for interest they had not paid. During the
same period, referring to Bill Clinton as the ``scandal-a-week
candidate,'' former California governor Jerry Brown made similar
Whitewater-related charges.
As was later learned by congressional investigators, to help the
Clintons respond to inquiries from the press and charges from other
candidates, Vincent Foster. Mrs. Clinton's then-law partner, who was
soon to become Bernard Nussbaum's Deputy White House Counsel, assembled
all the information he could on Whitewater. Webster Hubbell, who was
then also Mrs. Clinton's law partner and Bill Clinton's closest friend,
secretly removed the firm's only copies of files relating to Madison
Guaranty as well other as Rose Law Firm clients for whom Mrs. Clinton
performed legal services.
The files, which were legally the property of the clients, were
removed without the firm's consent and were later stored in Hubbell's
Washington home after he was appointed Associate Attorney General. In
addition, Hubbell and Foster were able to obtain computer print-outs of
the Rose Law Firm's billing records relating to Hillary Clinton's
representation of Madison Guaranty.
The records were later subpoenaed by Independent Counsel Robert
Fiske in early 1994, and by the Senate Whitewater Committee in October
1995. But they were no longer to be found. As was noted in the report
of the Whitewater Committee: ``At every important turn crucial files
and documents `disappeared' or were withheld from scrutiny whenever
questions were raised.'' [HE2 p. 40, 41]
Among Hillary Clinton's billing records that ``disappeared'' were
those relating to another questionable land deal and loan exchange
scheme of McDougal's, known as Castle Grande. The project benefitted
Webster Hubbell's father-in-law, Seth Ward. In 1988, bank regulators
had charged Castle Grande was a ``sham'' that cost federal taxpayers $4
million. [HE2 pp. 40, 41]
In 1992 and 1993 Hillary Clinton had denied she had done any legal
work for McDougal or Madison. In April 1994 it was learned some of the
Rose Law Firm Whitewater-related documents had been shredded. When
asked by reporters what she knew about the shredding, Mrs. Clinton
said: ``Nothing . . . [It] didn't happen, and I know nothing about any
other such stories . . . Absolutely not.''
In May 1995, Mrs. Clinton provided federal investigators written
responses under oath. She denied any knowledge of Castle Grande,
stating she had ``no recollection'' of doing legal work for Seth Ward.
[HE2 pp. 40, 41]
In January 1996, the First Lady admitted in written answers to
federal banking officials that in 1988--the year in which regulators
first began investigating Castle Grande--she had ordered the shredding
of three Castle Grande files, stating: ``It appears that I cooperated
with this effort [to dispose of the files].''
As for the files that had not been shredded, Hillary Clinton was
eventually to state through her attorney she ``may have'' reviewed them
during the 1992 campaign, but denied any knowledge of their
whereabouts. Hubbell was later to testify he last saw the records
during the 1992 presidential campaign in the possession of Vincent
Foster.
On July 17, 1993 Foster was found dead in Washington's Fort Marcy
Park and had apparently committed suicide. On the same day in Little
Rock, the FBI had obtained a warrant to search the office of David Hale
as part of its investigation of Capital Management Services, the
company through which Hale had loaned Susan McDougal $300,000 at the
request of James McDougal and then-governor Clinton.
Following the discovery of Foster's body, White House Counsel
Bernard Nussbaum initially promised Deputy Attorney General Philip
Heymann and Justice Department investigators full access to the files
in Foster's office. However, the First Lady insisted investigators be
denied ``unfettered access'' to Foster's files. After talking to one of
Hillary Clinton's closest advisers, Susan Thomases, Nussbaum reversed
himself, reneged on his promise to the Justice Department, and began to
impede the investigation.
Request by the Justice Department and Park Police to seal-off
Foster's office were ignored, giving White House aides an opportunity
to remove some of Foster's files. Nussbaum also asserted he alone would
first examine Foster's files and decide which documents to make
available to Justice Department investigators. He also asserted as
White House Counsel he would be present at interrogations of witnesses
by the FBI and the police.
Congressional investigators learned that after Nussbaum had
initially searched Foster's brief case he had declared it empty. Later
one of Nussbaum's aides purportedly searched the brief case and found
torn-up pieces of a note by Foster expressing bitterness about his life
in Washington. When Nussbaum met with investigators and produced an
envelope containing the pieces of the note the pieces fell out of the
envelope on to the floor.
Nussbaum and the White House soon clashed with Deputy Attorney
General Heymann, who later quietly resigned to return to a teaching
position at the Harvard Law School. Later, in sworn testimony to the
Senate Whitewater Committee Heymman said he had objected to Nussbaum's
conduct and asked him. ``Bernie, are you hiding something?'' Heymann
also testified that, because of the obstruction of the investigation,
he warned the Clinton White House of a ``major disaster brewing.''
Heymann had argued Nussbaum ``should not decide . . . alone'' which
papers in Foster's office could be reviewed by authorities, and that
``White House lawyers should not sit in on interviews of witnesses.''
Explaining that ``the player with significant stakes in the process
cannot be a referee.'' Heymann testified he was ``very angry and very
adamant'' in telling Nussbaum that career Justice Department officials
should review the documents.
As congressional investigators continued to probe events related to
Foster's death, they learned that in 1993 to Clintons were aware of a
pending criminal investigation of McDougal's Madison Bank by the
Resolution Trust Corporation, a federal regulatory agency that named
Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker as a target and the Clintons as
witnesses to, and beneficiaries of, illegal actions. [3/roadmap]
Foster was engaged in preparing responses to expected Whitewater
questions. He was also given the responsibility for the preparation of
the Clintons' tax returns for 1992 to reflect properly the sale of
their shares in Whitewater.
Congressional investigators were also able to obtain evidence that
Nussbaum was not alone in searching Foster's unsealed office on the
night of his death. Others included President Clinton's aide Patsy
Thomasson, and Margaret Williams, Mrs. Clinton's Chief of Staff.
Although each denied under oath they had removed any documents, Ms.
Williams' testimony was contradicted by a Secret Service agent who
testified he saw her leave Foster's office on the night of his death
with a stack of thick file folders.
Five days after Foster's death Nussbaum, without preparing an
inventory, turned over a number of files to Ms. Williams who
transferred them to the White House residence. In the ensuing effort to
obtain the missing files, a number of subpoenas were issued by
congressional committees and independent counsel Kenneth Starr. Under
subpoena to produce her billing records relating to the Madison Bank,
Mrs. Clinton stated through her personal counsel she ``may have'' seen
them during the 1992 campaign but did not know their present
whereabouts.
In August 1995 the missing billing records were eventually found by
presidential aide Carolyn Huber, in the ``book room'' next to Mrs.
Clinton's office in the White House residence. Mrs. Huber was later to
testify she did not realize what they were until she looked at them
again five months later in sorting out several boxes of documents in
her office. It was not until January 1996--two years after they were
first subpoenaed--that the billing records were turned over by personal
counsel for the President and Mrs. Clinton. Mrs. Clinton then denied
knowing how the records got to the book room, where access was limited
mostly to the Clintons and several selected friends.
The billing records contain handwritten notes and questions to Mrs.
Clinton from both Foster and Hubbell. They also contradict public
statements and sworn testimony by Mrs. Clinton that she had done little
or no legal work for Madison and had no knowledge of Castle Grande. The
records show she billed Madison for at least 60 hours of legal services
over 15 months, had numerous meeting, with Hubbell's father-in-law,
Seth Ward, and talked with Ward on the phone at least 14 times.
The complicity of Hillary Clinton, Nussbaum, and other aides to the
President in the obstruction of the investigations of Whitewater by
Congress and the independent counsel now has a sad irony. Twenty years
earlier on the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry staff,
both Hillary Rodham and Bernard Nussbaum were aware the role of Nixon's
White House counsel, John Dean, in the cover-up of Watergate was a
basis for charging Nixon with an impeachable offense.
In 1972, following the arrest of Watergate burglar Howard Hunt and
others, John Dean alone had personally examined the contents of Hunt's
White House safe, and had sat in on the interrogation of witnesses by
the Justice Department. For his acts, Dean was charged with the felony
of obstructing justice and served a prison term. In 1993, as Dean's
successor, Nussbaum similarly interposed himself between the Justice
Department's investigation of the files in the White House office of
Vincent Foster.
At the time of Watergate, Nussbaum and Hillary Rodham were aware
that for his complicity in Dean's acts and those of other White House
aides, President Nixon was charged with an impeachable offense by the
House Judiciary Committee and named as an ``unindicted co-conspirator''
by Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski. They were also aware of
the legal principles of complicity relied on both by the Judiciary
Committee and by Watergate prosecutor Jaworski. Under those principles,
if the President establishes a policy of obstructing investigations, he
becomes accountable for the acts of his aides in the pursuit of that
policy.
Under the same principles, President Clinton now warrants
impeachment for bribery; as well as for the cover-up of Whitewater by
Bernard Nussbaum, Hillary Clinton, other White House aides, and the
President's best friend, Webster Hubbell. As concluded in the 650-page
final report of the Senate Whitewater Committee released on June 18,
1996:
By the time of Vincent Foster's death in July 1993, the
Clintons had established a pattern of concealing their
involvement with Whitewater and the McDougals' Madison Guaranty
S&L. The actions of senior White House officials and other
close Clinton associates in the days and weeks following Mr.
Foster's death . . . were but part of a pattern that began in
1988 of concealing, controlling and even destroying damaging
information concerning the Whitewater real estate investment
and the Clintons' ties to James and Susan McDougal and the
Madison Savings and Loan. Indeed, at the time of Mr. Foster's
death, the Clintons and their associates were aware that the
Clintons' involvement with Whitewater land deal, the McDougals,
and the Madison S&L might subject them to civil liability and
even criminal investigation.
In 1997, further evidence came to light that was also reminiscent
of the Nixon impeachment proceedings. Based in part on the arrangement
by White House aides of payments of ``hush money'' to Howard Hunt and
other Watergate burglars, the first article of impeachment adopted by
the Judiciary Committee at the time of Watergate, charged President
Nixon with nine offenses, two of which included:
Approving, condoning, and acquiescing in the surreptitious
payment of substantial sums of money for the purpose of
obtaining the silence or influencing the testimony of
witnesses, potential witnesses, or individuals who participated
in . . . illegal activities; and
Making false or misleading public statements for the purpose
of deceiving the people of the United States into believing
that . . . with respect to allegations of misconduct on the
part of personnel of the executive branch of the United States
and personnel of the Committee for the Re-election of the
President and that there was no involvement of such personnel
in such misconduct.''
Similarly, there is now compelling evidence that, after Webster
Hubbell resigned as Associate Attorney General to face criminal charges
of fraud, President Clinton also acted through White House aides to
arrange payments of ``hush money'' to Mr. Hubbell. There is likewise
persuasive evidence that to deceive the public, President Clinton has
made false statements.
Early in 1994, then-Whitewater Independent Counsel Robert Fiske
discovered Hubbell had overbilled his clients at the Rose law firm
$482,410, and that he owed $143,437 in unpaid federal income taxes.
[HE2 p. 24] Initially, it was reported that in the nine months between
his resignation and his guilty plea, Hubbell received payments of
$400,000, of which $100,000 came from the Riadys. Later, House
investigators found evidence that Hubbell received $1 million or more,
of which $300,000 came from the Riadys.
When the first reports of the Riady payments to Hubbell appeared in
the press in January 1997, President Clinton was asked at a White House
news conference whether he found the Riady payment unusual or
suspicious, and what steps he had taken to find out whether it had been
hush money. His response was:
I can't imagine who could have ever arranged to do something
improper like that and no one around here knew about it. We did
not know anything about it, and I can tell you categorically
that did not happen. I knew nothing about it. None of us did
before it happened. I didn't personally know anything about it
until I read about it in the press.'' [HE2 pp. 26, 27; 3/
roadmap]
On April 3, 1997, again commenting on White House knowledge of
payments to Hubbell, President Clinton stated:
Let me remind you of the critical fact. At the time that it
was done, no one had any idea about whether any--what the
nature of the allegations were against Mr. Hubbell or whether
they were true. Everybody thought there was some sort of
billing dispute with his law firm. And that's all anybody knew
about it. So no, I do not think they did anything improper.
Several days afterwards, in a radio appearance Hillary Clinton
stated that in resigning Hubbell had assured her and the President he
had done nothing wrong, and that ``at the time we had no reason to
disbelieve his denials of wrongdoing.'' Later, the public record was to
include clear and convincing evidence the statements of the President
and the First Lady were lies.
It was later learned that after he resigned to face criminal
charges Hubbell visited the White House on March 18, 1994. He had a
private meeting with Hillary Clinton in the White House in July 1994.
He also met at least 17 times with Associate White House Counsel
William Kennedy, another former partner in the Rose Law Firm.
In the summer of 1994, Hubbell made at least two trips to Camp
David to visit the Clintons and had a golf match with the President and
Texas oil man Truman Arnold, who made a payment to Hubbell during that
period. He also met frequently with Gerald Stern, who was then in
charge of the division of the Justice Department responsible for
prosecuting financial institution fraud, and who later told the
Washington Post his meetings with Hubbell were ``strictly social.''
By May 5, 1997, the evidence the President had lied about his
knowledge of the payments to Hubbell was already so compelling the New
York Times--which had long tended to defend the Clintons against
charges of wrong doing--published an article by its editor, A.M.
Rosenthal, stating:
It [is now] impossible for me to believe it happened the way
President Clinton and his wife said it had. I [have] rejected,
for myself, the story . . . that neither they nor anybody else
at the White House knew that when their good friend Webster L.
Hubbell resigned as Associate Attorney General in 1994 he was
facing the likelihood of criminal accusations that could land
him in jail. They did.
If the President did know, then after the resignation he
opened himself to possible charges of obstructing justice by
approving White House job-hunting for Mr. Hubbell. It would not
take a particularly suspicious mind--let alone a prosecutor's--
to see high-paying jobs as hush money to keep a defendant
silent. Why would he take that risk?
In [this] paper Jeff Gerth and Stephen Labaton of the New
York Times Washington bureau reported that before Mr. Hubbell
resigned, David E. Kendall, the personal lawyer of the
Clintons, and James B. Blair, one of their closest Arkansas
confidants, received certain information form the Rose Law Firm
in Little Rock. . . . The information was that the firm had
``pretty strong proof of wrongdoing'' by Mr. Hubbell while he
was a partner. The Times account said Mr. Blair then warned the
Clintons that Mr. Hubbell had to resign, fast. Mr. Kendall was
also involved in getting the resignation.
Until the Times report, I found it hard to believe the
Clintons would take the risk of an obstruction of justice
charge, the accusation that led to Richard Nixon's
resignation--and down the same road of stonewalling.
And like most Americans. I think, I was and remain sick at
the thought of the damage to the U.S. of the destruction in
office of another Presidency.
The facts cited in the New York Times article were but a small
portion of the evidence of obstruction of justice and false statements
by the President. Congressional investigators and reporters have also
amassed other compelling evidence, much of which the White House has
subsequently confirmed.
The White House eventually acknowledge that a campaign to give
employment to Hubbell while criminal charges were pending against him
was mounted by: Thomas F. McLarty, then Mr. Clinton's chief of staff;
Mickey Kantor, then the U.S. Trade Representative; Erskine B. Bowles,
then head of the Small Business Administration; Vernon Jordan, a
Washington lawyer and close friend of President Clinton; and Truman
Arnold, a Texas business man who is also a long-time friend of the
President.
The White House also admitted that in March 1994, President Clinton
and Mrs. Clinton met with their advisers to discuss Hubbell's legal
troubles and impending resignation. In later describing the meeting
McLarty stated he told Mrs. Clinton, ``I'm going to try and help
Webb.'' He also stated he remembered ``saying something to the
President to the same effect.''
Investigators also discovered a written ``task list'' prepared by
then-White House Special Counsel Jane Sherburne, assigning a team of
government lawyers to ``monitor his [Hubbell's] cooperation with
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr.'' It was also learned that after
Hubbell's resignation Martha Scott, a White House aide and long time
friend of President Clinton, kept in close touch with Hubbell. In
addition, other White House aides closely monitored news reports and
other available information relating to Hubbell's prosecution. By June
1994, Hubbell reportedly was cooperating with the prosecutors. However,
in late June he changed his policy and began withholding Whitewater-
related documents and personal financial records.
During the same period in which Hubbell stopped cooperating, with
the prosecutors James Riady had responded to a White House request to
provide financial support for Hubbell. Secret Service records later
obtained by investigators show he visited the White House every day
from June 21st to June 25th, and saw President Clinton at least twice.
On June 23rd, Riady had a breakfast meeting with Hubbell and then
visited the White House. Later that day Hubbell and Riady then had a
midday luncheon meeting at Washington's Hay-Adams Hotel.
On Monday, June 27th, the first day of the new work week after
Riady had visited Clinton, a Riady company, Hong Kong China Ltd., sent
Hubbell $100,000. Hubbell had initially been expecting four quarterly
installments of $25,000, but after Riady's meetings with Hubbell and
the President, Riady decided to accelerate the payment into a lump sum.
The next weekend, the Fourth of July holiday, the President and the
First Lady went to Camp David and asked Hubbell to join them, as was
later confirmed by the White House. According to Hubbell, ``The
president asked me if I'd done something wrong, and I didn't tell him
the truth.'' [AP] On Tuesday, July 5th, Hubbell wrote to one of Riady's
top executives in Hong Kong, acknowledging the $100,000 he had received
the previous week. [3/Hubbl5.nyt]
In December 1994, Hubbell pleaded guilty to fraud and tax charges.
Although he had previously entered into a plea bargain agreement to
cooperate with the Whitewater prosecutors, at his sentencing
prosecutors took no steps to have his sentence reduced--presumably
because of his lack of cooperation. Prosecutors have been reportedly
frustrated by Hubbell's inability to recall transactions involving Mrs.
Clinton's role as a lawyer with Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan. [3/
roadmap]
In the spring of 1995, a few months after his fraud conviction, at
a dinner at Washington's Palm Restaurant, Hubbell and his wife asked
Mark Middleton, a recently retired White House aide, whether the Riady
family would be keeping him on its payroll even as he faced prison.
According to Robert Luskin, Middleton's lawyer, Middleton told the
Hubbells to take their question to the Riady family itself or to John
Huang, who was then a trade official at the Commerce Department. It is
not known whether Hubbell ever followed up on Middleton's suggestion.
During the nine months between his resignation and his guilty plea,
Hubbell received a total of more than $500,000 from a dozen
enterprises, many of which were controlled by Clinton associates or
major Democratic donors. In that period, White House chief of staff
McLarty had talked to Truman Arnold, a leading fund-raiser for the DNC
about hiring Hubbell. According to the New York Times. Arnold paid
Hubbell an undisclosed sum to help arrange a dinner party for top fund-
raiser. President Clinton attended the dinner.
Arnold also helped persuade three other Texans to hire Hubbell:
Bernard Rapoport, an insurance executive, who paid Hubbell $18,000;
Wayne Reaud, a lawyer; and C.W. Conn Jr., an appliance store owner.
[gerth] During the same period, Hubbell was also hired at a salary of
$8,500 per month for five months to do lobbying work for the Los
Angeles Airport Commission, a job that put him in frequent contact with
another top White House aide, John Emerson. [gerth; HE2 p. 25]
Hubbell was likewise employed by the Consumer Support and Education
Fund, a nonprofit Los Angeles foundation that paid Hubbell $45,000 to
write essays on the ethics of public service, which Hubbell never
wrote. After the payments were disclosed, Hubbell returned the money.
[HE2 p. 25]
While he was still under indictment, the Sprint Corporation hired
Hubbell in November 1994 at a salary of $15,000 per month to help win
federal approval for a European venture. According to Sprint official
Bill White, Hubbell was paid ``less than $90,000'' in total. At the
same time, in possible violation of American Bar Association rules
against conflicts of interest, Hubbell was also employed by Pacific
Telesis, a competitor of Sprint, for undisclosed duties and
compensation. [HE2 p. 25] The Time-Warner corporation likewise hired
Hubbell.
The Mid-America Dairymen Association--whose political action
committee contributes heavily to Democratic candidates--also hired
Hubbell for unknown duties and compensation. The association's
spokesman, Dan Reuwee, has told the Los Angeles Times that it is
``nobody's business what we hired him for.'' In addition, Sun America,
Inc., a California financial services company run by Eli Broad, a
friend of President Clinton, paid Hubbell an undisclosed sum to help
promote a national retirement savings policy. [HE2 pp. 25, 26]
While under indictment Hubbell also received other benefits from
other persons with close ties to the Clinton White House. [HE2 p. 25]
Michael Cardozo, executive director of the Presidential Legal Expense
Trust, arranged to provide Hubbell with office space and a
receptionist. In addition, former U.S. Trade Representative Mickey
Kantor persuaded the Federal National Mortgage Association to hire
Hubbell's son, Walter.
As was later confirmed by the White House, Clinton administration
official Erskine Bowles contacted still another company, Allied Capital
Corporation, to hire Hubbell. At the time of the contact, Bowles was
head of the Small Business Administration, which licensed Allied and
had regulatory authority over the company. In 1997, Bowles became White
House Chief of Staff.
Faced with incontrovertible evidence that administration officials
had solicited payments to Hubbell from a number of companies regulated
by the federal government, President Clinton abandoned his earlier
denials of January 1997. By the Spring of 1997 he no longer denied
``categorically'' that they had been solicited by anyone at the White
House; and no longer characterized such payments as ``improper.''
Instead, when asked again about the solicitation by his key aides of
financial help for Hubbell the President's explanation became:
From what I know about them, they were just--they were people
who were genuinely concerned that there was a man who was out
of work who had four children. And I understand it, they were
trying to help him for no other reason than just out of human
compassion. [Seper, WT, April]
Even if President Clinton were correct that the solicitations by
government official of payments to Hubbell were made out of compassion,
such solicitations would nevertheless be improper. Since the persons
and firms solicited were subject to regulation by the Clinton
administration, each official had conflicts of interests, and
participated in an unethical, if not criminal, act.
That the solicitation of payments to Hubbell were the culmination
of prolonged White House efforts to conceal evidence relating to
Whitewater, provides even more compelling reasons for the impeachment
of President Clinton. After the death of Foster, Hubbell was singularly
in possession of evidence of wrongdoing by the President and Mrs.
Clinton dating back to Arkansas; some of which still remains concealed.
Just as Congress and the public was never to learn all the facts
related to Watergate, so too the cover-up of Whitewater by President
Clinton and his key aides may well remain at least partially
successful. Yet, as in the case of President Nixon, there is now more
than sufficient evidence on the public record to sustain an article of
impeachment against President Clinton for the obstruction of justice.
Bribery Involving Monica Lewinsky
Based on the same legal authority described above, in my view the
facts alleged in Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's referral to the
Congress are substantial evidence that in approving acquiescing and
condoning the use of political influence by Vernon Jordan to obtain
employment for Ms. Lewinski, President Clinton has committed the
impeachable offense of bribery as well as obstruction of justice.
Bribery of President Clinton by Asian Interests
Of the more than $3 million of illegal or questionable campaign
contributions that were refunded after the 1996 elections, most came
from foreign donors with financial ties to Asian countries. There is
compelling evidence on the public record of bribery with respect to a
variety of policy decisions by the President which were influenced by
campaign contributions. One example relates to contributions from the
Riady family [2/lippo.lim], which was also involved in the payment of
``hush money'' to Webster Hubbell.
Under the umbrella of the Lippo Group, the Riady family owns mining
rights to Indonesian deposits of so called ``clean-burning coal.'' The
Indonesian coal has sufficiently low sulfur content to meet strict
environmental standards promulgated during the Clinton administration
by the Environmental Protection Agency. The Indonesian deposits of
environmentally safe coal are the second largest in the world.
The world's largest deposits of such coal are in the United States.
They are located in southern Utah, include more than 62 billion tons of
coal, and are estimated to have a value of $1.2 trillion. On September
18, 1996, six weeks before the presidential election--under
circumstances suggestive of influence by Riady--President Clinton
signed an executive order converting 1.7 million acres in southwestern
Utah that contain the coal into a park area the size of Connecticut.
This was the ``Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument.''
