<DOC>
[107 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:76801.wais]
S. Hrg. 107-207
RESPONDING TO HOMELAND THREATS: IS OUR GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED FOR THE
CHALLENGE?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 21, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Holly A. Idelson, Counsel
Michael L. Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Hannah S. Sistare, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Robert J. Shea, Minority Counsel
Jana C. Sinclair, Associate Counsel to the Minority
Jayson P. Roehl, Minority Professional Staff Member
John T. Daggett, Minority Professional Staff Member
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Thompson............................................. 4
Senator Cleland.............................................. 6
Prepared statements:
Senator Akaka................................................ 37
Senator Voinovich............................................ 38
WITNESSES
Thursday, September 21, 2001
Hon. Warren B. Rudman, Co-Chair, U.S. Commission on National
Security/21st Century.......................................... 6
Hon. Gary Hart, Co-Chair, U.S. Commission on National Security/
21st Century................................................... 10
Hon. James S. Gilmore, III, Governor of the Commonwealth of
Virginia and Chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess the
Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction.................................... 12
Hon. L. Paul Bremer, III, Former Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-
terrorism, U.S. Department of State and Member, Advisory Panel
to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.......................... 15
Hon. David M. Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. General
Accounting Office.............................................. 17
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Bremer, Hon. L. Paul, III:
Testimony.................................................... 15
Gilmore, Hon. James S., III:
Testimony.................................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Hart, Hon. Gary:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Rudman, Hon. Warren B.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Walker, Hon. David M.:
Testimony.................................................... 17
Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 53
Appendix
New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, Major
Themes and Implications, The Phase I Report on the Emerging
Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st
Century, by the United States Commission on National Security/
21st Century, September 15, 1999............................... 65
Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert For Preserving Security
and Promoting Freedom, The Phase II Report on a U.S. National
Security Strategy for the 21st Century, by the United States
Commission on National Security/21st Century, April 15, 2000... 76
Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase
III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century, by the United States Commission on National Security/
21st Century, January 31, 2001................................. 90
RESPONDING TO HOMELAND THREATS: IS OUR GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED FOR THE
CHALLENGE?
----------
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Cleland, and Thompson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. I
apologize to witnesses and to everyone in the room that we had
to delay the hearing because there were two votes on the floor
of the Senate. If this does not sound, to two of our witnesses,
Senators Rudman and Hart, like deja vu all over again, I would
be surprised, but I welcome all of you here this morning.
This morning, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
will be considering a question of whether the Federal
Government, and specifically the Executive Branch, is
adequately organized to meet threats to the security of the
American people in the 50 American States. Today's hearing
complements the series of hearings that the Committee has been
conducting on protection of the Nation's critical
infrastructure. It is, also, of course, a response to the
terrible attacks on America that occurred on September 11.
My personal response to those attacks has probably been
like the response of most other Americans, most other members
of Congress. I have gone from shock to anger to remorse to
determination that we must, together, do everything we can to
make as certain as possible that nothing like what happened on
September 11 ever happens again. The nature, scale, and
motivation of the attacks were unprecedented and so must be our
response.
This Governmental Affairs Committee is primarily an
oversight and investigative Committee. What we must now attempt
to understand is how this violation of our Nation was possible.
In particular, we must ask the difficult question of whether
our government did enough to protect its citizens. With the
horrifying images of devastation at the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania still fresh in our minds, the
answer to that question must, sadly, be no.
The purpose of these hearings, in one sense, is to make
sure that we never have to give that answer to that kind of
question again. After the attacks, the people who are our
government did all that was humanly possible to respond. We owe
a tremendous debt of gratitude to the firefighters and police
whose courageous efforts saved countless lives at the cost of
so many of their own, to the EMT personnel, and doctors, and
nurses who administered aid to the injured and dying, to the
public servants who manned the crisis support machinery at all
levels of government, managing priorities, handling logistics
and making key services of relief and rescue available, to
members of the military who were deployed to guard against
further loss of life, to elected leaders who brought a sense of
hope, unity, and purpose to a Nation stunned by this tragedy,
including, most recently, the magnificent statement of American
principles and purpose that President Bush delivered to the
Congress, to the Nation, and indeed to the world last night.
Our primary purpose here this morning is not to assign
blame, it is to prevent future attacks. Even before last week's
tragic attacks, we had important warnings that our government
was not as well-prepared to meet these new threats to our
security to the American homeland as it should have been. For
that, we can thank the dedicated efforts of at least two
important commissions that recently looked at this issue: The
U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, also
known as the Hart-Rudman Commission; and the Advisory Panel to
Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction referred to as the Gilmore
Commission, which have identified serious deficiencies in our
Nation's efforts to prepare for, respond to, and prevent
terrorist acts.
And, I am proud to say, we can also thank our own General
Accounting Office, whose oversight committee this is and whose
Comptroller, David Walker, will testify this morning. GAO has
given us repeated warnings that are relevant to our agenda this
morning.
The chief members of the two panels that I referred to are
with us today: Senator Hart, Senator Rudman, Governor Gilmore,
and Ambassador Bremer. I should note that Ambassador Bremer was
also chair of another commission, the National Commission on
Terrorism that, in some respects, laid the foundation for the
work that has followed.
Though they differ in their approach and recommendations, I
do see agreement between the Hart-Rudman and Gilmore
Commissions on three key points: First, they concluded that
there was a growing threat of homeland attack and how painfully
accurate they have now been proven to be; second, that the
Nation lacked a clear strategy to prevent and protect against
these threats; and, third, that responsibility for homeland
security was spread among too many agencies without sufficient
coordination.
In fact, current responsibility for addressing terrorism
and other homeland threats is diffused throughout all levels of
government--local, State, and Federal. At the Federal level,
coordination, operational planning, and implementation are
divided and subdivided among at least 40 agencies, bureaus, and
offices which spend over $11 billion a year. Both commissions
criticize this state of organization and offered
recommendations to improve homeland security.
The Hart-Rudman Commission proposed the establishment of a
National Homeland Security Agency, an independent agency whose
director would be a member of the President's Cabinet. The
Agency would be responsible for coordinating an array of
Federal activities related to homeland security. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency, the Coast Guard, the Customs
Service, the Border Patrol, and other entities that are
relevant here would be transferred to the new organization,
which would be functionally organized around prevention,
protection of critical infrastructure, and emergency
preparedness and response.
The Gilmore Commission went in a different direction,
recommending the creation of a National Office for Combatting
Terrorism. This new White House office would report directly to
the President and would be responsible for formulating
antiterrorism strategy. It would also coordinate terrorism
policy and have some influence over national budget allocations
for antiterrorism activities.
I must say that I come to this hearing favoring the Hart-
Rudman approach, but I want to hear from all sides in this
important discussion. I favor the Hart-Rudman approach because
it seems to me that creating a Homeland Security Agency has
special merit. If you want to get a job done, there is no
substitute for having an organization with a budget and line,
as opposed to advisory authority. Because in such a context,
real people are responsible and accountable for making
decisions and taking the necessary and appropriate action.
Within an executive agency, all of the policy, budget, and
programmatic activities can be integrated and focused toward
very specific programs and goals.
Now, as we all know, last night a funny and good thing
happened on the way to this hearing about a National Homeland
Security Agency. President Bush, in fact, endorsed such an
idea. In fact, he went beyond that and, by Executive Order,
created a National Homeland Security Agency with Governor Ridge
of Pennsylvania as its designated head with cabinet status.
This morning it is not clear what the contours, makeup and
powers of that agency will be. I certainly look forward to
having this Committee meet with Governor Ridge and others in
the administration to discuss this proposal, but I feel very
strongly, though I greet President Bush's action last night as
a welcome and significant first step toward greater homeland
protection, that Congress needs to pass a law, after deliberate
consideration, to make this Homeland Security Agency permanent
because it is clear that we crossed a bridge on September 11,
and in a way that has not been true for most of our history for
the future as far as we can see. We are going to have to be
prepared to protect the American people as they live and work
in the 50 United States.
In the history of America's Government, major
organizational changes have occurred during times of crisis.
General Marshall transformed what was a small peacetime Army in
1939 into the planet's most powerful military force by 1945,
helping to bring victory in World War II.
President Truman's realignment of our national security
infrastructure in 1947 helped us successfully prosecute the
Cold War. More recently, the sweeping defense reorganization
mandated by the Goldwater-Nickles Act of 1986 was an essential
factor in helping us win the Gulf War just 5 years later.
Similarly bold organizational change is demanded of us now,
given the events of September 11. This Committee can lead the
Congress to that change, and I hope and believe that we will.
I am very pleased to be working shoulder-to-shoulder on
these critical questions of national security with my friend
from Tennessee, the Committee's Ranking Republican, Senator
Fred Thompson. I am proud to call on him now.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I cannot think
of a more timely hearing than this one or a more important one.
Speaking of coordination or lack thereof, as you know, both
parties have conferences going on right now which will probably
keep some of our people away or some may be coming in a little
bit later. We very well may be discussing some of the issues we
are discussing here. You and I have discussed what Congress
should do, in terms of its organization or reorganization.
I would certainly appreciate our alums here commenting on
whether or not we need a select committee or a different
committee or what we should do about current jurisdiction. As
you know, we have jurisdiction over Capitol Hill, as well as
the Executive Branch. So I am going to leave briefly, and
hopefully come back, if that is satisfactory.
I want to start out by thanking the gentlemen at this
table. I think the whole Nation owes you a debt of gratitude.
You have all been telling us what we needed to hear for a long
time. Our country, and I suppose maybe all democracies which
are not interested in matters of war or aggression or anything
other than enjoying peace and freedom, was a little slow out of
the blocks. We have been very slow out of the blocks here with
regard to something that you have told us should be the
Nation's number one priority. You also told us that it is not a
matter of if we get hit, it is a matter of when we get hit.
This is pretty serious business. You have been steadfast. You
have been voices in the wilderness for the most part.
We get these reports up here. They do not filter up to the
Executive Branch, they do not filter down to the average
person. They show up; we have a hearing; three or four of us
are around; or maybe not. Maybe you get to page 16, in a
report, but nothing really happens, even though we know it is a
different world we live in. We are dealing with different kinds
of people than we ever have before, and we have vulnerabilities
that we have not had before.
We have let our guard down, as other countries have on
other occasions. Other democracies have done so after other
wars. Ours having been the Cold War victory. While we have
enjoyed discussing and consuming our peace dividend, things
have happened around us that we have not responded to. I am
very pleased, especially that the people we work with so
closely on a daily basis, and we inundate them with all of our
little pet ideas sometimes, that GAO has kept a wonderful focus
on all of this.
I read their strategic plan, several months ago, and told
them I thought it was the best document that I had seen. Every
member of Congress ought to be required to read it, and this
was in there. It had to do with a handful of issues that are
important, as most of the things that we deal with up here are
not. Of course, this is No. 1.
I hope that, in terms of Senator Rudman, Senator Hart, and
Mr. Bremer, that we will be able to keep your services somehow,
some way, as we go forward, and continue to enjoy the
contribution that you have made to this because more expertise
reside in you gentleman probably than anywhere else.
I was noticing, with regard to the counterterrorism
organization or lack thereof, staff pulled together some points
here that I think bring it home. who is in charge of these
activities depends on a number of factors, such as the nature
of the incident and the perpetrator. For example, FEMA is the
lead Federal agency in charge of consequence management. The
Federal Bureau of Investigations is the lead agency for crisis
management and for domestic terrorism events. The State
Department is designated as the lead agency for
counterterrorism overseas. The Federal Aviation Administration
is the lead for hijackings, but only after the plane doors have
been closed.
