<DOC> [106th Congress House Hearings] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access] [DOCID: f:71388.wais] H.R. 220, THE FREEDOM AND PRIVACY RESTORATION ACT ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON H.R. 220 TO AMEND TITLE II OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBERS ISSUED UNDER SUCH TITLE, TO PROHIBIT THE ESTABLISHMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF ANY UNIFORM NATIONAL IDENTIFYING NUMBER, AND TO PROHIBIT FEDERAL AGENCIES FROM IMPOSING STANDARDS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS ON OTHER AGENCIES OR PERSONS __________ MAY 18, 2000 __________ Serial No. 106-206 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 71-388 WASHINGTON : 2001 _______________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois DOUG OSE, California ------ PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent) DAVID VITTER, Louisiana Kevin Binger, Staff Director Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian Lisa Smith Arafune, Chief Clerk Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois JIM TURNER, Texas THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania GREG WALDEN, Oregon MAJOR R. OWENS, New York DOUG OSE, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York Ex Officio DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California J. Russell George, Staff Director and Chief Counsel Heather Bailey, Professional Staff Member Bryan Sisk, Clerk Trey Henderson, Minority Professional Staff Member C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on May 18, 2000..................................... 1 Text of H.R. 220............................................. 3 Statement of: Bovbjerg, Barbara, Associate Director of Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, U.S. General Accounting Office; Fritz Streckewald, Associate Commissioner for Program Benefits, the Social Security Administration; Charlotte Twight, professor and privacy expert, Boise State University; and Robert Ellis Smith, editor, the Privacy Journal.................................................... 27 Paul, Hon. Ron, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas................................................... 12 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Bovbjerg, Barbara, Associate Director of Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of.............................. 29 Horn, Hon. Stephen, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, prepared statement of................. 10 Kleczka, Hon. Jerry, a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin, prepared statement of.................. 25 Paul, Hon. Ron, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, prepared statement of............................ 15 Smith, Robert Ellis, editor, the Privacy Journal, prepared statement of............................................... 61 Streckewald, Fritz, Associate Commissioner for Program Benefits, the Social Security Administration: Information concerning impact of elimination of retirement earnings test............................... 78 Prepared statement of.................................... 40 Twight, Charlotte, professor and privacy expert, Boise State University, prepared statement of.......................... 52 H.R. 220, THE FREEDOM AND PRIVACY RESTORATION ACT ---------- MAY 18, 2000 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, Committee on Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen Horn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Horn and Turner. Staff present: J. Russell George, staff director and chief counsel; Heather Bailey, professional staff member; Bonnie Heald, director of communications; Bryan Sisk, clerk; Elizabeth Seong and Michael Soon, interns; Michelle Ash and Trey Henderson, minority counsels; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk. Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, the hearing of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology will come to order. This is the fourth in a series of subcommittee hearings on the issue of privacy. Today, we will examine proposed legislation that would prohibit Federal, State, and local government agencies from using Social Security numbers as identification numbers, except for Social Security and tax purposes. H.R. 220, the Freedom and Privacy Restoration Act of 1999, sponsored by Representative Ron Paul from Texas, in addition to limiting the use of Social Security numbers, the bill would prohibit government agencies from asking individuals for their Social Security number. The proliferation of personal information on the Internet, in combination with the broad use of the Social Security number, has caused a growing concern over protecting citizens against a rising tide of identity theft associated frauds. When the Social Security number system began in 1936, its purpose was to identify individuals who receive benefits from the Social Security retirement system. Over the years, however, the use of this number has expanded far beyond its original intent. Today, the social number is used as a personal identification number by State and local agencies, utility companies, universities, and a proliferation of private businesses. Credit bureaus use the number to maintain individual consumer credit histories. State income tax officials use it to identify tax filers. Numerous businesses that sell personal information, offer financial services, and provide health care also rely on the Social Security number. These companies use the number to assess personal credit ratings, locate assets, maintain health records, and ensure that individuals comply with a variety of rules and regulations. Clearly, there is a need to protect personal information. There is an equally compelling need to ensure the integrity of Federal programs. Today, the subcommittee will examine whether H.R. 220 is an appropriate balance between those needs. I will add that we will have a future hearing with individuals that relate to this problem, such as universities across the land, State governments, motor vehicle operations, county registrars. I welcome our witnesses today and look forward to their testimony. [The text of H.R. 220 and the prepared statement of Hon. Stephen Horn follow:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.009 Mr. Horn. The gentleman from Texas hasn't arrived yet, but we will begin with the other gentleman from Texas. We have with us the author of the bill, Hon. Ron Paul, a Member of Congress from Texas. STATEMENT OF HON. RON PAUL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS Mr. Paul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate this opportunity and I want to thank you for holding these hearings. The issue of privacy certainly is getting the attention of many people in this country and starting to get the attention of many Members of Congress. I do have a written statement that I would like to submit. Mr. Horn. Without objection, your prepared statement will appear in the record. I might say that the minute we introduce any witness here their full statement goes in automatically. Mr. Paul. And I would like to add there is one letter that came from a constituent and I would like to submit that letter as well. Mr. Horn. Without objection, that letter will also appear in the record. Mr. Paul. The issue of privacy certainly has been catching the attention of a lot of people. Last year I introduced this legislation to try to deal with it because we do hear from a lot of our voters who are saying that the Social Security number is being used too often and improperly. In a technical sense, they are right. They are right in the sense that in a free society they are not supposed to be monitored by the Government the way the Social Security number monitors us. When we established the Social Security number in 1935 or 1936, it was never intended to be a national identifier. In 1970, the Congress passed a bill called the Bank Secrecy Act. That sounds like maybe it would preserve secrecy, but it did exactly the opposite. It made sure the banks knew more about us and the Government got hold of more information. Congress responded in 1974 by passing the Privacy Act, and it too sounded good and has a very good sentence in there that says the taxpayer and voters will be protected and the Social Security number cannot be used as a national identifier. But unfortunately, in the same piece of legislation, it said that Congress can enact anything they want and mandate the use of the Social Security number. So Congress since that time has ignored the good statement and picked up on the other statement that said that they do have the authority, according to the Privacy Act of 1974. And Congress has not been bashful. There are 40 different programs now that use the Social Security number as the identifier. And in 1996, there was a giant leap forward to even expanding this more so because the Immigration Act was written with a mandate for the Transportation Department to develop a national identification card through our drivers' licenses. Fortunately, with some effort, we have been able to rescind that authority. But also in 1996, the Health Insurance and Portability Act established a need and authority to set up a national data bank and to have a national medical identifier. And today, with the Government being so involved in medicine, it was argued that this would make it more efficient for Government to monitor and manage medical care because the Government is dealing with the HMOs and this will make it more efficient. And there is some plausibility to that particular argument, but it also invites the risk, just as happened so often. What looks like a good program always has a down side. The down side is that the Government is going to have all our medical records. And as a physician, I certainly think that is a very dangerous thing because our Government doesn't have a real good record for protecting our privacy. They should be protecting our privacy and there is a lot more time spent invading our privacy. We do hear stories and they are not limited to one administration where the IRS has been abusive and has been used to invade our privacy. We have also heard about FBI files being abused. So the American people are very, very frightened by all this. My theory on why we heard so much from our constituents this year on the census wasn't that the census was that more onerous--I think the questions were probably similar to what has been going on for the last 20 or 30 years because they have always asked a lot of questions--but I think the American people now are much more nervous about giving information to the Government. And that is why I think they were complaining so much and worried about it. And even within the census, they have introduced an idea that they were going to expand on the monitoring approach by having a test in there they actually ask as a test 21,000 people for their Social Security numbers to see what they can learn and how well the people would respond. So if we don't pay more attention to this, soon the census will be monitored and our numbers will be used to report our numbers and our names to the census. Already today just about everything we do needs a Social Security number. If we're looking for a job, birth certificate, death certificate, bank accounts, medical care--the list goes on and on--drivers' licenses. In most States, you can't even get a fishing license without a Social Security number. This invites trouble. And one of the worst down sides to this is that by having a universal identification number, it is a good way to bring all our information together of every individual. If we don't do it, we are in trouble with the Government. And once the information is brought together, the job of identification theft becomes relatively easy. All you have to do is get the Social Security number. And because of Government mandates, we have set it up for them. My bill deals with this. You can't use your Social Security number for anything other than Social Security. And take away the