<DOC>
[108 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:87649.wais]
S. Hrg. 108-236
U.S POLICY REGARDING NARCOTICS CONTROL IN COLOMBIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 3, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Narcotics
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
87-649 WASHINGTON : 2004
_______________________________________________________________________
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SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
IN COLOMBIA
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
Charles E. Grassley, Iowa, Chairman
Joseph R. Biden, Delaware, Co-Chair
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BOB GRAHAM, Florida
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
Eric J. Akers, Staff Director
Marcia Lee, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 3, 2003..................................... 1
Statements
Grassley, Hon. Charles E., U.S. Senator from Iowa................ 1
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 1
DeWine, Hon. Mike, U.S. Senator from Ohio........................ 3
Sessions, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from Alabama................... 43
Witnesses
Santos-Calderon, Hon. Francisco, Vice President, Republic of
Colombia, Bogota, Colombia..................................... 4
Prepared sattement........................................... 14
Simons, Paul E., Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC. and J. Curtis Struble,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Struble, J. Curtis, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Western
Hemisphere Affairs, prepared statement......................... 27
Hill, James T., Commander, U.S. Army, Miami, Florida; accompanied
by Marshall Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC..................... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S.
General Accounting Office, Washington, DC...................... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 55
McLean, Phillip, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, The Americas
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC................................................. 65
Prepared statement........................................... 67
Submitted Questions and Answers
Responses by J. Curtis Struble and Paul Simons to Questions
Submitted by:..................................................
Hon. Joseph Biden............................................ 73
Hon. Charles Grassley........................................ 78
Colombia Hearing Questions Submitted (Classified Answers Retained
in Committee files) to:........................................
DoD.......................................................... 82
Jess Ford, GAO............................................... 83
Phillip McLean, CSIS......................................... 83
General Hill from Senator Biden.............................. 83
State Department............................................. 84
U.S. POLICY REGARDING NARCOTICS CONTROL IN COLOMBIA
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 3, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Caucus on International Narcotics Control,
Washington, DC.
The Caucus met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room
SD-215, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E.
Grassley, Chairman of the Caucus, presiding.
Present: Senators Grassley, DeWine, and Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA
Chairman Grassley. I thank everybody for their patience,
although everybody is here on time and we are able to get
started. I particularly want to acknowledge a lot of people who
have come a long distance, obviously, the leadership of our
friend, the country of Colombia, coming so far, as well as our
people here in the United States who are so integrally involved
coming from Florida and elsewhere.
Just in case our ranking minority member, Mr. Biden, is not
able to be here, he asked that I would put a statement in the
record for him and we will do that. But if he is able to come
and he wants some time for his opening, I will obviously be
very happy to give it to him.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
U.S. Senator from Delaware
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing today to examine
U.S. policy in Colombia.
We are honored to be joined by Vice President Francisco Santos. The
Vice President knows all too well the price that Colombia has paid in
its three-front war against drug traffickers, left-wing guerrillas, and
right-wing paramilitaries. He was held hostage for nearly 8 months by
the Medillin cartel in 1990--and he has received numerous death threats
from the FARC.
The people of Colombia live with a level of violence that Americans
cannot comprehend; the bravery that Vice President Santos and his
colleagues in government have demonstrated in the face of that danger
is inspiring.
Three years ago, we renewed our commitment to the Andean region,
providing funding for Plan Colombia, as well as for counter-narcotics
programs in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil. Since then,
we have provided over two billion dollars in assistance to Colombia to
combat the drug trade and restore the rule of law.
We have a duty to help in this effort because it is America's
seemingly insatiable demand for narcotics that has helped fuel the drug
trade.
We are beginning to see some results. Last year, there was a 15
percent decrease in coca cultivation and a 25 percent decrease in opium
poppy cultivation. This reduced supply has led to a modest decrease in
purity of both cocaine and heroin on the streets of the United States.
There is still a long way to go, but this progress is encouraging.
Unfortunately, we had a setback elsewhere in the Andean region,
with coca cultivation increasing by 8 percent in Peru and 23 percent in
Bolivia in 2002. We must do more to help Colombia's neighbors guard
against the so-called ``balloon effect''. And to successfully counter
the drug trade in the entire region, we must have a three-pronged
strategy: eradication, interdiction, and alternative economic
opportunities.
Several other elements of our policy in Colombia bear emphasis.
First, human rights. According to the most recent State Department
report, in 2002:
``The [Colombian] Government's human rights record remained
poor . . . A small percentage of total human rights abuses
reported were attributed to State security forces; however,
some members of the government security forces continued to
commit serious abuses, including unlawful and extrajudicial
killings. Some members of the security forces collaborated with
paramilitary groups that committed serious abuses. Impunity
remained at the core of the country's human rights problems.''
I know that the Vice President, and President Uribe are committed
to improving human rights. But the message is still not getting through
to all levels of the military. We need to see more improvements.
Second, last year Congress changed the law to allow Colombia to use
equipment we have provided for other than counter-narcotics purposes.
This recognizes the reality that Colombia's illegal groups are all
involved in the drug trade. But we must be sure that this change in
authority does result in a major change in focus: our priority must
continue to be fighting the drug trade.
Finally, we must make sure that our other commitments abroad do not
distract us from our promise to help Colombia and its neighbors.
There's a lot on the foreign policy agenda. But we have a lot at stake
in the Andes, and we owe it to our neighbors to help.
The Administration has done a good job in Colombia, but the
Secretary of State cannot be focused on every world problem
simultaneously. He needs some lieutenants. Unfortunately, the Narcotics
Bureau at the State Department has not had a confirmed Assistant
Secretary since August, and as yet no successor has been nominated. I
urge the Administration to send us a nominee as soon as possible.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses this
morning, and having a frank discussion with them about the progress we
are making and the road ahead.
Chairman Grassley. Today, we are going to examine the
current status of events in Colombia. The United States has a
particular interest in the stability and future of Colombia
because it is both one of the oldest democracies in our
hemisphere as well as the home to three terrorist groups, each
of whom get a significant amount of their operational funds
from drugs smuggled into the United States.
With illegal drugs grown and shipped from Colombia killing
Americans everyday and the sale of these drugs funding
terrorists who are killing Colombians everyday, it is in the
interest of both the country of Colombia and our Nation to work
together to eliminate drug production and trafficking in
Colombia.
This past year has seen a very significant increase in the
tempo of activities in Colombia, which has resulted in some of
the successes we will hear today. But we obviously still have a
long way to go, as we all know. This fight is by no means over,
and I hope that we won't let these first signs of success
distract us from the long road ahead. Today's hearing will
highlight several aspects of the situation in Colombia and the
nature of objectives of assistance that we are providing.
The last year has been a tumultuous one for the country of
Colombia. Rapidly evolving events make maintaining a clear
course of action even more difficult. The most recent
developments stem from former Colombian President Pastrana's
decision to give up on 4 years of attempted negotiations with
the FARC and end the Despeje territory, which had been created
in an attempt to bring the FARC to the negotiating table.
Negotiating a peace with the FARC has been a cornerstone of
the Pastrana presidency, but his efforts were ultimately
frustrated by the FARC's reluctance to negotiate seriously. The
failure to find a peaceful solution meant a new approach to the
problem had to be found.
The people of Colombia demonstrated their resolve to take a
new approach in confronting terrorist groups through the
overwhelming election of President Uribe and of our first
witness this morning, Vice President Santos. Elected in the
first round by a significant margin over the nearest
competitor, the President and Vice President face significant
pressure to quickly fulfill their campaign promises, a pressure
that we all understand and about which I am sure our first
witness is well aware.
For the United States, eliminating coca production in
Colombia is a longstanding goal of our National Drug Control
Strategy. Opium poppy cultivation is a more recent development,
but its elimination is also in our strategy.
Working in close cooperation with the Government of
Colombia, we have finally been able to get ahead of production
this past year. According to the most recent cultivation
surveys, coca production in Colombia was down 15 percent from
2001 and opium poppy production was down close to 25 percent.
United Nations estimates show an even bigger reduction in the
coca crop, so it seems that we are making some progress.
President Uribe has made it his goal to eliminate all coca
production within Colombia by August 2006. This is a laudable
goal that the United States is willing to and should support.
Eliminating coca and poppy production is important not only
because of the tremendous damage that these poisons do to
users, but because of the important role they play as a funding
source for terrorist organizations operating in Colombia. I
hope today's testimony by our second panel of witnesses will
shed additional light on what steps are necessary.
Does Senate DeWine have anything he wants to say in an
opening statement before I introduce the Vice President?
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DeWINE, U.S. SENATOR
FROM OHIO
Senator DeWine. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. I
want to thank you very much for holding this very important
hearing. The witnesses that you have lined up are very
impressive.
Mr. Vice President, thank you very much for joining us here
today.
Mr. Chairman, I have had an opportunity to travel to
Colombia on a number of occasions. We all have an interest in
Colombia. I had a chance to meet with President Uribe a few
months ago in Colombia and talk with him about the problems of
Colombia.
This is a country that is in our own backyard. It is one of
the oldest democracies in our hemisphere. It is a country that
is, as we all know, a struggling country that is struggling
against the narco-terrorists. And if we cannot assist a country
such as Colombia that is fighting terrorism in our own
backyard, then obviously we can't do it anywhere in the world.
And we are doing it; we are trying to help Colombia.
The importance of Colombia to the United States, I think,
is obvious. This is a country that is engaged with us in a
common struggle against not only terrorism, but a common
struggle against the drug dealers. We are the consumers of
drugs. Colombia is a producer of drugs. So we have a common
problem and we both recognize that problem and we are working
together. Our hearing today, of course, is to see where we are
in that common struggle, and to evaluate that and to see where
we need to go from here.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this very, very
important hearing, and I thank our witnesses, who all are on
the front line in this struggle, for being here today and I
look forward to their testimony.
Chairman Grassley. Our first witness obviously, as I
mentioned, is the Vice President, Francisco Santos, and he was
elected with the present administration in May of 2002. The
election of the Vice President is his most recent of a long
string of initiatives that Mr. Santos has undertaken to improve
the lives of all Colombians.
Previously, he was editor of El Tiempo, Colombia's largest
newspaper, and in weekly columns there often speaking out
against kidnappings and massacres, and calling upon the civil
society to take a more active role in finding peaceful
solutions to facing the problems of Colombia.
He has stridently condemned murderous acts, whether they
come from the extreme left or the extreme right, and obviously
has been a target of drug traffickers. He was, in fact,
kidnapped by Pablo Escobar, then-leader of the Medellin drug
cartel. He also, with 10 other journalists, was held then for
nearly 8 months in the unsuccessful attempt to extort a promise
from the Colombian Government not to extradite drug traffickers
to the United States.
After being released, he spent a year at Harvard University
as a Nyman Fellow, and then returned to Bogota, finding
publications that would assist the victims of kidnappings and
their families, and the organizations to back it up.
So he has been in the middle and suffered as a result of
his crusades for freedom and for better living conditions for
people in Colombia. So we are privileged to have the Vice
President here, and I thank you very much for your testimony.
Proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCISCO SANTOS-CALDERON, VICE PRESIDENT,
REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA, BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
Vice President Santos-Calderon. Good morning, Chairman
Grassley, Senator DeWine, and distinguished members of the
Caucus. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today to
discuss the significant progress both our countries are making
in the war against narco-terrorism. I have prepared a statement
for the record which I will summarize in the next few minutes.
Let me start by painting a broad picture of the situation
in Colombia today. My country remains one of the most dangerous
places in the world. As we have taken the fight to the
traffickers, they have responded with increasing violence
across the country. We are not just fighting disparate networks
of drug traffickers, but powerful terrorist groups who target
primarily civilians.
The fight has moved from rural, isolated regions of the
country to our largest cities. It has shifted from random acts
of violence to sophisticated and coordinated attacks. The
conflict is becoming increasingly regionalized, as illegal
actors use Colombia's borders to escape our reach.
More than 8,000 acts of terror have been committed against
the Colombian people over the past 5 years, more than the
combined acts of terror committed worldwide during this period.
Colombia suffers 30,000 violent deaths every year, equal to 10
times the victims who died on September 11 every year.
About 2,600 Colombians are kidnapped every year. Children
are forced to fight for the illegal groups. Every type of
economic infrastructure--roads, bridges, power lines, telephone
towers, reservoirs, and all pipelines--has been targeted,
costing billions of dollars and disrupting millions of lives.
More than 1 million Colombians have been displaced by the
violence of the drug terrorist organizations.
How have we responded to the situation in our first 9
months in office? The Uribe administration is implementing a
multi-track fight against the illegal drug trade. This involves
eradication of illegal crops, interdiction, destruction of
narco-trafficking infrastructure and seizing their assets,
military and police action against traffickers, and law
enforcement and judicial cooperation. All these efforts are
directed to a single goal: zero tolerance for drug trafficking
and total eradication of this activity in Colombia by the year
2006.
We have already had positive results to demonstrate in each
of these areas. A record level of illegal coca crops were
sprayed last year. We sprayed 130,000 hectares of coca. This
area of land is equivalent to 524 square miles, or 7.5 times
the size of the District of Columbia. This spraying reduced
Colombia's coca crop by 30 percent for the first time in 10
years.
We have sprayed an additional 65,000 hectares since January
2003, and we hope we will be able to achieve our goal of
spraying more than 150,000 hectares this year. Our aerial
spraying campaign is also targeting illegal poppy crops. We
have sprayed 3,300 hectares in 2002, and so far this year we
have sprayed 1,658 hectares.
We seized a record amount of illegal drugs. From January
2002 to the present, we have interdicted more than 100 tons of
pure cocaine and 850 kilos of heroin. The street value of these
drugs is more than $3 billion, but these drugs will never reach
America's streets.
With a better trained and equipped military and police, we
have targeted narco-terrorists with greater success. Last year,
3,553 guerrillas and 1,336 members of the self-defense groups
were captured. An additional 1,138 members of these illegal
groups have turned themselves in. We have seized over 4,000
weapons, arms that would have been used to perpetuate violence
against our citizens.
Our anti-narcotics brigades, trained and equipped by the
United States, have located and destroyed dozens of cocaine-
producing laboratories and other drug-trafficking
infrastructure. In just one 2-week period in May, a brigade
destroyed 16 coca labs in the State of Narino. Since assuming
office last year, the Uribe government has extradited 78
Colombians to the United States to face justice here for narco-
terrorist crimes.
Senators Plan Colombia is working. These results have been
realized because the Uribe government is committed to taking
the fight directly to the drug terrorists. But it is also the
result of military, economic and social assistance provided by
the United States and the extraordinary level of cooperation
between our two governments.
This cooperation that started under the Pastrana and
Clinton administrations has continued between President Bush
and President Uribe, but it also extends to many thousand
Colombians and Americans who are today working side by side to
defeat narco-terrorism wherever it exists and whenever it
strikes.
Plan Colombia is working for several reasons. First, it was
developed in a bipartisan manner, and bipartisan support has
enabled it to be implemented thoroughly. Second, it required a
commitment by both our countries to combine our resources and
share the burden that this activity inflicts in both of our
societies.
Third, we have both invested significant funds. To date,
the United States has provided $1.7 billion in military,
economic and humanitarian assistance. The Colombian Government
has spent nearly $4 billion of our own funds in support of Plan
Colombia.
Our recent effort to more aggressively target illegal
groups is reducing the level of violence in Colombia. During
the first months of this year, homicides were down by 20
percent, compared to the same period in 2002. Kidnappings were
down 40 percent over the same period.
We are investing significant resources to restore law and
order throughout the country. Defense spending will rise from
3.5 to 5.8 percent of GDP during President Uribe's 4-year term.
The armed forces will be enlarged by 126,000 troops. Already,
there is a greater police and military presence on Colombia's
rural highways and roads. This is critical for commercial
activity and for tourism and public safety.
In addition, we are this year training and equipping 27,000
new police officers who are being stationed in 170 rural towns
where there is no police at all and in 260 rural towns that
have less than 10 policemen each. The bottom line is this: We
are making Colombia a safer country day by day, road by road,
town by town. We are committed to this effort because we know
narco-terrorist violence affects all Colombians, rich and poor,
urban and rural, powerful and ordinary citizens.
President Uribe and I have not been exempt from it. Our
inaugural ceremony last year was targeted by a FARC missile
attack. The President's father was kidnapped and assassinated
by the FARC in the 1980's. I was kidnapped by Pablo Escobar and
held captive for 8 months in 1990. My brother-in-law was killed
by a bomb that Pablo Escobar put in an airplane.
Nearly every member of President Uribe's Cabinet has lost a
family member or a close relative in this violence. Governors,
mayors, congressmen, labor leaders, soldiers, policemen, human
rights workers and journalists, all brave citizens fighting to
take back our country from those illegal organizations, have
been murdered.
For President Uribe and myself, defeating terrorism is not
just a policy. It is a total commitment. We know the
destruction that drugs and violence inflict not just on our
country, but on our families and loved ones. To end the cycle
of drugs and violence, we need continued support and
cooperation from the United States and the international
community.
We are benefiting from American technology, intelligence,
training, and financial assistance. We offer in return our full
commitment and energy to learn, to execute, to cooperate, and
to achieve the results both our countries desired. Colombia's
strength is its national resilience in the face of adversity.
We move forward, propelled by our determination and the help of
allies like the United States to a more promising future.
Thank you.
Chairman Grassley. Well, thank you, Mr. Vice President. The
two of us would have a few questions to ask you, and I might
make an announcement for you as well as for other panels as
well.
Particularly on Tuesdays, there are a lot of committee
meetings and members might not be able to come to all these
hearings. So you might get questions in writing from members
who can't be here or even from those of us who are here, and we
would appreciate responses in about a 2\1/2\-week period of
time, if you do get questions in writing.
First of all, Mr. Vice President, you were very positive
from your point of view about Plan Colombia working, and I am
very happy to hear that sort of positive response and, of
course, that is what this hearing is basically about.
Are there any shortcomings in Plan Colombia that you would
want to point out to Members of the U.S. Congress?
Vice President Santos-Calderon. No. At this point in time,
I think the most important thing is to maintain the level of
assistance. Obviously, we are going into new areas where our
planes are being hit tremendously, the spraying planes, the
helicopters.
Right now, we have moved to the southern part of the
Bolivia region, to other regions, and the anti-narcotics
battalions are going to be moved there. So we think that will
improve the situation. But certainly, as we move more
aggressively in more areas, we are taking hits on those planes
in a more massive manner than we did before. But with the level
of assistance that right now is being provided, we think that
our goal of eradicating drugs and cultivation in the year 2006
will be able to be met.
Chairman Grassley. I would like to have you describe for me
the support that your administration has received from
Colombian citizens for its fight against drug trafficking and
terrorism. Obviously, I presume that those that are outside of
what you might call the drug-growing areas or the areas not so
close to the FARC and other organizations obviously would
welcome the sort of aggressive action you are taking.
But the extent to which you could quantify that support,
more important if there is any way you can describe support
from those whose lives are closer to the regions where fighting
might be going on, that would be helpful.
Vice President Santos-Calderon. President Uribe and his
administration have had a very, very clear discourse in regard
to defeating drugs. That is why Colombians elected us, and in
that sense we have been very, very clear with Colombian society
about what our goals are.
And we have backed up that discourse with action. We have
told drug barons that they are going to be extradited and we
have extradited them, that they are going to be attacked and
they have been attacked, that we are going to seize their
assets, and in the latest action we seized 6,000 hectares of
land that is going to go to displaced peasants.
We have told the peasants who are involved in drug
trafficking that an illegal hectare of crop is an illegal
hectare of crop, and that we are going to eradicate it. In that
sense, what we have seen is that more and more of the peasants
that have been displaced from those areas are going back to the
traditional agricultural areas where they used to be.
We are protecting some crops so that they can go back to
the places and be able to have a sustainable income. Our growth
in cotton is very impressive, and cotton in Colombia generates
a lot of rural employment. We are trying to protect coffee,
also, that generates employment.
So what we have seen is that our security policy has been
able to absorb those peasants that moved out of the traditional
cultivation areas into coca areas, and the growth of the
agricultural economy is pretty impressive. So in that sense, by
protecting the rural areas, we have been able to generate the
employment that our poppy and coca spraying campaigns have
generated in other areas.
President Uribe's popularity, according to sources, is
around 65 to 70 percent, and in that sense it shows that
Colombians are fed up with violence, that Colombians want this
to end, and I think have supported the President in a way that
sometimes we didn't expect it was going to be as high as it is.
We have been very transparent with the Colombian population
about what we are doing. We have accepted the mistakes that
sometimes the policy can have. We are willing to correct them,
but what we have been very clear on is that our zero-tolerance
policy toward drugs is non-negotiable, non-negotiable because
it is a national security matter.
If we eradicate drugs, we will take the main fueling agent
of the conflict and we will be able to defeat easier the drug
terrorist organizations that are killing all those Colombians
and that are destroying a lot of the infrastructure and that
are displacing Colombians. So Colombians who voted for us to
recuperate security, that is what they are getting and they are
pretty happy about it.
Chairman Grassley. Even though your administration is less
than a year old, have you seen, and if you have seen any
changes in terrorist organization functioning, how they
function or what they accomplish compared to before--in other
words, as a result of your administration's actions, any sorts
of changes that have taken place that you actually see within
the last few months.
Vice President Santos-Calderon. Yes, we can foresee a
couple of changes which are pretty important. The first one is
that the FARC, which used to be a very conservative
organization in terms of military development, has gone
shopping in the world, has bought technology from different
terrorist groups and has used it.
Last year, we lost, I think, 15 explosives experts because
they bought technology from a terrorist organization and they
learned very quickly how to put bombs in a different manner and
our explosives experts didn't know it was being done. The
attack on the 7th of August was technology also bought from a
terrorist organization.
So we can foresee the FARC to use more efficient methods of
terrorism, to look for it, to shop around the world not only
for technology, but knowledge too. And they have urbanized the
conflict, so we can foresee a lot more terrorist activities in
regard to the conflict, terrorist activities in the large urban
areas.
In the past 8 months, our police have seized in Bogota, the
capital, more than five tons of explosives. Our police have
done a very good job. Unfortunately, we can't stop them all and
we had the Nogal incident, but they really want to take
terrorism into the urban areas.
The second thing is that our attacks against the
paramilitaries and the drug traffickers have been so strong,
and will be even stronger in the future, that you can foresee
the most radical elements of those organizations working
together with the FARC in order to destabilize the country and
in order to make more efficient the terrorist war.
Drug traffickers fish in turbulent waters, and the more
order we have, the less they will be effective in promoting
their business. So I would foresee, and I think it wouldn't be
a strange thing if those radical elements come together and
move efficiently in some areas. The FARC and the paramilitaries
are starting to share the business, the coca business. So you
are starting to see some signals that are very worrisome and
that will require the Colombian army and the Colombian police
to combat them even stronger.
The other thing that I think will be worrisome--and I know
this might be in the future--the FARC has become a more
fearless type of organization. Their political elements are in
the back seat. A lot of the political figures who grew out of
the organizations have been taken away of positions of power.
And the FARC has created an organization that is very efficient
because it promotes those who get more money and are more
violence-oriented, produce more results.
And in that sense, what you foresee is an organization that
has less restraints and will look for allies all over the
world. I think that in the future, when they feel weak--and
when they feel weak, they react very violently. That is the
pattern they have had. I am worried that they might use
different types of weapons of mass destruction.
They have gotten involved in the water reservoirs, which is
very dangerous. So I foresee for the near future that our
successes will make the FARC more violent, more prone to get
allies in the international community of terrorists and looking
for new ways of generating terror in Colombia.
Chairman Grassley. My last question would be in regard to--
I don't know whether this would be a fair measure of your
continuing success, but I would see that in previous attempts
that maybe the average citizen in Colombia would be fearful of
helping the government in any way, with information or any
other way, against drug traffickers. But with an aggressive
administration, you might see the average citizen moving to
help the government and the police and the military to a
greater extent without feeling their lives were maybe so
jeopardized as otherwise.
Are you seeing any movement in that direction of the
average citizen being less fearful and more willing to
cooperate with the government against FARC and other
organizations, or is that still pretty much a difficult thing
for the average citizen to be involved with?
Vice President Santos-Calderon. That certainly has been the
case. The population more and more is cooperating with the
policy, with the army, and with the government. We are seeing
it all over the country.
As I said before, in 170 towns we are going to get back a
pretty important contingent of soldiers and policemen, between
50 and 100. In the 90 towns where we have put them back so far,
they are received like heroes. They say finally you are taking
away this terror that we used to live in. What people want is
authority, State legal authority, to be imposed and to get back
to being able to live successfully.
Our policy of recuperating the roads has been a major
success. Before, you used to be incarcerated in the cities. You
know, you were so worried that you left the cities and you were
kidnapped. Our internal tourism was practically dead, and that
has generated huge popular support because people immediately
realized that authority imposed with respect for human rights,
but authority nonetheless can benefit the citizens.
The past Easter where there was a big vacation, more than 8
million Colombians took to the roads again. We hadn't seen that
in the past 7 years. So all those small steps have made people
believe in authority again, have made people believe in the
government again. And certainly without their help, we wouldn't
be able to stop a lot of the terrorist actions we have been
able to stop.
The army and the police have responded very quickly to tips
from the citizens, which didn't used to happen. So there is a
trust that is starting to grow immensely. In polls that have
been made by independent organizations, newspapers, et cetera,
the No. 1 institution in trust and popularity in Colombia is
the armed forces. That is a process that has helped, certainly,
the cooperation of citizens with the government.
Chairman Grassley. I thank you for your testimony and thank
you for answering questions.
I now turn to Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Vice President, you have really touched upon this, but
I want to get into it just a little bit more. You really have
entered a new phase of this war with the guerrillas, the FARC,
moving into the urban areas. This is obviously a calculated
effort to bring terror to the middle class, terror to the urban
areas, to Bogota and the other major cities.
What impact has this had, do you think, on the people in
the urban areas so far? I mean, this was an attempt that was
made years ago by the drug dealers with some success, actually,
in the past. How are you going to keep this from happening
again? What has been the reaction of the people in Bogota? The
people in Cartagena and people in the other urban centers--what
has been their reaction?
Vice President Santos-Calderon. You know, certainly, for
example, the bomb that they put in the club where they killed
37 persons and more than 100 were injured, it hurt us. You have
to recognize it, you know, and people get scared.
But what we felt immediately was that after the initial
reaction, Colombians citizens toughened up and said, ``You
know, we know this is the price we have to pay''. So you have a
population that has lived through all that and is tougher than
ever, which doesn't mean that we don't have to really improve
our intelligence and try to avoid those types of acts.
As a matter of fact, with the help of U.S. Government
intelligence, informants, and work which we are doing in a very
coordinated way, the police have stopped many, many incidents
like those in Bogota, in Medellin, in Cali, and in other
cities. The work has been quite impressive. The results are
very, very good in stopping terrorist acts.
But unfortunately, with one that you can stop, a lot of
that policy gets not stopped, but people get frightened and
questioned. But I think the leadership of President Uribe that
he established after the bombing accident and that was
reflected in a phrase he said in a speech after that that said
that Colombians are crying but they will not surrender--that is
the feeling of the country right now.
And the support for security policy, even though it suffers
a little bit with those incidents--I think we have gone a long
way from the early 1990's when car bombs in the cities and
terrorism almost put Colombian society to its knees. We have
learned a lesson and we know that we are going to pay some more
prices, some really high prices in this fight against
terrorists, but we are willing to do it and so far we have the
support of Colombian society.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Vice President, in both your written
testimony and your oral testimony, you have really, I think,
done a good job in helping us understand the human cost of
narcotics production and trafficking in Colombia. While most
Americans understand the toll that cocaine and heroin take on
our own young people, I venture to say that few Americans are
really aware of the toll that narcotics take on the children of
Colombia.
As noted in a human rights report recently released by our
own State Department, children are often caught in a crossfire.
For example, last June a crossfire between paramilitaries and a
mixed contingent of FARC and ELN fighters killed a 7-year-old
boy outside that little boy's home in Colombia. In September,
three children in Bogota were killed when the grenade with
which they were playing exploded. The grenade apparently had
been discarded by members of the FARC urban militia that
operated in that neighborhood.
An estimated 12,000 to 15,000 children were members of
illegal armed groups, both paramilitary and guerrilla. The
Roman Catholic Church has reported that FARC used its freedom
and its former safe haven to lure or force children into its
ranks, which you have already talked about. Children who have
deserted from the FARC have reported that local guerrilla
commanders threatened to kill their families should they desert
or attempt to do so.
Let me ask you, could you further describe the impact that
narco-terrorism is having on your country's young people, or
maybe give us some personal perspective on this aspect of the
conflict? Will you expand on what you have already talked about
a little bit?
Vice President Santos-Calderon. Drug trafficking fuels
Colombia's war. It finances the paramilitaries, it finances the
FARC, and the alien which didn't used to get its finances from
drug trafficking now is involved in the business.
All those three organizations, especially the first two of
them, are involved in all aspects of the business, not only
protecting crops, not only protecting labs, but now they are
involved in all the ladder of the drug trafficking business.
That provides between $300 and $500 million to those terrorist
organizations. If Al-Qaeda had that kind of money, I don't want
to even think what they could do.
We need to take that money away from them. That money has
allowed them to grow, to buy technology. The FARC 10 years ago,
15 years ago, was a 3- to 4,000-member army. Now, they have
17,000, all financed from drugs.
I will give you a perspective of what is happening. We have
15 members of Congress kidnapped. The head of the human rights
commission is kidnapped. The head of the peace commission of
the senate is kidnapped. A Governor was just killed. They have
a former Governor kidnapped. They have a Presidential candidate
kidnapped. They had two former ministers kidnapped. They tried
to kidnap a bishop. Last year, they killed 90 council members.
They have 18 State assembly members kidnapped.
The Colombian government has a President, as I said before,
whose father was kidnapped and killed. The interior minister,
his father was kidnapped and was released. The education
minister has a brother who was kidnapped by the FARC, killed,
and now has a brother that is kidnapped.
The prosecutor general's wife, which was a former culture
minister, was kidnapped and she was murdered. The minister of
agriculture, his son used to work for the crop substitution
program and he was killed in a plane crash when he was going to
a region.
Obviously, I was kidnapped. I had to leave the country in
the year 2000 because of threats by the FARC. In the bombing of
El Nogal, I lost a very good friend, and my 9-year-old daughter
had to go the funeral of a school friend that died from that
bomb.
When you look at the amount of displaced people, it is a
horrendous humanitarian problem. The AUC, the paramilitaries
and the FARC use displacement as a military weapon, a
territorial control weapon. They are using displacement in
their barbaric types of tactics and we have between 1 and 1.5
million Colombians displaced by those organizations.
If we don't destroy crops and eliminate drug trafficking
from Colombia, we will not be able to destroy those
organizations. Therefore, we have to combat them with
everything we have, and there is an element that also generates
immense problems and it has to do with children in the
conflict.
The AUC, the FARC and the ELN, more than 30 percent of
their members are children between the ages of 10 and 15 years
old. What we are seeing in the massive desertions is a lot of
those children want to leave those organizations and we have a
special program designed with our institution to protect
children, the ICBF, the Colombian Institution for Children's
Benefits, to protect them and we have a special program. But
that is another element of it.