A few weeks after the signing of the executive order, a person
inexplicably identified as an unemployed gardener, gave the Clinton
campaign $400,000. It was not until the President's reelection that the
Democratic National Committee promised to refund the money; after it
was revealed it had come from Arief Wiriadinata and his wife Soraya,
whose father is an executive of the Lippo Group. [verify, get dates,
etc.]
At a televised press conference in Utah six weeks before his
election, President Clinton proclaimed the need to preserve the natural
beauty of the remote area, describing it as a ``beautiful, exotic
place.'' By election time the only published report suggesting the
President's concerns might have been other than aesthetic appeared in
an obscure mining newsletter, in which an unknown reporter, Susan
Foster, wrote:
With a stroke of his pen he wiped out the only significant
competition to Indonesian coal interests in the world market.
On election day 1996, the public was still unaware the President's
order permanently prohibited the mining of the most high quality clean-
burning coal in the world, and gave the Riady family's Indonesia-based
Lippo Group a world-wide monopoly on the sale of such coal. It was not
until after the President's re-election that an Associated Press
reporter, Karen Gullo, was the first to break the story in the national
media. In an article published December 26, 1996, Ms. Gullo noted that
``Jakarta-based Lippo corporation has business interests related to
coal'' and that in signing the Executive Order in Utah the President
``dashed plans to tap a huge reserve of environmental-friendly coal.''
[3/coal.wt 3/coal2; 3/coal3]
Subsequently, the public record became replete with evidence that
the signing of the executive order by the President was influenced by
the financial and political support of the Riady and the Lippo Group,
which had previously contributed illegally more than $1.5 million to
his campaign.
Environmentalists and local residents of the area who had long
urged protection for some lands in Utah dispute that the selection of
the site specified in the executive order was to preserve ``a beautiful
and exotic place.'' According to environmentalists, members of the
Western States Coalition, and local residents, ordinary desert land
with no significance or unique natural features was included in the
order solely to prohibit mining of the coal deposits; while other
important environmental sites that the local residents wanted protected
were left outside the 1.7 million acre park. [3/coal2]
The President's decision to issue the order was made without prior
consultation with Utah Governor Michael Leavitt or any members of
Utah's congressional delegation. It stunned Utah's lone congressional
Democrat, Bill Orton, in whose district the clean-burning coal is
found. It also came as a shock to Louise Liston, the commissioner from
Escalante County, who asked:
President Clinton has locked up a treasure house that could
be used for our children and to boost our economy. Why he would
want to do that: we don't know. Why would he put our nation at
risk? [also HE 6/18/97 p. 5]
The adverse effects of the executive order on the economy are
multiple and staggering. It has been estimated that $20 billion in
federal revenue from mining Utah coal will never be realized. The 62
billion tons of coal now locked permanently in the Utah desert land
would provide enough environmentally safe coal to keep non-nuclear Utah
power plants running for another 400 years. Coal mining, as a source of
revenue and power for Utah, is virtually shut down and jobs that would
have been available in coal mining no longer exist.
Of particular concern to local educators and officials such as
County Commissioner Liston, President Clinton's order cuts off major
sources of revenues traditionally relied on to fund public education.
When Utah was admitted to the Union, portions of the vast federal lands
in the new state were placed permanently in trust to provide funds for
education. In the words of County Commissioner Liston:
When Utah became a state, under the enabling Act, the
government allowed them four sections out of every township so
that when they have all these federal lands, that school kids
would not be left without some way of funding the schools. So
they allowed those four sections out of every township to be
trust lands.
Particularly distressed by the effects of the executive order on
local schools that could no longer obtain revenues from mining, County
Commissioner Liston added:
We're still kind of reeling from the effects of it, and
sincerely feel like he has no idea what he has laid upon two
counties in Southern Utah.
President Clinton's general response to environmentalists and
government officials who were shocked by his executive order ignored
the unique nature of the environmentally safe coal at the Utah site.
Giving the impression that similar coal was available elsewhere in the
United States, he said:
I am concerned about a large coal mine proposed for the area.
Mining jobs are good jobs and mining is important to our
national economy and to our national security. But we can't
have mines everywhere and we shouldn't have mines that threaten
our national treasures.
Respecting the concerns of Commissioner Liston and educators in
Utah on the adverse effect on local schools, President Clinton has
promised to trade the school trust land within the monument with
comparable land in other parts of Utah, stating:
I will say again--creating this national monument should not
and will not come at the expense of Utah's children.
That it is a promise he cannot keep, is indisputable. In that regard,
the official who heads the project tasked with finding comparable land
has stated:
We can't find enough coal, in Utah, to compensate for the
school trusts, and if we start adding oil and gas fields, other
mineral deposits, we still have a tough time finding enough
federal resources in the entire state of Utah to trade for just
the school children's coal within the monument, let alone their
other resources.
In June 1997 the Schools and Institution Trust Lands Association of
Utah, which manages the trust fund, filed a lawsuit against the Clinton
administration charging the executive order is illegal. In a separate
lawsuit the Utah Association of Counties has claimed the executive
order exceeds the powers granted to the President under the 1906
Antiquities Act, which was first used by Theodore Roosevelt to set
aside the Grand Canyon as a national monument. The lawsuit also charges
President Clinton violated the National Environmental Policy Act and
the Federal Land Management Policy Act, which require him to consult
with state officials and obtain the approval of Congress; procedures he
avoided. [HE 7/18/97 p. 5]
That President Clinton may have simply made an unwise policy
decision that has adverse economic effects on our economy is not, in
itself an impeachable offense, even though Congress is not bound by the
rules of evidence applied in the criminal courts. [See, Selected
Materials, etc.] However, even if Congress were to comply with criminal
rules of evidence, the fact that President Clinton signed the executive
order under such questionable conditions is substantial circumstantial
evidence that the Escalante National Monument is a ``quid pro quo''
related to the receipt of illegal canpaign contributions from the
Riadys, the Lippo Group, and others with financial interests in
Indonesia.
More and more as President Clinton's fund-raising tactics have
become exposed, he has asserted what is at best a political defense. He
has blamed ``the system.'' Arguing that the election laws enacted after
Watergate have created a corrupt system, some of the President's
defenders now refer to campaign contributions as ``legalized bribery.''
[NY Times Editorial, 4/9/97]
To suggest even metaphorically that President Clinton could legally
receive bribes, overstates the case for fund-raising reform and
trivializes the meaning of the term ``Bribery'' in the Constitution,
which holds the President to a much higher standard than those spelled
out under the election laws. As an act punishable only by removal from
office and not by a fine or imprisonment, the Impeachment Clause was
intended by the Founding Fathers to make it much easier for Congress to
impeach a President for bribery than to convict a public official of
bribery as a felony.
Constitutional History
In 1787 the Founding Fathers had compelling reasons, based on
English precedents, for defining ``Bribery'' as a specific ``High
Crime.'' For several centuries under the English common law, bribery
was among the highest crimes against the state (as was Perjury). [R.
Berger, Impeachment, p. 62 et seq. 1973] At the very time the U.S.
Constitution was being drafted, impeachment charges brought by Edmund
Burke against King George III's minister, Warren Hastings, for both
giving and receiving bribes from political leaders in India were
pending in the House of Lords. Our Founding Fathers who previously had
their own grievances against George III, noted Burke was chastising
Hastings for giving the King a reputation as ``head of a robber band.''
Also in the minds of the Founding Fathers, and noted in Madison's
journal of 1787, was the bribery of George III's predecessor. Madison
wrote:
One would suppose that the King of England would be well
secured against bribery. He has as it were [the ownership of] a
fee simple in the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II was bribed by
Louis XIV. [Selected Materials on Impeachment, 93rd Cong.
Committee Print, House Judiciary Committee, pp. 6, 11]
Recalling that Charles I and other earlier corrupt kings had been
beheaded, Alexander Hamilton noted that, in imposing no more punishment
than the removal from office, the Madison-drafted Impeachment Clause
``[s]ubstituted the gentle majesty of the law for the swift justice of
the sword.''
In his journal, Madison reiterated several times the concern of the
founders, a future president might ``betray his trust'' through bribes.
Explaining why Bribery as a High Crime had even more applicability to
the President than to Members of Congress, he wrote:
The case of the Executive Magistracy was very distinguishable
from that of the Legislative . . . It could not be presumed
that all or even a majority of an Assembly would be bribed to
betray their trust . . . And if one or a few members only
should be seduced the soundness of the remaining members would
maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body . . . In the
case of the Executive Magistracy which was to be administered
by a single man, corruption was more within the compass of
probable events, and might be fatal to the Republic.''
[Selected Materials on Impeachment, 93rd Cong. Committee Print,
House Judiciary Committee, pp. 3-7]
The constitutional standard for impeachment for Bribery as a ``High
Crime,'' like all other ``High Crimes,'' does not require the
commission of a felony; or proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Just as the standard imposed for Nixon's impeachment by the House
Judiciary Committee was not based on the commission of a felony by the
President himself, so too in 1989 the Committee relied on precedents
that were more than 200 years old to bring impeachment charges for the
High Crime of bribery against Judge Alcee Hastings, whose namesake,
Warren Hastings, had been impeached for Bribery by Edmund Burke in the
18th century.
In 1983 Judge Hastings, who had been appointed by President Carter,
was acquitted by a Florida jury of charges he had received a bribe of
$150,000. In 1989, based on the same charges, he was impeached by the
House, convicted by the Senate and removed from office.
conclusion
Just as the House Judiciary Committee voted to impeach President
Nixon--and later Judge Hastings-- for offenses that fell short of
felonies, but which clearly involved evidence thereof, so too the
current House of Representatives now has the authority to impeach
President Clinton for Bribery as a High Crime without proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Moreover, it can, again similar to criminal cases, do
so based on logical inferences from compelling circumstantial evidence.
Impeachment of a President is a civil remedy and not a criminal
one. As exemplified by the impeachment of Judge Hastings--and even more
dramatically by the successful case against O.J. Simpson--the
evidentiary standard of proof in civil proceedings is much less
stringent than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applicable in our
criminal courts. In the case of President Clinton, in constitutional
terms, there is substantial evidence that he should be impeached for
``Bribery'' and ``other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
Mr. Barr. I would respectfully ask that you do take a look
at it, because Mr. Zeifman raises a very interesting question,
and that is something also that you touched on in your written
testimony, and that is bribery.
Under 18 USC 201, which you are very familiar with, one I
think could very legitimately make the case that with regard to
the Webb Hubbell payments of several hundred thousands of
dollars involving--including from foreign sources, which is
part of the pattern of activity that you talked about earlier,
and which we see also in what appears to be an effort to buy
either the silence of Monica Lewinsky, obviously unsuccessful,
or her offering a job to have her shave her testimony in some
way, is it not correct that if you do look at 18 USC 201, which
is the bribery statute, that it would appear that many of the
allegations concerning the payoffs and the evidence relating
thereto could fall within 18 USC 201, and could also form the
basis for an impeachment article?
Mr. Starr. Well, again, we have given you our legal
assessment, and I know that prosecutors and obviously Members
of Congress can look at the law. We have not taken it through
an analysis with respect to the bribery statute, and I think I
should, if you would permit me to do that, withhold judgment in
terms of the legal analysis so that I am not making an off-the-
cuff statement, notwithstanding my familiarity with the
statute, in light of the various elements of the offense--or
set forth in the bribery statute. But I do think that at a
minimum, very serious questions are raised that are now here
for you to evaluate in your own way.
Mr. Barr. And this would also go to the----
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Starr, you consider yourself a prosecutor now, don't
you? You don't consider yourself an Independent Counsel?
Mr. Starr. Um, I have never prosecuted----
Mr. Delahunt. No, but I am saying in your current capacity,
you consider yourself a prosecutor.
Mr. Starr. We have to--that is certainly an important
dimension of----
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you. I want to get to another question,
and you can see how the time is so limited, and I will try to
be brief.
I think it was Mr. Canady who talked about due process, and
I dare say everyone in this room today is concerned about due
process. My colleague from Massachusetts talked about the fact,
and it is a reality, and I think it is important that the
American people understand that the witnesses that you dealt
with, none of them were subject to cross-examination, and you
know that because you are a prosecutor, and because you have--
and you have referenced them many times today--career
prosecutors in your office. So that in terms of their
credibility, their memory, it has never been tested in an
adversarial fashion. And you know, that really is a concept
that is embedded in our American jurisprudence. Would you agree
with that?
Mr. Starr. Absolutely. Cross examination is very important.
Mr. Delahunt. One other reference, I think it was my friend
from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte, who referred to Judge Claiborne
being removed from office because of--and I think it was the
chairman himself who elucidated for us, it was as a result of
filing an income tax return under the pains and penalties of
perjury, and I think that you agreed with that statement. But I
think it is important to remember that this same committee back
in 1974, when the laws and articles of impeachment presented
before the committee regarding allegations against President
Nixon concerning the very same offense, signing a tax return
under the pains and penalties of perjury, it was this committee
back then that voted against an article of impeachment on that
particular matter. I think it is really important that the
American people understand that.
So there was a difference. There was a difference.
I am just going to ask you one or two questions here, just
to clarify some confusion in my own mind. You referred earlier
to a letter dated June 16th that you directed to the editor of
the Brill report.
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Delahunt. And on page 7 of your letter you noted that
the Brill report stated, and I am quoting you here, ``They were
also going to try to get Lewinsky to wire herself and get
Jordan and maybe even the President on tape obstructing
justice.'' And I think that's an accurate reading.
In response, your letter went on to state, and I am
quoting, ``This is false. This office never asked Ms. Lewinsky
to agree to wire herself for a conversation with Mr. Jordan or
the President.'' And again, I would suggest to you that that is
an accurate reading of your letter, and I would hope that you
would adopt it. I presume when you wrote that, you took great
pains to be accurate, and particularly before you put such an
unequivocal statement in writing. Do you stand by that
statement?
Mr. Starr. The specific statement on the wiring with
respect to the President and Mr. Jordan?
Mr. Delahunt. The statement that I just read to you. This
office never had----
Mr. Starr. Yes. I don't have the letter before me, and I am
trying to follow it.
Mr. Delahunt. Let me read it to you again, and I will read
it slowly. ``This office never asked Ms. Lewinsky to agree to
wire herself for a conversation with Mr. Jordan or the
President.''
Mr. Starr. Right. Yes.
Mr. Delahunt. You stand by that statement?
Mr. Starr. May I elaborate? Yes. What we--may I--these are
serious questions, if I could----
Mr. Hyde. You can try, Judge Starr. It is going to be
tough. You can try to answer.
Mr. Delahunt. If I could just go on, because----
Mr. Canady. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order that the
witness should be allowed to answer the questions. This drive-
by questioning is not right.
Mr. Delahunt. I would ask the chairman to allow me to
continue.
Mr. Hyde. Well, elementary fairness dictates an opportunity
for the witness to answer your complex questions, and I think
if you want to be fair, you will let him answer.
Mr. Delahunt. I will be fair then, and I would ask the
Chair to indulge me again----
Mr. Hyde. I will indulge you for the answer.
Mr. Starr. We explained to her at the Ritz Carlton what a
cooperating witness would do. It is my understanding--I was not
personally there, but it is my understanding that it was stated
at a high level of generality with respect to what cooperating
witnesses could be asked to do, and that that was one of the
activities that could be included in what a cooperating witness
would do, once the witness has been evaluated in terms of her
credibility and the like.
Mr. Delahunt. So the statement in your letter to Mr. Brill
is inaccurate?
Mr. Starr. No. It went with respect to the--and that is why
I want to be careful that I understood exactly what the
question was. And I hope that I have made clear that we talked
at a high level of generality, not--as I understand it, not in
a person-specific way with respect to what a cooperating
witness would do.
Mr. Delahunt. You realize that Ms. Lewinsky's testimony
contradicts you.
Mr. Starr. I am aware that there may be other perceptions,
but that is what we, in fact, asked--it is my understanding
that what we asked her to do was to consider being a
cooperating witness, and it was stated by our people at a
fairly high level of generality.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Starr, I would like to thank you for being here, and I
would like to thank you for being very patient over a long,
difficult day, and I would like to say thanks for laboring
diligently on behalf of the citizens of this country for many
months at a very difficult task.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Mr. Jenkins. For the most part, I would compliment this
committee insofar as they have talked about and asked about the
Constitution, the law, the facts, and the testimony that
surrounds this case. This committee is to be complimented. But
there have been some occasional departures from these subjects,
and I do not believe that those departures have necessarily
been complimentary of this committee, and so I would like to go
back to a line of questioning that Mr. Inglis started.
On page 5 and paragraph 9 of your statement, you said that
the President made false statements under oath to a grand jury
on August the 17, 1998. As I understood the gentleman's
testimony, Senator-elect Schumer agreed with that statement.
And I noticed that you, in most of your characterizations of
the evidence, you said that the evidence suggests, but in this
particular instance you didn't even have that language in. You
said that the President made false statements.
Then you voiced an opinion in response to a question by Mr.
Inglis that a reasonable person, or a reasonable juror, could
find these statements to be material matter under the statute.
Now, I would like to read a statute. It is Title XVIII,
section 1621, and I would like to ask you if it is pertinent to
this case, and an additional question or two.
It reads in pertinent part, ``Whoever, having taken an oath
before a competent tribunal that he will testify truly,
willfully and contrary to such oath states any material fact,
matter which he does not believe to be true is guilty of
perjury.''
Now, I know it is not your role to determine if a violation
of that statute exists or did exist in this case, but let me
ask you the same question Mr. Inglis did. Could a reasonable
juror find that all of the elements were present in the
evidence in this case, and that there had been a violation of
that statute?
Mr. Starr. It seems to me that a reasonable juror could,
but obviously that would come at the conclusion of proceedings
that would be a full trial. But it seems to be based on the
evidence that is here, if that were the full body of evidence,
that reasonable jurors could so conclude.
Mr. Jenkins. And I understand that we are the reasonable
jurors to make that determination in this case.
Mr. Starr. It is your judgment.
Mr. Jenkins. Or at least eventually in the United States
Senate that decision is to be made.
Now, there has been some mention and some characterization
of the testimony of the 19 distinguished witnesses who appeared
before this committee, 19 professors and historians. Did you
happen to see or hear, or have you read the testimony of any of
those witnesses?
Mr. Starr. Some, but not all.
Mr. Jenkins. Did you hear the characterization on the other
side that very few felt that perjury is an impeachable offense?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I did hear that.
Mr. Jenkins. I personally heard differently when I heard
those 19 witnesses. My recollection is that an overwhelming
majority of them testified that perjury can be, or is, an
impeachable offense. Was that your understanding from the
testimony that they gave?
Mr. Starr. Well, I did not--I am not sure. The testimony
will speak for itself, but I certainly know that certain
individuals, such as Professor McDowell with his elaborate
common law analysis, did come to the conclusion, based on that
history of the common law, and then the history of the founding
of the American Republic, that to him and his scholarship, as
in his studies at the University of London, that that was, in
fact, clear in common law--which, of course, was transplanted
to this country. But I did not have a chance to evaluate all of
the 19 individuals.
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Founding Fathers had infinite choices when they
conceived our government. They considered placing impeachment
in the realm of the courts, but instead they decided that
impeachment should be a political process as well as a legal
one; that the House of Representatives was uniquely qualified
to deliberate on the removal of an elected President because we
would take into account the views of the President's ultimate
jury: the people of the United States of America. And make no
mistake about it, that jury rendered its judgment loud and
clear on November 3rd, and this committee did not listen.
This committee is ignoring the will of the American people,
and instead following the lead of this so-called Independent
Counsel who has conducted a politically-inspired witch-hunt in
search of a crime to justify 5 years and $40 million of
taxpayers' money.
The American people do not approve, Mr. Starr. They know
unfairness when they see it. They know injustice when they feel
it. They know hypocrisy when they smell it. They know partisan
politics when they are the victims of it. In their gut they
have figured this thing out, and still this committee does not
listen.
Here is what the American people have concluded: The
President had an affair. He lied about it. He didn't want
anyone to know about it. But he didn't bribe anyone, he didn't
obstruct justice, he didn't commit treason, he did not subvert
the government. And yet, the committee continues, because, they
say, they fear for the rule of law.
But as I listen to the questions of my Republican
colleagues today, I did not hear their concern for the rule of
law regarding Linda Tripp's illegally recorded phone
conversations. I do not hear their concern for the rule of law
regarding the illegal leaking of grand jury testimony. And
where is their concern for the rule of law about Ken Starr's
team denying witnesses their basic and fundamental rights of
due process?
How we obtain information and conduct investigations in
this country does matter. The President is not above the law,
Mr. Starr, and neither are you. That is why I must ask you the
following questions about your investigation. And please let me
read my four questions before you respond.
On January 16, 1998, do you admit or deny that your agents
threatened Ms. Lewinsky with 27 years in prison if she
contacted her attorney as she testified? Do you admit or deny
that your agents threatened to prosecute her mother if Ms.
Lewinsky called her attorney, as she testified? That your
agents told Monica Lewinsky that she would be less likely to
receive immunity if she contacted her attorney, as she
testified? Do you admit or deny that your office threatened
Julie Hiatt Steele, a witness in the Kathleen Willey matter,
that they would raise questions about the legality of the
adoption of her 8-year-old child unless she changed her
testimony?
If you would please, Mr. Starr, in the interest of time,
please admit or deny. Have your agents--did your agents
threaten Ms. Lewinsky with 27 years in prison?
Mr. Starr. Before I engage in an admission or denial, I
would want to see the question, and I would be delighted to
receive the question, and then I would then give you a written
admission or denial.
Mr. Wexler. May I make it simple?
Mr. Rogan. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry, please.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman will state his inquiry.
Mr. Wexler. I assume it is not on my time.
Mr. Hyde. Your time has almost expired, but I will give you
another minute.
Mr. Rogan. It is with respect to the procedures. Perhaps it
is only me, but I am finding it very difficult to follow with
this pattern of multiple questions being asked, and then
inviting multiple answers at once. The answers ought to be in
sync with the question, and I would suggest that the better
practice would be to follow ``question, answer, question,
answer.''
Mr. Frank. Point of order, Mr. Chairman. That is not a
parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. Hyde. The Chair states that that is not a parliamentary
inquiry.
A member who has 5 minutes can ask or assert whatever they
want. It is curious that they all use the 5 minutes, we have
done it, too, and then Mr. Starr has difficulty answering
because there are further interruptions. I don't think this has
been at all a fair proceeding. It hasn't been the Chair's
fault, but take what time you need to answer the speech of Mr.
Wexler.
Mr. Starr. Three of the questions went--and if you ask me
in writing, I will be happy to follow up. Three of the
questions went to the events of the evening of January 16th. I
will say that we conducted ourselves properly and lawfully;
that that determination has been made. These issues get
litigated in court, and I think, if I could finish, that we
conducted ourselves in a proper and professional way, saying
that we want the witness to cooperate under the circumstances
of her engaging in felonious conduct.
With respect to your fourth question--and that is my
response with respect to those.
With respect to the fourth question on Ms. Steele, as I
said earlier, I believe that our agents are going about their
work in a way that is appropriate to test credibility, to
inquire as to areas that, in their professional judgment, go to
credibility, but if there are issues with respect to how a
particular witness is handled, and I have heard a number of
those questions, I think the right thing to do is for the
individual, especially one, as Ms. Steele is, represented by
counsel, to go to court and say they have been treated unfairly
and to see what the remedy is. But for me to try to engage in
almost an adjudicatory function here is somewhat odd to take
certain selected ones and come to an ultimate
judgment.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wexler. Mr. Chairman, you had indicated that I could
have a minute before the other gentleman from California.
Mr. Hyde. Well, don't you consider the time to answer your
questions part of your time?
Mr. Wexler. Mr. Chairman, I sat very diligently--I ask for
15 seconds.
Ms. Waters. It has been this way all day.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Wexler, you may have 15 seconds.
Mr. Wexler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Starr, I did not ask you about the legality of the
actions of your agents. All I asked you was a factual question.
Did your agents or did they not threaten Ms. Lewinsky with 27
years in prison? It is either yes or no, not the legality.
Mr. Starr. I do not--I know what Ms. Lewinsky has said. I
would have to conduct an interview with my agents to know what
the position of the office is.
