<DOC>
[106th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:61036.wais]
THE STATE OF SECURITY AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NUCLEAR WEAPON
LABORATORIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 26, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-103
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-036 cc WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
TOM BLILEY, Virginia, Chairman
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JOE BARTON, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas
FRED UPTON, Michigan RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Vice Chairman SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER COX, California PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma ANNA G. ESHOO, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California BART STUPAK, Michigan
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREG GANSKE, Iowa THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma GENE GREEN, Texas
RICK LAZIO, New York KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
JAMES E. ROGAN, California DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona LOIS CAPPS, California
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
Mississippi
VITO FOSSELLA, New York
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
James E. Derderian, Chief of Staff
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
FRED UPTON, Michigan, Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
CHRISTOPHER COX, California HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BART STUPAK, Michigan
Vice Chairman GENE GREEN, Texas
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
GREG GANSKE, Iowa DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ROY BLUNT, Missouri JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
ED BRYANT, Tennessee (Ex Officio)
TOM BLILEY, Virginia,
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Browne, John C., Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory.... 106
Curran, Edward J., Director, Office of Counterintelligence,
U.S. Department of Energy.................................. 17
Habiger, Eugene E., Director, Office of Security and
Emergency Operations, U.S. Department of Energy............ 12
Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Independent Oversight
and Performance Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy....... 6
Robinson, C. Paul, President and Laboratories Director,
Sandia National Laboratories............................... 50
Tarter, C. Bruce, Director, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory................................................. 92
Turner, James, Manager, Oakland Operations Office, U.S.
Department of Energy....................................... 101
Weigand, Gil, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Strategic Computing
and Simulation, U.S. Department of Energy.................. 97
Material submitted for the record by:
Angell, John C., Assistant Secretary, Congressional and
Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of Energy:
Letter dated December 14, 1999, to Hon. Fred Upton,
enclosing response for the record...................... 140
Letter dated June 16, 2000, to Hon. Fred Upton, enclosing
response for the record................................ 212
Browne, John C., Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
responses for the record................................... 168
Inlow, Rush O., Deputy Manager, Albuquerque Operations
Office, Department of Energy:
Letter dated November 29, 1999, to Hon. Fred Upton....... 121
Letter dated December 13, 1999, to Hon. Fred Upton....... 126
Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Independent Oversight
and Performance Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy,
responses for the record................................... 187
Robinson, C. Paul, President and Laboratories Director,
Sandia National Laboratories, responses for the record..... 174
Tarter, C. Bruce, Director, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, letter dated December 13, 1999, to Hon. Fred
Upton, enclosing response for the record................... 129
Turner, James, Manager, Oakland Operations Office, U.S.
Department of Energy, responses for the record............. 162
(iii)
THE STATE OF SECURITY AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NUCLEAR WEAPON
LABORATORIES
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on Commerce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton
(chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Upton, Cox, Burr, Bilbray,
Ganske, Bryant, Bliley, (ex officio), Stupak, and Green.
Also present: Representative Wilson.
Staff present: Tom DiLenge, majority counsel; Anthony
Habib, legislative clerk; and Edith Holleman, minority counsel.
Mr. Upton. Good morning. We are here today to conduct what
will be our fourth public hearing this year to explore the
critically important, and very troubling, issue of lax security
at our Nation's key nuclear weapons laboratories. We will hear
today from the top security advisors to Energy Secretary Bill
Richardson, as well as the directors of Los Alamos, Lawrence
Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories.
In particular, we will hear from the Department's chief
internal inspector, Mr. Glenn Podonsky, whose team of
inspectors recently concluded inspections at Los Alamos and
Sandia. Mr. Podonsky previously testified before this
subcommittee on his team's inspection of Lawrence Livermore.
Taken together, these three inspection reports raise serious
questions about the Department's ability to effectively run a
national security apparatus.
One of the most surprising, recurring findings in these
reports is the lack of effective policy guidance by the
Department on security matters. Given the fact that the
Department has nearly 20 different security contractors or
subcontractors at various sites across the country, one would
think that the DOE would set clear requirements to assure some
degree of nationwide consistency and some minimal level of
security at each site. Yet the reality is far different.
For example, the Department has long required that the labs
take certain steps to ensure that foreign visitors or assignees
and not spies, and that their access to sensitive information
is adequately restricted. Yet the Department's guidance
seemingly applies to only those foreign nationals physically
located onsite. Thus, in the case of Lawrence Livermore for
example, this policy was not applied to foreign nationals who
had remote access to the lab's computers since they were not
actually ``onsite.''
Of course, such a distinction makes little common sense--
indeed, remote access may raise greater security concerns than
onsite access since it is more difficult to determine whether
the individual at the other end is, in fact, the authorized
user. But it was not until the recent inspection by Mr.
Podonsky's team that this practice was discovered and halted.
The Department still has not addressed this question as a
matter of policy, nor the related questions of how to deal with
the other information sharing with offsite foreign nationals,
including video- and tele-conferences or e-mail. Similarly, the
Department has never had any policy that set minimum standards
for computer password creation and use. Thus, the labs have
done their own thing--in some cases, passwords were not used at
all, while in other cases, passwords were common names and only
a few characters in length, and often were not changed with any
frequency. I find it hard to believe that this committee--which
does not engage in classified computing and does not possess on
its computer systems national security information--has a more
stringent password controls than our Nation's nuclear weapon
labs.
And the generally poor state of unclassified computer
security at these labs--what Mr. Podonsky calls their numerous
potentially exploitable vulnerabilities--can also be traced
back to the lack of any detailed policy from the Department in
this area. At two of the labs, the inspection team found that
the closed lab network could be penetrated from the outside
through the Internet, while all of the labs suffered from
general system weaknesses that permitted users, once on the
system, to move freely among data bases, gain passwords, and
access sensitive information without a need to know. With
literally hundreds of foreign nationals authorized on these
systems, including many from sensitive countries, the risk of
disclosure of sensitive nuclear information, business
proprietary data, or export-controlled materials is significant
and certainly worrisome.
It is ironic that a Department and laboratory management
that prides itself in being on the cutting edge of research and
technology has fallen so far short in this high-tech area.
Indeed, Lawrence Livermore is supposed to be the Department's
computer technology headquarters. It is clear that DOE policy
in this area needs to be brought into the 1990's, and hopefully
before we begin the next decade and get even further behind.
We will hear today about how the Department is drafting
policies to deal with remote access, computer passwords, fire
walls, and the potential for unauthorized transfers or
downloads of classified information, such as those allegedly
performed by Wen Ho Lee. Yet, with the exception of the remote
access issue, these problems were identified 5 years ago by
both Mr. Podonsky's office and the Office of Safeguards and
Securities. The response at the time, from both the labs and
the DOE hierarchy, was that computer security wasn't worth the
cost and that they were willing to accept the risk. I am
pleased to see that the DOE management and the labs are now
beginning to change their tune, but where is the accountability
for years of negligence that may have seriously compromised our
national security? Secretary Richardson boasts of recommending
disciplinary action against a handful of lab employees for
failing to take seriously the Wen Ho Lee counterintelligence
case. Yet no one in the labs has been held accountable for the
years of resistance to implementing sound computer security
policies.
This lack of accountability goes beyond the computer
security area. We will hear today about how Los Alamos has made
much progress over the last 6 months fixing a very troubling
situation involving the protection of classified weapons
parts--a problem that was first identified by the Department
inspectors more than 5 years ago. Despite directives from the
Department and agreed-upon action plans, Los Alamos failed to
take any meaningful steps to correct this situation, year after
year, such that the situation was essentially unchanged when
the inspectors returned 3 years later in 1997. Inspections in
1998 an 1999 revealed the same problems, but this time the wave
of bad publicity about lab security seems to have prompted Los
Alamos to begin corrective action to protect classified weapons
parts.
But did Los Alamos pay for its stubborn refusal to fix this
problem? To the contrary--despite the significance of the long-
standing deficiencies, Los Alamos received excellent or
similarly laudatory security ratings in its annual contract
performance appraisals, increasing the bonuses that its senior
management received from the U.S. taxpayers.
As I said before, unless we have a rigorous annual
inspection process that imposes real financial penalties on the
labs for failing to comply with DOE's security requirements, I
don't believe we will ever change the culture and achieve
lasting security reform. The recently-passed Defense
Authorization Act provides a framework for such action, but it
will be up to the Department to take that authorization
seriously and begin implementing serious contract and oversight
reform.
I have already begun discussions with the chairman of the
full committee to perhaps allow a number of us to go out early
next year to visit some of the labs, and I look forward to the
cooperation by the Department to make sure that will go without
a hitch.
With that, I will recognize Mr. Green from Texas.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
Thank you for scheduling today's hearing and keeping this
issue on the front burner, so to speak.
DOE has had problems for many years with regular, continued
oversight. Hopefully, our subcommittee and Congress will be
able to finally solve this decades-long problem. This committee
is prepared to hear testimony from DOE about its plans to
revamp and improve the security at our nuclear weapons
laboratories. This time, I hope we will be able to see real
progress on the security solutions at the Nation's labs.
I especially look forward to the testimony of Mr. Podonsky,
whose inspection teams recently completed security evaluations
at both Los Alamos and Sandia National Labs. I appreciate all
the hard work by the inspection teams in analyzing the
strengths and weaknesses of the security in these labs. Our
committee needs to look for solutions to the loss of the
classified information.
And, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing. And, again, I appreciate the continued effort because
long before we were in Congress, this was a problem. Maybe we
can put this to rest and have DOE do what we need to do to
protect the classified information.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Green.
Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our panel.
The issues that we are addressing today are issues that
have been before this committee during Republican and
Democratic Congresses over a period of many years and that have
been the subject of examination by the executive branch in a
variety of ways, also over the last several years, including
specifically the 1995 Galvin task force report, a half dozen
GAO reports, the report of the Select Committee that I chaired,
evaluations by the Intelligence Committees of the House and the
Senate. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory this
year, the PFIAB report, said the Department of Energy has had a
dysfunctional management structure and culture that only
occasionally gave proper credence to the need for security and
counterintelligence programs at the weapons labs. That is a
conclusion that I know, at least as of last year, Mr. Curran
shared because he shared that with our Select Committee.
Today, we are going to hear that DOE has finally gotten the
message, that by the end of this year all of DOE's nuclear
weapons labs will meet the highest security standards. Our
concern, as you might expect, given this track record, is how
to distinguish between these representations that everything is
fine and those that we have received in the past. Over the past
5 years DOE inspectors have repeatedly identified these very
same problems, but still nothing changed. Each negative report
has been met with earnest announcements that finally decisive
action will be taken and these problems will be resolved.
It was after these years of nonresponsiveness, including
throughout 1\1/2\ terms of the Clinton administration itself,
that President Clinton issued his Presidential decision
Directive PDD-61, which ordered from the Presidential level
counterintelligence measures at the nuclear weapons
laboratories.
Mr. Curran, who is before the committee today, made 46
recommendations to implement PDD-61. Today, nearly a year
later, at least 10 of those recommendations have not yet been
implemented. Furthermore, some of the recommendations are
worded such that the Secretary of Energy can claim
implementation of a recommendation based on the issuance of an
order in Washington, regardless of whether the changes were
actually implemented at the labs.
I appreciate this committee's continuing attention to the
protection of our scientific and military information. It is
only through sustained oversight and full implementation of the
reform measures that you have all identified that we will be
able to secure our information in the future and perform our
tasks as we are supposed to do.
I know that the history of this problem places a great
burden on you as individuals. It likewise puts us in the
position, as Congress, in the conduct of our oversight of Lucy,
Charlie Brown and the famous football. We hope that this time
what we're hearing is the truth, that--I know it has always
been intended as the truth. It was intended as true as spoken,
but we hope this time there will be change and follow-through,
and by the end of this year, we will be in the Promised Land.
And I appreciate the time for the opening statement, Mr.
Chairman. I also apologize because, as you know, I have a bill
on the floor; my Internet tax bill is the second on the
schedule, and it will require me to be gone for about an hour
of this hearing at some undetermined time; but I am of course
very interested in these subjects and will do what I can to
keep up with it even when I am not here.
Mr. Upton. I appreciate that. I just hope that you call a
recorded vote because I want to be on record in support of your
bill.
Mr. Burr?
Mr. Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will be brief.
I welcome our witnesses today and also pledge to the
committee that Mr. Cox is right. We have a responsibility to
follow up and to make sure that the efforts by the Department
of Energy are in fact fulfilled. And for that reason, Mr.
Chairman, I hope that this committee--subcommittee, full
committee--will make an inspection of all the facilities after
the first of the year; and if in fact the subcommittee or the
full committee won't, I will promise our witnesses, I will.
I yield back.
Mr. Upton. Dr. Ganske, would you care to make a public
opening statement?
Mr. Ganske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding the
hearing, and I look forward to the testimony.
Mr. Upton. Okay. We had alerted members of the Energy and
Power Subcommittee that they would be welcome to sit in on the
committee and ask questions, and with that in mind, I will
recognize Mrs. Wilson for an opening statement.
Mrs. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
willingness to allow me to sit in on your subcommittee today.
As you know, it is something of particular interest to me, both
because of the district that I represent and because of my
service on the Select Committee on Intelligence. I will be very
interested to hear from the witnesses about a number of things.
As all of you in the room know, there is a significant
increase in funding for cyber security in this year's budget. I
am interested to see what the plans are for meeting that
emerging threat even in open, or in closed session, and how you
are planning to implement change. There are a number of new
authorities that are given to the Department of Energy in the
Defense authorization bill and the Intelligence authorization
bill this year with respect to security and safeguards. And
what are your plans and where are we going from here?
I am very interested to hear from the witnesses about that,
and that also relates to the establishment of a new nuclear
security agency, which came about precisely because of some of
the problems that we are trying to oversee and investigate
here. What is the plan for the transition to that new nuclear
security agency and how are you going to integrate the need for
continuing vigilance in safeguards and security in that
transition?
And I appreciate the willingness and the openness of the
Chair to allow me to participate. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
We welcome as our first panel Mr. Glenn Podonsky, Director
of the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance
Assurance at the Department of Energy; General Eugene Habiger,
Director of the Office of Security and Emergency Operations,
also of the Department of Energy; Mr. Ed Curran, Director of
the Office of Counterintelligence, Department of Energy.
As two of you have testified before, you know that it is a
long-standing tradition of this subcommittee to take testimony
under oath. Do you have any objection to that?
Mr. Curran. No, sir.
Mr. Podonsky. No, sir.
Mr. Habiger. No, sir.
Mr. Upton. We also allow under House rules and committee
rules you to have counsel available if you desire to have such.
Do you need or desire to have counsel?
Mr. Curran. No, sir.
Mr. Upton. Stand and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Upton. You are now under oath.
We actually have a new clock. The egg timer is going to the
Smithsonian. We will see if this really does work. Your entire
testimony is certainly made a part of the record, and I will
start this over again. If you would limit your remarks to 5
minutes, that would be terrific.
TESTIMONY OF GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT
OVERSIGHT AND PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE; EUGENE E. HABIGER,
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS; AND
EDWARD J. CURRAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Podonsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to once again appear before this committee to
discuss our independent oversight activities at the DOE
national weapons laboratories. As you stated, I am the Director
of the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance
Assurance, which is responsible for providing the Secretary an
independent, impartial view of the effectiveness of safeguards
and security, cyber security, and emergency management policies
and programs throughout the Department of Energy.
My testimony will include an update on our follow-up
efforts at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory as well as a
summary of our recent inspections at Los Alamos and Sandia
National Laboratories.
Let me first cover Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
As you may recall, we provided classified briefings to the
members of this committee on July 1 and July 20 of this year on
the results of our May inspection of safeguards and security
programs at the Lawrence Livermore National Lab. To summarize
the results, we noted several positive attributes at the
laboratory, including security upgrades in the Superblock,
which is the building complex at Livermore where special
nuclear material is used and stored.
We also noted effective implementation of many of the
aspects of the Secretary's upgrades and initiatives in the area
of computer security, which is now referred to as ``cyber
security'' and which encompasses the measures designed to
protect information on DOE computer systems from unauthorized
access from hackers who might try and penetrate the computer
networks over the Internet, and from system users who could try
and exploit vulnerabilities to gain access to information for
which they are not authorized.
However, there were weaknesses in protection of classified
weapons parts. These are nonnuclear components of the nuclear
weapons access controls at areas where classified weapons
information was used and stored, and unclassified cyber
security which refers to the cyber security measures designed
to protect sensitive, but unclassified, information such as
unclassified research data and medical records and the like.
Also, Livermore had not done sufficient performance testing
to demonstrate that the protective force could reliably perform
its mission.
We have scheduled a formal follow-up review at Livermore's
site in December of this year. This review will include onsite
reviews of Livermore safeguards and security programs as well
as extensive scanning of the networks and penetration testing
using techniques that hackers would use. The review will also
include a detailed assessment of progress on the Livermore
corrective action plan, including actions taken by headquarters
and the Oakland operations office to support and verify the
provisions of the Livermore corrective action plan.
Although the formal review has not yet taken place, we have
been closely monitoring the progress on the corrective action
plan and have provided comments on several occasions. In
general, we are satisfied that our findings are being addressed
and that compensatory security measures have been put in place
to provide additional security until final resolution of the
identified issues.
As part of our ongoing follow-up efforts we have been
particularly focusing on Livermore vulnerability assessments
and performance testing of the protective force's ability to
respond effectively to defeat a terrorist attack at the
Superblock. We recognize that Livermore faces some difficult
situations as they try to improve their performance testing
program while still ensuring that tests are conducted with the
highest regard for safety. On several occasions, we have sent
some of our inspectors out to Livermore to observe their
planning efforts and performance tests and to provide
constructive independent oversight input.
Overall, we believe that Livermore has made improvements in
their security posture in the Superblock, and the performance
testing efforts are more rigorous and realistic. While much
work remains to be accomplished, Livermore has demonstrated a
rigorous approach to identifying and correcting weaknesses. If
Livermore fully implements their current plans for upgrading
their security posture and maintains the current attitude of
continuous improvement, there is good reason to be optimistic
that Livermore and the safeguards and security program will be
improved by the time of our follow-up inspection.
At Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico we found
effective programs in the areas of material control and
accountability, protective force and physical security systems.
Sandia has taken several actions to upgrade security, such as
repositioning protective force members to provide tactical
response, procuring armored vehicles with enhanced
capabilities, adding barriers to protect the protective force
members at the material access area entrance, and improving
protective force training. While some weaknesses were
identified in the vulnerability assessment and performance test
arena, Sandia corrected the most significant issues promptly
while we were there.
Sandia also has generally adequate programs in the
classified cyber security arena where they are further making
improvements. Senior Sandia managers demonstrated their
commitment to completing the enhancements identified in the
Trilab nine-point plan----
Your egg beater went off.
Mr. Upton. I see that it did. I was wondering if it was
going to ding. But you may continue.
Mr. Podonsky. [continuing] they identified in their Trilab
nine-point plan by allocating resources to achieve its
provisions. Although programmatic strengths were noted at
Sandia, there were weaknesses again in the unclassified cyber
security, protection of classified parts, access controls in
areas where classified matter is used and stored, and control
of foreign visitors and assignees. For example, Sandia needs to
strengthen the fire wall that protects the sensitive
unclassified network from the open network and the Internet.
Because of these weaknesses, Sandia received an overall
marginal rating. A marginal rating is the middle rating in our
three-tier rating system. The highest rating is satisfactory
and the lowest is unsatisfactory. A marginal rating indicates
that prompt attention and timely improvement is needed, but
does not imply that special nuclear material or classified and
sensitive information are at immediate risk.
Sandia has submitted corrective action plans, as required,
and independent oversight has provided comments to ensure that
the issues are fully addressed. We plan a formal follow-up
here, too, in December that will assess the progress and the
status of the program. As with all of our follow-ups, we will
review the status of the identified weak programs, perform
extensive cyber security testing and review the corrective
action plan.
We performed our inspection at Los Alamos National
Laboratory in August. Los Alamos earned an overall satisfactory
rating. They have effectively addressed long-standing problems
in the accountability of nuclear materials and made significant
progress in addressing deficiencies in the protection of
classified weapons parts. Los Alamos made additional
improvements in the protection of classified weapons parts
actually during our inspection. Los Alamos had also added
protective force personnel and implemented a rigorous program
to control the use of desktop computer modems. Classified cyber
security programs were found to be adequate, and Los Alamos is
making progress also on the Trilab nine-point plan.
Additionally, Los Alamos has significantly reduced risks
associated with weaknesses if unclassified cyber security
systems by installing an effective fire wall configuration to
prevent hackers from gaining access to sensitive networks.
The most significant residual weakness was the ability of
the unclassified cyber security program to protect against the
insider threat. A particular concern related to foreign
nationals that were permitted on the unclassified network which
had numerous potentially exploitable weaknesses. During the
inspection, Los Alamos developed and began implementing an
effective plan to address the residual weaknesses, both short-
term and long-term. Although significant progress has been
made, there is still work to be done in order to achieve the
goal of fully satisfactory programs at all DOE sites.
At the three national laboratories only Los Alamos receives
and earns an overall satisfactory rating; the other
laboratories were rated marginal. However, based on their
corrective action plans, we believe that Livermore and Sandia
are on the right track to make improvements needed to achieve
the satisfactory rating. Although Los Alamos earned an overall
satisfactory as with the other sites we plan to perform follow-
up activities and continue to monitor their progress.
If I might, Mr. Chairman, in looking at the weaknesses in
DOE safeguards and security for the last 15 years, it is
important to keep a sense of perspective. In general,
protection of our most critical assets such as nuclear weapons
components and special nuclear material has improved
significantly since the 1980's. While problems are still
evident, they are generally degradations in one layer of a
multilayered security system rather than the gaping holes of
the type frequently noted in the 1980's.
In addition, inspections indicate that sites are complying
with the requirements for protecting classified documents, and
classified computer systems are generally well protected from
hackers. While the gaping holes have not reappeared, attention
to security was very much in decline during the mid-90's, and
some sites did not adequately analyze the impact of the cuts in
security personnel or security measures before implementing
those cuts.
In our reviews of the national laboratories, it is very
clear that laboratory management has heard the wakeup call from
the Secretary and from the Congress. Safeguards and security is
receiving a high level of attention from senior management, and
we are seeing some improvements that could not have been made
without management support and without Secretary Richardson's
direct involvement. For example, the establishment of an
effective fire wall and the consolidation of classified parts
at Los Alamos were actions that we had previously experienced
resistance by Los Alamos line managers because of the
operational inconvenience. The need for these actions had been
identified on previous inspection reviews, but were not
implemented because safeguards and security was given
relatively low priority.
In the past year, however, we can report that senior
management has increased emphasis on safeguards and security
and many important enhancements have been implemented in a way
that provides a better balance between safeguards and security
and requirements and operational needs. One of the key elements
of the recent progress that we have seen is accountability.
Secretary Richardson has sent the message that senior DOE and
contract managers are accountable for safeguards and security.
The Secretary has stated that, ``People are getting the
message'' and that ``we're serious about protecting our
national secrets.'' The results of our recent inspections
demonstrate that the message has been heard and that actions
are being taken at all of our locations that we have inspected.
In conclusion, it is clear that a positive trend has been
established, but that a tremendous amount of work still remains
to be accomplished. We will not be satisfied as an oversight
body until all DOE sites achieve and maintain a fully
satisfactory program. However, it is encouraging to note that
safeguards and security programs at all three national weapons
laboratories have received high levels of management attention
over the past year, and there have been significant
improvements.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Glenn S. Podonsky follows:]
Prepared Statement of Glenn S. Podonsky, Director, Office of
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, U.S. Department of
Energy
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to once again
appear before this committee to discuss our Independent Oversight
activities at the DOE national weapons laboratories. I am the Director
of the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, which
is responsible for providing the Secretary an independent, impartial
view of the effectiveness of safeguards and security, cyber security,
and emergency management policies and programs throughout the
Department of Energy.
This discussion will include an update on our follow-up efforts at
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, as well as a summary of the
results of our recent inspections at the Los Alamos National Laboratory
and Sandia National Laboratories.
Let me first cover the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. As
you may recall, we provided classified briefings to members of this
committee on July 1st and July 20th on the results of our May 1999
inspection of safeguards and security programs at the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. To summarize the results, we noted
several positive attributes at the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory including security upgrades in the Superblock (the building
complex at Livermore where special nuclear material is used and
stored). We also noted effective implementation of many aspects of the
Secretary's upgrades and initiatives in the area of computer security,
which is now referred to as ``cyber security'' and which encompasses
the measures designed to protect information on DOE computer systems
from unauthorized access from hackers who might try and penetrate
computer networks over the Internet and from system users who could try
and exploit vulnerabilities to gain access to information for which
they are not authorized. However, there were weaknesses in protection
of classified weapons parts (non-nuclear components of nuclear
weapons), access controls at areas where classified weapons information
was used and stored, and unclassified cyber security (which refers to
the cyber security measures designed to protect sensitive but
unclassified information, such as unclassified research data and
medical records). Also, Livermore had not done sufficient performance
testing to demonstrate that the protective force could reliably perform
its mission.
We have scheduled a formal follow-up review of the Lawrence
Livermore site in December 1999. This review will include onsite
reviews of Livermore safeguards and security programs as well as
extensive scanning of the networks and penetration testing using
techniques that hackers would use. The review will also include a
detailed assessment of progress on the Livermore corrective action
plan, including actions taken by Headquarters and the Oakland
Operations Office to support and verify the provisions of the Livermore
corrective action plan. Although the formal review has not yet taken
place, we have been closely monitoring the progress on the corrective
action plan and have provided comments on several occasions. In
general, we are satisfied that our findings are being addressed and
that compensatory security measures have been put in place to provide
additional security until final resolution of the identified issues.
As part of our ongoing follow-up efforts, we have been particularly
focusing on Livermore vulnerability assessments and performance testing
of the protective force's ability to respond effectively to defeat a
terrorist attack at the Superblock. We recognize that Livermore faces
some difficult situations as they try to improve their performance
testing program, while still ensuring that tests are conducted with the
highest regard for safety. On several occasions, we have sent some of
our specialists to Livermore to observe their planning efforts and
performance tests, and to provide constructive Independent Oversight
input.
Overall, we believe that Livermore has made improvements in their
security posture in the Superblock and the performance testing efforts
are more rigorous and realistic. While much work remains to be
accomplished, Livermore has demonstrated a rigorous approach to
identifying and correcting weaknesses. If Livermore fully implements
their current plans for upgrading the security posture and maintains
the current attitude of continuous improvement, there is good reason to
be optimistic that the Livermore safeguards and security program will
be much improved by the time of our follow-up review in December.
At Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, we found effective
programs in the areas of material control and accountability, the
protective force, and physical security systems. Sandia has taken
several actions to upgrade security, such as repositioning protective
force members to improve tactical response, procuring armored vehicles
with enhanced capabilities, adding barriers to protect the protective
force members at the ``material access area'' entrance, and improving
protective force training. While some weaknesses were identified in the
vulnerability assessment and performance test arena, Sandia corrected
the most significant issue promptly by adding the barriers at the
material access area.
Sandia also had generally adequate programs in the classified cyber
security arena and were making further improvements. Senior Sandia
managers demonstrated their commitment to completing the enhancements
identified in the ``Tri-Lab nine point plan'' by allocating resources
to achieve its provisions.
Although programmatic strengths were noted at Sandia, there were
weaknesses in unclassified cyber security, protection of classified
parts, access controls in areas where classified matter is used and
stored, and control of foreign visitors and assignees. For example,
Sandia needs to strengthen the firewall that protects the sensitive
unclassified network from the open network and the Internet. Because of
these weaknesses, Sandia received an overall ``Marginal'' rating. A
Marginal rating is the middle rating in OA's three tier rating system,
the highest rating is Satisfactory and the lowest is Unsatisfactory. A
Marginal rating indicates that prompt attention and timely improvement
is needed but does not imply that special nuclear material or
classified and sensitive information are at immediate risk.
Sandia has submitted their corrective action plans as required and
Independent Oversight has provided comments to ensure that the issues
are fully addressed. We plan a formal follow-up review in December that
will assess the progress and status of the program. As with all of our
follow-up reviews, we will review the status of all identified weak
programs, perform extensive cyber security testing, and review the
corrective action plan provisions.
We performed our inspection of the Los Alamos National Laboratory
in August of 1999. Los Alamos earned an overall ``Satisfactory''
rating. Los Alamos had effectively addressed long-standing problems in
the accountability of nuclear materials, and made significant progress
in addressing deficiencies in the protection of classified weapons
parts. Los Alamos made additional improvements in the protection of
classified weapons parts during the inspection. Los Alamos had also
added protective force personnel and implemented a rigorous program to
control the use of desk top computer modems. Classified cyber security
programs were found to be adequate, and Los Alamos is making progress
on the ``Tri-Lab nine-point'' plan. Additionally, Los Alamos has
significantly reduced risks associated with weaknesses in unclassified
cyber security systems by installing an effective firewall
configuration to prevent hackers from gaining access to sensitive
networks.
The most significant residual weakness was in the ability of the
unclassified cyber security program to protect against the insider
threat. A particular concern related to foreign nationals that were
permitted on the unclassified network, which had numerous potentially
exploitable weaknesses. During the inspection, Los Alamos developed and
began implementing an effective plan to address the residual weaknesses
both in the short term and long term.
Although significant progress has been made, there is still work to
be done in order to achieve the goal of fully satisfactory programs at
all DOE sites. At the three national weapons laboratories, only the Los
Alamos National Laboratory was assigned an overall Satisfactory rating.
The other two laboratories were rated Marginal. However, based on their
corrective action plans, we believe that Livermore and Sandia are on
track to make improvements needed to achieve a Satisfactory rating.
Although Los Alamos earned an overall ``Satisfactory'' rating, as with
the other sites, we plan to perform follow-up activities and continue
to monitor their progress in implementing their corrective action plan.
In looking at the weaknesses in DOE safeguards and security
programs, it is important to keep a sense of perspective. In general,
protection of our most critical assets, such as nuclear weapons
components and special nuclear materials, has improved significantly
since the 1980s. While problems are still evident, they are generally
degradations in one layer of a multi-layered security system rather
than gaping holes of the type frequently noted in the 1980s. In
addition, inspections indicate that sites are complying with
requirements for protecting classified documents, and classified
computer systems are generally well protected from hackers. While the
gaping holes have not reappeared, attention to security was in decline
during the mid-1990s and some sites did not adequately analyze the
impact of cuts in security personnel or security measures before
implementing those cuts.
In our reviews of the national weapons laboratories, it is very
clear that laboratory management has heard the wake up call from the
Secretary. Safeguards and security is receiving a high level of
attention from senior management and we are seeing some improvements
that could not have been made without management support and Secretary
Richardson's involvement. For example, the establishment of an
effective firewall and the consolidation of classified parts at Los
Alamos were actions that had previously been resisted by the Los Alamos
line managers because of the operational inconvenience. The need for
these actions had been identified on previous Independent Oversight
reviews but were not implemented because safeguards and security was
given relatively low priority. In the past year, however, senior
management has increased emphasis on safeguards and security and many
important enhancements have been implemented in a way that provides a
better balance between safeguards and security requirements and
operational needs.
One of the key elements of the recent progress is increased
accountability. Secretary Richardson has sent the message that senior
DOE and contractor managers are accountable for safeguards and
security. This has been accomplished through various measures; a few
examples include:
<bullet> The reorganization of responsibilities at DOE Headquarters,
which established the Lead Program Secretarial Office as
responsible and accountable for safeguards and security
<bullet> The ``zero tolerance policy'' which establishes expectations
for safeguards and security and accountability at all levels of
line management from the first level supervisor to the
laboratory directors and to DOE operations office managers and
DOE program offices
The Secretary has stated [quote] ``People are getting the message
that we're serious about protecting our nation's secrets'' [unquote].
The results of our recent inspections demonstrate that the message has
been heard and that actions are being taken to improve the safeguards
and security posture at our national laboratories.
In conclusion, it is clear that a positive trend has been
established but that much work remains to be accomplished. We will not
be satisfied until all DOE sites achieve and maintain a fully
satisfactory program and establish processes for ensuring continuous
improvement. However, it is encouraging to note that safeguards and
security programs at all three national weapons laboratories have
received high levels of management attention over the past year and
there have been significant improvements.
Thank you again Mr. Chairman, we are now ready for your questions.
Mr. Upton. General Habiger.
TESTIMONY OF EUGENE E. HABIGER
Mr. Habiger. Mr. Chairman, it is my first opportunity to
testify before this committee.
Mr. Upton. All of these butterflies flying all around.
Mr. Habiger. As most of you are aware, Secretary Richardson
asked me to become the Department Security Director in June.
