HOMELAND and NATIONAL
SECURITY
Strategic Outcomes:
▪
Reduce
the vulnerability of the transportation system and its users to crime and
terrorism.
▪
Increase
the capability of the transportation system to meet national defense needs.
▪
Reduce
the flow of illegal drugs entering the United States.
▪
Reduce
the flow of migrants illegally entering the United States.
▪
Reduce
illegal incursions into our sovereign territory.
▪
Increase
support for United States interests in promoting regional stability.
▪
Reduce
transportation-related dependence on foreign fuel supplies.
Transportation
security is equal in importance to transportation safety. As we have witnessed, the Nation’s
transportation system has certain vulnerabilities, which need to be guarded
against attack, and our borders are subject to illegal intrusions by smugglers
of contraband or weapons of mass destruction, and by illegal migrants. DOT’s objective is to contribute to homeland
and national security by minimizing the vulnerability of our transportation
system to disruption, damage, or exploitation through crime or terrorism. In FY 2002, DOT homeland and national security
programs continued reducing the transportation system’s vulnerability to crime
and terrorism and enforced sovereignty over our borders.
|
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
2002 Target |
Met |
Not Met |
Percent
of high interest vessels screened. |
N/P |
N/P |
N/P |
N/P |
N/P |
N/P |
N/P |
N/P |
ü |
|
Percentage
of DOD-required shipping capacity complete with crews available within
mobilization timelines. |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
97 |
92 |
97 |
94 |
93 |
ü |
|
Percentage
of DOD-designated commercial ports available for military use within DOD
established readiness timelines |
64 |
57 |
93 |
93 |
93 |
92 |
92 |
92 |
ü |
|
Amount
of drugs seized or destroyed at sea (metric tons). |
27 |
94 |
52 |
79 |
83 |
79 |
72 |
75 |
|
ü |
Interdict
and/or deter at least 87 percent of undocumented migrants who consider
attempting to enter the U.S. via maritime routes. |
92 |
94 |
91 |
87 |
89 |
83 |
88 |
87 |
ü |
|
|
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2001 Target |
Met |
Not Met |
Percent
seizure rate for cocaine shipped through the transit zone |
6.1 |
5.3 |
16.3 |
10.1 |
12.2 |
10.6 |
11.1 |
15 |
|
ü |
Transportation-related
petroleum consumption (in quadrillion BTUs) per trillion dollars of Real GDP
in 1996 constant dollars |
3.075 |
3.037 |
2.945 |
2.90 |
2.74(r) |
2.63(r) |
2.55 |
2.76 |
ü |
|
N/A
= Not Available
NP
= Not published (Sensitive information protected under 49 CFR Part 1520.7(r))
* Preliminary estimate
(r) Revised
Aviation Security: The United States and its citizens remain targets for terrorist
groups seeking to challenge or influence domestic and international
affairs. Thus, protecting air travelers
against terrorist and other criminal acts is a homeland and national security
priority. After the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, the President signed the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (P.L. 107-71), establishing the Transportation Security Administration, and
charging it with carrying out this important responsibility. Public confidence in the safety and security
of air travel enables its continued growth, and tourism and world economies
depend on effective aviation security measures being efficiently applied. Governments, airlines and airports must work
together cooperatively to achieve our common goal - safe and secure air
transportation worldwide.
2002
Results: There were no
performance targets established for FY 2002.
TSA’s performance highlights in FY 2002 are:
▪
took
immediate steps to secure the cockpit against hijacking by significantly
expanding the Federal Air Marshal program and reinforcing commercial aircraft
cockpit doors. Administered a $100
million Federal grant program to help the U.S. airline and cargo industry
finance aircraft cockpit doors modifications;
▪
hired
148 Federal Security Directors, who are responsible for nearly 400 airports;
▪
hired
more than 36,000 security screeners and deployed Federal screeners to 142
airports;
▪
established
a customer service call center, a coalition to advice TSA on passengers with
disabilities, and other initiatives to promote communication and responsiveness
to the flying public;
▪
purchased
over 1,000 explosives detection systems and 3,700 explosive trace detectors for
screening checked and carry-on baggage; and
▪
continued
research and development on technologies and procedures to enhance
transportation security - including CAPPS II, an advanced automated profiling
system to focus screening.
