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REAUTHORIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
of the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 1, 1997
__________
Serial No. 105-47
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
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___________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois TOM LANTOS, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GARY A. CONDIT, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia DC
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
Carolina JIM TURNER, Texas
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
PETE SESSIONS, Texas HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey ------
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
BOB BARR, Georgia (Independent)
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
Justice
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Chairman
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GARY A. CONDIT, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JIM TURNER, Texas
BOB BARR, Georgia
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Robert Charles, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Chris Marston, Legislative Assistant
Ianthe Saylor, Clerk
Michael Yeager, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on May 1, 1997...................................... 1
Statement of:
McCaffrey, Gen. Barry, Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy............................................. 10
Rabkin, Norman, Director, Administration of Justice Issues,
General Accounting Office, accompanied by Jess Ford,
General Accounting Office, and Marsha Lillie-Blanton,
General Accounting Office.................................. 73
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 6
Hastert, Hon. J. Dennis, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Illinois, prepared statement of............... 3
McCaffrey, Gen. Barry, Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy, prepared statement of...................... 14
Rabkin, Norman, Director, Administration of Justice Issues,
General Accounting Office, prepared statement of........... 75
Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, December 31, 1996, Boston Herald article. 49
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 1, 1997
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, International
Affairs, and Criminal Justice,
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:10 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Dennis
Hastert (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Hastert, Souder, Mica, Barr,
Barrett, Blagojevich, and Cummings.
Staff present: Robert Charles, staff director and chief
counsel; Chris Marston, legislative assistant; Ianthe Saylor,
clerk; Michael Yeager, minority counsel; and Ellen Rayner,
minority chief clerk.
Mr. Hastert. The Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice will come to order.
I want to say good morning and welcome to everybody. We have an
excellent opportunity today and in the upcoming months. The
authorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy
expires at the end of this fiscal year, which is September
30th. Considering legislation to reauthorize this office gives
us a chance to evaluate the way our Government responds to the
threat posed by illegal drugs.
Since the office was established in 1988, it has been
reauthorized once in 1994. Several changes were made at that
time. We now need to consider the effect of those changes and
what new improvements we can make to enhance coordination of
our Nation's efforts to fight drug abuse. As the subcommittee
begins to develop its own ideas about changes in ONDCP, I look
forward to hearing from Gen. McCaffrey, as we always do, about
his proposals, and also Norm Rabkin of the General Accounting
Office about the considerable work that office has done in
evaluating coordination of the Federal drug control efforts.
Before we hear testimony from our witness, I'd like to take
a moment to remind everyone that the issue we confront today is
not just about technical changes in legislation; it's about the
threat posed to our Nation by illegal drugs. And not just the
people who you think sit or stand on the street corners. It's
in our schools. It's in our communities. It's all over. And it
really affects the No. 1 victim of this, our children.
As we consider proposals for changing ONDCP, we need to
remember that we are working to protect our children and our
society from the effects of drug abuse and the dangers
connected with drug trafficking. As recently as Tuesday, I was
reminded of the dangers presented by drugs. A man in one of our
adjoining districts in Illinois, just north of my own, was
arrested for giving a so-called date rape drug to a woman. Had
she not received prompt care, her reaction to the drug could
have killed her.
While we have no measures to indicate that the prevalence
of the particularly insidious use of date rape drugs, recent
studies tell us that other types of drug use among our youth
continues to rise. Illicit drug use among 8th and 10th graders
has doubled in the last 5 to 6 years. Our children are using
LSD and other hallucinogens, cocaine, heroin, and
methamphetamine, at increasing levels. MDMA, commonly referred
to as ecstacy, has been used by nearly 5 percent of 10th and
12th graders, as well as 2 percent of 8th graders.
MDMA is just one example of a new and emerging drug that
threatens our youth. Parents have stopped talking to their
children about the dangers of drug use. And only 3 of 10
children say their parents have talked to them about drugs. And
faced with a problem of this magnitude, we must take very
seriously the task before us today. Before asking Gen.
McCaffrey to testify, I yield to my friend, the subcommittee's
ranking member, Tom Barrett, for any opening comments that he
may have. Mr. Barrett.
[The prepared statement of Hon. J. Dennis Hastert follows:]
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Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to
welcome Gen. McCaffrey and Mr. Rabkin today. The consequences
of illegal drug use are more serious than ever for the health
of our Nation, for our productivity, and for the safety of our
communities. As you pointed out in the 1997 drug strategy,
every man, woman and child in America pays about $1,000 per
year to cover the ex- pense of crime in our neighborhoods,
extra law enforcement, unnec- essary health care, auto
accidents and loss productivity all result- ing from substance
abuse. And that's not to mention the incalcula- ble harm done
to families and communities by the effects of drugs.
Gen. McCaffrey, you have a difficult job. Not only are you
respon- sible for developing our national drug control
strategy, your office is also responsible for coordinating the
drug control efforts over 50 Federal agencies, each with its
own priorities, and each with its own bureaucracy. An important
place to start in our effort to com- bat illegal drugs--and I
see this reflected in the drug strategy and in the proposed
reauthorization bill--is with our country's young people.
In recent years we've seen a very troubling increase in the
num- ber of teenagers and young adults using drugs. The
percentage of youngsters between 12 and 17 using illegal drugs
has steadily gone up, from 5.3 percent in 1992 to 10.9 percent
in 1995. That's more than 1 out of every 10 young people in
America. Among eighth graders, drug use has gone up 150 percent
over the past 5 years. This year's drug strategy reflects the
fact that underage alcohol and tobacco use leads to more
serious drug use down the road. They are gateway drugs.
And research on the subject shows a strong statistical
association between adolescent tobacco and alcohol use and the
use of other drugs. Children 12 to 17 years old who smoke are
19 times more likely to use cocaine than children who have
never smoked. Chil- dren 12 to 17 who drink alcohol are 50
times more likely to use cocaine than children who never drank;
12- to 17-year-olds who smoke cigarettes, drink alcohol, and
use marijuana are 266 times more likely to use cocaine than
children who never used these sub- stances.
These are difficult problems, Gen. McCaffrey. And I stand
ready, as I'm sure all of my colleagues do, to do everything in
our power to help you succeed. I look forward to hearing your
testimony today. Thank you.
Mr. Hastert. The gentleman from Baltimore, MD.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General,
I've had the honor to hear your testimony before this committee
on different occasions. And let me say how impressed I am with
your continuing commitment and integrity in fighting this drug
war. I want to applaud you and encourage you to continue your
mission. It is not enough to have a vision, it is important to
be on a mission. And that is what I think you are trying to do.
And I support you.
General, we don't have time to point fingers. Life is too
short. And too many people are dying and suffering. You have
travelled to my district of Baltimore and walked the streets
with me where drug trafficking flourishes, and you have visited
treatment centers where patients strive simply to get well. You
have seen people who are in so much pain that they don't even
know that they are in pain. I fully support the HIDTA programs.
In fact, I'm scheduled to visit the Washington-Baltimore HIDTA
shortly.
This particular HIDTA provided vital support to the
investigation that culminated in the largest drug seizure in
Maryland's history. As you know, in February U.S. Customs and
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents seized 2,400 pounds
of cocaine, worth $25 million, concealed in steel drums
transported to a Baltimore chemical company. General, I am also
grateful to you for your attentions to the abuses of tobacco
and alcohol. Last May, a stunning report issued by the Federal
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention stated that 4.5
million children and adolescents smoke in the United States.
This is particularly troubling for me because the
proportion of African-American boys in grades 9 through 12 who
reported they smoked was almost double. The report concluded
that nearly one out of every three young people who smoke will
have their lives shortened from terrible diseases caused by
smoking. I am committed to doing everything possible to help
enact President Clinton's new tobacco regulations. These
policies are only the first steps in saving generations of
young people from becoming addicted to tobacco, which science
has proven causes serious health problems including early
death.
I would also like to take this opportunity to comment on
the Sentencing Commission's recent proposal to adjust the great
disparity in sentencing for powdered cocaine versus crack
cocaine. This development is long overdue. The current
guidelines are not only racist, but they do nothing to assist
in the development of a results-oriented national drug policy.
And finally, I urge your office to do more to address the
allegations made against the Central Intelligence Agency and
their relationship with regard to the introduction of crack
cocaine into American urban centers. Although you were one of
the first Government officials to call for full disclosure by
the CIA, very little or no interest in getting to the bottom of
these disturbing charges is evident.
As the use of crack cocaine continues to skyrocket in urban
areas, there is a growing outcry in American cities to know the
truth about how this plague began. Until we can get an honest
answer to the origins of this crisis, the talk of winning this
war is useless. The House of Representatives must follow the
example of the Senate, and hold open and thorough hearings on
the trail of drugs from Nicaragua to Washington to the
distribution networks of violent street gangs.
Finally, General, once again, let me say how pleased I am
for you to be here today. I also want to compliment you on your
hard-working and dedicated staff. They have been extremely
helpful to me and my personal staff. I am fully supportive of
your mission. And I stand ready to assist you in any way that I
can.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]
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Mr. Hastert. Without objection, we'll move now to
questioning. Anybody that has an opening statement will submit
it for the record.
Mr. Blagojevich. Can I say something?
Mr. Hastert. Go ahead.
Mr. Blagojevich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would only say
that--excuse me for being late, by the way. I would only say
that in my judgment the war on drugs is our new cold war in
America. We were successful in facing an external threat to our
national security during the cold war because we had the will
and the wherewithal, and we put forth the effort to meet that
challenge. And I just hope that our country can put that same
kind of focus in not only fighting but ultimately winning this
war on drugs.
And I would simply say again that it's a real privilege to
serve on this subcommittee. And, General, I look forward to
hearing your testimony because I can't think of anything more
important than this particular issue facing America. So, thank
you for coming, and I'm eager to hear your testimony.
Mr. Hastert. I thank the gentleman from Illinois. Now I
would like to formally welcome Gen. Barry McCaffrey, Director
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. General,
welcome. As usual, we look forward to hearing your testimony.
General, as you know, the rules of the committee require that I
swear you in. Will you please stand and raise your right hand?
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Hastert. Let the record show that the witness responded
in the affirmative. General, please proceed with your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF GEN. BARRY McCAFFREY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Gen. McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
opportunity to come down here and to lay out some initial
thoughts, and, more importantly, respond to your own questions
and listen to your own comments. Let me underscore that your
leadership and also Mr. Barrett's and Elijah Cummings' and Rob
Portman's and Steny Hoyer's and Jim Kolbe's and others has been
a source of not only enormous confidence in dealing with
Congress, but more importantly, we've learned a lot from
listening to those of you who have worked this problem over the
years.
With your permission, I would like to point out that we
have with us in the hearing room some very important people to
the drug issue. Dick Bonnette, Partnership for a Drug Free
America, which has done such absolutely splendid work over the
last many years trying to organize public service
announcements, pro bono announcements. Jim Burke, as you know,
has been the guiding light of that effort. We have with us the
Community Anti-Drug Coalition of America, Jim Copple,
representing more than 4,000 community coalitions across this
country. Jim has been absolutely pivotal in our success in
communicating the National Drug Strategy.
Bill Alden, from D.A.R.E. America, is also here. As you
know, the D.A.R.E. program, with some 25 million children
involved, has been what many of us believe the single most
effective drug prevention program in the school system we've
had to date. We also have Judge Jeff Tauber, from the National
Association of Drug Court Professionals. There are some 200
drug courts now, 89 of them funded by the United States,
supported by Federal funds. And they have, while not being a
magical bullet--are probably the single most effective new
initiative, I argue, we've seen in the criminal justice system
relating to the drug issue.
Mike Kirshenbaum, from the National Center for Drug Free
Kids, is also with us--a very key organization in our
continuing concern about gateway behavior with adolescents. And
we have Chris Rugaber, from the National Association of State
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors. And, as you know, they
represent our State Governors as sort of the primary point of
contact on prevention and treatment programs. And they've been
essential to my own education in the last year. Finally, and
very importantly, Laura Waxman, from the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, is here, representing some 1,500 mayors of cities with
populations over 30,000.
I've been involved very heavily in the last 6 months with
not only Mayor Rich Daley but also his mayors' coalition on
drugs, which, as you know, will come to Washington here, toward
the end of May--probably over 100 mayors--to have a national
conference and to present us with their own ideas. So I'm very
grateful for these representatives to be present and to provide
continuing guidance and support to me. Mr. Chairman, with your
permission, I might offer for the record our statement, which
we have provided to your committee members, and also the
associated graphs. And it's our attempt to bring together in a
coherent manner our own ideas on reauthorization.
Mr. Hastert. Without objection.
Gen. McCaffrey. I've also provided, obviously, not only,
Mr. Chairman, to your committee, but also to the Senate and the
House Republican and Democratic leadership, our rewritten
authorization bill for the Office of National Drug Control
Policy. And that packet has been made available to all of you.
We've had a very hard working group throughout the executive
branch struggling over this for the last 8 months. We think
it's a solid piece of work, and one that will allow us to
continue to support the American people and to carry out the
mandate of confronting drug abuse and its consequences in
America.