mandates. Don't tell the States--well, in order for you to get your highway funds, you will put the Social Security number on your drivers' licenses--we wouldn't be able to do that, either. So this is a broad approach, a serious approach, there is a lot of support for it, but I also understand very clearly the arguments against it because they talk about Government being less effective. They believe they can cut down on fraud if they use the Social Security number. But the real purpose of Government in a free society is not to make the Government efficient. The purpose of Government in a free society should be to preserve our freedoms. To me, privacy is equivalent to if not synonymous with freedom. So if we are carelessly willing to sacrifice so much of our privacy and so much of our freedom for the argument that Government may be more efficient, I think is a dangerous direction to be going in. So this is the reason I bring this to you. I appreciate very much your willingness to listen and look at it because I don't think this issue is going to go away. And I think the nice part about it from my viewpoint--from a civil libertarian viewpoint--is that it isn't a right-wing conservative issue and it is not a left-wing liberal issue. It is a civil libertarian issue which brings in a lot of people from both sides. And although we get a lot of support and understanding on the need for this, there is also the great hesitation to endorse this because they are frightened about what it might do in handicapping the efficiency of Government. And I will be glad to yield for questions. [The prepared statement of Hon. Ron Paul follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.013 Mr. Horn. Let me ask you about Medicare. When we drafted the Medicare bill--and I was on that team in the Senate staff in 1965--we followed essentially how Social Security had done it and we modelled the Medicare part on it. Now, would you permit the use of the Social Security number for medical files in Medicare, since it is needed to make sure there are real people getting benefits and not somebody that has a number--and there is no question there is a lot of misuse of the number in terms of people looking at the dead and all the rest. If it hasn't been changed in Baltimore, I guess they get away with it. But we will get some testimony on that later. But how do you feel about including Medicare with a Social Security number. Mr. Paul. My first thoughts are psychologically, in my mind, without thinking it through in detail legally--I think of Medicare and Social Security being pretty close together. I think if that were the only problem, I don't think I would be here with this piece of legislation. But I think if we were to use it for Medicare, it could be very, very strictly limited to that with the idea that that is part of the Social Security system, because I think of it as the same. I think of it as the same. But I think when you get into the other medical programs, whether it is the managed care system the Government has so much to do with or the Medicaid system and on and on, then I would not be nearly that generous. I would say that you should have another identifier because there will always be the efficiency argument, whether it is an educational program or a medical program. But strictly limited to Medicare for the protection of the individuals I think is very important. Mr. Horn. In the testimony we expect to hear on the next panel, it will be pointed out that if there isn't a common identifier when Government agencies attempt to locate that it creates a problem. For example, dead-beat dads, people with similar names may be mistakenly identified and there is a real problem where the people aren't submitting their alimony ordered by the court, they move across county lines in California or they move across State lines. How would you address that problem if your bill became law? Mr. Paul. I think States faced this problem prior to the time we had Social Security because I don't think of dead-beat dads as a separate issue. I think that is a problem of someone not paying their bills and meeting up to their financial responsibilities. So I would say that is a State issue. And if you are dealing with a cross-State problem, then those two States have to get together and work it out. But prior to even the 1960's, we didn't have that because it was only in the 1960's when we started really using it. And even in the 1970's when we dealt with all the financial accounts--we didn't even have the Social Security numbers on our tax returns until 1961. So I would say that that is not the job of the Federal Government or the Congress to facilitate this collection. This is a very serious problem, but prior to the Social Security number, it was handled as adequately as it is today, I am sure. Mr. Horn. Well, I remember one study we had a few years ago on Pell grants. Those are the ones that generally help the State schools and colleges. One person was eligible on Pell grants in terms of the information he showed at the student financial aid office, but actually he was a millionaire, and that was found through interconnection of his Social Security number with that in the tax record. Does that bother you? Mr. Paul. It bothers me that fraud was committed, but I do not think that we eliminate the prosecution of fraud by preserving freedom for the large majority of people. We shouldn't sacrifice the privacy of 99 people because you might catch one person that is going to commit fraud. I don't think we sacrifice our ability to pursue fraud because there would be ways of finding out if this person lied. But at the same time, you don't want to penalize and assume somebody is guilty of something and put a tremendous burden on them to follow so many of these privacy laws and let the Government accumulate this information. I think the supposed benefit is not worth the sacrifice of personal liberty. Mr. Horn. My last question, and then I'll turn it over to my colleague, Mr. Turner, your colleague from Texas. The written testimony of some of the second panel witnesses suggests adding a penalty section. What is your view of that idea? Mr. Paul. A penalty? Mr. Horn. If you misuse the Social Security number, should there be a penalty? Mr. Paul. I certainly think there should be a penalty on the U.S. Government when they misuse the Social Security number. But we should just prohibit by law the abuse of the Social Security number and then there would be--I think they use it because they have been granted the authority to use it and we encourage it. As we set up a new program, we are always anxious. The Social Security number is great. So we literally have it from cradle to grave now. Are you thinking about a businessman misusing the Social Security number? Mr. Horn. Your bill, if it was put on the law books, do you think there ought to be a penalty section to make sure that the people obey that particular bill? Mr. Paul. And you are referring to Government people? Mr. Horn. I am referring to anybody who uses the Social Security number, because I am assuming that is what you are banning in your bill. Mr. Paul. I hadn't thought about that, and maybe I am overly optimistic that if we pass a law and say ``Thou shalt not use the Social Security number,'' I would expect that we wouldn't use the Social Security number. I would think that if it were abused and the Social Security number was being forced on a State or Congress kept passing these laws, I guess the only penalty would be eventually at the polls. The American people would have to invoke the penalty. Right now, I think we are getting close to that point where the American people are getting nervous about the invasion of their privacy and it is an issue that they would like to hear more about from us. Mr. Horn. So you don't feel that a penalty section is needed? Mr. Paul. Well, at the moment, I don't. But I would have to admit I haven't thought it through completely and I would certainly be open to suggestions on that, if I could see the need for it. Mr. Horn. Well, I thank you and I now yield to the gentleman from Texas, the ranking member here, Mr. Turner for an opening statement as well as questioning the witness. Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Paul, a fellow Texan. It is always good to have Texans before our committee. There is another bill that Mr. Kleczka has that would ban the use of the Social Security number in both the public and private sector. I know you addressed that in your opening remarks, but expand on that a little bit. Why, if you fear the use of the Social Security number by Government agencies contributes to the invasion of our privacy, why wouldn't you just tell the private sector they shouldn't use it as well? Mr. Paul. Well, I deal with that but a little more indirectly because if the private sector uses that number mainly because we have made it convenient for them to use it and we have mandated it too often when it comes to financial records--I mean, we tell the banks what to do--and anytime we do anything we put the pressure on them to use that number. Then they accumulate the information and they are tempted to sell it and do whatever. I think the fact that we do get them to accumulate all this information makes it much easier for identity theft. But I don't think the answer to our problem is dealing with another set of regulations on business people. Like last year when we passed the banking legislation, we said that what we needed to do was make sure that some of this information isn't transferred within a certain corporation or closely in-line corporation. But what that actually did was mandated more forms to be filled out, which means there is more information accumulated under the Social Security number. I think the abuse in the private sector comes as a secondary consequence. If we weren't using it so much, there would be no reason for them to do it. But I don't see the answer coming by just putting another constraint or another form to be filled out by the private sector. I don't see that's where the problem is. Mr. Turner. So you think the private sector would just slowly quit using the Social Security number? There are obviously multitudes of records that have all of us identified by our Social Security number. Mr. Paul. If we didn't tie it all together, I think they would lose their enthusiasm for using it. I don't see a convenient way of saying--we could say it, but could you imagine telling every individual that they are not allowed to use it? That means that we would have more snooping to make sure that nobody ever asked somebody for their Social Security number. But I think the abuse in this area should be dealt with on a property rights issue, fraud issue, local issue, but not by leaving the system in place and coming up with more of a rule. And this is our temptation here, instead of looking at the basic problem, we are more tempted to come in and set up more rules and regulations on the private sector and not dealing with the source of the problem, which was our carelessness in allowing the universal identifier to be developed. Although it is not admitted that it is here and we have had a couple of victories like ``Know Your Customer''--that is something I don't think too many of us supported and they withdrew it. That was more banking regulations. As well, there was the National I.D. Card Authority. We got that removed. So we have minor victories, but I don't think overall we have reversed the trend. The need for, the desire for, and the so-called benefits of a universal identifier are very, very strong. I think that is where the problem is and not with the private sector participating in the use of a Social Security number when they probably don't even need to. Sometimes you wonder why so many businesses are always asking you for these Social Security numbers, even when it's not the law. But people have been so conditioned to do it. So we have the Government mandating the encouragement, everybody accepts the Social Security number, and then we have businesses sort of jumping on. So