FY
2003 Performance Plan Evaluation:
DOT met the passenger screening Federalization deadline, and with new
authority provided in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, met the baggage
screening deadline, and will ensure that explosive detection technology is in
full use for baggage screening as soon as possible in FY 2003.
Management Challenge – Aviation and Transportation
Security (IG/GAO)
The IG and GAO have previously noted that
challenges exist in effectively meeting national requirements for improving
security in aviation and surface transportation. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, Congress passed and
the President signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created
an Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, and a new DOT Operating
Administration - the Transportation Security Administration.
TSA efforts for 2002 mostly focused on
addressing aviation security and meeting deadlines established in the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act. TSA met
the unprecedented challenge to hire and train a federalized workforce to screen
all passengers and their carry-on baggage by November 19, 2002, and, for the
most part, to deploy the necessary equipment and federalized workforce to meet
the December 31, 2002 deadline to screen all checked baggage. At the same time, TSA significantly expanded
the Federal Air Marshals program with more flights being guarded now than
anytime in history.
However, TSA’s work is not done. Until TSA is transferred to the Department
of Homeland Security in March 2003, DOT must continue to take the lead for the
Government’s increased aviation security responsibilities, including completing
deployment of explosives detection equipment to the remaining airports where
alternate screening methods are employed, and developing plans for expanding
security in all modes of transportation.
The primary responsibility will move with TSA to the new Department of
Homeland Security.
DOT’s focus in FY 2003 will be to ensure
effective aviation security, to ensure an effective transition of these two DOT
administrations to the new department with no loss of effectiveness, and to
develop methods for working effectively with DHS on the overlapping issues of
transportation security and safety.
This issue continues on the IG’s 2003 list of DOT top management
challenges.
Public Transportation Security Initiatives
Since September 11, 2001, FTA has helped
prepare the transit industry to counter terrorist threats. To date, FTA has:
▪
completed
37 threat and vulnerability assessments and provided feedback to individual
agencies on how to improve their security systems and reduce vulnerabilities,
as well as information on “best practices” to all transit agencies;
▪
deployed
emergency response planning and technical assistance teams to the top 50-60
transit agencies to help them implement systematic security programs;
▪
awarded
83 grants for emergency responder and transit agency drills to test and improve
security and emergency response plans;
▪
accelerated
testing and deployment of the PROTECT system for chemical detection in subway
systems;
▪
FTA
also completed 11 short-term, quick payoff research projects identified by the
transit industry;
▪
facilitated
training and regional collaboration through security awareness courses for
front line employees and supervisors, and regional forums to promote regional
collaboration and coordination among fire, police, and medical emergency
responders and transit; and
▪
developed
a list of Security Program Action Items that transit agencies should
incorporate into their System Security Program Plans.
Strategies for FY 2003
With the knowledge and expertise acquired,
FTA is enhancing its strategies and moving forward to further enhance transit
security. FTA will continue to tap the
expertise of TSA, the intelligence community, the transit industry, and others
to help strengthen transit security, as follows:
Reducing America’s Vulnerability to Terrorism: FTA is working with the transit industry to identify critical,
high-risk assets and operations, and is developing a broad range of strategies
to increase security. These strategies
must become an integral part of daily transit operations and will include
special emphasis on training, as well as technical assistance, guidelines, best
practices, and testing of available technologies for intrusion detection,
surveillance, and chemical and biological substance detection. FTA will provide on-site technical
assistance to the largest 60 transit agencies to assist them in updating and
enhancing their security system programs. This will include implementing
protocols for handling suspicious packages and chemical/biological incidents,
as well as addressing the twenty priority security program initiatives that
have been identified by FTA. Chem/bio
guidelines have been developed and an updated transit security guidebook will
be published.
Minimizing Damage and Speeding Recovery: FTA’s ongoing security program will work to promote regional
coordination, communication, and shared drills among transit and emergency
responders. Training and emergency
response preparedness are top priorities for quickly enhancing transit
security. FTA will complete the
regional forums and collect best practices and develop training from the
full-scale emergency response drills and tabletop exercises. Security courses at Transportation Safety
Institute and National Transit Institute are under review. They will be updated and a comprehensive
curriculum will be defined.
