<DOC>
[105 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:49463.wais]
S. Hrg. 105-534
FISCAL YEAR 1998 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION FOR BOSNIA AND SOUTHWEST
ASIA OPERATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
49-463 cc WASHINGTON : 1998
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
SLADE GORTON, Washington DALE BUMPERS, Arkansas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
CONRAD BURNS, Montana TOM HARKIN, Iowa
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire HARRY REID, Nevada
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado PATTY MURRAY, Washington
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, North Carolina BARBARA BOXER, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
Steven J. Cortese, Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Deputy Staff Director
James H. English, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statement of William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Office of
the Secretary, Department of Defense........................... 1
Statement of Gen. Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense......................... 1
Opening statement of Hon. Ted Stevens............................ 1
Statement of Hon. Robert C. Byrd................................. 2
Bosnia progress and troop levels................................. 7
Southwest Asia overview.......................................... 8
Allied support of United States.................................. 9
Importance of early action on supplemental....................... 10
Prepared statement of William S. Cohen........................... 11
Financing requested appropriations............................... 13
Timely approval of fiscal year 1998 supplemental appropriations.. 13
General Shelton's overview on Bosnia............................. 14
General Shelton's comments on Southwest Asia and timing of
passage........................................................ 15
Prepared statement of Gen. Henry H. Shelton...................... 16
International war crimes tribunal................................ 21
Politics among gulf states....................................... 22
Hardening bases in Bosnia........................................ 25
Prepared statement of Senator Daniel K. Inouye................... 28
Prepared statement of Senator Barbara Boxer...................... 29
Prepared statement of Senator Larry E. Craig..................... 29
Prepared statement of Senator Lauch Faircloth.................... 30
Fixed end date versus open-ended................................. 31
Achieving milestones in Bosnia................................... 31
Ceasefire in Bosnia.............................................. 32
Pilot retention and readiness.................................... 32
Damage from failure to pass supplemental......................... 35
Balanced budget pressure......................................... 35
Balancing defense needs.......................................... 36
Possible damage to readiness..................................... 37
Milestones leading to troop reductions........................... 38
Allocation of DOD inflation savings.............................. 39
Funding for natural disaster repairs............................. 41
Anticipated funding shortfalls................................... 41
Spending on overseas facilities.................................. 42
Allied contributions............................................. 43
Policy toward Iraq............................................... 43
Providing for forward deployed forces............................ 44
Additional natural disaster funding.............................. 45
Rotation plan for troops......................................... 45
Questions submitted to William S. Cohen.......................... 50
Questions submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby................. 50
Continuing deployment of U.S. troops in Bosnia............... 50
Bosnia and Southwest Asia--supporting the two MRC scenario... 51
Questions submitted by Senator Lauch Faircloth................... 51
Departure date of U.S. troops from Bosnia.................... 51
Humanitarian projects in Bosnia.............................. 52
U.S. troop participation in nonsecurity activities........... 52
Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg............... 52
Questions submitted to Gen. Henry H. Shelton..................... 53
Question submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby.................. 53
Bosnia-American military objectives.......................... 53
Question submitted by Senator Lauch Faircloth.................... 53
Bosnia-U.S. participation.................................... 53
Question submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg................ 53
Bosnia-U.S. participation.................................... 53
(iii)
FISCAL YEAR 1998 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION FOR BOSNIA AND SOUTHWEST
ASIA OPERATIONS
----------
FRIDAY, MARCH 6, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Cochran, Specter, Domenici,
Bond, Burns, Shelby, Campbell, Byrd, Inouye, Hollings, Leahy,
Bumpers, Reid, Dorgan, and Boxer.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM S. COHEN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. HENRY H. SHELTON, U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
opening statement of hon. ted stevens
Chairman Stevens. Good morning, Mr. Secretary, General
Shelton. We welcome you before our committee this morning, and
appreciate your willingness to come to testify on very short
notice. We believe there will be a number of Senators attending
today's hearing. But I am going to ask my colleagues to
withhold their opening statements so that we can listen to your
statements first. I think that may reduce the number of
questions.
We are going to have your testimony, and then each member
will have 5 minutes to make a statement or ask questions, and
we will have as many rounds of questions as time permits. Since
Senator Byrd and I will take our time first, we will go last on
the question round.
We meet today to review the request for $1.85 billion in
emergency supplemental funds for the contingency operations in
Bosnia and Iraq, and $172 million to repair facilities damaged
in the Northeast, California and Guam. So the submission for
Bosnia before Congress was mandated by legislation included in
the 1998 Defense appropriations bill which was approved by the
President. Section 8132 required the President to submit a
supplemental request for Bosnia if he decided our forces would
remain past June 30, 1998.
The bulk of the request, $1.36 billion, actually pays for
operations in Southwest Asia, to contain Iraq. For 1998,
Congress appropriated $677.5 million for operations around
Iraq. This request before us increases the total spending to
meet the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to $2 billion for 1998.
Unlike our deployment to the gulf 8 years ago, we now find
ourselves virtually alone in paying the bills to meet the
threat posed to our allies in the gulf.
Our Arab allies have not publicly endorsed the use of
military force against Iraq, and our Arab allies who are really
the ones in immediate harm's way from Saddam Hussein, to my
knowledge, have not provided any increased support for our
military forces.
In fact, it is my understanding they are not providing even
the fuel and water necessary for the Air Force and the Army
units we have already sent to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait over the
past 3 months. We have to bring those supplies into the area or
buy them there, and that is one reason I understand the request
before us for Southwest Asia exceeds $1 billion.
I do support providing the necessary funding in 1998 in
this supplemental. But the American taxpayer should not have to
pay all of the costs of containing Iraq alone.
Following the passage of this supplemental, it is my plan
to take this committee to the gulf region, to meet those allies
and to discuss those questions. If our allies expect and rely
upon our military protection, they should be full partners in
the mission, including partners providing some of the needed
resources for our armed forces for the period of this
emergency.
For Bosnia, the supplemental request in the budget
amendment for fiscal year 1999 does show progress in reducing
the size of our force and costs to operate in and around
Bosnia. The total cost for the Army presence in Bosnia will
decline from nearly $2 billion in 1997 to $1.38 billion for
1999. The Air Force actually reduced spending below their
estimate for 1998 by $57.7 million.
At our insistence, the President submitted this request
under the emergency designation, which will mean that we will
not need to reprogram funds from the current defense program to
pay for the bills for Bosnia or Iraq. If we had to find nearly
$2 billion in offsets now, halfway through the fiscal year,
such reprogramming, in my judgment, would seriously retard our
modernization efforts, and we just cannot reprogram that much
money again, in 1998.
Our Nation bears a unique burden, as the sole remaining
global military superpower. But that capability does not imply
we must go it alone in every crisis, in every emergency.
Gentlemen, it is our intention to work with you to get you
the money you need to protect the safety, readiness, and
quality of life for our military forces. We know this emergency
has required you to spend funds needed to assure the continued
readiness of our military for the balance of this fiscal year.
Senator Byrd and I will urge our committee, the Senate, and the
Congress to respond to the request for these emergency funds as
quickly as possible.
Now, let me recognize the former chairman of our committee,
my great friend, Senator Byrd.
statement of hon. robert c. byrd
Senator Byrd. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, General Shelton, my colleagues, I join with my
chairman in supporting the request for the fiscal year 1998
amount. We were told last year that our forces would be in
Bosnia for roughly 1 year. To put it charitably, the
administration was being very disingenuous in saying that. And
I am sure that most of us felt that, but we gave it a try.
Now, the administration is no longer being so disingenuous.
In its report it is saying that there is no end date. There is
an indication that we are going to be there for a long time.
And I note that the President's report indicates that we
ought to show leadership in Bosnia, and so we are going to be
there for quite a while. And the exit strategy indicates that
we are there for nation-building, in my judgment. But we want
to show leadership, says the report.
In Iraq, we are not showing leadership. We have not been
showing leadership. We have been tagging along after the United
Nations. We get our orders and our instructions and our
recommendations, apparently, from the United Nations. And some
of those words may not be quite appropriate, but they make my
point.
I have been in the Senate 40 years, or soon will be, and in
the House and Senate for almost 46 years. And this is a strange
way of operating, in my judgment, especially since this
administration came into power.
We play along with the United Nations. We did that in
Somalia. Congress finally came to its senses and used the power
of the purse. And I assume the President is not going to line-
item veto anything in this bill, this supplemental. But we kind
of came to our senses and drew a line and said, OK, this far,
no farther. If it is going to go any farther, come back and ask
for the money.
So here we are now, we are being asked for the money to
continue the now open-ended operations in Bosnia and the
operations in Iraq. And we will be there quite a long time, in
my judgment.
I do not expect the U.N.-brokered agreement to hold up or
be very productive. But we got ourselves into a trap by saying
we will let the United Nations go there and we will wait on
their recommendation. So it was pretty hard to turn down the
recommendation once we had yielded that much ground.
So we are in both areas. And when we look over our
shoulders, we do not see very many other nations there behind
us. The deployments to Bosnia and the Middle East are in the
nature of permanent deployments of United States forces, based
on permanent emergency funding. The pressure to end these
deployments or to establish reasonable durations and exit
strategies, end games, the pressure is dissipating rapidly.
There are no tradeoffs with other programs, no pain that
provides the pressure to transform and end them. The pressure
to get our allies to fill in the slack is rapidly disappearing.
The President has provided the certification required by
the authorization and appropriations acts for fiscal year 1998,
that the continued presence of U.S. armed forces is required
after June 30, 1998, and an accompanying report. The report is
revealing, in that the expected duration of our deployment is
characterized as follows. ``We do not propose a fixed end date
for the deployment.''
Quite different from the situation last year. But we are
there now. And so the administration is going to be a little
more up-front with us. Thus, the pressure to get out and pass
off the ground force role to our allies has evaporated.
The exit strategy--in other words, the required condition
for our forces to come out and come home--reads like a nation-
building strategy. In other words, required achievements
include judicial reform, development of an independent media
throughout the territory, democratic elections, free market
economic reforms, an orderly minority return process, and so on
and on. And this appears to me to be a formula requiring a very
extended duration--certainly, several more years.
I do not think this is an indefinite free ride. And I think
we ought to let our so-called allies in on that secret. It is
not an indefinite free ride. I believe that the terms of U.S.
involvement are turning into a permanent force, with no
pressure to get out, that the mission is sliding toward nation-
building, that the Europeans are not under any pressure, or
very little at best, to replace our combat forces on the
ground, which will remain, therefore, at permanent risk, and
that the funding of some $2 billion per year through emergency
supplementals is becoming the method of congressional support.
Now, these funds are not going to be taken from
discretionary funding, but there are still costs to the
American taxpayer; $2 billion is not going to be charged
against our discretionary funds, which are very, very limited,
so they will be emergency funds. But they are still taxpayers'
dollars.
A similar permanency seems to be involved in Southwest
Asia. We now have 30,000 troops in the region, waiting for the
signal to go after the Iraqi regime, after we have announced
for several weeks that we are going to go after them. We have
given Saddam all the time that he could possibly have wished
for to carry out his methods of deception, and, at the tune of
$1.3 billion for this current fiscal year. Presumably we will
have to expend a similar sum next year if the situation remains
unchanged and we want to be ready to go after Iraq if and when
the U.N.-brokered inspection regime fails.
I would just note here my concern over what appears to be a
quickly developing habit of American leadership through the
permanent deployment of forces in theaters of potential
conflict. There seems to be little or no discussion in these
funding requests of sharing that burden with our allies. Why
shouldn't they help pay this bill?
Why shouldn't the Saudis? Why shouldn't the others in that
region help to pay this bill?
Since we are talking about biological and chemical weapons,
this is a threat to all countries, it seems to me. Why
shouldn't Japan, why shouldn't Germany, why shouldn't France,
why shouldn't the other prospering nations of the world help to
pay some of the bill?
It is our manpower, in the main, that is stationed there.
They are going to be soon sweating in the hot deserts.
How about our taxpayers? Let us have some relief.
Let us ask the other countries to belly up to the bar. If
they will not send manpower, they can at least send money.
The requests are now regularly based on provision of funds
under emergency designations. And I am concerned over the open-
ended sweeping nature of the commitments we are undertaking in
these deployments, now admittedly of indefinite duration. And I
am also concerned that we are dissipating pressure for
leadership roles on the part of our allies.
It has been fashionable for the Congress to talk about exit
strategies in regard to deployments of combat forces abroad. I
note that the President's response to the questions of exit
strategy on page 5 of his report outlines the conditions
necessary to be created in Bosnia before we can depart. There
is a long list. It included judicial reform in place, a
democratic, independent media, implementation of democratic
elections, free market reform, and so on.
Now, let me tell you, I counted, in the President's report,
40 nations that are involved in the Bosnian effort--40 nations.
Am I correct in that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Cohen. Approximately.
Senator Byrd. Sir?
Secretary Cohen. Approximately 40 nations, that is correct.
Senator Byrd. Well, it is 40, if you count them in his
report.
It sounds like a great array of cooperation and mass
strength. But I took the time to--I do not know how to use the
calculator; I have to use pencil and paper--that is the old-
time way--and I asked someone the other day to break down some
figures. They got out their calculator and they could not do
it. Well, I said, take your pencil and paper. Well, they could
not do that. They had calculators. There are lots of
calculators in the Nation's schools, but few, apparently,
students understand how to use the old math, and figure it out
with pencil and paper.
Well, I did this with pencil and paper this morning, Mr.
Chairman. And let me tell you what these 40 nations are
contributing. Fourteen nations out of the 40 contribute less
than 100 personnel each. Fourteen out of the 40 nations
contribute a total of 390 personnel. Fifteen nations, in
addition to the 14, 15 other nations, contribute over 100 each,
but less than 1,000, for a total of 6,766.
Of the remaining 11 nations that contribute 1,000 or above
each, only 4 nations contribute 2,000 or above--they being
Germany, France, each with 2,500; the United Kingdom with
5,000; and the good old United States with 8,500. In other
words, two nations, the United States and the United Kingdom,
bear the brunt of the effort. And we are talking about staying
there now. No end game. No light at the end of the tunnel in
sight. After we were told last year that we will be there 1
year, about 1 year.
I think the administration knew better than that when they
were telling us that. But that is the runaround that we get.
Then they come to the Congress. We take the recommendations of
the United Nations. We follow that crowd along. And then we
come down to where it hurts--putting the Nation's manpower, the
men and women of the Nation, into areas of danger. And the old
purse strings have Uncle Sam's taxpayers footing the bill.
Apparently, nobody is making any effort this time to get
other countries to help us in Southwest Asia. Now, we insisted
on that a few years ago when we had the big 100-day war, I
suppose it was. We insisted on the other countries bellying up
to the bar. And they gave right much. But there is no effort
this time.
We have got to show leadership, says the report. But as we
purport to show leadership in Iraq, we do not show leadership.
We let the United Nations jerk us around. And it is not going
to work.
Now, Mr. Chairman, to make a long story short, I will
support the fiscal year 1998 request. But I suggest that we
wait a little while before we talk about the fiscal year 1999
emergency funding request. It is about time that the
administration learns that there is a third branch of
government. It is an equal branch. And under the Constitution,
if we will go back and read the Federalist essays and read the
Constitution, we will find that this branch controls the purse
strings.
So, Mr. Chairman, I am in favor, as I say, of going along
on the 1998 request. But we have got some time. Let us take a
look at that fiscal year 1999 request. Let us not hurry. Let us
not be stampeded. I do not intend to be stampeded into
following the administration, no questions asked, just hand it
up, whatever they request. And they will take their request up
the line to the United Nations also, where they will get their
recommendations. But we will just follow along, and open the
taxpayers' purse strings and fund the bill. We are going to
take it a little slowly on that.
Now, there is some disturbing news in the paper this
morning about what the Serbs are doing in Albania. And so
perhaps all of the rosy stories about how the ethnic conflict
was being controlled and all of that, do not look so good this
morning. These are ominous, ominous headlines about what is
happening in Albania. And that is what we have been concerned
about, some of us, all along.
And this may go to be something big. And I think we had
better let our so-called allies know now that we cannot foot
the bill and provide the great bulk of the manpower
perpetually, and especially if this conflict is going to
spread. We had better talk turkey to those people, and they had
better respond.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I have taken too much of the committee's
time, but I feel strongly about this. I want to support our men
and women there, but I think the administration--this
administration and others--in recent years, they seem to think
that they can have it their way with the Congress, get what
they want, and then, when we get our men and women over there,
we in the Congress have got to go along. The veil of
disingenuousness has been stripped now. And so the
administration is back. And there is no end game.
A lot of this happened before you became Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, General Shelton, and some of it before you became
Secretary, Secretary Cohen. There is going to be a day of
reckoning, and we had better start adding up the costs now and
letting our allies know that they had better belly up to the
bar.
I would like to see some efforts on the part of the
administration to get our allies to come forward and help pay
this bill. I am glad that the chairman is going to have the
committee go over there. I am past 80 years old, but maybe I
can make one more trip abroad.
Thank you.
Chairman Stevens. We would be happy to have you, Senator.
Mr. Secretary and General, we would like to proceed with
your statements now.
Welcome. We are glad to have you here.
Secretary Cohen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Byrd, and members of the committee. I think a great deal has
already been said about the request, and so I will try to
summarize what I think is a brief statement that has been
submitted for the record. But I will just try to touch the
highlights.
Chairman Stevens. We will print both statements in full in
the record at the beginning of the hearing.