I think the solution is back to making sure that we do not establish the principle of a national identifier. That is what my bill deals with. Mr. Turner. Have you been able to address the cost of the abandonment of the use of the Social Security number by the Federal Government agencies? Mr. Paul. No, not directly. But I know the cost of not doing it is very, very high in terms of privacy and individual liberty, and that is the cost I am looking at because there is such an intrusion as a cost-in that we facilitate identification theft--so that cost is tremendous. How much the cost would be if we continue with our same type of Federal education programs and medical programs--if they had different numbers, I am not sure there would be a tremendous increase in cost on that. They would just have to come up with a different number. Mr. Turner. I guess there would also be some cost to State governments, maybe even local governments that have come to rely on the Social Security number. Mr. Paul. They would have to quit relying on it. In the State of Texas, you know that it is only recent that we have had to give our Social Security number. It isn't on our driver's license, but that is the direction that we were and probably still are moving in, that every State will have a universal driver's license with Social Security numbers. But we are now required to give it even though it doesn't appear. So there is the connection. The intertwining of being able to monitor and know everything about everybody is the universal identifier, which is the Social Security number. I don't want any pressure--in fact, my bill deals with this. We as a Congress cannot put pressure on the State to use the Social Security number. Maybe your question is saying that the State wants to. I think if we take away the incentive, the pressure, and the mandates, they are less likely to. Mr. Turner. We had a hearing just the other day in this committee on a proposal by Representative Hutchinson to have a study commission on the issue of privacy. I know we have several bills that are moving through the Congress, some regulations that have been proposed trying to protect our privacy. Do you feel that we can point to some specific abuses that relate to the use of the Social Security number where our privacy has been invaded? Do we have some specific examples on a wider scale that might point out the scope of the problem that you perceive to exist? Mr. Paul. I don't think that would be difficult to find. Certainly the notion that we have a medical data bank, and assuming that there would never be a violation is almost too much to believe. And we do know specifically that our Government too often has abused records like FBI records and IRS records and they were never to be used in the political sense. Yet I think both administrations have been guilty of abuse in using these records in a political sense. I think people really are fearful of the Government having their medical records. And we make no in-roads at all--we have made in-roads on the National I.D. Card, but we have made no progress at all in slowing up the National Medical Data Bank with the Social Security number as the identifier. I can't show you an example of how the Government has abused that, but gut instinct tells us it is not a very good idea and the American people don't want it. That I am sure of. Mr. Turner. Of course, the medical records are by and large in the private sector. Would there perhaps be some way to center in on specific areas that are particularly sensitive, like medical records and perhaps do something in that area rather than just across the board? Mr. Paul. But that really confuses the movement toward the universal health care because we are moving in that direction because so much is managed health care and HMOs. Once Medicare starts paying for HMOs, they have to monitor it and they have to make sure that patients don't abuse it, doctors don't abuse it, hospitals don't abuse it. There is always the temptation to abuse the system, so the argument will be that we have to be able to monitor it. They use the idea that we need this information because it is good to study health. We get statistics and we can learn more about medicine. There will be all these wonderful things that they are going to do. So the odds of us developing a medical care system that is being developed and be able to maintain medical records, as I did for 30 years--my medical records were in the office in a filing cabinet and that was it. But now, when you get into the managed care system and the HMO, they can march in and look at your medical records and find out whether you have been abusing medical care. They will just go through your file. For efficiency sake, they want these files changed. If somebody moves to New York, they don't want it the old- fashioned way where you mail the records or the patient carries them, they want HHS to have access to this and just transfer these medical files. That is what is coming unless we are able to stop this. Even my bill doesn't deal with that overall problem as much as it slows it up in that it wouldn't have the universal identifier. I would like to address the medical care system in this country, but that is not what this does. It just says that if you are going to move in the direction of a single payer, universal health care system in this country--which we are moving rapidly toward--that they cannot use the Social Security number so that they can do the matching up. When people want to know about individuals and they have a Social Security number, they can look up and find every piece of property owned, what your bank account is, and what kind of disease you have, it will undermine the practice of medicine like you have never seen it. I have talked to other physicians and the natural tendency is to not keep good medical records. If somebody comes in and has controversial things to talk about, the good doctor is not going to write it down because it is not going to be private. We are moving in that direction. And the other physicians in Congress have admitted that to me already, that they have the same concerns. Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. I just have one comment on this, and that is numberitis. There is a very interesting editorial in the Newark, NJ Star Ledger. The columnist and editorial board notes: ``We are challenged to remember e-mail addresses, office extension numbers, fax numbers, paging I.D.'s, PIN numbers, Web site addresses. The other day I telephoned a greenhouse manufacturer to buy some supplies. The service representative wanted to know my customer identification number. I told the woman I hadn't a clue. Then she asked for a serial number, but I wasn't about to trot out to the greenhouse and copy it down. Finally, she settled for my zip code and, bingo, I was able to place my order. We must be given the third degree every time we want to purchase something. Do we really have to?'' Then it goes on, ``In simpler times, all I had to know was my Social Security number and a couple of phone numbers. Now my head is so loaded with codes and personal identification numbers that it is understandable why my memory bank crashes from time to time. I am not a techie or a geek. Programming isn't my strong suit. I have given up, for instance, the notions that I will ever learn how to program a video recorder. Besides, I have neither the time nor the inclination to sit down and program numerical codes into, say, a palm pilot.'' So there are a lot of aspects of this and we appreciate you coming here. Since my colleague, Mr. Turner, mentioned Representative Kleczka's statement here, if you would like it put in the record here at this point---- Mr. Turner. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kleczka requested that we include his statement in the record. Mr. Horn. Without objection, his prepared statement will appear in the record. [The prepared statement of Hon. Jerry Kleczka follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.014 Mr. Horn. It is rather interesting. He has a bill in also and his bill is H.R. 1450, which is the Personal Information Privacy Act [PIPA]--we are getting just like the executive bureaucracy here. He said H.R. 1450 would allow credit headers to include only names and addresses. The credit headers could include an individual's telephone number only if it is already listed in the phone book. Currently, information such as Social Security numbers and mother's maiden names are available on credit headers, which are not protected by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Under the FCRA, a person can purchase a credit report only if they are making a firm offer of credit or insurance or if they have the consumer's consent. Credit headers, which contain the aforementioned sensitive information have no such protections and may be purchased by anyone. It is a very interesting bill, also. Have you had a chance to look at that? Mr. Paul. Not in great detail, but we have talked about it and we testified in another committee on that. Jerry and I have worked closely together because we have written a letter to the clerk about why our Social Security numbers are on our voting cards. So we can't even vote without Social Security number, but most of us have not paid much attention to it. They claim that they give us a chance to have it on or not, which isn't exactly true. So maybe next go around everybody is going to have to fill out a form on whether we want our Social Security number on our voting card or not. Maybe if we don't have a Social Security number we won't get to vote. Mr. Horn. And they will probably ask us to put the Social Security number on the form we fill out, right? Mr. Paul. That's right. Mr. Horn. Thank you so much for coming. You are going to stimulate quite a discussion nationwide on this, I think. But I think it is a worthwhile endeavor. We will now go then to panel two. If Barbara Bovbjerg, Hon. Fritz Streckewald, Charlotte Twight, and Robert Smith will come forward, we will swear you in. If you have staff behind you that will be possibly testifying, please have them stand up and the clerk will take their names and we will have them affirm the oath. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Horn. We have six people. The clerk will get the names of those behind Dr. Twight. We will start down the line with Ms. Bovbjerg, Associate Director of Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues for the Health, Education, and Human Services Division of the U.S. General Accounting Office, which is part of the legislative branch and does a wonderful job in terms of both programmatic analysis and fiscal analysis. We are glad to see you. STATEMENTS OF BARBARA BOVBJERG, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION, WORKFORCE, AND INCOME SECURITY ISSUES, HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; FRITZ STRECKEWALD, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER FOR PROGRAM BENEFITS, THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; CHARLOTTE TWIGHT, PROFESSOR AND PRIVACY EXPERT, BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY; AND ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, EDITOR, THE PRIVACY JOURNAL Ms. Bovbjerg. Thank you. I am happy to be here. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am really pleased to be here today to discuss uses of the Social Security number. Mr. Horn. I should say one more thing. We all have the written statement. We would like you to summarize it in 5 minutes. If you need 10, we will get to that, but go ahead. Ms. Bovbjerg. I will make it in 5 minutes. Almost 277 million Americans have been assigned a SSN, and because each is unique to the individual, the SSN is frequently used for a variety of purposes. Privacy concerns, coupled with mounting instances of identity theft have raised public sensitivity to this issue. I would like to focus my remarks on three aspects of the topic: the Federal role in the use of the SSN, State and private sector use, and finally the possible impact of restricting the number's use. My testimony is based on a report we prepared in 1998. First, the Federal role. No single Federal law regulates the overall use of the SSN, but several require its use to help enforce the law, determine benefit eligibility, or both. For example, the Internal Revenue Code requires that the SSN serve as the taxpayer identification number. This means that taxpayers must report their SSN when they pay taxes, and their SSNs must also be known to their employers and financial institutions from whom they receive income. Federal law also requires individuals to provide their SSN when they apply for means-tested benefits such as supplemental security income, Medicaid, food stamps. The numbers are used not only for recordkeeping but also to verify income that individuals report. For example, the Social Security Administration matches records with other entities such as the Department of Veterans' Affairs to identify SSI applicants who may also be receiving other benefits, and does so by using the SSN as the unique identifier. Federal law also requires States to use SSNs in their child support enforcement programs, in issuing commercial drivers' licenses, and on a variety of documents such as marriage licenses and death certificates. Federal law generally does not restrict SSN use, except in a few instances. The Privacy Act of 1974 restricts Federal agencies in collecting and disclosing personal information, such as SSNs without the individual's consent. The Driver's Protection Policy Act restricts State governments from disseminating the SSN with drivers' license databases. I would like to turn now to how SSNs are used outside the Federal Government. In our work, we focused on those users who reach the largest number of people: State governments and, for the private sector, businesses that offer health services, financial services, or personal information. State officials say they use SSNs in both administering programs and in enforcing the law. For example, State tax administrators routinely use the SSN as a primary identifier in their tax systems and to cross-check taxpayer income. State driver licensing agencies most typically use SSNs to check an individual's driving record in other States. Law enforcement agencies use SSNs to check criminal records. In the private sector, the health care industry generally uses SSNs as back-up identifiers. Other numbers serve as primary identifiers for patient medical records. But SSNs are needed to trace patients' medical care across providers or to integrate patient records when providers merge. Credit bureaus also use SSNs. Such organizations build databases of consumer payments and credit transactions. Credit bureaus use the SSN as a principal identifier for retrieving credit histories on demand. Most of their customers--insurance companies, collection agencies, credit grantors--provide a SSN when requesting a credit history and can deny credit to individuals who refuse to provide them. In contrast to these administrative uses, businesses that sell personal information collect SSNs for the sole purpose of selling them in a linkage with other information. Generally, these databases use SSNs to facilitate records searches when they are sold to customers like debt collectors, employers, anyone who may want to carry out some form of background check on an individual. Finally, I would like to summarize the possible effects of restricting use of the SSN. Users told us that without the SSN as a unique identifier, data exchanges would be at risk. Tax enforcement would be hampered by not being able to verify income reported. Stewardship of public benefit programs would weaken. States could not readily identify drivers concealing out-of-State traffic violations. Consumer credit histories could not be quickly updated and accurately retrieved. In conclusion, wide use of the SSN is permissible, but its presence in databases creates privacy concerns and fosters the growing problem of identity theft. In considering restrictions on the use of the SSN, these privacy and confidentiality concerns must be weighed against the Government's need for timely and accurate information to prevent fraud and abuse and against the public preference for services, like easy credit, that are enhanced by the use of the SSN. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I am available for questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Bovbjerg follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.019 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.023 Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. We now have our second witness, Hon. Fritz Streckewald, Associate Commissioner for Program Benefits in the Social Security Administration, which most know is an independent agency that reports directly to the President. Mr. Streckewald. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for inviting the Social Security Administration to testify on H.R. 220, the Freedom and Privacy Restoration Act of 1999, a bill designed to limit the use of the Social Security number [SSN]. I will submit my full statement for the record and summarize my remarks. At the outset, let me emphasize that SSA has always taken its responsibility to protect the privacy of personal information in agency files very seriously. For almost 65 years, SSA has honored its commitment to the American people to maintain the confidentiality of the records in our possession. We have longstanding and effective practices to maintain individuals' privacy. Initially, the only purpose of the SSN was to keep an accurate record of the earnings covered under Social Security and to pay benefits based on those earnings. The Social Security card is a document SSA provides to show what SSN is assigned to a particular individual. In spite of the narrowly drawn purpose of the SSN, use of the SSN as a convenient means of identifying people in records systems has grown over the years in steps often taken for good reasons, such as, in the public sector to help enforce laws, protect the public treasury, and collect funds from delinquent non-custodial parents. My statement for the record summarizes how legislation enacted over the years has expanded this use. While there are concerns that expanded use of a SSN as an identifier can compromise personal privacy, there are those that believe that the public interest and economic benefits are well served by these uses of a SSN. For instance, all Federal benefit-paying agencies rely on data matches to verify not only that the applicant is eligible for benefits, but also to ensure that the benefit paid is correct. The SSN is the key that facilitates the ability to perform the matches. We actively participate in data matches to ensure the accuracy of Federal and State benefit payments, to verify whether applicants are eligible for benefits, to undertake debt collection activities, and to safeguard program integrity. For example, our data matches with Federal, State, and local prisons save the Social Security in the supplement security income programs about $212 million annually and our national matches of death records save about $240 million annually. In addition, we verify SSN for employers to ensure correct posting of wages and for other Federal benefit-paying programs to help reduce their program costs. The data matching process is highly efficient, especially for programmatic benefits, which allows SSA to more quickly determine continuing eligibility and to ensure correct payment amount. SSA's estimated savings total about $700 million annually from computer matches for the Social Security and SSI programs and savings for other Federal, State, and local programs total about $1.5 billion annually. Mr. Chairman, SSA is very concerned that H.R. 220 would severely limit our ability to perform data matches and would restrict data exchanges which benefit the public. SSA and other Federal, State, and local governments use these data exchanges to ensure accurate payment of benefits and to verify eligibility. Limitations or foreclosures of such data exchanges would undermine SSA program integrity initiatives, cost about $2.2 billion in lost savings to Federal, State, and local government programs, and erode public confidence in SSA's stewardship of the SSA programs. Even though there are attempts to provide an exception for Social Security use of the SSN, the language in the bill is not clear as to whether SSNs could be used as the Social Security claims number for benefits. It is also not clear as to whether the exception would apply to the use of the SSN for SSI purposes. I understand that SSA's Inspector General, in a statement he is providing for the record at this hearing, has many of the same concerns about H.R. 220 that we have. We share Representative Paul's concerns about the expanded use of the SSN in every phase of society. However, at the same time, we have an obligation to ensure that benefits are paid only to eligible individuals and that the correct benefit is paid. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, by using data matching, SSA and other benefit-paying agencies validate that the correct amount is paid only for an eligible beneficiary. The expense of trying to obtain information from other agencies without a unique identifier would be prohibitive as well as labor intensive. In addition, we must carefully weigh the balance between protection of individual privacy rights and the integrity of the Social Security programs. We look forward to working with you to find the right balance and I would be glad to answer any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Streckewald follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.032 Mr. Horn. Thank you for that statement. Now we lean to a scholar in the field on this subject, and that is Dr. Charlotte Twight, the professor and privacy expert, Boise State University. Welcome. Ms. Twight. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Horn and members of the subcommittee. Thank you very much for inviting me to testify today. In addition to my written statement, I also request that a copy of my article entitled, ``Watching You: Systematic Federal Surveillance of Ordinary Americans,'' distributed last November to each Member of the House by Congressman Ron Paul, be included in the hearing record. Mr. Horn. Without objection, the referenced article will appear in the record. Ms. Twight. Thank you. I strongly support the spirit and the purpose of H.R. 220. My research suggests that without new measures such as H.R. 220 that significantly roll back the Federal quest for centralized information about American citizens, programs currently underway will inexorably tighten Federal monitoring and therefore control of American citizens. Today the Social Security number [SSN], has become the key to detailed Government portraiture of our private lives. federally mandated SSN-linked databases now incorporate detailed information on every individual's employment, medical history, educational experiences, and finances, right down to each check that every person writes. Even the Secretary of Health and Human Services now describes American SSNs as a de facto individual or personal identifier. SSNs were not supposed to be used in this fashion. They were supposed to be mere account numbers denoting an individual's old-age insurance account within the Social Security program. But expansion of SSN use came quickly. President Franklin D. Roosevelt began in 1943 by requiring all Federal departments and agencies that wanted to create records identifying individuals to utilize exclusively the Social Security account numbers. But the full impact of Roosevelt's order was not felt until the 1960's when gradual computerization made SSN-based record systems increasingly appealing. The IRS began using SSNs as taxpayer identification numbers in 1962. The SSN became the Medicare identifier in the 1960's. And thereafter SSN use spread unabated. As William Minor, writing the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Programs, described it: ``By the 1970's, the