I will give you a personal story. I had somebody who worked
with me. When I had to leave for Spain, she went back to her
town, which was in the highlands, and she went just 3 months
ago and told me a horrendous story about what was happening in
her region.
She had left because the FARC had come and wanted to take
her children, to recruit them, to force recruitment. So she
left everything and went to Bogota, and what she told me was
not only that the FARC was doing that--and what we have been
able to see is that forced recruitment of children is the No. 1
cause of displacement. People would rather leave their area
than give their children to the FARC, to the paramilitaries, or
to the ELN. So that is also complicating the social scenery and
the humanitarian tragedy that these terrorist groups are
generating.
So in all areas of Colombian society, you see the drug-
financing terrorist activities affecting Colombian society,
affecting broader elements of Colombian families. And the
hindering of social development is also an element that this
conflict is generating.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Vice President, that is a chilling
description, I think, of the price that your country is paying
and what the FARC and the ELN and the paramilitaries are doing
to your country. I appreciate hearing this and I think it is
something that the American people need to understand and I
think it was a very eloquent description.
I have been very impressed by your government. As I said, I
had the opportunity several months ago to meet with President
Uribe in Cartagena and discussed with him the situation for
about an hour-and-a-half. It was at a time shortly after some
additional attempts on his life and I was impressed by his
courage and his tenacity and his determination to do what was
necessary to hang in there and to fight back against the
terrorists.
So we appreciate your coming and we appreciate your
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Grassley. Mr. Vice President, I don't have any
other questions, but we obviously are going to monitor this
situation and continue to lend what help we can and encourage
you all we can. I hope that you will free to stay in touch with
this group that we call the International Narcotics Control
Caucus, the group that is holding this meeting, on how we can
be helpful.
We have been very impressed with the leadership that you
send representing your country here in Washington, DC. They
keep in touch with us on a regular basis. We consider them
friends and we want you to be very successful. Thank you very
much.
You are welcome to stay if you want to sit in the audience
for the rest of the day, if you want to. I know you are
probably very busy, but you would be welcome to stay if you
want to stay.
Vice President Santos-Calderon. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Vice President Santos-Calderon
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Francisco Santos-Calderon,
Vice President of Colombia
Good morning Chairman Grassley, Senator Biden and distinguished
members of the Caucus.
It is an honor to be here today and have a chance to report on the
progress that has been possible thanks to the support and cooperation
of both this Congress and the Government of the United States. Thanks
to U.S.-Colombia collaborative efforts we have made significant
progress in building democratic security in Colombia and begun to show
increasing results in successfully combating narcoterrorism.
i. a successful alliance
Through Plan Colombia the U.S. became more immersed and committed
to the fight against drugs. Less than 3 years into its implementation,
this strategy has demonstrated greater results than any other strategy
previously attempted.
President Alvaro Uribe's commitment is clear: zero tolerance for
drug-trafficking. One of Colombia's main goals is the total eradication
coca and opium poppy cultivation and trafficking by the year 2006.
Since year 2000, U.S. Congress has provided us over $1.7 billion
dollars in economic, humanitarian and security aid. The alliance
between our governments enables us to address common objectives such as
combating drug trafficking and terrorism. The narco-terrorist threat
affects both our countries and our joint efforts to combat it will
improve the security of the U.S. and Colombia and provide stability to
the entire Andean region.
Together, we have made considerable progress.
<bullet> Aerial spraying: In 2002, we sprayed 130,363 hectares of
coca. According to the United Nations, this represents a 30 percent
reduction of total coca cultivation. It is the largest number of
hectares sprayed and the steepest decline of coca cultivation. So far
this year we have sprayed over 65,000 hectares. By the end 2003 we
expect to eradicate 50 percent of all illicit coca cultivation.
<bullet> Interdiction: We have also made significant progress in
seizing illegal drugs. From January 1, 2002 to the present we
interdicted over 110 tons of pure cocaine, most of this in cooperation
with the United States. In the same time period, we confiscated more
than 850 kilos of heroin. We destroyed more than 225 cocaine production
laboratories.
<bullet> Coca production: Since every hectare of coca is equivalent
to 3.9 to 4.3 kilos of cocaine, our spraying strategy succeeded in
removing more than 150 tons of pure cocaine off the market last year.
This result, together with interdiction successes, represents 260 tons
of cocaine that did not reach the U.S. or the world market.
<bullet> Heroin production: As for heroine, a serious and growing
threat to the United States, we achieved a net reduction of 25 percent
in opium poppy cultivation in 2002 alone. Our spray teams, trained and
assisted by the United States, sprayed over 3,300 hectares last year
and, we have already sprayed 1,658 hectares this year. This is another
area of considerable progress, taking into account that, according to
CNC estimates, Colombia currently has approximately 4,900 hectares of
poppy plantations. As a positive consequence of the these efforts, from
2001 to 2002, the purity of heroin in the United States fell by an
average of 6 percent, according to DEA estimates.
When the Colombian Army Counter Drug (CD) Brigade began its
operations in 2001, it focused on the southern region of Colombia,
especially in the Department of Putumayo. This State was at that time
the heart of the Colombia coca cultivation. Trained and supported by
the United States, the Brigade achieved impressive results. They
located and destroyed dozens of cocaine production laboratories and
other drug trafficking infrastructure, including oil refineries used by
the FARC to produce cocaine base. As a consequence, the narco-
trafficking organizations have transferred their activities to other
regions of the country, mainly the Pacific Coast Department of Narino.
In late 2002, the Uribe administration restructured the CD Brigade.
It was transferred from the Joint Task Force South and placed under
Colombian Army command with the mission to attack high-value narco-
terrorist targets throughout the country. It also received advanced
training from United States Army Special Forces. These changes gave new
strength to the fight against narco-trafficking organizations. In May,
the Government deployed a battalion of the Brigade to attack the drug
industry in Narino: in only 2 weeks a CD Brigade-led joint operation
with the Colombian Navy and National Police destroyed 16 cocaine-
producing laboratories and confiscated a ton of pure cocaine alkaloid.
In light of the results of our successful alliance, it is easy to
understand what the Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP), John P. Walters, said recently:
``President Uribe has achieved major successes against the
illicit drug trade. Reductions in drug production in Colombia
will mean fewer drugs on American streets. We intend to remain
a solid partner with Colombia as they fight against a drug
industry that inflicts damage on both of our nations.''
You know as well as we do there were many skeptics that Plan
Colombia would succeed in reducing drug trafficking. These
accomplishments, which are just a few from a long list of successful
missions undertaken in cooperation with the U.S., speak for themselves.
We have proven non-believers wrong and the Uribe administration assures
you we will eradicate drugs from Colombia. To successfully accomplish
this mission our partnership with the United States is vital.
ii. narco-trafficking and terrorism
Terrorism continues in Colombia. Here are just 3 of the 361 acts of
terrorism suffered by Colombia during the first 4 months of 2003:
<bullet> On Friday, February 14, 2003, a patrol of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)--one of the State
Department's designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)--fired
upon a downed U.S. reconnaissance aircraft while it flew a counter-
narcotics mission in Southern Colombia. The FARC brutally murdered U.S.
citizen Jennis Thomas and Colombian Sergeant Luis Alcides Cruz, and
kidnapped three other American citizens who are still being held.
<bullet> Last May 5, in a jungle camp of the guerrillas in Urrao,
Department of Antioquia, another FARC group, perpetrated a massacre by
killing the Governor of that Department, Guillermo Gaviria, his Peace
Adviser, and former Minister of Defense, Gilberto Echeverri, who had
been kidnapped the previous year, and eight soldiers whom they had held
in captivity for several years. The hostages were kept in inhumane
conditions.
<bullet> On February 7, a car-bomb exploded, killing 32 people and
injuring close to 150, including many children, at the El Nogal social
club in Bogota.
Colombia is a long standing democracy with a president elected last
year with broad popular support. Our democracy is besieged by a violent
minority that lacks any popular support and whose main sources of
financing are drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion.
These illegal armed groups repeatedly and systematically engage in
summary executions, torture and kidnapping. They attempt to restrict
our freedom of movement and opinion. They threaten and assassinate
local elected officials. They destroy the country's infrastructure. In
general, our common heritage is under siege. The truth is undeniable:
Colombians are the victims of terrorism.
It is violence that affects everyone: rich and poor, urban and
rural, powerful and ordinary citizens. President Alvaro Uribe's father
was assassinated by the FARC in the 1980's. Last year this group
murdered the wife of the Attorney General Edgardo Maya, former Minister
Consuelo Araujo. My own family has been a victim of narco-terrorism: My
brother-in-law, Andres Escabi, died in a commercial airliner that was
blown up by Pablo Escobar, the former leader of the infamous Medellin
Cartel. I was kidnapped and held for 8 months.
Some key statistics illustrate the extent of the human cost in
terrorist violence:
<bullet> In the nexus between narco-trafficking and terrorism
Colombia has suffered an average of 30,000 violent deaths a year for
the last 3 years. This is a figure close to the total number of victims
of the attacks of September 11, 2001--every month!
<bullet> Over the last 5 years, 16,000 people have been kidnapped.
<bullet> Over 6,000 children have been recruited mainly by coercion
or force to fight for the illegal armed groups.
<bullet> Today, the illicit armed groups are responsible for almost
all the violations of human rights in Colombia.
<bullet> Over the last 5 years, we have suffered 8,000 acts of
collective destruction.
The economic costs of their actions are also enormous:
<bullet> During 2002, the illegal armed groups downed 483 power
lines, 62 communications towers, 100 bridges and attacked 12
reservoirs. These attacks have cost Colombia more than $4 billion
dollars, money which was literally stolen from the citizens of our
country.
<bullet> Terrorist violence costs an estimated 2 points of
Colombia's Gross Domestic Product every year.
The FARC and Colombia's other two State Department-designated FTOs,
the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the National
Liberation Army (ELN), have moved from simply taxing coca fields to the
production and distribution of pure cocaine.
Here are some examples:
<bullet> In November 2000, a senior lieutenant to FARC military
commander, Mono Jojoy, was arrested in Mexico City while meeting with
the chief of operations of the powerful Mexican Arellano Felix Cartel.
<bullet> In March 2002, soon after the end of the Zona de Despeje,
the Colombian National Police discovered over seven metric tons of pure
cocaine in several FARC-run cocaine production labs--these drugs were
ready to be shipped to international markets.
<bullet> The leader of the AUC has publicly admitted to trafficking
in drugs to finance his weapons and arms purchases. There is ample
evidence that paramilitary groups ship tons of pure cocaine through
Pacific and Caribbean drug transshipment points to United States and
Europe.
The FARC, ELN and AUC are the perpetrators of the majority of the
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in my
country. The principal victims are the civilian population. For each
member of the Armed Forces killed last year, at least six civilians
were murdered by the illegal armed groups. For every soldier and
policeman taken hostage against international humanitarian law, 43
civilians were kidnapped. A total of 35 mayors have been assassinated
over the last 3 years and 62 representatives of city councils in the
last year alone.
iii. environmental damage
Together with this escalation of death and terror, drug trafficking
organizations cause enormous, irreparable damage to the global
environment.
Drug traffickers have concentrated their activity in
environmentally-sensitive ecosystems: poppy is planted in high Andean
forests and highlands while coca is grown in the vast plains and
tropical forests of Orinoquia and Amazonia. These form part of one of
the world's most important ecological zones to regulate global climate.
Moreover, this region is humanity's largest source of flora and fauna
that could hold the secrets to curing diseases.
Studies show that for every hectare of coca cultivated, four
hectares of Amazon forest are felled. For every hectare of opium poppy,
2.5 hectares of Andean forest are destroyed. In addition to this loss
of flora and fauna, destruction of these forests itself contributes to
global warming--an estimated 380 kilograms of biomass per hectare is
burnt. The area destroyed by traffickers between 1990 and 2000 is equal
to about twice the size of Yellowstone National Park.
Drug traffickers use a broad range of insecticides, herbicides and
fungicides to grow their illegal crops. These destroy biomass because
of their high toxicity. In the year 2000 alone, approximately 4.5
million liters of these chemicals were used. These chemicals, solvents,
acids and bases are dumped into Amazon streams and rivers, damaging the
environment and the normal functioning of aquatic ecosystems,
especially the biological cycles and the very existence of their fauna.
The quantity of chemicals dumped into the Amazon river systems each
year is equivalent to two Exxon Valdez disasters.
iv. democratic security
In spite of terrible terrorist atrocities committed against my
country, Colombia continues to thrive. It is a dynamic Nation of 44
million people--the vast majority of whom are honest, love their
country, want their rights to be respected and are productive members
of society.
Colombia is the fifth largest economy in Latin America after
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela; the second largest in the
Andean region; and, the largest market among the Andean Trade Program
and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) member states. Our population is the
third largest in Latin America. 90 percent of our inhabitants are under
50 years of age and 71 percent live in urban areas. Colombia has a
cultured entrepreneurial class with a sizable and growing middle class.
It has a productive, intelligent workforce, with significant skilled
human resources and low labor costs. According to the United Nations
Development Program's (UNDP) Human Development Index, Colombia is a
medium developed country, ranked 15 among the 83 countries in that
category.
Even during recent years when acts of narco-terrorism were at their
highest, the Colombian economy continued to grow. Colombia grew 2.23
percent in the second half of 2002 and 3.8 percent in the first quarter
of this year. This places us in the same position of the 1980's and
1990's, when our economy grew without interruption and at rates much
higher than the Latin American average.
Colombia has always honored its international debts and
commitments. At present, the majority of our external debt is long-
term. In recent years, Banco de la Republica, the country's central
bank, succeeded in stabilizing inflation in line with international
standards.
The fact that we have achieved constant, uninterrupted economic
growth in spite of being plagued by many difficulties, is a
demonstration of the determination of our hard working people.
Colombia will not permit minority terrorist armed groups,
principally financed by drug trafficking, to continue indiscriminately
attacking innocent citizens, perpetrating assaults and massacres,
kidnapping, laying anti-personnel land mines and committing other
terrorist acts. These terrorist groups are harming our country's
economy, spoiling the tranquility of our citizenry and restricting
Colombians' right to progress.
President Uribe's commitment is to defeat narco-terrorism shares
the same vision expressed by President Bush after the events of
September 11, 2001 when he said:
``We will direct all the resources we have available to us--
all diplomatic channels, all the tools of intelligence, all the
instruments for the enforcement of the law, all the financial
influence and the necessary arms of war--towards the
destruction and defeat of the global network of terror.''
v. the colombian contribution
Under the leadership of President Uribe, we are implementing a
policy of democratic security to combat terrorism, drug trafficking,
extortion and kidnapping.
One of the priorities of this policy is to strengthen the Armed
Forces. Our military personnel and police ratio is very low compared to
other countries: 3.9 troops for every 1,000 citizens. President Uribe
intends to increase, the size of the Military Forces by 126,361 and
defense spending from 3.5 percent to 5.8 percent of GDP during his 4-
year administration. To achieve this, Colombians are being called upon
to make a greater sacrifice. Last year, the Government decreed a tax on
capital for companies and citizens with the highest incomes, through
which, in spite of the economic difficulties of the time, resources
close to 1 percent of GDP are being collected.
Since the onset of Plan Colombia, Colombia improved the
professionalism and efficiency of its public forces. Today we have a
force that is more aggressive and offensive-minded, better equipped and
trained for night combat, with improved war-fighting capability. There
is improved coordination and cooperation between the different
services. The military force is more sensitive to and respectful of
human rights.
One shortfall in returning security to Colombians has been the lack
of police presence in conflicting zones. The Colombian National Police
(CNP), in cooperation with the U.S. Government, is implementing a plan
to reestablish public security by training and equipping 165,000
policemen. These will be assigned to 157 municipalities which currently
do not have a police presence. We are creating 62 mobile Carabineros
Squadrons, or rural police, and building 80 hardened new police
stations in the larger municipalities.
Our efforts are already showing results, but we recognize there is
a long and difficult road ahead. Some statistics:
<bullet> Compared to last year, in the first 4 months of 2003 we
reduced the number of homicides by 20 percent, thus saving the lives of
1,964 Colombians.
<bullet> We also managed to reduce kidnappings by 32 percent and
have increased rescues of people held for ransom by 56 percent. This
has meant freedom for 322 Colombians.
<bullet> In the first half of 2002, there were 170,000 displaced
persons and in the second half, 98,000.
<bullet> In the first half of 2002, the deaths of 98 union members
were reported; in the second half, these deaths declined to 52 and in
the first quarter of 2003, to 9.
These results have been achieved by public forces who are
respecting human rights. Data we have provided to this Congress and to
the U.S. Government, in accordance with the requirement contained in
Section 564 of Law 107-115, show that in spite of the intensification
of the conflict, human rights complaints against members of the Armed
Forces have been substantially reduced.
President Uribe has made it clear: We do not accept violence either
to combat the Government or to defend it. Both are terrorist acts. We
are committed to promoting and defending human rights.
vi. towards final victory
Three of the four State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations which operate in the Western Hemisphere are present in
Colombia. It is time for all leaders, media, individuals and
organizations to realize the enormity of the danger these organizations
represent to our country.
Since 1992, these groups have kidnapped 54 and murdered 11 American
citizens. While they are not as clear and present danger as Al-Qaeda,
they have indirectly caused greater harm to Americans by promoting drug
consumption, poisoning the population, frustrating the future of
millions of young people and inciting violence and crime in towns and
cities. According to information provided by the ONDCP, drugs in the
United States cause the death of as many as 50,000 Americans every
year. This is a threat to both of our countries and we need to continue
working together to defeat it. The Uribe administration is committed to
this war.
The Uribe Administration, in addition to democratic security, is
focusing on political, economic and social transformation by reducing,
government spending, improving tax collection, reforming the
administration, reinvigorating the economy and social policy. In
addition to the results in the fight against drugs and the struggle to
overcome terrorism, the assistance we have received from the United
States have been important to our efforts to fight corruption, improve
the justice system, protect human rights, reinsert ex-combatants into
society [especially children] and promote alternative development in
coca and poppy growing regions.
In addition to building up democratic security, our priority is to
continue strengthening our economic stability. US-lead initiatives such
as FTAA, ATPA and ATPDEA allow us to create more jobs and move toward
greater growth and development, providing legal alternatives to narco-
trafficking.
I wish to express, once again, the gratitude of millions of
Colombians who have benefited, directly or indirectly, from America's
generous assistance.
We are committed to defeat terrorism. We need know-how, expertise
and to maintain the levels of support the U.S. provides Colombia. I
invite you to continue to protect this alliance, to strengthen and
empower its results. To channel the successes and abundant experience
we have accumulated in the fight against narco-trafficking and
terrorism, which are, at the end of the day, the same thing, to fulfill
the plans and attain the goals which the Presidents of our two nations
have been so right in outlining to eradicate these threats.
Thank you.
Chairman Grassley. It is my privilege now to call the
second panel. I had invited the Deputy Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Mark Grossman, to testify, but last week he
was sent by the Secretary of State to Europe for NATO
ministerial meetings, and then on to Africa. When the President
calls, I can understand his not being here.
So we are fortunate to have Curt Struble, Acting Assistant
Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, and Mr. Paul Simons,
the Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement. They have come in the stead of
Mr. Grossman.
Then we also have Marshall Billingslea, Under Secretary for
Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict. He has joined
General Hill to respond to any questions that we may ask.
Again, two witnesses for one invitation, and we feel very
fortunate to have these people with us.
I am sorry. I should have told you to come to the table as
I was introducing you, so please come up here. Then, according
to instructions from my staff, long statements will be put in
the record and you don't have to ask us to do that, and then we
would like to have you give whatever summary you want to give.
We appreciate very much your taking time, particularly
traveling long distances for some of you to be here.
So, Mr. Struble, and then Mr. Billingslea.
STATEMENT OF PAUL E. SIMONS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU
FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC. AND J. CURTIS STRUBLE,
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC.
Mr. Struble. Senator, thank you very much. I have agreed
with Acting Assistant Secretary Paul Simons that he will give a
short statement on behalf of both of us.
Chairman Grassley. Thank you.
Mr. Simons.
Mr. Simons. Mr. Chairman, Senator DeWine, thank you very
much for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to
talk about the narcotics situation in Colombia, as well as the
Department of State's response to that situation.
We have a longer written statement which we would ask be
submitted for the record. In order to give sufficient time for
questions, I would like to summarize that statement in four
very brief points.
First of all, what we are doing in Colombia on the drug
side makes a difference in terms of overall U.S. counter-
narcotics objectives in the world. Colombia, as you know, is
very much the center of the illicit narcotics industry. In
recent years, as the Vice President noted, the rural security
vacuum in Colombia created a situation in which Colombia has
grown to now be responsible for over 70 percent of the world's
total coca cultivation, as well as some 90 percent of the
cocaine entering the United States. Colombia is also a
significant source of heroin for the U.S. market. So we need to
get it right in Colombia for our overall counter-narcotics
objectives.
Second--and again this was a point that the Vice President
touched on--directly linked to the illicit drug trade is the
scourge of terrorism that also plagues Colombia. Terrorism in
Colombia both supports and draws resources from the narcotics
industry, and Congress' willingness to provide resources for a
unified campaign against narco-trafficking and terrorist
organizations, I think, is a very real demonstration of this
linkage.
Third--and I refer again to the testimony of the Vice
President which coincided so much with our thinking--since
taking office, President Uribe has demonstrated an unwavering
commitment to countering narco-terrorists. In spite of at least
15 assassination attempts, both before and after his election,
he continues to implement bold policies that are intended to
give Colombia back to the Colombians.
Most recently, during his meetings here in Washington at
the end of April with both the executive branch as well as
Members of Congress, President Uribe emphasized his commitment
to complete elimination of Colombia's coca crop by the end of
his term in office.
He is an avid supporter of the aerial eradication and
alternative development programs that are the centerpiece of
U.S. activity in Colombia. During his brief 10 months in
office, the Colombian police, together with U.S. support, have
sprayed an unprecedented 130,000 hectares of coca. And as the
Vice President mentioned, we are starting to see results from
Plan Colombia.
Coca cultivation overall is down by over 15 percent for the
first time in a decade. Opium poppy cultivation is down by 25
percent in 1 year alone. President Uribe is working together
with us to strengthen the presence of the Colombian State in
the rural areas and to ensure the primacy of the rule of law
and respect for human rights throughout Colombian territory.
His national security strategy includes commitments to
respect human rights, to dedicate additional resources to the
Colombian armed forces, and to reform the conscription laws. He
is eager to ensure the effectiveness of joint efforts with the
U.S. Government to achieve our common goals in combatting
narcotics trafficking and terrorism.
Finally, after many years of effort, we believe that the
money we have invested in Colombia is now beginning to pay off.
The Plan Colombia equipment did take a couple of years to
arrive--the helicopters, the spray planes, some of the training
of counter-drug brigades, the support for the Colombian police.
But we are now beginning to see that, having accumulated those
assets and that training on the ground, we are achieving
positive results.
We believe we have turned the corner, in particular, on the
coca crop in Colombia. Nationwide, hectarage was down more than
15 percent in 2002. As the Vice President mentioned, we sprayed
an additional 65,000 hectares during the first 5 months of this
year. And our plan, together with the Colombian police, is to
spray all of the remaining coca in Colombia by the end of this
calendar year, as well as all of the opium poppy in Colombia.
A spray program with this level of dedication sends a
strong signal to the Colombian farmers and cultivators that
they simply cannot wait us out this time, that there is firm
determination on the part of this Colombian government to see
the course and to have a policy that emphasizes continuity.
This is very important to the success of this program.
At the same time, we have strengthened our commitment to
pursuing an environmentally sound aerial eradication program,
and we have put into place a number of other programs which are
described in my statement that have helped strengthen
democratic institutions, protect human rights, assist
internally displaced persons, and foster social and economic
development. This is basically the coordinated approach that
was designed for Plan Colombia and it is beginning to show
results.
Finally, full realization of U.S. policy goals will require
concerted Colombian strategy and effort, backed by sustained
U.S. assistance to establish control over national territory,
eliminate narcotics cultivation and distribution and terrorism,
and promote human rights and the rule of law.
In this respect, we urge members of this Caucus and other
supporters on the Hill to provide full funding for our fiscal
year 2004 budget request. The Andean Counter-Narcotics
Initiative element of this request comes to $731 million, of
which $463 million is for Colombia. We also have an additional
$110 million in foreign military financing for Colombia that
indirectly supports these efforts.
This budget reflects our continued support for the Uribe
administration's courageous anti-narcotics and anti-terror
agenda. The progress described earlier needs to be cemented if
we are to achieve our long-term goals of improvements in all
areas of Colombian life and a reduction of illegal drug
cultivation, as well as terrorism.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statements of Simons and Struble follow:]
Prepared Statement of Paul E. Simons, Acting Assistant Secretary of
State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and members of the
Caucus. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you about the current
narcotics situation in Colombia, and the Department of State's response
to that situation. Because of the importance of our efforts in
Colombia, I am especially pleased to meet with this Caucus, which is a
key stakeholder in this process.
i. overview
Situation in Colombia
Colombia is of great importance to the United States. It is a
vibrant democracy and a country with extraordinary promise, facing an
extraordinary threat. Colombia has four times the land area of
California and a population of over 40 million. Its gross domestic
product is more than $90 billion a year. Colombia has important
reserves of petroleum, natural gas and coal.
Unfortunately, Colombia is also a center of the illicit narcotics
industry. In recent years, Colombia has been responsible for over 70
percent of the world's coca cultivation. Ninety percent of the cocaine
entering the United States is either produced in or passes through
Colombia. Colombia is also a significant source of heroin for the U.S.
market.
The drug trade has a terrible impact on the United States. There
are 50,000 drug-related deaths yearly in the United States with 19,000
directly attributable to drugs. This is six times the loss of life on
September 11, and it happens every year. The drug trade also has
devastating consequences in Colombia. Not only is that society rife
with drug-related violence, its unique eco-system and environment are
increasingly threatened by the slash and burn cutting of tropical
forest for coca cultivation and the indiscriminate dumping of toxic
chemicals used in drug processing.
Directly linked to the illicit drug trade is the scourge of
terrorism that plagues Colombia. Colombia is home to three of the four
U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) in this
hemisphere, and has suffered a four-decades cycle of violence and
conflict. Terrorism in Colombia both supports and draws resources from
the narcotics industry. Nefarious narcoterrorist organizations also
rely on kidnapping and extortion--including threats to U.S. citizens
and economic interests--to support themselves. Colombia's terrorist
groups have kidnapped 138 American citizens since 1980, and killed 11.
Since February, three DOD, contractors have been held hostage by the
FARC and one of their colleagues was assassinated upon capture.
The country's 40-year-old internal conflict--among government
forces, several leftist guerrilla groups, and a right-wing paramilitary
movement--intensified during 2002. The internal armed conflict, and the
narcotics trafficking that both fueled it and prospered from it, were
the central causes of violations of international humanitarian law. In
a 2001 report, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that
all sides in the conflict failed to respect the principles of
humanitarian law. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and
the paramilitaries are the principal perpetrators of these human rights
violations. The Colombian Army is charged with committing very few of
the human rights violations alleged in 2002.
Violence by the three FTOs--the FARC, the National Liberation Army
(ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)--caused the
deaths of thousands of civilians in 2002, including combat casualties,
political killings, and forced disappearances.
Kidnapping continues to be a major source of revenue for both the
FARC and ELN. The FARC continued to kidnap persons in accordance with
its so-called ``Law 002,'' announced in March 2000, which requires
persons with more than the equivalent of $1 million in assets to
volunteer payments to the FARC or risk detention. The Free Country
Foundation, a Colombian NGO, reported that guerrillas committed 75
percent of the 2,986 kidnappings reported during the year in which a
perpetrator was identified. The Foundation reported that the FARC
kidnapped 936 persons and the ELN 776. In addition, the FARC often
purchased victims kidnapped by common criminals and then negotiated
ransom payments with the families.
Additionally, the ongoing terrorist offensive against democratic
institutions and civil society has had tragic costs for Colombia. Each
year the AUC, ELN and FARC kill more than 3,000 persons. Their victims
have included judges and prosecutors, journalists, labor union leaders
and human rights workers, soldiers, police, and ordinary citizens. Even
clerics and Red Cross workers are! not exempt from the violence.
The narco-terrorist threat is among the greatest the United States
and Colombia face, and success against the drug trade and terrorism in
Colombia will improve security in both countries, and in the Andean
region as a whole. The ongoing internal strife that Colombia has
suffered has hampered its economic progress, severely strained both
military and civil institutions, and wreaked havoc on the civilian
population who must live with the constant threat of terrorist
violence. It has also resulted in a flood of illicit drugs into the
United States.
What is occurring in Colombia matters to the United States. We
stand in solidarity with the people of Colombia who, like us, know
first-hand the scourge of terrorism. Although Afghanistan and Iraq
currently receive more public attention, our important partnership with
Colombia is yet another front in the war on terrorism, and remains a
priority of this Administration. With the support of the U.S. Congress,
the Administration has devoted considerable monetary resources and
personnel to this effort.
Commitment of President Uribe
The recent visit of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, and President
Bush's renewed pledge to support him in his efforts against the narco-
terrorists, underscore the high value we place on our relationship and
the importance of this struggle.
Since taking office, President Uribe has demonstrated unwavering
commitment to countering the narco-terrorists. In spite of at least 15
assassination attempts, both before and after his election, he
continues to implement policies that will give Colombia back to
Colombians.
During his meetings in Washington, April 30 to May 2, with the
Executive Branch and many members of this Caucus, President Uribe
emphasized his commitment to complete elimination of Colombia's coca
crops by the end of his term of office.
President Uribe is an avid supporter of aerial eradication and
alternative development programs. During his tenure, eradication
programs have reduced coca cultivation by more than 15 percent and
opium poppy production by 25 percent from 2001 levels. President Uribe
is working to strengthen the presence of the Colombian State and to
ensure the primacy of the rule of law and respect for human rights
throughout Colombian territory. He is also making the tough fiscal
decisions that will allow him to fund these policies and reforms. He
has increased government security expenditures for military and police
activities from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to a goal of 5.8 percent of
GDP by the end of his term.
President Uribe's national security strategy includes commitments
to respect human rights, to dedicate more resources to the Colombian
Armed Forces, and to reform the conscription laws to make military
service universal and fairer. He is eager to ensure the effectiveness
of joint efforts with the United States government to achieve our
common goals in combating narcotics trafficking and terrorism, and has
proven an effective partner in the war on terrorism. Since the lifting
of the ban against extraditing nationals in December 1997, Colombia has
extradited more than 100 of its nationals charged with high-level
narcotics trafficking, drug-related money laundering, hostage taking,
and the murder of a retired New York City policeman. We have no better
extradition partner.
United States Policy Toward Colombia
Beyond the struggle against the narco-terrorists, there are broad
and important U.S. national interests in Colombia that include
stability in the Andean region, trade, immigration, human rights,
humanitarian assistance, and protection of the environment.
U.S. policy toward Colombia supports the Colombian government's
efforts to strengthen its democratic institutions, promote respect for
human rights and the rule of law, intensify counter-narcotics efforts,
foster socio-economic development, address immediate humanitarian
needs, and end the threats to democracy posed by narcotics trafficking
and terrorism. Our support reinforces, but does not substitute for, the
broader efforts of Colombian government and society.