Mr. Frank. The answer was yes.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Arkansas.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Starr, following up, am I correct that the
appropriate district court judge reviewed the conduct of the
agents at the time they initially interviewed Monica Lewinsky
and found that no due process was violated?
Mr. Starr. Well, it was put in terms of a right to counsel,
and there apparently are issues with respect to the orders. I
am doing my best to recall the judge's order, but the judge, in
fact, determined that there was no violation of a
constitutional right. That is my best recollection. But the
order will speak for itself.
Mr. Hutchinson. I want to thank you for your willingness to
appear here today. Going back to earlier in the day when we had
the dispute over how much time, I do hope the President's
counsel will have equal time to make a presentation similar to
what you have done today, and I trust that the President's
counsel will graciously submit to questions by the Members of
this body, as you have done.
I wanted to go back to your testimony. On page 34 you
testified that the Constitution provides for two separate
proceedings, the impeachment trial and a separate criminal
trial. And Mr. Boucher, I believe, asked some questions in
regard to this. Would it be within your jurisdiction to pursue
any criminal conduct for perjury or obstruction of justice?
Mr. Starr. Yes, Congressman, I believe that under the grant
by the Attorney General in the Special Division, there would be
jurisdiction in our office.
Mr. Hutchinson. In deciding to refer these charges to the
Congress of United States as substantial and credible evidence
that obstruction of justice and perjury occurred, I assume that
there was consideration in your office as to whether criminal
proceedings should be initiated?
Mr. Starr. That is exactly correct.
Mr. Hutchinson. You have to make a determination whether
that can be done during the President's term of office or after
he leaves office.
Mr. Starr. That will certainly be an issue.
Mr. Hutchinson. Do you have an opinion in that regard?
If you feel uncomfortable answering that, feel free to say
so.
Mr. Starr. I feel uncomfortable answering that. I think it
is an important issue on which there is a lot of difference of
opinion in terms of what is appropriate in our constitutional
order. So I am reluctant, without the most careful thought, to
speak to that, if you would indulge me that.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the point I am making is that
everybody says that the country wants to get this behind us.
And how do you get it behind us? We have had a gentleman from
the other side of the aisle say that the President committed
perjury, and he ought to be punished. Now, I haven't reached
that conclusion yet, but if you reach the conclusion that he
ought to be punished, and you don't believe this is an
impeachable offense, that means that the only option is for the
Independent Counsel to initiate criminal prosecution against
the President of the United States, and I don't see how that
gets it behind us. I think that is a heavy issue that I know
you have to weigh, as well this committee has to weigh.
Now, let me just go on to some other questions here. In
your referral, you referred on pages 7, 8 and 9 to a pattern of
conduct, and that was really the basis on which the Attorney
General gave you an expanded jurisdiction in the Monica
Lewinsky case. That pattern of conduct you referred to involved
Webster Hubbell; am I correct?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Hutchinson. Then in your testimony today at page 45,
you indicate that in June of 1994 $100,000 was paid to Webster
Hubbell from James Riady. James Riady is represented in this
country, by John Huang.
There has been published reports that John Huang is a
cooperating witness. So my question to you would be: Is John
Huang a relevant witness in the pattern of conduct you referred
to in the original report? And then I want to ask you this--
well, go ahead and answer that, if you could.
Mr. Starr. I would prefer to reflect on that and answer
that in a more sober way, if I could, as opposed to an
impromptu response. In terms of the relevancy of a witness at
this stage, and in light of, you know, our coming to judgment,
which we reached after a lot of deliberation, we did not
include him in the referral. So I would be happy to answer
that.
Mr. Hutchinson. Do we have all the material at the present
time that is relevant to this referral and the pattern of
conduct on which you based your jurisdiction?
Mr. Starr. I believe that you do. I know there are still
some issues, but I believe that you do, Congressman.
Mr. Hutchinson. I think it is important, you know, that we
have this information now and not at the conclusion of the
hearing process. So I know that you are laboring diligently to
that end, but I would certainly urge you to get everything over
to us.
And out of respect for the Chair, I will stop.
Mr. Hyde. I love you, Mr. Hutchinson.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement.
We are here today to consider the rule of law in America. I
am referring to the rule of law that should be applied fairly
to everyone in America, including the President of the United
States. That rule of law and fairness must also be applied by
this committee and by you, Mr. Starr. Whether the President
engaged in offensive conduct or deceptive conduct is not what
we are here to decide. Whether the President can or will be
brought up on civil or criminal charges is also not what we are
here to decide. We are here to decide whether a United States
President, for the first time in over 200 years of American
history, should be judged to have committed treason, bribery or
other high crime or misdemeanor, and whether it is necessary to
remove our President from office.
In yesterday's New York Times, Mr. Starr, your spokesman,
Charles Bakaly, III, said, in describing your work, quote, ``We
make no judgments. We have simply gathered the facts.''
Well, Mr. Starr, that is not what your office has done. In
truth, in your 450-page referral, you selected, for the most
part, the facts that tended to show the President in the worst
light and those that would bring condemnation to the President,
instead of revealing all the facts and the contexts that might
have exonerated the President, or shown the uncertainty and
ambiguity of the evidence against the President.
In fact, in my judgment, much of your legal case, Mr.
Starr, as set forth to date rests on unfair innuendo and
overreaching inference. For example, in your 450-page report,
you dismissed and did not even quote Monica Lewinsky's
statement to the grand jury when she said, quote, ``No one ever
asked me to lie, and I was never promised a job for my
silence.''
And it was left to a grand juror, on his or her own
initiative, to raise that question, because no one from your
office pursued this obvious line of questioning, which would
have been beneficial to the President.
In your 450-page report, Mr. Starr, with respect, I believe
you also failed the American people and this committee by
omitting or misrepresenting the following facts that would have
been favorable to the President, including that Betty Currie
testified that taking back the President's gifts was her idea;
that discussions about a job for Miss Lewinsky were made more
than 5 months before Miss Lewinsky was even mentioned as a
witness in the Paula Jones case; that Betty Currie was not a
witness in any proceeding at the time you allege that President
Clinton tried to influence her testimony; that it was the
Secret Service and not the President who urged the Court to
prevent their agents from being subpoenaed; and that both Miss
Lewinsky and the President have said that the President never
asked her to submit a false affidavit.
Mr. Starr, you are, as you have said, an eyewitness to
nothing relevant to your referral. You have heard nothing
firsthand. You saw nothing firsthand. You have no direct
knowledge of any facts relevant to your case for impeachment.
You have simply provided us with a one-sided 450-page
prosecutor's opening statement with unnecessary details of
explicit sexual activity designed solely to humiliate and
damage the President of the United States.
What motives have driven you to pursue certain evidence
only, to characterize that evidence, in my opinion, in a skewed
way, and to make a legal case for impeachment founded on
innuendo and inference and with whom you consulted in that
process will not in the end determine whether or not I will
vote for impeachment. But how you and your deputies have
pursued this President and the case you have set forth for his
impeachment does lead me to seriously question the facts you
have alleged and to seriously question the conclusions you
would have us come to.
Mr. Chairman, may I have 30 seconds, please?
Mr. Hyde. Thirty seconds more, surely.
Mr. Rothman. Notwithstanding this, I will withhold my final
judgment on impeachment until this inquiry is concluded.
In the end, Mr. Starr, this committee's legacy will not be
our decision regarding whether this President is the first in
200 years to be impeached on a finding of treason or bribery or
high crimes and misdemeanors. That is Mr. Clinton's legacy. Our
legacy will be how we arrived at our decision in faith with the
Constitution.
Finally, Mr. Starr, you say in your statement today that
you live in the world of the law, and you boast that you often
win. But Mr. Starr, this is not about winning or losing in the
courtroom. This is not some personal or professional
competition between you and Bill Clinton. This is not a legal
game or a sport to win or lose. This is about the Constitution
of the United States that has kept America strong and free for
more than 200 years.
Mr. Hyde. I thank the gentleman.
Do you choose to respond? You are welcome to.
Mr. Starr. Well, let me say this, and I will be, I think,
for me, extremely brief.
I believe, Congressman, this is elaborately corroborated.
If fair-minded people read it, they will see that the vast
majority of facts are not in dispute. It is for you to assess,
and this is where I think you are quite right. In terms of
judgments, it is your judgment. It is your judgment as to the
significance of this. That is entrusted to you.
But we had an obligation to gather facts pursuant to a
jurisdictional grant. We gathered them. We believe we were
complete. And all the information from which the questions have
been drawn with respect to why wasn't this there is all before
you.
In our judgment, to say--for example, to take the one
example that you especially emphasized, about Ms. Lewinsky's
statement, for me it is fair--and you may disagree with this,
and we can agree agreeably to disagree--to say in this referral
Miss Lewinsky has stated that the President never explicitly
told her to lie, and to tell the entire story, not just a part
of the story that she was interested in telling because of her
understandable reluctance to in any way hurt the President of
the United States. We told what we saw is the entirety of the
relevant story, and we provided you with all of the additional
information for you to evaluate.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pease.
Mr. Pease. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Starr, it has just recently been asserted that it was
the Secret Service and not the President that asserted the
novel notion of a protective privilege. But as I understand it,
the President's personal attorney Mr. Bennett filed papers in
the Jones case which said, among other things, quote,
``President Clinton, through undersigned counsel, emphatically
expresses his support, on behalf of himself, the office of the
Presidency and all past and future Presidents for the motion
for a protective order filed by the United States Secret
Service in this matter.''
I would appreciate your comment on that quote and whether
that assertion of a privilege affected your pursuit of the
facts in this matter.
Mr. Starr. Yes. It is my understanding that there was, in
fact, an embracing of the asserted privilege; and, yes, in our
investigation, it was a source of material and considerable
delay and an enormous amount of litigation that ultimately
went, as we all know, to the Supreme Court of the United
States; each judge who looked at it at the lower courts
determined that there was no legal basis for the creation of
the privilege under Rule 501.
As I said in my opening statement, I think it was a very
weak claim. It was not crafted--and I think this is important
for the people to understand--it was not crafted as a
constitutional privilege to protect the President. Rather, the
privilege that was asserted was the protective function
privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which looks to the common law, the experience of courts. It was
a very broad and sweeping, but unmeritorious, claim. We had to
litigate it. It also prevented our getting timely evidence from
people whom we needed it from.
Mr. Pease. Thank you, Mr. Starr.
Earlier today, I believe it was my colleague from Tennessee
who pointed out that in the case of the grand jury testimony,
your referral probably made a stronger statement than it did in
some of the other matters when it said categorically that the
President gave false and misleading testimony under oath.
Can you summarize for us the factual basis for that
conclusion?
Mr. Starr. Yes. I tried to do this in the opening
statement. Considering, for example, the relationship with Ms.
Lewinsky, their activities when they were together and the
circumstances of their being together, the circumstances with
respect to Mr. Jordan and the responses with respect to whether
Mr. Jordan and the President had had conversations about
certain subjects, as we outlined in the opening statement in
specific detail after specific detail, there is very
substantial reason to believe that the President did, in fact,
not tell the truth under oath and is contradicted very
substantially, we believe, by other undisputed evidence.
Mr. Pease. One of the--thank you, Mr. Starr.
One of the questions that was raised earlier and for
reasons that I understand from the Chair that we didn't go
into, our colleague from California raised the whole issue of
credibility of witnesses as you drew your conclusions that were
sent to us. But I would like to address, at least for a few
moments, the issue of the credibility of Miss Lewinsky. And we
know, from your statements and others, that she made false
statements. She was granted immunity, then made other
statements. Why is it that we should believe some of those
statements on which you rely and we should not believe other
statements that we know to have been false?
Mr. Starr. Yes. The reason is corroboration. And I quite
agree, a statement by a witness who has been known to lie
should, in fact, be then examined and checked. So you look at
other evidence and ask if the evidence corroborates it.
Her evidence was very powerful and indeed we thought
compelling, as I tried to mention earlier. When she could say
that when she was alone with the President--he denied being
alone--that he received a phone call from a Florida sugar
grower whose name sounded like Fanjul, it was very close,
including the time, so we would check telephone records and the
like, and movement logs. We elaborately and thoroughly
documented all of those issues for the very reason that a
number of the witnesses in this matter had questions with
respect to their credibility.
That's why you don't go with a witness statement alone. You
look to see what other evidence, if any, there is to
corroborate, and here there was overwhelming evidence to
corroborate.
Mr. Pease. Thank you, Mr. Starr.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Starr, I believe President Clinton's actions were
wrong.
Mr. Starr. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Barrett. I believe President Clinton's actions were
wrong, and we must decide as a Congress, as a country, how he
should be held accountable. But I also believe that the
ambivalence that this country feels and that I feel about this
matter is colored in large part by the actions of your office
and Linda Tripp.
I am going to ask you a series of questions, most of which
have been asked by Mr. Lowell and to which you have given
longer answers, so I would ask that you give short answers. In
fact, I believe every one of these questions can be answered
with a yes or no, and I am going to ask you and let you answer
right after each question.
Prior to being named Independent Counsel, you gave your
opinion publicly on several occasions that Paula Jones's
lawsuit should be allowed to go forward. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. I--the implicit--the answer to that is yes.
Mr. Barrett. It is an easy question, Mr. Starr.
Mr. Starr. I think the answer to that is yes.
Mr. Barrett. In fact, you even had several conversations
with Gilbert Davis, Paula Jones' attorney, and discussed
constitutional issues in this case, correct?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Barrett. Let's fast-forward to this hearing. Your
office entered into a written immunity agreement with Monica
Lewinsky; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Barrett. And this written immunity agreement contained
a secrecy provision that prohibited her from talking about her
testimony, including talking to the media; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Barrett. And your office also provided an immunity
letter to Linda Tripp; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Barrett. But Linda Tripp's immunity letter had no
secrecy provisions, did it?
Mr. Starr. I believe that is correct. I have not--
Congressman, may I be permitted to say just a word?
Mr. Barrett. Yes.
Mr. Starr. I have not reviewed the Linda Tripp letter in
advance of this, but it is my understanding that it does not
contain this. But that is my--that is my understanding, and
that is my best recollection.
Mr. Barrett. I will read it: This letter confirms the
previous representations I have made to you regarding your
client Linda R. Tripp. As we have discussed, we agree on behalf
of the United States that coextensive with the provisions of
Title 18 . . . no testimony or other information provided in
this agreement or information directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony or other information may be used against
Ms. Tripp in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury.
That is the essence of the letter.
So nothing in this immunity letter prohibited Linda Tripp
from talking to the media; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Again, that is correct, but if I can say just a
word.
Mr. Barrett. I think you have answered it. I just want to
get through my questions, and I think you have answered it.
Mr. Starr. But I need to get through my answer, and I
simply need to say one sentence. This was a different kind of
immunity than the immunity granted to Monica Lewinsky.
Mr. Barrett. I understand. You explained that to Mr.
Lowell.
Mr. Starr. Yes. I am sorry.
Mr. Barrett. Now, on January 13, 1998, your office sent
Linda Tripp, wired for sound, to meet with Monica Lewinsky at
the Ritz-Carlton Hotel; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Barrett. Indeed, after Linda Tripp had been wired, a
reporter for Newsweek called your deputy, Jackie Bennett, and
made inquiries about these activities; isn't that correct?
Mr. Starr. I believe the timing of that is correct.
Mr. Barrett. And following that call, there was nothing put
in writing to Linda Tripp or her attorney limiting her from
talking to the media; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. I think that is correct. I would have to review
the record, but I think that your understanding is correct,
subject to my review of the record.
Mr. Barrett. And nothing in the written immunity agreement
prohibited Linda Tripp from talking to or working with Paula
Jones or her attorneys; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. That is correct, and we then made it clear, when
it was evident that the--I am sorry.
Mr. Barrett. I am talking about the written agreement now.
And on the eve of the President's deposition in the Jones suit,
Linda Tripp met with Miss Jones's lawyers; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. That is my understanding now. It was not our
understanding or information at that time.
Mr. Barrett. I understand. And at that point, on January
16th, she was an agent for your office, and the same day she
met with Paula Jones's attorneys. That is correct?
Mr. Starr. Well, I would----
Mr. Barrett. I am not asking whether you liked it or you
approved of it. I am just asking factually whether that is
true.
Mr. Starr. That she was being a witness for us, and she
was, in fact, providing certain information to us. What we were
seeking under this immunity agreement was the information that
she said existed.
Mr. Barrett. I am asking whether it is true whether she had
acted as an agent for you that day, and whether she met with
Paula Jones's attorney that night.
Mr. Starr. She had acted as a cooperating witness.
Mr. Barrett. Fine, as a cooperating witness.
Mr. Starr. Well, she was acting in collaboration with us,
and if I could be permitted to answer that.
Mr. Barrett. Let me just finish.
Mr. Starr. Okay.
Mr. Barrett. I would ask the chairman to give you a little
time, if I could.
But she was free to do that because there was nothing in
the immunity agreement to prohibit her from doing that.
Mr. Starr. Again, the purpose of the immunity agreement was
different, and you are right.
Mr. Barrett. Okay. I just want to know that.
Mr. Starr. There was nothing in the immunity agreement
because of the very nature.
Mr. Barrett. The next day was, of course, the day that
President Clinton was deposed. And there was a question asked
of him about whether he had tried to bribe Monica Lewinsky or
other things, and he was very surprised by this. And James
Fisher, her attorney, responded, and this is from Time
Magazine, ``I think this will come to light shortly, and you
will understand.''
Now, what this tells me, Mr. Starr, is that we start out,
and 4 years earlier you have shown your support for not having
the President be immune from lawsuit. And in the end we have
the attorney for Paula Jones knowing exactly what your office
is doing and having one of the key witnesses in your case
cooperating not only with you, but with Paula Jones's
attorneys. That is why this country feels as it does.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time is up. The witness may
answer.
Mr. Starr. Yes, if I could respond briefly. There are a
number of premises in your last question that I just
respectfully but fervently disagree with.
I do not believe that my position with respect to the
constitutional immunity of the President, which I discussed
with a variety of persons, including Mr. Fiske, Mr. Davis, and
others, has the slightest bearing or relevance on the questions
that were before us in 1998. You may disagree with that, but
that was my judgment.
And I would simply say that the position that I took was
vindicated by the Supreme Court 9 to 0. That suggests that
the----
Mr. Barrett. I don't quarrel with that at all. Just so you
understand, I don't quarrel with that at all.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman is answering.
Mr. Starr. But it is also because the issue that had
engaged my attention, the possibility that Bob Fiske would file
an amicus brief in the Paula Corbin Jones civil case, was
likewise information that I did not think had a bearing on the
issues that were before us in a criminal case, and that was my
judgment. And what we did bring to the Justice Department, to
make sure that the Department knew what we were doing, was the
information that we had, and we said, we want to give all
information that is available to you, and ask questions. And my
involvement in 1994 had been very public, and indeed I had been
on various news programs espousing that very position.
Mr. Barrett. Again, Mr. Starr, I don't think----
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.
Mr. Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Starr, this has been a long and very tough hearing,
although I, for one, have thoroughly enjoyed your answers.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Mr. Cannon. Your name has been slandered around the country
for a year and more, and there have been many factual bases for
that slander. We have gone now through, I think, some of the
best and brightest--allegedly slander, I should say--of the
people in Congress, many of whom have participated in that, and
what I would call the President's prodefamation league. And you
know what, they have whiffed today. They have gotten nothing.
Your answers have been so good that I don't think they have
found even colorable impropriety on your part. The answers that
you have given being relatively difficult for them, it is easy
to see what they have reverted to.
We have had a series of repeated unsubstantiated and
frankly embarrassing bombast directed at you with great
intensity, and one to four questions leveled at you, sometimes
very complicated, with follow-up interruptions that have made
your answers difficult. And I might say that--just point out
that the Chair has been a lot more gracious with the Democrats
than with the Republicans in this hearing today.
I now see why the pit bulls of this administration have
been unleashed on you. You have done a great job and, frankly,
I believe that every pundit in America will believe and
conclude that your presentation today has changed the nature of
this debate from you to the President's acts.
Let me just clear up a couple of things that I have heard
today. You talked earlier about the civil perjury in the Jones
deposition, and the issue of materiality came up, and you used
the term ``bogus.'' Would you just clarify? Did you mean in
that to say that the false statements made in the Paula Jones
deposition were, in fact, material, and that any argument that
they weren't material is bogus?
Mr. Starr. Yes. I wasn't sure, and you will forgive me, I
am not recalling in what specific or particular I used that
term, and that is a strong term. But I do think that the
matters that were there and that you have been analyzing do
satisfy a reasonable juror's view with respect to the question
of materiality, which, again, as I have said, is ultimately a
jury question. And I think one of the issues, therefore, that
you would assess is what would I, as a juror, do, although I
hasten to note that your function, of course, here is
ultimately a constitutional function and not an ultimate fact-
finding function, although obviously you have great and
unbridled and unfettered discretion in terms of how you will
define the project or the mission in order to fulfill your
constitutional duty.
Mr. Cannon. That is in the context of a civil action.
Mr. Starr. Yes, and that is in the context of a civil
action. I am sorry.
Mr. Cannon. According to the sworn declaration of White
House counsel Charles Ruff, the President personally directed
him to assert executive privilege to prevent you from
questioning some of his assistants.
When he was in Africa, however, President Clinton denied
knowing about the assertion of executive privilege. Which is
it? Did Mr. Ruff ever amend his declaration, or is the
President lying to the public on his Africa trip?
Mr. Starr. To my knowledge, Congressman, there was never an
amendment to the declaration, and the declaration was filed on
March 17--the declaration may be dated March 17, and then the
President's statement in Africa was on March 24th.
So they both can't be right. Either the President had
discussed with Mr. Ruff the invocation of executive privilege
or he had not. Both cannot be true.
Mr. Cannon. I understand that certain White House officials
asserted executive privilege with respect to portions of
conversations with Vernon Jordan, a private citizen. Is this
true, and on what basis could such a claim be made?
Mr. Starr. There was an invocation of executive privilege
early on, and we believe--with respect to conversations with
Vernon Jordan. They were withdrawn. But we believe that that is
part of the pattern of the lavish and, we believe, unfounded
invocation of executive privilege.
How can a conversation with someone who is outside the
government and relating to matters involving an affidavit in a
private civil case and securing a job at Revlon for someone,
how can that possibly justify a good faith invocation of
executive privilege?
Perhaps others disagree with me. I gather, from the
testimony that you have heard, others do disagree with me. But
to me, when you look at the totality of the invocation and the
withdrawal of executive privilege, I conclude that there is a
pattern of abuse.
Mr. Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Starr. I think that 1998 is
going to be the year of McGwire, Sosa and Starr.
I yield back.
Mr. Hyde. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rogan.
Mr. Rogan. My colleagues' characterization may be right. I
just hate to guess what type of hall of fame you may end up in
when this is all over, Judge Starr, but I do thank you for your
staying power today and for joining us.
I was particularly interested in the grave concern that has
been repeatedly expressed by my colleagues across the aisle
respecting your office's initial interview with Monica
Lewinsky. I have been sitting here listening for several hours
to the vigorous cross-examination that you have endured by
those who are professing a desire to ensure that Monica
Lewinsky was neither inconvenienced or intimidated by your
office during your interview with her.
I would note that if your office did violate any of her
procedural due rights, there are legal remedies that she would
enjoy to protect her from any legal liabilities or criminal
liability.
Mr. Starr. Yes. And could I just add one thing,
Congressman, because this has arisen so frequently, that one of
the reasons, in terms of reliability, whatever one thinks with
respect to our activities on the evening of January 16th, not
one piece of evidence in this referral relates to or depends
upon what happened, because she chose at that time not to be a
cooperating witness.
Nothing in this referral is affected by the events at the
Ritz-Carlton. So it is ultimately a very interesting academic
question that embodies more a ``what can we attack the
prosecutor?'' with than anything else. But ultimately, even the
attacks on the prosecutor and the investigation are utterly
without merit.
Mr. Rogan. Judge, I want to take this----
Mr. Starr. Yes, excuse me.
Mr. Rogan. And I hate to interrupt, but my time is limited.