We have had presidential directives which have placed
substantial responsibility within the NSC. With regard to the
announcement last night that the President made, I share your
enthusiasm not only for the move, but for the gentleman who
will be taking this position. Obviously, we need to know more
about what the President has in mind there. I would agree with
you, without having talked to him about it or thought it
through, that we are going to need some legislation. I am not
sure at all that the new person, Governor Ridge, will have the
authority he needs in terms of the reorganization problem that
we have got or the ability to reprioritize budget matters and
things of that nature. So I think we have got to move forward
on it.
One approach would be to put the right tools in the hands
of the President and let him decide what to do and when to do
it. I think it is important that we not tie the President's
hands and decide up here unilaterally, precisely in great
detail, exactly what should and should not be done. I think we
need to work together with the President and take the lessons
put forth by the commissions, the GAO, the Department of
Justice, and FEMA, and apply them.
One way to do this would be to reauthorize the
Reorganization Act, which sunsetted in 1987. That act allowed
expedited consideration for any presidential proposals to
reorganize Federal agencies and would be a foundation upon
which a new and effective strategy for defeating terrorists
could be built. It is just another idea to go along with the
very good ones that you have set forth, Mr. Chairman. So I
think that we are now on the right track, and I think there is
going to be a lot of good come out of this, and I think that
what we are doing here today is a part of that.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Thompson.
Senator Cleland.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND
Senator Cleland. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank
our panelists, especially our dear former colleagues here.
A W.C. Fields' quote comes to mind that we have got to take
the bull by the tail and face the situation. [Laughter.]
I think we have to face the situation that the whole
counterterrorism, the homeland defense issue was very much on
the back burner, uncoordinated, buried deep in the bowels of
the Pentagon and the Justice Department until Tuesday. Now what
do we do? Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our panelists as to
how we move forward.
I do know that we need to coordinate these more than 40
different offices that deal with homeland defense better. I
just wonder how our panelists feel about the President's
decision last night, if they embrace that or not. So I am
looking forward to our panelists, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
Let us go now to Senator Rudman and Senator Hart. I would
say, very briefly, that the two of you proved that there are
ample opportunities for public service after one leaves the
Senate, and the two of you have just done admirably in that
regard.
I think I am just going to go without listing your
credentials. You are both very respected spokespeople on
matters of foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence and have
been leaders for a long time.
Senator Rudman, we are pleased to hear from you now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. WARREN B. RUDMAN, CO-CHAIR, U.S. COMMISSION
ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY
Senator Rudman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Cleland. It is an honor to appear before this Committee
which I served on for my entire service in the Senate, sitting
in this room.
Chairman Lieberman. Welcome home.
Senator Rudman. There are many questions that you have, and
I am going to try to brief and direct in my answers to
summarize on behalf of our commission what we did, and Senator
Hart, of course, will do that as well.
A little background. This commission came about after a
conversation between former Speaker Newt Gingrich and President
William Clinton, in which they commiserated about the fact that
there had been no ongoing study of America's national security
since 1947, which resulted in massive reorganizations of our
entire government. Thus, our commission was established. There
has been some misunderstanding, our commission, as opposed to
the other commissions, did not start out to study terrorism per
se.
This report, which you have seen, covers the entire panoply
of the Federal Government security apparatus: State, Treasury,
trade, education, intelligence, and law enforcement. The
curious thing is that the 14 people--seven Democrats and seven
Republicans--who worked for over 3 years on this, at the
conclusion, unanimously came to the consensus that the single
most important issue facing America was how to deal with
domestic terrorism. So that is why we are here today. It became
Chapter 1 of our report which deals with security, in general.
Our deliberations resulted in something rare in Washington:
A consensus amongst 14 people of divergent political views and
ideologies who came together on the 50 recommendations that are
contained in the report, seven of which deal with what we are
talking about here this morning.
We reached a consensus that an attack on the domestic
homeland was not a question of if, but a question of when, and
we reached the consensus that the Nation was, and is, largely
unprepared to respond here at home to such an attack. More
important, I believe, is that the commission also reached a
consensus on the core elements of a road map to allow the
Nation to move forward, and we were unanimous on that score as
well.
We proposed and still believe that any solution to this
problem must address issues of strategy. It must address issues
of Federal, State, and local organization and cooperation, and
it must address issues of capacity and cooperation. In general,
we said that the United States must replace a fractured ad hoc
approach to homeland security with a sustained focused
approach, emphasize integration of existing agencies and
departments, rather than wholesale invention, and recapitalize
our existing assets and capabilities rather than try to create
redundancy.
Is this plan ambitious? It is, without question. Is it
going to take the patience of the American people? Certainly.
Is it going to require a whole new way of thinking about our
national security? Absolutely. We believe that given the
evidence that we heard--all over the world we heard this
evidence--the history of our government and the resources
available, the best way we could help would be to come up not
with a philosophical approach, but with a series of specific
recommendations for the Executive and Legislative Branches of
government. After all, the charter of this commission, founded
by the Congress in 1998, was to give the incoming
administration in 2001 and the incoming Congress in 2001 a road
map to America's national security. That is what we have tried
to do.
The first step, and I will go through a number of steps, is
for the President of the United States to declare unequivocally
that homeland security is the primary responsibility of our
national strategy, not a peripheral responsibility.
Mr. Chairman, I think that happened last night, and I want
to just depart from the previous prepared remarks, just to give
you a few thoughts on that, which I know you have mentioned,
and Senator Cleland has mentioned you would be interested in.
The President has moved quickly to establish an office of
homeland security. We do not know yet the details of the
office, but would appear to be what is generally called the
czar approach. We have had drug czars and others. Why we have
ever picked that particular name, I am not sure, but that is
the one we tend to use. It is a very good method to bring
attention to a recognized problem. Moreover, it is a very good
way in time of crisis to encourage improved coordination
between disparate agencies which, in normal times, tend to
pursue their own bureaucratic purposes.
We applaud the President's initiative and heartily endorse
Governor Ridge, who is known to all of us. It is a great
choice. For an enduring solution to what we feel certain will
be a long-term problem, we believe the President must move
beyond this White House office and establish a major department
with homeland security, with a seat at the cabinet table, as
its singular mission.
We believe that without budget authority, command
authority, accountability, and responsibility to the Congress
and to the President, nothing in this government ever works
very well, but we applaud this step, and we believe that the
Congress and the President can build on it.
The President should propose, and the Congress should agree
to create a new National Homeland Security Agency. The nucleus
of this agency would be the current Federal Emergency
Management Agency, the nucleus. While retaining its 10 regional
offices, the new agency would have the responsibility for the
nationwide planning and coordination and integration of the
various government activities that now involve homeland
security. I believe there are about 51 of those activities in
various places, and we believe the Director should be a member
of the cabinet and a statutory adviser to the National Security
Council.
Third, the President should propose, and the Congress
should agree, to transfer the Customs Service to the Border
Patrol and the Coast Guard to this new agency. This transfer
would be for common purpose coordination, not bureaucratic
consolidation. Each of these entities would retain their own
distinct identities, structures, and internal operating
procedures. They would just be located in another cabinet
department. If you look at the details of the report, you will
see the logic of why those three agencies, in particular, with
FEMA are to be in one place.
I want to stress that under our plan, each of these three
entities would receive long overdue increases in resources. Let
me just summarize that shortly. We were shocked to hear that
the Customs Service currently has the capacity to inspect only
1 or 2 percent of all shipments received from overseas and our
country. This has to change. We were shocked to learn that the
cutter fleet of America's Coast Guard is older than 39 of the
41 world major naval fleets. That has to change.
We were somewhat disappointed to hear the continuing
challenges, the horror stories facing the U.S. Border Patrol.
Consider this: Each day 1.3 million people cross our borders;
340,000 vehicles cross our borders; and 58,000 containers
arrive at America's seaports. These figures are expected to
double by 2005.
Mr. Chairman, this is not a case of wanting to create a
political carrot to entice people to sign on to a reform
proposal. It is a matter of creating the political will to do
what we should have done a very long time ago.
Fourth, the President should ensure that the National
Intelligence Council include an analysis of homeland security
and asymmetric threats, particularly those involving
infrastructure and information technology. That portfolio
should be assigned full time to a national intelligence officer
and the national intelligence estimate, the so-called NIE,
should be produced on these threats.
Fifth, the President should propose to Congress the
establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Security within the Office of Security of Defense and reporting
directly to the Secretary. Along similar lines, we propose that
the existing Joint Forces Command and Joint Task Force for
Civil Support be broadened and strengthened. For those who may
not be familiar with those two organizations, these commands
are DOD's current mechanisms for planning and dealing with
homeland attacks.
Sixth, it is time to emphasize the ``national'' in National
Guard. Specifically, the Secretary of Defense, at the
President's direction, should make homeland security a primary
mission of the National Guard, and the Guard should be
organized, properly trained and fully equipped to undertake the
mission. However, these requirements, we make clear, should be
in addition to, not substitutes for, the current state of
readiness for sustained combat overseas. Parenthetically, Mr.
Chairman, to use the vernacular of the military, the National
Guard is forward deployed in the homeland. It is where we would
need it, in time of crisis.
Finally, we recommend, Mr. Chairman, and I say this with
some hesitancy, but directness, that the Congress reevaluates
its organizational approach to issues of homeland security,
counterterrorism and protection of information security.
Currently, the Congress has roughly two dozen committees
addressing these issues in a very scattershot way. We think
there ought to be two select committees, one in the House and
one in the Senate, and we believe that the members of those
committees ought to be carefully selected for their expertise
in foreign policy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and
appropriations.
Mr. Chairman, as I said, I wanted to keep these remarks
brief. Let me just say that many of the commentators in recent
days have tended to portray the types of changes that we talk
about here this morning as a zero sum game. They argue that
doing more here at home means that we will have to do less
overseas, that homeland is a code for a retreat to
unilateralism or that doing more on defense means less for
weapons and missiles.
The commission did not and does not subscribe to that point
of view. We firmly believe that an engaged, enlightened, and
unilateral foreign policy, and defense policy is still
America's first line of defense. America not only has interests
in the rest of the world, it has obligations. As we said in the
report, to shield America from the world out of fear of
terrorism is, in large part, to do the terrorists' work for
them, but to continue business as usual is irresponsible.
We think that, ultimately, our challenge is to balance the
openness and generosity of the American spirit with the
security and well-being of the American people. Essentially, we
address the issues that are the hallmarks of homeland security.
They are to prevent, to protect, and to respond.
As someone who has had the privilege to serve this country
on both the field of battle and in the halls of this Capitol, I
implore you to take action on the recommendations of these
panels that sit before you today. You have an obligation and a
duty to the American people to do no less.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Rudman, for that
excellent statement. I appreciate it very much.
Senator Hart.
TESTIMONY OF HON. GARY HART,\1\ CO-CHAIR, U.S. COMMISSION ON
NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY
Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, thank you and Members of the
Committee for holding these hearings and for the opportunity
for us to appear here.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Hart appears in the Appendix
on page 39.
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``Americans will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile
attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not
entirely protect us. Americans will likely die on American
soil, possibly in large numbers.'' This was our first
conclusion of our commission after almost a year of
investigation of what we called the ``New World Coming,'' which
we described in our first public report. That conclusion was
delivered September 15, 1999, almost exactly 2 years to the day
before our prediction came true.