And, finally, I will again remind myself, for starters,
that the National Drug Control Strategy 1997 and the National
Drug Control Strategy budget, which by law I must prepare and
certify and submit to Congress each year, has been put on the
table. We think they are solid pieces of work. The 1998 budget,
itself, is some $16 billion that I have asked for the support
of the two appropriations committees. Very briefly, with your
permission, Mr. Chairman, I will run through some ideas that
are on charts.
And starting off with, again, a restatement that our entire
effort is organized around five goals of the National Drug
Strategy. We have now articulated, we think, in a pretty decent
fashion, 32 supporting objectives for these five goals. That is
the conceptual framework that we intend to hang the budget,
policies and programs on. The next chart briefly outlines a
quick overview of where we are in drugs in America.
And, again, it's important to remind ourselves drug abuse
is down by 50 percent, cocaine use has plummeted 75 percent.
But that's not the nature of the problem we're working. That
may be the good news. But the bad news is that the--next
chart--the consequences of this drug abuse have gone up. We're
seeing more sick, desperate people, more hospital room
emergencies. In addition, we are clearly facing a tremendous
increase in the consequences of drug-related crime--1.6 million
Americans behind bars.
And I've just tried to demonstrate Federal, local and State
increases. We think it will go up 25 percent more by the turn
of the century. And this is a system which we assert we have 7
percent of the treatment capacity for those incarcerated that
we need. A quick overview. And this chart is not meant to be
discouraging, but it does cause some pause for thought. Since
the 1990 through 1995, we're looking at a system in which the
production of cocaine has essentially not gone markedly up or
down. The seizure rates in the international community have not
gone up or down. And the domestic seizure rates have not
changed.
I say this really to put explicitly on the table that what
we actually are seeing now in cocaine is a heavy amount of
drugs, the same amount of drugs, chasing less addicted people
who are more sick than ever. That's the truth of the matter.
And that's what we're facing on the interdiction fight. We can
and should do better. But that's our track record. We've seen a
change in youth attitudes. This, I would argue, as you have
said in your opening statement, is the heart and soul of the
problem.
Youth attitudes started changing in 1990. The perception of
risk went down. Drug use started up. It has gotten worse every
year since then. The problem is it's going to get worse. It's
half as bad now as it was 15 years ago. So, we've got to simply
get organized and confront this problem. The stat that bothers
me most out of all of these is a look at the eighth graders.
Look at the front end of the bubble, as they enter the most
vulnerable period of their adolescent development, whether it's
central nervous system or social development or the requirement
to learn and physically develop, drug use among eighth graders
has nearly tripled--primarily marijuana--in the last several
years. And I underscore this because this is much higher THC
levels of pot that we're talking about. These are not college
sophomores. These are eighth graders. Drug abuse in the United
States really begins in the sixth grade.
Finally, the purpose you've asked me to come over here and
talk about is the reauthorization of the National Drug Control
Policy Office. And these are two charts. If you'll put up the
second one, also, Steve. The two charts outline the principal
changes that we have tabled for your consideration and your
colleagues. First, we are arguing that there should be a 10-
year perspective on the strategy. I would still argue we should
come down each year and update and explain whether
environmental conditions have changed. But a 10-year commitment
to face this drug problem. We would argue for a 5-year drug
control budget, so that the debate that we put in front of you,
that I force the Federal bureaucracy to look at it in a longer
term and allow your judgments to come into play on a 5-year
budget.
We think we're making some absolutely spectacular progress
in developing measurable goals and objectives. And I can talk
about this in greater detail in response to your own questions.
But this may be one of the most exciting things going on in
Government to try and define performance targets and
performance measures, and to be able to come down here and
relate the money you gave me not to process but to outcomes.
Now, we're also going to argue to make more explicit what
has been in the national drug strategy since 1992 under
President Bush's guidance, that we are indeed concerned about
gateway behavior. And I won't repeat the statistics so nicely
laid out by your committee. But there is unarguable evidence
that the correlation between some of these gateway behaviors
and later addictive problems are so powerful that if we were
talking about seat belts or lung cancer or dietary
restrictions, there would simply be no discussion. On the other
chart I've outlined four other considerations I'd ask you to
consider.
We want to talk about an office of inter-governmental
relations instead of State and local affairs. This better
captures what they're doing. We're going to have to apply more
attention to this HIDTA program. Congress has now given me $140
million, and has designated 15 HIDTAs. This is paying off. It's
a good program. And so I recommended we put together an element
inside ONDCP to follow it. CTAC--we want to broaden their
viewpoint on bringing technology to bear on all five goals of
the National Drug Strategy.
And, finally, Mr. Chairman, I would ask your committee to
consider extending ONDCP for 12 years, to say that this is not
a 1-year campaign. This is a 10-year strategy, 5-year budget, a
long-term commitment to a coherent policy. That really captures
the broad scale of what I would ask you to consider. And, Mr.
Chairman, I thank you again for the opportunity to lay these
ideas out for you.
[The prepared statement of Gen. McCaffrey follows:]
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Mr. Hastert. I thank you, Gen. McCaffrey. And with us also
now is our vice chairman, Mr. Souder, who didn't get a chance
to give his opening statement. I think he's going to give a
short opening statement. I'll let you open the questions, Mr.
Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to welcome
Gen. McCaffrey. You were briefly over in the Republican
Conference. I thought you were going to address us over there
where I was. I apologize for missing the start of your
statement. I appreciate your continued commitment to speaking
out. I've read through your testimony and have some questions.
But in my opening statement I wanted to express a deep personal
concern, and make sure it's in the record. I would like to
insert for the record this article, if I could have unanimous
consent.
Mr. Hastert. Without objection.
Mr. Souder. It concerns William Weld and some of his
positions on medicinal use of marijuana.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Souder. In your statement to us, you correctly point
out, as you just did verbally, the danger of marijuana use as
an entry-level drug. You point out that in even reducing drunk
driving, that marijuana is now the second leading cause of
drug-related accidents behind alcohol. We have another section
countering attempts to legalize marijuana. You correctly point
out that in preventing drug trafficking across the Southwest
Border, that the United States-Mexican border is the microcosm
of America's drug problem. You correctly point out the
difficulties the we're facing with Mexico in the counter-drug
cooperation, and talk about Mexico continuing to face an
emergency situation in their country because their democratic
institutions are under brutal internal attack by international
drug criminals.
There are laudable things--you have a statement about
measuring and reducing illegal domestic marijuana cultivation.
In the Boston Herald, December 31, 1996, it says: ``Gov Rips
Drug Czar's Threat: Weld Backs Pot Use for the Ill. Says he:
`Let docs prescribe pot.' Governor William Weld yesterday took
a pot shot at President Clinton's bid to snuff out medicinal
marijuana use, following a push to allow state-based doctors to
prescribe the outlaw weed.''
Now, I want to know, if Mexico is our No. 1 problem in this
country, where the drugs are coming across. And this is
obviously not partisan. William Weld is a Republican. He takes
a cheap shot at you, headlined. And I want to commend you on
your efforts to speak out in a very difficult political
situation, when two major States pass referendums. And I
commend you for your efforts. And I think this potential could
undermine our biggest international crisis--the Mexican
border--if we send an ambassador to Mexico who is undermining
our domestic efforts, criticizing our drug czar, and every time
we meet the Mexican Government, every time we meet with Mexican
legislators, every time we meet with them, they're going to
throw our own Ambassador's statements back at us.
And I hope you will--if you can't publicly, at least
privately, ask the President to reconsider this. And this is
certainly going to be an issue. And many of us are going to
make it an issue. Because I did not spend these multiple years
and have my kid--working on the drug issue first as a staffer,
and since as a Member--and watch my kids in my home town and
people under attack by drugs, so that we appoint an ambassador
to a country that is pooh-poohing a threat of this gradual
legalization trend. And I can't imagine anything more
devastating. And I hope that understanding that he has made you
an issue, which puts you in an awkward position--that you'll be
willing to speak out. And this is a devastating blow to what
we've been trying to do to make America aware.
I just can't conceive that we would put a man in this most
high and conspicuous position with this background. Even if he
will retract this. If he understands what the administration
position is--we're still going to have this thrown back at us.
I felt that's very important to get in the record. It's not
something that's going to end. And it is directly related to
the drug czar, because he took--it says, ``Gov Rips Drug Czar's
Threat'' and the language goes through.
So, I'm very disappointed. I wanted to put that into the
record as an opening statement. And if I can now move to my
questions, I will do so. One of the questions that we've been
trying to sort out is some of where your drug research money
has been going. And we understand that there was some question
about what happened in 1996. 1997 is a bit unusual. And I just
wondered for the record if you could provide us a comprehensive
list of the individuals and organizations that ONDCP funded
over the past 2 years, as well as through other agencies which
you have budget review authority? Because there have been some
concerns about where we're headed in the research regarding
marijuana.
It is very important that we don't have mixed messages
going out. Many of us--I, particularly have been disturbed as
I've gone through schools, and have been evolving my position.
I always opposed tobacco use for minors. And I believe we've
had to up and--been moving along with the rest of the
Government. While I fear Government intervention in too many
areas, believe that we're going to have to cross some lines
because of the tobacco usage and its relationship to marijuana
and alcohol. I think we need to speak out more. But it's
important that we keep a united front on the marijuana
question. And I'm very concerned that--what research is out
there, how it's being used, and how it can be distorted, and
would appreciate that record so we can look at it in more
detail.
I also wanted to commend you in your written statement. I
missed the first part, so I'm not sure whether you verbally
referred to that--and that was the importance of your work with
the entertainment industry. It is clear from going to schools
that the music and the movies and particularly the music, is
one of the most sensitive areas with kids. And we really have
to work with the administration and others to try to turn this.
Could you elaborate on where you might be heading with this and
just give me some comments on what you alluded to? I think you
had, I think, just a few sentences that you were going to try
to work with that.
Gen. McCaffrey. The entertainment industry visit was, to be
honest, quite encouraging and almost surprising. I prepared for
that for 3 or 4 months. There was enormous suspicion on the
part of the entertainment world when I went out there whether
they would be treated to a lecture and a thumping and then I'd
leave. What we essentially did was, we asked for their help, we
asked for their support.
I told them we had three principal concerns. First, that
drug abuse be pictured realistically when it was shown, that we
had no problems with a movie like ``Trainspotting,'' but
enormous difficulty with a movie that romanticized or portrayed
as glamorous the use of drugs. We said if you're going to put
drugs into the entertainment world, make sure it looks like
real life. The second thing we asked them to do is, don't
portray drug use as the norm. It isn't. Most of us in America
don't use drugs. Some of us do and have enormous problems. So
make sure you tell our children that it's 1 out of 10, which is
a terrible problem, but it's not the norm of behavior among
adolescents.
And the third thing we asked the entertainment world to
consider is, don't portray drugs as funny. They're not funny.
They kill 14,000 people a year and cause enormous anguish
across this country. So we said, those are the three things
we'd like you to consider. Finally, we asked for their thoughts
and their involvement. I think we're getting some payoff
already. I was astonished. I went to the Writers' Guild, the
producers, the directors, the Entertainment Industry--EIC--
Council, the Actors' Guild, and I think there was a very
positive response.
The one clear problem I would suggest to you is, we're
going to do a lot better with television than we are with the
music industry. We're going to do better with the established
movie industry than we are with the independents. There's
tremendous sensitivity, which we support, to the rights of free
expression in the entertainment world. But I think the larger
firms were very positive. I was very impressed.
Mr. Souder. One thing that turned up in some of our
discussions around ``Trainspotting,'' which is very
controversial, and also some of the music industry--and this
may be something to look at in some of the research, is that
there's clearly a difference of opinion of what is viewed as
attractive by the majority of the people and what can be viewed
as attractive by actually the high-risk groups who are more
likely to be addicts.
Gen. McCaffrey. I agree.
Mr. Souder. And particularly when you go into the schools
and see the type of clothing and almost a depressing view of
life, that something to most of us that looks like portraying
the actual and is a depressing thing that we wouldn't find
attractive, is actually a reverse attraction.
Gen. McCaffrey. Yes. I agree.
Mr. Souder. And to some degree, educating, getting more
research on that as it relates to the fashion industry and
stuff, too, ups the awareness of parents as well.
Gen. McCaffrey. Yes. I think you're entirely right.
``Trainspotting'' is a good example in which perhaps to the
adolescent world it's an inappropriate movie, but it's a great
film for parents to see.
Mr. Souder. If I can make one other--just a brief comment.
While I understand--and I have taken to calling this both war
and cancer, that it's both things, as we've discussed this--the
likelihood of a 12-year reauthorization is pretty minimal
because it's one thing, if you're there and we're working
closely together--but just as far as how likely Congress is
going to move, and the ability to manage and do this--a 12-year
reauthorization is probably not realistic. It doesn't mean
we're not committed to a 12-year battle.
Viewing this as a cancer, any Congress that backs away is
going to learn from--we're going to repeat history again if we
don't keep the pressure on. I also wanted to express one other
concern. And that is, I understand that there's some fencing
going on between treatment interdiction. But I think that we
need to make sure, just like your one chart that you had up
there about interdiction, doesn't downplay that. Because there
was some movement in less international interdiction in your
chart, which actually opened up the amount of domestic.