Since my arrival, I have visited all the Department's major
sites, reviewed virtually all of our site protection plans,
observed and participated in segments of our protective force
training at our central training facility, examined our newly
implemented cyber security procedures at our national
laboratories, talked to hundreds of scientists and technicians
and taken a DOE-administered polygraph. What I have found so
far is this:
First, it is clearly obvious that the Department reacted
appropriately to the wakeup call received this past year with
the uncovering of internal security problems and the
publication of both the Cox and the Rudman reports.
Second, security throughout the Department is being
administered responsibly and conscientiously by dedicated hard-
working professionals who are firmly committed to protecting
the national security assets which are entrusted to them.
Finally, although we do have security issues which we must
and will address, I found all sites that I have visited have
the foundation to perform their security functions capably,
given adequate resources.
But I also discovered some troubling issues. First and
foremost, it was apparent to me early on that the Department
was extremely close to losing the confidence and special trust
of both the American people and the Congress with respect to
our ability to perform our security responsibilities.
Second, and equally as important, I discovered that over
the years the Department had lost its focus on security; and
you said it best in your opening remarks, sir, that we had a
dysfunctional organization. There was no office within the
Department that had ultimate accountability for the security
requirements for which DOE is responsible, nor was there any
emphasis on individual accountability. By-products of this
organizational dysfunction and lack of focus included a
deterioration of security awareness and education, resulting in
a failure to remind and educate our employees and contractors
as to their personal security responsibilities and
accountabilities.
Finally, Congress, up to this point, has failed to fund the
Department's fiscal year 2000 full budget amendment in order to
make near- and long-term fixes. We have, Mr. Chairman, valid
requirements in the area of cyber security to buy hardware
encryption equipment and to train our systems administrators.
We need to equip our protective forces with equipment to combat
weapons of mass destruction, and we need program direction
funds to stand up a viable foreign visitor access program, as
well as an acceptable plutonium, uranium, and special nuclear
materials control and accountability program.
Simply stated, we have been given a mandate, but not the
resources to accomplish that mandate. Though a series of
comprehensive and sweeping initiatives by Secretary Richardson,
the Department has, however, turned the corner, in my view, and
has aggressively and dynamically changed the way it does its
security business.
Soon after coming on board, I put into motion an aggressive
four-phased security campaign. In Phase I, which was completed
in August, I initiated visits to all major DOE sites. We
established a baseline from which to move forward. We found a
number of things that needed to be fixed quickly, and we did
that very, very quickly.
Phase II, currently under way, I completed visits to the
sites and issued or am in the process of issuing policy
addressing key issues such as standardization of weapons for
our protective forces, the requirement for our protective
forces to keep a round in the chamber of their weapons while on
duty. We weren't training the way we would fight. We now have
policies which we never had before, which mandate the timely
reporting of security incidents, the use of warning banners on
computer systems and badge validation procedures.
In the area of cyber security, the national laboratories
have implemented numerous corrective actions. Key among them is
a program to achieve physical incompatibility between removable
media formats within common laboratory work areas.
In Phase III, which will occur in January through March of
next year, most of the new policies to fix security problems
will have been implemented and I will revisit the field to
establish the effectiveness of those policies.
When we reach Phase IV in April to September of next year,
proposed fixes will be in place and our efforts turned toward
minor adjustments as we maintain our security program.
Today, the Department of Energy is in a security
environment decidedly different from the one we faced a decade
earlier. There is a growing concern about a new breed of
threats that confront the Department and the Nation's security
structures. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and cyber
attacks on information systems have become ingrained in the
global psyche and our Nation's security consciousness. This is
a significant challenge, Mr. Chairman, but one that the
Department of Energy is prepared to meet.
[The prepared statement of Eugene E. Habiger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eugene E. Habiger, General, USAF (Retired),
Director, Office of Security and Emergency Operations, U.S. Department
of Energy
I would like to thank the Chairman and Members of the Committee for
the opportunity to speak with you today regarding the current status of
security at the Department of Energy.
As most of you are aware, Secretary Richardson asked me to become
the Department's Security director in June. Since my arrival at the
Department, I have visited all of the Department's major sites . . .
Reviewed virtually all of our site security plans . . . Observed and
participated in segments of our protective force training at our
training facility in Albuquerque, New Mexico . . . Examined our newly
implemented cyber security procedures at our national laboratories . .
. Talked to hundreds of scientists and technicians . . . And, taken a
DOE-administered polygraph.
What I have found so far is this:
First, it is clearly obvious that the Department reacted
appropriately to the ``wake up call'' received this past year with the
uncovering of internal security problems and the publication of both
the Cox and Rudman reports.
Second, security throughout the Department is being administered
responsibly and conscientiously by dedicated, hard working
professionals who are firmly committed to protecting the critical
national security assets which are entrusted to them. The
responsibilities of these individuals are demanding--yet, despite the
obvious challenges, they continue to perform in an outstanding manner.
Finally, although we do have security issues which we must, and
will, address, I found all sites that I have visited have the
foundation to perform their security functions capably given adequate
resources.
But I also discovered several troubling issues.
First and foremost, it was apparent to me early on that the
Department was extremely close to losing the confidence and trust of
both the American people and the Congress with respect to our ability
to perform our security responsibilities. The enormous media coverage
surrounding recent security related events coupled with DOE's
historical track-record of security deficiencies added to this erosion
of public trust.
Secondly and equally as important, I discovered that over the years
the Department had lost its focus on security. The Secretary on several
occasions has referred to the Department as being a group of fiefdoms
within fiefdoms--and almost every fiefdom had its own security
responsibility and security budget. There was no office within the
Department who had ultimate accountability for the critical security
requirements for which DOE is responsible nor was there any emphasis on
individual accountability. By-products of this organizational
dysfunction and lack of focus included: a deterioration of security
awareness and education resulting in a failure to remind and educate
our employees and contractors as to their personal security
responsibilities and accountabilities . . . lack of attention to our
cyber security practices in a world of increased computer hacking and
cyber terrorism . . . And, a gradual erosion of resources required to
improve our capabilities to combat ever-changing terrorist and cyber-
terrorist threats.
And finally, Congress has, up to this point, failed to fund the
Department's FY2000 full budget amendment in order to make near and
long-term fixes. We have valid requirements in the area of cyber-
security to buy hardware, encryption equipment and to train our system
administrators. We need to equip our protective forces to combat
weapons of mass destruction . . . to fully arm the headquarters
protective forces and complete our headquarters security upgrades . . .
And, we need program direction funds to stand up a robust foreign
visitor access program as well as an acceptable plutonium, uranium and
special nuclear materials control and accountability program and bring
about our new organization. Simply stated, we have been given a mandate
but not the additional resources to accomplish that mandate.
Through a series of comprehensive and sweeping initiatives by
Secretary Richardson, however, the Department has turned the corner and
has aggressively and dynamically changed the way it does its security
business.
In May of this year Secretary Richardson announced his Security
Reform Package--the most sweeping reform of security programs in the
Department's history. This comprehensive plan involved the creation of
my office--the Office of Security and Emergency Operations, and the
elevation and revitalization of Mr. Glenn Podonsky's Office of
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance. In the words of
Secretary Richardson, ``this plan gives DOE the tools and authority we
need to detect security infractions, correct institutional problems and
protect America's nuclear secrets.'' Glenn and I are working closely
together to ensure an integrated approach to policy development and
oversight.
The foundation of the Secretary's security reform plan is his
policy statement regarding security incidents and violations. In his
statement, the Secretary established an expectation of personal
accountability by DOE employees and contractors for protecting DOE's
national security assets. The Secretary further established a policy of
zero tolerance for violations of security requirements that could place
nuclear or other sensitive information at risk.
Another important step was to change the way the Department managed
its security responsibilities. In this regard, the Secretary worked
diligently to remove the organizational barriers that had historically
impeded the Department's ability to effectively and efficiently
implement a comprehensive security program within the Department.
Soon after coming on board I put in motion an aggressive, Four-
Phased Security Campaign. In Phase I, which was completed in August, I
initiated visits to each of the DOE sites in the field, and established
a baseline from which to move forward. Areas requiring immediate fixes
were identified. During this period, a complex-wide security stand-down
was conducted to promote security awareness as an individual
responsibility. New policy was issued for foreign visitors who visit
our facilities to ensure that the tightest possible security procedures
are followed.
In Phase II, currently underway, I completed visits to the sites
and issued, or am in the process of issuing, policy addressing key
issues, such as: Standardized Weapons for Protective Forces, and the
requirement for protective forces to keep a round in the chamber of
weapons carried while on duty. We now have policies which mandate the
timely reporting of security incidents, the use of warning banners on
computer systems, and badge validation procedures. We are developing an
integrated security awareness training curriculum. Two very similar
personal security assurance programs will be combined into a single
departmental Human Reliability Program to eliminate redundancy and
streamline the administration process. In the area of cyber-security,
the National Laboratories have implemented numerous corrective actions.
Key among these is a program to achieve physical incompatibility
between removable media formats within common laboratory work areas. We
are taking this sweeping action in an effort to prevent the intentional
or inadvertent transfer of classified information from classified to
unclassified systems or to a media format easily concealed and removed.
In related efforts, the laboratories will continue to search
unclassified archives and to monitor outgoing e-mail messages for
classified content. We are also developing a comprehensive set of
metrics to make sure we are making continuous improvements.
Phase III will occur in January to March of 2000, at which time
most new policies to fix security will have been implemented. I will
revisit the field to evaluate the effectiveness of the policies and to
define metrics to be used for future assessments. At this stage, most
of the major security concerns will be fixed and the focus turned to
improvements and enhancements.
When we reach Phase IV in April to September of 2000, proposed
fixes will be in place and our efforts turned toward adjustments, as we
maintain our security program. A critical activity here will be
continuous feedback from the field, scheduled visits to the field, and
regularly held meetings with representatives from all sites to exchange
lessons learned and best practices.
Successful implementation of our security responsibilities will
also depend on a focused and well-defined mission and management
structure that addresses policy and decision making, personnel and
budget resources, planning and program execution. Therefore, we are
reconstituting available resources into a robust, responsive, and
unified safeguards and security organization. This was the Secretary's
intent when he announced his security reform initiative; and we are
making real progress.
Our workforce--both Federal and contractor--is the most critical
link in the chain of protection of security interests. Consequently, we
are instilling a sense of urgency and corporate ownership among all
Department of Energy employees and contractors, not just those that
have security as part of their job descriptions. This is being
accomplished through renewed emphasis on a meaningful enforcement
program that holds individuals accountable should they violate their
security responsibilities.
We are enhancing our efforts to ensure that employees are fully
aware of their own individual protection responsibilities. The granting
of a security clearance carries with it a very serious obligation to
protect the sensitive and critical assets entrusted to one's care. We
have mounted an aggressive and comprehensive security education and
awareness campaign to remind each and every individual of their
obligations.
For those individuals whose primary duties relate to the protection
of national security assets (that is, our security professionals), we
are instituting a comprehensive career development initiative that
establishes a centrally managed competency based promotion and
assignments program designed to institute staffing uniformity and
enhanced operability throughout the complex. This program is an
adaptation of existing programs in place with other government
agencies, the military and private industry. It represents what I
believe to be a ``best practice'' in the area of career development.
Finally, recognizing our critical role in the national security
community, we are institutionalizing my office as the principal
security coordinator for the Department in developing inter- and intra-
agency partnerships. In so doing we actively contribute to the
protection of the Nation's energy infrastructure and leverage
technology and, as applicable, expertise into the international
security community dealing with nuclear safeguards and security.
Today, the Department of Energy functions in a security environment
decidedly different from the one we faced a decade earlier. There is
growing concern about a new breed of threats that confront the
Department and the Nation's security structures. Terrorism, Weapons of
Mass Destruction and cyber attacks on information systems have become
ingrained in the global psyche and in our nation's security
consciousness. These non-traditional, multi-directional threats are
testing security resolve and capabilities as never before.
We cannot control or alter the threats to the security interests
entrusted to our care. What can be controlled, however, is our ability
to plan and respond to threats should they ever materialize. The
changing security environment and other threats over the past decade
have fundamentally altered the Department's security perspective and
posture. This is a significant challenge, but one that the Department
of Energy is prepared to meet.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Pretty close on the time as well.
Mr. Curran.
TESTIMONY OF EDWARD J. CURRAN
Mr. Curran. Good morning. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to be
here this morning to discuss the state of counterintelligence
at the Department of Energy. As you are aware, I have been the
Director of the Office of Counterintelligence at DOE since
April 1, 1998. In the 1\1/2\ years since I have assumed this
position, I believe DOE has made significant progress toward
developing an effective and efficient program to protect DOE
personnel and facilities, as well as classified and sensitive
unclassified information on foreign intelligence threats. This
progress would not have been possible without the strong
support of Secretary Bill Richardson and the Congress.
Before I discuss the specific progress that has been made
to date, I would like to provide some background on the
counterintelligence at DOE.
PDD-61, captioned U.S. Department of Energy
Counterintelligence Program, was signed by President Clinton on
February 11, 1998. The PDD was the result of numerous General
Accounting Office reviews, United States intelligence community
assessments, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation study
directed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in
April 1997. The PDD required that I prepare a report for the
Secretary of Energy 90 days after my arrival to include an
assessment of the current state of DOE's CI program, a
strategic plan for achieving long-term goals and objectives of
the PDD, and an action plan for near-term measures to reduce
the foreign intelligence threat to DOE laboratories.
To accomplish this effort, I pulled together a team of CI
experts, security professionals, and individuals with cyber
expertise from throughout the Intelligence Community. The
resulting report, captioned Mapping the Future of the
Department of Energy's Counterintelligence Program, hereinafter
referred to as the 90-Day Study, identified many deficiencies
in DOE's CI program and further verified that the program
didn't meet minimal standards.
The review was initiated on April 1, 1998, and concluded on
July 1, 1998, when the 90-Day Study was submitted to the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney
General, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director
of the FBI. The report made 46 concrete recommendations to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the DOE CI program.
On November 13, 1998, Secretary Richardson approved
virtually all of the 46 recommendations identified in the 90-
Day Study and furnished DOE's CI action plan to Mr. Sandy
Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs. In the Secretary's CI action plan, my office was
directed to prepare a CI implementation plan within 45 days of
the issuance of the action plan. This OCI implementation plan
was delivered to the Office of Secretary on February 3, 1999.
In the implementation plan, we assigned individual offices
primary and supporting responsibility for each recommendation.
We have since prioritized the 46 recommendations into three
different tiers.
I would like to assure you that even while my office was
preparing the CI implementation plan we were also in the
process of implementing many of the 90-Day Study's
recommendations. I am pleased to inform you that, to date,
approximately 75 percent of the 46 recommendations have been
implemented. Furthermore, almost 95 percent of the 24 Tier I
recommendations have been implemented.
I would like to take a few minutes to identify some of
these implementation successes and elaborate on many of the
procedures we have already put into place to address the
deficiencies in DOE's CI program.
The most important part of developing a world-class CI
program is, of course, the resources. Historically, the DOE CI
program has been underfunded and skills mix of the employees
has been insufficient to effectively execute a complex-wide CI
mission. Currently, the Department has over 110,000 cleared
individuals placed in 50 laboratories and facilities, most of
which are under separate contracts. These laboratories and
facilities house most of the Nation's premier scientists'
research and development and the most sophisticated technology
applications in the world. Yet when I came on board in April,
1998 to head the Department's CI efforts, DOE had only seven
full-time Federal employees at the headquarters dedicated to
the CI mission and just a few untrained CI officers in the
field. Seven of these CI officers reported to their separate
laboratories or facility management without any consolidated
headquarters oversight or direction for their programs.
Today, I have a staff of 130 Federal, contractor, and
Intelligence Community CI professionals. I expect this number
to increase to 156 by the end of this fiscal year. Next fiscal
year, it is our goal to hire a significant amount of CI-cyber
experts and place them at select DOE facilities. Importantly,
at each of the five weapons laboratories, I have hired with the
cooperation of all the lab directors seasoned CI professionals,
all of whom are retired FBI special agents. These CI officers
are no longer buried in the local bureaucracy. They have direct
access to me and to the laboratory director should they need to
discuss a CI matter.
The DOE CI program began in 1988, and from its inception
through 1996 the Department spent less than $3 million annually
on counterintelligence. In fiscal years 1997 and 1998, the
Intelligence Committees approved a supplement for DOE's CI
budget based on numerous GAO reports and their continued
significant concerns regarding visitors at the laboratories.
This supplement brought the total CI program funding to $6.6
million in 1997, and $7.6 million in the 1998. Since my
appointment in April of last year, I have successfully
increased DOE's CI budget from $7.6 million to $15.6 for fiscal
year 1999, and $39.2 million, which includes $8 million for CI
cyber initiatives, for this fiscal year.
This very tedious and exhaustive effort was accomplished
with exceptional support from Secretary Richardson and members
of the House Armed Services Committee and the House and Senate
Select Committees on Intelligence. Without their continued
support and push for adequate financing, none of the
improvements to DOE's CI program, which I am about to describe,
would have been possible.
Direct funding, along with headquarter's OCI control and
direction of funds to the laboratories and other DOE facilities
is the cornerstone of the 90-Day Study, the CI action plan and
the CI implementation plan and an overall effective CI program
at DOE. Without this level of control, meaningful oversight is
impossible. Direct funding has helped us to have great control
over allocation of resources to the priorities I have set for
the CI program. I would like to share with you these
programmatic priorities and the efforts OCI is undertaking to
improve the DOE CI program.
First, I will highlight some of the very critical and
necessary changes in day-to-day operations of the CI effort at
DOE headquarters. As a result of PDD-61, a new independent
Office of Counterintelligence was created that reports directly
to the Secretary of Energy. As Director of OCI, the PDD gives
me direct CI policy development, implementation and oversight
responsibilities for all CI activities throughout DOE. The
Secretary signed a delegation order confirming those
responsibilities and delegating to me the appropriate authority
to execute them. In addition to my direct reporting and access
to the Secretary on CI issues, on a regular biweekly basis, I
meet with Under Secretary Moniz and Deputy Secretary Glauthier
on CI issues or as need arises. Mr. Sanchez from the Office of
Intelligence and I both participate in these meetings since our
offices work very, very closely together.
As a result of the 90-Day Study findings, I determined that
the optimal OCI organizational structure includes six distinct
areas: analysis, investigations, CI-cyber training,
inspections, and a CI evaluation board. Importantly, each of
these programs must operate as a single, integrated program.
None of them, taken in isolation, would constitute a viable CI
program.
The analysis program is headed by an experienced analyst
detailed from the FBI with over 8 years of specific analytical
experience. Her deputy is a detailee from the FBI with
analytical experience. They both are very familiar with DOE,
since they participated in the FBI study of DOE directed by the
Senate Select Committee, which I previously mentioned. They
have six analysts currently working for them and are in the
process of hiring several more experienced analysts. We expect
to place CI analysts at five laboratories this fiscal year.
In my opinion, DOE has a wealth of information which has
not been analytically exploited in the past. The reports we
have produced and will be producing are obviously of great
importance to DOE, but also to the Intelligence Community.
For example, a DOE CI analyst played an extremely important
role in the preparation of the first annual threat assessment
prepared by the National Counterintelligence Center at the
direction of the DCI, published in November of last year. This
report is required on an annual basis as a result of PDD-61.
OCI analysts are currently playing a critical role in the
second annual PDD-61-mandated threat assessment which should be
published next month. These reports are a direct result of the
President's direction and represent meaningful impact to DOE
that I have not seen in the past. In my opinion, if it were not
for the tenacious efforts by my DOE analysts in this annual
effort, the reports would have been far less meaningful than
they are.
The analysis program has written and will continue to write
foreign intelligence threat assessments resulting from DOE's
extensive interaction with DOE-sensitive countries. As the U.S.
Government's technical advisor to various bilateral and
multilateral nonproliferation and arms control initiatives, DOE
hosts hundreds of sensitive country foreign nationals each
year, and DOE officials are frequent travelers to sensitive
countries.
The analysis program is also in the midst of a study of
potential economic espionage at the laboratories. The
laboratories engage in cooperative research and development
agreements, CRADAs, with private industry. OCI wants to ensure
that proprietary economic information is being properly
protected.
The projects I mentioned above are expensive, but the
results and benefits to DOE and the Intelligence Community will
allow us to detect and work toward neutralizing foreign
intelligence activities directed at DOE. These products also
provide our policymakers with the information they need to make
national policy decisions.
The investigations program is headed by another FBI
supervisor, currently on detail from the FBI, with over 20
years' experience in foreign counterintelligence. His primary
responsibility is to ensure that any instances in which
classified information is being or may have been compromised to
an unauthorized party are reported to the FBI. I will continue
to staff this program with qualified and experienced
investigators.
The CI cyber program is headed by an employee from the
FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center. The CI cyber
program director serves as OCI's representative to DOE's
critical infrastructure protection task force. Her daily
activities include interaction with DOE headquarters and
laboratory computer professionals, as well as the NIPC. With
the additional $8 million OCI received for cyber programs in
fiscal year 2000, we are implementing some of the
recommendations in the 90-Day Study.
One of the 90-Day Study's recommendations was the
development and implementation of a complex-wide strategy to
address the potential CI implications of e-mail. As mentioned
before, the CI program will significantly enhance the number of
CI experts this fiscal year in order to further develop field
intrusion detection and analysis abilities. CI cyber personnel
require skills in both computer security and
counterintelligence.
A DOE Federal employee heads our training program. The
purpose of the training program is threefold: to formulate an
in-house program to train our own CI personnel, to provide
professional awareness briefings and debriefings for our
scientists traveling to sensitive countries, and to provide
awareness briefings for the general DOE population who have an
interface with foreigners so that they become sensitive to CI-
related issues. Professional training for CI officers has been
reoriented to focus on core skills necessary to be an effective
CI person.
I would like to provide some examples of our current
outreach and awareness training efforts to the DOE population.
The OCI currently has CI professionals assigned to DOE highly
enriched uranium transparency program. This person is
responsible for all related CI issues and team briefings and
debriefings. He is accepted and trusted as a total team member
and the members are willing to address sensitive CI issues with
him. I have established the same relationship with scientists
and DOE employees associated with the Materials Protection and
Accounting Program, the largest program within DOE dealing with
the Russians, the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention, the
Nuclear Cities Initiative, and the China Arms Control Exchange
by assigning a CI officer to each team. Assigning a CI officer
to all such programs within DOE will help us to achieve our
goal of briefing and debriefing all personnel traveling to
sensitive countries. Our CI goal is not only to protect
technology, but the programs involving DOE personnel.
Inspections: We have established an internal inspection
process required by PDD-61. There are two teams available at
any given time to complete these inspections. One team is
headed by a retired FBI agent who was the former Assistant
Director in charge of the Washington field office and was
previously the Deputy Director in the FBI's Inspection
Division. The second team is headed by a former Special Agent
who retired from the FBI as the Special Agent in charge of the
Springfield office and was also an inspector in the FBI's
Inspection Division. Both of these individuals have over 25
years' experience in the FBI and specifically in the CI arena.
The inspection teams are supported by experienced retired FBI
and law enforcement officers who are experts in gathering
information and resolving complex cases. The teams have been
augmented by senior retired personnel security experts from
DOE, along with retired laboratory scientists.
As of this date two inspections have taken place: Los
Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory. A third inspection of Sandia National Laboratories
is under way this week. All DOE facilities are subject to CI
inspection, and we have scheduled 12 facilities for inspection
next calendar year. The results of the first two inspections
have been provided to me and Secretary Richardson.
In brief, these results show that significant improvements
have been made in the CI programs in these laboratories since
PDD-61 was signed. I will provide summaries of these
inspections to Congress in the annual report on
counterintelligence and security practices at the national
laboratories as mandated by the National Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2000. Any significant CI relevant events
will be provided to you immediately.
The CI Evaluations Board: PDD-61 authorized the use of many
tools designed to reduce the threat to classified and sensitive
information at DOE and its field activities. The polygraph was
specifically cited as being one of the tools which OCI, in
coordination with the DOE Office of Security Affairs, may use
to enhance the DOE CI program. Research and analysis conducted
for the 90-Day Study all indicated that the polygraph was one
tool that could be used to enhance the effectiveness of the CI
program.
OCI's Counterintelligence Evaluation Board is responsible
for implementing the DOE CI polygraph program. A senior OCI
officer is leading OCI's CIEB. I must stress that the polygraph
program is only one of six elements of the DOE CI program; it
cannot be considered in isolation. I do not believe that the
polygraph is a CI panacea or an infallible CI tool. However, I
do believe that the polygraph serves as a valuable deterrent to
individuals who currently have direct or indirect access to
classified information and may be contemplating espionage.
I also believe the polygraph serves as a constructive
screening device for individuals applying for positions
requiring access to classified and/or sensitive unclassified
information. The polygraph can also be used effectively as an
exculpatory tool. The purpose of the polygraph program is to
protect U.S. national security by attempting to determine if
anyone with access has engaged in espionage, sabotage or
terrorism or has had unauthorized contact with foreign
nationals or disclosed classified information in an
unauthorized manner.
I am extremely sensitive to the anxiety that the polygraph
program has caused in the Department. I want to stress that we
are only going to be administering the polygraph and
examinations to a small percentage of DOE employees having
access to the most sensitive high-risk national security
programs. These programs include Special Access Programs;
Sensitive Compartmented Information, SCI; Personnel Security
and Assurance Program, and the Personnel Assurance Program
known as PAPS. The latter two programs involve DOE employees
who are involved in the design of nuclear weapons and those who
have direct access to nuclear weapons.
OCI has made every effort to reach out to potentially
affected personnel to explain the polygraph. Technical
briefings for employees of Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, Los
Alamos National Laboratories were held last month. In
accordance with the rulemaking process, OCI participated with
General Habiger, Director of the Office of Security and
Operations in public hearings. The public hearings were held at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in September 1999;
Sandia National Laboratory on September 16; Los Alamos,
September 17; and Washington, DC, here, September 22.
Additionally, as you are aware, I provided a briefing on
the polygraph program to this subcommittee on October 4. We
also briefed the White House science advisor on the some
program.
While DOE has approved a notice on the polygraph program,
it only applies to DOE Federal employees. We're currently in
the latter stages of an Office of Personnel Management-mandated
rulemaking process to develop regulations for applying the
program to DOE contractors. DOE contractors constitute the
majority of individuals in the aforementioned high-risk
national security programs.
As DOE participates in the rulemaking process necessary to
apply to the polygraph program to DOE contractors, we have been
simultaneously administering the polygraph to DOE Federal
employees and volunteering contract employees in OCI and the
Office of Environment, Safety and Health. Additionally, some
high-level Department officials, including the Secretary,
Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary have taken the polygraph.
I was the first to volunteer to take the polygraph last year.
Overall, approximately 85 personnel have been administered and
passed a CI-scope polygraph thus far.
To ensure quality control, the polygraph program is managed
by an individual that has been the quality control on
polygraphs for DOE since 1991. He is the Director of Quality
Control for the American Association of Police Polygraph
Examiners and subcommittee chairman of the Quality Control
Committee for the American Polygraph Association.
The OCI polygraph program manager also served as the chief
instructor at the Federal Polygraph School from 1985 to 1991
and in Government Service Polygraph since 1974.
The current DOE Polygraph Program has four layers of
quality control. This is more than any other U.S. Government
agency which administers polygraph examinations.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Curran, I have been very generous with the
time.
Mr. Curran. I know. I have one more page.
Our decisions about who is granted access to classified
information must be made with the sole criteria of protecting
U.S. national security. The enhancement of the DOE Polygraph
Program is not without precedent, as our efforts are bringing
the Department in line with the rest of the intelligence
community insofar as access to high risk national security
programs are concerned. I believe that the Department's
commitment to the overall CI effort is embodied in its support
for the Polygraph Program. OCI has received strong support from
the Secretary for this initiative, and with his and your
continued support we will continue to use the polygraph as an
important CI tool.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience.
[The prepared statement of Edward J. Curran follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward J. Curran, Director, Office of
Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman. I am happy to be here this afternoon
to discuss the state of counterintelligence (CI) at the Department of
Energy (DOE). As you are aware, I have been the Director of the Office
of Counterintelligence (OCI) at DOE since April 1, 1998. In the one and
a half years since I assumed this position, I believe DOE has made
significant progress toward developing an effective and efficient
program to protect DOE personnel and facilities, as well as classified
and sensitive unclassified information, from foreign intelligence
threats. This progress would not have been possible without the strong
support of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson and the Congress. Before I
discuss the specific progress that has been made to date, I would like
to provide some background on counterintelligence at DOE.
background
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 61 (PDD-61), U.S. Department of
Energy Counterintelligence Program, was signed by the President on
February 11, 1998. The PDD was the result of numerous General
Accounting Office (GAO) reviews, United States Intelligence Community
assessments and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) study directed
by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in April 1997.
The PDD required that I prepare a report for the Secretary of Energy 90
days after my arrival to include an assessment of the current state of
DOE's CI Program, a strategic plan for achieving the long-term goals
and objectives of the PDD, and an action plan for near-term measures to
reduce the foreign intelligence threat to the DOE laboratories. To
accomplish this effort, I pulled together a team of CI experts,
security professionals, and individuals with cyber expertise from
throughout the Intelligence Community. The resulting report, Mapping
the Future of the Department of Energy's Counterintelligence Program,
hereinafter referred to as the 90-Day Study, identified many
deficiencies in DOE's CI Program and further verified that the Program
did not meet minimal standards. The review was initiated on April 1,
1998 and concluded on July 1, 1998 when the 90 Day Study was submitted
to the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, Attorney General,
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Director, FBI. The report
made 46 concrete recommendations to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of the DOE CI Program.
On November 13, 1998, Secretary of Energy Richardson approved
virtually all of the 46 recommendations identified in the 90-Day Study
and furnished a DOE CI Action Plan to Mr. Sandy Berger, Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs. In the Secretary's CI
Action Plan, my Office was directed to prepare a CI Implementation Plan
within 45 days of the issuance of the Action Plan. This OCI
Implementation Plan was delivered to the Office of the Secretary on
February 3, 1999. In the Implementation Plan we assigned individual
offices primary and supporting responsibility for each recommendation.
We have since prioritized the 46 recommendations into three tiers.
implementation plan progress
I would like to assure you that even while my Office was preparing
the CI Implementation Plan we were also in the process of implementing
many of the 90-Day Study's recommendations. I am pleased to inform you
that to date, approximately 75% of the 46 recommendations have been
implemented. Furthermore, almost 95% of the 24 most critical (``Tier
One''), 60% of the Tier Two, and 50% of the Tier Three recommendations
have been implemented. I would like to take just a few minutes to
identify some of these implementation successes and elaborate on many
of the procedures we have already put into place to address the
deficiencies in DOE's CI Program.
Resources
The most important part of developing a world-class CI Program is,
of course, the resources. Historically, the DOE CI Program has been
underfunded and the skills mix of the employees has been insufficient
to effectively execute a complex-wide CI mission. Currently, the
Department has over 110,000 cleared individuals placed in over 50
laboratories and facilities, most of which are under separate
contracts. These laboratories and facilities house most of the nation's
premiere scientists, research and development, and most sophisticated
technology applications in the world--yet when I came on board in April
1998 to head the Department's CI effort, DOE had only seven full time
Federal employees at headquarters dedicated to the CI mission, and just
a few untrained CI Officers in the field. Each of these CI Officers
reported to their separate laboratory or facility management without
any consolidated headquarters oversight or direction for their
programs.
Today I have a staff of 130 Federal, contractor, and Intelligence
Community CI professionals; I expect this number to increase to 156 by
the end of this fiscal year. Next fiscal year it is our goal to hire a
significant amount of CI-Cyber experts and place them at select DOE
facilities. Importantly, at each of the five weapons laboratories, I
have hired seasoned CI professionals, all of whom are retired FBI
Special Agents. These CI Officers are no longer buried in the local
bureaucracy; they have direct access to me and to the Laboratory
Director should they need to discuss a CI matter.
The DOE CI Program began in 1988 and from its inception through
1996, the Department spent less than $3.0M annually on CI. In Fiscal
Years 1997 and 1998, the Intelligence Committees approved a supplement
for the DOE CI budget based on the numerous GAO reports and their
continued, significant concerns regarding visitors at the laboratories.
This supplement brought the total CI Program funding up to $6.6M in
1997 and $7.6M in 1998. Since my appointment in April of last year, I
successfully increased the DOE CI budget from $7.6M to $15.6M for
Fiscal Year 1999 and $39.2M (which includes $8 million for CI-Cyber
initiatives) for this fiscal year. This very tedious and exhaustive
effort was accomplished with the exceptional support from Secretary
Richardson and Members from the House Armed Services Committee (HASC),
and the SSCI. Without their continued support and push for adequate
financing, none of the improvements to DOE's CI Program, which I am
about to describe would have been possible. Direct funding, along with
headquarters OCI control and direction of funds to the laboratories and
other DOE facilities, is the cornerstone of the 90-Day Study, CI Action
Plan, CI Implementation Plan, and an overall effective CI Program at
DOE. Without this level of control, meaningful oversight is impossible.