Secretary Cohen. I could make a short statement very long,
but I think that you would prefer to ask questions. And so I
will try to be as brief as possible.
bosnia progress and troop levels
With respect to Bosnia, as you have indicated, the fiscal
year 1998 supplemental request is $487 million, pertaining to
the planned extension of operations beyond June 1998. And the
1999 amendment seeks $1.8 billion to continue those operations
through the end of that fiscal year.
I could take a lot of time to discuss what has been
accomplished in Bosnia. I think many of you have had an
opportunity to visit that country. In fact, we have seen about,
I think it is, some 300,000 soldiers who are no longer in
service over there. We have seen the return of some 400,000
refugees. We have seen about one-third of the indicted war
criminals taken into custody. Economically, that country is
growing at a rate of between 50 percent in 1996--last year it
was 37 percent growth. It is one of the fastest growing regions
in the world today by virtue of the stability that has come to
that country.
So there are many positive things that, in fact, have been
achieved. And I must say that I, while a member of this body,
had my doubts about the wisdom of participation in Bosnia. I
can say, having been there on many occasions since, that we
have made an enormous difference in the lives of millions of
people.
I would also point out that one of the interesting things
about our troops, they feel very good about the service they
are providing to that country. It has the highest reenlistment
rate perhaps of any region that our forces are stationed, in
Bosnia, because the troops feel that they are indeed making a
major difference in the lives of people who have known a lot of
war and agony for quite a few years.
With respect to our forces, we will be coming down to
approximately 6,900. And this should be taken note of.
Originally, when we got involved in Bosnia, we had roughly
20,000 troops that were deployed to that country. And that is
not counting the troops that would have been in the neighboring
countries of either Italy, Croatia, Hungary, or Germany. But in
Bosnia itself, roughly 20,000.
Since that time, we have come down from 20,000 to 15,000 to
10,000 to 8,500. And we project going to roughly 6,900. So the
trend lines are in the right direction.
It is our hope that these institutions that have been
formulated will become sustaining over a period of time. And as
Senator Byrd has pointed out, it is hard to fix an end date, as
such, saying it will be completed by that time, but there has
been enormous progress that has been made in just a very short
period of time.
Last week, we saw three indicted war criminals turn
themselves in. If you would have asked me 1 year ago, would
that have been possible, the answer would have been no.
Last fall, we saw 14 war criminals turn themselves in. We
have had several who have been apprehended by the British, by
the United States, by the Dutch. And so there is enormous
progress taking place.
But one thing that we have learned in this turbulent
century is that America's security and European stability are
also intimately linked. And we believe that implementation of
the Dayton accords is changing the conditions that made Bosnia
a fuse in a regional powder keg. And our leadership has been
essential to sustain that rate of progress.
southwest asia overview
Let me turn, if I could, very quickly, Mr. Chairman, to
Southwest Asia. We all know that Iraq precipitated this crisis
when it sought to define who could come in as part of the
inspection team to look at what facilities, under what
circumstances, and when. That was precipitated last fall. We
responded to it when Saddam Hussein immediately threatened to
shoot down our U-2.
Chairman Shelton and I conferred. We decided, obviously,
that that could not take place and would not take place. And we
deployed--asked the President to order the deployment of a
second carrier. And from that time, we have augmented those
forces in the region.
As you correctly pointed out, we have roughly 33,000 to
34,000 troops that are in the region, largely by the increase
in the number of ships, but also we have had some ground forces
deployed to Kuwait in order to prevent any kind of a move south
by Saddam Hussein on a surprise attack.
We intend to keep that level of force there as long as
necessary. But in this particular request, what we are asking
for is funding at the current level of operations through to
the end of this fiscal year, which would carry us through to
the end of September.
This would not take into account, this request for the
supplemental appropriation, would not take into account any
need to use those forces, but simply to maintain them at their
current operational pace. But that is what we propose to do,
because Saddam Hussein has not given any indication that he
intends to fully comply with the U.N. resolution and with that
memorandum of understanding that was recently negotiated.
Let me try to respond, Senator Byrd, to a number of issues
you have raised.
We are there, I think as everyone knows, not simply to
protect the Saudis or the Kuwaitis or the gulf states. We are
there because we have determined--I believe the line was drawn
as early as President Carter's administration, when he said
that we have a vital national security interest in that region.
We have maintained that vital national security interest over a
variety of administrations, Republican and Democratic.
We are not operating under the instructions of the United
Nations. We have been enforcing U.N. resolutions, which call
for Saddam Hussein to fully comply with inspection regimes that
would allow the inspectors to determine whether he is retaining
any nuclear materials, any nuclear capability, any chemical or
biological weapons. We know that he has lied consistently in
the past about what he had in storage. That became apparent in
1995 and 1996. And as a result of that disclosure, many of his
stocks have, in fact, been destroyed.
And what we intend to do is to continue to support the U.N.
inspectors, so they can be on the ground, doing their job. A
lot of people have suggested, why not just bomb? And the answer
we have offered, and I think the right answer, is that bombing
may make us feel good, it may diminish his capacity to inflict
harm upon his neighbors, and possibly upon those far from his
region one day, but it will not be an adequate substitute for
having inspectors who are on the ground, knocking on doors,
opening doors, and, in fact, seeking and overseeing the
destruction of those weapons of mass destruction. There is no
adequate substitute for that.
allied support of united states
But barring their effectiveness, if he is to erect barriers
to prevent them from carrying it out, then the President, along
with our allies--and, Senator Byrd, let me indicate--you have
said we look over our shoulder and there are not many behind
us. There are some 25 nations who have pledged support. Some of
it may not amount to a great deal, but it certainly amounts to
a lot as far as our international standing is concerned, and 13
out of the 16 NATO nations have pledged support. Sixteen out of
the 19, if you include the new members who may be admitted as a
result of Senate action.
So we have had very strong allied support for our
commitment to the region, in terms of forces. They may be
small, but they are all that one would need.
In fact, General Zinni, who will be here on the Hill with
me later today, will tell you, if you were to call him, that he
has everything that he needs in order to carry out a military
option if it becomes necessary to exercise it. And he has been
fully integrating those 25 nations who have offered support,
ranging from ships to aircraft to demining and chemical
detection capability. And whatever expertise they can offer,
they are prepared to offer it. So we do have quite a few
nations behind us.
I would like to say also that some of that has come about
as a result of congressional pressure. There was a very
important conference that some of you attended. Senator Byrd,
you have attended it in the past. It is called the Wehrkunde
Conference, in Munich.
And I might say, as a result of the Senate and House
participation in early February in that conference, those
members made it very clear to our NATO allies, you cannot
continue to expect the United States to be concerned about
interests which are primarily located in Europe, although we
have an interest in it, if you are unwilling to support us in
areas where you have an interest as well as we have an
interest, and simply let us bear the burden.
As a result of those very strong statements coming from
Members of Congress, we saw an immediate raising of hands,
saying how many are with us. So congressional voices can be
critically important in that regard.
The commitment to Bosnia. It is not open ended, Senator
Byrd, as long as Congress has control of the purse strings. The
President can propose to keep our forces there as long as he
believes to be necessary. But the fact is that you are, if not
an equal partner, maybe a superior partner. Congress controls
the purse strings.
Senator Byrd. Thank God.
Secretary Cohen. Well, I am fully aware of the role of
Congress in our constitutional system.
Senator Byrd. And the Framers.
Secretary Cohen. Mr. Chairman, let me stop here.
I believe we could take some time to talk about the regime
that has been outlined by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. He has negotiated a memorandum of understanding. If
Saddam Hussein complies fully with that memorandum, then we
will have been successful, in that we will get access to sites
which have been ruled off limits for the past 7 years.
If we are not successful in gaining access to those sites,
then the process will have failed, as far as diplomacy is
concerned, and we will have walked the last mile. One of the
things that has been of concern to you and to me and to the
chairman is the support from our friends in the gulf. They--and
I just came back a few weeks ago from the gulf--those countries
were, in fact, supporters.
Are they worried about Saddam Hussein? The answer is yes.
Are they eager to take a very prominent position in opposition
to Saddam Hussein? The answer is no.
They have to live in a neighborhood with a bully, a bully
who is armed and dangerous. And so they have to look out for
their interest at home situation as well as the need to be
supportive of the United States. They have indicated that they
are going to be with us. They wanted the United States to take
the last diplomatic initiative.
I spoke with all of them this week. They are very pleased
with the fact that the United States was willing to walk this
last mile, as far as negotiations with Saddam Hussein. And they
are prepared to say, and have said, that we have done all that
is necessary. If Saddam Hussein refuses to comply with the
memorandum of understanding and the U.N. resolutions, he must
bear the full consequences of his actions. I think that is
pretty clear that they are with us.
importance of early action on supplemental
Mr. Chairman, let me just say that action on these
requests--and I have not touched upon the natural disasters,
but I think everyone is aware of what has taken place in Guam
and also the damage caused by El Nino, and the ice storms. And
I will be prepared to talk about those at greater length if you
would like. But if we fail to have action on the supplemental
by April, then the military services are going to have to start
actions which would be adverse to our interests. It will
require us to start cutting back on our training, which will
have an impact upon readiness. It will start piling up some of
the depot work. We will stop hiring a number of people.
Contracts will be stretched out.
There are a lot of consequences to the military if we do
not have action by early April, because the planning has to
begin at that time. And the chairman is in a much better
position than I am to detail that. But I hope that the
committee will recommend action before long. April is the
timeframe, obviously, when you go out for the break and come
back. But we need to start planning for these funds. And if we
cannot plan on these funds and really count on them, then we
are going to take measures which I think that almost everyone
in the Senate and the House would find to be adverse to our
interests as far as military preparedness is concerned.
prepared statement
And I would just simply close by endorsing all of the
requests contained in the supplemental. There are issues that
go beyond simply the DOD portion. But I would add my support to
all of those items contained in the supplemental request.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of William S. Cohen
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for scheduling so
promptly a hearing on President Clinton's request for emergency
supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1998 and for a budget
amendment for fiscal year 1999. This statement will highlight the
content of our funding requests, the President's proposals regarding
financing of these appropriations, and the importance of timely action
on our fiscal year 1998 package.
The President's funding request for the Department of Defense (DOD)
is summarized in the attached chart and has three major components:
Bosnia.--To support the vital U.S. role in maintaining a peaceful
environment in Bosnia, the fiscal year 1998 Supplemental requests $487
million related to the planned extension of operations beyond June
1998. The fiscal year 1999 amendment seeks $1.859 billion to continue
Bosnia operations through the next fiscal year. Although NATO has not
yet finalized the exact structure required for the follow-on-force in
Bosnia, our cost estimates assume that the United States will
contribute approximately 6,900 troops to the operation in Bosnia while
maintaining about 3,100 support personnel in Croatia, Hungary, and
Italy. This reduced force will allow for the continuation of currently
assigned missions with the support of other NATO countries while
providing for adequate force protection.
We have learned in this turbulent century that America's security
and Europe's stability are intimately linked. The Bosnia war saw the
worst fighting and the most profound humanitarian disaster on that
continent since the end of World War II. Implementation of the Dayton
Peace Accords is changing the conditions that made Bosnia a fuse in a
regional powder keg. American leadership remains essential to sustain
the current rate of progress.
U.S. and NATO operations in Bosnia have already achieved remarkable
success. A stable military environment has been created, over 300,000
soldiers have returned to civilian life, and 6,900 weapons have been
destroyed. Public security is improving through restructuring,
retraining, and reintegrating local police. Democratic elections have
been held at all levels of government, and hard-line nationalists are
increasingly marginalized. Independent media and political pluralism
are expanding. Over 400,000 refugees and displaced persons have
returned home. One third of the publicly-indicted war criminals have
been taken into custody. Economically, substantial progress has been
made in the Bosnian Federation, whose economy grew 50 percent in 1996
and 35 percent in 1997. Political progress in the Serb portion of
Bosnia has been notable, with a pro Dayton government gaining power and
which is helping to create conditions necessary for economic progress
there, as well.
Continued U.S. participation in support of the Dayton Peace Accords
is crucial because America has important national interests in ensuring
that war does not resume in Bosnia, from which it could spread to
elsewhere in the region. Stability in Europe and an international
environment favorable to our future requires, as much as ever, resolute
American leadership.
Southwest Asia (SWA).--In response to Saddam Hussein's
unwillingness to permit unrestricted access to UNSCOM inspection teams,
the United States has deployed additional forces that are prepared to
take appropriate action against Iraq, should the President determine
that to be necessary. The fundamental U.S. goal has been to assure that
UNSCOM has unconditional and unfettered access to all suspect sites, as
called for by U.N. Security Council resolutions. Diplomacy, backed by
the threat of force, has moved us forward toward achieving that goal.
Iraq precipitated a crisis by trying to avoid its obligations under
U.N. Security Council resolutions. It tried to dictate to the
international community where UNSCOM could hold inspections, the manner
in which inspections could be conducted, and the length of time they
would continue. Iraq's effort failed.
Last week, Iraq made a written commitment to provide immediate,
unrestricted, unconditional access for the UNSCOM inspectors to all
suspect sites. If fully implemented, this commitment will allow UNSCOM
to fulfill its mission of finding and destroying Iraq's chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver these
weapons and instituting a system of long-term monitoring to make sure
Iraq does not build more. This commitment applies to all sites anywhere
in the country--not only to the eight so called ``presidential sites,''
but also to all sensitive sites, which up to now Iraq had tried to
claim were off limits to UNSCOM. Any and all of these sites are subject
to repeat visits. There are no deadlines for UNSCOM to complete its
work. In short, for the first time, Iraq explicitly has committed to
open every site throughout the country to the weapons inspectors.
The Secretary General has provided assurances that UNSCOM Chairman
Butler remains in charge of UNSCOM and all weapons inspections. The
Special Team for the ``presidential sites'' will be part of UNSCOM,
will report to Chairman Butler, and will operate under procedures
developed by UNSCOM and the Secretary General, not Iraq. The Secretary
General has made this clear to the Iraqis, as well. There are issues
that still need clarification, notably with respect to the inspection
procedures for the ``presidential sites.'' The U.S. has made clear that
it expects all aspects of this agreement to reinforce the fundamental
requirement that UNSCOM be permitted to carry out its inspections in a
rigorous and professional manner.
Earlier this week the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a
new resolution that backs up this memorandum of understanding (MOU)
with Iraq by warning Baghdad that it will face the severest
consequences if it fails to fulfill its commitments.
The President has made clear that, in the days and weeks ahead,
UNSCOM must robustly test and verify this commitment. If Iraq
implements the agreement, the weapons inspectors will for the first
time have unrestricted, unconditional access to all suspect sites in
Iraq, with no limits on the number of visits or deadlines to complete
their work. If Iraq does not cooperate and we need to take action, we
are in a stronger position internationally than ever before.
The U.S. will keep military forces in the Gulf at high states of
preparedness while we see if Iraq lives up to its commitments. The U.S.
remains resolved to secure by whatever means necessary Iraq's full
compliance with its commitment to destroy its weapons of mass
destruction.
For the purposes of the fiscal year 1998 Supplemental, we are
requesting $1.361 billion to cover the added costs associated with
sustaining our enhanced level of forces in the SWA region this fiscal
year. These costs do not include any estimate for increased OPTEMPO
levels that would occur during an actual campaign of armed hostilities,
nor the related costs for expended munitions and cruise missiles, nor
the costs for attrition losses.
No additional SWA funds have been requested for fiscal year 1999.
However, if these higher forces levels are needed beyond next
September, the Administration will need to seek added fiscal year 1999
funding.
Natural Disasters.--To recover from damage to U.S. military
facilities and assets due to natural disasters, $123 million in
emergency fiscal year 1998 supplemental appropriations is requested.
This would provide $121 million for damage in Guam from Typhoon Paka
and $2 million for damage in the U.S. from ice storms. Most of these
currently identified costs are for repair of facilities and replacement
of damaged equipment, but some military construction and family housing
expenditures are needed as well. An additional $50 million for the
Department is also requested, to be made available contingent upon the
Administration's submission of a later request.
financing requested appropriations
Regarding the financing of this additional funding, President
Clinton is requesting that DOD's fiscal year 1998 unfunded requirements
be met by non-offset emergency supplemental appropriations. Similarly,
the President is proposing a non-offset emergency fiscal year 1999
budget amendment to fund the unanticipated costs of extending the U.S.
mission in Bosnia through the fiscal year. The Administration included
an allowance in the President's fiscal year 1999 budget of $3.2 billion
to cover the costs of contingencies like Bosnia, SWA, and natural
disasters.
The Administration's plan to finance these unanticipated
contingency operations is the only way to ensure support for our forces
deployed to Bosnia and Southwest Asia and avoid damage to military
readiness. Thus, I strongly urge the Congress to support the
Administration's request. If fiscal year 1998 supplemental
appropriations were required to be offset from funds currently
available to the Department of Defense, the damage would be broad and
deep. Non-deployed units would likely be forced to drastically curtail
training. Troop inductions and civilian personnel hiring would be
curtailed or halted. Research and production programs would be reduced
substantially, driving up costs and delaying needed modernization.
Civilian personnel might have to be furloughed. Requiring DOD budget
cuts this far into the fiscal year would multiply the severity of the
actions that would have to be taken to fulfill America's commitments in
Bosnia and SWA.
