<DOC>
[1997 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:41418.wais]
S. Hrg. 105-237
PROLIFERATION: RUSSIAN CASE STUDIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 5, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-418cc WASHINGTON : 1997
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOHN GLENN, Ohio
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel
Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff Director
Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL
SERVICES
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mitchel B. Kugler, Staff Director
Linda Gustitus, Minority Staff Director
Julie Sander, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Cochran.............................................. 1
Senator Levin................................................ 2
WITNESSES
Thursday, June 5, 1997
Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
Department of State............................................ 4
William C. Potter, Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies.................... 18
Richard H. Speier, Independent Consultant........................ 28
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Einhorn, Robert:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Potter, William C.:
Testimony.................................................... 18
Prepared Statement........................................... 24
Speier, Richard H.:
Testimony.................................................... 28
Prepared Statement........................................... 36
PROLIFERATION: RUSSIAN CASE STUDIES
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room SD-342 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran and Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The meeting of our Subcommittee will come
to order. We appreciate the attendance of our witnesses today
at this hearing which we are going to have today on the subject
of Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, one in a series of
hearing that we have been having looking into the issues
involving proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
particularly nuclear weapons.
In April, we had a hearing looking at the question of
Chinese actions which we consider very serious in terms of
their involvement in selling technologies, complete weapons
systems, and generally being at the center of a world-wide web
of proliferation, selling nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons technology as well as ballistic and cruise missiles to
other nations.
Russia is also a key supplier of weapons of mass
destruction technology and advanced conventional weapons to
countries of concern to the United States.
Moscow is in the process of constructing a nuclear reactor
in Iran, and has reached agreement in principle to sell up to
three additional reactors to Tehran. Russia has also agreed to
sell two nuclear reactors to India, and press reports have
surfaced on sales of ballistic missile technology to Iran and
Iraq.
While some of the specific Russian activities are
classified, many of the details are available in the open
press, and it is upon those open sources that we have relied
exclusively in preparing for today's hearing.
Russia's sales of weapons of mass destruction technology
and advanced conventional arms take place in the context of
severe economic and political stress in Russia. We know that
workers are paid months late, or not at all. Crime is a very
serious problem. There are severe housing shortages.
So the combination of hunger, draft evasion, poor training,
and aging equipment all plague the Russian military, which
remains one of the world's largest. Russia's premier defense
facilities have not been immune to disruptions.
Recent press reports indicate strategic missile facilities
have suffered repeated power cut-offs in recent months because
electric bills were not paid. During late 1996, thieves
reportedly disrupted communication to operational strategic
rocket forces units on numerous occasion by mining copper and
other metals from communications cables.
In addition, late last year, the director of a prestigious
Russian nuclear laboratory became so distraught over the dire
conditions at his facility that he committed suicide.
Despite the danger posed by transfers of sensitive million
technology, Russia's cash starved nuclear and defense
industries continue to pursue sales to rogue nations like Iran.
It is unclear how much control central government officials
have over these sales.
Senior Russian officials have approved some deals, but
Moscow appears unwilling or unable to halt other sales.
At today's hearing, we will explore how our government has
approached the problem, as well as whether the approach is
effective. We will also explore Moscow's record of adherence to
its international nonproliferation commitments, and what
incentives and disincentives the United States should use to
moderate Russia's proliferant behavior.
Our witnesses today are well suited to address these
issues. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Bob
Einhorn at the Department of State is with us. He will be
followed by a panel consisting of Dr. William Potter, director
of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey
Institute for International Studies who will discuss nuclear
proliferation; and Dr. Richard Speier, an independent
consultant and expert on the subject of Russian ballistic
missile proliferation.
Secretary Einhorn, we appreciate very much your attendance,
and before recognizing you though, I am going to yield to my
good friend and colleague from Michigan, the distinguished
Ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee, Carl Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you
in welcoming our witnesses today on the very important topic of
Russian proliferation. And I want to commend you again for this
series of very important and significant hearings, Mr.
Chairman.
I only wish that after I give these few remarks that I be
able to remain, but I am unable to now, and so we will be
following this hearing very, very carefully, however, because
of the importance of this subject.
Ever since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, we have
faced a very serious challenge in preventing the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons
and their materials and chemical weapons. With great foresight,
our former colleague, Senator Nunn, and Senator Lugar created
the cooperative threat reduction program in 1991.
This program, which is commonly referred to as the Nunn-
Lugar program, has made a significant difference in reducing
the risk to the United States from the potential proliferation
of former Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and
materials.
The Nunn-Lugar cooperate threat reduction program has
permitted the complete de-nuclearization of three former Soviet
republics, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan, which emerged with
the inheritance of thousands of former Soviet nuclear weapons
on their territory.
It has permitted the elimination of thousands of warheads
and hundreds of missiles and their launchers. That means that
those weapons cannot threaten us again, and that is a tangible
and direct benefit to our security.
The Nunn-Lugar program continues to reduce the threat to
our country, but there remains much more to be done. I believe
there are additional areas for cooperative threat reduction
with Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union,
and I would note that at least one of our witnesses has some
specific suggestions for how to expand that program to address
additional proliferation threats.
I hope that all of our witnesses will address the question
of whether the Nunn-Lugar program can be improved or expanded
to help reduce the most immediate and dangerous threats to the
United States, and if so, how.
Clearly, though, the Nunn-Lugar program cannot address all
the proliferation problems that we face with respect to Russia,
and this hearing is going to examine some of the other issues.
But we are working on a bilateral basis with Russia on
proliferation issues, and we have had some important successes,
as well as some notable challenges and problems. We need to
understand the situation to determine what else we should and
can do to improve it.
We should be trying to find out what works, and what will
help.
One of the problems that we face with respect to Russia and
proliferation, as I believe our witnesses have either said or
would agree, is that Russia appears not to be capable of fully
knowing of or controlling proliferant behavior.
This seems due in part to the inexperience of the new
governing systems in Russia and of the economic incentives for
public and private entities to earn cash in a financially dire
situation.
Lawlessness and disorder seem to be too prevalent there.
That means that sometimes the Russian government may not know
about or be able to effectively prevent proliferant behavior,
which is all the more reason to improve the situation as we're
trying to do.
Russia needs to improve its ability and desire to root out
and prevent proliferation. That may mean at times finding
incentives for responsible behavior and disincentives for
irresponsible behavior, whether at the government of private
sector level.
And it also means that we should help encourage reform and
democracy in Russia. But finally, it means being careful to
avoid actions that will worsen the situation and threaten the
security of this Nation.
So, Mr. Chairman, again I commend you for your initiative
here and look forward to these hearings.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
Secretary Einhorn, thank you again for being here. You may
proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT EINHORN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY
AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to testify before the Subcommittee on the administration's
nonproliferation agenda with Russia. And with your permission,
I will submit my prepared testimony for the record and proceed
with some brief opening remarks.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. It will be included
in full.
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Given the weapons of
mass destruction and other sensitive technologies it inherited
from the Soviet Union as well as its own international stature,
Russia is clearly a key player in international efforts to
prevent proliferation.
Its cooperation is indispensable. Its failure to cooperate
potentially very harmful.
Frankly, Russia's recent nonproliferation record is mixed.
It shares with us a strong security interest in preventing the
spread of weapons of mass destruction and other destabilizing
technologies.
But the current situation in Russia, including powerful
pressures to export, the evolving relationship between central
governmental authorities and an increasingly privatized
industrial sector, and a relatively new and unproven export
control system has led to questionable exports in cooperation
with some countries of proliferation, particularly Iran.
On the positive side, Russia has been a supporter and key
player in global nonproliferation regimes. For example, it
strongly favored indefinite extension of the NPT, and the
recent strengthening of the IAEA safeguard system to detect
clandestine nuclear activities.
It was a founding member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
and of the Wassenaar Arrangement, and it joined the Missile
Technology Control Regime in 1995. It has supported UNSCOM and
IAEA efforts in Iraq. It signed the CTBT, the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, last fall.
And while it has not yet ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention, its parliament says it will do so probably this
fall, and has passed its chemical weapons destruction bill.
Russia has also showed responsibility in cooperating with
us to address the proliferation risks posed by the large stocks
of nuclear weapons and fissile materials it inherited from the
Soviet Union. Senator Levin has just mentioned a number of
these efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program, just a few minutes
ago.
Under these programs, hundreds of bombs worth of Russian
highly enriched uranium have been converted into fuel for U.S.
nuclear power plants. With U.S. assistance, hundreds of tons of
weapons usable material are now subject to upgraded security
measures at over 40 Russian sites.
The U.S. is helping build a storage facility at Mayak that
will safely and securely house fissile materials from about
12,500 dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. Russia is working
trilaterally with the U.S. and IAEA to develop means of
verifying that fissile materials declared excess to defense
needs are not returned to nuclear weapons programs.
U.S. and Russian law enforcement officials and scientists
are coordinating their efforts to deal with the problem of
nuclear smuggling. And through the International Science and
Technology Centers, over 13,000 former weapons scientists are
engaged in peaceful scientific projects that reduce the risk of
their being lured away by proliferators.
The difficulties we have had with Russia in the
nonproliferation area have been in the area of exports to
foreign countries. Russia recognizes the need to establish a
strong export control system and has taken important steps in
that direction with some U.S. assistance.
But Russian export controls are new, and clearly they need
further strengthening. And this still rudimentary control
system is being severely tested by Russian exporters
aggressively seeking to pursue market share and earn hard
currency.
Our concerns have applied largely to Russia's cooperation
with Iran. We remain opposed to Russia's project to build a
nuclear power reactor in Iran. Indeed, we're opposed to any
nuclear cooperation with Iran.
We've raised our concerns forcefully and persistently, and
at the highest levels, and we believe that Moscow has limited
the scope and pace of its planned cooperation. For example,
Russia's leadership has ruled out the transfer of a gas
centrifuge enrichment facility, heavy water moderated nuclear
reactors, and other technologies that are directly useful
militarily.
Nonetheless, we will watch this carefully, and press for
further curtailment.
We are especially concerned about reports of cooperation by
Russian entities with Iran on long range ballistic missiles. We
take these reports very seriously. Iran's acquisition of a long
range missile delivery capability, coupled with its continued
pursuit of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction, would pose a grave threat to U.S. forces and
friends, and to regional stability in general.
We do not believe that Russia has transferred any long
range missiles to Iran, but Iran is now not giving priority to
importing complete missiles. Rather, it is actively seeking
various types of technical assistance and cooperation that
would enable it to produce its own long range missiles
indigenously.
We have raised this matter with Russia at the highest
levels, including during President Clinton's recent meeting
with President Yeltsin in Helsinki.
The Russian leadership has told us that it does not
support assistance to Iran's ballistic missile program. While
we appreciate such assurances, we remain disturbed by the
discrepancy between them and what reportedly is occurring.
Given the far reaching implications of this issue, we will
continue to pursue it at the highest levels.
We are also concerned by reports that Russian entities may
intend to transfer surface to air missiles to Iran. President
Yeltsin pledged in 1994 that Russia would not enter into any
new arms contracts with Iran, and would conclude existing
contracts within a few years.
In 1995, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin formalized that commitment. Any transfers to Iran
of advanced anti-aircraft missile systems would be inconsistent
with that agreement.
We raised this issue with Russia in March at the Helsinki
summit, and President Yeltsin reaffirmed his commitment to the
1995 agreement. The U.S. has not determined that Russia has
transferred to Iran any advanced missiles, although we continue
to monitor this very carefully.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we believe the United States
and Russia have a strongly shared security interest in
preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and other
sensitive goods and technologies. But Russia's ability and
determination to pursue its commitment to nonproliferation may
sometimes be eroded by a combination of power economic
incentives to pursue foreign markets, the evolving nature of
state controls in Russia, and Russia's relatively new,
understaffed, and still unproven system of export controls.
Improved Russian economic performance and institutional
reform will help alleviate these problems. But basic changes
will not be achieved overnight.
In the meantime, the Russian government must take effective
steps to insure a more accountable and conscientious approach
to export control, and it should better appreciate the risks of
engaging in even seemingly benign cooperation with determined
proliferators, such as Iran.
Encouraging Russia to adopt a more effective and
responsible approach to cooperation with third countries will
remain one of the administration's highest nonproliferation
priorities.
We will continue to press our case at the highest levels.
Pursuing our nonproliferation agenda with Russia will involve
both incentives and disincentives, including the implementation
of U.S. sanctions laws whenever applicable.
However, the use of certain sticks, such as cutting off or
curtailing our assistance programs to Russia, would only be
counterproductive. Not only would they be unlikely to achieve
our nonproliferation goals, they would also undercut key
programs to promote democracy and market reform, as well as to
insure that the process of disarmament takes place in a safe,
secure and accountable a manner as possible.
And, Mr. Chairman, if I could just return to a little old
business for a few moments regarding Chinese export behavior,
because we discussed this the last time I was before the
Subcommittee. And at that time I noted that the administration
was concerned by reports of Chinese entities exporting to Iran
chemical precursors, chemical production equipment and
technology.
And I indicated at that time that we were actively
considering these reports in light of U.S. sanctions laws.
Since that time, and I am sure you are aware of this, Mr.
Chairman, on May 21 the United States imposed trade sanctions
under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act against five Chinese individuals, two Chinese
companies, and one Hong Kong company for knowingly and
materially contributing to Iran's chemical weapons program.
I just wanted to update you and the Subcommittee on that
development. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Einhorn follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. EINHORN
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify before the
Subcommittee on the challenges and opportunities we face in obtaining
Russia's cooperation in the nonproliferation field. Preventing the
proliferation of dangerous weapons and technologies is among the
highest priorities of our foreign policy. Russia by virtue of the
weapons of mass destruction and other military and technological
capabilities it inherited from the Soviet Union as well as its own
international stature will be a key factor in the success of worldwide
nonproliferation efforts. My objective today is to provide you with a
snapshot of where we stand with Russia on these issues.
We have made progress with the Russians over the past four years on
our nonproliferation agenda. Russia recognizes that preventing the
spread of destabilizing arms and technologies can protect Russian
security interests. Russia is a strong supporter of the global
nonproliferation regime, and has worked constructively with us to
reduce the proliferation dangers credited by the collapse of the Soviet
Union. At the same time, the exigencies of a monetized, largely
privatized economy which no longer operates on the basis of command
resource allocations have underscored the importance of foreign sales.
Moreover, the uncertain and evolving nature of state controls in Russia
has increased opportunities for some ``grey markets'' sales. These
factors have at times contributed to serious U.S. concerns about
Russian exports of arms and sensitive technologies to third countries.
On the positive side, Russia has been a supporter of, and often a
key player in the global nonproliferation regimes.
<bullet> LRussia strongly supported indefinite extension of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and a recent agreement to give real
teeth to IAEA safeguards, significantly expanding their reach to
include access to information and locations that could be related to
clandestine nuclear programs.
<bullet> LRussian assistance was critical to securing the adherence
of Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons
states and in moving all nuclear weapons from these states to Russia.
<bullet> LAs a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, it
continues to abide by the Council's embargo on the sale of arms to Iraq
and Libya, and supports UNSCOM and IAEA efforts to uncover Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and prevent the regeneration of
those capabilities.
<bullet> LRussia is a founding member of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group that coordinates international export controls on nuclear
equipment, materials and technologies. Russia has also supported
measures for strengthening NSG controls, most important, the adoption
of a policy requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear
supply and establishment of a dual-use control regime.
<bullet> LIn 1993. Russia agreed to forgo the transfer of certain
rocket technology to India and to abide by the Guidelines of the
Missile Technology Control Regime. In August 1995, it was admitted to
the MTCR.