I'm not sure, simply because I don't know all the facts,
how much domestic drop there's actually been. But that's
something we all need to be very careful of, because we need to
keep all fronts moving aggressively.
Gen. McCaffrey. I absolutely agree, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. I yield back.
Gen. McCaffrey. That's why, when I show that chart, I'm a
little nervous. It could be used for mischief on both sides of
the question. I certainly don't mean to imply that that's
futile. That was over 300 metric tons of cocaine taken out of
the system each year, which potentially would have devastating
impact on America. So law enforcement in our country last year
took 107 metric tons of cocaine away from the criminals. Thank
God. I agree with your point entirely.
Mr. Hastert. Thank you. The gentleman yields back his time.
We have a vote pending. So I'm going to recess for 20 minutes.
And we'll be back here at five after.
Gen. McCaffrey. Yes, sir.
[Recess.]
Mr. Hastert. The committee will reconvene. General, one of
the things that we've had discussions about and the colleague
from Indiana opened up the whole issue with Mexico. And we've
had discussions on that. A couple things concern us. And let me
just ask you, do you feel that since we've had the
certification of Mexico and moved forward--and I know you've
had considerable talks there and in the Caribbean area--what
positive grounds are what measurable goals have we reached
there?
Gen. McCaffrey. Of course we have had a tremendous amount
of energy into this process. And I think the congressional
response and attention paid to it was in a large extent very
helpful, because it underscored the vehemence and the
insistence on the part of the United States Government as well
as Mexican authorities that this level of corruption and
violence that are threatening us out of international drug
crime is unacceptable. So, I think some good came out of it.
Now, we're watching Mexican partners with enormous
sympathy. That's the bottom line. We think their senior
leadership are committed to confronting the issue. We think
they have an enormous internal threat to their democratic
institutions. And to be balanced about it, much of it comes
from $49 billion of United States drug money, and I might add,
a considerable amount of United States arms being smuggled into
Mexico. Now, they also, it seems to me, have understood quite
clearly that if they don't confront effectively this issue with
their own police, judicial system and armed forces, that they
will lose their future.
So, a lot of specific measures are ongoing, whether it's
cooperation with training prosecutors, police agents. Mexico
has announced today a very bold program to try and rebuild
their drug police from the ground up. We have a considerable
amount of support thanks to U.S. congressional action for
providing their army with greater mobility to confront these
massive drug gangs that are operating on both sides of the
border.
We have extradition in a very balanced manner ongoing on
both countries. The Mexicans have made the tremendous effort to
energize these three binational border task forces. And I would
expect in the year to come we'll see more happen out of that.
They have fired hundreds of corrupt police officers. This thing
with Gen. Gutierrez Rebollo was a terrible blow, an incredible
blow to Mexican leadership, to President Zedillo and Minister
Cervantes, as you can imagine. They're attempting to roll up
the gang of thugs that was part of his operation, which
apparently was--essentially, he was a mole for Amato Carrillo
Fuentes' drug gang. So, I think they're continuing to push the
envelope. And we're going to work with them.
Mr. Hastert. General, one of the things that you know that
we've had discussions back and forth, there are about six or
seven issues that we felt very strongly about. You've talked
about one of them: extraditions, commitment to DEA agents, the
use of side arm, which I know is a very touchy situation,
permanent maritime agreements, the radar situation, and to
endemic police corruption. And I would like for you, before the
President goes to Mexico--I think it's May 6--that if you could
write a letter of conveyance to me just in your assessment of
where we're moving on that. I don't want you to do that
publicly at this time. But I would like you to either us have a
conversation or a letter outlining where we are at on those
issues. I'd appreciate that very much.
Gen. McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, I might add, in front of each
of you, you should have a copy of the letter that I sent to
the--if I can find it--to Hon. Porter Goss and Hon. Norman
Dicks. We had a closed, classified session, security
implication of Gen. Gutierrez Rebollo's arrest. You have a copy
of that. It has my letter to the congressional hearing and an
earlier letter to Foreign Minister Gurria. And I would be glad
to share with you, sir, the classified book that we put
together, which includes, among other things, our own internal
look at our intelligence system, and what we knew then and what
we intend to do about it. So, I'd welcome a chance to share
that with you.
Mr. Hastert. As you well know, one of our other areas of
concern in South America is Colombia and the situation we have
there. And, of course, they had some type of an action by the
State Department and the President. There's also a 614 Waiver
that's sitting, that's been approved by State and, I
understand, is sitting on the President's desk. I have a
personal view on that, that it's very important that they have
the ability, especially the national police force and the army,
have the ability to have weapons to protect themselves and
actually go out and do the job that they very, very gallantly
have been doing. What's your view on that? Can we have that 614
signed and sent to Colombia as soon as possible?
Gen. McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, I think there's commitment on
the part of the Secretary of State and most of her senior
people, and certainly on my part, and, I believe, on the
President's--I've talked to him about it--to provide 614 Waiver
authority for Colombia. We share your view. Gen. Serrano and
the Colombian police authorities, who at great sacrifice, have
continued to fight against this menace and also Gen. Bedoya and
the Army. There is a very definite problem now, though, as a
challenge on human rights concerns and the Senate amendment
which requires a waiver and puts us under caution to not
provide these weapons or, for that matter, FMS sales without an
in-use monitoring agreement. And we are working pro-actively
with the Colombians to get this signed to make sure both sides
recognize the legitimate interest of the human rights community
and the international press to watch this issue. If we can work
through that I think we're going to move ahead. And I'm very
confident we'll have a good outcome.
Mr. Hastert. Well, we understand that, according to
Ambassador Gelbard, at least, that is going to the police and
not that Army, and there certainly is less movement----
Gen. McCaffrey. But we're also going to support the Army.
Both. There was a change recently now to provide the
helicopters, I believe--one tranche of the helicopters will go
to the police.
Mr. Hastert. Well, we may want to have a separate
conversation on this. But I think it's very, very important
that we do get the aid down there. And, you know, I'm very
sensitive to human rights and the issues of human rights. But
the fact is that our children are being delivered cocaine, and
in some cases, heroin, on our street corners, in our schools.
And I don't think there are more heinous violations of human
rights than that. And anything that we can do on the ground in
Mexico, in the United States, in Colombia or Peru or any place
else to stop that, we need to do it. I'll yield back my time.
And Mr. Barrett is here for questioning.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gen. McCaffrey, one
of my reactions when I first came to Washington was it seemed
as though we had an office for everything. And many of these
offices conflicted in their goals or duplicated goals of other
agencies, and it was this office or that office overseeing
things. And one of the things that I'm happiest you're doing is
taking the lead on recognizing that the drug use can begin many
times with underage children, in particular the use of tobacco
and alcohol.
And I think it would be somewhat ludicrous if we had a drug
czar and then a teenage tobacco czar and then a teenage alcohol
consumption czar, when anybody who has been exposed to any of
this recognizes that there is a correlation, as you have
stated, as many others have stated. So I want to applaud your
efforts in taking the lead on that. I think that's extremely
important. And I think it helps dispel the notion that the
Federal Government is tripping over itself by duplicating
efforts. This is one of the times I have seen truly a person
who brings issues that are somewhat related together because in
the real world they are together. I just wanted to start off
with that.
You've heard some criticism already today about the notion
of having a 12-year authorization. From your perspective,
what's more important--getting the 5-year budget or the 1-year,
12-year authorization?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, I think these things have symbolic
importance beyond the practical. I think what I would like to
see us all do is understand that 5 years from today, we're
going to still confront addiction in America and its
consequences. And we're still going to have the responsibility
to actively promote drug prevention among American children,
and indeed to continue to defend our air, land and
seafrontiers.
Given that, we need to understand that that strategy isn't
a new idea every year, it's a concept that, if solid and
coherent, ought to be used to build budgets year after year.
And for that reason, I think the 10-year notion, if you didn't
say it was a 10-year document, I think we're missing a bet in a
very important philosophical way to make that commitment. But
I'm not sure practically it's going to stop us from doing what
we need to do. The second notion, though, is that the 5-year
budget--we're still going to have to come down here and
authorize a budget execution every year.
I got that. But I would like to see that executive branch,
the 50 agencies of Government, and the two Appropriations
Committees force ourselves to see the tradeoffs in options. We
simply can't have a debate over do we jail violent drug
criminals or do drug prevention programs? Do we maintain the
prison construction program or do after care? So if you don't
get your time horizons out, as we do in the national security
business or as IBM does and Sears & Roebuck does, I don't see
how we're ever going to get a sensible solution to the problem.
So, the strategy, the 5-year budgets, that's the heart and soul
of it.
For sure, what's going to be the case is, 12 years from
today--some of us may not be present--someone here is going to
continue to exercise this absolutely pivotal responsibility to
protect America from drug abuse. I'd like to recognize that,
embrace it, and say this isn't a trick, an election year issue,
this is a commitment to America's future.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you. One of the other issues that is
under your jurisdiction is the HIDTAs. Can you give me a little
better feel for how those work and why you think those are so
effective?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, we do have a problem with HIDTAs. And
the problem is having some concept that's defined having some
objectives, having some performance measures of effectiveness.
We've got to deliver that. The HIDTA concept has grown topsy-
turvy. We're now up to 15. We've got two more that I've
provided funding--$1 million each--to Detroit and San Francisco
for startup. I think we need clarity in what we're doing. And I
think we're going to provide that in this strategy and in the
subsequent performance measures.
Now, having said all that, the 10 HIDTAs that have had a
track record, some of them have been spectacular in using small
amounts of money to support what smart cops and prosecutors are
doing anyway: allowing task force operations so that local,
State, and Federal law enforcement and prosecutors can go to
the same place, share evidence, data and operations, deconflict
operations, and bring together some coherence to counter-drug
efforts. And the ones that are just spectacular are places like
Miami, which in 7, 8 years of hard work has really made a
tremendous change in the quality of the community life. And
HIDTA has been a big part of it.
We've got the one in Puerto Rico-Virgin Islands--is going
to make, I would argue, an enormous difference organizing some
600-some odd Federal law enforcement officers to act in sync
with Puerto Rican police, attorney general, et cetera. New
York--Howard Safers doing incredible work with--we've had--Mr.
Chairman, your staffer was up there with us looking with
tremendous admiration at what $9 million a year in Federal
money has helped with in New York. So we're pretty upbeat about
the potential of it.
Mr. Hastert. Just in passing, they also have some National
Guard assistance. Now, I want to talk about that in a few
minutes. And just stop short of harping on my behalf, General,
I just want to go back on the 614 for a second. You know, the
505NUST agreement is in place with the police. And it's just
very, very important that that's being expedited. I know that
you have very close consultations with the President. And
hopefully that thing could be signed before the President goes
to Mexico, and moved. And that's our desire. So hopefully that
can be passed on. I now recognize Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you and welcome back, General. Yesterday, a
district court in San Francisco barred the Federal Government
from retaliation against physicians who endorsed therapeutic
marijuana under California Proposition 214. The judge
specifically cited the mixed signals being sent by the Clinton
administration as one of the bases of the judge's ruling. This
week a Federal judge barred our law enforcement agents from
taking any action against doctors who recommend marijuana to
patients under California's Proposition 215. She cited mixed
signals from the administration as one of her reasons. General,
I'm really wondering if we are serious, if we are in fact
sending mixed signals about what we want to do in this war on
drugs. What's the situation? What's the problem? What can we
do?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, the judge issued a 42-page order,
which--I have skim read parts of it. Obviously, Department of
Justice has primary responsibility not only for representing us
during those proceedings, but also interpreting what the
results are. And I don't know. I don't know where this is going
to come out. The only thing I can assure you of is that the
administration position, we think, is prudent. It makes sense.
It's in writing. It's a seven page document.
It's endorsed by the President. It's in concert with U.S.
Federal law. We are supported by the American Medical
Association, the California Medical Association, the American
Cancer Society, the American Opthamological Society. We have
said we would be glad to aggressively examine the scientific
claims of smoked marijuana to be a safe and effective medicine.
And that's going on in the NIH, FDA community. We have funded
American Academy of Science Institute of Medicine studies on
what we know and don't know about smoked marijuana.
We believe it is vitally important for the United States to
maintain a system of national standards of medicine based on
scientific inquiry and not ideology. We've got a problem and
I----
Mr. Mica. You just got back, didn't you, from Mexico?
Gen. McCaffrey. I just got back from the Caribbean. I've
also been to Mexico, yes.
Mr. Mica. Well, fairly recently. And the President is going
there in the near future. Isn't the largest source of marijuana
coming into the United States from Mexico?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, it's hard to say because we don't
know how much marijuana is produced in the United States. We
have no accurate figures.
Mr. Mica. Well, OK. Let's not consider domestic production,
just foreign coming into the United States. Mexico is No. 1 for
marijuana?
Gen. McCaffrey. I think that's probably true, yes.