I want to take this bipartisan concern over the potential
victimization of Monica Lewinsky to the next step. Looking at
the evidence, as Ms. Lewinsky testified to, that the President
suggested she could sign an affidavit and use under oath
deceptive cover stories. If, in fact, the President convinced
Monica Lewinsky to engage in this pattern of conduct, what are
the legal liabilities that Monica Lewinsky would face if this
were uncovered and she were convicted?
Mr. Starr. She would be facing possible criminal charges,
at a minimum, for perjury, and additionally possibly
subornation of perjury, and the penalty with respect to perjury
alone is 5 years imprisonment maximum.
Mr. Rogan. This goes beyond mere inconvenience in an
interrogation. You are talking about incarceration for up to 5
years? Is there a potential fine that is involved? Could she
lose her voting rights in her home State? Are there other
severe penalties that she could face?
Mr. Starr. Yes, all those can flow. Fines can be imposed,
and the sentencing guidelines guide this, and yes, there could
be a loss of voting rights in her home State of California.
Mr. Rogan. And I raise that, Mr. Chairman, and Judge Starr,
because as much as I appreciate my colleagues on the other side
rising up in indignation over the bare suggestion that Ms.
Lewinsky was incommoded or intimidated during your interview, I
am absolutely dumbfounded by their heretofore silence on the
very real and very permanent threat to her liberty and her
rights as a citizen if her characterization of President
Clinton's conduct is true. And I hope that will be addressed
perhaps by the President's attorney when he joins us in a few
minutes.
Moving to the President's deposition in Jones v. Clinton,
when he said ``I don't recall'' if he had ever given any gifts
to Monica Lewinsky, and when he said ``I have no specific
recollection'' of ever being alone in any room of the White
House. Looking at those two sorts of answers, ``I don't
recall,'' and ``I have no specific recollection'': what is the
legal significance in a deposition or in a trial for a witness
who swears to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth to give an answer such as, ``I don't recall, or, ``I
have no recollection,'' when, in fact, they do recall and they
do have a recollection?
Mr. Starr. That can be proven up to be perjury. That is to
say, you have to give under the oath the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, and if one does recall but says one does
not; that may be a difficult issue, but one then looks to the
circumstantial evidence. Is it likely that one would recall
being in this room at some time in 1998? It is likely that one
would recall that, especially if one is asked that in 5 weeks?
So what were the circumstances? And, yes, the circumstances
were such that a reasonable human being, given our common human
experience, would recall, and, yes, individuals have been
prosecuted for the inability to recall that which is viewed as
so straining credulity as simply to be a lie.
Mr. Rogan. The mark of a freshman Congressman is they
always stop talking, Mr. Chairman, when their time really is
up. I hope to maintain that philosophy during my sophomore year
with this committee.
Mr. Hyde. Very well.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one question,
with a possible follow-up depending on the answer.
Did the 23 members of the grand jury sign off on this
referral?
Mr. Starr. No, we did not ask the grand jury to review the
referral. We briefed them on our obligations. It was our view
of the statute, it is our reading of the statute, that it is
the judgment of our office.
Mr. Berman. I understand the statute in no way obligates
that.
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Berman. My follow-up, given that they didn't sign off
on it, did they vote on or review the allegations, the
credibility determinations or the inferences that the referral
draws?
Mr. Starr. No. We did not ask the grand jury to make
specific judgments on specific witnesses. These were our
assessments. These were our evaluations.
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Lindsey
Graham.
Mr. Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If you can handle a couple more, we are about at the end
here.
One thing I have learned, Judge Starr, about impeachment,
it is becoming more and more clear to me, I asked a question
before to myself, really, is this Watergate or Peyton Place?
And I learned that I dated myself because no one in my office
knew what Peyton Place was about. So it should have been
Melrose Place, I suppose.
But one thing I have learned is without--we can talk
academically and legalistically about crimes and punishment,
but without public outrage, impeachment is a very difficult
thing, and I think that is an essential component of
impeachment. I think that is something that the Founding
Fathers probably envisioned.
But the most bizarre thing to me, and it is odd times in
which we live, that the public outrage is directed at you and
not at the person who has allegedly done all of these things.
Let me talk about that person for a second.
Is it Watergate or Peyton Place? I can remember Watergate
pretty well because I was in high school. And as I looked
through this, you have got Mr. Hubbell, who is about to come
testify or offer evidence to the government. Then you have a
cast of characters on behalf of the President, maybe on his
behalf. I don't know if it was on his behalf or not, but there
are certainly acquaintances of the President, friends, donors
and benefactors, who drop about $550,000 on this guy to do
business for them, and he is getting ready to go to jail. The
last time I checked, when you are getting ready to go to jail,
marketability goes down.
So I find it very difficult for me to sit here and believe
that that amount of money going to that man at that time wasn't
an orchestrated effort by somebody to get him to shut up to
avoid one of the messes that the Clintons have created because
a land deal went bad. But you are telling me you can't lay that
at the feet of the President, so I am going to be stuck with
that.
We have now evidence about Kathleen Willey, a lady who says
that she went to the President when times were bad to ask for a
job, and something bad happened. And whether she is telling the
truth or the President is telling the truth, I don't know, but
if she is telling the truth, that tells me a lot about William
Jefferson Clinton.
Now you give me some information that an individual close
to the President asked her to come down to his place, and now
he takes the fifth amendment about what he did with her.
We have files turning up in the White House that you have
been looking for a couple of years, that nobody can find, and a
copy of them are in the loft of a dead guy, and you are telling
me you can't lay this at the feet of the President.
Now we will go to what--I think that is Watergate stuff--
the Dick Morris secret police unit, from Bruce Lindsey and
other people who have been loyal to the President and some
private investigators, if you don't like Linda Tripp--and I can
understand that. There are some people over there you shouldn't
like either. The more you know about them, the less you will
like. But this is not about liking anybody. This is about the
law.
As much as I dislike the President politically, and as much
as I wonder about who he is and what kind of people represent
him, we are going to play it straight. And we are going to play
it straight, folks.
If I bring you two perjurers, does it matter if one
confessed and the one put the State through the pain and
expense of a trial and punishment? Does that matter, Judge
Starr, as a judge? Don't you take that into consideration?
Mr. Starr. I certainly think it is a relevant
consideration, whether someone accepts responsibility or else,
you know, as some pundit put it, ``It is the 7 months,
stupid.''
Mr. Graham. The point I am trying to make----
Mr. Starr. And I did not mean to direct that, but I was
just quoting the pundit. That it was what--it is what the
Nation was put through.
Mr. Hyde. I think we heard you right, Judge Starr. That
inflection was important.
Mr. Starr. That is what the Nation was put through.
Mr. Graham. I have heard a lot from pundits, and I would
rather try to focus on the facts, to be honest with you.
The point I am trying to make is that the law that you
cherish and I cherish, and I think we all love, allows for you
to treat people differently based on what they lied about. That
is not a bad thing to talk about. Every perjurer doesn't get
the same punishment. That is a concept that we are going to
have to deal with here.
Without public outrage, impeachment is hard to do, and it
should be hard to do. And the truth of the matter is, Judge
Starr, we may never get public outrage on behalf of what the
President did because some of the things that are Watergate-
like we can't lay at the feet of the President. But what he did
do is he lied through his teeth in a civil deposition, and I am
going to disagree with you about the legal effect.
When the judge ruled that his deposition was not
admissible, I have a problem with materiality in terms of
perjury, and I am going to disagree with you, and I am going to
stick by my word for the last 2 months. I am not going to
consider that an impeachable offense because I don't think
legally you would probably get prosecuted for that, or you
would have a heck of a hard time once the case was dismissed
and your testimony was deemed inadmissible. And I may be wrong,
but I am going to give him the benefit of the doubt.
But I am telling you right now, it is Peyton Place what we
are left with, but the cover-up Peyton Place has gone to the
point that I no longer can ignore it and feel good about it
because I believe the President of the United States went into
a grand jury, in front of your grand jurors, took an oath, and
6 and 7 months after this whole affair started, after being
begged by everybody in this country to come clean, lied again.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Bono.
Mrs. Bono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I actually want to share something with you first as your
newest Member. When I first came to this committee, I told my
colleagues that I don't understand the rules yet, the 5-minute
rules and the etiquette. I asked my colleagues for help. They
all yelled back at me, ``Don't worry; we don't understand it
either.'' I was thinking when I get my orientation on the
rules, maybe we can all sit down and learn the rules.
I just want to say to Judge Starr that it has been an
extremely enlightening day for me. Up until now, basically,
your persona has been one of a character out of Ground Hog Day,
if you will. Where you have been the same person day in and day
out to all of us. Where you have walked from your house to a
car, smiled, and got in. That is all that we have known of you.
I think that it is nice to see that behind that image there
is a human; behind the spin that there is a human. I also want
to say that what has been most interesting to me today is to
watch all of these lawyers attacking other lawyers for what it
is lawyers do, whatever it is.
I have to say also I think you have been the victim of a
lot of Monday-morning quarterbacking into your investigation.
None of that changes the facts. None of that changes the truth,
and the election on November 4th also did not change the facts.
It did not change the truth.
I must say that you have proven yourself to me today to be
a fair, competent, meticulous and thorough person that Attorney
General Janet Reno knew you to be when she appointed you.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Mrs. Bono. You know, some criticized you that you boast
about all of your wins. I think you should boast, because I
think you do what you do very well. I think far be it from
anybody in this town to criticize somebody for boasting about
their record.
I do have a question for you. Judge Starr, you and your
family have been subjected to an enormous amount of personal
persecution during your tenure as an independent counsel,
particularly over the last year. What motivates you to keep
going forward? Do you have this bone to pick with the President
or this personal vendetta? Do you hold personal animosity
toward him and has that affected the job you have done?
Mr. Starr. Well, I thank you for that question. And I hold
no animosity, and I would love to be back in private life. I
received questions today with respect to, well, didn't you
accept a deanship at Pepperdine, and look who made a
contribution.
So, you are right, I would prefer to be almost your
constituent, a little bit farther west. I would like to be--and
I even looked at a house in Malibu Country Estates. That is
where I would like to be. I would like to be living my life
with my family, and I tried to do that because I had a view
that I could, in fact, lay down the mantle long before Monica
Lewinsky ever walked into the Nation's life, and pass the
mantle on to someone else because of what I had tried to
create. And I have talked about it today, which is that this
Office of Independent Counsel should, in fact, reflect the
experience and practice of the Justice Department.
I love the Justice Department. I served there two times,
and I loved every moment that I was there, even during the
rough times, and there were plenty of those, because it is a
great department. And so I tried to create the Department of
Justice and frankly felt that I had.
Unfortunately a number of my prosecutors are being
calumnied and criticized. It is one thing to criticize the
Independent Counsel. It goes with the territory. But to
criticize and to calumny the men and women with whom I am
privileged to serve, many of whom are on detail from the United
States Department of Justice, is, I think, wrong, and I think
it is unfair, and I think it is unfortunate.
But that is what I thought I had created. I tried to say my
job has reached a stage where I feel that the Independent
Counsel's Office, with offices in Little Rock and in
Washington, would, in fact, be able to carry on very
effectively under new leadership.
I tried to retire. I think George Washington was very wise
in saying, 8 years is enough. I would rather go back. Of
course, he wasn't across the river where the capital was then.
But I would rather return to Mount Vernon, thank you very much.
Well, I would have preferred to have returned to private
life, but I was importuned by my own staff, and I let down my
staff because the deliberative process that I had so talked
about, that before we make any major decision, whether one
agrees with the decision or not, we deliberate about it, and
they basically said, ``Ken, you let us down. You didn't
deliberate with us. You chose your own decision professionally
without a process as to what this might mean at this particular
time to the investigation.''
If I could be indulged 30 more seconds.
I will always remember the comments by an assistant United
States attorney, one of the senior prosecutors in the South, I
think Congressman Bryant would know him, but I don't name the
names of our line prosecutors, but he was on detail to us in
the Little Rock office, and he had a major case responsibility.
He came to me and said, and this was indicative of what I was
receiving, ``You are making a profound mistake, and it is
unfair to the investigation. You cannot leave.'' And this was
after I had been roundly criticized on any number of--for my
many sins of commission and omission. Even with all of that,
the suggestion was made, and I was both honored by it and
humbled by it, but also frankly a little bit down in the dumps
about it, it was sort of, it is not time to leave.
So my duty is to do my duty. I did not ask for this
investigation to come walking in the door. It came to us. We
took it to the department that I love greatly and admire
greatly, the Department of Justice, and we said, what do we do?
As colleagues, how do we collaborate? How should this matter
that unfortunately for the country and unfortunately for this
committee is now before you, and it came to me, and that is why
I am here.
In terms of my family, they are bearing up well, and thank
you very much for asking.
Mrs. Bono. Thank you, Judge Starr.
Mr. Hyde. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mrs. Bono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. I would like to thank her very much.
We will now recess until 8:25 p.m., and we would ask that
everyone stay in their place until the Independent Counsel has
left.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, will Mr. Starr be back?
Mr. Hyde. What?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Will Mr. Starr be back? I have a point of
order.
Mr. Hyde. Indeed he will be back because Mr. Kendall has to
question him, and so does Mr. Schippers.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have a point of order.
Mr. Hyde. If you wish.
[Recess.]
Mr. Hyde. The committee will come to order.
The Chair now recognizes the President's counsel, Mr.
Kendall, to examine the witness for 30 minutes, should he chose
to do so. Mr. Kendall.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Conyers, members. My name is
David Kendall. I am the personal attorney for President
Clinton. My task is to respond to the 2 hours of uninterrupted
testimony from the Independent Counsel, as well as to his 4-
year, $45 million investigation, which has included at least 28
attorneys, 78 FBI agents, and an undisclosed number of private
investigators, an investigation which has generated by computer
count 114,532 news stories in print and 2,513 minutes of
network television time, not to mention 24-hour scandal
coverage on cable, a 445-page referral, 50,000 pages of
documents from secret grand jury testimony, 4 hours of
videotape testimony, 22 hours of audiotape, some of which was
gathered in violation of state law, and the testimony of scores
of witnesses, not one of whom has been cross-examined. And I
have 30 minutes to do this.
It is a daunting exercise, but let me begin with the simple
but powerful truth that nothing in this overkill of
investigation amounts to a justification for the impeachment of
the President of the United States.
Mr. Starr, good evening.
Mr. Starr. Good evening. How are you, David?
Mr. Kendall. I am very well, Ken. You have the book of
exhibits before you, do you not?
Mr. Starr. I do.
Mr. Kendall. Would you turn to tab 5, which is a press
release which your office issued under your name on February 5,
1998. Do you see that?
Mr. Starr. I do.
Mr. Kendall. I want to direct your attention to your
statement, and you are addressing the fact that you have not
been able to talk to Ms. Lewinsky yet, and you say in your
press release, ``We cannot responsibly determine whether she is
telling the truth without speaking directly to her. We have
found that there is no substitute for looking a witness in the
eye, asking detailed questions, matching the answers against
verifiable facts, and, if appropriate, giving a polygraph
test.''
Did you issue that press release saying that, Mr. Starr?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I did.
Mr. Kendall. And questions have been addressed to you today
about the credibility of various witnesses, including Ms.
Lewinsky. It is true, is it not, that you were not present when
Ms. Lewinsky testified before the grand jury?
Mr. Starr. That is true.
Mr. Kendall. And you were not present at her deposition.
Mr. Starr. At her deposition?
Mr. Kendall. Yes. Were you aware that Ms. Lewinsky was
deposed?
Mr. Starr. I am sorry, in our deposition. I am sorry, I
misunderstood you. Yes, I was not present.
Mr. Kendall. You were not present on any occasion when she
was interviewed by FBI agents, were you?
Mr. Starr. That is correct, I was not.
Mr. Kendall. And you have never really exchanged words with
Ms. Lewinsky, have you?
Mr. Starr. That is correct. The answer is yes, I have not
had occasion to meet or otherwise to look her in the eye
myself.
Mr. Kendall. The same is true for her mother, Marsha Lewis;
is it not?
Mr. Starr. Yes, that is true as well. That is true.
Mr. Kendall. The same is true for Betty Currie?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Kendall. The same is true for Vernon Jordan?
Mr. Starr. Well, in connection--I happen to know Mr.
Jordan, but yes, in connection with this----
Mr. Kendall. In connection with this case, were you present
during his grand jury testimony?
Mr. Starr. No, I was not.
Mr. Kendall. And were you present at any interview of him?
Mr. Starr. No, I was not.
Mr. Kendall. Would the same be true for Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Starr. The answer is the same with respect to Mr.
Podesta, yes.
Mr. Kendall. And indeed, Mr. Starr, there are 115
individual grand jury transcripts which your office submitted
to the House, and, with the exception of the deposition of the
President of the United States, you were present at none of
those grand jury proceedings, were you?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Kendall. Likewise, there were 19 depositions submitted,
and you were--at least the reporter doesn't show you being
present on any of those; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. I think that is right. I need to reflect on some
of the Secret Service matters, but I think you are correct that
I was not actually present for any of the depositions
themselves, including the Secret Service officers.
Mr. Kendall. And there are 134 FBI Form 302 interviews
submitted. You are not shown as being present at any of those,
are you?
Mr. Starr. That is correct. I would ordinarily not be
present for an interview of a witness.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, I bring this out not to cast any
aspersions or to question your use of time, but you are here
as--and I believe you have already said this--you are not a
fact witness; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, in terms--well, I can testify to a number
of facts in the investigation.
Mr. Kendall. Such as your own autobiography. I am talking
about facts of this investigation.
Mr. Starr. Could I answer the question? I believe that
there are a number of facts that I can, in fact, testify to,
but with respect specifically to this investigation and most
particularly with respect to the abuse of power issues. But
with respect to other questions, the President's perjury and
obstruction of justice and the like, to the extent that one is
talking about fact witnesses, you are quite right.
The function of the Independent Counsel himself or herself
is ordinarily, ordinarily, depending on the size of the
investigation, not one to accompany FBI agents. One relies upon
the professionalism and the expertise of one's colleagues in
the FBI who work ultimately under the aegis of Judge Freeh.
Mr. Kendall. There were--unlike the 1974 grand jury
referral to the House Judiciary Committee, this referral was
not submitted to the chief judge of the district court, was it?
Mr. Starr. The answer to that, and I may want to reserve
part of my answer for executive session, let me say that we did
not seek the approval of the Chief Judge with respect to the
contents of the report.
Mr. Kendall. Was she ever shown a copy of the referral?
Mr. Starr. I would prefer to go into executive session with
respect to communications I may have had with the district
court.
Mr. Kendall. The grand jury did not vote to approve or
forward this referral; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. That is correct, because, as I have said, the
decision with respect to the referral is the product of career
prosecutors who came together from around the country, and I
tried to make sure that the committee understood that the
individuals who were involved in assisting me and in guiding me
are career Department of Justice U.S. Attorney's Office
prosecutors from around the country, but ultimately this is,
David, my judgment.
Mr. Kendall. You are here really as an advocate for this
referral; are you not?
Mr. Starr. I view myself--no, I think that is not right. I
do believe in the referral. I tried to answer questions with
respect to the referral, although many questions did not relate
to the referral, but related to other matters. But I do believe
in it.
But the reason that I should not be advocating is because
it is this committee's judgment that they will come to by
virtue of the submission of this in writing, with the
supporting materials, and then it is up to the committee to
determine, do they want to call additional witnesses and the
like. Our task was to put before them the information that we
found met the statutory standard of substantial and credible
information.
Mr. Kendall. In your testimony today, you indicated that
you had exonerated the President with regard to the Travel
Office, if I heard you correctly; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes. What I indicated was that we had no
information that related to his involvement, although I also
made it clear that that investigation is continuing, and we
hope to announce decisions or actions very soon.
Mr. Kendall. The Travel Office firings which you are
investigating occurred in 1993; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, the firings were in 1993.
Mr. Kendall. Also, if I heard you correctly this morning,
you indicated that you had exonerated the President with
respect to the FBI files matter which had arisen in 1996; was
that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, that jurisdiction did come to us in 1996
from the Attorney General, and, yes, we have found, as I
indicated, no evidence of any wrongdoing by anyone who is
relevant to, I believe, at least in my assessment, I can't
speak for the committee, that would be relevant to the
committee's assessment of our referral.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, when did you come to those
conclusions?
Mr. Starr. With respect to the Travel Office, I would
frankly have to search my recollection to see exactly where we
were and when we were there. As I indicated with respect to the
Travel Office, we have, in fact, had to put part of the Travel
Office investigation--and I am now talking about the Travel
Office, and I will come to the FBI files--we had to put part of
the Travel Office investigation on hold, as it were, because of
issues over privileged litigation, which we did not prevail on
in the Supreme Court. And there are other matters that we are
presently examining and which I can't talk about here.
Mr. Kendall. Were the two exonerations you announced today,
did you come to those conclusions before or after November 1,
1998?
Mr. Starr. Before November 1 of this year?
Mr. Kendall. This year.
Mr. Starr. Well, I would say that we have not had
information that would guide us to the view that we should be
concerned about the President in respect of those two matters,
and that is why, of course, there is no mention of either of
those matters in the referral. But both matters were, in fact,
continuing, and no final prosecutorial decisions had been made
with respect to either the Travel Office matter or, now to
address the FBI files matter, with respect to that.
There is, as I have indicated, an unresolved question with
respect to one individual. I have not named that individual.
But I do not have--it remains unresolved, so it is a predictive
judgment, Mr. Kendall, that nothing we are likely to achieve in
either of those investigations will be relevant to this
committee's inquiry, and that is what I view my duty as being.
Mr. Kendall. And today was the first time you have
announced that with respect to these two matters; is it not,
Mr. Starr?
Mr. Starr. It is the first time that we have viewed it as
appropriate to speak to issues that are still, David, under
investigation. We are still investigating both matters, and I
hope I have made that point clear. Both investigations have
very live, active elements to them, and we will make those
decisions promptly. But I felt it was my duty to inform this
committee of the state of the record with respect to the
President of the United States, because the committee has been
asking me, do you have any other information that is relevant?
I have received a lot of correspondence. Mr. Conyers----
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, I have only 30 minutes. If I could,
I think you have adequately answered my question.
Let me return to a question asked by Congressman Wexler
this afternoon, and that was about a witness named Julie Hiatt
Steele. Have your investigators investigated the adoption of
her 8-year-old child? She adopted it from a Romanian orphanage.
Mr. Starr. Mr. Kendall, my investigators work very hard and
diligently to find relevant evidence. I believe that the
questions--and I have conducted no specific investigation, and
you just spent a good deal of time establishing that I don't go
with my FBI agents on every single interview. Indeed, I don't
go--may I finish? You asked the question.
I don't go with them on interviews. They have a fair amount
of discretion as professionals as to what is appropriate to
inquire into. But let me simply say this: There is an enormous
amount of misinformation and false information that is being
bandied about with respect to that particular witness and the
circumstances of questioning. I will look forward at the
appropriate time to be able to demonstrate that to any fair-
minded person beyond any reasonable doubt.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, I am asking the question for the
facts. I am not casting aspersions. Again----
Mr. Starr. But, Mr. Kendall, you just said I was not
present for the following persons: Ms. Lewinsky, Marsha Lewis,
and Vernon Jordan. You are now asking me about FBI interviews,
and you talked about how many witnesses there were, and now you
are asking me specifically was a specific question asked of a
particular witness. I will be happy to find that out, if it
seems to be relevant to this committee.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, I don't think it is unfair to try
to find out the facts, because there has been considerable
publicity about Ms. Steele's claim that that is, in fact, what
your investigators have been doing. I was simply asking to
clarify the record.
Mr. Starr. Well, in respect of some of her claims, some of
her claims, and I am going to say this even though there is an
active part of our investigation under way, are utterly without
merit and utterly without foundation, utterly without factual
foundation.
Mr. Kendall. Is this one of those claims?
Mr. Starr. No, I did not say that, Mr. Kendall. I am aware
of certain--the specific question that you asked goes to
whether one or a series of questions were asked of one witness,
and my point is, I thought that what we were here today to
discuss is a referral which we believe contains substantial and
credible information of potential impeachable offenses by the
President of the United States. What a particular witness's
demeanor was or what a particular FBI agent asked is, to my
mind, quite far removed from the sober and serious purposes
that I thought brought us here together. And the final thing I
would say in this respect, if there is an issue with respect to
the way a witness is treated, that is why courts sit. I was
privileged to serve as a judge. That is why judges work.