In implementing these programs, the Administration and Congress
increasingly came to understand that the terrorist and narcotics
problems in Colombia are intertwined and must be dealt with as a whole.
Working with Congress, the Administration sought and Congress enacted
new authorities in the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-
206) that would help address this combined threat. These provisions
were renewed in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L.
108-7).
Since 2000, the United States has provided Colombia with over $1.7
billion in economic, humanitarian and security assistance to support
these efforts, with another $600 million appropriated for fiscal year
2003.
The U.S. counter-drug objective in Colombia is to reduce illegal
drug production and trafficking. We use both eradication and
interdiction programs in this effort. Through programs to eradicate
coca leaf and opium poppy and to interdict their movement and that of
precursor supplies, cash or final products, we expect to reduce the
amount of cocaine and heroin entering the United States. Maintaining
effective demand reduction programs will also be key.
Additional pressure can be brought against the illegal drug
industry by more effectively controlling transportation corridors
across the Andes that are used to import chemicals, supplies and cash
into the growing areaas, or to move illegal drug products out. If the
drug producing areas are isolated from markets and necessary supplies,
the costs and risks of moving narcotics products will increase.
Interdiction of cocaine and heroin at sea and in the air is another
important element of drug market disruption. With U.S. assistance,
technology, intelligence support, and law enforcement training, the
Government of Colombia should be able to increase pressure on drug
warehousing sites and go-fast boat movements, and increase seizures of
cocaine and heroin.
Importantly, as a result of the ongoing Colombian criminal justice
reform, including United States training of specialized task force
units as well as prosecutors and police, and the bilateral cases
developed with U.S. law enforcement, more and more seizures and arrests
are leading to convictions and dismantling of narco-terrorist
organizations.
ii. fiscal year 2003 budget
In 2003, Congress funded $700 million of a requested $731 million
for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative account. Of that amount, more
than $433 million will go to Colombia, with $284 million for
eradication/interdiction support and $149.2 million for alternative
development, support for the rule of law, and institution building.
Programs include the following:
The $284 million for eradication/interdiction will go toward
support for the Colombian military (pending the Secretary of State's
certification that the conditions in section 564(3) of the fiscal year
2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-7) have been met)
including its Army Counter Drug Brigade (CD BDE) and Army Aviation.
These funds will also support a renewed Air Bridge Denial Program
(after necessary legal steps and interagency coordination are
completed), coastal interdiction and continued support for the
Colombian National Police, to include aviation support and eradication
and interdiction programs.
Funding for alternative development and institution-building
($149.2 million) will fund programs which support the rule of law, such
as the DOJ-supported specialized task force units on Human Rights,
Anti-Corruption, Money Laundering/Asset Forfeiture and Narcotics,
criminal code reform, judicial and witness protection programs and
prosecutorial and police training; bomb squad; human rights reform and
drug awareness and demand reduction projects; and the GOC
``carabinero'' program which will establish permanent police stations
and begin rural patrols in areas that have no government presence and
are under virtual control of drug trafficking and insurgent
organizations. Funding is also targeted for USAID's ``Support for
Democracy'' and alternative development projects, and USAID and PRM
programs to support vulnerable groups and internally displaced persons.
In addition, Congress appropriated $34 million to the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) in the fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-11) for Colombia, and the
Administration is allocating an additional $37 million in FMF funding
from the Supplemental. These funds will go toward Presidential
security; bomb squad support; increasing police presence in remote
areas; support for internally displaced persons; and aerial eradication
programs.
In fiscal year 2003, $93 million in regular FMF funding will
support the infrastructure security program for the area of the Cano-
Limon pipeline and stop terrorist attacks on this important source of
revenue for Colombia. IMET will improve the professionalism, technical
competence and human rights performance of the Colombian Armed Forces
through a variety of military educational training courses.
iii. returns on investment
Our years of effort, and the money that we have invested in
Colombia are beginning to pay off. This year, we have turned the corner
on coca and opium poppy cultivation. Nationwide coca hectarage was down
by more than 15 percent in 2002 to 144,000 hectares, with additional
declines in the first quarter of 2003. Key southern coca cultivation
(Putumayo/Caqueta) declined by over 50 percent (82,300 to 40,550
hectares) in 2002. In the first 5 months of 2003, we sprayed
approximately 64,000 hectares of coca, well on our way to meeting our
goal of spraying all remaining coca this calendar year. Opium poppy
cultivation has likewise decreased, with a 25 percent decline in 2002.
The CNC estimates that there are currently 4,900 hectares yearly (2,450
hectares counted twice to account for two distinct crops) of opium
poppy remaining. Our aim is to spray opium puppy three times during
calendar year 2003. Through May, we have sprayed approximately 1,650
hectares of opium poppy, well on our way to meeting our target of
spraying all remaining opium poppy in 2003.
At the same time, we have strengthened our commitment to pursuing
an environmentally sound aerial eradication program. In September 2002,
the Department switched to a more benign glyphosate formulation--one
with decreased risk of eye irritation compared to the former mixture.
We have evaluated the toxicity of the spray mixture and have also
increased environmental training for our spray pilots, conducted
toxicological reviews or medical investigations of each health concern
brought to the attention of the Embassy, trained Colombian specialists
who now conduct soil and water analysis, and coordinated with the OAS
in its long-term monitoring of the spray program.
Beyond the achievements in eradication, U.S. programs have helped
strengthen democratic institutions, protect human rights, assist
internally displaced persons and foster socio-economic development.
Specifically, we have succeeded in the following areas:
<bullet> deployment of Colombia's first Counternarcotics Brigade
which has moved aggressively against drug labs and other illegal
facilities and has expanded its interdiction efforts beyond southern
Colombia;
<bullet> support for the police Anti-Narcotics Directorate (DIRAN)
which destroyed 61 HCl labs and 401 coca base labs in 2002, and seized
thousands of kilos of cocaine;
<bullet> support for police presence in rural areas, which has
increased significantly with the addition of permanent police units to
79 municipalities that previously had no police presence;
<bullet> over 22,000 families have benefited from the alternative
development program;
<bullet> 24,549 hectares of licit crops are being supported;
<bullet> 16,673 hectares of illicit crops have been manually
eradicated by alternative development communities;
<bullet> 31 Justice and Coexistence Centers have been opened; these
provide cost-effective legal services to Colombians who have previously
not enjoyed access to the country's judicial system; over 1.6 million
cases have been handled by the centers;
<bullet> USAID programs have provided protection to 2,731 human
rights activists, journalists and union leaders;
<bullet> USAID has provided assistance to 774,601 Colombians
displaced by violence;
<bullet> USAID is funding a program to rehabilitate former child
soldiers, including those captured by the army or those who have
deserted from the illegal armed groups. Some 733 children have received
treatment, education and shelter;
<bullet> an Early Warning System (EWS) is helping Colombia avert
massacres and violations of international humanitarian law; to date,
over 194 warnings have identified threats to communities across
Colombia, and have resulted in 154 responses by the military, police
and/or relief agencies;
<bullet> the PRM bureau supports international and non-governmental
organizations working in Colombia that provide food, temporary shelter,
basic health and sanitation, education and other emergency humanitarian
assistance to displaced people. PRM also supports the dissemination of
information on international humanitarian law to the Colombian military
and police, local civilian authorities, and illegal armed groups;
<bullet> DOJ-sponsored justice sector reform programs have helped
the Government of Colombia to reform its judicial system and strengthen
local government capacity; implement a comprehensive program to
investigate and prosecute kidnapping and extortion offenses; trained a
cadre of professional prosecutors; enhanced maritime enforcement
capabilities; and improved witness and judicial protection programs;
<bullet> DOJ support to the Prosecutor General's Office has helped
in establishing dedicated human rights satellite units arrayed
throughout the country to facilitate the investigation and prosecution
of human rights abuses.
Additionally, our focus on human rights is having an impact on
Colombian institutions. President Uribe is working to end collusion
between the Colombian military and the paramilitary AUC terrorist
organization. Last year, 168 paramilitaries were killed, 764 captured
and 20 turned themselves in. In the past 2 months, the GOC has
increased its crackdown on illegal paramilitary groups. In four major
operations, Colombian security forces detained an Army officer
paramilitary collaborator, arrested a major paramilitary leader and
apprehended large groups of illegal combatants.
The Department takes very seriously the human rights record of the
Colombian military. For example on January 3, we suspended assistance
to a Colombian Air Force unit (CACOM-1) due to lack of responsiveness
and progress on an important human rights case. The suspension will
remain effective until the Colombian government provides a credible
account of what occurred at Santo Domingo and takes appropriate action
consistent with the facts.
The State Department carefully monitors the human rights record of
the Colombian Armed Forces. Pursuant to the ``Leahy Amendment,'' we
regularly vet units of the security forces and do not provide
assistance to units for which there is credible evidence (as determined
by the Secretary) that they have committed gross violations of human
rights.
In addition, the Department is moving ahead toward rapid resumption
of the Air Bridge Denial program. The U.S. and Colombia have signed a
bilateral agreement, which lays out the safety procedures for the
program. Our goal is to ensure that we have adequate procedures in
place for the protection of innocent life while at the same time
providing a credible deterrent to aerial trafficking of drugs.
Recently, a certification team visited Colombia to review whether
the Colombians would be able to discharge their responsibilities to
operate the Air Bridge Denial Program in accordance with the safety
procedures agreed upon between Colombia and the United States. If the
team recommends that Colombia's procedures meet the requirements of the
bilateral agreement, which would be a major step toward facilitating
the initiation of the program. Department officials will be on the Hill
this week to seek Congressional advice. If the President signs a
determination, the Air Bridge Denial program can recommence. We are
hoping this will happen in the near future.
I would like to note that we have achieved all this while
conforming to the limits on U.S. personnel in Colombia in connection
with support of Plan Colombia--400 U.S. civilian contractors and 400
U.S. military personnel--established by Congress.
If present programs are sustained, then Plan Colombia's original
goal of reducing coca cultivation in Colombia by 50 percent by the end
of 2006 should be achieved, President Uribe has called for a more
ambitious target: eradication of all coca by the end of his term of
office in 2006.
If these eradication and interdiction objectives are achieved we
would expect to see a major reduction in the amount of cocaine
available for the United States, with corresponding impacts on cocaine
price and purity in the U.S. market. Reductions in Colombian heroin
availability might not produce comparable effects because of the
availability of heroin supplies from other parts of the world.
iv. challenges to our programs
In addition to our success, many challenges also confront us in
Colombia.
First and foremost among these is safety of our personnel. The
terrorist organizations operating in Colombia are ruthless killers, and
the aerial spray operations, particularly of opium poppy, are perilous.
This weekend, another spray plane was destroyed when it hit a tree
while spraying coca; fortunately, the pilot survived. Recently, we lost
a U.S. citizen spray pilot during low-level application of herbicide to
opium poppy. There was no evidence that the plane had been hit by
ground fire; rather it appears that pilot error--in the difficult
terrain of the high Andes--was the cause of the crash.
This latest tragedy brings to three the number of U.S. citizen
civilian State Department pilot contractors who have died in Colombia
since 1998. Two perished on July 27, 1998 in an aviation accident when
their T-65 aircraft crashed during a training flight.
Colombia is a high-risk assignment and the U.S. military personnel,
U.S. civilian contractors and the permanent and temporary U.S.
Government personnel assigned to Colombia are well aware of this. Our
personnel and official facilities maintain a high State of alert, take
every possible precaution, and are very proactive in matters regarding
safety. The Department continually strives to improve the already
strong safety record of our spray program.
We are currently instituting additional safety procedures,
including improved intelligence exchange, increased armed helicopter
escorts, and joint operations that employ Counter Drug Brigade ground
troops on interdiction operations in areas where increased hostile fire
is expected.
v. the road ahead
Full realization of U.S. policy goals will require a concerted
Colombian strategy and effort--backed by sustained U.S. assistance--to
establish control over its national territory, eliminate narcotics
cultivation and distribution, end terrorism, and promote human rights
and the rule of law. We urge Members to support full funding of our
2004 budget request of $731 million, of which $463 million is for
Colombia.
This budget reflects our continued support of the Uribe
Administration's courageous anti-narcotics and anti-terror agenda. The
progress described earlier needs to be cemented if we are to achieve
our long-term goals of improvements in all areas of Colombian life and
reduction in illegal drug cultivation and terrorism.
First, we would stress that the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI)
is a regional effort. It will require full support in Congress if it is
to succeed. Among the goals we have set for ourselves is to ensure that
accomplishments in Colombia do not reverse our gains in Bolivia or
Peru. We also aim to prevent spillover into Brazil, Ecuador, Panama and
Venezuela.
We are making significant progress in our eradication efforts, but
will require continued support for eradication and alternative
development in order to eliminate remaining cultivation and replanting
and to deter permanently the coca growers from pursuing this illicit
business. Our budget request balances law enforcement with sustainable
long-term development.
In Bolivia, we need to provide the GOB with strong incentives to
reinforce counter-narcotics programs, particularly in light of
increasing political pressure to stop eradication and increase licit
coca cultivation. In Peru, the democratic government is experiencing
unprecedented unrest and resistance in hardcore coca cultivation
regions. We should not turn our backs on these partners when they most
need our political and financial support to cement earlier eradication
gains.
Specifically, our 2004 ACI programs are intended to do the
following:
<bullet> Combat illicit drugs and terrorism, defend human rights,
promote economic, social and alternative development initiatives,
reform and strengthen the administration of justice, and assist the
internally displaced;
<bullet> Enhance counter-terrorism capability by providing advice,
assistance, training and equipment, and intelligence support to the
Colombian Armed Forces and the Colombian National Police through
ongoing programs as well as by implementing the new authorities and the
pipeline protection program;
<bullet> Promote economic growth and development through support
for market-based policies, including negotiation of the Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA), and implementation of the Andean Trade
Preferences Act (ATPA) as amended by the Andean Trade Program and Drug
Eradication Act (ATPDEA);
<bullet> Reduce the production and trafficking of cocaine and
heroin from Colombia by strengthening counter-narcotics eradication
programs; advise, train, and assist counterdrug organizations and
units; dismantle drug trafficking organizations; disrupt the
transportation of illegal drugs, precursor and essential chemicals,
trafficker supplies, and cash; address major cultivation regions; and
respond rapidly to shifts in cultivation regions; eliminate any
remaining coca and opium cultivation, to include replanting of these
crops;
<bullet> Increase institutional development, professionalization,
and enlargement of Colombian security forces to permit the exercise of
governmental authority throughout the national territory while ensuring
respect for human rights; and
<bullet> Reform and strengthen the criminal justice system by
enhancing the capabilities of the police investigators and prosecutors
as the country moves in transition from an inquisitorial to a more
accusatorial system with oral and open trials to increase effectiveness
and build public confidence.
Along with ACI funding, Colombia assistance will include $110
million in FMF funding, to include maritime interdiction support--a
priority of President Uribe and one that meshes with U.S. counter-
narcotics goals.
vi. conclusion
Finally, I would like to thank you again for this opportunity to
update you on the status of our counter-narcotics policy and programs.
The Administration is committed to supporting the Uribe Administration
and to working with our other partners in the Andean region and beyond
to stem the flow of illicit narcotics into our country and to check the
influence of terrorist organizations wherever they reside.
These are important and costly missions--both in terms of financial
and human resources. But they are worthy missions--which require the
continued support of our Congressional partners. We thank you for the
tremendous support and counsel you have provided in the past, and look
forward to our continued partnership.
______
Prepared Statement of Curtis Struble, Acting Assistant Secretary of
State, Western Hemisphere Affairs
Good morning. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the Caucus,
allow me to first express our appreciation for your ongoing interest in
and support for our policy toward Colombia. Your consistent
availability to visiting Colombian government officials, such as Vice
President Santos this morning, and your Congressional delegations to
Colombia help sustain crucial support for our Colombia strategy.
My colleague Paul Simons has addressed in detail our
counternarcotics policy in Colombia, I would like to offer an update on
the current status of U.S.-Colombian relations, and our efforts to
bolster regional and international support for President Uribe's goals
of attaining peace and strengthening democracy.
Colombia is central to our regional counternarcotics and
counterterrorism goals. We are committed to helping President Alvaro
Uribe address Colombia's security, economic and narcotics issues, not
only because it is in our national interest to do so, but because we
recognize the unique, reliable partner we have in President Uribe. He
has our full political support. U.S.-Colombian cooperation has never
been better. Colombia is producing tangible results and deserves the
full support of the region.
The focused high-level interest in Colombia, supported by the large
number of two-way visits, including your Congressional delegations, is
a positive contribution to our relationship.
President Uribe has been to Washington three times: once as
President-elect (June 2002); then in September 2002; and most recently
in early May.
Vice President Santos, Foreign Minister Barco, Defense Minister
Ramirez, Peace Commissioner Restrepo, Minister of Commerce Botero, and
others have made individual trips to solidify this relationship.
Our Cabinet level visits:
<bullet> Secretary Powell traveled to Colombia in December 2002.
<bullet> Secretary Snow visited in April 2003.
<bullet> USTR Representative Zoellick is planning a trip for July.
President Uribe's first year in office continues to be marked by
unprecedented cooperation between Colombia and the United States. Last
week: (May 28th), Colombia extradited the first FARC terrorist to the
U.S. for the kidnapping and murder of three U.S. indigenous rights
workers in February/March 1999, bringing the total number of
extraditions under Uribe to 44. This is in addition to the 64
extraditions former Colombian President Andes Pastrana ordered during
his presidency. Uribe has sent a clear message to the FARC and other
illegal groups that reinforces the rule of law in Colombia: They will
be held accountable for their actions.
President Uribe remains a stalwart supporter on Iraq. Even before
Operation Iraqi Freedom began, Colombia was key in lining up support
before rotating off the U.N. Security Council last December. As UNSC
President, Colombia decided to distribute the Iraqi Declaration to
UNSC: members with the expertise to assess risks of proliferation
first, despite objections by Syria. Three months later, President Uribe
expressed solidarity with the U.S. on Iraq at a high political cost
because he believes the world must stand up to terrorists.
On May 5 the Colombian Army mounted an unsuccessful hostage rescue
operation and the FARC responded by murdering 11 of its hostages, among
them Antioquia's Governor Guillermo Gairia and former defense minister
and peace adviser Gilberto Echeverri. This brutality reminded
Colombians and the international community of the ruthlessness with
which the illegal armed groups rob Colombians of peace and security.
Instead of cowering, the Colombian people maintained their support of
President Uribe's aggressive stance against the FARC. His current
approval rate is steady at 71 percent. No other Latin American leader
comes close to this level of support.
The Uribe administration's concerted effort to extend ``democratic
security'' throughout Colombia is still in its early stages, but
President Uribe has underscored the importance of human rights as an
integral component of his strategy. On May 16, he told graduating
Colombian Police cadets, to act with:
``aggressiveness to defeat: terrorism, determination to defend
human rights, respect and tolerance for critics, respect and
tolerance for NGO's, whether or not we share their points of
view.''
He further said that respect for human rights and tolerance of
critics is ``fundamental for the respectability of our use of force, so
that we can speak forcefully'' on terrorism both in Colombia and
abroad.
building international and regional support
We are committed to bolstering more support for President Uribe
both regionally and internationally. Many of Colombia's challenges do
not stop at Colombia's borders and require a regional solution. After
February's bombing of the El Nogal social club in Bogota, we supported
Colombian efforts to secure a UN Security Council resolution and an OAS
resolution condemning this bombing and calling on member states to stop
providing refuge to terrorist groups while cracking down on terrorists
manipulating their financial institutions. In March, the Colombians
organized a Defense and Security ministerial with representatives from
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, to strengthen
regional cooperation in pursuing, capturing, and punishing the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of terrorist acts.
In July, Colombia's Foreign Minister Carolina Barco will have the
opportunity to outline the Colombian government's priorities to donors
in order to increase international consensus for Uribe's policies and
to build better coordination of the various donor, NGO, and GOC
programs. We will be there to lend our support. We have been working
with the Europeans, the United Nations, the IDB, and the GOC to make
this conference happen. It should gain additional EU support for
Colombia, confirm for the international community the link between
terrorism and narcotics, and help to better coordinate international
assistance to Colombia.
Thank you again for your interest, and for your commitment to help
us help Colombia confront the daunting challenges it still faces. This
concludes my formal statement, but I am ready and eager to answer your
questions.
Chairman Grassley. Thank you very much.
General are you the one giving the statement?
General Hill. I am, Senator.
Chairman Grassley. Please proceed.
We have been joined by Senator Sessions, as you can see.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES T. HILL, COMMANDER, U.S SOUTHERN
COMMAND, U.S. ARMY, MIAMI, FLORIDA; ACCOMPANIED BY MARSHALL
BILLINGSLEA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC.
General Hill. Mr. Chairman, other members of the Caucus,
thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss
the U.S. Southern Command's role in supporting our country's
efforts and assisting Colombia with the battle on narco-
terrorism. I also have to say I have had the privilege of
sitting here this morning and listening to Vice President
Santos' very compelling testimony.
Your soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardmen
are performing in an outstanding manner in a variety of
missions aimed at preventing the flow of illegal narcotics that
kill over 19,000 Americans annually, while destabilizing the
security and stability of Colombia and increasingly other
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The illegal narcotics trade in Colombia is dominated by the
FARC, ELN and AUC. These groups, all on the State Department's
list of terrorist organizations, are incredibly well-financed
and sustain themselves by their involvement in every aspect of
drug cultivation and production. They destabilize the region by
operating in and out of Colombia's neighbors, and fueling other
illicit activities such as arms trafficking and money
laundering. Additionally, traditional transit nations are now
becoming consumer nations. Brazil, for example, has become a
major consumer of cocaine and is suffering the terrible effects
of the drug-fueled gangs in Rio and Sao Paulo.
I have traveled to Colombia 12 times since taking command
in August and have met several times with President Uribe. I am
impressed by his strong and principled leadership, as well as
his determination and vision to get the job done. He knows the
Colombian government must do more to succeed. He understands
that there is no single military solution to the crisis of
governance that is Colombia. He and the Colombian military know
and understand they must fight the narco-terrorists justly, in
accordance with democratic values and human rights. His actions
are beginning to show results.
President Uribe is increasing the size of the military and
the police. He levied a war tax on the wealthiest segment of
Colombian society, and more importantly he has collected it.
They are reclaiming areas where the government hasn't operated
in for years and going after the leadership of the narco-
terrorist organizations in ways the Colombian military has
never done before.
Southern Command is actively engaging in non-combat roles
with the Colombian military. We are assisting them in making
the counter-narcotics brigade lighter and more operationally
flexible. We have helped them develop a special operations
command and commando battalion to go after counter-drug and
narco-terrorist high-value targets throughout the country.
We are training units in northeast Colombia to protect oil
pipelines and other infrastructure so vital to Colombia's
economy which remain under attack by narco-terrorists. We are
training Colombian riverine units to interdict the tremendous
volume of illicit traffic along the waterways.
We are expanding our strategic and operational planning and
assistance to Colombian staffs and units. We are working with
the Colombian military to better allocate and use resources by
planning and conducting more joint operations, and we are
seeing progress.
The Colombian military is a capable, professional force
that respects human rights. This progress is resulting in
increasing success on the battlefield. With steady U.S.
assistance and support, and under President Uribe's leadership,
I am guardedly optimistic that Colombia will be able to
establish the security and stability so necessary for other
democratic reforms that President Uribe has advocated to take
hold and mature.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of the Caucus
for this opportunity and for the support that you provide to
the tremendous men and women of Southern Command. I look
forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Hill follows:]
Prepared Statement of General James T. Hill, U.S. Army Commander,
U.S. Southern Command
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the Caucus,
it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the United
States Southern Command's role in assisting Colombia and the region's
other countries with the battle on narcoterrorism. Every day our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, civilians and
interagency members work hard to accomplish their missions in our part
of the War on Terrorism. This work is vital for regional security and,
given our nation's proximity to Latin America and general ease of
access to the United States, shores up our own national security.
I have traveled to Colombia 12 times since taking command last
August. Our unwavering fiscal, political, and military support provide
their government steady reassurance that we stand with them in their
fight. Practical measures are required, however, to augment our
support. The most important of these measures is the continuation of
Expanded Authority through Fiscal Year 2004. Expanded Authority
successfully broke the artificial barrier that previously existed
between counterdrug and counterterrorist efforts and synchronized
disparate funding streams to address a common threat. It boosted the
effectiveness of our support in 2003 and is the most logical way to
continue combating Colombia's illegal armed groups, groups that are
most accurately described as drug-fueled terrorist organizations.
These narcoterrorists pose a grave threat to Colombia as well as to
the entire Andean region. All of Colombia's neighbors have experienced
the total disregard for sovereign borders displayed by these groups.
Most countries are taking efforts to address this threat, but we must
help them coordinate and bolster their efforts. The region's countries
are all consolidating democracies that will take time to mature.
Meanwhile, these countries face uncertainty, whether from weak
institutions that have yet to undergo multiple cycles of free elections
or from disappointment that liberal market reforms have not yet
produced sustained improvement. It is upon these inherent
vulnerabilities that narcoterrorist organizations prey. The corruption,
greed and instability narcoterrorists foster undermine the best efforts
of dedicated public servants and honest citizens. Corruption and
instability create safe havens for not only narcoterrorists but also
for other international terrorist organization such as Hizballah,
Hamas, and Islamiyya al Gammat, which have support cells throughout
Latin America. Battling narcoterrorism and its beneficiaries is just
one part of the overall War on Terrorism, but it is an essential part
which must be waged, particularly in our hemisphere.
To outline United States Southern Command's efforts in this
endeavor, I will discuss the threats we face, the progress we have
made, and the way ahead. Helping the region's countries gain and
maintain security is an ongoing, gradual process that requires us to
stay the present course. Building security inside these countries is
vital to our overall regional approach, because only nations that are
secure can benefit from democratic processes and economic growth. In
both the short and the long term, it is in our own best interest to
help the Colombians and their neighbors help themselves. Our
continuous, steady support is required to forge the way ahead.
threats in the region
The War on Terrorism is my No. 1 priority. While the primary front
in this global war is in the Middle East, Southern Command plays a
vital role in fighting branches of global and local terrorism in this
hemisphere. We are increasingly identifying and assisting partner
nations to engage those who seek to exploit real and perceived
weaknesses of the region's democracies.
The primary threat in our region continues to come from the three
largest illegal armed groups in Colombia, all named on the State
Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations: the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC, the National Liberation Army or ELN,
and the United Self-Defense Forces or AUC. Many familiar with
Colombia's conflict and many press accounts still sentimentally
describe these terrorist groups as ``revolutionaries,'' ``guerrillas,''
``rebels'' or ``militias,'' lending them some kind of tacit legitimacy
with those words. These terms are misleading and obsolete. A group that
straps explosives to an 11-year-old boy, sends him into a police
station, and then remotely detonates the explosives, as the FARC did on
April 17th in Arauca, Colombia, forfeits any claim to legitimacy. While
these groups surely retain fragments of their founding philosophies,
they appear to have jettisoned ideology in favor of terrorist methods
and illicit revenues. Today, these groups consist of criminals, more
precisely defined as narcoterrorists, who operate outside the rule of
law in order to profit at the expense of Colombia and its people. These
terrorists directly challenge the legitimate authority of the Colombian
administration yet offer no viable form of government themselves. Some
of them have had 40 years to win the hearts and minds of their
countrymen, yet they, and the FARC in particular, can garner no more
than 3 percent public approval.
Colombia is on the very front line of the regional war against
terrorism. Their citizens suffer daily from murder, bombings,
kidnappings, and lawlessness practically unimaginable to us. In this
war-torn country, the conflict has been accelerated by illicit drug
money and claimed thousands of lives. Colombia is also experiencing an
unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with an estimated 1.5 million
Colombians having been displaced from their homes. In 2001 there were
more terrorist attacks in Colombia alone than in all other nations of
the world combined--averaging four per day. Colombia has the highest
homicide rate in the world--77.5 per 100,000--nearly 14 times the U.S.
rate, making homicide the most likely cause of death. Moreover, about
3,000 people were kidnapped last year, making Colombia the kidnapping
capital of the world. Colombia remains the world's leading producer of
cocaine and accounts for 90 percent of the U.S. supply. The
narcoterrorists have become dependent on drug income for much of their
operational capacity. We expect them to fight to keep the drug industry
productive as it comes increasingly under attack from the Government of
Colombia.
One example of this trend is found in the Cocaleros movement in
Bolivia, in which manipulative traffickers, in conjunction with a
radical political party, seek to tap peasant frustration to undermine
the elected government. There is evidence that outside forces are
attempting to influence this movement. On April 10th, Bolivian
authorities arrested suspected Colombian ELN member Francisco Cortes,
along with Bolivian Cocaleros and two members of the Bolivian ELN.
Authorities confiscated ELN literature, false identity documents, over
two kilos of cocaine base, and material to fabricate explosive booby
traps. Another example is becoming evident in Peru. The Shining Path is
undergoing a resurgence, based on the FARC model, by protecting cocaine
smugglers and collecting taxes on the coca trade. This resurgence
already directly threatens U.S. interests, as evidenced by the Shining
Path bombing near the U.S. Embassy prior to President Bush's visit last
March. These examples of narcoterrorists operating transnationally and
attempting to influence other movements set an unwelcome but likely
precedent in the region.
Beyond the narcoterrorist threat concentrated in the Andean Ridge
are extensions of Middle Eastern terrorism. Radical groups that support
Hamas, Hizballah and Islamiyya al Gammat are all active in Latin
America. These cells, extending from Trinidad and Tobago to Margarita
Island off Venezuela to the tri-border area of Paraguay, Argentina and
Brazil, consist of logistics and support personnel. However, terrorists
who have planned or participated in attacks in the Middle East, such as
recently captured Khalid Shaihk Mohammed, have spent time in the
region. These groups make millions of dollars every year via illicit
activities. Hizballah, for example, smuggles Latin American cocaine to
Europe and the Middle East. These cells continue to reach back to the
Middle East and solidify the sophisticated global support structure of
international terrorism. Not surprisingly, international terrorist
groups and narcoterrorists in Colombia all practice the same business
methods.
A derivative threat from continued narcoterrorist violence is the
instability and corruption it provokes across the region. Governments
that face direct challenges to their legitimacy and which cannot
effectively police their entire sovereign territory can become safe
havens for illicit groups of all persuasions. As the United States
roots out international terrorists across the world, we must be careful
not to overlook instability generated by narcoterrorists nearer to
home, which makes threatened countries attractive destinations for
terrorist groups. These countries are desirable to those who seek to
harm the United States for many reason. First, they are close to us.
Second, they provide launching points along already established drug,
arms, and human trafficking routes. Third, terrorists with large
amounts of cash can procure counterfeit official documents in the
region. Fourth, Islamic radicals can easily blend into Latin America's
long established Arab communities to avoid scrutiny. Finally, the money
generated by narcotrafficking cannot fail but to entice terrorist
groups beyond those already operating in Colombia, such as we are
seeing with the Shining Path in Peru.