Mr. Mica. And we're now about to send a United States
Ambassador to Mexico, who takes a position in opposition to the
administration. And, in fact, that appointment may be sending a
message now, that it's not all that bad, particularly for
certain purposes that the administration has--and I sent you a
letter applauding you on your initial stand on this. But can't
you see that through our actions--our policy may be one thing,
but our actions are sending a mixed message. What do you think
about this appointment?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, I think, again, it's unequivocally
clear in writing, that the Attorney General, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Education and I and
others supported, obviously approved by the President, are
unalterably opposed to the legalization of drugs or the
surreptitious legalization of drugs under the guise of medical
uses.
Mr. Mica. Will you join me in asking the President to
withdraw this proposed Ambassador?
Gen. McCaffrey. No. I wouldn't think it would be
appropriate, Mr. Congressman, for me to join that viewpoint.
Mr. Mica. OK. Thank you. Last year it was revealed that
President Clinton had accepted a $20,000 check from Jorge
Cabrerra, a member of a prominent Florida Keys fishing and
lobster family. The donation enabled Cabrerra to attend a
fundraiser with Vice President Al Gore----
Mr. Barrett. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to raise a point of
order. I don't believe this is within the scope of this
hearing.
Mr. Hastert. Well, it probably is within the scope. I
believe the parliamentarian says, this counsel says it's within
the scope. I'll take it under reservation and discuss it later.
Mr. Barrett. No. Could you give me a specific reasoning as
to how this is within the scope of this hearing?
Mr. Mica. Well, it deals--Mr. Chairman, may I speak to the
gentleman's point? This deals specifically with an individual
who smuggles $6,000 pounds of cocaine through the Florida Keys
and----
Mr. Barrett. Could he do it in an authorization bill?
Mr. Mica. I have a very specific question. We are not
dealing with an authorization and appropriations. This is a
Government Reform and Oversight Committee investigative
subcommittee.
Mr. Barrett. Mr. Chairman, what is the title of this
hearing today, please?
Mr. Hastert. It is the authorization of the ONDCP. The
ONDCP has jurisdiction over drug smuggling and the reduction of
the use of drugs. I would see that it's appropriate. The
gentleman's time has expired. And we'll move on to the next
questioner, Mr. Blagojevich.
Mr. Blagojevich, the gentleman from Illinois has no
questions. The gentleman from Georgia.
Mr. Barr. In followup to something that my colleague from
Florida said, I think, General, that we had a discussion about
this at your last visit here. I think that very clearly what
the judge perhaps was reflecting is contained in page 59 of the
1997 National Drug Control Strategy. The conclusion of the top
paragraph on the left column it says, ``We must continue to
oppose efforts to legalize marijuana.'' You say here today,
``The administration is `unalterably opposed' to medicinal uses
or legalization of marijuana.'' Yet you go right down--a
paragraph and a half further down that page, and it says,
``Nonetheless,'' and then talks about--and you follow this up
with a letter to me, $1 million that you wish to spend that the
administration wants to spend to study the medicinal uses of
marijuana.
I just fail to see very clearly that the administration can
truly be unalterably opposed and then ask for money to study
the issue. I think that is precisely where the confusion comes
from. I'd like to turn, though, for a couple of specific
questions, General, to another matter that concerns me. And I
do appreciate the material that you and your office have
furnished to me. And that is with regard to the legal basis on
which your office expends moneys and deals with matters
involving tobacco usage.
And this has nothing whatsoever to do with all of our
opposition, which I share and which I know the President feels
strongly about as do you, too--tobacco usage by teenagers, by
underage children. But just liking that as a policy and
agreeing with it does not provide the legal basis for the
Office of National Drug Control Policy to engage in programs
and policies and promotions of anti-tobacco programs.
And I still fail to see, even though in your kind letter to
me you mentioned various provisions of 21 U.S.C. 1502 and 1507.
There is absolutely nothing in those authorities that talks
about tobacco as within the legal jurisdiction of your office.
And, as a matter of fact, I truly believe, General, that the
precise language of those sections supports my position that if
this administration or any administration--and I know that you
cite very correctly that a former administration sort of began
this slippery slope in 1992. If, in fact, the administration or
you want to engage in anti-tobacco efforts, as laudable as that
may be, I think you need to come to the Congress--the
administration does--and ask for the legal authority to do so.
Because I don't think you have the legal authority. And I
intend to make that an issue. For example, in 21 U.S.C. 1507-1,
the term drug is defined. And it refers very clearly to
controlled substances. Tobacco is not a controlled substance,
no matter how much people might want it to be, no matter how
much people might want to, for various reasons, good or bad,
substantive or political, to make it so. And I continue to have
a very serious problem with your office engaging in activities,
expending moneys, designed to stop tobacco usage.
I do think that if you believe that that is something that
is an important part of the overall drug strategy. Maybe it is.
Maybe it isn't. That you lay out the case and propose an
amendment to the authorization legislation that provides for
the jurisdiction of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Because I don't think that power is there, the legal basis. As
a matter of fact, I think it is very clear that it isn't there.
And, again, I appreciate you corresponding with me on this. Is
there anything you want to add to the record today over and
above the letters that you sent me?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, I certainly understand your concern.
In fact, I think I share it. That's why in this reauthorization
bill we do explicitly ask you to put aside those concerns and
specifically enumerate gateway behavior by tobacco and alcohol.
So I share your conviction that we ought to come to Congress
and explicitly ask you for this authority. And that's what I've
just done. Now, the second thing I would argue, though, is that
what you've cited is the Controlled Substances Act.
And what the 1988 law told us in ONDCP to do was establish
policies for the drug program. And that certainly includes the
right to do comprehensive, demand reduction efforts, which from
President Bush on has, I think, quite wisely encompassed the
reduction of use of illegal substances by adolescents. So, it's
unquestionable that alcohol and tobacco are illegal substances
for use by youngsters. We have found the evidence of University
of Michigan and Columbia University, in particular, quite
persuasive that smoking and alcohol use does indeed inexorably
set one up for higher risk correlations of later addictive
problems in life. But I do agree, Mr. Congressman, I ought to
get from you explicit authority. And it will put aside some of
these questions.
Mr. Barr. Could I just ask one very quick followup
question, Mr. Chairman? Will you then be recommending to the
President that he send forward to the Congress a specific
proposal for providing that explicit authority or jurisdiction?
Gen. McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, it's in the bill I sent over
here. This hearing is on----
Mr. Barr. In chapter 20, so that it would appear--the
language would appear in chapter 20.
Gen. McCaffrey. Yes. It's in----
Mr. Barrett. I'm looking at page 2 of the bill. It appears
that there's----
Gen. McCaffrey. Yes. It would be in our authorization and
definition aspect of drug control.
Mr. Barr. OK.
Gen. McCaffrey. We will exclusively ask you----
Mr. Barr. But would it be amendment to chapter 20 of title
21? Is that where it will be?
Mr. Barrett. Mr. Barr, I'm looking at page 2, lines 11
through 16.
Gen. McCaffrey. I can try and provide you a written
response. But it will be in 21.1507 under definitions.
Mr. Barr. OK. Well, that's in chapter 20 of the----
Mr. Hastert. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett. Gen. McCaffrey, I would
like to ask you a couple things. First of all, in the issue of
reauthorization, which I think we need to talk a couple minutes
about. I tend to agree that we probably need to have a 5-year
budget authorization. I see the need for planning to make sure
that the equipment and strategies are in place over a period of
time. I question whether a 12-year authorization is something
that we'd want to do. I think things change. People change.
Administrations change. Drug Czars change. And certainly the
changes that you brought about, bringing in new ideas and
different approaches from your predecessors have certainly been
noted and marked. I'm not sure that we'd want to be bound under
a policy that was set under one administration and one person,
and drive that policy when people come and go and change. And
I'd like your reaction to that.
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, I think your point is a good one, Mr.
Chairman. The only thing I would, though, suggest is, you'll
still pass budgets every year. Every dollar will have to be
appropriated by Congress. And the Director of ONDCP will still
have to come down here and explain the 5-year request and what
they did or did not accomplish. I think second, the way we
wrote that, it said that the strategy would still have to be
updated, and the Director ought to explain--I mean, this is a
dynamic problem. With any luck, 10 years from today, cocaine
will not be a major drug of abuse in America.
But the problem may well be that methamphetamine and
boutique drugs will be. So, I think you'll still have clear
authority to demand hearings and to adjust this strategy as the
situation evolves. So, again, I think what we've got is--we've
got a request on my part for you to consider that this is a
permanent challenge to our children, to our schools, our work
places, that the mechanism that we put in place ought to be
responsive to congressional interest. But the problem won't go
away.
What we want to do is manage it down until it's causing the
least amount of anguish. I think ought to commit to a decade.
And 12 years, apparently. We just said 2 years beyond a 10-year
strategy.
Mr. Hastert. Well, I think we need to get your view. I
think we'll have this as a point of issue and discussion.
Gen. McCaffrey. Yes.
Mr. Hastert. And furthermore, I would just say that one of
the things that I would hope we'd have in 10 years is a drug
free America. I hope that we can fight this war week by week,
day by day, month by month, and have some achievement there.
Gen. McCaffrey. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Hastert. And as that fight progresses through the
years, I think maybe we need to sometimes change our strategy.
Gen. McCaffrey. I agree. Yes.
Mr. Hastert. I'm sure that if a general is going to place
and fight a war, I'm not sure a 10-year strategy is always in
place without some changing of it from time to time. But that's
my own opinion.
Gen. McCaffrey. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Hastert. At this time I'm going to yield to the
gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Blagojevich.
Mr. Blagojevich. General, I was very impressed with the
information that you provided with regard to the eighth graders
and marijuana use and the rise of marijuana use among eighth
graders. What specific policies are being implemented by your
office or being discussed by your office with regard to
addressing that problem that clearly can only get worse unless
we meet the challenge head on?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, the Department of Education, in
particular, but also Health and Human Services and, indeed,
Department of Justice, have a series of initiatives that we
think are enormously important. I might also add that this is
not only a Federal responsibility and the kind of work we saw
endorsed by Gen. Powell and the President and others in
Philadelphia are part and parcel of it. We think the reduction
of drug abuse among children is primarily a function of
parents, educators, local coalitions. And that's the heart and
soul of it.
Now, having said that, we're also asking Congress, Mr.
Kolbe and his committee, to support $175 million a year for 5
years, where we'll also go back, after a matching pro bono $175
million. Partnership for a Drug Free America and the
Advertising Council are assisting us with this. And we're going
to try to talk to adolescents and their parents through the
medium they're watching, through what is being used to instruct
them. But I think it's a whole array of issues, and that the
heart of and soul of it is not just the magnificent
contributions of the D.A.R.E. program. You've got to have more
than that. Something has got to happen between 3 p.m. and 7
p.m.
Mr. Blagojevich. Mm-hmm.
Gen. McCaffrey. And so mentoring initiatives and a whole
series of other approaches--safe and drug free schools. The
1998 budget, we've got $620 million in there. We know we've got
to be more responsive to Congress and make that it produces
outcomes that I can explain what we did with the money. But we
think we've got a pretty good effort.
Mr. Blagojevich. General, just quickly, did you say $620
million?
Gen. McCaffrey. In the 1998 budget. It's an increase of
some $64 million--11.5 percent.
Mr. Blagojevich. And that money would be specifically
earmarked to send back to community groups or local governments
that match funds at the local level? Is that what you were
saying?
Gen. McCaffrey. One of the challenges, of course, when you
get into programs like this, is finding out where block grants
go and how effectively they are spent, and what constraints do
you put upon them. So I think Dick Riley and I and others have
to ensure we deliver the goods. But, yes, that's where that
money is going.
Mr. Blagojevich. Thank you, General.
Mr. Hastert. The gentleman from Florida is recognized.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. General, I'm glad to see that you did
get a hearing or opportunity to explain your side of the
situation with the----
Mr. Hastert. Did the gentleman have a specific question of
the Chair?
Mr. Mica. Yes. I'm referring to the report that he referred
to with Mr. Goss' Intelligence Committee. Because the--I can't
think of a better term--but the screw up of having our highest
folks dealing with the drug war, dealing with an involved drug
czar from another country and our not knowing about it is a
matter of importance if we're going to be funding these kind of
programs, particularly over a long-term period. So, I'm pleased
to see that my request was adhered to for that.
Along the same lines, I'm still concerned that in funding
you in a multi-year fashion that we send the wrong signals. I
believe that having a convicted drug dealer or a drug dealer
actively involved in drug trade getting an invitation to the
White House. I took my mother-in-law to the White House for a
Christmas party. They checked her out. I would expect that the
President of the United States, the Vice President and the
First Lady should have some assurance that we have some program
in place that, in fact, that these highest individuals aren't
sending the wrong message by having these folks as their
guests.
So, that is a concern in this multi-year funding. And also
a congressional report that the Cabrerra donation was requested
of him while he was in Havana on a business trip. So, I'm
wondering why we find ourselves in this situation, why we don't
have good intelligence. Are we putting enough resources in
these areas? And do we have controls and policy in place to
deal with these situations under your proposed multi-term
budget?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, the piece of the question that I
guess I could respond to is, how good is our intelligence on
foreign drug operations. And the answer is, it's pretty good.
And it ought to be better. And it has difficulty. We don't get
the appointments of the Government of Colombia or Mexico or--in
the case of Gutierrez Rebollo, I think that Minister Cervantes
and others were shocked and dismayed to find that they had
pulled up a general officer who turned out to be a, apparently,
a stooge of another drug gang.