<bullet> LAlso in 1995, Russia agreed not to enter into and new
arms contracts with Iran and to conclude existing contracts within a
few years. In connection with becoming a founding member of the
Wassenaar Arrangement--a multilateral regime committed to increasing
transparency and responsibility in connection with transfers of arms
and dual-use goods and technologies.
President Yeltsin in Helsinki reaffirmed Russia's commitment to
ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Russian parliament has
indicated that it will ratify the Convention, most likely sometime in
the fall. In addition, Russia has recently enacted a law which provides
the legal basis for the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile
and seems to be on a path which will eventually result in the
destruction of the 40,000 tons of chemical munitions it acknowledges it
holds.
<bullet> LRussia signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty last
fall, has stopped producing fissile material for nuclear weapons and
has joined the U.S. in calling for negotiation of a Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty in Geneva.
<bullet> LRussia ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in
1975. President Yeltsin, however, has acknowledged the existence of a
decades-old, offensive biological warfare research program. He issued a
decree on April 11, 1992 prohibiting any illegal biological weapons
activity in Russia. Though we do not doubt his sincerity, we continue
to be concerned that the offensive BW program has not been entirely
eliminated.
Russia has also taken important steps to address the proliferation
risks posed by the large stockpile of nuclear weapons and fissile
materials it inherited from the Soviet Union, in many cases working
jointly, with the United States.
<bullet> LHighly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear
weapons is being converted into commercial reactor fuel for use in U.S.
nuclear power plants. Hundreds of weapons worth of uranium have already
been transferred from Russia to the United States.
<bullet> LWith U.S. support Russia has expanded the program to
improve security at facilities where fissile material is located to now
over 40 sites. Hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear material are
now subjected to substantially upgraded security.
<bullet> LWith critical U.S. financial assistance, Russia is
constructing a modern facility at Mayak for the safe, secure storage of
fissile materials released from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
<bullet> LRussia has committed to disposing permanently of its
surplus weapons plutonium, and is working with the U.S. and France to
develop technologies for converting plutonium weapons components into a
form suitable for final disposition and international verification.
<bullet> LRussia has furthermore ceased use of newly-produced
plutonium for weapons purposes. The U.S. and Russia are negotiating a
cooperative arrangement to convert Moscow's plutonium production
reactors so they no longer produce weapons-grade material.
<bullet> LRussia is working trilaterally with the U.S. and the IAEA
to develop means of verifying that weapons-origin and other relevant
fissile materials declared excess to defense need are not returned to
nuclear weapons programs.
<bullet> LRussian law enforcement officials and scientists are
working with their American counterparts to share information on
illicit nuclear trafficking and improve laboratory analysis of nuclear
materials seized from smugglers.
<bullet> LThrough the International Science and Technology Centers
and the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention, more than thirteen
thousand former weapons scientists, the majority Russian, are engaged
in peaceful scientific projects that reduce the risk they will be lured
away by money from rogue or terrorist states.
As it transforms its economy, Russia recognizes the need to
establish an export control system comparable to those of other major
industrial countries. It has committed to doing so in several
international settings, has enacted the necessary legislation, and has
set up the necessary internal mechanisms, including improved border
controls and customs surveillance aimed at restricting unauthorized
transfers of equipment and technology related to weapons of mass
destruction. The U.S. and others are helping Russia in this effort.
There are still major challenges ahead, however, particularly in view
of the economic pressures facing Russian industry and the
responsibilities placed on new, untested Russian institutions charged
with implementing export controls.
At times, however, Russia has demonstrated an unwillingness to
forgo profitable transactions for the sake of nonproliferation. After
the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russian market share of defense
exports dropped precipitously, primarily because Russia could no longer
afford to sell defense-related equipment at below market prices. Russia
is actively seeking to replace those markets with clients willing and
able to pay hard currency. In addition, Russian firms, sometimes
operating with little or inadequate oversight from Moscow, are targeted
by states seeking to circumvent the more restrictive export policies of
the U.S. and Western Europe. We can expect Russian exporters to
continue to pursue aggressively market share and hard currency through
arms and technology.
While economic incentives are the principal reason for the export
of sensitive goods and technologies. Russia can see the political value
such sales bring in firming up ties with regional powers such as China,
India and Iran.
We have followed carefully the recent expansion of Russian trade in
arms and proliferation-sensitive technologies with a variety of
recipients. In the case of the growing relationship between Russia and
China, which has become Russia's number one customer for conventional
weapons and military technology, the questions raised are not directly
proliferation-related because China already possesses the relevant
capabilities. Moreover, we do not question the right of either party to
engage in legitimate defense cooperation. Instead, we believe it is
important to focus on the implications of such cooperation for the
stability of the Asia-Pacific region, a concern we have raised, and
will continue to raise, on a case-by-case basis with the parties
involved whenever we believe it to be warranted.
Our proliferation-related concerns with Russian exports have
applied largely to Russia's nuclear and missile cooperation with
certain states, primarily Iran. Russia maintains that it confines its
cooperation with Iran to areas that are not of proliferation concern
and do not threaten others. We have raised with Russia reports that
call into question these assurances.
We remain opposed to Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran, and
have pressed Russian leaders at the highest levels to refrain from any
such cooperation. Russia began construction of the first reactor at the
Bushehr complex in 1995. While we remain opposed to the project, we
have seen indications that Moscow has limited the scope and pace of its
nuclear cooperation with Iran. President Yeltsin has stated that Russia
will not provide nuclear technologies to Iran that are directly useful
militarily including a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.
Russian leaders have also assured us that they would not supply Iran
with a heavy water-moderated nuclear reactor. Such reactors raise
particularly serious proliferation concerns because of their potential
for plutonium production. We will continue to monitor this closely and
will press Russian authorities on any reports we receive of cooperation
between Russia and Iran in the nuclear field.
We are especially concerned about reports of cooperation by Russian
entities with Iran on long-range ballistic missiles. We take these
reports very seriously. Iran's acquisition of a long-range missile
delivery capability, coupled with its continued pursuit of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, would pose a grave
threat to U.S. forces and friends in the region, and to regional
stability generally. Transfers would also be inconsistent with Russia's
commitments to the MTCR, and could raise serious issues under U.S.
sanctions laws. We do not believe that Russia has transferred any long-
ranged missiles to Iran. But Iran is now not giving priority to
importing complete missiles. Rather it is actively seeking various
types of technical assistance and cooperation that would enable it to
produce its own long-range missiles indigenously. It is reports of such
technical interactions between Iran and Russian entities that concern
us. We have raised such reports with Russia at the highest levels,
including during President Clinton's recent meeting with President
Yeltsin in Helsinki. The Russian leadership has told us that it does
not support assistance to Iran's ballistic missile program. While we
appreciate such assurances, we remain disturbed by the discrepancy
between them and what reportedly is occurring. Given the far-reaching
implications of this matter, we will continue to pursue it at the
highest levels.
We are also concerned by reports that Russian entities may intend
to transfer surface-to-air missiles to Iran. President Yeltsin pledged
in 1994 that Russia would not enter into any new arms contracts with
Iran and would conclude existing contracts within a few years. In 1995,
Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin made formal that
commitment.
At the time that the agreement with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was
reached, Russia informed us that one Kilo-class submarine was expected
to be delivered to Iran, and that other old contracts including those
for tanks, would be fulfilled. Prior to concluding the 1995 agreement
we made certain that the contracts in the pipeline that would be
concluded within a few years did not involve any new weapons systems,
and would not alter the regional balance or compromise the ability of
the U.S. and our allies to protect our mutual interests. Any transfers
to Iran of advanced anti-aircraft missile systems would be inconsistent
with the 1995 agreement. We raised this issue with Russia in March at
the Helsinki Summit, and President Yeltsin reaffirmed his commitment to
the 1995 agreement. The U.S. has not determined that Russia has
transferred to Iran any advanced missiles, although we continue to
monitor this carefully.
In conclusion. Mr. Chairman, Russia has, for the most part, been a
strong partner in the effort to prevent proliferation, as reflected in
the constructive approach Moscow has taken on the international regimes
as well as in the responsible manner with which it has dealt with the
challenge of securing the fissile and other sensitive materials on its
territory. The difficulties we have encountered have been in the area
of questionable sales to certain countries of proliferation concern,
particularly Iran.
We believe the United States and Russia have a strongly shared
security interest in preventing the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and other sensitive goods and technologies. But Russia's
ability and determination to pursue its commitment to nonproliferation
may sometimes be eroded by a combination of powerful economic
pressures, the evolving relationship between central governmental
authorities and an increasingly privatized and export-dependent
industrial sector, and a relatively new, understaffed, and still-
unproven system of export controls.
Improved Russian economic performance and institutional reform will
help alleviate these problems--but basic changes will not be achieved
overnight. In the meantime, the Russian Government must take effective
steps to ensure a more accountable and conscientious approach to export
control. And it should better appreciate the risks of engaging in even
seemingly benign cooperation with determined proliferators such as
Iran.
Encouraging Russia to adopt a more effective and responsible
approach to cooperation with third countries will remain one of the
Administration's highest nonproliferation priorities. We will continue
to press our case at the highest levels, making clear that cooperation
on nonproliferation matters is an essential element of the strong
bilateral relationship both sides seek. Pursuing our nonproliferation
agenda with Russia will involve both incentives and disincentives,
including the implementation of our sanctions laws, whenever
applicable. However, the use of certain ``sticks,'' such as cutting off
or curtailing our assistance programs to Russia, would only be
counterproductive. Not only would they be unlikely to achieve our
nonproliferation goals: they would also undercut key programs to
promote democratization and market reform, as well as to ensure that
the process of disarmament takes place in as safe, secure, and
accountable a manner as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for you testimony and
your assistance to our committee's inquiry. I was particularly
happy that you brought up the subject of the Chinese action,
the action taken by our government in response to those sales.
And immediately when I read the story I wondered whether
there was any connection between that action and the hearings
that we had held. Could you tell us whether we contributed to
that?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, the concern
expressed by you and members of the Subcommittee was shared by
us. We were all looking at similar facts, and I think we came
to similar conclusions.
Senator Cochran. I notice that the Chinese reaction was not
unexpected in that they protested and disagreed with your
conclusions that there was any government knowledge or
participation or culpability at all in the exports. Have you
developed any further facts since that public reaction from the
Chinese government?
Mr. Einhorn. No, we have not, Mr. Chairman. We hope to
pursue this issue further with the Chinese government. we see
the imposition of sanctions not simply in punitive terms. We
see this action as a means of encouraging China to take firm
steps to prevent these Chinese entities from engaging in such
activity in the future.
We hope to have the opportunity to work with the Chinese
government to try to persuade them that it's in their interest
to pursue such steps.
Senator Cochran. In that connection, with Russia and the
situation that you mentioned, you called our attention to and
reminded us that Russia has joined the Missile Technology
Control Regime in 1995, and one of the criteria for MTCR
eligibility is establishing export controls, or a structure to
maintain control over what is and is not being sold to
potential proliferators.
I know you mentioned that Russia's export control system is
still young and there are immature structures and controls in
Russia now. Is that one of the reasons why you think there have
been exports of material, weapons material, technology,
equipment to Iran that could be used in ways that seem to be
violative of the provision of the Missile Control Technology
Regime?
Mr. Einhorn. I think perhaps there are a number of
explanations, Mr. Chairman, but I think one of them clearly is
that Russia's export control system is to this day inadequate
to the task of controlling Russian firms adequately, especially
in this area of missile technology.
Senator Cochran. You mentioned Iran, and you mentioned in
your statement a trading relationship in weapons that has
developed between Russia and China. Are there other countries
as well where Russia has to your knowledge been involved in
selling either missile technology or systems or weapons of mass
destruction or ingredients of them, elements of them that would
concern us?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, I could say--you mentioned weapons of
mass destruction. I genuinely believe, and I think it is the
administration's shared judgment, that Russia is not interested
in seeing other countries acquiring weapons of mass
destruction.
Russians know that their security is not strengthened by
the acquisition of these very destabilizing capabilities. So I
think they have been quite careful in not providing weapons of
mass destruction, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons and so
forth.
Where we have had disagreements with the Russian Federation
is on the transfer of certain technologies, and we have
differed on the contribution of that cooperation to sensitive
weapons programs.
The Bushehr reactor is a case in point. Here, the Russians
agree to sell a thousand megawatt power reactor to Iran. They
point out correctly that this reactor would be under safeguards
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and believe, the
Russians, that there is little or no risk of this reactor
project contributing to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.
We assess the situation differently. In our view, this is a
large reactor project. It will involve hundreds of Russians
being in Iran, hundreds of Iranians or more being in Moscow,
being trained. And this large scale kind of project can provide
a kind of commercial cover for a number of activities that we
would not like to see--perhaps much more sensitive activities
than pursuing this power reactor project.
It also will inevitably provide additional training and
expertise in the nuclear field for Iranian technicians. In our
view, given Iran's intention to acquire nuclear weapons we do
not want to see them move up the nuclear learning curve at all,
and we believe this project would contribute to moving them up
that curve.
I think the Russians assess the situation somewhat
differently. They believe that the expertise acquired in the
course of this project would not be critical, or even important
in contributing to Iran's aspirations to acquire nuclear
weapons.
Senator Cochran. I asked whether or not there were other
countries where trading relationships existed, either with
government firms or entities that would be subject to control
and direction by the Russian government, or should be, in order
to comply with the MTCR.
Are there any such instances that you could tell us about?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, there is an aggressive effort by Russian
export organizations to find foreign markets for a variety of
goods and technologies, arms as well as other kinds of
sensitive technologies. Russia has looked to China as a market
for arms sales.
China is now the biggest purchaser of Russian arms. Russia
is China's biggest supplier of conventional arms.
Now, there is nothing wrong per se with international arms
trade, with the effort to provide for legitimate defense
requirements. And in the case of Russia-China trade, we are not
talking really about a proliferation concern, because after
all, China is a have country. It possesses these weapons of
mass destruction capabilities.
What is sometimes a basis for concern is when such transfer
relationship involves items that might cause instability in a
particular regional context--in this case, the Asia-Pacific
region. And so we monitor this kind of trade relationship and
on a case by case basis we raise our concerns with the parties
involved.
So China is clearly a country that has an active trading
relationship with Russia.
Also, India has been a traditional market for Russian
goods. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union India was a
major trading partner, and in the last few years Russia has
been actively marketing its goods, including arms, in India.
You made reference earlier in your opening statement to an
attempt by Russia to sell two power reactors to India. We have
opposed that sale. We have opposed it, frankly, less because we
think that the transfer would contribute materially to India's
nuclear weapons program than we think that the transfer would
be inconsistent with Russia's commitments as a member of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
As a member of the so-called NSG, Russia has committed not
to engage in nuclear cooperation with countries that do not
have IAEA safeguards on all of their nuclear activities. India,
of course, does not have safeguards on all of its nuclear
activities.
There is a provision in that commitment that says pre-
existing deals can go forward. Russia is attempting to
grandfather an old 1988 U.S.S.R.-India, government to
government agreement under that provision. In our view, this is
not legitimately grandfathered.
In 1988 there was no specific contract, no financial
arrangements concluded. There are still no financial
arrangements concluded. So we tell the Russians that this was
not the kind of deal, pre-existing deal, that can be
grandfathered, and that it should not go forward with this sale
of two power reactors to India.
So even though the transfer itself probably does not
involve substantial proliferation risks, because we doubt that
the Indians, who have their own access to unsafeguarded
plutonium, would actually divert plutonium from the safeguarded
reactors, we nonetheless have urged Russia not to go forward.
But there are also other cooperative arrangements between
Russia and India. And I believe you mentioned in your opening
presentation Iraq.
Senator Cochran. Yes.
Mr. Einhorn. On Iraq, we believe that the Russian
government scrupulously adheres to the current embargo against
Iraq. There is a very comprehensive sanctions regime that is
applied by the U.N. Special Commission and the IAEA against
Iraq to prevent Iraq from regenerating its sensitive
capabilities.
