<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:31463.wais]
NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL POLICY,
AND HYDROELECTRIC LICENSE EXTENSION AND
ENERGY EFFICIENCY LEGISLATION
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 13, 2006
Serial No. 109-138
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
31-506 WASHINGTON : 2007
_____________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202)
512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida Ranking Member
Vice Chairman HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
FRED UPTON, Michigan EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia BART GORDON, Tennessee
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ANNA G. ESHOO, California
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico BART STUPAK, Michigan
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
CHARLES W. "CHIP" PICKERING, Mississippi ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
Vice Chairman GENE GREEN, Texas
VITO FOSSELLA, New York TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
ROY BLUNT, Missouri DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado
STEVE BUYER, Indiana LOIS CAPPS, California
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire TOM ALLEN, Maine
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania JIM DAVIS, Florida
MARY BONO, California JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
GREG WALDEN, Oregon HILDA L. SOLIS, California
LEE TERRY, Nebraska CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey JAY INSLEE, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, Idaho MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
SUE MYRICK, North Carolina
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
BUD ALBRIGHT, Staff Director
DAVID CAVICKE, General Counsel
REID P. F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY
RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chairman
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky Ranking Member
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
CHARLES W. "CHIP" PICKERING, Mississippi GENE GREEN, Texas
VITO FOSSELLA, New York TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California LOIS CAPPS, California
MARY BONO, California MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania
GREG WALDEN, Oregon TOM ALLEN, Maine
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan JIM DAVIS, Florida
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, Idaho HILDA L. SOLIS, California
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas (EX OFFICIO)
JOE BARTON, Texas
(EX OFFICIO)
CONTENTS
Page
Testimony of:
Sproat, III, Hon. Edward F., Director, Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of
Energy 16
Reyes, Luis A., Executive Director for Operations, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 20
Wise, Hon. Stan, Chairman, Georgia Public Service
Commission, on behalf of National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners 44
Earley, Jr., Anthony F., Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, DTE Energy Company, on behalf of Nuclear
Energy Institute 52
Boyd, Michele, Legislative Director, Public Citizen 63
Otter, Hon. C. L. "Butch", Member, U.S. House of
Representatives 82
Mollohan, Hon. Alan B., Member, U.S. House of
Representatives 214
Robinson, Mark J., Director, Office of Energy Projects,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 238
Additional material submitted for the record:
Sproat III, Hon. Edward F., Director, Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of
Energy, response for the record 247
Reyes, Luis A., Executive Director for Operations, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, response for the
record 251
Wise, Hon. Stan, Chairman, Georgia Public Service
Commission, on behalf of National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners, response for the
record 254
Earley, Jr., Anthony F., Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, DTE Energy Company, on behalf of Nuclear
Energy Institute, response for the record 258
NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL POLICY,
AND HYDROELECTRIC LICENSE
EXTENSION AND ENERGY
EFFICIENCY LEGISLATION
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2006
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 2322 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ralph M.
Hall (Chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Hall, Norwood, Shimkus,
Otter, Murphy, Burgess, Barton (ex officio), Boucher, Markey,
Green, and Dingell (ex officio).
Staff present: David McCarthy, Chief Counsel for Energy and
the Environment; Kurt Bilas, Counsel; Annie Caputo, Professional
Staff Member; Elizabeth Stack, Policy Coordinator; Peter Kielty,
Legislative Clerk; Sue Sheridan, Minority Senior Counsel; and
Bruce Harris, Minority Professional Staff Member.
MR. HALL. The committee will come to order. I would like to,
of course, welcome all the witnesses to this committee with a
particular warm welcome to fellow members, Congressman Otter
and Congressman Mollohan. A warm welcome to all of them but
to our associates, we always like to see them come before the
committee. Without objection, the subcommittee will proceed
pursuant to committee rule 4E, which allows members the
opportunity to defer opening statements for extra questioning time.
I recognize myself for an opening statement.
First, I want to thank Ranking Member Rick Boucher and
Chairman Barton and Ranking Member Dingell of the full
committee for their help in setting up this hearing. Nuclear and
hydroelectric energy are the mainstays of our Nation's energy
supply and resolving these issues before us today is just absolutely
critical to insuring that our country continues to receive the
benefits of these clean energy sources.
First, let me comment on nuclear waste. Yucca Mountain is a
necessary solution for hazardous disposal of our Nation's nuclear
waste. I have said before, and said it before and before and before,
we owe it to our children and to our grandchildren to live up to the
commitment to build a safe and secure repository. Today's
hearing is an opportunity for us to hear from the stakeholders
regarding their opinions on the various legislative proposals
regarding nuclear waste storage and disposal, and any additional
recommendations that they might have. I know many people are
frustrated with the length of time we have been working on this
issue and how much longer it will be until the repository opens.
I think that frustration leads people to question whether Yucca
Mountain will ever open and to suggest that we proceed with
interim storage instead. I have supported interim storage
provisions in the past at Yucca Mountain. We should not allow the
pursuit of interim storage to slow progress in the repository. After
addressing nuclear issues, we will turn to five bills that provide for
hydroelectric license extension. These bills address seven projects
in five States and have been introduced by Republicans and
Democrats.
Our first hydro panel will consist of two of our colleagues,
Congressman Butch Otter from Idaho, and Congressman Alan
Mollohan from West Virginia to discuss the bills that they have
introduced to extend the licensing for projects in their States. We
will also hear from Mark Robinson of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission on FERC's view on these five bills. I
encourage my colleagues to use this hearing to gain a better
understanding of the issues before us in preparation for possible
legislative action. I remind all members have the opportunity to
submit questions for the record following the hearing. I ask the
witnesses to please respond to these questions as soon as you can.
I look forward to working with you and listening to your testimony
today, so as we get underway I will recognize Mr. Boucher for an
opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Ralph M. Hall follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. RALPH M. HALL, CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY
The Subcommittee will come to order. I would like to
welcome all of the witnesses to this Committee with a particularly
warm welcome to our fellow Members, Congressmen Otter and
Mollohan. Without objection, the Subcommittee will proceed
pursuant to Committee Rule 4(e), which allows Members the
opportunity to defer opening statements for extra questioning time.
The Chair recognizes himself for an opening statement. First, I
want to thank Ranking Member Rick Boucher, and Chairman
Barton and Ranking Member Dingell of the Full Committee for
their help in setting up this hearing. Nuclear and hydroelectric
energy are mainstays of our nation's energy supply. Resolving the
issues before us today is critical to ensuring that our country
continues to receive the benefits of these clean energy sources.
First, let me comment on nuclear waste. Yucca Mountain is a
necessary solution for how to dispose of our nation's nuclear
waste. As I've said before, we owe it to our children and
grandchildren to live up to the commitment to build a safe and
secure repository.
Today's hearing is an opportunity for us to hear from
stakeholders regarding their opinions on the various legislative
proposals regarding nuclear waste storage and disposal, and any
additional recommendations they have.
I know many people are frustrated with the length of time we
have been working on this issue and how much longer it will be
until the repository opens. I think that frustration leads people to
question whether Yucca Mountain will EVER open and to suggest
that we proceed with interim storage instead. I've supported
interim storage provisions in the past, at Yucca Mountain.
However, a short term fix should not detratct from the focus and
resources needed for the long-term solution - the pursuit of interim
storage should not slow progress on the repository.
After addressing nuclear issues, we will turn to 5 bills that
provide for hydroelectric license extensions. These bills address 7
projects in 5 States and have been introduced by Republicans and
Democrats. Our first panel will consist of two of our colleagues,
Congressman Butch Otter from Idaho and Congressman Allan
Mollohan from West Virginia, to discuss the bills that they have
introduced to extend the FERC licenses for projects in their States.
We will also hear from Mark Robinson of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission on FERC's views on these 5 bills.
I encourage my colleagues to use this hearing to gain a better
understanding of the issue before us in preparation for possible
legislative action. I remind all Members of the opportunity to
submit questions for the record following the hearing. I ask the
witnesses to please respond those questions as soon as you can. I
look forward to working with you, and listening to your testimony
today.
MR. BOUCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
want to commend you for convening today's hearing on our
nuclear waste disposal and storage policies, as well as on
legislation providing for hydroelectric license extensions in several
selected circumstances. I will focus my comments this afternoon
on the nuclear waste portion of today's hearing. This is a matter of
great concern to many stakeholders including the electricity
consumers who are paying every year into the Nuclear Waste
Fund.
I was pleased to learn during our hearing in July on the status
of the Yucca Mountain program that the Department of Energy has
developed a new schedule and plans to submit a license application
in the year 2008 to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with the
opening of the repository expected to follow in the year 2017.
While I am encouraged by the new schedule that DOE has put
forward and even more encouraged by its apparent determination
to meet that schedule, we are all still awaiting the receipt of an
accompanying anticipated funding stream statement, and we hope
we will be receiving that statement in the near future. That will be
the schedule of money that will flow to DOE and to this program
that would be required to meet the new schedule.
The longstanding matter of funding for the Yucca Mountain
project continues to be of great concern. While the balance in the
Nuclear Waste Fund is currently approximately $19 billion, annual
appropriations for the Yucca Mountain program are only a fraction
of the amount annually contributed by the ratepayers. This year,
for example, the Administration has proposed $156 million for
civilian nuclear waste disposal, but $750 million in rate payer
contributions will go into the Nuclear Waste Fund during the
current year. These monies are not walled off and protected and
are therefore being spent for other purposes in order to fund the
Federal government's general operations, and that was never the
intent at the time that ratepayers were taxed with funding the
nuclear waste disposal program.
Over the past several years several legislative proposals to
address the funding mechanism have been debated by this
committee but because of objections from other committees no
resolution has been reached on ways to secure funding to this
project. I would say again it is a matter of paramount importance.
It is in my view essential to secure for the Yucca Mountain project
not only future rate payer contributions into the Fund, but also the
existing balance of approximately $19 billion which has been paid
for the purpose of establishing the repository. And as we consider
legislation to secure future contributions, I think it must have a
component that assures that the Yucca Mountain project receives
the full balance, approximately 19 billion, currently residing within
the Fund.
A number of new proposals have surfaced in recent months
including the establishment of possible interim storage facilities
and also the global nuclear energy partnership, a program which
would promote nuclear waste reprocessing. I am interested in
hearing about the potential merits of both of these proposals, but
let me say that I am somewhat skeptical about the ability of DOE
simultaneously to fund and staff those new efforts while
continuing to meet the new schedule for opening Yucca Mountain.
And I hope that our witnesses today will offer some comments on
how that might happen if either or both of these new programs are
put into effect. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
MR. HALL. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes Dr.
Norwood, the gentleman from Georgia, for an opening statement.
MR. NORWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing today on a very important energy issue
including nuclear and hydroelectric power issues. I have been a
strong supporter of these types of power since coming to Congress
and would very much like to see their expansion in these areas to
promote clean, renewable power and diversification in our
Nation's energy portfolio. Unfortunately, I think that we keep
seeing the same opposition from the usual suspects. These folks
who oppose the energy bill oppose offshore exploration, oppose
domestic resources in Alaska, oppose expanding refineries, and
even oppose wind power when it hurts their vacation home view.
Yet, they are the first to vilify oil companies when trying to
bring my product to market first to make us beholding to
international energy moguls and the first to cry when their winter
heating bill goes up or their power blacks out because of lack of
infrastructure. Now we have the expansion of nuclear power
before us, and as we have for some time, and the delays continue.
I for one come from a State that is ready, is willing, is able to
expand our nuclear power infrastructure, but the industry and the
expansion are hamstrung by the failure to achieve some certainty
that a plan will be in place for proper safe disposal of nuclear
waste, all the while power bills slowly are creeping up and waste
piles up.
This is a security issue. It is a power issue. It is an
infrastructure issue, and it is a jobs issue. I would have thought
that we could have agreed on all of these things, but clearly we do
not. I look forward to this hearing. I look forward to being
reassured by Mr. Sproat that after my visit to Yucca Mountain in
1995 he might actually open it and hopefully before 2008. Finally,
I would like to welcome my friend and fellow Georgian, Mr. Stan
Wise, who serves our home State with both dedication and
distinction. I appreciate his service to Georgia and our constituents
appreciate his efforts on their behalf back home. I know that he
will be an able and informative witness for us here on this second
panel. Thank you for coming today, Stan, and I look forward to
your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. HALL. Thank you, Dr. Norwood. The Chair recognizes
Dr. Murphy, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, for an opening
statement.
MR. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this important hearing. As you know, we are in the
unfortunate and tragic position in the United States of funding both
sides in this war we are immersed in, a war that has been going on
for some 30 years, curiously as long as we have also not been
building nuclear power plants, building oil refineries, exploring for
oil and natural gas to a very limited extent. In the meantime,
countries like Iran take our oil money that people pay for every
time they fill their tank and they have recently given I believe it
was about $100 million worth of aid to Hezbollah in their fight
against Israel.
We have countries like Venezuela who openly embrace other
terrorist supporting Nations saying that they also see the United
States as their enemy, all the while taking money from our citizens
to fund their hostile comments and their hostile activities. The
only way we can combat this is to have a diverse source of energy
in this Nation that includes exploring for our own sources of oil off
the Atlantic Coast, the Gulf Coast, the Pacific Coast, the Rocky
Mountains in Alaska, and stop delaying this for the sake of politics
and really see that we have to have some energy independence
here, diversify our energy sources to include such things as clean
coal technology which we have been funding but we need to move
forward more aggressively on that, and also diversity with other
sources, solar, hydroelectric, and nuclear being among them.
If we fail to do that, we are continuing to send money to people
who use it against us to kill our citizens, people who are part of a
network who have promised to kill some four million adults and
two million children as part of their war against us. This is a
serious undertaking. I am pleased that as a result of our energy
bill, companies like Westinghouse Electric are now working
actively to build nuclear power plants. But of course we can't
move forward on that unless they have a place to put the nuclear
waste. A large part of the solution to America's energy problem is
American energy, and the more we see energy independence by
diversifying our sources through such things as nuclear, clean coal,
domestic source of oil, and other renewables, the better off we are
as a Nation.
Like most Americans, I am tired, I am sick and tired of having
hostile Nations dictate our economy while we sit back and here
and argue politics instead of working on energy policy. This issue
of Yucca Mountain is a major issue for our energy independence
and the sooner we understand it is a major issue for our American
peace the sooner we will move forward in doing the right thing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. HALL. Thank you, sir. The Chair recognizes Honorable
John Dingell for an opening statement. Mr. Dingell, welcome.
MR. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, you are most courteous.
MR. HALL. You are worth waiting for.
MR. DINGELL. We will see after I finish this statement if you
still want to hold that view.
MR. HALL. I may want to revise my statement.
MR. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing. I
applaud the attention which the subcommittee and the full
committee have brought during this session to the Department of
Energy's DOE Yucca Mountain waste repository program. This
program is long delayed. It has undergone an internal review
which I hope will get it back on track so the DOE can prepare and
file the license application with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in the near future. It is important that this committee
and this subcommittee stay on top of these changes, and I
commend you, Mr. Chairman, and the Chairman of the full
committee for your doing this.
I am pleased to have Director Sproat before the subcommittee
today. While past delays in the program are regrettable, it was
good to learn at our last hearing in July that Mr. Sproat believes
DOE will be in a position to file an application by 2008 and
potentially to open the repository in 2017. I am pleased that Tony
Earley, a personal friend, and the Chairman and CEO of DTE
Energy Company in my home State of Michigan will be testifying
today on behalf of the Nuclear Energy Institute.
The nuclear industry has upheld its end of the bargain in terms
of channeling funds into the Nuclear Waste Fund. I appreciate the
support that the industry gives on funding reform and on other
things related to these matters. This is sorely needed to protect it
and the ratepayers' investment. I hope that industry will support
my efforts to find the means of halting the diversion of the $19
billion in the Fund, which sadly remains vulnerable to raids by the
Budget and the Appropriations Committees, which is regularly
diverted to other purposes for the reasons best understood by the
Budget and Appropriations Committees.
Today's hearing may shed light on questions surrounding the
issue of centralized interim storage. The idea surfaces from time to
time and indeed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act included a very
narrow and specifically drawn version which expired in 1990.
Similarly, during the 106th Congress the committee referred the bill
authorizing DOE to construct a strictly limited interim storage
facility in Nevada. While interim storage may hold promise, we
should not lose sight of the fundamental trade off that the Congress
has waged in past debates that interim storage not grow so large as
to undercut incentives for completing the repository.
Those who suggest the time has come to abandon this concern
should be prepared to explain why ratepayers should be asked to
pay for both the repository program and one or more interim
storage facilities which will have substantial cost in addition to the
cost of on-site storage. This brings me, Mr. Chairman, to my last
observation. For years DOE has provided information to this
committee projecting funding needs for the Yucca Mountain
project for the following decade. This has enabled members to
assess whether or not the program funding will be adequate and
when DOE will need access to the corpus of the Nuclear Waste
Funds to meet peak spending needs.
To date, DOE has not provided Congress with updated cost
estimates that reflect the programmatic changes announced in July,
and I hope that this hearing today will help us get some of that
information. To be sure, I would rather that the Department take
the time needed to get it right, rather than to hurry this information.
The lack, however, of updated cost estimates precludes members
from making an informed judgment about legislative proposals for
centralized Federal interim storage. DOE did not include interim
storage in its legislative proposal, and I share the concerns that
several of my colleagues from both sides of the aisle expressed
about the effect of such a new initiative and the impact it could
have on DOE's resources. In terms of process, a policy change of
this magnitude is best considered by the regular order. If not, the
product is likely to be disappointing and will make matters worse.
It would be a shame if the Congress saddled DOE with another
layer of responsibilities that resulted in still more delay and still
more litigation. With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your
kindness. I thank my colleagues for their attention, and I look
forward to hearing from the witnesses, and I yield back the balance
of my time.
MR. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Dingell. The Chair notes the
presence of Mr. Barton, Chairman of the Energy and Commerce
Committee. I recognize you, Mr. Chairman, for an opening
statement.
CHAIRMAN BARTON. Thank you, Chairman Hall, for holding
this hearing. Nuclear energy and hydropower both play crucial
and growing roles in meeting our Nation's energy needs. Solving
the nuclear waste issue and facilitating hydroelectric licensing are
crucial steps to insuring that these clean energy sources continue to
be available. Two months ago your subcommittee heard testimony
from the Department of Energy on the new schedule at Yucca
Mountain. Meeting that ambitious schedule will require legislative
action and funding. Mr. Sproat is here today. I am going to let
you know that I remain committed to helping you meet that
schedule. I am going to go everything I can to help you be
successful in meeting that schedule.
I realize that 2017 is a long way off, but there is a growing
desire on the part of some to pursue interim storage. As Chairman
Hall has commented, I have also supported interim storage in the
past at Yucca Mountain. However, building interim storage
facilities in as many as 31 States is not something that I support,
and I don't think the House will support it. I think it is unrealistic.