We had a DEA office that had worked in that city of
Guadalajara with him for 7 years and had not picked up on the
fact that he was apparently an employee of the ACF gang. So I
think we probably need to and we are scrutinizing how we go
about learning more about the drug threat. But we do a
remarkable job, by and large, of following smuggling routes,
interdiction routes. Our biggest problem may well remain
picking up Minister of Defense Boterro, that he was an active
recipient of millions of dollars of drug money from a Colombian
drug gang.
Mr. Mica. The other area, General--you know that I'm very
supportive of you getting the money on a long-term basis or
whatever-term basis you need it. The problem I have is still
the issues like the 614, where we have equipment on the shelf,
where we have funds already appropriated, and we can't get the
equipment to Colombia in this instance. I have 14 waivers that
the President granted. One for Serbia, Montenegro, Haiti,
Somalia, Jordan, the list goes on and on. And since last year I
wrote him, and again, we still don't have that equipment.
So what assurance do we have even if we go to a multi-year
that we can even get the equipment that's on the shelf or
already appropriated to these folks? And then I read today that
Myles Frechette says, ``Oops. I made a mistake. This is going
to the police. And we may not even have had to have some type
of consideration by the state to oppose this.'' It doesn't seem
like we've got our act together.
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, I think we're working the 614
authority. We have not yet deliver the helicopters. We think
we've got a shipping date on an American flag ship. We think we
will get them there in May or June. There are problems with in-
use monitoring agreements and human rights. We'll have to face
up to the Leahy amendment and try and deal with it. We are
still a Nation of laws, and we can't unilaterally direct these
things to happen. But I share your dismay. And, Mr.
Congressman, I will assure you it will get my attention. And we
will try and support the police and army of Colombia. They
deserve it.
Mr. Hastert. I thank the gentleman. We have a vote on. And
I know you have a time constraint, General. We will come back
in approximately 10 minutes and make sure that you're out of
here by the time that you have to be out of here. And I just
want to say thank you very much for your cooperation and
candidness today.
[Recess.]
Mr. Souder [presiding]. I'd like to call this hearing back
to order. Thank you for being patient as we go through these
voting processes. I have some additional questions, some of
which are variations of some earlier questions. But I want to
work through the record and talk. One is regarding Colombia.
And I understand during the period I was gone you had some
discussion about the helicopter assistance 614 Waiver.
But the particular concern we have--because we've had Gen.
Serrano here in front of us, here. When we were in Colombia
last year, we met with Gen. Serrano. While we have and share
your concerns about the head of Colombia, there's certainly no
question in his record that they've been fighting the drug war.
Many of their police have died. I don't believe there are any
human rights allegations against him. And our question is, why
are his helicopters being held up, since the allegations are
not against him?
Gen. McCaffrey. Mr. Chairman, I would probably be better
off providing you an update for the record. I'll go back and
check the specifics. The bottom line is we are committed to
supporting the police and the Army of Colombia. We're also
committed to following the restrictions of U.S. law, which
requires us to take into account these very legitimate concerns
about human rights, in-use monitoring agreements, and to ensure
that the support goes to the counter-drug fight and not to
counter-narcoguerrillas.
Now, having said that, there has been a continuing problem
to get the appropriate concurrence of Colombian authorities,
and to get the agreement of lawyers throughout the United
States Government that we satisfy these requirements. I think
we have finally--we're about to solve the problem. And I will
try and come back to you and give you an update on what
remaining difficulties there are.
Mr. Souder. Yes. As we talk with the leaders from the
different countries--when people are actually out there
fighting and dying as aggressively as Gen. Serrano. And I
understand that this has been a concern in multiple countries,
not just in Colombia, but in multiple countries as far as the
human rights question. But I don't believe--and my
understanding, unless you have something different for the
record, that the allegations aren't in the area or even the
concerns aren't in the area where the helicopters would be
going. In other words, there are some questions regarding the
Defense Department and concerns about the agreement. But you're
not saying there's any concerns about Gen. Serrano's human
rights record, are you?
Gen. McCaffrey. No. Not about him personally. I think
there's been human rights abuses on a massive scale throughout
the region. They've made a tremendous effort to improve them.
Serrano has fired hundreds of corrupt cops. But I think there
is a very deep concern on the part of our human rights
community about the police, the Army, the institutions of
justice. And I might add, a third of the country isn't under
the control of Colombian authorities anyway, it's under the
control of narcoguerrillas. So, we do have a problem. We're
going to have to face up to it.
Mr. Souder. We're concerned that this has been--it was
promised 8 weeks ago. I appreciate the update. I hope you'll
keep the pressure on the administration. Because I don't know
how we proposed the--I mean, we heard very explicitly what they
need the helicopters for. I don't know how we can continue to
encourage them and not help equip them when they're doing a lot
of our fighting, because we haven't reduced the demand here in
our country. And it's something that we're very concerned
about. I share human rights concerns. I have some question
about--and I think it's important for the record--you're not
saying Serrano, when allegations occur, isn't dealing with
those?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, I have----
Mr. Souder. You're saying he hasn't had any allegations,
but you said there were people in the national police. But his
record has been as aggressive.
Gen. McCaffrey. Sure.
Mr. Souder. We don't have any complaints against the
national police?
Gen. McCaffrey. None. None at all. As far as we know, we
have great respect for Gen. Serrano's leadership and integrity.
Mr. Souder. Our big concern--and I think this is important
to be communicated--is that he hasn't used his leverage for
some other battle. Because if they're going to him, and there's
no complaints against him, and we're trying to use our ability
to crack down on narcoterrorists and the drug people
indirectly, even though this has been promised multiple times,
it starts to undermine our credibility. And I think it's
important, since it's been promised multiple times, to move
this ahead and, if necessary, figure out several tracks here.
Because I don't believe the national police are under question.
If I can move to another area. Understanding that you're
going to get back to us. And I assume you've heard our grave
concerns from multiple members here. I wanted to move into the
question of the National Guard. At a strategy hearing we had in
February you testified that the excellent work that the
National Guard is doing to support our counter-drug efforts.
And we've had several hearings with the National Guard. And I
wholeheartedly agree that they've done an important work. And
that's why I'm concerned. Our committee is concerned about why
you had a $30 million decrease in funding for the National
Guard in the President's request. Can you explain why you would
want to cut funding for such an important part of our counter-
drug effort?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, I've had a conversation with
Secretary Cohen. I went over and saw him about that and other
matters in the defense area. And I think one of the principal
problems facing DOD is maintaining an adequate defense given a
very constrained budget. And in that constrained budget the
answer has been that the National Guard percentage essentially
remains unchanged: it's 23 percent of the total counter-drug
DOD percentage. And when you get into State plans, there was--
it's historically at 16 percent.
It's been higher. But that's about normal. The whole pie,
though, has gotten smaller. And so the Guard's State plan
efforts has been cut. It requires more funding in our judgment.
But I'd be hard pressed to have suggested to SECDEF that he
should cut other pieces of his counter-drug effort and provide
the money to these National Guard efforts. So I've asked him to
consider it and to come up with his own thinking. And we'll
have a further discussion of it. And I will get back and try
and resolve this concern. DOD's total funding is actually
pretty good. We're up at about $1.6 billion.
If you take out the supplemental you gave us last year of
$168.3 million it, in fact, is an increase. But I think the
National Guard does need more funds. We're going to attempt to
see how we can do it.
Mr. Souder. We're very concerned, because it impacts every
State, particularly a lot of the States along the border where
they're doing unique services and the cut is 30 percent, which
is a fairly significant cut. So, we'll continue to work with
you. But take this as that we're deeply concerned. I have some
additional questions, but I'll go to Mr. Barrett.
OK. Another--I know that you and the President are, in
general, working with Mexico and are visiting there soon. But I
wanted to ask you a series of questions not so much about what
you've necessarily done in this interim from the time we
certified Mexico. If you have anything in the interim you can
add this here but concerns that I hope you will address there
and can report back the progress on after your trip. One is
progress with Mexico and allowing DEA agents to carry firearms
while assisting Mexican counter-drug operations.
Second is obtaining assurances from Mexico that the
additional DEA agents that Congress appropriated can be
stationed in Mexico, what commitments they have made to root-
out the endemic corruption in their counter-drug efforts. The
good news is that they seem to be making efforts. The bad news
is that they're finding them in such high level places. But we
want to be kept posted on what they're doing to get rid of the
endemic corruption, not just the occasional. Have they made any
headway on the over 100 outstanding extradition requests
currently pending with Mexico?
I understand they say that they have extradition requests,
too. But there's a question of scale and potency of these
requests. And we want to hear what progress we're making.
What's the status of our efforts to get a permanent maritime
agreement with Mexico? So, those are among the questions that
we've raised in the House, that, hopefully, if you don't have
any additional updates on that now, which I would welcome you
to give if you do, that you can, once again, inform us upon
your return what progress you've made.
Gen. McCaffrey. I'd be glad to do just that, come back here
and update you.
Mr. Souder. OK. Another question is, in regarding
certification, in December 1996, in the State Department IG
report, Assistant Secretary Gelbard was quoted as saying,
``Since its inception in the mid-1980's the President's annual
certification process has emerged as one of the most powerful
tools in the conduct of our foreign drug control initiatives.''
Do you agree with this?
Gen. McCaffrey. I think it has been. You know, a lot of
good has come out of it. It has focused the energies of the
executive branch. The Secretary of State has the lead for this
process. It has, as the President of Bolivia just said in an
international conference on Monday, it's been a major factor in
driving drug money out of the electoral process in Latin
America. It has clearly galvanized many of us to even greater
efforts.
Now, having said that, the other side of the coin is--and
it really came over me in the Carter Center listening to nine
former or currently serving Heads of State of Latin America--it
has damaged the central notion that we can only confront the
drug issue in cooperation with international allies. It's
causing us a major difficulty. It's viewed as a direct
offensive interference in the internal sovereignty in another
nation. It allows the argument to come up--and it shouldn't
come up--between partners, who are you to talk, you whose money
and weapons drive this criminal process.
So I think there's been great damage. And I really have
welcomed the thinking of people like the Speaker, Newt
Gingrich, who was at this conference, and had some very
creative, forward-thinking words. Sen. Coverdell has really
pushed us to rethink the issue. We made need a higher order way
of multi-national cooperation, perhaps in addition to
certification, to try and remove this problem.
Mr. Souder. It's kind of an ironic position here that--a
minute ago when we were talking about releasing helicopters to
the national police of Colombia, which are being held up
because we can't agree on the exact language of some
relationships with their defense department, which is intense
micro-managing, there's an incongruity. That we have to decide
that when we're doing trade with countries, when we have opened
processes, that we have a right to say that we expect you to do
certain things, or the American taxpayers have a right to have
certain actions.
I, too, share a concern that that is sometimes taken as a
holier than thou position and sometimes looking down the nose
as ugly American. And I've tried to be careful with my rhetoric
in regards to Mexico, to be precise that we're fighting an evil
which is shared by many of the concerns in Mexico. But that
doesn't mean that I don't have a right to defend the taxpayers
of Indiana. And it also doesn't mean not just in the drug area,
but in the human rights area. And it also comes into most
favored nation status, that we don't have a right as America
without pronouncing--in other words, I'm not sure sometimes
we'd certify ourselves if you look at some of the areas.
In other words, in States where they're legalizing
marijuana, at least for not only medicinal purposes, we might
have some internal problems. But the fact is that we're facing
in the international area, some of these types of questions.
And I think it's important that we take a strong stand as our
country. And the review process has been working. So, I think
your statement was very effective at the beginning. And I hope
the latter part of that isn't taken that we should be backing
away. What we need to figure out is how to keep the partnership
going but still keep our flexibility here. With that, I yield
to Mr. Barrett from Wisconsin.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you. Gen. McCaffrey, GAO has recommended
that ONDCP develop an after-action reporting system top review
counter-drug operations after their completion, assessing their
strengths and weaknesses. The purpose is to learn lessons from
the past to plan more effective future operations. Do you agree
with the GAO's recommendation?
Gen. McCaffrey. I think I do. Let me say that, when I do,
that I have been watching this process at work in the
Department of Defense for 30-some-odd years. And I would be--if
we do that, we need to ensure that we don't spend a ton of
money to develop an automated system that produces reams of
unexamined data in the years to come. So I think ONDCP should,
indeed, be a center for institutional memory of what works and
doesn't work.
But I'm more inclined to say that we need to go to
performance measures of effectiveness to get targets to measure
outcomes and to be able to show you dollars in, results out.
And, oh, by the way, to learn from it. Because some of these
programs aren't going to work and others are going to work
spectacularly. I noticed the GAO report had cited the CALL
system--Center for Army Lessons Learned. And, you know, we've
done a lot of work on that. We just have to be cautious that we
don't build another giant data base that doesn't influence real
people like Tom Constantine, Director Freeh and others.
Mr. Barrett. OK. Earlier this week I think you issued a
statement on the sentencing guidelines and the treatment of
crack cocaine versus powder cocaine. Can you capsule that for
us and give us your reasoning for you thoughts on that issue?