Direct funding has helped us to have greater control over allocation of
resources to the priorities I have set for the CI Program. I would like
to share with you these programmatic priorities and the efforts OCI is
undertaking to improve to the DOE CI Program.
program overview
First, I will highlight some of the very critical and necessary
changes in day-to-day operations of the CI effort at DOE Headquarters.
As the result of PDD-61, a new and independent OCI was created that
reports directly to the Secretary of Energy. As Director, OCI, the PDD
gives me direct CI policy development, implementation and oversight
responsibilities for all CI activities throughout DOE. The Secretary
signed a Delegation Order confirming those responsibilities and
delegating to me the appropriate authority to execute them. In addition
to my direct reporting and access to the Secretary on CI issues, on a
regular, bi-weekly basis, I meet with Under Secretary Moniz or Deputy
Secretary Glauthier on CI issues, or as the need arises. Mr. Sanchez,
Director of the DOE Office of Intelligence, and I both participate in
these meetings since our offices work very closely together. As the
result of the 90-Day Study findings, I determined the optimal OCI
organizational structure includes six distinct areas: Analysis,
Investigations, CI- Cyber, Training, Inspections, and CI Evaluation
Board. Importantly, each of these programs must operate as a single,
integrated program; none of them taken in isolation would constitute a
viable CI Program.
Analysis Program
The Analysis Program is headed by an experienced Analyst detailed
from the FBI with over eight years of specific analytical experience.
Her Deputy is also a detailee from the FBI with extensive analytical
experience. They both are very familiar with DOE since they
participated in the FBI study of DOE directed by the SSCI which I
previously mentioned. They have six analysts currently working for
them, and are in the process of hiring several more experienced
analysts. We expect to place CI analysts at five laboratories this
fiscal year. In my opinion DOE has a wealth of information which has
not been analytically exploited in the past. The reports we have
produced and will be producing are obviously of great importance to DOE
but also to the Intelligence Community.
For example:
<bullet> A DOE CI analyst played an extremely important role in the
preparation of the first annual threat assessment prepared by
the National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) at the
direction of the DCI, published on November 27, 1998. This
report is required on an annual basis as the result of PDD-61.
OCI analysts are currently playing a critical role in the
second annual PDD-61 mandated threat assessment which should be
published next month. These reports are a direct result of the
President's direction and represent meaningful intelligence
produced by the Intelligence Community which directly impacts
DOE. In my opinion, if it were not for the tenacious efforts of
my DOE analysts in this annual effort, the reports would be far
less meaningful than they are.
<bullet> The Analysis Program has written and will continue to write
foreign intelligence threat assessments resulting from DOE's
extensive interaction with DOE ``sensitive countries.'' As the
U.S. Government's technical advisor to various bilateral and
multilateral non-proliferation and arms control initiatives,
DOE hosts hundreds of sensitive country foreign nationals each
year, and DOE officials are frequent travelers to sensitive
countries.
<bullet> The Analysis Program is also in the midst of a study of
potential economic espionage at the laboratories. The
laboratories engage in Cooperative Research and Development
Agreements (CRADAs) with private industry. OCI wants to ensure
that proprietary economic information is being properly
protected.
The projects I mentioned above are expensive but the results and
benefits to DOE and the Intelligence Community will allow us to detect
and work toward neutralizing foreign intelligence activities being
directed against DOE. These products also provide our policymakers with
the information they need to make national policy decisions.
Investigations Program
The Investigations Program is headed by another FBI supervisor
currently on detail from the FBI with over 23 years experience in
Foreign Counterintelligence operations. His primary responsibility is
to ensure that any instances in which classified information is being
or may have been compromised to an unauthorized party are reported to
the FBI. I will continue to staff this Program with qualified and
experienced investigators.
CI-Cyber Program
The CI-Cyber Program is headed by an employee from the FBI's
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). The CI-Cyber Program
Director serves as OCI's representative to DOE's Critical
Infrastructure Protection Task Force. Her daily activities include
interaction with DOE headquarters and laboratory computer security
professionals, as well as, the NIPC. With the additional $8 million OCI
received for Cyber Programs in Fiscal Year 2000, we are implementing
some of the recommendations in the 90-Day Study. For example:
<bullet> One of the 90 Day Study's recommendations was the development
and implementation of a complex-wide strategy to address the
potential CI implications of email to foreign nations.
<bullet> As mentioned above, the CI-Cyber Program will significantly
enhance the number of CI- Cyber experts this fiscal year in
order to further develop field intrusion detection and analysis
abilities. CI-Cyber personnel require skills in both computer
security and CI.
Training Program
A DOE federal employee heads our Training Program. The purpose of
the Training Program is three fold: 1) to formulate an in-house program
to train our own CI personnel; 2) to provide professional awareness
briefings and debriefings for our scientists traveling to sensitive
countries; and 3) to provide awareness briefings for the general DOE
population who have an interface with foreigners so they become
sensitive to CI related issues. Professional training for CI Officers
has been re-oriented to focus on core skills necessary to be an
effective CI Officer.
I would like to provide the following examples of our current
outreach and awareness training efforts to the DOE population: The OCI
currently has a CI professional assigned to the DOE High Enriched
Uranium/Transparency Program. This person is responsible for all
related CI issues and team briefings and debriefings. He is accepted
and trusted as a total team member and the members are willing to
discuss sensitive CI issues with him. I have established that same
relationship with the scientists and DOE employees associated with the
Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program (the
largest program within DOE dealing with the Russians), the Initiative
for Proliferation Prevention, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, and the
China Arms Control Exchange (CACE) by assigning a CI Officer to each
team. Assigning a CI Officer to all such programs within DOE will help
us to achieve our goal of briefing and debriefing all DOE personnel
traveling to sensitive countries. Our CI goal is not only to protect
technology, but also programs involving DOE personnel.
Inspections
We have established an internal inspections process as required by
PDD-61. There are two teams available at any given time to complete
these inspections. One team is headed by a retired FBI agent who was
the former Assistant Director in Charge of the Washington Field Office
and was previously the Deputy Director in the FBI's Inspection
Division. The second team is headed by a former FBI agent who retired
from the FBI as the Special Agent in Charge of the Springfield office
and was also an Inspector in the FBI Inspection Division. Both these
individuals have over 25 years experience in the FBI and specifically
in the CI arena. The Inspection teams are supported by experienced
retired FBI and law enforcement officers who are experts in gathering
information and resolving complex cases. The teams have been augmented
by a senior retired personnel security expert from DOE along with
retired DOE laboratory scientists.
As of this date two inspections have taken place--Los Alamos
National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A third
inspection--Sandia National Laboratories--is underway. All DOE
facilities are subject to a CI inspection, and we have scheduled 12
facilities for inspection next calendar year. The results of the first
two inspections have been provided to me and the Secretary Richardson.
In brief, these results show that significant improvements have been
made in the CI Programs at these laboratories since PDD-61 was signed.
I will provide summaries of these inspections to Congress in the Annual
Report on Counterintelligence and Security Practices at the National
Laboratories, as mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000. Any significant CI relevant events will be provided
to you immediately.
The CI Evaluations Board (CIEB)
PDD-61 authorized the use of many tools designed to reduce the
threat to classified and sensitive information at DOE and its field
activities. The polygraph was specifically cited as being one of the
tools which OCI, in coordination with the DOE Office of Security
Affairs, may use to enhance the DOE CI Program. Research and analysis
conducted for the 90 Day Study also indicated that the polygraph was
one tool that could be used to enhance the effectiveness of the CI
Program.
OCI's CIEB is responsible for implementing the DOE CI Polygraph
Program. A senior OCI officer is leading OCI's CIEB. I must stress that
the Polygraph Program is only one of the six elements of the DOE CI
Program; it cannot be considered in isolation. I do not believe that
the polygraph is a CI panacea or an infallible CI tool. However, I
believe that the polygraph serves as a valuable deterrent to
individuals who currently have direct or indirect access to classified
information and may be contemplating espionage. I also believe the
polygraph serves as constructive screening device for individuals
applying for positions requiring access to classified and/or sensitive
unclassified information. The polygraph also can be used effectively as
an exculpatory tool. The purpose of the Polygraph Program is to protect
U.S. national security by attempting to determine if anyone with access
has engaged in espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or had unauthorized
contact with foreign nationals, or disclosed classified information in
an unauthorized manner.
I am extremely sensitive to the anxiety that the Polygraph Program
has caused in the Department. I want to stress that we are only going
to be administering polygraph examinations to a small percentage of DOE
employees having access to the most sensitive ``high risk'' national
security programs. These programs include: Special Access Programs
(SAPS), Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), Personnel Security
and Assurance Program, (PSAPS), and Personnel Assurance Programs
(PAPS). The latter two programs involve DOE employees who are involved
in the design of nuclear weapons and those who have direct access to
these weapons.
OCI has made every effort to reach out to potentially affected
personnel to explain the polygraph. Technical briefings for employees
of Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories
were held last month. In accordance with the rulemaking process, OCI
participated, with General Eugene Habiger, Director of the Office of
Security and Emergency Operations, in public hearings. The public
hearings were held at:
<bullet> Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, September 14, 1999,
<bullet> Sandia National Laboratories, September 16, 1999,
<bullet> Los Alamos National Laboratory, September 17, 1999 and
<bullet> Washington, D.C., September 22, 1999.
Additionally, as you are aware, I provided a briefing on the
Polygraph Program to this Subcommittee on October 4. We also briefed
the White House Science Advisor this month.
While DOE has approved a Notice on the Polygraph Program, it only
applies to DOE Federal employees. We are currently in the latter stages
of an Office of Personnel Management mandated ``rulemaking'' process to
develop regulations for applying the program to DOE contractors. DOE
contractors constitute the majority of individuals in the
aforementioned ``high risk'' national security programs.
As DOE participates in the rulemaking process necessary to apply
the Polygraph Program to DOE contractors, we have been simultaneously
administering the polygraph to DOE Federal employees and volunteering
contract employees in OCI and the Office of Environment, Safety and
Health. Additionally, some high-level Department officials, including
the Secretary, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary have taken the
polygraph. I was the first volunteer to take the polygraph. Overall,
approximately 85 personnel have been administered and passed a CI-scope
polygraph thus far.
To ensure quality control, the Polygraph Program is managed by an
individual that has been the quality control on polygraphs for DOE
since 1991. He is the Director of Quality Control for the American
Association of Police Polygraph Examiners (AAPP) and the Sub-Committee
Chairman of the QC-Committee for the American Polygraph Association
(APA). The OCI Polygraph Program Manager also served as the Chief
Instructor at the Federal Polygraph School (DODPI) from 1985-1991 and
in Government Service Polygraph since 1974. The current DOE Polygraph
Program has four layers of quality control; this is more than any other
U.S. Government agency which administers polygraph examinations.
Our decisions about who is granted access to classified information
must be made with the sole criteria of protecting U.S. national
security. The enhancement of the DOE Polygraph Program is not without
precedent, as our efforts are bringing the Department in line with the
rest of the Intelligence Community insofar as access to ``high risk''
national security programs are concerned. I believe that the
Department's commitment to the overall CI effort is embodied in its
support for the Polygraph Program. OCI has received strong support from
the Secretary for this initiative, and with his and your continued
support we will continue to use the polygraph as an important CI tool.
I am very encouraged about the many initiatives we have begun and
accomplishments achieved thus far. While there is work yet to do, I am
pleased to say that I have received absolute cooperation from all the
senior DOE officials at the laboratories and headquarters. In addition
to the senior management support from DOE and the laboratories, I have
received nothing but the utmost support and encouragement from
Secretary Richardson, Director Freeh of the FBI and DCI Tenet. In
addition to showing his support for the CI Program outside of DOE,
Secretary Richardson has personally met with the Laboratory Directors
and various DOE Assistant Secretaries to reaffirm his support and
endorsement of an aggressive CI Program within DOE. This very vocal,
personal commitment by Secretary Richardson to an aggressive CI Program
at DOE has been paramount to our success thus far. With this continued
level of support I am looking forward to appearing before you again to
proudly discuss a fully implemented DOE CI Program as mandated by PDD-
61.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.
I would just note for the record that all members'
statements on both the Oversight Subcommittee as well as Energy
and Power will be made part of the record, and I noted that
Chairman Bliley came in at one point.
This point we will proceed with questions. I will be pretty
strict with this 5-minute rule on the clock. I know that Mr.
Cox has already gone to the floor. His bill is on the floor. We
have a number of other subcommittees that are meeting as well,
and we will start with my questions.
I guess, Mr. Curran, noting your emphasis at the end
particularly on polygraphs, there's been a lot of discussion on
this for some time. I know you and I talked about it in my
office last winter, but--I guess it was in early spring--and
where are we on the polygraph?
I noted that Secretary Richardson I think in a very visible
way took the polygraph himself to try and illustrate to
employees at one of the labs that it was nothing really to
fear. There's been a lot of discussion. You talked about that
this was a valuable deterrent, only a small percentage of
folks, in fact, would be polygraphed. But it's my understanding
that so far no DOE employees, other than the Secretary and
yourself, but no scientists have been polygraphed; is that
correct?
Mr. Curran. That's correct, sir. We have polygraphed over
95 Federal employees since the program started.
Mr. Upton. Are these security people?
Mr. Curran. Mostly it is CI people. We required that if
we're going to be asking other people to take a polygraph, not
just for that reason, because we have access to sensitive
information, that all our people will take a CI polygraph. We
give an exception as reciprocity for other employees who have
received other types of polygraph from the CIA, DOD. We accept
that, but CI we do not. We mandate that everybody in CI has to
take it.
Mr. Upton. At what point do you think sensitive folks in
sensitive positions, in fact, may be asked to----
Mr. Curran. We are--as I said, we are in the final stages.
We meet almost daily. We could not legally polygraph
contractors unless they volunteered to take that polygraph. We
had to go through this rulemaking process where you had the
four public hearings. We have concluded that. We have to now
respond to the comments in the public hearing which we are
doing. Once that is done, then it goes back to the Federal
Register, and you have 30 days before you can actually
implement.
What we have been doing, because it is such a sensitive
topic within DOE, we have been going over each one of these
programs with the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and,
basically, the rule is that we are relying on these people who
run these programs, based on the criteria, to tell us who
should be polygraphed. We have that list.
Now, we are looking at it and re-examining it to determine
are we down to the core, the hard-core people that we want.
We're trying to minimize the impact as much as we can, but we
still have to address the national security concerns. So I
would expect that we would respond to the public hearings, then
we have the 30 days in November, and then after that we would
start polys.
Mr. Upton. So beginning?
Mr. Curran. December.
Mr. Upton. December, okay.
Mr. Podonsky, in my opening statement and in your statement
as well, there was quite a bit of discussion with regard to the
access, particularly from folks not onsite, through computers
to information on those computers, the e-mail whatever. You
indicated with the Lawrence Livermore that you thought that
there were protections from unauthorized access. You indicated
that there were some weaknesses. You were expecting some
penetration testing used by hackers. At what point do you
expect that to happen? December? Do you remember?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir. In December, as I mentioned, we're
going back to all three laboratories. Our biggest concern in
the cyber security were the unclassified, and it was not so
much from the external penetrations but it was from people who
had cleared access from foreign nationals.
We didn't have an issue with foreign nationals. Our issue
was if they were from sensitive countries, as we have stated in
our classified report, and the potential that those individuals
may or may not have to go through the unclassified net into
other areas in the unclassified. We had no concern about the
classified net. I want to make that clear.
Mr. Upton. So you feel that the firewall is sufficient on
the classified with all of the labs that you looked at?
Mr. Podonsky. With all three laboratories, we felt that the
firewall was sufficient. There are improvements to be made in a
couple of the areas, but that would get into some classified
area.
Mr. Upton. Okay. I am watching the clock for me.
Sandia, you indicated, was marginal and it was the rating
that you gave them, prompt attention needed. Is that also with
regard to the access to unclassified material?
Mr. Podonsky. To the unclassified.
Mr. Upton. Why is it that if Lawrence was satisfactory,
Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia was marginal, you couldn't get
those same type of systems, encourage those same type of
systems at Sandia?
Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Chairman, are you talking about the
overall rating?
Mr. Upton. Yeah. Your overall rating. I presume--well, you
tell me--by giving a marginal rating at Sandia tells me that
there's some obvious weaknesses there. Were some of those
weaknesses in regard to access to unclassified information
through the computers?
Mr. Podonsky. Relative to all three sites, Los Alamos
receiving overall satisfactory, the other two labs received
overall marginals, but all of them received less than
satisfactory in the unclassified cyber security because of
weaknesses on the access of the internal approved individuals.
For example, there are different tiers of an unclassified
information. Some of it is sensitive, and we had the concern in
terms of what kind of administrative controls were on at
actually all three laboratories.
Mr. Upton. I will follow up when we come up.
Mr. Stupak, do you want to go next?
Mr. Stupak. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for being late. I just got in from Michigan,
dealing with DOE no less.
Mr. Podonsky, if the laboratories can reach satisfactory
rating without more money, can you tell us why we should give
them more money? Either they're satisfactory or they're not. Or
are you just determined, as the General said that they have,
and I am quoting his testimony, foundation to perform their
security functions capably given adequate resources? So do you
really need the money or are you playing off that statement?
Mr. Podonsky. When we assign a rating that we believe that
the individual site earns, it's based on their performance. A
satisfactory rating does not mean that everything is perfect.
It does not mean that there are not other management areas
needing attention. Relative to resources or money, I would
yield to the policy arm as well as the lead PSOs as to what
moneys they do or do not need. When we look at it, we try to
not look at programmatic needs. We look at strictly how
effective the policies are being implemented or not.
Mr. Stupak. If you're going to give a satisfactory rating,
I don't say on appropriations, obviously, but I am sure the
Congress would be probably hard pressed to give more money to
an agency that's doing satisfactory work, and if it's
satisfactory, how would you make the case to the appropriators
that you need more money?
Mr. Podonsky. Well, specifically if we take Los Alamos,
there are many upgrades that are still needed regardless of the
fact that they have received a satisfactory rating.
Satisfactory is not the penultimate that we walk away from and
say everything is fine. In the case of cyber security,
unclassified, as I mentioned to the chairman, all three
laboratories need extensive work in this area. So, obviously,
there would be funds necessary----
Mr. Stupak. What was the last rating of Los Alamos?
Mr. Podonsky. The last overall rating, it was just rated in
August as satisfactory.
Mr. Stupak. And let me take it one step further. The last
time we had a hearing here, it seemed to me we gave--there was
a special line, $5.3 million I believe the number was--I am
going off the top of my head, so I may have the number wrong.
That's supposed to be for security, but two-thirds of that
money went for administrative costs and administrative travel.
What guarantee do we have that even if we gave you more on top
of a satisfactory rating, that it is really going to go to this
security upgrade that you need?
Mr. Podonsky. Well, one point of clarification that I need
to make, on the satisfactory rating, it may in fact also be
because of compensatory measures which are short-term fixes,
not long-term. So there are long-term fixes at all three of the
sites. We add an oversight element of the Department. We cannot
give you the guarantees that the moneys are going to be used
appropriately. All we can do is report back on how effective
the security is, and we report it back to the Secretary and to
the lead PSOs.
Mr. Stupak. So you don't oversee the security operations
then?
Mr. Podonsky. We oversee the security operations. We
oversee the security implementations of improvements, but we
don't oversee the security budget. That's General Habiger.
Mr. Stupak. Sure. Okay. So you're the oversight. How much
pressure do you have as oversight to get these security
measures implemented in a timely, cost-effective manner?
Mr. Podonsky. When the Secretary elevated our office to
directly report to him, our responsibility was to go out and
kick every stone, turn over every piece of information, find
out where the vulnerabilities or the strengths were. But, at
the same time, the Secretary encouraged us to work with the
policy folks as well as the lead PSOs to help find solutions.
Our main thrust as we provide information to the Secretary and
to the Congress is how effective the policies are being
implemented. The pressures that we have are strictly that the
Secretary wants to make sure, as I am sure the Congress is,
that there are no security problems in the department.
Mr. Stupak. Speaking of your oversight roll in that, you're
supposed to be independent of the rest of the security
bureaucracy, are you not?
Mr. Podonsky. That is true.
Mr. Stupak. And you're supposed to be independent of
General Habiger, and you don't report to him, do you?
Mr. Podonsky. No, I do not.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Then who do report to?
Mr. Podonsky. I report directly to the Secretary of Energy.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. You're supposed to be the outsider in
this whole thing to give your recommendations, right?
Mr. Podonsky. We are supposed to give an unbiased,
unfiltered, independent look at how effective the Department is
implementing its policies, how effective its policy is and
report that back to the Secretary, report it to the lead PSOs.
We're the outside, independent, internal group.
Mr. Stupak. Well, in the General's statement, he says, and
I am quoting now, Glenn and I are working closely together to
ensure an integrated approach through policy development and
oversight. Well, you're supposed to be doing oversight, not
policy development, right?
Mr. Podonsky. We do not develop policy.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Well, that statement would indicate an
integrated approach to a policy development oversight, so I
want to make sure that you're truly independent and that we're
developing security with an independent look at it and not back
into the culture of DOE which has neither been accountable nor
accept responsibility for past breaches at DOE.
Mr. Podonsky. I can't answer for the General, but if you
indulge me----
Mr. Stupak. Sure.
Mr. Podonsky. One of the major changes that have occurred
in the last year, and I have been with the Department for 15
years, is that the security infrastructure that the Secretary
set up is working together. In the last 15 years, it was not
always so. For example, we do not develop policy, but we
evaluate the effectiveness of that policy. In previous years,
we would inform the policy people of our concerns about some of
the unclear policies. Oftentimes, we had disputes and with no
resolution.
What General Habiger, I believe, is inferring is that we
now have an infrastructure where when we provide information
directly to the General and his people. We're seeing corrective
actions. We're seeing an adult dialog, which has not been the
norm of the Department.
Mr. Stupak. From where we're sitting, and it seems like
maybe too much of a cozy relationship in that I think--and I
don't speak for all of the members--but I always thought your
idea would be to have General Habiger write policy and
implement it and then it was your job to see that it got done.
Mr. Podonsky. That's what we're doing.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Just from the statements there it sort of
looked it's not really what's going on, maybe too close of a
relationship. And I want to make sure that, you know, the
General's shop is not determining how oversight should be done,
but that really should be on your side and be independent
thereof.
Mr. Podonsky. Just as an illustration, the General has a
number of findings in our reports that he's responsible and his
office is responsible for providing corrective actions to.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. General, welcome. Glenn, good to have you here
again. Mr. Curran, also good to have you.
Mr. Curran, you mentioned polygraph 27 times. The General
mentioned it once. I don't think Mr. Podonsky, unless I missed
it, mentioned it. Polygraph was one of, if not the biggest
initiative that the Secretary announced in his revelation that
we had a problem. He conveyed not only this Congress, but to
America that it would start the next day. To date, 85 people,
if your first statement was correct, 95 if your second
statement was correct, have been given the polygraph. They are
CI individuals. They are the Secretary, they are the General,
and they are you. To date, no DOE employed scientist have been
given a polygraph; am I correct?
Mr. Curran. Correct.
Mr. Burr. Do you need further policy directives to have the
jurisdiction to administer a polygraph to DOE employees?
Mr. Curran. Contractors?
Mr. Burr. DOE employees.
Mr. Curran. No.
Mr. Burr. You do for contractors?
Mr. Curran. I don't need any further regulation for DOE
Federal employees, correct.
Mr. Burr. And are there Federal employees that you intend
to administer a polygraph to?
Mr. Curran. All Federal employees assigned to my office
have been polygraphed.
Mr. Burr. Is there anybody in the lab structure that is a
Federal employee?
Mr. Curran. That has not been polygraphed, no.
Mr. Burr. Have all the managers of those facilities that
are deemed DOE employees been polygraphed?
Mr. Curran. Some of them, not all of them.
Mr. Burr. Not all of them. Do you intend to polygraph the
other ones?
Mr. Curran. They would--they would come under the matrix to
be polygraphed.
Mr. Burr. But they have not been done yet?
Mr. Curran. Have not.
Mr. Burr. You also made the statement that we're relying on
the individuals that run these programs to tell us who should
be polygraphed; is that correct?
Mr. Curran. That's correct.
Mr. Burr. Are these the same individuals who have had the
responsibility to oversee security at these facilities?
Mr. Curran. No. There's a catchall there, also. The manager
who runs a specific SAP program or is required to provide me
with a list, based on the criteria that I give him, of who he
thinks should be polygraphed. I then have the option to
disagree with the manager's decision.
What we're asking is to work this as a concerted effort at
this point, since these people know more about the SAPS and the
PSAPS than I do, but we have the authority to go back.
Mr. Burr. Do you agree that the intent to polygraph, as far
as the size of the population based upon where the Secretary
originally made statements from than what it is today, has been
reduced significantly?
Mr. Curran. No. The rulemaking process that we have just
been through covers all the areas that I identified in the PDD
report. That's the total population.
Now, I have said right from the beginning I do not believe
that all those people involved in those programs need to be
polygraphed. That's why we're in this process now. For example,
a SAP program has different layers of access, Tier I to--one's
in administrative access; one's a technical, which is the most
critical; and one's a security.
Now, in some SAPS, we may say everybody gets polygraphed.
In other SAPS, we might just say Tier III people get
polygraphed. That's what we are looking for the program
managers to help us out with. But they're not deciding what the
criteria is. We are. We're working with them to do that.
Mr. Burr. Well, clearly, if program managers had their
choice, the answer would be none.
Mr. Curran. Excuse me, sir?
Mr. Burr. If the program managers had their choice, I think
the answer would be none.
Mr. Curran. I have been meeting with the Secretary and the
Under Secretary almost daily for the last 3 weeks. They have
come up with a number that is pretty close to what we had
originally. I can honestly tell you the program managers in
these programs have been very, very cooperative.
Mr. Burr. I wait curiously to see what your number is and
to go back and read the Secretary's statements when he made it
about how many people he sought to be administered polygraphs.
General, I need to ask you a question, and I hope you will
take this in the spirit that I ask you. Who wrote your
testimony?
Mr. Habiger. Who wrote it?
Mr. Burr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Habiger. I wrote 90 percent of it, sir.
Mr. Burr. Ninety percent of it. The part about the budget,
did you write that?
Mr. Habiger. Yes, sir, I personally wrote it.
Mr. Burr. You personally wrote that.
Mr. Curran, have you ever been denied of any of the
resources you have requested?
Mr. Curran. No, I have not, sir.
Mr. Burr. Let me give you a description of what the Budget
Committee said about the $35 million requested for DOE, which
was emergency money, I think either slightly before or upon
your arrival that I'm certainly not tagging to you. I won't use
the word, but it's four letters. It started with C-R and ended
in A-P.
They asked for that request to go back and for there to
actually be specifics tied to it as far as what it was going to
be used for.
Now, we've got one of the gentlemen who will testify in a
minute, Mr. Weigand. He's the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Research and Development. He says we have committed an
abundance of resources to fix the problems and to date have
reprioritized funding within our existing budget.
Let me ask you, General, can this be reprogrammed and meet
our needs? I think there's currently $800 million that is
devoted to security. Or will the Congress have to appropriate
new funds within DOE to meet this need?
Mr. Habiger. Sir, let me make this very clear. When I took
this job, I asked the Secretary to do two things: No. 1, allow
me to work directly for him. Done. No. 2, I told him I couldn't
do the job without having absolute total control over the $800
million. We're in the process of doing that. We're going to be
working with the appropriations committees and authorization
committees. For the fiscal year 2000 budget, we're tagging the
money. I have oversight over security dollars in the fiscal
year 2000 budget.
The fiscal year 2001 budget, which will be coming over to
the President in early February, the money will be broken out,
stripped out under a different appropriation, be titled
security. I'll be accountable. I'll be responsible. We're going
to spend it in the right place.
Mr. Burr. I feel very confident that your intentions are,
in fact, correct. One of the hesitancies of this committee has
been I think a thing that Mr. Podonsky and this committee
share, that we have been in the process a heck of a long time,
and I hope in the next 5 minutes, Mr. Chairman, in the next
round we will be able to ask some more questions.
Mr. Upton. We'll do so.
Mrs. Wilson.
Mrs. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a number of questions with respect to computer
security, and I don't know, Mr. Curran, if you're the correct
one to address these to. If not, these others chime in.
I understand that you have conducted security reviews at
the national laboratories. What other DOE facilities have you
conducted cyber security audits on ?
Mr. Curran. That's more a function----
Mr. Podonsky. That would be more in our area, ma'am.
Mrs. Wilson. Okay.
Mr. Podonsky. We just finished an inspection at Oak Ridge
at Y-12 facility.
Mrs. Wilson. Have you ever conducted an audit on DOE
headquarters?
Mr. Podonsky. We did, in 1991.
Mrs. Wilson. Have you conducted one within the last year, 2
years?
Mr. Podonsky. No, ma'am, we have not.
Mrs. Wilson. Are there connections between the DOE
headquarters or DOE Germantown computer systems and the
national laboratories, either through wide area networks,
client servers or anything?
Mr. Podonsky. I believe there are.
I was just told, no, there is not.
Mrs. Wilson. There are no computer links between Germantown
or DOE headquarters and our national laboratories?
Mr. Podonsky. There is communication links between, and it
varies. There's classified networks----
Mr. Chairman, may I introduce the director of the Office of
Cyber Security?
Mr. Upton. I think you should, and we probably need to give
him the oath, too. We will stop this clock here. I don't know
that we'd be such good 2-minute coaches here, 2-minute drills,
but if you could state your name for the record.
Mr. Peterson. My name is Brad Peterson.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Upton. You may proceed in answering that question.
Mr. Peterson. The headquarters network is linked between
Forrestal and Germantown as part of one DOE headquarters
network. As far as a wide area network with other fields, as
far as, you know, linked into one network, no. There is, of
course, Internet connectivity. As far as on the classified
side, there is a capability to send classified e-mail back and
forth over an ES net, but it goes through NSA encryption as it
leaves one site and would go through encryption on the other
side as it would come out.
Mrs. Wilson. Thank you.
Mr. Podonsky, obviously the question that I am getting at
here is the weakness of the computer system is only as strong
as its weakest link, which means checking the laboratories
themselves. That alone is probably insufficient for cyber
security services, and I wonder if you could tell me what your
plans are for auditing of DOE headquarter systems.
Mr. Podonsky. Currently, Mr. Peterson, our office director,
is working with John Gilligan, who's our CIO, in looking at the
overall implications of what we are finding in the field and
bringing it back to the national look. For example, there were
just--the unclassified computer security order is just being
put out now. It's been an issue that we've had for quite some
time.
Mrs. Wilson. Let me interrupt you here. When do you plan to
do an audit of DOE headquarters or Germantown's systems or is
it just not on the schedule?
Mr. Podonsky. No. It's on the schedule for next year.
Mrs. Wilson. Thank you.
When you did your review of the national laboratories, were
you able to penetrate the classified systems from outside of
the fence--I mean, from offsite?
Mr. Peterson. No, we weren't, ma'am. Their systems are air
gapped, so you cannot actually gain access.
Mrs. Wilson. Were you able to penetrate the unclassified
systems? And, if so, what kind?
Mr. Peterson. We were able to penetrate the unclassified
firewall at Sandia. However----
Mrs. Wilson. What kinds of systems? Was it personnel? Was
it--what kinds of systems were you able to penetrate?
Mr. Peterson. We were able to gain access to different
servers. Our time we test is very limited, so we did not fully
explore how far we could migrate through the system. At
Sandia----
Mrs. Wilson. Was it the personnel computer? Was it the
telephone controller? What did you penetrate? Or if you can't
do it in an unclassified forum, I understand.
Mr. Peterson. It was a regular computer that might be
sitting on a researcher desk type of a thing so you can get
some types of files.
Mrs. Wilson. So you penetrated researchers' computers at
the national laboratories?
Mr. Peterson. That was--and, again, this is probably
something we should wait and go into at a different level to be
able to answer your question fully. It's not appropriate in an
unclassified environment.
Mrs. Wilson. Thank you.
I think we can probably answer this question in this forum.
If you hired the same hackers, Mr. Podonsky, or contracted with
them or conducted them to penetrate your computer on your desk
or my computer on my desk, do you think they could do it?
Mr. Podonsky. I think, without worrying about damage to
your software or mine, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Wilson. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you. I have got a handful of notes from
staff who are trying to keep track of what was said. I
apologize for my absence, and I also apologize if I cover any
ground that's already been covered. I think I have a good idea
of which topics were covered, and I will try not to be
repetitive.
Just as an overview, since you are all DOE employees, the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, as I mentioned
in my opening statement, said the Department of Energy ``has
had a dysfunctional management structure and culture that only
occasionally gave proper credence to the need for rigorous
security and counterintelligence programs at the weapons
labs.'' That report, as you know, was as of mid-year 1999. Does
any of you disagree with that? Anybody care to disagree with
that?