Management Challenge – Computer Security (Department-wide
and FAA) (IG/GAO/OMB)
The IG, GAO, and OMB have
identified information system security as a critical government-wide management
challenge, and in particular, have identified FAA air traffic control
information systems as needing special attention to harden them against
malicious or criminal attack.
The DOT Chief Information Officer (CIO) will lead intermodal efforts to
ensure the continued security of our transportation information systems to make
IT systems less vulnerable to attack and other service disruptions, including
those caused by natural disasters.
The
Computer Security Challenge presents itself on two fronts: 1) protection of all
IT assets as required by the Computer Security Act of 1987, the Government
Information Security Reform Act (GISRA), OMB Circular A-130, National Institute
of Standards and Technology guidance, etc.; and, 2) specific protection of
critical IT assets in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 63
(PDD-63).
DOT
established an IT Security Program requiring:
▪
that all DOT IT systems be assessed to identify
vulnerabilities;
▪
that vulnerabilities be evaluated and mitigated where
justified; and
▪
that systems be tested and certified as adequately
protected.
In FY 2002
▪
DOT CIO developed a comprehensive Information Technology
Security Performance Measurement (IT SPM) program to identify and track
quantifiable results related to key IT security metrics. DOT reduced GISRA program related weaknesses
by over 40 percent and reduced vulnerabilities in the primary “demilitarized
zone” (DMZ) by over 70 percent a month.
▪
DOT instituted a robust training and awareness program, focused on
developing and providing specialized training to IT security personnel. DOT provided awareness training to more than
99 percent of all employees, provided specialized training in certification and
accreditation (C&A) and network security to more than 90 percent of the
Agency-level Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO).
▪
DOT
developed and began implementing a comprehensive policy for integrating IT
security into the Capital Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) process, with
Agency ISSOs participating as members of the CPIC Review Board. IT security policy is embedded in each phase
of the CPIC and the system development life cycle through security costs
estimation methodologies.
▪
DOT
developed and executed an Incident Reporting Policy Memorandum and began
reporting incidents on a weekly basis to the Federal Computer Incident Response
Center (FedCIRC), the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and
other law enforcement agencies as required.
DOT is implement intrusion detection systems (IDS) at critical access
points throughout the DOT backbone and on NHTSA, RSPA and FAA local area networks. FAA, in particular, has made significant
improvements in implementing and monitoring network and perimeter security.
▪
DOT
published comprehensive network security guidelines and began a Web Server
Vulnerability Testing Program in the DOT DMZ.
Based on this program, vulnerabilities decreased from an average of more
than 200 incidents a month to fewer than 30 a month for systems within the
DMZ.
For FY 2003, DOT established a contract for
an enterprise-wide vulnerability-scanning tool. This contract was the result of an FAA testing project and
provides all DOT organizations with an effective, cross cutting cost solution
for vulnerability testing.
FAA has developed a
concept of operations, approach, and major milestones to address information
security issues and protect information assets. FAA’s approach focused on protecting the operational capability
of its facilities, which requires an integrated approach to information
systems, personnel, and physical security at each facility. Other efforts included authorizing and
certifying computer security systems, security awareness training,
vulnerability assessments, and improving intrusion detection capability, and to develop methods for
working effectively with DHS on the overlapping issues of transportation
security and safety. This issue continues
on the IG’s 2003 list of DOT top management challenges.
Coastal and Seaport Security: The Department, through the
Transportation Security Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard, provides an
essential maritime element of homeland and national security. DOT’s maritime homeland and national
security functions are anchored in coordinated interagency law enforcement,
coastal sea control, and port security.
Performance measure:
Percent of high interest vessels screened.
1999 2000 2001 2002
Target: N/A
N/A N/A ##
Actual: N/A
N/A N/A ##
##
Not published due to sensitive security information being protected
under 49 CFR Part 1520.7(r).