I think it depletes the Nuclear Waste Fund, and I think it does not
meet our obligation to the ratepayers who have paid for Yucca
Mountain. To the extent interim storage is appropriate, let us
locate it at Yucca Mountain.
The ratepayers that have paid into the waste fund for all these
years are counting on Congress to do our part by building the
repository. We owe them the value of that facility. We also owe it
to our future generations to take care of the spent fuel that we
already have on hand. In the process we should not preclude
future generations from applying advance technologies that almost
certainly will be developed. You don't have to be a nuclear
engineer to know with certainty that future generations will almost
certainly discover more effective solutions to the nuclear waste
issue than we have today. As knowledge accumulates, new ideas
will emerge and progress will happen. Therefore, I strongly
believe that we should proceed with licensing and constructing the
repository at Yucca Mountain in a way that maintains flexibility
for future generations to incorporate the improvements that they
devise.
The National Research Council has issued a report back in
2003 that was entitled one step at a time. It proposed a concept
called adaptive staging. I am intrigued by the proposal and intend
to study it further. Staged development of repositories is a concept
that is gaining support internationally. It may provide a flexible
framework for incorporating future innovations without delaying
the current repository. As I have said before, I remain committed
to doing everything I can as Chairman of the Energy and
Commerce Committee to help the Department of Energy meet the
2017 time table for opening the Yucca Mountain repository.
There are legislative provisions that must be passed to
accomplish that. I expect if there are other provisions that could be
passed it would be helpful. In the coming months I hope to work
with Mr. Dingell on a legislative package to put the Yucca
Mountain program on a path to success. Support for Yucca
Mountain has been bipartisan in this committee and in the House.
It is my goal that the work we do on this issue will continue to be
bipartisan. We should not let politics get in the way of addressing
this important issue. The subcommittee today is also going to take
up five bills, or review five bills, to extend their licenses to begin
the construction of seven hydroelectric projects.
Last year's Energy Policy Act contained important provisions
regarding hydroelectric project licensing to encourage more
hydroelectric generation. I see that the first panel after this panel
contains two Members of Congress, Representatives Otter of
Idaho, who is a member of this committee, and Alan Mollohan of
West Virginia. I look forward to their testimony. With that, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOE BARTON, CHAIRMAN,
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
Thank you, Chairman Hall for having this hearing. Nuclear
energy and hydropower both play crucial and growing roles in
meeting our nation's energy needs. Solving the nuclear waste
issue and facilitating hydroelectric licensing are crucial steps to
ensuring that these clean sources of energy will continue to be
available.
Two months ago this Subcommittee heard testimony from the
Department of Energy on the new schedule for Yucca Mountain.
Meeting that ambitious schedule will require legislative action and
funding. Mr. Sproat, I remain committed to helping you meet that
schedule and will do everything I can to give you the tools you
need to succeed.
I realize 2017 is a long way off and that there is growing desire
on the part of some to pursue interim storage. As Chairman Hall
already commented, I have also supported interim storage in the
past: at Yucca Mountain. However, building interim storage
facilities in as many as 31 states in NOT something I support. It is
unrealistic, depletes the Nuclear Waste Fund, and does not meet
our obligation to the ratepayers who have paid for Yucca
Mountain.
They're counting on Congress to do our part by finally building
the repository. Not only do we owe THEM the value of the
facility, we also owe it to future generations to take care of the
spent nuclear fuel that our generation has benefited from.
However, in the process we should not preclude future generations
from applying advanced technologies that they will develop.
You don't have to be an engineer to know with certainty that
future generations will discover more effective solutions to the
nuclear waste issue. As knowledge accumulates, new ideas will
emerge and progress will happen. Therefore, we should proceed
with licensing and constructing the repository in a way that
maintains flexibility for future generations to incorporate the
improvements that they devise. The National Research Council
issued a report in 2003 entitled, "One Step at a Time" which
proposed a concept called, "Adaptive Staging." I am intrigued by
the proposal and intend to study it further. Staged development of
repositories is a concept that is gaining support internationally and
may provide a flexible framework for incorporating future
innovations, without delaying the repository.
As I've said before, I remain committed to doing everything I
can to help DOE meet their 2017 opening date for the repository.
There are legislative provisions that must be passed to accomplish
that and I expect there are other provisions that would be helpful.
In the coming months, I hope to work with Ranking Member
Dingell on a legislative package to put the Yucca Mountain
program on a path to success. Support for Yucca Mountain has
been bipartisan on this Committee. It is my goal that the work we
do on this issue will continue to be bipartisan. We should not let
politics get in the way of addressing this important issue.
The Subcommittee will also take up 5 bills to extend the FERC
licenses to begin the construction of 7 hydroelectric projects. Last
year's Energy Policy Act contained important provisions regarding
hydroelectric project licensing to encourage more hydroelectric
generation. I see that the first hydro panel consists of 2 members
of Congress - Representatives Butch Otter of Idaho and a member
of the Energy and Commerce Committee, and Allan Mollohan of
West Virginia. I look forward to their testimony. It is always
encouraging to hear from people who want to see new energy
facilities in their States.
MR. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I recognize Mr.
Shimkus, the gentleman from Illinois, for an opening statement.
MR. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be brief.
I want to welcome our panel. This is an important hearing. I agree
a lot obviously with the Chairman and even the Ranking Member.
Divide and conquer is a strategy to delay, confuse, and stop the
expansion of nuclear power in this country. That is why we were
so excited, Mr. Sproat, when you gave your testimony and
committing a time line. I want to join my Chairman in saying
anything we can do to meet the 2008-2017 we want to do because
the best signal we can send to the nuclear industry is that we are
serious. We are serious about Yucca.
This interim proposal is just ridiculous. If we think that each
State is going to not delay, confuse, obfuscate, I can't even say the
word, this process and delay interim storage for decades like the
attempts that have been at Yucca Mountain, we haven't been in
Washington very long, so I want us to move forward. You have
got a lot of supporters here. You can count me as one of them, and
I look forward to working with you to achieve that end so that we
can diversify our energy portfolio for all the reasons that members
have already mentioned before. We want a competitive, electricity
generation market. That means coal. I am from a leading coal
State. That means nuclear and natural gas and hydroelectric. You
want them to compete, and you don't want to disenfranchise any of
those competitors. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
MR. HALL. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Mr. Otter, the
gentleman from Idaho, for an opening statement.
MR. OTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would to welcome
the panel. Thank you for being here today. I would associate
myself with the remarks of Mr. Shimkus and also our Chairman,
and all those other remarks that says basically we are not much in
favor of interim storage. The future of energy, I believe, in this
country is nuclear. And the future of nuclear energy in this
country is how we treat our waste. Can we clean up the messes
that we have got? Can we take care of the messes that we would
create? And to delay and to try to now establish an interim storage
scheme which would actually delay the final resting place of the
nuclear waste that we have, I think is a terrible mistake not only in
terms of promises made and promises not yet kept, but I think it is
also a terrible mistake in terms of how we are going to be able to
view the role in which nuclear energy can play in the future in the
United States.
I am aware and I am sure you too, sir, are aware of an
agreement that we have in Idaho on the removal of nuclear waste,
and there is a time line on that. And that time line since its
inception of that contract is 12 years now and certainly that
agreement between the Department of Defense and Energy and the
State of Idaho did allow for some time lines to be stretched, but it
is getting perilously close now to an irreversible trend. And so I
would join the rest of my colleagues in total support of going
forward with permanent storage and getting those projects
underway so that we really do have a future for nuclear energy in
this country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
[Additional statements submitted for the record follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. GENE GREEN, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding our third Nuclear Waste
hearing in the 109th Congress.
It's about that time when people start looking to pass all kinds
of legislation in lame duck omnibus appropriations bills, so it is a
good idea for our Committee to be paying close attention to this
issue.
The scope of the challenge of nuclear waste has been well
documented by this Committee and elsewhere, but the language in
the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations bill is a new wrinkle
we must confront.
Many on this Committee are very concerned with this
language. By starting from scratch on new "interim" storage
facilities at unknown locations, we are likely undercutting the
Yucca Mountain project.
With DOE and Congress struggling so hard to get Yucca
moving, it's hard to see how the federal government has the time
and resources to set up any more nuclear storage facilities.
If we switch course and pursue an interim nuclear storage
facility, we run the risk of eliminating all the momentum behind
Yucca Mountain.
Some Yucca opponents support the Senate language, and they
probably view this proposal as a strategy to delay Yucca Mountain
indefinitely.
As a result, it is going to be very difficult to site an interim
facility since any area that is chosen will suspect they're the new
permanent facility.
An interim facility will likely be smaller than Yucca Mountain
which likely means that some nuclear waste will remain at on-site
storage facilities for even longer than expected.
Some facilities may be stuck with their waste because the
interim facility won't be big enough to take care of everyone, but it
will be big enough to take away Yucca's momentum.
DOE needs to take a leadership role in the appropriations
negotiations this year and do what is best for the entire nation's
safety and reliable electricity supply.
If DOE sits on its hand on the sidelines it will be much easier
for anti-Yucca elements in the Senate to sneak in through the back
door and kill the Yucca Mountain project which Congress
approved overwhelmingly.
If that happens, the pro-nuclear Bush Administration may go
down in history as the Administration that did the most damage to
the future of nuclear power in America.
Thank you and I yield back.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. MIKE ROGERS, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for convening this important hearing on nuclear
waste storage and disposal policy. First and foremost, I would like
to welcome from Michigan Mr. Tony Earley, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of DTE Energy to the Committee.
Mr. Earley, in your important role serving as Chairman of the
Nuclear Energy Institute, the Committee welcomes your expertise
on this important issue facing our region and the entire nation.
Mr. Chairman, my home state of Michigan has four nuclear
waste storage sites. Yet Michigan is also the home of the Great
Lakes which contain 20 percent of the world's fresh water. I can
assure you that Michiganders are very interested in securing and
opening the permanent nuclear waste storage facility at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada to get this hazardous material off of the shores
of our precious lakes.
Many of the provisions found in H.R. 5360 would take
important steps to continue moving this process forward. This bill
would go a long way toward providing certainty that the Yucca
Mountain facility is progressing, ensure the funding stream already
created goes toward Yucca as intended and by clarifying the
licensing process.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this important
hearing. I look forward to working with you going forward on this
issue.
MR. HALL. Thank you. We are very fortunate to have two
gentlemen who are very much in the mix of discussions who we
have here today. We appreciate once again your coming to our aid
and giving us the advice that you are going to give us. Edward F.
Sproat, III, Director of Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management, U.S. Department of Energy, I recognize you at this
time hopefully for 5 minutes but whatever it actually takes to
summarize yours and then we will ask questions. I recognize you,
Mr. Sproat.
STATEMENTS OF HON. EDWARD F. SPROAT, III, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND LUIS A. REYES,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
MR. SPROAT. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Boucher, members
of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to
appear before you today to talk about H.R. 5360, which is entitled
the Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act, and on behalf of
the President and the Secretary, I would particularly like to thank
Chairman Barton for his introduction of this important piece of
legislation. Let me talk about--I am very encouraged by what the
committee said this afternoon regarding your support for Yucca
Mountain, and I want to talk specifically about what can we do for
you to help make this happen, and that is what I want to talk about
in 5 minutes or less.
Two months ago I came before this committee, and I laid out
the new best achievable schedule for the Yucca Mountain project
showing that we believed under optimum circumstances the best
achievable date of opening Yucca Mountain is March of 2017. I
got criticized in a number of quarters about how unrealistic that
schedule was, and I want to make it very clear that the schedule is
best achievable, not most probable, and there is a difference. And
I want to make it very clear that the legislation that the
Administration sent up here to Capitol Hill back in the spring and
here in the House as H.R. 5360 is absolutely positively critical to
making that March, 2017 date.
I can tell you unequivocally that if we don't get that legislation,
I have a zero chance of making that March, 2017 date, and I am
prepared to go into some of the details as to why that is the case,
and so that is why I am here, to try and make that case to you about
how important that piece of legislation is to allow us to open that
repository by March of 2017. There have been a number of
discussions about this legislation, and there are a number of
misconceptions out there about what it is asking for and what it is
intending to do. I am going to hit the highlights very quickly and
try and put it in plain English because there are a number of--it is
very legalistic in a number of ways, and I want to try and keep it
very simple and very straightforward.
Number one is around the waste fund; this legislation is not
about taking Yucca Mountain off budget. It is not about taking
away from Congress its right of appropriations for Yucca
Mountain. This is about making the annual receipts in the Nuclear
Waste Fund and characterizing them as discretionary. And what
that allows the various appropriations committees to do is to take
that money, the receipts as they come in, appropriate them for
Yucca Mountain without impacting the committee's budget limits
that they are given for the budget process. It does still maintain
congressional control of the appropriations process over Yucca
Mountain so that is very important to understand.
Just one last point on money before I move on. There have
been a couple questions raised about the cash flows which you
asked about when I was here 2 months ago. The cash flow
estimates for the Yucca Mountain project are in the final stages of
being put together through the entire construction period of the
project. We are bringing in an outside, independent architect
engineering firm to do an independent review of the methodology
and the numbers that we have for that. I expect that independent
review to be done in early October. Once that is done, we will
present that to you in an appropriate forum so that you have those
cash flows, but that is where we stand with that right now. I
understand you would like to have those as soon as possible but we
want to make sure they are right.
The second issue in the bill concerns land withdrawal, and to
make it very simple, in order for the NRC to license the repository,
DOE as the licensee needs to show that it has control of the
repository area. I can't do that unless that land is withdrawn from
public use and public access, and what the legislation allows us to
do is give the Secretary of Energy control that way and make
determinations how it is to be used. That is critical to the licensing
process of Yucca Mountain.
The third area is removal of a 70,000 metric tons limit on the
capacity of Yucca Mountain. Right now with the current fleet of
nuclear plants and with the license extensions they have open, we
will have Yucca Mountain totally committed within the next
several years.
What this legislation is proposing is to remove that
administrative limit that is in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and
allow the NRC to determine during the licensing process what the
maximum allowable capacity of Yucca Mountain should be. What
I can tell you is that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act also requires me
to report to Congress between January 1, 2007, and 2010, if I
believe, there is a need for a second repository. If we do not
remove this administrative cap, I can tell you I will present a report
to the Congress certainly during my tenure that says we need a
second repository, national repository, if that 70,000 metric ton
limit is retained.
The next issue is around water, and this is about can we get the
water we need to operate and construct Yucca Mountain, and we
are not trying to usurp the State of Nevada's water rights here.
What we are asking for is the Congress to declare Yucca Mountain
in the public interest because right now the State of Nevada
legislature has declared it not in the public interest and therefore
the State water engineer cannot give us a permit to withdraw water.
So all we are asking is that the Congress declare Yucca Mountain
in the public interest, basically overriding the Nevada legislature's
alternate determination and then allowing us to go in front of the
State water engineer and present our case. That is all we are
asking for. We are not trying to usurp Nevada's rights in terms of
control of their water.
In terms of waste confidence, this is an issue that a number of
people have talked about. This is about trying to make it very clear
so that the NRC and the Congress believe that the disposal of spent
nuclear fuel is an issue that the NRC does not need to consider in
their environmental impact statements for new plants or for license
extensions of existing plants. This is an issue of vital importance
to the industry and to our ability to move forward with nuclear
energy in this country.
The sixth area is around transportation, and there has been a lot
of misinformation around this issue also. Very simply, the
Department of Energy already has authority to transport spent
nuclear fuel and high level waste under the Atomic Energy Act.
What we are asking for is authority under that Atomic Energy Act
to use an existing Department of Transportation pre-emption
process so that, if we get to a locality that is obstinate and not
willing to work with us in the planning process to allow us to plan
the transportation routes, that we can use the existing Department
of Transportation pre-emption process, which is very well
developed and very complete. This gives us an alternative process
to work around any obstructions we might get at a local level.
We are not asking for, nor do we have any plans not to work
very directly with county, State, local, and tribal members in
planning the transportation routes. That is what we have done in
the past. That is what we plan on doing in the future. But we need
this alternative pre-emption process that the Department of
Transportation has in place so that we can apply it to our
shipments. There is also a request to clarify our capability to build
infrastructure for the rail line to Yucca Mountain. And just to be
clear about that, we believe we already have the authority to do
these things. What we are trying to be clear about is that these
actions are connected to Yucca Mountain, but we believe, and we
are trying to clarify, that we have the authority to do these
activities before receipt of a construction authorization from the
NRC, without prejudicing the NRC decision-making process for
the construction authorization.
That is the focus of this. It does not in any way affect NRC's
authority over the nuclear safety aspects of licensing Yucca
Mountain. This is strictly about the connected actions and
allowing us to start activities like building the Nevada railroad spur
prior to issuance of a construction authorization for Yucca
Mountain by the NRC, and that is important to be able to meet our
schedule. The last area that I just want to talk about very quickly
is the several issues associated with trying to clarify Federal
authority over duplicative regulatory review processes. One is
around air quality. We are asking that the EPA be given authority
to regulate our air quality permits for Yucca Mountain and not the
State of Nevada.
Secondly, for the materials to be buried at Yucca Mountain,
right now the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, RCRA,
applies. It is a law that is very focused on shallow burial of
hazardous wastes. It is our contention and belief that NRC
licensing of the materials that we are putting into a deep geological
repository is a much more stringent set of regulations than what the
RCRA law would require, and we are asking elimination of the
duplicative reviews and regulatory frameworks that both RCRA
and NRC regulations would require.
And then finally for those infrastructure improvements that I
talked about before, we just want to clarify that EPA has authority
over the environmental impact statement reviews of those
connected actions. So in summary, Mr. Chairman, the President,
the Secretary, and I all believe that this legislation is critical to
achieving that schedule that I gave you 2 months ago for opening
Yucca Mountain by March of 2017, and we respectfully request
that the Congress act on this legislation.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Edward F. Sproat, III
follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. EDWARD F. SPROAT, III, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss H.R. 5360
entitled the "Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act."
Enactment of this bill would significantly enhance the Nation's
ability to manage and dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste. I thank Chairman Barton for taking up this
critical issue and introducing the legislation.
Over the last 50 years, our country has benefited greatly from
nuclear energy and the power of the atom. We need to ensure a
strong and diversified energy mix to fuel our Nation's economy,
and nuclear power is an important component of that mix.
Currently more than 50,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel is
located at more than 100 above-ground sites in 39 states, and every
year reactors in the United States produce an additional
approximately 2,000 metric tons of spent fuel. In order to ensure
the future viability of our nuclear generating capacity, we need a
safe, permanent, geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel at
Yucca Mountain.
Recently the Department announced its plans to submit a
License Application for the repository to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) by June 30, 2008, and to initiate repository
operations in 2017. This opening date of 2017 is a "best-
achievable schedule" and is predicated upon enactment of the
pending legislation. This proposed legislation addresses many of
the uncertainties, currently beyond the control of the Department,
that have the potential to significantly delay the opening date for
the repository. I would like to briefly summarize the bill's
provisions for the Committee.