The President's fiscal year 1998 budget request and subsequent
appropriations enacted by Congress did not accommodate nor anticipate
these DOD funding requirements. The decision to maintain a significant
presence in Bosnia and to confront Iraqi efforts to build and maintain
a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction emerged after fiscal year
1998 appropriations were completed. Moreover, the Defense topline set
in the bipartisan budget agreement did not anticipate these added
costs. The Department used the Quadrennial Defense Review to carefully
construct a balanced Defense program that sustains the necessary high
levels of readiness, but still funds modernization at levels that will
ensure that future readiness is also protected. To now unravel this
program by requiring funding offsets will undermine this balance and
hurt readiness both now and in the future.
timely approval of fiscal year 1998 supplemental appropriations
I cannot stress enough the need for House and Senate action on our
requested fiscal year 1998 non-offset emergency supplemental
appropriations by early April. Without timely action, the significant
costs of continuing our presence in Bosnia and responding to the crisis
in Southwest Asia will begin to hurt force readiness. The risk to
readiness will be especially acute because so many of our forces are
deployed in major operations.
Beginning in April, the Military Services must decide on the
funding to allocate to their programs for the remainder of the fiscal
year. Without assurances on supplemental funding, major expenditures
could be curtailed or deferred. The Services could begin curtailing
deferrable activities--consisting primarily of training, depot
maintenance, and maintenance of real property. (Fixed costs such as
salaries, utilities, and base support contracts are difficult to
curtail in the short term.) Were that to happen, important training
opportunities would be lost, and the readiness of our nondeployed
forces reduced. While depot maintenance and real property maintenance
programs are deferrable, late funding of them potentially disrupts
activities and can result in the idling of certain functions, thus
creating a logjam of backlogged work that cannot be accomplished
expeditiously or efficiently.
closing
In closing, let me join with the President to urge Congress to
consider this fiscal year 1998 Emergency Supplemental as part of a
comprehensive package together with requests for supplemental
appropriations included in the fiscal year 1999 Budget, including
additional funding for veterans compensation and pensions; requests
transmitted on February 2, 1998 for the Department of State to pay U.S.
arrears to the United Nations and other international organizations and
for the International Monetary Fund; and requests for other important
needs that were transmitted on February 20, 1998.
CONTINGENCY FUNDING
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998 1999
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bosnia............................... $0.5 billion........................... $1.9 billion.
Southwest Asia....................... 1.4 billion............................ TBD.
Natural disasters.................... 123 million (+$50 million)............. ................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 1998 costs to be met by non-offset emergency supplemental.
Fiscal year 1999 costs to be covered by a non-offset emergency budget amendment covered by an allowance in
President's budget.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
General Shelton, we are glad to have you here. We would be
happy to have your comments.
General Shelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and
distinguished members of the committee. I am very pleased to
appear before you today.
Chairman Stevens. Could I interrupt just a minute, General.
Gentlemen, I would remind you, these microphones are all
live, and it takes an awful lot to be able to hear the General
back there if we talk in front of the microphones. Turn away
from them, if you will, please.
Thank you, General.
General Shelton's overview on Bosnia
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
I am very pleased to appear before this committee today to
offer my views on the need for the supplemental funding for our
ongoing operations in both Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
Let me begin by saying that the Joint Chiefs and I are
convinced that a strong military presence in both regions is
essential if we are to safeguard our security, protect our
interests, and maintain our position of world leadership.
However, this presence must not come at the expense of either
current readiness, quality of life, or modernization.
As I know you appreciate, these are not issues that lend
themselves easily to compromise. And so I am here to request
your full support for the supplemental funds that we need to
meet our demanding requirements around the world.
In Bosnia, as Secretary Cohen outlined, much has been
accomplished in the last 2 years, since the Dayton agreement
was signed. And U.S. forces deployed as part of the NATO-led,
multinational force have played a key part in that progress. We
have brought stability to the Balkans, and we have kindled hope
for a lasting peace. And we have shown the continuing relevance
of NATO as the principal instrument of peace in Europe.
We are proud of what has been accomplished, but much
remains to be done to repair the aftermath of 4 years of brutal
ethnic war. And the U.S. military will continue to play a
significant role.
SFOR, the NATO-led coalition of 37 to 40 countries,
depending on which day you count, is hard at work doing just
that, first, by preventing another outbreak of armed conflict;
and, second, by providing a secure environment so that the
civil and political tasks required by the Dayton accords can go
forward. A stable, peaceful Bosnia, at peace with its neighbors
and at peace with itself, is fundamental to stability in the
Balkans and in Europe itself.
For the present, the NATO nations have concluded that a
continued military presence is necessary to achieve our
objectives. But we believe we can prudently reduce our forces
on the ground, from the 8,500 average of recent months, to
about 6,900. The exact numbers and the composition of the
follow-on force will be based on a formal statement of
requirements that will be submitted by NATO in mid-March.
These requirements will be derived from NATO's assessment
of the security environment in Bosnia, the mission that the
force will undertake and the level of risk that we are willing
to accept. But it is clear that the U.S. contribution can be
smaller, while still reflecting the key role we play in NATO
and in SFOR, though the European nations will shoulder
increased responsibilities.
Let me assure you that force protection remains our No. 1
priority. The United States contingent will be strong enough to
defend itself against all threats that it is likely to
encounter in Bosnia.
General Shelton's comments on Southwest Asia and timing of passage
In Southwest Asia, our latest dealings with Saddam Hussein
confirm that Iraq will only comply with Security Council
resolutions regarding weapons inspections when confronting
overwhelming military strength and the clear resolve to use it.
Thus, our strong military presence in the region is the
indispensable component of our diplomatic efforts to force
Iraq's compliance.
United States military power, supported by military
contributions from the other members of the international
coalition, give unambiguous meaning to the expression
``severest consequences for Iraq,'' embodied in last Monday's
Security Council resolution.
We are now at a critical juncture. And this is not the time
to falter in our resolve. We know all too well that Saddam
Hussein, in continued possession of his arsenal of chemical and
biological weapons, represents a clear threat to the stability
of the region, to our friends and allies who live there, and to
our own vital interests.
Mr. Chairman, we have looked closely at the cost of both of
these critical operations. For the fiscal year 1998
supplemental, we are requesting $500 million for Bosnia and
$1.4 billion to cover the cost of sustaining the current force
levels and operations in the Arabian Gulf for the remainder of
the fiscal year.
The request is an emergency, nonoffset proposal. Similarly,
we are requesting a nonoffset emergency amendment of $1.9
billion for fiscal year 1999, to fund the unanticipated cost of
extending our mission in Bosnia through the fiscal year.
If approved, all supplemental appropriations will be
applied directly to the field and to the fleet. Without these
funds, we will be forced to divert money, either from readiness
accounts or from modernization, or both. If we transfer funds
from readiness accounts, the services will suffer the impact.
For the Army, O&M dollars would have to be diverted from
training and maintenance, reducing some divisions to C-3
readiness status by the end of this year. The Air Force would
have to reduce their peacetime flying training early in the
fourth quarter for flight crews not engaged in contingency
operations. Many other combat aircraft units would be degraded
to C-4 readiness status. With flight training curtailed, the
critical shortage of pilots would be further aggravated.
The Navy would have to postpone shipyard maintenance on 22
ships, which would affect future schedules and degrade
reliability and the long-term life of these ships. The
readiness of our nondeployed carrier air wings would slip
because of the impact on both training and maintenance. The
Marine Corps would also have to defer important maintenance,
take money from family housing projects, and postpone southern
California storm repair damage.
To prevent such serious impacts on readiness, training, and
quality of life, the services must know by early April that
they will receive nonoffset funding, and they will need the
actual funding by early June. If we are forced to divert funds
from modernization programs, we will fall even further behind
the investment goals defined last spring in the ``Quadrennial
Defense Review.''
In fact, the supplemental funding that we are requesting is
equal to 4 percent of each year's planned expenditures for
modernization. That is twice the amount in this year's budget
for modernization of the Army's main battle tanks and Bradley
fighting vehicles. It is double the number of both Harriers and
Ospreys in this year's procurement budget for the Marine Corps.
It will buy more than a squadron of F-18's for the Navy. And it
would buy eight new C-17's for the Air Force.
Clearly, transferring money from modernization accounts is
not an attractive option either. As the chairman's posture
statement emphasized this year, for the fifth consecutive year,
we must reverse the trend to defer modernization to help
finance today's ongoing operations--operations which are vital
to our national security. And reversing that trend will not be
possible without supplemental funding.
Mr. Chairman, without assistance from the Congress in
funding the costs of these operations, we will pay a price in
degraded readiness and quality of life, and find ourselves with
an aging inventory of systems and weapons. Sometime, somewhere
we will be asked to pay an even greater price, in American
lives, because we doubt our resolve or our ability to exercise
the leadership that is so essential to peace and prosperity
throughout the world.
prepared statement
Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for the support of this
distinguished committee and the whole Congress for our men and
women in uniform. I appreciate very much the opportunity to
appear before you today and to state my views on these
obviously very serious issues. And at this time, I will be
happy to join the Secretary in taking your questions.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gen. Henry H. Shelton
Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to appear before this committee to
offer my views on the need for supplemental funding for our ongoing
operations in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
Let me begin by saying that the Joint Chiefs and I are convinced
that a strong military presence in both regions is essential if we are
to safeguard our security, protect our interests, and maintain our
position of world leadership. However, this presence must not come at
the expense of either current readiness and quality of life, or
modernization. As I know you appreciate, these are not issues that lend
themselves easily to compromise and so I am here to request your full
support for the supplemental funds we need to meet our demanding
requirements around the world.
In Bosnia, much has been accomplished in the two years since the
Dayton agreement was signed and U.S. forces deployed as part of the
NATO-led multinational force. We have brought stability to the Balkans
and kindled hope for a lasting peace. And we have shown the continuing
relevance of NATO as the principal instrument for peace in Europe. We
are proud of what has been accomplished but much remains to be done to
repair the aftermath of four years of brutal ethnic war and the U.S.
military will continue to play a significant role. SFOR, the NATO-led
coalition of 37 countries, is hard at work doing just that first, by
preventing another outbreak of armed conflict and second, by providing
a secure environment so that the civil and political tasks required by
the Dayton Accords can go forward. A stable, peaceful Bosnia at peace
with its neighbors and at peace with itself is fundamental to stability
in the Balkans and in Europe itself.
For the present, the NATO nations have concluded that a continued
military presence is necessary to achieve our objectives but we believe
we can prudently reduce our forces on the ground from the 8,500 average
of recent months, to about 7,000. The exact numbers and composition of
the Follow-on-Force will be based on a formal statement of requirements
submitted by NATO in mid-March. These requirements will be derived from
NATO's assessment of the security environment in Bosnia the mission the
force will undertake and the level of risk we are willing to accept.
It is clear that the U.S. contribution can be smaller while still
reflecting the key role we play in NATO and in SFOR though the European
nations will shoulder increased responsibilities. But let me assure you
force protection remains our number one priority. The U.S. contingent
will be strong enough to defend itself against all threats it is likely
to encounter in Bosnia.
In Southwest Asia, our latest dealings with Saddam Hussein confirm
that Iraq will only comply with Security Council resolutions regarding
weapons inspections when confronted by overwhelming military strength
and the clear resolve to use it. Thus, our strong military presence in
the region is the indispensable component of our diplomatic efforts to
force Iraq's compliance. U.S. military power, supported by military
contributions from the other members of the international coalition
gives unambiguous meaning to the expression ``severest consequences for
Iraq,'' embodied in last Monday's Security Council resolution. We are
now at a critical juncture and this is not the time to falter in our
resolve. Beyond that, we know all too well that Saddam Hussein, in
continued possession of his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons
represents a clear threat to the stability of the region to our friends
and allies who live there and to our own vital interests.
Mr. Chairman, we have looked closely at the cost of both of these
critical operations. For the fiscal year 1998 supplemental, we are
requesting $0.5 billion for Bosnia and $1.4 billion to cover the cost
of sustaining the current force levels and operations in the Arabian
Gulf for the remainder of the fiscal year. This request is an emergency
non-offset proposal. Similarly, we are requesting a non-offset
emergency amendment of $1.9 billion for fiscal year 1999 to fund the
unanticipated costs of extending our mission in Bosnia through the
fiscal year. If approved, all supplemental appropriations will be
applied directly to the field and to the fleet. Without these funds we
will be forced to divert money either from readiness accounts or from
modernization or both.
If we transfer funds from readiness accounts, the services will
suffer from the impact. For the Army, O&M dollars would have to be
diverted from training and maintenance, reducing some divisions to C-3
readiness status by the end of the year. The Air Force would have to
reduce peacetime flying training early in the 4th quarter for flight
crews not engaged in contingency operations. Many other combat aircraft
units would be degraded to C-4 readiness status. With flight training
curtailed, the critical shortage of pilots will be further aggravated.
The Navy would have to postpone shipyard maintenance on 22 ships,
which will affect future schedules, and degrade reliability and long-
term life of the ships. The readiness of non-deployed carrier air wings
would slip because of the impact on training and maintenance. The
Marine Corps would also have to defer important maintenance, take money
from family housing projects, and postpone Southern California storm
damage repairs.
To prevent such serious impacts on readiness, training, and quality
of life, the Services must know by early April that they will receive
non-offset funding, and they will need the actual funding by early
June.
If we are forced to divert funds from modernization programs, we
will fall even further behind the investment goals defined last spring
in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
In fact, the supplemental funding we are requesting is equal to 4
percent of each year's planned expenditure for modernization. That is
twice the amount in this year's budget for modernization of the Army's
main battle tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. It is double the
number of both Harriers and Ospreys in this year's procurement budget
for the Marine Corps. It will buy more than a squadron of new F/A-18's
for the Navy. And it would buy 8 new C-17's for the Air Force. Clearly,
transferring money from modernization accounts is not an attractive
option either. As the Chairman's Posture Statement emphasized this year
for the fifth consecutive year we must reverse the trend to defer
modernization to help finance today's ongoing operations which are
vital to our national security. And reversing that trend will not be
possible without supplemental funding.
Mr. Chairman, without assistance from the Congress in funding the
costs of these vital operations we will pay a price in degraded
readiness and quality of life and find ourselves with an aging
inventory of systems and weapons. Sometime, somewhere, we may be asked
to pay an even greater price in American lives because some may doubt
our resolve or our ability to exercise the leadership that is so
essential to peace and prosperity throughout the world.
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the support of this distinguished
Committee and the whole Congress for our men and women in uniform. I
appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before you to state my
views on these very serious issues. At this time I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have. Thank you very much.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you very much.
I would state to the committee that the 1999 request is not
before the committee at this time. Senator Byrd has stated his
position on that, and I welcome your making comments about it,
but the two witnesses are here to discuss the 1998 supplemental
emergency request, and I would urge the members to concentrate
on those requests before us.
As I said before, we are going to go on the early bird
rule, with a 5-minute limitation, and I hope the Senators will
cooperate with that. It is my understanding we have two votes
starting at 11 a.m., and we will continue as long as the
witnesses can remain to accord the members the opportunity to
make their statements.
I welcome the statements of Senator Byrd. That is why I
decided to take the committee to both Iraq and to Bosnia--
actually to Belgium, to talk to the NATO people--sometime
before we mark up the 1999 bill, and I hope that all members
will come. I hope it will be the first time in history we take
every member of the committee, in two planes, and go over
there, and let them know our resolve. We are not going to pay
this bill alone.
Our first Senator is Senator Campbell.
Senator Campbell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think I would prefer to just make a statement before I
get into any questions, if we only have 5 minutes, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. You may use the 5 minutes in any way you
wish.
Senator Campbell. OK.
Mr. Secretary, welcome. General Shelton, welcome.
I have to tell you both, and particularly you, General
Shelton, I respect every man and woman in uniform in America.
And I have had a voting record that has been sterling for the
military. I voted for things I do not understand and things I
never saw and things I never will see because I thought the
military wanted them and needed them. But I have to tell you
that I have got some real concerns that our Commander in Chief
is leading with his chin on some of these things, particularly
on the things that are affected in our emergency supplemental.
I can remember not too long ago we were told we would be
out of Bosnia in 6 months. I do not know how many millions of
dollars that was ago, but it has been a considerable amount.
And as I look at the history of that country, I know we have to
have some involvement, but I think there has only been two
times they have been at peace in the last 400 years, once was
under Tito and once under Hitler. And I am convinced that the
end of their strife is not yet in sight. Even if we think it is
settled and we come home, it is going to start again.
And the same might be said of Iraq, as long as Saddam
Hussein is in office. My view of this latest escalation in Iraq
was that we just fought the second gulf war and we lost without
firing a shot. I read the reports and saw what Saddam Hussein
has done, declaring a national holiday. He said that he has
broken the U.S. domination of the U.N. inspections commission.
And then I see the things that have been put in place, like an
oversight group that will watch over UNSCOM's inspection of
these locations.
I asked Madeleine Albright the other day if that
politically appointed team would have the authority to overrule
UNSCOM, and she said no. But that is not what Saddam Hussein
has said and thinks. So we clearly do not have an agreement in
place. And as I understand from reading the newspapers, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations thinks that they are
supposed to be a negotiating group between UNSCOM and Saddam
Hussein.
But, clearly, we spend a lot of money--something like $3
billion, I understand, building up the forces in Iraq. And from
my perspective, we have accomplished a few things. We have
increased his statute in the Arab countries. There is no
question he is trying to be the new Nasser, as far as I am
concerned. We have decreased our own. We have had very little
cooperation. At least, I understand what you have said, Mr.
Secretary. And I suppose some of the leaders are telling you
that privately.
But I know they are being driven from the right not to get
too close to America or our agenda over there. The wolf is not
at their door right now. And so it is clear that we did not do
our homework beforehand to make sure that we kept that
coalition together before we had that buildup.
But, in addition to that, by lifting part of that embargo,
he is going to be able to sell something like three-fourths of
the amount of oil that he sold before the embargo. Which, I
mean, any fool ought to know that that buys unlimited weaponry.