``The United States is today very poorly organized to
design and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the
homeland,'' our commission also concluded in its final public
report on January 31, 2001. Eight months later, regrettably,
that same assessment is true. In light of the dark, satanic
events of last week, further delay in creating an effective
national homeland defense capacity would be nothing less than a
massive breach of the public trust and an act of national
folly.
As Senator Rudman has pointed out, our commission was
appointed to conduct the most comprehensive review of U.S.
national security since 1947. The commissions of that era,
post-World War II, pre-Cold War, ended in creating a statutory
base for the conduct of the Cold War and created, among other
things, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the U.S. Air Force, and a massive overhaul of this
Nation's defense structures.
Those of us on this commission represent almost 300-person-
years of public service, almost all of that in the field of
national security and foreign policy. As Senator Rudman has
pointed out, although we debated issues such as the structure
of a homeland defense agency at great length, in the final
analysis we were all unanimous.
Senator Rudman has more than adequately summarized the
seven conclusions that relate specifically to the creation of
what President Bush fortuitously last night called a new
Homeland Security Office. What we are really here now to
discuss, that decision by the executive having been made, is
what the nature of that office or agency should be.
As Senator Rudman has pointed out, we particularly called
attention to the role of Congress in this effort and would do
so again today. The events of the last 10 days--and the
President's speech last night--have presented to the Congress
both an opportunity and an obligation to help the President put
form, structure, and content on what was essentially a two-line
commitment.
We believe this should be a statutory agency. We believe
this agency should have budget authority. We believe it should
consolidate, under one authority, one civilian authority who
has the accountability to the President and the American people
for homeland security.
Our commission strongly believes that any lesser or more
tenuous solution will merely perpetuate bureaucratic confusion
and diffusion of responsibility. No homeland czar can possibly
hope to coordinate the almost hopeless dispersal of authority
that currently characterizes the 40 or 50 agencies or elements
of agencies with some piece of responsibility for protecting
our homeland.
May I recall to you when we had an energy crisis in the
1970's, a czar for energy was created. It happened to be a
former governor of my State of Colorado. It turned out to be
obvious within a matter of months that a czar approach to the
issues of energy security in this country was not going to
work. And whether you agree with the result or not, we ended up
with the Department of Energy.
We have heard, particularly before a week ago Tuesday, that
Washington bureaucracy will not permit our solution to be
adopted. Mr. Chairman, I would like to hear a cabinet officer
or bureau head in this government make that argument today. I
would like to hear the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Transportation or the Secretary of the Treasury explain to the
President, and the American people, and the Congress why it is
more important to keep that piece of bureaucratic turf in that
department than to protect the people of the United States.
Bureaucracy matters nothing right now. The lives and safety of
the American people are at stake.
Of those who have taken the trouble to read our
recommendations and the reasons for them, some have said that
we have gone too far in creating what some have called an
``Interior Ministry,'' a rather ominous phrase. Others say that
we have not gone far enough to incorporate intelligence,
counterintelligence, and military components. There are
thoroughly debated reasons of constitutional principle and
practical effectiveness that caused us to strike the balance we
did.
The Homeland Security Agency should not have police or
military authority, it should not be an intelligence collection
agency or have responsibility for counterterrorism. It should
not be a military agency. It should be the central coordinating
mechanism for anticipating, preventing, and responding to
attacks on our homeland.
The executive director of our commission, General Charles
Boyd, who is here with us today, has, I think, made a very apt
analogy to the situation. We are now, where homeland security
is concerned, as if we were in the situation before we had a
Department of Defense and a Secretary of Defense. Those who
argue against an approach similar to ours would essentially be
saying the Army should be in one department, the Navy should be
in another department, the Air Force in another department, and
by the way, we will have a coordinator of those services
somewhere in the White House.
We think the logic of our circumstances require a statutory
agency under the accountability of one individual. This is a
daunting task, but, Mr. Chairman, we owe it to our children to
begin. It would be a mistake of historic proportions to believe
that protection must await retribution, that prevention of the
next attack must await punishment for the last. We can, and
must, do both simultaneously. We do not know when we will be
held accountable for the next attack on this country. I
believe, personally, it will be sooner rather than later, and
we are still not prepared.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Hart, very much for
very strong testimony.
Governor Gilmore, good morning and welcome. I know you had
some difficulty with flight arrangements getting here, but we
are very grateful for your persistence.
For the record, Governor Jim Gilmore is, of course,
Virginia's chief executive and also vice chair of the National
Governor's Association, an Army veteran. He is here in his
current capacity as the Chairman of the Advisory Panel to
Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Welcome, Governor.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JAMES S. GILMORE, III,\1\ GOVERNOR OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA AND CHAIRMAN, ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS
THE CAPABILITIES FOR DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO TERRORISM INVOLVING
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Governor Gilmore. Thank you, Senator Lieberman, and also,
Senator Cleland, of course who is here, and other Members, for
the record. Thank you for inviting me to discuss
recommendations of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction and local response, a national panel that was
established by the Congress in 1999. We have a statutory duty
to report to the Congress and to the President.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Govenor Gilmore appears in the
Appendix on page 41.
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I have served as chairman of this advisory panel, Senator
Lieberman, and it has been my privilege to work with experts in
a broad range of fields, many from outside of the Washington
Beltway, including current and former Federal, State and local
officials, specialists in terrorism, such as L. Paul Bremer who
is here to speak in just a few moments who has chaired his own
commission and has been a faithful member of our commission,
people from the intelligence community, the military, law
enforcement, emergency management, fire services, health and
medicine, and public health. And this is the unique quality of
the congressional panel that was assembled. It includes the
local and State responders as a primary force and input into
our panel which I think makes us unique and different.
I might take a moment to say that one of our panel members,
Ray Downey, the deputy fire chief for the City of New York, is
listed as missing, as he was trying to help people in the City
of New York at the World Trade Center, when he was lost,
together with about 300 other firefighters in the City of New
York, and we will miss him on our panel.
Our panel has had time. We have been working for almost 3
years. We have been able to deliberate quietly and without any
type of pressure of crisis. For many generations to come,
Senators, September 11, 2001, is a day that is going to stand
out in the history of the United States, and indeed I think the
entire world, as the day that the tyranny of terrorism attacked
American freedom.
The criminals who committed these acts on the people of the
United States in New York and in Virginia sought a decisive
strike that was designed to remake the world and the post-Cold
War period. Sooner or later those who inflicted these injuries
will feel the full weight of justice and the free world's
combined efforts to hold them responsible, and I believe no one
can exceed the President's eloquence in this matter, as we
heard last night.
This brings me quickly, Senator, to the work of the
Advisory Panel and the work that lies ahead for the Congress,
the Executive Branch, and for our States and for our
communities. To date, our panel has issued over 50 specific
recommendations in two reports. The first report was issued in
December 1999 and the second was issued in December of the year
2000.
In quick summary, the first report was devoted to the
assessment of the threat, concern over the issue of who was to
be in charge of any particular response effort, and an
increased concern, particularly to recognize that weapons of
mass destruction, while less probable, could not be dismissed,
but that in the meanwhile, that a conventional attack was
nearly inevitable. This was our conclusion in December 1999.
The next report, in December 2000, recognized that there
was not a national strategy, that there was an absolute
essential to have a national strategy, including State and
local people, and to make sure that there was, in fact, a
separate approach on response itself, particularly emphasizing
State and local people in combination with FEMA and other
Federal agencies, and of course recommendations for enhancing
and improving our intelligence capabilities.
I want to focus your attention today, Senator, on two
central recommendations concerning the role of government
organization and inner-agency coordination in this war against
terrorism.
In our December 2000 report, we proposed at that time the
statutory creation of a new national office for combatting
terrorism, to coordinate national terrorism policy and
preparedness in the Executive Branch located in the White
House. The President has done this last night.
Our recommendation was that the director of this office
should be a high-ranking official appointed by the President;
that, foremost, that the office should have the responsibility
to develop a comprehensive national strategy to be approved by
the President. The issue is the need for the central direction
on this issue among the different complex, solid, different
issues, including budgetary concerns, a need for the
development of the national strategy, as the President said
last night, but including Federal, as the President said, State
and local response. Otherwise every agency up and down the
line, vertically and horizontally, will assert its own
authority in, of course, an uncoordinated way.
Senator this is an important distinction here with our
panel and others. Our proposal is an office located in the
White House reporting directly to the President of the United
States, not a separate homeland agency that competes against
other agencies or even other cabinet secretaries. Instead, this
office will invoke the direct authority of the President to
coordinate various agencies, receive sensitive intelligence and
military information, and deal directly with Congress and State
and local governments on both domestic and international
counterterrorism programs. This defines the difference between
our panel and that of Hart-Rudman.
The central point is this: America needs a White House-
level office for a White House-level crisis, and that is the
plan that the President adopted last night.
Senator the Annual Report to Congress on Combatting
Terrorism of July 2001 points out that we spend about $10.3
billion per year now. Approximately 8 percent of that goes to
preparedness and response. About $300 million, only, is
designated for State and local government concerns.
Our third report, which is due December 2001, will now be
accelerated in an executive summary, although completed on time
in December 2001. We propose to accelerate our meetings and to
accelerate our report for the benefit of the Congress to which
we report and the President. We will, at that time, define five
areas of further study in our third year: Health and medical,
use of the military, cyber security, local and State response,
and border security, as well as filling out some of the
additional points on intelligence and other matters.
The second point that I wish to address to you this
morning, and that is the area of border security as a prime
example of the need for White House coordination. As you know,
on September 11 hijackers entered the United States. The
question is how did they get in. Senator, as was previously
read, we have 100,000 miles of national coastline; 2,000 miles
of land bordered with Mexico; 4,000 miles with Canada; 500
million people cross our borders annually; 127 million
automobiles cross annually; 11.5 million truck crossings
annually; 2.1 million rail cars; 200,000 ships annually dock;
and 5.8 million containers enter annually, less than 3 percent
are adequately inspected.
The answer calls for interagency coordination. If America
is to be secure, we must coordinate immigration enforcement and
border securities at all levels of entry in the United States,
air, sea, and land. It will require unprecedented coordination
between the appropriate agencies.
Our report on this one single issue of the five we will
address in our new report will propose that border and
immigration agencies all be included in intelligence collection
analysis and dissemination process, that there be an
intergovernmental border advisory group within the Office of
Combatting Terrorism, a coordinated plan for research and
development, particularly with sensors and warning systems,
trusted shipper's programs to begin to address the issue of
containers, and full coordination with Mexico and Canada, and
we will have identical and more comprehensive detail in the
other four areas as well, as we conclude our report back to the
Congress and to the President.
Senator we must start preparing the Nation to defend
freedom within our borders today. There is certainly not a
moment to spare. The President and the Congress face solemn
decisions about how to proceed, and there is certainly little
time for deliberation. This is not a partisan political issue.
It transcends partisanship. It is about the preservation of
freedom and the American way of life. The American people
deserve to be prepared, and they deserve to be prepared now. We
must take bold action to defend our freedom at home and abroad.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Governor. We appreciate your
service and your testimony. I look forward to a question and
answer period.
Our next witness is Ambassador Paul Bremer, formerly
Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism in the Reagan and
first Bush administrations. He is clearly one of our Nation's
leading experts on terrorism and, in fact, as I mentioned
earlier, chaired the National Commission on Terrorism. He was
also a member of the Gilmore Commission.
Ambassador Bremer, thanks for being here, and I look
forward to your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. L. PAUL BREMER, III, FORMER AMBASSADOR-AT-
LARGE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND
MEMBER, ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS THE CAPABILITIES FOR DOMESTIC
RESPONSE TO TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Mr. Bremer. Senator, I will be brief because the governor
has summarized our report. I am just going to make two or three
points.