Gen. McCaffrey. I think the mandatory minimum sentences and
the sentencing commission have been concerned that--there was
some very good rational thought that went into this in the
beginning. There was a concern that crack was more rapidly
addictive than powdered cocaine--that tends to be the truth--
that crack was more closely associated with violence, with
child abuse, with domestic abuse in general--I think that
tended to be the case--and because, to deter those crimes, we
needed a much lower threshold for possession of crack or sales.
So we rolled into that.
But I think over time what's happened is we've developed an
institutional problem. One of them is we've ended up with an
African-American population of 11 percent of America. Thirty-
three percent of the arrests for drug related offenses were
African-American. And 48 percent of the people in prison were
African-American. So we ended up with the appearance of racism
in our judicial system. I don't think that was there. But I
think the outcome has caused serious American concern. Now, the
second thing that came out of that was when I listened to the
people in the corrections system, who are locking up 1.6
million Americans, a figure that's growing enormously, they say
that these floors and the mandatory minimums weren't
necessarily helping solve the drug problem, a position that I
largely agree with.
You've got to have drug courts, punishment and treatment in
some sync, rather than just telling young men, this offense is
7 years, that one is 15 years. That isn't what actually affects
behavior of young people doing crimes. I think the sentencing
commission has rethought it. I welcome their initiatives. The
Attorney General and I have been ordered by the President to
examine their findings. And I hope we can end up with a perhaps
more helpful and better received policy in the country.
Mr. Barrett. As you know, when Congress considered this
issue last session, the recommendation was to equalize the
treatment, and to equalize it by lowering the penalties for
crack cocaine. And that was defeated by Congress. And
ultimately the sentencing commission recommendations were
signed into law by the President. What advice do you have to
us--again, the perception, I think, among some politicians, at
least, is if you do anything at all to even minimally lower the
penalties for crack cocaine, that you're sending the wrong
message. As the drug czar in this country, what is your
response to that?
Gen. McCaffrey. I think that--look, at the end of the day 5
years from today, I would hope that we're going to continue to
have less crack cocaine and powder cocaine abuse in America.
The prevention program has been working for 10-15 years. New
initiation of cocaine use has come down 60 percent in 10 years.
But a lot of that is because people see the wreckage of human
life when addicted to crack. African-Americans are using less
crack than caucasians because there has been more visibility on
the devastating impact of it.
If you watch crack sales in one of these big cities at 8
p.m., in many cases it's an African-American male selling to
people out of the suburbs. Now, the bottom line is, I think
we've got to remember what our purpose is: it's to reduce drug
abuse and drug sales and not to put people in prison. We need
drug treatment combined with the threat of incarceration. We've
got too many people in prison. It's not helping the drug effort
at all. That's my own viewpoint.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you. I yield back my time.
Mr. Souder. My friend Mr. Barr from Georgia.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's my understanding,
General, that just within the last few days, I think--and I'd
just like to ask you to clarify this--it's my understanding
that a new extradition bill or a piece of legislation or
constitutional provision was drafted and presented to the
General Assembly down in Colombia. Could you tell me exactly
what that was and what the status of it is?
Gen. McCaffrey. Mr. Congressman, I'll have to give you an
answer in writing. I've been following the extradition issue in
Colombia for 5 years now. It is not clear to me--our internal
Government viewpoint is that it's not yet likely that it's
going to pass. And we're pushing them pretty hard on it. We
think, in accordance with international law with the 1988 U.N.
convention, that it ought to pass, that civilized nations ought
to have extradition so that offenses committed against another
country can be punished in that country. I don't know how this
is going to come out. I simply can't tell you. And I'd rather
go back and review the evidence on it.
Mr. Barr. I'd appreciate it. And it doesn't have to be
anything formal. Just have somebody give me a call. Because it
sounds to me like at least it's some movement in the right
direction.
Gen. McCaffrey. The only thing that gives me pause for
thought is, there are two things these international criminals
fear. The biggest one is extradition. And the other one is
asset forfeiture. So, the notion of being hauled out of
Colombia and made to stand trial and imprisoned in the United
States is one that they are adamantly against. And that's why
the threat of violence and corruption on democratic
institutions on that issue has been so extraordinary. I hope
they do it. It's the right thing to do in accordance with
international law. And that's what we're pushing them to do.
Mr. Barr. OK. Well, if you or somebody from your office
could get back to me and clarify that I'd appreciate it. Let me
return to the issue of the legalization of marijuana. I don't
need to recite all the terms or the definition of a schedule 1
substance other than to make clear for the record for purpose
of our discussion here, that a schedule 1 substance is a
substance which ``has no currently acceptable medical use and
treatment in the United States.'' And there are, of course,
other criteria as well.
I do have a very serious concern about any effort on the
part of our Government given the fact that, as I understand it,
we still do consider marijuana a schedule 1 substance. And,
therefore, I have to believe that this administration continues
to believe firmly and has the basis on which to back it up that
marijuana, as a schedule 1 substance, meets the criteria in 21
U.S.C. 812 1A, B and C. That being the case, why would we want
to study whether or not it has therapeutic uses, which is the
work that's used in your drug strategy, which is a strange
word.
I'm not quite sure what that means. The schedule 1, as the
other schedule substances talk in terms of medical usage, not
therapeutic usage. Therapeutic is a very, very, I think, vague
word that is applied to many other sorts of procedures other
than medical procedures. And it worries me that the
administration is considering some sort of effort possibly to
allow the usage of marijuana if it, quote--and this is a quote
from page 59 of your drug strategy--if it ``could have
therapeutic uses.'' Could you clarify this anymore than in
previous discussions we've had? Because it really, particularly
in light of the court decision that my colleague from Florida
referred to earlier today, is a serious concern. Because I
think this type of language is directly undermining our effort
to continue to hold the line against marijuana usage.
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, Mr. Congressman, I absolutely share
your concern. And I won't recite the list of major medical
organizations. But literally all serious professional medical
organizations in this country support the viewpoint that the
National Institute of Health and the FDA, using a scientific
process, should be the manner, the protocol by which we deem
medicines safe and effective. And marijuana, smoked marijuana,
is still a schedule 1 drug believed to have no known medical
benefit and poses great harm. That's the viewpoint based on the
evidence generated by decades of research.
Mr. Barr. But why then--and I don't mean to cut you off--I
certainly want you to finish your train of thought--but why
then would we waste 1 penny, much less $1 million that we could
be using, I think, much more effectively in some of your other
programs, to study this issue, if that is, in fact, the
position which is firmly backed up, as I believe it is, by the
medical community and the medical experts in our Government?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, let me just go on to suggest that
smoked marijuana was studied intensively in the 1980's. And out
of that came the viewpoint that one component of the 435-some-
odd components--THC--did potentially have medical benefit. It
was made available for 15 years. It's been in pharmacies,
suspended in an oil called marinol. There are problems with it.
It isn't used much at all. In 1997, it's hard to imagine
prescribing THC for management of pain or for that matter
nausea. There are two other drugs that work far better.
Now, having said that, however, it's hard to disprove a
negative. There may be other compounds in smoked marijuana that
do have benefits. And the door ought to be open to scientific
inquiry to determine that. That's why we--the $1 million was to
review existing scientific literature that----
Mr. Barr. But why do we need to, I mean, with all of the
things out there that we could be doing?
Gen. McCaffrey. Because two States--well, let me answer the
question. Two States voted to do just that. And we have
enormous pressure, some of it by drug-legalizing forces, others
by legitimate communities, to have us look at this question.
And, so, I think, from a scientific viewpoint, we should not be
threatened by the examination of claims. And the $1 million was
review the existing literature and make sure we know what we're
talking about. Then the NIH will conduct serious inquiry,
narrowly focused, on whether there actually is medical benefit
from smoked pot.
Mr. Barr. Where did this term ``therapeutic'' come from and
what does it mean? Because when you use the term ``medical,''
to me that is--as used in the statute, also--a very specific,
precise term. Why did you switch over to the use of a much
different term in the drug control strategy, this term
therapeutic?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, I think the whole notion was, is it
the case medically that smoked pot, that we know to be a
carcinogenic, intoxicating substance, does it actually have
benefit for the relief of AIDS nausea, chemotherapy, pain
management, glaucoma, et cetera. That's the notion in which
therapeutic was implied.
Mr. Barr. But are we going to start applying--see, this is
the slippery slope and the open door problem here. Do we then
start talking in terms of this broader concept of therapeutic
uses for other drugs as well? I mean, somebody else comes in
and claims that some other controlled substance other than
marijuana and THC has therapeutic uses--and I suppose it does.
It makes some people feel better. That's a therapeutic use.
Don't you see the danger of starting to change very subtly
here, by the use of terminology, what we're trying to do here?
Gen. McCaffrey. Yes.
Mr. Barr. And don't you see the slippery slope?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, I hear your concerns. Let me take
that into account. It's certainly not my intention to do
anything but say we have a scientific medical process. We have
the best medicine on the face of the earth. We got there by not
allowing laetrile, thalidomide or smoked marijuana to end up as
medicines. But if these substances can demonstrate a legitimate
scientific benefit, then, of course, the door would be open.
Mr. Barr. But nobody has done that yet, have they?
Gen. McCaffrey. Done----
Mr. Barr. Exhibited that?
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, it's been tested.
Mr. Barr. Provided that scientific evidence.
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, no. It was tested. And out of it came
the determination that THC did have medical benefit out of that
process----
Mr. Barr. But that predates the inclusion in the controlled
substances list, doesn't it? That was done quite some time ago.
Gen. McCaffrey. Well----
Mr. Barr. It may not predate a--I mean, you're talking
about something that done a long time ago.
Mr. Barrett. Mr. Chairman, regular order.
Gen. McCaffrey. Well, no. I think there's been continuing
investigators, and there are still attempts to study the
potential benefit of medical marijuana. That's why we have a
genuine issue. I wouldn't, Mr. Barr, negate the fact that there
is an issue at stake here to be confronted. My viewpoint has
been the easiest way to do this is to use science to determine
the outcome. You know, I don't think we're going to sign up for
thalidomide.
Mr. Barr. But shouldn't----
Mr. Barrett. Mr. Chairman, regular order.
Mr. Barr. To be consistent that----
Mr. Barrett. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Barr. That we have made that determination and that
that is----
Mr. Barrett. Mr. Chairman, regular order, please. We are
well beyond the 5 minutes.
Mr. Barr [continuing]. In the tradition of the Government.
Mr. Barrett. Mr. Chairman, would you please rule on my
statement?
Mr. Souder. Let him finish this last question. But what I
would ask of Gen. McCaffrey, if you'll be willing to come back
in June. Partly, we can followup on Mexico. But to pursue some
of these kinds of questions which I know you're concerned
about, too. I think this is actually an important sub-part
inside the report that we're dealing with. But I know we also
made a commitment to get you out of here at 1:30 p.m.
Gen. McCaffrey. I'd be delighted to return.
Mr. Barr. OK. And that last question was, that shouldn't
the position of our Government, if it truly is that we are, in
your words, unalterably opposed to the legalization of
marijuana, shouldn't the position of the administration be very
clearly enunciated that we have made the determination that it
should continue to be a schedule 1 substance with no legitimate
medical use? Why should we fuzz that up?
Gen. McCaffrey. Now, the legalization of marijuana, I would
suggest, is a different question than whether it has medical
benefits. Methamphetamine, the amphetamine family, are schedule
2 drugs. They have medical benefit. Cocaine is used for eye
surgery, cocaine products. So, there's no where that the door
is completely open to any chemical substance that might benefit
American doctors. So far, smoked pot doesn't fall in that
category. One of its components does--THC. And we'd certainly
be glad to examine the validity of that assertion, in response
to what has been a pretty strong demonstration of interest
along those lines.
Mr. Souder. I thank the gentleman from Georgia. And I want
to thank Gen. McCaffrey for spending so much time with us
today. We wish you the best in coming back with direct progress
from Mexico and also in your work in prevention and treatment
areas. And thank you again. We'll look forward to continuing to
work with you.
Gen. McCaffrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. With that I would like to welcome our next
panel. And now I would like to introduce Mr. Norm Rabkin. Mr.
Rabkin is the Director of Administration of Justice Issues at
the General Accounting Office. Rabkin, is that the correct way
to say your name?
Mr. Rabkin. That's fine. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Souder. OK. If you'd please stand and raise your right
hand, I'll swear you in.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Souder. Let the record show that the witness has
responded in the affirmative. And Mr. Rabkin, if you could
introduce Mr. Ford and Ms. Lillie-Blanton for the record so
that we have that--all three of you were sworn in and took the
oath, responded in the affirmative. But I didn't get the names
before I did that.
Mr. Rabkin. Certainly. I'm pleased to be here today to
discuss the General Accounting Office's views on the
reauthorization of ONDCP. And with me are Jess Ford, who is
responsible for GAO's work on international drug control
issues, and Marsha Lillie-Blanton, who is responsible for GAO's
work on drug abuse, prevention and treatment.
Mr. Souder. Thank you very much. And I look forward to
hearing your testimony.