2002 Results: DOT met the performance target.
DOT’s FY 2002 actions to
ensure seaport and cargo security included:
▪
USCG protection of high
consequence targets, including critical bridges, port facilities and other
infrastructure; a permanent regulation requiring 96-hour advance notices of
arrival for ships arriving in U.S. ports; tracked inbound high-interest vessels
in cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence; and disseminated
intelligence on passengers, crew, and cargoes to partner agencies; and deployed
Sea Marshals and small boat escorts to ensure positive control of vessels
containing critical cargoes and in sensitive areas;
▪
MARAD’s work with
maritime industry to examine and address security issues and policy and
heightened security at its Ready Reserve Force fleet sites and outports;
▪
TSA’s, MARAD’s and an
inter-departmental Credential Direct Action Group’s examination of ways that
advanced technologies, including smart cards, biometrics and public key
infrastructure, could be used throughout the maritime and related industries to
identify employees working in security-sensitive areas; and TSA/MARAD/ USCG’s
distribution of $93 million in grants to seaports for security assessments and
enhanced facility and operational security; and
▪
SLSDC’s close
partnership with its Canadian counterpart and USCG to heighten security on the
St. Lawrence River and ensure the protection of ocean access to Great Lakes
ports.
An interagency Container
Working Group established by the Secretary of Transportation and co-chaired by
the Department of the Treasury, worked to address security issues surrounding
the movement of marine cargo containers through the international and
intermodal transportation system. The
Container Working Group focused on information technology, security, business
practices, and international affairs, and made recommendations to improve
international container security efforts and increased use of advanced
technologies to improve container profiling.
“Operation Safe Commerce,”
co-led by DOT, was initiated by the private sector as an attempt to make the
supply chain more secure. This effort
seeks to move the primary reliance away from control systems at U.S. ports of
entry and toward improved controls at points of origin and along the way. It relies on using new technology such as
electronic container seals to strengthen the security of cargo as
it moves along the international supply chain.
Efforts center on the following:
▪
ensuring that containers
are loaded in a secure environment at the point of product origin, with 100
percent verification of their contents;
▪
using pressure, light,
or temperature sensors to continually monitor containers throughout their
overseas voyage to the point of distribution in the United States; and
▪
using cargo-tracking
technology to track containers at all points in the supply chain, including
delivery of cargo inside containers to consignees.
The
three largest container port complexes (Los Angeles/Long Beach, New York/New
Jersey, and Seattle/Tacoma) are involved in the Operation Safe Commerce pilot
project addressing security vulnerabilities posed by containers entering the U.S.
through seaports. These projects will
help determine which procedures and technologies constitute the best practices
in supply chain security.
DOT
and other Federal agencies are working with international organizations [the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the
United Nations Subcommittee of Experts on the Transportation of Dangerous
Goods] to accelerate, where possible, the deadlines for implementation of
important new security requirements.
USCG continues to make progress in providing the
required number of “combat ready” units to meet Combatant Commander operational
requirements in wartime and peacetime.
The Coast Guard contributes high endurance cutters, patrol boats, Law
Enforcement Detachments, and Port Security Units to DOD Combatant Commanders’
war plans. High endurance cutters met
readiness requirements 84 percent of the time.
Readiness degradations stemmed from equipment casualties and unit
training deficiencies. This is a seven
percent drop from last year, but deficiencies were manageable and quickly
remedied on notification of a scheduled deployment. Patrol boats met readiness objectives 100 percent of the
time. Though Port Security Units
achieved acceptable readiness ratings only 25 percent of the time, recruiting
incentives, increases in unit budgets and establishment of a formal training
and standardization program have been established to close readiness gaps.
The challenges associated with operating an aging
cutter fleet are well recognized and the Coast Guard is taking steps to ensure
replacement assets are brought into action without the transition degrading
current capability.
USCG supplementary performance measure:
Percentage of days that the designated number
of critical defense assets (high endurance cutters, patrol boats, and port
security units needed to support DOD operational plans) maintain a combat
readiness rating of 2 or better.
1999 2000 2001 2002
Target: N/A
100 100 100
Actual: 4
51 67# 70
# Three-quarter year data since
fourth quarter data did not survive the attack on the Pentagon.
FY 2003 Performance Plan Evaluation: DOT cannot characterize Transportation Security
Administration and Coast Guard performance for FY 2003, since they will be a
part of the new Department of Homeland Security.