We believe that the Russians have not, at the governmental
level, sought to circumvent that embargo, those sanctions.
Senator Cochran. Let me ask you about a specific incident,
though, that occurred in November of 1995. I am told that
Jordan intercepted a shipment of guidance components for long
range inter-continental ballistic missiles destined for Iraq at
the Amman airport.
And you were asked about this at a committee meeting over
on the House side, the National Security Committee on June 26th
of last year, and you said we have no indication that the
Russian government sanctioned this.
Would this not be violative of the U.N. embargo, the U.N.
Security Council embargo on Iraq following the Gulf War, and
would it not also be a violation of the MTCR by Russia?
Mr. Einhorn. You are correct, Mr. Chairman. Those
gyroscopes, those guidance components that were found by UNSCOM
should not have been sent to Iraq. This was clearly a violation
of the embargo. The question is who is responsible for this
violation.
Nothing since the testimony that you cited has changed our
conclusion that this was not an act by the Russian government,
not a conscientious act. These were very sensitive pieces of
equipment as you pointed out. They are guidance components for
fairly long range strategic missile systems.
So it's a very serious matter, and we still have not
received a full report from the Russians on their investigation
of how this happened. But what we do know of it leads us to the
conclusion that this was a kind of black market action, a
renegade action, and not the conscientious decision of Moscow.
Senator Cochran. Are you satisfied that the Russians are
undertaking a serious investigation to get to the bottom of
this, and to find out who was responsible?
Mr. Einhorn. We have no way to judge how thorough and
conscientious the Russian investigation has been. I think by
now they are overdue in reporting on the results of their
investigation to UNSCOM, and we also would very much like to
hear the results of that investigation and we have recently
asked the Russians about it.
Senator Cochran. Is there any provision in the MCTR or any
of the other agreements that we have that would permit some
other independent inquiry into this, to get to the bottom of
it?
Or does the sovereignty--the relationship of the Russian
government to its own citizens and business activities and
other entities prohibit anybody else from looking into it?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, you are right, Mr. Chairman. The MTCR is
a kind of voluntary, informal sort of regime. There is no
enforcement authority. The closest we have in this case is the
U.N. itself, and the U.N. Special Commission. And I am not
privy to discussions that the UNSCOM chairman has had with
senior officials in the Russian government about this case, but
I think that is where the enforcement authority comes in.
Because, after all, the U.N. Special Commission is
implementing the will of the Security Council and its
Resolution 687 on Iraq. I think that is where UNSCOM should be
pursuing this strongly with the Russian government.
Senator Cochran. And when you say UNSCOM, you are talking
about the U.N. Special Commission? That's the acronym for that?
Mr. Einhorn. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. And that is the group that includes us?
The U.S. is a member of that commission, right? We have a
representative at that commission, do we not?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, the chairman is in effect an employee of
the Security Council. He is currently, unless they have
switched over, a Swede named Rolf Ekeus. The next one will be
an Australian named Richard Butler.
But these individuals are functioning as kind of
international civil servants. The deputy chairman of UNSCOM
happens to be an American.
Senator Cochran. Are you satisfied with the progress that
the U.N. Special Commission is making in cases like this to try
to find out what the facts are when you suspect that there has
been a violation of this regime?
Should we try to do something that would provide another
alternative if UNSCOM is not doing the job of getting all the
facts out that you think should be brought out?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I think UNSCOM has done a heroic
job in pursuing the will of the Security Council with Iraq. I
think special praise needs to go to Rolf Ekeus for very
courageous action in pressing the Iraqi regime.
He has been under some personal threat and risk and has
basically ignored that risk in pursuing his mandate from the
Security Council. He has been tenacious, and the whole U.N.
Special Commission has been tenacious.
Where the fault lies is with Iraq and Saddam Hussein. They
simply have not been prepared to cooperate fully, as they are
obliged to do by the U.N. Security Council. Even today, after
many inspections, many interrogations, it is the considered
view of the U.N. Special Commission that Iraq continues to
conceal an operational missile capability.
We believe, our own people believe, and UNSCOM also
believes that Saddam is hiding some number of Scuds, and UNSCOM
also believes that the Iraqis may well be hiding warheads
containing chemical and or biological munitions for those Scud
missiles.
So UNSCOM really deserves tremendous credit in continuing
to go at the Iraqis on this. But Iraq deserves full
responsibility for not making a full accounting.
Senator Cochran. Has there been any contribution to the
investigation that Russia is conducting by the UNSCOM staff or
the regime that they manage at the U.N. Security Council?
Mr. Einhorn. I am not aware of any, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Is there any evidence that Russia has
prosecuted anybody or cited anybody or taken anybody to task in
any way at all for this sale of these guidance components to
Iraq--or the attempted sale to Iraq?
Mr. Einhorn. I am not aware that they have taken any action
against perpetrators of this act, but I am pretty confident
that UNSCOM has not found additional cases of such smuggling of
proscribed equipment from Russia to Iraq since then.
Senator Cochran. Do you know what our administration is
doing, whether any other departments of our government are
involved in any activity that would contribute to the cessation
of that kind of smuggling, or to the identification and
prosecution of those who are responsible for violating the
embargo that the U.N. Security Council has imposed on Iraq?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, the U.S. Government has made a major
effort to support the U.N. Special Commission and the IAEA. In
the division of labor, the IAEA action team has responsibility
for detecting elements of Iraq's former nuclear weapons
program.
We give strong support. We provide information, we provide
material support for those efforts, to ferret out any evidence
of proscribed activities or material. So it is a major priority
in the nonproliferation field for us.
Senator Cochran. There was another event that Vice
President Gore discussed with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin when
he was here in February. At least this was reported in the Los
Angeles Times, where we had information that Russia had
transferred SS-4 missile technology, including instructions on
how to build the missile and components, to Iran.
And Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, according to this article,
denied that Moscow had authorized the sale, but acknowledged
that the action would violate Russia's pledge not to initiate
new arms sale to Iran.
Do you believe that sale was sanctioned by the Russia
government or was it an illicit or illegal transfer?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my remarks and
in my prepared statement, we take such reports of Russian
entities assisting Iran's long range missile program very, very
seriously.
We follow up all of these reports, and naturally we have
our own intelligence information about such activities. We have
pressed the Russian leadership at the highest levels. And, as I
mentioned, we have been told that it is not Russia's policy to
assist Iran's long range missile programs.
But the problem is this: there is a disconnect between
those reassurances, which we welcome, and what we believe is
actually occurring. There is a disconnect.
We have raised this with the Russians. We have provided
them information available to us to demonstrate that we know
what we are talking about, and we have urged them to
investigate seriously and to prevent any activity that would be
inconsistent with what they state is their own national policy.
Senator Cochran. Have we made any specific suggestion about
how Russia could imposes a stricter export control regime over
sensitive technology like this, or ballistic missile component
parts and technologies like this? Are we trying to assist them
in figuring out how to do a better job, if they say that is
what their goal is?
We are assisting them in dismantling nuclear weapons that
had been targeted at us, and this is all well and good, but is
there any kind of technical assistance program in the form of a
structure or a regime, a control regime, that would do a better
job dealing with these kinds of problems?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, we have under the Nunn-Lugar
program made funds available for export control assistance to
Russia, and we have sought to interest the Russian government
in a very serious technical exchange aimed at strengthening
their capabilities in this area.
And there has been some cooperation, but it has not gone
very far, not because of a reticence on our part, but for a
variety of reasons I think the Russian government is reluctant
for us to be too closely engaged with them in this effort.
I think there is a certain resentment, the perception that
we are throwing our weight around, that they see this as kind
of condescending on our part. And in part they may be
embarrassed a bit at the rudimentary nature of their own export
controls, and reluctant to expose that fully to us.
For whatever set of reasons, they have been less willing
than we have to engage in the kind of cooperation you suggest,
which we fully support.
Senator Cochran. You talked about Russian nuclear
cooperation with India. Reports of missile deployments near the
Pakistani-India border have been widely reported, and it occurs
to me that given Russia's past history of transactions with
India, weapons sales, generally, but in the nuclear program
particularly, and China's closer relationship with Pakistan on
the other hand, and the question about whether China has
contributed to the development of nuclear weapons program in
Pakistan, are we on the verge of a conflict here that could
involve a Russia-India partnership competing with a Chinese-
Pakistani partnership? Do we have on our hands a nuclear
weapons proliferation activity that could be destabilizing and
contribute to an increase in tensions in that part of the world
such that our security interests are at risk?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, we share your concern about the
prospects for nuclear and missile competition in south Asia. I
think the world has evolved quite a bit since the days when
there was a very tight alignment between the outside countries
and the states of south Asia.
I think China, even, is seeking to improve its relations
with India and to adopt a more even-handed policy toward the
two states of the subcontinent. Also, Russia, while it does
have an arms transfer relationship with India, and a good
relationship with India, is also seeking to broaden its
relations.
So I do not see the danger that outside powers will be
drawn into any kind of conflict, but we are concerned that
programs that are proceeding on both sides of the Indo-Pak
border could lead to a destabilizing competition there.
One of the most promising developments we have seen in a
long, long time has been a resumption in recent months of a
high level political dialogue between leaders of India and
Pakistan. There has been a recent meeting in Male in the
Maldives.
A few months ago the Pakistani prime minister, Nuar Sharif,
and the Indian prime minister, Mr. Gujural, had a positive
meeting. And we're looking forward to additional steps toward
reconciliation between the two countries.
We hope that these reports about missile activities will
not have the effect of disrupting what is the most promising
trend we have seen in a long, long time.
Senator Cochran. That is encouraging to hear. Let me ask
you one other related question on that subject. Russia and
other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1992 agreed not
to sell nuclear technology or nuclear materials that could be
used to develop nuclear weapons to any state which had not
accepted full scope IAEA safeguards.
The sale by Russia of the two nuclear reactors to India,
which you mentioned, seems to violate that commitment. Does it,
in your opinion, and has the administration attempted to
develop a consensus among the other suppliers who make up this
group about whether to do anything about it?
Mr. Einhorn. As I mentioned earlier, Mr Chairman, we do not
believe that Russia can legitimately regard this deal as
grandfathered under the terms of this----
Senator Cochran. I know that. But what are we going to do
about it?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, what we have done is raise this issue
directly with the Russian government on a number of occasions
as well as raise it with other partners in the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, and suggest that they raise it with the
Russians to express their disapproval.
We have found no one, by the way, willing to support
Russia's interpretation of the grandfather provision of the
full scope safeguards commitment, and a number of our partners
have approached the Russians directly on it.
If there is a saving grace in this story, it is that
prospects actually for consummating this nuclear deal may be
small. The Indian government may not be prepared ultimately to
devote the very substantial resources to purchasing two large
power reactors from Russia.
And so even though both Russia and India take a very
defensive, nationalistic approach whenever challenged about the
deal, I think the actual likelihood of this deal materializing
is rather small.
Senator Cochran. Let me simply wind up by saying that I am
very pleased to hear you bring up the action that was taken by
our administration with regard to the Chinese transfers of
ingredients for chemical weapons by these Chinese exporters.
I am hopeful that we will see in the future some
determination about the identity of those in Russia who have
been doing things that are just as dangerous to the rest of the
world as what we see happening in China so that we can then
impose sanctions, if not against the government, which you
chose not to do in the case of China, then directly against the
firms, thereby saying that we would not permit the purchase of
any material or services or goods from these firms.
I think that is the nature of the sanction that our
government has imposed, specifically targeted to those
businesses and those individuals. It seems to me that that's
what we ought to be doing a better job of with regard to
Russian proliferation activities and smuggling from Russia of
prohibited weapons grade material, technologies into Iran or
into Iraq--and specifically Iraq, in violation of the U.N.
sanctions.
Do you expect that we will be able to get enough
information to be able to do something like that, and would you
be able to tell the Committee that that would be the hope and
the goal of this administration, to pursue sanctions and to
pursue them in an aggressive way?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I can assure the Subcommittee
that we will pursue very vigorously all information we have
that Russian entities are acting in a way that is inconsistent
with Russia's obligations.
We have done that. We will continue to do that. We will
continue to press the Russians to investigate, and where
applicable, we will apply our laws.
We have imposed sanctions on Russian entities on a number
of previous occasions, and that is a tool available to us. But
we need to get the facts, and we are pressing very hard on
Russian authorities to try to get the facts.
Senator Cochran. I appreciate your testimony and your being
here, and your willingness to help us as we try to deal with
this, and try to decide whether or not the laws that we have on
the books are sufficient to protect our security interests in
this proliferation area.
Thank you very much, Secretary Einhorn.
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Our next witnesses are Dr. William Potter
and Richard Speier, who will testify on Russia and missile
proliferation.
We appreciate very much your being here, and we want you to
proceed with your presentation to the Committee. I want to
first call on Dr. Potter, and then Dr. Speier.
We have copies of your prepared testimony which we will
have printed in the record in full, and we would encourage you
to make whatever summary comments you think would be helpful to
our understanding of these issues.
Dr. Potter, we will start with you. You may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM C. POTTER, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Mr. Potter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to
address this Committee on the very important issue of the post-
Soviet nuclear proliferation challenge.
This is the fifth time in the past 6 years that I have
prepared testimony on this theme for Congress, and as in the
past there remain more proliferation dangers than I can review
in the time allotted to me.
As you are aware, the main technology barrier to nuclear
weapons proliferation, both for state actors and for
subnational terrorists organizations, has been the difficulty
of obtaining weapons usable fissile material.
I do not think there is any doubt that this barrier has
been eroded as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the increased vulnerability to diversion of the
successor states' vast inventory of nuclear weapons and
inadequately safeguarded stocks of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium.
I believe that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program has made a major difference in containing many
proliferation risks in the region. Having said that, however, I
believe that other serious dangers do remain and are deeply
rooted in the very different economic, political and social
conditions in the former Soviet Union.
As such, I believe they are unlikely to be resolved until
considerably more progress is made in stabilizing the economy
and in restoring public trust in governmental institutions, law
and social justice.
Unfortunately, I doubt if these changes will occur quickly,
and as a consequence, I believe that the United States will
continue to face a variety of nuclear threats from the former
Soviet Union for the foreseeable future.
Given the time constraints before us, I think rather than
enumerate the many remaining proliferation challenges that one
could identify, I would rather focus on several of those which
are less obvious and have received less attention. I will then
identify a number of specific steps that the U.S. Government
might take to mitigate the risks that I have identified.
The first challenge that I would like to highlight, and one
that I don't believe has received adequate attention, is the
risk posed by the presence of nuclear material outside of
Russia.
In November of 1994 it was widely assumed that with the
successful conclusion of Project Sapphire the United States had
removed the last substantial quantity of highly enriched
uranium from Kazakstan. That now is known not to be the case.
Rather, in late 1995, Kazakstan notified the IAEA that some
205 kilograms of highly enriched uranium remained at its
nuclear research site in Semipalatinsk. Although the weapons
useable portion of that batch of material finally was removed
to Russia this past fall, the unanticipated discovery of a
cache of hundreds of kilograms of weapons useable material is,
I believe, a useful reminder that we probably can expect to
find further undeclared quantities of highly enriched uranium
in the non-Russian successor states.
Likely locations include Georgia, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan,
Belarus, Ukraine and Latvia, all of which either have or had
research reactors fueled with highly enriched uranium.
The second challenge, I believe, is for us to anticipate
future cases of illicit nuclear trafficking. Although the West
has generally been very lucky regrading nuclear leakage from
the former Soviet Union, despite rather sensationalist
headlines to the contrary, I don't think that we can count on
that situation persisting.