While the threats to our Nation from international terrorism are
well known, the threats spawned by narcoterrorism are lesser known yet
reach deep into this country. According to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, over 19,000 Americans die annually as the
direct result of drug-related causes. This equates, in my mind, to a
weapon of mass destruction. This staggering number does not take into
account the second and third order effects on families, the lost
productivity of those lives cut short, or the additional thousands of
Americans we lose to indirect drug-related causes. As a Nation we
simply cannot afford to give up on tens of thousands of our own
citizens every year. Taking the fight to the narcoterrorists is one way
we as a Nation can effectively address one crucial part of this multi-
faceted problem.
the uribe administration's progress
The threats we face in our hemisphere are real, but we are not
standing idly by and watching them grow. Instead we are working with
the nations across the region to shore up their internal security.
Colombia faces the biggest challenge; the narcoterrorist center of
gravity lies within its borders. President Uribe won a landslide
victory by running on a platform of aggressively hunting down the
terrorists in his country. After years of failed attempts to negotiate
with these groups, to include a bold experiment that gave the FARC a
safe haven in the southern part of the country, the people of Colombia
had finally had enough of terrorist groups, especially after seeing how
the FARC had used their safe haven to plot terrorist acts instead of
social progress and to cultivate coca rather than community.
President Uribe faces enormous challenges, but he is using his
mandate to put deeds behind his words. He has only been in office for 8
months, and turning the government from a conciliatory posture to an
aggressively focused one is not an easy task. We need to be steadfast
in our support of him now to set the conditions for his longer-term
success. We are only two and a half years into our substantial support
for Plan Colombia. President Uribe will be the critical player in
ensuring the overall success of this investment by the American people.
The signs of his progress are already becoming evident. Colombia
developed a comprehensive national security strategy that directs all
the tools at the government's disposal toward a common end of defeating
the terrorists. President Uribe has levied a war tax on the country's
wealthiest citizens. He is increasing military and police end-strength.
The government has developed a plan to protect travelers along the
major roadways. He is pushing the military and the police to regain
control of areas and neighborhoods dominated by the narcoterrorists. In
those areas where the government is regaining control, they are
providing more robust social services to support those who previously
suffered most from their absence.
Specifically, the military has had growing operational success
against mid-level leadership in narcoterrorist organizations across the
country. Last October, elements of the Colombian 1st Counter Narcotics
Brigade dealt the FARC a significant blow when they carried out an
intelligence-driven combined arms operation that resulted in the death
of the 15th Front Commander, Mocho Cesar, and the capture of several
key subordinates. On February 15th of this year, Colombian forces
captured Aparicio Conde, the finance chief of the FARC's Joselo Lozada
Mobile Column. On March 10th, they captured 13 FARC members of the 37th
Front in Barranquilla, to include Jose Olivero Ospina, the 37th Front
operations officer. This notably cohesive operation was a joint and
interagency undertaking, effectively coordinating the efforts of the
police, the Army, and the Prosecutor General's office. On March 24th,
the Colombian National Police captured Luis Armando Castillo, the
finance chief of the FARC's Manuel Cepeda Vargas Front. Finally,
throughout the month of April, Colombian security forces arrested
senior members of the Antonio Narino Urban Front, the main unit that
terrorizes Bogota.
The Colombian military and National Police have also been more
aggressive in rescuing a number of kidnap victims, to include an
archbishop and the daughter of a prominent businessman. Eradication
efforts showed marked improvement in 2002 as coca cultivation in
Colombia decreased by 15 percent. These examples show the incremental
progress that is being made against key actors and support systems in
the narcoterrorist infrastructure. Meanwhile, the psychological
benefits that all law-abiding Colombians derive from observing these
successful and professional actions do much to strengthen their
national morale.
A remarkable event occurred on April 25, 2003. Rafael Rojas, a 20-
year veteran of the FARC and commander of the group's 46th Front under
the alias Fidel Romero, turned himself in to Colombian authorities. On
April 28th, flanked by President Uribe and the administration's top
military leaders at a nationally televised press conference, Rojas
called on his former comrades to surrender stating, ``Positive things
have not resulted . . . On the contrary, the prolonged war has left
only desolation and destruction.'' More importantly, Rojas said the
``movement had clear origins, but its ends are no longer known.'' While
we don't know Rojas' motivation for turning himself in, his statement
implies that he grasps the reality of what is occurring today in
Colombia. We hope this marks the beginning of a trend. The firm resolve
of the Uribe administration, backed by aggressive military operations,
has resulted in increased desertions by enemies of the state. The
government's actions are paired wisely with a complementary government
program under which those who leave the FARC voluntarily are put in
protected housing and receive health care, education, and work
training.
In conjunction with military efforts, President Uribe has sponsored
political, economic, and judicial reforms. With the support of his
Congress, the government is calling for political reforms. These
reforms aim to reduce the government bureaucracy, cap pensions, and
eliminate corruption. These measures will streamline the government and
increase its ability to focus on the internal disturbance.
Economically, Uribe's stance and the promised reforms have buoyed the
country's confidence. Colombia has raised over one billion dollars via
bonds since the new administration took office, and its stock market
has increased by 50 percent this year. Likewise, President Uribe has
sought to stamp out corruption and bolster judicial reform. He issued
Presidential Directive No. 10, which was his anti-corruption strategy,
designed to halt the revenue lost from corruption and political
cronyism. He established a mechanism to oversee State contracting that
will save an estimated two billion dollars annually, and he has
established merit-based hiring practices. Though an overburdened
judiciary continues to sort through an enormous pending case backlog,
there are positive trends that those accused of crimes, especially
those with money and influence, are being tried in due course and not
being allowed to opt out of the system.
Colombia is fighting its illegal armed groups justly, in accordance
with democratic values and human rights. This is instrumental in what
we are collectively striving to achieve. The Colombian government is
not resorting to rural concentration camps, peasant roundups,
massacres, disappearances or other tactics used by their enemies. We
continue to monitor closely the human rights record of the Colombian
military. If one reads all of the Department of State's 2002 Colombian
Human Rights Report instead of the snippets that have been circulating,
one gains a deeper appreciation of the strides the government has made.
The vast majority of allegations of human rights abuses, over 98
percent, are attributed to Colombia's illegal armed groups, primarily
the three-narcoterrorist groups, and not to government forces. This
report clearly demonstrates the institutionalization of human rights by
the Colombian government, whose forces as recently as the mid-1990's
were accused of 50-60 percent of human rights abuses.
The Human Rights report finds that,
``The government has an extensive human rights apparatus
coordinated by the office of the President's Advisor for Human
Rights. That office coordinates with local human rights groups.
Most notably, it established a special `momentum' committee to
advance judicial resolutions of 100 key human rights cases.''
Over 290,000 members of Colombia's security forces have received
specialized human rights training since 1996, conducted by the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the Colombian Red Cross, the
Roman Catholic church, foreign governments, and other government
offices and agencies. The Ministry of Defense signed an agreement with
two prestigious, private civilian national universities and the Inter-
American Institute of Human Rights to conduct research and training on
human rights and international humanitarian law issues and to organize
seminars designed to foster dialog with nongovernmental organizations
and academics. I am convinced the Colombian government is serious about
human rights and will continue to promote them aggressively.
An area of concern is the perception of collusion between the
Colombian military and the AUC. President Uribe and the senior military
leadership have made it perfectly clear that they will not tolerate any
collusion with the AUC or other illegal ``self-defense'' groups, and
that they are just as criminal as the other terrorists. Collaboration
with any groups that operate outside the law is illegal and punishable
by the civilian justice system. Despite great progress, it would be
disingenuous to say that all collusion has been stamped out. Like any
tough problem, this one will take time. I'm confident that as an
institution, the Colombian military and its current leadership
completely understand the seriousness of this matter and are headed in
the right direction. As just one demonstration of their resolve in this
area, the military doubled operations against illegal self-defense
groups last year and has quadrupled the number captured since 2000.
This list is just a partial highlight of the coordinated effort the
Colombian government is making to solve its own problems. President
Uribe has infused his government with energy, organization, and a sense
of purpose. He is getting results now, and will continue to direct all
his resources toward snaking Colombia a safe, prosperous, democratic
nation. He understands that this is primarily a Colombian problem, one
which Colombia must solve, yet he still needs our help to make his
efforts ever more effective. President Uribe stood by us as a member of
the Coalition of the Willing in Operation Iraqi Freedom, a stance
unpopular with both Colombian public opinion and his regional peers. He
is providing the strategic leadership that Colombia needs to move
ahead. Recent polls show public confidence in him and the military
increasing. Now, early in his administration, is the time he most needs
us to demonstrate to him, his government, and his people our continued
resolve.
u.s. southern command assistance to colombia
Southern Command's assistance to Colombia is not operational but
instead is in training and assisting the Colombians to deal with their
internal problems themselves. We have a vested interest in the outcome,
but it must remain primarily a Colombian fight. President Uribe's
actions have generated momentum against his country's criminals, and
our deployed forces have seen a noticeable boost in the attitudes of
those we are training. Our physical presence is rather modest, by law
being no more than 400 troops and 400 civilian contractors. But you've
seen what a few dedicated men working with allied forces can
accomplish. We're having a similar effect in Colombia. Their military
proficiency is improving. This means they can respond quicker, move
faster, and fight better than ever before.
Our Special Forces have trained the staff and soldiers of
Colombia's best units, giving these units an added edge of operational
effectiveness that is paying dividends. The 1st Counter Narcotics
Brigade has provided the Colombians a flexible, mobile, offensively
oriented fighting force of three 600-man battalions that are able to
conduct quick strike missions against narcoterrorists. The
establishment and training of a Commando Battalion, modeled on our own
Ranger battalions, has given the Colombians a unit that can strike
high-value targets including enemy leadership. The Colombians plan on
establishing another commando battalion in Fiscal Year 2004. We have
also trained with the Colombian urban counter-terrorist unit and
continue to work with them to upgrade their capabilities and equipment.
Recently, U.S. Special Forces have also been training Colombian Armed
Forces in Arauca to protect a portion of the 772-kilometer oil pipeline
that has been a frequent target of FARC and ELN attacks. This training
is just one part of a nationwide Infrastructure Security Strategy that
protects critical facilities and reestablishes control in
narcoterroirist influenced areas of the country.
We continue to train Colombia's helicopter pilots, providing their
forces a growing ability to perform air assaults that are key in the
battle against dispersed enemies. We deploy intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance assets in country that have provided timely,
actionable intelligence to Colombian units. We are training their
staffs with Planning Assistance Teams that increase their ability to
plan and execute intelligence driven operations against illegal armed
groups. We are working with Colombian Marines to establish two Mobile
Training Teams that will work with the Riverine Brigade to raise
proficiency for riverine interdiction. We contract logistics to help
the Colombians maintain their own C-130 fleet. We are training the
Colombian National Police Carabineros (Rural) with the goal of
reestablishing governance throughout the country. We are providing
medical training and assistance to help the Colombians improve their
casualty evacuation methods as well as implementing other safety
programs to help them preserve their combat power. In civil-military
operations, we are helping the Colombians to build civil-affairs
capability that will be implemented in the Arauca Rehabilitation Zone
to bring humanitarian aid and functioning institutions to previously
terrorized areas. This program will eventually be expanded across the
country. Finally, we are working with the State Department to re-
establish the Air Bridge Denial Program to be run by the Colombians
with U.S. ground and air safety monitors. In support of this issue, the
United States Department of Justice is assisting a certification team
to ensure that legal controls are applied and implemented.
The one constant running through all of our efforts is the non-
negotiable emphasis on human rights. Southern Command has played a
leading role in advancing the cause of human rights in Colombia and
throughout the region, and our efforts have certainly supplemented the
government's program and helped professionalize the Colombian military.
We are the only combatant command to have a full time human rights
staff directorate. Respect for human rights is embedded in everything
we do, whether training forces, educating officers, or conducting
exercises. This guiding principle will remain our foundation.
Although we are not taking part in direct operations, Americans are
still at risk during the course of their duties. Currently, three
American contractors are being held hostage by the FARC. We have been
working hard to recover them, There are several factors that make this
recovery difficult, but two are overriding. First, the area where the
search is being conducted is in some of the thickest jungle in the
country. Second, this area is the FARC's backyard, and they have a
first hand knowledge of the terrain combined with a sizable support
network in the area. We are pressing forward with the search and rescue
effort around the clock. There is at least one positive result so far.
The Colombian Military, to include units from the 1st Counter Narcotics
Brigade, has been leading the search, and in doing so are operating in
parts of the country they haven't set foot in for 15 to 20 years. They
are taking the fight to the enemy on his turf, and they are doing well.
Our training shows.
regional support beyond colombia
Colombia is the linchpin in the narcoterrorist battle, but we must
be careful not to win the battle in Colombia and lose the war in the
region. As the Colombians make progress, their success will push
narcoterrorists to seek safer areas in which to operate. Already, the
FARC, ELN, and AUC operate freely across the weak borders of Colombia's
neighbors, and the remote nature of many of these areas makes them ever
more attractive as safe havens. Those countries also lack the
organization and resources to maintain territorial sovereignty in these
ungoverned spaces. Consequently, across the Andean Ridge we are working
with the bordering nations to increase cooperation, fortify borders and
strengthen capabilities.
We are actively strengthening regional cooperation. In an ongoing
multinational exercise, we are training with the Colombian Navy on
littoral techniques in a combined operation with Panamanian, British,
and Dutch participation. In Peru, we have built upon their riverine
interdiction ability, as well as working with the interagency to
support their eradication program and counternarcotics aviation. We are
working to restart the Air Bridge Denial Program in Peru with
additional safeguards. In Ecuador, we have supported their riverine
capability and worked closely with them in completing the essential
forward operating location at Manta. We are seeing a welcome
acknowledgment of the Colombian border concern by their leadership, and
we are studying the possibility of training; their 19th Jungle Brigade
along the same lines as the units we've trained in Colombia. In
Bolivia, we have worked on their riverine capabilities as well and
supported their eradication efforts. We will continue to monitor the
Cocalero movement. I am particularly encouraged by the bilateral talks
President Lula of Brazil and President Uribe conducted in March during
which they acknowledged the common interest their countries shared in
controlling drug traffickers in the Amazon region. We have already seen
the Brazilians take up active patrolling on their own border with
Colombia.
Venezuela is undoubtedly a key player in overall regional security
but also the most unpredictable. We are maintaining military-to-
military contacts at the colonel level and below. Venezuelan officers
come to our schools and we send U.S. officers to theirs. In the
domestic turmoil so far, the Venezuelan military has not harmed its own
citizens, which is a positive signal that the military is attempting to
maintain its professionalism. We will maintain our contacts providing
the Venezuelan military continues to act in a constitutionally correct
manner.
way ahead
As the lead agent for the Department of Defense to implement U.S.
policy for the military efforts in Colombia, U.S. Southern Command will
continue to maintain a priority effort against narcoterroriism. Key in
most of our recent endeavors has been approval by the U.S. Congress of
Expanded Authority legislation. This legislation has allowed us to use
funds available for counterdrug activities to provide assistance to the
Government of Colombia for a coordinated campaign against the terrorist
activities of its illegal armed groups. The granting of Expanded
Authority was an important recognition that no meaningful distinction
can. be made between the terrorists and drug traffickers in our region.
All three of Colombia's terrorist groups are deep into the illicit
narcotics business. Trying to decide whether a mission against a FARC
unit was a counterdrug or counterterrorist one was an exercise in
futility and hampered operational effectiveness on the ground. Expanded
Authority has eliminated the time consuming step of first evaluating
the mission based on its probable funding source and now allows us to
bring to bear all our assets more rapidly. As just one example, it will
allow assets controlled by Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S)
to continue being used to their full potential to provide real-time,
actionable intelligence that is key in conducting effective operations
against the narcoterrorists. Expanded Authority for FY04 is the single
most important factor for us to continue; building success in Colombia.
Expanded Authority is foundational for the overall way ahead for
Colombia, but it will be supplemented on many fronts across the region.
JIATF-South, a model of interagency cooperation for our entire
government, will broaden its focus beyond narcotics to use its assets
to counter all illicit trafficking, including arms, ammunition,
explosives and weapons of mass destruction. We will continue to conduct
exercises and training in the region. We are working with nations in
the region to build their intelligence capabilities and to protect
their critical national infrastructures. We are working with them to
build effective logistics and communications architectures that will
support intelligence driven operations.
We will continue to bring Latin American officers, non-commissioned
officers, enlisted members, and defense civilians to our professional
schools in the United States. Hand-in-hand with our professionalization
efforts is a continued emphasis on human rights and international
humanitarian law. All of these efforts help build a coordinated
regional approach and regional cooperation. While our efforts are, for
good reason, Colombia-centric, we are not letting others fall behind to
become the next targets for terrorist groups. The cooperative counter
narcoterrorist groundwork we are laying today will further our national
security for decades to come.
conclusion
For most nations in our region, the threats come from within. It
will be up to those nations to demonstrate their ability to govern,
enforce the rule of law, implement judicial reform, and develop a
profound respect for human rights. These fundamentals provide the
stable and secure environment necessary for economic growth--growth
that will improve the quality of life for ordinary citizens. Southern
Command plays a crucial role in assisting the development of security
forces that help provide the ability to govern throughout the region,
particularly in Colombia.
We are at a critical time in Colombia's history. The elected
government of President Uribe enjoys unparalleled approval[ ratings
approaching 70 percent. Under his leadership, the military and police
are helping to regain control of areas long held by narcoterrorists.
Colombia's citizens are taking a more active role in their nation's
defense and providing actionable intelligence to the Colombian Armed
Forces. There is a renewed sense of momentum, commitment, and hope as
the Colombian people struggle to save their country, but there is also
a finite window of opportunity beyond which public opinion and support
will wane without significant progress.
I am cautiously optimistic about Colombia, though there remains an
enormous amount of work to be done. I am proud to say we do a great
deal to further our nation's interests in this hemisphere with very few
resources and a modest presence. We are at a critical point where the
progress in eliminating conflict, reducing tension, and establishing
democracy throughout the region could be at risk if we are not
steadfast in our efforts. While our attention is drawn to another
region of the world, we must keep in mind that we live in this
hemisphere, and its continued progress as a region of democracy and
prosperity is paramount to our national security.
I would like to thank the Chairman and the Members of the Caucus
for this opportunity and for the tremendous support you have provided
this command. I can assure you that the men and women of the United
States Southern Command are working to their utmost to accomplish their
missions for our great country.
Chairman Grassley. What I am going to do here is ask
questions that both of you can respond to, but you don't have
to both respond. When I say both, I mean the four of you as two
different entities.
Originally, Plan Colombia called for significant levels of
assistance from several European countries. I hope I am right
in understanding that very little assistance has been
forthcoming, despite current estimates that close to 50 percent
of all cocaine produced in Colombia is ending up in Europe.
Is that accurate, and what changes have had to be made to
U.S. assistance to compensate for the lack of help we expected
from the Europeans?
Mr. Struble. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. You are
correct that we have been very disappointed.
Chairman Grassley. Just a minute. I think that we should
put the clock on so that I don't eat up all the time of my
colleagues.
Proceed.
Mr. Struble. Thank you, sir. We have been disappointed by
the failure of the European Union and individual European
countries to come in to support the goals of Plan Colombia. As
you have noted, they have a strong interest in this.
I am pleased to say, though, that there are some increasing
signs of recognition on the part of European countries that
they need to do more. We believe that they could most
particularly make a contribution to the social goals of Plan
Colombia.
The United Kingdom will be sponsoring a conference on July
10. It is actually a preliminary conference which is aimed at
getting donor countries to talk about the unmet needs of
Colombia. And then a second conference later on in the year
will seek to ensure that there is a more robust answer to those
needs.
Now, I will say that some European countries have been an
exception to this general rule. The Government of Spain, for
example, has donated some aircraft to Colombia and the British
government has provided some very useful military training of
special units in, for example, long-range reconnaissance.
Chairman Grassley. The United States has spent, I believe,
over $2.5 billion since the year 2000 to assist Colombia in
this way. Have there been some changes in the original time
lines that were very wildly optimistic?
Now that all assistance called for in Plan Colombia has
been delivered, could you highlight what performance measures
are being used to assess the success or failure of the
eradication and military training assistance that has been
funded, and what is the time line for either the completion of
the eradication or the military assistance programs currently
being conducted?
Mr. Simons.
Mr. Simons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The original Plan
Colombia document included a policy objective of reducing the
coca crop by 50 percent in 6 years' time, and that would
essentially mean a 50-percent reduction in cropping levels by
the end of 2005.
I think it is fair to say that because of initial delays in
the provision of some of the helicopters and some of the spray
planes that we got going a little later than we originally
thought. But we believe that, in particular, with the results
that were demonstrated last year and with the pace of spraying
that we are on now, including the goal of spraying all
remaining coca in Colombia during the course of calendar 2003,
we are on track to meet that original deadline of a 50-percent
reduction by the end of 2005.
Now, President Uribe has staked out an even more ambitious
goal of complete elimination of coca by the end of his term in
office. And, again, our goal for 2003 is to spray all remaining
coca, spray all remaining poppy.
The other area that we have set, I think, a fairly----
Chairman Grassley. Can I ask you if those time lines have
been affected in any way because we have lost two spray planes
since the first of the year, and presumably they haven't been
replaced yet?
Mr. Simons. That is correct, but fortunately we recognized
during the course of 2002 that we were going to have to step up
our spray operations, including stepping up our infrastructure.
So what we have been able to do, with the cooperation of
Congress, is we have adjusted our 2003 budget to provide an
additional $9 million for the spray program. Congress also, in
the context of the emergency supplemental for 2003, provided us
an additional $14 million for the spray program. So with those
resources, we believe that we can achieve our objectives for
this year.
I would like to make one other point, though, on the
question of objectives. On the helicopter side, 2 years ago the
Colombian army had no helicopter fleet at all. We essentially
stood up from scratch a 72-unit helicopter fleet. In 2 years'
time, while it has been costly in terms of the amount of
operating expenses that we have had to cover, we now have 72
helicopters up and running at an 80-percent operational
readiness rate.
I believe this is a very strong achievement, and these
helicopters are the ones that are providing the mobility for
the counter-drug brigade to undertake interdiction operations
to support the spray operations on the ground. So I think
actually, while it took some time to get these helicopters up
and running, they are making a major contribution now 2 years
into Plan Colombia.
Chairman Grassley. General Hill, does that speak for you,
too, or do you have a different perspective or an added
perspective from where you are posted?
General Hill. Yes, sir. From my perspective, especially
since President Uribe took office in August, the ability of the
Colombian military to conduct military operations, both in a
counter-drug and a counter-terrorist situation, has gone up
exponentially.
We did a wonderful job and they responded greatly in terms
of training the counter-narcotics brigade, especially, and then
they went into operations in the Putumayo and Caqueta area. We
have essentially moved drug trafficking out of those two
provinces closer to the coast to the Narino area, and the
Colombian military is now undergoing major operations in Narino
and doing a wonderful job there, also, collecting significant
seizures.
Those kinds of military operations, though, are simple
operations when compared to going after high-value targets,
infrastructure, and the leadership of the illegal narco-
terrorist organizations. In the last 90 days, we have done some
work with their commando unit and those operations are also
paying off tremendously.
I think that over the next year you will those operations,
as the Colombian military even gets better at those very
sophisticated operations, paying off in even greater dividends.
But you cannot overstate the importance of the mobility of the
helicopter fleet. It is what gives the Colombians the ability
to get out into the countryside and to carry out operations
where they have not been to go for years.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Grassley. This will be my last question and it is
in regard to our bilateral agreement regarding the number of
personnel that are available for helicopter operations and
maintenance.
While initial levels for trained personnel were met, we are
going to have the General Accounting Office later on today
testify that many of the trained personnel cannot be currently
located. This means that this program is heavily dependent,
then, on contractor support for operations.
What is being done to ensure that trained Colombian
military personnel can be identified and are putting their
U.S.-funded training to use?
General Hill. I think there are two pieces to that, so I
will have Mr. Simons start.
Mr. Simons. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a very good point
that we have been in discussions with the GAO about for some
period of time and it is one that we focus a lot of energy on.
I think I would like to address it in two separate pieces;
first, the pilot situation and, second, the situation of the
mechanics.
Again, we were creating a Colombian army aviation capacity
from the ground up, and in the case of the pilots for the 72
helicopters that we have up and running now, we have identified
and trained a total of 126 Colombian pilots in the past 2
years. So all the helicopters now have Colombian co-pilots full
qualified and we are in the process of converting those co-
pilots into pilots and command. That process is going to take a
couple of years, but we are well on our way to a
Colombianization of the pilot crews for all of these
helicopters.
With respect to mechanics, we have approximately 65
Colombian army mechanics available to perform maintenance on
the helicopters and they are undertaking training under the
contractor's supervision. I have discussed this issue this
morning with my staff and I understand it takes about 6 years
to get a fully trained helicopter mechanic operational.
So this is going to be again something that is going to
take some period of time, but we are fully committed to it. We
are fully committed to working with the Colombians to try to
get them to enforce agreements such that when we put people
through the training program, they stay on the job for a
significant period of time. But this will be something that
will take a number of years to fully phase in.
Chairman Grassley. Does that speak for you, General, or did
you have something to add?
General Hill. No, sir. It does speak for me.
Chairman Grassley. I thank each of you for coming here and
for your testimony. I am going to call on Senator DeWine now,
but I am also going to call on him to Chair the Caucus because
I have the responsibility as Chairman of the Finance Committee
for the prescription drug program and I have to go to a meeting
on that now.
So would Senator DeWine take over?
Senator DeWine. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Grassley. I apologize to the third panel that I am
not going to be able to hear them. I have a lot of questions of
this panel, so I may submit some for answers in writing because
I didn't get very far down the line.
Senator DeWine [presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask members of the panel--and you have covered this
really a little bit, but if you could kind of summarize for me
what has been the biggest disappointment or disappointments of
Plan Colombia. Where are we behind? Just kind of give me a
list.
Who wants to start? And if we are behind, how are we going
to get caught up?
Mr. Struble. I will start, Senator, by saying that we
acknowledged a year when we requested new authorities from this
Congress that the original premise of Plan Colombia was too
limited, that the actions of narcotics traffickers and of
Colombia's terrorist groups were so intertwined that an effort
that focused simply on the law enforcement piece of this, on
going after the narcotics traffickers, created a number of
anomalies in intelligence-sharing, for example, and in our
ability to provide training for some key Colombian units that
were needed in that integrated counter-terrorism role.
I believe, though my colleague, General Hill, could comment
on this more, that the provision of the new authorities has
been extremely important in setting us on the right course and
allowing us to set the stage for the rapid progress that we
have seen.
Senator DeWine. But you have that now.
Mr. Struble. We have that, yes.
Senator DeWine. So you are catching up, is what you are
saying.
Mr. Struble. We are catching up, indeed.
General Hill. Sir, let me add to Mr. Struble's comments,
especially on the expanded authority. If you said to me what
are the two biggest issues, one is the expanded authorities
that allowed us to break the drug nexus into narco-terrorism,
counter-terrorism operations, is the single greatest
deficiency.
We focused so long only on the drug nexus that we were
unable to go after the leadership. We can now do that--greater
intelligence-sharing with the Colombian military, use of the
Plan Colombia helicopters, dollars, and other assets, and the
ability of the Colombian military to take that actual
intelligence and operate with it. That is before the Congress
again and we just simply have to have it. If we walked back
from expanded authority, it would be a terrible mistake.
I will give you two anecdotes, one good, one bad.
Senator DeWine. That would be helpful.
General Hill. When Ms. Bettencourt was kidnapped, before
expanded authorities, the Colombian military came to us and
asked us for helicopter support to go in search of her. We
could not provide it because there was no drug nexus to support
that operation.
Senator DeWine. You could not supply----
General Hill. The helicopters to look for Ms. Bettencourt.
Senator DeWine. What about intelligence?
General Hill. We couldn't provide the intelligence either.
Senator DeWine. So you can't do intelligence, you can't
share intelligence?
General Hill. No, sir.
Senator DeWine. There was a wall there?
General Hill. An absolute firewall between, if you couldn't
prove a drug nexus, you could not provide the intelligence.
That put the burden on the intel analyst to sit there and to
show you that there really was a drug nexus in order to do it.
That is ludicrous and we are beyond that.
Senator DeWine. So it is equipment, plus intelligence.
General Hill. Yes, sir. If the Congress gave it to us with
drug money, before expanded authority, we could not use that
money in support of activities in Colombia. We are beyond that.
Senator DeWine. OK, one example.
General Hill. Yes, sir. I will give you a good example.
About 4 months ago, after we had expanded authority, the
Colombian military and the counter-narcotics brigade was
running an operation in the Putumayo area and they were doing
operations going from village to village with our helicopters,
Plan Colombia helicopters.
In one little village, a man walked up to them and said,
``You know, the 45th Front FARC commander comes in here all the
time; if you will give me a cell phone, I will call you the
next time he is in town and you can come and get him.''
About 3 weeks later, the phone rings, it is a Saturday
morning, and it is this villager who said, ``Hey, they're
here'', and described the building that they were in and all
the details. As luck would have it, and sometimes wars are won
on luck, there was a platoon sitting on an airstrip and an
aggressive commander who was able to get some helicopters.
They had been in that village a couple of weeks before.
They got the helicopters in, they planned the attack, they flew
there, they took down the village, and got the FARC commander
and 300 kilos of cocaine and a lot of ammunition. Start to
finish, 6 hours. If that was a unit from the 101st Airborne
Division Air Assault at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where I used
to command a brigade, you would applaud it. It was an excellent
operation. It could never have taken place before expanded
authorities.
Senator DeWine. Good, that is helpful.
General Hill. I think Mr. Billingslea would like to add
something.
Mr. Billingslea. Senator, I think we came to the
realization that the FARC is fundamentally a narco-terrorist
organization somewhat late, and we inherited a structure
related to the Plan Colombia program that was somewhat
stovepiped, as you have heard, between the counter-drug
approach and the counter-terrorism approach.
Because we have not only obtained the expanded authorities,
but because we have, I think, more prudently defined the term
``counter-drug'' to include measures that are reasonably
related to narcotics trafficking, we have been able to provide
a variety of assistance that previously was not provided.
We have been able, for instance, to provide military
assistance teams to translate intelligence information into
operational capacity. Just because you have intelligence on a
terrorist group doesn't necessarily mean that you have the
gears engaged to then take action to thwart a planned terrorist
attack. That is something that has been evolving and is going
to be crucial to the process.
Second, you will find that we have been able to train a
larger variety of units, all carefully vetted through the
Department of State process. That is critical, but sometimes
can be slow, and that can impede the rapidity with which we can
act in concert with our partners.
But you will find that we have been able to train not only
a counter-narcotics brigade, but also a special forces commando
battalion; a lancero battalion, which is a rangers type of
unit; and a special operations command headquarters staff. All
of this training is essential to bring the other pressure point
to bear, which is not just eradication of the coca fields and
the financial mechanisms that the FARC uses to fund itself, but
to move against the FARC itself, to move against the
leadership, to assist the Colombian government in deploying
small, agile teams that are capable of going after this
terrorist group to strike them before they are able to conduct
further attacks.