Management Challenge – Cargo Security (IG)
The IG has stated that strengthening cargo
security is a major management challenge facing DOT. Ensuring robust port and maritime security is a national priority
and an intermodal challenge, with impacts in America's heartland communities
just as directly as the U.S. seaport cities where cargo and passenger vessels
arrive and depart daily. The U.S. has
more than 361 ports containing more than 3,700 passenger and cargo
terminals. Current growth predictions
indicate that container cargo will double in the next 20 years. The biggest cargo security challenge facing
DOT is how to ensure that legitimate cargo is not unnecessarily delayed as we
introduce enhanced security measures against security threats.
Management Challenge - Coast Guard Capital
Acquisition Budget (IG/GAO)
The IG and GAO have stated that DOT needs to:
▪
stabilize
Coast Guard's missions and budget requirements in light of post-9/11
priorities;
▪
make
progress on Deepwater, while at the same time moving with dispatch on National
Distress and Response System and Search and Rescue procurements;
▪
meet
the enhanced Coast Guard port security mission, while continuing to effectively
meet Coast Guard's other responsibilities; and
▪
ensuring
the planning progress includes a realistic level of funding and using a process
to assess the readiness of proposed technology.
Deepwater Capability Replacement. The Coast Guard is in the midst of the largest acquisition
project in its history. On June 25,
2002, the Coast Guard awarded the Integrated Deepwater System contract to
Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), a joint venture of Lockheed Martin and
Northrop Grumman. In executing the
contract, ICGS will modernize or replace the Coast Guard’s major cutters and
aircraft and their supporting communications, sensors, and logistics systems,
transforming the aging current fleet into an integrated, interoperable
network-centric system. This
innovative, performance-based approach manages acquisition risk by using
state-of-the-market technologies. The
overall goal of this unique acquisition project is to develop an integrated
system that maximizes operational effectiveness while minimizing total
ownership costs.
The IG identified the Coast Guard Search and
Rescue program’s effectiveness as needing additional focus due to staffing,
training and capital asset readiness problems; particularly with regard to
budget and acquisition schedule estimates for replacing the National Distress
System (NDS). The Coast Guard is
currently undertaking the major task of modernizing the NDS. Through a six year, $611M contract with
General Dynamics, the Coast Guard will upgrade the existing system to meet the
safety requirements of growing marine traffic and the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea treaty.
The acquisition project, named “Rescue 21”, will expand existing
capability through greater area coverage, eliminate emergency access problems,
comply with Federal mandates for narrow banding, provide voice recorder replay,
and add direction finding capability to improve Coast Guard emergency
response. In FY 2003, Rescue 21
deployments will begin in southern New Jersey, the Eastern shore of Maryland
and Virginia, the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound, Washington; the
panhandle and west coast of Florida, and south Alabama and Mississippi. Rescue 21 deployments in the continental U.S.
will be completed by September 2005 with all regions completed by September
2006. Training and staffing are
discussed above under the Maritime Safety performance results.
The Coast Guard’s acquisition projects remain
on the IG’s top management challenges list for 2003.
Strategic
Mobility: To maximize DOD’s logistics capability and minimize
its cost, defense sealift increasingly relies on the U.S. commercial
sector. DOD’s ability to respond to
military contingencies requires adequate U.S.-flag sealift resources, skilled
U.S. maritime labor, and the associated maritime infrastructure. DOT helps provide for a seamless,
time-phased transition from peacetime to wartime operations while balancing the
defense and commercial elements of our transportation system. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) is a key
source of strategic sealift capacity to support the rapid deployment of U.S.
military forces during the early stages of a military crisis. Merchant mariners employed on commercial
vessels in the U.S. domestic and international trades provide the core job
skills needed to crew the RRF. The Maritime Security Program
(MSP) and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) program ensure that
the active U.S.-flag fleet is available for sealift while continuing to carry
commercial freight. Merchant mariners
employed on these and other vessels in the U.S. domestic and international
trades provide the crew to simultaneously operate both the RRF and the
commercial fleet during wartime. DOT is responsible for establishing DOD's
prioritized use of ports and related intermodal facilities during DOD
mobilizations, when the smooth flow of military cargo through commercial ports
is critical.
Performance measures:
Percentage of DOD-required shipping capacity
complete with crews available within mobilization timelines.