First, the most important factor in moving the Yucca Mountain
Project forward is the ability of the Department to have access to
the Nuclear Waste Fund to ensure adequate funding is available to
meet the requirements necessary to construct and operate a
repository. By making a technical budgetary scoring change, the
proposed legislation would correct a structural budget problem by
changing the budgetary treatment of the Nuclear Waste Fund fee,
from mandatory receipts to discretionary offsetting collections
equal to annual appropriations from the fund. Funding for the
Program would still have to be requested by the President and
Congressional appropriations from the Fund would still be
required.
Second, to meet NRC licensing requirements it will also be
necessary for Congress to approve the permanent withdrawal of
the lands needed for the operational area of the repository. The bill
would withdraw permanently from public use approximately
147,000 acres of land in Nye County, Nevada. The Department is
confident that the permanent withdrawal of land would meet the
NRC licensing requirement for the Yucca Mountain repository and
would help assure protection of public health and the environment.
Third, to promote efficient management and disposal of the
current and projected future inventories of commercial spent
nuclear fuel located at reactors throughout the United States, the
proposed legislation would eliminate the current statutory 70,000
metric ton cap on disposal capacity at Yucca Mountain and allow
for maximum use of the mountain's true technical capacity. By
eliminating an artificial statutory limit and allowing the NRC to
evaluate the actual capacity at Yucca Mountain, this provision
would help provide for safe isolation of the Nation's entire
commercial spent nuclear fuel inventory from existing reactors,
including life extensions, and may postpone the need for a second
repository elsewhere until the next century.
In addition, the proposed legislation includes a number of
provisions that would promote prompt consideration of issues
associated with the Yucca Mountain repository or would address
other matters that have the potential to cause delays in moving
forward with the Yucca Mountain Project.
First, the proposed legislation contains provisions that would
provide for a more streamlined NRC licensing process by
amending the licensing process in several respects. In particular,
the legislation would make clear that an application for
construction authorization need not include information on surface
facilities other than those facilities necessary for initial operations.
The bill would also establish an expedited one-year schedule and a
simplified, informal process for the NRC to consider the license
amendment for the Department to receive and possess nuclear
materials as well as for other future license amendment actions.
The bill would also direct that the NRC, consistent with other
provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, need not
consider in its environmental review any actions taken outside of
the geologic repository operations area; this will help focus the
licensing process.
Second, the proposed legislation would permit early initiation
of infrastructure and pre-construction activities at the Yucca
Mountain site for utility, communications, and safety upgrades,
and the construction of a rail line to connect the Yucca Mountain
site with the national rail network prior to receipt of an NRC
construction authorization for the repository. Construction of
repository surface and sub-surface nuclear facilities would still
require a construction authorization from the NRC.
Third, the proposed legislation includes additional provisions
that would simplify the regulatory framework for the repository.
In particular, the legislation would designate the Environmental
Protection Agency as the appropriate agency to issue, administer,
and enforce any air quality permits required in connection with the
Yucca Mountain repository. Material owned, transported and
stored in NRC-licensed containers and NRC-licensed materials at
Yucca Mountain would also be exempt from Federal, State, and
local environmental requirements under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act. The intent is to ensure that dual regulatory
requirements do not apply to the same waste streams, once they are
ready to be shipped to a repository for disposal. These provisions
would simplify the regulatory framework for the repository
without compromising environmental protection or safety.
Fourth, the proposed legislation would address the use of water
needed to carry out the authorized functions under the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982. This legislation would allow the
Department to be treated like a private business in requesting water
access, resulting in non-discriminatory treatment of the
Department. The State of Nevada would still review and
administer water allocation to the Department under this provision.
Fifth, the proposed legislation would address transportation and
ensure the expedited movement of shipments to Yucca Mountain.
In this regard, the legislation would provide the flexibility for the
DOE to regulate the transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste to the repository in the same manner that we
currently conduct transportation of nuclear weapons. The
Department has been transporting such nuclear materials safely for
many years. In addressing this issue, we are not proposing to
change in any way our route planning activities with State, Tribal
and local authorities or how we work with them on emergency
planning, training, and education. This provision would reflect our
longstanding commitment to transporting nuclear material in a
manner that meets or exceeds NRC and Department of
Transportation requirements for transportation of comparable
material. Likewise, it would permit continuing our longstanding
practice of working with State, Tribal and local governments,
transportation service providers, and other Federal agencies to
utilize their resources and expertise to the maximum extent
practicable.
Finally, the proposed legislation would promote the licensing
of new nuclear facilities by addressing the need for a regulatory
determination of waste confidence by the NRC in connection with
proceedings for those new nuclear facilities. This provision directs
the Commission to deem that sufficient capacity will be available
to dispose of spent nuclear fuel in considering whether to permit
the construction and operation of a nuclear reactor or a related
facility.
Conclusion
Nuclear power has been demonstrated to be a safe, reliable, and
efficient source of power. Enactment of the proposed legislation is
necessary to allow the Yucca Mountain Project to move forward
and to advance the Nation's energy independence, energy security,
and national security objectives. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to
working with you and the Members of this Committee on this
legislation to facilitate the construction and operation of the
repository and to ensure the continued development of safe, clean,
and efficient nuclear power in this country. I would be pleased to
answer any questions at this time.
MR. HALL. Thank you. Mr. Luis, Reyes, we recognize you,
Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, for an opening statement.
MR. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you
today on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to discuss
our capability to regulate the storage and disposal of spent nuclear
fuel. Specifically, I plan to address some of the national spent fuel
management strategies embodied in various legislative proposals
currently under consideration by Congress. Since I plan to
summarize my testimony, I will ask that my full statement be
entered into the hearing record including an update for page six.
MR. HALL. Without objection.
MR. REYES. It is important to make clear at the outset that
because of our role in the regulation of spent nuclear fuel and our
potential role in considering an application for a high level
radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, the
Commission has not taken a position on most of the provisions in
these legislative proposals. Therefore, I would like to focus on the
impact certain of the proposals will have on the NRC. We have
reviewed the language contained in the Senate appropriations bill
and believe that the existing regulatory infrastructure could
accommodate the alternative approaches to storing spent nuclear
fuel.
We believe that we may be able to review and license
concurrently the large number of facilities anticipated in the bill.
However, in order to do so, we will need sufficient funding, the
receipt of high-quality license applications, and considerably more
time to review and adjudicate the applications. We have also
reviewed S. 2610 and note that some provisions in the bill could
affect the timing of our review of a Department of Energy
application for authorization to receive and possess spent nuclear
fuel and high level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain.
Specifically, S. 2610 will require us to reach a final decision on
receipt and possession within 1 year with the possibility of a 6-
month extension. Such a requirement wouldn't allow us enough
time to complete both our safety review and the required
adjudicatory proceeding in 1 year. The changes to a national spent
fuel management strategy that are being considered in the various
bills involve shipping spent fuel. The provisions in the bills may
affect the transportation roles of the Department of Energy and the
Department of Transportation. They do not appear to affect our
role with respect to certifying casks as specified in the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act.
The NRC believes that the existing transportation regulatory
infrastructure can accommodate the various legislative actions
being considered. However, as with the other topics addressed in
this testimony, our ability to complete this work will depend upon
sufficient appropriations and submittal of complete high-quality
applications. In conclusion, the Commission understands the
importance of addressing the storage, transportation, and disposal
of high level radioactive waste in a systematic and integrated
manner that is safe, timely, and efficient.
We urge Congress to assure that sufficient appropriations be
made available to adequately fund regulatory infrastructure
activities and increased staffing prior to receipt of new license
applications. Provided that we receive sufficient resources and
staffing levels are maintained and appropriate time is given to the
agency to conduct its technical reviews and adjudications, we
believe we can reach decisions on the relevant applications in a
timely fashion, assuming high-quality license applications are
received.
On behalf of the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to
testify today, and I look forward to working with you on this
legislation, and I will take any questions you may have now.
[The prepared statement of Luis A. Reyes follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF LUIS A. REYES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure
to appear before you today to discuss the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (NRC's) capability to regulate long-term and short-
term spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal. Specifically, I plan to
address some of the national spent fuel management strategies that
are being considered in S. 2589, the "Nuclear Fuel Management
and Disposal Act;" S. 2610, a bill "to enhance the management and
disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste, and
for other purposes;" and Section 313 of H.R. 5427, the "Energy
and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2007."
It is important to make clear at the outset that, because of the
NRC's role in the regulation of spent nuclear fuel and the potential
application for a high-level radioactive waste repository at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada, the Commission has not taken a position on
most of the provisions in these legislative proposals. Therefore, I
would like to focus on the impact the following proposals would
have on the NRC.
Interim Storage
Spent fuel storage and transportation are and can be
accomplished both safely and securely, consistent with the current
regulatory framework, regardless of the number of sites and their
locations. The NRC has stated in its Waste Confidence Decision
that, if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored
safely and without significant environmental impact in its spent
fuel storage pool or at either on site or off site interim storage
facilities for at least 30 years beyond the licensed operational life
of the reactor. In general, the Commission concluded that, if
stored properly, spent fuel presents a low risk to the public during
normal operation or under potential credible accident conditions
and can be stored safely in either wet or dry storage systems
without significant environmental impact for at least 100 years.
It is important to note that the threat of sabotage has always
been a factor in the design and licensing of spent fuel storage
facilities. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the
NRC issued Orders to licensees to implement additional security
measures, and undertook a comprehensive reassessment of the
security of commercial nuclear facilities including those for spent
fuel storage. Since 9/11, NRC has issued Orders to licensees to
implement additional security measures. Dry spent fuel storage
casks are robust structures, which are highly resistant to significant
damage, and we are confident that storage of spent fuel in dry
casks remains a safe and secure spent fuel management strategy.
Spent fuel pools are strong structures constructed of very thick
steel-reinforced concrete walls with stainless steel liners located
inside protected areas. The NRC's domestic safeguards program is
focused on physically protecting and controlling spent nuclear fuel
against sabotage, theft, and diversion.
The NRC supports efforts to address interim storage issues in a
timely manner. Nuclear power plants need to increase their spent
fuel storage capacity to support plant operations. In order to
maintain operational capability in the spent fuel pool, including
full core off load capability, spent fuel must periodically be moved
to dry cask storage. There are currently 43 licensed independent
spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), and we expect in the next
few years that this number will grow to over 50, as more power
plants contend with filled spent fuel pools. The 43 current sites
have successfully loaded and stored over 800 casks. An
exceptional safety record has been achieved using dry cask storage
technology.
Safety and security are the key elements in a comprehensive
spent fuel management strategy. We must also be cognizant of the
need for efficiency and effectiveness in every element of spent fuel
handling, storage, and transport systems. The NRC believes that
instituting canister and infrastructure standards will make storage
and transportation both safer and easier, facilitating interoperability
among handling and loading activities at different reactors and
ISFSIs. Standards will also improve the ease with which these
activities can be licensed. Canister and infrastructure standards
should be developed with input from industry, taking advantage of
lessons learned from previous designs.
The legislative proposal in H.R. 5427, as approved by the
Senate Committee on Appropriations, includes new consolidation
and preparation (CAP) facilities as part of a new national spent
fuel management strategy. This proposal would significantly
affect the NRC's spent fuel storage oversight program and
resource needs. Specifically, H.R. 5427 calls for a high number of
new storage facilities to be reviewed and licensed by NRC in a
very short time span. Currently, the NRC has neither the monetary
resources nor the necessary employee resources to support the
technical review and adjudication of a large number of concurrent
storage license applications as considered in H.R. 5427. Also, the
time frames in the draft legislation, which must allow for license
preparation by the applicant, environmental and safety reviews by
NRC and completion of associated hearings before the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board Panel, are very short and likely not
achievable.
The NRC has reviewed the proposed legislation and believes
that the existing regulatory infrastructure could accommodate the
alternative approaches outlined in H.R. 5427. Although the NRC
believes that it may be able to review and license a large number of
new facilities anticipated in H.R. 5427 concurrently, the following
items would be necessary prerequisites for success: sufficient
funding; receipt of complete, high-quality license applications; and
considerably more time to review and adjudicate the applications.
NRC believes that centralized storage or storage at multiple sites in
different locations can be achieved safely, consistent with our
regulatory system. One must approach spent fuel management as
an integrated system, balancing the very small risks associated
with storage and transportation components. The Commission is
open to working with our stakeholders in support of a systematic
and integrated approach that is safe, timely, and efficient.
Transportation
The NRC believes that the current, well-established
transportation regulatory system is protective of public health and
safety. Spent nuclear fuel has been safely transported in the United
States for more than 30 years. There has never been an accident
involving the transportation of spent fuel resulting in a radiological
release or death or injury from radiation. The National Academy
of Sciences recently completed a three-year study that concluded
that the radiological risks of spent fuel transportation are low and
well understood and that the existing regulations are adequate to
ensure safety.
Any of the changes to a national spent fuel management
strategy that are being considered (such as in S. 2589, S. 2610, and
H.R. 5427) will involve shipping spent fuel. Federal regulation of
spent fuel transportation is shared by the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the NRC. Generally, NRC does not
regulate the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) shipments of
radioactive material; however, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
requires DOE to utilize NRC-certified casks for spent fuel
shipments to a repository and to follow NRC's advance
notification requirements. The Commission has reviewed and
certified a number of package designs which could be used to
transport spent fuel. Provisions of S. 2589, S. 2610, and H.R. 5427
may affect the transportation roles of DOE and DOT, but do not
appear to affect the NRC role to certify casks as specified in the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Section 313(c) of H.R. 5427 calls for
licensing of DOE's spent fuel shipments by NRC and DOT. This
means that NRC's physical protection requirements would be
applicable to all of the DOE's shipments of spent nuclear fuel, and
to this extent H.R. 5427 will increase NRC's responsibilities.
The NRC believes that the existing transportation regulatory
infrastructure can accommodate the various legislative actions
being considered. The transportation aspects of the various
options and facilities do not present new or inherently different
technical challenges. New transportation packages will need to be
designed and certified to address: DOE initiatives on transport,
aging, and disposal canisters; new types of spent fuel; or existing
spent fuel that is not covered by current designs. As with the
other topics addressed in this testimony, the NRC's ability to
complete this work will depend upon sufficient appropriations and
the submittal of complete, high quality applications.
Disposal
The NRC understands the importance of addressing disposal of
high-level radioactive waste in a manner that is both safe and
timely. The NRC has a record of moving responsibly and
promptly to meet its obligations under the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act. To prepare for conducting an independent safety review of a
Yucca Mountain application, the Commission continues to conduct
pre-license application activities aimed at providing guidance so
that DOE can provide a high quality application. NRC is confident
that we will be ready to receive an application if submitted in 2008
as is currently proposed by DOE. We are also confident that we
will reach a timely decision on the application provided that the
application is complete and of high-quality.
The NRC offers the following comments on provisions in the
proposed legislation, S. 2610, that could affect the timing of the
NRC's review of a DOE application for an authorization to receive
and possess spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at
Yucca Mountain. The proposed legislation would require the NRC
to reach a final decision on receipt and possession within one year
(with the possibility of a six-month extension). This proposed
requirement does not give the NRC sufficient time to complete its
necessary proceedings. First, the NRC cannot complete both its
safety review and the adjudicatory proceeding in one year. In
particular, NRC will need to conduct a hearing. Even under the
informal hearing process proposed in S. 2610, the NRC would
need to adjudicate issues raised by participants that are admitted as
contentions by the licensing board. It is difficult to predict the
amount of time it will take to complete the review and adjudicate
issues in controversy without knowing the scope and number of
issues that will require adjudication as well as the number of
parties involved. Second, the proposed legislation's provision
regarding surface facilities could be read to provide for staged
consideration of surface facilities. In this case, the NRC would
review certain facilities during the construction authorization phase
and other facilities during the later receipt and possession phase.
Facilities that otherwise could have been reviewed in the
construction authorization phase might be shifted to the receipt and
possession phase, increasing the scope of review for that phase
despite the reduced time allowed for that review.
S. 2589 and S. 2610 also contain a provision requiring the
NRC, in deciding whether to permit the construction or operation
of a nuclear reactor or any related facilities, to deem, without
further consideration, that sufficient capacity will be available in a
timely manner to dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste. H.R. 5427 contains a similar provision. The
NRC does not object to these provisions of the legislation.
Conclusion
The NRC fully understands the importance of addressing the
storage, transportation and disposal of high-level radioactive waste
in a systematic and integrated manner that is safe, timely, and
efficient. We would urge the Congress to assure that sufficient
appropriations be made available to adequately fund regulatory
infrastructure activities and increased staffing prior to the receipt
of license applications initiating licensing activities. Provided
sufficient resources and staffing levels are maintained and
appropriate time is given to the Agency to conduct the necessary
technical reviews and adjudications, we believe that we can reach
decisions on the relevant applications in a timely fashion, assuming
high-quality license applications are received.
We appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look
forward to working with you on this legislation.
MR. HALL. We thank you, Mr. Reyes. Mr. Sproat, are you
familiar with the concept called adaptive staging by the National
Research Council?
MR. SPROAT. I haven't read the report, Mr. Chairman, but I am
aware of the concept and have done some reading about how other
countries have utilized or are thinking of utilizing a concept like
that.
MR. HALL. Are you in position to maybe give us a good idea
of how it could be applied to the Yucca Mountain program?
MR. SPROAT. It is interesting, Mr. Chairman. When I was in
front of this committee about 5 years ago when I was still with
Excelon, somebody asked me a question very similar to that in
terms of how do you think the licensing process for Yucca
Mountain should proceed, and my thoughts on that haven't really
changed very much since then. The way the current licensing
process for Yucca Mountain exists under 10 C.F.R. Part 63, it is a
multi-step process that requires a construction authorization first,
an operating license second, and then a decision that actually
permanently closes the repository, third.
Unfortunately, the way Part 63 is written right now all of the
requirements that the repository has to meet including how it needs
to perform up to a million years into the future, depending how the
EPA standard is resolved, all of that analysis has to be shown,
reviewed, and verified prior to receipt of a construction
authorization. As Chairman Barton, I believe, said earlier this
afternoon, we are going to know a heck of a lot more about the
mountain, how it reacts, about new technologies that we haven't
even thought about 50 years from now, 75 years from now, than
we do now.
So, it makes sense to me that we take a similar approach here.
Unfortunately, as 10 C.F.R. Part 63 is written right now, it really is
a very front-end loaded process. And just to give you an example,
in Part 63 there are criteria along the different steps of the process
that the Commission needs defined before they can make a
decision. Unfortunately, in Part 63, for the decision to close the
repository, there are actually no acceptance criteria for the
Commission to find have been met before they make a decision to
close, and so it is left undefined in the current regulatory process.