Mr. Kendall, if there is an issue with respect to the
treatment of a witness, let's take it to court and have the
court resolve it in an orderly way, just as the Supreme Court
of the United States said, that this particular individual is
entitled to an orderly disposition of her claims.
Mr. Kendall. In your testimony this morning, Mr. Starr, you
said, ``We go to court and not on the talk show circuit. We are
officers of the court who live in the world of law. We have
presented our cases in court.'' That is at page 36 of your
testimony.
Now, Mr. Charles Bakaly, your press spokesman and public
relations adviser, has been on, by my count, 10 talk shows and
is on Nightline tonight. I would be happy to read them to you.
This is from late April. But does that sound about right, that
he has been on 11 talk shows?
Mr. Starr. That probably sounds about right, but I would
have to do the count. But let me say that no lesser authority
than Archibald Cox talked, very eloquently and movingly, about
the public information function of a prosecutor's office. Not
only do we have the right, we have the duty to engage in a
proper public information function, because this is the
public's business. We must do so in order at times to combat
misinformation that is being spread about, including at times
by lawyers who frequently claim that their clients have been
grossly mistreated, which is what criminal defense lawyers are
paid to do.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, I take it there would be no
disagreement that you, as a United States prosecutor, are under
a legal obligation to protect the secrecy of the grand jury
process?
Mr. Starr. Yes, there is no dispute whatsoever.
Mr. Kendall. No dispute. Indeed, if you turn to tab 17 of
the materials, you wrote me a letter on February 6th, 1998, and
if I could direct your attention to the second paragraph of
that letter, I complained about leaks of grand jury
information. You had replied, ``From the beginning, I have made
the prohibition of leaks a principal priority of the office. It
is a firing offense, as well as one that leads to criminal
prosecution.''
You say also that you have reminded the staff that leaks
are utterly intolerable. Am I reading that correctly?
Mr. Starr. Yes, you are reading it correctly.
Mr. Kendall. And has anybody been fired from your office,
Mr. Starr, for leaking?
Mr. Starr. No, because I don't believe anyone has leaked
grand jury information, Mr. Kendall.
Mr. Kendall. On the day this story broke in the press,
which was Wednesday, January 21, you issued a press release. Do
you recall that press release?
Mr. Starr. Could you say that again? On January----
Mr. Kendall. On January 21st, the day the Washington Post
story ran, you issued a press release about your information
policy.
Mr. Starr. Do you have that here?
Mr. Kendall. Yes, I do. Let me direct your attention to 27.
Mr. Starr. Twenty-seven.
Mr. Kendall. And also we have a blowup of this press
release on the easel. Now, it is a very short press release,
but I will give you a moment to read it.
Have you read it?
Mr. Starr. I have.
Mr. Kendall. In your testimony this morning you described
the litigation that your office has been involved in at page
36. You said you faced an extraordinary number of legal
disputes on issues of privilege, jurisdiction, substantive
criminal law and the like. Do you see that at the top of your
testimony?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I do see that.
Mr. Kendall. You did not mention leak litigation in that
list, I observe.
Mr. Starr. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Kendall. In fact, we have litigated on a number of
occasions, producing by my count at least five district court
opinions which have all been unsealed and in the binder, and
one court of appeals decision on this matter; have we not?
Mr. Starr. Yes, and in fact with respect to that, we did,
Mr. Kendall--and I think you will agree-- prevail in the court
of appeals with respect to the issue that you are talking
about; and I want to be careful about what I say, because I
have found that some lawyers are very quick to suggest that
certain comments made by prosecutors may run afoul of
confidentiality requirements.
I think I can say this: The D.C. Circuit unanimously
concluded that the procedures that you had urged were entirely
inappropriate, improper, unauthorized by law, and that there
had to be an orderly process that was protective of very vital
interests. That was a unanimous opinion by the D.C. Circuit
overturning a process that you had urged upon the district
court in your effort to find out as much information inside the
prosecutor's office as you possibly could. So I hadn't even
thought of that as one of the 17, but you are absolutely right.
That is part of our litigation record, and we are now in
the process, as you well know, of additional litigation, and I
think that judgment should be withheld--judgment should be
withheld--with respect to this question until such time as
there is a judgment, an ultimate judgment in this case, because
I am confident that we have abided by our obligations. I am
confident of that.
Mr. Kendall. I take it you would agree with Chief Judge
Johnson that enforcing rule 6(e), which enforces grand jury
secrecy, is of the utmost importance to the integrity of the
grand jury process?
Mr. Starr. Yes. Chief Judge Johnson has made it abundantly
clear, and I agree with that, that the values of
confidentiality of matters occurring before the grand jury is
very important.
Mr. Kendall. And she has also ruled, has she not, that due
to the serious and repetitive prima facie violations of rule
6(e), a thorough investigation is necessary and is now being
conducted. This, let me direct your attention to, is at tab 24,
and that is her opinion which was just unsealed.
Mr. Starr. Tab 24?
Mr. Kendall. Tab 24, page 20.
Mr. Starr. Yes, this is the October 30 and then the
redacted version. And this, and I think this is fundamental
fairness, requires this body to know that the law of this
circuit permitted Mr. Kendall to say, ``Here are articles. Look
at the sourcing, we get to ask the prosecutor to come forward
and to show that the prosecutor is not the source of this grand
jury--or of this information.'' And that is the process that is
under way now.
We are at phase 2. But the law of this circuit, under the
Barry case, with which you are intimately familiar, is
essentially a hair trigger. All it takes is a letter from Mr.
Kendall saying, ``Here is an article with ambiguous sourcing; I
believe it may relate to the grand jury matters,'' and a prima
facie case, as is said in the law, may be established.
And in this district, and I think this is a major issue for
the administration of justice, in high-profile cases, such as
Congressman Rostenkowski and Mayor Barry; again and again, the
criminal defense bar of this jurisdiction is rushing into court
and saying there are grand jury leaks----
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, I don't mean to interrupt you, but
I only have 30 minutes.
Mr. Starr. I am sorry.
Mr. Kendall. In fact, Judge Johnson had before her 24
submissions from us as to what might be leaks from the
independent counsel's office; did she not?
Mr. Starr. And we are in the process of litigating those,
as you know.
Mr. Kendall. How many did she find there was prima facie
reason to believe your office committed these leaks?
Mr. Starr. I think you know the answer to that. Under the
hair trigger Barry standard, where almost anything will
satisfy--and the D.C. Circuit noted that; you cited the D.C.
Circuit's opinion--the D.C. Circuit's opinion makes it very
clear, as you know, David, that the burden on the moving party
is quite limited. That is not a quote, but that is the idea. It
is a very limited burden that you have.
Mr. Kendall. I think the answer to my question was all 24.
And are you saying that the journalists invented sources like
``prosecutors painted a different picture,'' ``sources in
Starr's office tell us,'' ``sources near Starr,'' ``prosecutors
suggest''; does the media make up those quotes, Mr. Starr?
Mr. Starr. I am not here to accuse the media of anything. I
am here to say that fairness requires us to be able to litigate
this matter, which, as you well know, is under seal, and to
litigate that in an orderly way, and then to come to a judgment
as to the significance of that.
But I will simply say that the law of this circuit makes it
quite easy for you to say, ``Look at this sourcing. I get to
now put the burden on the prosecutor to come forward and show
evidence that the prosecutor is not the source.'' David, that
is what we are doing.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, in fact there has been no case
remotely similar to this in terms of the massive leaking from
the prosecutor's office. I think we know that.
Mr. Starr. I totally disagree with that. That is an
accusation, and it is an unfair accusation. I completely reject
it, and I would say, David, let's wait until the litigation has
concluded. You are asking to--and especially with the rules
being what they are on a prima facie case--you are asking,
let's now come to judgment after about 10 minutes of the first
half. That is not fair.
Mr. Kendall. May I direct your attention now to the exhibit
that we have displayed up there. It is 27.
Mr. Starr. This is, I am sorry, number 27?
Mr. Kendall. Yes, it is your press release on the first day
of the Lewinsky story breaking. It is a press release on the
letterhead of the Independent Counsel's Office. We secured it
from your office through a Freedom of Information Act request.
It is under your name. It says, ``Independent Counsel Kenneth
W. Starr issued the following statement today from his office
in Washington D.C.'' And then it says, ``Because of
confidentiality requirements, we are unable to comment on any
aspect of our work.''
Is that what you announced to the world on January the
21st?
Mr. Starr. Yes, and I must say, I think that this is
inconsistent with the duty of a prosecutor to provide
appropriate and lawful public information. I think it is the
duty of the prosecutor to combat the dissemination of
misinformation as long as the prosecutor can do that without
violating his or her obligations under Rule 6(e). And that is
the position, David, as you know, of the Justice Department.
Mr. Kendall. Did you issue any press release admitting that
you were talking about aspects of your investigation?
Mr. Starr. I am sorry, could you say that again?
Mr. Kendall. After the press release which you now said--
and I have forgotten your exact phrase. What was it, that you
would not have issued it now?
Mr. Starr. No----
Mr. Kendall. Does it depend on what you mean by
``comment''?
Mr. Starr. No. In terms of being able to provide a public
information function, it depends upon how broadly one wants to
read a particular document. This is not a legal document, it is
a statement of policy, and ordinarily, in contrast to what most
prosecutors do, we try to treat all individuals, those, for
example, charged with crime, with complete fairness. We do not
go out and hold press conferences and the like. That is our
methodology and our approach. But we follow Justice Department
policy, and I frankly think that this comment is an overbroad
statement, because it is incompatible with DOJ policy.
Mr. Kendall. It is your comment, though, Mr. Starr. It is
what you wanted the world to think you were doing in the
Lewinsky investigation; is that not a fact? It is your press
release.
Mr. Starr. Well, except I think it is still--you are
talking about a press release, you are not talking about a
filing in court and the like. And what we were, in fact, doing
virtually contemporaneously with this was issuing--it may not
have been contemporaneously, and perhaps you will guide me to
that, but we were being accused, and we have heard it all day
long today, about the events at the Ritz Carlton, and I felt
duty-bound to provide public information that I thought was
appropriate about the conditions that Ms. Lewinsky found
herself in, and that the character assassination by her then-
attorneys no longer--at least one is no longer her attorneys.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Kendall, your time is up. You may want to get
into the facts. Do you need additional time?
Mr. Kendall. Chairman Hyde, I think I would like additional
time.
Mr. Hyde. How much time would you like?
Mr. Kendall. I think that the analysis--I am sorry, what
did you say?
Mr. Hyde. I was going to say, is 15 minutes helpful?
Mr. Kendall. I would like--that won't be enough.
Mr. Hyde. You are being coached by Ms. Waters here now.
That doesn't count. How much?
Mr. Kendall. Your Honor, another hour.
Mr. Hyde. Another 30 minutes?
Mr. Kendall. Could I have another hour?
Mr. Hyde. How about 30, so you can get into the facts.
Mr. Kendall. I thank the Chair for 30 minutes. I think,
though, that these are the facts, Your Honor. How this analysis
was done, the campaign to disseminate information against the
President is very much a part of the fairness of the document
which your committee is having to consider.
Mr. Hyde. Very well.
Mr. Kendall. Is the analysis reliable, is it fair, does it
present the facts, have proper procedures been followed?
Mr. Hyde. I see. Well, the gentleman is recognized then for
an additional 30 minutes, but that should wind it up. So you
have 30 more minutes.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, you were right. You did issue a
press conference about Ms. Lewinsky's treatment at the Ritz
Carlton. That was a press release, it was on the record,
everybody knew you were saying that. You were accountable. To
use your phrase, you were transparent. But you also spoke
frequently on background to the press. And my question to you
is you and those around you, your subordinates----
Mr. Starr. Yes, be careful when you say the ``you,''
because I do not speak frequently or otherwise to the press.
Mr. Kendall. Did Professor Dash give you any advice as to
what should be on background and what on the record?
Mr. Starr. We discussed with Sam a variety of issues. I
would have to search my recollection with respect to any
specific observations that Sam gave us with respect to this.
But let me say this: If you look--because your comments to
the Chairman, whom you called Your Honor, and I have been
tempted to do that most of the day, because you and I are both
accustomed to being in courthouses--when you look at the
information that we had in our Office and the FBI, as opposed
to information that you had access to, it never, never entered
the public domain.
For example, the dress, the DNA, the test results, those
were never in the public domain, because you did not have a
witness in your joint defense arrangements who you could
debrief and tell you, because it was the distinguished judge
who is the head of the FBI and a handful----
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr----
Mr. Starr. No, you are talking about fairness. It is time
for some fairness with respect to all of these charges that
keep being bandied around without any kind of judicial
determination that there is, in fact, wrongdoing under 6(e).
Mr. Kendall. My question was simple, Mr. Starr. My question
was why would you speak on background? Why not be accountable?
Why not be transparent? I have never protested a press release
which you have issued, have I?
Mr. Starr. No, you have not.
Mr. Kendall. And I think that there may well be times as a
prosecutor when it is necessary to correct misinformation. You
have sometimes done that. It is necessary to get the facts out
so that people aren't misguided. But why speak off the record
on background? Why not be accountable?
Mr. Starr. It depends on the circumstances, and I will say
this: I believe the Justice Department practice, it certainly
was the practice when I was there; I will hazard that it is
still the practice of the Justice Department, that these are
judgment calls as to whether the prosecutor wants to make
herself or himself part of the story.
A specific example: If someone comes to us with a specific
allegation of wrongdoing on the part of one of our
prosecutors--perhaps a criminal defense lawyer who has said the
prosecutor did the following bad things--it may be utterly
bogus, because people do, in fact, lie about what happens to
their clients, I am sorry to say. We do not want to in any way
be part of a story as to whether--and obviously we can't talk
about matters occurring before the grand jury, but we can, in
fact, respond to a suggestion that the FBI in some way or a
prosecutor in some way conducted herself or himself improperly.
But it is quite wise to say----
Mr. Kendall. Then why not say it on the record? Why the
secrecy?
Mr. Starr. You are asking essentially about press policy as
opposed to the constitutional issues that have brought us all
here, and if this is an oversight hearing with respect to the
press policy of the Independent Counsel's Office, or if that is
what the President's lawyer wants to spends his time doing,
then that is your prerogative. Let me tell you what our press
policy is.
Mr. Kendall. Well, Mr. Starr, I only have got 30 minutes. I
asked you, I think, a simple question, but let me move on.
You yourself executed an affidavit in the leaks
investigation; did you not?
Mr. Starr. David, this matter is in litigation, and, Mr.
Chairman, as a matter of fairness, I have to be careful about
what I say because he may tell me that it is not--it is just
not right to be in litigation under seal before the district
court and to be cross-examined by the President's attorney with
respect to that matter which seems to have no germaneness
whatever, although----
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, I was going to ask you about an
affidavit, a sworn declaration, which you yourself executed,
which is not under seal in the leaks proceeding. But I will
move on if this is not something you want to respond to.
Mr. Starr. Well, David, I just think if you are talking
about the leaks litigation, that is the point, it is in
litigation. Why don't we allow that litigation to go forward,
instead of individuals, Members of Congress who talk about
fairness, jumping to the conclusion that there has been a
violation when there has been no adjudication of anything
beyond the existence under the law of this circuit of a prima
facie case.
That is unfair. It is unfair to my career prosecutors, it
is unfair to investigators, it is wrong. And, just to finish
the point, when we had highly sensitive information that Mr.
Kendall did not have, the DNA on the dress, that was held
within our Office and the FBI. There was no dissemination of
that information.
But what happens is Mr. Kendall and others interview
witnesses, and any criminal defense lawyer, and if you see fit
to inquire into the joint defense arrangement in existence
here, I would be grateful. I know you want to move forward with
these proceedings, but the joint defense arrangement that has
been in effect in this operation is a very significant aspect
of the very issues that Mr. Kendall is now raising before this
committee, because one of the issues in 6(e)----
Mr. Kendall. Excuse me, could I direct your attention to
tab 15? I think you have answered the question, and I would
like to move on. I am running against the clock.
Mr. Starr. I am sorry, Mr. Kendall. I have been here since
10 o'clock, so forgive me.
Mr. Kendall. I know, and I will move on.
Carol Bruce, Ms. Carol Bruce, was appointed Independent
Counsel to investigate the Indian gambling casino matter; was
she not?
Mr. Starr. Yes. The Secretary Babbitt matters, yes.
Mr. Kendall. Are you aware of her press policy?
Mr. Starr. No, I am not.
Mr. Kendall. It is indicated there at tab 15 that she held
a press conference when she was appointed, and then said she
did not anticipate making any further public comments until the
investigation is completed.
You mentioned the experience of Ms. Lewinsky at the Ritz
Carlton on Friday, January 16, 1998. One of the reasons your
agents held Ms. Lewinsky was that they----
Mr. Starr. I have to interrupt. That premise is false.
Mr. Kendall. Let me rephrase it.
Mr. Starr. That is false, and you know it to be false.
Mr. Kendall. I will rephrase the question.
Mr. Starr. She was not held.
Mr. Kendall. Her own psychological state will speak for
itself as to how she felt. It is in the record in her
testimony.
Mr. Starr. You said she was held; you didn't say how she
felt. You said she was held, and I think that is unfair to our
investigators, and this issue has been litigated, David, as you
well know, with respect to the constitutional rights of the
individual involved. Excuse me.
Mr. Kendall. During her sojourn with your agents----
Mr. Starr. Well, the Ritz Carlton is a very pleasant place
to have a sojourn.
Mr. Kendall. One of the purposes was to get Ms. Lewinsky to
wear a recording device and surreptitiously record Mr. Jordan
or the President; was it not?
Mr. Starr. It was not. And I know that there is testimony,
and this has been referred to, but let me explain. She was
asked and given the opportunity, which she turned down, to be a
cooperating witness. And we explained to her--we did not invent
this, this is all traditional prosecutorial activity and
techniques--one of the things that a cooperating witness can do
is to assist us in consensual monitoring. We described that at
a high level of generality, it is my understanding, and I
believe my prosecutors, in fact, conducted themselves
consistently with what I have just told you.
Mr. Kendall. Could you turn to tab 7, and could we have----
Mr. Starr. I am sorry, tab 7?
Mr. Kendall. Yes, tab 7 of the binder.
You may have read the Time Magazine essay by Messrs.
Ginsburg and Speights in which they state the following: ``The
government didn't just want our client to tell her story, they
wanted her wired. They wanted her to record telephone calls
with the President of the United States, Vernon Jordan and
others at their will.''
You are familiar with Mr. Ginsburg's charge?
Mr. Starr. Mr. Ginsburg is wrong, and he must know that he
is wrong. He was wrong then, and it is a calumny to repeat that
now. Mr. Ginsburg was not known for his consistency of
articulating positions, nor was he known for his consistency in
dealing with facts. I would say that he was rather fast and
loose with the facts, and if you are going to rely in this
proceeding on a Time Magazine essay by Bill Ginsburg, then I
think the standards are not quite as lofty as I thought they
would be this evening.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, what is an FBI 302 form?
Mr. Starr. An FBI 302 form is a report of interview by FBI
agents with a witness.
Mr. Kendall. Now, you categorically denied wanting to have
Ms. Lewinsky wear a wire or secretly tape record the President
or Mr. Jordan when the charge was made in the Time article; did
you not? You categorically denied that.
Mr. Starr. Are you saying at the time of this Time article?
Mr. Kendall. At the time of that Time article, you denied
Mr. Ginsburg's charge; did you not?
Mr. Starr. I believe that we did, but I am just not
recalling specifically how we did it.
Mr. Kendall. You certainly denied it----
Mr. Starr. We have had a number of charges, so you will
have to remind me of where my rebuttal is.
Mr. Kendall. Let me direct you to tab 12 in the volume.
This is your later letter to Steve Brill. We are displaying the
page there. It is page 7. You don't have to read your entire
letter.
Mr. Starr. Okay, page 7.
Mr. Kendall. Do you see where it is indented 6? It is tab
12, page 7 of the exhibit, your own letter. You say, ``This is
false. This Office never asked Ms. Lewinsky to agree to wire
herself for conversation with Mr. Jordan or the President. You
cite no source at all, nor could you, as we had no such
plans.''
Have I read correctly your letter?
Mr. Starr. Yes, you have.
Mr. Kendall. All right. Now, when you wrote the letter, did
you review--you were not present at the Ritz Carlton, were you?
Mr. Starr. No, I was not.
Mr. Kendall. Did you review with Mr. Emmick, for example,
what had happened there?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I have reviewed with a number of--well, in
terms of this particular letter, if you are asking did I review
the contents of the Ritz Carlton in connection with this as
opposed to what we had already done in terms of the allegations
being made at or around the time, I do have very vivid
recollections of discussions with respect to the circumstances
of----
Mr. Kendall. Do you remember----
Mr. Starr. --of the Ritz Carlton. You are asking me in
connection with this letter did I have a conversation with one
of my colleagues, and I would have to review notes and so
forth.
Mr. Kendall. I apologize for my speed, but I don't have
much time. I don't usually talk this fast, Mr. Starr.
Would you look at tab 13.
Mr. Starr. Okay.
Mr. Kendall. At tab 13 is the FBI 302 form describing--that
is not Mr. Ginsburg or Mr. Speights, is it? It is one of your
own agents. We don't know who because the name is blacked out,
but if you look at page 5 of that exhibit, it says--at 11:22
p.m., it says A.I.C. Emmick talked to Bernard Lewinsky, that is
Ms. Lewinsky's father. ``Cooperation, interview, telephone
calls, body wires and testimony were mentioned.''
Do you see that?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I do.
Mr. Kendall. And then do you see down below the 11:37 p.m.
entry, Ms. Lewis has arrived on the scene, Ms. Lewinsky's
mother, and she expresses, Ms. Lewinsky has expressed concern
about what is being requested of her. She says, according to
the FBI 302, ``What if I partially cooperate?'' That is as
recorded by the FBI agent. ``Marsha Lewis asks what would
happen if Monica Lewinsky gave everything but did not tape
anything.''
Do you see that?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I do.
Mr. Kendall. It was in the grand jury that the events of
Friday, January the 16th, were presented through the testimony
of Ms. Lewinsky; was it not? Was it her second appearance?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I believe that is right.
Mr. Kendall. And do you remember--do you have the
appendices to your volume?
Mr. Starr. I can get them.
Mr. Kendall. I don't think we will need to, because this is
a famous passage. The grand jurors--your prosecutors had no
more questions, and the grand jurors themselves began to
inquire about the events that day. One of them said, at page
1143, ``We want to know about that day. We really want to know
about that day.'' And this elicited then from Ms. Lewinsky, who
was under oath, a tearful description of what had happened to
her. She asked Mr. Emmick to leave the room; did she not?
Mr. Starr. That is my recollection of the transcript, yes.
Mr. Kendall. And, in fact, she said that she was told on
Friday, January the 16th, by your agents that she would have to
place calls or wear a wire to call Betty and Mr. Jordan and
possibly the President.
``Question: And did you tell them you didn't want to do
that?
``Yes.''
Was that Ms. Lewinsky's testimony?
Mr. Starr. Yes, that is her testimony.
Mr. Kendall. I think the point was made earlier, but the
affidavit that Ms. Lewinsky filed had not been mailed by her
attorney until the end of the day, Friday, January the 16th,
had it?
Mr. Starr. I believe that is right in terms of the timing,
but I would have to reconstruct in terms of the actual timing
of the mailing. I am sorry, I would have to double-check that.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, you have repeatedly said that the
Attorney General asked you to take on this matter----
Mr. Starr. Well, that is your characterization. I have said
that we collaborated with the Justice Department, and the
Attorney General came to her decision. We brought it to her
attention. We did say that we thought the steps that we had
taken had been within our jurisdiction, but we were concerned
about whether any additional step could be taken properly
within our jurisdiction, and that is how the discussions began.
Mr. Kendall. In fact, you requested that the matter be
referred to you; did you not?
Mr. Starr. At some point during the discussion in our own
deliberations we came to the view that we felt that because of
the involvement, and I will be very specific here, of Vernon
Jordan, that this was related to our existing jurisdiction. The
Attorney General disagreed with that, but that was our view.