I think there is a lot of value in both of these panels.
These are not mutually exclusive. There are some things that
can be borrowed from one or the other. There is a fundamental
difference on the structure. And I think one of the reasons
there is a difference on the structure has to do with one of
the most important trends in terrorism, which we saw
dramatically last week, and that is the fading distinction
between domestic and international terrorism.
As you said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, since
1985, our government, has been divided between the State
Department being responsible for international terrorism and
the Justice Department being responsible for what we call
domestic terrorism. This is a nice distinction. It just does
not happen to be one that terrorists follow, as we saw last
week. And one of the places where this is the most dramatic the
governor has just referred to, and that is in the question of
immigration and border controls.
The State Department is responsible for issuing visas to
people overseas, but it is the INS which is responsible for
deciding whether somebody gets into the country and then
monitoring, to the extent the INS can, whether that person
remains in their visa status in the United States. The
intelligence involved in this problem of immigration control is
not seamless; that is to say, there are lots of databases
around, they are not all interactive.
For example, the consular officer who issues a visa, until
today, does not have access to important FBI databases dealing
with people who are suspected criminals. There is legislation
in the bill which was sent up yesterday, by the Attorney
General, does try to deal with this issue, but it is just an
example of the fact that you cannot make a distinction any
longer between international and domestic terrorism.
Indeed, I think that is one of the problems with trying to
set up an agency, one of the substantive problems of trying to
set up an agency whose role is essentially just to look at
domestic terrorism. You cannot do it. You cannot cut it that
way any more. And as our report pointed out, it is very
important to get a seamless connection between intelligence
collected by various agencies overseas and intelligence
collected in the United States.
A second point I would make is we look very hard at the
necessary attributes for the office, whatever the office is,
whether it is the one that the distinguished gentleman on
Rudman-Hart proposed or one we did or what the President came
up with.
First of all, I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. I think it
should be established by statute. I think it is important for
two reasons. It is important for the political reason that the
Congress should embrace whatever the new reorganization is
going to be. Second, it is important because of the overriding
importance that both of our panels stressed on budget.
We looked at the attributes of what a new office should
have, and in my view came up with four. The new office should
have political accountability; that is to say, the person in
charge should be appointed and given the advice and consent of
the Senate. He should be responsible to the American people
through the Senate. We said that should also be at the cabinet
level, which is the second attribute. The person in charge of
this office should have access and visibility.
Third, that office must have budgetary authority, as both
of our panels have stressed. In our view, it is important for
this office to have an ability to design a national strategy
and then to certify whether various departments of the U.S.
Government programs are consistent with the President's
strategy, and when they are not, to decertify those budget
requests as, indeed, has been the case with the Office of
National Drug Control for the last decade.
Finally, it is important, we thought, for that office to
have a certain degree of autonomy and neutrality, not to be
seen as an active member of the bureaucratic fights which are
so familiar to all of us here inside the Beltway. These fights
are almost a necessary part of life in Washington, but in this
particular case we thought you need to rise above it.
The final point I would make, Senator, is a political
point, even though I am not a politician. I have followed this
subject now, on and off, for almost 30 years. It is the case
that over those 30 years attention to terrorism has been very
episodic. In the wake of a terrorist attack, as we are now,
there is a lot of attention. There are congressional hearings.
There is a lot of stuff on television. There are interviews and
articles. After a couple of months in the past, that attention
span has gone away. The spotlight moves on to some other
subject.
One of the problems this country has had in coming up with
a coherent counter-terrorist policy is precisely that we do not
get sustained attention in a balanced way to this problem. I
would urge this Committee and your colleagues in both Houses of
Congress to work now with the administration and all of us in
trying to keep a sustained attention. It does not mean we need
hysteria. We do not need hysteria. As the President said last
night, we need to get back to work. We need to show again the
great, wonderful resilience of this society, but we need a
sustained and balanced attention to this problem that is going
to outlive the immediate emotions of this week.
Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Ambassador Bremer. That was
very helpful testimony.
I think the last point you made is a critically important
one about the attention to terrorism having been episodic over
recent decades. When we talk now about a war on terrorism and
talk as the President so eloquently did last night about this
being a long, sustained struggle, that is what we are talking
about.
Part of the problem is the elusive nature of the enemy
here. It is not as if we can say at any point, well, we have
won one battle, but the enemy is still occupying Country A, and
the war is not over until it ends. They blend into the
darkness, the shadows. But if we are not persistent and do not
break the episodic response, we will lower our guard again and
once again be victims of attack. So I think your last point is
a very important one, and it is part of why a permanent agency,
however we decide to shape it, is critically important.
Mr. Bremer. People ask how do you define victory? What is
our goal? It seems to me our goal is to delegitimize terrorism.
We will not, as you point out, ever capture all of the
terrorists, but we can delegitimize the practice, and that is
our goal.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much.
Our final witness today is David Walker, Comptroller
General of the United States, head of the General Accounting
Office. He and his extraordinary staff are a constant source of
good counsel for this Committee and Congress, generally, in
making the government more efficient.
Welcome, again, Mr. Walker. Thanks for your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID M. WALKER,\1\ COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today to discuss a framework for
possibly addressing the need to enhance homeland security.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Walker appears in the Appendix on
page 53.
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As Senator Thompson said, GAO's past and present strategic
plan includesa number of key themes, one of which has been the
changing nature of the security threats that this Nation faces
in a post-Cold War environment.
We have issued over 65 reports dealing with homeland
security-related issues during the past 6 years, and we have
issued three in the last 3 days, including this report, which
is entitled combatting terrorism, selected challenges, and
related recommendations. I might also add, for the record, that
of the reports that we recently issued, we let the
administration know about them at least 6 weeks ago and had an
opportunity to be able to relook at them to consider
classification and other factors before we released them this
week, and we will continue to do that.
According to a variety of U.S. intelligence assessments,
the United States now confronts a range of increasingly diffuse
threats that puts greater destructive power in the hands of
small States, groups, and individuals, and threatens our values
and way of life. GAO's work indicates that we face a range of
challenges in this area that will have to involve many Federal
agencies, as well as State and local governments, the private
sector, and even private citizens. The Federal Government must
address three fundamental needs.
First, the government needs clearly defined and effective
leadership with clear vision to develop and implement a
homeland security strategy in coordination with all relevant
partners, both foreign and domestic, and the ability to marshal
the necessary resources to get the job done;
Second, a national homeland security strategy should be
developed based upon a comprehensive assessment of national
threats and risks; and,
Third, a large number of organizations will need to be
involved in addressing homeland security. They need to have
clearly articulated roles, responsibilities, and accountability
mechanisms in order to get the job done.
Crafting a strategy for homeland security involves reducing
the risk, where possible; assessing the Nation's
vulnerabilities; and identifying the critical infrastructure
most in need of protection. To be comprehensive, the strategy
should include steps to use intelligence assets and other means
to identify attackers and prevent attacks before they occur,
harden potential targets to minimize the damage from an attack,
and effectively manage the consequences of the incident.
In addition, the strategy should focus resources on the
areas of greatest need and measure performance against
specified goals and objectives. Because the plan will need to
be executed nationally, the Federal Government can assign roles
to Federal agencies once the strategy is developed, but also
will need to develop coordinated partnerships with State and
local governments, as well as with private and not-for-profit
entities.
Effective homeland security will require forming
international partnerships to identify attackers, prevent
attacks and retaliate if there are attacks. It will also
require efforts by both the Executive and Legislative Branches
of the Federal Government.
As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, just yesterday we issued this
report which discusses challenges confronting policy makers on
the war on terrorism and offers a series of recommendations.
One of these recommendations is that the government needs a
more clearly defined and effective leadership to develop a
strategy for combatting terrorism and assuring the security of
our homeland, to oversee development of a new national threat
and risk assessment, and to coordinate implementation among
Federal agencies.
Similar leadership is also needed for the broader issue of
homeland security. President Bush, as has been noted, announced
the creation of a new cabinet-level office of homeland security
and the nomination of Governor Tom Ridge to head that office.
Important details have not been provided. It is important to
understand what the nature and extent of this office will be,
what control it will have over resources, what responsibilities
it will have with regard to the determination and the
implementation of the strategy, whether or not this will be a
statutory position, whether or not this will be a term
appointment, and there are a variety of questions that we
believe are important that the Congress needs to ask in order
to make sure that, in substance, this can be an effective
approach.
I think the fact of the matter is that whether we end up
having a particular vertical silo or a department agency deal
with this or whether you take a horizontal approach because we
believe this is a horizontal issue, you will never be able to
combine all of the different entities that are going to have to
address this issue. In fact, as has been mentioned, there has
not been a recommendation to combine the military elements, the
law-enforcement elements, the intelligence elements, and
certain other elements.
Therefore you need to consider whether or not there should
be some combination, but in any event, there is going to have
to be coordination across a number of boundaries, across a
number of silos, both foreign and domestic, not just at the
Federal Government level, but also State and local, the not-
for-profit and the private sector because, after all, the
private sector owns a lot of the critical infrastructure that
is exposed.
The United States does not currently have a national threat
and risk-assessment mechanism to guide Federal programs for
homeland security. Given the tragic events of Tuesday,
September 11, a comprehensive national threat and risk
assessment that addresses all threats has become an urgent
need.
In addition, as this report notes, neither the Executive
Branch nor the Congress is well-organized to address this
issue.
In my statement, Mr. Chairman, I summarize a number of
areas where GAO has done work relating to these issues,
combatting terrorism, aviation security, cyber security,
international crime control, public health, a variety of areas.
Finally, let me note that we believe that there are four
key questions that need to be addressed in connection with this
issue, as noted on this chart:\1\ (1) What are our vision and
our national objectives to make the homeland more secure? (2)
What essential elements should comprise the government's
strategy for homelansecurity? (3) How should the executive
branch and the Congress be organized to address homeland
security issues? and (4) How should we assess the effectiveness
of any homeland security strategy implementation to address the
spectrum of threats?
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\1\ Chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 64.
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As you might imagine, Mr. Chairman, homeland security
issues are now at the top of the national agenda as a result of
last week's tragic events. Obviously, our work has not been
able to be updated to reflect all of the actions that the
administration has taken in the last 2 weeks. We expect that at
some point in time we will be asked to do so. We stand ready to
continue to assist this Committee and the Congress in
addressing homeland security and a range of other issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Walker. Thank you all
for your very direct and relevant testimony.
Again, I want to express my regrets that the other Members
of the Committee are not here, and I know it is because both
parties have chosen to hold caucuses this morning, so hopefully
as they end, they will be here. But for better or worse, I have
a lot of questions that I want to ask all of you, and I am sure
my colleagues will review the record.
Let me begin, before we get to the discussion about which
is the appropriate response structure for the Congress to
choose, to ask you to talk just a bit more about what we mean
by ``homeland defense.'' And I am just going to throw something
out and ask you all to put some more leaves on the tree here.
I take it that what we mean is taking efforts to prevent or
secure potential targets of terrorist or other enemy attack on
the homeland, and then if they, God forbid, occur, to be
certain that we are prepared to react quickly and
comprehensively in a way that diminishes human suffering. But I
wonder if you could just go through this a little bit in terms
of what you saw, what you learned and the considerable work you
did, to help build a record, but also help inform the public as
to what we are actually talking about here when we say
``homeland defense.''
Senator Rudman, you want to begin?