If you think he is going to feed his kids with that money, I
think you are mistaken. He is not going to do it. Kids are
still going to starve. He is going to feed his military and buy
more weapons.
I am convinced that we are going to face the same thing we
did 7 years ago. Sooner or later, we are going to face the same
thing. And the cost of it, I understand, is about $300 million
a month to keep our forces over there. How long can we afford
that? Time is on his side. All he has to do is sit it out. If
he sits out of it a while, sooner or later we simply will not
be able to afford it and we will bring our forces home. When we
bring our them home, he steps forward again. That has been the
history of Saddam Hussein. And sooner or later, the American
taxpayer is going to rebel at that, at least in my view.
Now, I tell you, I do not know the answer to all of that.
But it just seems to me that we should have done a lot more
work in the international public relations arena that seems to
be a component part of any military venture now. I do not like
it that way. We have got so darn much political involvement in
our military operations now, it makes it difficult for the
military to win any battles. But that is the way it is.
I would like, Mr. Chairman, myself--it probably cannot be
done, but I would like to take some of this money, if we are
spending $300 million a month over there, take about $100
million of it and write into this bill that we put a reward on
Saddam Hussein, or a bounty or something. It would be cheaper
in the long run.
We put money up to bring Manuel Noriega to justice. And I
do not know why we cannot with him. There is no question in
anybody's mind the guy is a killer, a tyrant. He kills his own
people. Out West, there are five members on this committee--I
was just looking at them--Senator Domenici, Senator Burns, and
some of us that come from out West, where we used to put
bounties on uncontrollable killers. We did not get them all,
but we sure got many of them.
And it seems to me that if we want to have the most
efficient use of our money, we ought to put some of the dough
just to bringing him to justice, instead of just keeping that
buildup in the military.
Chairman Stevens. Senator, I am sorry to tell you, your
time has expired.
Senator Campbell. My time is up. Well, I want to thank you
very much for indulging me, Mr. Chairman.
And, General Shelton and Mr. Secretary, too.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Specter.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. There is not much time
and a lot to talk about. First, I congratulate you on the job
that you have done. There is a lot of confidence from the
Senate, because we know you so well and we have confidence in
your being in that key position.
The first question I have relates to the trial of Saddam
Hussein as a war criminal. I introduced a resolution to do that
on March 5, 1991, right after the end of the gulf war, in line
with the work which Senator Dodd and Congressman Leach and many
of us have done to try to establish an international criminal
court.
And 1 week ago Monday, I renewed that application, and the
majority leader, Senator Trent Lott, has listed it for argument
on Monday. And I think we will pass it.
And my question to you is, to what extent, if at all, will
that be helpful to the United States in giving us the high
moral ground if we indict him and try him perhaps in absentia
in perhaps taking some action as to Iraq or covert action or
any other kind of action which may come into play?
The second question that I have, Mr. Secretary, is our
relations with Saudi Arabia. I personally am very, very, very
dissatisfied with their response to very important U.S. needs.
We lost 19 airmen and so many injured at Khobar Towers in June
1996. Saudi Arabia now has in custody people who are charged
with that offense. The FBI is not permitted to question them.
The same thing happened after a Riyadh car bombing, where
Americans were killed in November 1995. The FBI was not
permitted to question those suspects.
They were executed on May 31, 1996, and less than 1 month
later, Khobar Towers blew up. We have 5,000 personnel in Tent
City. I know you know it very well. I visited there recently.
About 2 weeks after, I visited the Allenwood Federal Prison,
which is a palace compared to the facilities for our 5,000
people in Tent City. And there is religious persecution. People
cannot practice their religions freely in Saudi Arabia, not
only American citizens but others. Even the people who are at
the bases.
And my question there is, how much do we need Saudi oil?
How important are they to us? Or is it possible to structure a
foreign policy, a defense policy, that says to the Saudis very
bluntly and very fairly, if you do not give us fair
cooperation, we are not going to protect you?
International war crimes tribunal
Secretary Cohen. Thank you very much, Senator Specter.
First of all, as to the first question, your bill to create
an international criminal court. And you said, what happens if
we indict? And I was going to have a question, who is the
``we''? Is the United States going to be the indicting----
Senator Specter. No; it would be the war crimes tribunals,
the specification of the resolution. It has been established,
since 1991, of course. And they are trying people from the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Secretary Cohen. But I believe a court would have to be
created. And that would take, I assume, other parties other
than ourself.
Senator Specter. Correct. It would take a United Nations
resolution, just as the war crimes tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Secretary Cohen. That was the point I was trying to make.
This is not something that we can do on our own, to create an
international war crimes tribunal. This is something that will
have to be done through the international community. So the
question would then be, what support would we have at this
point?
I am only speculating right now, but I would assume, until
such time as we see how this most recent memorandum of
understanding unfolds, and whether there is going to be full
compliance or whether or not it is going to be another example
of cheat and retreat on the part of Saddam Hussein, that there
is unlikely to be that broad support for the creation of it.
But I could be wrong.
If, in fact, you have an international community that says
yes, we would like to create a tribunal, and yes, we would like
to indict him, then obviously that would be a very strong
signal to Saddam Hussein. But I think that until such time as
we see, in the next few months, how this is going to play out,
then I suspect that we will not have that kind of support for
it.
Senator Specter. If we could indict him and try him,
perhaps in absentia, the indictment or conviction, how much
would that strengthen our hand against Saddam Hussein?
Secretary Cohen. Well, I think if the international
community were to do that, it would certainly degrade the image
that Saddam Hussein currently has, as far as being any kind of
a champion of the Arab people. You would have the international
community condemning his actions and seeking to bring him to
justice.
Very quickly, on Saudi Arabia. They still remain the
dominant player in the Arab community, as far as oil policy and
other policies are concerned. I believe that the FBI has been
working with them. I have not talked to the Director recently,
but he has been working very closely with the Saudi
authorities.
Senator Specter. Mr. Secretary, the FBI is very
dissatisfied with the cooperation, especially their refusal to
let us talk to the suspects.
Secretary Cohen. Well, I have talked with the Director. And
the last time I talked to him, he did not express that interest
to me. I knew that he was frustrated, but that he had been
making some progress on it.
Politics among gulf states
Let me just make one other comment, because I want to pick
up on something that Senator Campbell said. And that has to do
with the politics that are taking place in the region itself.
I think it was Speaker O'Neill who said that all politics
is local. We all understand that. Back in 1991, when it came
time to deciding whether we would go, in fact, to war with
Saddam Hussein, to liberate Kuwait, there was a lot of domestic
politics at work here, because the American people were
divided. Even though Saddam Hussein was burning and looting and
raping and pillaging, there was great doubt in this body and
the other body as to whether or not any action should be taken
to evict him.
The Arab communications have problems as well. They have
local politics to deal with. And I must tell you that part of
the reason that the coalition is no longer as strong as it once
was is they do not believe that we have been pushing hard
enough on the Middle East peace process. And they believe that
we have a double standard.
And that is something that the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the
Omanis, and everybody else in the region have to deal with.
Their local population does not believe that we have been
either evenhanded or fair-handed or have been pushing hard
enough to get a Middle East peace settlement, and think that we
are eager to punish Arabs but not eager to punish Israelis. So
that makes it more complicated. I am not saying it is right,
but those are the domestic politics that they have to live
with.
And that is one of the reasons why you have not seen the
kind of solidarity that we had before. It is much harder when
the case is the threat of weapons of mass destruction versus
Saddam Hussein setting off 600 oil wells in the fields of
Kuwait, and seeing that kind of a threat, which is real and
tangible as opposed to one which might take place some time in
the future, as far as the use of these chemicals and
biologicals.
I am just saying it is more complicated. We have the
support of the gulf states. They want us to pursue diplomacy if
at all possible. But I believe I can represent to you that if
it comes time for a military option, we will have the support
of everyone concerned.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Hollings.
Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Shelton, I will support your
request, because I understand that you two distinguished
gentlemen are doing the best you can with the policy. However,
we in the Congress and you in the administration, like my
grandchildren say, have got to get real, get a life. We have an
unenforceable Iraq policy. Put that down. Write it down. Mark
it down.
We walked away from a ceasefire back in 1991. The premise
was that, well, we needed Saddam, some thought, as a balance
against Iran. Otherwise, the Kurds were going to drive him out.
But then we let Saddam have gunships, which he used to dominate
the Kurds. Now, that still leaves us with a flawed,
unenforceable policy.
I wish you could have been with the FBI Director when he
told me of the 100 cases of anthrax that we had in this
peaceful United States; 90 of them were spurious, but 10 of
them were serious. Now you get in Iraq and you puff, and you
blow, and you puff and you blow, and then you strike for 5
days. You knock out delivery systems and you knock out palaces.
Then Saddam appears like the Secretary, with a little bag on
TV, but his bag is not a 5-pound bag of sugar. He says, ha-ha,
I am still here and I have anthrax.
The policy has got to be, as we employed with the Soviets,
mutually assured destruction. That is exactly what Israel told
Iraq this time. They said, no, no, we are not going to hold
back. You let one Scud come into downtown Tel Aviv, and that
will be the end of Baghdad, and you. Then, Saddam appeared
immediately on TV and said, wait a minute, we are not going to
fire at Israel this time.
So we must keep enough force out there for mutually assured
destruction. Let him pile up all the anthrax he wants in every
one of the palaces. It will help us as we will not have to use
as many bombs. Just one hit will get rid of the whole area.
But, in any event, it is not only a flawed policy, it is a
destructive policy. That is what really bothers me. The
distinguished colleague from West Virginia wonders why the
members of our former coalition do not pay us. It is not their
policy. In 1991 France, Russia, China, Syria, Turkey, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, were all our allies. This
time, all oppose a military strike.
You can tell us, well, they tell you quietly one way and
quietly another way. We do not play that game with our
military. Their lives are on the line. We cannot play the
political game.
And that is the trouble. We have learned how to lose. Our
military is trained how to win. We lost in Korea and Vietnam
and Somalia. I do not want them to go back in and lose again,
in the gulf. If they have got a chance to win, commit them. If
they do not have a chance to win, then quit misusing them.
There is no question it is a destructive policy. Not just
flawed. Those heads of countries, emirs or shahs or what have
you, would end up with all of their people arising against them
if they back our current policy. That is what Saudi Arabia is
worried about. Well, we have our planes and equipment there,
but we cannot fly off the airfields. That is a stupid policy.
We have got to get real and understand the reality.
Unless we are going after Saddam, the real target, with all
our resources, calling on Israeli intelligence if necessary,
and are willing to support any opposition he has, we will not
succeed. The mission is not to just kill a lot of people on
both sides, and puff and blow, and use the military to make us
and the Government up here in Washington look good.
That is exactly what we do with the Social Security
surplus, to make like we are balancing budgets. Now we are
running around, using the military to make like we have a good,
valid foreign policy. It is a flawed policy, a destructive
policy. We are losing out in the Middle East. All of those
countries were our friends in 1991. They are against us now. We
pay Egypt $5 billion a year, or whatever it is, and then they
say no, they oppose us. We ought to find out whether the policy
is sound or otherwise.
With respect, quickly then, to Bosnia, Mr. Secretary, I use
the same test you use. You said that the troops feel good about
their mission. Yes; on what they are doing they are doing an
outstanding job. But last July, I went to the region with the
majority leader and others. We met with the three leaders,
Serbian, Croatian, and Moslem. Senator Hagel turned and said,
what are you going to do about the war criminals?
Oh, boy, that Serb president sat up. He said, now, Mr.
Senator, no one is a war criminal until they are tried and
proved guilty of war crimes. What you allege the offenses are
of our leader, you can allege against the Moslem leader, and he
points. In other words, I was sitting with a war criminal. When
I saw that, I said, we have another Ireland. The British have
been there for 30 years occupying that country.
But, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think they get the pitch.
Chairman Stevens. I thank you very much, Senator Hollings.
Secretary Cohen. May we have a chance to respond? Well, I
will wait.
Chairman Stevens. You can.
Secretary Cohen. I will wait.
Chairman Stevens. Yes, later.
Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. I would like for you to respond now.
Chairman Stevens. This is not a democracy. You have 5
minutes. [Laughter.]
Senator Burns. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary and General, thank you.
I have one question and I want to follow on the heels of
the statement of my friend from West Virginia. I think it
should be made very clear here that whenever we start moving
money around and taking it away from modernization, O&M, and
training to further a policy, that is a decision that has been
made by the administration and not by this Congress and not by
this committee and not by this Senator. There is a message
here. And I do not want to sacrifice the readiness of any of
the services and our ability to protect ourselves and react to
something that is really in the interest of national security.
That is a decision that is being made by this
administration and not by this Senator or, I think, this
committee.
Hardening bases in Bosnia
General Shelton, I notice in this supplemental that there
has been--I think the figure is--around $42 million or $47
million to harden the bases in Bosnia. Is that correct?
General Shelton. Senator, to the best of my knowledge, that
is an approximate amount. I do not have the exact figure.
Senator Burns. OK. I do not know whether it is $42 million
or $47 million. Can you tell me what we mean by hardening the
bases, that term?
General Shelton. That is to continue to improve on the
positions in terms of being able to protect the troops that are
located inside the base itself, which will allow us to use more
of the troops to carry out the missions the SFOR commander has,
rather than standing guard and things of this type. That will
allow him to have more troops at his disposal, rather than
being contained to one specific point.
Senator Burns. Well, to me, this takes on an appearance of
permanency. And I think that is what sort of gets the attention
and our concerns here in Congress.
General Shelton. Senator, any time that we stay in a place
for 1 day or 1 year or 2 years, the idea is to continue to
improve the force protection, to improve the quality of life of
the troops that have to live there, et cetera. And that is all
part of the continuation, not designed to build permanent
installations.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all that I
have. I just wanted to make that point, that I do not want to
sacrifice the readiness and the skills and the operation and
maintenance of the main force of this country to further what
some would think is a flawed policy.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. Do you want to use the balance of this
time now, Mr. Secretary, to answer Senator Hollings?
Secretary Cohen. I will wait, Mr. Chairman. I know you have
a vote coming up at 11 o'clock.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Domenici.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It is nice to be with you, Secretary Cohen. We have missed
connecting on the phone three or four times. And to the extent
that part of that is my problem, I apologize.
General, it is wonderful to be with you. And I am glad we
had an opportunity to sit at some of the meetings that preceded
this.
I tried for this morning's meeting, Senator Byrd, to see if
I could recap how much money we have spent in Bosnia and thus
far in Iraq. And I will recap it for you quickly. I will tell
you my dollar number for this is $16.1 billion. And it comes
about in the following way.
The total Department of Defense costs for Bosnia since the
initial United States deployment in 1995 up to June 1998 has
been $6.4 billion. In addition, under function 150, which has
to do with foreign affairs, nation-building so as to speak, we
have spent $1.3 billion. The grand total for Bosnia to the end
of 1999, therefore, is $10.1 billion.
Chairman Stevens. 1998 or 1999?
Senator Domenici. We are now assuming that their 1999
budget is paid for. And so I am telling you, based on their
budget submitted, what they want, we will have spent, by the
1999 appropriation bill, $10.1 billion, according to the GAO.
And I believe that is a correct number.
Now, for Iraq, since the end of the war in February 1991--
and that is a long ways back; that is not the current crisis
alone--but the total cost to the United States up to 1998 for
deployments to the U.N. peacekeeping in the Persian Gulf amount
to $3.9 billion. That is according to the Congressional
Research Service's most current estimate.
With the supplemental that we are being asked to do, that
you have requested, and I think properly, that we wait on, for
1999, it will be $5.3 billion, over and above the ordinary
costs of our military. So you add them up--and I had left out
actually, so I will correct it--I had left out $700 million for
1997 in Iraq--so I will tell you the sum total is $16.1 billion
for both of those operations of the United States Government
that would not have normally been in a defense budget. And I
can take that $1.3 billion out if you would like, for nation-
building, because that is not in the Defense budget.
But that is a rather large amount of money that we would
have not have spent. And I tell you, I am not sure that any of
us understand the consequences of spending that and not having
been appropriately budgeted for it in the ordinary budgets. And
that leads to some very, very interesting ramifications with
reference to preparedness. And I am not a preparedness expert,
but I am beginning to understand that you just cannot take
money out of preparedness and say, we are just taking it out
for 6 months and then we will put it back. You cannot do that
without having a very consequential negative effect on
preparedness.
Chairman Stevens. Do you want to yield just a second?
Senator Domenici. Sure.
Chairman Stevens. You are talking about 10 destroyers and
48 C-17's that we did not build.
Senator Domenici. All right.
Now, what I would like to submit to them, and I would ask
that they give us this before we vote on the 1998 supplemental,
I would like to know how many training operations or joint
exercises will have been canceled in the military service
because of not having the money that we thought we would have.
I would like to know the impact on lower mission capable rates
for the Air Force and the Navy aircraft that is lowering their
mission capability, lowering pilot retention, lowering mechanic
retention, lowering mounted infantry retention, lowering spare
part stocks, and raising cannibalization rates.
And I think they might be able to supply us with that, Mr.
Chairman, in short order. And I will submit the list to both of
you as I read them.
[The information follows:]
Impact on training operations.--As one would expect, the impact on
training operations and Joint exercises of not receiving a supplemental
varies by service. The Army would be forced to absorb a large shortfall
in the current O&M account and would be forced to cancel most training
and maintenance starting in June. We would expect to see Army readiness
begin to decline, with the potential of Army Divisions reporting C-3 by
end of fiscal year. The Army does not consider the absorption of the
contingency shortfall as a viable option.