Here was Linda Tripp, who was a witness in the Travel
Office matter and the Vincent Foster documents matter and the
Vincent Foster death matter, and she had come to us with
information. So we felt very comfortable--and she said, ``I am
being asked to commit crimes. I am being asked to commit
perjury.'' We felt comfortable that we were within our
jurisdiction at that juncture, but we did feel that there was a
jurisdictional issue from that point forward, which we worked
on collaboratively with the Justice Department.
But we did, in fact, send a letter indicating that we felt
that this was related to our jurisdiction. But I hasten to note
that the Attorney General disagreed with that and said, no, it
is not related to your existing jurisdiction, but we think your
Office should investigate it. We can't, because the President
is implicated.
Mr. Kendall. In her transmission to the Special Division,
the Attorney General stated ``Independent Counsel Starr has
requested that this matter be referred to him.'' Is that not
the case?
Mr. Starr. You will have to refer me.
Mr. Kendall. I am sorry, I don't have that in your binder.
I will represent that to you----
Mr. Starr. I certainly am going to accede to your
representation, and it certainly is true, as I just indicated,
that we did, in fact, send a written submission indicating that
we felt that this was related to our jurisdiction. The Attorney
General felt we should have jurisdiction, but determined that
under the statute it should be an expansion of our existing
jurisdiction.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, when did you first learn, you
yourself, that there might be an audiotape with a conversation
involving the President and a young woman?
Mr. Starr. The young woman, Monica----
Mr. Kendall. A young woman.
Mr. Starr. I'm sorry?
Mr. Kendall. A young woman.
Mr. Starr. I think we have had questions about that, and I
have been asked that, and I am searching my recollection. But
let me say this: If you are talking about Monica Lewinsky, and
I don't know that you are, you didn't use her name, but the
first I knew, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, of
Monica Lewinsky was in January of 1998.
Now, I had questions, and they seemed to me to suggest that
there is some information with respect to information that may
have come to me in November of 1997 with respect to tapes, and
it was all very vague and shrouded in mystery, and I said I
will be happy to respond if I get some additional information.
But with respect to Monica Lewinsky, which is what I assume
we are here to talk about, I did not know anything about Monica
Lewinsky, to the best of my recollection. I don't think I ever
had occasion to meet her or otherwise hear about her until
January of 1998.
Mr. Kendall. Were you aware of how Ms. Tripp came to
communicate with your office in January of 1998?
Mr. Starr. I was told--I will be very specific, and I can
be very brief. I was at the American Bar Association Journal
Board of Editors meeting when the initial contact was made with
one of the associate independent counsels. I do not believe--
that was on January 8th, and I do not believe in that contact
Linda Tripp's name was mentioned.
That information was brought back to Washington. The
information was conveyed to a deputy independent counsel, who
said information comes in the front door, and I'm not sure at
that time that we knew who this person was. We were then called
on January 12th by Linda Tripp, that was a telephone call, and
I was made aware of the telephone call promptly thereafter. And
that is when it was brought to my attention that there was
information that we would proceed to act on.
Mr. Kendall. Were you aware that your partner Richard
Porter had played a role in steering Ms. Tripp to your office?
Mr. Starr. I know Richard. I am not aware of what his role
was. I have since read about what his role was, but I did not
in any way have any involvement whatsoever or participation in
any way with whatever he did, and I have not conducted an
investigation. There may be facts of which I am unaware that I
should be aware in terms of before I formulate a complete
response.
Mr. Kendall. Could you turn to tab 2, Mr. Starr. It is a
provision of the independent counsel statute. It is 28 USC
594(J). Do you see that?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I do.
Mr. Kendall. And you have made the point that you kept your
law practice, as you were legally entitled to do; you made, I
think, over $1 million each year for the last 4 from that law
practice, again, as you were legally entitled to do. But in
exchange for allowing private counsel to serve part time as
independent counsel, the Ethics in Government Act enforced a
very strict conflict of interest rule; did it not?
Mr. Starr. Yes, it is very specific, yes.
Mr. Kendall. And that says that any independent counsel
cannot have any person associated with the firm, not just a
partner, represent in any matter any person involved in any
investigation or prosecution under this chapter; is that
correct?
Mr. Starr. I believe that's right. I would have to reread
it, but I am going to simply accept your representation, but I
think that is correct.
Mr. Kendall. I call your attention to Exhibit 4, which is
another 302 interview form, and that is for Ms. Lucianne
Goldberg, tab 4.
Mr. Starr. Yes, I do have it.
Mr. Kendall. At page 1232 of the exhibit, do you see that
one of your agents is describing why Linda Tripp is nervous.
Mr. Starr. And where--I am sorry, I have not read this 302.
Mr. Kendall. It's 1232.
Mr. Starr. Yes, I know, but what paragraph?
Mr. Kendall. All right. It is the paragraph that begins,
``In the meantime, because Tripp--''
Mr. Starr. It is not on my page 1232.
Mr. Kendall. I beg your pardon. It is 1231.
Mr. Starr. Okay, I am sorry. All right.
Mr. Kendall. ``Goldberg called around to friends she has,
including one in Chicago who works at the same firm Ken Starr
does. This person recommended Goldberg call Jackie Bennett at
the OIC. Goldberg advised that the OIC knew who this person is,
and that this person is very nervous at this time.'' Did you
ever have any reports from any source that some person at your
law firm had expressed nervousness about this contact with
Linda Tripp?
Mr. Starr. You are talking about at any time?
Mr. Kendall. At any time.
Mr. Starr. Well, you have just brought this to my
attention. But I do not know. I don't have a recollection of
something being brought--you are talking about to my attention.
No.
Mr. Kendall. Did you cause any check to be made at any time
before you sought jurisdiction in the Lewinsky matter as to
whether any person in your law firm had any kind of an
association with the Paula Jones case?
Mr. Starr. No, I did not. But I must say that what you
pointed me to in the statute was representation, and I have
read the 302 quickly for the first time. I have not had
occasion to read this 302, and the 302 does not talk about
representation; it talks about calling a friend.
Mr. Kendall. It is possible, is it not, Mr. Starr, for the
provision of legal advice of some kind to involve a
representation, at least for conflict of interest purposes,
even if there is no written retainer, there is no formal hiring
of a person?
Mr. Starr. Well, I am not sure I would readily agree with
that. Let me just say this. Conflict of interest analysis is,
as you well know because you are a partner in a very
prestigious law firm, is very technical and very complicated,
and very careful evaluation has to be made, and that is why I
am sure at your firm, as we do at our firm, the firm in which I
am on leave of absence, we have a partner who is dedicated to
the issue--to the analysis of these very issues. So these are
things that you assess all the facts. What is a conflict? As
you know, the issue of conflict is one that is at times a
very--very much a judgment call that reasonable persons have to
have an enormous amount of information in order to come to that
judgment.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Starr, could I direct your attention to
exhibit--tab 14, please. Do you have that exhibit?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I do.
Mr. Kendall. That is a Washington Post article from June of
1997 indicating that your investigators are now probing rumors
about the President; is it not?
Mr. Starr. It is an article about that subject, yes.
Mr. Kendall. And indicating that State troopers, two who
are named and quoted, Ronnie Anderson and Roger Perry, are
being interviewed about rumors of affairs that the President
had while he was Governor of Arkansas; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. That is what the story is about, but whether the
story reflects the facts is obviously a different matter.
Mr. Kendall. Did you cause any investigation to be done as
to whether, in fact, your investigators were asking witnesses
about a list of 12 to 15 women by name, including Paula Corbin
Jones?
Mr. Starr. When this--and we were in Little Rock at the
time, all of the attorneys were in Little Rock as we were
assessing a very important issue, and when we were in the midst
of our discussions, we were receiving urgent inquiries from The
Washington Post asking about interviews, and you are quite
right in pointing out that this was a Washington Post piece
from June of 1997. They were talking about interviews that had
been conducted in February, so it was old news, and we did then
inquire, in light of this, we then did make inquiries
internally of the FBI, because these are professional agents
and we said, what kinds of questions are being asked; what is
the purpose, and the purpose of the investigation was as we
were moving forward in the Little Rock phase of our
investigation, we wanted to make sure, as investigators should
do and as prosecutors should do, that we had reached out and
interviewed anyone who might have relevant information, and
that is what we were doing. We were, in fact----
Mr. Kendall. Relevant to this interview, did you go to the
Attorney General and seek an expansion of your jurisdiction to
accompany this particular investigation?
Mr. Starr. I guess I wasn't clear. This was the Whitewater
phase of our investigation that is referenced here in the press
we are talking about, in Little Rock; we are not talking about
activity in Washington. And we were, in fact, interviewing, as
good prosecutors, good investigators do, individuals who would
have information that may be relevant to our inquiry about the
President's involvement in Whitewater, in Madison Guaranty
Savings and Loan and the like, and specifically, a loan from
Madison Guaranty that we had information on in which we were
not able to secure as much information as we would like, given
the records of the bank and given Susan McDougal's lack of
cooperation. As you know, as you well know, Susan McDougal was
not cooperating with the investigation, and indeed, as we know,
you spent time with Susan McDougal during the course of the
trial representing the President's interest to communicate with
her, as you are entitled to do. We are also entitled, just as
you are entitled to reach out to your fellow criminal defense
lawyers, we are entitled to reach out to witnesses who may have
relevant information.
Mr. Kendall. Did you use private investigators to do this
investigation into the 12 to 15 women?
Mr. Starr. I beg your pardon? Private investigators?
Mr. Kendall. Your GAO report, for the last three times, has
a line item of approximately--it varies, but it is about half a
million dollars, for among other things, private investigators.
Mr. Starr. No, we have never hired Terry Lenzner, David.
Mr. Kendall. What private investigative----
Mr. Starr. But what we do do is we do hire retired FBI
agents, and those are--I will have to look at--you are talking
about an audit report, and if you want to guide me to the audit
report, that's fine.
Mr. Hyde. The Chair has got to intervene. The hour is over
quite a little bit. Mr. Lowell and Mr. Kendall have had 2
hours. Mr. Schippers has been waiting since 10 o'clock and is
getting testy, which is his natural state. But Mr. Kendall, you
will have an opportunity, a further opportunity to present and
address the committee at length in extensio as you lawyers say,
and offer whatever evidence, exculpatory or otherwise, you
want. You will have a full opportunity before we go to any
markup, if we go to a markup. So really, it is a long day. One
must have some compassion for Mr. Starr, and if not----
Mr. Starr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Chairman, I thank you, but I would simply
request, Mr. Starr testified for two and a quarter hours; I am
simply trying to get my fair crack at him. I would like to go
into omissions from the referral and other areas.
Mr. Hyde. Well, I am sure----
Mr. Kendall. I would come back tomorrow, if that were
appropriate.
Mr. Hyde. Well, I don't think many of us want to come back
tomorrow. But really you will have an opportunity to address
the committee fully and produce whatever you want by way of
evidence, witnesses, exculpatory material. We will not
foreclose you, but the night is waning and we would like to get
to Mr. Schippers, so with your kind indulgence, and I see you
are putting your glasses away, which is a healthy sign.
Mr. Starr, do you want a little break?
Mr. Starr. No, Mr. Chairman. We are almost at my bedtime.
Mr. Hyde. We are at mine, I can assure you.
Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The gentlewoman from California.
Ms. Waters. I would like to inquire of the Chair, what
opportunity will we have to clarify what appears to have been
conflicting information that we have received here today from
our star witness?
Mr. Hyde. I would write a letter to Mr. Starr, if I were
you. If I were confused about some of the evidence, I would
write him a nice letter and I would say please straighten me
out, and I bet he would answer you.
Ms. Waters. I think it is a little deeper than that. It may
go to perjury. This man is under oath.
Mr. Hyde. Well, he is under oath. Are you charging him with
perjury?
Ms. Waters. I would like clarification, and after the
clarification is made, I can determine whether or not I would
make that charge.
Mr. Hyde. Well, Ms. Waters, the Chair has to control this
committee. We have been at it all day, and I think what you are
asking at this late moment is an imposition on the committee,
not to mention Mr. Starr, so you would not be recognized for
that purpose. But I will recognize Mr. Schippers for 30
minutes.
Mr. Schippers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Starr, my name is David Schippers and I am the chief
investigative counsel for the committee. Can you hear me?
Mr. Starr. Now I can. Thank you.
Mr. Schippers. I will try to be as brief as I possibly can,
but I do have a little bit of territory to cover, as you well
know.
I will begin with some of Mr. Kendall's statements and some
of Mr. Kendall's questions to you. First of all, do I
understand that there is such a thing as a hair trigger? You
referred to a hair trigger that would set off an investigation
of whether or not there were leaks out of your office.
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Schippers. And that hair trigger can be and often is
triggered by a defense attorney sending something to the judge
claiming that there is a leak; is that right?
Mr. Starr. It is--yes, it is standard practice for criminal
defense lawyers to charge leaks of grand jury information,
their allies then pick up the charge, and suddenly it becomes
conventional wisdom that there has, in fact, been some final
adjudication, which is wrong as a matter of law and unfair,
just in terms of basic human decency, because these are
professional prosecutors that we are talking about.
Mr. Schippers. Thank you, Judge.
Mr. Starr. Yes, I am sorry.
Mr. Schippers. Do I understand that Mr. Kendall sent 27 of
these such requests about leaks?
Mr. Starr. I think he had some 24 exhibits which again I
have been reluctant to talk about, because it is in litigation.
I mean the specifics are in litigation, as David knows.
Mr. Schippers. Well, Judge, if I were expecting someone to
testify before a congressional committee and I wanted some
questions to ask him about leaks, all I would have to do is
send some letters to the judge and trigger this hair trigger
effect, isn't that correct?
Mr. Starr. I don't want to suggest that the hair trigger is
a nonexistent trigger, but the burden on the defense lawyer is
quite modest, and one of the things that we have learned, and I
know this is your time, but I would just say, one of the things
that we have learned in this investigation is that a lot of
people, including Mr. Kendall, talk on background and the like,
and the sourcing that is then used by the reporter becomes very
important. Someone as responsible as Tim Russert sourced a
story in such a way that it came from us. He was decent and
honorable enough to say, no, it didn't come from Starr's
office, it in fact, with all due respect, came from the
Congress.
Now, you are not under a 6(e) obligation, so you can talk
as freely as you would like, and indeed you enjoy Speech and
Debate Clause immunity. However, prosecutors are very
sensitive, especially in this jurisdiction in light of the hair
trigger to a reporter who sort of says, ``sources close to.''
Well, what does that mean? It can mean almost anyone. And I
think that one of the things that this litigation will, in
fact, show, is that that becomes an issue ever so quickly as we
saw in the Marion Barry case and as we saw in the Dan
Rostenkowski case.
Mr. Schippers. Judge, Mr. Kendall mentioned massive
leaking. I am going to ask you a specific and direct question.
As you sit there, do you have any information, evidence or
anything in your possession to indicate that anyone in your
office has leaked anything? Any 6(e) material?
Mr. Starr. Well, again, it depends on what one means by
6(e), because there are issues. I have a press release----
Mr. Schippers. With your information.
Mr. Starr. Within my understanding, and I think that my
understanding is correct, no, I can say here that now. But I
also think that it is important for this litigation that I had
talked about to go forward and let's see what happens in that
litigation, which is again under seal, but there is an orderly
process, just as the Supreme Court said in the Paula Corbin
Jones case. Let's allow that orderly process to go forward.
Mr. Schippers. Fine. Sir, you were asked whether you were
present during the taking of the 302s, the FBI interviews,
whether you were present at the grand jury appearances of all
of these witnesses; whether you were present during the course
of interviews and depositions, and you answered no; isn't that
correct?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Schippers. But you did have experienced, highly
experienced professional agents and prosecutors present at each
and every one of those occasions, did you not?
Mr. Starr. I did.
Mr. Schippers. And you relied upon the integrity, the
honesty and the decency of those agents and investigators, did
you not?
Mr. Starr. I did, and very proudly so.
Mr. Schippers. All right. I notice that Mr.--we have heard
an awful lot about fairness here, Judge Starr, but I notice
that when you sat down this morning you were given about 2
inches of documents to review. How long did you have to review
those before Mr. Lowell began questioning you?
Mr. Starr. Unless Mr. Lowell shipped it over this morning,
I left the office at 9:15 a.m. to come to the House of
Representatives, and I had not seen it. If it is waiting on my
desk, then I suppose he gave me some notice, but no, in terms
of actual notice, I had no notice whatsoever.
Mr. Schippers. You were also given a book filled with some
63 tabs when Mr. Kendall began to question you. When is the
first time you saw that book?
Mr. Starr. This evening, when I came in after having a
sandwich.
Mr. Schippers. And of course they had, they were in
possession of those books before you left to have your
sandwich. They didn't give it to you to review, did they?
Mr. Starr. No, unless it is sitting on my desk--it is not.
They did not, and I am confident I have to be careful what I
say, because of not having universal facts, but Mr. Schippers,
no, I had no advance notice that this was going to be inquired
into.
Mr. Schippers. You were questioned about specific, one
line, two lines inside of this 2\1/2\-inch document and you had
to go and hunt for the answers, didn't you, Judge?
Mr. Starr. I did.
Mr. Schippers. Now, we have heard over 2 hours of
questioning, almost 3 hours of questioning if we include the
Democratic members of this committee, and I haven't heard
anybody ask you one question about the facts of these cases. So
with your permission, Judge, I am going to take a few minutes
and get to the facts and the issues that are really before this
committee.
First of all, Mr. Conyers in his opening statement made a
remark about a recent delivery of four boxes of documents. That
delivery was made, what was it, yesterday or the day before to
the Ford Building, was it not, Judge Starr?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I believe it was the day before.
Mr. Schippers. Now, that wasn't your idea to deliver those,
was it?
Mr. Starr. No, it was not.
Mr. Schippers. It was in answer to a request by Mr. Conyers
that you provide additional information, wasn't it?
Mr. Starr. Yes. Well, it was a congressional request. I
believe it originated with Congressman Conyers.
Mr. Schippers. And you were just----
Mr. Starr. We have had so many requests. We have had
individual requests from individual Members. I don't mean to
complain, but we don't have a congressional office. We are
prosecutors and lawyers, so we do the best we can. We have had
a virtual flurry of requests for information, but I believe
Congressman Conyers was one of the requesters with respect to
that information and we tried to be responsive, yes.
Mr. Schippers. Now, Judge Starr, you have been
investigating President Clinton and the Monica Lewinsky matter
and other matters involving perjury, obstruction of justice,
conspiracy and so on for some 7 or 8 months; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I guess now 10 months.
Mr. Schippers. Have you been given any exculpatory evidence
by the President, or have you been offered any exculpatory
evidence or witnesses by the President in that time?
Mr. Starr. I don't believe that we have. I would want to
check, and if I have additional information I would provide it
to the committee. But as I sit here this evening, I am not
aware of any suggestion that there is exculpatory evidence,
other than the discussion we have had here today with respect
to what one individual witness may have said. But no, no
witness has come forward to say, Monica Lewinsky made it all
up. No one has suggested that. No one has suggested it. So I am
sorry to be going on, but the point is----
Mr. Schippers. I think you have answered the question.
Mr. Starr. We stand ready to receive information, but no
one has come forward.
Mr. Schippers. That was my next question. If information
were available and had been given to you, you would have
considered that along with all of the other information, is
that correct?
Mr. Starr. Oh, yes, absolutely. In fact, one of my
colleagues reminds me that we specifically asked in the flurry
of this investigation, we asked Mr. Kendall by letter, please
provide us with any exculpatory information. Mr. Kendall said,
there was nothing to exculpate, or that there was nothing to
worry about exculpation from.
Mr. Schippers. Now, there was a great deal of discussion
throughout the day about the difference between your
investigation and that of Mr. Jaworski. There was no
Independent Counsel Act when Mr. Jaworski was performing his
duties, was there?
Mr. Starr. That is correct. He had no statute to look to at
all.
Mr. Schippers. Your actions as regards referrals to this
committee are alluded to by statute; are they not?
Mr. Starr. They are indeed.
Mr. Schippers. And you tried to the best of your ability to
comply with those statutes.
Mr. Starr. That is correct. I would just add that there was
no experience for this, happily for the country, under this
provision of the statute. So we were sailing in uncharted
waters and trying to come to the best professional judgment we
could about what Congress intended and wanted in this provision
that required us to report to it.
Mr. Schippers. One aside. In the 63--have you had an
opportunity--I know you haven't had a reasonable opportunity,
but have you had any opportunity to page through Mr. Kendall's
63 tabs?
Mr. Starr. Only as he was guiding me.
Mr. Schippers. Well, I have, Judge Starr, and I note that
it contains several newspaper articles, several magazine
articles, several self-serving letters from the President's
counsel, and not one word, not one word of evidence.
By the way, the other 2 inches is equally devoid of
evidence.
During your term as Independent Counsel, sir, and with
particular reference to your investigation of the Lewinsky
matter and the perjury and the obstruction of justice and other
related criminal activity, you were under the guidance and
control of the Attorney General of the United States, were you
not?
Mr. Starr. Well, I was certainly under her ultimate
supervision in terms of the provisions for removal, but of
course the Independent Counsel is to be independent of her
daily supervision.
Mr. Schippers. I mean that in the sense that if you were to
be involved in anything untoward, unethical, illegal, the
Attorney General had the absolute ability to fire you for
cause; did she not?
Mr. Starr. Yes. I mean the statute is clear that an
independent counsel can be removed for good cause.
Mr. Schippers. Now, you have been pilloried and vilified in
newspapers and magazines and here, unfortunately. Has the
Attorney General ever indicated that she had any thought of
firing you for cause?
Mr. Starr. I am not aware of any expression of any issue at
all with respect to good cause. In fairness to the Attorney
General--because of the flurry of allegations that are just
constant--there is a process of evaluation on her part, but no.
I meet with the Attorney General episodically and her senior
staff, and there has never been a suggestion that there is good
cause to remove me as Independent Counsel. At least I am not
aware of any suggestion.
Mr. Schippers. Well, has the Attorney General ever
questioned you about conflicts of interest or anything like
that?
Mr. Starr. No, the Attorney General has not, but the
Attorney General has a process through the Office of
Professional Responsibility or otherwise exercising her
jurisdiction, but thus far, the issues that have been acted on,
we have been cleared on, or else no action has been taken over
the years of my stewardship as the Independent Counsel.
Mr. Schippers. Now, all of these specific factors that
various people have asked you if you reported to the Attorney
General when you met her on the 16th of, when was it, the 15th
of January?
Mr. Starr. Well, we met with the Deputy Attorney General on
the 15th and then there was--and again, I did not have these
meetings, as it turned out.
Mr. Schippers. There was a litany of things that you
apparently allegedly did not tell the Attorney General.
Mr. Starr. Oh, yes, yes, I am sorry, yes.
Mr. Schippers. But of course shortly thereafter all of that
litany of information became available to the Attorney General.
Mr. Starr. If it wasn't available to begin with. Part of
the quarrel that I have had with a number of the suggestions
about what I should have told the Attorney General is that
these were all in the public domain. As I said in response to
questions very early, or earlier in the day, certain things did
not occur to me as relevant or germane. It may be that others
would say, gee, isn't it relevant that you were asked by Bob
Fiske to consider preparing an amicus brief in the Paula Corbin
Jones case. I didn't view it as--well, it just didn't occur to
me.
Mr. Schippers. That's fine. But it did become available and
no action was taken.
Mr. Starr. No. That is correct.
Mr. Schippers. Now, let's get to this January 16 meeting
with Monica Lewinsky that so much has been made of.
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Schippers. I have been a prosecutor too, and Monica
Lewinsky from my reading was treated very, very nicely by your
agents.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Mr. Schippers. I believe-- I hear laughter from the left,
but I often here laughter from the left, even when you were
testifying, and I didn't really think it was fair to laugh at
you when you were testifying either.
Mr. Starr. Well, I think a fair assessment of the record
will show that we wanted her cooperation, and we treated her
with dignity and with respect, but we were prosecutors and we
were investigators investigating crime. That is a serious
matter and we made it very clear to her, she is in a serious
situation. But we treated her with dignity and we certainly
took every step to make sure----
Mr. Schippers. I wonder how many of your accusers have read
the log that was kept of every minute of that day.