STATEMENT OF NORMAN RABKIN, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JESS FORD,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AND MARSHA LILLIE-BLANTON, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Rabkin. I have a prepared statement. If it could be put
in the record. I have a very short summary that I'd like to
offer.
Mr. Souder. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Rabkin. Thank you. Over the years, Mr. Chairman, the
GAO has issued numerous reports on the Nation's drug control
efforts. These reports show a consistent theme: the Nation's
effort to control illegal drugs is complex, fragmented among
many agencies, and hindered by the absence of meaningful
performance measures for gauging the progress and guiding
decisionmaking to better ensure that resources are used
effectively.
In 1983, GAO concluded that there was a need to coordinate
the Nation's drug control efforts, and recommended that the
President delegate the responsibility to one individual to
strengthen oversight of Federal drug enforcement programs.
Since then GAO has periodically concluded that there is a
continuing need for a central planning agency. Congress
addressed this issue through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
which created the ONDCP to better plan a Nation-wide drug
control effort and assist Congress in overseeing that effort.
ONDCP was initially authorized through November 1993 and
later reauthorized through September 30 of this year. Since the
last reauthorization of ONDCP, GAO has issued many reports on
various aspects of the drug control effort. Most recently we
summarized our work on international supply reduction efforts,
most of which has been done for this subcommittee. We concluded
that these efforts have not reduced the availability of drugs
for several reasons, including sophisticated drug trafficking
organizations, competing U.S. foreign policy objectives and
inadequate assistance from governments of drug producing and
transit countries.
We also summarized some promising initial research results
in the area of demand reduction. For example, recent research
points to two types of promising drug prevention approaches for
school age youth and three approaches for treating cocaine use.
However, we also found that sufficient valuative research had
not been done to test their effectiveness and applicability
among different populations in different settings.
Our work also shows that the Nation still lacks meaningful
performance measures to help guide decisionmaking for the drug
control effort. We have acknowledged that performance
measurement in the area of drug control is particularly
difficult for a variety of reasons. Notwithstanding, we have
concluded over the years that better performance measures than
the ones in place were needed. In 1993, we recommended that
Congress, as part of its reauthorization of ONDCP, direct the
agency to develop additional performance measures.
In reauthorizing ONDCP in 1994, Congress specified that
ONDCP's performance measurement system should assess changes in
drug use, drug availability, the consequences of drug use, drug
treatment capacity, and the adequacy of drug treatment systems.
ONDCP's initial effort began around January 1994 with a private
contractor, but did not prove fruitful. In the summer of 1996,
it began a new effort involving working groups composed of
representatives from Federal drug control agencies and State,
local and private organizations. The working groups have been
tasked with establishing performance measures for the goals set
forth in the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy articulated by
ONDCP.
As yet, however, no new measures have been approved by the
ONDCP director. Given the complexity of the issues and the
fragmentation of the approach to the National Drug Control
Strategy among more than 50 Federal agencies, we continue to
believe that there is a need for a central planning agency such
as ONDCP to coordinate the Nation's efforts.
We note that while it is difficult to gauge ONDCP'
effectiveness in the absence of good performance measures, we
have found no compelling evidence that would lead us to advise
against ONDCP's reauthorization for a finite period of time.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. And my colleagues
and I would be pleased to answer your questions at this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rabkin follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much for your testimony. There's
a couple different ways to approach this. First, let me ask you
some kind of fundamental questions. You raised the performance
standard question, alluded to the fact that you believe that
they're working with it. Do you believe they've carried out the
provisions at ONDCP regarding its performance measurement?
Mr. Rabkin. Well, they're not there yet. I think they're
making a very good faith effort. We've been briefed on the
status, what they're doing, and where they are. And I think
that they're on the right track by involving the agencies that
are going to be charged with carrying out the strategy, getting
them involved at the working level and at a policy. I think
that they're on the right track.
Mr. Souder. One of the most difficult things in measurement
is, in business terms we call them opportunity costs. Here it's
kind of the reverse. In other words, you said, for example, in
international narcotics, because of the sophistication of the
organizations, it's not clear that we've actually reduced. How
do we know what it would have been?
Mr. Rabkin. Well, we really don't know what the problem
would have been without the efforts that were there. And I
think the concept of a measurement system is to measure the
results that are achieved with the resources that are invested.
And as I understand it, it doesn't focus on what you call
opportunity costs.
Mr. Souder. Because one of the fundamental questions that
we get into in this whole area and in other committees that I'm
in--in education, for example, these things are difficult too--
that if you hold somebody just accountable for--let me relate
to something I know. I was in furniture retailing. If you set a
sales goal for somebody and say, ``This is what we expect you
to reach,'' and don't have an additional measure for saying,
unless of course there's a recession--in other words, it may be
a percentage of total--or have some adjustment--part of the
problem here is, is that by definition if cocaine is seized,
it's not on the market.
So it may be relative improvement that we're measuring, for
one thing. But then if the coca production is higher, then it
may be that we've made progress--part of what I sense here, and
in the immigration question, quite frankly, as I was down along
the California border looking at the drug and immigration
question--is that since we have no idea exactly how much drugs
are coming in and no idea how many illegal immigrants are
coming in, it becomes very difficult to measure the performance
standards other than the few things that are out there.
So, another way to ask my question then is, do you believe
that the performance standards which we're trying to measure by
are accounting for the different variables? And if not, what
would you change?
Mr. Rabkin. In a large sense I think that they may be. In
fact, I think that they can be. The performance standards will
be--the program will be measures at different levels. There
will be an overall, I think--an overall standard. And the ONDCP
says, the overall mission is to reduce drug use. And I think
you can look at that measure and see whether all the individual
components of the strategy are having an effect when looked at
as a whole. You can also break that down by goal. You can break
it down by objectives within the goals. And you can find, for
example, the agencies that are responsible for interdicting
cocaine: the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the other
agencies that have that mission.
What are their individual performance goals? What results
are they expected to achieve to help to contribute to the
overall goal. And you can measure. The Congress, ONDCP as the
overseer, the agencies themselves can measure their progress
against the goals, taking into account the resources they were
given to meet those goals. And that's where I think the 5 year
planning, the 5 year budget comes, because the assumption is
that the agencies will have the resources, will have a given
level of resources to achieve these results.
If they get fewer resources, then I think it's appropriate
to ask the question, well, what results will we get with those
fewer resources, and then hold them accountable for that. And
then there are other external factors. You cited a recession in
the furniture business. There are other external factors,
changes in economic conditions in source countries, changes in
culture, that may affect the operations. And those should also
be taken into account.
Mr. Souder. One of my frustrations, having first come to
Washington as a Republican staff director on the Children and
Family Committee, is that the social issues, we really didn't
have much accountability standards for what we were spending.
With law enforcement--there's a little bit more. I am a strong
advocate of performance standards, because I believe at least
it starts the bait and shows you what the exceptions are. But I
also think it's important to keep in mind that those constantly
need to be revised and worked on--and we need your help in
advising on those.
Let me give you one other personal illustration. I used to
jokingly do this in then Congressman Coats' district staff, as
economic development liaison, my job was to help get industries
in. And we didn't argue whether or not it was part of the
Federal Government's role. What we were doing is drowning in
northeast Indiana, last one out, please turn out the lights
after a harvester pulled out. When I took the position with
Coats the unemployment rate--I can't remember what it was--but
it was near 15 percent. When I left it had dropped to about 5.
In the 2 years after that it went back up to 7.
Hey, I did a great job, except GM came and put a plant in,
really, with--pretty irrelevant to what I was doing. But the
performance standard for my job, had it been, he lowered the
unemployment rate, I'd have looked really good. But it really
had little to do--I won't take no credit--but it had little to
do with what I was doing. And I think one of things that we
need to try to do--because all of us, as we're tightening our
budget, need to know where are we getting the most bang for the
buck--but we also need to know what those conditions are.
And, in fact, if we had a process--say, OK, now explain,
not excuse, not whine, but explain the variations and how do we
tighten this the next time. That's what the real world out in
the private sector has to do or you go broke. Do you see that
in this area, being able to evolve some--like you said, the
sophistication of the trafficking, the unlimited borders along
Mexico, both in water and land? How are we going to do the
international trafficking? Also, I'm on the oversight
subcommittee on treatment and education programs, the only
things out there are like D.A.R.E., where we have studies.
And it seems like often in prevention programs, they are
very effective if you measure short term in third and fourth
and fifth grade when the kids aren't very tempted. The question
is, what happens when it hits junior high. Any additional
insights on the performance standards related to any of these
categories given how nebulous, how many influences are on the
process?
Mr. Rabkin. Well, I'd like to make an overall comment and
then perhaps some of my colleagues can answer some of the
specific issues that you raised. I don't want to leave you with
the impression that this is an easy process. Developing the
performance measures themselves is difficult and yet it may be
the easiest part of the process. A lot of the evaluation that's
going to take place is going to depend on the quality of the
data. You suggested that no one knows how much cocaine is
coming into the country or is being shipped to the United
States.
Well, it's important to know that if one of the measures is
going to be the success of the interdictors in stopping it
coming in. It's easy to find out what you stop. It's hard to
know what you missed. And yet many of the measures that are
being developed relate to the percentage of the goods that are
coming in that are actually interdicted. So you need to know
that denominator. So that's very difficult.
And if you do get good data, the analysis of the data and
the assignment of these outcomes of the specific inputs is
going to be extremely difficult. You know, is it really the
efforts of the Customs Service at the border or is it really
the efforts of DEA in some foreign countries, or is it really
the efforts of the local law enforcement or is it really the
efforts of the parents and the teachers that has caused it.
That's going to be a very difficult evaluation to make. So I
think that we're really just at the start of this whole
process. And if you'd have comments on international or the
treatment side?
Mr. Souder. Have Mr. Ford or Ms. Lillie-Blanton?
Mr. Ford. Yes. Let me comment on the international side,
which is the area that I deal with. And I want to concur with
Mr. Rabkin's comments. I don't think there's an easy answer
coming up with measurable indicators that everyone is going to
commonly agree to. But I think if you look at our efforts over
the last 10 years, say, in the international side, all too
often we've found cases where we have planned efforts either in
a country or in a region or by agency and they don't seem to be
well integrated. And what you cite as success of reduction in
cultivation in one country there's an increase in another, so
the net effect is that there's a net increase.
I think it's important--and this is why we support what
ONDCP is trying to do--that we develop measures that generally
we all agree to, but we have to have some flexibility. From
your perspective you want to know where to make the right
investment in terms of where to put the resources. And I think
you have to have good data and some analysis of what the
results are in order to make the best judgment instead of
looking at it in a piecemeal fashion. I think that's why we
support what ONDCP is trying to do, particularly on the
international side. Because it leads to a more coherent
approach to what we're trying to achieve there.
Ms. Lillie-Blanton. I just want to respond briefly to your
concerns about prevention. Because I fully agree that the
problem of looking at all the intervening variables is very,
very difficult. But on the treatment side, we made an
investment on research and evaluation. I mean, we have several
longitudinal studies over a 10-year period of time. We have
several multi-site evaluations that looked at 5 to 10,000 drug
users in treatment. And we now have in place another 7-year
study that's looking over time at defined performance measures
that have been set up in treatment. In the prevention arena we
are nowhere close to where we have come in treatment.
And so I would say that setting those performance targets
and developing the measures is the first that we need to do to
get us to the point where we're not just looking at D.A.R.E. or
just looking at the Midwestern Prevention Project. We have a
few models. But we need to test out and evaluate those models
in a larger context and, certainly, as you have said, over a
longer time period. Because the intervening variables over the
course of time is really what can effect the outcomes that we
evaluate in a short time period.
Mr. Souder. One of the things in prevention--some things
are more easily measurable directly than other things. For
example, I know in Fort Wayne where they put the drug dogs in,
the first year they found some, the second and third year they
found none. That doesn't mean all of a sudden marijuana
disappeared. But it wasn't at the school. Also we know that
schools that put drug testing programs in for certain targeting
things like athletes, which started probably 9 years ago in a
case with McCutcheon High School in Indiana, all of sudden it
disappeared during the period of time at least they were in
athletics.
So there are some measurement things that are easier to
measure, some that are harder. And even that only gives us
short-term. I want to move to some other types of categories.
But Mr. Barr said he had to leave. He said he appreciated your
work, wants to stay posted on this type of thing as we look at
performance standards and how we're doing the budget, and
apologize that he didn't get his questioning in.
You mentioned, Mr. Rabkin, about the 5 year plan. The
administration is--and you're supportive of long-term. The
administration has been looking at a strategy for 10 years. Do
you think that's the most effective way given the fact that
we're struggling even to get the five?
Mr. Rabkin. I think there's value in a long-term strategy.
I think it's good for an issue like drug control for the
Government, for a coordinated effort with 50 different
departments at the Federal level, not even to mention what's
going on at the State and local and in the private sector, to
have these targets set out there so you know where you are
today--hopefully you have a baseline--and you know where you
want to go. And I think it's important that you measure all
along the way to see if you're still on the same path, the
right path. And I think ONDCP's plan calls for that. I mean,
obviously there will be annual plans that will be up before the
Congress every year in sessions like this.