Senator Rudman. I will be pleased to. I think probably all
of us would agree on this at this panel. We have all determined
that there are major threats out there. We define the threats
as weapons of mass destruction, and we specifically referred to
weapons of mass disruption, which is what we saw on September
11.
We must look at the three things with which the government
has to organize itself in order to deal with that. One is to
prevent, if possible. The second is to protect. And the third
is to respond. And that is a Federal, State, local
responsibility, particularly the response. Obviously, the most
important one, in terms if you could make it work, would be the
prevention.
But I can tell you, having served, as you know, for many
years on the Senate Intelligence Committee, having chaired the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for a long
time, I have to tell you, Senator Lieberman, and I wish more
people would be saying it, we should not let the American
people think that intelligence, no matter how good, is ever
going to be good enough to prevent all of these things from
happening.
Historically, intelligence agencies throughout the world,
going back to the late 1800's, are very good at assessing
capabilities and threats. They have been very poor at figuring
out people's intentions. If they were good at figuring out
intentions, even though they knew what the threat was, we would
not have had Pearl Harbor, we would not have had the Battle of
the Bulge, and Saddam Hussein would not have got into Kuwait,
because we had the basic intelligence. We did not know what the
intentions were.
So we talk about prevention, we talk about intelligence,
and Ambassador Bremer is quite right, we leave most of those
activities where they are now. They should not be transferred.
When we talk about prevention, a lot of that is intelligence,
but a lot of it has to do with the kind of physical security
that we have seen here in Washington over the last few years,
and which unfortunately, we will probably be seeing more of
around the country. That will be an inconvenience, but I do not
think a loss of freedom. It will be an inconvenience.
When we talk about response, we are talking about what I
think Governor Gilmore has very eloquently laid out, this
response depends heavily on local and State organizations, but
you do not get these things to work right unless you do a lot
of war gaming, if you will, long before these things happen.
And one final thing. We have all admired Mayor Giuliani and
Governor Pataki and the extraordinary job that they have done,
and they have done it in an incredible city that has incredible
resources of fire and police and emergency workers, and they
have done war gaming in New York. I am aware of it. Their
hospitals have gone through a number of exercises to deal with
things. But the fact is that most places in our country do not
have that capacity or that experience or have not exercised
these things. And that is why the response side of it is so
very important, and I think to some extent the Gilmore
Commission properly, because of its charge, has dealt more
directly with the response side of this than certainly we have.
We have talked about it generally, but not with that kind of
specificity.
Chairman Lieberman. So one of the responsibilities of the
agency or the office would be to aggressively see to it that
local, State, and Federal agencies are better prepared than
they are today to respond to such attacks.
Senator Rudman. The major responsibility. In fact, it is
being done now. It has been done by a number of cities with the
aid of the military in some cases. One of the Marine divisions
has done exercises in the Southwest in local communities to try
to help them. But the fact is, it is sporadic. The resources
have not been there, and we have got to get the resources out
there.
Let me just say one other thing, because I know we are
going to get to it, and I would rather say it now and then let
the other panel talk about it. This is an honest disagreement
about organization between people of good will who respect what
each other have done, and I admire what they have done, and it
is a major contribution. But, I come at it differently based on
my experience in government, and let me just lay it out in a
way that I think everybody can understand. We have an
intelligence czar in this country. He is called the Director of
Central Intelligence, and everybody really believes that he
runs intelligence in this government, but anybody on the
Intelligence Committee can tell you that--and I cannot talk in
detail because it is classified--but with a relatively small
percentage of the intelligence budget being in the CIA. He is
also dual-hatted. He is the Director of the CIA and he is
Director of Central Intelligence, and some people do not
understand the distinction. He has no control over the budget
authority, the activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
He has little control over the National Security Agency and
many other defense agencies. And everyone who has studied it
has said that it does not work as well as it should because he
does not have the budget authority for the command or the
control.
We have come at this by saying that at least when it comes
to our borders, Border Patrol, Customs, Coast Guard, and FEMA,
because of what it does, which the Gilmore Commission has
written about, we believe that that consolidation is important
because it belongs more properly there than where it currently
resides. We certainly are not talking about taking all of those
other activities and moving them into this new agency,
certainly not.
But I want to answer your question more broadly than you
asked it. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. The kind of straight talk we have come
to respect from you, Senator Rudman. Thank you.
Senator Hart, before you answer, let me add an addendum to
the question as you are prepared to answer in this way. But one
of the things, I think, we are all feeling now after September
11, as we saw the insanely inhumane acts of these terrorists,
that one of the things we are not doing is thinking like they
are. So as we talk about preparation, we have to really begin
to think beyond what would be normally unthinkable for us, and
one of the things that I think we have to think about, and I
know that your commission looked at, is the possibility of a
chemical or biological attack on the United States.
So I wonder, as you give the answer to my initial question,
whether you would give us some help in examples of what a
homeland security agency would do to, in some sense prevent,
but also protect and respond to such an attack if it ever
occurred?
Senator Hart. Well, obviously, such an agency would not
itself combine either the military or the police functions of
our country which are, as Governor Gilmore said, distributed on
at least three levels of government. The direct response,
counterterrorism, if you will, will come from the military and
come from police agencies broadly defined. Senator Rudman
accurately stated the way our commission broke down the threat.
Try to find out who has evil intent against this country, who
they are, how they are organized, how they are financed, and to
the degree possible, what their intentions are. Now, their
intentions are to do harm to the United States. What you try to
find out is when and how, and that is the hardest part.
Then if you get a sense, any sense that this threat is
imminent, you try to stop it at the borders using all the
assets that we have presently uncoordinated.
Chairman Lieberman. It is a very important point. Excuse
me. And that is why you focused on the coordination of the
agencies that control access of people or goods into the United
States.
Senator Hart. And the reason why I stress, frankly, this
problem with bureaucracy is that those agencies had a different
mission. I mean they are where they are for a different
purpose. Border Patrol is in Justice because it is a law
enforcement agency. It is trying to prevent people from
illegally entering the country. Customs is the Treasury because
its purpose originally was to collect revenues. Coast Guard
regulates incoming and outgoing seaborne traffic, makes rescues
and so on, but that historic function was a Transportation
function. Now these are front-line defense organizations. It
frankly makes little sense for them to be where they are given
their new responsibility. If we are in fact in war, and I
believe we are, in a prolonged war, the nature and function of
these agencies has changed. So the reason why they are where
they are, frankly, makes very little sense any more, and to
protect that bureaucratic turf, as I have indicated, under
these circumstances is folly.
If the bad guys get inside our country, then the prevent is
to try to get them before they act, any way you can, and again,
this is FBI, local law enforcement, every asset you have.
And finally, if they act, to limit the damage, bringing
together FEMA, State and local agencies, and so forth, under
one command.
I think what is important, on September 11 the nature of
warfare changed. You have to get your mind around that concept,
the nature of warfare changed. Now, it has been changing since
the colonial area. The rise of guerilla warfare, that gave way
to terrorism. In the Cold War we helped support some people
that are now--these people that are now trying to kill us on
the theory that the enemy of our enemy is our friend. But the
nature of warfare has changed, and the distinction between war
and crime has changed.
Had there been a couple of fewer zeroes, had 50 or 60
people been killed, it would have been a crime--6,000 to 7,000
is war. Now, how many people have to die when it quits being
crime and becomes war is a matter that theoreticians can
debate. So what we are seeing now, what we have to think about
differently is to bring assets of the military and policy
together, and frankly, I think it will lead to the creation of
an entirely new kind of paramilitary capability, something
combining Delta Force, Rangers, Seals, some Special Forces of
the Marines, and maybe they will not wear uniforms. But that is
another whole subject.
I think Senator Rudman, for the commission, has very
accurately answered your original question.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you want to take me up on the
question of how, just to give an example, a homeland security
agency would prevent or protect and respond regarding chemical
or biological attack?
Senator Hart. Try to find a way to inspect more than 2 or 3
percent of the containers coming into the country. We had one
scenario we discussed of a small tactical warhead, nuclear
warhead, begin in one of the inspected sealed containers,
shipped from Shanghai or from Singapore to Newark by way of the
Chicago Rail Yards, off loaded in the Long Beach Port, put on a
train. The train is reorganized in the Chicago yards, and you
use global positioning triggering to blow up the nuclear
warhead. Got to stop them at the borders I think.
Now, you get the chemical, everybody knows chemical is hard
to do. All the experts will tell you how hard it is to disperse
the chemicals. Biological agents is a little bit different, and
here, Ambassador Bremer is much more an authority than I and
many members of the commission were, but I am told you can
disperse smallpox virus from an aerosol can. now, how we are
going to find every aerosol can coming into this country is
going to be very, very tough.
The only answer I can give you is do our very, very best to
stop whatever the agent is at the border.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Governor Gilmore.
Governor Gilmore. Senator Lieberman, there is so much to
say, let me see if I can organize this in a way that is
efficient. Our panel evaluated chemical, biological, nuclear,
and radiological. These are the classic weapons of mass
destruction. We evaluated them. We were absolutely unwilling to
dismiss the possibility of those kinds of attacks, although we
examined very closely the difficulty of delivery of those kinds
of attacks. Yes, you can certainly deliver them in an aerosol
can and so on like that, so we have focused our attention, for
example, on the organization of health and medical, which will
be discussed in our next report, so that physicians and the
communities will begin to trigger those kinds of responses with
the Center for Disease Control in a rapid way so that we can
address those kinds of issues.
Biological is an extremely serious matter, nuclear as well,
although we considered them relatively unlikely, although
catastrophic, and that is why we must address them. On the
other hand, a conventional attack, such as the one we have just
experienced we thought was highly likely, and that is why we
call for a national strategy not a Federal strategy, a national
strategy that absolutely incorporates in the locals and the
States. They are the cops on the beat. They are the State
troopers. They are the local physicians in the local clinics.
They are the people in the hospitals that are going to be the
responders who are going to see these issues first, and then
allow a circumvention of the problem at the earliest possible
moment.
I know you are going to go to the issue of the national
office and coordination types of issues. That has been the
central point of our commission, and we are anxious to talk
about that, but we have not discussed moving agencies because,
as has been so widely discussed by everybody on this panel, it
is fairly fruitless to move agencies. They are doing other
things, too, besides terrorism. But aside from that, there are
so many, that it requires not movement or restructure, but
coordination, and we will be happy to return to that topic, but
we will put it aside for just a moment so that I can be
responsive to your question.
The terrorist has the absolute advantage. He picks the time
and the place and the manner of the attack. And the freer the
society, the stronger the terrorist is. That is why America
becomes the target of opportunity because we are the freest
society in the world. So we have tried to analyze this into two
pieces. Let me just take them up quickly.
One is the issue of response. The Pentagon is a perfect
example, and I am the Governor of the State in which the
Pentagon is located. The minute that I saw the second plane go
into the World Trade Center, we triggered the Emergency
Operation Response System in Virginia immediately. What that
does is automatically hooks into FEMA. This is a program that
has been in place for years and years. And I have some good
news for you, Senator--this is something that actually works,
and it works very well. You do not get competition between FEMA
and the local State authorities and localities. All of these
professionals work well in coordination together, and they did
in the Pentagon situation, as a matter of fact. I will not
dwell on some of the other issues that I took specifically in
Virginia, but I want to say that our panel has concluded that
there is a system in place on the response already that works
well, although there is, of course, much to do to prepare for
that response. That is the office of the local and national
coordinator dealing with all of these other types of issues.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me just interrupt and punctuate
that. I think it is an important point, because though all of
the work that has been done here has shown inadequacies either
in preparedness or in organization, perhaps it is saying the
obvious, but it bears saying at a time when the American
people's confidence has been shaken, there is a lot out there
now in all these three categories--prevent, protect and
respond--not as much as any of you or we would like, and not as
well organized or coordinated as we would like, but I
appreciate your example.