MR. HALL. What would it take for DOE to implement the
concept if you have gone that far into it?
MR. SPROAT. Well, we couldn't implement a concept ourself.
It really is the NRC's regulations under 10 C.F.R. and in this case
it is 10 C.F.R. Part 63 as it is currently written. It is the regulatory
construct for licensing Yucca Mountain, and that regulatory
framework would have to be changed.
MR. HALL. And how would it impact the repository schedule
and resources just in your opinion?
MR. SPROAT. I guess it is too early for me to be able to answer
that question. It would really depend on how it would change.
MR. HALL. Mr. Reyes, in the industry's testimony they
indicate that the interim storage could be licensed expeditiously.
How many licenses has the NRC issued for away from reactor
independent spent fuel storage installations?
MR. REYES. There has been only one facility that has been
licensed away from reactors.
MR. HALL. How long did that take?
MR. REYES. It took us about 8 years from application to final
issue of the license.
MR. HALL. What do we have to hope for and to look to in
future issuances?
MR. REYES. We could expedite the process. This particular
example, the application was changed by the applicant several
times, so there were hearings that required a lot of work by the
staff, so we hope we could do it in a faster way but with only one
example it is hard to know how long it will take us.
MR. HALL. What is a reasonable explanation for it taking that
long?
MR. REYES. Well, I mentioned in my testimony emphasis on
high-quality applications. That particular application, the design
was changed through the process, and the hearings identified
technical issues that needed to be pursued. We think a facility
away from a reactor that has a good application, 2 years perhaps
with an extension of 6 additional months would be sufficient.
MR. HALL. I think my time expired. I recognize Mr. Boucher.
MR. BOUCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to also thank both of our witnesses for their testimony today. And,
Mr. Sproat, again let me say how much I admire your
determination and confidence to move this program forward.
Along with others who have spoken from this panel, I also strongly
support the Yucca project and wish you well and offer you
assistance as you move the project forward. When do you think
you will have your funding schedule to be submitted to us?
MR. SPROAT. I believe it should be very close--no later than
the beginning of November. It should be around the end of
October because we have it basically built now, but we are
bringing in an outside, experienced company to do an independent
review of our construction schedule, the cash flows associated with
it so when we give you something that is more than just DOE
saying here are the numbers.
MR. BOUCHER. That is a timely submittal, and we will
certainly look forward to receiving it and reviewing it, and then
having further discussions with you. I noted your support in your
testimony for the Administration's bill that has been put forward,
and I also find most of the provisions in that measure to be
constructive, but I want to ask you questions about two of the
provisions of the bill. One thing the bill does not do is protect the
$19 billion corpus that is currently in the Nuclear Waste Fund,
monies that have been paid into the Fund to date and not
appropriated for the Yucca Mountain project.
So my question to you is this. Can you build the Yucca
Mountain project and have it open by 2017 only using the
prospective payments of about $750 million annually that will be
coming into the Fund? Over the 10-year period between now and
2017 that is about $7.5 billion. Is that going to be enough for you
to build Yucca Mountain?
MR. SPROAT. Well, we don't have the final cash flows yet, but
to maintain that best achievable schedule that we put out, where we
would be both building the repository and building the
transportation infrastructure, particularly the rail line, it is highly
likely that we will exceed that amount in certain peak years of
funding probably, but I wouldn't expect to reach that peak funding
profile for probably about another 10 to 11 years from where we
are right now.
MR. BOUCHER. Well, you are supposed to have it open 10
years from next year and so at some point surely short of 10 years
from now you would reach a peak funding profile.
MR. SPROAT. You are correct. I am wrong in that number. I
got the math wrong. It is probably closer to 6 to 7 years out in
terms of where that peak funding would occur.
MR. BOUCHER. Okay. So what you are saying is you are
going to need some of this $19 billion that is within the corpus of
the Fund itself. If the Administration's bill doesn't protect that
money, what is your solution to that going to be?
MR. SPROAT. Well, I am not sure if it doesn't--I certainly can't
address whether it protects it or not. I know there have been an
awful lot of discussions and a lot of--at least within the Department
we believe that there are a number of things that we can't use that
fund for and so, from my perspective, I believe the Fund is
protected.
MR. BOUCHER. Mr. Sproat, there is nothing in the legislation
that would require that these monies be set aside and reserved
exclusively for the Yucca Mountain program and therein lies the
basic problem. And so based upon the testimony that I am hearing
today, I think we can probably anticipate you coming to the
Congress and asking not only for the $750 million that will flow
prospectively into that fund for your Yucca Mountain project, but
also general appropriations on top of that.
MR. SPROAT. For the next--between now and the time we
reach submittal of the license application in the next 2 � years, the
request that we proposed in the legislation for access to the annual
receipts will be enough to get us through license application
submittal for sure. At some point in time after that--and once I get
the cash flows completed, I will be able to tell you with much more
certainty exactly when--that amount of required funding would be
exceeded.
MR. BOUCHER. All right. Well, fair enough, and this is a
subject to be continued, but let me simply reiterate our concern that
the legislation does not protect this $19 billion and assure that
whatever portion of it you have to have you actually can get at the
time that you need it. The second issue that I want to raise with
you is that provision of the legislation that would essentially deem
that there is sufficient capacity at Yucca Mountain to give waste
confidence with respect to the opening of new nuclear plants in the
United States.
I ask these questions from a perspective of one who supports
the opening of new nuclear power plants. I think this has to be a
part of our energy mix going forward, and additional nuclear
power helps us with energy independence issues and with global
warming concerns, and a range of other policy objectives, and so I
think it is necessary. I am a little bit concerned, however, that the
legislation says that we as Congress will simply make what is a
technical determination that there is sufficient capacity at Yucca to
accommodate all of the waste that will flow from newly licensed
facilities.
This is a decision that the NRC has the authority to make and
has historically been making, and in fact has already, I am told,
found from a technical standpoint that there is sufficient capacity
up until the year 2025, and the NRC has continuing authority to
adjust that estimate and make additional findings as events
warrant. Why is not that ability of the NRC to make these
determinations sufficient? Why are nuclear generating companies
not likely to get through a licensing process in the absence of
Congress actually making a factual determination that I frankly
think we can't make with regard to deeming sufficient capacity?
MR. SPROAT. That is a very good question. I am not sure the
concern is quite as limited to the issue of is there capacity in Yucca
Mountain. I think it is a little bit broader issue in terms of do we as
a country have reasonable assurance that we have a path to dispose
of or otherwise utilize our spent nuclear fuel coming out of our
nuclear fleet. One of the things that is different today than where
we were a year ago, with this issue is that we have as an
Administration policy, said we are going to move forward with
GNEP and with closing the fuel cycle.
Now there are a lot of questions around exactly the time line
for that, how long that is going to take to proceed. But what we
are arguing is that given that we have made a decision that we are
just not going to take all fuel and put it in the ground forever, and
that given the progress we are making and the schedules we have
set for moving Yucca Mountain forward, there is a reasonable
amount of data there for the Congress to make a determination
that, in terms of a national level determination on waste
confidence, do we have a good idea--do we have confidence that
we know what we are going to do with spent nuclear waste? We
think the answer is yes. The question of capacity of Yucca
Mountain is a little bit, at least the way I view it, is a little bit of a
separate issue of the 70,000 metric ton limit and getting that lifted.
MR. BOUCHER. Okay. Well, let me turn to Mr. Reyes, and ask
you a couple of questions about the idea of interim storage. In
your statement you say that you support efforts to address interim
storage generally. You also say that it could be accommodated
within your regulatory structure, but you also say that you do not
have the financial resources or the human resources with which to
implement a regulatory program for interim storage, and so what
you are basically saying is you can do it but you would have to
have the money to do it with.
MR. REYES. That is correct.
MR. BOUCHER. Have you received any kind of assurance from
shall we say the sponsors of this provision and the Senate
appropriations bill that would mandate an interim storage program
that you are going to be appropriated the money in order to carry
this forward?
MR. REYES. We have had no discussions on that subject so we
have no information regarding our budget, but we would have to
receive appropriations or budget starting in fiscal year 2007 based
on the proposed schedule.
MR. BOUCHER. So you would actually have to have money
next year and we are now debating the FY 07 appropriations bills.
We are in the season for doing that. Do you see anywhere in any
of the various appropriations bills an appropriation that would give
you the money you need to do this in FY 07?
MR. REYES. There is a discussion of a very modest amount,
but let me give you how much of an impact this could be. If you
end up with 30, some away from reactor facilities that have to be
licensed in a short amount of time, you are talking in the order of
$300 million and a couple hundred FTE, full-time equivalents, so
that in that worst case scenario there is a very significant impact.
MR. BOUCHER. Is there anything in any of the appropriations
bills that would even get you started with this?
MR. REYES. No.
MR. BOUCHER. No. All right. Thank you, Mr. Reyes. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. SHIMKUS. [Presiding] I always enjoy Mr. Boucher and
his great questions. I would like to now recognize the doctor from
Georgia, Dr. Norwood.
MR. NORWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Sproat, I am glad to see you back. We had you, I think, in July.
MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir.
MR. NORWOOD. You had been on the job about 3 weeks at the
time. I am wondering how you feel about it now.
MR. SPROAT. Even better.
MR. NORWOOD. Are you as positive now that you will be able
to open Yucca Mountain by 2017?
MR. SPROAT. As I said in the beginning of my opening
statement, if I can get this legislative package that we have sent up
here to the Hill to address some of these key issues around some of
the issues that we need to get fixed around Yucca Mountain, my
answer is yes.
MR. NORWOOD. You heard Chairman Barton talk about the
interim storage. You are going to have to put it at Yucca to get it
through this committee. I just want you to know. We can
probably go along with a lot of the stuff that you want to do in
there, but I don't think you are going to find us very willing to
store it around the country on an interim basis.
MR. SPROAT. Well, just for clarification the Administration
has not proposed that, sir.
MR. NORWOOD. Yeah, but I know who did. Let me ask you if
I may, have you had any time to look back or ask any questions
over at the Department of what they have been doing the last 10
years?
MR. SPROAT. Yes, I have, sir.
MR. NORWOOD. I mean it borders on criminal, I think. How
much money have we spent on Yucca in the last 10 years, do you
know that?
MR. SPROAT. I don't have the exact numbers.
MR. NORWOOD. When you all look it up, tell him, then he can
tell me.
MR. SPROAT. Around $9 billion.
MR. NORWOOD. Nine billion dollars. Almost a billion a year.
MR. SPROAT. Yes.
MR. NORWOOD. And what have we gotten for that?
MR. SPROAT. We have a lot of scientific information and
understanding of the mountain, of its geology, how it developed in
the past and how we expect it to perform in the future, and we have
a draft license application and a first cut at design of the surface
facilities that quite frankly weren't adequate to docket the license
application back in 2004. And so we are fixing the inadequacies in
terms of that surface design and in terms of the further analysis of
the mountain and how it is going to perform, or at least how we
project it to perform out in the--not only beyond 10,000 years but
out to a million years, which is what the current EPA draft
standard requires us to do. So there is a lot of analysis still being
done with that scientific data that has been collected over those
years to put together that license application that I need to send to
the NRC in 22 months.
MR. NORWOOD. My questions are based on a thought that
keeps running through my head. The American people built the
Pentagon in 16 months. We have spent $10 billion in 10 years and
now we are saying we have got to have 10 more years to keep
doing analysis. Does that bother you any or is it just me?
MR. SPROAT. No, no, it would certainly bother me, and let me
just clarify we are certainly not going to spend the next 10 years
doing analysis. What we are doing now is design and the actual
completion of the license application based on the analyses that
have been done. And then we are going to spend the next at least 4
years defending that license application through the NRC licensing
process.
MR. NORWOOD. Four years, Mr. Reyes? He got to spend 4
years over there defending his application?
MR. REYES. I think the legislation called for 3 years, but you
have to remember there will be a lot of hearings involved in this
process so it is more than a technical review. We have to defend
our decision that it is technically sound which we are ready to do
upon the application but it does take time, sir.
MR. NORWOOD. So we could build two Pentagons by the time
he defends his application. I mean something is wrong with this
basically that we can't be a little more efficient. I have no idea
what you do over there. I have no idea what the rules are. All I
know is that that is an inordinate amount of time. Didn't you just
say earlier that a year and a half--I am sorry I didn't hear all of it,
but you said something to the effect that a year and a half wasn't
going to be near enough time for you to do something.
MR. REYES. This is a license for a facility for interim storage
away from a reactor.
MR. NORWOOD. So you want 2 � years to do that?
MR. REYES. Yes.
MR. NORWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I can't do anything. I yield
back.
MR. SPROAT. Mr. Norwood, if I could just clarify.
MR. NORWOOD. Yes, sir, Mr. Sproat.
MR. SPROAT. The cost numbers, that was $10 billion over the
life of the program, not $10 billion total cost over the last 9 or 10
years, so I just wanted to clarify that.
MR. NORWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Sproat.
MR. SPROAT. It doesn't make it any better.
MR. NORWOOD. No, it doesn't. And I am counting on you.
You come from the real world. I am counting on you to get this
done and I am sure you can get it done before 2017.
MR. SPROAT. I will do my best.
MR. NORWOOD. Thank you, sir.
MR. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes Dr. Murphy from Pennsylvania.
MR. MURPHY. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, and thank you both
for being here. I wanted to follow up on some of these aspects too
in terms of these other sites because I recognize we are trying to
balance our needs to build more nuclear power plants and also
dealing with this spent fuel. For example, on these temporary sites
will they all be the same size or different sizes, and how much
would each one cost?
MR. REYES. Well, the States will have to decide where they
will have to put the interim locations and you have a lot of
combinations. You have States which have operating reactors and
licensed storage facilities at the reactor. You have States that have
no reactors but do have storage facilities because there used to be
an operating reactor there. So under the bill, as I understand it, the
States will have to make a decision where to put the interim
storage.
MR. MURPHY. But how much will each one of these facilities
cost?
MR. REYES. I can only give you the review cost through the
licensing process. I think the industry would be in a better position
to talk about the cost of building it.
MR. SPROAT. I am probably the only one in the room that
actually was involved with designing and constructing an interim
spent fuel storage facility, but that was at a reactor so it was on
land we owned and from the time we decided to do it to the time
we actually completed construction was probably in the
neighborhood of about between 5 and 6 years; but that was a
relatively simple approach compared to what we are talking about
here, where it is away from reactors. They have to do an
environmental impact statement. You have to have control of the
land. It is more than just designing it and licensing the interim
storage facility itself, which is pretty straightforward. It would
obviously depend on the size, but you are talking at least, at least,
$15 million a piece and that may be low depending on the amount
of litigation and licensing time and processing time to finally get
approval to actually build it.
The cost to build these by themselves is not that significant. It
is basically a concrete pad with a fence, multiple fences, security
systems around it, and the infrastructure to bring the spent fuel
casks to the pads so the construction itself of the facility is not that-
-
MR. MURPHY. The facility would have to be pretty secure in
terms of bomb proof?
MR. SPROAT. The design bases for those facilities, at least the
ones we built, I would not classify them as bomb proof but in
terms of what the design basis threats are, I can't talk about those.
MR. MURPHY. Basically similar to what we have at nuclear
power plants?
MR. SPROAT. Yes.
MR. MURPHY. But you are saying it would be $15 million.
How many years would it take? You said 5 or 6 years?
MR. SPROAT. Actually the critical path on building a facility
away from the reactor would be the siting process, both the
environmental impact statement and whatever litigation would be
associated with the environmental impact statement and the NRC
licensing process. Once you have that, the actual construction
itself assuming the transportation infrastructure, was relatively
simple. You could probably do it in a year, a year and 18 months.
MR. MURPHY. Construction in a year and 18 months.
MR. SPROAT. Yes.
MR. MURPHY. And all the other processes could add another 5
or 6 years to that?
MR. SPROAT. Yes.
MR. MURPHY. If we have 5 or 6 years worth of helping
attorneys and engineers and then a year and 18 months of actually
building it, and yet the actual use of Yucca Mountain is 10, 11
years away, that seems pretty close, and we would spend several
billion dollars along the way to build these interim facilities.
MR. SPROAT. That is the conclusion I drew. I think the last
time I was here the committee asked me that exact same question,
and that is what I said. It is pretty close time-wise, depending on
how these interim storage facilities are sited and where they are
sited, and the amount of time it takes to actually get a license to
build them.
MR. MURPHY. So in closeness of time wise, and this is an
issue I remember coming up before, and I am wondering if we
have changed much, and that is it will cost us a lot of money.
They will be ready just before Yucca Mountain will be opening
anyway and so why are we doing this? I guess that we all--that is
the question.
MR. SPROAT. That is a valid question.
MR. MURPHY. And do we have an answer? Will we have one
today on that?
MR. SPROAT. I don't.
MR. MURPHY. Okay. On that point, I don't have any more
questions either.
MR. SHIMKUS. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
MR. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up
my colleague from Pennsylvania because that is my concern. And
I have a district in Houston and we benefit from having a small
portion of our electricity generated by nuclear power, and I think in
our country we know that we have to have lots of ways to heat and
cool our homes and nuclear power has to be an increasing use of it.
My concern is that if we follow the path of Senate appropriations
and we build this interim facility for nuclear waste, will that
facility likely hold all the nuclear waste that is currently being
stored at our own site power plants? Is that interim possibility,
will it store what we have at South Texas or Glenrose in Texas or
elsewhere?
MR. SPROAT. I am not sure, as I read the appropriations bill
language from the Senate, I don't believe it is that specific in that it
specifies sizes or locations. It gives a broad direction in terms of a
number of potential, up to a certain maximum number, sites to be
funded. It would depend on each State. As I understand the
proposal, it would depend on each State to determine location and
size of those facilities. Now one of the things I would clarify is
that even if interim storage facilities are built, they would be built
to handle spent fuel that has already come out of spent fuel pools at
reactors and put into casks so they would strictly be dry storage in
cask facilities. We would still have spent fuel at the reactor sites in
the spent fuel pools.
MR. GREEN. But that is--I understand that because that was
stated anyway. Does your office have the resources and ability to
begin work on new interim storage facilities without losing the
focus on the progress on Yucca Mountain?
MR. SPROAT. Not at the current time.
MR. GREEN. So you would need more resources. Since it
would be difficult to pursue two nuclear storage projects at once,
do you believe the effort behind this recent interim storage
legislation is an intentional effort to delay or kill Yucca Mountain?
MR. SPROAT. I really have no opinion on that. I can't speak to
that, sir.
MR. GREEN. Mr. Reyes, if Congress and DOE go down the
path of limiting the amount of interim storage capacity and
progress on Yucca slows or halts, what will be the impact when
you are reviewing applications for new reactors to new or existing
nuclear power plants?