1999 2000 2001 2002
Target: N/A N/A
N/A 93
Actual: 97 92 97 94
Percentage of DOD-designated commercial ports
available for military use within DOD established readiness timelines.
1999 2000 2001 2002
Target: 90 90 93 92
Actual: 93 93 92 92
2002
Results:
DOT met both performance targets for DOD-required shipping capacity and for
DOD-designated port availability.
MARAD also achieved its target of 99 percent RRF
ship mission-capability while under Military Sealift Command control, but did
not achieve its 100 percent target for timely ‘no-notice’ RRF ship activations
(97 percent on-time activation rate).
Beginning in FY 2002, on-time activation includes a requirement that
activated ships successfully complete a 72-hour sea trial upon activation. MARAD is conducting additional repairs to
ensure successful activations. MARAD
was slightly below its 165,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) target for
the amount of available sealift capacity within the MSP/VISA fleet (164,271
TEUs).
MARAD estimates that sufficient mariners were
available to crew the available shipping capacity, however, the number of
mariners declined significantly since many mariners did not upgrade their
licenses to meet new, more stringent standards for maritime training and
certification implemented in 2002.
FY 2003 Performance Plan Evaluation: DOT
will meet both performance targets in FY 2003.
In November 2002, a larger vessel will replace a vessel in the MSP and
provide the additional necessary TEUs.
Drug
and Migrant Interdiction: Illegal drugs threaten our
children, our communities, and the social fabric of this country. Illegal immigration also poses a serious
threat to America’s economic and social well being, and challenges the integrity
of our borders as a sovereign Nation. Approximately 52,000 deaths occur
annually in America from drug abuse and drug-related crimes, accidents, and
illnesses. An untold number of illegal migrants perish each year when
overloaded and un-seaworthy vessels founder at sea.
Performance Measures:
Amount of drugs seized or destroyed at sea
(metric tons).
1999 2000 2001 2002
Target: N/A N/A N/A 75
Actual: 78.7 83.2 78.6 71.9
Interdict and/or deter at least 87 percent of
undocumented migrants who consider attempting to enter the U.S. via maritime
routes.
1999 2000 2001 2002
Target: 87 87
87 87
Actual: 86.7 89 82.5
88.3
2002 Results: DOT met the illegal
migrant interdiction performance target, but did not meet the drug interdiction
performance target.
Although the flow of cocaine toward the U.S. remains
relatively high, USCG cocaine seizures dropped by about 15 percent from FY
2001. There are two reasons for this
drop in performance:
▪
the
apparent increase in the smugglers' willingness to destroy their vessels rather
than face interdiction and prosecution.
For example, upon approach for boarding, smugglers scuttled two vessel
strongly suspected of transporting a total of over 20 metric tons of cocaine. Had these drugs been seized, the Coast Guard
would have set a new record for fiscal year total seizures.
▪
the
Coast Guard’s FY 2002 focus on coastal and seaport security required shifting
some effort from drug interdiction.
USCG stopped 4,104 illegal immigrants from reaching
the U.S. Most of the illegal migrants
successfully interdicted and returned were from the Caribbean. Cuban migration was steady but slightly less
than previous years. Haitian migrant
flow was higher than last year and this is expected to persist. In the Pacific, almost 1,500 Ecuadorian
migrants were interdicted in eight events.
People’s Republic of China (PRC) migration was slightly higher than last
year, but remained low overall. Guam
and the U.S. Virgin Islands will continue to remain attractive targets for future
PRC migration since they are the closest points of entry along traditional
migration routes.
USCG supplementary performance measure:
Percent of cocaine seized that is shipped
through the transit zone (high seas between source countries and the United States).
1999 2000 2001 2002
Target: 12.5
13.0 15.0 18.7
Actual: 12.2
10.6 11.1 10.3#
# Preliminary estimate based on 2001 cocaine flow
quantity.
FY 2003 Performance Plan Evaluation: DOT cannot characterize Coast Guard performance for
FY 2003, since the Coast Guard will be a part of the new Department of Homeland
Security. As requested resources for
port and coastal security come on stream, the Coast Guard will be increasingly
able to restore levels of effort to drug interdiction.