That's a pretty harsh assessment, and it is as of the
middle of this year. It gives rise to the question why, if we
are looking for something systemic here, did it take 20 years
for the Department of Energy to come up with a
counterintelligence plan? And I guess, Mr. Curran, since you
have been tasked now with that----
Mr. Curran. If I can answer your question.
Mr. Cox. We didn't even have an Office of
Counterintelligence created by the direction of the Secretary,
then Secretary Pena, until 1998. Why did it take so long?
Mr. Curran. I can't answer the whys to that, sir.
I think in my opening statement we confirmed exactly what
you did say. I mean, there was not any counterintelligence
program within DOE that even met minimal standards.
I am not a DOE employee. I am an FBI employee detailed to
DOE. Since my initial 90-day study and the implementation plan,
I can tell you that I have received outstanding cooperation
from the senior management in the three weapons labs. I don't
think we could have made the progress that we have made without
their cooperation. The CI inspection process looks at executive
management and their role and participation in a CI program.
And if we don't have that, the program's not going to work. So
I think we do hold their feet to the fire on that. I know the
Secretary does.
Mr. Cox. I know that there's been some discussion during
the members' questioning of polygraphs, and so I'm going to be
as brief as I can because I don't know exactly what was said,
and I don't want to ask you the same questions over again.
But, Mr. Curran, in your testimony you said that the plan
for polygraphing is modelled on other intelligence agencies.
Using the CIA as an example, what's your understanding of CIA's
policy?
Mr. Curran. As you know, Mr. Cox, I served for 3 years out
at the CIA, post Ames, and one of the problems I faced was the
fact that they had an exorbitant number of people who had
failed the CI polygraph. They went back after Ames and
retrieved all the charts in the hundreds. That's what I was
faced with when I got there. Now, obviously you don't have that
many spies in the agency. There was something wrong with the
program, in my opinion.
The counterespionage group that I ran at the CIA determined
that we need to revise the polygraph itself. CIA has a
lifestyle polygraph, the general polygraph. What I was
interested in only was if the person was a spy or not. We were
able to bring down the focus of the polygraph. The more focused
the polygraph is, the more successful it is. The wider it is,
the less useful it becomes.
And basically we came down to two questions. When we asked
a CI employee, have you ever passed on--have you ever had
unauthorized disclosure of classified, they all flunk it. I
mean, because that's their business. They are in that on a
daily business.
But if you ask them, have you illegally passed classified
information to a foreign agent? Do you know what I mean? We
were able to resolve--of the hundreds of cases we had, we
resolved 85 percent of those that we said, hey, this person may
have other problems, but the person is not a spy. They may have
to pay their income tax for the last 10 years, but that's how
we were able to get through that.
Mr. Cox. What you're outlining is a distinction between the
proper administration and use of this tool on the one hand and
the universe of people to whom the test is applied.
Particularly with respect to the latter, what do you understand
CIA's policy to be?
Mr. Curran. All employees of CIA get a lifestyle polygraph.
Mr. Cox. Would that include a secretary?
Mr. Curran. Yes, all employees.
Mr. Cox. So the night watchman?
Mr. Curran. Yes. I think it excludes the gardener. I am not
quite sure.
Mr. Cox. Now at DOE, as of today, as we meet here, is there
any nuclear weapons scientist who has been polygraphed other
than in the course of a law enforcement investigation?
Mr. Curran. As far as I know, there has not been. Now, I
think there's an area that we can go into that I don't think we
should go into here where because of what that person can maybe
do and may have been polygraphed, but I think 99 percent, no.
Mr. Cox. My red light is on. Is my time expired? That's
usually what it means.
Mr. Upton. I indicated earlier that we wouldn't make very
good 2-minute drill football coaches, unless you play for Notre
Dame. They had a little trouble at the beginning of the year.
We'll start the second round of questions. Just for the
record, too, Mr. Peterson, if you could give your title.
Mr. Peterson. Director of the Office of Cyber Security and
Special Reviews within the Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Based on that, I don't know if this question would be more
directed to you or Mr. Podonsky. But, as I understand it, that
in the past the inspections in fact have found--even though
there's a firewall that's been identified for access to
classified information, in fact, as I recall, some inspections
showed that classified information was on unclassified systems.
Isn't that correct?
Mr. Podonsky. The short answer to that is, yes, when we
were doing some penetration tests a year ago that we did find
on the unclassified one or two documents that were deemed to be
classified by the Office of Classification.
Mr. Upton. Has that been corrected? I know, I think in the
Wen Ho Lee case that was indicated that he perhaps wittingly or
unwittingly had transferred many, many lines, thousand perhaps,
of classified on to the unclassified. Is that still--is that
allowed? Is that possible?
Mr. Podonsky. We have not found that during this round of
inspections.
Mr. Upton. And you would agree that if that was still
possible, though, one could navigate and, in fact, get
classified information on that unclassified system; is that not
correct?
Mr. Podonsky. If that is still possible, that is correct.
Mr. Upton. I understand that each of the labs permit
foreign nationals from sensitive countries, whether it be Iran,
Russia, to have authorized user status on their unclassified
systems, both onsite and via remote dial up. Is that correct?
And, if so, how many folks would that be?
Mr. Peterson. We would have to defer to the laboratories
for the specific numbers, but it's our understanding that both
Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos have individuals from
sensitive countries, foreign nationals from sensitive countries
with remote access, including at Los Alamos one from Iran. At
Sandia, to our understanding, there is no foreign nationals
from sensitive countries with remote dial up access.
Mr. Upton. There are none at Sandia?
Mr. Peterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Upton. Is that possible that's going to happen at all
three labs? I mean, is that a goal and is it anticipated to
happen soon?
Mr. Peterson. I do not believe so, sir.
Mr. Habiger. Mr. Chairman, if I may?
Mr. Upton. Yes.
Mr. Habiger. Podonsky discovered the problem at Los Alamos
in August. We have got policy that should have been out a week
ago, but because of some legal verbiage, we will have policy
out within the next 5 days that will greatly tighten this
foreign access. And I think with your experience with the
Department of Energy you could say this is unprecedented, to
get policy out that quickly.
Mr. Upton. Will it be prohibited with this new policy that
will be in place?
Mr. Habiger. No, sir. We have gone to the labs. We got
their inputs. There are certain treaty implications that give
foreign scientists access into some of our systems.
Now, let me point out, we have to look at the different
tiers of access in terms of the national laboratories versus a
Brookhaven where we have medical research that's going on. We
have scientists out there that need access to that kind of
information, but the control and the approval will be at a very
high level at the lab sites--so that there be accountability,
and the security plans for each of these individuals--and there
will be a security plan for each individual--will be brought to
bear before that individual has access.
Mr. Upton. What about access to some of these weapon parts
that are at these sites? How would you describe the protection
of those parts that might be, I don't want to say lying around,
but stored at each of those sites. I don't know who would have,
Mr. Podonsky.
Mr. Podonsky. At all of the sites we had issue and concern
about classified matter, classified parts. What we have found
is that all the sites did take corrective action. For example,
Los Alamos had over 105 different locations that are now down
to 41 sites. They needed to be inventoried. They needed to be
put into smaller storage areas so that they could be better
protected. And if I am not correct, I do believe that all three
sites have taken corrective actions, but we'll have a better
feel for that in December when we go back to see how far they
went.
But relative to what type of access, we didn't see when we
were out there that other folks had access. We were concerned
about the potential of the vulnerability of the parts where
they were stored.
Mr. Upton. And what types of parts would they be that you
looked at 41 different sites within one site? I mean, you're
talking about cruise missile--what type of parts are you----
Mr. Podonsky. Well, it varied at the different sites. At
Los Alamos, it was very nonnuclear weapon components, an array
of shapes. At one site earlier in 1998 there were cruise
missiles, as you started to mention, but that was put into
locked storage.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Podonsky, where does your office go if the Department
puts its weapons facility into a new semiautonomous agency?
Mr. Podonsky. That's not clear, sir. As far as we know, we
still work for the Secretary, and if we fall into that nebulous
area called Secretary staff to oversee the new agency, but
there is no clear indication where that would be. It's my
understanding in talking to the Secretary that that would be
his intent, is that we would be the oversight arm for that new
agency.
Mr. Stupak. So you'd still see the weapons facilities
operations then.
Mr. Podonsky. That's our understanding, but right now the
devil is still in the details, and we haven't seen all the
details yet.
Mr. Stupak. But that's only if the Secretary's plan is
approved as he's laid out for us?
Mr. Podonsky. That's as much as I know.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. What would happen if there is any
oversight?
Mr. Podonsky. My personal opinion is it's kind of like the
formation of the entire Federal Government, executive branch
and legislative arm. It's based upon oversight existing--and my
belief is that there's always going to be a need for an
independent arm to just be a wake-up call, a reminder for the
various elements in the Department or the new agency.
Mr. Stupak. One of the lab's responsibilities is to protect
special nuclear material, isn't it?
Mr. Podonsky. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. Stupak. One of your responsibilities is to protect
special nuclear material.
Mr. Podonsky. The Department's responsibilities, yes.
Mr. Stupak. One of the lab's responsibilities?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. We're going to hear later today that one of the
labs has consistently met measurement inventory requirements
for special nuclear material, but you told the staff a few
weeks ago that Livermore has not been able to do measurements
for a long time. Mr. Weigand has now said new procedures have
been put in place to, quote, inventory different system
analysis, end of quote, and that the reference material has
just been acquired to measure uranium holdings. So has
Livermore consistently met these measurements in inventory
requirements?
Mr. Podonsky. Not in the past, no, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Where are they now then? Are they meeting it
now?
Mr. Podonsky. My understanding from my inspectors, yes,
that they are moving forward in their material control
accountability program. This is another area that General
Habiger and his folks are going to need to take a look at
across the complex in terms of the dealing of different
materials that are difficult to measure.
Mr. Stupak. Well, if they're doing it now, how are they
able to measure it now? Is that because they have new
equipment? Have they done a reinventory?
Mr. Podonsky. When we were out there, they had committed
that they were purchasing new equipment. My understanding is
that's where they are moving toward. Again, I want to
emphasize, we're going back out there in December to see the
progress that have been made.
Mr. Habiger. Sir, if I may, one of the organizations that
works for me now, the New Brunswick laboratory, is responsible
for getting some measuring isotopes out there. I was out at
Lawrence Livermore here about 2 months ago. They told me that
they could not go green, complete their material control and
accountability by the end of the year unless they got that
measuring standard. We pulled out all the stops, got the stuff
there. It's there. They are in the process. They'll be fixed by
the end of the calendar year.
Mr. Stupak. So what did they do before then if they didn't
have the equipment to do it?
Mr. Habiger. They were--I am talking about one specific
item that I was responsible for, but there's--part of the
problem, and I am not going to go into a lengthy explanation,
is that when you do inventories, let us say you did an
inventory in 1991, you used a set of equipment. Then you did
another inventory in 1995. Things looked okay using the same
set of equipment. Then you bought a third set of equipment and
higher technology, closer measurements. You have a delta in the
amount of material. Then you have to go mitigate, figure out
did you actually lose some or is it just the measuring
standards. And that's part of the issue that I am most familiar
with.
Mr. Stupak. We don't have an answer yet on that part. We're
still trying to figure out what happened there then for the
discrepancies in the numbers then?
Mr. Habiger. Yes, sir. And we're talking about very, very
small bits.
Mr. Stupak. That would be small bits of like plutonium?
Mr. Habiger. I cannot answer that for you, sir. I will have
to get back to you.
[The following was received for the record:]
The Department is confident that the discrepancies in
inventory values at LLNL are not caused by actual losses of
nuclear material but, instead are caused by measurement errors.
A known source of these errors is the inability to accurately
measure these materials (Highly Enricher Uranium). In the past,
LLNL's inability to accurately measure portions of their
inventory has been due to a lack of new measurement
technologies and measurement standards. Recently, LLNL has
acquired new technologies and measurement standards for use in
their measurements program.
With these new capabilities, LLNL and the responsible DOE
offices have committed to performing all required measurements
related to their nuclear material inventory.
Mr. Stupak. Okay.
Mr. Podonsky, do you believe that problems at the labs are
particularly DOE's fault because their directives were
ambiguous or completely lacking?
For example, Sandia brags that it has a world-renowned
security expert, but it didn't know enough to set up the secure
password systems on its computers. So whose fault would that
be, DOE's or the world-renowned lab?
Mr. Podonsky. If you indulge me for a moment, I'd like to
answer that. There's a lot of fault in terms of the security
posture of this Department. Having spent 15 years inspecting
and producing over a hundred classified reports, I would tell
you that many of these issues, with the exception of the
potential espionage--alleged espionage case we have identified,
it's a matter of attitude and accountability. That's both on
the Federal side as well as the contractor, be they lab or be
they M&O contractor.
We have seen cyclical periods in which the Department has
focused on environment safety and health, security, back to
security, back to environment safety and health. What we are
seeing now is something starting to hopefully take hold, and
that is that everybody has a responsibility, be it a safety or
security responsibility. There is no question that there's
expertise at the laboratory as well as within the Department.
None of these issues that we have seen over time is, we call
it, rocket science. A lot of responsibility rests with
everybody that's involved in the Department, be they contractor
or----
Mr. Stupak. I don't disagree, but, you know, I asked just a
question on passwords, who really would have the responsibility
there, and we always seem to get back to the questions about,
well, you know, it's the culture, there's been no
accountability, there's been no responsibility, but it keeps
going on. So, when you're going back from environment to
nuclear to whatever it might be, if it's the same old culture,
we don't break that cycle, it's going to continue, and we're
going to be back here a few more years later.
And when I asked the questions earlier about you and the
General being cozy on your relationship of policy and
implementation, I wasn't trying to do it in a negative light,
but we've got to break that cozy relationship if you're really
going to get some answers here. And so like I just took a
simple example like passwords on the systems for the computers,
who would responsible, DOE or the labs themselves. I guess
that's what I'm trying to show, to break this up here, so we
get some responsibility, so we have some accountability so we
can change this culture.
Mr. Podonsky. What we have seen--and I wish to reiterate
this point--is that we have seen that the M&Os are taking the
responsibility, the line in the Department is taking the
responsibility, the policy folks. And I also want to emphasize,
working together is important. Because there is such
fragmentation within the Department, that also calls for
confusion of what policies were meant to be implemented, what
was expected, as well as what the expectations were for the
various contractors.
Mr. Upton. Okay.
Mr. Stupak. I know my time is over. I appreciate it, Mr.
Chairman, but I just--I even go back to the password. Someone
has to know they need a password. I mean, that's pretty basic.
Mr. Habiger. Mr. Chairman, if I could, 15 seconds.
Mr. Upton. You got it.
Mr. Habiger. Mr. Stupak, I am accountable--I'm responsible
for policy, and one of things we found, we didn't have a policy
for passwords. Within 10 days, we'll have policy out in the
field for passwords.
Mr. Stupak. I wouldn't think that these world-renowned labs
would need a policy that you have to have a password to get
into a computer. Good grief, the basic level in my office know
that.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Podonsky, I'd like to just ask your help in
understanding some of your findings. There's already been some
Q and A about classified parts. In your view, are the inventory
problems fixed at the labs?
Mr. Podonsky. In our view, they are on their way to being
fixed at the labs.
Mr. Cox. That's different than they are fixed, I take it?
Mr. Podonsky. Well, we would like to see--we would like to
see more, but we are pleased at the progress that has been made
thus far.
Mr. Cox. So they're better than in 1998 for example?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Cox. This cruise missile incident that the chairman
mentioned was fall of 1998; is that right?
Mr. Podonsky. That was in 1998, yes, sir.
Mr. Cox. Now, I take it that the external aspect of the
cruise missile is not classified so that photographing it from
the other side of the chain link fence--where it was visible--
would not have been a breach of the classification?
Mr. Podonsky. I'm not aware as to what parts of the missile
would or would not be classified.
Mr. Cox. What can you tell us about that incident?
Mr. Podonsky. One of my inspectors found a number of--
number--3 or 4, I am not sure, I don't recall which--of cruise
missiles that were being stored, and we felt that they were not
in a secure environment. If I'm not mistaken, they were stored
outside--they were stored inside a block building, but there
was no protective force that we could see during the
inspection. Now, since then, all these parts have been put into
a secure environment.
Mr. Cox. I take it the problem with classified parts is one
that's gone on for a number of years?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cox. If I understand your report correctly, you raised
concerns about Los Alamos' protection strategy in 1994?
Mr. Podonsky. As far back as 1994, yes.
Mr. Cox. In your 1997 report on Los Alamos, 3 years later,
you stated that the lab received clear direction from the
Department and its field office in 1995. Now, that 1995
direction would have come a year after your 1994 report finding
problems, that Los Alamos received clear direction again in
1996 to fix its problem with classified parts protection, and
that when you returned in 1997 you found that the situation,
``remains essentially unchanged since 1994.'' So we've got
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 4 years where there's a clear signal
going to Los Alamos to fix the problem, and in your estimation,
nothing happened; is that right?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir, that's a correct characterization.
Mr. Cox. Since you have been around this, do you know why
that would be?
Mr. Podonsky. I can only give you my personal opinion, but
relative to--relative to the focus at that time, I would defer
that to line defense programs and the laboratory to explain why
that reoccurred.
Mr. Cox. I take it that if you don't have a good inventory
system for classified weapons parts, that creates an immediate
problem because you don't know when a piece has gone missing;
is that right?
Mr. Podonsky. You have a potential for that.
Mr. Cox. And so when it then comes to questions of
adequately securing those parts, in other words, they're not
guarded properly, we don't know whether in consequence of this
long-running problem, that at Los Alamos we have said recurred
throughout 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, whether or not something was
stolen and we no longer have it; is that right?
Mr. Podonsky. You could infer that. We have no evidence
that anything was missing. We were concerned about the
practice.
Mr. Cox. But, of course, you don't have an adequate
inventory either.
Mr. Podonsky. No, they do not.
Mr. Cox. Let me ask you about the Superblock. This is the
area at Livermore which we are most concerned about from a
security standpoint, I would take it, because that's where we
store our nuclear material. Now, your report tells us that we
had a guard force that I take it was adequate in 1995. Was it
adequate in 1995?
Mr. Podonsky. They started to go through some reductions.
Adequate training, yes. Adequate numbers----
Mr. Cox. From 1995 to 1997 your report says that guard
force got cut almost in half. Why did that happen?
Mr. Podonsky. The Department was going through reductions
in attempts to save, save money.
Mr. Cox. In your view, is that a good place to save money
and a good way to save it?
Mr. Podonsky. It was never our view, no, sir.
Mr. Cox. You describe the measures that have been taken to
upgrade that security since you pointed out the deficiencies as
temporary, pending permanent fixes. What is the nature of the
temporary fix compared to the permanent fix that you expect?
Mr. Podonsky. Without getting into classified because of
the open session, we are working to--we are following what they
are doing in terms of their testing. What's of critical concern
to us is their ability to perform against various scenarios.
They have, to their credit, have increased the numbers of
guards at the Superblock. The next piece of it is going to be
their ability to protect assets they are assigned to.
Mr. Cox. Given that you have been around this block several
times, around the Superblock, given that you've had to write
reports in successive years pointing out that nothing has
changed, when we hear that fixes are pending, that, for
example, the accounting problems are not solved, parts of
accounting problems are not solved but they are on their way to
being solved, that the temporary fix is in place for the
nuclear material guard force, will be made permanent, what can
you tell Congress that will assure us that this time it's
different?
Mr. Podonsky. I have served through four Secretaries. I
have reported to many congressional committees. It's only in
this last year that I have seen a Secretary of Energy fully
engaged and a Congress fully engaged to follow through on many
of the issues that we have identified over the years. So I and
my people feel very confident, albeit somewhat guarded, that
there's so much attention being paid that perhaps now we will
finally get there. We know the Secretary is committed. We know
the Department is committed. I know that my colleagues that
report directly to the Secretary, such as General Habiger, is
committed. We haven't seen that before.
Mr. Cox. My time has expired I see, and I don't want to
test the goodwill of the chairman.
My understanding is that you're gone in a year; is that
right? Well, I'm sorry--I'm happy you're not gone in a year. I
would have hated to be the one to bring you that news.
Mr. Podonsky. I think I need to be resuscitated.
Mr. Cox. No, no. It's a problem of having things whispered
to you from staff. The staff were just pointing out that the
Secretary is going to be gone in a year, of course, or perhaps
not, but we do have changes of administration and changes of
personnel which leads to me what I hope will be a question that
I will finally be permitted, and that is, whether or not any of
the three of you can tell us that you are reasonably far along
in narrowing a field of candidates for the new administrator of
the NNSA? Is that something that you are taking responsibility
for, any of you?
Mr. Podonsky. No, sir.
Mr. Cox. You haven't been asked for suggestions or to
review credentials or qualifications of people?
Mr. Habiger. No, sir.
Mr. Cox. Well, I think that concerns me a little bit.
Oughtn't you to be consulted on such a thing? Don't you have
some expertise in those areas?
Mr. Habiger. If I could, sir, not necessarily. The
Department of Defense, as the commander-in-chief of one of our
commands, I was asked to make inputs on people that work
directly for me, but my colleagues at very high level, that was
never an issue of discussion.
Mr. Cox. All right. Well, I do certainly hope that this is
progressing and that we don't have the Secretary acting as the
administrator.
I thank the chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
I have two additional questions, and I want to make an
announcement, in conferring with my colleagues. We are going
to--I'm going to ask--I have a couple of questions. Mr. Burr,
who is in the next room, is going to ask another round of
questions--I hope that's not a vote that I hear--and then we
are going to adjourn. We will finish then with this panel, be
finished, and we will start with Panel II at one o'clock.
Mr. Podonsky, at Sandia you found problems with access
controls in areas where classified matter was used and stored.
Can you give us just a couple of examples of that, help us with
that?
Mr. Podonsky. I am going to have to defer for a question in
terms of whether I would get into classified or not.
Mr. Upton. Maybe if you could just submit that for the
record. And at this point, that gives me a good transition. All
members will be able to ask and submit written questions, and
they will stay in a classified state if you deem them to be,
and we will put that in there.
The last question that I have before I yield to Mr. Burr,
what troubles me as I look at these ratings, and you indicated
that two were satisfactory, one was marginal. Marginal to me is
not satisfactory. I guess by definition it's not.
I'd be interested to hear from each of the three of you
with regard to what attention or what measures do you think we
should impose on the outside contractors when, in fact, that
rating is not satisfactory, is--in other words, when it's not
satisfactory or marginal? What additional pressures should we
be able to see to bear on those when that happens, Mr. Curran?
Mr. Curran. Sir, I can only speak for our inspection
process. If the inspection finds a CI program to be less than
satisfactory, or even if it is satisfactory, there are
recommendations we make to improve the system. If it's less
than satisfactory, but they still have effective program, yet
they're not where we would like them to be, we clearly state
that, and we give them recommendations to fix it and fix it
immediately. We will go back in 6 months to see if they fixed
it. If they haven't, then we need to make changes. We don't
keep going back. I mean, you either fix the problems----
Mr. Upton. Can you provide--you know, one of the things I
indicated my opening statement was the fact that we are going
to be talking with Chairman Bliley about a bipartisan trip of
members to visit a couple of these labs probably early next
year. Would it be possible for us to see a list of the items--
--
Mr. Curran. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Upton. [continuing] by the labs in terms of what you
found?
Mr. Curran. Some of these issues that we raised--for
instance, in Livermore, we found it had a satisfactory program.
There are issues that we say, you know, you need to do this
better than you have been doing it, and there's other issues
that they raised with us.
For instance, we need our people, our CI people at the
laboratory to have access to security files, which they don't
have at this point. General Habiger and I have been working on
that, and that's going to be fixed. Our contractors, CI people
at the labs, don't have a personnel list of people who are
involved in high-risk programs. They need to know that for
briefing, debriefing and whatever. We are going to fix that.
So not all the recommendations pertain particularly to lab.
What we are looking for is to improve the overall DOE program
as best we can.
Now, these items are coming out that need our attention
that we have these Special Access Programs that are taking
place in. The CI people are not aware of what those are. We
need to fix those programs. But if a lab is less than
satisfactory or marginal--if it is marginal, we may have to
make changes right on the spot. If it is an effective program,
but should be a lot better, then we will go back there and fix
it. It is one shot. We don't just keep going back and back
until we run out of narrative here.
Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Podonsky. One of the things
that we also look for--and there is a requirement as of August
31, 1999--after every one of our inspections, the facility,
together with the PSOs, needs to provide us with a corrective
action plan for comp measures and long-term corrective actions.
And one thing that has never happened before in the Department
is, security findings and issues do not always result in
corrective action plans that got implemented.
Mr. Upton. Does that corrective action plan include a time
line in terms of when it is going to be fixed?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir, it is supposed to include that.
Mr. Upton. That would be interesting for us to see before a
visit to look, just since August 1999.
At this point I yield to the vice chairman, Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me follow up on
where the chairman was, and that is with contractors because
the contractors also go through an annual evaluation; and I
think in hearings past, we have pointed out the discrepancies
in what you found, Mr. Podonsky, as it related to their
security status and, in fact, what the annual assessment of
their job performance was. In some cases, at the end, it was
satisfactory. You came with marginal or unsatisfactory, and at
some point during the year, deficiencies were noted.
In June, Secretary Richardson issued a memo that said DOE
is drafting a new contract clause that would place the labs'
annual performance fee at risk.
General, what do you think about that proposal?
Mr. Habiger. It is a great idea.
Mr. Burr. The contractors are not going to be too happy
with that.
Mr. Habiger. This gets back, sir, to the accountability
issue, in terms of the contractors being accountable, as well
as DOE employees being accountable.
We certainly got the University of California's attention.
Sitting behind me as a spectator here is recently retired Air
Force Colonel Terry Owens, who was in charge of security and
counterintelligence for all of Europe. He is now the full-time
Security Administrator for the University of California.
Before, they had a part-time individual who came in 3 or 4 days
a month.
Mr. Burr. General, out of all the things that you told me,
that is one of the things that I hope is 100 percent accurate,
because one question that I asked yesterday in our briefing
was, did the University of California understand after their
visit up here the seriousness with which we're going to take
this issue. And I hope, in fact, that did get through to them
and that your former colleague is not there just for window-
dressing alone.
Mr. Habiger. I guarantee you, sir, he is not. I know him
well. He used to work for me.
Mr. Burr. Part of this requires a cultural change at the
DOE because, in fact, when Mr. Podonsky goes into a facility,
or Mr. Curran, when there is a suggestion from the security
side of our inspection team that they had a deficiency, the
contractor, as I understand it, cannot carry anything out until
there is a policy directive from the Department of Energy.
You shake your head, General, but when there is a
recommendation made--now, correct me if I am wrong, Mr.
Podonsky--when there is a recommendation made, the Department
of Energy has to then write the policy before the contractor--
--
Mr. Podonsky. No, sir, first we don't make recommendations.
We make findings and we issue findings that are tracked to see
what the corrective action is going to be. Our findings are
based on existing policy and performance.
I am not aware that the contractor does not take corrective
action until there is a policy. It's--it's the lead PSOs that
have the responsibility to make sure that these things are
being implemented and corrected.
Mr. Burr. Would I take for granted then that all the
findings that you found are currently being acted on and that
none of the findings are, in fact, idle?
Mr. Podonsky. I wish that would be the case.
Mr. Burr. Then, of the findings that you have addressed,
why is there not action on 100 percent of them?
Mr. Podonsky. I would ask you to ask that of the PSOs and
the laboratory, because what we tried--when we identify, it is
a simple----
Mr. Burr. I think at the last hearing--I think you were in
attendance when the University of California and other people,
as well as the lab managers, testified, and I will look to our
counsel in case I misunderstood it--my understanding was that
their reasoning was that they didn't have the policy directive
from the Department of Energy. I am told in certain cases, yes.
I don't know that that gets us any further down this road. But
what you're saying is that where you have had a finding, 100
percent of them haven't been acted on and that we need to ask
the contractors and the labs why; is that correct?
Mr. Podonsky. One hundred percent have not been acted on
for various reasons. Some may, in fact, be resources. What we
were talking about before, they may take compensatory measures,
and we are looking for long-term fixes.
Mr. Burr. Did your team send to DOE management findings
that DOE has not acted on?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes.
Mr. Burr. And what percentage of your total findings would
that be?
Mr. Podonsky. It is a low percentage today, but part of
that--and we understand the business of prioritizing those
which are the priority ones, but I must hasten to say that what
we have seen today in terms of response is a far better picture
than what we've seen in past years.
Some of it is resource requirements, be it money or
manpower; some of it is technology like in the cyber security
arena. But I'm not--my point, that I'm trying to answer your
question to, is it's not always, as far as we are concerned,
tied to a policy shortcoming; there may be other variables
there. But, to date, since the Secretary created this office in
May of this year, most of the findings are being addressed, at
least with compensatory measures.
Mr. Burr. Do we still have a policy of remote access to
unclassified computers at the labs?
Mr. Podonsky. I think General Habiger----
Mr. Habiger. I addressed that while you were out of the
room.
Mr. Burr. I apologize if I was out of the room.
Mr. Habiger. No problem.
The problem was identified in August by Glenn. We have
policy that will be out late next week that greatly tightens up
that shortcoming, that his people identified, Glenn's people
identified. They will make--if we're going to have people on
that list of 25 countries that are sensitive and the terrorist
countries that will have access to unclassified systems----
Mr. Burr. Is that a policy, then, that the contractor will
administer?
Mr. Habiger. You bet. And he will be accountable.
Mr. Burr. Tell me, was this not a road we were just down, a
finding, a policy?
Mr. Habiger. Well, let me, if I could, sir--and I think
this is an important point because I got into this when I
started getting smart about how the Department operates,
legally, the contractor doesn't have to comply unless there is
a policy. But I can tell you my relationships with the three
national laboratory directors, and I have a very close working
relationship with them; every time I've called them and talked
to them about these kinds of issues, they've taken immediate
action.
Mr. Burr. General, I hope that--I assure you that I will
and I hope that you will go back and read the testimony of
those individuals who testified in front of this subcommittee
and how many times they said, we can't do it without the policy
written by the Department of Energy. And I am sorry they're not
here to testify as well.
Let me ask you, Mr. Podonsky, one last question. If we had
a weapon stored at one of these facilities--and I think it is
safe to say that we do--and somebody wanted access to that
weapon, would they steal the weapon or would they steal the
blueprint of the weapon, given that both had access that was as
easy as the other?
Mr. Podonsky. I think the way I would answer that is that
we do not believe that nuclear material or weapons parts or
components are at risk today. Our area that we are most
concerned about is the information security. So, your
hypothetical situation, I would say that they would be more
attractive to go after the information as opposed to the actual
material.
Mr. Burr. Thank you. I thank all three of you.
I yield back.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Cox, do you have any further questions?
Mr. Cox. Actually, Mr. Chairman, I have a number of
questions, and I think if the panel would be willing to respond
to the committee and follow up with written questions and
answers we can handle most of them that way. There are a number
of details that I think the committee ought to be very
interested in, and so I would prefer to follow up that way on
these details.
They are not just details. Many of the things--I think we
could spend an hour talking about e-mail, because we are
becalmed there. I know we are doing a lot to try to change the
status quo, but in terms of results I think we're sort of where
we started. And on and on.
There are a number of these issues that I think need to be
covered. So if you are all willing, and if the committee is
planning to do this in any case, I will pursue my questions
through that route.
Mr. Upton. We have indicated that we will, in fact, be
pursuing that course.
Panel, thank you very much. We appreciate your time, your
testimony, and we want very much to encourage your continued
commitment to try and do your very best to make sure that all
of these secrets and facilities are, in fact, properly and
adequately safeguarded.
Thank you very much. We will reconvene at 1 o'clock.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Upton. Okay. We are back. As you saw with the first
panel, we have a long tradition of taking testimony under oath.
Do any of you have objection to that?
We also, under both committee rules and House rules you are
allowed to have counsel, do any of you wish or desire to have
counsel?
If you would stand and raise your hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.
We will start with Dr. Robinson.
TESTIMONY OF C. PAUL ROBINSON, PRESIDENT AND LABORATORIES
DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES; JOHN C. BROWNE,
DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; C. BRUCE TARTER,
DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY; GIL WEIGAND,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STRATEGIC COMPUTING AND SIMULATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND JAMES TURNER, MANAGER, OAKLAND
OPERATIONS OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I, as well
as all my colleagues, will try and be somewhat careful in our
remarks today in an open session. In security matters, it is
better to put any sensitive questions that involve
vulnerabilities into a closed session--I don't know if that is
possible--or else answer them for the record.
We also make a practice, which I think is also common
sense, of not fully revealing the methods and practices that we
put into use in monitoring because we get a bigger deterrent
force by those.
Sandia has indeed had a long history of R&D responsibility
for security technology, including the design of systems for
nuclear weapons storage, for transportation and for site
security. We have designed the site security for major military
bases with high value as well as for airport security.