In my prepared testimony, I identify four confirmed cases
in which more than minuscule quantities of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium have been exported from the former Soviet
Union, another three cases in which HEU or plutonium were
diverted from Russian nuclear facilities, but were seized prior
to export, and an additional four cases of diversion or export
that were of proliferation concern but for which we do not have
quite as much hard evidence.
Rather than go over those points, I simply refer interested
parties to the appendices of my prepared paper. But I would
like to draw just one or two conclusions from those cases.
Perhaps most striking about the proliferation--significant
cases involving seizures of material is that much of the
material appears to have been fresh fuel for naval propulsion
reactors. It's also the case that most of the suppliers of this
material appear to have been insiders working at nuclear
research institutes, or naval bases, or having previously
worked as such facilities.
Now, if the good news is that there have been relatively
few cases, I think we also have to be concerned about several
caveats, one being how confident should we be that we have
simply not detected other cases that have transpired; and,
second, I think we have to be concerned about the lesson from
the missile area that may be applicable in the nuclear realm--
and here I am referring to the case that you already raised
with Secretary Einhorn where the U.N. Special Commission on
Iraq clearly has evidence which indicates that strategic
gyroscopes from dismantled Russian SLBMs were shipped to Iraq.
I would also add as a concern similar indications that
there may be Ukrainian-Iraqi missile contacts and contracts. In
addition, I would point to what I believe are disturbing and
continuing largely unregulated trade by the post-Soviet States
in nuclear related dual use materials, such as zirconium and
beryllium.
These activities in an environment of nuclear material
plenty but nuclear worker poverty caution against attaching too
much importance to the apparent lull in reported seizures of
proliferation significant material in Europe.
I would also like to call attention to the challenge that
we face in the sphere of nuclear terrorism. To date, little
U.S. nonproliferation assistance to the ex-U.S.S.R. has been
directed specifically to reducing terrorist threats at NIS
nuclear facilities.
These threats pertain not only to the seizure of nuclear
material, but also to attacks on or sabotage of civilian
nuclear power plants and spent fuel storage sites. I would like
to emphasize that these are not hypothetical threats.
In 1992, for example, an employee of the Ignalina nuclear
power plant in Lithuania planted a virus in the plant's
computer system that could have led to a major accident. The
same plant, in November of 1994, received two bomb threats, one
of which involved organized crime, and led to the shutdown of
the facility.
More recently, a disenchanted employee of the Severodvinsk
submarine facility, whose salary had not been paid, threatened
to blow up a shop containing two nuclear reactors.
Although Russia has taken some steps to heighten security
at civilian nuclear plants, particularly in the wake of the
conflict in Chechnya, most civilian nuclear facilities remain
deficient in such basic defensive elements as intact perimeter
fences, more than token armed guards, vehicle barriers,
surveillance cameras, metal detectors at entrances and control
cages.
Unfortunately, these gaps in perimeter defense are
compounded by an approach to the terrorist threat that is
fixated on Chechens. As the assistant director of a major
Russian nuclear research center told me not long ago, there is
little concern about perimeter defense against terrorists
since, ``Chechens look different than us, and would be
recognized before they could get close to the site.''
Even if they were recognized, it's problematic if much
force could be marshalled quickly at the scene. Indeed, I would
argue, and I don't say this facetiously, heavy fire power is
much more visible at most banks, night clubs and fur stores in
the former Soviet Union than at many nuclear facilities.
And I say that having visited seven or eight such nuclear
sites in the former Soviet Union.
If security of fissile material is suspect at nuclear
facilities in the former Soviet Union it's even more vulnerable
in transport. These are problems that in part are due to the
generic difficulty of safeguarding nuclear material or warheads
compounded by the frequency with which fissile material is
moved, both between facilities in Russia and also within
facilities.
At one nuclear facility that I visited last year near
Moscow, for example, it was apparent that all transportation to
and from that site involving fissile material was accomplished
with a single truck, one which would appear to be an inviting
target for a terrorist or criminal group.
Safeguarding transport of fissile material within many
large nuclear complexes in Russia also is a serious problem
given the frequency with which the material is moved about, in
some instances on uncovered or unescorted hand carts. The
weapons that I observed happened to be black rather than red,
but I think the image was nevertheless telling.
As troubling for nonproliferation efforts as nuclear
smuggling are indications that in recent years Russia and the
other post-Soviet States have pursued imprudent state-
sanctioned exports of nuclear technology equipment and nuclear
related dual-use commodities.
You have already noted the difficulties associated with
Russian contracts to provide nuclear assistance to Iran, to
assist in the development of China's nuclear program, and also
to build two 1000 megawatt power reactors in southern India.
I share your concern particularly with the Indian deal
because I believe if it is implemented, it definitely would be
at odds with Russia's full scope safeguard commitments. Perhaps
in the question and answer period I can provide a little more
detail which would suggest how Russia in fact has revised its
own internal nuclear export regulations to take account of this
Indian export generated grandfather clause. Initially their
regulation did not have this caveat in place.
High level political commitment to export controls also has
been slow to materialize in Ukraine and the Baltic States,
which only recently began to develop meaningful export control
procedures and expertise. There have been a number of cases
involving these states, for example, in which sensitive, dual-
use nuclear items were either exported in violation of
establish export control procedures, or due to the absence of
such regulations.
Unfortunately, from the standpoint of nonproliferation,
improving export controls remains a low priority, not only for
Russia, but for most, if not all, of the post-Soviet States.
Finally, with respect to my short list of proliferation
challenges, is the need to enhance the security of sub-
strategic nuclear weapons in Russia. It is typically assumed in
the West that notwithstanding shortcomings in the civilian
nuclear sector, that physical security is high in the military
domain.
Although it may be higher in the military realm than at
most civilian sites, I would argue that the situation is not
good, and in fact is apt to deteriorate further before it gets
better. Most vulnerable to theft are older sub-strategic
nuclear weapons that are relatively small in size and lack
permissive action links to protect unauthorized use.
The security of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Russia
today is compromised by a number of things, including the lack
of adequate storage facilities to handle the influx of
warheads, by the continuing turmoil, and economic hardship, and
general malaise within the armed forces.
I am particularly concerned about the vulnerability of
theft of these sub-strategic systems by disgruntled past or
present Russian Special Operations (Spetsnaz) soldiers who were
trained to use atomic demolition weapons, and may have special
knowledge or even access to nuclear weapons storage depots.
Tactical weapons for aircraft pose particular risks since they
are not kept at better guarded central storage sites.
The problem of sub-strategic nuclear weapons is magnified
by Russia's growing reliance on nuclear arms as its
conventional forces deteriorate. I think this dependency is
reflected in Russia's abandonment in 1993 of its no first use
nuclear policy, and in the open discussion among prominent
Russian military and defense industry figures of the need to
develop a new generation of nuclear munitions for tactical and
battlefield use.
The dangers in this shift of emphasis are compounded
because of Moscow's reliance on a launch-on-warning nuclear
strategy and by the deterioration of Russia's early warning
system, large portions of which existed in other post-Soviet
States.
Having identified some of the problems, let me turn briefly
to some steps that might be taken to reduce those difficulties.
First, I believe the United States should seek to reduce the
quantity of fissile material which must be protected and the
number of sites where fissile material is stored.
As part of a program of consolidation and elimination, I
would recommend that the U.S. should undertake to negotiate the
purchase of all highly enriched uranium known to reside at
research facilities in the non-Russian successor states.
Given the relatively small, but nevertheless significant,
quantities of weapons useable material at sites in Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, that I
calculate to be slightly under 200 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium, a uranium buy up approach to the non-Russian republics
represents, I believe, a low cost, high return nonproliferation
strategy.
To the extent that HEU is actually being used by research
facilities, the United States also should provide the small
amount of money needed to convert the research reactor to run
on low enriched uranium.
Parenthetically, I might note the principal obstacle to
this HEU purchase plan is not resistance on the part of the
successor states, but rather is the difficulty of gaining
inter-agency agreement in the United States. This difficulty is
a direct product of the inter-agency battles that were waged
during the ultimately successful operation of Project Sapphire.
My second recommendation is to expand CTR cooperation in
the area of reactor security. Nuclear power plants in the
Soviet Union were not designed to confront current terrorist
threats which could lead to catastrophic accidents with global
consequences.
More attention should be given under the Nunn-Lugar program
to enhanced reactor security as a part of a large effort to
strengthen international and national nuclear safeguards. At a
minimum, current physical protection efforts need to be
coordinated with work to upgrade the safety and security of the
four dozen nuclear power reactors currently operating in five
post-Soviet States.
My third recommendation is to pursue negotiated constraints
on sub-strategic nuclear weapons. As you know, nuclear weapons
of a non-strategic variety have not figured prominently in the
arms control and disarmament agenda since the important Bush
and Gorbachev initiatives in the fall of 1991. It is precisely
this category of nuclear weapons that poses the greatest risk
in terms of vulnerability to theft, and/or unauthorized use. A
number of steps need to be taken, including the codification in
a legally binding treaty of the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev
declarations on the withdrawal of sub-strategic weapons.
Finally, more attention must be given to sustaining those
important nonproliferation initiatives that already have been
begun in the former Soviet Union.
I believe it is vital to U.S. national security to continue
to support the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. It is now
time, however, to confront the problem of sustainability and
the issue of facilitating the rational transfer of
responsibility for physical protection and material control
activities from the United States to the NIS and especially to
Russia.
A step in the right direction, I believe, is the recently
established safeguards training center in Obninsk, Russia which
will reinforce indigenous physical protection efforts by
educating a new generation of specialists who will serve as
both practitioners and instructors. Much more, however, needs
to be done to create incentives in the post-Soviet States to
foster indigenous safeguards efforts and to sustain those
activities once they have begun.
Unfortunately, an influx of money alone will not solve that
problem. A sustained educational effort is required to change
attitudes and to instill a new nonproliferation and safeguards
philosophy or culture. This is a task, I believe, for which
non-governmental organizations are particularly well suited to
perform.
Let me conclude, therefore, by calling for much closer
cooperation between the U.S. Government and the non-
governmental community in the provision of such educational
assistance and in the pursuit of mutual nonproliferation
objectives.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Potter follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. POTTER
the post-soviet nuclear proliferation challenge
Nature of the Problem
The main technical barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation, both
for state actors and sub-national terrorist organizations, has been the
difficulty of obtaining weapons-usable fissile material. There is
little doubt that this barrier has been eroded as a consequence of the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the increased vulnerability to
diversion of the successor states' vast inventory of nuclear weapons
and inadequately safeguarded stocks of highly-enriched uranium (HEU)
and plutonium.
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program has made a
major difference in containing many proliferation risks in the region.
Other serious dangers, however, remain and are deeply rooted in the
difficult economic, political, and social conditions of the post-Soviet
States. As such, they are unlikely to be resolved until progress is
made in stabilizing the economy and restoring public trust in
governmental institutions, law, and social justice. These changes will
not occur quickly, and the United States will thus continue to face a
variety of nuclear threats from the former Soviet Union for the
foreseeable future.
Given severe time constraints, rather than enumerate the many
remaining proliferation challenges, I will focus on several that are
less obvious and have received inadequate attention. I will then
propose specific steps the U.S. government should take to mitigate
these risks.
Don't Assume that the Problem Outside of Russia Has Been Solved
In November 1994 it was widely assumed that with the successful
conclusion of Project Sapphire, the United States had removed the last
substantial quantity of HEU from Kazakstan. That now is known not to be
the case. Rather, in late 1995, Kazakstan notified the International
Atomic Energy Agency that 205 kilograms of HEU remained at its
Semipalatinsk nuclear research site. Although the weapons-usable
portion of that batch of material finally was removed to Russia in Fall
1996, the unanticipated discovery of a cache of hundreds of kilograms
of weapons-usable material is a useful reminder that we probably can
expect to find further undeclared quantities of HEU in the non-Russian
successor states. Likely locations include Georgia, Uzbekistan,
Belarus, Ukraine, and Latvia--all of which have (or had) research
reactors fueled with HEU.
Anticipate Future Cases of Illicit Nuclear Trafficking
The West has been extremely lucky regarding nuclear leakage from
the former Soviet Union. Despite frequent sensationalist headlines to
the contrary, it appears to have avoided an influx of militarily
significant nuclear goods from the ex-USSR. Since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, one can identify only four confirmed cases in which more
than minuscule quantities of HEU or plutonium have been exported from
the former Soviet Union, and another three cases in which HEU or
plutonium were diverted from Russian nuclear facilities, but were
seized prior to export. At least four additional cases of diversion
and/or export are of proliferation concern, but do not as clearly meet
the standard of unambiguous evidence with respect to either independent
sources to corroborate the diversion, or the size or enrichment level
of the material. (See Appendices One and Two for a summary of the
important characteristics of these cases).
Perhaps most striking about this set of proliferation-significant
cases is the preponderance of seizures involving definite or possible
fresh fuel for naval propulsion reactors. Most of the suppliers of
material in these cases appear to have been ``insiders,'' working at
nuclear research institutes or naval bases, or having previously worked
at such facilities. None of the seizures to date provide any evidence
of having a nuclear weapon's origin.
One must be careful, however, about drawing conclusions from this
small body of confirmed diversion and/or export cases. First, one
legitimately may ask, ``How confident should we be that proliferation-
significant exports of NIS origin material have simply escaped
detection?'' Given the underdeveloped state of export controls in the
former Soviet Union outside of Russia and the virtual absence of any
barriers to movement of sensitive goods and material between Russia and
the other CIS states, it is entirely possible, although not proven,
that significant amounts of nuclear material and technology already may
have exited Russia via a number of southern routes (e.g., through the
Caucasus or Central Asia).
In addition, while there is no hard evidence that nuclear
proliferants have illegally provided HEU or plutonium from the ex-USSR,
there is indisputable evidence that would-be proliferants have been
able to acquire key missile system components of Russian origin. The UN
Special Commission on Iraq, for example, has documents which indicate
that strategic gyroscopes from dismantled Russian SLBMs have been
shipped to Iraq. Similar concerns exist regarding Ukrainian-Iraqi
missile contacts and contracts. Also disturbing is the continuing,
largely unregulated trade by the post-Soviet States in nuclear-related
dual-use materials such as zirconium and beryllium. These activities
and an environment of nuclear material plenty but nuclear worker
poverty, caution against attaching too much importance to the apparent
lull in reported seizures of proliferation-significant material in
Europe.
Take Measures to Reduce the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism
To date, little U.S. nonproliferation assistance to the former
Soviet Union has been directed specifically to mitigating terrorist
threats at NIS nuclear facilities. These threats pertain not only to
the seizure of nuclear material (or even larger and less secure stocks
of chemical weapons agents), but also to attacks on or sabotage of
civilian nuclear power plants and spent fuel storage sites.
These are not hypothetical threats. In 1992, for example, an
employee of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania planted a
virus in the plant's computer systems that could have led to a major
accident. The same plant in late 1994 received two bomb threats, one of
which involved organized crime and led to the shutdown of the facility.
More recently, a disenchanted employee of the Severodvinsk submarine
facility whose salary had not been paid threatened to blow up a shop
containing two nuclear reactors.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For a more detailed discussion of these and other terrorist
incidents in the former Soviet Union, see Oleg Bukharin, ``Upgrading
Security of Nuclear Power Plants in the Newly Independent States,'' The
Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1997), pp. 28-39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the Russians, in response to the Chechen conflict, have
taken some steps to heighten security at civilian nuclear power plants,
most civilian nuclear facilities are deficient in such basic defensive
elements as intact perimeter fences, more than token armed guards,
vehicle barriers, surveillance cameras, metal detectors at entrances,
and control cages. Unfortunately, these gaps in perimeter defense are
compounded by an approach to the terrorist threat that is fixated on
Chechens. As the assistant director of one major Russian nuclear
research center told me not long ago, there is little concern about
perimeter defense against terrorists since ``Chechens look different
than us'' and would be recognized before they could get close to the
site. Even if they were recognized, it is problematic if much force
could be marshaled quickly at the scene. Indeed, heavy firepower is
more visible at most banks, nightclubs, and fur stores in the former
Soviet Union than at many nuclear facilities.