Governor Gilmore. And it is working in New York also very,
very well. Now, when you get over into the issue of chemical,
biological, nuclear, and you go into a factor of 10 or 100
times what we have already seen this week, then it requires a
coordinator to do a national strategy to be prepared.
But the final point that I would make is the one that you,
I think, were approaching before you move onto your
governmental structure issue, and that is the one of
prevention. We have thoroughly addressed that issue as a matter
of fact. We focused a great deal of attention on the
intelligence community. I was in the intelligence community in
the early 1970's as a low-level agent in the U.S. Army. I was
trained on human intelligence. But it was very clear very
quickly that the intelligence community was getting out of
human intelligence in the early 1970's. We were moving more
technologically into satellites, into your electronic
intercept, which are doing extremely well. But we have been out
of the human intelligence for a long time in its most complete
and comprehensive fashion. We believe you must go back in. How
can you determine intent of conspirators unless you make an
effort to get into the conspiracy and find out the information
from the inside. And there are many ways you can confirm the
reliability of that kind of information. One of our points is
we believe that the rule against the recruitment of terrorists
and criminals overseas should be dropped. It is not fun to do
business with bad guys, but bad guys are the ones that we have
to try to stop. And as a result of that, you have to find--as I
have said in local media and national media, the terrorists
worldwide must wake up every morning wondering who in their
organization is informing on them to the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Chairman Lieberman. Well said.
Governor Gilmore. That is what we must do.
And then third, we believe that there must be dissemination
of intelligence up and down the line vertically, Federal, State
and local. Unheard of in the intelligence business, but we
believe, as a panel, that you can qualify people, that you can
clear them, you can give them need-to-know, and you can have
the same security that you would have inside any given agency,
and we believe that begins to disseminate the information as
necessary.
In addition, of course, we focused a great deal of
attention also in health and medical and on border. I
emphasized border in my opening statement, because we believe
that you can in fact apply all of these approaches in order to
secure your border types of issues, and you must use the
locals. When the terrorist picks the random target because of
his advantage of secrecy and because of surprise, you have got
to want to have the local policemen see it and be alert to
looking for it before it occurs.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Ambassador Bremer.
Mr. Bremer. I will just make two brief points. First,
Senator Rudman is absolutely right about the problems of
intelligence. I have been in the foreign affairs community for
about 35 years now, and I know of no area where intelligence is
more vital than in counterterrorism. If you do not have good
intelligence, you do not have a policy. It does not matter what
you have got on the borders or anywhere else, and that is
really the answer to your question about how we stop the
hypothetical example that Senator Hart talked about. The only
way to stop that is to have good intelligence and the only way
to get good intelligence, as the Governor points out, is to
have human resources.
So it will not stop it all. As Senator Rudman said, the
American people have to be aware that there will be further
attacks, but without intelligence, there is no point in talking
about the rest of this stuff. You have to do that right.
Second point, and here I may have a disagreement with my
Chairman, in which case he can disavow me. I think in fact one
of the bridging ideas between these two panels involves
immigration and border control. I could imagine, myself,
putting together an agency, where you could take Coast Guard,
Customs, Border Patrol, and I would throw in INS, and make an
agency that is called the Immigration and Border Control Agency
or some other such thing, where you pull together these things
that have indeed been sort of bureaucratically encrusted over
the decades, in some cases, centuries, to take a really serious
look at the problem of what kind of regulations there are for
letting people and things into this country. And that would be
consistent with our having a homeland agency, whatever it is
going to be called that Governor Ridge is going to head. No
contradiction there. So it is one of those ideas that maybe
between the two panels one could find----
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Walker, from GAO's work, comment
about what a homeland agency would actually do?
Mr. Walker. Well, first, I think, one has to focus on what
is homeland security, and then you have to look at how do you
go about trying to achieve it. I think on the ``what'', in our
view, it is a lot broader than many people have assumed. I mean
you obviously have the traditional national defense issues that
we have always dealt with, but you also have the nontraditional
threats that both of these commissions have dealt with. The
scope is very broad. It deals with transportation issues, as we
saw last week very dramatically, financial issues, cyber
issues, public health issues, immigration and border issues,
drugs, a whole variety of areas.
I think our objectives really need to be threefold. First,
avoid events; second, to maximize preparedness; and third, to
manage the consequences.
I would make an observation. I think last week dramatically
illustrated how Federal, State and local entities, and how
public and private sector entities, can rise above silos and
narrow institutional interests and borders that are real or
perceived, and manage consequences with outstanding results.
We need to figure out how we can best (1) avoid events, (2)
maximize preparation, and (3) manage a crisis if an event
occur.
Chairman Lieberman. Have your folks done any work on--I
keep coming back to them--chemical and biological? In other
words, I think what has been said is the difficulty of
preventing here, apart from intelligence, very high, very
difficult. So perhaps part of this is response and the state of
our preparedness now to respond. Has your office done any work
on that?
Mr. Walker. Mr. Chairman, we have done some work on bio-
terrorism and on the chem-bio area. We have got some work
ongoing right now with regard to that. Some additional reports
are be coming out soon. I would be happy to provide information
on that if you so desire.
Chairman Lieberman. Senator Rudman.
Senator Rudman. I just want to add one thing that I think
none of us have addressed, but I am sure we all agree with. I
think it was Vince Lombardi who said the best defense is a good
offense. I mean since the intelligence community is very good
at assessing the threat and the capability and knowing many of
these organizations and the foreign governments that support
them, the best way to start to cut down the threat is to
eliminate the threat. And I thought the President was very
eloquent last night when he said to these people out there,
``Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.''
Now, that has not been U.S. policy for a long time
irrespective of which party held the White House. That has not
been U.S. policy. If that is U.S. policy and we are serious
about it and the American people recognize that there will be
loss of life amongst the military to protect our freedoms, then
the best thing we can do is to start eliminating the threat.
You will never get all of it, but you can sure get a lot of it
if you work at it, and I think that is precisely how I read
what the President had to say last night.
Chairman Lieberman. A very important point. Apart from the
eloquence, the fact that the President dealt with the public's
fear and anger very constructively, what was stated last night
and is reflected in both parties in Congress, this is a totally
new policy to finally catch up with and meet the new threats
whose reality became painfully clear to us last Tuesday, but we
have turned a corner both in terms of the search and pursuit of
terrorists internationally and in our willingness and
commitment to defend ourselves here at home from their attacks.
Senator Rudman. And unfortunately, but not unsurprisingly,
in a democracy such as ours, it took what happened on September
11 to galvanize everyone to that point of view.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Let me ask the members of the
two commissions now to engage directly on the question of the
organizational response. I think you see the problem in very
similar terms, and each commission said homeland attacks are
likely, there are agencies out there working on it, but they
need to be coordinated. And let me ask you each why you chose
the course you did and why you did not choose the other
recommendation?
Senator Rudman. Well, we chose our plan for really two
reasons. First, it was the collective wisdom of that panel--and
if you look at that panel they are people with extraordinary
experience in Federal Government, not local and State, which is
very important for what the Gilmore Commission--but they are
all people who have held major positions in the Federal
Government. If you want to take the Border Patrol and leave it
where it is, and leave Customs where it is, and leave Coast
Guard where it is, and have someone in the White House, no
matter how friendly the President or how good, and assume that
person will strongly influence those agencies, it is not going
to happen. Now, we believe that. Others may not, but we believe
that.
Now, certainly we set up a liaison agency here if you will.
If you look at, have your staffs later look at page 17 of our
report, and again, on the emergency side on page 21, you will
see the organization. Why it is written that way and why it is
done that way is we said let us try to protect the borders, and
I think Senator Hart has said that as well as it can be said,
and I think Ambassador Bremer has indicated that he thinks
maybe in some other form that might work. That has to be done
in our view.
Beyond that, you have to have this agency, whether it is an
office in the White House or a cabinet department, we think a
cabinet department. Once you get that reorganization done,
there will be time to do all of the things that these two
commissions say need to be done, Federal, State and local.
But I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, I have enormous
respect for the Governor and his commission, but I have seen
others come into the White House with supposedly high-
visibility positions, and a few months went by, and they were
not reporting to the President, they were talking to some staff
aide--I hate to be that blunt, but I am just going to lay it
out the way it is--and the Secretary of Defense is not in the
White House. He is sitting over in Virginia. But he is
important, and when he wants to see the President, he sees the
President, and we believe that you could have a cabinet
secretary with the same kind of responsibilities without being
necessarily located at the White House. But we think the
reorganization is very important from a functional point of
view.
Chairman Lieberman. Senator Hart.
Senator Hart. I think it gets down to one word, and that is
accountability. If a White House office has authority to
coordinate, the agencies that it has authority to coordinate
are not necessarily accountable to that office. They are
accountable to their department head, cabinet secretary or
whatever. They will accept the coordination recommendations.
There will be a lot of task forces and working groups and so
forth, but no one is accountable. No one is accountable today.
The President of the United States, but I think the President
has, in his wisdom, understood that he cannot run this
operation. Somebody else has to. The question is: What is most
effective? What is effective? Is there a single person
accountable to the President and the American people? And I do
not think, whether it was energy in the 1970's, drugs in the
1990's, as much power as you give the czar or whatever you want
to call that person, they are ultimately accountable.
Chairman Lieberman. Governor, you have served as a
Governor, you know the importance of authority and
accountability, why not go with an agency such as the Senators
have described?
Governor Gilmore. Senator, obviously, we are very
respectful of the other panel's conclusions and its
suggestions, and it is on the table for debate just like every
other issue, and that is what we are engaged in right now. Our
sense as a panel was that a national security coordinator type
of model perhaps works better. This is a single person who is
in fact accountable. And as the President said last night, that
Governor Ridge would be reporting directly to him. We think
that is setting off in the right direction. We have to
remember, Senator, that an attack by the terrorists and the
entire community of terrorists can be on the fabric of a
complete free society, and it can be anywhere at any time at
anywhere. So how do you ever conglomerate every aspect of the
society into one homeland agency? Instead the emphasis needs to
be on coordination of all agencies as needed, as planned, as
part of an overall strategy for the national strategy.
I think it was said a little while ago that the big dogs
are still going to be there to run, and we understand that,
because the major people in national security, the Secretary of
Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, they all have
duties to do, and they are going to want to do them in the most
effective possible way that they can. If they are competing
just with simply another agency on the same level in the same
way, then there is going to be the danger and hazard. There is
going to be turf battles and back and forth, but if the
President is basically operating this business through his
national coordinator, his national office, that it is the
President's authority that then begins to coordinate and manage
from the top, and then at that point I think you begin to be
able to put something together in a coordinated way.
Chairman Lieberman. How about the argument that the
Senators make that unless there is direct line and budget
authority, that the office in the White House is not going to
be as effective as it should be?
Governor Gilmore. We agree. As a matter of fact, we have
proposed in our reports that in fact that the national
coordinator have in fact budget authority within the area of
terrorism, so that a national strategy goes into place each and
every department and agency fits within it, including its plan
for its expenditures so it can be spent in the most effective
possible way, and that there be a certification process where
this individual looks not just at his agency, but at all
agencies in order to determine whether or not the spending and
the budgetary considerations are coordinating with the national
strategy.
Chairman Lieberman. Ambassador Bremer.