We have also become, over the years, specialists in cyber
security. Thus, I take that our laboratory, as well as all the
members of our staff, I believe, should have a higher
obligation to be sensitive to security matters.
I would certainly like to clear up a problem in the last
session where it was suggested that Sandia does not have
security passwords for its computers. That was not the case. A
very narrow question was raised in the I&E inspection about
passwords, certainly not an across-the-board. Sandia has had a
secure system of three levels of access for its computers since
1989, and a full fire-walled system between the restricted
information and the open unclassified network. And we have
always had a fully air-gapped system to our secure computers.
The sites that we operate do have distinct advantage, at
least our New Mexico site, our site in Kauai, Hawaii and in
Tonopah, Nevada. They are the equivalent of living in a gated
community, though perhaps a little stronger. They are fully
contained within operating military bases. The principal site
is completely within the site of Kirtland Air Force Base, and
we carry out a close relationship with the security forces of
our laboratory and the Air Force.
The DOE's independent oversight office in their inspection
and evaluation in August of this year, in six of the areas,
they declared ``satisfactory,'' three areas they declared
``marginal'' with problems having been found in one area
``unsatisfactory'' and an overall of ``marginal.'' I would
point out that in prior years, in 1994, 1996 and 1997 and other
DOE inspections of our security, we were satisfactory in all of
those.
In 1998, a partial inspection had been done and we were
marginal in a couple of areas there. I believe the review was,
in fact, a useful review this time. And certainly a set of
fresh eyes is always good to look at what's going on and spot
something that you, operating every day, may not see, though I
believe the biggest change is, in fact, that threats are
changing and have changed over time. And we are not always as
rapid to respond to those, and it is a good wakeup call when we
do find something that does need to be fixed, and we have given
high attention to fixing those.
We are trying to institute an approach to security that we
found is successful in other areas, and I would call it
applying quality methodologies in the security area. It is
certainly not enough to try and inspect out all the defects in
security. You have got to build the quality in as the
foundation. That means getting every individual in the
laboratory involved in their responsibility for security and
put most of your emphasis there, which is what we do. We try to
install an integrated security management system in a similar
way to which we have done it in the environmental safety and
health area with, I think, very high success.
I attached to my statement, which I assume you will accept
for the record, a much longer statement, a comment about
polygraphs. And, again, in the earlier session there was a
statement that people hadn't been polygraphed. At our
laboratory just under 200 people have been polygraphed, not as
a result of a DOE directive but as part of other programs. The
wish to extend polygraphs to a much wider area has caused me to
have to look a lot more carefully at the underlying science of
polygraphs if we are to, in fact, risk the future of the
laboratory on this.
I attached as an appendix to my statement a report done by
a number of my senior scientists which I commissioned to look
at the underlying basis of polygraphs. I was not pleased with
their findings. I don't think you will be either when you read
as to the adequacy of polygraphs. If not applied carefully, we
may in fact be making things less safe because when you crank
down the polygraph to try and get a smaller and smaller number
of false positives, you must at the same time open the doors to
let real deceptives get through. And in particular, when
polygraphs such as these are to be used to apply--to allow
someone to be given a clearance in advance of a background
investigation, I think you are putting in a risk that I would
find unacceptable.
Finally, let me say I think we've got to, in the future,
put more attention on stopping the espionage problems in other
routes than just looking at security. I think attacking it
directly. First of all, better background investigation--and I
am pleased with the legislation that was just passed. I think
our site will probably go up to exclusively Qs, which is how we
used to operate throughout most of our history; and we will
celebrate our 50th anniversary at end of this month.
I also believe it's appropriate with the level of security
material and the responsibility we are given that sting
operations are an approach to directly attack security
problems, as well as greater surveillance activities of
laboratory activities.
With that, I'll complete my oral statement.
[The prepared statement of C. Paul Robinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of C. Paul Robinson, Director, Sandia National
Laboratories
introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today. I am Paul Robinson, director of
Sandia National Laboratories.
Sandia National Laboratories is a multiprogram laboratory of the
U.S. Department of Energy and one of three DOE laboratories with a
research and development responsibility for nuclear weapons. Sandia's
job is the design, development, and certification of nearly all of the
non-nuclear subsystems of nuclear weapons. Our responsibilities include
arming, fuzing, and firing systems; safety, security, and use-control
systems; engineering support for production and dismantlement of
nuclear weapons; and surveillance and support of weapons in stockpile.
We perform substantial work in programs closely related to nuclear
weapons, such as nuclear intelligence, nonproliferation, and treaty
verification technologies. As a multiprogram national laboratory,
Sandia also performs research and development for DOE's energy offices,
as well as work for other agencies when our unique capabilities can
make significant contributions.
As you know, the DOE Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance recently concluded a comprehensive inspection of
safeguards and security at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico,
and issued a report on August 23, 1999. The inspection gave
``satisfactory'' ratings in six topical areas in security at Sandia,
``marginal'' ratings in three areas, and an ``unsatisfactory'' in one
area, resulting in an overall facility rating of ``marginal.'' The
security areas receiving ``marginal'' rankings were
<bullet> Unclassified Visits and Assignments by Foreign Nationals,
<bullet> Unclassified Cyber Security, and
<bullet> Protection Program Management.
The area receiving the ``unsatisfactory'' rating was Classified
Matter Protection and Control. Our corrective action plan for
addressing the findings and issues identified in the inspection is well
under way.
A ``marginal'' facility rating is clearly unacceptable to Sandia,
and we are committed to achieving a satisfactory evaluation at our next
opportunity. However, I do not believe this score necessarily indicates
that security has deteriorated at our site. Rather, I believe it
reflects a new reality of higher threat levels than existed in the past
and more rigorous requirements to counter them.
Because the inspectors' report is classified ``SECRET,'' we cannot
discuss its specific findings in open session. Consequently, I will
give a general overview of Sandia's security programs and the
initiatives that we are taking to improve performance. If the committee
wishes to discuss the details of the inspectors' findings and our plan
for corrective actions, I will be happy to provide information in
closed session.
sandia is committed to excellence in security
The espionage threat against the DOE nuclear weapon laboratories is
a matter of great concern to me and my colleagues at Los Alamos and
Lawrence Livermore national laboratories and at the Department of
Energy. We are all taking vigorous steps to address this threat in its
various forms.
Sandia National Laboratories has always been managed by an
industrial contractor. I believe our laboratory culture has been
strongly influenced by its industrial heritage, which began under the
AT&T Bell Laboratories and continues today with Lockheed Martin. That
heritage includes a strong cultural commitment to security. I am
pleased but not surprised that the inspectors noted a positive and
cooperative attitude among Sandia managers with whom they worked during
the inspection. Sandians care!
In a programmatic sense, Sandia is one of the nation's top centers
of expertise in security. For decades, Sandia National Laboratories has
been a leader in security research for nuclear weapons, nuclear
facilities, and nuclear materials. We have designed security systems
for sensitive military installations and other facilities such as
airports, for example. For more than thirty years, we have worked
closely with the National Security Agency on nuclear control codes and
hardware that implement the highest levels of code protection. We
design and maintain the usecontrol systems (including the hardware,
software, and code management subsystems) that ensure that the nation's
nuclear weapons can be used only with proper authorization. We also
design and develop the equipment, facilities, and information systems
for secure transportation and storage of nuclear weapons. These systems
are subjected to extensive testing to ensure that they are secure.
Sandia's design engineers and scientists associated with the
nuclear weapons program and related national security programs have a
deep appreciation of the gravity of their security responsibilities.
And I can assure you that management at Sandia is equally serious about
security. It is a fact, however, that the technological challenges of
information security have grown enormously in recent years. It is a
tougher problem than it used to be. The recent attention given to
security at the DOE Defense Programs laboratories is salutary and will
help us focus on the emerging challenges of security in the cyber age.
security as a contractual obligation
Sandia National Laboratories is managed and operated by Sandia
Corporation, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. As an officer
of Sandia Corporation, I am well aware of my contractual
responsibilities for security. Effective security is not a choice, it
is a requirement. The management contract for Sandia National
Laboratories is quite explicit in this regard:
The contractor shall conduct safeguards and security
programs, including counterintelligence, physical security,
protection of government property and information;
classification and declassification of information and
materials; safeguards of nuclear materials control and
accountability; foreign national program; computer security;
and personnel security and access control for laboratory staff
and visitors.
Moreover, several DOE directives relating to security are
incorporated by reference into the contract:
<bullet> DOE Order 470.1, ``Safeguards and Security Program''
<bullet> DOE Order 471.1, ``Identification and Protection of
Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information''
<bullet> DOE Order 471.2A, ``Information Security Program and Manual
for Classified Matter Protection and Control''
<bullet> DOE Order 472.1B, ``Personnel Security Activities''
<bullet> DOE Order 474.1-2, ``Nuclear Materials Management and
Safeguards System Reporting and Data Submission''
<bullet> DOE Manual 475.1-1, ``Identifying Classified Information''
<bullet> DOE Order 1240.2B, ``Unclassified Visits and Assignments by
Foreign Nationals''
<bullet> DOE Acquisition Regulation 952.204-70, ``Classification/
Declassification''
Sandia Corporation's prime contract with DOE is a performance-based
contract. Performance under the contract is determined through a
laboratory appraisal system. DOE evaluates Sandia's performance
annually and issues the Sandia National Laboratories Multiprogram
Laboratory Appraisal Report. This performance appraisal is based on a
jointly negotiated appraisal agreement that defines specific
performance objectives, performance measures, and performance
expectations to be evaluated each fiscal year.
I and the directors of Sandia Corporation are mindful that
unsatisfactory performance will impact our annual laboratory appraisal
and reflect on the reputation and credibility of Lockheed Martin
Corporation. Security performance is a part of each corporate officer's
performance management plan. Thus, contractual motivations for
satisfactory security performance exist, and they are tangible to
management.
trends in security during the 1990's
Protection philosophies were clearly affected by the end of the
Cold War. Concerns over espionage took a back seat to other worries,
such as whether we could sustain the program and the stockpile and
whether we could get sufficient resources to do our work. There was a
willingness to assume, perhaps, that the fall of the Soviet Union
signaled the beginning of a new era of global peace in which espionage
would not require the same level of concern.
The more relaxed attitude toward security was evident in certain
policy changes. Secretary O'Leary ordered an aggressive
declassification review program early in her tenure. In 1992 DOE
relaxed the accountability requirements for controlled documents. The
modified accountability program omitted requirements for unique
document numbers and maintenance of accountability records for certain
classes of documents, inventories, destruction certificates, written
authorizations to reproduce, and internal receipting. DOE also
eliminated the requirement that all personnel with access to limited
areas have a Q clearance, encouraging instead the use of the less
rigorous L clearance for employees without need-to-know.
The end of the Cold War also resulted in substantial budgetary
reductions for the DOE laboratories. From fiscal year 1992 through
1995, the Defense Programs budget dropped 25 percent in constant
dollars. In response to criticism by Congress and the Galvin Task Force
(Secretary of Energy Advisory Board) that costs were too high,
Secretary O'Leary pledged to reduce costs at the nuclear weapon
laboratories by $1.7 billion over five years beginning with fiscal year
1995. In response, Sandia committed to achieve $250 million in cost
reductions. The bulk of the savings came from reducing administrative
support costs and overhead, such as processes for procurement and
materials management, human resources, financial management,
information systems, and facilities services including security. We
reengineered our corporate processes to streamline these activities and
achieve efficiencies comparable to those in private industry.
Meeting the cost reduction targets for security during this time
was very challenging. Even so, Sandia's safeguards and security program
continued to receive satisfactory ratings in external appraisals and
assessments. We were complying with the applicable directives for DOE
security programs. We didn't consider, however, that such compliance
might not be a reliable indicator of actual performance. In my view,
this was a logical flaw that lulled the DOE community into feeling good
about security when it should have felt rather uneasy. Yes, we complied
with the DOE directives without serious consideration as to whether our
security programs were truly effective with respect to the evolving
threats. As a result, our security capabilities remained static while
the threats advanced.
In 1998 DOE and the laboratories both began to realize that their
security capabilities had not kept pace with the evolution of security
threats. A review by the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office that year,
as well as our own internal assessment, identified areas where security
capabilities and performance required improvement. We took immediate
corrective actions (as we do whenever an inspection indicates
vulnerabilities), we tried to identify root causes, and we formulated
an action plan to develop long-term solutions to the issues. I am
pleased that the recent comprehensive inspection of safeguards and
security by the DOE Office of Independent Oversight and Performance
Assurance found that Sandia made significant progress in correcting the
deficiencies identified in last year's special survey. Nevertheless,
our goal is not merely to correct items identified by inspections, but
to improve and sustain the capabilities and performance of our security
programs.
overview of security program management at sandia national laboratories
We are implementing an approach to security management at Sandia
that draws from a successful strategy DOE adopted a few years ago for
managing environmental, safety, and health programs. Sandia's
integrated safety management system (ISMS) is designed to enable safe
and compliant mission work performance, rather than being focused on
compliance alone. Integrated Safety Management is a DOE-wide program
that Sandia helped develop and which we wholeheartedly support. The
program has proved to be an effective and rational approach to
sustaining excellence in safety performance over the long term. We are
adopting a similar approach for security.
Sandia's Integrated Safeguards and Security Management System (ISSMS)
Sandia is in the process of implementing--with DOE's support and
encouragement--an Integrated Safeguards and Security Management System
(ISSMS) for all its security responsibilities. The first principle of
security management under ISSMS is that line management is responsible
for the protection of the assets entrusted to them: It is the
realization by employees that security is not someone else's job, it is
part of your own job. We can't just bring in security experts and give
them the job; every single person bears responsibility.
ISSMS will establish clear and unambiguous lines of authority and
responsibility for ensuring that secure operations are established and
maintained at all organizational levels. It will ensure that personnel
possess the experience, knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to
discharge their security responsibilities. And it will provide a way to
allocate resources efficiently to address security and operational
needs.
Our ISSMS methodology stresses the need to identify applicable
security standards and requirements before work is performed.
Administrative and engineering controls to prevent and mitigate
security risks are tailored to the work being performed and designed
into work processes. ISSMS will measure security performance in a way
that will help us identify effective and ineffective practices. We
will, of course, comply with all applicable DOE directives for
security; but the ISSMS program will go beyond compliance to measure,
evaluate, and improve actual security performance.
Funding for Internal Security Programs
Sandia National Laboratories and DOE spent about $43 million on
internal security programs at Sandia in fiscal year 1999. Of that
total, $37 million supported general safeguards and security programs,
such as control and accountability of special nuclear materials,
physical security systems, classified matter protection and control,
protective force, and personnel security. Counterintelligence was
funded at $850,000 in FY1999; I expect the budget for
counterintelligence (which is provided directly from DOE headquarters)
to increase substantially in FY2000. Total funding for Sandia's
internal security programs in FY2000 is expected to be nearly $50
million.
Cyber security operations were funded at $2 million in FY1999 and
were increased by 30 percent in FY2000. In addition, we invested $2.6
million for information security (InfoSec) improvements in FY1999 but
discovered that much more is needed to meet the challenges revealed in
the Cox Report. The Integrated Security Management Program of DOE's
Office of Defense Programs calls for investments of approximately $100
million per laboratory in FY2000 and about $35 million per year in
subsequent years for cyber security. That level of investment is far
beyond what can be accommodated within the FY2000 budget.
Physical Security
Assets protection at Sandia encompasses a multitude of security
interests ranging from government property to special nuclear
materials. Naturally, with such a broad range of assets, there must be
a graded approach to protection. The level of protection afforded a
particular asset depends on the potential risk to national security,
program continuity, and the health and safety of employees and the
public. Sandia's security program is based on risk management, which in
this context requires that higher risks get greater protection. This
approach minimizes activities that add little protective value but
increase program costs.
Physical security areas are established with appropriate levels of
protection for the nature, sensitivity, or classification of protected
material or information:
<bullet> Property Protection Areas are security areas established for
the protection of unclassified DOE property against damage,
destruction, or theft.
<bullet> Limited Areas are security areas defined by physical barriers
used for the protection of classified matter or special nuclear
material, where protective personnel or other internal controls
can prevent access by unauthorized persons. Exclusion Areas may
be established within limited areas where mere presence in the
area would result in access to classified matter.
<bullet> Protected Areas are established for the protection of special
nuclear materials or vital equipment. Material Access Areas are
contained within Protected Areas and have separately defined
physical barriers constructed to provide sufficient delay time
to impede or deter unauthorized access. Vital Areas are areas
located within Protected Areas used for the protection of vital
equipment.
<bullet> Restricted Access Areas are areas established to protect
sensitive compartmented information facilities, central alarm
stations, secondary alarm stations, secure communication
centers, and automated information system centers.
Classified matter may not be stored or used in a facility until
specific approval has been granted by DOE, based upon review and
acceptance of the facility security plan and, if appropriate, an onsite
survey. Control procedures are established to protect classified matter
appropriately under all conditions: in use, storage, and transit.
Sandia's laboratory facilities in New Mexico, and its testing
facilities in Nevada and Hawaii, are located on military installations,
which provide significant additional security buffers. DOE limited
areas are protected by physical barriers, access control systems, and
alarm systems. Sandia's protective force patrols such areas during
nonstandard hours and has the capability to respond immediately to
intrusion. In addition, the protective force at Sandia's major
laboratory site on Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, can coordinate
with U.S. Air Force security police if necessary to respond to any
major incident.
Personnel Security
The personnel security program at Sandia National Laboratories
involves security clearances, security awareness and education, special
personnel security assurance programs, and the foreign visits and
assignments program. Personnel security is the keystone of an
integrated security program. All functional areas of security depend on
assuring that only people with the proper credentials have access to
protected information and materials, and that those people are fully
trained and equipped with the proper tools to carry out their security
responsibilities.
Security Clearances--The first line of defense in personnel
security is the requirement for security clearances. The vast majority
of employees and resident contractors at Sandia National Laboratories
today must obtain a U.S. government security clearance as a condition
of employment. A DOE Q clearance is required of the subset of employees
who may have a need to access nuclear weapon design information (secret
and top secret restricted data). Most other employees must obtain the
DOE L clearance, which is approximately equivalent to the DoD SECRET
clearance. The DOE Q clearance requires a background investigation of
the individual by an agency independent of DOE and a reinvestigation
every five years. An L clearance requires only a national agency
records check for violations of law or bad credit, and is repeated
every ten years.
In addition to the requirement for a security clearance, the
laboratories operate under the DOE policy of ``need-to-know.'' This
security principle requires that access to classified matter ``be
limited to persons who possess appropriate access authorization and who
require such access (need-to-know) in the performance of official
duties'' (DOE Manual 471.2-1A, Manual for Classified Matter Protection
and Control). A Q clearance alone does not provide access to nuclear
weapons restricted data.
Until 1993, all employees and contractors were subject to a Q-level
background investigation. In 1993, DOE changed that policy: The
laboratories were urged to maximize the use of the less rigorous L
clearances for employees whose job assignments did not require access
to nuclear weapon restricted data. Consequently, thousands of
individuals began to work and move about in the limited areas of the
nuclear weapons laboratories without having been subject to the
exhaustive background checks required for Q clearances.
I am pleased that the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000 requires Q clearance background investigations for all personnel
who work in or around locations where restricted data is present. The
law also empowers the Federal Bureau of Investigation to perform
background investigations for special access programs and personnel
security and assurance programs. These requirements should
significantly strengthen personnel security at the laboratories.
Security Education and Awareness--The principle objective of the
Security Education and Awareness Program is to ensure that employees,
consultants, and subcontractors are equipped to protect sensitive and
classified information, classified material, special nuclear material,
and other government assets entrusted to them. An equal objective of
this program is to motivate and instill a high level of security
awareness in individuals concerning the protection of national security
interests.
Four types of security briefings are conducted for our personnel.
An initial security briefing is given to all new employees before they
report to their job assignments. The purpose of this briefing is to
inform both cleared and uncleared employees who will have access to
security areas about their obligations to protect materials and
information, and to educate them on local security procedures and
access control requirements. A general facility overview is also given
which familiarizes employees with their responsibilities in the
protection of DOE interests.
A more comprehensive security briefing is provided to employees,
consultants, and subcontractors prior to granting access to classified
information. The purpose of the briefing is to inform individuals who
have been granted a DOE security clearance of their security
responsibilities when working with sensitive and classified
information.
Annual security refresher briefings are required of all employees,
consultants, and subcontractors possessing an active DOE clearance to
reinforce information about security policy and responsibilities. The
annual briefings are presented using a variety of delivery methods,
including an on-line option, department meetings, or seminars and
workshops.
A termination security briefing is given to all Sandia and contract
employees when their security clearance is terminated, regardless of
the reason. This briefing informs individuals of their continuing
security responsibility.
On June 21 and 22, 1999, at the direction of Secretary of Energy
Bill Richardson, Sandia (and the other DOE Defense Programs
laboratories) suspended normal operations to conduct security immersion
training for all employees. At Sandia, we reiterated long-standing DOE
and laboratory security policies and briefed staff on the Secretary's
zero-tolerance security policy. We placed special emphasis on the new
implementations in cyber security. The laboratory's center directors
were required to prepare training plans for those two days covering
security topics appropriate for their work environments. Employees
studied and discussed security policies and procedures, and many issues
and suggestions were raised for follow-up. Frank discussions were held
on the issue of the laboratory's culture and how it shapes attitudes
toward security. In general, the two-day exercise was well received by
our staff. Feedback indicates that it was an interesting, stimulating,
and businesslike exercise.
I am aware that the House Committee on Science reported that 20
percent of the population of the DOE Defense Programs laboratories did
not participate in the security stand-down training in June. That
statistic is grossly inaccurate for Sandia National Laboratories.
Ninety-three percent of our personnel completed the security stand-down
training on June 21 and 22. Of the seven percent who did not
participate on those dates, five of those percentage points were for
people who were on previously scheduled vacations--not an unusual
figure for late June (we insisted that employees not take vacation on
those dates if they had not already scheduled it). Another one and one-
half percent of the lab population were ill or excused for legitimate
personal reasons. Less than one percent of the lab population were in
work status on June 21 and 22 who did not take part in the security
immersion activities. Some of those people were on business travel that
could not reasonably be rescheduled. In addition, quite a few jobs--in
our security and medical departments, for example--must be staffed at
all times. However, all employees who missed security training during
the stand-down have been required to make it up.
Foreign Visits and Assignments Program--To ensure compliance with
DOE regulations, Sandia conducted a self-assessment of its foreign
visits and assignments program prior to the recent safeguards and
security audit. All the findings reported in this topical area by the
DOE Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance had been
self-identified by Sandia. In addition, Sandia made several
enhancements in its program in an effort to administer it more
effectively:
<bullet> We increased the staff of the foreign visits and assignments
program by 60 percent over the last year.
<bullet> We improved and expanded our education and awareness programs
in their coverage of the requirements for foreign visits and
assignments.
<bullet> We created a Foreign Interactions web page on Sandia's
intranet, which is used as an information tool for the entire
Sandia National Laboratories population and especially for
Sandia hosts of foreign national visitors.
<bullet> Sandia's executive management formalized and published
discipline guidelines as a mechanism for imposing consequences
related to violations of foreign visits and assignments rules
and regulations.
Nearly all of the foreign nationals who come to Sandia National
Laboratories visit facilities that are outside the fence of the
laboratories' limited (secure) area. Such facilities are called, in DOE
jargon, ``property protection areas'' (PPAs). That terminology reflects
the fact that no classified information or activities exist in those
areas and that government property, rather than classified information,
are the principal assets that require protection there. Ninety-eight
percent of the uncleared foreign nationals who came to Sandia National
Laboratories during 1998 visited property protection areas only.
Nevertheless, we know that within that 98 percent, some visitors could
be information-gatherers for their governments. For that reason, we
brief Sandia employees on the risks and responsibilities of hosting
foreign visitors. We require hosts to file a report after such visits
to determine if any unusual activity occurred.
The two-day security immersion stand-down in June raised employee
awareness of the policies and responsibilities with respect to hosting
foreign national visitors or assignees. As a direct result of that
exercise, several employees came forward to disclose previously
unreported incidents during visits or assignments where security
procedures had not been followed. We are reviewing those incidents to
determine root causes and establish procedures to prevent recurrences.
Security infractions may be assessed against some individuals if
warranted.
We recently implemented additional measures to strengthen our
controls over foreign visits and assignments:
<bullet> Sandia's foreign national program integrates key program
elements (foreign interactions, counterintelligence, computer
security, operational security, classification, and export
control) in the approval process for foreign visits and
assignments. The Foreign Interactions Office is the focal point
for such visits and coordinates the reviews and approvals with
the key program elements.
<bullet> Visits by uncleared foreign nationals must now be approved by
a vice president of Sandia National Laboratories. The
laboratory's executive vice president or president must approve
visitors who are affiliated with sensitive countries. In
addition, all visits and assignments from countries on the
State Department's ``Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998'' list
require prior approval by the Secretary of Energy. These
countries are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and
Syria.
<bullet> Sandia requires indices checks for all visits and assignments
by foreign nationals who are citizens of or employed by a
government or institution of a sensitive country, and for all
visits and assignments requiring access to limited (secure)
areas or involving sensitive unclassified subject matter. All
indices checks are coordinated through Sandia's
counterintelligence office. Any exception to this requirement
must be approved by the laboratory director, and very few
exceptions have been granted.
<bullet> Anytime a Sandia employee hosts a meeting or conference off-
site where foreign nationals will be present (regardless of
whether the meeting is held in Albuquerque, Livermore, or
elsewhere in the world) the Sandia employee is responsible for
going through the same formal approval process unless the event
is open to the general public (per DOE Policy 142.1, the formal
approval process does not apply to events open to the public).
<bullet> Foreign assignees (post-docs, limited-term employees, etc.)
must be certified by the host as possessing unique technical
skills not readily available to the laboratory from U.S.
nationals.
<bullet> Foreign nationals visiting for longer than one day receive a
red badge with photo and citizenship displayed.
<bullet> Badging of foreign nationals is centralized for consistency
and better control.
<bullet> Foreign visitors and their hosts receive more extensive
briefings on their responsibilities and obligations.
<bullet> A list of sensitive technologies recently developed by DOE is
being used to help evaluate the appropriateness of visit access
and topics.
<bullet> All foreign visit and assignment activity for Sandia is
tracked on Sandia's own database systems. In July 1999, Sandia
implemented the Foreign National Request (FNR) system to track
foreign visits and assignments. The application can precisely
identify, in real time, numbers of foreign nationals on-site,
identities of foreign nationals and hosts, technologies,
security restrictions, and statistical information used in
managing foreign visit activity.
I must emphasize that foreign nationals are pervasive in the U.S.
high-technology sector. Many of the top graduate schools in science and
technology in the United States have majority populations of foreign
students. U.S. companies have hired vast numbers of foreign nationals
with technical degrees into their ranks. Forty-five percent of the
visitors to Sandia National Laboratories who are affiliated with
sensitive countries are from U.S. universities or U.S. companies. This
exceeds even the number of visitors who represent their countries for
official activities related to agreements in arms control,
nonproliferation, and nuclear materials control (approximately 40
percent).
As you know, the FY2000 Defense Authorization Act imposes a
moratorium on foreign visits and assignments to the DOE Defense
Programs laboratories by citizens of sensitive countries. This
requirement may prevent the laboratories from collaborating with U.S.
universities or companies on some projects where citizens of sensitive
countries are involved as students or faculty of universities, or as
employees of U.S. companies. Consequently, we will work very hard to
get our foreign visits and assignments program certified by the DOE
Office of Counterintelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the Central Intelligence Agency, as required by the law, as quickly as
possible. We hope that those agencies will cooperate with us to perform
that requirement expeditiously.
Cyber Security
Sandia has long been recognized as a leader in network security.
Our three-level security structure, which has been in place since 1989
and fully deployed since 1995, has been adopted by DOE as a model for
DOE laboratories and plants through the Tri-lab InfoSec Plan of April
1999. Sandia has stringent computer security procedures already in
place, and we are improving our procedures based on our own research
and by adopting best practices from other DOE laboratories, industry,
and other government agencies.
However, we recognize that policy, personnel training, and
technology must continually be improved to meet the escalating threats.
Recent attempts at espionage through cyber attacks highlight the
necessity of very substantial action, and I appreciate the greater
attention and support that cyber security is attracting. The Task Force
for Integrated Security Management, referred to as ``ISecM,'' is a
joint endeavor of the three nuclear weapon laboratories and DOE, in
consultation with DOE's production plants and field offices. The task
force has recommended an ambitious program for a major enhancement of
cyber security as a system of policy, people, and technology.
We have been working closely with DOE's chief information officer
and the other Defense Programs laboratories to identify best practices.
Three of these deserve special mention: The TAP utility, developed at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, supports the critical second
layer of our three-layer process for monitoring email going to the
unclassified internet for classified content. NADIR, developed by Los
Alamos National Laboratory for monitoring usage patterns to detect
suspicious behavior is another promising tool. StatePoint Plus software
developed by Westinghouse is being implemented for security
configuration management on our switched network. Cooperation among the
laboratories and DOE has been excellent.
Sandia's classified network and computing environment has
repeatedly earned high marks for security during numerous audits.
Unfortunately, it has not earned high marks from the people who have to
work in that environment for functionality and ease of use. We
recognize that we must enhance the functionality of our classified
multi-site network environment to allow secure, effective, and facile
collaboration among the laboratories and DOE for classified work.
Sandia has aggressively implemented the action plan developed as
part of the Tri-Lab Information Security (InfoSec) Nine-point Plan in
April and the Secretary's Six Enhancements in June, 1999. We have
completed 42 of the 46 actions called for in our InfoSec action plan.
Two more actions will be complete before the end of the year. The
remaining two are ``red team'' assessments that will be completed early
next year, as soon as these scarce personnel resources are available.
Let me summarize some of the important actions we have completed as
part of our InfoSec action plan:
<bullet> We have configured our unclassified restricted access networks
at our sites in New Mexico and California so that electronic
mail flows through a single control point. We are monitoring
email messages to scan for classified content. So far, we have
found that less than one in 10,000 of the email messages from
high-risk areas of the laboratory are of concern, and those
have been at the confidential level.
<bullet> We are strengthening the need-to-know controls over
information on classified systems. For nuclear weapons data, we
are improving the information infrastructure so that we can
migrate from a set of physical islands of need-to-know groups
to a more auditable and controllable need-to-know network. This
new architecture will guarantee password protection, provide
automated need-to-know controls, and record attempts to achieve
access.
<bullet> We are reviewing and strengthening the need-to-know protection
for sensitive unclassified information on our internal
restricted-access networks.
<bullet> For authorized transfers of unclassified files from classified
computers to unclassified computers, we are documenting
approved transfer procedures that (1) require review of the
material to be transferred by an authorized derivative
classifier; (2) specify authorized transfer points and the
required content for transfer logs; and (3) enforce two-person
control by Qcleared personnel, one of whom must be current in
the DOE Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP).
<bullet> We are exploring the feasibility of technical measures to
prevent unauthorized transfers of classified files. We are also
exploring the potential of individualized encryption codes for
compartmentalized information.
<bullet> We are enhancing software protections on classified, secure
email to provide redundant assurance that only the desired
recipient has access to a classified message and attachment.
<bullet> We will perform red-team assessments of our unclassified and
classified networks annually. Experts who are organizationally
independent of the technical groups that design, maintain, or
administer the networks will perform the assessments.
<bullet> We are monitoring all three levels (open, restricted
unclassified, classified) to detect intrusion attempts and to
respond decisively to those attempts.
<bullet> We have instituted a rigorous training program for our people
who operate in the classified environment to ensure that they
follow proper procedures in this quickly changing environment.
We are reviewing available U.S.-designed and built commercial
products to augment the intrusion detection mechanisms on our networks.
We employ user authentication, network intrusion, and vulnerability
analysis software from industry, universities, and other government
laboratories. Some years ago, Sandia implemented its own firewall
between its open and restricted networks because we were not satisfied
with any of the commercial firewall software available at that time. We
recently identified a product from a domestic source that may provide a
better firewall, and we are testing it for possible installation on our
network.
The most popular commercial firewalls are produced by foreign owned
companies. To mitigate the potential vulnerability of a nation-state
attack through those foreign interests, we are working to validate and
implement a commercial firewall from a U.S. vendor. A vendor has been
selected and the firewall software has been acquired and installed in a
test system. In hopes of meeting the December date for the next
inspection, we are working through issues of reliability, vendor
support, data-handling capacity, compatibility with our California
site, and some apparent security anomalies that must be understood. We
are committed to prudence even if the date for deployment has to be
delayed.
We are pleased that our classified network received the
satisfactory rating and our unclassified policies, networks, and
personnel practices received favorable comments. However, we take
seriously the overall rating of marginal for the unclassified system.
The inspectors from the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance
Assurance explained to us that the requirements for a rating of
satisfactory have been tightened in response to the escalating threat.
The standard is being raised faster than we have been able to respond.