If security of fissile material is suspect at nuclear facilities in
the former Soviet Union, it is even more vulnerable in transport. This
problem results from the generic difficulty of safeguarding nuclear
material (and warheads) in transit, compounded by the frequency with
which fissile material is moved between facilities in Russia, the lack
of sufficient dedicated nuclear transport vehicles, and less than clear
lines of organizational responsibility for protecting material in
transit. At one major nuclear facility near Moscow, for example, all
transportation of HEU to other facilities is accomplished with a single
truck--one that would appear to be an inviting target for a terrorist
or criminal group. Safeguarding transport of fissile material within
many large nuclear complexes in Russia also is a serious problem given
the frequency with which significant amounts of material is moved
daily, often on uncovered or unescorted handcarts.
Discourage State-Sanctioned Exports
As troubling for nonproliferation efforts as nuclear smuggling are
indications that in recent years Russia and other post-Soviet States
have pursued imprudent, state-sanctioned exports of nuclear technology,
equipment, and nuclear related dual-use commodities.
In Russia, a tendency to emphasize profits over nonproliferation is
evident in contracts to provide nuclear assistance to Iran, in
agreements to assist the development of China's nuclear program
(including provision of reactors and a uranium enrichment plant), and
in plans to build two 1000 MWe VVER-type reactors at Koodankulam in
southern India. The Indian deal, if implemented, is particularly
serious as it would be at odds with Russia's pledge to insist upon
full- scope safeguards (i.e., international safeguards on all
facilities) as a condition of nuclear export.
High-level political commitment to export controls also has been
slow to materialize in Ukraine and the Baltic states, which only
recently began to develop meaningful export control procedures and
expertise. There have been a number of cases involving these states,
for example, in which sensitive dual-use nuclear items were exported
either in violation of established export control procedures or due to
the absence of such regulations. Unfortunately, from the standpoint of
nonproliferation, improving export controls remains a low priority
issue for most of the post-Soviet States.
Enhance the Security of Sub-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
It typically is assumed in the West that, notwithstanding
shortcomings in the civilian nuclear sector, physical security is high
in the military domain. Although security at military facilities
probably remains much higher than at most civilian sites, the situation
is not good and is apt to deteriorate further before it gets better.
Most vulnerable to theft are older sub-strategic nuclear weapons that
are relatively small in size and lack ``permissive action links''
(PALs) to protect unauthorized use.
The security of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Russia today is
compromised by the lack of adequate storage facilities to handle the
influx of warheads and by the continuing turmoil, economic hardship,
and general malaise within the armed forces. Sub-strategic nuclear
warheads are particularly vulnerable to theft by disgruntled past or
present Russian Special Operations (Spetsnaz) soldiers, who are trained
to use atomic demolition weapons and may have special knowledge of and
even access to nuclear weapon storage depots. Tactical nuclear weapons
for aircraft pose special risks since they are not kept at central
storage sites.
The problem of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Russia is magnified
by Russia's growing reliance on nuclear arms as its conventional forces
deteriorate. This dependency is reflected in Russia's abandonment in
1993 of its no-first use policy, and in the open discussion among
prominent Russian military and defense industry figures of the need to
develop a new generation of nuclear munitions for tactical and
battlefield use. Some advocates of tactical nuclear weapons go so far
as to contemplate Russian abrogation of the 1987 INF Treaty. The
dangers in this shift of emphasis are compounded because of Moscow's
reliance on a ``launch-on-warning'' nuclear strategy and by the
deterioration of Russia's early warning system.
What Is to Be Done?
There is no shortage of good recommendations about what needs to be
done to address these urgent proliferation problems, and a number of
these suggestions actually have been adopted as U.S. policy. Let me
suggest several additional steps that might be taken: \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ An extended list of policy recommendations is provided in two
recent publications: John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds.,
Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997),
especially pp. 385-405; and Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S.
Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and
Technologies in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Purchase all HEU from Non-Russian Successor States
The United States should seek to reduce the quantity of fissile
material which must be protected and the number of sites where fissile
material is stored. As part of a program of consolidation and
elimination, the U.S. should undertake to negotiate the purchase of all
HEU known to reside at research facilities in the non-Russian successor
states. Given the relatively small, but nevertheless significant,
quantities of weapons-usable material at sites in Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakstan, Latvia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, a uranium ``buy-up''
approach to the non-Russian republics represents a low cost, high
return nonproliferation strategy.
To the extent that HEU actually is being used by research
facilities (as is the case at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in
Uzbekistan), the United States also should provide the small amount of
money needed to convert the research reactor to run on low-enriched
uranium. Plans for such conversion already have been drawn up by
Russian engineers and could be implemented at some sites in three-four
months at about $1 million per reactor. Parenthetically, the principal
obstacle to the HEU purchase plan is the difficulty of gaining
interagency agreement in the United States. This difficulty is a
product of the interagency battles that were waged during the
ultimately successful operation of ``Project Sapphire.''
2. Expand CTR Cooperation in the Area of Reactor Security
Nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union were not designed to
confront current terrorist threats which could lead to catastrophic
accidents with global consequences. More attention should be given
under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to enhance
reactor security as part of the larger effort to strengthen the
national nuclear safeguards system. At a minimum, current MPC&A efforts
need to be coordinated with work to upgrade the safety and security of
the four dozen nuclear power reactors currently operating in five post-
Soviet States.
3. Negotiate Constraints on Sub-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear weapons of a non-strategic variety have not figured
prominently in the arms control and disarmament agenda since the Bush
and Gorbachev initiatives in the fall of 1991. Yet it is precisely this
category of nuclear weapons that poses the greatest risk in terms of
vulnerability to theft and early and/or unauthorized use.\3\ A number
of steps need to be taken, including the codification in a legally
binding treaty of the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev declarations on the
withdrawal of sub-strategic weapons.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ On this point, see Bruce Blair, ``Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on National Security,'' March 13, 1997.
\4\ These steps are elaborated on by the author in ``Unsafe At Any
Size,'' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/June 1997), pp. 25-27
and 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Focus on Sustainability
I believe it is vital to U.S. national security to continue to
support the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. It is now time,
however, to confront the problem of sustainability and the issue of
facilitating the transfer of responsibility for MPC&A activities from
the United States to the NIS, and especially Russia.
A step in the right direction is the recently established MPC&A
training center in Obninsk, Russia, which will reinforce indigenous
MPC&A efforts by educating a new generation of specialists who will
serve as both practitioners and instructors. Much more, however, must
be done to create incentives in the post-Soviet States to foster
indigenous safeguards efforts and to sustain those activities once they
have begun.
An influx of money alone will not solve the problem. A sustained
educational effort is required to change attitudes and to instill a new
nonproliferation and safeguards philosophy or culture. This is a task
for which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are particularly well
suited to perform. Let me conclude, therefore, by calling for much
closer cooperation between the U.S. government and NGOs in the
provision of such educational assistance and in the pursuit of mutual
nonproliferation objectives.
APPENDIX ONE--CHRONOLOGY OF PROLIFERATION-SIGNIFICANT CASES OF DIVERSION
OF PROBABLE FSU-ORIGIN HEU AND PLUTONIUM
Date of Diversion: May-September 1992
Date of Seizure: October 9, 1992
Amount: 1.538 kg of HEU in the form of UO2
Description of Material: HEU (90% enrichment level)
Point of Origin: Luch Scientific Production Association,
Podolsk
Point of Seizure: Podolsk, Russia
Date of Diversion: July 29, 1993
Date of Seizure: August 1993
Amount: 1.8 kg of enriched uranium
Description of Material: HEU (approximately 36% enrichment level)
Point of Origin: Andreeva Guba Fuel Storage Area, Russia
Point of Seizure: Andreeva Guba
Date of Diversion: November 27, 1993
Date of Seizure: June 1994
Amount: 4.5 kg enriched uranium
Description of Material: HEU (approximately 20% enrichment level)
Point of Origin: Fuel Storage Area 3-30, Sevmorput Shipyard
near Murmansk
Point of Seizure: Polyarny (near Murmansk, Russia)
Date of Diversion: ?
Date of Seizure: May 10, 1994
Amount: 5.6 grams Pu-239
Description of Material: 99.78 pure Pu-239
Point of Origin: ?
Point of Seizure: Baden-Wuertemberg (Tengen), Germany
Date of Diversion: ?
Date of Seizure: June 13, 1994
Amount: 800 milligrams
Description of Material: HEU (enriched to 87.7 %)
Point of Origin: ?
Point of Seizure: Landshut, Germany
Date of Diversion: ?
Date of Seizure: August 10, 1994
Amount: 560 grams of mixed-oxide of plutonium and
uranium (363 grams of Pu-239)
Description of Material: Mixed-Oxide (MOX) fuel
Point of Origin: Institute of Physics and Power Engineering,
Obninsk (?)
Point of Seizure: Munich, Germany
Date of Diversion: ?
Date of Seizure: December 14, 1994
Amount: 2.72 kg of HEU in the form of UO2
Description of Material: HEU enriched to 87.7% U-235
Point of Origin: Obninsk (?)
Point of Seizure: Prague, Czech Republic
APPENDIX TWO--ADDITIONAL CASES OF POSSIBLE PROLIFERATION CONCERN
Date of Diversion: 1992
Date of Seizure: May 1993
Amount: Approximately 150 grams of HEU implanted in
beryllium
Description of Material: HEU
Point of Origin: Institute of Physics and Power Engineering,
Obninsk
Point of Seizure: Vilnius, Lithuania
Date of Diversion: March 1994
Date of Seizure: June 1994
Amount: 3.05 kg of HEU
Description of Material: HEU (approximately 90%-U-235) in the form
of UO2
Point of Origin: Electrostal
Point of Seizure: St. Petersburg, Russia
Date of Diversion:
Date of Seizure: January 1995
Amount: Less than 1 kg of HEU
Description of Material: HEU enriched to 87.7% U-235 in the form of
UO2
Point of Origin: Obninsk (?)
Point of Seizure: Prague, Czech Republic
Date of Diversion:
Date of Seizure: March 1995
Amount: 6 kg of HEU enriched to about 20% U-235
Description of Material: HEU (20% enrichment level)
Point of Origin: ?
Point of Seizure: Kiev, Ukraine
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Dr. Potter.
When I was introducing our witnesses as I opened the
session today, I did not mention that Dr. Speier had been in
the administration and helped develop our missile technology
control regime, participated in monitoring that, and is an
expert in nuclear nonproliferation issues as well, having
served in the government until 1994 when he retired and became
an independent consultant.
We appreciate very much your participation in our hearing
today. You may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD H. SPEIER, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT
Mr. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to
testify on recent Russian actions affecting missile
proliferation. In addition to my full statement which you have
put into the record, Mr. Chairman, with your permission I will
submit a recent policy brief distributed in the last week by
the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center that gives an
independent view on the same matters that I will be discussing.
Senator Cochran. That's good to have, and we appreciate it.
It will be included in the record. Thank you.
[The information of Mr. Speier follows:]
RECKLESS RUSSIAN ROCKET EXPORTS
A Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Policy Brief
Introduction
Whatever one might say about the vitality of U.S.-Russian security
cooperation, Russian missile proliferation is still an embarrassment.
In fact, not more than a week after the White House announced its
agreement with President Yelstin over what kinds of theater missile
defenses the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 allows,
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu protested Russia's transfer of the
means to make a 1,250 mile-range Russian-designed rocket to Iran.\1\
These missile exports, along with others to Armenia, Iraq, Syria,
China, India, and Brazil, all fly in the face of Moscow's repeated
pledges to the U.S. and others to adhere to the Missile Technology
Control Regime. More important, they track the Administration's
repeated failure to employ U.S. nonproliferation sanctions laws to
deter such behavior or to suspend U.S. government-sanctioned space
cooperation and satellite transfers to Moscow. If Congress takes its
laws and Russian missile proliferation seriously, it should act both to
eliminate existing loopholes that encourage Executive inaction and to
condition future U.S.-Russian space commerce on Russia living up to its
nonproliferation obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Martin Sieff, ``Albright OKs Saddam's Ouster, Washington
Times, March 27, 1997, p. A13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia's Missile Nonproliferation Promises
Communist Russia first publicly pledged to uphold the objectives of
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in June of 1990. Five
months later, however, it was caught violating this pledge in sharing
missile production technology for development of an entire upper rocket
stage with India. This promoted imposition of U.S. missile
proliferation sanctions in May of 1992.\2\ Two years later, after
securing Moscow's pledge to stop lending India missile production
assistance, the Clinton Administration made the Russian Republic an
adherent to the MTCR late for purposes of U.S. law. In exchange for
nearly $1 billion in U.S. commercial and government-to-government space
cooperation through the year 2000, Russia claimed it had renegotiated
its space cooperation with India to exclude transfers that would
violate the MTCR. Finally, satisfied that Moscow had created an
effective legal system of export controls, the White House sponsored
Moscow's formal entry into the MTCR in 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See Andrew Lawler, ``U.S. Sanctions Imposed; Indian Deal With
Russia Still On,'' Space News, May 18-24, 1992, p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It's Proliferating Performance
Clearly, the White House has tried to give Moscow every positive
incentive not to help other nations acquire missiles. Yet, throughout
President Clinton's tenure, Russia has been caught exporting extremely
sensitive missile technology and hardware. Thus, just one month after
U.S. officials got Russia to agree to stop lending India missile
production assistance, Moscow was caught air-shipping North Korean SCUD
missile launchers and other components to Syria.\3\ This, in turn, was
followed a month later with Russia's transfer of its most advanced
missile technology to China. Under a 5-year defense cooperation
agreement with China, Russia sent solid rocket fuel technology, mobile
missile know-how, large liquid rocket engines, missile guidance and
multiple warhead hardware and technology and hundreds of Russian
missile experts to help the PRC develop its own version of Russia's
highly accurate, intercontinental SS-25 missile.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See John P. Hannah, ``How Russia Still Abets Mideast Terror,''
The Wall Street Journal, September 15, 1993.
\4\ See John J. Fialka, The Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1993,
p. A12 and Martin Sief, The Washington Times, November 12, 1993, p.
A16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nor did Russia end its missile assistance to India. Having agreed
in July of 1993 to stop helping India build cryogenic rockets, Moscow
insisted that it needed until November of 1993 to renegotiate its
Indian contracts. Russia did this but, in addition, it sent New Delhi
blueprints (something MTCR clearly prohibits) along with at least four-
fifths of the related production technology to build the engines. Then,
six months after Russia's self-imposed November deadline, U.S.
contractors negotiating space launches with Salyut/Krunichev in Moscow
found the Russians working with six-foot high, high-fidelity mockup of
the Indian rocket that Russia was supposed to have cut off missile
production assistance to. According to the Russians, this detailed
model was being used to teach Indian scientists precisely how to launch
their rockets.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See Vivek Raghuvanshi, ``Russia, India Discuss Cryogenic
Contract,'' Space News, November 15-28, 1993; ``Export Saga,'' Aviation
Week, October 25, 1993, p. 19; and House Committee on Science, Space
and Technology staff Memo to Congressman Sensenbrenner, ``Potential
Russian Violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime, August 1,
1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, Russia's transfers of missile technology did not end
here. A year later, in late May of 1995, the White House waived missile
proliferation sanctions against Russia for helping Brazil with the
casings on a large rocket known as the VLS project. Administration
officials explained this missile misdeed away claiming that the
Russians agreed to this sale before it promised the United States not
to conduct such trade. After talking with the Brazilians, though, U.S.
officials learned that Russia had helped Brazil on many more components
than the rocket casings and that the cooperation had been going on for
some time.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ R. Jeffrey Smith, ``U.S. Waives Objection to Russian Missile
Technology Sale to Brazil,'' The Washington Post, June 8, 1995, p. A23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The next Russian missile misdeed to hit the press was its attempted
missile guidance shipments to Iraq, which Jordanian authorities
interdicted in November of 1995. Since Desert Storm, the U.N.
resolutions have prohibited all military trade with Iraq. Yet, on 10
November, 30 crates containing 115 Russian-made gyroscopes from
dismantled intercontinental-range missiles were air shipped from Russia
aboard an Royal Jordanian aircraft to Amman. These components were
destined for Karama, Iraq's missile development center. At first, the
Russians denied any involvement. Then, U.S. State Department officials
admitted that the Russians did ship the gyroscopes but claimed that the
shipment was ``aberrational,'' that, again, Russian authorities
``tried'' but could not find the Russian perpetrator of the sale.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, December 15, 1995, p.