The Air Force will have to cease all peacetime flying training in
the 4th quarter of fiscal year in order to able to support ongoing
operations such as Southern/Northern Watch, Bosnia, and Counterdrug
operations. We could expect to see the combat flying squadrons not
involved in these operations to report C-4 readiness by the end of the
fiscal year. Furthermore, all pilot training will cease.
The Maritime Services do not plan to cancel any scheduled training
operations or Joint Exercises. The Navy would offset the costs to
sustain deployed force readiness by requesting money intended for 4th
quarter ship depot and real property maintenance activities. If
supplemental funding was not available, we would expect these actions
to begin by the end of 3d quarter to preclude degradation to readiness.
The Marine Corps expects offsets to come from deferred maintenance and
reductions in family housing.
The relationship between current contingency operations and: Lower
mission capable rates for Air Force and Navy Aircraft; lower spare
parts stocks; higher ``cannibalization'' rates?; lower pilot retention;
lower mechanic retention; and lower mounted infantry retention.
Contingency operations can be thought of effecting both people and
equipment. The impacts of these operations on people can be
problematic. For example, certain military units and specialists have
had a pronounced increase in the number of deployments away from their
home station. This increased personnel tempo, or PERSTEMPO, has been a
cause of concern, affecting quality of life and, possibly the retention
of our military personnel.
In terms of retention, the results appear mixed. The Air Force
``exit surveys'' of pilots and aircraft mechanics leaving the force
often cite PERSTEMPO as one reason for their decision. On the other
hand, Army re-enlistments for units deployed to Bosnia are better than
the Army average. The Department is concerned with any negative effect
and has taken considerable steps to mitigate any negative impact of
increased PERSTEMPO.
To that end, we are carefully managing those units, platforms, or
occupational specialties that are in the most demand for deployment via
our Global Military Force Policy (GMFP). This system monitors the
capacity constraints, and when these constraints are exceeded,
priorities are established and conflicting demands resolved. To reduce
deployment workload, we cut the number of man hours associated with
Joint Exercises by 15 percent and encouraged Commanders at all levels
to reduce tempo burdens where possible. Finally, we have asked the
Services to establish PERSTEMPO metrics to monitor the levels of
employment and report these trends to Senior Readiness Oversight
Council. This allows us to measure over time the changes in the demand
for specific units and platforms.
In terms of equipment, the major impact of contingency operations
occurs if they displace funding for maintenance, spare parts, and
related items. For this reason, we urge Congress to approve passage of
the emergency supplemental without offsets. We have outlined below some
of the potential implications to readiness if DOD is directed to offset
the costs of the supplemental.
potential readiness implications
Army
Eliminating collective training above the platoon level, including
canceling Combat Training Center rotations and Joint Exercises (would
decrease Army Division Training ratings to T-3).
Lowering equipment maintenance readiness standards and deferring
depot maintenance.
Deferring facility/real property maintenance.
Drawing-down spare parts stock (without replacement).
Air Force
Combat flying squadrons not engaged in ongoing operations will be
C-4 by end of fiscal year.
Aircraft mission capability rates will decline 2 to 3 percent by
end of fiscal year.
Limited parts inventories will be further-depleted which could lead
to higher cannibalization rates.
Combat flying squadrons not engaged in ongoing operations will be
C-4 by end of fiscal year.
Pilot training will cease, further aggravating pilot shortage, with
limited ability to make up shortfalls due to capacity limitations.
Recovery from unfunded contingency costs could take 2 to 3 years
and require increased O&M funding.
Navy
Delay Maintenance ``availabilities'' on approximately 22 ships.
Reduce spare parts funding for non-deployed units. Fleets would
defer stock replenishment until sufficient funds available. Would
reduce non-deployed aircraft MC/FMC rates 5 to 10 percent.
Restructure/stretch modernization programs placing QDR force
structure levels at risk.
Marines
Defer 1st through 4th echelon maintenance.
Defer MRP; repair only critical damage.
Adjust O&M accounts between MARFOR's to offset/balance.
Reductions in family housing and MilCon accounts.
Senator Domenici. I am not here to talk as if I have a
course of conduct for the United States in the Middle East or
in Bosnia that is different from what is going on. But I will
say that I frankly think, in both instances, both with
reference to Iraq in the last few years and with reference to
Bosnia, that it has been pretty difficult for the United States
Congress to be a real partner and a player. Because the
President of the United States has not performed in a
forthright manner with reference to the Congress.
I mean, he knew when he told us we were going to be there
for a given period of time that that was not going to be the
case. I do not think there is any question about that. And yet
he took it to the American people, he campaigned on it and all
kinds of things. And it gets kind of tiresome up here when that
happens over and over again.
In Iraq, we have been touting our offensive capabilities
and what we are going to do as a great superpower for far too
long. My own opinion is that the President of the United States
threatened too long and too many times, and the credibility of
that threat has diminished greatly.
I yield back. I am sorry I took over my time. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
May I request that my opening statement be made part of the
record.
Chairman Stevens. Yes; that will be done for any Senator
who wishes to submit their opening statement.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared statement of Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Mr. Chairman I want to begin by commending you for holding this
hearing today. On Wednesday of this week, the President submitted his
request for supplemental appropriations for the Defense Department.
That request of $2.02 billion is critical to ensure that military
readiness and support for our military families are not curtailed to
pay for the costs of responding to the threats in the Middle East or
for extending our presence to preserve peace in Bosnia.
In the past, Congress has often required DOD to absorb the costs of
unanticipated contingencies to keep the deficit in check. As defense
spending has been reduced over the years, DOD's ability to absorb such
costs has diminished. Were we to require that today, we might break the
force.
I commend Secretary Cohen and our military leaders, most notably,
General Shelton, for prevailing upon the administration and insisting
that this request be on top of your existing funding.
In recent months, there have been numerous reports bubbling up from
the field that readiness is teetering on the edge. Spare parts
shortages, inability to meet operating goals in flying, steaming, and
other training, all of these show that DOD cannot be forced to absorb
large costs for unexpected operations in both Southern Europe and the
Middle East.
Our military leaders are well aware of the current situation and
fully support the addition of funding to sustain these operations.
It is my belief that we must respect their military judgment and
approve these emergency requests.
Some of my colleagues and many in the audience may not be aware
that this emergency procedure was agreed to in the Balanced Budget Act
of 1990 to ensure that ongoing Government programs were not sacrificed
to pay for emergencies. And, that it was our colleague Senator Byrd who
helped lead the fight to ensure that this type of authority was
enacted. I for one can think of no better reason to use this emergency
designation than to allow for the protection of military readiness and
the preservation of the quality of life for our military families.
Mr. Chairman, again I thank you for calling this hearing, and I
look forward to the statements and responses of our witnesses.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Barbara Boxer
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the Defense
Department's fiscal year 1998 supplemental budget request. It is an
honor to have the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as our distinguished guests this morning.
This supplemental aims to meet the emergency requirements of our
build-up in the Persian Gulf, the extension of the military mission in
Bosnia and natural disasters, including those associated with El Nino.
I am very pleased that the Department of Defense has included
$172.8 million for natural disasters--$50 million of which will go
toward El Nino related disasters. I'm sure that everyone is aware that
California has suffered tremendously due to this unusual weather
phenomenon.
I am also looking forward to the opportunity to hear from Secretary
Cohen and General Shelton on the U.S. military role in both Bosnia and
Iraq. The United States has major national interests in these regions
of the world, and it is essential that U.S. policies promote stability
and work toward a lasting peace.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Larry E. Craig
I thank the Chairman for holding this very important hearing
regarding the Supplemental Appropriations request to support our
current missions in Bosnia and the Gulf. I would also like to thank in
advance our distinguished witnesses, Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Hugh Shelton.
As you might recall, I opposed the deployment of U.S. troops to
Bosnia. I voted, along with twenty-one other Senators, to stop funding
for the deployment of troops to the region. There is no question that
the humanitarian situation in the area has been tragic. However, I
opposed it because I had grave reservations about putting U.S. troops
in harm's way without a clear goal or mission--not to mentioned
legitimate questions about whether the mission was within U.S. national
and security interests. Ironically, it appears as though we are asking
those same questions today.
The Administration continues to emphasize the need for benchmarks,
rather than deadlines when considering prospects for U.S. troop
withdrawal. However, there doesn't seem to be a quick-fix solution to
the deep rooted problems plaguing that region, and security experts on
both sides of this issue seem to believe that--like it or not--NATO is
committed to the region for the long haul. In fact, a statement issued
February 20th by NATO's ruling North Atlantic Council said, ``Rather
than focusing on a specific end date, the aim is to achieve an end
state of a secure environment adequate for the consolidation of the
peace without further need for a NATO-led military force''. It is more
disconcerting when an expert at the U.S. Defense University wrote that
NATO's role in Bosnia ``is essentially permanent--20 years or more.''
Although I realize that many will refute that specific claim, I think
we can all agree that this mission has lasted much longer than
promised.
We have spent nearly $8 billion in support of ``peacekeeping'' in
Bosnia, well beyond the $2 billion originally estimated. While the
discrepancy between the estimated amount and the actual cost speaks for
itself, the related issue of the mission's impact on U.S. troop
readiness must be examined. Since 1989, manpower has been cut by nearly
one-third, yet the number of missions has quadrupled. I increasingly
hear reports about a heavily burdened military system--planes lacking
replacement parts, low morale, inability to retain pilots, and
difficulties recruiting. I know that the distinguished Senator from
Texas, Ms. Hutchison, has been raising this issue for sometime, and I
share her concern that these problems could jeopardize our ability to
defend our interests in other parts of the world.
Now that we have stepped back from the brink of imminent conflict
with Iraq, it is essential that this Administration takes a serious
look at a long-term policy toward Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Since
January 13th, we have amassed a huge force in the Gulf: twenty ships,
including two aircraft carriers, along with 30,000 troops and more than
160 combat aircraft. Because few believe the U.S. has permanently
averted conflict with Hussein, much of this force may remain in the
Gulf for some time. What concerns me is that if Hussein thwarts arms
inspector efforts again, how will the U.S. respond, especially if we
face the same luke warm response from our ``allies'' in the Gulf and
other parts of the world next time?
During the Gulf War, the United States mounted its multinational
coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait. We had military and logistical
support from twenty-seven other nations, including the Arab League.
This time, only Kuwait explicitly supported the use of force. On the
other hand, the United Arab Emirates denounced the military build up.
Saudi Arabia would not allow the U.S. to attack from Saudi soil or air
space. France, Russia, and China stonewalled attempts to gain consensus
from the Security Council and opposed military action. As Brent
Scowcroft recently wrote, ``Going it alone may sound great in theory,
but in the real world of large-scale, complex military operations, even
superpowers need help.'' Although there is world wide consensus that
Iraq must comply with all applicable U.N. resolutions, international
attitudes differ sharply on how to force Iraq to comply with
eliminating their weapons of mass destruction programs. President
Clinton must consolidate support, in case Saddam Hussein tests U.S.
resolve again.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, I have deep reservations about our continued
presence in Bosnia and am concerned that the Administration's call for
``benchmarks'' as a precursor for U.S. withdrawal, is a justification
to keep our men and women in uniform there indefinitely. I don't find
that policy acceptable. In regards to Iraq, the Administration must
forge a long-term policy to ameliorate the very dangerous threats
resulting from Saddam Hussein. That policy can't come soon enough.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this very important
hearing. Secretary Cohen, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Mr.
Shelton, thank you.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Lauch Faircloth
Mr. Chairman, I am troubled by this request. Once again, our
President is asking us to pour more money and troops into the
multinational effort to obtain peace in the former Yugoslavia. He asked
us to support an implementation effort that he told us would be
completed in 1996. Then, after he was re-elected, he told us that the
troops would need to stay in Bosnia through June 1998. Now, as the
second deadline is looming, the President again asks for more money,
more troops, and more time. There is no end in sight and no exit
strategy.
Mr. Chairman, no decision is made in a vacuum. Other national
defense priorities are being neglected as long as we stay in Bosnia.
Our military infrastructure is crumbling, and our troops are working at
an operational tempo that is literally driving them out of the service
at an alarming rate. Meanwhile, the Bosnia spigot is open. If we are
going to appropriate over two billion dollars, I know of many better
uses for it than this operation.
Regarding the Iraqi situation, we were nearly engaged in an
operation there. Frankly, though, given the state of today's defense, I
am not sure we could re-fight Desert Storm.
Mr. Chairman, because the Bosnian effort lacks a clear objective,
the only appropriation that we should approve for it is the amount
needed to immediately wind it down and bring our troops home by the
already once-extended deadline of June. As for Iraq, I will support
spending for a properly planned response to violations of the
inspection commitments that Iraq made after Desert Storm.
Fixed end date versus open-ended
Senator Inouye. Mr. Secretary, General Shelton, the
President's Bosnia certification letter to Congress states, and
I quote: ``Although I do not propose a fixed end date for this
presence, it is by no means open-ended.''
From a military perspective, do you believe it is better to
provide an end date for your operation or leave it unsaid?
General Shelton. Senator, from my perspective, it is better
to leave an open-end date on any operation. Because I think
when you put an end date on it, you play right into the hands
of those that are opposing whatever it is you are attempting to
accomplish, whatever the mission is, be it a combat mission or
a peacetime engagement mission.
Senator Inouye. So it just does not make sense to have an
end date at this time?
General Shelton. From my perspective, from the military, it
does not make sense to have an end date. It does make sense to
have a strategy, to have a means by which you plan to carry out
the task, to have some phases in that operation that you know
internally but that you do not publish or have imposed on you
as an end date, which then allows them to slow-roll you or to
do things to kind of look like they are playing along, just to
get you out of there and then it goes down again.
If you want to really make progress, if you want to achieve
the objectives, you are better off if it appears that you have
got an open-ended manner in which to achieve it even though you
may have internally imposed milestones and objectives at which
time you would like to move the force out.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Secretary, do you agree with that
response?
Secretary Cohen. I do.
Achieving milestones in Bosnia
Senator Inouye. In the President's report, he cites great
successes in just about every criteria. While the report claims
much success in moving toward these goals, there is no
timetable as to when they will be achieved. How does one define
how to measure whether the achievement has been successful.
Secretary Cohen. I think you have to look at the record
itself. For example, one of the objectives is to have free
elections in Bosnia. We are having free elections in Bosnia.
One of the objectives is to start to get the resettlement of
refugees. Refugees are starting to flow back into the region.
Another objective is to prosecute the war criminals. There
have been almost one-third of those who have been publicly
indicted who are now before The Hague. So you can, in fact,
point to a number of successes in the objectives and see what
is taking place on the ground itself.
There has been a change in momentum. We now have a new
leader, for example, in the Republic of Srbska. And that leader
is, in fact, pushing for changes in that country. And those are
taking place. And sometimes you have to build up a momentum.
And as you build that momentum, you see an acceleration of the
kinds of things, of achievements. I think that is taking place
now.
Could it go the other way? The answer is yes. Senator Byrd
talked about events taking place in that region today which
could spread all over southeastern Europe.
But right now, the trend is very positive. The trend lines
are in our favor. We have had General Clark, who has been
helpful in putting together a special unit, as such, that will
serve as a buffer between the armed forces and the police
forces which are being trained by the IPTF. So the trend lines
are quite favorable. They could be reversed, but right now they
are positive.
Senator Inouye. If the trend line proceeds as you have
described it, when do you think we will have a successful
certification report?
Secretary Cohen. I cannot tell you that. That is going to
be up to the President to decide, in consultations with
Congress. As I have indicated before, there can be no open-
ended commitment as long as Congress is the one that really
controls the purse strings and says, we are not going to pay
for this; we are going to say no more funds, period. Then,
under those circumstances, it comes to an end, whether any
administration likes it or not.
Ceasefire in Bosnia
Senator Inouye. General Shelton, there is a ceasefire in
effect at this moment. When would you consider this ceasefire
to be permanent?
General Shelton. Senator, that is a hard question to
answer. In terms of certainly right now, it appears that the
ceasefire has been holding for quite a period of time. I do not
know what the technicalities are for when you say we have
transitioned to a permanent ceasefire, from a legal standpoint.
But I would also say that a part of that agreement, to add
on to what Secretary Cohen said, is that every 6 months, we
will review our accomplishments laid out in the milestones that
we are attempting to achieve in Bosnia right now, reassess
where we are, see if, in fact, we are getting to a point that
we could even further reduce our force. And that is all part of
the milestones that have been laid out for us to go with.
Pilot retention and readiness
Senator Inouye. One of the concerns that we requested the
administration to respond to was the matter of morale,
effectiveness, and retention. And the report indicates that
morale is high. And yet we have heard reports from chiefs,
telling us that something is wrong. For example, pilots are
leaving at unprecedented numbers. How do you explain this?
Secretary Cohen. Well, I will defer to the chairman in a
moment, but I wanted to come back to this point. Because there
was something in Senator Domenici's request which I thought was
necessary to require us to explain what the impact would have
been had we had $16.1 billion for other items. But he
mentioned, please show us what the impact would have been upon
pilot retention.
In factoring to that equation, you have to say, can we
exclude hiring practices on the part of the private sector?
Because that has been a major problem as far as how does the
Air Force deal with a private commercial sector that is hiring
them at rates that are unprecedented, at levels of compensation
that cannot be matched by the military? And so there are a
number of factors involved as far as pilots are concerned.
There are also some readiness problems and retention
problems with units that we call low-density/high demand. They
have fewer of them, but they are in greater demand. There is a
new management system that has been instituted by the chiefs.