Mr. Bremer. Both of these suggestions involve pretty
dramatic changes in the Executive Branch, so either way we are
up to some pretty dramatic changes. I am very sensitive to the
point that the Rudman-Hart panel made about the difficulties of
coordination. It actually can work without direct budgetary--
without command and control authority, and the example I would
give is exactly how the government has coordinated its
international counterterrorist policy over the last 15 years,
and I was intimately involved in setting up that process back
in the second Reagan Administration. And effectively, it is a
person on the NSC who does that coordination. Now, he had no
authority over me as Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism,
nor over the CIA, nor over the other concerned agencies, but
was able by virtue in fact of being located in the NSC, to
coordinate. You could say, well, why do we not just do the same
thing? Well, the answer is, he is not politically accountable.
No President, and for very good reasons in my view, having been
in the Executive Branch, is going to have NSC people be
accountable to Congress.
And therefore, when we got looking at this question, we
came back to this question about budget authority and political
accountability, and concluded you need to have it be cabinet
level. It needs to be somebody with the advice and consent of
the Senate appointed, and he needs to have the budgetary
authority that we put in our report.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Walker, let me ask you first, and
then the others if they want to respond. Are these two
proposals mutually exclusive?
Mr. Walker. You read my mind, Mr. Chairman. I do not think
they are mutually exclusive.
Chairman Lieberman. Spending too much time with you, David.
Mr. Walker. We spend a lot of time together, and I enjoy
it, personally.
I do not think they are fundamentally at odds. The fact of
the matter is that you have 40 to 50 plus Federal entities that
are going to be involved in this fight. There is no question
about it. And theoretically you could say that there are
certain entities that you might be able to consolidate. As
Senator Hart said before, there are some entities that are
merely placed where they are today based upon what they were
originally focused on decades ago, and those reasons may no
longer be the most important reasons or even valid in some
circumstances. And, by the way, there are a lot of other
government departments and agencies outside of homeland
security that are in the same situation.
You could theoretically consolidate a number of those that
should be focused primarily on what we could all define as
being homeland security. But even if you do that, a vast
majority of the resources and a vast majority of the people
that are going to be necessary in order to accomplish the three
objectives that I talked about before, are not going to be in
that entity in all likelihood. And therefore, you still have to
have some means to have somebody, as Senator Hart said, who has
overall responsibility and accountability, who has the ability,
as Governor Gilmore has said, to be able to have control not
only over the planning, but the execution, who has some direct
involvement in control over people, process and technology,
even if they are not in that entity that you have consolidated.
And so I think there are several dimensions of this
challenge that have to be addressed.
Chairman Lieberman. Senator Rudman, I presume you could not
have an office in the White House and an agency dealing
exclusively with homeland security, or does that seem like an
unnecessary overlap? The fact is that you cannot include
everything in the Homeland Security Agency related to terrorism
or weapons of mass destruction.
Senator Rudman. Let me answer the question that you just
have posed to us, because I think there are some great
similarities here. Let us understand what our commission
recommended in terms of government reorganization. The only
area that we considered in the area of government
reorganization was ``protect the border,'' because that is so
fundamental. I mean, we would all agree, if you cannot protect
the border better than we are doing now, then no matter how
good your intelligence, how good your response, you got big-
time trouble coming at you.
So we said--and I think Gary Hart put it better than I
can--here is what these people used to do, here is why they
were created. Let us protect the border and take Coast Guard,
Border Patrol, and Customs. Now, that goes into a cabinet-level
agency which has all of the kinds of responsibilities that
Governor Gilmore and Ambassador Bremer have talked about, and
the comptroller general, in terms of coordinating, I believe it
is 51, take away three after you took those three agents, but
it is 48 disparate government responsibilities in the area of
responding, protecting, and preventing terrorism. And I think
the only difference is, that we are saying that Governor Ridge
would be confirmed by the Senate. He would sit at the cabinet
table. He would not be competing with other people's resource
in that area. Those three entities would have their budget
about to where they are now or increased by the Congress, but
the only agents to be moved in would be that which protected
the border. All of the others, and we all know the obvious, the
Defense Department, CIA, FBI, but there is HHS and the Governor
probably knows even more than that, having dealt with them as a
Governor, they would still be where they are, but they would be
subject to strong coordinative authority issued by the Congress
in statutory language and the President by Executive Order to
get it done. So I do not think there is a huge difference about
what we are talking about here.
But we are very firm about the fact that these three
agencies ought to be where they are, and FEMA, of course, which
we think is a major building block.
Senator Hart said to our group, about 2 years ago, when we
were debating some of these things, ``Let us not recommend to
the Congress and to the President that which we think is
politically doable. Let us submit, in our report, what we think
ought to be done.'' And this was one of the big hot buttons,
and we knew it at the time. That is no reason it should not be
done.
Chairman Lieberman. The big hot button was bringing those
agencies----
Senator Rudman. Was bringing these three, taking them away
from where they are.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask you the question while we
are on it, because I was going to ask it in a while, which is:
What about the other functions of those agencies, particularly
Coast Guard, but also Customs and Border Patrol, but
particularly Coast Guard, that are not directly related to
homeland defense, such as navigational security that the Coast
Guard does?
Senator Rudman. They would keep their absolute identities,
just as the Coast Guard did when it went into the Department of
Transportation. Its mission did not change. Its mission was the
same.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Senator Rudman. All we are saying is that a very heavy part
of their responsibility, those three agencies, is border
security from goods and from people, and we think they ought to
be together.
Chairman Lieberman. Governor Gilmore, are these two
proposals mutually exclusive? I mean, could you envision
yourself being supportive of a kind of agency that would
combine FEMA, Border Patrol, Customs, Coast Guard, that Senator
Rudman has talked about?
Governor Gilmore. Senator Lieberman, the essence of
legislative life is a combination of different proposals.
Chairman Lieberman. Spoken like a Governor. [Laughter.]
Governor Gilmore. No, spoken like a legislator, I believe.
Chairman Lieberman. I accept your amendment, spoken like a
former legislator.
Governor Gilmore. Naturally, we are all very deeply
respectful of every proposal that is here, and I am confident
that they could be harmonized, and that they could be
accommodated to each other if that is what it takes in order to
pass a piece of legislation and to get the votes.
From an executive point of view, sometimes you must choose
that which is best, and weigh and balance the different options
as meritorious as each of them may be, and ultimately choose.
Our belief has been that the answer here was not any
bureaucracy, but a vehicle for management, and a vehicle for
management. I believe the President has established a vehicle
for management with Governor Ridge last night. I suppose that
one could put these pieces together, and you could have an
agency. It would then go into the cabinet I suppose, a border
cabinet position or something, or an agency, something of that
nature. And then it would fight for turf, budget issues, and
accommodations and influence with other perhaps bigger dogs.
That is all right. But ultimately, we believe the ultimate
answer is the coordination, budget authority, planning of a
national strategy from a national terrorism office that I
believe that the President has now established.
Chairman Lieberman. Anyone else want to comment on that
last question? If not, let me go to another part of this. I
noticed my staff gave me two articles from the Defense Trade
Press today in which there were statements made, attributed to
people in the Pentagon, that we are talking about defense here.
So why should this not go under someone in the Defense
Department? Why should there not be a new unified command for
homeland defense? Presumably, although the article is not
totally clear on this, that would include the border control
agencies and even the preparedness that we are talking about.
Senator Hart.
Senator Hart. Two and a half reasons. One is the
Constitution of the United States. The second is the Posse
Comitatus Law. The third is this practical necessity.
The constitutional argument dates to the constitutional
debate. What we did then, 225 years ago, was create two armies.
The Federalists wanted a standing army and navy to protect
American commercial interests broad, Alexander Hamilton. The
anti-Federalists were afraid, dating to classic Republican
theory from the Greek city-states, that a standing army in
peacetime in a republic was a danger. So they insisted that the
defense of the homeland be in the hands of the militia, and the
militia would be under the control of the States, and that was
the compromise. Now, the militia, in the late 19th Century,
became the National Guard. In the 20th Century the National
Guard became an auxiliary expeditionary force, and that's the
way they think of themselves. But the fact of the matter is,
their primary duty under the Constitution is to defend the
homeland of the United States. Now, as Senator Rudman has
appropriately said, we have not said that is their exclusive
duty. They have not heard what we said, but we have not said
that is their exclusive duty. They can still keep their, and
need to keep their ability as a follow-on expeditionary force,
that a primary, if not the primary, mission of the National
Guard is to defend the homeland. That is the constitutional
argument.
The statutory argument, as you know, prohibits the use of
American troops, regular army forces, on our soil, absent
declaration by Congress. And that goes back to, oddly enough, a
very closely-contested national election in 1874. So you have
got a statutory prohibition against the Defense Department
running this thing in effect.
And practically, as Senator Rudman said, National Guard
units are forward deployed in 2,100 different units around the
country. Now, you are going to get the argument that the Guard
is ``weekend warriors,'' and incompetent. Wrong. If the
National Guard can fight world wars, and it has, it can defend
the homeland. It has to be properly trained and equipped. It is
to today? Largely not, but if it is made a national priority
and the Commander in Chief orders it done, it will be done.
These are citizen soldiers. These are people in the communities
and if you need--if the terrorists take over a downtown office
building in Denver, it is going to be a while before the 82nd
Airborne Division gets there and the damage may be done. But
the Governor knows you can mobilize the Guard awfully fast and
special units particularly, and if you have had any prior
warning, they can be ready to go. They are in the streets of
New York. They were within hours, not too many hours.
So I focused my attention here on the Guard because it is
the solution to the question that you have asked. It is a
constitutional military power under the control of the States,
locally deployed, and trainable and equipable for this mission.
Chairman Lieberman. I admire your answer, appreciate it.
You must have had some very interesting sessions of this
commission.
Senator Hart. You do not know the half of it.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, I do not want to hear half of it.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rudman. Well, let me tell you, interesting enough,
Newt Gingrich, who was the father of this idea, on the theory
that no good deed goes unpunished, when he left the House, was
put on this commission. And he is a historian who brought a lot
of insight.
Let me just add one thing to answer your question. The
military made it very clear they do not want this primary
responsibility. That is not theirs. They have enough to do
protecting the Nation overseas, and they do not think that they
should have it.
However, everyone agrees, that if we had had a chemical, a
nuclear or a biological incident in this country, it is only
the active force military with the National Guard that would
have the resources to deal with the horrendous situation that
would face the country under those circumstance. That is a
response issue.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask you just a quick question
here about the role of the National Guard as you contemplate it
in homeland defense. If you take your tripartheid approach of
the responsibilities of the Homeland Security Agency, prevent,
protect and respond, is it primarily in the respond part that
you see the Guard being active?
Senator Rudman. Yes, it is. Some protection, but mainly
response, and I think Governor Gilmore would be in a better
position to tell you when they have had disasters in Virginia,
hurricanes and whatnot, I mean there is nothing like the Guard,
even though many are not trained to do that. We say they need
specific training to deal with these kind of contingencies.
Chairman Lieberman. What were you thinking about, Senator
Hart, when you said there might be a role in protection as
well?
Senator Hart. Well, let us hypothesize, which I hate to do
because in an interview a few days ago I said this could happen
in Nashville, Denver and Seattle, and my phone has been ringing
off the hook from people in those three cities. Take a city,
Hartford. [Laughter.]
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks. [Laughter.]
Senator Hart. Sorry.
Chairman Lieberman. What was your phone number? [Laughter.]
Senator Hart. Let us say intelligence picks up a threat.