A30 and James Bruce, Jane's Defence Weekly, January 3, 1996, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran and Armenia: Moscow's Latest Missile Customers
Perhaps the most frightening act of Russian rocket recklessness was
first reported in early February: It was caught selling Iran the means
to produce a SS-4, a 1,250 mile-range missile that could reach all of
Saudi Arabia and Israel.\8\ This missile can carry a 4,400 pound
warhead but is so inaccurate, it is only useful for delivering nuclear
or biological warheads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See Robin Wright, ``Russia Warned on Helping Iran Missile
Program,'' The Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1997 and Barbara Opal,
``Israelis Say Russia Aids Iran's Quest for Missiles,'' Defense News,
February 10-16, 1997, p. 1; and Bill Gertz, ``Russia Disregards Pledge
to Curb Iran Missile Output,'' The Washington Times, May 22, 1997, p.
A3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. officials learned of this deal only when General Amos Gilad,
director of research for Israeli military intelligence visited
Washington just days before Russian Prime Minister Vicktor Chernomyrdin
was to meet with Vice Present Gore February 6. The timing was hardly
accidental. The Israelis could have briefed their U.S. counterparts
privately at any time. Instead, they chose to wait until just before
the Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting in a fashion that the Administration
could not ignore. First, the Israeli delegation briefed the area desks
at State and Defense; then, the delegation briefed the various U.S.
intelligence agencies; and then the House and Senate intelligence
committee staffs. Finally, as news of their briefings leaked to the
press, the Vice President demanded a briefing.
Vice President Gore did, in fact, bring the SS-4 deal to Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin's attention. The Prime Minister, though, denied
that his government authorized the sale. He did admit that this deal
would violate Boris Yeltsin's 1994 pledge not to engage in further arms
sales to Iran. More important, the transfer presents a serious security
threat to the entire Middle East and is a clear violation of the MTCR.
Finally, there's Russia's recent sale of missiles to Armenia. In
this case, Russia sold eight Scud-B launchers with enough missiles--24
to 32--to ``complete demolish,'' (in the words of the Chairman of
Russia's Duma Defense Committee), Armenia's Azerbaijani foes in
Baku.\9\ Although these transfers continued as late as last year,
Russian officials claim that they were only able to confirm them early
this winter. Washington officials, meanwhile, privately are raising
doubts that any ``transfer'' technically took place. The Scud missile
systems, they note, after all, were on Armenian soil under Soviet
control prior to their actual sale.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See Nikolai Novichkov, ``Russia Details Illegal Deliveries to
Armenia,'' Jane's Defence Weekly, April 16, 1997 and Glen E. Howard,
``Oil and Missiles in the Caucasus,'' The Wall Street Journal, May 14,
1991, p. A22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What's to Be Done?
Under U.S. law, adherents and formal members of the MTCR cannot be
sanctioned for missile exports unless they allow the MTCR guidelines to
be violated and fail to make an earnest effort to prosecute the
perpetrators. The law also requires sanctions only when a proliferator
has acted ``knowingly.'' These provisions, in effect, have been used by
the Executive to serve as a blanket exemption for Russia from
sanctions.\10\ Thus, repeatedly, Administration officials have argued
that Russia did not authorize or ``know'' of the missile misdeeds
identified or that they have been unable to identify the perpetrators
or are in the mist of disciplining some lower-level official. This has
prompted justified calls for tightening up existing nonproliferation
sanctions laws.\11\ The Administration, instead, has focused on
diplomacy. Last fall, U.S. officials shared a detailed list of current
troublesome Russian missile transactions with Moscow officials in hopes
that they would stop these deals. So far, the Russians have admitted
nothing and it's unclear if they have stopped any of these deals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See Testimony of Henry Sokolski, ``America's Fight Against
Strategic Weapons Proliferation: Why and How We Can Do Better,'' Senate
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Acquisitions and Technology,
March 27, 1966.
\11\ See, e.g., the initial findings of The Nonproliferation Policy
Reform Task Force, ``Nonproliferation Policy Reform: Enhancing the Role
of Congress'' (Washington, DC: The Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center, June 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clearly, if we are serious about our security, we need to do
better. It's too late for the Executive to undo the harm Russian
missile proliferation has already done. But Congress can make sure
Russia has an interest in stopping future proliferation. In fact, the
U.S. has considerable leverage if it chooses to use it: Most of
Russia's cash-earning space launches are of U.S.-made satellites that
require U.S. export licenses. In addition, the U.S. continues to fund
much of Russia's participation in NASA projects. Together, these
activities are worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually in hard
currency to Russia's space industry. These space firms are the ones
whose technology is being sold and who are closest to those doing the
proliferating.
The pros and cons of tying future approval of U.S. export licenses
and funding of Russian participation to the absences of more missile
misdeeds are likely to be taken up in planned hearings of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation and Federal Services. Such oversight comes none too soon.
The U.S. backed Russia's membership into the MTCR and offered it space
cooperation.because the White House claimed Moscow had finally
established a sound system missile technology export controls. If there
is no such system, we need to know. Certainly, the last thing we would
want is for U.S. space commerce and cooperation to subsidize more
missile proliferation.
RECKLESS RUSSIAN ROCKET EXPORTS
White House
Action Taken to
Russian Missile Enforce U.S.
Misdeed Administration Assessment Missile
Technology
Sanctions Law
Air ships North Korean Tel erector launcher units may NONE
SCUD launchers to have been mistaken by Russians
Syria (8/93) to be trucks
Sells China mobile, Russia made these transfers as NONE
multiple-war-head, an MTCR adherent and so is
high-accuracy solid legally exempt from US
and liquid missile sanctions. Acting against
technology to Beijing would jeopardize U.S.-
modernize its aging China relations
strategic rocket
forces (1993)
Russian rocket builder Shown evidence of Russia's NONE
says it's still continued missile assistance
lending India space to India and warned it could
launch integration jeopardize $100's of millions
tech (6/94) despite in U.S.-Russian space
MTCR and Russia's 7/ cooperation, White House tells
93 pledge not to give House Space Committee Chairman
India missile (9/94) CIA will ``look into
production assistance the matter''
Washington Post Waived U.S. missile sanctions NONE
reports Russia has against Brazil and Russia
been helping Brazil (citing US national security
build a large rocket interest), admitted both into
(6/8/95) the MTCR because of their
creation of a ``sound''
systems of nonproliferation
export controls
Ships intercontinental- Shipment of gyroscopes was an NONE
range ballistic ``aberrational'' action.
missile guidance sets Russian efforts to find who
to Iraq. Jordan was responsible are
interdicts ship- inconclusive
shipment (11/95)
Sells Iran 1,250-mile Administration official is NONE
range missile quoted in Los Angeles Times
production technology explaining that the transfer
(96-97) may have been ``beyond the
control of the government'' (2/
12/97)
Sells Armenia 8 Scud-B Administration officials claim NONE
missile launchers that there may have been no
with 24-32 missiles ``transfer'' since the Scud
(through late 1996) systems were in Armenia under
Soviet control prior to the
sale. Russian officials claim
that they were only able to
confirm these sales recently
Mr. Speier. Mr. Chairman, we are fortunate to be living in
a time of world peace, but what kind of a peace is it? Ambrose
Bierce, the great American cynic, defined peace as ``a period
of cheating between two periods of fighting.''
Mr. Chairman, there is a system of international rules and
procedures called the Missile Technology Control Regime. The
purpose of the MTCR is to limit the proliferation of missiles
capable of delivering mass destruction weapons. Twenty-nine
nations are now formal members of the MTCR. They include
Russia.
But it appears that there is some cheating going on. Is
Russia cheating? If so, what should we do about it? I shall
address these questions by first summarizing the key rules of
the MTCR, then recent Russian actions, and then implications
for policy.
The MTCR is a non-treaty arrangement that has been in
effect for 10 years. To understand its key rules, I must ask
you, Mr. Chairman, to understand one phrase of MTCR jargon--
Category One systems.
Category One systems are unmanned delivery vehicles that
can send a 500 kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilometers.
Category One systems are rockets and unmanned air vehicles,
such as cruise missiles, but of any kind--civilian or military,
as long as they meet the 500 kilogram, 300 kilometer
parameters.
Category One systems also include technology, production
equipment and certain major components. Category One systems
include Scud missiles, as well as those of greater capability.
Category One systems are the target of the MCTR's rules for
export restraint.
Given this bit of jargon, the MTCR has three key rules.
First, there is a strong presumption to deny exports of
Category One systems, regardless of purpose. On the rare
occasions when they are exported, the supplier government, and
not just the recipient, must take responsibility for ensuring
end use.
Second, there is a strong presumption to deny exports of
any missile intended for the delivery of mass destruction
weapons regardless of its range of payload. This denial rule
extends to every item controlled by the MTCR, as long as that
item is intended for the delivery of nuclear, biological or
chemical weapons.
And, third, there is a flat prohibition against exporting
complete production facilities, or complete production
technology, for Category One systems. In a nonproliferation
regime, it makes no sense to create new suppliers of the most
sensitive items.
The United States, since late 1990, has supplemented these
rules with legislated sanctions against foreign actions that
contribute to the proliferation of Category One systems.
These sanctions have encouraged export restraint by some
governments, but by law the sanctions do not apply to transfers
approved by any of the governments of the 29 members of the
MTCR.
Given these rules of the MTCR, I shall now summarize
relevant actions by Russia, starting in 1993, the year that
Russia formerly agreed to abide by the guidelines of the MTCR.
Nineteen hundred ninety three--Russia was faced with U.S.
sanctions for the export of Category One rocket engines and
their production technology to India.
So it made a deal with the U.S. Russia agreed in July, 1993
to halt the transfer of the technology, and to abide by the
rules of the MTCR without yet becoming a full member of the
regime. In return, the U.S. agreed to make Russia a space
station partner, and to allow U.S. satellites to be launched by
Russian rockets.
But Russian transfer of rocket engine technology continued
to go to India, although it was supposed to have ceased. It
continued for another 6 weeks, until all aspects of the
agreement were formally in place, resulting in the transfers
being 60 to 80 percent completed.
1994--there are no public reports of Russian Category One
exports in that year. But the U.S. Government is concerned
about Russian activities involving China, India, Iran, Libya,
North Korea and Syria.
So the U.S. refuses to approve full Russian membership in
the MTCR. The criteria for MTCR membership, as you yourself
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, include the ability to control
missile-related exports, and the actual cessation of actions
inconsistent with the MTCR.
1995--the U.S. catches Russia aiding Brazil in the
development of a Category One space launch vehicle, but the
U.S. waives the imposition of sanctions. Instead, the U.S.
agrees to support full Russian membership in the MTCR,
presumably because Russia has met the criteria for membership.
In August 1995, Russia becomes a full member. One month
later, in September, a Russian lieutenant general states
publicly that if NATO expands eastward, Russia will export
nuclear and missile items to Algeria, India, Iran and Iraq.
Two months after that, in November, the missile guidance
systems that we have already discussed, salvaged from missiles
with ranges of thousands of kilometers, are transferred from
Russia to Iraq.
U.S. officials, as we've just heard, say that this transfer
may not have been authorized by the Russian government, but we
are still waiting for the results of an investigation.
1996--in January, well connected Russians renew the threat
to link U.S. behavior to Russian restraint in missile exports.
In February, some 6 months after Russia has joined the MTCR, an
official of the Russia Duma Defense Committee states that if
NATO expands eastward, Russia will export missiles to China and
India.
By February, Russian firms are concluding contracts to help
Iran produce ballistic missiles. In May, the U.S. protests to
Russia and Ukraine over talks to supply China with SS-18 ICBM
technology.
During this year, some unspecified entity in Russia makes
an illegal export--so called by the chairman of the Duma
Defense Committee--of eight Scud launchers and 24 to 32 Scud
missiles to Armenia.
Mr. Chairman, it is one thing to talk about loose nukes,
where individuals may attempt to steal small quantities of
plutonium in their coat pockets. But it is quite another thing
to envision loose Scuds, where dozens of complete missiles and
their launchers are illegally spirited out of Russian control.
Nineteen hundred ninety seven--Israeli officials report
that Russia is helping Iran to produce SS-4 type missiles, and
to test an SS-4 rocket engine. SS-4s have a range on the order
of 2,000 kilometers, and transfers of their production
technology are banned by the MTCR.
Moreover, SS-4s can only be effective with mass destruction
payloads.
Israel also reports that Russia is willing to stop these
transfers if Israel will enter an economic deal with Russia. In
spite of this quid pro quo offer, a senior U.S. source
speculates that the transfer may be beyond the control of the
Russian government.
U.S. officials say, however, there is even stronger
intelligence on other Russian Category One transfers to Iran,
specifically transfers of Scud missile production technology,
which are also banned by the MTCR.
Mr. Chairman, if these reports are substantially accurate,
Russia has exported Category One missiles and has exported
missile items intended for the delivery of mass destruction
weapons, in spite of the MTCR's strong presumption to deny such
exports.
Russia may have exported complete Category One production
technology to Iran, in spite of the MTCR's flat prohibition
against doing so. Russia is either incapable of controlling
such exports, or is unwilling to control them, or both, in
spite of such capability and willingness being key criteria for
membership in the MTCR, and key elements of the 1993 U.S.-
Russian agreement for space cooperation.
The policy implications are four fold.
One, space cooperation. Because Russia has violated the
1993 bargain, the U.S. is no longer obligated to keep Russia as
a space station partner or to allow Russian launches of Western
satellites.
Two, MTCR membership. Because Russia has failed to fulfill
key criteria for MTCR membership, continued Russian membership
is no longer in the interest of the regime. The regime has no
procedures for expelling a member, but it may be appropriate
for Russia itself to leave the regime until it is capable of
and willing to abide by its rules.
Three, sanctions. Because Russia is a member of the MTCR,
current U.S. law largely exempts it from missile related
sanctions. But Congress may want to consider whether such
sanctions are necessary to change the cost-benefit calculus of
Russian exports.
One way to apply sanctions would be to require Presidential
certification of Russian behavior consistent with the MTCR.
Such certification could be a prerequisite for the continuation
of space cooperation with Russia or other trade in MTCR-
controlled items between the U.S. and Russia.
And, four, intelligence. Because a key assumption of
National Intelligence Estimate 95-19 was that Russia would not
egregiously violate the MTCR, the conclusion of that NIE, that
North America would not face missile threats from additional
nations before the year 2010, needs to be reassessed.
The NIE described exports from countries such as Russia as
a ``wild card,'' and the independent panel reviewing the NIE
criticized the assumption of Russian compliance. The fact is
that the Russian behavior I have described blows the NIE
assumptions to smithereens.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. and Russia have a great many common
interests. Moreover, the Russian Federation is not a monolith.