And they are now trying to have a better management control on
those forces that are in high demand, that we track them, that
we try to find alternatives to sending them on continuous
rotations.
So we do have a management problem which is now being
addressed. But it is a very complicated issue, and it is not
confined to just one area.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Chairman Stevens. Thank you.
For the information of the Senators, I am informed there is
just one vote now. We tried to have it postponed, but it will
commence at 11 o'clock. The next Senator is Senator Cochran and
then Senator Bumpers, and then Senators Dorgan and Leahy. I
would suggest that those who could, go over and vote and then
come back. We might be able to meet the requests of the
witnesses who want to leave here right after 11:30.
Senator Bumpers. Why don't we come back after the vote.
Chairman Stevens. There was an objection, from your side as
a matter of fact, to that, because someone is scheduled to
leave at noon.
Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
On the subject at hand, the request that has been submitted
by the administration is in two parts, as the witnesses have
pointed out. And the first is the one that is really the
subject of this hearing this morning. And that is the
supplemental request, not the budget amendment for fiscal year
1999. And that includes Bosnia and Southwest Asia, a total of
about $1.8 billion.
As I see it, the question before our committee is whether
we are going to approve this request or try to modify it in
some way, or to reflect concerns with the administration's
policies by refusing to vote for it. I worry that those
alternatives are really going to undermine the ability of the
country to continue to maintain a military that can protect our
national security interests in this very dangerous world that
we find ourselves in right now. And that is the reality.
And the reality is, if we do not approve this supplemental
budget request as an emergency, as requested by the
administration, we are going to hurt those who are in the
military, who are obligated to continue to serve. Because we
are going to reduce their training. We are going to cut back on
the housing allowances that are available. We are going to
threaten their quality of life, and exacerbate the pilot
retention problems and the other difficulties that the military
is facing right now, with a shortage of funds to do the things
that are necessary to help attract career service from young
men and women that we need today.
This was brought home to us in the Subcommittee on Defense
appropriations, when we reviewed the budget request for the Air
Force for the next fiscal year. Even though we have the pilot
retention problem, and some of that has to do with the quality
of life--it is not all just money--housing requests are down
for this next fiscal year compared to the current year, other
military construction accounts that have to do with quality of
life are down. The request is down.
We have got to do something about the management of this
whole situation. We have got to control those things that we
can control. Maybe we cannot control the level of pay for
pilots, although the chairman made a very persuasive argument
in our hearing on the Air Force budget that we need to look at
that, and maybe increase the pay for pilots. We need to think
about that--a way to do it. We already have a bonus system now,
but we need to explore other options.
So the point I am trying to make is, what is the impact of
a decision by this committee to reject, if we reject the
President's proposal, if we do not go along with it? I do not
think we have any choice. And we can debate the policy. We can
talk about Saddam Hussein. We can talk about the Bosnia war
criminal situation and all that. And all of those are very
important issues. But we are not going to settle them on this
supplemental appropriations bill.
What we would do, if we do not approve the President's
request, is undermine the capacity of this country to continue
to defend itself, because we are going to weaken the military
if we do not. Because these funds are going to be spent, and
they will have to come out of other accounts that are already
down in the projected budget for next year--already down. Under
the President's budget request, he is requesting less for
housing, less for military construction; less for the Guard and
Reserve, which are being called upon now to train more, to be
ready to deploy more, spending more time overseas, away from
their homes. You have got people now rethinking their
obligations who are in the Guard and Reserve because of these
very same problems.
So this administration has been tough on the military. They
can continue to cut the programs that would help retain and
attract high-quality service for our military, and then expect
that it is all going to get better just by itself. And they are
making it worse.
I am not talking about the two witnesses here, but the
policymakers at the White House are making this problem worse,
I think. We are left with a situation where I think we have to
support the budget request, and that is the way I am going to
vote. I hope a majority of this committee will do so, and that
the Senate will. And we will try to work our way through the
conference with the House and get this money into the hands of
the Department of Defense so you can do what you need to do to
deal with these problems in Southwest Asia and in Bosnia,
fulfill our responsibilities that the President has undertaken,
whether they are right or wrong, so we will not hurt the
military in the future and jeopardize the security of the
country in the process.
A strong letter follows, I guess.
What is your reaction to that?
Oh, Senator Dorgan, you are here.
Chairman Stevens. Well, you have still got a couple of
minutes.
Senator Cochran. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I thought you
had gone to vote.
Chairman Stevens. What is your reaction?
Damage from failure to pass supplemental
Secretary Cohen. I agree with Senator Cochran that a
failure to pass this supplemental will result in something that
I would describe as calamitous, in terms of its impact upon the
military. The chairman has outlined it in his oral
presentation, I have it in my written presentation, what the
consequences would be for a failure to have these additional
funds.
It would impact upon certainly housing. It would impact
upon depot repair work. It would impact upon hiring and
recruitment. It would have a reduction in training. And that
means a reduction in readiness. It would have very serious
consequences to the military were we not to get the
supplemental. So I agree with you that we need it.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Dorgan.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will be brief. You both have tough jobs. And this
morning's hearing reflects, once again, that there is a great
deal of impatience and concern about some of these issues. I
think Senator Cochran and Senator Domenici, and I think Senator
Stevens, alluded to this issue. They have raised important
questions. And I guess I would like to hear a response.
What about readiness? What about the issue of taking for
the purpose of these missions, weakening the structure? I mean,
I think you will want to respond to that and should respond to
that. Let me say I agree with them that we will, I am sure,
approve this supplemental request.
And, finally, before you respond to the questions of
readiness and strength, let me also say that Senator Specter
talked of a resolution which I am a cosponsor of, calling for
the formation of an international tribunal on Iraq. I noticed
in a newspaper recently, I think in the last week, a suggestion
that Saddam Hussein be considered for the Nobel Peace Prize.
That suggestion would not be made of a convicted war criminal.
He should have probably been convicted of war crimes 6 years
ago. Certainly we ought to ask the United Nations to convene an
international tribunal, present the world with the evidence,
indict, and try--in absentia if necessary.
I think that is an important recommendation and I hope the
administration will consider that and discuss it. We certainly
will be doing that in Congress with the resolution Senator
Specter has offered.
Now, I wonder if you might respond to the question of, does
this money, which I think we will approve, does it lead to
questions about taking money from readiness and other accounts
that inevitably weaken our military?
Balanced budget pressure
Secretary Cohen. If we do not have the funding, it will
certainly have an impact on readiness. And that is a given.
I would like to make just a quick response to Senator
Cochran's comments and your own. We also live in a balanced
budget environment. This body, along with the other, has gone
along with passing a balanced budget amendment, which does, in
fact, present some unique challenges for the future, in terms
of the allocation of defense versus domestic spending. This
year you have walls that have been set up between defense and
nondefense matters. Next year the wall comes down.
It will be interesting to me to see whether there can be
support for a greater allocation of resources coming from the
domestic programs going into defense, or whether the reverse
will be true. But, nonetheless, we had to at least try to
anticipate what the level of funding would be for the
foreseeable future.
I assumed, in a balanced budget environment, we were going
to plan on having roughly the same amount, plus inflation, for
the foreseeable future. Given those parameters, how do we
allocate money for readiness versus modernization and
investment?
Balancing defense needs
As you look at the QDR, we tried to come up with a
responsible balance. Sometimes we have to cut back on readiness
in order to achieve the kind of savings that would be necessary
to put into investment. We have to achieve overhead reductions.
We have not been successful in persuading the Congress yet that
we have got too much overhead and too much infrastructure to
support the forces structure. But those are the kinds of things
that we are faced with.
The chairman can give you a recitation in terms of what the
impact has been on readiness. We have got some shortfalls. We
are now trying to address them. But there never will be a point
in our history where we can say everything is in perfect
balance, we have got the money necessary to pay for
compensation, we have got the money necessary for full
readiness across the board, plus we have what we need for
investment. It is always a balance. Sometimes we will be higher
on investment, sometimes higher on readiness. But it is a
management problem that we are trying to deal with.
I do not want to take the chairman's time, but he can tell
you how we are proposing to deal with the readiness issues
which have surfaced in recent months.
Senator Domenici. Is this weakening the military, this
diversion of money?
General Shelton. Senator Dorgan, let me address that if I
could. And I underscore everything that the Secretary said. But
when we went into the QDR, one of the things that each of the
service chiefs did in the process of trying to see how he could
continue to manage within the balanced budget amendment and, at
the same time, we were drawing down the force, there was an
understanding that we would, first of all, take advantage of a
revolution in business affairs to gain greater efficiencies,
that we would be able to get rid of some of the excess
capacities that we have, and that we would have to take a
greater risk in the area of readiness. All of that had to be
very carefully balanced in the process.
We started down that particular road, and are able to
balance those things right now. In the out-years, if we are not
able to achieve the savings through efficiencies or through
eliminating excess capacities, then we have got some problems
on the horizon as we try to continue to modernize. And that is
critical for modernization.
By basically having the modernization accounts fenced and
trying not to have to cut into those in order to shore up the
readiness accounts, by having these unforeseen requirements
that we are asking this nonoffset supplemental for, it means
that you have no place to go, really, except into your
discretionary funds. And as an example, this particular
supplemental that we are asking for would take out about 80
percent of the Army's discretionary funds in the fourth
quarter.
Possible damage to readiness
I can give you some specific examples of direct impacts on
readiness in order to move forward, or not to get the
supplemental. We would have to cancel the combat training
center rotations in the Army. That is their premier training
event, the one that keeps the forces trained and ready at the
battalion and brigade level. The Army would cancel their
participation in JCS exercises. Their home station training
would be reduced to individual-and platoon-level. That is about
a 30-man unit--level of training. So you lose the combined arms
aspect, which is critical to maintaining a trained and ready
army.
In the Air Force, you have to severely curtail your
peacetime flying training. And, of course, as a result of that,
you get air crew readiness degradation. And, of course, these
great pilots that we have in the Air Force love to fly. They
want to be trained and ready. And when they see they are not
getting to fly, then that adds to our pilot retention problem.
Because the commercial airlines now are hiring at unprecedented
rates. And they would allow them to fly. And that,
consequently, is another draw on the pilot shortage that we
already are experiencing.
They would have to defer some depot-level maintenance. And
that means, in essence, that some of the aircraft would be
grounded as a result of that. And then they would have to park
all their nonmission-essential vehicles. These are some of the
things that our services have looked at.
The Navy and Marine Corps would defer depot maintenance,
and then they would have to restructure and stretch out their
modernization program--again, something we have tried to stay
away from in order to ensure that we continue to be
technologically ahead of any potential adversary.
Those are just some specific examples, but it is a rather
bleak picture, without the supplemental, for readiness in the
third and fourth quarter.
Senator Domenici. Thank you.
Chairman Stevens. Gentlemen, there is a $50 million request
here for drawdown authority. And I have been told that that may
be used to transport military forces from other nations to the
gulf region. Is that what that is for?
Secretary Cohen. The answer is yes.
Chairman Stevens. And just to make sure, this is an
emergency supplemental with money for military personnel, are
those personnel costs associated exclusively with the overseas
contingency operations?
Secretary Cohen. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. With regard to the costs, when Deputy
Secretary Hamre was here before us earlier, he said that the
Department had been compelled to borrow from the fourth quarter
training, base operations, maintenance, and quality-of-life
funds already. Will passage of this supplemental request
restore those funds that have already been taken from the
fourth quarter for any functions of the Department?
Secretary Cohen. The answer is yes.
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
Milestones leading to troop reductions
Chairman Stevens. You mentioned, Mr. Secretary, some
specific milestones. I think they may be in your statement.
What events or milestones must we reach before the U.S.
presence in the gulf would be reduced?
Secretary Cohen. Well, we have some key military tasks
which I believe I have outlined, but let me just take a moment
to talk about them. Maintaining the deterrence of renewed
hostilities, we are doing that today. We are preventing the
removal of heavy air defense weapons from cantonments. I can go
down the list of all of the objectives.
We are achieving those military objectives. We are also
seeking the creation of an independent judiciary. We are
seeking to train local police forces so they can be competent
and professional. We are trying to persuade our European
friends to put more money into the IPTF. We think we are making
some progress there.
One of the major, I think, accomplishments has been the
efforts on the part of Bob Gelbard and also on the part of
General Clark, and other members of the administration, to
persuade our European friends--and including myself, speaking
to the NATO members--to help form a special unit that would be
a buffer between our forces and the local police, until such
time as they become trained and competent.
We are looking to see whether or not we can have greater
economic progress undertaken so that these democratic
institutions can take deeper root. There is no one fixed date
in which we could say, now it has been complete. It is an
ongoing process. And as we see this evolving, again, it looks
very positive.
Could it go the other way? My answer is yes. It can go the
other way more quickly if we do not maintain a presence there.
I think that that would assure a reversal of the----
Chairman Stevens. I see the vice chairman is here.
Senator Inouye, would you recognize members as they come in
for 5 minutes, and Senator Bumpers first?
Senator Inouye [presiding]. Sure.
Senator Bumpers.
Senator Bumpers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, first of all, let me compliment you on what
I thought was an excellent opening statement. And, frankly, all
of your answers have demonstrated a sensitivity and a depth of
understanding of the issues that gives me great comfort. I
think you are doing a fine job.
And, second, I would say we have another tinderbox
developing there. About 4 years ago, Senator Warner, Senator
Nunn, and a group of us went to Europe and we visited with the
president of Macedonia, who predicted and demonstrated a really
great fear of precisely what is now developing. And that is
that Albanian refugees are going to come across the border into
Macedonia, and that that has the potential of involving Greece
and other countries in the region.
I thought General Shelton's answers to Senator Hollings was
excellent. When you start setting a date for getting out, you
just reveal your hand and you help defeat your very purpose of
being there. It seems to me that things are very tentative and
difficult in Bosnia right now, but they are getting better
every day. So I do not want to put a date on it, and I am going
to continue to support our troops there, as long as people who
are more knowledgeable than I am think we ought to be there.
But, as I say, the cost of the whole thing has the
potential for being a bigger nightmare to us than perhaps
Bosnia was. The President seems to be on top of that.
Allocation of DOD inflation savings
Mr. Secretary, I have a question about this request for the
supplemental. And it goes to this point. The administration has
granted the Defense Department a $21 billion windfall over 5
years because inflation was lower than expected. And that
windfall translates into $796 million for this year, 1998. And
my question is, where is that money? Can you spend it without
further congressional approval? And, third, why not use that at
least to take care of roughly 50 percent of this request?
Secretary Cohen. If I could, Senator Bumpers, with respect
to the so-called windfall, the moneys that have been allocated
to the Defense Department as a result of allowing for the
inflation costs really have been allocated into a number of
accounts--most specifically the modernization accounts.
One problem that always occurred when I was sitting on the
other side of this table and the Pentagon would come up to
testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General
Shali would point to a chart, saying, we hope to get up to
roughly $60 billion on investment, because there has been such
a depreciation since the height of the cold war in our
modernization accounts that unless we reverse it and climb to
$60 billion, we are going to be in deep trouble in the future.
So when I took over as Secretary of Defense and started to
preside over the QDR process, I made a pledge to Congress this
past year. And I said we will hit that $60 billion mark by the
year 2002, and that next year, I will pledge to you, when I
come up to make a presentation, there will be $49 billion
allocated for modernization.
I was a bit shy. I came up, as I recall, at $48.7 billion.
But it was a very significant increase in modernization. So
those dollars which have been allocated to the Defense
Department really have gone into accounts--readiness accounts,
also the modernization accounts. And that is where the money is
being allocated.
Senator Bumpers. Well, Mr. Secretary, let us just take an
example. Let us assume that you had so much money, a couple of
billion dollars, for the F-22, and that a part of the so-called
windfall due to the lowered inflation is in that program. Let
us say $100 million of that is in the F-22 program. Does that
money stay in that program, No. 1? No. 2, can you spend that
money, even though it is in excess of what you had intended to
spend, without congressional authority?
Secretary Cohen. Well, in terms of an F-22 program, by way
of example, the money is not spent out equally in any given
year. And one would take whatever excess there was, as a result
of inflation adjustments or being allowed to keep them, to go
to a variety of accounts. It is not specifically laid out each
year so that we cannot touch the money. It would not
necessarily go into the F-22 program. But there is, I believe,
the authority, once the money comes back, to spend at a certain
level.
If we are going to reprogram, for example, if we are going
to say, OK, we are going to plus-up F-22 or reallocate the
money for F-22 into a helicopter program, we would have to come
back to Congress for reprogramming.
Senator Bumpers. But you have got $2.8 billion of this
allocated in 1999. This is $21 billion over a 5-year period. I
assume that that assumes that inflation will remain at a lower
level than we had anticipated. Is that a fair statement?
Secretary Cohen. That is a fair statement.
Senator Bumpers. In other words, it disappears if inflation
starts back up?
Secretary Cohen. That is right.
Senator Bumpers. And you would use it to take care of
inflationary increases, in case in the year 2000-01, for
example, if inflation starts back up, you will have to use a
part of that $21 billion to take care of that, would you not?
Secretary Cohen. Right. We are talking budgetary numbers
now. And it may not be real, as you have indicated. If
inflation goes up, there is no surplus as such. So we are
really talking about notional numbers at this point that we
would have. So we have to plan, as far as our budgeting is
concerned, that inflation is going to stay where it is or
possibly lower. But we plan where it is. If it goes up higher,
then we no longer have that level of funding available.
I think the Comptroller is sitting behind me, and he can
perhaps give you a better explanation of how that is allocated.