We are aggressively addressing the five action items from the audit to
correct deficiencies. I must emphasize, however, that the
recommendations of the Defense Programs' Task Force for Integrated
Security Management (ISecM) must be funded and implemented in order to
robustly address the escalating threat.
The cyber security threats encountered by DOE plague many agencies
across the government, including the Department of Defense and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Unfortunately, the cyber
security problem is very difficult and very complex. It is fruitless to
attack this problem on a site-by-site basis; we need to address the
problem in a systematic way for the complex as a whole.
The InfoSec Task Force recently published its report outlining an
integrated system of policy, people, and technology for the nuclear
weapon complex. In contrast to the current site-specific planning and
accreditation that makes the system only as strong as its weakest link,
the task force proposes integrated security at the system level for the
nuclear weapons complex as a whole. Experts in computer science and
communications from all three defense programs laboratories and the
nuclear weapons production complex worked together to identify
vulnerabilities and propose and implement countermeasures in the plan.
According to their report, an investment on the order of $100 million
per DOE site and a continuing maintenance of approximately $35 million
per site to achieve very low levels of risk. Funds of that magnitude
cannot be provided from existing programs and will require additional
appropriation. The DOE Defense Programs Complex Information Security
Action Plan is available from the DOE Office of Defense Programs.
Counterintelligence
We are building a counterintelligence program at the laboratory
that responds to the President's direction in PDD-61 and implements
DOE's Counterintelligence Implementation Plan. During 1998, Sandia's
counterintelligence office actively contributed to the design of the
DOE Counterintelligence Implementation Plan, which resulted in
revamping the counterintelligence program at the laboratories. We moved
Sandia's counterintelligence office out of the safeguards and security
organization to a position with direct access to the laboratory
director. We hired a 30-year veteran of the FBI to manage our
counterintelligence program. The FBI is the lead agency with cognizance
and expertise in all national counterintelligence and espionage
matters, and it is appropriate that the laboratories'
counterintelligence programs be staffed by individuals with that
experience. Because of their professional ``CI'' background, they are
knowledgeable of the FBI's investigative methodology. At the same time,
because the counterintelligence personnel at the laboratories are part
of the laboratory community, they are in a position to earn the trust
and confidence of the scientists and engineers that is so important to
the job.
Counterintelligence activities are now funded directly from DOE
headquarters. The counterintelligence program at Sandia National
Laboratories was funded at $850,000 in fiscal year 1999. We expect
FY2000 funding to increase substantially. The higher level of funding
will permit us to support four counterintelligence officers, a
counterintelligence research analyst, one or more technical experts in
cyber security, and additional support staff.
polygraph screening
Many employees have expressed deep concern to Sandia's executive
management and DOE about proposed polygraphy testing. In acknowledging
the confusion and anxiety on this issue, I asked a group of Sandia's
senior engineers and scientists for their thoughts and inputs. The
seniors reviewed the literature on polygraphy and submitted a report
summarizing expert opinion and expressing their own conclusions. Their
report is attached as an appendix to this statement.
The report highlights several issues that as a laboratory director
I find rather troubling:
<bullet> Many experts in the field of psychology believe that
polygraphy is not theoretically sound and that claims of high
validity for the procedure cannot be sustained. (This
information was derived from a survey of members of the Society
for Psychophysiological Research and Fellows of the American
Psychological Association.)
<bullet> Studies performed by the Office of Technology Assessment and
the Polygraphy Institute of the Department of Defense show that
claims and estimates for the rate of false results in polygraph
testing vary greatly.
<bullet> Reports by the Office of Technology Assessment, the Polygraphy
Institute of the Department of Defense, and independent experts
in polygraphy state that the effectiveness of polygraphs as a
screening tool has not been established and appears to be much
less than their utility for specific-incident investigations.
<bullet> The Office of Technology Assessment and independent
authorities state that polygraph tests can be beaten through
learned countermeasures.
(Reference citations for these issues are in the report.)
These issues raise serious concerns for those of us who bear
responsibility for the long-term health and vitality of the
laboratories and the success of the national security programs they
serve. The Department of Energy must be very careful in how it designs
and conducts its polygraphy program. If the program is mishandled, the
resulting personnel problems could be very damaging to the laboratories
and their national security programs.
Notwithstanding the safeguards and protections that DOE intends to
incorporate into its regulations for the polygraphy program,
significant issues remain for laboratory managers. One issue is the
legitimacy and validity of the polygraphic process itself. Laboratory
directors will have difficulty persuading their employees to embrace a
screening methodology that they know is not generally accepted by the
psychology profession, that many polygraphy experts regard as
unreliable for screening applications, that is not amenable to
objective measures of accuracy, that is prohibited by law in the
private sector, and that can be fooled with learned countermeasures.
Thus, a major concern for the laboratories is what impact the
polygraphy program will have on our retention of personnel in sensitive
programs. Will those programs lose good people? Will they lose people
with critical skills?
A related issue for laboratory directors is how the polygraphy
requirement will affect recruitment. It has already become more
difficult for us during the last several years to attract top graduates
in engineering and science. We must already compete for those people
with private corporations that can offer challenging technical work and
more attractive packages of salary, benefits, stock options, and career
advancement. If we will have to tell candidates that they may be
subject to a scientifically questionable polygraph exam every few
years, I am sure that many good people will be dissuaded from
considering employment in the national laboratories. One study of
polygraphy found that individuals with college degrees tend to have
higher rates of false positives. My fear is that within ten to twenty
years of a polygraphy program, we may not have the nation's best and
brightest scientists and engineers looking after the reliability,
safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons.
Finally, I am worried that excessive confidence in polygraphy may
divert attention and resources from essential security programs that
are more productive. We could put a lot of resources into a polygraph
program for DOE and fail to aggressively improve the funding, staffing,
and sophistication of our programs in cyber security, personnel
security, security education and awareness, counterintelligence
investigations, inter-agency coordination, and comprehensive periodic
background reinvestigations. Polygraphy is probably the weakest tool in
the security and counterintelligence toolbox, and we should not cherish
unrealistic expectations for it.
In view of the many uncertainties surrounding polygraphy, I believe
DOE must proceed cautiously with a limited program that will be subject
to reevaluation after an appropriate time.
conclusion
The escalating security threat against the DOE nuclear weapon
laboratories is a matter of great concern to me and my colleagues at
Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and the Department of Energy. The
recent inspection of safeguards and security at Sandia National
Laboratories by the DOE office of Independent Oversight and Performance
Assurance was a useful independent review and provided me with insights
that can only be seen with ``fresh eyes.'' It helped identify several
ways in which we can strengthen our security posture. We are taking
vigorous steps to resolve all findings and issues identified by the
inspection as quickly as possible. For the long term, we are
implementing an Integrated Safeguards and Security Management System
which will help us achieve excellence in security performance on a
consistent basis.
The unmistakable message of the recent inspection is that security
must stay ahead of the threats. The threats will always change as
technology changes. Measures that were sufficient in the past no longer
afford an adequate defense. Security policies and systems must be
designed for capability and performance against real, current threats.
Compliance is simply not enough.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.024
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.
Dr. Browne. By the way, as in the first panel, your entire
statement will be made a part of the record. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN C. BROWNE
Mr. Browne. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I am John Browne,
Director of Los Alamos National Lab, and I am pleased to have
the opportunity to provide your subcommittee with a statement
on the status of security programs at our laboratory. I have
been Director for not quite 2 years. And during that time,
security has been one of the main focus areas that I've
identified for improvements at our laboratory. It has been one
of my top priorities.
The recent DOE audit confirmed that we've made significant
progress in upgrading our security programs during the last
several years, but it's clear to me that there's still many
improvements that need to be made. As Dr. Robinson mentioned,
security is integral to accomplishing our mission, and we
recognize that the security threats that we face today are
different from those during the cold war. And as such, our
responses have to be continuously improved to address the newly
emerging threats.
To meet these threats, I have reorganized our security and
counterintelligence programs and hired new leadership to
provide us with the best program possible. And I think I'm
starting to see the results of having both new programs and new
people in place.
I want to point out just a few things that I think are very
important. First, discuss personnel security since people are
the heart of anything related to security, whether it's
information or materials control. And I think perhaps the most
fundamental change in our security posture during the last 2
years has been the increased buy-in and involvement of our
staff and our employees. Although the employees have always
taken security seriously, the new challenges that we face have
been met with an increased commitment at the laboratory.
To help the employees understand the threat and their
responsibilities for security, we've significantly improved our
employee security training and awareness program. Our
management team has communicated to all employees the
expectations for improved individual security responsibilities.
We've had experts communicate the nature of past and present
threats. We have reiterated that people will be held
accountable for their actions, and we have taken disciplinary
action when appropriate.
In the area of access control to our site, we are
implementing a more stringent badging and control system. And
this new system ties together through a central computer
network key information such as citizenship, clearance level,
clearance status, training needed to get into any given site,
so that as an individual comes up to an access point and they
hand their badge to a guard, the guard not only can see the
badge, they can swipe it through and find out what's up to date
on everything; and we think that's going to be an important
capability that will improve our security.
During the early 1990's, the number of Q clearances was
reduced for cost-cutting purposes, and this action led to an
increase in the number of people at the laboratory cleared at
the lower L-cleared level. This mix of clearance levels has led
to additional administrative controls required to restrict
access of L-cleared people to secret restricted data, which of
course requires a Q clearance. In my opinion, this cost-saving
measure actually lessened security during this period; and we
would like to see an increase, as Dr. Robinson also pointed
out, in the number of Q clearances for people who must work in
our facilities containing secret, restricted data. We think
this would definitely enhance security effectiveness.
In the 1998 annual report to the President on safeguards
and security, inadequate protection of classified non-nuclear
weapons parts was identified as the single biggest information
security problem at Los Alamos. We have made major improvements
in protecting these classified items. The number of storage
locations has been reduced from 105 to 41 and will be reduced
to 22 by the end of this calendar year. We have added 25
additional protective force personnel and the patrol frequency
has been significantly increased.
Cyber security is the fastest changing security issue for
the laboratory and the Nation. Our classified computers where
our nuclear weapons work is done are totally separated from our
unclassified systems. It is a true air gap that exists between
the classified and the unclassified. Classified networks have
no connections to the outside world except through a National
Security Agency-approved encryption device.
The recent DOE audit found that our classified computer
network was secure and fully compliant with DOE orders. The
recent DOE audit also tested our unclassified network fire
walls that we began installing in November 1998, almost a year
ago. DOE inspectors could not penetrate these barriers from
outside Los Alamos. However, they did find areas that we must
protect against the insider threat and we are taking corrective
actions to close some of those vulnerabilities.
With respect to the insider threat, I think this is
probably the biggest challenge we all face. We are now allowing
no electronic transfer of authorized unclassified information
from our classified systems to our unclassified systems. That's
been since the April security shutdown. We are doing 100
percent scanning of all outgoing unclassified e-mail and our
unclassified--the ``yellow network,'' as we refer to it, which
is fire walled, is being strengthened with even stronger
password protection, enhanced network scanning and switching
which allows people to only remain--have access to the
information they need.
Let me close by saying that we recognize that although the
audit this year came out very positive in the sense that we
received a ``satisfactory,'' the opinion at our laboratory is
that we want to continue to receive a ``satisfactory'' and that
means making continual improvements in how we approach
security. It is a never-ending game. You have to maintain
yourself strong against new and emerging threats.
I believe we have a solid foundation to build on. I feel
strongly now that I have the right people in place and they
have the right attitude and we can make this happen. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of John C. Browne follows:]
Prepared Statement of John C. Browne, Director, Los Alamos National
Laboratory
introduction
I am pleased to have this opportunity to provide your subcommittee
a statement on security programs at the Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL).
I would like to make three key points in my testimony today:
1. Security is a top priority at the Department of Energy and the
Laboratory. When I became Director two years ago, security was
one of my focus areas for improvement. As such, I strengthened
our security and counterintelligence activities by increasing
employee training and awareness, hiring new leadership to
increase our effectiveness, and increasing institutional
resources to fix problems.
2. We have made significant progress in upgrading our security programs
during the past two years. Secretary Richardson was
particularly instrumental in focusing attention to this
important matter. Our security progress is documented in our
own self-assessments and was recently validated by a Department
of Energy (DOE) security audit. The Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance performed this audit.
3. There are still improvements to be made. The recent DOE security
audit confirmed the results of our own self-assessment; there
were no surprises. We aggressively pursued corrective actions
before, and during, the audit. The University of California and
Laboratory management is committed to implementing corrective
actions until all findings are addressed.
overview
The Los Alamos National Laboratory mission is to ensure the safety
and reliability of US nuclear weapons and to help reduce the threat of
weapons of mass destruction. In performance of this mission, we ensure
the security of our people, our information, and our nuclear materials.
Security is integral to the success of our mission. We recognize that
the security threats we face today are different from those during the
cold war. As such, our response must be continuously improved to
address newly emerging threats.
Our Laboratory, located in a relatively remote part of northern New
Mexico, occupies 43 square miles. This location presents both
opportunities and challenges to security. We have 158 security areas
where classified work is performed. These security areas contain over
6.5 million classified documents, 75,000 nonnuclear classified weapon
parts, over 2,000 classified computers, and 3 major nuclear facilities
holding several metric tons of special nuclear materials.
Our Security Approach
Los Alamos uses a layered methodology to protect classified
documents and materials. With our security protection, one must
overcome several barriers before obtaining access to classified matter.
This methodology applies to our security programs for physical
security, cyber security, information security, etc. An example of this
may be observed in special nuclear materials protection at our
plutonium facility. The double fence surrounding this facility has a
perimeter intrusion detection system (the outer layer). The second
layer is the well-trained, well-armed professional guard force
patrolling the facility 24 hours a day. The third layer is the armored
guard post controlling access. The fourth protective layer is alarmed
vault type rooms and safes within the plutonium facility.
Los Alamos has made enhancements in all these areas of security
over the past two years. Using the plutonium facilities as an example,
our improvements include the following:
<bullet> improved protective forces response plans for plutonium
facilities--we now get there faster with more firepower,
<bullet> state-of-the-art protective masks to counter chemical threats
against protective forces,
<bullet> portable explosive-detection equipment, and
<bullet> use of a special vehicle with built-in delay and denial
technologies for intrasite transport of nuclear material.
Our protective forces are capable of responding to the full
spectrum of threats we face. We provide an average 250 hours of
intensive training per person per year using a DOE-certified program.
The results are exceptional. Over the past two years, 98.5% of the
protective force have passed the critical performance tests on the
first attempt. Performance is tested in areas of firearms, physical
fitness, handcuffing, and unarmed defense techniques.
In August, the DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance performed a comprehensive security audit. This
audit inspected the five major security areas: program management,
information security, cyber security, nuclear material control and
accountability (MC&A), and personnel security. The DOE overall security
rating for the Laboratory was Satisfactory, the highest possible
rating. More importantly, this audit confirms that our corrective
actions are effective. General Habiger, the DOE's ``Security Czar,''
commented on this audit while visiting LANL on September 17, 1999.
General Habiger stated: ``Los Alamos just came through an evaluation
with an overall satisfactory, which is the highest rating you can get,
and this . . . was deemed the best evaluation in the history of Los
Alamos. That's a phenomenal achievement.''
We have structured this testimony to follow the categories used by
DOE for their audit. I will now discuss the actions we have taken which
contributed to receiving this overall Satisfactory rating.
program management
In April 1998, I reorganized all security functions into one
division. At the same time, we began implementing Presidential Decision
Directive 61 and established an independent counterintelligence
program. I hired experienced professionals to lead both organizations.
A former United States Air Force security officer, a specialist in
running complex nuclear security organizations, leads the Security
Division. The Internal Security Office is responsible for our
counterintelligence program. Leading this office is a retired Federal
Bureau of Investigation special agent with 30 years of field and staff
experience in counterintelligence. We have continued to add external
expertise to staff of both organizations. Additionally, the University
of California strengthened its national laboratory security oversight
by hiring a safeguards and security manager. This professional is a
former United States Air Force officer who specialized in investigative
programs involving computer security, personnel security, asset
protection, anti-terrorism, and vulnerability assessment.
Since 1996, the Laboratory has been augmenting security funding by
10 percent per year in our overhead budget to address new demands. We
increased the annual security budget from $44 M to $64 M. We increased
the protective force by approximately 70 uniformed personnel, for a
total of 390. Eight new armored vehicles were purchased to replace
antiquated vehicles, and $1.5 M was invested in a new radio system that
provides improved and flexible protective force communication.
Perhaps the most fundamental change in our security posture has
been the increased buy-in and involvement on the part of our employees.
Employees have always taken security seriously, but new challenges have
been met with increased commitment at the Laboratory. Direct
involvement by our management team has communicated to all employees
the expectations for improved individual security responsibilities. We
reiterated that people will be held accountable for their actions and
have taken disciplinary action when appropriate. Secretary Richardson
ordered two security immersion stand-downs this year. Both were very
effective in increasing employee awareness of the changing threats and
employee responsibilities for security.
Additionally, Laboratory management continues to track and correct
identified security issues. For tracking, management uses a
comprehensive database system called ``The Red Book.'' This book
includes all findings and their status from every self-assessment, DOE
audit, and Government Accounting Office report, plus a variety of
Presidential and Congressional commission reports.
information security
In the 1998 [DOE] Annual Report to the President on Safeguards and
Security, inadequate protection of classified nonnuclear weapons parts
was identified as the single biggest information security issue at Los
Alamos. Los Alamos has made major improvements in protecting these
classified items. Examples of our improvements include the following:
<bullet> Storage locations have been reduced from 105 to 41. This
number will be reduced to only 22 locations by the end of this
calendar year.
<bullet> Storage locations have been organized into security clusters.
To protect these clusters, 25 additional protective force
personnel were assigned to augment the existing forces.
In another area of information security, classified documents, Los
Alamos was judged to have effective document control and protection
over the millions of classified documents maintained at the Laboratory.
DOE security audits since 1994 have validated this result. Equally
important, our strategies for securing special access programs and
intelligence information have been closely scrutinized in numerous
inspections and determined to meet all requirements.
cyber security
Cyber security is a critical element of the Laboratory's overall
security posture. The Laboratory maintains classified and unclassified
computer networks. The classified computers are totally separate from
unclassified systems--a true air gap. The classified networks have no
connections to the outside world except through National Security
Agency--approved encryption devices.
The following list highlights important accomplishments in Los
Alamos's cyber security:
<bullet> During the recent DOE audit of security, the classified
computer network was determined to be secure and fully
compliant with DOE orders.
<bullet> This audit also tested the unclassified network firewalls. DOE
inspectors could not penetrate these barriers from outside Los
Alamos.
<bullet> Los Alamos fully participated in two security stand-downs
directed by the Secretary of Energy this past spring. Extensive
training on security and threat awareness was provided to the
employees and contractors.
<bullet> A nine-point Tri-Lab Action Plan to improve cyber security was
written and an implementation plan was approved. To date, Los
Alamos has met all milestones.
<bullet> Controls to prevent any unauthorized classified-information
transfer from classified to unclassified computer systems were
strengthened, and an action plan for technical prevention is in
place.
<bullet> No electronic transfer of authorized unclassified information
from classified systems to unclassified systems has been
permitted since the security stand-down. New controls,
including a revised two-person information control policy, are
in process of development and approval.
<bullet> Scanning outgoing unclassified e-mail and computer files for
possible classified information was initiated and is ongoing.
<bullet> A stronger and improved certification program was implemented
for those foreign nationals who require access to unclassified
computer resources as part of their job. These foreign
nationals must meet stringent programmatic criteria before
access is granted. Their computer access is subject to
additional monitoring and management review.
Los Alamos continues to upgrade its cyber security to adapt to
changing technology and meet continuously evolving threats.
material control and accountability (mc&a)
Our nuclear material control and accountability needed improvement
in past years. After taking corrective actions, we now have a great
deal of confidence in our inventory accuracy. More importantly, our
control measures have been strong, and we are equally confident that
our material has been adequately safeguarded from theft or diversion.
In the 1998 [DOE] Annual Report to the President on Safeguards and
Security, we received a Marginal rating in MC&A. The issue identified
in that report questioned our ability to ensure that nuclear materials
were in their authorized locations and at stated quantities. Much of
this issue dates back to old measurement practices tied to imprecision
in previous generations of measurement equipment. Through a
comprehensive program involving new equipment and new procedures, we
have revised and rebuilt our MC&A program. Within the last two years,
our MC&A program has achieved a new level of performance that was rated
by the most recent audit team as ``the best in the DOE complex.'' Los
Alamos has been a leader in international safeguards technology for
close to 30 years. We are proud of our improved internal practices to
meet the MC&A standards.
personnel security
People are the heart of information control. We have increased
employee security training and awareness. Additionally, we have
improved our security procedures, and we are tracking and correcting
deficiencies. The positive results of our effort were validated in the
DOE audit. Clearance processing, human reliability programs, and
security badging were determined to be operating effectively, with no
findings identified.
Los Alamos continues to improve personnel security. For example, we
are implementing a more stringent badging and access control system.
This new system ties together, through a central computer network, key
information such as current training status, citizenship, clearance
level, and clearance status for each employee and visitor. This
enhancement will improve our real-time ability to tie security-area
access to virtually all of the eligibility requirements for area entry.
We also are installing electronic badge readers at all manned entry
posts so that we have an electronic screening of each badge as well as
a physical check. Our access controls also include the most extensive
use in the DOE complex of collateral biometrics checks (hand-geometry
readers) for access control. In addition, we have begun rebadging the
entire workforce to move to the new color-coded DOE badge that will
allow employees and security officers to more readily identify a
person's clearance level.
During the early 1990s, there was a well-intended DOE objective to
reduce the number of Q clearances for cost-cutting purposes. This
action led to an increase in the number of people at the Laboratory
cleared at the lower L level. This mix of clearance levels has led to
additional administrative controls to restrict access of L-cleared
people to secret restricted data (which requires a Q clearance for
access). In my opinion, this cost savings measure has lessened
security. We would like to see an increase in the number of Q
clearances for those people who must work in our facilities containing
secret restricted data. This change would enhance our security
effectiveness.
foreign visits and assignments
All foreign nationals visiting or on assignment to the Laboratory
require prior DOE or DOE-delegated approval. In March 1999, we
implemented a new internal policy that established a rigorous approval
and verification process to support our foreign national visits and
assignments. Every visitor has a Laboratory host, who is trained,
briefed, and debriefed on the visit. The recent DOE audit verified this
process through performance testing and interviews. Additionally, the
auditors attempted to infiltrate foreign national ``actors'' into our
security areas on several occasions, using false badges, ruses, and
intervention by ``co-opted'' senior managers--the actors failed to gain
access in every case. Strict access limitations are in place and
verified by our Operations Security staff.
areas for improvement
Despite our recent documented successes, we recognize further work
is required to maintain the appropriate level of security at the
Laboratory. Significant examples include the following:
<bullet> We will continue to expand and improve the comprehensiveness
and quality of our security-training program. Clearly, our
employees are our first and best lines of defense in meeting
the tremendous challenge of safeguarding nuclear material and
classified information. Training is the key through which we
keep our employees knowledgeable of and vigilant to security
threats. We have a number of initiatives underway, which are
relevant and meaningful to our mission and the security
challenges we face.
<bullet> We will continue our efforts to protect against the insider
threat to our cyber security. Our efforts will be coordinated
with the IsecM Task Force, which is composed of representatives
from the three nuclear weapons laboratories, the DOE nuclear
weapon production plants, and the DOE.
<bullet> We recently obtained release of funds from DOE for the first
segment of our Nuclear Material Safeguards and Security
Upgrades Project (NMSSUP), which is intended to replace our
aging security alarm system. We will work to ensure this line-
item construction project is accomplished within scope,
schedule, and budget. We have assigned one of our best project
managers to this project, and it receives regular review by my
senior managers and me.
<bullet> We have added an effective firewall to protect our
unclassified network. We will continue to expand the
vulnerability testing of these unclassified computer systems to
ensure our systems are adequately protected from within the
firewall (the insider threat).
<bullet> We will reduce the use of temporary nuclear material access
areas. Our older facilities require the occasional use of
temporary material access areas. These areas are created to
utilize specialized equipment outside the normal special
nuclear materials protective area. These temporary areas
provide full protection for the nuclear materials. However,
they are more difficult to protect and require expensive
compensatory measures. Minimizing the use of these areas and
obtaining newer secure facilities are the best solutions to
this issue.
<bullet> We will continue to improve our internal Laboratory
coordination between counterintelligence, security, and foreign
visitor and assignment organizations.
closing remarks
I am very pleased that the recent DOE security audit recognized
many improvements to the Los Alamos security programs. In those areas
identified for further improvement, I want to assure you that we are
committed to making those improvements. We are committed to continuous
improvement of our security program, just as we are with safety,
facilities, project management, and other areas of business and
operations. We have a solid foundation to build on, we have a detailed
plan for the path forward, and most importantly, we have the right
people, with the right attitude, to make it happen. I would like to
thank Secretary Richardson and other DOE leaders for their support of
our Laboratory's efforts to improve security. With the continued
support of the administration and Congress, we will continue to achieve
established security goals.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.
Dr. Tarter. Welcome back.
TESTIMONY OF C. BRUCE TARTER
Mr. Tarter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
saying, in partial answer to a comment Mr. Podonsky made this
morning, we are responding to 100 percent of all of the
findings which were found in the OS&E inspection. Let me
briefly comment on our response in the three areas that I've
discussed before: physical security, computer security and then
personnel security.
In the area of physical security, I think the three major
areas in which there were significant findings, I think the
most important, as alluded to earlier by, I believe,
Congressman Cox, was essentially on the Superblock and the
guarding of special nuclear material. And I think--as Mr.
Podonsky said this morning, I think we have done a number of
things. We have done a very, very large number of computer
simulations to test all kinds of scenarios for possible
intrusion into that area. And I think those have--I think
exposed and allowed us to take measures to work on that
facility.
I think we carried out a physical force-on-force exercise
during September, which again will have to be judged eventually
by his team, but I think we did it in concert with the Oakland
operations office, with the defense programs office in DOE, and
I think, learned a great deal; and I believe we were reasonably
satisfied with the results of that exercise.
The third piece, which I alluded to in my July response, we
have been adding special response team personnel and they
basically go through extensive training. The first new class I
believe will graduate this December, and then the other classes
will soon come on line, which will bring us to full strength in
terms of the special people to respond in those areas.
In terms of the materials control and accountability
overall, we have essentially completed, in our judgment, the
work in all but one area; and as was discussed this morning,
that last area involved acquiring measurement capability, which
we have basically done this week, and we will begin to use that
to take measurements on the inventories in this one area, which
I don't want to go into further in an open hearing, but that
will be well under way.
Finally, in the classified part of physical security we
expect to have all of our storage areas brought into the
standard configurations by the end of the year, and we're using
special patrols to guard that during the interim until we have
done that.
In the area of computer security, I think our major
activity both in response to the Secretary's 6-point plan and
the 9-point plan, but also the findings, is to bring a very
extensive new fire wall into operation in the unclassified part
of our systems. A second--and that's acquired, but it will take
extensive work to separate into all of its components; and that
is where we're putting much of our effort.
The other activity I would mention, in which all three of
the laboratories are participating, and which I think Dr.
Weigand could comment on further, is that all of the labs and
external experts in computer security have basically spent a
great deal of time trying to assess all of the conceivable
measures. And this is done in concert with things like the
National Security Agency and the other parts of the government
which have to work at high levels of cyber security; and I
think we have carried out an extensive set of discussions and
workshops with a number of recommendations for cyber security
in general, but I would rather let Dr. Weigand, or perhaps Dr.
Gilligan, comment on how those are going to be responded to and
how they will fit into the 6- and 9-point plans.
Let's see. In terms of the foreign national access, which
was clearly a topic of significant discussion this morning, we
have tightened the administrative controls along the lines
General Habiger indicated so that we have even more extensive--
we have always had an extensive review process for the foreign
national access, but we have added layers of additional review
before any foreign national has access to the computer site.
Finally, I will just mention briefly in the area of
personnel security, I think, as both Dr. Robinson and Dr.
Browne have commented, that a significant issue for us has been
the presence of L clearances. I think we have asked again for Q
clearances; I think we're pleased--we would like to have an
all-Q site. In the first proximation--in the interim, we have
added a number of physical barriers so that it is not--so that
L-cleared people cannot simply administratively and easily get
into the Q areas as an interim measure. But I think our
preferred result is to have essentially a Q-cleared facility
inside a Q-cleared--basically inside the restricted areas. I
think we are--for all kinds of reasons we think that was a
vulnerability, and we think changing that will enhance the
security of the site.
Finally, in response to another comment this morning, we
have used polygraphs. We have not done them as part of the new
CI program, but they have been used historically as part of the
investigative process, and so the tool has not been part of the
systematic thing, but has been part of the investigative
process used with staff members in the past.
And so I will leave that with that, and I will be happy to
take questions again from the staff.
[The prepared statement of C. Bruce Tarter follows:]
Prepared Statement of C. Bruce Tarter, Director, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, University of California
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am the Director of the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Our Laboratory was
founded in 1952 as a nuclear weapons laboratory, and national security
continues to be our central mission. Livermore is a principal
participant in the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship
Program, heavily involved in programs to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and engaged in energy, environmental, and
bioscience R&D as well as industrial applications of our core
technologies.
Our National Security Mission and safeguards and security are
inextricably linked, and we take both of them very seriously. In my
testimony to this committee on July 20, 1999, I stated our commitment
and described our efforts to provide increased confidence in the
security of the Laboratory. I would like to report to you today the
substantial progress that has been made in addressing the issues
resulting from the May 1999 inspection by the DOE Office of Security
Evaluations (OSE).
In the area of protection of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), we
are well along in executing an action plan to analyze, document,
performance test, and enhance the Laboratory's comprehensive protection
strategy. There have been several progress reviews by DOE Defense
Programs (DOE/DP) and the Oakland Operations Office (DOE/OAK). Hundreds
of simulations have been performed, and a force-on-force performance
test against an outside adversary team has validated the protection
strategy. In parallel with this effort, there have been numerous
physical and procedural upgrades and interim staffing increases. A new
class of Special Response trained officers will graduate in December
and enhance our staffing.
In the area of Materials Control and Accountability (MC&A), we have
demonstrated the ability to consistently meet SNM measurement and
inventory requirements and resolve inventory differences in a timely
manner. Specific concerns raised by the OSE, ranging from statistical
sampling procedures to verification of tamper indicating devices, have
been addressed. This past week LLNL took delivery of a new certified
calibration standard from DOE's New Brunswick Laboratory that will
allow us to begin making certain specific accountability measurements.
We have also made improvements in the area of physical security and
protection of classified matter. Performance issues identified by OSE
in several vault-type rooms (VTRs) have been corrected, and two newly-
hired alarm testers are conducting a detailed inspection of all vaults
and VTRs at the Laboratory. Alarming and other physical upgrades of
non-compliant classified parts storage areas are being aggressively
pursued and will be completed by the end of the year. Over 100 non-GSA-
approved repositories have been replaced, and we are in the process of
replacing or relocating the remainder to VTRs. Physical barriers have
been installed in many Q-clearance-only areas to restrict accidental
access by L-cleared personnel, and a comprehensive cost and engineering
study for completing the remainder is nearing completion.
The Laboratory has taken many steps to improve cyber security.
Computer access by any foreign national must be approved through a
rigorous review process. For cases where dial-in access is allowed for
foreign nationals, the access is routed through a single terminal
server running state-of-the-art network intrusion detection software.
In addition, unclassified systems are being scanned for
vulnerabilities, and outgoing e-mail is being scanned for classified
content. No issues have arisen. Steps have also been taken to limit the
physical possibility of accidental transfer of information from a
classified system to an unclassified system. We have installed a
firewall between the open and restricted partitions of the unclassified
network and are beginning transition of servers to the appropriate
partition. And finally, we are actively participating in the DOE/DP
Integrated Security Management (ISecM) initiative to further improve
computer security.
In summary, much progress has been made in addressing the issues
identified by the DOE/OSE security evaluation, and we are well on our
way to reaching the goals we have set. I am committed to achieving an
excellent Safeguards and Security Program at the Laboratory.
progress on ose findings
Protection Program Management
During the inspection in April, DOE/OSE (now DOE Office of
Independent Oversight & Performance Assurance, DOE/OA) cited a concern
that LLNL had not demonstrated assurance of the SNM Protection
Strategy. Immediately, LLNL responded with a ``Path Forward'' action
plan to analyze, document, performance test, and enhance the
Laboratory's comprehensive protection strategy. With the support and
concurrence of DOE/OAK, DOE/DP and DOE/OA, LLNL has performed over 300
tabletop and computer modeling simulations of possible adversary
scenarios. The results provided LLNL with the credible scenarios that
were performance tested during the first two weeks of September. During
the week of September 12, DOE/OAK validated and DOE/DP verified the
LLNL protection strategy through force-on-force testing conducted with
an outside adversary team. The validation and verification testing was
observed by representatives of DOE/OA and the Office of Security and
Emergency Operations (DOE/SO). General Habiger was present for part of
the validation and verification exercise.