For these reasons it is important to target U.S. actions
against those Russian entities benefitting from missile
proliferation. It is important not to link other, completely
separate elements of our relationship to missile
nonproliferation issues.
But having said this, we are faced with 4 years of reports
of Russian missile proliferation. We cannot afford to tolerate
cheating against basic rules of international security. We need
remedial action.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Speier follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. SPEIER
It is an honor to testify before the Committee this afternoon on
the relationship between recent actions of the Russian Federation and
missile proliferation. Of course, the views I will express are my own
and not necessarily those of any organization with which I am
affiliated.
We are fortunate to be living in a time of world peace. But what
kind of a peace is it? Ambrose Bierce, the great American cynic,
defined peace as ``a period of cheating between two periods of
fighting''.
I spent ten years of my government career working on a set of
export control rules and procedures to limit the proliferation of
missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. These rules
and procedures are called the Missile Technology Control Regime--or
MTCR. Twenty-nine nations are now formal members of the MTCR. But it
appears that there is some cheating going on.
Is Russia cheating? If so, what should we do about it? I shall
address these questions by first summarizing the key rules of the MTCR,
then outlining a chronology of recent actions by the Russian
Federation, and then examining the implications for policy.
The MTCR
The MTCR is a non-treaty arrangement that has been in effect for 10
years. To understand its key rules I must ask the Committee to
understand one phrase of MTCR jargon, ``Category I systems.'' Category
I systems are unmanned delivery vehicles capable of sending a 500
kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilometers. Category I systems
consist of rockets and unmanned air vehicles of all kinds--civilian and
military, as well as their technology, their specially designed
production equipment and certain major components, such as rocket
engines and complete guidance systems. Civilian as well as military
systems are covered because such items as space launch vehicles and
reconnaissance drones are interchangeable with ballistic missiles and
cruise missiles. The founders of the MTCR set the parameters for
Category I systems at 500 kilograms and 300 kilometers because 500
kilograms is the weight of a relatively unsophisticated nuclear warhead
and 300 kilometers is the strategic distance in the most compact
theaters where nuclear-armed missiles might be used. Category I systems
include Scud missiles as well as those of greater capability.
Category I systems are the target of the MTCR's rules for export
restraint. But other, dual-use items are also controlled by the MTCR--
so-called Category II items, such as rocket fuels, composite materials,
and lesser components--because they can contribute to missiles capable
of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
The MTCR has three key rules:
First, there is a strong presumption to deny export approval for
Category I systems. On the rare occasions when Category I systems are
exported, the supplier government--and not just the recipient--must
take responsibility for ensuring the end use. This presumption of
denial applies to all systems of Category I capability, regardless of
purpose.
Second, there is also a strong presumption to deny export approval
for any missile--regardless of range and payload--or for any Category
II item if the item is intended for the delivery of mass destruction
weapons. This presumption of denial applies to intentions, regardless
of the capabilities of a missile.
And third, there is a flat prohibition against exporting complete
production facilities or complete production technology for Category I
systems. In a non-proliferation regime it makes no sense to create new
suppliers of the most sensitive items.
All members of the MTCR agree to abide by these rules. But the
United States, since late 1990, has supplemented these rules with
legislated sanctions against foreign entities that contribute to the
proliferation of Category I systems. These sanctions have been
effective in encouraging export restraint by some governments. But, by
law, the sanctions do not apply to transfers approved by any of the 29
members of the MTCR.
So these are the key rules of the MTCR: (1) a strong presumption to
deny exports of Category I items, regardless of purpose; (2) a strong
presumption to deny exports of other items if they are intended for the
delivery of mass destruction weapons; and (3) a flat prohibition on the
export of complete production facilities or technology for Category I
systems.
Chronology of Russian actions
Now I shall summarize relevant actions by the Russian Federation
starting in 1993, the year that Russia formally agreed to abide by the
guidelines of the MTCR. I will be happy to share with Committee staff
the basic data that I used.
Two caveats are necessary before I outline this chronology: First,
I must emphasize that this chronology is drawn exclusively from reports
in the public domain. These reports suggest a clear pattern of Russian
behavior, but I cannot guarantee their accuracy. If the Committee
wishes to pursue this matter, I understand it will have access in a
closed hearing to the agencies in the Executive Branch responsible for
intelligence and for negotiations with Russia.
Second, when we talk about actions of the Russian Federation, we
must remember that Russia is still getting its act together and that it
is certainly not a monolith. Some elements of the Russian government
may disapprove of specific exports--or may not even know about them.
The entity benefiting from an export may be acting independently, may
be the winner in a split decision by the government, or may be carrying
out a coordinated government policy. So, although the MTCR makes the
Russian government responsible for missile-related exports, actual
government control may or may not be in place.
1993. Russia, faced with U.S. sanctions for the export of Category
I rocket engines and their production technology to India, agrees in
July to halt the transfer of the technology, to limit the export of
hardware, and to abide by the rules of the MTCR without yet becoming a
full member of the regime. In return, the U.S. agrees to make Russia a
partner in the space station project and to allow satellites with U.S.
components to be launched by Russian rockets. This U.S. concession is
reckoned to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars to the Russian
space program. But Russian transfer of rocket engine technology to
India--which is supposed to have ceased--is reported to continue for
another six weeks until all aspects of the agreement are formally in
place, resulting in the transfers being 60-80 percent completed.
1994. There are no public reports of Russian Category I exports.
But the U.S. government is concerned about Russian activities--
including Category II exports to China, India, and Libya; the Russian
transport of missile equipment from North Korea to Syria; and reports
of Russian missile experts in such countries as China, North Korea, and
Iran. For these reasons the U.S. refuses to approve full Russian
membership in the MTCR. The criteria for MTCR membership have never
been made public. But official U.S. testimony states that they include
the ability to control missile-related exports and the actual cessation
of actions inconsistent with the MTCR.
1995. The U.S. catches Russia aiding Brazil in the development of a
Category I space launch vehicle but waives the imposition of sanctions.
At the June Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting, the U.S. agrees to support full
Russian membership in the MTCR--presumably because the U.S. believes
that Russia has met the criteria for membership. In August the other
members also approve, and Russia becomes a full member. One month
later, in September, a Russian Lieutenant General is quoted in the
Russian press as saying that, if NATO expands eastward, Russia will
export nuclear and missile items to Algeria, India, Iran, and Iraq. Two
months after that, in November, Russian missile guidance equipment--
salvaged from submarine-launched ballistic missiles with ranges in the
thousands of kilometers--is transferred to Iraq. U.S. officials say
that this transfer may not have been authorized by the government of
the Russian Federation.
1996. In January, well connected Russians renew the threat to link
U.S. behavior to Russian restraint in missile exports. In February,
some six months after Russia has joined the MTCR, an official of the
Russian Duma Defense Committee states on the record that, if NATO
expands eastward, Russia will export missiles to China and India. By
February, Russian firms are concluding contracts to help Iran produce
liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. Starting in May the U.S. protests to
Russia and Ukraine over discussions with China to supply SS-18 ICBM
technology--a possible violation of the START I Treaty as well as of
MTCR pledges. During this year, some entity in Russia makes an
``illegal'' export--so termed by the Chairman of the Duma Defense
Committee--of eight Scud launchers and 24 to 32 Scud missiles to
Armenia. Mr. Chairman, it is one thing to talk about ``'loose nukes'',
where individuals may attempt to steal small amounts of plutonium in
their coat pockets. But it is quite another thing to envision ``loose
Scuds'', where dozens of complete missiles and their launchers are
illegally spirited out of Russian control.
1997. Israeli officials, speaking on the record, report that Russia
is helping Iran produce SS-4 type missiles with a range on the order of
2000 kilometers. SS-4's are banned by the INF Treaty, and transfers of
their production technology are banned by the MTCR. Because of the
inaccuracy of these missiles, they can only be effective with mass
destruction payloads. Israel reports Russian transfers of SS-4
components as well as production technology and announces an Iranian
test of an SS-4 rocket engine. Israel also reports that Russia is
willing to stop these transfers if Israel will enter economic
arrangements advantageous to Russia. The U.S. is reported to raise
these matters with Russia at a Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting. In spite of
the Israeli reports of a Russian quid-pro-quo offer, a senior U.S.
source speculates that the transfer may be ``beyond the control'' of
the Russian government. And unidentified U.S. officials say the
intelligence on these transfers is weaker than the intelligence on
other Russian Category I transfers to Iran--specifically, transfers of
Scud missile production technology, which are also banned by the MTCR.
Implications for policy
I shall now discuss some policy implications that follow if these
reports are substantially accurate.
If the reports are true, Russia has exported Category I missiles
and has exported missile items intended for the delivery of mass
destruction weapons in spite of the MTCR's ``strong presumption to
deny'' such exports. If the reports are true, Russia may have exported
complete Category I production technology to Iran in spite of the
MTCR's flat prohibition against doing so. If the reports are true,
Russia is either incapable of controlling such exports or is unwilling
to control them--or both--in spite of such capability and willingness
being key criteria for membership in the MTCR and key elements of the
1993 U.S.-Russian agreement for space cooperation.
If the reports are true, the policy implications are as follows:
(1) Space cooperation. Because Russia has violated the 1993 bargain
under which the U.S. has agreed to make Russia a partner in the space
station project and to approve Russian launches of Western satellites,
the U.S. is no longer obligated to continue this space cooperation.
(2) MTCR membership. Because Russia has failed to fulfill key
criteria for MTCR membership, continued Russian membership is no longer
in the interest of the regime. Membership criteria are important
because, once in the regime, a member can cause mischief through access
to information exchanges, a veto on regime decisions, increased access
to missile-related technology, and protection from U.S. sanctions. The
regime has no procedures for expelling a member. But international
security--with or without Russia in the regime promotes Russian
national security. So it may be appropriate for the Russian Federation
itself to leave the regime until it is capable of and willing to abide
by its rules.
(3) Sanctions. Because Russia is a member of the MTCR, current U.S.
law exempts from sanctions those Russian entities making exports
approved by the Russian government. Congress need not open up the
question of whether sanctions should apply to MTCR members other than
Russia. But with respect to Russia, the Congress may want to consider
whether such sanctions are necessary to change the cost-benefit
calculus of Russian exports. One way to apply sanctions would be to
require Presidential certification of Russian behavior consistent with
the MTCR. Legislation could require that the President make such a
certification before the U.S. can approve the continuation of space
cooperation with Russia or imports or exports of MTCR-controlled items
from or to Russia.
(4) Intelligence. Because a key assumption of National Intelligence
Estimate 95-19 was that Russia would not egregiously violate the MTCR,
the conclusion of that NIE--that North America would not face missile
threats from additional nations before the year 2010--needs to be
reassessed. The NIE described exports from countries such as Russia as
a ``wild card'', and the independent panel reviewing the NIE criticized
the assumption of Russian compliance. The fact is that the Russian
behavior that I have described blows the NIE's assumptions to
smithereens.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. and Russia have a great many common
interests. Moreover, the Russian Federation is not a monolith. For
these reasons, it is important to target U.S. actions against those
Russian entities benefiting from Russian contributions to missile
proliferation. It is important not to link other, completely separate'
elements of the U.S.-Russian relationship to missile non-proliferation
issues.
But, having said this, we are faced with four years of reports of
Russian missile proliferation. We cannot afford to tolerate cheating
against basic rules of international security. We need remedial action.
Senator Cochran. Thank you. Dr. Speier for your interesting
testimony and for your suggestions about the possible steps
that we can take to do something more effective about getting
compliance with the obligations under the MTCR.
Let me ask Dr. Potter a couple of questions in connection
with the testimony that he gave us about the security issue.
Dr. Potter, you focused on that, and the problem of having
weapons grade nuclear material available in such a widespread
region outside the Soviet Union. You named five or six
different nation-states now, including Latvia, I think, where
this material is now located.
Is the list that you give us an effort to identify areas
where these nuclear materials can be easily stolen or at risk
of being stolen? Or is this just a list of those places where
nuclear material is available, but has a varying degree of
security surrounding it?
Are these all high risk in terms of secured areas or not? I
want to be sure I understood what you were telling us.
Mr. Potter. I think the first point to make is that it
clearly is the case that the overwhelming bulk of weapons
useable material is located in Russia. But having said that, it
is also the case that there is a significant quantity that
resides outside of Russia.
My point is that if I were a would be proliferator, would I
necessarily go to the place where there was the most material,
or would I turn to the place or places where the material was
most accessible. I think in part the answer is the latter, and
I can identify then some specific places where the material
outside of Russia is not adequately safeguarded.
The U.S. Government has been concerned for some time about
a small quantity of weapons useable nuclear material in Tblisi,
Georgia. We have had discussions with the Georgian government
and with the Russian government about how to get that material
out of the country, but to date, without any demonstrable
effect.
Unfortunately, there is also material that is weapons
useable in other states that I mentioned--Belarus, Kazakstan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Latvia. The vulnerability of that
material varies from country to country.
My basic thesis is that rather than continuing to invest a
large amount of money in trying to make secure those limited
number of facilities where there are discrete amounts of
material known to be present, it makes more sense to remove
that material as a nonproliferation measure.
My calculation is that there is about 191 kilograms--let's
say slightly under 200 kilograms of material that is known to
exists in these states. My center has had discussions with the
directors of some of these nuclear facilities who are quite
prepared to see that material taken from them if they are
compensated in some fashion for the material.
They are also quite prepared to see the reactors modified
to run on low-enriched uranium which would not constitute a
significant proliferation threat.
So I think while this will not solve the problem at large,
namely with respect to Russian material, it may help us to
reduce the proliferation threats that nevertheless are real,
and, I would argue, to date have not received sufficient
attention.
Senator Cochran. One of the reasons, we are told, that some
of these rogue states are slow in their ability to develop
nuclear weapons capability is the difficulty and the cost of
producing the fissile material.
Iran is embarking, it seems to be, it's reported by many--
upon a planned effort to build nuclear weapons.
Would not they get nuclear weapons quicker if they were
able to steal or purchase fissile material from Russian
facilities, or other facilities that are unsecured outside of
Russia, which you talk about? Could they successfully obtain
fissile material in this way, do you think?
Mr. Potter. I think your question really directs attention
to the great problem caused by the inadequate state of security
of nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union, the fact that
there is such a tremendous quantity of material in the post-
Soviet States.
I can respond specifically to the efforts that I am aware
of involving Iran, and at least one of the post-Soviet States,
namely, Kazakstan. We do know, and the U.S. Government to the
best of my knowledge is well acquainted with, Iranian interests
in nuclear material that was located in Kazakstan, at least
since 1993.
Some of this information is related to the so-called
Project Sapphire, the successful effort to take out some 600
kilograms of HEU from the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in Ust-
Kamenogorsk, Kazakstan.
One of the things that Americans who were involved in
Project Sapphire discerned was that in a room next to the room
holding the highly enriched uranium in Ust-Kamenogorsk were a
number of canisters that had Tehran addresses on them.
I have been told that the American Government believes that
these canisters were filled with the dual use nuclear related
material beryllium which was produced in great quantities at
Ust-Kamenogorsk. This example suggests that there was at least
contact between the Iranian government and this Kazakstan
nuclear facility which had a large quantity of highly enriched
uranium.
It's also known that Iran was very much interested in the
Aktau nuclear power facility, which is on the Caspian Sea,
across from Iran. That as early as 1993, the Iranian government
was interested in establishing a consulate at Aktau where the
fast breeder reactor is located.
This is significant, among other things, because
approximately one ton of plutonium exists on site at this fast
breeder reactor facility. And what is significant about this,
in addition to the quantity, is that the material is in low
irradiated form, that is, it doesn't have the radiation barrier
that is typical in most spent fuel.