SSN floodgates had opened fully. Congress in 1972 amended the Social Security Act to require the use of SSNs for identifying legally admitted aliens and anyone applying for Federal benefits. In the following years, additional legislation required the SSN for the identification of those eligible to receive Medicaid, AFDC benefits, food stamps, school lunch programs, and Federal loans.'' Moreover, the 1970's Bank Secrecy Act required all financial institutions to identify customers by SSNs and preserve detailed records of their customers' personal checks and other financial transactions. The Privacy Act of 1974 did not stop the flood. Incrementalist policies continued to advance SSN use, as illustrated by the gradual introduction of requirements for Social Security numbers for young children. For approximately 50 years of the Social Security program, one did not acquire a Social Security number until beginning one's first job, usually around age 16. Today, as you know, every child must acquire a SSN at birth or shortly thereafter. That process culminated in 1996 when Congress passed a requirement that a SSN must be presented for anyone of any age claimed on Federal tax forms as a dependent. In addition, as part of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, the Federal Government mandated creation of a SSN-based Directory of New Hires at both the national and State level, covering every working individual in America who enters the work force or changes jobs. Privacy concerns raised by these developments are further magnified by recent Federal commitment to establish a national electronic database tracking each person's personal medical history and new Federal powers to track every child's educational experiences through a variety of Federal entities. My research indicates that unless H.R. 220 or similar legislation is passed, the coordinated Government effort now underway to require even greater use of SSNs will further centralize Federal monitoring of all American citizens. This effort includes Federal mandates governing State drivers' licenses and birth certificates, Federal work authorization databases, Federal development of a unique health identifier for each American, Federal implementation of expanded education databases, and finally Federal development and issuance of new tamper-resistant Social Security cards, perhaps with biometric identifiers, viewed by many as a precursor of the long-feared national identity card. Moreover, with the SSN now at the heart of a vast array of Government databases, linkage of those separate databases occurs routinely despite periodic statutory lip-service to individual privacy. Against this backdrop, H.R. 220, in my view, is an important step in the right direction. It would repeal many of the privacy-eroding uses of SSNs that I have described this afternoon. I have made several specific suggestions in my written statement aimed at closing some loopholes that may exist in the bill's present language. In my view, we are at a crossroads. Today, many people are so accustomed to massive Government monitoring of their lives that all too often they ask, why should people worry about Government monitoring if they haven't done anything wrong? That current and prospective levels of Federal monitoring of American citizens are incompatible with the ideas of freedom upon which this country was founded never crosses their minds. Pervasive Government extraction of personal data, stored and linked via compulsory use of SSNs, is today's reality. The threat to privacy is clear. And in the absence of privacy, political and economic freedom cannot long endure. The restrictions contained in H.R. 220 represent our first real chance to counteract the erosion of privacy that has taken place through the burgeoning use of SSNs. In supporting H.R. 220, however, let us not forget that the ultimate solution to the existing Government threat to personal privacy is restricting the power of Government to interfere in people's lives. The quest for information about private citizens, after all, is a byproduct of the vast substantive powers now wielded by the Federal Government. Dr. Richard Sobel of Harvard Law School has stated that centralized information is centralized power. I would add that the converse is also true: with today's technology, centralized power is centralized information. With its fine existing provisions and the modifications I have suggested in my written statement, H.R. 220 perhaps can be a first step in reducing both centralized information and centralized power. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Ms. Twight follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.038 Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. That is very helpful and we will have further dialog on some of that you have mentioned. Mr. Smith--Robert Ellis Smith--is editor of the Privacy Journal. We are glad to have you here. Mr. Smith. Thank you, sir. We have really worked ourselves into an illogical situation, I think, in our country where we are relying on the Social Security number as an authenticator of a person's true identity, yet it is no longer a private number. Either we have to rely less on that number as an authenticator, or we have to find a way to make it a confidential bit of information. Doing the latter is going to be highly unlikely and very difficult. Congress contributed a lot to this dilemma; so I think it has a burden to come up with a solution. This bill, H.R. 220, is really commendable for its brevity and its simplicity. I would like to do two things in my testimony: show that the bill will not be disruptive to governmental agencies and outline some of the objections that people have to being enumerated. Mostly people have said that they object to Social Security use because of ``privacy,'' but I think the concerns are deeper than that. First, universal identification, whether it is de facto as we are close to having now or whether it is required by law, simply gives too much discretion to those who are in authority to demand that one's papers be in order. That is the kind of domestic passport that we have disparaged in South Africa and eastern Europe. Second, being known as a number, not a name, is dehumanizing and we pay a big price for that. When people feel that they are dehumanized, it makes brutality, violence, and criminality a lot easier to do. The best place to look is in a prison, which is a dehumanizing environment because a person is not known by the name of his or her choice. We should also look to prisons for another lesson, too. That is an environment where everybody is positively identified by number and name, yet they are certainly environments of criminality, fraud, and other behaviors for other reasons that we are all aware of. Look also to the military, where everybody is positively identified by name and by number. I am sure the incident of criminality, fraud, and the like is roughly equivalent to what it is in the non-military world. Next, many Americans have a fundamental religious objection to being enumerated that goes back deep in our history. I have just completed a book about the history of privacy in the United States and found that this goes back to colonial times and contributed to many of the early objections to census- taking. Next we should realize that assigning surnames and assigning numbers to people has really been a means of social control throughout the history of not only this Nation but other countries as well. In fact, the introduction of surnames was a governmental invention, not a family invention. I believe that the need to carry a Government I.D., which is what we are moving toward, would really remove the spontaneity of American life, the intellectual risk-taking, the informality that other cultures have come to envy in the United States. Since the 1990's, there have been very compelling, pragmatic reasons to why we have to protect Social Security numbers, and that is the epidemic of identity theft. And I use that term intentionally. It has become an epidemic. The spigot for Social Security number availability on the Internet and through so-called information brokers has been the ``header information'' phenomenon that you described. Representative Paul's bill and Representative Kleczka's bill, taken together, would really chop the phenomenon of identity theft roughly in half. And that is the reduction in fraud that we should realize. We think of abandoning Social Security numbers as an invitation to increase fraudulent activity. In fact, it will have the opposite effect, I believe, and cut down on identity fraud. Mr. Turner asked for victims. There are probably thousands of victims now of identity theft, including the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the present president of the Associated Press, both of whom were subject to identity fraud solely because a stranger got a hold of their Social Security numbers, something that would not have happened without this header information phenomenon that you outlined. I would like to talk about some of the alternatives to Social Security numbers. There are lots of organizations that do quite well without using either Social Security numbers or any numbers whatsoever. Back in the 1970's, IBM discontinued using a Social Security number as an employee identification number. They do use it for payroll purposes. Now, by law, higher education institutions in both Wisconsin and Arizona are prohibited from using the Social Security number as a student identification number. Stanford University, for instance, has used a unique number for many years without the Social Security number. And the largest collector of information in the whole world, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, does not use the Social Security number at all. It was once suggested to me that we should look to genealogists to try to figure out ways to keep track of people accurately without Social Security numbers because for most of that database there are no Social Security numbers. Congress can help a lot by pushing the Government to look toward biometric identifying devices. This is essentially the matching of a physical aspect of a person to prove his or her identity positively. It would do away with the need for numerical identification, do away with a lot of personal information, intrusive forms--no more mother's maiden name, none of that--and I think it would be a much more less intrusive way of establishing identity, if it is done correctly. And we shouldn't worry that Americans can't tolerate more than one identity number. Canadians for many years have had both the health identifying number and a social insurance number. A couple of suggestions for the bill--and I am about to conclude--one is that State tax authorities ought to be authorized to use the Social Security number. That is a compatible purpose with the purpose for which it was originally submitted as a Federal taxpayer identification. Second, I would hope that this bill would make clear that nothing can compel a family to require that a child 16 years or younger must be enumerated. There are lots of coercive requirements in the Government to make this necessary. Now we have in the United States something that all of us thought would never happen: an enumeration requirement from birth. The Internal Revenue Service requires that in order to get a credit or deduction for a dependent, one must produce a Social Security number, even if that is an infant. And if the family happens to be on public assistance, there is a requirement that they have a Social Security number from birth so that many nurses in maternity wards now say they don't care about the name of the child, they simply want a Social Security number so that they can complete their paperwork. Many people, like myself, simply have to do without the deduction because I am not about to decide for my children that they should be enumerated before they can do that on their own. And I don't think that ought to be necessary. I think we ought to have a prohibition against requiring children under the age of 16 from being enumerated. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.043 Mr. Horn. Thank you. We will now proceed to some of the questions we have. Mr. Turner and I will divide it 10 minutes on a side each. Let me start with the representative from the General Accounting Office. You mentioned that most of the States give people the option of having another identifier on the drivers' licenses. How effective has that been in giving citizens added protection against fraud? Ms. Bovbjerg. If I said most, I want to correct that because I am not sure that that is true. Some States do give people the option of having another number. And this is sort of an emerging position on the part of the States. We haven't assessed how extensive it is. I think it is everyone's hope that not having it on your driver's license does help protect you from cashing a check and having someone take that number. Mr. Horn. Has the separate identifier made it tougher for the Division of Motor Vehicles to keep track of the drivers? Ms. Bovbjerg. That is among the many things we don't know about this. Most States keep the Social Security number in some way, either on the license or they have linked it to this separate identity number for data matching with other States. Mr. Horn. What is your judgment as to different alternatives of numbers that aren't the Social Security number? Is it just each person in an agency, or an agency and its personnel to start their own numbering system? What does GAO see as the relevant alternatives? Ms. Bovbjerg. When I think about a system where each Federal program has a different system of numbering, one of the things I am concerned about is how you carry out your program stewardship responsibilities as the Federal Government. As the Social Security Administration stated earlier, there are a number of programs where data exchanges with other agencies help verify program eligibility or the level of benefit eligibility that people have. Without that, you are relying on self-reported information. Surely the overpayment cost would rise in such a situation. Mr. Horn. But say--and this is a true situation--in my district there is a house in which 20 different people live and they all have the same name. How do you separate that out? And should you? And does it matter? Ms. Bovbjerg. I think that it matters for certain types of uses. It matters to me, for example. My name didn't used to be so complicated. My name used to be Davis. And it mattered to me that I had a lot of difficulty cashing a check because I was constantly confused with all these Barbara Davises bouncing checks. So it might matter to an individual. But that might differ among individuals as to how inconvenient that is. It matters a great deal to certain Federal programs that you have a unique identifier for an individual so that you can assign--in Social Security's case-- their earnings to their account. In the IRS case, so you know they are paying their taxes and you are not looking at tax avoidance on the part of the wrong person. There are a number of other Federal programs--I think we mentioned Pell grants earlier and student loans are another example. Mr. Horn. This is an actual case. In the Eisenhower administration they were putting together a delegation to go to the International Labor Agency in Geneva. We found that people had exactly the same name, born in the same city in the State of New York, and had gone to school at the same time, and the interesting thing was that one was a communist and one wasn't. And yet that person who wasn't was going to be bounced because of this communist file, etc. And it wasn't somebody duplicating files or anything, it is just sheer chance. So how do we solve that if we don't have something like a Social Security number that might help us differentiate between these people? Ms. Bovbjerg. One of the things we have thought about--and we were thinking particularly of the private sector and less of the Federal Government-- is that it would make their jobs harder if they couldn't use a unique identifier. But it does not make their jobs impossible. Now I am getting into a technological area that I can't go very far into, but then could we relational databases where you can look at a number of fields and, by combining them, create a unique identifier. But I am not sure that that is a comfort if the concern is protecting privacy and keeping personal information from being disseminated widely. I think that in the private sector an inability to use the Social Security number will make things harder. It won't be as convenient for businesses. But they won't go out of business. There will be a way to figure out how to identify one Barbara Davis from another. Mr. Horn. Would any of you like to comment on these questions and the answers? Does Social Security have a view on this? Mr. Streckewald. We are in agreement that without a unique identifier--as far as we know the Social Security number is the only unique identifier that is widely used--it is very easy to confuse John L. Smith of Lincoln Avenue with John L. Smith of Lincoln Boulevard. And for a lot of purposes--not only that you don't want Mr. Smith's credit on your credit account if you're not him--but also to make sure that we pay the right people. We agree that it would be very difficult. The relational databases she is mentioning are feasible, but I think in the end they tend to do the same thing. You have to connect them so that you know who you're dealing with. Mr. Horn. Any thoughts on this, Dr. Twight? Ms. Twight. One thought that I have is that when we are trying to weigh these things out, we are always going to have difficulty because the increased administrative costs associated with doing something other than having the Social Security number used as the all-purpose identification--those administrative costs are tangible and measurable. The costs on the other side, in terms of loss of personal privacy, freedoms--those sorts of things, loss of personal autonomy--are by definition intangible and hard to measure. So I think that is an important thing to keep in mind when we are trying to balance these things out. Mr. Horn. Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith. Historically, the Social Security Administration has had to deal with people who are using duplicate Social Security numbers and there are many people using more than one Social Security numbers. There are tie breakers, in the case of this home in California. There are--as the witness from GAO said--now techniques that we have that incorporate other aspects of a person's identity that we can use. Nothing in Representative Paul's bill, first of all, prohibits the Social Security Administration from continuing to use that number. Nothing prohibits any Federal agency from using a unique identifier. What is prohibited is that they can't use the same one. I think that is doable. Mr. Horn. How about having a modern type of reader for one's hands or fingerprints or whatever, but something so that when you go into a light there that apparently differentiates people. Presumably, then, the only people who might have it is your bank or something else. But it wouldn't be something that other people are likely to have without--it's hard to change your fingerprint. Mr. Smith. Exactly. And that is biometrics. And one of the values of it is that it tells only who you are. It tells nothing more about you. It doesn't tell how many kids you have or what you like to do at home. If implemented properly, it could be a less intrusive technique for establishing identity. What we don't know at this point is the reliability rate. Most of them are no more than 60 to 70 percent as reliable as a fingerprint. Second, the real danger is that we will be tempted to use a DNA sample as the identifier, and that is an aspect that tells more about you than your identity. It will take in diseases and predilections for certain problems in the work place which could be extremely discriminating to people. If it is implemented properly, I think biometrics is the less intrusive way to establish identity. Mr. Horn. Any other reaction to that? Is biometrics---- Mr. Streckewald. Mr. Chairman, for Social Security purposes, the Social Security number works very well. As long as we continually look to tighten our enumeration process, we feel that for Social Security purposes, for posting wages, for doing data matches with other Federal, State, and local governments that the Social Security number works fine. We are in the process of implementing recommendatins contained in a recent Inspector General report. And at this point, there is no need for biometrics. The Social Security number was not meant to be an identifier. It only says that there is a number that relates to this person. It doesn't prove identity. Say that this person in front of you is necessarily that person. We use it for recordkeeping. Mr. Horn. And you don't see any biometric that you could use? Mr. Streckewald. We haven't fully explored that yet. Mr. Horn. Does GAO know about other Government agencies exploring that? Ms. Bovbjerg. I don't. That would be something I could get back to you on. Mr. Horn. If you would, I would appreciate it because I know I have looked at some of that equipment in various places and it could be used by Customs, Immigration, and so forth. Ms. Bovbjerg. I know that HHS has looked at the possibility of Biometric Identifiers for purposes of the unique health identifier. That is one of the things listed in the report they came out with a while back. And I think that there are some questions and difficulties in terms of how much of a threat to personal privacy that will actually represent. I am not as sanguine about it as some of my colleagues here at the table. Mr. Horn. Thank you for that comment. I now yield 11 minutes to my colleague from Texas, the ranking member, Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I need some help on how you can calculate the cost of a piece of legislation like this. Obviously, if you're going to force the Federal agencies to abandon the use of the Social Security number, they are going to replace it with some other number. And I suppose that if you are against using an identifier, you might be against using any number. But I guess the problem I see is trying to figure out how you would accomplish this and at what cost would it incur. Do any of you have any suggestions? Has GAO looked at this to see if there is any way you can estimate the cost of a bill like this? Ms. Bovbjerg. Well, often we will ask CBO to do it. But in this case I presumed that the bill prevents the Federal Government from coming up with any kind of replacement for a unique identifier. In considering the cost of the bill, I was actually thinking less about administrative costs than about the overpayment cost or the inability to collect on debt owed the Federal Government. And I think Dr. Streckewald has some figures on what Social Security and other agencies get from the current data matches they do. The cost could be something in that order of magnitude. Mr. Turner. What information do you have, Dr. Streckewald? Mr. Streckewald. Mr. Streckewald--thanks, though. [Laughter.] Yes, that is how we have looked at this. We have no idea what it would cost to manually match notices. But we do know what we save from data matches. Social Security is both the recipient and the source of numerous data matches. We save about $350 million a year from Title II data matches that we sent out daily to other agencies to verify income sources that Title II beneficiaries have. And we save about $350 million there. We save another $325 million from the SSI Program doing the same thing, sending out data and getting it verified. We have been heard and there have been estimates within the agency that about $1.5 billion a year are saved by the State, local, and Federal Governments that send us information to verify and we verify the Social Security amount. So there is a lot of money involved, $2.2 billion total just in the matches. We are also concerned