Senator Bumpers. Let me suggest this, Mr. Secretary, that
you provide that to the committee, or just me individually,
because maybe nobody else on the committee is concerned about
it. I am concerned about it because I just thought that is a
place we might pick up $796 million to help offset this.
I must say, I know you probably gave a very lucid answer to
my question. I do not understand it. And my time is up. So I am
going to suggest, if you will, that you send a letter to the
chairman of the committee, and copy the other committee
members, about how the inflation money is going to be spent,
and what role Congress has, if any, in allocating the money.
Secretary Cohen. Of course.
[The information follows:]
As in past years, the Office of Management and Budget
directed the Department of Defense to reprice its Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) based on revised inflation rates. For
fiscal year 1998, the increased buying power that came from
reduced inflation in the investment accounts is outweighed by
increased costs in the military personnel and operations and
maintenance accounts. For fiscal years 1999 through 2003, the
savings from reduced inflation were applied to fact of life
bills, such as increased costs in the Defense Health program
and a higher than forecasted pay raise, and to protect the
procurement programs. All of these changes are subject to
congressional approval through either the reprogramming or
appropriations process.
Funding for natural disaster repairs
Senator Inouye. Thank you.
Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. There is a small amount of the budget
request that has to do with natural disasters. And I know you
touched on that in your opening statement. Are these funds that
are needed to be spent in this fiscal year? You are not looking
at just adding money for the next fiscal year, but these are
funds that are needed now; is that correct?
Secretary Cohen. That is correct. This is to help repair
the damage that Guam suffered, and also facilities in
California, obviously, with El Nino, and throughout the
country, as far as ice storms are concerned. So these are funds
that--we have $123 million, plus there is a $50 million request
which we would have to come forward in the future to identify
exactly what those costs are, because some of them are quite
soft at this point. We have not seen the full consequence.
But, in Guam, as far as the estimate of what damage has
been done that needs to be repaired, it is fairly solid.
Anticipated funding shortfalls
Senator Cochran. Are there any other programs where there
have been shortfalls that were unanticipated, where we would
have to consider offsets? Is there another supplemental, for
example, that is not emergency in nature, that will be
submitted to this committee?
Secretary Cohen. Well, as I have indicated in my opening
statement, the supplemental being requested for Southwest Asia
really only keeps our forces at their current level, not
counting on any sort of a military action itself. It does not
take into account the deployment costs or the return costs or
the reconstitution costs. And we may have to look at those
costs in 1999.
But if we were to have to exercise that military option,
obviously we would have to come back and say this is a big bill
involved in that.
Senator Cochran. Is that one of the things that the amended
budget request seeks to address--and that is things that you
know really are going to be required to go on and tell the
Congress about them in advance rather than waiting until after
the budget has been submitted and the President claims to have
balanced the budget, submitted the first balanced budget in the
history of--well, in 30 years?
Secretary Cohen. Well, with respect to Southwest Asia, all
we can predict right now is that we intend to maintain the
current level of operations at least until the end of this
fiscal year. It could be less, but it could be longer,
depending upon what takes place over there.
We cannot predict at this point or project what will take
place beginning in October, as far as the level of our
operations are concerned. I would hope that it would be far
less. But there is no way to predict that right now. So that is
the reason why we have confined the Southwest Asia request to
fiscal year 1998.
With respect to Bosnia, we have, in fact, indicated it is
$1.9 billion for Bosnia for fiscal year 1999, which would have
to be an amendment to the budget agreement and a nonoffsetting
allocation of funds of $1.9 billion, because we anticipate that
will be the level that will be required for fiscal year 1999.
Senator Cochran. This may or may not have a budget impact,
but we know that there has been a tremendous investment made at
Aviano, and that missions are flown to Bosnia from Aviano.
Training occurs in that area as well. When this committee
visited that area, it seemed to me that it was part of a trend.
And that is, you are trying to close bases, and you have argued
for closing bases here, having another base closure round. The
Air Force says, even if we do not agree to another base closure
round, they may close bases on their own. That was the
testimony of the acting Secretary of the Air Force.
Secretary Cohen. Well, there is something called the law.
Senator Cochran. Well, that is what we thought, too. But,
anyway, we discussed that a little bit yesterday.
Spending on overseas facilities
But the point is this: It seems that we are making huge
expenditures of funds in military construction dollars at
Aviano, at Prince Sultan in Saudi Arabia. The budget request
contains requests for funding in Korea, where we have 37,000
troops deployed. Huge expenditures are required in those areas.
And unlike in Japan, where our costs are being paid by the host
country, in effect, these costs are being paid by the American
taxpayers.
And my question is, in connection with these budget
amendments which we will consider in due course, to what extent
are these requests reflecting the decision to make these huge
expenditures on our own, unilaterally? Other countries are not
paying the costs in these situations. We do not even have title
to the land in Aviano, yet we are building these facilities
over there, again, trying to make sure that our troops are
taken care of, that they have a place to sleep and have food
that is available, and it is safe and all the rest.
What is your reaction to that? Have we gone too far in that
direction? Shouldn't we be insisting, for example, that our
NATO allies, or our coalition partners in Southwest Asia, pay
those costs?
Secretary Cohen. Well, let me respond, first, by saying
that we are in Southwest Asia to serve our own interests. I
wanted to go back, when the question was raised by Senator
Domenici, he would like a list of all that we have foregone as
a result of expending. And I will take his numbers and assume
that they are accurate--$16.1 billion.
I was going, if I had the chance, to ask the other
question: What are the consequences were we not to have spent
this money? And I go back to 1973, when I can recall the gas
lines that were in this country, and people being shot trying
to get gasoline as a result of the controversy in the gulf in
terms of the interruption of the flow of energy.
So it is not exactly a full comparison if you say, what are
the consequences to us not having spent this money for
readiness and modernization? We also have to look at the other
side of the equation, what would have been the consequences if
we were not to have deployed our forces there? What would be
the consequences if Bosnia did, in fact, disintegrate and
spread throughout Kosovo, down to Albania, involving Greece and
Turkey? What would have been the requirements of military
spending at that time, when there would be a conflagration in
Europe and possibly a shutoff of energy in Southwest Asia? So
those have to be factored in, as well.
Allied contributions
Obviously, I think that our allies should help bear this
particular burden, as far as the gulf is concerned and also in
Bosnia.
In the gulf, the states, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, they
contribute roughly $326 million on an annual basis in the way
of support. Can they do more? I would hope so. I think the
committee going there will be very helpful in making them
understand the pressures that are on our budget, as well.
The British have been helpful in terms of the no-fly zone
in the south. The French have been helpful in that respect, as
well, in helping to patrol the no-fly zone in the south.
We have had support from other countries, as far as their
willingness to help us on this particular crisis.
And so, asking them to do more, many of them are going
through the same sort of downsizing that we have been going
through. And so their resources are somewhat limited.
I have been impressed with the fact that we had 25
countries line up and say, what can we do, and, can we send a
carrier? The Brits have a limited carrier capability, but,
nonetheless, they have two carriers that have been changing and
coming into the gulf.
The Canadians offered a frigate, plus some C-130's.
Australia, New Zealand--there have been a variety of countries
saying, how can we help?
Now, they may be limited in their ability, and we may,
frankly, have a problem in terms of integrating what they would
like to do with our plan. But General Zinni has worked this to
the point where we have a very good plan.
Policy toward Iraq
And I wanted to respond to Senator Hollings, as well. That
this may be a flawed policy. I have never seen a perfect
policy. But the fact is that Saddam Hussein has been deprived
of $110 billion over the past 7 years. He has not been able to
rebuild his military. And when Senator Burns said, gee, this
money, the oil being sold will go for his military, that is
incorrect. The oil for food program is something that we have
supported. And he does not get to use that money. That money
goes for food and humanitarian matters, as controlled by the
United Nations and not by Saddam Hussein.
So there are things that have been done. Again, Senator
Hollings said he does not want to play games with our military.
I do not want to play games with our military. And, frankly,
Chairman Shelton is not going to play games with our military.
And General Zinni is not going to play games.
We all understand what it means to put the troops at risk.
What we have done is put together a plan, should it become
necessary, that I believe would have a very serious impact upon
Saddam Hussein's ability to threaten his neighbors. He might
emerge from that particular type of operation. He will not do
so in a manner that will allow him to pose a threat to his
neighbors for the foreseeable future with these weapons of mass
destruction.
And so I think that we have had a policy. It is not
perfect. But the fact is that he has been deprived of what he
wants to do to rebuild his military. We have got a no-fly zone
in the north, a no-fly zone, no-drive zone in the south. He is
contained. He has got inspectors on the ground. And, by the
way, Scott Ritter is back in Baghdad, over the objection of the
Iraqis. Butler still retains his authority. And Butler will
retain the authority to determine whether and when and under
what circumstances the inspections will be carried out.
So I think there are a lot of positive aspects to this
which is being overlooked.
Providing for forward deployed forces
With respect to this particular issue, Senator Cochran, I
think that you asked a question about based--are we shoring up
those bases overseas? The answer is yes, to some degree. We
also want to provide a quality of life, which you just touched
upon. If we do not have a good quality of life, be it in Aviano
or be it over in Prince Sultan Air Base.
Why are we there? Because we had the Khobar Towers bombing.
We had an inadequate force protection in Saudi Arabia. And so
it was decided, to protect our troops, we needed to go to
Prince Sultan Air Base. We have got a vast improvement in force
protection. We have got quality-of-life improvements. All of
which is essential. And it comes around to retention.
If you have got troops who are out there who are either
exposed to unreasonable risk, their lives are in greater
danger, but, No. 2, if you have got a quality of life which is
unacceptable, they are not going to stay. So all of this is
part of our QDR: shape, respond, prepare.
We are trying to shape the environment by being forward
deployed. To be forward deployed means you have got to have
physical assets and facilities that are acceptable to the men
and women that we put there. And so, in order to shape the
environment, we had to be forward deployed. We have to be able
to respond to all of these contingencies, and also prepare for
the future. That is part of the whole QDR process.
And shaping that environment means being forward deployed.
It means having facilities. It means having good facilities--
the best we can afford. And there is always a tradeoff.
You mentioned the housing. The housing is of concern to me.
There are 375,000 housing units that we have in the Department
of Defense [DOD], two-thirds of which are in need of repair. We
have not got enough money, on a year-by-year basis, to start
repairing those. We have turned to a new private incentive, or
private mechanism, to try to leverage private dollars, almost
on a 4-to-1 basis, that we would have to spend if we were doing
it simply through Government financing.
So we are trying to cope with dealing with housing issues,
involving the private sector into DOD so we can get more bang
for our dollars, so to speak, because of the fact that we have
got a fairly limited amount that we are going to be able to
spend in the foreseeable future. But there is no easy answer to
should we close bases here or do you shut down those facilities
where the action is likely to take place, where we are most at
risk in terms of our national security interests, and do we
provide an adequate quality of life for those men and women who
we ask to serve over there. We try to make the best allocation
that we can under the circumstances.
Chairman Stevens [presiding]. Senator, did you have another
question?
Senator Inouye. Yes, I do.
Additional natural disaster funding
Mr. Secretary, in your request, there is $50 million
assumed for El Nino damages. The Navy and Marines have already
indicated, as of the time of submission, that their costs will
exceed $46 million. The National Weather Service tells us that
El Nino will be around for at least another 2 months. So we
should be anticipating additional damage.
Can you assure us that you will be advising us of
additional costs, if such should come about, before we act upon
this bill?
Secretary Cohen. The total request for natural disasters we
have at $123 million, plus the $50 million that we would have
to come forward and identify what those costs would be for.
Those cost figures are not very hard right now, so we want to
have some flexibility. But we have to come back to you to
demonstrate what those would be used for.
Senator Inouye. In your supplemental for Southwest Asia,
you are assuming that the funding will be for the rest of the
year. What impact would it have on the troops if they had to
stay there on a wartime readiness basis for the rest of the
year? Or are we rotating them?
Rotation plan for troops
General Shelton. We have a rotation plan that we are in the
process of developing right now. But the plan is to rotate. And
the cost for doing some of those rotations are included in the
supplemental request.
Senator Inouye. So we will not insist that they remain
there, for the rest of the time, on a wartime readiness level?
General Shelton. No, sir; we will not. As a matter of fact,
they will remain at a readiness level, ready to carry out the
operation as long as it appears that they need to stay in that
position. But, for example, we go with about a 120-day rotation
with the air crews that are there. The carriers turn over--in
fact, we have one that is going through the Suez tonight that
is en route to a normal turnover in the gulf. So the forces
will be rotating that are on station right now.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. Could you supply us for the record the
specific amounts that were borrowed or withheld from each major
command in the military service? I think those would be
important for us on the debate on the floor on this bill. I
would hope, and I have already asked and you said they were
going to be repaid, but I think members should know where the
money was borrowed and how much has to be put back.
[The information follows:]
Thus far, commanders have not been forced to spend fourth
quarter funds for Bosnia and Southwest Asia. To ensure
readiness was not adversely affected, the full amount of
contingency funds previously appropriated were distributed, and
commanders were advised to assume expeditious approval of the
supplemental request. Therefore, commanders currently have
adequate financing for ongoing operations without using fourth
quarter funds. However, action on the supplemental request is
needed by early April to ensure the Services can continue their
normal rate of activity for the remainder of the fiscal year.
Early in the third quarter, the Services must assess their
funding posture and make responsible management decisions. In
some cases, they will be required to pull funding forward from
the fourth quarter and may have to curtail some activities to
maintain the current level of contingency operations. The
structure of the fiscal year 1998 supplemental request
(emergency and non-offset) has enabled the Services to direct
their major commands to continue operating at the approved
budgeted level without mission degradation. A non-offset
supplemental is necessary to shield these commands from program
turbulence and potential funding delays. Approval of the
supplemental in its current form is absolutely critical to
protect readiness and avoid serious disruption of core Service
programs.
Chairman Stevens. I am told that now we have two aircraft
carriers, an amphibious group of marines, various Air Force
units, and an Army brigade with supporting units; that the Army
and the Air Force is going to rotate every 4 months, the Navy
and Marine Corps every 6 months. Is that the plan now for this
deployment, at least until something changes? If they would
have to accelerate, I am sure that might be changed.
General Shelton. That is the plan as of right now, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Stevens. It is my understanding--and this will be
my last question, and Senator Byrd may be coming and that is
why we are waiting--we pay 26 percent of NATO, we pay 23
percent of the U.N. costs, we are paying about one-half of the
cost of the Bosnia operation, and we are now going to pay more
than 90 percent of the cost of the Iraq operation. And none of
those are contributing to our modernization. None of them are
at all helping with improving the quality of life or trying to
catch up with the backlog in maintenance and repairs, as you
have just mentioned, of the housing. We have the same thing
with regard to aircraft, tanks, everything.
We are building up an enormous backlog. Now, can you tell
me, is there any hope we can get any change in our contribution
to these international organizations? And those figures were
computed, the percentages, were computed in the fifties. We are
still paying on the basis of being the largest military in the
world, which we are not any longer.
Now, what hope do we have that we are going to get some of
those international contributions reduced?
Secretary Cohen. Mr. Chairman, I cannot predict what the
success will be. I think it is important that we ask that there
be changes in the allocation.
A lot of changes have taken place since these formulas were
created, or established. I was thinking, as one of the--I
cannot recall who mentioned this point--about the contributions
that each of the countries are making. It may have been Senator
Hollings. But Germany, for example, you may recall that about 5
or 6 years ago, I attended a function, the Wehrkunde
Conference, and I questioned, why couldn't the Germans do more,
in terms of participating in out-of-area activities? And it may
have been more recent, maybe only 4 years ago or 3 years ago.
And at that time, you may recall that the Germans had taken
the position they could not be deployed anywhere where they had
occupied territory during World War II. I found that to be an
unacceptable argument. And, in fact, you had people like the
minister of defense, who also agreed that that was
unacceptable. They took it to their supreme court. They now
have a supreme court ruling. At that time, it was considered to
be quite an improvement that they could have personnel aboard
our AWACS in Bosnia. Now, they have almost 3,000 troops in
Bosnia.
And so there have been a lot of changes that have taken
place as a result of the money we have spent on PFP, the
Partnership for Peace, program. You now have countries who are
exercising regularly with NATO, who want to become part of
NATO, which is another issue I know the chairman is very
concerned about. But you see these countries who have tried to
formulate their policies, structure their militaries in ways
that are comparable, or complementary at least, to the United
States. That has worked to our advantage.
That is why we had Hungary say, how can we help in
Southwest Asia? Poland said the same. The Czechs said the same.
And so you have got countries who, 5 or 10 years ago, it would
have been inconceivable that they would be willing to
participate in some of these activities.
So there are a lot of changes that have taken place. I
think it is important that we raise this. I cannot impress upon
all of you enough the importance that the congressional
delegation meant to the conference in NATO the first week in
February. Senator McCain, Senator Warner, Senator Robb, Senator
Smith, and so many others who were there, said, wait a minute,
you are asking us to go it alone in Southwest Asia, while you
are demanding that we be the ones who carry the load in Bosnia.
That is not going to happen. We are not going to accept that.
As a result of those kinds of statements, showing
congressional support for saying we are going to insist upon
more, you suddenly had a catalyst. And Chancellor Kohl
responded that day: How can we help? Other countries called
immediately, saying, we are prepared to send an aircraft, we
are prepared to send a ship; how can we help?
So I think it is important that you, as chairman of the
Appropriations Committee, that other members of the committee
remind our friends in Europe and elsewhere that this is not
something that the United States is going to continue to bear
the majority of the burden on.
