<DOC> [110 Senate Hearings] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access] [DOCID: f:34148.wais] S. Hrg. 110-20 US-VISIT: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES FOR SECURING THE U.S. BORDER ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY of the COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ JANUARY 31, 2007 __________ Serial No. J-110-6 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 34-148 PDF WASHINGTON : 2007 --------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202)512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JON KYL, Arizona RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN CORNYN, Texas BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island TOM COBURN, Oklahoma Bruce A. Cohen, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Michael O'Neill, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JON KYL, Arizona JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah HERB KOHL, Wisconsin JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma Jennifer Duck, Chief Counsel Stephen Higgins, Republican Chief Counsel C O N T E N T S ---------- STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS Page Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas........ 3 prepared statement........................................... 107 Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California..................................................... 1 prepared statement........................................... 109 Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts, prepared statement.............................. 111 WITNESSES Barth, Richard C., Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy Development, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.. 5 Bond, Phillip J., President and Chief Executive Officer, Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), Arlington, Virginia............................................ 18 Mocny, Robert A., Acting Director, US-VISIT, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C............................. 7 Stana, Richard M., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C...... 16 Verdery, C. Stewart, Jr., Partner and Founder, Monument Policy Group, LLC, and Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C......................... 19 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS Responses of Richard C. Barth and Robert A. Mocny to questions submitted by Senators Cornyn, Kennedy, Sessions and Feinstein.. 29 Response of Phillip J. Bond to a question submitted by Senator Kennedy........................................................ 77 Responses of Richard M. Stana to questions submitted by Senator Kennedy........................................................ 78 Responses of C. Steward Verdery, Jr. to questions submitted by Senator Kennedy................................................ 81 SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD Barth, Richard C., Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy Development, and Robert A. Mocny, Acting Director, US-VISIT, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., statement... 86 Bond, Phillip J., President and Chief Executive Officer, Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), Arlington, Virginia, statement................................. 96 Clawson, Greg, Regional Manager, Motorola Enterprise Mobility Government Business Solutions, statement....................... 102 Koslowski, Rey, Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York (SUNY), Albany, New York, statement............................ 114 Stana, Richard M., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C., prepared statement............................................. 133 Verdery, C. Stewart, Jr., Partner and Founder, Monument Policy Group, LLC, and Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., statement............. 164 US-VISIT: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES FOR SECURING THE U.S. BORDER ---------- TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007 U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Feinstein, Kennedy, Cardin, and Cornyn. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Chairman Feinstein. This meeting of the Subcommittee will come to order. Senator Kyl, who is the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, is not able to be present due to the press of other duties. I believe he is on the floor. So the ranking position will be occupied fully and completely by Senator Cornyn of Texas. We are delighted to have you here. The Subcommittee today will be dealing with a program that is not without its controversy, namely, the US-VISIT Program. I have long been very concerned about the interplay between immigration and national security. I believe that we will not be able to protect our Nation effectively until we can protect our borders. I do believe we need to know who is coming in and out of our country. The congressional mandate to create a system for tracking who enters and leaves this country was first codified in 1996 with a deadline of establishing a workable program by September 30, 1998. To the best of my knowledge, that is 8 years ago. Since that time, Congress has extended the deadline over and over. Time and time again, we have sacrificed our border security because of inaction or slow action by the Federal Government. According to the 9/11 National Commission Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, prior to 9/11, no agency of the U.S. Government thought of border security as a tool in the counterterrorism arsenal. 9/11 and its subsequent actions have made this goal a priority and have exposed our country's vulnerability. Yet over 5 years later, the Federal Government has failed to devote sufficient time, technology, personnel, and resources to making border security a cornerstone of our national security policy. In 2003, 5 years after its first deadline in 1998, the Department of Homeland Security created the US-VISIT Program to implement an automated system for documenting entry and exit by capturing biometric information. US-VISIT is an important program that has done a decent job of monitoring the entry of the millions of visitors into the United States. But there is so much more work to be done. Today, over 10 years after the initial congressional mandate, we do not have a reliable means of measuring who leaves our country. We are here today to examine the challenges of implementing a workable system. DHS--Homeland Security--has essentially declared that the exit program is dead as far as land borders are concerned. This is a serious problem. There are over 425 million border crossings at U.S. borders every year. Because we do not know who is leaving the country, we do not know who of these 425 million is overstaying a visa versus who is playing by the rules. We do know that in 2004 there were 335.3 million crossing at land ports of entry. About 4.6 million people who crossed by land were eligible for US-VISIT screening. And we have no way of knowing whether any of those 4.6 million ever left the country. Think about that. We do not know whether 4.6 million people here on a visa, whatever that visa is, ever really followed the visa regulations and left the country. I understand that the 4.6 million people subject to US- VISIT screening at land ports is only a fraction of the total number crossing each year. I also understand the argument that more US-VISIT-eligible persons come into our country via airports than by land. This argument, though, does not convince me that we should shelve the exit program at the land border. I think we have got to take seriously that we have left a gaping hole in our country's border. Anyone coming in by air or sea could leave undetected by way of one of our 170 land ports of entry on more than 7,500 miles of border with Canada and Mexico. By failing to address exits at all ports, we are providing a blueprint to those who wish to harm the United States. Without implementing a comprehensive exit and entry system at all of our ports, we are leaving ourselves vulnerable to another attack. The biggest problem here is that we still have not heard a sufficient explanation from the Department of Homeland Security as to the challenges--or I should say the failure--to implement an exit program at all ports. The New York Times reported that Homeland Security claims that an exit program would cost tens of billions of dollars to implement, but we have yet to see a breakdown of these costs or a good-faith explanation of what is at stake here. Homeland Security has failed to meet their June 2005 statutory requirement to submit a report to Congress describing, one, the status of biometric exit data systems already in use at ports of entry; and, two, the matter in which US-VISIT is to meet the goal of a comprehensive screening system with both entry and exit biometric capability. I must say I am very disappointed that the Department of Homeland Security, this huge Department, has failed to submit this report, and I call upon them to expedite this report to the Congress. So today, I hope we can have a very candid, honest discussion of how we can implement a workable entry-exit system. I would also like to just indicate that the National Sheriffs Association is represented here by their general counsel, Richard Weintraub, and I want them to know that we are delighted to have you join us in the audience. [The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein appears as a submission for the record.] And now, if I may, I would turn it over to the Ranking Member, Senator Cornyn. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, and I appreciate very much your convening this hearing, and also Senator Leahy for scheduling this hearing. This is an important program. As we move forward with our debate about immigration reform and how to solve our Nation's immigration crisis, we all recognize the importance of an immigration enforcement system that enhances the security of our citizens and visitors to the United States. No enforcement system, however, should be adopted without assessing the impact it will have on legitimate travel and trade to the United States. Our Nation's security is paramount, to be sure, but trade, especially with our partners on the Northern and Southern borders, is critical to the health of our economy. The US-VISIT Program is one component of an overall border and interior enforcement strategy. Since its inception in 2004, the Department of Homeland Security has made significant progress in phasing in implementation of the program at air, sea, and land borders. And I want to specifically congratulate the Department. I know they receive few kudos and more than a few arrows, but this is one program that I think was very well implemented in consultation with local stakeholders. And it was an important part of the rollout process to do that, and I think we should give credit where credit is due. But DHS must continue working hard to ensure that it continually receives the input of the public and interested stakeholders on any expansion efforts, such as officials along the Texas border. I remain concerned about the effect of the US-VISIT program on Southern border communities. According to DHS, the US-VISIT entry technology has been installed at most air and sea ports and in secondary inspection areas at 154 land borders. The Texas border region already has felt the effects of increased security screening. Southern border businesses and officials are concerned with the increased delays at border crossing checkpoints and the impact of delays on the local economy. As we continue working toward additional security measures, we need to develop a quick and efficient process to identify those who may be a threat to our national security, while allowing legitimate, law- abiding travelers to enter and exit the United States in a timely manner. One significant initiative to facilitate trade and travel on the Southern border is the border crossing card. I have introduced yesterday a new bill, S. 422, which will actually permit Mexican nationals who hold laser visas and who have already undergone rigorous background screening by the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security to remain in the United States for an initial period of up to 6 months. The bill allows for expedited entry into the U.S. while at the same time maintains the strong border enforcement process. It also ensures that commerce on the Southern border remains strong and viable, notwithstanding any new enforcement measures that DHS will put into place. Now, just a footnote to say that this legislation would merely establish parity with visitors from Canada, and I think it is an appropriate goal for this Nation ultimately, by the use of technology, to treat all of our guests and lawful visitors exactly the same, without any discrimination. DHS has indicated that the US-VISIT entry process has been beneficial, especially in terms of identifying criminals, people who commit identity theft, and immigration violators. DHS, however, also acknowledges that it needs additional resources and personnel to improve the existing entry process. If we are going to be a welcoming Nation to lawful trade and traffic, we ought to make that as easy as possible, consistent with security efforts, while we spend whatever it takes to secure our borders against those who attempt to enter our country in violation of our laws. So we will need to continue to work with DHS to make sure that it gets the help that it needs in order to make the system successful. As Senator Feinstein has noted, DHS has recently announced it would delay implementation of the exit procedures at land borders, in part due to the potentially significant delays in the flow of cross-border traffic and the significant resources it will take to expand existing infrastructure and systems communications that are needed for the US-VISIT process to work effectively. Of course, I share Senator Feinstein's concerns, but I do note that at this point we have not thought far enough ahead to determine what it is we would actually do with that information if we were to capture it and whether there would be sufficient ICE agents necessary to actually enforce overstays. It is a significant problem, but I think it needs to be addressed in the context of overall border security and immigration reform, and perhaps not as a stand- alone issue. DHS should continue to explore various strategies for improving the ability to capture traveler biometrics and entry and exit information. With the movement to create a single, secure biometric and machine-readable travel card, like the e- Passport, DHS should work with industry leaders and stakeholders to determine how the latest technologies, such as radio frequency identification technology, can best be incorporated into travel and entry-exit documents. DHS also needs to complete its law enforcement systems integration, which is a cornerstone of any successful law enforcement strategy. With these improvements and with the support of the Congress, we will eventually be able to have an integrated entry-exit process that protects our Nation's security and facilitates legitimate travel to and from the United States. Thank you, Madam Chairman. [The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator. I would like to introduce the witnesses of panel one. The first will be the Honorable Richard Barth, Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy Development, Department of Homeland Security. He has been the Assistant Secretary for this office since August 26th of 2006. He is the principal action officer for coordinating policy among DHS entities, as well as with State and Federal agencies and foreign governments. Prior to this, Assistant Secretary Barth was Corporate Vice President and Director, Homeland Security Strategy, for Motorola's Government Relations Office in Washington. The other witness is Robert Mocny, the Acting Director of US-VISIT, who is on the hot seat today. Mr. Mocny is Acting Director of US-VISIT. He is responsible for the day-to-day operations of US-VISIT, including managing the development and deployment of the program. Over the course of his career, he has served in several senior Federal Government positions related to U.S. immigration policy and operations, including director of the Entry-Exit Project and Acting Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Chief Inspector with the former INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service. Welcome, gentlemen. What we usually do at these hearings is you will have a time limit of 5 minutes, and that way Senator Cornyn, and I hope other members, will have a chance to ask you additional questions. So please proceed. STATEMENT OF RICHARD C. BARTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Barth. Chairman Feinstein and Ranking Member Cornyn, thank you for taking the time and inviting us here to discuss the efforts of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to record the exit of non-citizens as they leave the United States. It is one of DHS' missions to modernize and improve our immigration and border management systems, and biometric exit control is a key component of fully securing our Nation's borders. Our first priority, though, given that we do not have unlimited resources, is to fully implement ten-fingerprint collection of non-citizen travelers as visa-issuing ports around the world and upon entry to the U.S. Secretary Chertoff has made it clear many times that keeping terrorists out of the country is the priority as we make decisions for the prudent, risk-based investment of the border control dollars we have. Yet the challenge for border security is to implement a well- planned exit solution to assist us in closing the door on those individuals who pose an overwhelming risk of entering or remaining in the United States undetected. As you can imagine, the deployment of a comprehensive exit solution poses significant challenges. First, we must address three very different border environments: air, sea, and land. Second, the United States has almost always had some form of entry inspection, and over time, infrastructure developed to support that entry process. U.S. international airports have customs inspection booths near the baggage claim areas for arriving international passengers. Seaports serving international cruise lines provide terminal-based customs inspection. The number of lanes processing vehicular traffic and pedestrian entry inbound is constantly expanding. But not one of these ports was designed to accommodate exit control. Unlike the entry process, there are only limited facilities to process international travelers as they leave the United States. In fact, the aerial photograph that we have displayed over here, Chairman Feinstein and Ranking Member Cornyn, I think vividly shows the striking difference between entry and exit infrastructure at the largest land border port of entry-- San Ysidro, California, which I will discuss in more detail in a moment. And, finally, an exit solution presents not only an infrastructure challenge but, equally important, a fundamental change in the business process of travelers who are departing the United States. Accordingly, DHS proposes a phased deployment of exit in the three environments of air, land, and sea, with an initial focus on air. We are beginning at airports primarily to focus on travelers from countries of interest, 91 percent of whom arrive in the United States via air. It is absolutely essential for us to know what travelers from these countries have complied with the terms of their admission. We will, of course, work closely with our Government and private sector partners to deploy the most viable option for air exit. We are already in dialog with the airline industry on the options to deploy biometric exit at airports. After deploying exit procedures at airports, we will begin deploying a solution to seaports based on the air solution. And this brings us to our most significant challenge: deploying an exit solution at the land border. Biometric confirmation of the departure of travelers via land ports is significantly more complicated and costly than the air and sea environments. Using the aerial photograph of San Ysidro, I would walk you through the two different variations of the entry and exit. On the left is the entry, and on the right is the exit from the U.S. San Ysidro is the largest entry-exit land border port for travelers entering or leaving the United States, with 25 lanes for vehicular entry traffic and only about 4 for exit traffic. Simply duplicating biometric, biographic collection of data upon departure will not work. It would require costly infrastructure improvements, land acquisition costs, and staffing for additional lanes of traffic over multiple shifts. I could go into the cost of wait times for the public to cross the border, but in the interest of time, I will rely on the written testimony we have provided to give you those details. As I said, while the challenges are significant, they are not insurmountable. There are ways to approach a land border exit solution, and we intend to pursue them. We are closely monitoring technology solutions that could help resolve the land border challenges without the extraordinary infrastructure investment that otherwise would be required. An interim solution for exit data collection at the land border could also involve the cooperation of Canada and Mexico. Such cooperation could include agreements between our countries to share data on an as-needed transactional basis between our systems. We will explore that option to more quickly obtain good data on departing aliens. The Department takes seriously the issue of protecting the privacy of non-citizens travelers also. Our written testimony, again, goes into some detail on attention to privacy as well as accessibility issues. In conclusion, a comprehensive exit solution for the United States requires the administration and Congress to collaborate closely on finding the best, cost-effective solutions for each environment. We will meet this challenge with a set of policies and processes that provide our decisionmakers with flexible solutions. Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and we look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Barth appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Dr. Barth. Mr. Mocny? STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. MOCNY, ACTING DIRECTOR, US-VISIT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Mocny. Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Cornyn, thank you for inviting me to discuss the operations of the US-VISIT Program, which has just marked its third anniversary. In those 3 years, US-VISIT has significantly strengthened our Nation's immigration and border security capabilities to a level that simply did not exist before. I am proud of our dedicated team of professionals who are working hard to solve some difficult challenges that face our Nation. And I am proud that many are supportive of the program's progress. For example, some governments expressed apprehension when we first launched the program. Now many of those same governments are seeking our expertise as they work to establish their own biometrics-based border management programs. US-VISIT has clearly become the standard for the rest of the world. The background of US-VISIT is our innovative use of biometrics, which enhances our capacity to know definitively who is coming into our country and to crack down on fraudulent document use. With biometric identification technologies at its base, US-VISIT has revolutionized our ability to verify that travelers are who they say they are and do not pose a risk to the United States. US-VISIT also provides immigration and law enforcement decisionmakers with critical information when they need it and where they need it. But perhaps the best way to evaluate the success of US-VISIT is to look at what we have achieved against our four goals, and those are: to enhance the security of our citizens and our visitors, to facilitate legitimate travel and trade, to ensure the integrity of our immigration system, and to protect the privacy of our visitors. In terms of enhancing security, since January of 2004 we have processed more than 76 million visitors and in that time have intercepted approximately 1,800 immigration violators and people with criminal histories based on the biometric alone. US-VISIT also provides the infrastructure for the State Department's BioVisa Program, which consular officials use when they process a person applying for a visa to the United States. Biometrics are also depriving potential terrorists of one of their most powerful tools--the ability to use fraudulent or stolen identification documents to enter the country. This means that biometrics also protect travelers by making it virtually impossible for anyone else to claim their identifies should their travel documents be lost or stolen. US-VISIT also tracks and records changes in immigration status and matches entry and exit records to determine overstays. ICE officials, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, have made more than 290 arrests based on US-VISIT overstay information. US-VISIT uses and maintains the Arrival and Departure Information System, or ADIS, which has grown to be the definitive immigration status system that provides overstay information for subsequent action. Regarding our second goal, facilitating legitimate travel and trade, US-VISIT's biometric-based capabilities, while enhancing security, have not increased wait times at our ports of entry. US-VISIT has also strengthened the integrity of our immigration system, our third goal. We continue to work with the FBI to achieve interoperability between their fingerprint data base and DHS'. We are piloting a program that will provide Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers biometric- based access to criminal and immigration information. We are also moving from a collection of a two-fingerprint to a ten-fingerprint standard. This will help us collect more accurate and actual information on those attempting to enter our country. But we also recognize that keeping bad people out is not enough. We must ensure that those few people who remain in the country as a threat to our Nation's security do not go undetected. This brings me to perhaps our greatest challenge: the development of biometric exit procedures that address our goals of security and facilitating legitimate travel and trade at those three very different environments--air, sea, and land. Over the past 2 years, we have been evaluating new and evolving technologies that allow us to definitively know when a traveler has left the country. Through pilot programs at 14 air and sea ports, we have learned that a technology to record a traveler's departure does, in fact, work. But to be most effective, it has to be integrated into the existing travel process. We have already reached out to the travel industry to identify the best way to integrate exit procedures into the traveler's current airport experience. The land border poses its own challenges. Assistant Secretary Barth adequately explained those challenges, but you should know that we have been pursuing possible solutions there as well. US-VISIT recently completed a test of radio frequency identification, or RFID, technology at five land border ports of entry, proving that vicinity-read RFID technology is a viable solution to meet the multiple challenges of the land border environment. But as cited in the recent GAO report and our own findings, more work needs to be done. Finally, we are achieving our mission without compromising our fourth goal of protecting the personal privacy of our visitors. Privacy is a part of everything that we do, and it is essential to our mission. But US-VISIT's job is not done. Challenges remain, especially regarding the solution to exit procedures. We have proven the skeptics wrong in the past, and we believe we can do it again going forward. Thank you again for your support and for the opportunity to testify here today. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, both of you. We appreciate it. It is my understanding that at least a third of visa holders do not leave the United States. So the looser the system we have, the more visa holders we are going to have who do not leave, the more you add to the numbers of undocumented, and the more you make any reform of immigration more difficult. I think the economic arguments that are made really have to deal with that factor. The numbers are only going to grow, so the importance of developing an exit program I think is really there. And I travel. I get visas. The other governments know when we leave the country. But the bigger you get, the harder it is going to be. And I think you ought to develop some system. I have gone in and out of San Ysidro. This is my backyard. There is no problem going out. And you look at that photo, and that shows it right there. The lane leaving the United States is vacant. Coming into the United States is where there are a lot of cars. So, in a way, that to me countermands what you are saying. It seems to me we could have an exit land program that would work. Is it true that you have suspended work on an exit system, Mr. Mocny? Mr. Mocny. No, Chairman Feinstein, we have not abandoned exit in any way. In fact, we are pursuing both the air and sea exit this very year and beginning to look at the challenges that we continue to face at the land borders. But we have not-- and I want to correct the record that has been out there for some time. We have not abandoned our move toward exit control. Chairman Feinstein. OK. GAO notes that Homeland Security has discontinued testing of its radio frequency identification system at the land borders. Is this true? Mr. Mocny. We concluded a proof of concept, and so we were very clear to call it not a pilot or something that we were going to put out there-- Chairman Feinstein. No, let me--my question is very carefully phrased. Have you discontinued testing of the radio frequency identification system? Mr. Mocny. Yes, ma'am. Chairman Feinstein. Now you can go ahead and answer the rest of it. Mr. Mocny. Thank you. We had a proof of concept. It was always designed to be put up and then brought down. The idea was to look at what technologies might afford us to have a viable exit program at the land borders. So we had a very clearly defined--and one thing with US-VISIT is that we practice what I believe to be good project management, which is we have a beginning and an end to anything that we put out there to be able to evaluate that. So we had a proof of concept with a beginning and an end portion to that, with the idea to evaluate that and take it to its next level to see where would we go with that. And what we identified was where there were certain challenges with that proof of concept. Chairman Feinstein. OK. Are you currently testing any alternative means of tracking who leaves the country? Mr. Mocny. We currently have the 14 air and sea pilots that we have, but we do not have any testing at the land ports of entry. Chairman Feinstein. All right. So there is no testing going on. So as I interpret all of that, effectively the exit program has been stopped. Nothing is moving ahead, so I conclude it stopped. Am I wrong? Mr. Barth. Chairman Feinstein, you are correct in concluding that any physical activity by people to test systems, to implement, to do something at the land borders is going on. There is nothing there. You are correct. However, the planning to do something that is efficacious, cost-effective, and real to plug the holes that we are all in agreement need to be plugged for controlling our exit at the borders is very actively underway. When we hopefully in the very near future send to you our strategies for the 2007 spend plan and budgets, et cetera, you will be able to see in a better level of detail the kinds of things we will be doing to actively pursue air exit, air bio- exit technologies, and implement them, actively pursue them at sea, and actively find the technological solution that we truly believe is out there to solve the problem that we see here. We cannot do--in our Department's completely agreement throughout, we cannot do a mirror image of that and block up traffic going out of the country like it is blocked up there coming in without costs that are astronomical. That border control station you see there that is causing all that blockage is a very old-- Chairman Feinstein. The blockage is coming into the country, sir. Mr. Barth. It is all coming in. And if we tried to put biometric exit data capture going out, we would have to have a similar number of lanes, we would have to have similar staffing, and we would see back-ups like you see coming in. And just to the point of the costs of those buildings there that the U.S. Government owns, the Congress has already approved and has half-funded a $500 million upgrade and replacement of those facilities. So the cost of doing that on the outbound lanes, we have a good data point. Maybe it is only one, but it is a very good one. At your backyard to do what we are doing incoming with biometric exit outgoing would cost $500 million, not including the land acquisition costs and not including the staffing costs. Chairman Feinstein. You know, I guess I have been around here for almost 15 years now. I mean, this to me is the typical bureaucratic argument: ``We cannot do it because it costs too much, therefore...'' I mean, we cannot even get a report that was due in 2005. I guess what I want to say, that is in my State. I care about it. I care about this issue. I think this is a soft underbelly of this country not to know that people ever leave. Virtually everybody that came into this country to do us harm so far came in on a visa. We have no way to know that people leave this country by way of a land border. And that ought to-- I mean, how many employees does Homeland Security have, 250,000? How many--what? Mr. Barth. Not quite. Chairman Feinstein. An awful lot. It would seem to me that if this is a priority--and my view is to make it a priority-- you would adjust priorities within this huge megalopolis of yours and be able to deal with it. So I have just got to tell you, I do not accept reasons, well, the building is going to cost X and this is going to cost Y. You came up here with something that shows that this could be done at San Ysidro with some ease because there are no cars on the road leaving. And I will just leave it at that. I think this is a real national security issue, and hopefully somehow that will get through. So thank you very much. Senator, your turn. Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. Gentlemen, I want to pick up on the matter of overstays. The latest statistic I have seen indicates that 45 percent of the illegal immigration in this country results not from people who have entered illegally but from people who have entered legally and overstayed. In other words, 55 percent have come across the border without a visa; 45 percent have come in with a visa, but have simply overstayed. And I guess that gets to my question, Mr. Mocny, to you. You indicate, if I heard you correctly in your statement, that ICE--Immigration and Customs Enforcement--has arrested 290 people for visa overstays. And so I guess the next question is obvious. That is just a fraction of the number of people who come in legally but overstay their visa. Can you speak to what we need to do as a Nation to make sure that we can actually deal with everyone who overstays their visa, ultimately? Mr. Mocny. Well, I think having a viable exit program will begin to address that. The information that we provide to the ICE agents is culled from many different systems. It is corroborated by the biometric systems that we have at the 12 airports, and so we can produce on a daily basis reports to ICE that have people who have definitively been overstays and actually checked out with the biometric. That is called a ``confirmed overstay.'' That record is then flagged for any time they may want to get another visa or try to come back under the Visa Waiver Program. They would be prevented from doing so. But we also have many unconfirmed overstays, and those are people where this ADIS system, as I described earlier, sends an automatic trigger to our unit, the Data Integrity Group, that culls through that information and says this person is a possible or unconfirmed overstay. We then have to go through many other multiple systems to make a determination whether or not that person did, in fact, leave. And, of course, they go through I-94 information, the boarding card that they get upon arrival. That is a separate system that we have to go into. And then they would have to also consider the land border departure as well. And so, clearly, this speaks to, in fact, why we have not abandoned exit. We believe that exit has to occur in order to close this gap, but we do not have that. This is the first time in many years that we have been able to actually make arrests on overstays based on an automatic trigger of that person's immigration record. In the past it has been because of some work site enforcement and it was later determined that they were an overstay. But this sends an automatic signal to ICE. I will grant you it is far from being as many as we would like it to be, but it is much further than we have been before. Senator Cornyn. Well, I will grant you both that birds have come home to roost due to many, many, many, many years of neglect that no doubt preceded even the creation of the Department of Homeland Security or your being hired by the Federal Government in your current position. But it strikes me that we have come up with a comprehensive way to deal with the information. Let's say we do get information that somebody has not left the country at the expiration of the visa, so what? Collecting the information does not keep unless we are going to actually have the people to followup on the information and are going to have the ability to communicate technology through the various data bases to give a law enforcement person the information they need in order to apprehend that individual. So I think what this points out is that there is a huge void we have in other areas. Even if you had the exit system up and running 100 percent, the question is what you are going to do with that information. I want to ask Dr. Barth--and I think, Mr. Mocny, you also mentioned the desire of the Department to go after a ten- fingerprint on US-VISIT. As I understand right now, it is an index finger on each hand. Mr. Mocny. Correct. Senator Cornyn. But as I understand from Secretary Chertoff, the desire to go to ten fingerprints is to be able to try to get matches with various partial prints that had been obtained in places like safe houses in Afghanistan or Iraq or elsewhere around the country to take advantage of all the fingerprint records that may be available and then match those with people coming across our border through the US-VISIT Program. Do I have that about right? Mr. Barth. Yes. Mr. Mocny. Yes, you have it very clear. Senator Cornyn. And what are your estimates in terms of how much of an improvement this will be in terms of our ability to catch criminals and threats to our country by the use of ten fingerprints as opposed to just two? Mr. Barth. Let me just add one factor. Then I will have Bob answer your details here. An additional feature of the ten-fingerprint system is that the DHS data bases then will be able to be more easily aligned with the significantly large FBI data bases which are based on ten fingerprints. So there is an added advantage there that you are not just searching half of the universe, if you will, of available prints. And the interoperability of those two systems is something that our two Departments--the Justice Department and DHS--are very actively pursuing so that when we do have DHS' ten-print systems fully set up, we will have a very good exchange of prints with the FBI. Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. Madam Chairman, I think, you know, one of the things that we have talked about in terms of comprehensive immigration reform is the importance of work site verification and eliminating some of the identity theft and document fraud at the work site, which, of course, is most often the magnet that draws people to this country. And I would just say I will leave this portion of the hearing even more convinced that we are going to have to fill in a lot of different gaps here and not just the exit program in order to make this system work. Thank you very much. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn. I would like to ask one quick question. Doesn't Customs and Border Protection require that land passengers submit their I- 94 forms to a Mexican or Canadian immigration inspector when they leave the country? Mr. Mocny. I don't know if it is a requirement that they actually have that as a requirement, but that is often what happens. So the I-94, the arrival card and the departure card the person gets when they enter the U.S., is either surrendered at the airport to the airline check-in agent and at the land border often times is given to a Canadian officer. The challenge we have with the Mexican border is that for every port of entry we have on the Southern border, there is not always a corresponding port of entry in Mexico. So there is that additional challenge for us as well. But that does happen on a regular basis and very often on the Canadian border that data--those cards are handed over. Chairman Feinstein. Well, I have one here. It says you must surrender this permit when you leave the United States across the Canadian border to a Canadian official, across the Mexican border to a United States official. Why can't that be a starting point? Why can't we require that when people leave? If they are leaving and they have to give the U.S. official or the Canadian official the information---- Mr. Barth. I am not sure of the legal or regulatory basis for the language on the card itself. However, it again comes back to an infrastructure problem that we have and have to fix. I think-- Chairman Feinstein. Well, why don't we try to fix it? Mr. Barth. Because I think in the first instance we have neither the staff nor the facility to slow down the traffic and collect those things as people leave the U.S. Mr. Mocny. That also does not get to the biometric capture at this point. As you have the biographic information--and that is helpful in some cases. We have the name of the individual. But we cannot capture the biometric that way, and I think we are trying to pursue technologies that would allow us to capture a biometric as part of the exit. But that very well may mean work with Canada in doing so. As Assistant Secretary Barth says, they have the infrastructure just 100 yards north of us, and we may be able to use some of that. But that is a negotiation with Canada that we would enter into and have discussions with them. But as I said--and I think it is fair to note--at our 37- some ports of entry on the Southern border, there is not always a corresponding port of entry into Mexico. So it just represents another challenge for the program. Chairman Feinstein. But at least where there is a will, something might be worked out. I appreciate that. We are joined by Senator Kennedy. Senator, I understand you would like to make a statement. Senator Kennedy. No, thank you. I will put it in the record, Madam Chairman. I have just a couple of questions at an appropriate time. [The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Feinstein. Yes, please go ahead. Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. I apologize for being late. I was going to ask about these exit systems of other countries. How do they do it? And have you looked at other countries? Which countries are doing it well? What are their systems? Are there lessons we ought to learn from those? I know Singapore, for example, does it well. That is probably a unique situation given the size of the country and the population. But, I mean, in Europe, they might have had a system years ago, but because of the EU, it may be somewhat different. But have you looked at other countries to see what we might be able to learn from them? Mr. Mocny. We have, and that is certainly something that we note to ourselves, that these countries have had departure control for many, many years, and it is just something that we never had here. So as they begin to modify some of their systems--you have departure control, passport control in France and Japan and Australia. They have always had that infrastructure in place, and the challenge that we are faced today with is in a very, you know, rapid fashion to stand up any kind of exit control absent that infrastructure. So they do it well, and it is useful information. I will say that some countries are, in fact, beginning to look at biometric exit, are doing away with the basic infrastructure, the kind of hard brick and mortar, as it were, with personnel in place because that does become very expensive. So we do look at many countries across the world to try to learn from them as well. Senator Kennedy. Maybe you have gone over this, and if you have, don't bother. But biometric, I mean, I think all of us are familiar with what happens with automobiles and going through the tolls and all the rest. So you have got that capability, but how do you know who is in the car? And that is obviously the problem. Did you discuss in terms of the biometric some suggestions in these areas? Mr. Barth. We did not go into that particular detail, Senator, but it is safe to say that that poses the additional layer of problem. If you have the driver and they merely have to come up and put their finger on the biometric detector at the land point of exit, that is one problem. Having everyone get out of the car and have to approach the stand and put the finger on it just would create an impossible back-up at the border that we believe the technology will help us solve, just as--whatever it was-10 or 15 years ago, EZPass just burst on the scene and you had to slow down to 5 miles an hour to get through it, but compared to the Route 95 toll booths, that was definitely an improvement. We will get to that point sometime, and we believe at some time in the future we will get to where the New Jersey Parkway is, which is you can speed through at 55 miles an hour and capture the data you need. Senator Kennedy. Just finally, in the next panel we are going to hear some testimony about the use of electronics, and I don't know whether you want to make any comment or if you have got a reaction to it. I think people ought to be able to make their presentation before people make maybe a comment. But we are all friends here, and we are all trying to learn. So if you have got some ideas or suggestions or comments, it would be useful. Mr. Mocny. Thank you, Senator. We did provide in our written testimony the concept of a bio-token, and that is the combination of radio frequency identification with biometrics. So it is a very nascent technology at this point. We have to look at the ergonomics. If people are going to be leaving the country at 55 mph, we have to be careful about what device we give them to actually biometrically verify their departure. So what we know is that technology is beginning to emerge, but we have to factor in so many things such as the ergonomics, the safety of it as well. So this is something that we are trying to pay attention to. We are looking at it earnestly, and we believe, as the Assistant Secretary says, it is not here now, but in the office in a couple years' time, it may very well present ourselves with a potential solution. Senator Kennedy. Thank you. Madam Chairman, if I could, I will submit some additional questions, if I could. Chairman Feinstein. Absolutely. Senator Kennedy. Thank you very, very much. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. I thank you gentlemen. We look forward to great things happening. Thank you very much. The next panel consists of--and I will begin while you all come to the table, please--Richard Stana, the Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues for the U.S. Government Accountability Office. He is a 30-year veteran of GAO who has directed reviews on a wide variety of complex military and domestic issues. Most recently, he directed GAO's work relating to immigration and border security issues, and he is the author of the recent report on the challenges of implementing an exit program at the land borders. Phillip Bond is the president and CEO of Information Technology Association of America. Mr. Bond directs the day-to- day operations of the largest and oldest information technology trade association, representing 325 leading software services, Internet, telecommunications, electronic commerce, and systems integration companies. Stewart Verdery is the president of the Monument Policy Group. He is the founder and president. This is a consulting firm in Washington that advises clients on issues relating to homeland security, immigration, and technology. So, gentlemen, we are very interested to hear from you, and if you could particularly -you have heard the problem. If you could particularly concentrate your remarks as to possible solutions, that would be appreciated. Mr. Stana, please. STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Stana. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Senator Cornyn, Senator Kennedy. I am pleased to be here today to discuss DHS' implementation of the US-VISIT entry-exit program. As you know, the US-VISIT Program is designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the country at air, sea, and land ports of entry. Data is captured to learn and verify visitors' identities, screen information against watchlists, and record arrival and departure. My prepared statement is based on a report we did last month on the US-VISIT implementation on land ports of entry, and I would just like to make a few points about that effort. First, we found that DHS cannot currently implement a biometric US-VISIT exit capability, as mandated by statute, without incurring a major physical and economic impact on land border ports. Implementing a biometrically based exit recording system that mirrors entry would require more than $3 billion in new infrastructure and could produce major traffic congestion because travelers would have to stop their vehicles upon exit for processing. Technology compatible to the land port environment is not currently available to address this processing issue. The RFID technology tested at land ports--and you can see them on the picture board hanging on gantries and on poles here at ports of entry, at Alexandria Bay, New York, and Nogales, Arizona--was subject to numerous performance and reliability problems. In fact, it had a success rate of only 14 percent in one test and provided no assurance that the person recorded as leaving the country is the same one who entered. It is important to note that DHS has not yet provided to Congress a statutorily mandated report which was due by June 2005 on its plans to fully implement an exit-entry program. Second, we found that DHS had not yet articulated how US- VISIT will strategically fit or incorporate other land border security initiatives and mandates. It is important to know, for example, how the new Secure Border Initiative, or SBI, will tie in with US-VISIT, especially given the interior enforcement goals of SBI and the inability of the US-VISIT system to generate comprehensive, reliable, and accurate overstay data. It is also important to know how the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative will work with US-VISIT. Last, DHS deserves credit for installing the entry portion of US-VISIT at nearly all of the land ports, and this was done with minimal new construction or changes to existing facilities. But officials at 12 of the 21 land ports we visited told us about US-VISIT-related computer slowdowns and freezes that adversely affected processing times and could have compromised security. These problems were not routinely reported to headquarters, in part because of the lack of coordination between US-VISIT and CBP. A real challenge lies ahead because the introduction of technology to permit a ten-fingerprint scan and read e- passports could increase inspection times and crowding, and thus affect port operations at aging and space-constrained facilities like those pictures on the picture board. The left- hand side is San Ysidro--it is a port right in your backyard, Senator Feinstein and on the right is the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel. There is really no place to expand in the tunnel. In the limited time I have remaining, I would like to raise a few other issues that members of the Committee may wish to consider as you conduct oversight of the US-VISIT Program. First, technology is a tool, but not a cure for every border security problem. It is only one leg of a three-legged stool that includes people, process, and technology. As good as technology might be, it must fit in the port operational environment and facilitate, not hamper, the inspection process. CBP inspectors told us that technology is unreliable at times or can overwhelm them with information. And when this happens, the inspection process can slow down. Time pressures have resulted in information being ignored and security being compromised by hasty inspections. And keep in mind that Ahmed Ressam, the Millennium Bomber, was stopped not by technology but by an alert customs inspector who observed the subject and had a gut instinct that something was not quite right. We do not want technology to force our inspectors to keep their eyes off the traveler. Second, the US-VISIT Program cannot operate effectively in a vacuum but, rather, needs to be integrated with other border security systems. Even an effective entry-exit system would be compromised if travelers could walk, drive, or sail in and out of the country without detection between the ports. Controlling 7,500 miles of land border and 95,000 of coastline is no easy or inexpensive task. Fragmenting responsibility for border security programs among several organizational components at DHS frankly is not helpful. Third, although various laws and mandates call for an entry-exit system, there may be opportunities to help achieve the system's goals in combination with other DHS programs. An effective entry system is extremely important to prevent identified terrorists and other criminals from entering the United States, but enhanced intelligence might also be needed to improve our watchlists. And an effective exit control system would be helpful to identify those who have overstayed their visas, but the feasibility of locating and removing millions of overstays who may not wish to be found is questionable, without increasing the modest number of ICE agents and resources currently devoted to this task and implementing an effective work site enforcement or temporary worker program. In closing, there is no question that securing our Nation's borders is a vital task and deserves high priority. The challenges we have found provide an opportunity for Congress to consider how this task can best be accomplished. This concludes my oral statement, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Stana appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Stana. Mr. Bond? STATEMENT OF PHILLIP J. BOND, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (ITAA), ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA Mr. Bond. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Senator Cornyn, Senator Kennedy. On behalf of the membership of ITAA, it is a privilege to be here. Let me get right to the point. For this hearing, I was asked to discuss whether technology currently exists that can verify the identity of a foreign visitor leaving this country, as mandated by Congress. The short answer is yes, both proximity-and vicinity-read RFID technologies can help accomplish this task, but as with almost any technology, I have to quickly add that it depends. Let me talk briefly about the two and preface that by saying just very generally the Co-Chair of the bipartisan RFID Caucus understands this well, but RFID simply means you have some information and a small antenna which transmits differing amounts of information to a receiver, which then reads that information via radio wave. Two different basic approaches. Proximity-read RFID systems have a very secure chip, a lot of information. These are the smart cards you read about for access to buildings and so forth. They are commonly used and have advanced computing powers. Very good at authenticating the user and ensuring that the person using the card is who they claim to be. For the purpose of the exit program, DHS could issue all US-VISIT applicants a smart card upon entering. They would then authenticate their identity upon exiting by going through a reader station. Officials located at the stations could verify that the person is who they say they are by a visual matchor by a biometric match which fingerprints. This may, as has been noted, slow traffic. It may require significant investment, additional agents at point of entry, or expansion of those. On the other hand, stopping the traffic to inspect the documents may be the answer if the national priority is 100 percent authentication. That technology would do that. DHS would need, I think, to perform a cost/benefit analysis. Alternatively, there is ultra-high frequency or vicinity- read RFID. This could be attached to the I-94 form when visitors enter. These have a longer read range--they are like the speed pass that you are familiar with on some of the roads--and would provide some flexibility in facilitating the flow of traffic while hopefully securing our borders. Vicinity-read RFID technology transmits a unique number, kind of like your license plate number on a car, and then you separately dive into a secure data base to determine the connection between the two. With the UHF border solution, DHS could quickly read a high volume of credentials while vehicles passed through. And as with any type of exit program, presumably some visual inspections would need to occur. Unlike the smart card or proximity-read option, it would keep the traffic moving and perhaps align with existing trusted traveled programs that we have today that use similar technology. However, the current generation of vicinity-read solutions, like existing smart card products, do not independently tie a person to an ID card through biometrics without some intervention, without checking visually or with some other biometric. The limitation in this case is that it really only proves that the I-94 left the country, not the person that is supposed to be attached to that I-94, which is, of course, not the same thing. I am aware of the pilot program that was mentioned and the results there are not satisfactory looking at the ultra-high frequency vicinity-read. However, I also know that this kind of technology works. It is in use on both our borders today with the NEXUS and SENTRI programs. The DOD has used it. And as has been mentioned, there is technology on the horizon that would combine the longer read, faster flow with the biometric capability. It is not here yet, but it is on the horizon. Proponents of the vicinity-read technology would say that implementing this through a phased approach would give significant benefits in the near term, increasing dividends on security, and commerce in the future while minimizing delays. That is the chief advantage there. However, it is not up to me or my association to pick winners in this space, and I think Government should be very careful about picking winners and losers as well. As Senator Cornyn I think alluded to earlier, Government should define the mission, objectives, and requirements, and then go to the technology sector of the country and find what is best to fit the mission and the objectives and the priorities that Congress in its oversight helps to set. If I can, with 12 seconds, I want to briefly just point out that some folks very legitimately concerned about privacy have depicted vicinity-read RFID as a privacy risk. I would submit that it is not at all inherently secure and that those charges do not really hold up to scrutiny because, again, it only transmits a number, like your license plate, and unless you know which secure data base to go to and how those numbers correspond to the personally identifiable information, the risk is very, very small. In fact, in the 10 years that these kind of technologies have been in use, I am not aware of any identity theft problems that come from that operation. I am over my time limit. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein. [The prepared statement of Mr. Bond appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Bond. Mr. Verdery? STATEMENT OF C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., PARTNER AND FOUNDER, MONUMENT POLICY GROUP, LLC, AND ADJUNCT FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Verdery. Chairman Feinstein and Ranking Member Cornyn and Senator Kennedy, it is nice to return to your Committee again and talk about some of the issues that the country faces in securing our borders and mixing policy, technology, and personnel to do so. Not only must these programs protect us against terrorism, crime, and illegal immigration, but also must welcome those and facilitate the travel of those who contribute to our economic livelihood and contribute to our public diplomacy efforts. My written testimony goes into great depth about six priorities for US-VISIT in 2007 and moving forward. I am only going to touchon some of them. But, in order, they are airport exit, the International Registered Traveler Program, land entry and exit, transition from two- to ten-fingerprint capture, cooperation internationally, and how this would fit in with our employment verification efforts. I have a great faith in the US-VISIT Program Office and the Office of Screening Coordination at the Department to make the best use of the dollars that Congress gives them under the authorities that they are operating under. As you may know, I served as Assistant Secretary for Border and Transportation Security Policy at DHS 2003 to 2005 working for Tom Ridge and Asa Hutchinson. I was proud to help build the US-VISIT Program into what it is today. We spent many years, as you mentioned in your opening statement, Madam Chairman, with no deployment because people could not figure out how to build a system all at once. So Secretary Ridge made the tough decision to build this in increments, and that is the way it has gone since, and it has worked well with what has been built. The problem has been the lack of progress in the last couple years on building additional steps. One reason for that fact is, of course, the budget for the program has relatively been flat, between $330 million and $362 million a year for the last 5 years, just enough to pay for ongoing operations and the important interoperability work with the FBI systems. In addition, the post-Ridge leadership has gone the extra mile to try to coordinate US-VISIT with other credentialing and screening programs resulting in delays. I was interested to see the GAO report that Mr. Stana released last month. I thought it was a fascinating report. Some news stories picked this up as a huge bombshell. It was a development out of left field no one had heard of. We had taken a shocking turn away from monitoring departures of all foreigners leaving the country--except it is not so shocking and it is not a new development. There has never been money in the budget that has been requested, and there has never been money in the budget that has been enacted to do a land exit solution for the reasons that have been discussed here related to infrastructure and personnel. On air exit, I do believe that DHS and US-VISIT have to end 2 years of deliberation and choose a system to deploy. They have had a difficult time deciding whether to place this at the airport check-in counter, at the TSA checkpoint, at the boarding gate, or at some combination of the above. In my view, it ought to be at the checkpoint where TSA screeners operate because they are used to interacting with the public. You have a law enforcement presence there. You have information technology connectivity there, and also it is a natural funneling device to move people through a limited number of locations as opposed to putting it at the counter or at the gate. This, of course, would have to require coordination with the airlines' departure records to make sure that the person who was ``exited'' biometrically at the checkpoint actually left the country. Hopefully, once we have a robust exit system, this would change some of our visa policies that have been deterring travel to the United States. The overwhelming majority of people who want visas, don't get them because we are not sure they are going to leave. Hopefully, with a robust exit system, we could expand the Visa Waiver Program if countries meet the security criteria that DHS has put forward, the new proposal that has been proposed, as well as requiring those nationals to compile a sterling record--and whatever percentage you want, 98 percent, 99 percent--of on-time dedicated departures. I think this is a way to both do the risk management of travel that we need to do and also make our country more welcoming than it has been in several years. The Discover America Partnership announced a report today endorsing the Visa Waiver Program enhancements that the President has put forward, but also the exit requirement as a way to make sure that people have actually left the country. Another aspect of this would be the International Registered Traveler Program. Frequent business travelers, whether they are U.S. citizens returning to the country or foreigners coming to the country, should not have to through robotic screening time after time after time. The U.K. has deployed a system, their Project IRIS. They are going to have a million people enrolled by the end of the decade who have been enrolled, gone through a thorough background check, and are able to skip immigration processing with a random audit function, of course. It is a way to maximize the attention on less known travelers. On the land side--and it looks like I am running out of time--I do believe that the RFID solution that Secretary Bond mentioned can work. The piloting that was done in the last couple years, the results were not good, but I think it really will require a port-by-port deployment with the kind of resources you need to put the gantries in the right place. Programs are coming online with RFID and travel documents, such as the Western Hemisphere Passport Card, which will be unveiled later this year or perhaps next with RFID. The Border Crossing Card that Mexicans travel with will need to be retrofitted to include RFID. And this can work, and we should