Senator DeWine. My time is up and I am going to turn to
Senator Sessions, but I want to get back to the question of
what is not working. You have told me now we have changed
something and we are moving in the right direction, but if we
look at the overall Plan Colombia, what is not working?
General Hill. From a military perspective, in my view, the
Colombian military, especially in the last 9 months, has made
significant strides in their ability to take actionable
intelligence that we can provide them and operationalize that
intelligence. They are still a long way away from doing that
routinely or without our assistance. They are getting better
everyday, but they have a way to go.
The other thing that the Colombian military needs to
improve upon is the ability to operate jointly, but again we
are working with them in order to do that.
Senator DeWine. What does that mean, General?
General Hill. Sir, that means the ability for the army and
the air force to coordinate an operation, again, in a routine
manner effectively and efficiently. It means that if there is
an operation that requires the police and the military to act
coherently that they do. They are getting better at it.
As I remind many of my colleagues both in the State
Department and in the military, this is a learned skill,
jointness. The U.S. military became joint at the point of a
Congressional gun in 1986, and we are still not as joint as we
should be. This is hard work, but I applaud them on their
efforts.
Senator DeWine. We have a cap on the number of U.S.
military in Colombia. We have trainers there. Describe for me
in layman's terms what our role there is as far as training.
What kind of impact can we have?
We are doing training and I look at this and say, well, how
can we have much of an impact? I will play the devil's
advocate. How can we have much of an impact with a relatively
small number of trainers? Now, maybe from a military point of
view, it is not a small number of trainers.
General Hill. What is a small number of trainers?
Senator DeWine. I mean, just tell me what is it, General,
from a military point of view.
General Hill. I think the results that we have--I will go
back to the first part of your question, which is what is our
job. Our job is, from a military perspective, to work with the
Colombian military to help them more professionalize themselves
to gain greater proficiency in operationalizing on actionable
intelligence and to work jointly, as I just discussed, and at
the unit level to be more tactically correct.
What is happening with our ability to do this with a small
number of trainers is that we started with a pretty
professional army and military. They were not an unprofessional
group before we started working with them. They have a long
history of being a good, capable force. We are helping them
become a more capable force.
We do it only after we have vetted a unit and that unit
then can receive U.S. training. All the units that we have
trained you can point to and see the difference, how much
better they are. I will also say to you there is an ancillary
benefit. I can also go down and point to units that the United
States has not helped train and they are getting better because
there is, in fact, cross-fertilization as people move between
units.
Senator DeWine. Good, thank you.
Senator Sessions.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS, U.S. SENATOR
FROM ALABAMA
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much, Senator DeWine, and
I want to express my appreciation to Senator Grassley and to
you for your consistent and dedicated interest in this issue. I
know you have been to Colombia and other countries, and
probably more than anybody in this Senate have personally been
engaged on the ground with the problems of drugs from this area
of the world.
I do remember a number of years ago when I came here that I
asked a series of questions about our role. Ambassador
Pickering, a fine public servant, insisted under the previous
administration that our goals were solely anti-narcotics. And I
said, ``Are we on the side of the Colombian government against
the communist narco-terrorists?'', and he basically said our
interest is narcotics. And I pressed him again. Our interest is
narcotics. To me, that was always an absurd philosophy and I am
glad to hear that we have made some substantial progress over
the years in eliminating that.
General Hill, it would be irrational to expect a government
like the Government of Colombia to eliminate narcotics in an
area of the country they don't even control, would it not?
General Hill. It would certainly be a very difficult thing
to do that, for sure.
Senator Sessions. It seems to me that from the beginning we
have had two goals, to encourage the Colombian government to
assert its control over its entire country, and in the course
of that victory against these terrorist insurgents we can
expect and would expect that they would take strong efforts to
eliminate narcotics trafficking in the process.
Secretary Struble?
Mr. Struble. I fully agree, sir. That is one reason why we
have, for example, provided such enthusiastic support for the
efforts described by Vice President Santos earlier today to
help the Colombians establish a police presence in the
municipalities where they have not had one. It is absolutely
key that there be an official presence throughout the national
territory of Colombia.
Senator Sessions. Well, as a Federal prosecutor and a U.S.
Attorney for a number of years on the Gulf Coast, we prosecuted
a lot of cases that traced back to Colombia. I remember
indicting a number of Colombians and we hoped that there would
be extraditions. They never occurred.
I remember a young police officer coming and testifying
from Colombia and he was utterly courageous. I asked him about
his personal safety and he had no fear. He told the truth and
if they came after him, so be it. So there are a lot of superb
people in Colombia that are dedicated to changing what is
occurring.
General Hill, is the Government of Colombia making progress
in expanding its control of territory, and how would you
characterize the strength of the FARC and the other groups?
General Hill. Yes, sir, they are, in fact, expanding their
territory, as Vice President Santos testified earlier this
morning. There are two major programs underway by the Uribe
government to go into areas that they had either vacated before
or have never been in, and there are many locales where they
have never had much government presence.
One, there is a campesino program where they have trained
volunteers to give them some sort of military training under
the control and guidance and leadership of a Colombian military
person to go back into the villages to provide security. They
have also expanded police presence. The number that I have seen
is about 127 villages over the last 3 or 4 months that they
have put police presence back into.
The FARC and the ELN and the AUC are strong opponents. They
have lots of money, they have a defined ability of
infrastructure and communications, and they are ruthless in
their application of power. We have, however, over the last
several months seen some intelligence indicators that you make
you want to smile.
We are seeing a little bit of the money dry up because of
the effort that goes after the drugs and the narco-terrorism.
We are seeing some areas where they have not been able to make
their coca paste production. The eradication effort is
beginning to really make some inroads in their ability to fund
themselves. The desertion rates are up tremendously. A lot of
that I think is because they have gone out and forcibly
recruited children and other people, and those folks are taking
off and there are some good signs in all of that.
Senator Sessions. It seems to me that President Uribe is
what Colombia needed. I think in the United States and in
Colombia there was a sort of generalized feeling that this war
had gone on so long and it was just going to go on forever and
it just couldn't be ended. But it can be ended. There is no
doubt in my mind that if the people of Colombia make up their
minds that they will not allow this to continue that they can
defeat this group.
I mean, they have so many advantages, General. Wouldn't you
agree that, militarily, a united, determined Colombia can
defeat these insurgent groups and restore the democracy which
Colombia is known for? As one of the oldest democracies in the
hemisphere, it is in a life-and-death struggle, it seems to me,
for its heritage and future.
General Hill. Yes, sir, and I agree with that. I would also
say to you that, militarily, they have made great strides. They
will continue to make great strides and, militarily, I believe
they have the momentum and they can continue the momentum.
But I think just as importantly, what the Uribe government
has done is understand that it can't be only a military
victory. They must, in fact, have political reform, labor
reform, and judicial reform, which is a major point. And they
have programs and they are, in my view, moving in the correct
direction in all of those areas, and it is paying off both in
terms of political and people support for the Uribe government,
about a 65-percent popular government, and the fact that the
military has emerged as the single most respected institution
in the country.
If that military was out there violating the human rights
of the citizenry, they would not be the most respected
institution in the country. I think that all of those things
bode well for two things to happen: the Uribe government stays
the course, along with the Colombian people, and I believe they
will, and that the United States, with the support of this
Congress, does the same.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
Mr. Billingslea. Senator, I might add denial of territory
in the spraying program which is having an effect on the
revenue stream as the coca crops dry up is one piece of the
Uribe administration's strategy. They have got several other
pieces that are also working very effectively.
They have an amnesty program which is inducing not only
foot soldiers and conscripts to come in and lay down arms, but
has also induced the defection of a number of key personnel
from the FARC and the ELN, including some financiers.
They have made progress in Europe with disrupting FARC
fundraising in Europe. Gone are the days when the FARC is
romanticized as some kind of egalitarian revolutionary
movement. It is now recognized for being a brutal, drug-running
terrorist organization. So the information campaign and the
perspective on the organization has changed in a very positive
way.
Senator Sessions. Marxist in its heritage, is it not?
Mr. Billingslea. Marxist in its heritage, but those
individuals are increasingly taking a back seat to the drug-
running crowd.
Then, finally, there is a program to degrade the FARC
infrastructure and the cell structure that it has as the
Colombian military gets more agile and is able to operate in
remote areas in small units for sustained periods of time. So
there is a very positive picture that is evolving here.
Senator DeWine. I would like to turn to the topic we have
not talked about today, and that is the Air Bridge Denial
Program. Who is going to be my volunteer to talk about that?
Mr. Secretary, very good.
Now, my understanding is that we are getting close to
starting that back up. Is that correct?
Mr. Simons. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. We have made
substantial progress over the past 6 months in moving toward
standing up this program.
Senator DeWine. How far away are we?
Mr. Simons. We are very close. I would expect in the next
couple of weeks you will be hearing from us on this. We have
had very good cooperation from the Colombians. We held two
rounds of negotiations with them during the course of this
year. Colombia agreed to establish air bridge zones. They
agreed to the revised safety procedures which we needed to put
into place following the shoot-down in Peru.
They have agreed to a vigorous process of notifying their
own public of the existence of the air bridge zones. Again, we
have had good cooperation with the air force, civil aviation,
the Colombian police.
Senator DeWine. As you know, I think this is something that
we have to do. I don't want to take a lot of time today to go
into all the details. I know you are going to roll this out at
some point in the future, but what I would like to talk about
is the U.S. accountability. I wonder if you could talk a little
bit about that and who is going to make that decision and do
the sign-off and what our role will be.
Mr. Simons. That has been very carefully worked out between
the State Department, the Defense Department, the Colombians,
and the Customs Service, which is also a participant. We have
just sent an interagency team down to Colombia which was
represented by State, Defense, Customs, and Homeland Security.
There are various players on the U.S. side who are
providing intelligence, who are operating the aerial frames, or
who are involved as riders in some of the Colombian trackers.
There is a very detailed procedure for the steps that we need
to go through in order to ramp up to an eventual decision.
All of these procedures have been worked out. They have
been fully coordinated here, interagency, with the Department
of Justice. There has been a testing of these procedures on the
ground with the Colombians, and so we are ready to move on
this.
Senator DeWine. What is the role, if any, of any contract
employees?
Mr. Simons. There is a contractor, a State Department-hired
contractor, that will be performing some of the ground safety
monitoring function, as well as the air safety monitoring
function. But the overall coordinator of the process will be
JATF South, in Florida. They will be essentially in charge of
making sure that the steps are passing through.
Senator DeWine. Well, again, I have a concern about what
the role of the contractor is going to be; in other words, that
we don't contract out ultimate responsibility here. Do you want
to get into a little more detail for me here about the role of
the contractor?
Mr. Simons. The contractor clearly will play a key role,
but there will be other players that are direct-hire U.S.
Government employees that will also be involved in the process,
as well as the Colombians.
Senator DeWine. What you are telling me is you don't want
to talk about it today.
Mr. Simons. I think it is a shared responsibility.
Senator DeWine. Well, what is the role? What is the
contractor's role?
Mr. Simons. The contractor has a role in sitting with the
Colombians at the command center of the Colombian Air Force, in
Bogota, in making sure that the various steps are being
followed. There are contractors also that will be flying with
the Colombians as air safety monitors, making sure that those
steps are gone through.
But there is also someone back in Florida who is monitoring
the entire process, who is bringing the intelligence together
through JATF South, who is also following the same sheet of
music going down the steps to make sure that all the steps are
followed that have been agreed to in terms of meeting our
security conditions. So there are a number of checks and
balances that have been built into the program.
Senator DeWine. Well, I won't belabor it.
General do you have anything you want to add about this?
General Hill. The only thing I would add, Senator DeWine,
is that as the contractor who is overseeing and making--he has
a checklist and making sure that they are following exact
procedures. But the person in charge who eventually gives that
instruction goes back to JATF South, our folks sitting,
understanding all the intelligence, what they are looking at,
and ensuring that all the proper steps are being taken to do
it.
Senator DeWine. Who ultimately makes the decision to shoot
down?
Mr. Simons. The Colombians make the decision, in
consultation with the various U.S. operators.
Senator DeWine. And the various U.S. operators include who?
Mr. Simons. Contractor, as well as JATF South; Customs, if
they are involved, and anyone else who has provided intel into
a particular operation.
Senator DeWine. Well, I support starting this up. I think
we have to do it. I don't think we have any choice. Obviously,
we want to have as many safeguards as we can. We all have that
same interest. I just want to put everyone on notice as someone
who has looked at this before that I have a concern about the
role of a contractor and the role of contracting anything out
that is ultimately a governmental responsibility. I am going to
be looking at it.
I think we in the Congress have a responsibility to look at
this and to have some oversight over this. So when you all are
ready to totally roll this out, that is fine, but this is one
Senator who is going to be looking at it. That is all. I am
very sympathetic to doing it, but I am also very leery,
frankly, of having a contractor, a contract employee, doing
this.
Mr. Simons. We will be up to brief you in the next couple
of weeks in detail on this.
Senator DeWine. I look forward to that.
Mr. Billingslea. Senator, we are also very aware of that.
We labor in Colombia under some unusual requirements that you
don't find anywhere else in the world. There is a congressional
restriction that caps our military presence at 400 people and
our contractor presence at 400 people.
Senator DeWine. I understand.
Mr. Billingslea. So there is that context to all of this.
Senator DeWine. You have got both, though; I mean, you have
got both caps.
Mr. Billingslea. Yes, sir. I think you will find when we
brief you that there are a number of safeguards built in for
legal protection of all U.S. personnel involved in the program,
as well as a structure which was negotiated with the Colombian
government that is designed from beginning to end to guard
against and to protect against the loss of innocent life.
Senator DeWine. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Just to reiterate how proud I am of the
Colombian people and President Uribe, I just can't overstate
that. I think he has an opportunity to be the Abraham Lincoln
of Colombia. The Civil War in the United States was not an easy
battle. A lot people lost their lives, but you had consistent,
strong leadership from the top and we are now a united Nation.
So I think it is a big, big deal what is going on.
General Hill.
General Hill. If I could, sir, you said Abraham Lincoln and
I wanted to relate to you a story. When President Uribe was
here several weeks ago to visit President Bush--and I know he
made lots of rounds on the Hill, also--I had the privilege of
taking him to Gettysburg on Saturday morning. He wanted to go;
he asked to go.
He and I and several people walked the battlefield with
some experts. He asked very pointed questions, because he made
that same analogy in his mind--I could see it--the comparison
between what Lincoln had to do to save this country and what
President Uribe has to do to save his.
Senator Sessions. I think there is a legitimate analogy
there and it has just gone on longer. I am sure it is more
difficult to rally the country.
One of the things that troubled me, General Hill, was the
recruitment of the military, the length of their service, and
some of the things that indicated a lack of commitment there.
Have they made improvements in that, and what would you say are
the problems that remain?
General Hill. They have, sir. They have done a couple of
things to improve that situation. One, they are increasing the
length of service from 18 months to 24 months. They have
essentially done away with, without the law, the bachelaras
program that said high school grads couldn't serve in certain
capacity. They have, on their own, whittled that down to almost
nothing. In fact, there is proposed legislation to just do away
with that program completely. Those are major steps forward to
demonstrate the commitment of the Colombian people, not just a
small segment of it.
I would also say one other thing on that issue. If you are
a recruit in the Colombian military, you can elect to stay on
as a professional soldier after your 18-month, or now 2-year
stint. At that point, you go into a school of the professional
soldier and after that is over with, you are integrated into
the army as a professional soldier.
We have encouraged them, and the Colombian army, in
particular, has wanted to build a professional non-commissioned
officer corps. I have had my command sergeant major on about
five different trips to Colombia in the last couple of months,
both looking at their procedures and talking with their senior
commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and have brought up
several of their non-commissioned officer leadership to some of
our schools, in particular at Fort Benning, not WINSEC, but our
non-commissioned officer academies at Fort Benning. I believe
that the army will name a sergeant major of the army sometime
in August. This is a major step forward in terms of
professionalizing their force.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator DeWine. Let me turn to the pipeline security issue.
Last month, the State Department released its report on
international terrorist activity and according to that report,
there were 199 international terrorist attacks during 2002 in
Colombia, which was a 44-percent drop from the previous year.
But what many people fail to notice is that one of the
biggest reasons for the decrease was the sharp drop in the
number of oil pipeline bombings in Colombia. There were 41 such
bombings last year, which was down from 178 in 2001. Really,
that decrease is remarkable, and wonder, General, or anyone
else on the panel if you would like to comment about what this
decrease is due to and what the change in the policy has been
and what our program has been, and talk a little bit about
that. And if you could explain whether we have any other plans
to change that policy or to expand that policy, whoever would
like to take that one.
Mr. Struble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will begin and then
ask General Hill to fill in. The most remarkable thing about
that decrease, Senator, is that it precedes the main deployment
of our trainers into Arauca Province. But in point of fact, a
number of steps have been underway since we originally
requested the Congress' authorization for this program that
have already, as you have noted, had a big impact.
The first was our discussions with the Colombians about
dedicating adequate force to this mission. The Colombians, even
before the arrival of our trainers, began to essentially double
the number of troops on the ground that were devoted to
security in Arauca Province.
Senator DeWine. These were Colombian forces on the ground?
Mr. Struble. These were Colombian forces on the ground,
sir.
The second was to ensure that the Government of Colombia
took a general approach to the problem of security here. So to
give one very important example, there is now a fiscal, a
prosecutor--Senator Sessions can identify with this--who has
been assigned from Bogota to that area because the local
prosecutors were too compromised, if you will, by the violence
in the area by association with some of the illegal actors.
This person, this prosecutor, lives on a Colombian military
base and has been brought in to ensure that those who have been
detected or suspected or are being investigated for bombings
and other terrorist acts are, in fact, detained and subjected
to the process of justice.
And then, last, we have had a number of assessment missions
that came out to help us design the most productive training
program that had some fast-acting recommendations for the
Colombians on how they integrate intelligence and put it in the
hands of those who most need it.
General Hill. Sir, I will just add a couple of short
statements to that very good answer. I think one thing it shows
is our determination, the United States' determination to stay
the course, and bolsters the Colombian military's self-
confidence. It urges them to take the fight to the enemy and
helps in their ability to do that.
Also, the early training and discussions that we did and
the fact that they added more people up in the Arauca area and
Sarvina area--when you say ``regarding the pipeline,'' that
conjures up someone sitting on top of the pipeline, and that is
what they used to do. What we do now is we have got them out in
the countryside taking the fight to the enemy where the enemy
is, not waiting for something to simply blow up and to go back
and fix.
Mr. Billingslea. Which, in turn, translates into one simple
thing, which is every day of unimpeded oil that goes through
that pipeline is an additional day of revenue for the
government to use in this struggle.
Senator DeWine. We have talked today specifically about
Colombia and we have gotten some very good news about Colombia,
but as we look around the region, we have seen some other
countries around the region and drug production going up.
We always talk about this balloon effect. We have good news
here and we push it here and then we have it go out in other
regions or in other parts of the region. What are we going to
do about that?
We look at the funding for the region, $731 million. The
funding that is requested for the Andean Counter-Drug
Initiative is $731, which is really the same amount that was
requested in the previous two fiscal years, flat-funded. The
bulk of the funding goes to Colombia. I don't think anyone is
disagreeing with that, but we have got problems in surrounding
countries. What are we going to do about that?
Mr. Struble. I think that there are two answers to that
question, Senator. One of them has to do with the political
approach to it, and the second is the programmatic approach. I
know that Assistant Secretary Paul Simons can speak to the
latter.
On the political side, you are right that we do have a very
serious problem. First of all, there is a need for greater
regional coordination. In fact, I should have stepped in when
you asked earlier what are the areas where we still have
deficiencies in Plan Colombia. That is one.
Colombia's neighbors need to realize that Colombia's fight
is their fight, too, that they have a strong stake in the
Colombian government establishing effective security over its
national territory, and especially the border regions. I
commend the Colombian government for having taken the
initiative on March 12 of this year to invite foreign ministers
and defense ministers from all the neighboring countries for a
very open discussion of this problem, in which they shared, for
example, an intelligence brief that talks about the presence in
border areas of foreign terrorist organizations.
The second issue here is we have made significant progress
in Peru and Bolivia over the past 5 or 6 years in decreasing
coca cultivation. It is down about 70 percent, even with some
increase last year. But what we have seen, as that number gets
lower and lower, is that core group of people whose
livelihoods, especially farmers whose livelihoods depend upon
coca production start to resist more the continued eradication.
In the case of Bolivia where that has come together with a
number of other problems, a drop in growth rates in the last
few years, it has created a very, very significant political
problem for the government.
We are working very closely with the international donor
community, with the international financial institutions and
bilaterally to ensure that there is an increased flow of money
to Bolivia for development in order to show that staying the
course on this is going to be productive for the vast majority
of Bolivian citizens.
Mr. Simons. I agree with Curt's observations. I would just
add one point, which is that when the Andean Counter-Narcotics
Initiative was put together initially, this problem was
anticipated, the fact that we could be successful in Colombia
and therefore pressures would grow. So there was a rather
substantial increase up front in our funding for both Peru and
Bolivia, in particular on the alternative development side.
So we were able to create very robust alternative
development programs both in Bolivia and in Peru that have to
some extent given us a head start. So, clearly, there are going
to be more pressures. To the extent we are successful in
Colombia, pressures will grow. Pressures are already growing,
but we have to some extent built an infrastructure.
The funding that we have requested for 2004, $207 million
for Peru and Bolivia, we think is adequate to provide the
assistance that is needed both on the alternative development
side as well as on the eradication and interdiction side.
On the eradication and interdiction side, we have some
advantages that we don't have in Colombia. We have a much
better security situation. We have a long history of working
with the military and the police on a lot of these programs.
So, for instance, some of the difficulties we have with
mechanics and pilots, we don't have these problems in Bolivia
and Peru because we have been there a long time and we have
worked out a lot of bugs in the programs. So we can get a
little more efficiency out of those programs and we can get the
job done.
Senator DeWine. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator DeWine. Again, I want
to express my appreciation for your leadership. I know you have
been to Colombia four times. That is probably as much as
anybody in this Senate. You are care about it and are providing
good leadership there.
I guess, Secretary Struble, the economic damage from
terrorism and what is happening in Colombia is significant.
Isn't that another big reason why Colombia needs to break the
back of this terrorist insurgency?
Mr. Struble. It is indeed. In his written testimony, Vice
President Santos said that terrorism in Colombia costs the
country 2 percent of its domestic product every year, year
after year. And, of course, the human cost is horrific as well,
with 30,000 deaths. Frankly, I think that is the reason why the
Colombian people have responded to President Uribe's call for
greater sacrifice.
If we look at what has happened in that country in the past
10 months, where the people have been asked to pay a special
tax contribution based upon their assets that is equivalent to
1 percent of GDP, where the Congress has passed a number of tax
efficiency measures in December of last year and government
reform measures that are intended to save hundreds of millions
of dollars and to generate additional resources for the state,
where the government has announced its intention to increase
spending on the security services from about 3.5 percent of GDP
to 5.8 percent of GDP in the next few years, what we have seen
is the people are tired of this and they recognize that the
cost is borne by society as a whole and that they are willing
to contribute to meeting that cost.
Senator Sessions. I think there is a possibility of victory
here and it encourages me to hear some of the numbers that you
mentioned, such as we have got more territory taken back by the
government, sabotage of the pipeline is down, defections have
increased in the FARC. Those kinds of things can be sustained
and actually can sometimes increase as the doom becomes more
obvious to those who are resisting.
I don't want to be overly optimistic. I know this has gone
on for a long time, but I also think that we can see cause for
optimism here. Would you agree?
Mr. Struble. I would very strongly agree. In fact, I will
add another area that you have not cited to the successes and
that is on the institutional side. You mentioned your
experience as a Federal prosecutor when you couldn't get
extraditions from Colombia. It was because the judiciary in
Colombia was so intimidated that it didn't process them
effectively even in those moments when there was not a
constitutional prohibition against it.
If my colleagues from the Department of Justice were here
today, I am confident they would tell you, as they have told
me, that the best extradition relationship we have in the
Western Hemisphere today is with Colombia.
Senator Sessions. Well, let's ask about that because you
say they were intimidated. That should not demean the judges
too seriously because, in fact, they were being killed in large
numbers. They killed nine members of the Supreme Court of
Colombia. Judges who took courageous actions, they and their
families could expect to be killed frequently and it was a
very, very difficult time.
What is the status of the ability to prosecute a
significant drug dealer or a significant insurgent member in
the courts of Colombia today?
Mr. Struble. What I would like to do, Senator, is respond
for the record in writing with some more specific detail about
the number of prosecutions and the decrease in time of people
in the system.
What I will note in terms of strengthening the judiciary is
that, in part thanks to U.S. assistance over the past few
years, a lot of hardened courtrooms have been built. Security
details have been provided for prosecutors and judges to
protect them. Justice has been made available to people who
were formerly denied it because they lived miles and miles away
from any courtroom.
I think one of the most successful programs we have is that
of the casas de justicia. There are now some 31 that we have
funded in Colombia and they have adjudicated 1.6 million cases.
Many of those are civil cases, but you also understand
perfectly well the importance of having access to civil law as
well as civil law, and I think that we have seen the Colombian
judiciary measurably perform in these areas over the last few
years.
Senator Sessions. One more brief question, General Hill.
You talked about the essential need for helicopter lift to
respond rapidly to opportunities in the conflict there. We had
some debate here about the proper mix between Blackhawk
helicopters and Hueys. Let me ask you how you feel about that
mix and would it be helpful if there were more helicopters
provided.
General Hill. Well, more is always better, and the
Blackhawk helicopter is the finest helicopter made in the world
and there is no comparison between the Blackhawk helicopter and
any other type of assault helicopter or troop-carrying
helicopter that is necessary. However, it is also more
expensive.
The Colombians, in fact, do have a mixture of air frames
that makes it more difficult in several areas--spare parts,
mechanics, pilots, all the above. The reality of life, however,
is they do have that mixture. There is something to say for
more than less. For example, with the infrastructure money for
the pipeline that is coming, we are going to get 2 Blackhawks,
6 UH-2s, and we are going to fix another Blackhawk and give
them some more spare parts. I think that is a good mixture. It
has been worked out between the Colombians and us, the State
Department. I think that is a good mixture.
Would it be better if they were pure-fleeted? Absolutely.
Could they or we afford that? I think the answer is no.
Senator Sessions. I tend to agree. The Huey is still a
valuable aircraft and can do many things. Isn't it more
expensive to maintain a Blackhawk, in addition to just the
cost?
General Hill. The Huey and the Huey-11, in particular, are
excellent aircraft. They get the job done for what the
Colombians need. They are easier to fly. They are, in fact, if
you have the spare parts, easier to maintain. So there is a lot
to say for that and I am not in any way taking away from that.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator DeWine. Gentlemen, thank you very much. I think it
has been a very helpful panel, very informative. We appreciate
your testimony and we also appreciate your service. Thank you
very much.
Let me introduce our third panel, and I would ask our third
panel to start coming up as I introduce you. Our third panel
today is here to give us their take on what all this means.
Jess Ford, the Director of the International Affairs and
Trade Division at the General Accounting Office, will be
presenting testimony drawn from GAO's extensive oversight of
our activities in Colombia. The GAO is currently finishing up
their latest work on U.S. assistance to the region which, I
understand should be published later this month.
Mr. Phil McLean is currently a Senior Associate with the
Center for Strategic and International Studies' Americas
Program. He previously served for more than three decades in
the U.S. Foreign Service with overseas assignments in Latin
America and Europe. After retirement from Government service in
1994, he was appointed Assistant Secretary for Management at
the Organization of American States and served as adviser to
the OAS Secretary.
As a standard practice, gentlemen, you may submit a
lengthier statement, but I would ask that you keep your opening
comments to 5 minutes. Thank you very much and we look forward
to your testimony.
Who wants to start?
Mr. Ford, do you want to start?
STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND
TRADE, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC.
Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here to discuss
GAO's work on U.S. counter-narcotics in Colombia. As you
mentioned in your opening statement, we will be issuing a
report later this month.
Today, I am going to focus on two key areas that the Caucus
asked us to examine, as well as the Senate Appropriations
Committee, dealing with the status of U.S. assistance to the
Colombian army from fiscal years 2000 to 2003, approximately
the time of Plan Colombia, and what the U.S.-supported police
aerial eradication program has accomplished in recent years.
And then I am going to talk a little bit about some of the
remaining challenges, as we see them.
First, with regard to the army, the United States has
provided approximately $640 million to train and equip the
Colombian army counter-narcotics brigade, and supplied the army
with 72 helicopters, which was mentioned this morning. All of
the helicopters have been delivered to Colombia, and based on
the information we have obtained, all of them should be
operational by sometime this month.
After the successful first year of operations, the
brigade's results dropped off in 2002. The brigade initially
busted 24 labs in 2001. The number of labs busted in 2002 was
reduced to four. As a consequence, U.S. Government and
Colombian officials decided to re-train the brigade and provide
it with greater mobility. The training occurred in late 2002.
The Colombian army reorganized the brigade, made it smaller,
more professional and more mobile. They currently, as you heard
this morning, are conducting operations in Narino.
Although all the U.S.-produced helicopters are in Colombia,
there were a number of unanticipated problems in training the
Colombian army pilots and mechanics to operate and maintain the
helicopters. Some of these problems continue to limit the
army's ability to operate and maintain the aircraft.
These include insufficient numbers of trained pilots and
mechanics, the availability of pilots and mechanics, and
limited financial support from the Colombian government.
Consequently, the army will have to rely on contractor support
because it will not have enough trained pilots in command and
senior mechanics for the foreseeable future.
U.S. assistance to support the helicopters was originally
planned to end in 2006, with the Colombian army taking over
responsibility for operating and maintaining the aircraft.
However, U.S. and Colombian officials stated that a continued
level of U.S. assistance will be needed beyond this date
because the army is not expected to have the personnel trained
and the resources necessary. Although U.S. embassy officials
stated that they have not officially estimated what the
assistance level will be, they have tentatively projected it
will cost approximately $100 to $150 million a year to sustain
this operation.
Now, I am going to turn to the police. In recent years, the
Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has had
mixed results. Since 1995, net coca cultivation rose every
year, until 2002. As you heard this morning, the official
numbers are there has been a reduction of 15 percent in overall
coca cultivation. The story for poppy is even better. The
results for the last 2 years are a 35-percent reduction in
poppy cultivation.
U.S. embassy officials attributed these recent successes
primarily to the Colombian government's willingness to spray
coca and poppy plants in all areas of the country. Since 1998,
U.S. embassy officials have been concerned with the rising U.S.
presence in Colombia and the associated costs. Since 1998, the
costs of the aerial eradication program from the U.S.
perspective has almost doubled.
Now, I want to turn to some of the challenges. Although the
U.S.-supported counter-narcotics program has recently shown
some results, Colombia and the United States continue to face
financial and management challenges in sustaining these
programs.
Colombia's financial resources are limited. Neither the
army nor the police can sustain ongoing counter-narcotics
programs without continued U.S. funding for the foreseeable
future. According to our analysis and our discussions with U.S.
officials, ongoing programs for the police and the Colombian
army will cost approximately $230 million a year, and future
costs for some other programs have not yet been determined.