MR. REYES. The Commission has stated that we believe there
is a confidence and solution to the waste would be obtained in this
country so it would not have an immediate impact on the new
license application but I think if you talk to the industry in their
mind they want more confirmation than that before they invest
money, so I think it is a decision from the private industry that it is
looking for more confirmation that there is a final solution.
MR. GREEN. Both TXU and NRG Energy have announced
plans to expand ours we have in Texas, and again we have to have
lots of different ways to heat and cool our homes so both in South
Texas and Comanche Peak. Can they go forward with their plans
without Yucca Mountain on track?
MR. REYES. Yes. They can go forward. I think as a business
decision you have to wonder if that is a good decision, but
technically we can review and issue a license for new applications
without having the issues that we are discussing fully resolved, but
it raises a question with the industry as committing the resources,
whether that is a good business decision.
MR. GREEN. Well, again, if we don't have nuclear then we are
going to see even more coal-fired plants. That may be okay for
some parts of the country but some folks in Texas would rather not
have that type of coal, and nuclear is a non-polluting substitute
although again in Texas we like to use natural gas, but since we are
still worried about our chemical industry we don't want to compete
with that.
MR. MURPHY. We like coal in Pennsylvania. It is a nice thing.
MR. GREEN. I imagine you all like coal in Pennsylvania. We
used to like natural gas until we almost were running out. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. SHIMKUS. Thank you. I recognize myself for a couple
minutes. Mr. Sproat, how many of our nuclear facilities are almost
at maximum capacity of their interim storage on site, do you know
that? In the energy bill there was a couple that we were at risk of
having to make that tough decision of closing because they had no
place to then move because they are almost at max capacity. Do
we know that number?
MR. SPROAT. Just so I am clear, Congressman. Is your
question around maximum capacity in their spent fuel pool or their
interim storage facilities?
MR. SHIMKUS. Well--
MR. SPROAT. Let me try and answer your question the best I
can without--because I don't know the exact numbers. But, for
example, the plant that I was directly involved with licensing,
building, and running, Limerick is currently going through--its
spent fuel pool is going to be full within the next 24 months.
Limerick Unit One came on line in 1984 and Limerick number two
came on line in 1987 or 1988. So that kind of gives you an idea
after plants have been on line between 15 to 16 years is when their
spent fuel pools are becoming full. At that point in time they need
to have an interim spent fuel storage facility licensed on site and
ready to start unloading their fuel pools and putting those fuel
bundles in their casks.
MR. SHIMKUS. Let me ask, when was the last nuclear power
plant built in this country because you are talking about 20 years so
when was the last--
MR. REYES. The last one licensed was in 1996 but that plant
took a long, long time to construct.
MR. SHIMKUS. So there are probably about 42 sites that have
dry cask storage.
MR. REYES. The issue I think if I could form the issue a little
different, there is no limit to dry cask storage at the site, but it is a
large investment. If you are operating the facility and you don't
see a final solution in the horizon you want to have the capability
to unload the fuel from the reactor for maintenance and repairs, et
cetera, et cetera. You want to keep that flexibility. So because
there is no final solution on the horizon you could continue to
invest in dry cask storage. It is a large investment. It has to be
reviewed by the NRC. It takes several years to go through the
environmental review process and the safety process so it is a
never-ending process where the industry pays to the Nuclear Waste
Fund, and in addition to that they have to pay to--
MR. SHIMKUS. They are paying twice.
MR. REYES. They are paying twice. They pay for our--
MR. SHIMKUS. With no assurance of any final solution as to
the promise the Federal government made years ago.
MR. REYES. That is correct.
MR. SHIMKUS. And that is what those of us who support
moving sooner rather than later has tried to get additional risk off
because we do believe that nuclear power ought to have a role.
Again, I would say because I am from a coal State too, a
diversified portfolio, that we are competitive, and it addresses a lot
of the concerns. In the bill, not in the proposed changes, we have
been talking about the 70,000 metric tons. That was established by
the--
MR. SPROAT. Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
MR. SHIMKUS. By legislators.
MR. SPROAT. That is correct.
MR. SHIMKUS. We said that amount.
MR. SPROAT. Yes.
MR. SHIMKUS. And I think part of the problem that sometimes
we have here is--again that was guys like me, a MVA military guy,
former high school teacher, no real--there wasn't any--we didn't do
any scientific analysis to say 70,000 metric tons, did we?
MR. SPROAT. Not that is apparent to any of us, no. When the
environmental impact statement for Yucca Mountain was done, it
was analyzed for 120,000 metric ton capacity; so we have already
analyzed the environmental impact of storing up to that much in
the mountain. What we are asking for in the legislation is that as
part of the licensing process, let us do analysis presented to the
NRC and let the NRC license--
MR. SHIMKUS. You are proposing that we actually use science
to maybe make the debate of what should be stored t there?
MR. SPROAT. Well, that and engineering too.
MR. SHIMKUS. And engineering too. Good. And I would
obviously agree with you. I think there is some outside analysis
that says that there could be more than 70,000 metric tons.
Obviously, there has to be a lot more research, but that would
address this second debate which it is going to force your hand
should we not do anything which then as Dr. Norwood said would
be more money, more time. And I think one of the reasons why
we dipped in to the Federal policy makers have used the funds, and
it depends on how you talk about budgeting and trust funds and
where are the dollars really going because we haven't set a secure
policy to even convince ourselves that we are going to build Yucca
Mountain, hence, we can rob and use these other dollars or
forestall the tough decisions on spending until we actually see
some positive movement that we are going to have to spend these
dollars.
I would say it is partly the fault of Federal legislators for not
being aggressive and being committed because there is a delay
aspect here that a lot of people would like to see to stop progress.
So my time has expired. The Chair recognizes my colleague and
friend from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey.
MR. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman very much. Mr. Reyes, a
2005 National Academy of Sciences report found that "Under
some conditions a terrorist attack that partially or completely
drained a spent fuel pool could lead to a propagating zirconium
cladding fire and the release of large quantities of radioactive
materials to the environment." We know that Al Qaida wants to
do that if they can get away with it, hijack a plane, a small plane,
and dive bomb into one of these facilities without a containment
dome around it. The National Academy concluded that it would be
feasible to reduce the risk of a spent fuel fire by rearranging the
spent fuel in the pool so that hotter fuel assemblies weren't so
densely packed together.
My understanding is that doing such rearranging would not
take much time or cost much for the licensees to do. Has the NRC
ordered its licensees to take this step or begun a rulemaking to
require that it be done?
MR. REYES. All the fuel has been changed accordingly so
instead of waiting for Federal processes the utilities understood the
recommendation from the National Academy of Science and those
pools today reflect that approach. It is called a checkerboard
approach where you allow for the heat dissipation to be
maximized.
MR. MARKEY. And that is now the policy of every single
nuclear power plant in the United States?
MR. REYES. That is correct.
MR. MARKEY. Does that include all of the nuclear power
plants that are retired as well?
MR. REYES. They have a different issue there. For example, if
you think a facility that has been retired for over 10 years the
cooling is at such a point that the academy did not address those
because the heat dissipation is not relevant to the issue.
MR. MARKEY. Mr. Reyes, the National Academy also
recommended other measures to better secure spent fuel pools
from terrorist attacks. Those included, one, limiting the frequency
of off loads of full reactor cores into spent fuel pools, two,
requiring longer shut downs of the reactor before any fuel is off
loaded, three, providing enhanced security when such off loads are
made, and, four, development of a redundant and diverse response
system to mitigate loss of pool coolant events that would be
capable of operation even if the pool or overlying building were
severely damaged. Has the NRC fully implemented each of those
recommendations as well?
MR. REYES. Most of those recommendations have been
implemented. In fact, in some cases they have been enhanced.
MR. MARKEY. Which of these have you not implemented?
MR. REYES. The particular one about enhancing security
during some of the transfers because the security is already there
so I think when they wrote--the academy report is kind of dated.
We have taken a lot of action since then, but if you take the
essence of the recommendations, we have acted on all of them.
MR. MARKEY. Thank you. Thank you very much. Mr. Sproat,
on August 16, 2006, the Department's Inspector General issued a
report on the Office of the Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management's corrective action program. This report found that
your office has not been effectively managing and resolving
conditions adverse to quality at the Yucca Mountain project,
specifically the DOE Inspector General found "over 100 potential
conditions were not being managed in the corrective action
program which should have been. More than half of the significant
planned corrective actions had not been implemented in a timely
manner, and corrective actions were not always effective and that
conditions continued to recur even after management reported that
appropriate corrective actions had been taken."
This DOE IG report is a blistering indictment of your office's
management and oversight over the Yucca Mountain project, and it
is only the latest of a series of critical reports revealing real
problems at the Yucca Mountain project. Just last January the
NRC blasted Bechtel for measurements that they were making in
corrosion. We could go down the list. In light of the ongoing
problems with your existing program and the clear problems in the
Department's management why should this committee enact the
Administration's proposed bill to further weaken environmental
and procedural protections aimed at protecting the environment
and insuring a sound scientific and technical evaluation of the site
and its ability to be licensed by the NRC?
MR. SPROAT. Congressman, first of all, I would say that I
would disagree with your characterization of the proposed
legislation as a weakening of the oversight. What we are trying to
do is very clear about NRC's maintaining their oversight and
control of the licensing process for Yucca Mountain.
MR. MARKEY. You want to exempt Yucca from RCRA,
preempt State environmental and public safety laws, deem that
waste confidence exists where it does not, and allow for
construction to begin before all licensing questions are addressed.
Why should we grant you all of those additional authorities,
exemptions, from a process that already apparently doesn't work
and further weaken what little public safety and public
participation already exist?
MR. SPROAT. Well, how I view the issue that you raise,
Congressman, which is a very valid issue, around the effectiveness
of the corrective action process and the quality processes within
this project over its life, I acknowledge that those problems have
existed in the past and still exist to some extent today. And what I
am here to tell you is that I am personally invested and involved in
fixing them. And the corrective action program, I have been on the
job now for 10 weeks. I have been personally involved with
meetings on that to get it fixed and fixed right.
MR. MARKEY. And that is good, and I think what you should
do is honestly, and I appreciate the difficulty of your job after only
10 weeks, I think that we should have this hearing after you fixed
all the problems. Then we should come back and talk about what
additional legislative authority we are going to give you. But I
think it would really be a mistake for this committee to know that
there is an incredible boostering, scalding indictment of existing
management of policies and then to give even further latitude to
this agency.
And so that would be my point to you, sir. You didn't create
the problems, but we have to see how good a job you do in
cleaning up the mess.
MR. SPROAT. I understand.
MR. MARKEY. And you can't tell us right now that with 100
percent confidence you are going to be able to do that. So I think
that we should wait to be honest with you. It would be the prudent
way to go. And that we should deal with these issues in a way that
reflects the seriousness of the problem that exists right now. The
DOE corrective action program is akin to the Holy Roman Empire.
It wasn't holy, it wasn't Roman, and it wasn't an empire, and you
can say the same thing about a DOE corrective action program.
They just don't exist as they have been examined by the Inspector
General, and I think that we should take that into account before
we move forward. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
indulgence.
MR. HALL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Barton.
CHAIRMAN BARTON. I am certainly willing to yield to Mr.
Otter, who has been here the entire time.
MR. OTTER. I just got back.
CHAIRMAN BARTON. Oh, you just got back too. I don't mind
going ahead of you then.
MR. OTTER. I just wanted to say that it wasn't until the
Government of Rome got so big that it was no longer an empire. I
yield back.
CHAIRMAN BARTON. Mr. Hall, I just have one basic question.
I have introduced at the Administration's request the Yucca
Mountain bill, and I would like to ask Mr. Sproat how the Senate
Energy and Water appropriations line on interim storage would
impact their proposal for Yucca Mountain.
MR. SPROAT. At this stage of the game, Congressman, I don't
see that proposal having a direct impact on this legislation. I was
asked a question earlier as to whether or not if that legislation was
passed as is, appropriations language was passed as is, do I have
the resources available to me right now to execute that as well as
Yucca Mountain. My answer is no. That is probably the best
answer I can give you.
CHAIRMAN BARTON. Then it has to impact it. I don't see the
House, Mr. Hobson on the appropriations process or myself as the
authorizing Chairman saying we will take the money for Yucca
and spend it on interim storage. I don't see that happening. We
want to get Yucca done and then if we need to do some interim
storage in the interim, fine.
MR. SPROAT. We are fully committed to making Yucca
Mountain happen. I am fully committed to making it happen and
the less distractions I have the better.
CHAIRMAN BARTON. And I assume you wouldn't say it if it is
not a true statement, then we need to convince our friends in the
Senate to work with us on getting a Yucca bill done as soon as
possible.
MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN BARTON. Because there is a limited amount of
money, and the sooner we get the permanent repository the better
off we all are with the legislation that funds it and operates it.
MR. SPROAT. We agree.
CHAIRMAN BARTON. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.
MR. HALL. Thank you, sir. Mr. Otter.
MR. OTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to reiterate in
my earlier statement I am fully in support of going forward with
Yucca Mountain with all due haste. There were a couple of things
you said in your opening statement though that I find concerning.
You indicated several things that had to happen and amongst those
were the superseding the State's perhaps laws on environment and
water and clean air, safety, and a few other things. Maybe my
friend, Mr. Markey, threw in a few others that I haven't heard.
And you said you thought you had the authority for that.
MR. SPROAT. No.
MR. OTTER. I am just trying to clarify.
MR. SPROAT. Obviously, there are different issues with each of
those aspects. For example, on water, the issue there is the State,
the legislature, the State of Nevada has declared the Yucca
Mountain project not in the public interest, and therefore the State
water engineer by law in Nevada cannot give us, the Department of
Energy, any water withdrawal permits that we need to construct or
operate Yucca Mountain.
MR. OTTER. Yes, and I am glad you brought water up because
that was the one that concerned me more than anything else, and I
am fully aware that sometimes States will engage in law making to
simply stop something that they don't want to happen in their
State.
MR. SPROAT. And that has happened in this case.
MR. OTTER. And I wish perhaps in Idaho's case we had done
that in a few cases like with wolves. But anyway that is another
subject. What does concern me though is have you tried to buy
existing water rights from other water users that would have prior
rights?
MR. SPROAT. We have been forced to do some temporary
water buying from California. We have trucked water in but, as of
right now, we have not attempted and we don't have access to
other water rights in that area.
MR. OTTER. And you do know how much water you would
need and for how long you would need it?
MR. SPROAT. Yes, we do. Yes, we do. The figures I have
been told are that during the construction of Yucca Mountain we
need the equivalent of 4 days of usage of water by Las Vegas.
That is over the 8 to 10 year construction period. Now that equates
to a certain number of acre feet, and I don't have that figure with
me, but that just gives you some relative sense of the usage that we
are anticipating needing during the construction period which is
the peak period of water usage. After construction, water usage
would drop way down.
MR. OTTER. Well, I am sure that you are familiar with that
water in the west is extremely valuable.
MR. SPROAT. Yes, I am.
MR. OTTER. So then I go back when there are existing water
rights and there would be existing water rights that either farmers
or ranchers themselves would have that would seem to me to be
fertile ground for establishing or at least buying temporarily a
water right, and especially if it is only 4 days of usage during the
construction period that Las Vegas would use, but Las Vegas uses
a lot of water. I fully understand that. But on the total scheme of
things holding up an entire project for that, especially one as
important as this and one as needful as this, I just get a little
concerned about giving any Federal agency the authority to take
over water rights within a State.
MR. SPROAT. I totally agree. Just for clarification purposes,
we are not asking to take over water rights. What we are asking is
the Congress to say Yucca Mountain is in the public interest of the
country, thereby overriding the State legislature's adverse
determination. The legislation will allow us to go to the State
water engineer, present our permitting requirements, explain what
we need, and allow the State water engineer to make a
determination within the State regulatory framework to allocate
water to us. Right now we can't even get in the door because the
State legislature said it is not in the public interest and the State
water engineer can't even review the application.
MR. OTTER. Okay. Well, that is much different than the
impression that I got from your opening statement, and I am glad
we got that clarification. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
MR. HALL. I think that covers the questions, and we do thank
you two gentlemen for your very valuable information and your
time. Thank you for your preparation and for attending.
MR. SPROAT. Thank you.
MR. HALL. And we assure you that we will see you again.
You are excuse. We will have the second panel. Our second
panel this afternoon on the nuclear waste disposal question is the
Honorable Sam Wise, Chairman of the Georgia Public Service
Commission, from Georgia representing the National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. Also, Ms. Michele Boyd,
Legislative Director, Public Citizen, Washington, D.C., Mr.
Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer at
the DTE Energy Company, on behalf of the Nuclear Energy
Institute. The Honorable Stan Wise, begin.
STATEMENTS OF HONORABLE STAN WISE, CHAIRMAN, GEORGIA PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY
COMMISSIONERS; ANTHONY F. EARLEY, JR., CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
DTE ENERGY COMPANY, ON BEHALF OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE; AND MICHELE BOYD,
LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, PUBLIC CITIZEN
MR. WISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and,
Dr. Norwood, thank you for your very kind comments in your
opening remarks. I am Stan Wise. I am Chairman of the Georgia
Public Service Commission, and I am here today on behalf of the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, most
often referred to as NARUC. In addition, my testimony reflects
the views of the Georgia Public Service Commission. I very much
appreciate the opportunity to appear with you this afternoon.
The issues that you are addressing in this oversight hearing are
very important to NARUC's membership and to my State, and I
am grateful to have this opportunity to present our point of view
concerning the disposition of spent nuclear fuel at nuclear power
plan sites that is intended for ultimate disposal at the Yucca
Mountain geologic repository. I would like to summarize my
testimony, and have the full statement entered into the record. We
continue to be concerned with delays in progress on the repository
program. It has been 4 years since Congress approved developing
the Yucca Mountain site and the next major milestone was for
Department of Energy to submit a license application to NRC to
authorize construction.
And while we had hoped that the license application might
occur in 2005 the latest schedule now shows that it will occur no
later than June of 2008. That was not welcome news for the
directors of the repository program and we must respect his
assurance that additional time is needed to provide a defensible and
dockable license application. NARUC's primary concern is the
need to reform the matter in which the Nuclear Waste Fund is
managed. We believe that the repository schedule cannot be met
without greater financial resources, and although the Nuclear
Waste Fund was well designed and nuclear waste policy as the
mechanism for the commercial share of repository disposal cost to
be rate payer financed that is not the way that the Fund is currently
being used.
In the present fiscal year, $750 million in fees were expected to
be paid by utilities from ratepayers into the Fund and yet Congress
has appropriated only $99 million for the same period. That means
that 87 percent of the fees that are collected are not being used for
their intended purpose. We are told that the excess over
appropriation is added to the balance on the Nuclear Waste Fund,
and that it has grown to over $18 billion. We are concerned that
the money is either gone or at best represents a collection of IOUs
that future Congresses may or may not appropriate when it is
needed to later fund the repository.