Now, sir, there was also some question as to why Ms.
Lewinsky was not allowed to call Mr. Carter. Mr. Carter had
been given to Monica Lewinsky by Vernon Jordan, isn't that
correct?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Schippers. And the evidence available to you at that
time, phone evidence indicated that perhaps Mr. Jordan had been
in telephonic contact with the President at the time he was
getting her that lawyer; isn't that correct, sir?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Schippers. And in an abundance of caution, you did not
want the President to know that Monica Lewinsky was talking to
you; isn't that right?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Schippers. And that is a perfectly valid prosecutorial
move, isn't it?
Mr. Starr. Yes, very traditional. Nothing out of the
ordinary.
Mr. Schippers. As a matter of fact, later Ms. Lewinsky
decided she didn't want to be represented by Mr. Carter on that
day; isn't that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes. She came to a decision to be represented by
Mr. Ginsburg.
Mr. Schippers. And she called Mr. Ginsburg and she talked
to him, didn't she?
Mr. Starr. Yes. I was going to say that was in consultation
with her family, so I don't know to what extent Ms. Lewinsky
was being guided by her parents, and especially Dr. Lewinsky.
Mr. Schippers. But in any event, she changed lawyers from
the one that had been provided to her indirectly by the White
House to an independent lawyer from the West Coast, is that
right?
Mr. Starr. Oh, yes, and one who was well-known to the
family.
Mr. Schippers. Doesn't the evidence demonstrate that from
the 16th on, from that day on when she was unavailable, there
was a 3-day frenzy at the White House to try and find Monica
Lewinsky by phone, by beeper, and that Mr. Jordan, Mr. Carter,
and Ms. Currie were in constant efforts to reach Monica
Lewinsky; isn't that a fact?
Mr. Starr. I believe that is true.
Mr. Schippers. Does that indicate to you that they were a
little bit afraid of what Monica might say?
Mr. Starr. I think there was concern.
Mr. Schippers. By the way, when Monica Lewinsky was--I am
not going to say being held, because I don't want to run into
trouble. When Monica Lewinsky was in with your agents----
Mr. Starr. And prosecutors.
Mr. Schippers. She was never questioned about criminal
activity, was she?
Mr. Starr. No, she was not.
Mr. Schippers. She was not questioned at all about criminal
activity until she was represented by counsel, isn't that
right?
Mr. Starr. That is absolutely right, and that is why not
one word in this referral comes from any information that was
gleaned or gathered on the evening of January 16.
Mr. Schippers. As a matter of fact, the first time Monica
Lewinsky testified in the grand jury was some 7 months later,
correct?
Mr. Starr. It took a long time and a new set of lawyers,
two very distinguished lawyers here in Washington.
Mr. Schippers. And if she was afraid and if she was
disturbed on January 6th, she was sure as heck over it by
August 6th, wasn't she?
Mr. Starr. Well, she was at least--yes, she seemed to be.
But I am very fearful of saying anything about state of mind,
especially in light of a comment I have heard with respect--but
in any event.
Mr. Schippers. Do you have before you, Judge Starr, the
first two-incher, the one that Mr. Lowell gave you? Would you
turn to tab 35, please. There are a whole series of remarks on
page 35, and I think there was a--356 is the page number; that
is where tab 35 begins. The first bullet, do you have it,
Judge?
Mr. Starr. I do.
Mr. Schippers. The first bullet says Monica Lewinsky
testified before the grand jury that quote, ``No one ever asked
me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence.'' Is
that right?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Schippers. She also testified, ``But nobody told me to
tell the truth, either,'' didn't she?
Mr. Starr. Absolutely.
Mr. Schippers. Monica Lewinsky also testified that she had
a conversation with the President in the White House on the
phone when she found out that she was on the witness list and
the President told her, you can make an affidavit.
Mr. Starr. That is correct, words to that effect.
Mr. Schippers. The affidavit of course would be for the
purpose of avoiding testimony; isn't that correct, Judge Starr?
Mr. Starr. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Schippers. And in order to accomplish that purpose,
both the President and Ms. Lewinsky were fully aware that that
affidavit would have to be a lie; isn't that right?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Schippers. And it was the President's suggestion that
she make that affidavit, according to her testimony?
Mr. Starr. According to her testimony, yes.
Mr. Schippers. We might as well be complete about these
tabs when we are going over them. We are going to talk a little
bit about fairness, if I may.
The President of the United States testified before a grand
jury, did he not, Judge Starr?
Mr. Starr. Yes, he did.
Mr. Schippers. And he was permitted to testify by videotape
or by closed circuit television from the White House, was he
not?
Mr. Starr. Yes, he was.
Mr. Schippers. How often is a perspective witness before
the grand jury permitted to testify from home?
Mr. Starr. Very rarely. Usually----
Mr. Schippers. So that was being overly fair to the
President by letting him testify from there, isn't that right?
Mr. Starr. We tried to respect the dignity of the
Presidency and the President, and we readily agreed to provide
this alternative mechanism at Mr. Kendall's request to his
actual appearance before the grand jury.
Mr. Schippers. Also, the President was permitted to have
his attorney sitting with him and to consult with that
attorney; isn't that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes. Mr. Kendall and Ms. Seligman and----
Mr. Schippers. How many perspective witnesses before a
grand jury are permitted to bring their lawyer into the grand
jury room with them?
Mr. Starr. None. It is inconsistent----
Mr. Schippers. Except the President.
Mr. Starr. --with grand jury practice.
Mr. Schippers. So another favor to the President in the
interest of fairness; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. That's correct.
Mr. Schippers. The President was permitted to read a
statement before he began to testify. How many witnesses in a
grand jury are permitted to read a statement of their own
before testifying?
Mr. Starr. Ordinarily, it is not done. They are there to
answer questions that the prosecutors and the legal advisors to
the grand jury or the grand jurors themselves
have.
Mr. Schippers. The President was originally subpoenaed to
appear before a grand jury?
Mr. Starr. Yes, he was, after he had declined six
invitations to testify.
Mr. Schippers. And as an accommodation to the President,
you and your staff withdrew that subpoena and allowed him the
courtesy of appearing quote, ``voluntarily?''
Mr. Starr. Yes, at Mr. Kendall's request.
Mr. Schippers. Once again being eminently fair to the
President.
Mr. Starr. We acceded to his request. We did try and do try
to be fair.
Mr. Schippers. Now, Judge Starr, when an individual
testifies before a grand jury, that individual has three
choices. He can tell the truth, one; he can lie, two; or he can
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify because his
answers might tend to incriminate him; isn't that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Schippers. When an individual is questioned in a grand
jury, is he permitted to say, I stand on my statement in lieu
of taking the Fifth?
Mr. Starr. No.
Mr. Schippers. But the President was allowed to do that,
was he not?
Mr. Starr. He was.
Mr. Schippers. So much for the unfairness of the grand
jury.
You were also asked by some of the members here, and a
great, great deal was made that none of these individuals in
the grand jury were subjected to cross examination, and that is
true; none of them were?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Schippers. Are you aware of any grand jury proceeding
in which the defense is permitted to come in and cross-examine
the witnesses before the grand jury?
Mr. Starr. Absolutely not.
Mr. Schippers. It is unbelievable, isn't it?
Mr. Starr. It is completely outside the contemplation of
grand jury practice, because that is not the function of the
grand jury; it is to gather information and to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that a criminal
offense may have been committed.
Mr. Schippers. That's right. Now, the cross examination is
for the trial; is it not?
Mr. Starr. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Schippers. Now, if I could change horses a little bit
and go to the impeachment proceeding, the Constitution provides
that the sole power of impeachment resides in the House of
Representatives; isn't that correct?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Schippers. And that is in the nature of a grand jury
proceeding which results in a charge; isn't that right?
Mr. Starr. That's right.
Mr. Schippers. So there should be no cross examination at
that stage of the proceeding either, should there?
Mr. Starr. That is entirely within your prerogative, but to
the extent that you are mirroring the grand jury, there is no
cross examination.
Mr. Schippers. Well, over and above that, Judge Starr, the
Constitution further provides that the sole power to try an
impeachment resides in the Senate; isn't that correct?
Mr. Starr. That is true.
Mr. Schippers. So if this House were to permit cross
examination and to hold a mini trial here, they would be
usurping the constitutional duties of the United States Senate;
isn't that correct?
Mr. Starr. Well, I am not sure I would necessarily agree
with that, because I think----
Mr. Schippers. I hear the moaning from the left.
Mr. Starr. I think, I think----
Mr. Hyde. Does somebody need aspirin?
Mr. Starr. But I think there are substantial--I shouldn't
be advising the House of Representatives in terms of its
prerogatives, but it seems to me that under the Constitution
you have extraordinary latitude under whatever the Rules of the
House under which you are operating to determine how to
proceed. But you are quite right, the Constitution contemplates
the trial to be in the Senate, and what you are quite rightly
saying is, if one is saying, ``let's have a trial,'' you might
have the raw power to do it, but it is almost as if, well, that
doesn't count, because the real issue is, is there substantial,
or whatever the standard is, that the House of Representatives
sees fit to articulate as its operative standard.
Mr. Schippers. Now, Judge, let's do some fairness comparing
here. Did anybody in the grand jury, while the President was
testifying, laugh at him?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Schippers. Who?
Mr. Starr. Members of the grand jury.
Mr. Schippers. And when was that, Judge Starr? While the
President was testifying and telling what he told the grand
jurors, they were laughing at him; is that right, sir?
Mr. Starr. I understand that there were some occasions
where one or more grand jurors, at least that is my
understanding. But I want to protect the confidentiality of the
grand jury process and deliberative process, even though you
have all the transcripts and the like. I would just rely on
what the transcripts say.
Mr. Schippers. All right. When the President was asked
questions, he was asked questions one at a time; was he not?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Schippers. And they were relatively simple questions
and he was permitted to give full and complete answers, isn't
that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Schippers. He wasn't asked six or eight questions at a
time running over a 4 or 5-minute period and then given 10
seconds to answer, was he?
Mr. Starr. Definitely not.
Mr. Schippers. Now, by the way, did anybody cut off the
President when he tried to answer questions?
Mr. Starr. No, I don't think there was any episode when we
cut off the President. Although may I say, we were operating as
well under very strict limitations, and we did want to proceed
with additional questions, and the grand jury had questions,
but Mr. Kendall did enforce the understanding that we had,
which was a 4-hour session by the President, and we abided by
that. And I don't mean to sound quarrelsome in suggesting that
Mr. Kendall was not within his rights. He was.
Mr. Schippers. Now, Judge, there has been a lot of talk in
the public domain and on the television and things that this
is--that all the President did was deny sex, deny a sexual
relationship with an intern. He went a lot further than that,
didn't he? For an example, with Mr. Blumenthal?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Schippers. As a matter of fact, before Mr. Blumenthal
came in to testify, he was subjected to an elaborate, elaborate
lie by the President concerning the relationship with Monica
Lewinsky.
Mr. Starr. Yes, he was.
Mr. Schippers. If I may, the President told Mr. Blumenthal
that Monica made sexual demands upon him which he rebuffed. Is
that right? And that was not true, was it?
Mr. Starr. That was not true.
Mr. Schippers. He also said that Monica Lewinsky threatened
to claim an affair and he wouldn't go along with it; that he
had been threatened by Monica Lewinsky; is that right?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Schippers. Now, this is at a time when the President
thought that it was a one-on-one with Monica Lewinsky, didn't
he?
Mr. Starr. I believe that is what he thought at that time.
Mr. Schippers. And this would have been a perfect answer.
``She threatened to say I had sex with her if I didn't do
something for her. I didn't do something, therefore, everything
she is saying is a lie.''
Mr. Starr. It would be a very good answer.
Mr. Schippers. It has been suggested that your people used
the young lady and betrayed the young lady. Wouldn't that more
properly belong to the President of the United States?
Mr. Starr. Well, I am not sure I should be the one to pass
judgment, but we certainly did not betray Ms. Lewinsky. We were
doing our job, and we certainly never took any steps other than
to try to vindicate the interests of the criminal law.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Schippers, your time has expired. Do you need
additional time?
Mr. Schippers. If I may, and if Judge Starr can stand it. I
will not need a great deal more, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. All right. I will allow an additional 15 minutes,
and maybe you won't use that, said he hopefully, prayerfully.
Mr. Schippers. There has been some suggestion, Judge, that
this was merely a private crime. The United States Constitution
provides for three branches of government, does it not, coequal
branches?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Schippers. And the judiciary is coequal with the
executive?
Mr. Starr. Absolutely.
Mr. Schippers. Did I understand you earlier to say that
lying under oath, perjury, and obstruction of justice strikes
at the very heart of the judicial system of the United States?
Mr. Starr. Absolutely, and I think every judge would agree
with that, that this is absolutely inimical to the judicial
functioning. It is inimical to our court system.
Mr. Schippers. And under the Constitution of the United
States, if the judicial system is destroyed, that is destroying
one of the constitutional portions of our government; isn't it?
Mr. Starr. No question that from the founding of the
Republic, the importance of our judiciary as an enforcer of
rights and the vindicators of rule of law is absolutely
critical.
Mr. Schippers. So when the President of the United States
lies under oath, a civil or criminal case, grand jury or other,
and obstructs justice, civil or criminal, grand jury or other,
he is effectively attacking the judicial branch of the United
States constitutional government, isn't he?
Mr. Starr. That is the way I would view it.
Mr. Schippers. And a President takes the oath that he will
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States, and will, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States, right?
Mr. Starr. Right.
Mr. Schippers. That is not defending, is it?
Mr. Starr. No, it is not.
Mr. Schippers. There is a term that has stuck in my brain
from these transcripts that I have read, and that is mission
accomplished.
When Webb Hubbell needed help, Vernon Jordan got somebody
at Revlon or the parent company of Revlon to put him on
retainer for no work, right?
Mr. Starr. Essentially no work.
Mr. Schippers. So, Vernon Jordan, mission accomplished.
When Monica was looking for a job, and it became very
urgent for her to get a job, Mr. Jordan again accomplished his
mission.
Mr. Starr. Yes, he did.
Mr. Schippers. When Ms. Currie, when they wanted to get rid
of the gifts, Ms. Currie went and picked them up, put them
under her bed to keep them from anybody else. Another mission
accomplished?
Mr. Starr. That's right.
Mr. Schippers. By the way, there has been some talk here
that Monica said that she recalled that Betty Currie called her
and said, either the President wants me to pick something up,
or I understand you have something for me to pick up. Later,
Ms. Currie backed off of that and said, well, I am not sure,
maybe Monica called me. In the material that you made
available, you and your staff made available to us, there were
302s in which Monica said, I think when Betty called me, she
was using her cell phone. Do you recall that, Judge Starr?
Mr. Starr. I do.
Mr. Schippers. And in that same material that is in your
office that both parties were able to review and that we did,
in fact, review, there are phone records of Ms. Currie; are
there not?
Mr. Starr. There are.
Mr. Schippers. And there is a telephone call on her cell
phone to Monica Lewinsky's home on the afternoon of December
28, 1997; isn't there?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Schippers. Once again, Monica is right and she has been
corroborated, right?
Mr. Starr. That certainly tends to corroborate Ms.
Lewinsky's recollection.
Mr. Schippers. By the way, they did find some of the
billing records from the Rose firm in the attic of Vince
Foster's home.
Mr. Starr. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Schippers. They weren't under the bed, were they?
Mr. Starr. No, they were in the attic.
Mr. Schippers. I am sorry.
Now, when Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed, Mr. Jordan contacted
the President and then got Ms. Lewinsky an attorney, Mr.
Carter, is that right?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Schippers. Another mission accomplished.
When Monica did her job search and she signed a false
affidavit, the next day she was down in New York or up in New
York trying to get a job; isn't that right?
Mr. Starr. I believe it was the next day, yes.
Mr. Schippers. And she couldn't get a job because she kind
of didn't do a very good job on the interview.
Mr. Starr. She did not feel that the interview had gone
well and she was not given a job offer, and that concerned her
and she expressed that concern.
Mr. Schippers. This is when Mr. Jordan called the chairman
of the board and got her the job.
Mr. Starr. He certainly--yes. He called Mr. Perelman and
Mr. Perelman then made a call and she was reinterviewed and she
was hired.
Mr. Schippers. So Mr. Jordan at that time knew that the
false affidavit had been signed and that he had had a job for
Monica, and he went to see the President of the United States
and said, mission accomplished, didn't he?
Mr. Starr. Well, in fairness to Mr. Jordan, he knew the
affidavit had been signed; the rest I am sure would be in some
dispute, but yes, that is----
Mr. Schippers. Well, he knew the affidavit had been signed
and he knew that the job had been gotten and he went into the
President and said, ``Mission accomplished.''
Mr. Starr. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Schippers. We don't know which he was referring to,
whether it was the job or we got the affidavit signed, do we?
Mr. Starr. No, I don't think that we do know that. We just
know that he said mission accomplished. I know he felt that he
had, you know, engaged in a certain amount, a certain level of
effort to secure that job for Ms. Lewinsky at Revlon.
Mr. Schippers. Now, Judge Starr, I only have a few more
questions.
You are a senior partner in a major law firm, or you were
before you took a leave of absence?
Mr. Starr. Yes, past tense.
Mr. Schippers. You are a recognized scholar in
constitutional law and in law in general. You have been the
Solicitor General of the United States; is that correct?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mr. Schippers. Argued a number of cases before the Supreme
Court of the United States?
Mr. Starr. That's correct.
Mr. Schippers. You have received honorary doctors of law
degrees from six universities?
Mr. Starr. I think that is right.
Mr. Schippers. You have written numerous articles in
various scholarly journals?
Mr. Starr. Yes. I have written a number.
Mr. Schippers. You have a completely unblemished career for
your entire life as a lawyer, and you are looked upon in the
profession as a man of honor, integrity and decency, is that
right?
Mr. Starr. Well, I would like to think that at least once
upon a time, that was the reputation.
Mr. Schippers. For the past year, you have been trashed in
the newspapers, on television, and with snide backward remarks
to which you could not reply, isn't that right, Judge Starr?
Mr. Starr. Well, I have chosen until now not to reply, but
I think the code of silence at some times in terms of basic
fairness gets to come to an end.
Mr. Schippers. And you have been pilloried and excoriated,
charged with unbelievable things of which you are incapable of
being guilty?
Mr. Starr. I cannot imagine me and my colleagues engaging
in some of the suggested activities that have been described
here seriously. We simply cannot in conscience live with one
another as professionals, and I laid out in my opening
statement the backgrounds of my colleagues, and I have been
privileged to serve with two John Marshall award winners, and
that is special at the Justice Department. That means there is
no better trial lawyer in the Department of Justice recognized
in a particular year, and I have been privileged to serve with
two of them with public corruption chiefs. These are career
civil servants, and it is not right and it is not fair to
attack and calumny career civil servants. But for my part, I
have learned that it goes with the Independent Counsel
territory.
Mr. Schippers. And the Independent Counsel job, you didn't
seek that, did you?
Mr. Starr. Absolutely not.
Mr. Schippers. You were asked to take it, and you tried to
leave and your staff begged you to stay and you did stay; is
that right?
Mr. Starr. All of that is true. I never sought this job. I
am reminded of the old song about taking a job and what you can
do with it, but it would be indecorous of me to say it. But no,
I was asked to, by the Special Division to take on this
responsibility; the three-judge panel saw fit to ask me to
serve. I had been asked by Phil Heymann, who was Deputy
Attorney General of the United States in January of 1994,
whether I would be willing to be considered for appointment as
the Whitewater counsel under Ms. Reno to be appointed by Janet
Reno. Happily for me, she wisely chose Bob Fiske. Unhappily for
me, the Special Division chose me.
Mr. Schippers. You have been given a duty that you did not
seek, and you have performed that duty to the best of your
ability; is that correct, sir?
Mr. Starr. I have certainly tried, and I do it to the best
of my ability, and I am proud of what we have been able to
accomplish. As I indicated earlier, the records of convictions
obtained, but also, the decisions not to seek an indictment,
the decision to issue thorough reports, all of that is part of
what we have co-labored together, with Mr. Kendall pointing out
the number of persons involved in the investigation. I am proud
of those persons. They are my colleagues, and they have become
my friends, and they have worked very long and very hard under
very difficult circumstances, and recognizing, and we are big,
big boys, and I mean that in a gender-neutral way. So when we
were accused in Arkansas of a political witch-hunt, we took it
and we did our arguing in court, and we proved to the
satisfaction of a fair-minded jury with a very distinguished
judge that the sitting governor and the President and the First
Lady's business partners were guilty of serious felonies, and
we had been listening month after month to ``it's a political
witch-hunt,'' and that was unfair, but we learned that goes
with this territory.
Mr. Schippers. Judge, for all that doing your duty, you
have been pilloried and attacked from all sides, is that
right.
Mr. Starr. I would hope not all sides, but yes, that's----
Mr. Schippers. Well, sometimes it seems like all sides.
How long have you been an attorney, Judge Starr?
Mr. Starr. 25 years.
Mr. Schippers. Well, I have been an attorney for almost 40
years, and I want to say I am proud to be in the same room with
you and your staff.
Mr. Starr. Thank you, Mr. Schippers.
Mr. Schippers. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The gentlewoman from Houston.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I indicated I had a point of order. This might be more
preferable as a point of clarification, and that is, I know it
is extremely late in the evening, Mr. Starr, but Mr. Chairman,
did I understand Mr. Starr to state that we would not expect
any referrals on Filegate, Travelgate, and Watergate--excuse
me, Whitewater, it has been many years--as relates to the
provision in the Constitution on impeachment? Did I hear that
correctly?
Mr. Chairman, I had in addition to add to the record a
question as to whether or not because of the shortness of the
time of questioning, whether or not Mr. Starr would be able to
answer, as he indicated I believe to many members that he would
be willing to answer some of our questions in writing. For
example, as to the question I had of his firsthand knowledge of
any details in that referral.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But Mr. Chairman, excuse me. It is late
into the evening. And I do want to add United States v.
Birdman, 602 F. 2d 547 (3rd Circuit, 1979). I would like to ask
to have it submitted into the record, as it deals with the
statement that courts have shared the legal profession's
disapproval of the liberal role of an advocate witness.
Mr. Hyde. The gentlelady has had her time now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Do you have a specific request?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would like the
specific question answered as to the referrals on Whitewater,
Travelgate and Filegate.
Mr. Hyde. Okay. Mr. Starr, can you answer that?
Mr. Starr. I am sorry. The opening statement spoke to the
FBI files and Travel Office matter. I did not comment beyond
those two matters.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What did you say on those matters, Mr.
Starr? That is what I asked.
Mr. Hyde. Well, if the gentlelady would read the report.
Mr. Starr. When I say I didn't comment with respect to the
conclusion of such matters, the opening statement speaks for
itself, and I think we can, in fact, have that as part of the
record.
Mr. Hyde. Well, it is part of the official record.
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Hyde. Very well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Thank you, Judge Starr, for a wonderful day.
Thank you.
Mr. Starr. Thank you.
Mr. Hyde. Everybody stay, please. The committee will stay.
We are going to have a meeting.
Ladies and gentlemen, the committee hearing stands
adjourned, but the committee will remain here for a very short
meeting.
Pursuant to notice and subject to the authority granted in
H. Res. 581, I now move that the committee authorize the
issuance of subpoenas for the following individuals: Daniel
Gecker, Nathan Landow and Bob Bennett.
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman. The room is not in
order, and I cannot hear you.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. The committee is not in order, and I cannot
hear you.
Mr. Hyde. Okay. I will try it again.
Pursuant to notice, subject to the authority granted in H.
Res. 581, I now move that the committee authorize the issuance
of subpoenas for the following individuals: Daniel Gecker,
Nathan Landow, Bob Bennett.
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Is there any objection?
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know the response
for those subpoenas, in particular Mr. Gecker.
Mr. Hyde. If the gentleman will permit me, if we have to go
into it, we have to go into executive session to do that.
Mr. Nadler. Let me ask one question which may not have to
go into executive session.
Mr. Hyde. Okay. What is it?
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Gecker, I believe, is Ms. Willey's lawyer.
I presume he may avail himself of the attorney/client privilege
claim, in fact he might have to. If you need information about
the Willey case, why call the lawyer? Why not call the witness
directly?