Colombia also continues to face challenges associated with
its political and economic instability fostered by the
longstanding insurgency. For U.S. assistance to continue, there
will be a need for the army and the police to comply with human
rights standards. The aerial eradication program will need to
meet environmental conditions, and alternative development
projects must be conducted in the areas where aerial
eradication occurs.
Colombia is a long-time ally and significant trading
partner of the United States, and therefore its economic and
political stability is important to the United States, as well
as the Andean region. Colombia's longstanding insurgency and
the insurgents' links to the illicit drug trade complicate its
efforts to tap its natural resources and make systematic
economic reforms. Solving these problems is important to
Colombia's future.
As we noted in 2000, the total costs of the counter-
narcotics program were unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the
Department of State and the Department of Justice have still
not developed estimates for the future costs of the program,
defined their future roles in Colombia, identified the proposed
end state, or determined how they plan to achieve it.
Mr. Chairman, that is a summary of my comments. I would be
happy to answer any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs
and Trade
Drug Control--Financial and Management Challenges Continue to
Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia
what gao found
In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640
million in assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army
counternarcotics brigade and supply the army with 72 helicopters and
related support. Most of this assistance has been delivered and is
being used for counternarcotics operations.
In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication
program has had mixed results. Since 1995, coca cultivation rose in
every year until 2002 and opium poppy cultivation remained relatively
steady until 2001. But, for 2002, the U.S. Office of National Drug
Control Policy reported that net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased
15 percent and net opium poppy cultivation decreased 25 percent--the
second yearly decline in a row. U.S. officials attributed this success
primarily to the Colombian government's willingness to eradicate coca
and poppy plants without restriction.
Although the U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia
has recently begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in Plan
Colombia, Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with
financial and management challenges. Neither the Colombian Army nor the
Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs
without continued U.S. funding and contractor support for the
foreseeable future. According to U.S. embassy officials, these programs
alone may cost up to $230 million per year, and future costs for some
other programs have not been determined. Because of overall poor
economic conditions, the government of Colombia's ability to contribute
more is limited, but the continuing violence from Colombia's long-
standing insurgency limits the government's ability to institute
economic, social, and political improvements. Moreover, Colombia faces
continuing challenges associated with the need to ensure it complies
with human rights standards and other requirements in order for U.S.
assistance to continue. As GAO noted in 2000, the total costs of the
counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years
later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed
estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in
Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan
to achieve it.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7649.001
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Caucus:
I am pleased to be here to discuss GAO's work on U.S.
counternarcotics assistance to Colombia. Today we will highlight the
preliminary findings from our ongoing review of U.S. assistance to
Colombia. Our draft report is with the responsible agencies for
comment; we expect to issue a final report in mid-June. I will focus my
comments on (1) the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the
Colombian Army in fiscal years 2000-03 and how this assistance has been
used, (2) what the U.S.-supported Colombian National Police aerial
eradication program has accomplished in recent years, and (3) what
challenges Colombia and the United States face in sustaining these
programs.
In 1999, the Colombian government introduced Plan Colombia--a $7.5
billion program that, among other things, proposed reducing the
cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50
percent over 6 years.\1\ A key component of the Colombian-U.S.
counternarcotics strategy was the creation of a Colombian Army 2,285-
man counternarcotics brigade, for which the United States agreed to
provide helicopters to help it move around southern Colombia to reduce
cocaine production and trafficking. Closely allied with this objective
was U.S. support for the Colombian National Police's aerial eradication
program to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, coca and opium poppy
cultivation.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For more information on U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia, see
U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to
Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results, GAO-01-26 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 17, 2000).
\2\ The leaves of the coca plant are the raw ingredient of cocaine,
and opium poppy is used to produce heroin. The aerial eradication
program involves spraying the coca and poppy plants from low-flying
airplanes with an herbicide that attacks the root system and kills the
plant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
summary
In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640
million to train and equip the Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade
and supply the army with 72 helicopters and related training,
maintenance, and operational support. Most of this assistance has been
delivered and is being used for counternarcotics operations. However,
some problems were encountered. For example,
<bullet> After a successful first year of operations, the brigade's
results dropped off in 2002. U.S. and Colombian officials attribute
this, in part, to coca growers and producers moving out of the
brigade's range in southern Colombia. In late 2002, with U.S.
assistance, the Colombian Army reorganized the brigade and gave it
authority to operate anywhere in the country. This change, according to
U.S. embassy and Colombian Army officials, will improve the brigade's
ability to conduct operations against high-value, drug-trafficking
targets, such as cocaine production laboratories and the leadership of
insurgent groups involved in drug-trafficking activities. One of the
brigade's retrained battalions has been operating in Narino department
since early May 2003.
<bullet> Some initial impediments slowed the delivery and
operational use of the helicopters. The start of entry-level helicopter
pilot training was delayed 5 months while the United States determined
who would provide and fund the training. The delivery of 25 UH-II
helicopters was delayed 5 months while the United States and Colombia
decided what type of engine to use in the aircraft. U.S. funding for
the brigade's operations was slowed for a total of about 5 months in
2002 because the Department of State did not meet congressional
deadlines for reporting on Colombia's progress in addressing human
rights violations.
U.S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan
Colombia was originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army
taking over the responsibilities of operating and maintaining the
aircraft. However, U.S. embassy and Colombian officials stated that a
continued level of U.S. assistance will be needed beyond this date
because the army is not expected to have the personnel trained or the
resources necessary. Although U.S. embassy officials stated that they
have not officially estimated what this assistance level will be, they
tentatively projected that it would cost between $100 million and $150
million a year to sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs. In
addition, other recently initiated U.S. programs will require
additional support.
In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication
program has had mixed results. Since 1995, net coca cultivation rose in
every year until 2002 and net opium poppy cultivation remained between
6,100 to 7,500 hectares. But in recent months, the Office of National
Drug Control Policy reported that:
<bullet> net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent in
2002, from 169,800 hectares in 2001 to 144,450 hectares, and
<bullet> net opium poppy cultivation in Colombia decreased 25
percent in 2002, from 6,500 hectares in 2001 to 4,900 hectares--the
second yearly decline in a row.
U.S. embassy officials attributed this recent success primarily to
the current Colombian government's willingness to spray coca and poppy
plants without restriction in all areas of the country. However, since
at least 1998, U.S. embassy officials have been concerned with the
rising U.S. presence in Colombia and the associated costs of the aerial
eradication program. At the time, the embassy began developing a 3-year
plan to have the Colombian National Police assume control over the
program; but, for various reasons, the police never agreed to the plan.
Since then, contractor involvement and the associated costs have
continued to rise, and the Colombian National Police are not yet able
to assume more control of the aerial eradication program. In fiscal
year 1998, U.S. embassy officials reported that the costs for the U.S.
contractor, fuel, herbicide, and related support totaled $48.5 million.
For fiscal year 2003, U.S. embassy officials estimated that the
comparable costs totaled $86.3 million. Much of this increase occurred
between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to support the additional spray
aircraft, multiple operating locations, and the anticipated
continuation of spray operations throughout Colombia. According to U.S.
embassy officials, these costs are expected to remain relatively
constant for the next several years.
Although the U.S.-supported counternarcotics program has recently
shown some of the results envisioned when Plan Colombia was first
introduced, Colombia and the United States continue to face financial
and management challenges in sustaining programs in Colombia.
<bullet> Colombia's financial resources are limited. Neither the
Colombian Army nor the Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing
counternarcotics programs without continued U.S. funding and contractor
support for the foreseeable future. According to U.S. embassy
officials, ongoing programs alone may cost up to $230 million per year,
and future costs for some other programs have not been determined.
<bullet> Colombia also continues to face challenges associated with
its political and economic instability fostered by its long-standing
insurgency and, for U.S. assistance to continue, the need to ensure
that (1) the military and police comply with human rights standards,
(2) the aerial eradication program meets certain environmental
conditions, and (3) alternative development is provided in areas
subject to aerial eradication.
Colombia is a longtime ally and significant trading partner of the
United States and, therefore, its economic and political stability is
important to the United States as well as the Andean region. Colombia's
long-standing insurgency and the insurgents' links to the illicit drug
trade complicate its efforts to tap its natural resources and make
systemic economic reforms. Solving these problems is important to
Colombia's future stability. On the other hand, recent world events--
from the global war on terrorism to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq--
have diverted scarce U.S. resources and made it paramount that the
United States fully consider the resources committed to its overseas
assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the total costs of the
counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. Nearly 3 years
later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not developed
estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in
Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan
to achieve it.
background
The United States has provided assistance to help reduce illegal
drug production and trafficking activities in Colombia since the
1970's. Yet, Colombia is still the world's leading cocaine producer and
distributor and a major source of the heroin used in the United States.
According to State, Colombia provides 90 percent of the cocaine and
about 40 percent of the heroin entering the United States. The Drug
Enforcement Administration reports that several billion dollars flow
into Colombia each year from the cocaine trade alone, and this vast
amount of drug money has helped the country's two largest insurgency
groups--the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National
Liberation Army--gain unprecedented economic, political, and social
power and influence. The insurgents exercise some degree of control
over 40 percent of Colombia's territory east and south of the Andes
where much of the coca is grown.
In an effort to address the influx of cocaine and heroin from
Colombia, the United States has funded a counternarcotics strategy in
Colombia that includes programs for interdiction, eradication, and
alternative development, which must be carefully coordinated to achieve
mutually reinforcing results. Besides assistance for the Colombian Army
counternarcotics brigade and the Colombian National Police aerial
eradication program, the United States has supported Colombian efforts
to interdict illicit-drug trafficking along rivers and in the air as
well as alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally
displaced persons programs. The Departments of Defense and State have
provided most of the funding and State, through its Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Narcotics
Affairs Section in the U.S. Embassy Bogota, oversees the program. In
fiscal years 2000 through 2003, the United States provided more than
$2.5 billion to Colombia for counternarcotics assistance. (See table
1.) For fiscal year 2004, the administration has proposed an additional
$700 million in aid.
Table 1.--U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia, Fiscal Years 2000-03
[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal years
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 \2\
Agency 2000 \1\ 2001 2002 (estimated) Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
State.................................................. $744.9 $48.0 $275.4 $452.0 $1,550.3
DOD.................................................... 128.5 190.2 119.1 149.9 587.7
USAID \3\.............................................. 123.5 0 104.5 151.0 379.0
--------------------------------------------------------
Total................................................ $1,026.9 $238.2 $499.0 $752.9 $2,517.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Departments of Defense and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development,
\1\ Includes funds appropriated for Plan Colombia through the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Fiscal
Year 2000 (Division B of P.L. 106-246).
\2\ Includes $93 million in Foreign Military Financing funds appropriated in the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 2003 (Division E, Title III of P.L. 108-7); $34 million
appropriated to State and $34 million appropriated to Defense in the Supplemental Appropriations Act to
Support Department of Defense Operations in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 108-11); and $37.1 million for
Foreign Military Financing allotted from fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriations.
\3\ In fiscal years 2000-03, State transferred $375 million to the U.S. Agency for International Development for
alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally displaced persons programs.
Following increased violence in Colombia during early 2002, the
Congress provided ``expanded authority'' for the use of U.S. assistance
to Colombia, which enabled the Colombian government to use the U.S.-
trained and--equipped counternarcotics brigade, U.S. provided
helicopters, and other U.S. counternarcotics assistance to fight groups
designated as terrorist organizations as well as to fight drug
trafficking. Similar authority was provided for fiscal year 2003 and is
being sought for fiscal year 2004.
assistance to the colombia army has been delivered, but problems
were encountered
U.S. assistance to the Colombian Army during fiscal years 2000-03--
$640 million for the counternarcotics brigade, 72 helicopters, and
related support--has, for the most part, been delivered and is being
used for counternarcotics operations. However, both the United States
and the Colombian Army experienced some unanticipated problems that
delayed the operational use of the helicopters. In addition, U.S.
support will be needed for the foreseeable future to sustain
operations.
Status of the Brigade
The United States initially agreed to train and equip a Colombian
Army counternarcotics brigade of three battalions and a total of about
2,285 professional and conscripted soldiers. The United States provided
the counternarcotics brigade with about $45 million in training and
equipment--from weapons and ammunition to rations, uniforms, and
canteens. The brigade's primary mission was to plan and conduct
interdiction operations against drug-trafficking activities, including
destroying illicit drug-producing facilities, and, when called upon, to
provide security in insurgent-controlled areas where aerial eradication
operations were planned. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the
brigade was highly effective in 2001--for example, it destroyed 25
cocaine hydrochloride laboratories\3\--but was less successful in 2002,
when it destroyed only 4 such labs. U.S. embassy officials stated that
the brigade became less effective because the insurgents moved their
drug-producing activities, such as the laboratories, beyond the
brigade's reach. In addition, according to these officials, the brigade
became more involved in protecting infrastructure, such as bridges and
power stations, and performing base security. Moreover, the aerial
eradication program did not call on the brigade to provide ground
security on very many occasions, essentially planning spray missions in
the less threatening areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The laboratories are used in the final stages of processing
coca into cocaine and are considered high-value targets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In August 2002, U.S. embassy and Colombian military officials
agreed to restructure the brigade to make it a rapid reaction force
capable of making quick, tactical strikes on a few days' notice. As
part of this restructuring, the Colombian Army designated the brigade a
national asset capable of operating anywhere in Colombia rather than
just in its prior area of responsibility in southern Colombia. The
newly restructured brigade consists of three combat battalions and a
support battalion with a total of about 1,900 soldiers, all of whom are
professional. Two of the combat battalions have been retrained. The
third combat battalion should be retrained by mid-June 2003. This
change, according to U.S. embassy and Colombian Army officials, will
improve the brigade's ability to conduct operations against high-value,
drug-trafficking targets, such as laboratories containing cocaine and
the leadership of insurgent groups involved in drug-trafficking
activities. One of the retrained battalions has been operating in
Narino department since early May 2003.
Status of the Helicopters
A key component of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia was enhancing
the brigade's air mobility. To do this, the United States provided the
Colombian Army with 33 UH-1N helicopters, 14 UH-60 Black Hawk
helicopters, and 25 UH-II helicopters.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Of the 33 UH-1Ns, 28 remain available for use by the brigade; 1
crashed on a mission and 4 were transferred to support the aerial
eradication program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> The 33 UH-1N helicopters were supposed to serve as interim
aircraft until the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters funded under Plan
Colombia were delivered. The UH-1Ns were delivered in stages between
November 1999 and March 2001. Since flying their first mission in
December 2000, the helicopters have logged 19,500 hours in combat and
have supported more than 430 counternarcotics brigade operations.
Colombian Army personnel are qualified as pilots and mechanics, but
many of the experienced pilots and mechanics who operate and maintain
the aircraft are provided through a U.S. contractor.
<bullet> The UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were delivered between
July and December 2001 but did not begin support operations for the
brigade until November 2002 because of a shortage of fully qualified
Colombian Army pilots. Forty-two Colombian Army personnel have
completed the minimum UH-60 pilot training, of which 13 have qualified
as pilot-in-command. U.S.-funded contract pilots fill in as pilots-in-
command. In addition, a U.S.-funded contractor continues to maintain
the helicopters and provide maintenance training.
<bullet> State procured 25 UH-II helicopters under Plan Colombia
and planned to deliver them to the Colombian Army between November 2001
and June 2002. However, they were delivered between March and November
2002 instead because the Colombian military was considering whether to
use a more powerful engine in the helicopters than the one usually
installed. Ultimately it decided to use the more common engine.
According to NAS officials, although some of the UH-II helicopters are
being used for missions, all the helicopters will not be operational
until June 2003. As of January 2003, 25 Colombian Army pilots had
completed their initial training and 21 of these pilots are completing
the training needed to qualify for operational missions. However,
contractor pilots continue to supplement Colombian Army pilots and a
U.S.-funded contractor continues to provide maintenance support.
Problems with Pilot and Mechanic Training
Although all the U.S.-provided helicopters are in Colombia, a
number of unanticipated problems in training Colombian Army pilots and
mechanics to operate and maintain the helicopters were encountered.
Some of these problems continue to limit the Colombian Army's ability
to operate and maintain the aircraft. Primarily, the Colombian Army
will have to continue to rely on contractor support because it will not
have enough trained pilots-in-command and senior mechanics for the
foreseeable future.
<bullet> When the United States agreed to provide the UH-60 and UH-
II helicopters for the Colombian Army in July 2000, the assistance for
Plan Colombia did not include any funds to train the Colombian pilots
and mechanics needed to operate and maintain the helicopters. About 6
months after passage of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia, Defense
agreed to provide the training and reported that it would transfer up
to $20 million from other counternarcotics projects in Colombia to pay
for it.
<bullet> A training plan was approved in mid-2001. Although the
plan provided training for Colombian Army personnel to meet the minimum
qualifications for a pilot and mechanic, it did not include the
additional training necessary to fly missions in a unit or to become a
senior mechanic. Basic training for 117 helicopter pilots--known as
initial entry rotary wing training--began in November 2001 and is
projected to be completed by December 2004. This training is intended
to provide a pool or pipeline of pilots for more advanced training to
fly specific helicopters. In addition, according to U.S. embassy
officials, a new pilot takes an average of 2 to 3 years to progress to
pilot-in-command.
<bullet> According to U.S. embassy and contractor officials, 105
out of 159 Colombian Army personnel have completed the basic UH-60 and
UH-II maintenance training and are taking more advanced training to
qualify as senior mechanics. These officials told us that the remaining
54 personnel will receive the contractor-provided basic training in the
near future, but they did not know when it would begin. Moreover, these
officials also told us that it typically takes 3 to 5 years for
mechanics to gain the experience necessary to become fully qualified on
speck helicopter systems, in particular the UH-60 Black Hawks.
<bullet> The Colombian Army Aviation Battalion is responsible for
providing helicopters and other aircraft and personnel for all
Colombian Army missions with an aviation component, including
counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations throughout Colombia.
Information provided by the Colombian Aviation Battalion shows that it
is staffed at only 80 percent of its required levels and that, over the
past several years, it has received between 60 percent to 70 percent of
its requested budget for logistics and maintenance. The Colombian
military's decision to continue using the UH-1N helicopters in addition
to the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters will also make it more difficult for
the Aviation Battalion to provide the numbers of personnel needed to
operate and maintain the helicopters. State originally intended that
the UH-1N helicopters would not be used after the UH-60 and UH-II
helicopters were available to support operations.
<bullet> According to bilateral agreements between Colombia and the
United States, the Colombian Army must ensure that pilots and mechanics
who receive U.S. training be assigned to positions using their training
for a minimum of 2 years. This has not always been the case. For
example, although 19 Colombian Army personnel were qualified to serve
as pilots-in-command on UH-1N helicopters, only 1 pilot was assigned to
serve in this position. The remaining pilots-in-command were provided
by a U.S. contractor.
<bullet> Of the funds appropriated for fiscal year 2002, $140
million was used to support Colombian Army counternarcotics efforts.
Most of this amount was used for U.S. provided helicopter operations
and maintenance, logistical, and training support. However, not all the
funding could be released until the Secretary of State certified, in
two separate reports to appropriate congressional committees,\5\ that
the Colombian military was making progress meeting certain human rights
conditions. Because State was late in providing these reports, the U.S.
embassy could not use this funding for operations and training on two
occasions for a total of about 5 months during 2002.\6\ These delays
resulted in fewer counternarcotics operations and limited the training
and experience Colombian Army pilots could obtain to qualify as pilots-
in-command.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Section 567 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115). Specifically,
the act provided that not more than 60 percent of the funds could be
obligated until after the Secretary of State made a determination and
certification that the Colombian military was (1) suspending members of
the Colombian Armed Forces who have been creditably alleged to have
committed gross violations of human rights, (2) cooperating with
civilian prosecutors and investigators, and (3) severing links between
the Armed Forces and paramilitary groups. In addition, the remaining 40
percent of the funds could be obligated only after June 1, 2002, and
after the Secretary of State made a second determination and
certification with respect to the same conditions.
\6\ According to U.S. embassy political section personnel, they
encountered difficulties developing the information required to make
the human rights determination and certification. The first report was
issued on May 1, 2002--almost 2 months later than State's target date.
The second report was issued on September 9, 2002--almost 3 months
later than State's target date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continued U.S. Support Needed to Sustain Operations
U.S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan
Colombia was originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army
taking over these responsibilities. However, U.S. embassy and Colombian
Army officials stated that a continued level of U.S. contractor
presence will be needed beyond this date because the Aviation Battalion
is not expected to have the personnel trained or the resources
necessary. Although the embassy officials stated that they have not
officially estimated what this assistance level will be, they
tentatively projected that it would cost between $100 million and $150
million annually to sustain the U.S.-supported counternarcotics
programs. Moreover, other recently initiated U.S. programs will likely
require U.S. assistance and contractor support, but the long-term costs
of sustaining such programs are not known.
colombia's aerial eradication program has had mixed results
Since the early 1990's, State's Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (through the U.S. Embassy's Narcotics
Affairs Section (NAS) and the Office of Aviation) has supported the
Colombian National Police's efforts to significantly reduce, if not
eliminate, the cultivation of coca and opium poppy. However, for the
most part, the net hectares of coca under cultivation in Colombia
continued to rise until 2002, and the net hectares of opium poppy under
cultivation remained relatively steady until 2001-02.\7\ In addition,
the U.S. embassy has made little progress in having the Colombian
National Police assume more responsibility for the aerial eradication
program, which requires costly U.S. contractor assistance to carry out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The estimates of net hectares of coca and opium poppy under
cultivation are prepared annually by the U.S. Director of Central
Intelligence, Crime and Narcotics Center. See U.S. General Accounting
Office, Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in
Colombia, GAO-03-319R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 8, 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recent Progress in Reducing Net Cultivation of Coca and Poppy
As shown in figure 1, the number of hectares under coca cultivation
rose more than threefold from 1995 to 2001--from 50,900 hectares to
169,800 hectares--despite substantially increased eradication
efforts.\8\ But in 2002, the Office of Aviation estimated that the
program eradicated 102,225 hectares of coca--a record high. In March
2003, the Office of National Drug Control Policy reported for the first
time since before 1995 a net reduction in coca cultivation in
Colombia--from 169,800 hectares to 144,450 hectares--a 15 percent
decline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The number of hectares eradicated is provided by the Office of
Aviation and is based on the number of net hectares sprayed multiplied
by an estimated ``kill rate.'' Although many thousands of hectares of
coca and poppy are killed, coca and poppy farmers often replant in the
same or other areas, which helps explain why the number of hectares
under cultivation often does not decline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7649.002
As shown in figure 2, the net hectares of opium poppy under
cultivation varied between 6,100 and 6,600 for the period 1995-98 but
rose to 7,500 hectares in 1999 and 2000. In 2001, the net hectares of
poppy estimated under cultivation declined to 6,500 and, in 2002,
further declined to 4,900--nearly a 35 percent reduction in net
cultivation over the past 2 years.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7649.003
U.S. embassy officials attributed the recent unprecedented
reductions in both coca and poppy cultivation primarily to the current
Colombian government's willingness to allow the aerial eradication
program to operate in all areas of the country. They also noted that:
<bullet> the number of spray aircraft had increased from 10 in July
2001 to 17 in January 2003;
<bullet> recently acquired spray aircraft can carry up to twice the
herbicide as the older aircraft; and
<bullet> as of January 2003, aircraft were flying spray missions
from three forward operating locations--a first for the program.
The ability to keep an increased number of spray aircraft operating
out of three bases was made possible, at least in part, because the
U.S. embassy hired a contractor to work with the Colombian National
Police to, among other things, help maintain their aircraft. As a
result, the availability of police aircraft for the spray program
increased. Moreover, in August 2002, the Colombian government allowed
the police to return to a higher strength herbicide mixture that,
according to embassy officials, improved the spray's effectiveness.\9\
These officials project that the aerial eradication program can reduce
the amount of coca and poppy cultivation to 30,000 hectares and 5,000
hectares, respectively, by 2005 or 2006, assuming the police continue
the current pace and can spray in all areas of Colombia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ In March 2002, the previous Colombian government reduced the
strength of the spray mixture because of environmental concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Colombian National Police Have Not Assumed Control Over Aerial
Eradication
Operations
As we reported in 2000,\10\ beginning in 1998, U.S. embassy
officials became concerned with the rising U.S. presence in Colombia
and the associated costs of the aerial eradication program. At the
time, the embassy began developing a 3-year plan to have the Colombian
National Police assume increased operational control over the program.
But for various reasons, the police did not agree to the plan. Since
then, contractor involvement and the associated costs have continued to
rise and the Colombian National Police are not yet able to assume more
control of the aerial eradication program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ GAO-01-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As shown in table 2, in fiscal year 1998, the Office of Aviation
reported that the direct cost for a U.S. contractor providing aircraft
maintenance and logistical support and many of the pilots was $37.8
million. In addition, NAS provided $10.7 million for fuel, herbicide,
and related support, for a total of $48.5 million. For fiscal year
2003, the comparable estimates for contractor and NAS-provided support
were $41.5 million and $44.8 million, respectively, for a total of
$86.3 million. Most of this increase occurred between fiscal years 2002
and 2003 and is for the most part to support the additional spray
aircraft, multiple operating locations, and the anticipated
continuation of spray operations throughout Colombia. According to NAS
and Office of Aviation officials, these costs are expected to remain
relatively constant for the next several years.
Table 2.--U.S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program, Fiscal Years 1998-2004
[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal years
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 2004
Cognizant office 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (estimated) (proposed) Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of Aviation............... $37.8 $36.8 $52.5 \ $38.0 $38.2 $41.5 $45.0 $289.8
1\
Narcotics Affairs Section........ 10.7 14.1 20.9 11.1 17.6 44.8 \2\ 44.2 163.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................... $48.5 $50.9 $73.4 $49.1 $55.8 $86.3 $89.2 $453.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Office
of Aviation.
\1\ Includes $20 million for additional spray aircraft.
\2\ In addition, NAS paid $38.8 million for a contractor to support the Colombian National Police Aviation
Service. NAS could not readily identify the proportion of this contract that is related to aerial eradication.
NAS officials stated that they expect this expenditure to continue for the next 2 years and possibly up to 4
years.
The Colombian National Police do not provide funding per se for the
aerial eradication program and, therefore, the value of its
contributions is more difficult to quantify. In recent years, the
police have provided helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for spray
mission support and the use of many of its facilities throughout
Colombia. In addition, the police have about 3,600 personnel assigned
to counternarcotics missions and estimate that 84 are directly
supporting the aerial eradication program.
U.S. Efforts to Improve Police Capacity for Aerial Eradication
To help the Colombian National Police increase its capacity to
assume more responsibility for the aerial eradication program, NAS has
initiated several efforts.
In February and March 2002, the Office of Aviation conducted an
Aviation Resource Management Survey of the Colombian National Police
Aviation Service. According to Office of Aviation officials, these
surveys are intended to provide a stringent onsite assessment of flight
operations from management and safety to logistics and maintenance. The
survey team made a number of critical observations. For example,
<bullet> The Aviation Service's organizational structure, lines of
authority, and levels of responsibility were not clear. Relying on an
overly centralized command structure resulted in unnecessary delays and
the cancellation of some planned aerial eradication missions because
the commanding general could not be reached.
<bullet> The Aviation Service did not have a formal flying hour
program to help forecast its budgetary requirements and enhance
maintenance scheduling.
<bullet> About 35 percent of the maintenance staff were
inexperienced. According to the survey team, this could result in
improper maintenance procedures being performed, which could adversely
affect flight safety and endanger lives.
<bullet> Management of items needing repair and control of spare
parts were deficient. The survey team found 230 items awaiting repair--
some from August 1998--and more than $4 million in UH-1H helicopter
blades and parts stored outside and unprotected.
As a result of the survey, in July 2002, a NAS contractor (a $38.8
million, 1-year contract with options for 4 additional years) began
providing on-the-job maintenance and logistical training to the
Aviation Service and helping the police address many of the issues
raised by the Aviation Resource Management Survey team. Embassy
officials noted that a more formal flying hour program has improved the
availability rates of many of the Aviation Service's aircraft. For
example, the availability rate of the Aviation Service's UH-II
helicopters--often used to support aerial eradication missions--
increased from 67 percent in January 2002 to 87 percent in December
2002. According to these officials, improved availability rates made it
easier to schedule and conduct spray missions.
In addition, NAS has begun a program for training pilots to fly T-
65 spray planes and plans to start training for search and rescue
personnel who accompany the planes. U.S. officials stated that the
contractor presence should decline and the police should be able to
take over more of the eradication program by 2006, when NAS estimates
that coca and poppy cultivation will be reduced to ``maintenance
levels''--30,000 hectares and 5,000 hectares, respectively.
financial and management challenges continue to complicate efforts to
reduce illicit drug activities
The U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has
recently begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in 1999-2000.
However, Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with
financial and management challenges.
<bullet> Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the Colombian
government had pledged $4 billion and called on the international
community to provide $3.5 billion. Until recently, Colombia had not
provided any significant new funding for Plan Colombia and, according
to U.S. embassy and Colombian government officials, anticipated
international assistance for Plan Colombia--apart from that provided by
the United States--did not materialize as envisioned. But because of
overall poor economic conditions, the government of Colombia's ability
to contribute more is limited.
<bullet> The Colombian government has stated that ending the civil
conflict is central to solving Colombia's problems--from improving
economic conditions to stemming illicit drug activities. A peaceful
resolution to the long-standing insurgency would help stabilize the
nation, speed economic recovery, help ensure the protection of human
rights, and restore the authority and control of the Colombian
government in the coca-growing regions. The continuing violence limits
the government's ability to institute economic, social, and political
improvements.
<bullet> For U.S. assistance to continue, Colombia faces continuing
challenges associated with the need to ensure that the army and police
comply with human rights standards, that the aerial eradication program
meets certain environmental conditions, and that alternative
development is provided in areas subject to aerial eradication.
Overall, neither the Colombian Army nor the Colombian National
Police can sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs without continued
U.S. funding and contractor support for the foreseeable future.
According to U.S. embassy officials, these programs alone may cost up
to $230 million per year, and future costs for some recently initiated
programs have not been determined. In addition, we note that this
estimate does not include future funding needed for other U.S. programs
in Colombia, including other aerial and ground interdiction efforts;
the police Aviation Service's U.S.-funded contractor; and alternative
development, judicial sector reform, and internally displaced persons
programs.
In recent years, world events--from the global war on terrorism to
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq--have diverted scarce U.S. resources
and made it paramount that the United States fully consider the
resources committed to its overseas assistance programs. As we noted in
2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were
unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense
have still not developed estimates of future program costs, defined
their future roles in Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or
determined how they plan to achieve it.
scope and methodology
In conducting our work, we reviewed pertinent planning,
implementation, and related documentation and met with cognizant U.S.
officials at the Methodology Departments of State and Defense,
Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Southern Command headquarters, Miami,
Florida; and the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia In Colombia, we
interviewed Colombian military, police, and government officials and
visited the Colombian Army bases at Larandia, Tolemaida, and Tres
Esquinas and other sites in the primary coca-growing regions of
Colombia In addition, we observed a Colombian Army counternarcotics
brigade airlift operation and several aerial eradication missions.