LLNL will implement the new protective force posture in December
1999, when a new group of Special Response Officers graduate from their
SPO III Academy training. In the interim, increased protective force
personnel are staffing the facility around the clock. Significant
physical and procedural upgrades developed during the Path Forward
analysis and performance testing have been implemented, with other
upgrades on target for completion in February 2000.
Material Control and Accountability
LLNL has made great strides in achieving its commitment to the DOE
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs to rectify all MC&A issues,
including those cited in the Annual Report to the President on
Safeguards & Security and those of the DOE/OSE inspection report. Of
the seven issues, all but one has been closed and validated by DOE/OAK.
In particular, LLNL's MC&A team has demonstrated the ability to meet
DOE's requirements for SNM measurements and inventory monitoring. The
team has implemented procedures that are able to quantify and resolve
inventory differences within a prescribed time frame and that process
has been validated. Other validated procedures include means for
assuring that personnel removed from the Personnel Assurance Program
(PAP) and the Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP) are not
permitted access to SNM, providing inventory confirmation of in-process
material, and verifying the integrity of tamper indicating devices. In
addition we have developed an improved sampling plan, based on item
attractiveness, to be used to confirm inventory.
The Laboratory has now received shipment of certified measurement
standards from New Brunswick Laboratory for use in inventory and
measurement accountability. These standards will enable LLNL to begin
certain accountability measurements by the close of 1999.
Physical Security
The physical security program at LLNL was rated satisfactory;
however, DOE/OSE identified five areas of weakness. Two of the concerns
were addressed through modeling and performance tests as part of the
Path Forward activity for Protection Program Management. LLNL's final
protection strategy, which was validated by DOE/OAK, mitigated those
concerns. One of the remaining concerns was closed through updated
operational directives and was validated by DOE/OAK.
One of the remaining issues relates to the protection of classified
matter and the adequacy of sensor coverage and proper testing. LLNL has
taken aggressive action to address this concern. Two additional alarm
testers have been hired and all alarm testers have now completed formal
physical security training through the DOE Non-Proliferation and
National Security Institute. The VTRs that were questioned in the OSE
report have all been brought into compliance and there is an aggressive
schedule to inspect and test all other VTRs and vaults at LLNL by the
end of the calendar year.
The other remaining issue deals with the barrier delays for SNM
laboratory doors. The validated protection strategy uses the delay
value of the existing doors and basically mitigates the need for doors
with longer delay times. The existing doors are not in compliance with
the current DOE order. LLNL is developing a project plan, including a
cost/benefit analysis, for the replacement of the doors to meet the DOE
standard.
Classified Matter Protection and Control
In the area of the protection of classified matter, LLNL took
immediate action to mitigate the OSE's concerns regarding the non-
standard storage of classified parts. We established a two-hour roving
protective force patrol for the identified storage areas and now are
fully compliant with pertinent DOE Orders. In addition, LLNL has
completed a comprehensive self-assessment to assure that all facilities
housing non-standard storage of classified parts, including those
identified during the OSE inspection, are appropriately protected.
LLNL has initiated an aggressive upgrade program to bring all
identified areas of non-standard storage to either the VTR standard or
to relocate the items to vaults or VTRs by December 15, 1999. That
program is well under way with alarm and physical upgrades currently
being installed and items being consolidated or destroyed.
LLNL has identified all the locations of non-GSA-approved
repositories and a comprehensive plan to replace all non-GSA
repositories not stored in VTRs has been initiated. The plan also
includes bringing into operation a new identification method that will
permit the location of all repositories to be tracked in the LLNL
property management database and verified by protective force patrol
checks. Over 100 new repositories have been replaced to date, with
additional containers on order. It is the goal of LLNL to either
replace, relocate to VTRs, or provide off-hour checks of all non-GSA
repositories by December 31, 1999.
A DOE/OSE concern was raised about the procedures and barriers used
in Limited areas where personnel with both L and Q clearances have
access. A survey of such areas is complete and a cost/benefit analysis
is due on October 31, 1999. Options include the use of barriers and
access control or requests for additional Q clearances. Many programs
at LLNL have already installed, or are in the process of installing,
physical barriers and access control to segregate L-cleared employees
from Q-only areas. LLNL does not have any L-cleared foreign national
employees. We have, however, implemented a policy to require any
potential L-cleared foreign nationals from elsewhere in the DOE complex
to be escorted in general limited areas.
LLNL has implemented other actions to address the OSE concerns in
the area of protection of classified matter, including modification of
the Laboratory's Operations Security plan to place added emphasis on
the highly critical and sensitive topics.
Cyber Security
LLNL is actively participating in the ISecM initiative chartered by
DOE/DP. ISecM aims to achieve a comprehensive, integrated solution to
improving security in the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, particularly
security against the ``insider'' threat. ISecM constitutes a major
upgrade to security in the Nuclear Weapons Complex and will require
several years with significant new funding to implement. When
implemented, ISecM will integrate security more fully and more
transparently into classified computing across the Complex. In the long
term, ISecM will comprehensively address the concerns expressed by the
OSE while broadly improving security in the Complex.
In the near term, LLNL has taken immediate actions to address OSE
concerns. LLNL has installed a state-of-the-art system to monitor all
remote dial-in access by foreign nationals. In addition, LLNL has
strengthened its existing foreign national approval process. We now
require review and approval by the LLNL Chief Information Officer (CIO)
and the LLNL Associate Director for National Security for cyber access
by any sensitive-country foreign national.
We are also vigorously addressing OA concerns related to LLNL's
implementation of the Nine Point Action Plan:
--LLNL is applying Tamper Indicating Devices (seals) to classified
computers to increase the assurance that users do not modify
their computer systems to add ways of transferring data.
--LLNL has instituted rigorous new procedures for the authorized
transfer of unclassified files from classified systems.
--LLNL is scanning all its unclassified computer systems to determine
whether or not those systems have vulnerabilities.
--LLNL has procured new software that has the potential to
significantly increase the Laboratory's ability to
automatically scan e-mail for classified information.
--LLNL has installed a firewall between the open and restricted
portions of the unclassified network and is beginning
transition of servers to the appropriate partition. The
firewall will be fully operational by March 1, 2000.
In addition, LLNL's programs have re-evaluated the need-to-know
boundaries pertaining to the information they handle and their
personnel. Each LLNL program area is restructuring its computer systems
appropriately to enforce more stringent need-to-know separations.
To guide computer security in the future, the Laboratory has
created a Computer Security Policy Board headed by the LLNL CIO to
promulgate policy regarding computer security for the site.
closing remarks
The security evaluation conducted by OSE noted many improvements to
LLNL's security system while identifying areas for further improvement.
We are carrying out a comprehensive corrective action plan to address
those areas, and much progress has been made. I have committed the
resources and set priorities to ensure that this plan is executed. Many
corrective action milestones have already been achieved, and we are on
schedule with the remainder. Most milestones are expected to be
achieved by the end of the year. DOE has evaluated and concurred in or
validated much of our work to date. OA has noted LLNL's strong
commitment to action.
I appreciate the opportunity to provide an update to the Committee
on the status of security improvements at LLNL. I am confident that our
Special Nuclear Material and sensitive and classified information are
secure.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.
Dr. Weigand, welcome back.
TESTIMONY OF GIL WEIGAND
Mr. Weigand. Thank you, again. I would ask that my full
text be entered into the record, and then I will attempt to be
extremely brief and you can get on with the questioning.
I do appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
committee again. I want you to know that as I have indicated
before I am fully committed to strengthening the security
posture at the laboratories and in defense programs, and doing
so by the end of the calendar year. I hope to achieve a
``satisfactory'' rating on the report that goes back over to
the President.
You are fully aware that last year's report that went to
the President did not have a ``satisfactory'' rating, it had a
``less than satisfactory''; and as a result of that, the
Assistant Secretary, along with the cooperation of Deputy
Assistant Secretaries like myself have created a set of
corrective action plans and reported those corrective action
plans to Under Secretary Moniz in a memo we call the ``goalpost
memo.''
It is a classified memo in which we lay out the plan by
which we expect to achieve our ``satisfactory'' rating by the
end of the year. It was clearly based upon the information we
had at the time we drafted the memo.
I think why I am very confident that we are going to come
to this ``satisfactory'' rating or very close is because the
three things it takes to make this happen are in place. One,
there is a corrective action plan. That corrective action plan
two, has milestones, measurable; if not week-by-week, they are
appropriate, and they are reported to my office on a regular
schedule. And we can audit those a bit.
And third and most important is that a corrective action
plan with milestones and clear objectives is one thing, but
funding it is the other. And this plan has been funded. I have
letters from each of the directors of the laboratories that
they will fully fund those corrective action plans.
I think on the positive side here, we have just recently
gone through a set of inspections by the independent office.
Those inspections, as you have heard today from Mr. Podonsky,
are showing very good progress, very good signs we had an
overall satisfactory rating at one of the laboratories, Los
Alamos, and we are very proud of that progress.
One other thing I did want to mention here is that we
aren't just leaving this to a goalposts memo that ends at the
end of this December. Those are what I call the intermediate
set of actions.
I have asked the laboratories to form a laboratory-industry
task force to create a plan for continuous improvement. The
purpose of the plan is to ensure that our security will be
sustainable in the long run and capable of adapting to the
threat as it increases. And I really want to emphasize that.
This is not a game where the threat lies dormant and lets you
have some slack. This is a slippery pole. As you climb and
achieve new technological advances to overcome the current
threats, those technologies are used against you in the future
to overcome the barriers you put up.
So this is a slippery pole on which we have to constantly
be climbing. I am very interested in the continuous
improvement.
I asked this task force to work jointly with myself and the
Office of the Chief Information Officer, Mr. Gilligan, who is
here with us today. If you wish to question him, I am sure he
will be willing to offer his viewpoints.
I also charged this task force to make cyber security
within defense programs ``best in class.'' We would do as good
as the rest of the government and hopefully adapt what good
ideas they use throughout the government. But I insisted they
take one additional step, and that is that I wanted them to be
very forefront on insider espionage. I think that is a
capability that the Department of Energy could contribute
across the government. Given the concern of this committee on
insider espionage, I think that we need to step up to that, and
I ask the committee to do that.
To ensure objectivity in this task force, I established a
leadership team that was chaired by Bill Crowell, who is the
Chief Executive Officer of Cylink and the past Deputy Director
of the National Security Agency. The majority of the leadership
team was selected from commercial enterprise, including Boeing,
IBM and TRW who have a very large enterprise in classified work
for the Federal Government, IBM and TRW. The TRW representative
was Bill Studeman, Admiral Studeman, was the former Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
I stacked this committee in favor of the industry
representatives who knew the cyber security world from inside
the government and outside the government. They can outvote the
labs at any given time.
The task force proposed a long-term system-level approach
to cyber security and provides a basis for creating the 21st
century classified information system for defense programs that
will continue to enhance the protection of our classified and
sensitive nuclear weapons information, on ongoing and
increasing threat.
We have a draft from them. We are evaluating that draft. We
are looking at options on how to implement and options on how
to fund. And, again, because this is a system-level approach
that we are taking here, it has many nuances to it, and we need
to assess them fully before we get back to the committee with
what we think we should be doing.
So, in conclusion, I just believe there has been
significant progress. I think you have a pretty good team in
place right now. I think we just need to move the ideas and the
plans that we have forward, and hopefully by the end of this
year we will be reporting back to you a ``satisfactory'' along
with our report to the President with a ``satisfactory.''
[The prepared statement of Gil Weigand follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gil Weigand, Deputy Assistant Secretary For
Research, Development and Simulation, Office of Defense Programs, U.S.
Department of Energy
introduction:
Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to testify on security issues. We, in
Defense Programs, are fully committed to ensuring that our laboratories
and facilities enhance their safeguards and security protection
postures and achieve a Satisfactory rating by the end of the calendar
year. As line managers, we fully recognize that effective safeguards
and security protection is required in order to meet our National
Security mission. APPROACH:
As documented in the most recent Annual Report to the President,
several Defense Programs' sites were rated less than Satisfactory.
These ratings were based on previous oversight reviews (surveys,
assessments, inspections). On May 24, 1999, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense Programs set forth in a ``Goal Post'' memorandum to the Under
Secretary, our get-well plan and approach to correct deficiencies by
the end of the calendar year. The ``Goal Post'' memorandum was
coordinated with Non-Proliferation and National Security and the Office
of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance and accepted by the
Under Secretary. It committed to ``fix the problems'' through immediate
and interim actions and follow-on corrective actions with associated
milestones to be completed by the end of the calendar year. We have
committed an abundance of resources to fix the problems and, to date,
have reprioritized funding within ourexisting budget. Finally, we are
closely tracking all Corrective Action Plans to assure milestones are
being appropriately met.
Also, there have been inspections completed at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos
National Laboratory subsequent to the Annual Report to the President.
These inspections by the Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance focused on a review of safeguards and security
programs with documented problems and evaluated the effectiveness of
cyber security programs in both the classified and unclassified areas.
While work remains to be done, recent inspections have documented that
significant progress and improvements have been accomplished at all of
the weapons laboratories in the safeguards and security, as well as
cyber security areas.
As you are aware, the Department has recently been giving much
attention to the area of cyber security. This began with action plans
to address the Secretary's nine points and six enhancements. Once the
plans had been developed and implementation had begun, I asked the
laboratories to create an Integrated Security Management (IsecM) Task
Force. The task force was to prepare a plan for continuous improvement.
The purpose of this plan is to ensure that our security will be
sustainable in the long run and be capable of adapting to the threat as
it increases. Specifically, I charged the task force with developing a
plan that has been coordinated with the Department's Chief Information
Officer to make the cyber security within Defense Programs the best in
class and preeminence against the insider threat. To ensure
objectivity, I established a leadership team for the task force that
was chaired by Bill Crowell, Chief Executive Officer of Cylink and past
Deputy Director of the National Security Agency. The majority of the
leadership team was selected from commercial enterprises, including
Boeing, IBM and TRW, the TRW representative being Bill Studeman, former
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The task force has proposed a long-term system-level approach to
cyber security. It provides the basis for creating a 21st Century
classified information system for Defense Programs that will continue
to enhance the protection of our classified and sensitive nuclear
weapons information in the face of ongoing increases in the threat. The
task force completed the plan in September and is currently refining
the associated cost estimate. The plan has been submitted to the
Department and is currently being reviewed. I hope for a decision on
further action soon.
I will now provide a brief summary of specific actions taken and
planned to correct weaknesses in safeguards and security at the DP
laboratories by the end of the calendar year.
lawrence livermore national laboratory (llnl):
All worst case adversary paths and scenarios have been reassessed
to include re-running of all computer modeling and performance tests to
validate the protection posture at the ``Superbloc'' (where SNM is
processed/stored). There has been an increase in protective force
manning at the Superbloc and additional physical security upgrades have
been put in place. New and enhanced procedures have been put in place
and validated by Oakland Operations Office to address weaknesses in the
material control and accountability area (addresses Tamper Indicating
Device integrity, Inventory Differences Analysis, Inventory Sampling
Plans based upon attractiveness of SNM, and acquiring reference
materials for measurement of uranium holdings). In the area of
Classified Matter Protection, LLNL has established two-hour patrols
during off hours, holidays, and weekends of classified matter/parts
pending the matter/parts being relocated to vaults or alarm system
upgrades completed by December 15, 1999. All vault type room alarm
coverage is being assessed with corrections by December 31, 1999; those
identified during the inspection have already been corrected. Also,
additional alarm testers have been hired and trained. Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory is in the process of consolidating its
classified holdings destroying unnecessary classified materials. In
addition, over 100 GSA approved repositories have been received with
additional on order.
In the area of unclassified cyber security, LANL is scanning E-mail
to detect classified information that has been accidentally or
deliberately placed in an unclassified message. Across the Lab
vulnerability assessment scans are being conducted. Also, the Computer
Security Organization has instituted ``spot checks'' to assure the
vulnerability scans are being completed and to further assure that
significant vulnerabilities uncovered by the scans are corrected.
Finally, foreign nationals are not permitted access to a Limited Area
unless under escort. In addition, intrusion detection is in place to
monitor off site foreign national access to LLNL's open terminal
server.
sandia national laboratories (snl)
SNL has taken several immediate actions to improve security
including restaffing a protective force tower position, creating an
additional elevated protective force response position, and adding
physical barriers at the material access portals to protect the
protective force members. Additional physical security enhancements
have included securing tamper switches on alarm cabinets and the
implementation of metal detector procedures to detect items in shoes.
In the area of materials control and accountability, SNL has updated
its physical inventory and tamper-indicating procedures as well as
ensuring that existing measurement plans reflect the procedure of
always measuring 100% of Category I nuclear material holdings. In the
area of classified matter protection, SNL has increased the frequency
of protective force patrols of buildings containing classified parts
and has placed a Security Police Officer in one building containing
Secret Restricted Data parts during non-operational hours to perform a
full perimeter walk-around. All classified containers, including space
savers, have been made accessible to the protective force and SNL will
provide a plan to DOE by December 23, 1999, for the approved standard
storage of classified materials either in GSA safes, vaults, or vault-
type rooms. Also, deficiencies in the SNL security infraction/inquiry
program are being addressed with the recent addition of 3 staff members
to the Security Incident Management Program Team with the elimination
of the backlog of security inquiries/investigations to zero by December
23, 1999.
In the area of unclassified cyber security, SNL is moving forward
aggressively to implement the Secretary's six further enhancements to
cyber security . Also, SNL now has in place a formal process requiring
SNL Vice Presidential approval for any foreign national access to the
unclassified Sandia Restricted Network (SRN). They have also applied
tamper-indicating solutions to unused ports of classified computers
collocated with unclassified computers and implemented the NT secure
model on the SRN servers with deployment to individualized computers by
December 23, 1999. They will also correct all significant
vulnerabilities on the Sandia Open Network (SON) and SRN computers as
an interim measure and implement the automated NT server model with
monitoring on the SON plus servers by December 23, 1999. Finally, SNL
plans to implement the UNIX SECURE Model on SRN and SON by September
29, 2000.
los alamos national laboratory (lanl):
The LANL protection program was rated in the February 1999 Annual
Report to the President as Marginal with all topical areas also rated
as Marginal. However, the August 1999 comprehensive inspection of LANL
resulted in an overall SATISFACTORY rating. This represents the
commitment of senior line management to address the actions needed to
correct past deficiencies and weaknesses. LANL has effectively
addressed long-standing problems in the accountability of nuclear
materials and has made significant progress in addressing deficiencies
in the protection of classified weapons matter/parts. There have been
significant physical security upgrades put in place and the protective
force response has been robustly improved and performance tested. Aging
security systems are being addressed by a line item construction
program. LANL will be down from 105 buildings containing classified
parts to 22 buildings within 8 building clusters with 8 dedicated
patrols by December 31, 1999. In the area of material control and
accountability, LANL is using current limit of error inventory
difference data for inventory calculations and will review all nuclear
material characterized as not amenable to measurement and revise, as
appropriate, their plan by November 30, 1999. The inspection team
characterized the LANL materials control and accountability program as
the best in DOE.
In the area of unclassified cyber security, LANL has strengthened
its policy on foreign national access to their unclassified network and
by November 1, 1999, will assure that all systems accredited to process
classified material employ tamper indicating seals on unused ports.
They will also have finished by November 1, 1999 the strengthening of
their pass word protection and implementation of a scanning process and
on-going performance-based testing. LANL hasalready begun
implementation of switched networks (65% completed on red, 40% on
yellow networks- all to be completed by FY-2000).
closing:
As you can see, significant progress has been, and continues to be,
made. We are prepared to brief the Committee in more detail on the
specific actions underway to meet ``goal post'' commitments and to
correct weaknesses noted by the recent inspections. Mr. Bill Hensley is
available to provide these briefings.
In closing, I want to again express Defense Programs' continuing
line management commitment to improving our Laboratory and facility
protection programs and obtaining Satisfactory protection programs by
the end of the calendar year.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.Dr. Turner?
TESTIMONY OF JAMES TURNER
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a short
statement.
I am pleased to return to give you a status report on our
efforts to address safeguards and security findings at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. I am the manager of the
DOE Oakland Operations Office. Our role in security consists of
two parts: First, we provide Federal oversight of the
laboratory through the presence of Federal personnel on the
site and in the facilities. These Federal staff, one, perform
spot checks on activities; two, conduct focused reviews and
issue findings where appropriate; three, validate that
corrective actions are complete and effective; and four,
maintain a constant presence in key facilities to understand
what is being done and to offer suggestions for improvement.
Second, I am the DOE contracting officer for the contract
with the University of California for the management and
operation of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In
addition to administering the terms of the contract, we work
with headquarters to develop performance measures and to assess
the laboratory's performance annually.
When we were here in July, a corrective action plan had
been agreed by the parties in the field and headquarters,
several upgrades and improvements were under way, and Livermore
was working cooperatively with Sandia and Los Alamos in areas
of common interest, such as cyber security. At that time,
Livermore was meeting all time lines and milestones in the
corrective action plan. To date much more work has been
completed and the laboratory is still on track with the agreed
schedule.
Some examples of specific actions taken are: increasing the
numbers of protective service officers within the Superblock
where plutonium, enriched uranium and classified parts are
stored; successful completion of performance tests to
demonstrate the capability to protect Superblock assets in
scenarios consistent with the design basis threat; successful
completion of bimonthly inventories of special nuclear material
to address previous deficiencies in nuclear materials controls
and accountability; the acquisition of measurement standards
for precision measurements of quantities of nuclear material--
this was accelerated through the assistance of General Habiger;
increasing the number of sensors and alarms in open storage
areas to protect classified parts; and implementing the Trilab
cyber security plan for classified and unclassified computers.
In summary, the laboratory is still on track to complete
the steps necessary to have the safeguards and security rating
assessed by Mr. Podonsky's office changed from the current
``marginal'' to ``satisfactory,'' that is, to have the
laboratory ``green'' by the end of the calendar year. This is a
commitment I made to Secretary Richardson. Dr. Tarter made a
similar commitment. In my view, we're working hard, working
well and working together to implement this commitment.
In addition, for fiscal year 2000, the performance
evaluation points allocated to security in the contract have
been increased such that they are now equal in weight to
safety.
The final point I want to make is that we're committed to
continue the pressure and the momentum to improve security
against the current threat, new, emerging threats and evolving
threats such as those in the cyber security area. I agree with
Mr. Podonsky that security is an attitude. It is a
responsibility that all of us who deal with national security
and economic security matters accept when we take such
positions. To be most effective, security and safety should be
an integral part of the work needed to accomplish the program
mission.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.
As we did with the first panel, members will be allowed to
ask questions for about 5 minutes. And we will rotate between
sides and probably have one or two rounds of questions.
First of all, I appreciate all of you for--those of you who
testified before, certainly--coming back. And our subcommittee
has had a long history, whether it be Republican or Democrat,
in trying to identify abuse, going after it and then making
sure that it's corrected. And I do believe that we are on the
right track to correct it. I just want to make sure that we are
on a fast enough track to make sure that secrets in the future
will not be allowed to be given away.
And I guess, with that in mind, I have a couple of
questions. No. 1, Dr. Robinson, you indicated and so did Mr.
Tarter, background checks, polygraph checks have been taken--
wait, maybe you didn't say so, Dr. Tarter, but Dr. Robinson,
you indicated that polygraph tests had been taken from a number
of DOE employees more than just the CI folks?
Mr. Robinson. These are laboratory employees who are
involved in special compartmented programs. And to participate
in those programs, agreeing to be available for polygraph was a
part of the condition for joining those programs. I'm giving
you the statistics on the actual number of folks who were
involved in such programs, who have been called on and have
been polygraphed.
Mr. Upton. Dr. Tarter, you indicated that you wanted more
Q-cleared folks as compared to L, which I assume is a lower
clearance?
Mr. Tarter. Yes.
Mr. Upton. But Q-cleared folks don't have the background
check, do they? Or don't they? Do they--what is the difference
between an L and a Q other than the M-N-O-P.
Mr. Tarter. Perhaps Rich Mortensen ought to come up----
Mr. Upton. What level of degree is different for a Q than
an L?
Mr. Tarter. Rush?
Mr. Inlow. I am Rush Inlow, Deputy Manager, Albuquerque
Operations. A Q is a full field investigation currently done by
the Office of Personnel Management in most cases. It also
includes a records check and a statement from the applicant,
filling out a questionnaire that deals with both background and
lifestyle issues.
An L is merely a records check and a statement submitted by
the applicant.
Mr. Upton. Now, these clearances are only for U.S.
Government employees; is that correct?
Mr. Tarter. No, U.S. citizens who are----
Mr. Upton. U.S. citizens that are participating at the labs
or employed at the labs?
Mr. Robinson. There are a few exceptions of foreign people
who have obtained clearances. We have a UK employee working in
a limited cleared area with a Q clearance.
Mr. Upton. What percentage of foreign nationals that would
have access to unclassified information, what type of
clearance, if any, would those individuals have?
Mr. Inlow. None.
Mr. Robinson. They would have none.
Mr. Upton. And they do have access; is that not right?
Mr. Robinson. No.
Mr. Upton. Not even to unclassified?
Mr. Turner. Unclassified, yes.
Mr. Upton. But not classified?
Mr. Turner. Correct.
Mr. Upton. Is that 100 percent guaranteed?
Mr. Robinson. To the best of our abilities, yes.
Mr. Upton. Dr. Weigand, you mentioned a goalposts memo. I
don't know whether I asked our staff if we had a copy and we
may have one in my--though I'm not sure. I've not seen it,
though we may have it. One of the things that I indicated in my
opening statement was that I think a number of members may be
interested in going to see for themselves a number of the labs,
probably come January when Congress is in recess and it will
not interfere with our votes here.
Do you know whether the goalposts memo has been shared with
our committee staff?
Mr. Weigand. Mr. Chairman, your staff has the memo and we
would be glad to supply another copy.
Mr. Upton. One of the things that I would ask is that
before we embark on such an adventure, going to these three
labs, I wonder if it would be possible for you to come up and
give a briefing to those members who might be interested and go
through the goalposts memo and look at the recommendations and
look at the time lines that you suggested. And as you indicated
in your testimony, the milestones that are there are on a
regular schedule and you believe that they are fully funded,
but I wonder if we might get a report at that time, in January
maybe, in a private meeting of those members to see how the
labs in fact are doing with regard to the suggestions that you
offered, to make sure that in fact we are achieving the
milestones and the direction that you thought was wise?
Mr. Weigand. Sir, so I'm really committed, let me commit
myself to do the following: Since it's on the record--I just
got through looking at the cyber security, the nine points and
so forth corrective action plans; and I asked for an informal
audit by some of my staff to do that. And I get reports back of
different things that we see happening and we are responding to
some of those. I will be perfectly willing and happy to again
have my staff informally meet with the laboratories and find
out exactly where they stand on these corrective action plans.
To my knowledge, they are on time and sort of on schedule,
but there are always little concerns here and there that come
up, and I'll be glad to share that with your staff before you
go out.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Browne, you became director of Los Alamos lab in 1997;
did you not?
Mr. Browne. That's correct. November.
Mr. Stupak. I had a couple of questions about the Wen Ho
Lee investigation, and I would like to ask you, since you're
here today, when were you first briefed about this
investigation?
Mr. Browne. It was about 2 weeks after I became Director.
Mr. Stupak. Give me a month. Do you know a month?
Mr. Browne. I believe it was November 1997.
Mr. Stupak. When did you first become aware that the FBI
concluded that it had finished its investigation and Wen Ho
Lee's clearance should be lifted?
Mr. Browne. If you're referring to the remarks that have
been reported in the paper by FBI Director Freeh--is that what
you're referring to?
Mr. Stupak. Yes.
Mr. Browne. I think I read about those in The Washington
Post sometime in like April 1999. I was never directly informed
of those.
Mr. Stupak. No one ever told you?
Mr. Browne. No.
Mr. Stupak. So that was April 1999?
Mr. Browne. 1999, whenever that story came out.
Mr. Stupak. Any idea why you weren't told by the FBI? Did
they make attempts to contact you before the stories appeared
or anything?
Mr. Browne. I certainly had meetings with the people in the
local FBI office, but they never raised that issue with me
directly. We certainly discussed--the ongoing investigation is
the way it was presented to me; it was not present as if there
was a change in the status of that case.
Mr. Stupak. So you knew about the ongoing investigation and
the next thing you knew is what Director Freeh had said in the
newspaper; correct?
Mr. Browne. Correct.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Did the FBI--they were requesting a
search warrant for Dr. Lee's computer, but they were told that
DOE's policy was not too clear, or was not clear about
expectations of privacy of lab employees that might have access
on a government computer?
Mr. Browne. No, it was--my understanding of this is that
there was a ruling by the FBI counsel about the adequacy of the
approval, that all of our employees signed a waiver, basically,
when they became employees, and it was part of our security
updates that you signed, saying that ``I know that my computer
is subject to search by the government, it is government
property,'' et cetera.
My understanding was that when the FBI and the Department
of Justice counsel looked at it, they thought that was not
adequate unless every day when you signed onto the computer a
banner appeared that reminded you of that every day.
Mr. Stupak. So the FBI made that determination? It wasn't
you or your administration personnel there telling the FBI they
could not grant access to the computer without a search
warrant?
Mr. Browne. That's right.
Mr. Stupak. Did your policies require the FBI to get a
search warrant for this?
Mr. Browne. No, no.
Mr. Stupak. Okay.
You said that the FBI--you knew the FBI was doing the
investigation, and they were sort of advising you. Were you or
any of your people involved--personally involved with this
issue, whether it is getting the search warrant or directing
the FBI? Or assisting the FBI; I won't say directing.
Mr. Browne. When the FBI opens a case, they were
responsible for the conduct of that case, and we certainly
supported them in all their requests that they made with
respect to the investigation. So our people had to help them
with access to certain information regarding the individual;
and any attempts they were trying to make, they kept us
informed about as well. We were in complete communication with
both them and the Department of Energy throughout this whole
period.
Mr. Stupak. This was a pretty high-profile case going on,
especially as the news stories started to break. Were you
personally involved in some of the decisions being made and
things like this?
Mr. Browne. Up until December 1998, I would say that it was
a low-profile case. And it became much more of a high-profile
case after December 1998, when we started to obtain our own
information in the Department and the FBI obtained more
information about the security violations that this individual
committed.
Mr. Stupak. You said that was about December 1998, but if
my memory serves me correctly, by then it had taken on a
pretty--it had become a high-profile case; even--if my memory
serves me correctly, I think even the President was briefed on
this by December 1998.
When--were you just sort of out of the loop on this one?
Mr. Browne. No, we were not out of the loop. In December
1998, the individual actually passed the polygraph examination
and there was a determination at that point to--although he had
passed the polygraph, the Department of Energy asked us to
remove him from his position into a totally isolated part of
the laboratory, which we did immediately. And there was a
determination at first that it looked like he passed and the
case would be basically terminated against the individual.
After a subsequent review of the information, it was
determined that he was deceptive on the polygraph and then that
led to a much deeper set of investigations.
But we were totally part of the entire interaction. Our
counterintelligence people were involved. It was not like we
were out of the loop.
Mr. Stupak. I guess for a case to get where the President
is briefed on it, that has got to be pretty high-profile, and
yet I get the impression that you were still giving it low
profile until December 1998.
Mr. Browne. There was not much evidence up to December 1998
that the FBI was not in a position to prosecute any case, and
of course they still have not moved that far against the
individual. But the evidence, to my understanding, that I was
aware of at that point, they did not have sufficient evidence
up until December 1998 to do anything except consider it an
ongoing investigation.
Mr. Stupak. When the President was initially briefed before
December 1998, were you or any of your personnel involved in
that briefing?
Mr. Browne. No.
Mr. Stupak. Did you prepare any briefing documents for the
President or anything?
Mr. Browne. No.
Mr. Stupak. Do you think the lab director should play a
role in these investigations?
Mr. Browne. I think we--in retrospect, I think we should
have had more information provided to us during that period.
For example, as I stated, if the information that Director
Freeh provided to the Department of Energy had been available,
it might have changed some of our viewpoints.
Mr. Stupak. How much responsibility do you think Los Alamos
lab personnel, who handled these requests for computer access
and delayed in lifting Dr. Lee's clearance, how much
responsibility should you have in that or your personnel?
Mr. Browne. We are not responsible for removing the
clearance. The Department of Energy's responsible. We can
recommend that to the Department of Energy.
Mr. Stupak. Did you in this case?
Mr. Browne. Yes, we did.
Mr. Stupak. When?
Mr. Browne. It was in January 1999.
Mr. Stupak. On this investigation, did you have a single
source person who worked for you, that worked with the FBI and
DOE on this?
Mr. Browne. That's correct.
Mr. Stupak. Who was your point person on that?