Mr. Hyde. Well, I can't answer that, but I will say the
attorney/client privilege does not overwhelm an impeachment
committee.
Is there any objection to the approval of the three
subpoenas?
Mr. Scott. Reserving the right to object.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Do you want to put your mike on?
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, are we--am I to assume by the
issuance of these subpoenas that we are not confining the
inquiry to the Starr allegations?
Mr. Hyde. What we are doing is pursuant to the House
Resolution 581. It is pursuant to that resolution.
Mr. Scott. Well, Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to
object.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman reserves the right to object.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that at some
point, I would appreciate it if we would focus the inquiry into
specific allegations so we know what we are investigating.
We are now not focused on the Starr allegations. I have no
idea what the allegations are going to be, and if we are to
conduct an inquiry that we can conclude at some point in the
foreseeable future, we have to focus on certain allegations
that might be impeachable offenses.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Scott, this is focusing on material the
committee has received in executive session. We have that
material.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation.
Mr. Hyde. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Watt.
Mr. Watt. Reserving the right to object.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman reserves the right to object.
Mr. Watt. The motion that I am reserving, the unanimous
consent request that I am reserving the right to object to, is
to authorize the subpoenas; is that correct?
Mr. Hyde. Yes.
Mr. Watt. Okay. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Hyde. These are subpoenas for depositions.
Mr. Watt. I don't feel like I can pass on that without
having some background information, and I understand----
Mr. Hyde. We have to go into executive session.
Mr. Watt. Well, then, that is--I hate to put us to that
burden, but I don't know how I can pass on it without having
some more information.
Mr. Hyde. We will go into executive session. We will have
to clear the room.
Mr. Schumer. Wait, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. What?
Mr. Schumer. Mr. Chairman, a question. Why do we have to be
in executive session to debate this?
Mr. Hyde. Because the material to explain the rationale for
wanting these depositions is material that is executive
material.
Mr. Watt. Well, with respect, Mr. Chairman, I don't feel
like I can vote--I can sit here and not object without
understanding the rationale myself.
Mr. Hyde. I understand, and we are perfectly willing to go
into executive session.
Mr. Watt. I am not trying to violate the executive rule.
Mr. Schumer. Will the chairman yield?
Mr. Hyde. Yes, I will yield.
Mr. Schumer. I mean, look, it seems--I am befuddled by why
we are doing this. I understand----
Mr. Hyde. We wish to take depositions of these three
people.
Mr. Schumer. I understand that.
Mr. Hyde. And we will explain that in executive session.
Mr. Schumer. If I might make my point, sir----
Mr. Hyde. Sure.
Mr. Schumer [continuing]. Which is I think the public, most
of which is wondering why this is dragging on and on, also has
a right to know why we are doing this. So what I would suggest,
what I would suggest, is that we discuss as much of the
rationale for this as we can out of executive session so the
public can hear, and then if there are any specific references
as to why we have to go into executive session--about materials
that are gathered in executive session, we can go in for that
portion.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Schumer, we can't really discuss really
anything around the edges even without transgressing on
executive session material. So let's just go into executive
session.
Mr. Schumer. Well, then what I would move, Mr. Chairman--I
have no problem with us going into an executive session, but
then I would like for us to be able to discuss the rationale
for this without using executive session material in public
session, and that is the move I would--that is what I would
propose.
Mr. Hyde. Well, we can't do it. We are going to have to go
into executive session.
Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman, if I could be heard on the motion?
Mr. Hyde. Yes, you may.
Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman, I know it is late, but we didn't
decide--and you have been accommodating to us in some regards,
but we didn't decide to do this all in 1 day, and I do not
think it is legitimate to constrain members by running too much
in 1 day and then saying, oh, it is getting late in the day.
Then do it tomorrow. We have been spending--many of us felt
that we should have started this a while ago. You waited until
November 18th or 19th. Then you put it all in 1 day. It is
simply not legitimate then to argue the time constraints.
I think this committee has erred greviously by going into
executive session and discussing things in executive session
that ought to be discussed publicly. It is very, very strange
to have these arguments about the need for the public to know,
et cetera, et cetera, and we do it all in secret. This is the
committee that released grand jury information on the
television. We made history in denying what has traditionally
been something that would be kept somewhat private, and we do
these--we debated doing that in a private session.
There is simply a great abuse of this. And again, I have to
say then adjourn, come back tomorrow, come back next week. You
know, as far as these depositions are concerned that were so
important, I don't know why they weren't taken in September or
October or earlier in November. I don't know how they became an
emergency overnight.
The fact is that you have, I think, overused the executive
session. There are very important questions, and it is simply
inconsistent to say this is a terribly important issue to the
American people, people need to know about it, and we will go
into secret and make all the decisions. Virtually every
decision this committee has made it has made in secret, and it
is simply an inconsistent position to talk about the important
public issues that are involved here by going into it in
secret.
Mr. Hyde. All right. The gentleman has made his point.
Mr. Frank. No, excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I think I have 5
minutes. I am sorry. Look, I didn't decide that we would try to
do it all in 1 day, but having decided to do it all in 1 day,
you can't use that against us, and you can't use that to
constrain things.
You know, isn't it somewhat paradoxical? We talk about how
important this issue is. We talk about this is such a
fundamental constitutional question, but we have to worry
because it is getting late? Then don't schedule us so that you
constrain the most important thing we could possibly be talking
about by the clock. Then let it go over to tomorrow. Let it go
over until the next week. We should have been doing it a month
ago. I will not be constrained by a self-imposed handicap of
the clock.
And I still do not think we should go into executive
session without some justification as to why we have to go into
executive session. We are not discussing national security. We
are not discussing anything that is going to give anything away
to anybody. We are not tipping off anybody. So I do not
understand, and I think we have a right to be told, why we have
to go into executive session.
Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. I thank the gentleman. There is a motion before
us----
Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. --before the committee, to authorize the issuance
of these subpoenas, and the clerk will call the roll.
Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman, there are members--point of order,
Mr. Chairman.
The Clerk. Mr. Sensenbrenner.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Sensenbrenner votes aye.
Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of fairness, do
you think by cutting off members seeking recognition----
The Clerk. Mr. McCollum.
Mr. McCollum. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. McCollum votes aye.
Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Frank. This is unworthy of you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. All right. Hold it.
Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frank. There were members seeking recognition.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman, earlier today you made a ruling,
which I agreed with, on a point of order raised by the
gentlelady from Texas that with respect to the jurisdiction for
this inquiry, the House has spoken.
The House did not mandate this committee to investigate
everything under the sun. It allowed this committee to conduct
an inquiry on anything under the sun.
We have the authority to decide what we are going to
investigate.
Mr. Schumer makes a point. When you issue subpoenas for
people involved in the Kathleen Willey case, the implication is
that that matter becomes part of the impeachment inquiry.
Everyone on this side of the aisle voted to limit the
inquiry to the Monica Lewinsky referral. The Independent
Counsel has not made a referral on the Kathleen Willey case. He
has not found substantial and credible information that conduct
by the President in that matter may justify impeachment--that
finding has not been made, and that referral has not been made.
So there should be a bifurcation. First, the issue of
whether we go into this line of inquiry is something that
should be discussed in open session. Then, if our position is
lost, then in executive session the justification for the
subpoenas can be raised. That is the only question that I have,
and that is why I think we should be able to get the
justification for the subpoenas if we decide we are launching
into that inquiry, and I sure hope we don't.
Mr. Schumer. Just would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Berman. I would be happy to.
Mr. Schumer. I would like to finish my point from before.
Could the Chair give us some--without treading on executive
session or anyone's confidentiality being disclosed, could the
chairman give us some idea why these three people were chosen
and not others, and where the Chair intends to take this--these
depositions? What is the point?
We already have heard from Mr. Starr that he doesn't think
the Willey episode rises to a level of impeachment. In my
judgment, he has a pretty low threshold for impeachment, and if
he doesn't think that the Willey affair does, then that is
pretty dispositive to me.
And here we are, with three completely--you know, yesterday
we heard talk of John Huang. It was very hard to figure out
what that was all about. Now we are hearing these three. One
can only draw the conclusion, Mr. Chairman--Mr. Chairman, one
can only draw the conclusion, without hearing an explanation,
that the majority doesn't quite know what to do here and is
sort of prolonging this with whatever thing they can grab onto,
because there is no logic to this, at least to me.
I would like to hear it, and I think the public is entitled
to hear it. And I think in this case it could well be argued
that executive session is being used as a shield because there
is no good explanation as to why these three people are going
to be deposed, why other people are not, and where the Chair
and where the committee intends to take the depositions of
these three people as, again, in--at least particularly in an
area where the Office of Independent Counsel has said there is
no impeachable offenses as far as it can see.
Mr. Hyde. All right. The Chair----
Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The Chair will declare a 5-minute recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Hyde. The committee will come to order. The committee
will come to order.
I move that pursuant to Rule 11 Clause 2(g)(1), this
committee meeting be conducted in executive session. The clerk
will call the roll.
Mr. Schumer. I move the previous question.
Mr. Hyde. It is nondebatable.
The Clerk. Mr. Sensenbrenner.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Sensenbrenner votes aye.
Mr. McCollum.
Mr. McCollum. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. McCollum votes aye.
Mr. Gekas.
Mr. Gekas. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Gekas votes aye.
Mr. Coble.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith votes aye.
Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. Gallegly. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly votes aye.
Mr. Canady.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Inglis.
Mr. Inglis. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Inglis votes aye.
Mr. Goodlatte.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Buyer.
Mr. Buyer. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Buyer votes aye.
Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Bryant votes aye.
Mr. Chabot.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Barr.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins votes aye.
Mr. Hutchinson.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Pease.
Mr. Pease. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Pease votes aye.
Mr. Cannon.
Mr. Cannon. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Cannon votes aye.
Mr. Rogan.
Mr. Rogan. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Rogan votes aye.
Mr. Graham.
Mr. Graham. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Graham votes aye.
Mrs. Bono.
Mrs. Bono. Aye.
The Clerk. Mrs. Bono votes aye.
Mr. Conyers. Mr. Conyers.
Mr. Conyers. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers votes no.
Mr. Frank.
Mr. Frank. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Frank votes no.
Mr. Schumer.
Mr. Schumer. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Schumer votes no.
Mr. Berman.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Boucher.
Mr. Boucher. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Boucher votes no.
Mr. Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler votes no.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Scott votes no.
Mr. Watt.
Mr. Watt. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Watt votes no.
Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. No.
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren votes no.
Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. No.
The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee votes no.
Ms. Waters.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Meehan.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt votes no.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler votes no.
Mr. Rothman.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Barrett.
Mr. Barrett. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Barrett votes no.
Mr. Hyde.
Mr. Hyde. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Hyde votes aye.
Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Mr. Berman votes no.
The Clerk. Mr. Berman votes no.
Mr. Hyde. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Waters.
Ms. Waters. Votes no.
The Clerk. Ms. Waters votes no.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot votes aye.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Canady.
Mr. Canady. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Canady votes aye.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Goodlatte.
Mr. Goodlatte. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte votes aye.
Mr. Hyde. Have all voted who wish?
Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Hutchinson. Aye.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Meehan.
The Clerk. Mr. Hutchinson votes aye.
Mr. Meehan. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Meehan votes no.
Mr. Hyde. The clerk will report.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 19 ayes and 15 noes.
Mr. Hyde. The motion is agreed to and the House, that is
the committee----
Mr. Schumer. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. --will stand at ease while we clear the room.
Mr. Schumer. Point of order before that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Yes, Mr. Senator.
Mr. Schumer. Mr. Chairman, according to the rules, at least
a cursory review of the rules, a move to go into executive
session is indeed debatable.
Mr. Conyers. Yes.
Mr. Schumer. It is indeed debatable, and you said it was
not debatable. I would ask----
Mr. Hyde. I was so informed by staff.
Mr. Schumer. Could counsel make a ruling on that, please,
and point to the relevant part of our rules which shows that it
is? I mean, now we are really flying by the seats of our pants.
Mr. Buyer. I moved the previous question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schumer. You did, and I just made the point of
order.
Mr. Hyde. Your point of order is well taken. It is
debatable. I was informed it was not.
Mr. Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. But do you want to debate this some more now?
Mr. Schumer. Yes.
Mr. Hyde. Well, you have already spoken, so Mr. Nadler is
recognized.
We will undo the roll call. We will dump the roll call and
start again.
Mr. Conyers. Dump the roll call.
Mr. Hyde. Ms. Jackson Lee will be next.
Mr. Nadler. Could the committee be in order?
Mr. Hyde. Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Nadler. I am all ears.
Mr. Nadler. Regular order. The room is too noisy.
Mr. Hyde. The room won't be cleared until we go into
executive session.
Mr. Nadler. I didn't ask for it to be cleared. I simply
asked for it to be quiet.
Mr. Hyde. Oh, quiet. Okay.
Mr. Nadler. I do not want it cleared.
Mr. Chairman, we should not go into executive session until
a reason is given as to why we are going into executive
session.
Number two, before we talk about these subpoenas, we should
have some basic idea of why we are being asked for these
subpoenas. Specifically the subpoenas apparently relate to the
Kathleen Willey matter which, as Mr. Schumer pointed out, the
special prosecutor says raises no questions that rise to the
level of possible impeachable offenses. And so I would want to
know, does this relate to the Willey matter? If it doesn't,
does it relate to something else? And why are we being asked
for this?
I can't believe that some reason can't be given in public
session.
Thirdly, if we are to have a motion to go into executive
session, I would ask that the motion say go into executive
session and then come back into open session so we can address
whatever it is we can address publicly, because I believe we
owe that to the public.
Mr. Hyde. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Nadler. Yes.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman can make that motion when we are in
executive session.
Mr. Nadler. No. I think we have to make that motion now.
That ought to be a condition of our going into executive
session.
Mr. Hyde. I don't agree with that.
Mr. Nadler. Because if we make that motion in executive
session, and it is voted down, we can't even say it was voted
down.
Mr. Hyde. That is true.
Mr. Nadler. And that is not right.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman has it exactly right.
Mr. Nadler. But it is not the right thing to do or the
right way to conduct our business.
Mr. Hyde. Okay. Are you through?
Mr. Nadler. I would move to amend the motion then.
Mr. Hyde. I hear you. Thank you.
Mr. Nadler. I move to amend the motion.
Mr. Buyer. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Buyer has a parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. Nadler. May I finish saying more on the amendment
before his parliamentary inquiry?
Mr. Hyde. I am sorry. What?
Mr. Nadler. I said, could I finish stating the amendment
before Mr. Buyer's parliamentary inquiry?
Mr. Hyde. Surely. You can finish anything you want.
Mr. Nadler. I move to amend the motion that after we go
into executive session, when the executive session is
completed, we come out and resume regular session and then
discuss the matter of the proposed subpoenas to the extent we
can, in public session, and that the vote on those subpoenas be
held in public session.
Mr. Hyde. The clerk will call the roll. You have heard the
motion.
You want to talk on the motion? Ms. Jackson Lee? Well, the
amendment to the motion, that is right. Yes, Ms. Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to associate myself with the words of Mr. Nadler and his
motion, for two reasons.
One, Mr. Chairman, you were quoted as saying that in spite
of the resolution passed dealing with how we would proceed in
this impeachment process, that you look to the end of 1998 to
complete this process. I think it is important for the American
people to know where we are going with this process, how long
it will take, and how many people will be caught up in our web.
Clearly, I think to go into executive session will preclude us
from discussing this in an open manner as to whether this is
going to go on and on and on and on.
We have determined today that the witness Mr. Starr has
indicated that certain referrals would not come here. Are we
now encouraging him to bring other referrals that he had not
even contemplated or has already indicated there is no basis
for bringing forward? And so I would just argue that we are not
providing the direction and allowing for a discussion on
whether or not we should go into executive session, and call
witnesses, of course, we don't know for what basis we are
calling them, then I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that we not go
into executive session on these matters, and instead find out,
as a whole, where we are going and when we will be able to
complete this matter, in a timely manner. And I yield back.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. Buyer. Mr. Chairman, I am somewhat bewildered and
confused, so I am going to ask a parliamentary inquiry. We had
a motion here before the committee. I moved the previous
question, and then we had a vote. Now, I would like to ask the
Parliamentarian why would that vote not stand?
Mr. Hyde. I will answer that. Because I told them that the
motion was not debatable, and I was wrong. It was debatable. So
I did not want to ram through something under the mistaken
ruling of the Chair that it was not debatable. That is why. I
made a mistake.
Mr. Buyer. Well, I will move the previous question on Mr.
Nadler's amendment to the motion.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman moves the previous question. All
those in favor say aye.
Opposed, nay.
The ayes have it, and the previous question is moved.
The question now occurs on the motion of Mr. Nadler to go
into executive session but then to hold an open session
thereafter.
Mr. Nadler. And to vote in the open session.
Mr. Hyde. And to vote in the open session? What will we
vote on?
Mr. Nadler. The discussion----
Mr. Hyde. I understand. The vote on the subpoenas.
Mr. Nadler. Let me clarify. The debate would be in the
closed session. We come out of the debate whatever and discuss
that which could be discussed in the open session, and then we
would have the vote in the open session.
Mr. Hyde. We understand Mr. Nadler's motion. All those in
favor say aye.
Opposed, no.
Mr. Berman. Roll call.
Mr. Hyde. Roll call.
The Clerk. Mr. Sensenbrenner.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Sensenbrenner votes no.
Mr. McCollum.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Gekas.
Mr. Gekas. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Gekas votes no.
Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Coble votes no.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith votes no.
Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. Gallegly. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly votes no.
Mr. Canady.
Mr. Canady. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Canady votes no.
Mr. Inglis.
Mr. Inglis. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Inglis votes no.
Mr. Goodlatte.
Mr. Goodlatte. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte votes no.
Mr. Buyer.
Mr. Buyer. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Buyer votes no.
Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Bryant votes no.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot votes no.
Mr. Barr.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins votes no.
Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Hutchinson. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Hutchinson votes no.
Mr. Pease.
Mr. Pease. Mr. Chairman, no.
The Clerk. Mr. Pease votes no.
Mr. Cannon.
Mr. Cannon. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Cannon votes no.
Mr. Rogan.
Mr. Rogan. Mr. Chairman, regrettably, before voting, I
simply want to make sure I am clear on Mr. Nadler's motion, and
I apologize for the confusion, but the noise and the rapidity
with which this was moving was so quickly, and I wasn't able to
get a clarification to my satisfaction.
Is the motion that we are debating upon now whether to
debate the issuance of subpoenas in executive session?
Mr. Nadler. No. Could I clarify the amendment again?
Mr. Hyde. Yes, please.
Mr. Nadler. The amendment says we will go into executive
session. We will discuss whatever we discuss in executive
session. Then we will come out and resume the public session,
debate whatever we can debate in the public session, and then
vote in the public session.
Mr. Rogan. With that elucidation, Rogan votes no.
The Clerk. Mr. Rogan votes no.
Mr. Graham.
Mr. Graham. He is deliberating. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Graham votes no.
Mrs. Bono.
Mrs. Bono. No.
The Clerk. Mrs. Bono votes no.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Barr votes no.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. McCollum.
Mr. McCollum. No.
The Clerk. Mr. McCollum votes no.
Mr. Hyde. The clerk will report.
Mr. Conyers. Have we voted?
Mr. Schumer. Mr. Chairman, do we get to vote? Thank you,
Mr. Floyd--I mean, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Haven't you ever heard of cut to the chase?
Mr. Frank. Well, we didn't think we would be the ones that
were cut.
Mr. Hyde. The clerk will continue to call the roll, and
don't let me try that again.
The Clerk. Okay. Mr. Conyers.
Mr. Conyers. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers votes aye.
Mr. Frank.
Mr. Frank. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Frank votes aye.
Mr. Schumer.
Mr. Schumer. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Schumer votes aye.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Berman votes aye.
Mr. Boucher.
Mr. Boucher. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Boucher votes aye.
Mr. Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler votes aye.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Scott votes aye.
Mr. Watt.
Mr. Watt. Pass.
The Clerk. Mr. Watt passes.
Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren votes aye.
Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee votes aye.
Ms. Waters.
Ms. Waters. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Waters votes aye.
Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Meehan votes aye.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt votes aye.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler votes aye.
Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Rothman votes aye.
Mr. Barrett.
Mr. Barrett. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Barrett votes aye.
Mr. Hyde.
Mr. Hyde. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Hyde votes no.
Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. Watt. I vote aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Watt votes aye.
Mr. Chairman, there are 16 ayes and 21 noes.
Mr. Hyde. Mr. Nadler's motion is defeated.
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. The question occurs----
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schumer. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. For what purpose does the gentleman seek
recognition?
Mr. Nadler. To offer an amendment.
Mr. Hyde. The previous question has been moved.
Mr. Nadler. I haven't heard the previous question moved.
Mr. Buyer. I have now moved the previous question.
Mr. Nadler. Excuse me.
Mr. Buyer. I move we go into executive session.
Mr. Nadler. Excuse me.
Mr. Hyde. You are not recognized for that purpose. Let us
move on.
Mr. Nadler. No.
Mr. Hyde. Come on.
Mr. Buyer. Mr. Chairman, I move the previous question.
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, it is not a dilatory amendment.
You may even agreed to it.
Mr. Hyde. You have spoken on this question already.
Mr. Nadler. No, it is a new amendment. It is not the same
question.
Mr. Hyde. All right. What is your amendment?
Mr. Nadler. My amendment is simply, Mr. Chairman, that the
ayes and nays on the issuance of the subpoenas and the ayes and
nays on the motion will be made public. I ask yes on executive
session.
Mr. Hyde. All right. The gentleman's motion is not in
writing, but that is all right. We are accommodating tonight.
You have heard the motion. All those in favor say aye.
Opposed, nay.
The ayes have it.
Mr. Buyer. Mr. Chairman, I have a motion that this
committee now move to executive session.
Mr. Hyde. All those in favor of the motion say aye.
Opposed, nay.
The ayes have it.
Mr. Frank. Roll Call, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hyde. Roll Call. Roll Call.
The Clerk. Mr. Sensenbrenner.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Sensenbrenner votes aye.
Mr. McCollum.
Mr. McCollum. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. McCollum votes aye.
Mr. Gekas.
Mr. Gekas. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Gekas votes aye.
Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Coble votes aye.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Smith votes aye.
Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. Gallegly. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly votes aye.
Mr. Canady.
Mr. Canady. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Canady votes aye.
Mr. Inglis.
Mr. Inglis. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Inglis votes aye.
Mr. Goodlatte.
Mr. Goodlatte. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte votes aye.
Mr. Buyer.
Mr. Buyer. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Buyer votes aye.
Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Bryant votes aye.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chabot votes aye.
Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Barr votes aye.
Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins votes aye.
Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Hutchinson. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Hutchinson votes aye.
Mr. Pease.
Mr. Pease. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Pease votes aye.
Mr. Cannon.
Mr. Cannon. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Cannon votes aye.
Mr. Rogan.
Mr. Rogan. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Rogan votes aye.
Mr. Graham.
Mr. Graham. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Graham votes aye.
Mrs. Bono.
Mrs. Bono. Aye.
The Clerk. Mrs. Bono votes aye.
Mr. Conyers.
Mr. Conyers. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Conyers votes no.
Mr. Frank.
Mr. Frank. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Frank votes no.
Mr. Schumer.
Mr. Schumer. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Schumer votes no.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Berman votes no.
Mr. Boucher.
Mr. Boucher. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Boucher votes no.
Mr. Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Nadler votes no.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Scott votes no.
Mr. Watt.
Mr. Watt. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Watt votes no.
Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. No.
The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren votes no.
Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. No.
The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee votes no.
Ms. Waters.
Ms. Waters. No.
The Clerk. Ms. Waters votes no.
Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Meehan votes no.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt votes no.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Wexler votes no.
Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Rothman votes no.
Mr. Barrett.
Mr. Barrett. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Barrett votes no.
Mr. Hyde.
Mr. Hyde. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Hyde votes aye.
Mr. Chairman, there are 21 ayes and 16 noes.
Mr. Hyde. And the motion is carried, and the committee will
go into executive session, and we will stand at ease until the
room is cleared.
[Whereupon the committee proceeded in Executive Session.]
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