not wait for a biometric, bio-token system which could be several years down the road, which is the ultimate solution. We should be able to do both at the same time. As I mentioned, my written testimony also talks about the use of biometrics from employment verification as part of the guest worker program. Perhaps we can address that in written questions. I thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Verdery appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, gentlemen, very, very much. Mr. Verdery, since you mentioned the Visa Waiver Program, as you know, two terrorists entered the country on the Visa Waiver Program: Mr. Moussaoui and the Shoe Bomber, Mr. Reid. As you also know, there are 27 countries, there were 15 million people who came in a year ago on Visa Waiver, and no one knows whether they left or not. You also know that there is great pressure to expand the program. The rejection rate of Visa Waiver is 3 percent. In other words, if you are a country that rejects more than 3 percent of the--has 3 percent or more of the visas to come here rejected, you are not eligible. Well, these countries have like 20 percent rejection, 25 percent rejection. I don't know whether you know or not, but there are tens of thousands of Visa Waiver country passports that are stolen, international travel documents, Geneva Convention travel documents that are stolen, international driver's licenses that are stolen. What do you think happens to those? People buy them. They are in the country that is part of the Visa Waiver Program, and they come into this country, and we do not know who they really are. Now, some of us have had a bill to tighten up passport fraud. Use a forged passport illegally, you know, it is a go-to-jail card, which it should be in my view. Having said that, I think, you know, we are with this dilemma. The bigger these programs get, the more people come here and stay, the more you swell the undocumented population, which creates this backlash in America which prevents us from doing a number of things to reform immigration. Mr. Bond, you mentioned that there are systems that could provide the kind of exit program, and you mentioned coordinating them with the I-94 document. I am not asking you to declare a winner and a loser in the competitive race for this, but what kind of a system would be most practical, would be doable, and satisfy verification simply that a visa holder has left the country? Mr. Bond. Well, I think in the near term there is no perfect solution right now. You could attach RFID to the I-94 and know that the I-94-- Chairman Feinstein. You could attach--go ahead. Mr. Bond. RFID technology on the form. Chairman Feinstein. Right. Mr. Bond. It could actually go on the form, and so you know when the I-94 has left. Now, if that were combined with random testing of some leaving, the visitor who is getting ready to leave thinks, well, there is some chance I may be pulled out and checked, and so you have some additional security. Ultimately what they are looking at is-- Chairman Feinstein. Is that costly to do that, to attach it to the I-94 form? Mr. Bond. No. I think compared to some of the alternatives, that would be considered a very low-cost factor. Chairman Feinstein. And so that would be a chip. Is that correct? Mr. Bond. Yes. Chairman Feinstein. That essentially would have biometric identifiers? Mr. Bond. No. In this case, it would have--currently, it would just simply transmit a unique number, which then, when read on the other end, that separately connects to a secure data base that tells you what that number corresponds to. This is where I used the example of your license plate. It does not really tell you anything, but when combined with the DMV data base, then you know who that person is. That could be done today, but, again, if it is attached to the form, it only tells you the form has left. If you combine it with some random testing, you get some more discipline in the system perhaps. They are looking at ways to use a biometric on the form-- and this is where you heard concern about safety and ergonomics--so that it perhaps might have a biometric on the form so when my thumb is read, that releases the identifier. So then I know that not only is it the I-94 but it is my I-94 because it read my finger. Chairman Feinstein. Fascinating. Mr. Bond. But that is not here today, I want to be clear about that. Mr. Verdery. Senator, could I just jump in? Because, again, the air side is a key. You do not need all this for the air side. You have people there. You have connectivity. Chairman Feinstein. You do not need all this what? Mr. Verdery. You do not need these forms and this kind of RFID. You have the person right there who can be fingerprinted. So the air side, it is just a question of where you put it--at the checkpoint, at the counter, at the gate. You have the person right in front of you, can put their fingerprints down, two, four, ten, or whatever. And then in terms of the visa waiver question, if people who come in, fly in from France or Japan or a new country, South Korea, and want to leave for a day trip to Mexico, that is fine. They come back in. But they still would have to leave the U.S. by air, ``exited,'' checked out. You would know they left within 90 days. And if their country does not compile a sterling record, it is out. It would solve the problem that you eloquently described. Mr. Stana. Senator, can I add a note of caution to the RFID discussion? Chairman Feinstein. Please. Mr. Stana. One of the things that concerns me about the discussion of using a card or a key fob and pressing your thumb to it as you leave at X number of miles an hour is that I have witnessed Border Patrol agents at Border Patrol stations and I have witnessed inspectors at the ports trying to take fingerprints. Taking fingerprints is nothing that is easy, that you can just put your finger on a form while you are talking on the cell phone going through a port at 35 miles an hour. Maybe technology will catch up, but currently it is very difficult to get readable prints that would satisfy the biometric identity requirement of the law. Prints, you know, are pressed too hard, or too soft; it could be raining outside, or be foggy. As a result the technology does not pick up the print. The car's glass could be tinted. You might hold the I-84 too close to your body. There is any number of reasons why it won't work as planned. There might be a solution down the road, but right now I think it is a bit optimistic. Chairman Feinstein. So come up with a better one. Mr. Stana. Well, right now--what can we do right now, I guess is your question. Right now there is no good solution, and unless you want to embark on a $3 to $5 billion building program--and I do not think any of us want to do that. There might be something downstream a little ways that we can rely on. Right now we might be able to build somewhat on current trusted traveled programs, but, again, you are basically keeping honest people honest. People who enroll in those programs are not a threat. They are likely to leave. But it is a start. The other thing I would do is I would look to non-US-VISIT, non-trusted traveler programs to see if we can get there through different means. Senator Cornyn mentioned more effective work site enforcement, beefing up ICE agents to search out visa overstays. If you do the math, Senator, there are about 5 million visa overstays in the United States--12 million illegal alien times roughly 40 percent estimated to be overstays, you get about 5 million overstays. ICE has between 200 and 300 agents out looking for them right now. And if you consider the numbers, you would see they are not going to get very far, and it explains the 200 apprehensions figure that Mr. Mocny mentioned a few minutes ago. So that is one way we can do it. We can beef up intelligence services to try to get our line of defense up so we do not let dangerous people in to begin with. We only know to stop those on the watchlist, and there are ways we can improve those lists. And then, of course, there's the work site. If people are coming here to find work, fine. We can acknowledge that and create a temporary worker program. Or we can enforce the work site rules and reduce the size of that haystack, so to speak. But until a technology solution presents itself, I think we need to take interim steps. But I would caution against taking a step that would lead us to a large investment that would not ultimately be the solution we are looking for. Chairman Feinstein. My time is up. Mr. Bond had wanted to respond. Do you mind, Senator? Senator Cornyn. No. Mr. Bond. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein. Just one additional point. While I agree that the technology is not there today, you had mentioned, Chairman Feinstein, your desire for at least a starting point. And I guess if I could, I would say a common denominator you may be hearing here is some combination of faster flowing vicinity read along with bringing some percentage of the folks out for a real fingerprint biometric test so there is some discipline or decent chance of discipline in the system. But that might be a starting point for you and the Department to discuss. Chairman Feinstein. Just one quick comment. I think Mr. Stana is right about the fingerprint. I think they are very difficult. You have to have very trained people. They do take time, and I am not sure that that is the right biometric indicator to use for this. What piqued my interest was the I-94 form that is simple, that is a piece of paper, but that Canadian officials and Mexican officials at least at places collect. Maybe there is a way of temporarily building on that. Mr. Bond. That would let you know, as I said, that the form had left. You do not have real correlation between--certain correlation. Chairman Feinstein. We understand that. We understand it is imperfect. Mr. Bond. But it would be the starting point, right. Chairman Feinstein. I mean, China, you know, you go into China, and you get a piece of paper, and you fill it out. It is in triplicate. And you give it out at various places, and when you leave, you provide one piece of paper, too. They know you have left. Mr. Bond. I think all I was trying to suggest is just as we do at airports pull some people out for a little bit closer examination, you may do that with some percentage of the folks going across the land borders. Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Sorry, Senator. Go right ahead. Senator Cornyn. No problem. We have a former State elected official in Texas who likes to, when she is traveling around the State on the stump, talk about the Yellow Pages test and her conviction that Government should not do anything that you can find provided by a private party in the Yellow Pages. And I think there is a lot of merit to that. But I am struck by the fact that I can carry a card like this around with me, provided by the financial services industry, and I can transfer funds at a store, at a money machine, virtually anywhere in the world. And in the United States, in talking about the various incremental changes we have made to try to adapt to a post-9/11 environment, we have, for example, Mr. Stana, you mentioned the Secure Border Initiative, which is a huge project that has been announced by the Department of Homeland Security. I think, Mr. Verdery, you talked about the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, which will require American citizens to have a passport or passport equivalent just to go back and forth to Mexico or back and forth to Canada, out of the country. We have the laser visas that we issue to Mexican nationals. We have the port security bill we passed late last year that requires workers at ports to carry cards that will demonstrate they have gone through the appropriate background and security check. And we have this proliferation of programs and cards. And what I worry about a little bit is that Government is just so slow and we do things in such an incremental way that the wisdom perhaps of a program that seemed like exactly the thing we needed to do 5 years ago after 9/11 has sort of been overcome by subsequent events. I would be interested to know, and perhaps get a comment from each of you, about whether there is anything that you would recommend we do to reduce or minimize that problem in order to address the concerns that we are talking about here today. Mr. Stana, do you have any thoughts? Mr. Stana. Well, yes, I have a few thoughts. First, you mentioned a number of programs--SBI, WHTI, US- VISIT, and so on. There is an alphabet soup of border security programs--NEXUS, SENTRI. If they are not well coordinated and funded on a level where they complement each other, I think we might be at a point where we are creating chains with a lot of weak links. A great US-VISIT Program is not going to be any good if you can walk 2 miles down the border and cross without detection. So that is one point. The second point is let's define what the goals are. What are we trying to achieve here? If we are trying to achieve a criminal-and terror-free country, then I would want to beef up entry, because I think experience has shown that sometimes terrorists they do not exit alive. If I am looking for immigration control, I would-- Senator Cornyn. If I could just interject there, the problem is when they get in, not them leaving. Mr. Stana. Exactly. Mr. Bond. Because they are going to do their damage, and we-- Mr. Stana. They are going to do their damage and they do not care if they leave. If you are looking for immigration control, there are any number of programs and methods of getting at overstays without a US-VISIT system. The trick is identifying them. I would point out we ran into this identification and location issue with the old Alien Registration Program. I don't know if you remember, but every January, aliens used to have to go to the post office and fill out a card about their whereabouts. And many filled it out, and many did not because they did not want to be found. And that is the problem that ICE has now. Even when US-VISIT sends them the names of overstays, trying to find people who do not want to be found is extremely difficult. We all leave electronic fingerprints everywhere. You pointed at your credit card, and somewhere, if you used it today, there is going to be a record of you using it. If you do not want to be found, you do not us the you do not use the card and those records will not exist. So if we are trying to find overstays and if overstays is the problem we are trying to address, you probably do not need a US-VISIT system or have to rely solely on a US-VISIT system to get there. You might find another way to at least start doing that. But I would agree with the proposition that we ought to know who is in the country and we ought to have some way to assure our border security and our internal security, but maybe we do not need to wait until the US-VISIT technology is mature enough to give us that assurance. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Stana, your comments remind of--I think I have seen or read about cell phones that are being marketed to parents because they have the capacity to be tracked by global positioning systems so they can determine where their children are. Mr. Stana. That is true. The same with the video surveillance technology with cameras everywhere. I have been told that there probably are not too many hours of the day--and those hours are probably at home in your bedroom while you are asleep--where you are not recorded on some camera, either passing by an ATM machine or being in a CVS pharmacy. Senator Cornyn. I am not suggesting we issue cell phones to all of our visitors when they come to the United States, but, clearly, the technology exists if we can figure a way to direct it in a way that is most constructive. I know my time is up, but I would appreciate it, Madam Chairman, if Mr. Bond and Mr. Verdery could respond. Chairman Feinstein. Please, go ahead. Senator Cornyn. Thank you. Mr. Bond. Thank you. I will be very brief. I think that that, as was alluded to here, Government should define the mission, the objectives, and the prioritized requirements so that you can get started, and then sit down with those folks in the Yellow Pages who are the technology leaders, many of them in Texas and California, and figure out what is possible, what is possible in the near term, what really are longer-term considerations so you can begin to match the technology with the prioritized requirements. Senator Cornyn. Thank you. Mr. Verdery. Senator, just a few points. One, I completely agree with the need to synergize and look at these programs holistically. There is a new office at the Department that started last year, the Office of Screening Coordination. That is their exact job, to look at these credentialing programs and find out where the gaps are, where the benefits are in coordination. And they are trying to do that. I think in terms of the land systems, if you could get a system where the Western Hemisphere Passport Card or a State- issued passport card was online with RFID, you retrofitted the Border Crossing Cards or laser visas with RFID, you have people with the new e-Passports--it is a different kind of RFID, but it would still probably work--you essentially have gotten to the point where most people are coming in with an RFID capability that could be tracked inbound and outbound; you have gotten far down the road for the land borders. The other question would be, as Mr. Stana mentioned, on the entry side, the ten-print conversion that you have heard a lot about is unfortunately moving rather slowly. This was announced in the summer of 2005. Those machines are out there. They are being tested, but we are not talking about full implementation now until the end of 2008 at our consular posts and ports of entry. And they are not the big giant, bulky ones you saw before. They are very smooth and work well. So I think that is an entry security enhancement that is ready to go from a technology basis. Chairman Feinstein. Just by way of having a bit of discussion here until we have the vote and can excuse the panel, I want to go back to the national security implications. There is a lot of pressure on us economically, ease everything, let people come in--largely, a lot of businesses. I have had California companies, I have had others come in to me. They run big operations. They want more and more and more people. On the other hand, you have to look at it as to whether we are going to be a country that respects a border at all, and we have always been a sieve. People have come, they have gone, and we now find ourselves wanting to have some security, some knowledge, with huge immigration problems that grow every year. Senator Cornyn and I got interested in the last Congress in something that is called the OTM, the Other than Mexican, who comes across the Mexican border. And we see those numbers burgeoning, and we see more people appearing from Middle Eastern countries who come into the country illegally through Mexico--all of which sends a signal, you know, there could be a problem. And I do not know how we sit here and just shrug our shoulders and say, well, it does not appear to be doable, without trying different things. And I do not think the perfect should be the enemy of the good. I think we probably do not worry about the fingerprint on it, but just at least if you give in a piece of paper when you leave, that is a record that that individual has left. And so I am really interested in following this through and trying to get a continuum of technology where, for a modest investment up front, you can begin to get this correct accounting and then build on it as the technology improves. So if anybody has any ideas, at least I--and I hope Senator Cornyn, too--would be interested in receiving them. Would you like to make any further comment? Senator Cornyn. Just one last comment, Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much again for convening this hearing. This is important to me and my constituents in Texas and I submit, to the Nation, for the reasons that you have mentioned and we have discussed here today. But I think there is also a risk that we need to acknowledge, and that is, a false sense of security. I am reminded of the recent raids by ICE on the Swift Meat Packing Plant companies across the country. This is a company that participated in a voluntary program, as you know, called Basic Pilot to be able to verify that, in fact, their employees could legitimately work in the United States. So they were sort of the good guys participating in it. But what they did not realize is that a large percentage of their employees were using forged documents, which Basic Pilot does not reveal. And so while it is true that they were--that because they participated in the Basic Pilot program, they were immunized from certain penalties that might otherwise attach to those who hire people who cannot legally work in the country, they suffered millions of dollars of business disruption because, in fact, they were under the false impression that if they just complied like a good citizen with the Basic Pilot program that they would be protected. And they were not. So this is another way to look at this problem that we have got to solve as we address all these other issues. Chairman Feinstein. I really agree with that, and this is really about bringing order out of disorder. And I think it is worth it to do it, and I think it makes it easier for us to do some of those things like a guest worker program that you referred to, Mr. Stana, because there is so much hyperbole. People's emotions swell so greatly around this issue. And we cannot go out and represent to anyone that our borders are enforced. We just cannot do it. And that is a very terrible situation. So my very strong view is that we have to walk before we run, that we should work on, even if it is a paper system, whatever it is, to try to bring about a continuum of order and have it cost-effective. So, once again, any suggestions would be more than welcome, and I really want to thank the witnesses for being here. I hope to continue this conversation. I know Senator Cornyn, Senator Kyl, and Senator Kennedy would like to as well. Thank you very much. The vote has started, and the meeting is adjourned. 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