Congress has considered various legislative remedies that
might make a more direct connection between annual revenue and
appropriations. If not, the assurance of the purported balance will
be available in the future, but those efforts have fallen short. The
Administration now proposes to reform the process with the
proposed Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act and whether
by this proposal or by some other means it achieves the same
objectives we urge the Congress to enact that bill this year and
bring greater financial stability to the repository program.
We were disappointed to learn that last week the bill will not
be taken up by the Senate this year. There are two other aspects of
spent fuel management that are before Congress, and I would like
to comment on them. Totally contrary to the intent of the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act and existing contracts with utilities to remove
spent fuel from reactor sites is Senate 2099. That bill would
authorize DOE to take title of spent fuel and dry cask storage and
maintain it at reactor sites for unspecified period at a cost that is
likely to be in the billions of dollars per year. Keeping the waste
on site is not what the utilities and/or the ratepayers have paid over
$25 billion for. That bill should be rejected.
Finally, there is a consideration of having the Government
provide some form of interim storage away from reactor sites.
NARUC has urged Congress and the DOE to consider interim
storage for as long ago as it was evident that DOE was not going to
meet the 1998 mandate of the waste acceptance set in statute and in
contracts. We believe that it would have made more sense to
provide the added storage capacity at one or a small number of
storage sites ideally designed and built for that purpose rather than
to have each utility retrofit additional storage at reactor sites.
Since such storage was only made necessary by the continued
failure of the Government to meet the disposal schedule we never
envisioned that the Nuclear Waste Fund would be used for such
expenses.
And when the House proposed last year an interim storage plan
for DOE installations on a short schedule, we thought it would be
worthwhile although we were concerned that the Nuclear Waste
Fund would be used for initial planning. This year the House
appropriations bill would provide $30 million, not from the
Nuclear Waste Fund, but sought to make storage a part of a
broader, integrated spent fuel recycling initiative pursued by DOE.
And when the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations bills
included the proposal to have DOE search for a site in each State
with a commercial nuclear reactor for possible development of an
interim storage facility for 25 years for regional facilities it took
many States by surprise. I know it did in Georgia.
And as indicated in a letter to Chairman Barton in July,
NARUC continues to believe that it might be better to move some
spent fuel from the present storage sites to a central location
selected and built for safe and secure interim storage, and we
question whether that is needed in all 31 States that have reactors.
As far as sites go, the Senate bill rules out the two locations that
seem to make the most sense, Yucca Mountain and the already
licensed private fuel storage facility in Utah.
We need to know more about the cost and benefits before we
consider whether it is appropriate to use the Nuclear Waste Fund to
pay for interim storage, and until H.R. 5360, or something like it
reforms the Nuclear Waste Fund appropriations process, a dollar
spent for interim storage is a dollar not available for developing the
repository. There was also a decision in 2002 in the 11th Circuit of
the United States Court of Appeals that indicates that the Fund
may only be used for disposal of interim storage, and it is not an
act of disposal. So let me summarize what we are in favor of in the
Nuclear Waste Program.
We urge reform of the Fund so that collected fees are available
for their intended purpose as proposed in 5360. DOE needs to
press on with the licensing of Yucca Mountain. Central interim
storage away from reactor sites that does not interfere with
developing a repository and meets as cost benefit test. Research
and further study of all aspects of advanced reprocessing as
proposed in the GNEP initiative. Infusing a sense of urgency in
spent fuel repository development as the other provisions of H.R.
5360 support.
And just so there is no mistake, let me summarize what we are
opposed to. The continued diversion of the Nuclear Waste Fund
fee payments. Having DOE take title of spent fuel to be retained at
reactor storage sites. Use of the Nuclear Waste Fund for interim
storage, and certainly not as long as appropriations for interim
storage means fewer appropriations for the repository. Putting as
many as 31 States through a concurrent site search for interim
storage before the cost and benefits of the proposed consolidation
and preparation facilities have been determined. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Stan Wise follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. STAN WISE, CHAIRMAN,
GEORGIA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
NARUC supports:
1. Reform of the Nuclear Waste Fund so that collected
fees are available for their intended purpose, as
proposed in H.R. 5360.
2. DOE needs to press on with licensing the Yucca
Mountain repository.
3. Central interim storage away from reactor sites that
does not interfere with developing the repository.
4. Research of advanced reprocessing and further study of
all aspects of the GNEP initiative.
5. Infusing a sense of urgency in spent fuel repository
development.
NARUC strongly opposes:
1. Continued diversion of the Nuclear Waste Fund fee
payments.
2. Having DOE take title of spent fuel at reactor storage
sites and to retain it there.
3. Use of the Nuclear Waste Fund for interim storage,
certainly not so long as appropriations for interim
storage would come at the expense of adequate
appropriations for the repository
4. Putting as many as 31 States through a concurrent site
search for interim storage before the costs and benefits
of the proposed "consolidation and preparation"
facilities have been determined.
Good Afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Boucher,
and Members of the Subcommittee.
My name is Stan Wise. I am the Chairman of the Georgia
Public Service Commission. I also am the immediate past
president of the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners (NARUC). I am testifying today on behalf of
NARUC. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
this morning. The issues that you are addressing in this hearing are
very important to NARUC's membership and my State, and I am
grateful to have this opportunity to present our point of view
concerning the disposition of spent nuclear fuel currently stored at
nuclear power plant sites that is intended for ultimate disposal at
the Yucca Mountain geologic repository.
I would like to summarize my testimony and have my full
statement entered into the record as if fully read.
NARUC is a quasi-governmental, non-profit organization
founded in 1889. Its membership includes the State public utility
commissions serving all States and territories. NARUC's mission
is to serve the public interest by improving the quality and
effectiveness of public utility regulation. NARUC's members
regulate the retail rates and services of electric, gas, water, and
telephone utilities. We are obligated under the laws of our
respective States to ensure the establishment and maintenance of
such utility services as may be required by the public convenience
and necessity and to ensure that such services are provided under
rates and subject to terms and conditions of service that are just,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory.
NARUC's goals in the nuclear waste area are well known and
have been stated before this and other Congressional committees
on a number of prior occasions. NARUC believes that the federal
government needs to meet its obligation under the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, as amended, to accept spent nuclear fuel from
utilities and other nuclear generators in a timely manner for safe
disposal. NARUC further believes that the nation's ratepayers
have upheld their end of the bargain struck in the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act by providing, either directly or through income
generated on prior payments, over $25 billion for use in
constructing a nuclear waste repository. Finally, NARUC believes
that the Nuclear Waste Fund should only be employed for its
intended purpose and that the monies in the Nuclear Waste Fund
should be utilized, along with appropriations from the Department
of Defense budget, for the sole purpose of supporting the opening
of the Yucca Mountain facility in a timely fashion. The basic
principles underlying NARUC's approach to the nuclear waste
issue provide a solid foundation for future policy decisions
concerning the nuclear waste program.
Two years ago, the repository program seemed to be very close
to having the repository license application completed for
submittal to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission during 2004, but
was further delayed due to the need for the Environmental
Protection Agency to revise the radiation standard to be used in the
license review. In addition, there were some difficulties between
DOE and the NRC in meeting the documentation certification
requirements of the Licensing Support Network (LSN) that many
of us outside the government did not fully understand. And there
was the revelation that there may have been some records
falsification by some employees of the United States Geologic
Survey who had worked on the project. Since then, EPA has issued
their proposed revised radiation standard and has concluded the
public comment period. We don't know the status of the LSN
documentation but the USGS and DOE records investigations
seemed to be concluded, with the program scientific work
reaffirmed.
NARUC's primary concern with the civilian radioactive waste
management program is for Congress to reform the way the
Nuclear Waste Fund is managed and the way in which
appropriations are made from the Fund. Reform of the Fund
appropriations process is necessary to provide a stable financial
footing so that the government can fulfill its statutory and
contractual obligation to provide safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel
and other high-level radioactive waste as was the intent of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Although the House Energy and
Commerce Committee voted favorably on H.R. 3981 in the
previous Congress, the bill never made it to a floor vote and no
action was taken in the Senate. We did not consider that a perfect
bill (it was only for a five year period) but it would have helped
ensure that more of the fee revenue collected by the Fund would
actually be appropriated for its intended use. While the FY 2006
budget referred to the Administration's remaining interested in
pursuing a similar proposal for reclassification of NWF fees as
offsetting collections and discussing it with Congress, no
legislation was developed that year.
NARUC's and State utility regulator's prime concern for the
repository program remains to reform the Nuclear Waste Fund
appropriations process. It is difficult for us to see how the
repository program can ever shift into an implementation phase
when funding requirements would need to increase by orders of
magnitude compared with the pre-licensing phase. Simply put, the
repository cannot be built without a more stable financing
arrangement. Without the repository, spent nuclear fuel continues
to accumulate and be stored in places that were never designed or
permitted for indefinite storage. Spent fuel would be stored at 72
locations along rivers and lakes in 34 States instead of in a more
secure, well-designed repository. Although we see many favorable
signs for investment in new nuclear power plants, including
provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, we also continue to
hear that lack of a clear path towards disposal of spent nuclear fuel
may hold back that investment.
We also need to reform the Nuclear Waste Fund because we
owe it to the ratepayers who pay the fees in their electric bill. For
the past five years, three quarters of the fees collected for nuclear
waste disposal have gone to other unrelated federal purposes. In
the current fiscal year, total fee payments into the Nuclear Waste
Fund are expected to be $750 million. That compares with $99
million appropriated for the repository program. All that we as
utility regulators can show ratepayers is a financial report from the
Department of Energy that there is an account in the Treasury
called the Nuclear Waste Fund that supposedly has $18 billion in it
for the repository program. It is a cruel fact of life that for all
practical purposes those funds are inaccessible or already spent.
All the ratepayers want is for the government to remove the spent
fuel for disposal as they were promised over 24 years ago would
already have begun by now.
We are grateful for the leadership of the House Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee and its
unwillingness to simply do nothing last year while the repository
license application was delayed and no reform to the Nuclear
Waste Fund was in the works. In the markup of the FY 2006
budget, Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee
Chairman David Hobson sought to add $10 million to initiate an
interim storage program using DOE sites that are presumed to
already have the security and other support that could
accommodate spent fuel from commercial reactors. DOE would
take title to and ship utility waste to the unspecified locations that
already store similar government radioactive waste. We had many
questions about that approach, but it could have been a step in the
right direction, especially for spent fuel now stored at 14 shutdown
reactor sites. We doubt that any significant quantity could have
been moved in FY 2006, as the Subcommittee report indicated, or
that much could be done for the $20 million the bill would have
appropriated. Of course, when the Senate did not include similar
provisions or equal funding, the proposal did not survive in
conference.
For FY 2007, the House again took up an interim storage
proposal in the appropriations bill, this time adding $30 million,
not from the Nuclear Waste Fund, for development of some
undetermined amount of interim storage of spent fuel at
"integrated spent fuel recycling facilities" that could be serve as a
vanguard for demonstration of spent fuel reprocessing under the
Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative being pursued within DOE as part
of the broader Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). There
was a stipulation in the bill that authorization be obtained for
interim storage, since DOE has maintained that it lacked authority
to establish interim storage.
Then the Senate Appropriations Committee released its
proposal, as Section 313 of the FY 2007 Energy and Water
Appropriations Bill (Senate Report 109-274), calling for DOE to
propose "consolidation and preparation facilities" for interim
storage of spent fuel in each State with a commercial nuclear
reactor or, alternatively, regional CAP facilities. We understood
Chairman Domenici wanted to stimulate a dialogue on interim
storage and to get States involved. A NARUC witness testified at a
hearing of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on
August 3rd. States are involved in nuclear waste storage at
reactors. In my State, we have utilities expressing great interest in
building new nuclear plants to provide emissions-free reliable
baseload power for forecasted energy demand. Yet, the utilities
indicate they may have difficulty raising capital without greater
certainty on nuclear waste disposal. State utility commissioners are
also involved in another way: those utilities making payments into
the Nuclear Waste Fund pass those costs on to their ratepayers.
Since 1983, close to $900 million has been paid into the Fund from
Georgia.
We have many questions about the CAP proposal which were
conveyed to Chairman Barton in a July 11th letter. Unless DOE is
better staffed than I suspect they are, it would seem unlikely that
DOE could undertake a delicate site search concurrently in 31
States within the 270 day timeline indicated in the bill. There are
environmental impact considerations and the potential for litigation
that could slow the process. Are we even sure that every State has
a storage deficiency? It is my understanding that once it was
apparent that DOE would not meet the 1998 waste acceptance
mandate, many utilities resigned themselves to the necessity to
develop dry cask storage on-site to supplement pool storage. There
is litigation over recoupment of those expenses, but for the active
reactors, there has been a steady increase (over 38 so far) of
separately licensed dry cask facilities and more are planned.
Governors will want to know how the site search process
within their States will proceed. Some States have restrictions on
developing new nuclear facilities within the State and, although the
factual record on nuclear waste transportation safety is superb,
there is nonetheless public concern over transportation and unease
over siting that is not likely assuaged by assurances in the bill that
the CAP storage would only be for 25 years.
NARUC has supported interim storage away from reactor
storage sites for some time, whether by the government or at
private facilities provided by the utilities themselves such as
proposed at Skull Valley, Utah. In our view, the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act does not permit government interim storage to be
financed by the Nuclear Waste Fund (Section 302.d.). Some of the
expenses relating to waste shipping casks and transportation might
be permitted since they could be interpreted as needed for the
permanent repository. However, there is a broader question of
equity: why should the Nuclear Waste Fund, which is supposed to
be used to develop a permanent repository, be used for expenses
that could have been avoided had DOE met its statutory and
contractual obligations to begin spent fuel acceptance in 1998?
This is at the heart of the ongoing litigation by numerous utilities
against DOE and it is not anticipated that the Nuclear Waste Fund
will be used to make damage payments that may be awarded in
those cases.
Also relevant to the use of the Nuclear Waste Fund is the 2002
decision by the Eleventh Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals (Alabama Power, Carolina Light and Power, et al. v.
Department of Energy) ruling that the Nuclear Waste Fund may
only be used for disposal and that interim storage is not an act of
disposal.
Last year, the House Appropriations Report (109-086) called
for DOE to initiate a plan to begin spent fuel reprocessing (or re-
cycling) in FY 2007. Members of the Committee are familiar with
the history of reprocessing in this country and the experiences in
other countries. We know the 2001 National Energy Plan
recommended that the subject be re-visited, and that DOE has an
Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative as part of a research effort to look
at what to many is an intuitively appealing goal of "recycling"
used fuel. Yet technology, economics, environmental and
proliferation concerns remain. Testimony by industry and
academic experts before the House Science Committee last July
also suggested there are many economic and other questions to be
addressed. We will leave that for others to sort through, but I want
make a single point here: There is no known reprocessing method
in use today or likely to be developed in the future that does not
result in some quantity of high-level radioactive waste that will
require disposal in a repository. Therefore, whether we reprocess
in this country or not, we will still need a repository like Yucca
Mountain. Put another way, reprocessing is not an alternative to
building a repository, as much as some might wish it to be. There
may be less waste if we reprocess and it may be of different
toxicity, but it still must be isolated from the human environment.
All of the countries that reprocess know this and are planning long-
term disposal.
Moreover, the repository design that is being proposed for
Yucca Mountain does not preclude a future decision to retrieve any
or all spent fuel emplaced in it for reprocessing (or other reasons)
until the decision is made to seal the repository, which, according
to DOE, could be anywhere from 50 to 300 years in the future. If
spent nuclear fuel is indeed an energy asset, Yucca Mountain will
be an ideal place to store it until needed.
With the FY 2007 Department of Energy Budget, Secretary of
Energy Samuel Bodman announced the initiative called the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP.) It has many dimensions and
purposes, but one that we are interested in is the suggestion that if
advanced forms of reprocessing and recycling of spent nuclear fuel
were to be developed under the GNEP vision, that the amount of
nuclear waste requiring disposal might be greatly reduced and its
radiation characteristics would be hazardous over a much shorter
period of time. We are interested in learning more about the
proposal and its feasibility in terms of achievable technology,
economics, environment and non-proliferation considerations. It is
too new for us to take a position on the matter until we learn more,
but our existing policy remains current. In 2000, we revised our
Nuclear Waste Guiding Principles to include: "Reprocessing of
spent fuel may be worthy of research, but, even if feasible, does
not eliminate the need for a permanent repository."
Accordingly, we support the research proposed for GNEP and the
Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative in the FY 2007 DOE budget
request. It appears to be a worthwhile investment that could pay
dividends down the road while investigating the feasibility of
proliferation-resistant reprocessing.
We have been troubled by the legislative proposal to have the
Department of Energy take title to spent nuclear fuel at commercial
reactor sites and manage it there for some unspecified time, as in S.
2099. We see press reports that the scheme would be financed by
the Nuclear Waste Fund and we also interpret the real objective is
to somehow-with no clear terminating point-keep the spent fuel
where it is instead of building the repository. Obviously, to
abandon the repository would require amendment or possibly
repeal of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Proponents of this
proposal seem to disregard the finding in the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act that "Federal efforts during the past 30 years to devise a
permanent solution to the problems of civilian radioactive waste
disposal have not been adequate." Instead, they would have us
revert to that Square One posture.
We have been careful to avoid any suggestion that continued
spent fuel storage at reactor sites is not as safe and secure as the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission maintains that it is, but in our
view, the proposal to have DOE take title and manage spent fuel at
present reactor storage sites is not consistent with the "compelling
national interests" that former Secretary of Energy Spencer
Abraham referred to when he recommended Yucca Mountain as a
suitable repository site to the President and Congress in 2002. He
said, and we agree, that the repository is important to homeland
security.
We strongly oppose the suggestion that the government take
title to spent fuel which would remain at 72 reactor sites instead of
going to a repository. That is not what was promised in the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act and reaffirmed by Congress in a joint resolution
in 2002, and it is most certainly not what ratepayers have paid $25
billion in fees and interest over the past 22 years to achieve.
Before I conclude, there is one other item to discuss. We urge
strong leadership on the part of the Department of Energy and its
support contractors to keep this much-delayed repository program
moving forward. We have expressed our frustrations in the past
with the chronic underfunding and series of delays that have
troubled the program. DOE needs to work its way through
whatever else needs to be done to put the repository licensing back
on course. We commend the positive spirit and determination of
Mr. Edward Sproat, the new director of the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management, when he announced the revised
schedule in July and we wish him and the repository team well in
meeting that schedule. We appreciate EPA for meeting the
challenge of responding to the court remand with its proposed
revised radiation standard. Although we disagreed with extending
the regulatory period to one million years, EPA did meet the
mandate of the court and it is time to issue the final rule. We have
been aware that during the license application delay, DOE has
been conducting a re-examination of repository plans. We saw
some of the results of what is termed "program re-direction" in a
press release last October. A change in approach was described as
being "simpler, safer and more cost-effective," mostly as a result
of a shift to standardized spent fuel canisters that will allow
significant changes in fuel handling at the receipt facilities at
Yucca Mountain. We certainly applaud cost savings, improved
safety and the prospect of reducing the licensing complexity, but
we have two concerns that we want to pursue:
1. Will these changes further delay the license application and
how will that affect eventual repository operational dates?