There has been assistance provided by the U.S. Government
to try to safeguard this material, but it's also the case that
there is a major Iranian presence at this particular port
facility. In fact, there is cooperation proceeding between Iran
and Kazakstan to develop a harbor in Aktau.
So, these would be at least two examples in which it
appears as if Iran has sought to establish contact in locations
of the former Soviet Union where nuclear material was present.
It would suggest the possibility of their acquiring material,
although I have no information that they have been successful
in actually acquiring any material that would be of use from
the standpoint of the development of a nuclear weapon.
Senator Cochran. There has been a report in the Washington
Times that Iran is using its civilian nuclear power program as
a cover for acquiring technology and expertise that is
necessary to enable it to build nuclear weapons.
And also we are told in the same report, this was in 1994,
that Iran was about eight to 10 years away from fulfilling that
objective, but that the timetable could be shortened with
foreign assistance.
I assume that foreign assistance is the kind of assistance
that would include Russia's sale of a reactor and working with
technicians and scientists in Iran to develop an alleged
civilian nuclear power program in Iran.
Do you agree with that assessment, or do you have the
background to tell us, in your opinion, whether you think that
is on target with what the facts are, and whether or not the
sale and participation by Russia in the Iran nuclear power
program has weapons proliferation consequences?
Is this a violation of the NPT, for example, in your view,
and what should we be doing to try to insure compliance with
NPT?
Mr. Potter. I think the issue of whether or not the
Russian-Iranian nuclear deal constitutes a violation of the NPT
turns upon the belief on the part of the Russian government
that Iran is in fact intent upon pursuing a nuclear weapons
program.
If, in fact, the Russian government does not believe that
Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, then as a member in
so-called ``good standing'' with the NPT, with international
safeguards in place, there is nothing that legally precludes
Russian provision of nuclear assistance to Iran.
In fact, some would argue that under Article IV of the NPT,
a state has some obligation to provide nuclear assistance if a
party is in fact in good standing under the NPT.
I think the problem though is not so much the provision of
power reactors that would use low enriched uranium, but rather
is the assistance that Iran will get, and, in fact, is getting
with respect to building a nuclear infrastructure. We are
talking about personnel training, particularly training that is
taking place in Russia.
Unfortunately one might note that to some extent Russia
here is carrying on where the U.S. left off in the training of
Iranian nuclear specialists.
I think that what is important for the U.S. to do to try to
redress this problem is to pursue a two-track policy. On the
one hand we need to continue to try to persuade Russia to stop
nuclear cooperation with Iran, not because it is necessarily
illegal, but because it's imprudent. It doesn't serve Russia's
interests. It does not serve the international community's
interests.
We also have to persuade Russia to require much more
transparency over the different nuclear activities with which
it's associated in Iran, and to try to create more stringent
safeguards in that country.
We also have to insist upon the return of the spent fuel to
Russia that will be generated by these nuclear reactors. It
would be very dangerous for the spent fuel to remain on site
where it could be reprocessed by Iran.
We need to encourage Russia to require Iran to accept more
stringent IAEA safeguards, such as the so-called 93 plus 2
safeguards agreement, which includes environmental sampling
which would make it much more difficult for Iran to utilize it
civilian nuclear program for covert weapons purposes.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. Let me turn to Dr.
Speier, and ask a few questions about the MTCR. You pointed out
that Russia had not really lived up to its MTCR commitments.
I was going to ask you if, based on your knowledge of the
things that have been done by Russia in terms of selling and
transferring missile technology to Iran and Iraq, do you think
this is solid evidence that would justify our inviting them to
withdraw--which was one of your four suggestions--from MTCR?
What would that really accomplish, though? Isn't it better
to have Russia under the tent and working with them, possibly
being influenced by consensus among other nations, as well as
the U.S., to change or modify its behavior, rather than to
undergo the possible public embarrassment or humiliation or
whatever would be attendant to being expelled, in effect--even
though you say there's no way to expel a member, though asking
them to withdraw is sort of the same thing.
In other words, I am questioning whether or not that might
be an effective way to obtain a change or modification in
behavior. It seems to me that a more productive way of dealing
with that would be to try to get at the facts more, and
conclusively identify who is really actively involved in these
violations.
Is it the Russian government itself condoning what they
know to be prohibited behavior under the MTCR, and if it is,
should we do something to show our displeasure? Cancelling
space station cooperation, not allowing them to send up our
satellites on their vehicles, space vehicles, for example?
What is your reaction to that?
Mr. Speier. Those are very good questions, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, with respect to my certainty of the transfers
that I have reported on, as my full statement attempts to make
clear, I have been drawing exclusively on information in the
public domain.
And I understand that this Subcommittee will have the
opportunity to have a briefing from the appropriate members of
the intelligence community.
Senator Cochran. That is correct. We do intend to have that
session as well.
Mr. Speier. And I defer to whatever facts they have agreed
on.
With respect to your very prescient question about the best
way to influence Russia, whether it is really better to ask
them out of the MTCR, or to keep them in there, there are a
number of advantages to MTCR membership that unfortunately
provide opportunities for mischief making.
A member is a part of very extensive and very sensitive
information exchanges among the other members that suggest
opportunities to exploit--to exploit the market that no one
else is attempting to enter.
Membership also gives one a right of veto over changes in
the regime. Membership, according to the practices of some
members, and the proposals, some proposals that are actually in
Congress right now, membership entitles one to greater access
to missile technology.
And finally, membership, as I mentioned, protects the
member from the imposition of U.S. sanctions.
Now, the question is, given the apparent inability or
unwillingness of Russia to enforce the regime, do we want
Russia to have these advantages? Is there much that Russia
could be doing in the way of missile trade that she isn't
already doing?
Those are some of the questions that I believe one would
ask in addressing the issue of membership.
Senator Cochran. You mentioned the transfer of Scud
missiles and launchers from Russia to Armenia--I think you did.
Mr. Speier. Yes.
Senator Cochran. This was back in 1994 to 1996, and there
is an indication that a former defense minister--well, the Wall
Street Journal reported this--Minister Grachev approved the
sale or transfer of more than a billion dollars worth of
conventional arms to Armenia from 1994 to 1996, including 32
Scud-B ballistic missiles and eight associated launchers. This
was all in the Wall Street Journal.
That transfer seems to have clearly violated Moscow's
commitment to abide by the guidelines of the MTCR as well. The
question that this raises, along with the other reports, the
Washington Times report that we talked about, to Iran, is it
plausible that the Russian government, given all these facts,
itself was not aware of these activities?
That is almost conclusive evidence that in order to comply
with the provisions of U.S. law, our government would be
obligated to impose some kind of sanctions against Russia.
Is there no sanction provision at all associated with the
obligations of the MTCR?
Mr. Speier. First of all, with respect to the transfer from
Russia to Armenia of the Scud missiles, according to the actual
statement of the chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, that
transfer took place in 1996, at the tail end of this 1994-1996
period, took place in 1996, months after the Russians had
formally joined the MTCR.
Could the Russian government have been unaware of this
transfer? That is the assertion of the chairman of the Duma
Defense Committee, that it was an illegal transfer.
Is the U.S. obligated to impose sanctions, or does it have
the authority to impose sanctions? There is one case in which
one can impose missile related sanctions on an MTCR member. And
that is if the transfer was not authorized by the member
government and if the member government takes no steps to
prosecute the entities that did make the transfer.
So if the Russian government sits on its hands in the case
of a transfer like the one to Armenia, or a transfer like the
one of the guidance systems to Iraq, then one could impose
sanctions under existing law. There is that authority.
Senator Cochran. What is your reaction to the exchange that
I had with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State about doing
a more aggressive job of investigating to get to the bottom of
who is responsible, what entities are involved in transferring
these prohibited weapons and elements of weapons to Iraq and
Iran, so that we can target some sanctions as we have done in
the case with China, now, as an example of our seriousness, and
the fact that we consider these very serious violations of the
MTCR, and we are not going to tolerate this kind of action by
Russian businesses, individuals, or the government?
What other options do we have for doing a better job of
getting the facts, or causing Russia to do a better job of
getting the facts?
Mr. Speier. Mr. Chairman, I think what we are talking about
is the question of the cost/benefit calculus of these exports.
If there is a penalty to making these exports, then they are
less likely to be made than if they get a free ride.
Unfortunately, the recent record of the application of
missile related sanctions that are authorized by our law has
not been very strong. For the first 2 years of the law, from
the end of 1990 to the end of 1992, missile related sanctions
were imposed five times in 2 years.
In the next 4 years, they have only been imposed twice, in
4 years. One of those sanctions was a no-brainer against a
transfer between North Korea and Iran. The other sanction was
against China in 1993, and within a few months of the
imposition of that sanction, 90 percent of the force of it was
withdrawn by a Commerce Department interpretation that the
sanctions did not apply to U.S. satellites launched on Chinese
launch vehicles.
So we really have not been too active in missile related
sanctions in recent years. If we were, we might see a different
behavior on the part of these exporters.
I think certainly if we make it clear that the 1993
bargain, where Russia would abide by the MTCR in return for
space station and launch cooperation, if we make it clear that
we take that very seriously and that it is in jeopardy as a
result of this kind of behavior, there will be a great premium
on the Russian aerospace firms and entities to avoid these
kinds of exports.
Senator Cochran. I got the impression from the former
witness that there are a lot more smuggling activities going on
between Russia and Iraq than have been publicly reported up to
this point.
We know about the guidance components that were intercepted
in Amman, Jordan, that were being shipped from Russia to Iraq,
in violation of the United Nations Security Council sanctions.
And we know that Russia is saying that it is investigating
that, but we have had no report on the results of that
investigation. It seems to me, and I am not an expert on what
kind of authority this UNSCOM group has, but it seems to me
that in order to make it an effective enforcer of U.N.
sanctions that there has to be some investigative arm, there
has to be some way to deal with the challenge that we face now.
If you know smuggling is going on, you can go on site, the
IAEA can go on site and do inspections to see if safeguards are
being adhered to and the like. But isn't there something
missing here?
What are the other options available to us? Should we try
to force some change in the enforcement regime under the U.N.
Security Council's authority?
Mr. Speier. Mr. Chairman, first of all, with respect to the
question of whether there is more smuggling going on than this
one incident in November of 1995, I think we should remember
that the absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence.
We may not know about everything that is going on. But more
than that, there have been reports of Russian experts going
where they should not be going, and helping countries develop
missiles.
Part of the MTCR controls are to stop this. But I have been
told by a Russian official recently that perhaps these are
retired Russian missile experts who are making their own
decisions to do this.
So the transfer of technology can go on apace without one
finding guidance equipment at the bottom of the Tigris River.
But more than that, you've twice raised the very important
question of investigations, and how should we pursue them.
I think first of all, the Subcommittee should see what the
intelligence community already knows, and make its judgment
about their ability to conduct investigations. The problem may
be either the lack of investigations or the lack of action to
follow up those investigations.
I think certainly the actions in the form of sanctions have
trailed off in recent years.
Senator Cochran. That seems to be an option that you are
suggesting, or intimating, that we ought to press the
administration to consider. Is that an accurate impression that
I have gotten from what you are saying?
Mr. Speier. Investigations? Or----
Senator Cochran. Sanctions.
Mr. Speier. Sanctions?
Senator Cochran. Yes.
Mr. Speier. To the extent that there is authority under
existing law, absolutely. We have got to make it clear there--
in Senator Glenn's words, we must take the profit out of
proliferation. Right now, it is a big money maker to do this.
If you impose the right kinds of sanctions, it's a big
money loser.
Senator Cochran. I would like to hear your reaction to a
recent article in Foreign Affairs written by Michael Mandelbaum
on the subject of U.S. relations with Russia and China.
He says this: ``While difficult, the Russian-Chinese
policies to which the United States objects, are not impossible
to change. If an issue is important enough, the governments in
Moscow and Beijing can impose their will.
``Irritants in American relations with Russia and China
persist not only because the administrative capacity of each
government is limited, but also because the issues at stake are
not important enough for either government to muster the
political capital and incur the costs necessary to remove
them.''
Now, he is, I think, telling us that we have got to make it
more politically attractive and economically attractive for
Beijing and Moscow to take action. And that is my impression.
Dr. Potter, what do you get from that? Do you agree with
Michael Mandelbaum?
Mr. Potter. I do agree, although I guess I would add
another dimension to the problem here and this is where I
probably disagree with my good friend, Dick Speier, about the
wisdom of trying to induce Russia to leave the MTCR.
I am very much concerned about the need to provide
incentives to develop larger nonproliferation constituencies in
problem countries, whether those countries be Russia, China,
India, Pakistan--you pick your favorite country of concern.
And I think that one probably does not assist the process
of developing these constituencies by removing countries from
international nonproliferation regimes. On the contrary, by
engaging them in international regimes, you create offices, you
provide budgets, you attract individuals who develop a vested
interest in various nonproliferation activities.
I think there is not an adequate constituency in Russia or
the post-Soviet States. There is an even smaller constituency
in China.
Unfortunately, these constituencies are not likely to
develop very quickly. I am not suggesting that this is the only
approach that one has to take, but I think that one needs to be
cognizant of this fact, and wherever possible when we can
engage a country, it is useful to do so.
I would argue, for example, that even though there are a
number of the post-Soviet States that are not directly involved
in the export of nuclear material, a number of them are
transshippers. We should try to bring those countries into the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, because it would focus more government
attention on important nonproliferation issues.
While we both need to think about better ways to increase
incentives and to provide disincentives, one also needs to
think about the long term issue. And related to that is the key
question of trying to deal with defense conversion in the
former Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, as long as there is a strong economic
incentive to sell basically anything to anyone for the right
price, regardless of the development of export controls, we are
not really going to be able to get a handle on the problem.
This is why we need to focus first and foremost on shoring up
the nuclear material and the missile technology at the source.
I think export controls is important, but it's going to be
much more difficult to try to capture that material once it
leaves the source. So this is where I would invest my greatest
effort.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Speier.
Mr. Speier. I partially agree with Dr. Potter. First of
all, with respect to the Mandelbaum statement, the statement as
I heard you read it, Mr. Chairman, argues that we can influence
the Russian and Chinese governments if we put enough priority
on it.
But it's not clear that the problem in missile
proliferation is just with the Russian government. The problem
may be that it is so profitable for these Russian aerospace
entities and military entities to make these exports that they
either attempt to influence the government to approve the
exports, or they make them outside of the government's control.
What appropriate sanctions can do, such as putting the
space station cooperation and the launch cooperation into
jeopardy, what they can do is threaten to pull all the profit
out of these deals, and, indeed, to make them very costly.
And the same for other sanctions that we might impose. So
it's not a question of acting on--the people have very good
will in what is certainly a minimal central government in
Moscow.
There are other elements of the system that need to see the
right combination of costs and benefits, and I think this is
perhaps where Dr. Potter's comments and mine overlap.
As far as regime membership, the Missile Control Technology
Regime, and, indeed a nonproliferation regime in general should
not be viewed as a birthday party where everybody gets to come.
There should be some serious requirements for ability and
willingness to contribute to the cause of nonproliferation if
one is going to be in that regime.
And it's very questionable whether Russia right now
qualifies.
Senator Cochran. This has been an excellent discussion of
some of the issues and the problems that we face in trying to
do a better job of influencing the conduct of nation-states to
try to hold down the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
That's the goal that we have in holding these hearings, to
better understand the challenges and what some of the options
are for government policies that will be more successful in
dealing with the challenge.
We also want to announce that our next hearing will be on
the subject of proliferation and U.S. export controls, and we
will hold that hearing next Wednesday, June 11, at 9:30 a.m.
Until then, this Subcommittee will stand in recess.
[Whereupon, 4:10 p.m. the Subcommittee stood in recess, to
reconvene, Wednesday, June 11 at 9:30 a.m.]
(all)