Let us say the intelligence is precise enough to say probably a
capital city in New England. I can see the Guard, units of the
Guard, not the whole Connecticut National Guard, but units
specially trained, paramilitary units of the Guard, in a
protective role, working with the State patrol, the local
Hartford police, to find them and prevent them from acting.
Chairman Lieberman. Good example. Governor, how about the
role of the military generally, why the commission decided to
not ask the Pentagon to take this over, and then specifically,
uniquely as Governor, how you see the role of the National
Guard here?
Governor Gilmore. Senator Lieberman, this is a very
important question, and I want to be as forthright as I can. We
also will be addressing an entire provision of our third report
to the issue of the use of the military. We have had thorough
discussion about it over a long period of time. We absolutely
reject the Department of Defense playing a leading role even in
the event of a weapon of mass destruction catastrophic attack
should the President conclude that only regular military can
step in to help, even then we recommend that that be
subordinate to a Federal civilian agency, logically FEMA. If
the military has to be engaged, they should be engaged only at
the request and in support of FEMA and the combined operation
of State and local people as well.
We reject the use of the military in any first type of
response. It is exactly what the enemy wants, is to have United
States military people patrolling the streets of our Nation and
imbuing our citizens with the idea that they are to be
controlled by uniform military people. It is absolutely against
the American tradition.
And furthermore, Senator, I have made some statements, and
I believe that I reflect the panel's feelings, that we should
never ask any American to give up any civil right in return for
security. The civil rights and human rights of the people of
the United States under the Constitution are absolutely
paramount, and we should not give the enemy the win to say that
we should in any way compromise any of that. As a former
elected prosecutor, I know that you can take actions consistent
with the Constitution and security--the Fourth, the Fifth, and
the Sixth Amendments. You can do these things. But we should
not cross that line, and we are concerned that the use of the
military, unless it is in a subordinate capacity, would be in
fact moving down that direction. And all our representatives in
the Department of Defense on our panel have concurred that they
should not be first responders.
And the second point I would make is to remember, when you
start thinking about sticking something like this in the DOD,
remember the key provision that we have put forward, the locals
and the States absolutely must be built in to the local
response. I cannot imagine a day that the local and State
officials across the 50 United States will become subordinate
to a military authority in the case of a crisis. And in fact,
if you went the DOD route, even there are some Federal agencies
that would be a little uncomfortable with that, the CIA
perhaps.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you for the answer. I was
thinking, as you were talking, that I have spoken to a number
of people in New York, and people do not want the Guard
patrolling streets in normal times, but the rapid appearance of
the National Guard on the streets of New York after the attacks
was immensely reassuring to the public there.
Governor Gilmore. Senator Lieberman, two things. First of
all, the Guard is a little different, as Senator Hart said.
They are the historical militia of the United States. They are
under control of the Governor of each individual State, that
civilian authority, unless federalized, and I do not believe
there has been a federalization in any of these disasters. So
that is a little bit different, but in addition to that, even
then, they should come in subordinate to the first responders,
police, fire, rescue, health, medical, and then come in to
provide additional hands, and then finally, as the situation or
the attack escalates or becomes a weapon of mass destruction,
then perhaps the regular services, but only in response to and
at the request of a civilian authority.
Chairman Lieberman. Ambassador Bremer, correct me if I am
wrong. It is my impression, not that you disagree with what has
been said, but that you have a more expansive view of the
potential role of the military in these matters. Is that true?
Mr. Bremer. The National Commission on Terrorism, which I
chaired, which was a bipartisan commission appointed by
Congress, reached a slightly different conclusion which was
based on the following analysis. It is possible, particularly
if one considers biological and chemical terrorism, to imagine
a circumstance, as we said in our report, where not thousands
but tens of thousands of casualties are inflicted. In such a
circumstance it is possible to imagine that one event or
several events like this would quickly overwhelm available
local, State and Federal capabilities, including FEMA. In such
circumstances, we said, the President of the United States
ought to have the possibility on a one-time ad hoc temporary
basis of asking the Department of Defense to be the lead agency
in responding to such an attack or series of attacks.
There are no plans for that to happen for a lot of the
reasons that the Governor has mentioned and others. Our view is
that under those circumstances, again, hypothesizing a much
worse attack than we saw last week, the President in fact is
likely to do that. He is likely to move the military into the
lead agency because they do have all of the capabilities. Our
commission's view, and I speak now for the National Commission,
not for the Gilmore Commission, our commission's view was the
best way to protect civil liberties in that circumstance is to
plan for it ahead of time and exercise it. The worst way to
protect civil liberties is never to even allow the possibility.
And the example I have given, Senator, in testimony on my
National Commission, is what happened after Pearl Harbor, the
last major domestic attack, when the two great American
liberals, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Earl Warren, responded
by locking up Japanese Americans. Although the Supreme Court
upheld that decision--most Americans today believe that was a
violation of their civil liberties. So I take the opposite view
precisely because of the respect I have for civil liberties,
and that was the unanimous consensus of my bipartisan
commission, which is, as you point out, different from where
some others have come out.
Chairman Lieberman. Very interesting and worth thinking
about. It is true also that in the recent crisis the President
did deploy military assets in response in a very controlled
way. For instance, the fighter planes that were sent out over
American cities, the AWACs, and in a very different way, the
medical ships, for instance, that came in to New York and maybe
other areas as well.
Mr. Walker, a final question just to give a perspective. I
believe the GAO has done some comparative work here on the way
other countries in the world deal with homeland security, and
the role of the military in homeland security, and I wonder if
you could just speak for a moment about that.
Mr. Walker. Senator, we have done some work with regard to
how certain other countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom,
France, and Israel, end up approaching this issue. We have
already issued a report on that. It is publicly available, and
it would provide some useful information for you and the
Congress to consider. One of the things that we find at GAO is
that we are very much in a borderless world. In many cases the
United States is the lead with regard to many types of
activities. In some cases we are not. And in this area we are
not. And there are other countries that have been dealing with
this issue for longer than we have for various reasons, and I
think there are some lessons learned there that we ought to
draw from.
Chairman Lieberman. We will look to that. You have been
immensely helpful. Any of you want to make a statement? Yes,
Senator Hart?
Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, in our efforts since our
commission to convey what our report does and does not do at
both the congressional staff and administrative and media
level, a lot of misunderstanding has occurred. And I know you
get, and your staff gets, dozens of these. We obviously believe
this is an extraordinary effort, a historic effort.
Chairman Lieberman. We agree.
Senator Hart. May I just say if any on your staff or any of
your colleagues need to understand what we do and do not do,
the first report is 8 pages, the second report is 16 pages.
Eleven pages of this one will show you what we propose and what
we do not propose, and I would really hope anyone making a
decision as to what the congressional response should be, or
the administrative response, should at least read those 35
pages. It is not too much.
Chairman Lieberman. I absolutely agree. We will make sure
that, with your cooperation, that every Member of the
Committee, if they have not already, gets copies of the
reports. I have been over them, and they are superb pieces of
work, as is your commission's work, Governor Gilmore.
I thank each and every one of you. You have been very
constructive. You were ahead of your time, ahead of the rest of
the Nation's time unfortunately, but it is not too late now to
put into effect the recommendations that you have made to deal
with the new realities that we face.
This Committee will continue its consideration of
protection of critical infrastructure next week with two
hearings, one on airline security and then the other on what we
are doing now to protect other elements of critical
infrastructure, including other transportation systems, public
utilities, and the computer infrastructures on which so much of
our country today, including the financial systems, are based.
And then I certainly hope that we can engage Governor Ridge and
the administration as quickly as possible.
And I would like to set the goal for the Committee, and I
believe Senator Thompson shares this--we have talked about it--
to see if we can work with everyone involved here and report a
bill out soon. These are not ordinary times and we should not
be following an ordinary legislative schedule. The President,
by his action last night, if you will, closed the gap, and now
I think we have to act with the administration to create a
permanent structure here to forever after protect the American
people when they are at home.
We are going to keep the record of the hearing open for a
week. Senators Akaka and Voinovich have submitted statements,
which I would like to add for the record.
[The prepared statements of Senators Akaka and Voinovich
follow:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Mr. Akaka. Good morning. I commend the Chairman for calling this
hearing and thank all the witnesses for being here. It is a pleasure to
have such expertise on this subject here today. I especially want to
welcome my friends and former colleagues, Senator Hart and Senator
Rudman.
In the face of tragedy, our leadership must be steady and our voice
calm but firm. The President is right to say this will be a long
conflict.
I was a young man when Pearl Harbor was attacked. I watched as
Japanese Zeros bombed Hawaii and my country. Then we knew our enemy,
but today's faceless terrorist is more difficult to identify.
Dreadful as the attacks were on September 11, we can imagine some
which could be even more lethal. In July the International Security
Subcommittee, which I chair, held a hearing on FEMA's Role in Managing
a Bio-terrorist Attack. One truth became clear: We lack a national
security strategy and institutional organization to address terrorist
attacks.
This threat is amorphous . . . amoral . . . without race . . . or .
. . ethnicity and may operate from several countries. It is asymmetric
in the sense that it exploits our strengths--in technology and
organization--and turns them into weaknesses. This Nation's commercial
airline system, piloting knowledge, and the way our institutions are
designed and our people trained to react to such threats, were turned
into a weapon against us. Our airline system is clearly not our only
vulnerability. This was not Pearl Harbor--this was an asymmetric attack
altogether different than anything we have experienced.
The response last week reflected a strategy and coordination that
was inadequate. Today's hearing properly focuses on how our Nation's
institutions must be reorganized in a way that maximizes their ability
to react effectively.
Today the enemy of democracy is less definable in a world that was
forever altered on September 11. I look forward to the testimony.
__________
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing
this morning on the Federal Government's role in responding to
terrorist threats against the United States. I would also like to
welcome our witnesses and thank them for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, last Tuesday, the United States of America suffered a
horrible national tragedy, the images of which will forever etch the
date, September 11, 2001, on the collective minds of the American
people. The events of that day and the days following the terrorist
attack have highlighted just how important a role our Federal
agencies--and the individuals who work for them--play in the defense of
our Nation.
While this Committee has broad jurisdiction to examine the
efficiency and effectiveness of these agencies, there is perhaps no
greater function that we can undertake than ensuring that those
entities of our Federal Government are properly arrayed and structured
to deal with any attack on our homeland. Both the Hart-Rudman and
Gilmore Commissions have released reports in recent months on this
issue. Little did we know that their observations would be so
prescient. In the wake of last week's tragic events, I believe we
should consider more carefully than ever the recommendations of these
two commissions and ensure that our government is prepared to act
expeditiously in responding to any future attacks.
Mr. Chairman, we have an excellent panel of witnesses with us
today, and I am especially pleased to welcome Senator Gary Hart and
Senator Warren Rudman. As you know, Mr. Chairman, earlier this year,
the Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee held a hearing on
the national security implications of the human capital crisis. I was
pleased to have former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and retired
Admiral Harry Train, two of the commissioners who worked with Senators
Hart and Rudman, as witnesses at that hearing. They offered excellent
testimony on preparing our Federal workforce for the challenges of
national defense in the 21st Century, and I will be interested in
hearing the recommendations of our witnesses today on the homeland
security section of their report.
Mr. Chairman, like all Members of this Committee, I wish we did not
have to conduct this hearing under these circumstances. However, I
think it is important, in light of last Tuesday's tragedy, to get this
dialogue going so that we may ultimately eliminate the threat of
terrorism once and for all.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. But you have each done extraordinary
public service here, and I thank you for it. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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