Chairman Stevens. Well, I may not succeed, but I intend to
offer a condition to the NATO expansion that will say that we
will consent to that expansion only when they reduce our
participation costs in NATO to less than 20 percent. I do not
see why, if we have three new nations coming in, our costs
should increase. They should be able to take off of our
shoulders some of the cost we have borne in the past. It was
our costs, our expenditures that led to their freedom.
Now, by the same token, this problem, as Senator Byrd said,
of constantly following the United Nations dictates, when they
do not put any money up to enforce their dictates, and we are
called upon to do it all, I think that our people are going to
really tire of supporting either NATO or the United Nations if
this cost squeeze on our future does not change. We will not be
able to modernize our force and be a superpower after 2005 if
we continue expenditures like we have outlined here today,
unless we have another revenue stream from somewhere.
I am told Senator Byrd will be here in a minute.
I have just conferred with the leadership, and I told them
that I have, in fact, indicated to the committee that we want
to go to the area, and we will visit our friends in the Persian
Gulf and in Bosnia and in Belgium.
It will be a fast trip, but we intend to take them a
message: We control the funding for this operation, and this
committee, the country, ought to be alerted to the fact that I
believe the majority of this committee agrees with what Senator
Byrd said this morning. We cannot jeopardize our balanced
budget process by continually taking these expenditures off
budget. And unless there is another revenue stream, it means
that we will demand that the United States withdraw from these
areas if we do not get some help.
We are very serious about it, Mr. Secretary and General. We
put the survival of our country first, and that means
modernization of these forces and continuation of our
acquisitions as planned in your QDR. Currently we will have to
reduce that, as you know, in 1999 if we stay within the caps
that we have now.
Do you have any comments, Senator?
Senator Inouye. You are doing very well, sir.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Cochran, do you have a comment?
Senator Cochran. No; I have asked all the questions I need
to ask. I do agree with you that we are going to have to insist
that we get a better rate of participation financially from our
NATO partners and from our other coalition partners. That was a
point that I was making when you were voting.
I think the time has come for the administration to
recognize that we are no longer going to shoulder a
disproportionate share of the financial responsibility for
conducting these operations. We have got to insist on more from
others.
Chairman Stevens. Senator Byrd, you have the opportunity to
have the last word, sir.
Senator Byrd. I thank the Secretary and General Shelton.
They have listened to a great deal of expressed views here from
this side of the table. They have not had much of an
opportunity to respond. But I think that the hearing has been
of great service.
I am sure they can understand body language as well as that
which flows from the lips. And I think they understood the
message today. I am sure they will be able to carry it back to
the others in the administration.
I would simply sum it up by saying I am not suggesting we
jerk our men out of there all of a sudden, but I am suggesting
and I just want to add this postscript, I am suggesting that we
get busy and get our so-called allies and friends to join in
the effort. And if they cannot commit forces, they can commit
money. With respect to biological and chemical weapons, there
are many countries that are not in the immediate neighborhood
who are reachable by this kind of weapon. And to name one would
be Japan, and one that is in the area, Saudi Arabia.
If they are concerned that they may be offending this man,
they ought to consider that he might not be around. They ought
to take a chance on being with the United States and the
others, who see the importance of stopping him. So perhaps, as
you say, they are concerned because they have to live with him.
Well, he will not be here always, just as Robert Byrd will not.
He will not be around always. And if we get into a real
conflict over there, he may go sooner than even Robert Byrd.
So they ought to consider about what it is going to be like
after he is gone, as well as if he is still around. He leads
pretty much of a charmed life. But we have got to get off this
kick of following the United Nations around, rag-tagging after
the United Nations, letting that be the kite and we are the
tail. I got into this when this administration first came into
power. They sent people into Somalia. And they were going to
engage in nation-building there. And it was mission creep. And,
well, take a lesson.
When I came to this Senate, we did not follow the United
Nations. We were a power in our own right. We exercised
leadership. And the Congress and the administration both felt
that way about it and worked in that fashion.
But since this administration came in, it has been mainly
follow the United Nations. And I am not for that. I am for
exercising our own leadership and for both the executive and
the legislative working together. Do not follow their
recommendations, hitch the tail onto their kite and then come
with hat in hand to the Congress, asking for money. Start here.
This is the place to start. Those people up there in the United
Nations are not going to--there are very few of them who are
going to lay their money on the barrel head. And there are not
many of them who are going to come up with manpower.
They are long on advice and moral lecturers. But when it
comes to putting something on the barrel head, they are not
there. So I think it is about time to stop and take note and
come back to our original thinking, and follow the concept that
was expressed by Abraham Lincoln and George Washington.
I will not go any further. Just thank you both for coming.
You will have an opportunity, maybe at another day, to respond
longer and more fully.
Thank you.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to William S. Cohen
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
Question. Mr. Secretary, I am concerned that during the last few
years, the Administration has neglected the Gulf War Coalition. In the
last few months, it appears as if there is no international resolve to
contain Saddam Hussein's long-term strategy regarding Iraq? How does
the present response to the immediate crisis with Saddam Hussein fit
into your broader strategy?
Answer. Our long term objective is to see that Iraq is readmitted
to the international community and abides by acceptable norms of
international behavior. Much must happen before this goal can be
realized. First and foremost, Iraq must honor its U.N. obligations;
demonstrate to U.N. inspectors that it has destroyed its WMD programs,
account for over 600 Kuwaiti missing and prisoners of war--numbers
which include non-combatant Kuwaiti civilians; return property and
weapons stolen from Kuwait; renounce terrorism; and, end internal
repression, specifically, the marsh Arab community in southern Iraq and
the Kurds in the north.
While the recent crisis with Iraq was over the issue of access for
U.N. inspectors, the broader issue is Iraq's compliance with and
respect for its U.N. obligations. We will not allow Iraq to flout the
will of the international community. Our military deployments in the
region, and those of our coalition partners, were of critical
importance in producing a viable diplomatic solution to the recent
crisis. U.N. Secretary General Anan has clearly acknowledged this. We
are now in a testing phase to see whether Iraq will live up to the
commitments it made in the February 23 MOU to provide immediate,
unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites the weapons
inspectors choose to visit.
continuing deployment of u.s. troops in bosnia
Question. The President recently proposed an open-ended deployment
of U.S. troops to Bosnia in support of the Dayton Accords. Our nation's
pilots have been enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq for more than six
years. Do you foresee any likely end to these missions? With neither
mission likely to end in the near future, do you consider these
regional deployments to be semi-permanent missions, such as our
commitment to protect South Korea? Why do you continue to fund these
operations through the services' O&M accounts as if they are temporary
contingencies?
Answer. The NATO-led military mission in Bosnia was never intended
to be a permanent deployment but rather one to assure the successful
implementation of the Dayton peace process. U.S. force levels in Bosnia
have continually been reduced from the initial deployment of 30,000
troops in December 1995 to a new level of 6,900 in June of 1998. NATO
will pursue a transition strategy with the aim of progressively
reducing force levels taking account at the time the security situation
in theater and the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. NATO's
intent is to review tasks, the security environment and risks at about
six-month intervals with reductions in force size beginning, if
possible, after the national elections in September 1998.
Rather than focus on a specific end date, the aim is to achieve an
end state of a secure environment adequate for the consolidation of the
peace without further need for a NATO-led military force. As the
President said, ``the mission must be achievable and tied to concrete
benchmarks not a deadline. We should have clear objectives that when
set--when met, will create a self-sustaining secure environment and
allow us to remove our troops.''
I cannot say how long our stay will be. We have developed aims
which we consider necessary in creating a sustainable peace. The basic
idea is to create the conditions necessary for non-military instruments
(diplomatic, institutional, economic) to be able to work effectively
without the presence of a large NATO-led military force.
In reference to the fiscal year 1998 supplemental and fiscal year
1999 budget amendment, DOD did not request any funds to establish
permanent infrastructure in Bosnia. However, the request does include
$47 million in fiscal year 1998 and $30 million in fiscal year 1999 to
improve the quality of life for our troops stationed in Bosnia. The
request for the Army includes $42 million in fiscal year 1998 and $30
million in fiscal year 1999 for infrastructure upgrades to improve
living and operating conditions in Bosnia for our troops. The Air Force
includes $5 million for refurbishment of an existing building into a
contingency dormitory due to the removal of an existing tent city in
Bosnia.
bosnia and southwest asia--supporting the two mrc scenario
Question. What specific impact does the President's decision to
extend the deployment of U.S. troops beyond the June 30 deadline have
on our ability to respond with military force to other crises?
Answer. Participation in Bosnia (SFOR) does not seriously reduce
the ability of U.S. forces to fight and win a regional conflict
elsewhere. Combat forces most needed in the opening phase of a regional
conflict would still be available to deploy on short notice. There is,
of course, some degradation in the preparedness of SFOR deployed units
to immediately engage in combat missions elsewhere. Some period of time
would be needed to withdraw, repair and replace equipment, retrain, and
prepare for deployment to a Major Theater War. This is the normal cost
of doing business.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lauch Faircloth
Question. Please list, by year, for the past three years, what
priorities would have been funded if not for the fact that there have
been U.S. troops in Bosnia?
Answer. The Department has spent a total of $4.8 billion in fiscal
year 1996 and fiscal year 1997 for operations in Bosnia to support the
Dayton Peace Accords. It is estimated that an additional $2 billion
will be required for fiscal year 1998 to continue this effort. If the
U.S. had not been involved with the heavy commitment in Bosnia, then
the Department would have allocated additional resources towards our
modernization effort to replace our aging systems and incorporate
cutting edge technologies into the force to ensure continued U.S.
military superiority over time.
Question. How much is reserved in the current plans for the budget
for fiscal year 2000 for maintaining troops in Bosnia?
Answer. No funds have been budgeted for operations in Bosnia during
fiscal year 2000. The Defense topline set in the bipartisan budget
agreement did not anticipate costs for Bosnia beyond June 1998. If it
is decided that the United States will continue to have a role in
Bosnia during fiscal year 2000, we will have to address this
requirement in next year's budget.
Question. What has been the total cost to date of our effort in
Bosnia?
Answer. The incremental costs of DOD participation in operations in
and around the Former Yugoslavia, predominately Bosnia, totaled $2.5
billion for fiscal year 1996 and $2.3 billion in fiscal year 1997, and
costs of $2 billion are projected for fiscal year 1998. These Bosnia
costs cover the preparation, deployment and sustainment of U.S. forces,
as well as the costs associated with enforcement of the no-fly zone
over Bosnia, and support of other U.N. observer related missions in the
Area of Responsibility (AOR). Incremental costs totaling $347.4 million
in fiscal year 1995, $292 million in fiscal year 1994, $138.8 million
in fiscal year 1993, and $5.8 million in fiscal year 1992 were incurred
by the DOD to support humanitarian-related missions in, and aircraft
operations over, the Former Yugoslavia.
departure date of u.s. troops from bosnia
Question. What is the new departure date from Bosnia?
Answer. Rather than focus on a specific end date, the aim is to
achieve an end state of a secure environment adequate for the
consolidation of the peace without further need for a NATO-led military
force. As the President said, ``the mission must be achievable and tied
to concrete benchmarks, not a deadline. We should have clear objectives
that when set--when met, will create a self-sustaining secure
environment and allow us to remove our troops.''
I cannot say how long our stay will be. We have developed aims
which we consider necessary in creating a sustainable peace. The basic
idea is to create the conditions necessary for non-military instruments
(diplomatic, institutional, economic) to be able to work effectively
without the presence of a large NATO-led military force.
humanitarian projects in bosnia
Question. Are U.S. troops involved in any humanitarian projects in
Bosnia?
Answer. SFOR and U.S. forces continue to focus on their key
military tasks which include: Deterring the resumption of hostilities
by maintaining a military presence, monitoring, and if required,
enforcing compliance with the military aspects of the GFAP,
contributing to a secure environment which allows civilian
organizations to accomplish civil tasks, ensuring force protection/own
freedom of movement, operating Joint Military Commissions, and
enforcing rules/procedures governing the use of and controlling the
airspace over Bosnia. One humanitarian program that U.S. forces have
been actively involved in is demining. The goal of the SFOR-regulated
military demining program is to assist the Bosnian Entity Armed Forces
in establishing a self-sustaining indigenous demining capability. U.S.
soldiers are conducting a ``train the trainer'' program within the
Serb, Croat, and Bosniak Armies to establish a cadre of trained
demining instructors able to instruct the basic deminers course
syllabus.
u.s. troop participation in nonsecurity activities
Question. What activities in which U.S. troops participate are non-
security related?
Answer. Noticeable progress has been achieved in all areas of the
GFAP, particularly SFOR's contribution to a stable environment. SFOR
and U.S. forces assistance to civil authorities remains within
available resources and subject to the primacy of the military mission.
Examples of these activities include economic reconstruction (road
reconstruction, bridge building/repair and opening the railroad) and
democratization (election assistance). Although these activities appear
to be non-security related, they indeed are, as reconstruction projects
provide lines of communication for SFOR troops/equipment and
democratization efforts contribute to a stable security environment
which fosters continual progress toward democratic reform.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
Question. If the funding for Bosnia will not be provided until
October for operations throughout the next fiscal year, why is it an
emergency? What is the ``sudden, urgent, usually unforeseen occurrence
or occasion requiring immediate action?''
Answer. The President announced in December 1997 his decision to
support an extension of the U.S. mission in Bosnia past June of this
year. There was insufficient time to assess the planning and resource
implications of the decision for inclusion of a budget quality cost
estimate of the mission extension in the fiscal year 1999 budget
request. More importantly, however, the Defense topline set in the
bipartisan budget agreement did not anticipate costs for Bosnia beyond
June 1998. As a result, the Administration decided to propose an
``emergency,'' non-offset fiscal year 1998 supplemental funding request
for Bosnia. To cover fiscal year 1999 Bosnia costs, the Administration
decided to submit a non-offset budget amendment that is also designated
as an ``emergency'' to ensure that Bosnia is considered as Congress
sets its spending priorities before deliberations on the fiscal year
1999 Budget Resolution are completed.
Question. We know now that we will need to pay bills in Bosnia for
next year. We've known that for quite some time. Wouldn't it be more
responsible to budget the $1.9 billion as part of the defense
appropriations bill and within the defense cap for fiscal year 1999
rather than outside of it?
Answer. The Defense topline set in the bipartisan budget agreement
did not anticipate costs for Bosnia beyond June 1998. To cover fiscal
year 1999 Bosnia costs, the Administration decided to submit a non-
offset budget amendment that is also designated as an ``emergency.''
The President's fiscal year 1999 budget request contains an allowance
for undistributed funds to cover contingency events, such as Bosnia and
natural disasters. The Administration considers Bosnia funding
requirements to have first claim on the undistributed allowances, and
we have informed the relevant committees in Congress of this. In sum,
we have structured the fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 1999 Bosnia
funding requests in such a way that resources are not diverted from the
Department of Defense's current and future appropriation levels. By so
doing, we hope to avoid adverse effects on military readiness.
Question. There is no emergency request for domestic spending as
part of the fiscal year 1999 budget. Why should the Pentagon be treated
differently than domestic agencies?
Answer. The Pentagon is not being treated differently than the
domestic agencies. The President's fiscal year 1999 budget request
contains an allowance for undistributed funds to cover unanticipated
contingency events. This allowance would cover requirements in the
domestic agencies as well as the DOD for unanticipated situations such
as natural disasters (e.g., floods, tornadoes, etc.) as have occurred
this past year.
______
Questions Submitted to Gen. Henry H. Shelton
Question Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
bosnia-american military objectives
Question. General Shelton, during your confirmation hearing before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, you raised several concerns about
the duration and conduct of the Bosnia operation. Considering the
President's intention to extend the U.S. mission beyond the June 30
deadline, please explain your view of the objectives for American
military personnel deployed to Bosnia and the surrounding Balkan
states?
Answer. SFOR and the U.S. military forces participating in it will
continue to deter a resumption of hostilities and provide support for
civil implementation in a manner similar to the current approach of
SFOR. SFOR's objective will be to consolidate the gains achieved to
date while sustaining the current pace of civil implementation. This
approach will encourage the implementation process to become
progressively more self-sustaining without exceeding SFOR's current
level of intensity and involvement. Overall, the aim is to establish
conditions under which Dayton implementation can continue without the
support of a major NATO-led military force.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Lauch Faircloth
bosnia-u.s. participation
Question. With the information you have today, do you anticipate
that the United States will have to participate in any way in the NATO
Follow-on Force in Bosnia?
Answer. As the President certified in his 4 March letter to the
Speaker of the House, the continued presence of U.S. armed forces,
after June 30, 1998, in Bosnia and Herzegovina is required in order to
meet the national security interests of the United States.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
bosnia-u.s. participation
Question. Will NATO troops continue to arrest war criminals if they
do not surrender voluntarily and the tactical situation permits?
Answer. NATO political guidance for the development of the OPLAN
for the follow-on force states that ``current policy towards detention
of indicted war criminals would remain in force and should continue to
be implemented rigorously.'' In that regard, current guidance
authorizing SFOR soldiers to detain persons indicted for war crimes if
they come into contact with them in the performance of normal
activities and when the tactical situation permits, would remain in
force.
conclusion of hearing
Chairman Stevens. Thank you very much. We are going to do
our best to mark this bill up next Thursday afternoon, and,
hopefully, get it to the floor the following week. We are
working with our colleagues in the House to try and see if we
can effect a miracle, and that is to have both bills be the
same. But you must say your prayers to have that happen.
Thank you very much.
Secretary Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Shelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., Friday, March 6, the hearing was
concluded, and the committee was recessed, to reconvene subject
to the call of the Chair.]