The 50 agencies that are involved in the plan will be up
before their authorizing and appropriations committees
justifying their requests for that money and explaining what
they are doing and what they have achieved and how their
results fit in to this overall plan. I think there's plenty of
opportunity for oversight. But it to me is a good move to have
the target out there. It seems to me the strategy that has
developed has evolved over time. You know, they were authorized
in 1988-1989, and the first strategy came out shortly
thereafter.
It sort of wavered. It seems to have settled in now. There
seems to be some consistency over the last couple of years in
the overall strategy. Now it's time to move on to the issue of
measurement and evaluation. So, I think the 10-year strategy is
a good idea.
Mr. Souder. You're raising some very difficult questions.
Because if, indeed, we lack data on what's effective in so many
different categories, it becomes a little presumptuous to plan
too far given the fact that we're trying to up that research.
And let me ask you a question, in working with Government
agencies, if there's a plan out there, do you think the
research and the monitoring tends to try to justify the
behavior or do you think it's open minded research?
And isn't one of the natures of bureaucracy to try to
justify its behavior? That's one of the dangers of having a
plan where you start to try to justify what you're doing. In
other words, stability is important for performance. On the
other hand, when you get stability, it means you have
entrenched bureaucracies trying to explain their behavior as
opposed to trying to figure out how best to tackle the problem.
Mr. Rabkin. I think the theory here is not to focus on the
behavior but rather to focus on the outcomes. And as long as
the oversight focus is on outcomes and the agencies are held
accountable, whatever behavior they exhibit to get to those
outcomes--I mean, they would have planned it along the way and
laid it out--but the focus should be on the outcomes. Are we
reducing drug use and the illegal use of drugs and the
consequences of that drug use? I mean, that's the overall
mission of ONDCP. It's the overall mission of the drug control
effort in the Federal Government. So I think as long as the
focus is on outcomes. I think that's the theory behind the
Government Performance and Results Act: hold the agencies
accountable for outcomes rather than activities.
Mr. Souder. Right. Which is definitely what it should be.
The figures lie and liars figure, however, still is there. We
all know how statistics can be used. The Office of Management
and Budget only accepted one third of the critical anti-drug
interdiction effort proposed by the Coast Guard. Why would you
or the President keep interdiction funding so low? In other
words, do you feel there's any--what's your reaction to the
funding level on interdiction? Should we up that?
Mr. Rabkin. I'm not in a position to--the General
Accounting Office is not in a position to suggest what the
funding level should be for interdiction. ONDCP's role is to
consider the missions of all the agencies that are involved in
the interdiction function and to make that recommendation from
a broader perspective. And I think there are results that can
be gained through the investment of additional resources. The
Coast Guard ran an operation called Frontier Shield last year
or earlier this year, where they put additional resources in
the Caribbean.
It produced activities. There were more seizures. You know,
there were more cutters out for more hours looking at more--
interdicting more ships, making more boardings, more seizures.
And that resulted in less drugs getting into the country. But
one of the things from a broader perspective, we've found, that
when there are successes in one area of the country, that the
sophisticated drug trafficking organizations move to where the
resistance is less. And so it's important to look at this issue
from a broader perspective. So increased funding for the Coast
Guard may achieve certain results in certain areas, but you
want to make sure--and that's where ONDCP plays a pivotal role,
is looking at this in a much broader context, that the overall
goals of interdiction and the overall goals of the drug
strategy are being met.
Mr. Souder. Have you seen in performance review--one thing
we heard at least informally when we were in Bolivia and Peru
was that because of price pressures, partly because we were in
fact forcing--in other words, that coming through Florida
initially was the cheapest or they wouldn't have been coming in
through Florida. As we move them to more complicated
procedures, or as Peru moves them--instead of flying an
airplane they have to go around the water route--as we tighten
that, that affects their costs. So that either drives the price
up in the United States or what they pay at the wholesale
level.
And one of things that we were hearing was, for example--
AID was saying--for the first time people were saying, well,
what about planting bananas? Because have you looked at that in
part of the performance monitoring in the international either
Mr. Rabkin--in the source countries--or Mr. Ford?
Mr. Ford. First of all, we haven't done any recent work in
Peru. What you're referring to is that outcome of an air
operation that we've had there since 1995--it's an ongoing
effort--that did have apparently some impact on the prices at
the local level there which caused a number of the local
farmers to say, hey, I'm not making enough money, I want to do
something else. I think the issue here is we want to talk about
sustainment of effort. And the fact that there appears to be
some evidence that the traffickers are now, in fact, going
around.
Now, how much that costs them in addition and how that
impacts on street prices, at this point I can't comment on
that. I haven't looked at the most recent data. But I think the
most important point here is that while that effort appears to
have been successful, you need to talk in terms of sustainment
and you need to talk about how you're going to react to it.
Because they always react to our operations. We tend to have
success over some period of time and then the traffickers find
ways around it.
And I think that there's some--I just recently came back
from Panama and talked to SouthCOM, and they're talking a more
regional perspective at looking at that issue and trying to
come up with a more sustained approach. I think that from
ONDCP's point of view, they need to make sure that their
interdiction strategy takes into consideration the entire
region, not just what's going on in one country or country by
country piecemeal. It needs to be all integrated together.
Because otherwise you're not going to be able to really get
to the bottom line of what the impact is. It's all going to be
short-term.
Mr. Souder. Well, the change in the flow into Florida has
substantially--in other words, I agree that it moves.
Mr. Ford. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Souder. And it would be very difficult without having a
lot of information we don't have to know what their cost
changes are internally. But presumably even if you don't stop
it, as you make it more complicated--some of these patterns
have changed long-term. Now if we back down we start to see it
go back to the previous area. But there's some--as I understand
what you're saying--is that there's not really that type of
performance review, partly because it would be very difficult
to get the data. But the fact that they've had an 18 percent
decrease in the amount being produced in the countries where it
comes from, or that they have to clearly expend more, we know
intuitively that that's made a change. We just don't know how
much. Is that not correct?
Mr. Ford. Yes. I think that is correct. And I think that's
important, though, because if you're going to advocate spending
more resources on a particular operation, you want to--I would
want to have a little more data on what the likely outcome of
that is going to be, particularly if things seemed to have
changed. And they're now analyzing that as we speak. They're
now trying to figure out where the bad guys are now going and
where do we need to put the effort.
Mr. Souder. Now, one of the problems that we have is that--
we started in this discussion saying we have very little hard
core evidence to grab onto, in particular, and what we have
here is that we know that the Coast Guard accomplished its
particular thing. We know that certain eradication programs are
accomplishing certain things. We know that the shoot down
policy in Peru accomplished certain things.
We know that the drug dogs accomplished certain things. We
know that drug testing accomplished certain things. Many things
where the funding proposals are actually going have less
evidence then even that. It isn't that any of them seem to be.
It's not that we shouldn't be looking at comprehensive--any
evidence we get from anywhere given the totality of the problem
and the inter-related variables, it's always going to be
inconclusive, because it's a problem that will never really go
away.
It's a matter of reducing the supply, upping the costs,
trying to do some prevention treatment. It's not likely that
we're ever going to totally get rid of the problem. So it
becomes a little different performance standard than a zero
tolerance.
Mr. Rabkin. Yes. I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think that that's
behind the strategy and the measurement system. The goal that
they set--and I expect that they will be presenting that
information to the Congress some time late summer or early
fall, that the goal will not be a zero goal, but it will be a
certain reduction over a given period of time, and will
probably have some incremental targets along the way. But I
think there will be these interim measures and it will be
something--that each of these different factions will have
measures and targets and can be held accountable to those.
Mr. Souder. Have you been involved at all in the
comprehensive overview and review by ONDCP of their counter-
intelligence efforts? Because we've heard a lot--we're very
concerned about what happened in Mexico. It took us ablind.
Have you looked at any of that?
Mr. Rabkin. No. We have not looked recently at that. In the
past we have looked at the drug intelligence structure in the
Federal Government. This was 4 or 5 years ago. And we are
working with committee staff on doing more work for the
committee this year.
Mr. Souder. ONDCP hasn't contacted you or you haven't done
or had any direct relationship with them on the counter-drug
intelligence?
Mr. Rabkin. No, we have not. But we will--on this work for
the committee, we will be working with ONDCP.
Mr. Souder. What about--apparently ONDCP has indicated that
it is still studying the feasibility of implementing a lessons
learned data base. What's your reaction to that?
Mr. Rabkin. I'll let Mr. Ford answer that.
Mr. Ford. Yes. Again, that was a recommendation in the
report we did for the committee in February. And I want to
preface my remarks. This dealt primarily with the international
side of the drug war, not the entire operation. But basically
our recommendation is geared toward a problem that we found
over the years and the work we've done. And that has to do with
the continuity of effort. What happens is that we run
operations. We run people in and out. They're rotated out of
their assignment. They move on to other assignments.
And a lot of the good information that we've learned from
previous efforts sometimes gets lost or we actually have the
data but it's not put in a place where people can touch on it
so when they plan their reference in the future they have a
good idea of what's happened. Our recommendation that we put in
our report was geared toward having ONDCP develop a way of
capturing that centralized information so that the continuity
problem wouldn't resurface on various operations. We did not
intend, necessarily, to develop an expensive data information
system.
We basically wanted them to be a repository, central local
point, for planners to go to get information on how to plan
operations using some historical experience that we've had. And
that's what the intent of the recommendation was when we put it
into the report.
Mr. Souder. One gentleman I worked with years ago from the
city of Miami School System, Dade County, as they were putting
in the pioneer areas in school-based management, said that
often nobody wants to do analysis because they're afraid that
somehow somebody will get retribution, and lessons learned is a
kind of a scary--it's like, what works, what doesn't and why.
People are willing to say what works because then they might
get more money. They aren't necessarily willing to share what
didn't work.
And often you can learn more as a baseball player as why
you struck out than how you got the hit. You need to study both
parts of that. And I think a lessons learned repository would
be helpful, not only for national, but, like you say, for
around the country. You said--there was a quote, if I
understand this, you have found no compelling evidence to lead
us to advise against ONDCP's reauthorization. It doesn't sound,
on the other hand, like you thought that it's been the central
planning agency that you envisioned in your original.
In other words, I think Gen. McCaffrey has brought a
strength to it in the sense of a public forum much like Bill
Bennett did. But it really hasn't accomplished the type of
integration that was the goal of that office. Do you feel
there's a better structure that could be developed? How would
you do that?
Mr. Rabkin. Mr. Chairman, I think the hesitancy in our
language is simply because we didn't conduct an evaluation of
ONDCP specifically to determine if it had effectively carried
out its mission. We've been looking at some programs around
from the different agencies that have peripherally been
involved with ONDCP in their role as a coordinator. And it's
only been--we spent a couple weeks getting ready for this
hearing, focusing on the performance measurement system.
But basically what we're saying is there's certainly a need
to coordinate, there's a need for that agency. ONDCP seems to
have done the things that the Congress asked it to do when it
reauthorized ONDCP in 1993. It seems to me that ONDCP is a good
value for the investment in terms of the investment that the
Congress is making in it as a coordinator. And there's a need
for it. The only reason that we phrased it that way was because
we hadn't done any specific work to answer the broader
question.
Mr. Souder. In closing--and I appreciate the patience
you've had, because this has been a strung-out hearing. That's
a poor choice of words. But a hearing because of the voting and
changing over here, it took a while. But let me--is it true,
even given what you've just said, that--and I agree that we've
made progress--that it could be doing better in these areas. If
you could comment on this if you disagree or if you agree. At
least in these areas including intelligence coordination--
because clearly we've had problems--when the drug czar
announces his satisfaction with a man who you find out not only
was on the payroll of a cartel but was living in the apartment
and living in the apartment with the person from the cartel and
had hired a staff person that had been busted before for having
been a narcotics trafficker, it is pretty self evident that we
have an intelligence question, problem--that also, in budget
oversight and certification, in internal hiring and
coordination, in anti-legalization coordination and in
coordination of interdiction and support, to just name a few.
Would you not agree that they at least need to improve even if
you're saying that they deserve to be reauthorized and that
they're doing a reasonable job?
Mr. Rabkin. Well, from the evidence that I've heard
presented today, I would think that, yes, there is an
opportunity for ONDCP to do a better job. But, again, we
haven't done any work specifically looking at these issues. For
example, in the intelligence coordination, there's issues of
coordination among the intelligence gathering agencies and
issues of coordination between the gathering agencies and the
law enforcement agencies that can make use of that
intelligence.
And then there's coordination among the law enforcement
agencies to make sure that the best use of the intelligence is
made. Those are some issues that we plan to get involved with
in dealing with the question that the subcommittee is putting
forth on drug intelligence. And so it's a very complicated
area. And we'd rather do the analysis first and then reach the
conclusions.
Mr. Souder. OK. Well, thank you very much for your time.
And we look forward to continuing to work with you. Because
it's an important part. Because as much as we are appalled by
the continuing deaths in our own districts and the threats to
our own families in addition to the Nation as a whole and the
international community by narcotrafficking, it is wise to look
at how we're spending the money and where, and getting the most
value for each dollar, particularly as we're under the budget
constraints. So we look forward to working with you with that.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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