Mr. Browne. It was an individual named Mr. Terry Craig.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Thanks.
No further questions at this time.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
I'd like to ask Dr. Robinson and Dr. Browne and Dr. Tarter,
there was a memo, I guess that DOE was considering. I don't
know if they actually drafted it or not, but it was a new
contract clause that indicated--would place the lab's annual
performance fee at risk if they failed to achieve a
satisfactory rating in evaluation of their performance under
the security plans.
What is your reaction to that? Is that something that you
all could support? Would you agree to forfeit some of the bonus
if, in fact, you didn't achieve that type of rating? What is
your reaction to that?
Mr. Robinson. I think, as a matter of anything, we would
make a contract, we would want things to be spelled out as to
what the obligations are that you are to meet. We have never
favored open-ended contracts, but certainly when reasonable
conditions are spelled out, we agree to take those obligations
that would be perfectly acceptable. We do that in some other
areas.
Mr. Upton. Dr. Browne?
Mr. Browne. Well, our responsibilities for security
certainly are at the top priority, along with protection of the
health, safety, and environment. In addition, we have a
responsibility at all three labs for certifying the safety and
reliability of the stockpile each year. So I would think any
one of those is paramount to what the government should be
evaluating, how well we are doing our job. If any one of those
fails badly, then I think one has to have measures in place to
ask what caused the failure.
If it is true failure versus something being not quite
appropriate, if you see what I am driving at--``marginal''
versus totally ``unsatisfactory,'' I think ``marginal'' many
times has deficiencies, and a deficiency doesn't necessarily
mean you are failing.
Mr. Upton. That's right. But you would support some degree
of accountability using these bonuses?
Mr. Browne. I think it should be graded according to your
performance. If you had a graded metric that said, if you are
totally ``unsatisfactory,'' that you risk a certain amount of
your fee versus if you're ``marginal'' you risk less, and
perhaps if you're ``satisfactory,'' you get a positive
indicator on your fee.
Mr. Upton. Dr. Tarter?
Mr. Tarter. I think my response is very similar to Dr.
Browne's. I think there were several responsibilities for each
laboratory.
I think safety is an extremely high responsibility. I think
security is at the very top of the list; I think certifying the
stockpile. And I think, however you decide to apportion those
in grading the laboratories, I think those need to have
extremely high weight.
And then I think you need to assess in each case the
reasons for it, whether they are institutional, whether they
are individual, but I think they need to have a way to make a
very strong statement a laboratory or the institution does not
perform at a satisfactory level in one of those really major
areas.
Mr. Upton. Would all three of you agree that the goalposts,
I don't want to say ``scenario,'' but the goalposts memo and
work that is being done and laid out has been a very
constructive way to meet the ultimate goal of achieving full
security within the labs? And have you cooperated fully with
regard to that?
Mr. Tarter. Let me just start at the other end with the
microphone.
I think--one of the things I think we have asked for very
much, and I think--particularly in view of the fact that
requirements, particularly in the cyber area, do change very
rapidly, I think the goalposts approach and the milestones have
a lot of good things. But many of them put you on a plan, you
know, how well you are doing as you move along the plan, but
also the goal line doesn't shift. And then the next year, you
may reevaluate the exact form of the goal line by technology
changes and requirements change.
But I think having that each time has been a very, very
good thing.
Mr. Upton. Dr. Browne?
Mr. Browne. I would agree with that. I think there's one
other point that I think we are all pushing for, having
security viewed in an integrated sense with our business much
like we've done with safety, so that from the top down to the
person, you know, on the lowest level of the laboratory out
handling the material sees the whole picture of security
integrated with their responsibilities for doing their job.
That's how it works for safety.
The goalposts memo is a way to help us get there. The way I
see it, it's a very focused opportunity for us to really fix
things and then move into this more integrated security
management approach.
Mr. Upton. Dr. Robinson?
Mr. Robinson. Yes, as I said in my statement, only doing
inspections is not a sufficient route to really get security to
the level it needs to be. You have got to take a process to
build in the security in all that is done, or you just continue
finding things, fixing and finding those.
Preventive activities to try and maintain the security at a
higher level is the direction we want to go.
But I think it has been a useful exercise. We do push back
if we disagree with particular findings; but others, we say,
yes, we see there's a problem, and any time we find a problem
in security, you can count on us both to be concerned and to
fix it.
Mr. Upton. Dr. Weigand, you indicated in your testimony
that you thought that there were adequate levels of funding
throughout this year, I presume you mean calendar year, though
maybe it was fiscal, but calendar year to achieve the goals in
the goalposts exercise.
Where are we for funding to make sure that that same type
of process is continued next year?
Mr. Weigand. To achieve the goalposts, I did receive a memo
from each one of the directors. It does go across a fiscal year
boundary, so----
Mr. Upton. So it goes into the end of September of next
year?
Mr. Weigand. I expect their commitment to find the dollars
to meet that, meet that level of activity that achieves a
``satisfactory.''
I will caveat this with one thing, though. My tenure in
this position has come during a period of time in which we're
trying to work a very challenging nuclear deterrence problem--
maintain the safety, reliability, and performance of the
nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. It also is coming
under a period of time in which we have seen several things,
like our safety program getting sort of on track, that had been
off track; our construction programs getting on track, some of
which have been off track; and security getting on track after
being off track.
And one of the decisions I made was that I really needed to
have a solid infrastructure to build a national program that
would serve the deterrence issue. The plant has to be open, the
facilities have to be open, they have to be safe, they have to
be reliable, they have to be guarded appropriately.
The secrets need to be protected because shutdowns caused
by lab lapses in security costs the program grievously. A 2-
week shutdown of the system is not a 2-week shutdown. It is 2
weeks of downtime on the computers, another couple of weeks
bringing them back up, another couple of weeks getting them
loaded with the appropriate data and the researchers back on
them. That is very costly to the program.
So I have asked these gentlemen to take the money out of
the program because I need the infrastructure. If we continue
to do it only on that basis, if we are not allowed to step back
and say, what is the impact now of finding that we have
increased requirements in security and so forth, we could do
harm to the program. And I would not like to see that.
I don't believe we've done harm to the program at this
point in time.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Robinson, the chairman was asking some questions about
the goalposts memo, and you said some of the things you do and
``others we push back.'' what do you mean by ``push back''?
Mr. Robinson. You, this morning, made a reference about
passwords for security and that you would have expected a
laboratory like Sandia have to have passwords on security.
Indeed, sir, we do; we always have. The narrow finding was a
question of whether or not our unclassified--I stress our
unclassified; neither our restricted information network nor or
third network, our security networks were in question, but our
unclassified network. Their investigators had been able to
penetrate and find some passwords that appeared to be easily
broken, not that we did not have a password system in place.
It's those kinds of things that we try and dig into and use
a lot more care in the description of; and if we think a
finding is not appropriate, we say they're not appropriate. In
the cyber security area there is still room for doubt as to
what can be done.
Mr. Stupak. What do you mean by ``push back'' then? You
just don't do it?
Mr. Robinson. No, we debate with them about what is
appropriate.
For example, Sandia was the first laboratory to have a fire
wall. Our colleagues at Los Alamos had installed a new fire
wall and they suggested our fire wall should be changed to be
as good as theirs. We said we would not unless we could find a
U.S.-built fire wall. And that's the kind of debate I would
call ``push back.''
Mr. Stupak. How long did it take----
Mr. Robinson. In the last 2 months we have been able to
find and develop a supplier on our own of a fire wall.
Mr. Stupak. You don't have a fire wall yet?
Mr. Robinson. Of course, we have had a fire wall.
Mr. Stupak. For how long?
Mr. Robinson. We have had a fire wall for 10 years. We have
changed it three times in that period. The latest change that
was proposed, we pushed back against making another change
until we could get a U.S.-built fire wall. And that's the kind
of push-back activity----
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Weigand, is that accurate?
Mr. Weigand. I don't disagree with what Dr. Robinson is
saying. I can't speak for him, but there are a number of things
that we negotiate on.
I would like to see us only negotiate on time. We don't
negotiate on policy with the laboratories. The policy is very
clear. It is sometimes the implementation of the policy that is
not. And I don't want to get to wild examples, but in certain
select areas, passwords may not have been on every single
system at one given time. This may have been a small section of
a restricted area.
But the policy is very clear on passwords today and the
policy is very clear on understanding how we implement
passwords, and I think the laboratories are implementing the
policy.
Mr. Stupak. I think today the policy is very clear on
passwords, but it hasn't been in the past.
Mr. Weigand. That may very well be true. I can't comment
too extensively on the policy of the past.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Robinson, other than passwords, is there
anything else you would push back?
Mr. Robinson. There is one other set of discussions and
this involves a particular type of storage repository for
classified data, and here there was a difference between two
parts of the Department of Energy over what was acceptable and
what was not acceptable. And those, we suggest, need to be
resolved before we can act on them as to what is an acceptable
repository and what is not.
Mr. Stupak. Ms. Stone, I know you do a lot of these
investigations for Mr. Podonsky. Would you agree with that on
passwords and on the storage classification and
unclassification?
Ms. Stone. What specifically are you asking me about, the
push-back?
Mr. Stupak. The push-back.
Ms. Stone. Sometimes we do encounter push-back during our
inspections. From an inspection perspective, it is important
that we collect the information and validate the facts. Our
validation process is very rigorous where we sit down with
points of contact--let's say we were inspecting one of the
laboratories, it would be the laboratory representatives, the
operations office representatives, and sometimes even Dr.
Weigand's folks from defense programs would be out observing an
inspection activity.
But it's important for us to be able to present our case
and show the facts. And then whether there is push-back or not,
provided we are correct on our facts, we move forward with that
finding.
Mr. Stupak. After you present your case, do they ever
refuse to carry out the recommendation?
Ms. Stone. We have not, during the period of time since we
have worked for the Secretary, had the case where they have
said----
Mr. Stupak. Right, prior to that time. This is all new that
the Secretary put in prior to that?
Ms. Stone. Before we worked for the Secretary, beginning in
May of this year, many times. There were times where--for
example, the classified parts finding that we talked a lot
about this morning was one that had not been resolved.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Well, let me ask all of you then, do you
think the directives by the Secretary, Secretary Richardson,
reviewed by Mr. Podonsky, and the integrated security
management system set up by Mr. Weigand have improved security
at your labs, Dr. Robinson?
Mr. Robinson. I believe they have, yes.
Mr. Stupak. How about you, Dr. Tarter.
Mr. Tarter. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. Dr. Browne?
Mr. Browne. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. Would it be fair to say, based upon past
history, that these steps were long overdue at the weapons
laboratory?
Mr. Robinson. I would prefer to say that security has had
highs and lows over time, as I believe any human activity does.
A lot of it is change in focus. I believe during the nineties,
as I said in my written statement, the focus was not on
security in the early part of the nineties following the cold
war. It was very much on will there still be a nuclear weapons
program? What will we be able to afford as the budget was
reduced in half?
Those activities came higher and, yes, there were some
lapses in focus on security during that time. So we are not
always at 100 percent, though certainly our desire is to be
there.
Mr. Stupak. So it is fair to say, then, these steps were
probably overdue then, right? No?
Mr. Robinson. I certainly am not opposed to them at all.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Ms. Stone, do you think they were
overdue, the steps integrated by Secretary Richardson? I mean,
you do the investigations, right?
Ms. Stone. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Dr. Browne, did you and the University of
California favor the creation of the new Nuclear Security
Administration within the Department of Energy?
Mr. Browne. We did not take a position on it. Since we are
a contractor to the government, our opinion was that that would
be decided and we would abide by the law.
Mr. Stupak. Well, did anyone from the University of
California ever contact Members of Congress about this
reorganization?
Mr. Browne. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Stupak. No? No. Under this new agency, there will be no
independent oversight of laboratory security or health and
safety in environmental programs. Mr. Podonsky's group won't be
looking at your security; nor will General Habiger. Mr. Weigand
won't have any authority to make changes or run his integrated
security management group.
Nothing this committee has ever seen indicates that the
laboratories will be responsive on any of these issues
regarding the strong and continuing oversight from DOE. Even
then the labs have managed to avoid making changes until forced
to do so by some crisis.
Who do you think will play this role in this new agency of
enforcing to make sure that changes are being made?
Mr. Browne. I think we don't know how this is going to be
implemented yet. We haven't seen an implementation plan.
I believe, if my two colleagues would probably not disagree
with this, our expectation is that there would continue to be
independent oversight. We don't see that as a problem. We think
that Mr. Podonsky's function is a very valuable function for
both us and the government.
Mr. Robinson. I would respond that there is a much larger
history that we haven't discussed of steps the laboratories
take to improve security, safety, all of our work, without
being forced to do so. But I think there has been no decision
as to how oversight would be done by the new agency. At least
it hasn't been communicated to me.
Mr. Stupak. Can you provide us those things you have done
without oversight as far as security and safety? I would really
be interested in seeing that.
Mr. Robinson. How many would you like? It is likely to be a
very large volume.
Mr. Stupak. Well, I can go all the way back to 1978 and
start bringing in documentation when Mr. Dingell chaired the
Commerce Committee about all the pressure we had to put on the
labs to try to tighten security. Even during the heightened
investigation we have here, there were letters from Democrats
and Republicans on both sides of this, trying to ask and trying
to get you to just do what the GAO would recommend, and they
weren't done. I don't know if there was a pushback attitude or
whatever happened, but it just never happened. And then we have
this major incident here in the last year. And quite frankly,
when we sit on this side of the bench, we don't know who to
trust to do anything on their own, if the labs are going to do
it properly.
There is this culture out there and there is no
accountability and responsibility and we are very concerned
about it. So I would be happy to see your list and I will be
happy to provide mine.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you.
Earlier I asked our DOE witnesses whether they wanted to
register an objection to what the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board said.
They described DOE as a place with ``a dysfunctional
management structure and a culture that only occasionally gave
proper credence to the need for rigorous security and
counterintelligence programs at the weapons labs.''
Does anybody on this panel want to register a disagreement
with that statement? Dr. Robinson?
Mr. Robinson. I think there have been serious problems in
the Department of Energy management. We have communicated those
to past Secretaries. Basically, when everyone is in charge no
one is in charge, and there was not an effective structure
within the Department to bring differences of opinion within
the Department itself to resolution.
And sitting where we were as laboratories, we seem to be
blowing with the winds of dispute between different parts of
the Department on any given day.
I believe that is consistent with the studies of the Galvin
report and not out of step with the report of the Rudman
Commission.
Mr. Cox. The Rudman Commission, the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, also described the laboratories as
possessing science at its best and security at its worst.
Does anybody want to register an objection to that
characterization? That was, in fact, as you know, on the cover
of their report.
Mr. Tarter. I think we could have a long discussion about
aspects of that. I think--I think there are--as you have heard,
I think there are a number of security issues. I think--some of
the serious ones, I think, are still being, as the Rudman
report captured, the actual magnitude of some of the possible
security losses are still trying to be understood.
I think the part I would disagree with, to the degree a
single phrase captures it, I do not think, and I said that
before this committee previously, that the vast majority of
laboratory employees--and I can't give you a number of whether
it is 95 percent or 99 percent of those who had access to
national security data--I do not think--I think that personal
security with which they guarded the information they had, I
think they always considered one of their highest
responsibilities. And so I think to the degree it captured a
system characterization, we could debate that. To the degree it
captured the opinion and perspective of the employees, I do not
think it was an accurate characterization of how employees felt
about guarding the security of the information they had.
Mr. Cox. So you would prefer that we took this as a failure
of management rather than of the employees?
Mr. Tarter. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cox. I think we have the right witnesses.
Mr. Browne. I would agree with that, Mr. Cox, because the
people--remember, the ones that were being colored with this
same brush are the people that created the information that we
are protecting. If anyone is going to really want to protect
it, it is the people who create it. That was a real blow to
them that they were being accused essentially of not caring
about the information that they had devoted their lives to
creating to help our country. That was really very damaging to
morale.
Mr. Cox. Now, on the preceding panel, Mr. Podonsky
described to us the continuing problems at the laboratories
with the protection of classified weapons parts.
He mentioned that at Los Alamos he brought this to the
attention of the laboratory in 1994; that Los Alamos received
clear direction to fix this problem again in 1995 from both the
Department of Energy and its field office in that year; again
in 1996; and that in 1997, when he, Mr. Podonsky returned to
review the progress that had been made on fixing security
problems with classified weapons parts, he found that the
situation, quote, remains essentially unchanged since 1994.
Why are we here today with these same problems, hearing
that now the problem is going to be fixed?
Mr. Browne. Well, the problem is fixed today.
Mr. Cox. The previous panel, as you were here and listened
to, said it was not fixed.
Mr. Browne. Mr. Podonsky said it is fixed. We got a
satisfactory in the protection of our classified parts at Los
Alamos.
Mr. Cox. Well, when I asked him that question this morning,
he said that in particular where it came to the inventory of
parts, that it was on the way to being fixed but it was not
fixed.
Mr. Browne. I believe we did receive a satisfactory rating
on the protection of classified parts.
Mr. Cox. You were here for that testimony, were you not?
Mr. Browne. Yes.
Mr. Cox. Am I not correct that that is what Mr. Podonsky
told me this morning under oath?
Mr. Browne. I don't remember the details of what he said.
Maybe Ms. Stone could clarify that statement. But I thought
when he was talking about classified parts at Los Alamos that
it was a progress in the past. We made significant improvements
and were judged by the most recent audit to be satisfactory.
That doesn't mean there aren't areas for improvement. I
certainly agree that there are areas for improvement.
Mr. Cox. Let's let the record speak for itself on the
respective representations of Dr. Browne as the head of the lab
and Mr. Podonsky as the inspector.
Mr. Browne. Okay.
Ms. Stone. May I interrupt?
Mr. Cox. Sure.
Ms. Stone. I work for Glenn Podonsky. Just to clarify
Glenn's point on this, one of the things that we have to
remember about these fixes to these problems is that many of
the sites are implementing what they call compensatory
measures. The compensatory measures are normally a very
resource-intensive and very high-cost, short-term fix, kind of
a Band-Aid that's put on things while you work to a longer-term
solution for the problem.
I think we are getting into somewhat of a difference in
terminology where, yes, we found the program to be satisfactory
but there still remains some things to be done before those
longer-term items are actually fully implemented.
Mr. Browne. The longer-term items would require line item
construction of vaults and vaulted rooms, and those that are
multiyear-type of activities. In the meantime, we have
increased the number of protective forces by about 25 percent,
and we have increased the time frequency of patrols to make
sure this material is guarded appropriately. It is behind a
fence and it is locked in buildings. It is just not vaulted
buildings like you would prefer to have for such parts.
Mr. Cox. So stipulating, if we might, to the essential
accuracy of what Ms. Stone has just told us, and if that
bridges the gap between Mr. Podonsky and yourself----
Mr. Browne. Correct.
Mr. Cox. [continuing] as to where we are today in October
1999, why did it take until now, inasmuch as this iterative
process had Mr. Podonsky personally going back to Los Alamos
between 1994 and 1997 on an annual basis and finding nothing
happened?
Mr. Browne. Although I wasn't in charge until----
Mr. Cox. I know you have only been there 2 years.
Mr. Browne. Let me tell you what I know about the period;
what I understand, what I have been told, is there were within
the Department disagreements about how best to fix this.
Mr. Podonsky is an oversight function. He makes excellent
recommendations on how to improve things. Those resources that
have to be applied to the problem sometimes--and I think this
was in this case a discussion within the Department about how
best to solve this problem. Now, you might ask the question,
why didn't Los Alamos just go out and fix it? Because we have
been asked that question many times during this hearing. And
when you are talking about millions of dollars of commitment of
resources, we really believe it is important for a contractor
like ourselves to have some direct guidance from the government
to spend that level of resources.
We are talking about $2.5 million or $3 million a year just
in incremental costs for the protective forces. So during that
time period it is my understanding that there was a lack of
agreement on how best to fix the problems that were identified
by Mr. Podonsky.
Mr. Cox. Dr. Robinson, you look as if you want to respond
also.
Mr. Robinson. The characterization of security at its worst
is a broad statement and covers a lot of areas. I would not
agree that all of our security would fit such a categorization.
I am confident some of the areas of our security are, at
its best, not only best in DOE but against any other part of
the government. And so I think you have to be careful to
dissect exactly what is being discussed. With the area of these
investigations, our philosophy in security has always been a
layered set of protections; that if one area fails, you now
have additional areas that would serve as protection and you
are trying to stack them up so that you never get a case of all
systems failing.
And when we are judged, the things that are reported are
problems in a particular layer, not a failure of all of the
layers, and that's very important to focus on.
Mr. Cox. Dr. Tarter, I wonder if I might ask you about the
earlier testimony that we had from Mr. Podonsky concerning the
reduction almost by half in the guard force at Superblock.
Mr. Tarter. Right. If I need to get precise dates, I either
would like to do them for the record or from the people in back
of me, and Dr. Turner might wish to comment on this also, but
during a period in the nineties, and again I am not going to
be--let me go ahead and do the statement and then----
Mr. Cox. Well, at least according to Mr. Podonsky, from
1995----
Mr. Tarter. That's correct.
Mr. Cox. [continuing] to 1997, the guard force for----
Mr. Tarter. Was reduced.
Mr. Cox. [continuing] for Superblock was reduced by almost
half?
Mr. Tarter. Let me give the general sense and then perhaps
the--one of the things we did with the agreement at the time,
at least of the Department of Energy operations offices, was to
use local law enforcement as a surge force to handle much of
the special response team actions, and that was driven by the
fact that we thought we could do the job and we reached an
agreement to do the job at a reduced cost by bringing in, in
our particular area, the Alameda County Sheriff's Department
who were trained with us to do the response.
So we believed that that was the appropriate way to meet
the threat, as we understood it, to the Superblock at that
time.
We also, I think, and again I need more details from the
people in direct charge, but I think we kept the security high
at the Superblock and we balanced the area with people in the
local law enforcement, again in a surge capacity in the case of
an incident.
Much of the addition has been--recently has been that, in
fact, it was viewed as no longer an adequate response set of
measures and therefore we began some time ago to rehire our own
special response team personnel to make them always there
onsite. Dr. Turner.
Mr. Cox. Is that because the threat has changed between now
and 1997?
Mr. Turner. Could I just add, I think it is because the
Department strategy has changed. The point is that in the 1995/
1996 timeframe, the Department's strategy was containment. And
so in that, using the available forces onsite, as well as the
local law enforcement, we were able to accomplish that mission.
Then the strategy changed to recapture recovery. And so we
had to--so that--you know, what was sufficient for a
containment strategy was now not sufficient for the new
strategy of recapture recovery.
Subsequently, the strategy has now changed to denial, which
again has, you know--as the strategy changes, then your force
structure, your composition, how they are deployed, your time
lines, all of those things change.
So the laboratory has been working, you know, to
accommodate those changes and bringing on--now they have
brought on significant numbers of new guards. There is going to
be another class that's going to be completed in December.
I think the point--you know, that's--you are only getting
half the story when you get the raw numbers. Those raw
numbers----
Mr. Cox. Just to make sure that we all understand on the
panel, if you go from containment to recapture to denial, you
are steadily increasing your security; is that right?
Mr. Turner. Absolutely.
Mr. Cox. So what you are saying is that our standards in
1999 are higher than our standards were in 1997?
Mr. Turner. Absolutely. So that the numbers of people----
Mr. Cox. Why is that? Is that because the real world threat
is different in 1999 than it was in 1997? What we are talking
about at Superblock is protecting the actual nuclear materials,
right?
Mr. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Cox. So this is the most significant security function
you have got?
Mr. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Cox. Do we think that the nuclear materials are subject
to different levels of threat in 1999 than they were in 1997?
Mr. Turner. Well, frankly, you know, we don't participate
directly in developing the design basis threat.
Mr. Cox. All right. So somebody around here, we don't know
who, is changing their assessment of just how much security we
need for the nuclear weapons material and it was higher in 1995
than it was in 1997 and now it is higher in 1999 than it was in
1997.
Mr. Turner. Okay. It was higher in 1997 than it was in
1995, and it is higher again in 1999.
Mr. Cox. No, no, no, no, that's not what we heard this
morning. What we heard was that between 1995 and 1997, we
actually reduced significantly the guard force.
Mr. Turner. Because the strategy then was containment.
Mr. Cox. I understand. We had a different strategy, but we
also had less security.
Mr. Turner. We had--we had adequate security to meet that
strategy, to meet that threat. And then as the threat and the
strategy----
Mr. Cox. The threat is a constant?
Mr. Turner. No, the threat is not a constant.
Mr. Tarter. Let me give you an example, sir.
Mr. Cox. I invited somebody to tell me that the threat was
different in 1997 than 1999. Was the threat different in 1997
than 1999?
Mr. Robinson. Yes.
Mr. Cox. Why?
Mr. Robinson. But we need to give you a classified answer.
Mr. Cox. All right. Let's do it.
Mr. Upton. We have to vote on it.
Mr. Cox. Didn't we vote earlier that we could now go on to
classified?
Mr. Upton. We did not have 10 members here so we did not do
that.
Mr. Cox. I see.
Mr. Upton. We could get it in writing.
Mr. Tarter. This is not--the direct answer to your
question, as Paul said, we would have to do that in a closed
session. But I think General Habiger this morning mentioned an
issue which he perceived to be a changing threat for the
future, which we have not yet----
Mr. Cox. I understand that.
Mr. Tarter. But the chemical and biological issues, I
think, are new and whether we put personnel in place to train
personnel in those responses, I think, is an ongoing issue, and
that is a change.
Mr. Turner. I think, too, I think it is important to
recognize that in security you have an adversary that grows
stronger every day, and so your capability cannot just be
static.
Mr. Cox. Well, that's why I am particularly interested in
the diminution, the reduction in the force between 1995 and
1997. The guard force was cut by almost half.
Ms. Stone, do you want to comment on this?
Ms. Stone. The design basis threat is a classified
document, but is reassessed on an annual basis. From an
independent oversight perspective, we see the changes in the
strategy really being driven by the changes in material inside
those areas as opposed--relying more significantly than the
changes to the threat.
Yes, there have been some changes in the threat from year
to year, but our perspective is that it is the actual, you
know, either movement of material from one site to another that
really drive those significant changes in strategy.
Mr. Cox. Now, when I asked Mr. Podonsky earlier in the day
whether he thought that it was wise to make the changes between
1995 and 1997 that were made, he said, no, he didn't think it
was wise at all.
Is that your sense as well?
Ms. Stone. Yes.
Mr. Cox. And why?
Ms. Stone. To be able to put that much reliance on local
law enforcement that really has a limited understanding of DOE,
that has a limited amount of abilities, is really expecting a
lot of these people that do not have responsibility for the
material themselves.
Mr. Cox. But now what we saw in the foreign launch
situation was that the Department of Defense, not the
Department of Energy, decided to rely upon rent-a-cops, as it
happened, private security guards that were hired not by the
Department of Defense but by the private commercial satellite
manufacturers, who told us in our congressional investigations
that security was--one of them said security was ninth on our
list of priorities.
So we had Pinkerton guards providing what turned out to be
wholly inadequate coverage of our national security mission,
and here we are relying upon the Alameda County Sheriff's
Department compensate for the diminution in the guard force
after 1995.
Isn't that essentially what we are talking about?
Ms. Stone. Right. It wasn't solely relying on the Alameda
County Sheriff's Department; it was supplemented by. So there
were still some number.
Mr. Cox. Did the sheriff's department move people over to
the labs?
Ms. Stone. No.
Mr. Turner. No, but they were----
Mr. Cox. How long would it take them to get there?
Mr. Mortensen. May I answer that?
Mr. Cox. Let me ask Ms. Stone.
Ms. Stone. It took more time than I think folks imagined
for them to get there, or had hoped for them to get there, and
that's probably all I should really say in this forum.
Mr. Cox. All right. Well, I do think we need to get answers
in another setting.
Dr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Could I just add, how this unfolded was that
there was some concern about whether the--first of all, this is
a swat team from the Alameda County Sheriff's so this isn't
just any old--I mean, these aren't traffic cops or people
behind a desk. And there was some concern about whether they
could meet the time lines or not. And so what was agreed to by
Defense Programs, by the field and by headquarters, was that we
would run some performance tests back in the 1997 timeframe and
we would live by the results of those tests.
As a result of those performance tests, it was agreed that
as--you know, with the new strategy and with the response times
that the swat team could answer, that it was not adequate; and
we moved immediately to, again, abide by the commitment to--to
abide by those results and move immediately to hire more
guards.
Mr. Cox. All right. I think the lights are off altogether,
so I don't know whether I have a green light or a red light or
an amber light, but I am getting the sense that I am stretching
the limits of goodwill here from the chairman to continue
asking questions.
What I asked the earlier panel is whether or not they would
be willing to provide responses to the committee's follow-up
questions, and I hope that we will be able to do that as well,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. We will.
Mr. Cox. Let me just say in conclusion--because we have had
a chance in other fora to, most of us, to talk about these
issues before--that I think you are right as leaders of your
organizations to parse out the responsibilities of management
on the one hand and the employees of the labs on the other
hand.
I don't think there is any question at all that we have the
best and the brightest at our labs. We want to keep recruiting
them and we want to continue to retain them. And I think
everybody in Congress, on both sides of the aisle, counts
themselves as fans of the laboratories and their important
national security and other national missions.
So what we are trying to do here is necessarily accomplish
our security objective at the same time as we try to keep
people happy in the organization, because security is a central
function, if not the central function of our national
laboratories.
It is unfortunate that over a period of so many years,
these questions have not only gone unaddressed but in some
cases have proliferated, and we have more problems rather than
fewer; and it is especially unfortunate that as you sit here
today and tell us that things are going to be okay, and we have
every reason to believe you and we want to believe you, that we
have a track record of people telling us in the past that
things were going to be okay when they turned out not to be.
So there's a credibility problem for the Department of
Energy and derivatively for the laboratories that we have to
deal with. And I think that to the extent that management takes
this on its own shoulders and says that, maybe in Dr. Browne's
case, ``I wasn't there but it is still my responsibility,'' but
for everybody else here, ``We were there and things should not
have been run this way and we are going to change it because it
is unacceptable,'' I think that will give us a high level of
confidence.
We know that you need to be defensive about attacks on the
laboratories' integrity, but Congress isn't interested in
attacking the integrity of the laboratories. We are interested
in ensuring that there is security at the laboratories. And I
think when we listen to Ed Curran or when we hear General
Habiger tell us this morning that you all received an
appropriate wake-up call this past year with the uncovering of
internal security problems in the publication of both the Cox
and Rudman reports, and when he says that your Department of
Energy has an historical track record of security deficiencies,
for that purpose the labs have to own up to the fact that you
are all part of the Department of Energy, too. And I understand
that if we reorganize the Department of Energy and get security
as a central focus, an exclusive focus in a new NNSA, that that
might make your jobs easier and make your life better and that
the dysfunction within DOE itself, external to the labs, has
made your jobs unnecessarily difficult in the past.
It is also true, though, that you are very important
national leaders and so we look to you folks to fix these
problems directly, even if DOE is actually in your way, as has
obviously been the case many times in the past.
So we are on your side. We are trying to make sure the job
gets done, because it hasn't been done in the past, and we
certainly hope we are not back here again next year.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Cox.
I want to say we appreciate your work, particularly as co-
chair with Mr. Dicks, on bringing this to light. This is not an
easy topic, and for most of us it doesn't involve things in our
own district. We don't have a background in this.
Mr. Stupak, I know, does have a law enforcement background,
but this is new ground for a lot of us, and we appreciate your
testimony. We appreciate your commitment. We want to make sure,
absolutely sure, that the comfort level that all of us on this
committee have is that your job--that you have not only the
sufficient resources but you are doing the necessary job to
make sure that these labs are run well and they are secure, and
we appreciate the members that were here present. We will
probably send some questions on to you for you to respond to.
We also appreciate the staff that have walked us through a
number of questions and have done their homework. This is an
issue that is not going to go away and we want to make sure,
though the horse may be out of the barn in some cases, we want
to make sure that that door is locked and it will not happen
again.
For that reason, I think the chances are pretty likely that
we will see a delegation from this subcommittee visit some of
your labs early next year, and we appreciate the assistance and
constructive views that you have had and look forward to that
as the days unfold.
So with that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you very
much.
[Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.064
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.068
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.069
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.071
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.072
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.073
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.074
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.075
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.076
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.077
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.078
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.079
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.080
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.081
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.082
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.083
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.084
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.085
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.086
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.087
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.088
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.089
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.090
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.091
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.092
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.093
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.094
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.095
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.096
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.097
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.098
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.099
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.100
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.101
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.102
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.103
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.104
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.105
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.106
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.107
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.108
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.109
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.110
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.111
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.112
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.113
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.114
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.115
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.116
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.117
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.118
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.119
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.120
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.121
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.122
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.123
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.124
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.125
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.126
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.127
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.128
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.129
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.130
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.131
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.132
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.133
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.134
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.135
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]61036.136