The revised schedule showing initial waste disposal in 2017
is predicated on a number of variables including adequate
funding.
2. How will DOE and the utilities be able to ensure that all
spent fuel presently stored at reactor sites (up to the current
planned amount of 63,000 metric tons) will be able to be
transferred into the standardized canisters? Spent fuel is
increasingly being stored in sealed canisters in dry casks
that will either have to be accepted as is or have the
contents transferred to the standard canisters.
Finally, NARUC has not taken a position on the other elements
of the proposed Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act (H.R.
5360), aside from our support for the Nuclear Waste Fund
reclassification proposal. In general, we find the other provisions
to be helpful for the overall goal of licensing, building and
operating the repository. We agree that the 70,000 metric ton
statutory limit on the repository capacity is arbitrary and the
proposal to have the capacity be among the elements of the license
review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission makes sense. We
have always urged DOE to plan and eventually conduct the spent
fuel transportation in cooperation with other federal, State, tribal
and local governments and, to the best of our knowledge the
Department is planning to do that as required by the NWPA and as
has been done successfully in previous nuclear waste shipments.
We were disappointed to hear that Senator Domenici indicated last
week that the counterpart Yucca Mountain bill (S. 2589) will not
be taken up in the Senate this year.
Let me summarize what we support:
1. Reform of the Nuclear Waste Fund so that collected fees
are available for their intended purpose, as proposed in
H.R. 5360.
2. DOE needs to press on with licensing the Yucca Mountain
repository.
3. Central interim storage away from reactor sites that does
not interfere with developing the repository.
4. Research of advanced reprocessing and further study of all
aspects of the GNEP initiative.
5. Infusing a sense of urgency in spent fuel repository
development.
And, let me summarize what we strongly oppose:
1. Continued diversion of the Nuclear Waste Fund fee
payments.
2. Having DOE take title of spent fuel at reactor storage sites
and to retain it there.
3. Use of the Nuclear Waste Fund for interim storage,
certainly not so long as appropriations for interim storage
would come at the expense of adequate appropriations for
the repository
4. Putting as many as 31 States through a concurrent site
search for interim storage before the costs and benefits of
the proposed "consolidation and preparation" facilities have
been determined.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I
look forward to your questions.
MR. HALL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Earley, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of the DTE Energy Company for 5
minutes. Try to summarize and then we will question. Thank you.
MR. EARLEY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
thank you. My name is Tony Earley, and I am Chairman and CEO
of the DTE Energy Company headquartered in Detroit. I am here
today not only in my capacity as the owner of a nuclear power
plant, but also as Chairman of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the
trade association for the U.S. nuclear industry. I want to thank you
for the opportunity to express our strong support for H.R. 5360,
and I want to say that I agree with the priorities identified by Mr.
Sproat in his remarks.
This legislation would be another step forward in the country's
quest to manage and dispose of used nuclear fuel and high level
waste. You all understand how vital nuclear power is to the energy
policy of our country. You know that 20 percent of our electricity
is produced from nuclear power plants. It is a safe,
environmentally friendly, and economic source of power and it is
critical that we expand the use of this technology. The United
States has shown remarkable leadership in this field in the last half
century since the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, but
we are in danger of losing that leadership in nuclear technology.
China, India, and other Pacific Rim countries race to build more
nuclear plants.
As indicated earlier, it has been over a decade since the last
U.S. nuclear plant came on line, but fortunately momentum is
changing. Thanks to the visionary leaders in our industry and your
work with the Energy Policy Act last year, NEI member
companies have spent over $1.5 billion in planning the next
generation of nuclear reactors over the last several years. But that
momentum will be lost unless we make progress on the nuclear
waste front at a faster pace than we have seen in the last two and a
half decades since the passage of the Waste Policy Act. That is
why passage of H.R. 5360 is so important. I can tell you from
conversations with my fellow CEOs, unless progress is made on
nuclear waste issues, spending on plants will slow and could
eventually grind to a halt.
On the other hand, if the Department of Energy makes visible
and measurable progress implementing a national used fuel
management strategy companies will be willing to move ahead. I
can't emphasize enough that the nuclear industry believes that the
Yucca Mountain repository is an essential component of any such
strategy. Let me just mention three important provisions that we
support. First, waste confidence. As responsible business leaders,
CEOs of nuclear companies must have confidence that nuclear
waste issues will be handled appropriately. It is not only socially
responsible but it is legally required by the NRC.
Waste confidence, however, is a national policy determination,
not an issue that ought to be litigated in each plant licensing
proceeding. H.R. 5360 reiterates our country's commitment to do
the right thing with respect to nuclear waste. Second, we need to
reclassify the Nuclear Waste Fund. H.R. 5360 deals with the
chronic funding problem that has plagued Yucca Mountain for
years. Ironically, it is not a lack of cash as has been mentioned
earlier. Customers of the nuclear utilities have paid $27 billion
into the waste fund, only 9 billion has been spent.
H.R. 5360 has provisions to insure that funding for nuclear
waste solution will not be held hostage to budgetary maneuvering.
Finally, we need to clarify the licensing process. The bill includes
important provisions that will give more certainty to licensing
process for a nuclear waste repository. I will tell you I have first-
hand experience on how the NRC licensing process can be used to
thwart national energy policy. As a participant in the decades
long, multi-billion dollar struggle to license the Shoreham nuclear
plant in New York, I know that streamlined licensing processes are
absolutely crucial.
These and other provisions are welcomed by the industry, but
we also urge the committee to consider several other steps that
would add to the value of H.R. 5360. I have discussed these in my
written testimony, and I ask that they be included in the record, but
I will highlight just a few. As Chairman of NEI and member of its
executive committee for over 5 years, I can tell you our top priority
is getting Yucca licensed and built but from a symbolic, legal, and
policy standpoint having DOE take title and start to move fuel
from reactor sites would be a huge step forward.
It would reaffirm the Government's commitment to meet the
obligation of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, halt the continued
growth and monetary damages, and be consistent with both long-
term storage plans at Yucca and potential developments in
reprocessing. I have heard the committee's well-founded
concerns, and I want to make it clear as my testimony indicates we
do not support the proposal in H.R. 4538 for multiple sites, but we
do know that Americans love common sense solutions, and a
carefully crafted, tightly focused interim storage plan could
address the very real concerns expressed by the committee
members and yet continue to make progress on the nuclear waste
front.
We believe the program should have a very limited number of
interim storage sites. We agree with Mr. Norwood's comments.
One of them ought to be at Yucca. We also want to look at other
sites that would be consistent with future proposals for
reprocessing technology, and if we included incentives for
voluntary participation, we believe that there are a small number of
sites that would be willing to participate. We need to recognize
that while the Nuclear Waste Fund could be used to pay for the
small number of interim storage sites it should not be used to
finance the developing of reprocessing or other technologies.
And finally we do need to provide the NRC with the necessary
resources and appropriate management focus to get the job done.
But I want to emphasize that this should not be done without losing
focus on the ultimate goal, and that is the functioning repository at
Yucca Mountain. Another provision we ask you to consider is
nuclear waste disposal contract issues. Utilities are required to
enter into a contract. Those contracts that were signed in the 1980s
are outdated and Congress should direct that those new contracts
consistent with the current realities be used.
So I want to end by thanking the committee for the opportunity
to testify. I know you are faced with important decisions that will
influence the role of nuclear power in the United States in the
future, and I urge you to continue to insure that nuclear energy is a
viable option for our country. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Anthony F. Earley, Jr. follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTHONY F. EARLEY, JR., CHAIRMAN
AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, DTE ENERGY COMPANY, ON
BEHALF OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is
Tony Earley.
I am Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of DTE Energy
headquartered in Detroit. DTE Energy is a diversified energy
holding company that owns, among other companies, the Detroit
Edison Company, which serves over 2 million customers in
southeast Michigan. One of our most important electric generating
assets is the 1130 MW Fermi 2 nuclear power plant which has
been a workhorse of our system since 1988.
As we look to the future, there is a growing need for baseload
generation across the United States. In Michigan, our Fermi plant
was the last baseload plant to come on line. Our state has
identified a need to make significant generating additions in the
next decade. At Detroit Edison, we are actively engaged in
planning studies analyzing the possibility of building a second
nuclear plant at our Fermi site. While there are many issues to
consider before proceeding with a new nuclear plant, plans for the
management and disposal of nuclear waste are critical to the
decision making process.
I come here today not only in my capacity as the CEO of a
company that owns a nuclear plant, but also as Chairman of the
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). NEI is the trade association of the
U.S. nuclear industry. Our membership includes the owners of all
U.S. nuclear power plants, as well as a large majority of the firms
that supply equipment and technical expertise to the industry.
Thank you for this opportunity to express the nuclear energy
industry's strong support of H.R. 5360, the Nuclear Fuel
Management and Disposal Act. I also will address additional
provisions that we believe would strengthen the legislation's goal
to enhance the management and disposal of used nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste, to ensure protection of public health
and safety, and to ensure the territorial integrity and security of the
repository at Yucca Mountain.
Summary
In keeping with the scope of this hearing, I will focus my
testimony on these key issues:
<bullet> The Department of Energy (DOE) must make visible and
measurable progress in implementing an integrated
national used nuclear fuel management strategy. The
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, repository is a critical
component of any such integrated strategy. This progress
will help ensure that the expanded use of nuclear energy
will play a key role in our nation's strategy for meeting
growing electricity demand.
<bullet> H.R. 5360 can play a key role in establishing a solid basis
for making necessary progress toward addressing the
challenges facing the Yucca Mountain project, as well as
helping set the stage for new nuclear plants.
<bullet> Congress should add additional legislative provisions to
H.R. 5360 to support the removal of used fuel from
commercial nuclear plant sites as soon as possible,
together with steps to accelerate development of new
technological approaches that would substantially benefit
approaches toward the disposal of used fuel.
Nuclear Energy Must Play a Key Role in Our Energy Future
In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush
affirmed the nation's commitment to "safe, clean nuclear energy"
as part of a diverse portfolio that will meet America's future
electricity needs. A long-term commitment to nuclear energy will
make the United States more energy independent and ensure
diversity of energy sources. The Administration and Congress
demonstrated strong leadership by enacting the Energy Policy Act
of 2005. This legislation encourages diversity of energy sources,
including emission-free sources of electricity, such as nuclear
energy.
The United States has demonstrated remarkable leadership in
advancing the commercial use of nuclear energy. Its 103 reactors
have achieved record levels of safety, reliability and efficiency. I
am convinced that nuclear energy offers a clean, reliable and cost-
effective answer to many of our nation's current and future energy
needs. Nuclear energy offers several unique advantages. It is the
only expandable baseload energy source that does not emit carbon
or other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere during operation.
Nuclear energy safely and reliably provides price stability for
electricity customers as the prices for fossil fuels fluctuate. It also
provides exciting new opportunities in areas such as hydrogen
production. It is essential that nuclear energy maintain at least the
current 20 percent contribution to U.S. electricity production.
Maintaining that level of production will require construction of a
significant number of new nuclear plants beginning in the next
decade.
There is strong, bipartisan support for a continuing significant
role for nuclear power. More than two-thirds of the public
supports keeping nuclear energy as a key component of our energy
portfolio. Many in the environmental community recognize and
endorse the role that nuclear energy can play in controlling
greenhouse gas emissions. The industry appreciates the
recognition of nuclear energy's importance that Congress and the
Administration demonstrated in last year's comprehensive Energy
Policy Act of 2005.
Recently, a new coalition of diverse organizations and
individuals has been formed to educate the public on nuclear
energy and participate in policy discussions on U.S. energy issues.
The Clean and Safe Energy Coalition, co-chaired by Greenpeace
co-founder Patrick Moore and former Environmental Protection
Agency Administrator and New Jersey Governor Christine Todd
Whitman, includes business, environmental, labor, health and
community leaders among its more than 430 members.
The Need for Legislative Action
To realize fully the benefits that nuclear power offers,
however, the country must resolve outstanding issues related to the
ultimate disposal of used nuclear fuel. Ratepayers across America
have paid more $27 billion into the Nuclear Waste Fund, and
continue to pay an additional $750 million each year. However,
DOE has yet to move used fuel from reactor sites as required by
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. It is, in fact, eight years behind
schedule in meeting its statutory obligation. Moreover, electricity
customers have had to finance costly on-site storage facilities.
The causes for the failure of the federal used nuclear fuel
program to date are well-documented. The fundamental problem,
however, lies not with the authorizing legislation that Congress
enacted 25 years ago. It is, rather, a failure to implement that
legislation, as evidenced by a failure to appropriate sufficient funds
for the repository and by a failure to follow-through on a consistent
commitment to develop the repository. Although new legislation
to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is paramount, it is even
more critical that the federal government commit itself to the
implementation of existing law.
The nuclear energy industry is encouraged by the ambitious
schedule announced by DOE on July 19, 2006, for submission of
the license application by June 30, 2008, and the "best-achievable"
construction schedule that could have the repository begin
receiving used fuel in March 2017. The industry encourages DOE
to submit the application as soon as possible so the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) review can begin.
Although DOE's announcement of a schedule for licensing the
repository is a significant development, experience suggests that
the schedule will be difficult to achieve without congressional
action in a number of areas:
<bullet> Congress' providing appropriations consistent with
Administration requests
<bullet> an NRC construction authorization decision consistent with
the timelines contained in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
<bullet> any necessary Federal or state authorizations or permits for
the repository and the transportation system
<bullet> DOE's achieving a nuclear culture consistent with that
needed to be a successful NRC licensee.
Enactment of the Nuclear Fuel Management Disposal Act,
H.R. 5360, with the amendments we propose, as spelled out below,
will help advance several of these important objectives.
H.R. 5360 Supports the Future Role for
Nuclear Power in Our National Energy Strategy
Waste Confidence Is Affirmed
The nation must be confident that policies are in place to
ensure the safe and secure storage and disposal of used nuclear
fuel. This waste confidence determination is reflected in NRC
rules requiring an NRC finding of "waste confidence" to support
various licensing decisions. However, such an approach creates
uncertainty because NRC regulations and licensing decisions are
subject to litigation, and the issue is one of public policy, not
regulatory or technical determination.
Section 9 of H.R. 5360 takes the very important step of
codifying the waste confidence rule. This will help avoid potential
contentions in individual plant licensing proceedings over the
timing and certainty of DOE's performance with respect to its
obligations. We strongly support this important step in creating
certainty for major new investments by the nuclear industry in
response to Congress' Energy Policy Act of 2005.
Managing the nation's used fuel is a firmly established federal
obligation and, as such, is a matter of broad national policy under
the purview of the elected representatives of our country's people.
There is solid scientific and technical justification to affirm waste
confidence. In 2001, the National Academy of Sciences confirmed
four decades of international scientific consensus that geologic
disposal is the best method for managing used nuclear fuel.
Congress approved a geologic disposal site at Yucca Mountain in
2002.
In the Energy Policy Act, Congress included provisions that
encourage the construction of new nuclear power plants,
demonstrating public confidence in the nation's ability to manage
used reactor fuel in the future. In addition, DOE has safely
operated a geologic disposal site for transuranic radioactive waste
near Carlsbad, New Mexico-the Waste Isolation Pilot Project.
Issues regarding the timing and certainty of DOE's
performance toward meeting its statutory obligations should be
resolved in repository proceedings, or in Congress. Litigation of
such issues as part of individual plant licensing proceedings is
neither efficient nor appropriate. The NRC has long recognized
that individual plant licensing proceedings should not be burdened
with debates over DOE's development of the repository. Congress
should codify "waste confidence" as called for in H.R. 5360, so
that the NRC need not address this broad public policy matter in
routine licensing proceedings.
Artificial Constraints on Repository Operations Are Eliminated
Currently, a statutory limit of 70,000 metric tons (MT) exists
on the amount of nuclear waste material that can be accepted at
Yucca Mountain. The environmental impact statement for the
project analyzed emplacement of up to 105,000 MT of commercial
used fuel in the repository. Additional scientific analyses suggest
significantly higher capacity could easily be achieved with changes
in the repository configuration that use only geology that has
already been characterized and do not deviate from existing design
parameters. Advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies could
provide significant additional capacity for disposing of waste
products in Yucca Mountain.
Decisions on licensing and operations of a deep geologic
repository at Yucca Mountain should be based on scientific and
engineering considerations through DOE technical analyses and
the NRC licensing process, not on artificial constraints. Given the
decades of study and the billions of dollars invested in Yucca
Mountain, it makes sense that we fully and safely utilize its full
potential capacity, rather than developing multiple repositories
when there is no technical reason to do so. H.R. 5360 will allow
the nation to do just that by lifting the artificial 70,000 MT
capacity limit.
H.R. 5360 Includes Key Provisions for Yucca Mountain
Progress
Offsetting Collections Reclassification Will Enhance Funding
Predictability
Congress established the Nuclear Waste Fund to cover costs
associated with disposal of commercial used nuclear fuel. This
fund is paid for by a one-tenth-of-a-cent-per-kilowatt-hour fee on
electricity used by consumers of nuclear energy. Congress has
routinely failed to appropriate to the repository program the total
fees paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund in that year. Further,
restrictions on the federal budget have prevented fees collected, but
not appropriated, in one year from being appropriated in
subsequent years.
As a result, Yucca Mountain budget requests have been cut by
more than $1 billion over the past decade. Program funding
requirements are forecast to increase substantially over the next
few years. If overall spending totals remain flat, even more
significant delays could result, not because nuclear power
consumers have not provided the funds necessary to support the
program, but because of inappropriate federal budget accounting.
To date, consumers of nuclear power have committed more
than $27 billion in fees and accrued interest into the fund. They
continue to pay at a rate of $750 million each year. However, only
some $9 billion has been spent on the project, leaving a balance in
excess of $18 billion. In recent years, fee income has significantly
exceeded the annual spending from the fund.
H.R. 5360 would reclassify prospective annual fees so that
appropriations up to the full amount of fee revenues for any year
would not be limited by discretionary spending caps. Although
this approach would be a major step forward, we believe that
Congress also should reaffirm the compact with ratepayers in the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act and provide that any appropriation for
the program could be offset by balances in the Nuclear Waste
Fund, whether derived from prospective fees or past fees and
interest. This approach has been advocated consistently by the
leadership of this Committee from both sides of the aisle.
In addition, we believe it is important for the Congress to act to
maintain the integrity of the Nuclear Waste Fund. We support
amending H.R. 5360 to define clearly that only activities directly
contributing to meeting the federal government's obligation under
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act can be supported from the Nuclear
Waste Fund. This includes expenditures related to transportation,
storage and disposal of used fuel and high-level waste.