We also discussed this testimony with cognizant officials from
State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
and its Office of Aviation and State's Bureau for Western Hemisphere
Affairs. They generally concurred with our treatment of the issues
presented.
We conducted our work between July 2002 and May 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Senator DeWine. Very good.
Mr. McLean.
STATEMENT OF PHILLIP McLEAN, SENIOR FELLOW AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
THE AMERICAS PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC.
Mr. McLean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to
this Caucus, and let me make a few brief remarks from my
written testimony which is submitted to you.
I think there is a question in the public mind when the
discussion of Colombia comes up, is this a narcotics-only
activity or is the main objective terrorism. I would like to
make the case today that, in fact, the narcotics target is, in
fact, the correct target. If you are going to conquer terrorism
and conquer the chaos in the country, you have got to get at
this narcotics heart of what the problem is.
Colombia some years ago was a very promising country. It
stood with Chile as one of the best-performing countries in the
hemisphere. But you can draw a strict correlation from the rise
of narcotics in Colombia to the decline of the Colombian
institutions and states. So it is not inappropriate, in my
view, to make narcotics the central focus and target of what
you are doing.
Colombia in the 1970's, as you had the rise of the
narcotics culture, which has brought into the country something
like 2 percent of the gross national product in illegal
funding--that money overcame the institutions, and particularly
the institutions of law and order. The military to some degree,
the police, but most specifically the judicial system has been
deeply damaged, and these damages to these institutions is not
something that you cure with a 1-year appropriation or even a
decade of appropriations.
That country, which had the ability before to stand up and
be among the proud countries of the world, is, in fact, being--
almost a generation has got to be worked through as those
countries re-focus their attention. Clearly, the corruption and
the violence which is so impressive if you have lived there--
and you, Senators, have visited the country. You know many of
these stories.
I lived there for 3 years as No. 2 in the embassy and the
charge, and I left the country in 3 years and I knew 11 people
who had been murdered in that short period of time. Since that
time, of course, I have known a great many more. It is an
enormously tragic event.
I would just like to address some fallacies that often come
up. There is a fallacy that the United States can't do anything
about this. I disagree with that. That perhaps the only thing
we could do would be to legalize drugs. I certainly disagree
with that. That there is a balloon effect. I can't disagree
that there is not a balloon effect to some degree. But, in
fact, my experience is that the balloon effect depends upon
some assumptions. One of them is that the demand for drug must
necessarily be constant. And, in fact, we know that it is not.
Americans can change to other drug formulas, or, in fact, one
would hope, reduce our drug consumption.
Another fallacy is that you have to have a crop
substitution program. Well, of course, given the price of the
narcotics products, the illegal products, there can be no
substitution. But I have seen, in fact, that when you have a
program where you combine law enforcement with programs that
help people, you can get people to move off that particular
economy.
Another fallacy is that these are poor campesinos, poor
peasants who have been living there for years and have gotten
hooked into this particular trade. The story in Colombia is not
that. The story in Colombia is they are people who go there to
produce drugs. They are, in fact, called colonos, colonists,
who move into these areas. Therefore, that is one of the
reasons you can, in fact, give them incentives to move away.
What Colombia needs is a vibrant, restored economy, and the
United States, in fact, has taken a number of steps. Certainly,
the Andean trade preference initiatives by this Congress and
were just renewed are said to have produced 100,000 jobs in the
last round of that preference initiative, and is expected to
produce another 100,000 to 300,000 in the coming years.
So my point is that the United States should, in fact,
choose narcotics as the focus of what we are doing. It is very
important in this particular instance to keep our programs very
focused and not try to cure or address every Colombian need.
I think, in fact, by and large we have been doing that, but
there obviously are big pressures, in fact, to expand and try
to address every single need of the Colombian people. My
experience is that President Uribe, whom I have known for many,
many years, is, in fact, focused in this way.
One of the strange things is as I begin to hear in the
United States, oh, narcotics is not the appropriate target for
our assistance, it is just at this time that the Colombians
themselves, including their President, are saying narcotics
should be what the United States is directing itself to.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McLean follows:]
Prepared Statement of Phillip McLean, Senior Fellow and Deputy
Director, The Americas Program, The Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Overcoming Narcotics and Violence in Colombia
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak to this
Caucus about a topic that has been a concern to the United States for
many years. Are U.S. policies ever going to make a difference in
slowing the flow of narcotics to this country? What can be done to help
Colombia overcome the constant violence that has plagued that country
and is the most obvious threat to peace in our own hemisphere? And, in
fact, should not terrorism, rather than narcotics, be the main object
of U.S. involvement in Colombia?
I followed the growing crisis in the Andes, and in Colombia
especially, during more than a decade of my professional career in the
Department of State and in recent years have made Colombia a subject of
my writing and other activities at CSIS. My belief is that narcotics
should very definitely be the main target of U.S. programs in Colombia.
It is no accident that the Colombian government, encouraged and
strengthened by the programs authorized and funded by this Congress, is
beginning to have success against both the drug trade and violence.
From what I have observed, the arrival of U.S. aid is making a
difference. The hard part now will be to keep both the U.S. and
Colombian governments focused on achievable counter narcotics goals.
The story of Colombia in recent years is most often told with vivid
anecdotes. Dry statistics do not quite get across the depth of the
tragedy and the frequently bizarre results of so much illegal money
flowing into the economy of a poor country. Estimates are that some $35
billion drug profits enter Colombia each year. These vast sums distort
normal economic incentives and have ironically made Colombia a poorer
nation. The greed unleashed by the narcotized economy has broken down
the institutions that normally protect people and led to devastating
personal stories. Drug earnings finance death and corruption.
<bullet> I had the privilege of knowing the charismatic Luis Carlos
Galan. He stood up to the Medellin Cartel but then was assassinated by
Pablo Escobar in the middle of his campaign for the presidency. His
interrupted political career promised to unite the country as never
before.
<bullet> Just a year ago I met with the wife of the Governor of
Colombia's important Antioquia department a month after he was taken
hostage by the FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The
Governor had thought that he could use the principled tools of the U.S.
civil rights movement to shame the guerrillas into making peace with
civil government. After holding him for a year, the guerrillas killed
him and ten other captives when they heard army helicopters arriving
for a rescue attempt.
<bullet> It came to light in recent weeks that a Colombian army
company sent to re-take a guerrilla zone had stumbled across barrels of
money totaling some $14 million buried in the jungle. Higher-level
officials discovered that the troops had shared the cash among
themselves rather than turning it in when non-commissioned officers
began resigning and troops showed up with expensive purchases. Many
Colombians expressed sympathy with the poorly paid soldiers--an example
of how hard it is to hold to a sensible moral discipline when
challenged by waves of narcotics wealth.
some fallacies
For many years a common view among Americans, repelled by the
bloodshed and chaos, was that we should not get involved. If the United
States were to do anything, according to some, it would only be to
legalize the consumption of narcotics. Efforts to suppress drug
production and trafficking, they assert, send the price of the illegal
products up and that just feeds criminality. Moreover, there is a
``balloon effect.'' Suppression necessarily drives the drug business to
other places and other criminal networks. Eradication, according to
this argument, deprives poor campesinos of their only possible
livelihood because alternative development programs do not work.
Alienated peasants then join the guerrilla bands that have engaged the
Colombian government in a ``civil war'' for the last 40 years.
My experience suggests that all of those arguments are essentially
wrong.
<bullet> ``Legalization'' may be an interesting proposition for a
debate, but no reasonable person would ever want to see the United
States experience the increased drug consumption that would follow,
certainly not of the ``hard'' drugs now produced by Colombia. By
working on both the demand and supply side of the problem, the United
States has reduced cocaine consumption by two thirds since the late
1980's. Drug use is still, of course, intolerably high, but, while the
signs are mixed, there is reason to believe we are about to see a
further decline in cocaine use.
<bullet> The usual rules of economic analysis are of only limited
value when it comes to criminal enterprises, particularly one so large
and constantly changing as the drug trade. Criminals don't keep
accurate records. Statistics derived from indirect evidence are often
at best indicators. When Bolivia and Peru reduced their coca harvests,
cultivation in Colombia did increase but not proportionately to what
had been destroyed, and now that Colombia is having success with its
eradication program, production in the southern Andean countries has
increased only slightly. Studies indicate the total amount of cocaine
produced has decreased every year since 1988. Within Colombia,
cultivation does move from one area to another but is pushed more by
movement of the drug producers and less by economics.
<bullet> The simple version of the ``balloon'' theory assumes that
demand is constant. It is not. After the sharp drop of cocaine
consumption in the United States beginning 15 years ago, demand for the
drug continued to fall, if only marginally, in this country. Sadly,
during the 1990's it increased significantly in Europe and Brazil. Now
it appears the supply of cocaine is destined to be squeezed, at least
in the short run. It will be an opportunity for the United States to
reduce addiction. Whether or not that happens will depend on other
factors since the millions who now consume cocaine will be able to
substitute other drugs. Whatever the outcome here, the result will be
favorable for Colombia.
<bullet> Contrary to the image often portrayed, coca cultivation is
not good for poor Colombians. Rather it is a bonanza economy that
leaves people miserable over the long run.
<bullet> LNo agricultural product can compete with its very
high immediate returns--and therefore there is no such thing as
``crop substitution.'' The prospect of such high short-run
returns draws subsistence farmers into remote parts of the
country for what is generally a primitive slash-and-burn form
of agriculture that destroys tropical forests.
<bullet> LIn several recorded cases, these new arrivals have
driven indigenous native people of their historic lands. In the
Catatumbo near the Venezuelan border the Motilones people once
lived in peace. Now the region, largely stripped of its jungle
cover, is the battleground where two distinct guerrilla bands
and paramilitary forces seek to dominate the newly arrived coca
cultivators.
<bullet> LThe life of the coca farmer is not just violent but
also contaminated by the chemical used to extract the coca base
from the plant's leaves. The smell of kerosene and other
chemicals is characteristic of a coca farm.
<bullet> LExperience shows that if laws against narcotics
production are seriously enforced and some alternative economic
activity is offered, most cultivators get out of the drug
business. Clearly, even with the aid of government programs--
however well designed--only a fraction of those currently
engaged in drug production will be able to make a living out of
the weak tropical soils.
<bullet> LUltimately their welfare and that of all poor
Colombians will depend on the growth and diversification of the
Colombian economy as a whole. In that regard, it is interesting
to note that the Andean trade preferences initially extended to
Colombia in 1991 have created some 140,000 jobs in the modern
sector of Colombia's economy, and the act renewed and amplified
last year by the Congress will, according to estimates, create
an additional 100,000 to 300,000 jobs.
<bullet> The final fallacy is to say that Colombia is in a ``forty-
year-old-civil war.'' The two major guerrilla movements are widely
unpopular and attract minuscule support. They may have had some
ideological underpinning early in their histories, but they are now
best understood--given their mafia-like loose organization, their
criminal methods of extortion, kidnapping and narcotics trafficking--as
criminal gangs. In the same way, the paramilitary groups that in some
cases began as local defense forces are now dependent on criminal
activity to support their existence. It is all good and well to offer
to ``keep the door open'' to discussion with all of them, as President
Uribe has, but ending Colombia's plague of violence will be more
similar to a campaign against lawlessness than a war.
u.s. approach to colombia's crisis
If the Colombia conflict is more a gigantic law and order problem
rather than a war in the classic sense than the United States must
manage its assistance accordingly. Counterinsurgency models from El
Salvador or even less Vietnam are not appropriate. U.S. aid, as large
as it currently is, would be diluted if it were simultaneously directed
at every aspect of Colombia's security crisis. Moreover, it is not
clear that this country could properly select and prioritize the best
targets for such a comprehensive approach. Colombia's needs are urgent
and important, but it just seems in the complex conditions there to be
good management sense for the United States to choose specific tasks,
with specific goals and performance measures rather than searching for
a wider role.
The security assistance given to Colombia under Plan Colombia has
up to now, in fact, followed that practice. Stopping narcotics
trafficking has been the main goal, and even though the Congress
loosened the strict prohibition against using U.S. resources for other
than counter narcotics purposes, my understanding is that the anti-drug
goal is still the primary focus. In several instances, I have heard,
even when the United States has authorized the diversion of Plan
Colombia aid, the operation ended up uncovering narcotics or tracking
related activity--a further illustration of the extent of link between
violent groups and criminality.
Instead of having an open-ended commitment and the U.S. purpose
defined as ``strengthening the Colombian state'' or some other highly
desirable but ill-defined goal, the narcotics control objective gives
U.S. activities a clear way to judge success or failure.
Curiously, the much smaller U.S. program to assist with the
protection of the Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline similarly has a specific
objective and means of measuring accomplishment. But defeating the
narcotics trade deserves to be the main objective of U.S. security
efforts both because of its direct connection to one of our country's
leading social concerns but also because narcotics corruption is the
principal cause of Colombia's failure in the last two decades.
Before the scourge of the narcotics trade, Colombia was one of the
best-regarded countries in Latin America. Now many fear that it could
become a troubling base for terrorism. Certainly, President Alvaro
Uribe puts a high priority on narcotics control. If it can find the
will, as it seems to have in the last year, Colombia can do much on its
own to confront its antagonists. The United States can best help him
save his country by staying focused on specific objectives. With the
arrival of the U.S. resources anticipated under Plan Colombia there is
a chance of breaking the power of the narcotics interests, helping
Uribe and finally reducing cocaine shipments to the United States.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Ford, the GAO previously reported that
alternative development programs were having trouble getting
off the ground mainly due to poor security and the fact that
they were originally focused on a flawed strategy geared toward
crop substitution.
From what I understand, we have shifted strategy somewhat
to focus less on crop substitution and more on creating jobs
and improving infrastructure. How are we coming in regard to
that?
Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, we are aware of the changes. They
made a change in strategy after we issued our report in
February of 2002. I have seen the State Department's recent
progress report, issued, I believe, in the second quarter of
this year which has indicated that they have made quite a bit
more progress from the time we issued our report.
We have not independently analyzed that information, but I
will say that there is a clear sign that they are making
progress in the area. They did adjust from the idea of crop
substitution, particularly in southern Colombia where they
found it was not going to be viable and security wasn't going
to allow them to operate programs down there. So they have made
adjustments in areas where they think they can have more of an
impact.
Senator DeWine. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Mr. McLean, I think you made some very
good points. The first one is that the United States can do
something and can be a positive influence. But I think you
would agree that ultimately the success or failure in Colombia
will be determined by the will of the Colombian people.
No. 2, I think you are correct about crop substitution
programs. That is a nice-sounding idea, but it has never struck
me as particularly realistic. There was an article some
professor wrote in the Washington Post that showed just how
little--if I recall, it is something like 10 cents is paid to
the crop grower for cocaine that sold for over $100 an ounce.
So you could afford to pay the crop grower a dollar or ten
dollars and still have a huge profit on cocaine.
Be frank with us. Isn't that the difficulty? If the demand
is strong, it would be difficult to create an economic system
in which an alternative crop could still compete economically
with cocaine production.
Mr. McLean. Senator, I would say that any program has to
have a one-two punch and the lead has got to be the strong
line. You have got to have law enforcement. Unless it is
illegal, unless you are establishing a legal order, you are not
going to have effectiveness.
I do believe that you can top it off. If you have an
alternative development program in the area, it can help lure
people away at the end. I will give you an experience of the
anti-marijuana programs of the 1980's. It is hard to remember,
but there used to be something called Colombian Gold. I was a
little bit too old to enjoy it, but I am told it was a much-
used product.
The United States came in and had a very strong program of
eradicating marijuana. It was an easier crop to take care of,
and we did it year after year after year. And suddenly--and I
mean suddenly--it just stopped. Now, it stopped because the
Colombian government on its own, not with pressure from the
United States, came in behind us after years and years of
eradication and came in with an assistance program to lure
those discouraged farmers to finally get them off the land and
doing something else.
So if you use the two things together, I think it is
possible, but most of all it is the health of the economy and
the law enforcement regime that you have to put in place.
Senator Sessions. So strong law enforcement with efforts to
strengthen the economy so that there are other ways to make a
living is the combination.
Mr. McLean. That is right.
Senator Sessions. Well, that is an interesting story about
marijuana. When I first became a Federal prosecutor in the mid-
1970's, and even in the early days of the 1980's when I was a
U.S. Attorney, we still saw boat loads of marijuana coming from
Colombia. But by the mid-1980's, I think virtually it dried up
to zero. Marijuana comes, I guess, from Mexico or is home-grown
from what we see, but the huge multi-ton, 15-ton, 20-ton boat
loads that were coming through virtually ended. So that was a
success story that we should not forget.
I don't think I understand you to be suggesting, do I, Mr.
McLean, that it is not important for the Colombian government
to take over its country, to be able to enforce law and order
in every area of the country, and ultimately that means
confronting these insurgent groups?
Mr. McLean. Not at all, Senator. I, of course, have dealt
with the Colombian police and military for many, many years and
have the greatest respect for some of them. I feel there have
been some failures over the years, but I blame it more to a
condition of defeat than anything else.
Certainly, the United States, I think, should be a helpful
partner, but I am talking about specifically where we put our
$2.5 billion and how we perform as a friend. I think we perform
best as a friend by keeping ourselves in the types of things
where you can measure performance.
I think that is, in fact, one of the good things about the
narcotics program is that the GAO and others can come along and
say you said you were going to do this and you have done this,
but not fully fulfilled. You have a program that has a measure
of success or failure and if you are failing, you may get out,
but in this circumstance I think you would probably adjust what
you do. That is perfectly right.
But if you take on a goal such as strengthening the
Colombian state, it is so broad, it is so wide, you will never
accomplish it. And my own experience is that there will be a
lot of pressures for the operators of the U.S. Government to
push their funds into areas where there is an immediate demand.
Unless we have some restraint--and I am not saying going
back to what I think was an erroneous policy of a strict
firewall, as General Hill talked about, but I think there must
be a strong orientation. I am not quite sure how the Congress
handles that or the administration. My understanding is, in
fact, at this point people are well-focused, but my fear is
that we will get off focus in the future.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator DeWine. The two of you had the opportunity to
listen to the first two panels and I would like to give you an
opportunity to react. Mr. McLean has already reacted to the
balloon analogy, but I wonder if either one of you would like
to react to anything else that was said in the last 2 hours, I
guess.
Mr. Ford. Well, I think from where we sit, first of all, we
have been going down to Colombia since the mid-1990's, so we
have kind of a longer view of what we have tried to do there. I
believe that there are clear signs that there is progress there
and a lot of it has to do, I think, with the attitude of the
Colombian government to support the kinds of things that the
United States is interested in.
I think that the point we tried to make and we will be
making in our report is that there is a cost associated with
this, and that we would like to see from a GAO point of view a
little more transparency from the administration about what
these programs are going to cost, because they have new
initiatives that they talked a little bit about this morning
and there is a dollar tag to that.
On some of these things, we are not aware of what their
costs will be and we think that we would like to see those
costs up front, and we would like to see some time line that
lets the Congress know how long it is going to take for some of
these programs to reach fruition and get some real results.
So I think we are favorably disposed that progress is being
made, but we would like to see a plan from the administration
that lays out how much it is going to cost and some benchmarks
along the way so we can measure whether we are moving in the
right direction.
Senator DeWine. Well, Mr. Ford, that is an interesting
comment. I think that is certainly a legitimate position.
When you are dealing with the situation in Colombia, I
think it is quite frankly difficult to tell how long this is
going to take. If you can project it--I don't know; maybe you
can, but I don't think I can. You know, this is going to take a
while.
One thing I do know is it is going to take a while. I don't
know what a while is, but we are in this for a number of years,
I think. I understand your point, but this is not any short-
term problem, at least from my perspective.
Anything else you want to add, Mr. McLean?
Mr. McLean. Well, Senator, I would only say thank you again
for having me. I do think that the question of keeping focused
on our security system is very important, but clearly Colombia
has many, many other problems. I think that the United States
is, in fact, taking certain portions of those problems, but I
wouldn't undersell the Colombians.
As you saw here today with Francisco Santos, the Vice
President, they are people of enormous talent and energy, and
they are able to do a lot. But we have to think about the way
that we relate to those problems. We now have certainly more
than 1,000 official Americans in Colombia. This is a management
problem and if our relationship to them is to be successful, we
have got to be very clear on what we are trying to accomplish.
Thank you.
Senator DeWine. Well, let me thank both of you for coming
in, very helpful, a very, very important topic, and we
appreciate it. I thank all of the members of the three panels
for coming in. I think it has been a very productive hearing.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the Caucus was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Questions Submitted by Hon. Joseph Biden to J. Curtis Struble, Acting
Assistant Secretary (WHA) and Paul Simons, Acting Assistant Secretary
of State (INL)
Question 1a. Over the past few years, as you know, there has been
significant and legitimate concern about the human rights situation in
Colombia. Indeed, the Department's most recent Human Rights report,
released in March, states that in 2002:
``The [Colombian] Government's human rights record remained
poor . . . some members of the government security forces
continued to commit serious abuses, including unlawful and
extrajudicial killings. Some members of the security forces
collaborated with paramilitary groups that committed serious
abuses.''
The Colombian military needs to make significant progress on human
rights and severing ties with paramilitaries--yet according to the
Department's report, serious problems remain.
I understand that you are in the process of determining whether or
not Colombia will be certified this year on its progress on human
rights.
Can you speak to these continuing concerns, especially those
outlined in the Department's report?
Answer. Over the last several years, the Colombian Armed Forces
have made significant progress in improving their human rights record.
Still, some military personnel continue to maintain ties to
paramilitary units that are a major source of human rights violations.
A high level of criminality in Colombia, together with a weak
judiciary, further undermines the rule of law and human rights in
Colombia. A lack of accountability for many types of criminal activity,
including human rights violations, remains a significant issue.
Question 1b. What can we point to, specifically, that indicates
that Colombia is making significant progress on human rights?
Answer. The Uribe Administration has taken steps to improve the
human rights situation in Colombia. Vice President Santos has
reinvigorated the Presidential Human Rights Program creating a Special
``Momentum'' Committee to promote more actively the judicial resolution
of high-priority human rights cases. He has also established regular
dialog with local human rights groups. Additionally, at the request of
President Uribe, the mandate of the Colombia office of the United
Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) was extended through
2006. To create an environment conducive to the protection and
promotion of human rights, Uribe has instituted a Democratic Security
plan designed to increase and consolidate state presence throughout the
country, particularly in previously neglected areas where U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations have traditionally had
significant influence.
As we have certified in past reports to Congress, the Colombian
Armed Forces are taking effective action to sever links between
military personnel and paramilitary units. Intelligence activities and
combat operations by the Colombian Armed Forces against paramilitaries
increased in 2002. As of November 30, 2002, Colombian military
operations have resulted in the deaths of 183 paramilitaries (compared
to 117 in 2001) and the capture of 1,214 (compared to 1,089 in 2001).
We are committed to continue working closely with the GOC to
strengthen and increase access to the judicial system, prevent human
rights violations, and to promote the rule of law.
Question 1c. I understand that there has been an increase in the
number of arrests of paramilitaries--however, have any high-ranking
members of the paramilitary been arrested?
Answer. There has been progress in apprehending paramilitary
members and their high-ranking leaders. On June 21, 2003, the Colombian
armed forces seized a far-right paramilitary warlord, Bolmar Said
Sepulveda, sought in the killings of 450 people in Barrancabermeja.
Question 2a. As you know, U.S. personnel are under high security
risk in Colombia. Drug traffickers view the Drug Enforcement
Administration as enemy No. 1, embassy personnel must travel by armored
vehicle, dozens of U.S. citizens have been kidnapped in the last
decade, and three are currently being held hostage.
What can you tell us about continuing efforts to locate the three
U.S. citizens who are currently being held hostage by the FARC?
Answer. Since the February 13 plane crash, the Colombian Government
has committed significant resources to an extensive and intense search
and rescue effort. It initially deployed more than 2,000 Colombian Army
troops to the area where the Americans were most likely being held. The
Colombian government committed another 5,000-plus to support
operations. To support the Colombian Army's efforts, the U.S. sent
additional personnel to Colombia, and made available resources and
equipment that were already in-country.
Despite several engagements with FARC units, it appears that the
FARC has moved the three hostages to a remote area outside the
immediate reach of the Colombian military. We continue to provide
intelligence and logistical support to Colombian security forces
involved in the search and rescue effort.
Our primary concern is the safe return of the hostages. We are
assessing additional steps to bring about their recovery. As tactical
search operations involving large-scale deployments of troops are
reduced, good, actionable intelligence becomes more important. We
continue an active campaign to locate the hostages.
The Department of State continues to maintain close, regular
contact with the families of the three hostages to keep them apprised
of events on the ground in Colombia. The United States has made clear
that we hold the FARC responsible for the safety of these three
individuals. We have made clear that we will not press the Government
of Colombia to make concessions nor will we make concessions to the
FARC to obtain their release.
Question 2b. Are we considering any significant policy changes
toward Colombia as a result of the kidnappings?
Answer. The holding of American hostages underlines the imperative
that we continue our current policy for providing support--both
financial and diplomatic--to the Colombian government as it seeks to
combat the twin threats of terrorism and narcotrafficking in that
country. As Colombia advances toward its aim of projecting a
stabilizing security presence throughout its territory, threats to U.S.
citizens and interests will gradually recede.
Question 2c. Are we seeing increased threats to U.S. personnel and
facilities in Colombia in general?
Answer. Colombia is a dangerous environment for U.S. personnel and
American citizens in general. From November 2002 until May 2003,
Embassy Bogota received an increase in the number of threats. The
Embassy's assessment is that the seizure does not necessarily signal an
elevated threat against Americans. The FARC has routinely and
repeatedly designated Americans as legitimate ``military'' targets;
however, to our knowledge, it has not conducted premeditated operations
with the specific intent to kill or capture American citizens. That
said, the general threat to Americans of kidnapping remains
significant.
The threat of collateral damage impacting U.S. citizens has
increased significantly. Although the local police and military have
had many successful operations targeting FARC cells, a higher number of
urban bombings have occurred since the beginning of the year. In the
past, the majority of bombings targeted Colombian government facilities
in rural areas, or in the southern part of Bogota. However, the attack
on an exclusive social club just three blocks from the U.S.
Ambassador's residence in Northern Bogota is evidence that the FARC has
broadened its targeting spectrum. We have not seen an increase in crime
against Americans, but U.S. businesses frequently received extortion
threats from November 2002 until early May 2003.
Question 2d. What additional security measures can be put in place
to protect U.S. citizens and facilities in Colombia?
Answer. The Embassy has already tightened its security
significantly since November 2002, even before the February hostage
situation began.
The USG relationship with the police and other Colombian security
services is excellent; however, the Colombian forces are stretched very
thin. The Embassy's Consular Section, in consultation with the Regional
Security Office, sends warnings to American citizens via its network of
wardens when the Embassy obtains specific and credible threat
information. Realistically, however, the large presence of Americans in
Colombia makes it likely that many will continue to frequent popular
malls, clubs, and restaurants. Embassy announcements have no binding
authority over non-official Americans, but serve to alert them of
possible dangers and advise them to vary their patterns of activity.
Embassy Security Officers also work very closely with American
companies through the Overseas Security Advisory Committee, which has
about 120 members and associate members. This has been an effective
source for disseminating security information to U.S. companies
throughout the country.
Question 3. I understand that civilian contractors often experience
ground fire as they fly spray missions over FARC-controlled territory.
Recently, one press report quoted one U.S. official that planes have
been hit by bullets seventy times so far in 2003.
<bullet> How do we provide protection to U.S. and Colombian
personnel, who are conducting these highly risky missions?
Furthermore, we are all aware of the three fatal plane crashes of
U.S. contractors since February, two of them involving Cessna 208
aircraft. I understand that contractors have raised concerns that the
single-engine Cessna 208, which is used for the U.S.-supported spray
programs, is not suitable for Colombia's mountainous regions because it
cannot perform the steep climbs required by the terrain.
<bullet> Do we know the reason for the engine failure that caused
the two recent crashes?
<bullet> Are the contractors and other analysts raising a valid
concern about the use of single-engine aircraft in the mountainous
areas of Colombia? If so, why are we using this type of plane, and
putting U.S. contractors at further risk?
<bullet> Is the Department contemplating leasing or acquiring
alternate aircraft for surveillance and spray missions?
Answer. We have seen a sharp increase in ground fire hits against
the spray aircraft and escort helicopters in our counter-drug efforts.
As of June 3, 2003, there have been 184 ground fire hits--compared to a
total of 194 hits for all of CY2002. We believe the aggressive spray
program is really hurting illicit drug crop growers--and that they and
narcoterrorist groups such as the FARC and AUC, all of which thrive on
the narcotics trade, are responding by shooting more often.
With respect to the three fatal plane crashes of U.S contractors
since February, the two Cessna 208 aircraft were operated by Department
of Defense contractors and the one Ayres ``Thrush'' spray aircraft was
operated by the INL Air Wing contractor. INL was in no way involved in
the maintenance, operation, and accident investigation process for
those two Cessna 208 aircraft. Therefore, Department of Defense is the
appropriate agency to respond to questions about the results of the
crash investigations and concerns about the single-engine Cessna 208
aircraft's ability to perform the Department of Defense missions they
are assigned. However, we would comment that INL pilots who fly the
Cessna 208 are confident in the performance of our aircraft.
Of six Cessna 208 aircraft supported by the INL Air Wing, only one
is operated in Colombia, for the purpose of coca crop targeting and
coca spray verification. That aircraft, equipped with a MDIS
(multispectral digital imaging system), performs its missions at
altitudes that are well beyond the range of most small arms. While we
have found our Cessna aircraft to be very reliable over the years, we
have a request into the Pentagon for the transfer of several excess
twin-engine C-12 ``King Air'' planes as replacements for our aging
Cessnas. The multi-engine C-12 aircraft will yield increased area
coverage on each MDIS mission due to its greater airspeed. It will also
provide an enhanced margin of safety for its crewmembers, as our MDIS
camera aircraft usually operates as a single-ship mission without a
wingman or escort aircraft.
On April 7, we lost one of our pilots in the crash of a single-
engine, Ayres ``Thrush'' spray aircraft. The accident was due to pilot
error and not ground fire. Though we practice extensive security
procedures to minimize risk to pilots and planes, it must be noted that
there is no procedure that perfect, in itself, to ensure total safety
during flight operations. INL's Air Wing continues flying what is
universally recognized as a very difficult mission in an increasingly
hostile environment. To meet that environment, we are increasing
security of our spray program through an integrated program--one that
provides for improving intelligence coordination and exchange, using
armed Black Hawk helicopter escorts, adding Colombian ground troop
presence in the aerial spray zone, and flying twin-engine spray
aircraft in the higher risk areas.
Question 4. According to the report that the General Accounting
Office (GAO) released at the hearing, there have been numerous problems
with pilot and mechanic training as well as pilot retention: Pilots are
not showing up for training; qualified Colombian pilots are not being
assigned to flying missions; and trained pilots are not remaining in
the program. The report contends that the U.S. must, as a result, spend
$150M a year to sustain ongoing operations with contractors.
<bullet> How can we get enough pilots trained if we can't even get
them to show up?
<bullet> What can we do to keep the pilots we train in the program?
Why do you think they are dropping out?