about our ability to collect debt. There are three tools that we use that we think this bill may jeopardize: the tax refund offset, which we use to offset refunds if people get to pay back their overpayments; the treasury offset program, which is broader than just going to tax refunds; and then referring or reporting to credit bureaus delinquent debt. In 1999, we collected $84.4 million using these techniques and we aren't sure if they would be available to us in the passage of this bill. Mr. Turner. Mr. Smith, wouldn't there be some way to continue to use the Social Security number because so many businesses are using it, and so many Government agencies are using it--but in areas where we want to be sure we protect access to the data that is identified by the Social Security number, we add some additional number as a part of the Social Security number--would that be helpful rather than simply abandoning the use of the Social Security number? Mr. Smith. I don't think this bill does abandon the use of it. It seems to me it coerces Federal agencies to use different identifying numbers. A couple of ways, if you find the costs are too much-- simply giving an option, the way the Privacy Act does, that an individual may not be declined benefits because of a refusal to give a Social Security number. Perhaps for 10 percent of your database you are going to have people with other nine-digit numbers assigned at random. I don't think that is unduly costly. Another way, possibly, is to fix the language in the current bill that says you can't use a derivative of a Social Security number. Just using the last four digits with other randomly assigned numbers, Federal agencies can use it as a tie-breaker and can establish identity without sacrificing privacy. Agencies ought to look into that, too. That is another very real possibility. Among the savings in cost will be a reduction in identity theft by 50 percent. That is mostly a private sector cost, but it's growing more and more. And you will save money from a lot of false matches. The Veterans' Administration finds a lot of false matches when they run a match based on a Social Security number. People quite often misstate one digit and that gives you a false match. And that is a very costly process to unravel that. So you will save that money as well. Mr. Turner. The first suggestion you made was basically to give an individual the option of whether they use the Social Security number. Mr. Smith. Yes. Mr. Turner. I can understand from an individual's perspective that that gives that person the option of trying, in that way, to preserve their privacy. But it seems like we ought to be dealing with this issue on a little broader basis. If it is important to protect the privacy of one person, it seems that it ought to be important to protect the privacy of all. So just to say that you are going to give people the option--which I would think would create a lot of confusion within the various agencies for people who say they don't want their Social Security number used--that you would be better off approaching this problem and being sure you are trying to institute and create ways to protect the privacy of everyone. Mr. Smith. You would protect the privacy of everyone if the option is available and it says in the law that you need not present the Social Security number if you wish not to. That would establish for a lot of people the right to say no, which is essentially what they want. So it is not tailor-made just for a tiny few individuals. It is really how the Privacy Act provision on Social Security numbers was intended to work. I recommend this only as an alternative. If it turns out that this is going to be an extremely costly endeavor--I don't think it is going to be a costly endeavor. For instance, the State of Maryland manages all their motor vehicle records with no Social Security number at all. They use some of these modern techniques that I speak of. Now, to convert to some of these other techniques--one of these is Soundex--there is going to be a cost, but I think the Federal Government is going to face that eventually. They are going to have to convert to those other identifiers because we can no longer rely on a system that relies on a Social Security number to authenticate your true identity and yet makes that number a public number. That just doesn't make sense. Mr. Turner. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. I just have a few questions to pursue, and here is one of them. How does the Government account for people who refuse the Social Security number with regard to retirement benefits and Government services? What do we do on that? Mr. Streckewald. Social Security requires that you give us your Social Security number in order to receive benefits. Mr. Horn. Do you know if private pension systems use that? Mr. Streckewald. I don't. Mr. Horn. Did GAO look at that? Ms. Bovbjerg. I believe that private pension systems would have to use it because of the tax affiliation. Private pensions are one of our largest tax expenditures. Mr. Horn. Are you aware to what degree, say, IRS has problems with the members that don't have any Social Security number? Is that a problem with IRS? Ms. Bovbjerg. It would be a problem not to have one, but I don't know what the extent of that problem is. Mr. Horn. And then those that serve in the military, of course, does their dog tag include the Social Security number? Or do they just have their own? I see nodding heads that they use their Social Security number. Explain to me a little bit, Mr. Smith, the Soundex personal identification searcher. How does that work? Mr. Smith. Well, the way I understand it, it incorporates other factors in a person's name, address, birth date, even occupation, and makes it into essentially a digital formula. It can also be altered over time because one's address may change with time. It is, what I would call, a covert number. I never see it. It is simply a formula that identifies me. Whenever I present myself at an agency, they use the same algorithm to identify me. The beauty of it is that when you have an applicant in front of you with name and perhaps birth date and address, you can retrieve the 10 or 12 closest matches and then either the computer or the individual can choose precisely the match you are looking for. You can't do that with a Social Security number. If a person is one digit off, you aren't going to get a match. So I think these modern techniques are more reliable in getting matches. Mr. Horn. When we are talking about maybe rolling back the use of the Social Security number, is there any rational way you can think of to peel it back? And if so, where would you start, besides the Government? Mr. Smith. I would say it may be used only for Social Security purposes, its original intent, and tax purposes. One of the logics is chronological. Those were the first two. They were both established by law, not by Executive order or bureaucratic happenstance. They are closely allied purposes. They also now have become extremely ingrained and to stop those would be extremely disruptive. It would not be as disruptive to discontinue some of the other uses that have taken hold since the 1960's. Mr. Horn. Any other thoughts on that and how we peel it back and which ones don't really need the number or could figure out another way to have a number of their own origin? Have you taken a look at that, Dr. Twight? Ms. Twight. I agree with what Mr. Smith said. Mr. Smith. I think you identified the difficult question and that is Medicare. I am not prepared to answer that one. That is a tough one. Mr. Horn. Especially when we think there is $30 billion of fraud there. Mr. Smith. Well, it is so closely allied with the Social Security system as well. Mr. Horn. Exactly. There are interchanges there with Medicare and Social Security still? Mr. Streckewald. Yes, as far as I know. Mr. Horn. Because they are under HHS and you're independent, you're still talking to each other? Mr. Streckewald. We sure are. We actually have some data matches with them, too. Mr. Horn. What does GAO think about the peel back movement? Where would you start? Ms. Bovbjerg. Well, when you were asking this, I was thinking--and I can tell you the exact name of the law in a minute--the Drivers' Privacy Protection Act seemed to have the potential to make some difference. That was just upheld by the Supreme Court a couple of months ago. It prohibits States from disclosing Social Security numbers for purposes like surveys, marketing, solicitation. They can no longer sell them as part of their motor vehicle drivers' license database without the express consent of the individual. And it is too early to know whether that makes a difference, but it is data sets like that or birth certificates and things like that where the private sector sellers of personal information get the information that they sell. Mr. Horn. Well, that's helpful and we will be asking other panels as to where they think they can peel this thing back a little bit and just not have everybody find out everybody else's Social Security number because it is getting to be pretty open. In your survey, did a number of Federal agencies say they were using any individual identifiers or were thinking about it or what? Ms. Bovbjerg. When we did our survey, we actually talked to States and private sector users. We didn't talk to Federal users in the same way. We talked more about what the laws require and what the restrictions were. So we didn't ask that question. Now that you're having this hearing, we wish that we had. Mr. Horn. What about the States? We can look at them as a prototype of us. We are just a little bigger up here. Ms. Bovbjerg. The States said that they would have trouble not using the Social Security number. A particular place is State taxes because they link their information to Federal tax information, Federal income information to try to do verification. They mentioned law enforcement as being an issue for them. I think in motor vehicles they would like to continue to use the number. They are still required to use the number for the commercial driver's license. But I think that was less of a concern to them than the law enforcement and tax enforcement areas. Mr. Horn. Has any scholar ever done a book on what the Government was like before 1936 in terms of identifying people? Ms. Twight. Not that I am aware of. Mr. Horn. It seems to me that would be a pretty interesting Ph.D. dissertation. Mr. Smith. Prior to 1935, very few people had a contact with the Federal Government so there weren't that many databases. Mr. Horn. And that is one good reason why they didn't have it. It was a simpler world. People cite technology as one of the vital factors in identifying theft and fraud. I am the author of the Debt Collection Act of 1996 and I have a letter here now from the general counsel of the Department of Treasury as to what the effect of Mr. Paul's bill would have on a lot of things such as debt collection. And that would bother me because there are a lot of people who are just chiselling the taxpayers. That is what got me started in that little endeavor. A guy got a loan from the Farmer's Home Loan crowd and has this great ranch up in Sonoma County and then he defaults and they give him another loan to live in Santa Barbara, which is a rather pricey place, and there we are. We don't think the taxpayers' money should go that way. Mr. Smith. I would like to point out that characters like that also know to use different Social Security numbers; so we shouldn't rely on that number to catch crooks. Mr. Horn. Before the technological revolution, personal information like Social Security would take an investigator weeks to obtain because none of the information was centralized. This is no longer the case. Information is in one central location or just a few keystrokes away. Do you feel that is a realistic summation of the problem? That is just too easy now to find out so easily about people? Mr. Smith. Yes, definitely. The data systems are built and then privacy is an afterthought. Security is an afterthought, too. Mr. Horn. Do you think it would be more effective to boost internal security on the distribution of the national identifier by Federal, State, and local agencies? Or what would you do to sort of limit that? Mr. Smith. When you have six to a dozen States that display it on the face of the license, I think the damage is done. You cannot put the Social Security number back into a confidential box, I am afraid. That is why a new identifier might have that potential. It could be truly a confidential bit of information that only the bearer would know. Mr. Horn. Does anybody else have a comment on that approach? Dr. Twight. Ms. Twight. I have a general comment. I wanted to share just two sentences from legal scholar, Paul Schwartz, who was writing in the Hastings Law Journal, ``Personal information can be shared to develop a basis for trust, but the mandatory disclosure of personal information can have a destructive effect on human independence.'' And he went on, ``Totalitarian regimes have already demonstrated the fragility of the human capacity for autonomy. The effectiveness of these regimes in rendering adults as helpless as children is in large part a product of the uncertainty they instill regarding their use of personal information.'' And then in the very next paragraph, he talks about how that has occurred in America to some degree, how people in America no longer know how their information is going to be used. And with these universal identifiers that we see represented now in the form of the Social Security number--it creates a lot of pressure for conformity that perhaps would not otherwise exist. Mr. Horn. Any other comments? Mr. Streckewald. Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to Mr. Smith's comment about systems being built without security in mind. As you consider this bill, you need to also consider that Congress has seen fit to pass several laws that address this issue. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act has a number of safeguards built into data matches, the type of things that are in question here. We have to specify the purpose of the match in a memorandum of understanding. We have to verify the information we derive from the match prior to acting on it. So we cannot lower someone's check just because the data match tells us that without verifying it. We have to give the person an opportunity to contest the information. We have to have security procedures in place to protect the data, and we have to strictly limit redisclosure. Social Security takes that even further. We personally go onsite and visit every agency that we share data with or from whom we get data to make sure that they have the security procedures in place and are capable of following this law. Mr. Smith. I would like to comment that that proves my point. Computer matching began in 1976 and 1977 and the bill came much later than that, in 1988. I was there at the creation. So first came matching and after came the security precautions. Ms. Bovbjerg. I just have a couple of thoughts. One is that we have kind of been assuming that people's Social Security numbers are used entirely without their involvement. And it has been our observation that people freely give out their Social Security number. I don't think people think about it very much anymore. It is difficult to keep such a thing confidential when people at various retail outlets ask for it and people give it to them. The other thing I wanted to respond to is the idea of a new number that would be kept confidential. First, we would have to do a better job than we have done with people and how they safeguard their Social Security number. But my mind reeled as I thought of the prospect of how the Federal Government would actually accomplish this in any reasonable period of time--277 million people being re-enumerated. So there would be an administrative cost I would be concerned about. Mr. Horn. But nobody has given us any. Does GAO want to make some guesses as to what the cost would be one way or the other? Ms. Bovbjerg. We never guess at GAO. [Laughter.] But I can tell you that anytime you do anything at the Social Security Administration that affects all cardholders, it costs a huge amount. We talked a year or so ago about the counterfeit-proof card and what it would cost to create such a thing. And the range was something like $4 billion to $10 billion. And that is because anytime you do anything for 277 million people, it ends up costing a lot. So my guess is that it would cost a lot. Mr. Horn. Now that we have locked in Presidents from putting their little hands in the Social Security trust funds, maybe they will have more money for administrative analysis. But right now, we have to appropriate that for administration? And you can't use what is in the trust fund? Am I right on that? Mr. Streckewald. Yes. If the new card were to go beyond the purposes of what the Social Security card is currently used for, we could not use the trust funds to pay for the cost. Mr. Horn. Are there any other points you would like to make before we adjourn this hearing? Dr. Twight. Ms. Twight. I wanted to comment on the point that was just made about private people's willingness to divulge their Social Security numbers for seemingly the most trivial of business transactions. I recently had an experience at the Bon Marche in Boise, ID where I forgot my charge card and they just asked me for my Social Security number and I refused to give it. But in any event, it seems that today so many people are willing to just divulge that Social Security number. My theory is that this gradual process by which the Social Security number has been used for everything--you have little kids growing up who have had the Social Security number since birth and so on--that people have become sort of desensitized to what that represents. So I think that makes it even a larger problem than we might otherwise think. Mr. Horn. Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith. I would like to defend people, if I may, with two examples. I gave my Social Security number as a young person entering law school. Six years later, it shows up on the label of my alumni mailing to me so that it was open to the whole world. I didn't know the consequences of that when I provided my Social Security number. I provided it to an authority figure and figured that it was required. I opened a bank account and was asked for a Social Security number because the Department of Treasury requires it. My bank was sold to another company that now wants to use it as the access code to get my account information over the telephone and use it as the last four digits of the PIN number. I didn't provide it for that purpose. So I think people ought to be defended. They give out the Social Security number to authority figures without knowing the consequences of how it might be used later for secondary purposes. Mr. Horn. I think you are absolutely right. I have had so many people tell me that. And I know in a couple of cases when I have said, ``It's none of your damn business,'' they looked at me like I was a crook. So be it, and they didn't get the sale. Mr. Streckewald. Mr. Chairman, this bill could impact Social Security, even though we are actually exempted from some of the restrictions on it. We think it would interfere very much with our pledge to the American people to deliver services. For years, our informal motto at SSA has been to pay the right check to the right person at the right time. This bill could interfere with all three of those. Paying the right check, of course, is dependent upon knowing other sources of income. Without the data matches we have, either we would have to rely upon manual error prone processes or we would not be able to do them at all. So the right check would be in question. Paying the right person is the same idea. The Social Security number is a unique identifier. We know which John Smith we are dealing with, so the use of Social Security numbers allows us to know that we get the right check to the right person. And then the final piece, the right time, is referring to timely service so that people don't have to wait for their check. They don't have to wait for changes in the amount of their checks. Manual processes take a lot longer than automated computer matches, although we have no way of knowing right now exactly how much longer. It may create an additional burden on the American people to come and give us, on a regular basis, the information that we currently receive from these matches. These are just some of our concerns about this bill. Mr. Horn. Now, I am sure you are following the legislation we have already worked on in the last couple of months, and that is to relieve you of having to worry about this person having extra income to work and just wiping that out. Will that help you in the sense that it doesn't matter who they are--and I think we have wasted a lot of administrative time, probably, in Social Security to try to get some poor soul that has $500 a month in a check and she is working in a local hardware store at minimum wage. Won't that help you when we knock that out? Mr. Streckewald. I am not sure if I understand your question. Are you referring to---- Mr. Horn. We are talking about the employment thing I am talking about. I was curious how many thousands of people you have worrying about that, because we are going to relieve you of that. Mr. Streckewald. I see. You are talking about the elimination of the retirement earnings test. Mr. Horn. That's right. Mr. Streckewald. That will definitely relieve people of reporting their earnings to us who are past the retirement age. You are right, there. Mr. Horn. So we are looking at about 900,000 beneficiaries that might be affected by that. How many employees could you let go because they are no longer figuring that, or harassing people, or whatever? Mr. Streckewald. We haven't done that analysis yet, but I would be glad to submit something to you if we have anything. Mr. Horn. I really would like to have that analysis and put that in the record, without objection, at this point because we are wondering at that. There are a lot of things you have to do and that is not going to be one of them anymore. I think everybody is going to be happier and they will have more money and it wasn't helping that much anyhow. But we have to argue and they go through our district offices because they have seen a deduction from their check and wonder what that is all about and they have to worry about writing out a check themselves when they don't have the money. So I would hope that is relieving you of a lot of work. Mr. Streckewald. We will look into it. Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. I would like the response put at this point in the record. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1388.044 Mr. Horn. Thank you. You have all been very good witnesses and we have learned a lot. This is simply the first hearing to take a look at this situation. And I understand that the Ways and Means Committee that does have authorization on Social Security is also doing that. So maybe something good will come out of it. We thank you for coming here and sharing. And I will say to anyone else here that might want to file a statement, if you could file it in the next 2 weeks, we would be glad to put it in the record because I know a lot of groups at the State level, motor vehicles, the universities, and all the rest would like to get their views in on it, and we welcome them. With that, we thank you and we thank the staff here: Russell George, the staff director and chief counsel; Heather Bailey to my left and your right, the professional staff member who put this one together; Bonnie Heald, director of communications is here; Bryan Sisk, clerk; Elizabeth Seong, intern; Michael Soon, intern; Trey Henderson, the counsel for the minority; along with Jean Gosa, the minority clerk. And we thank Mr. Mel Jones today for being the court reporter. With that, we are adjourned. Thank you. 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