<bullet> When do you think the Colombian military will be able to
operate without extensive U.S. assistance? When will we be able to
scale back on aid to the military?
Answer. The challenges associated with training pilots and
mechanics for 72 helicopters provided to the Colombian Army over a
relatively short period of time have been great. With help from the
Department of Defense, we have made excellent progress. There are now
126 Colombian Army pilots for the Plan Colombia helicopters, and
training is continuing. Of these pilots, 31 are Pilots-in-Command or
Instructor Pilots. Approximately 220 COLAR personnel have received
maintenance training from Department of Defense, and many of these
personnel have obtained additional formal and informal instruction from
INL's aviation support services contractor.
As noted in the GAO report, there have been some difficulties in
ensuring that COLAR's internal management of these resources is as
effective as possible. Because of maintenance demands associated with
COLAR's FMS-purchased (non-Plan Colombia) helicopters and other
military requirements, at times the full complement of trained
personnel was not available to fly or work on the helicopters. We have
not experienced COLAR personnel ``dropping out,'' but COLAR leaders
have not always managed the workforce effectively. We are working as
closely as possible with the COLAR to maximize the availability of
their personnel to perform operations and to step up training and
development in preparation for assuming full responsibility for
operation and maintenance of these important assets in the future.
We are working very hard to expedite the transfer of responsibility
for running this program to the Colombians, and will make the
transition as quickly as possible without compromising safety or
mission effectiveness. As part of that process, we do anticipate
significant contractor participation for the foreseeable future while
the COLAR continues to train and gain experience and maturity.
Question 5. We have all discussed that to have an effective
counternarcotics policy, we need to advance a three-pronged approach:
interdiction, eradication, and alternative development.
Yet, last year a report prepared for the Agency of International
Development (AID) concluded that the alternative development programs
originally planned for Colombia are not likely to work for a number of
reasons: the farmers in the southern part of the country distrust the
government so they continue to plant coca as an insurance policy even
as they agree to stop growing it; the soil is not conducive to many
legal crops, and costs of production are too high for them to be
competitive; the infrastructure is so poor that they cannot get
products to market; and security concerns make it difficult to operate.
More recently, AID has estimated that a comprehensive alternative
development program may be cost prohibitive: about 130,000 families are
involved in the illicit crop business and it costs around $12,000 per
family per year to provide a long-term sustainable economic development
program. That brings the total to about $1.5 billion a year.
What is the plan to create an effective and sustainable alternative
development program in Colombia?
Answer. The report which you mention identified a number of
constraints that make it difficult and sometimes dangerous to carry out
development activities in areas where there is not a significant and
visible national government presence. It was written just as the
alternative development program was beginning in Putumayo Department
and at a time when the aerial spray program had been largely suspended
there.
Since that report was written, USAID has made a series of
implementation adjustments in the alternative development program and
the aerial spray program has been reactivated. The results have been
impressive. Production of coca in Putumayo Department (the focus of the
alternative development program) has been reduced from about 60,000
hectares to approximately 1,500 hectares. This experience shows that
the USG's counter-narcotics strategy which calls for a combination of
alternative development, forced eradication (aerial spraying) and
interdiction is fundamentally sound. We are, nevertheless, continuing
to learn from our experiences and have consequently expanded our
thinking regarding the essential elements of an effective and
sustainable alternative development program.
Current thinking regarding creation of an effective and sustainable
alternative development program in Colombia calls for a broad program
of activities with five important elements:
<bullet> Alternative Development assistance to identify, promote
and develop licit production and employment alternatives;
<bullet> Forced eradication (by aerial spraying or other methods);
<bullet> Interdiction;
<bullet> Public Diplomacy; and
<bullet> Governance assistance.
As Public Diplomacy and Governance are relatively recent additions
to our set of counter-narcotics tools, we are still discussing how they
may best be applied in particular situations.
The central features of Public Diplomacy include:
<bullet> Provision of information to the public regarding the ways
that international narcotics activity damages the economy and society
as a whole;
<bullet> Information on how drugs and the drug culture harms
individuals; and
<bullet> Development of anti-cocaine norms and values.
Important features of the Governance element include:
<bullet> Establishment of police and military presence to ensure
that illegal armed groups do not control the area and become the ``de-
facto'' government.
<bullet> Expansion of national government presence in rural areas
by providing support for rural infrastructure and socioeconomic
services such as: health care, education, access to justice,
agricultural extension and related services.
<bullet> Support for activities that strengthen links between
communities and the State; and
<bullet> Support for local governments and activities that
strengthen municipal management capacity, community cohesion and
collaboration among local groups.
Question 6a. I am concerned about reports that the office of the
Colombian Attorney General is not improving its record in prosecuting
human rights cases. According to the March 2003 State Department Human
Rights Report, of the 116 killings of labor union members documented as
of September 2003, there were no arrests, prosecutions or convictions
at year's end.
Furthermore, I am aware of concerns that members of the Uribe
Administration have made statements that threaten non-governmental
human rights workers in Colombia.
Can you speak to these points, especially in light of the
Department's pending human rights certification of Colombia?
Answer. Colombia's under-equipped and overworked judiciary
confronts profound challenges, such as corruption and intimidation by
guerrillas, paramilitaries, and other wealthy criminal organizations.
Limited accountability for human rights violations and other crimes is
the single greatest obstacle to the integrity of the Colombian State
and the creation of a culture of respect for human rights.
Owing to these systematic weaknesses, prosecuting murderers of
trade unionists has proven extremely difficult. Prosecutors have been
unable to identify the assailants in 125 of the 178 such murders in
2002.
However, Colombia has made improvements. The National Labor School
in Medellin (a labor NGO) reports a downward trend in the number of
murders of trade union officials over the past 2\1/2\ years: from 184
in 2001 and 178 in 2002 to 29 in 2003 (through mid-May).
Colombia's vice-President has created a special committee dedicated
to trade union murders, particularly in the conflictive areas of
Barrancabermeja, Arauca, and Cauca.
Question 6b. Are you aware of an increasing climate of threat and
intimidation toward human rights workers, perpetuated by members of the
Uribe Administration?
Answer. Several NGO's have claimed that statements made by
Colombian officials contribute to a climate of threat and intimidation
for human rights workers. For example, Human Rights Watch stated that
Brigadier General Camelo accused NGO's of waging a ``legal war''
against the military, calling them ``friends of subversives.'' In our
conversations with Colombian officials, we have stressed that such
comments, particularly from military officials, are counterproductive
and undermine the credibility of the Uribe Administration's commitment
to improve human rights.
President Uribe has publicly addressed these concerns. At the 96th
Anniversary of the Jose Maria Cordova Cadets School, Uribe called for
respect and tolerance for NGO's. At a recent conference on security and
individual liberties, he emphasized that democracies require the
defense of human rights workers so that they can pursue their
activities without fear.
The President has acted on this commitment, instituting a
Democratic Security Plan designed to increase and consolidate the
government presence and rule of law throughout the country, and
reinvigorating the Presidential Human Rights program. Under the Vice
President's leadership, the GOC conducts regular discussions with local
human rights groups and has encouraged efforts to more aggressively
resolve 100 high priority human rights cases. President Uribe has
requested the extension of the mandate of the Colombia office of the
United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) to the end of
his term in 2006. He has also instructed the Foreign Ministry to more
energetically pursue settlements of cases currently before the Inter-
American commission on Human Rights.
Question 6c. Is the Uribe Administration making adequate efforts to
prosecute cases of human rights violations?
Answer. The Uribe Administration is committed to holding members of
the Colombian Armed Forces accountable for their actions. The Colombian
judiciary continues to process cases. On June 19, a Colombian judge
sentenced Colonel Lino Sanchez to 40 years in prison for conspiring
with paramilitaries to massacre peasants in Mapiripan in 1997. In
March, the Prosecutor Generals Office charged Lt. Col. Orlando Pulido
Rojas with homicide and conspiracy for collaborating with
paramilitaries in the murder of five alleged FARC collaborators. At the
same time, he issued an arrest warrant for former General Jaime
Humberto Uscategui for failing to prevent a paramilitary massacre in
Meta Department in 1997.
Question 6d. What are we doing to support investigation of the
assassination cases of trade unionists?
Answer. U.S. Government judicial sector reform programs and
assistance to protect human rights are strengthening the Uribe
Administration's ability to investigate and prosecute trade union
cases. As part of Plan Colombia, the Embassy has provided support to
the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) in an effort to aid
investigations of assassination cases of trade union officials. Plan
Colombia funding has established 11 satellite Fiscalia Human Rights
throughout Colombia, enhancing the Fiscalia's ability to identify,
investigate and prosecute human rights violations, including cases
involving trade union activities. In total, we have provided
$3,711,734.07 for crime scene kits, modular furniture, office
equipment, armored vehicles, operational support funds, and specialized
training in human rights and forensic sciences. In FY03, the USG
provided $154,030 directly to support investigations.
______
Questions Submitted by Hon. Charles Grassley to J. Curtis Struble,
Acting Assistant Secretary (WHA) and Paul Simons, Acting Assistant
Secretary of State (INL)
Question 1a. The United States has spent over $2.5 billion since
2000 to assist Colombia in its fight against narco-trafficking. The
press has been full of reports questioning the success of our efforts
in Colombia, pointing to reports that just as much cocaine is available
in the United States today as was available 5 years ago, at higher
purity and lower price. While there may be questions regarding the
interpretation of statistics, it does raise a fundamental question of
what measures should be used to gauge the progress of our efforts.
What performance measures are being used by the State Department to
assess the success or failure of U.S.-funded counter-narcotics programs
to Colombia?
Answer. The main goal of the United States' counter-narcotics
programs in Colombia is to supply side reduction. The availability of
illegal narcotics is reduced through destruction of the illicit crops
that are the essential ingredients of illegal drugs in Colombia coupled
with attacks on the narcotics processing and trafficking
infrastructure. Crop reduction programs include forced eradication
(through aerial spraying) and alternative development programs
administered through USAID.
The eradication program measures progress toward its goals by
tracking illicit crop production estimates, provided for the U.S.
Government by the CIA's Crime and Narcotics Center (the United Nations
Drug Control Program separately conducts an estimate). The eradication
program also measures progress by monitoring the number of hectares of
illicit; crops sprayed and by estimating the effectiveness of the
spraying as evaluated through ground truth verification of previously
sprayed fields. These figures are then combined with processing
efficiency estimates to estimate how much processed cocaine has been
removed from the supply chain to U.S. and other markets for
consumption.
USAID gauges progress of its alternative development efforts
through illicit crop size estimates, coupled with other performance
measures--including the number of families that USAID programs assist
with programs to provide legal employment and the number of hectares of
legal crops that USAID generates through alternative development
programs.
Other Department of State-assisted programs support supply
reduction by helping the Government of Colombia's security forces
(Colombian National Police and the Colombian Armed Forces) to destroy
laboratories where drugs are produced and to interdict narcotics
trafficked through Colombian road, sea, and air corridors. These
programs evaluate success with statistics recorded by the Government of
Colombia. The leading indicators include the number of laboratories
destroyed (both coca base and cocaine hydrochloride), and quantities of
illicit drugs and precursor chemicals interdicted. Other important
performance measures are the number of drug traffickers arrested in
Colombia and the number of Colombians extradited to the United States
for narco-trafficking offenses (through the Department of Justice's
Multilateral case Initiative program).
The ultimate goal of the supply side narcotics reduction strategy
is to reduce the amount of illegal drugs available in the United
States. Performance measures to track progress toward this goal--the
price and purity indices alluded to in your question--also measure
supply side efforts in other drug producing countries as well as law
enforcement programs in the drug transit zone and on U.S. soil. These
indices are determined by the USDEA.
Question 1b. Please provide a summary of each ongoing
counternarcotic program in Colombia, the baseline for these programs,
what has been accomplished to date, and what the Department believes
will be accomplished by these efforts should Congress provide full
funding, and an associated timeline for these programs.
Answer. The recently published GAO report that you solicited
recommended that ``the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, establish clear objectives, including developing
specific performance measures, and estimate future U.S. funding
requirements for the programs with the Colombian Army and the Colombian
National Police.'' The State Department concurs with the GAO
recommendation and is in the process of developing revised goals,
estimates of funding requirements, and timelines for U.S. assistance to
Colombia for the remainder of Plan Colombia and beyond. It is our
intention to provide this information to the Congress for consideration
in the fiscal year 2005 appropriations cycle.
Question 2a. The U.S. Agency for International Development has
received approximately $350 million for alternative development for
Colombia since fiscal year 2000. The funding information I have
received from USAID (see attached table) provides funding levels for
general program functions and purposes.
Within the categories on the attached worksheet, what specific
programs in Colombia are currently being funded through USAID and how
much is currently being spent to run each of them?
Answer. USAID has received $351 million for its program in Colombia
since fiscal year 2000. These resources have been used to support three
programs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strengthening Democracy......... $99 million...... (28 percent)
Alternative Development......... 160 million...... (46 percent)
Internally Displaced Persons.... 92 million...... (26 percent)
---------------------------------------
Total......................... $351 million...... (100 percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The attached fiscal year 2004 ARI funding worksheet shows that $150
million has been requested for Alternative Development/Institution
Building in Colombia. USAID will receive $122.2 million (81 percent) of
this amount. The remaining $27.8 (19 percent) will be used to support
Alternative Development/Institution Building projects that are
implemented by the Department of Justice and the State Department's
Bureaus for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), and for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The $122.2
million that USAID expects to receive in fiscal year 2004 from the
Alternative Development/Institutions Building line item will be used as
shown below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strengthening Democracy......... $24 million...... (20 percent)
Alternative Development......... 60 million...... (49 percent)
Internally Displaced Persons.... 38 million...... (31 percent)
---------------------------------------
Total......................... $122 million...... (100 percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions 2b and 2c. How much, if any, additional funding will be
needed to see these projects (identified in A) through to their
completion?
What timeframe has been established for their completion?
Answer. It will take approximately five to seven more years to
consolidate USAID's existing alternative development achievements and
help the Colombians expand the national government's presence into
areas formerly controlled by illegal armed groups. USAID's resources
will be crucial in assisting the GOC to provide alternative
development, administration of justice, human rights and related socio-
economic assistance in areas that were here to fore neglected by the
national government. The Department of State and AID are in the process
of discussing future funding requirements with the GOC. As these
discussions progress, we will be able to better specify the level of
funding that will be needed to see our programs to a successful
conclusion in order to consult with Congress.
Question 2d. What measures will be used to judge the success or
failure of these programs?
Answer. Each USAID project has results indicators and targets for
implementation activities that are used to determine if the project is
on track. Illustrative indicators which USAID has used in Colombia are
as follows:
<bullet> Hectares of licit crops established to replace drug crops;
<bullet> Number of social infrastructure projects completed;
<bullet> Number of internally displaced persons assisted;
<bullet> Number of justice houses established;
<bullet> Number of alerts issued by the Early Warning System; and
<bullet> Number of responses by the Colombian police, military;
ombudsman or other government institutions to Early Warning System
alerts.
USAID will continue to use these indicators as long as they remain
relevant. New indicators will be identified and adopted, as needed, to
monitor progress and demonstrate results for existing or new
activities.
Question 3. We have been providing assistance to Colombia for over
two decades. Can you please provide two or three examples of
alternative development programs that were established in Colombia
during that period but no longer require U.S. assistance to be
maintained?
Answer. USAID assistance to Colombia today is the result of
international drug trafficking and terrorist activities that have
almost destroyed the Colombian economy and are a serious threat to
Colombian democracy. USAID support for Plan Colombia is not simply a
continuation of USAID assistance over the last two decades and programs
today bear little resemblance to USAID's Colombian programs from 1980
to 2000.
<bullet> USAID assistance to Colombia was scheduled to end by the
year 2000 and was reduced to about $200,000 in fiscal year 1998.
<bullet> Very little (if any) USAID assistance during the period
1980-1998 was for alternative development (AD).
<bullet> USAID support for alternative development began in 1999
with a small program to assist poppy farmers and was greatly expanded
in fiscal year 2001 when Plan Colombia Funds became available.
<bullet> The USAID program since fiscal year 2001 has been highly
successful. Significant AD achievements since fiscal year 2001 include:
<bullet> LEstablishment of over 30,000 hectares of licit crops;
<bullet> LProvision of AD assistance to nearly 33,000 families;
<bullet> LVoluntary manual eradication of nearly 18,000
hectares of illicit crops; and
<bullet> LCompletion of over 400 social infrastructure
projects.
<bullet> Most of USAID's assistance to Colombia during the last 20
years provided support for health and democracy programs.
<bullet> The health sector is one example of an area in which
previous USAID assistance had strengthened Colombian institutions to
the point where minimal outside assistance was needed.
<bullet> The corrupting influences of huge narco-trafficking
operations have, however, weakened the fabric of, society and virtually
all government institutions to the point that some observers are asking
if additional health assistance may be necessary.
Questions 4a and 4b. There was a considerable increase in the
number of hectares of.coca sprayed during 2002. Much of this increased
spraying has been attributed to the new policies put into place by the
Uribe administration. For 2003, President Uribe has set a goal of
spraying 200,000 hectares--almost 60,000 more than were sprayed in
2002.
Do you believe that this is a realistic objective, or is this a
``stretch'' goal that we hope, but do not expect, to meet? Please
include an assessment about what effect, if any, the loss of two spray
planes since this goal was established has on the ability to reach this
goal.
If this objective is a stretch, what combination of assets and
funding must be added to the current levels of U.S. assistance to make
sure that the goal of eradicating 200,000 hectares is reached?
Answer. INL's stated goal for 2003 is to spray all of the remaining
coca in Colombia, up to 200,000 hectares. This is an ambitious target,
but spray goals have expanded commensurate with the recent expansion of
Government of Colombia political will mentioned in the preface to your
question. Whether all the remaining coca in Colombia really means
spraying 200,000 hectares depends largely on whether there are 200,000
hectares of coca available for spraying in 2003.
in 2002, coca eradication markedly outpaced replanting and new
cultivation, resulting in a CNC estimate that Colombian coca
cultivation dropped by 15 percent from the previous year (the first
CNC-registered decline in Colombian coca cultivation in over a decade).
The CNC estimates Colombian coca cultivation at 144,450 hectares as of
year-end 2002. The UNDCP estimated that Colombia cultivated 1.02,000
hectares of coca in 2002.
Certainly, 2003 is a year of decision for coca eradication. we are
now in a position to convince growers that nowhere in Colombia is safe
for investing in coca. Coca eradication in 2003 is on pace to surpass
last year's record spraying--planes have already sprayed some 71,000
hectares of coca in Colombia as of June 24. This should allow us to
spray more than 144,450 hectares in the CNC estimate, meaning that
planes can return to some areas more than once--to discourage
replanting and new cultivation.
We are concerned about the loss of two spray aircraft and have
noted a sharp rise in the levels of hostile fire that the spray planes
receive from the ground (planes have received 204 impacts to date this
year, already surpassing the entire year totals for 2001 and 2002).
However, we still have sufficient fixed wing (and related helicopter)
assets to maintain spray operations from three spray bases
consecutively. Congress has provided $15 million, through the 2003
counter-terrorism supplemental, to sustain increased eradication and
will fund the purchase of replacement spray aircraft.
Barring additional, unfortunate accidents, our fleet of aircraft
should allow us to target Colombia's decreasing illicit crop, even as
we face the law of diminishing returns. 2002 and early 2003 levels of
eradication will be hard to sustain over time, as field dispersal,
smaller fields, and aircraft range limitations will require that planes
have to fly more to spray less.
Question 5a. I understand that the 200,000 hectares scheduled to be
eradicated next year is part of a larger strategy by the U.S. Embassy
in Bogota to move coca cultivation in Colombia to a ``manageable
level'' of about 30,000 hectares.
Is this strategy a written document with periodic benchmarks and
other measures to ensure that the strategy is on track? if so, please
include a copy for the record.
Answer. Initial Plan Colombia eradication goals were drafted under
the previous Colombian Administration and contained more modest
assumptions about the amount of spraying that the Government of
Colombia would allow. As stated in the Department's answer to your
question 1(b) above, the Department is leading an interagency review of
Plan Colombia andintends to provide this information to the Congress
for consideration in the fiscal year 2005 appropriations cycle. An
updated eradication strategy with eradication goals and benchmarks to
gauge progress will be a fundamental part of that revised assessment.
Question 5b. What role did the Government of Colombia play in
arriving at the conclusion that our ultimate objective should be to
reduce coca production in Colombia to this manageable level?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Bogota maintains a constant dialog with
the Government of Colombia on counternarcotics policy and operations,
including the setting of goals for U.S.-supported counter-narcotics
programs. This coordination will continue as we determine goals and
objectives, benchmarks for success, required resources, and a new
timeline.
Question 5c. What resources (planes, funding, etc.) are expected to
be necessary to ``manage'' coca production at this level?
Answer. As per the Department's answer to 5(A) above, this
information will be provided to the Congress for consideration in the
fiscal. year 2005 appropriations cycle.
Question 6a. Protection of the basic human rights of all
individuals in Colombia is an important priority of the United States.
In addition, Congress has placed some restrictions on the assistance
that we provide Colombia in an attempt to encourage human rights
reforms.
Are the current human rights restrictions (commonly known as the
``Leahy Amendment'') on U.S. assistance adequate to ensure that funding
is not being used for actions that violate human rights?
Answer. The Leahy Amendment has been an effective tool to help us
identify problem individuals and units within Colombia's security
forces. Those receiving U.S. assistance and training are being
thoroughly vetted by all relevant U.S. Government agencies to ensure
that such assistance is not provided to human rights violators.
Question 6b. Are the current restrictions overly burdensome to the
implementation of U.S.-funded programs?
Answer. Vetting foreign security forces can be a lengthy process,
involving both the Embassy in Bogota and the Department of State in
Washington. U.S. funded training at times has been delayed by vetting
requirements. We do not consider this an obstacle but rather an example
of the seriousness we place on human rights vetting.
Question 6c. How successful do you believe the human rights
training programs have been in reducing violations in the Colombian
Military?
Answer. USG-funded human rights training programs have placed human
rights concerns firmly on the agenda of our bilateral security
relationship, and have helped create a culture of respect for
fundamental rights among military and police officials. Rights
violations by State actors continue to occur, but on a far smaller
scale than in years in which U.S. security assistance was minimal.
Question 6d. Have these changes been made institutionally--that is,
are they permanent? If so, are the restrictions created by the Leahy
Amendment still needed?
Answer. A commitment to severing military-AUC ties exists at the
highest levels of the Colombian government. President Uribe and senior
Colombian officials have stated repeatedly stressed the importance of
respect for human rights and taken actions to back up their commitment
to improve performance in this area. The Government of Colombia has
responded more aggressively to cases where members of the Colombian
military committed human rights violations. Most recently, a Colombian
judge sentenced retired Army Colonel Lino Sanchez to 40 years in prison
for conspiring with far right paramilitaries to massacre 30 peasants in
1997. This sentence is considered one of the heaviest ever levied
against such a high-ranking Colombian military officer.
There is more that must be done. while the majority of human rights
violations in Colombia continue to be committed by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and
the Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a small portion of human
rights violations can still be traced to the Colombian military. The
Leahy Amendment is a useful mechanism that helps the U.S. identify
problem individuals and units and focus the attention of the Government
of Colombia on the issue. We are committed to human rights and continue
to underscore this issue with Colombian officials.
______
Questions Submitted to Colombia Hearing (Classified Answers are Being
Retained in Committee Files)
Colombia Hearing Questions to be Submitted--DoD
Question 1. United States assistance for the helicopter program was
originally supposed to end in 2006 when the Colombian Military was to
assume complete control. That deadline has been pushed back
indefinitely.
<bullet> What steps are being taken to re-establish this time line?
<bullet> What recommendations have been made to create an internal
capacity within the Colombian Military to foster the successful
assumption of program control?
Question 2. Protection of the basic human rights of all individuals
in Colombia is an important priority of the United States. In addition,
Congress has placed some restrictions on the assistance that we provide
Colombia in an attempt to encourage human rights reforms.
<bullet> Are the current human rights restrictions on U.S. military
aid adequate to ensure that funding is not being used for actions that
violate human rights, and are they overly burdensome?
<bullet> How successful do you believe the human rights training
programs have been in halting violations in the Colombian military?
<bullet> Do you believe these changes have been made
institutionally--that is, are they permanent?
Question 3. After a very successful year in 2001, the productivity
of the Counter-Narcotics Brigade diminished significantly in 2002. In
response, the Brigade was reorganized and their area of operations was
expanded to include all of Colombia. In support of this shift, the U.S.
agreed to provide advanced training to take advantage of the expanded
function areas.
<bullet> Please provide an update on the current status of this new
training. In particular, highlight the new capabilities the Brigade
should have once the training is complete.
<bullet> Does this new training, take advantage of the expanded
authorities the Senate reauthorized for 2 years in the 2004 Defense
Authorization Act?
<bullet> How has the Counter-Narcotics Brigade been integrated with
the rest of the Colombian military operations?
Question 4. Both the Colombian National Police and the Colombian
military have noted successes in forcing cocaine-processing facilities
to move from one area of the country to another. In my view, this is a
measure of activity, not of success which would be the reduction of
coca processing throughout the region. However, this cannot happen
until the Government of Colombia fully regains control of the
countryside.
<bullet> Is it possible, with our current levels of assistance to
Colombia, for the Colombian military and police to significantly deter
and reduce the creation of new coca labs throughout Colombia?
______
Colombia Hearing Questions to be Submitted--Jess Ford, GAO
Question 1. Mr. McLean's testimony touches briefly on the ``balloon
effect.'' While coca production in Colombia has decreased, it has
slightly increased in other countries of the region.
<bullet> Do you believe there is more that we should be doing today
to prevent the spread or re-emergence of coca cultivation outside
Colombia?
<bullet> Given that we live in a world of limited resources and
based on your familiarity with the region and understanding of the
current situation, do you believe that some of our funding and efforts
currently directed toward Colombia should be redirected to other drug
producing countries in the region?
______
Colombia Hearing Questions to be Submitted--Phillip McLean, CSIS
Question 1. Currently, the various guerilla forces have control
over approximately 40 percent of the countryside which impedes the
ability of both the Colombian and U.S. governments to implement
programs in many regions of the country. You have described the
Colombian government's struggle to gain control as more of a campaign
against lawlessness than a war.
<bullet> How central is the elimination of lawlessness to our
efforts to eliminate narcotics production? Should our efforts and
attention be refocused away from eradication and toward a campaign to
end this lawlessness?
Question 2. Your testimony touches briefly on the ``balloon
effect.'' While coca production in Colombia has decreased, it has
slightly increased in other countries of the region.
<bullet> Do you believe there is more that we should be doing today
to prevent the spread or re-emergence of coca cultivation outside
Colombia?
<bullet> Given that we live in a world of limited resources and
based on your familiarity with the region and understanding of the
current situation, do you believe that some of our funding and efforts
currently directed toward Colombia should be redirected to other drug
producing countries in the region?
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. for the Record for
General Hill
Question 1. As you know, the 2002 supplemental appropriations bill
changed long-standing policy that limited the use of U.S.-provided
equipment to counter-narcotics missions by giving Colombia authority to
use the equipment for counter-insurgency purposes.
<bullet> To what extent is this new authority being used?
<bullet> What types of missions are being carried out under this
new authority?
<bullet> To what degree is the counter-insurgency authority
distracting from the counter-drug mission?
<bullet> What is the decisionmaking process in the Embassy for
approving missions that do not involve a direct counter-narcotics
mission?
Question 2. According to the report that the General Accounting
Office (GAO) released at the hearing, there have been numerous problems
with pilot and mechanic training as well as pilot retention: Pilots are
not showing up for training; qualified Colombian pilots are not being
assigned to flying missions; and trained pilots are not remaining in
the program. The report contends that the U.S. must, as a result, spend
$150 million a year to sustain ongoing operations with contractors.
<bullet> How can we get enough pilots trained if we can't even get
them to show up?
<bullet> What can we do to keep the pilots we train in the program?
Why do you think they are dropping out?
<bullet> When do you think the Colombian military will be able to
operate without extensive U.S. assistance? When will we be able to
scale back on aid to the military?
______
Colombia Hearing Questions to be Submitted--State Department
Question 1. The United States has spent well over $2.5 billion
since 2000 to assist Colombia in its fight against narco-trafficking
but with only limited success.
<bullet> What performance measures are being used by the State
Department to assess the success or failure of U.S. funded programs?
<bullet> What is the ultimate objective for our counter-narcotics
assistance programs in Colombia?
Question 2. The U.S. Agency for International Development has
received over $350 million for alternative development since FY2000.
<bullet> What alternative development projects have been identified
and what timeframe has been established for their completion?
<bullet> How much, if any, additional funding will be needed to see
these projects through to their completion?
<bullet> What goals and purposes have been established for each of
these alternative development projects and how successful have the
programs been in meeting their goals to date?
<bullet> We have been providing assistance to Colombia for over 2
decades. What programs have we helped the Government of Colombia set up
that no longer require U.S. assistance?
Question 3. There was a considerable increase in the number of
hectares of coca sprayed during 2002. Much of this increased spraying
has been attributed to the new policies put in place by the Uribe
administration. For 2003, President Uribe has set a goal of spraying
200,000 hectares--almost 60,000 more than were sprayed in 2002.
<bullet> Do you believe this is a realistic objective, or is this a
``stretch'' goal that we hope, but do not expect, to meet?
<bullet> If this objective is a stretch, what combination of assets
and funding must be added to the current levels of U.S. assistance to
make sure that the goal of eradicating 200,000 hectares of coca is
reached?
Question 4. I understand that the 200,000 hectares scheduled to be
eradicated next year is part of a larger strategy by the U.S. Embassy
in Bogota to move coca cultivation in Colombia to a ``manageable
level''.
<bullet> Is this strategy a written document with periodic
benchmarks and other measured to ensure that the strategy is on track?
<bullet> Has this strategy been agreed to by the Government of
Colombia?
<bullet> Can a copy of the strategy be provided to the members of
this Caucus?
Question 5. I understand that as part of the eradication strategy
for Colombia, the threshold of 30,000 hectares of coca cultivation is
being considered a ``manageable level''.
<bullet> Can you please define what a ``manageable level'' of coca
production is and how this amount was determined to be a ``manageable
level''?
<bullet> What resources (planes, funding, etc.) are expected to be
necessary to ``manage'' coca production at this level?
Question 6. The Colombian National Police Anti-Narcotics
Directorate has noted successes in forcing cocaine-processing
facilities to move from one area of the country to another. In my view,
these should not be considered successes because the cocaine is still
being produced but the facility has simply changed its location.
<bullet> What, if anything, is being done to completely shut down
the labs?
Question 7. Protection of the basic human rights of all individuals
in Colombia is an important priority of the United States. In addition,
Congress has placed some restrictions on the assistance that we provide
Colombia in an attempt to encourage human rights reforms.
<bullet> Are the current human rights restrictions on U.S. military
aid adequate to ensure that funding is not being used for actions that
violate human rights, and are they overly burdensome?
<bullet> How successful do you believe the human rights training
programs have been in halting violations in the Colombian Military?
<bullet> Do you believe these changes have been made
institutionally--that is, are they permanent?
<greek-d>