Advanced research on energy technologies has consistently
been funded through general revenues, and there is no reason
research on advanced technologies in processing used nuclear
fuel-such as those contemplated under the President's Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program-should be financed
any differently. The nuclear industry is deeply appreciative of the
amendment successfully offered by Chairman Barton to the fiscal
2007 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill in the
House. This amendment prohibits funding from the Nuclear Waste
Fund to support GNEP. We believe this should be incorporated
into permanent law.
Additionally, Congress should reaffirm its authority over any
changes in the Nuclear Waste Fund fee by requiring such changes
be made by statutory amendment.
H.R. 5360 Will Enhance Clarity and Stability in the Licensing
Process
The NRC repository licensing process should be restructured to
ensure that the proceedings are prioritized properly. First, a
reasonable, but finite, schedule for review of the authority to
"receive and possess" fuel is needed following approval of the
construction license. This would be consistent with an established
schedule for the initial review of the construction license
application and could avoid dilatory procedural challenges that
would undermine the government's ability to meet its contractual
obligations and avoid the significant costs of delay.
Second, clarification must be provided as to what activities are
authorized to develop used fuel management infrastructure prior to
the NRC granting a construction license, including the construction
of a rail line to connect the Yucca Mountain site with the national
rail network. Regulatory authority for the transportation system
needs to be clarified as well.
Third, the hearing process for the authorization to receive and
possess fuel should be simplified to provide for clear and concise
decision-making.
Finally, several key areas need clarification. These include
land management and regulations that apply to repository
construction and operations. In addition, there is a need to clarify
which agencies will administer those regulations.
H.R. 5360 addresses each of these issues to increase the
prospect that the "best-achievable" schedule announced by DOE
can be met.
Congress Should Consider Additional Steps to
Promote Comprehensive Used Nuclear Fuel Management
While industry fully supports H.R. 5360 and believes its
enactment would be a major milestone in implementing our
national strategy for managing used nuclear fuel, we believe
Congress should include a number of additional provisions in
comprehensive legislation.
DOE Should Move Used Nuclear Fuel From Reactor Sites as
Soon as Possible
The industry's top priority is for the federal government to
meet its statutory and contractual obligation to move used fuel
from operating and decommissioned reactor sites. The
government already is eight years delayed in meeting this
obligation, and it will be at least another decade before the
repository is completed. That failure is the subject of more than 60
lawsuits. These lawsuits potentially expose the federal
government to billions of dollars in judgments and settlements.
Further delays in federal receipt and movement of used nuclear
fuel and defense waste products will only add to utility damage
claims. According to DOE, these delays will increase taxpayer
liability for defense waste site life-cycle costs and Yucca Mountain
fixed costs.
While DOE moves forward to license, construct and operate
the Yucca Mountain repository, the government must take title to
used fuel and move it to secure federal facilities as soon as
practicable. A number of proposals have been made to address the
issue of "interim or temporary storage."
The best approach would be for the federal government to
begin to move fuel in proximity to the planned repository at the
Nevada Test Site.
We urge the Congress to evaluate alternative interim storage
proposals. We recommend the following principles:
<bullet> Minimize the number of interim storage sites to reduce
costs and maximize efficiencies of consolidation.
<bullet> Provide host site benefits ideally linking interim storage to
recycling and reprocessing technology development as an
incentive for voluntary participation.
<bullet> Recognize that, while the Nuclear Waste Fund could be
used to pay for this interim storage, it should not be used to
develop the complementary technology.
<bullet> NRC must be provided with the necessary resources and
appropriate management focus.
It appears that one or two temporary storage sites that provide
benefits desired by the host state and community are the
appropriate approach. Industry experience demonstrates that such
facilities can be sited, licensed and constructed on an expedited
schedule. We are encouraged that DOE has advised Congress, in
its solicitation for prospective sites for nuclear fuel recycling
facilities, that there will be, of necessity, some temporary storage
of used nuclear fuel involved. Several communities have
expressed initial interest in participating in such a project. We
believe Congress should work with DOE, industry and potential
host sites to determine what steps will best facilitate the movement
of used fuel from utility sites, including appropriation mitigation
benefits, and incorporate appropriate provisions into H.R. 5360.
Both House and Senate Energy and Water Development
appropriations bills for fiscal 2007 have provided direction on this
issue. Although clear interest exists in looking at options for early
movement of fuel, no option has demonstrated that it is politically
and technically workable and could be accomplished in a timely
manner. We believe a cooperative and supportive host site is
critical to meeting these criteria.
The industry does not believe that the "take title" approach
suggested in H.R. 4538 by any measure either meets the
government's statutory obligation or provides any benefit. The
requirement in that legislation that all used fuel at reactor sites be
moved immediately into dry cask storage could add up to $800
million a year over five years to the costs of producing nuclear
energy. Regardless of the temporary storage strategy chosen, it is
critical that those activities not divert attention and resources from
repository development.
New Reactor Waste Disposal Contract Issues Need to Be
Addressed
As utilities prepare to license and construct new nuclear power
plants, it is important that appropriate changes be made in the
Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-
Level Radioactive Waste originally established by rulemaking (10
CFR, Part 961) to reflect developments since these contracts were
originally drafted in the 1980s. While the language in both the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act and disposal contracts allows an existing
contract to be amended adding new plants, DOE's failure to
perform, and the subsequent litigation, has created a situation
where this option may be difficult to execute. Instead, the
preferred path forward would be to enact legislation directing DOE
to enter into new disposal contracts for new nuclear plants that are
consistent in form and substance with the existing disposal
contracts, but which take into account the schedule for the
operation of new plants. In particular, the 1998 deadline in the
existing contracts should be revised in contracts executed for new
plants.
Congress also should consider steps that could facilitate early
resolution of future claims by utilities against the federal
government for its continuing failure to meet its obligations under
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
Yucca Mountain Licensing Process Should Provide Flexibility to
Address Future Developments
As provided by existing regulations, Congress should direct
DOE to incorporate features into its repository development plans
that maintain flexibility for future generations to make informed
decisions based on operational experience, changing energy
economics and technological developments. It should be made
clear that it was always the intent that the repository design retains
the ability to monitor and, if needed or desired, retrieve the used
fuel.
The nuclear energy industry supports enhancements to the
Yucca Mountain repository that would provide greater long-term
assurance of safety and permit DOE to apply innovative
technology at the repository as it is developed. These
enhancements include:
<bullet> extensive monitoring of the used nuclear fuel placed in the
repository and its effects on the surrounding geology for
300 or more years
<bullet> the ability to retrieve the used nuclear fuel from the
facility for an extended period
<bullet> periodic review of updates to the repository license that
take into account monitoring results and ensures that the
facility is operating as designed.
DOE already has committed to facilitate the use of these
elements in its repository planning. According to DOE's final
environmental impact statement, for a period of 50 to 300 years,
the federal government will "collect, evaluate and report on data"
to assess the performance of the repository and the ability to
retrieve the used fuel within the facility, if desired. In addition to
monitoring material within the facility, DOE will conduct tests and
analyses to ensure that the repository is constructed and operated
according to strict guidelines. Although DOE is pursuing these
elements, Congressional direction on the proposed enhancements
would provide greater certainty on the scientific and regulatory
oversight of long-term repository operation and the condition of
the material stored there.
Doing so would require no modification to the existing federal
statutory or regulatory framework. DOE could include these
enhancements as part of its "receive and possess" application and
the commitment to complete them should be incorporated as a
condition of the NRC license.
This direction will offer greater assurance to the public that
long-term stewardship of used fuel at Yucca Mountain will be
carefully monitored throughout repository operation. It also would
allow DOE to take advantage of future technological innovations
to improve the repository or provide for the potential reuse of the
energy that remains in the fuel.
Yucca Mountain's Public Health, Safety Standard
Should Be Consistent With Regulatory Precedents
We believe that the revised 1 million-year radiation standard
proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency would be fully
protective of public health and the environment, and that the
repository design could meet such a standard. Nonetheless, we are
deeply concerned that the potential for an extended rulemaking
review process and subsequent litigation could result in yet more
costly, unnecessary delays in the Yucca Mountain project. In
addition, given the significance of the issue, we believe it is
important for Congress to address the matter directly.
Congress should carefully consider the inherent uncertainties in
establishing regulations extended over such an unprecedented
period. This approach could have unintended effects on regulatory
standards for other non-radioactive and radioactive hazardous
materials. We advocate incorporating a 10,000-year regulatory
standard in legislation. Such a compliance period is consistent
with that prescribed for all radioactive waste requiring disposal in
other geologic repositories. The million-year standard applies only
to Yucca Mountain.
The 10,000-year standard, for example, applies to long-lived
waste, such as transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
The 10,000-year standard also applies to land disposal of non-
radioactive hazardous waste by means of underground injection.
In fact, the 10,000-year standard is considerably greater than other,
analogous regulatory compliance periods. These include 500 years
for the land disposal of low-radioactive waste; and 1,000 years for
the decommissioning of NRC licensed nuclear facilities.
Adaptive Staging
The 2003 report of the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Science, "One Step at a Time."
recommended the use of adaptive staging for repository
development. While there are elements of this concept that appear
attractive, we have significant concerns that the specific processes
recommended in the report could unduly complicate and delay
repository licensing and operations due to lack of certainty in
decision making.
Used Nuclear Fuel Recycling
The nuclear energy industry has shown consistent and strong
support for research and development of advanced fuel-cycle
technologies incorporated in the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative
(AFCI). In anticipation of a major expansion of nuclear power in
the United States and globally, it is appropriate to accelerate
activities in this program. The resurgence in development of
nuclear energy is expected to require advanced fuel cycles.
However, regardless of the success of AFCI technology, a
repository will be necessary to handle defense waste, as well as
commercial used nuclear fuel and its byproducts, regardless of any
fuel cycle that is ultimately developed.
President Bush has presented a compelling vision for a global
nuclear renaissance through the GNEP. This initiative provides an
important framework to satisfy U.S. and world needs for an
abundant source of clean, safe nuclear energy while addressing
challenges related to fuel supply, long-term radioactive waste
management, and proliferation concerns. As recently introduced
by DOE, it may be possible that currently available technologies
could be used creatively to jump-start the development of the
needed advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies.
We appreciate the steps that DOE has taken to solicit industry
views on the timing, direction and defining roles of interested
parties in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. The extensive
response the Department received to its Expression of Interest last
week, and additional input it will receive in the coming months,
will help DOE and Congress make more-informed decisions on the
best way to proceed with research and development of these
technologies.
We recognize that Congress has important questions regarding
this program. DOE's near-term focus for GNEP is to determine,
by 2008, how to proceed with the demonstration of advanced
recycling technologies and other technological challenges. We
also recognize that special attention must be given to how facilities
would be licensed and the potential impact this could have on NRC
resources for major licensing actions on new plants and Yucca
Mountain in parallel periods. Consequently, the industry fully
supports increased funding for AFCI in fiscal 2007. However,
neither AFCI nor GNEP reduces the near-term imperative to
develop the Yucca Mountain repository.
A Constructive Role for Nevadans
The nuclear energy industry supports an active and
constructive role for Nevada in the development of Yucca
Mountain to help ensure the safety of its citizens. The industry
also supports compensation for the State to account for the
program's socioeconomic impact, as called for in the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act. This model is consistent with the siting and
operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
The industry is encouraged by the steps DOE has taken to work
with affected local governments in the State, and we further
encourage DOE to expand its interactions with Nevadans
interested in constructive engagement in the project. The industry
urges the Congress to include provisions in H.R. 5360 to foster
these developments.
Conclusion
We must never lose sight of the federal government's statutory
responsibility for civilian used nuclear fuel disposal, as stated by
Congress in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982. The industry fully supports the fundamental
need for a repository so used nuclear fuel and the byproducts of the
nation's nuclear weapons program are managed safely and
securely in a specially designed, underground facility. World-class
science has demonstrated that Yucca Mountain is an eminently
suitable site for such a facility.
A viable used fuel management strategy is necessary to retain
long-term public confidence in operating existing nuclear power
plants and in building new nuclear power plants to meet our
nation's growing electricity needs, and to fuel our economic
growth. The public confidence necessary to support construction
of new nuclear plants is linked to successful implementation of an
integrated national used fuel policy, which includes a continued
commitment for the long-term disposition of used nuclear fuel.
This requires a commitment from the Administration, Congress
and other stakeholders to ensure that DOE makes an effective
transition from a scientific program to a licensing and construction
program, with the same commitment to safety. New waste
management approaches, including temporary storage and nuclear
fuel recycling, are consistent with timely development of Yucca
Mountain.
Enactment of H.R. 5360, with the amendments we have
advocated, is the critical prerequisite to implementing our national
policy for used fuel management.
MR. HALL. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes Ms.
Boyd, Legislative Director, Public Citizen, for 5 minutes, please.
Thank you.
MS. BOYD. I would like to thank the Chairman and the
members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on
issues related to nuclear waste storage and disposal. My name is
Michele Boyd, and I am the Legislative Director of Public
Citizen's Energy Program. Public Citizen is a 35-year-old public
interest organization with over 100,000 members nationwide. We
represent consumer interests through research, public education,
and grassroots organizing.
Five years after the September 11 attacks, Congress has yet to
implement safeguards that address our must vulnerable and
dangerous security threat, the storage of highly radioactive spent
fuel from commercial nuclear reactors. If any of the many spent
fuel pools in the United States were breached through a terrorist
attack or any other action, the health, environmental, and economic
consequences could be catastrophic. National focus should be on
addressing the immediate threats from vulnerable spent fuel
storage, not on wasting resources on a failed repository program, a
dangerous reprocessing plan, or interim away from reactor storage
of waste. The most sensible action in the near-term is to require
hardened on-site storage.
Clearly, the United States does not have a near-term solution
for the permanent storage of spent fuel. DOE's flawed scientific
and quality assurance practices have repeatedly cast serious doubt
on the validity of the work performed at Yucca Mountain. The
Administration's proposed Nuclear Fuel Management and
Disposal Act fails to address any of the project's fundamental
problems. Instead, this bill overrides public health and safety laws
and eliminates the role of science in determining whether or not
Yucca Mountain can safely isolate nuclear waste for hundreds of
thousands of years, as is required under the law.
This bill should not be enacted as it would be another failed
attempt to prop up this deeply flawed project. In February the U.S.
Department of Energy announced the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership as a research and development program to develop
advanced recycling technologies that would in theory postpone the
need to license additional geological repositories until the next
century. International and U.S. experience, however, clearly
shows that reprocessing at fast reactors are not going to solve our
Nation's radioactive waste problem. Rather, reprocessing would
dramatically increase the threat from and complexity of dealing
with our nuclear waste.
Reprocessing would also undermine U.S. global
nonproliferation efforts and cost U.S. taxpayers at least $100
billion. For the foreseeable future reprocessing and plutonium fuel
use simply does not make sense economically, environmentally, or
from a national security perspective. With no permanent
repository for nuclear waste, attention has turned to dry cask
interim storage. According to a 2006 study by the National
Research Council, dry casks were designed to store waste, not to
resist terrorist attacks. The NRC has granted interim storage
licenses at 42 sites but it has not considered the environmental
impacts of an attack at any of those sites.
Significantly, a recent 9th Circuit Court decision rejected the
NRC's claim that the National Environmental Policy Act does not
require terrorism considerations. The current interim fuel storage
proposals in the Senate and House fiscal year 2007 Energy and
Water Appropriations bills also fail to address the security threats
posed by dry cask storage. Away from reactor interim storage
would not meaningfully reduce the number of locations where
spent fuel is located and it would increase the transportation risk to
the public. Instead of interim away from reactor storage the focus
should be on improving the security of spent fuel at the sites.
The Bush Administration and Congress have urged Americans
to pay greater attention to and take more responsibility for our
national security. It is with that in mind that citizens and public
interest groups have developed what we are calling the principles
for safeguarding nuclear waste at reactors, which are being release
today for the first time. I would like to submit for the record the
list of 94 national and grassroots groups from 37 States that have
signed on to these principles thus far.
The key elements of the principles are to, first, require a low-
density, open-frame layout for spent fuel pools, which could allow
enough air circulation to keep the fuel from catching fire in the
event of a water loss in the pools due to an attack or an accident.
Establish hardened on-site storage or HOSS for the waste removed
from the pools. The overall objective of HOSS should be that the
amount of releases projected in even severe attacks should be low
enough that the storage system would be unattractive as a terrorist
target.
Protect fuel pools to withstand an attack by air, land, or water
from a force at least equal in size and coordination to the 9/11
attacks. Require periodic review of HOSS facilities and fuel pools
and dedicate funding to local and State governments to
independently monitor the site. And, finally, prohibit
reprocessing. The Spent Nuclear Fuel On-Site Storage Security
Act of 2005, which was introduced in both the House and the
Senate by the Nevada and Utah delegations would be a good basis
for incorporating these principles into law. I thank you again for
the opportunity to testify in front of this committee.
[The prepared statement of Michele Boyd follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHELE BOYD, LEGISLATIVE
DIRECTOR, PUBLIC CITIZEN
I would like to thank the Chairman and members of the
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality for the opportunity to
testify on issues related to nuclear waste storage and disposal. My
name is Michele Boyd and I am the Legislative Director of Public
Citizen's Energy Program. Public Citizen is a 35-year old public
interest organization with over 150,000 members nationwide. We
represent consumer interests through research, public education
and grassroots organizing.
Five years after the September 11 attacks, Congress has yet to
implement safeguards that address our most vulnerable and
dangerous security threat - the storage of highly radioactive spent
fuel from commercial nuclear reactors in fuel pools. If any of the
many spent fuel pools in the United States were breached through
terrorist attack or any other action, the health, environmental, and
economic consequences could be catastrophic. National focus
should be on addressing the threats from this waste, not on wasting
resources on a failed repository program, a dangerous reprocessing
program, or interim away-from-reactor storage. The most sensible
action in the near-term is to require hardened on-site storage.
I am going to start with a discussion of the proposed geologic
repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, followed by the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and the proposal for interim
storage. I will conclude with a plan developed by national and
grassroots public interest groups to address the urgent need to
protect the public from the threats posed by the current vulnerable
storage of commercial spent fuel. Unlike the other proposed
"solutions," this proposal could be implemented in the near-term
and would dramatically increase the safety of spent fuel for
decades to come.
Yucca Mountain
Clearly, the United States does not have a near-term solution
for the permanent storage of high-level nuclear waste. The U.S.
Department of Energy's (DOE) recent estimate of when Yucca
Mountain will begin accepting waste is overly optimistic, because
it does not factor in delays due to funding limitations or litigation
and ignores the scientific problems with the site. Nor does DOE
have a current estimate of how much the Project will cost. Energy
Secretary Bodman stated in February that DOE "may never have
an accurate prediction of the cost."
Even under DOE's optimistic scenario, the proposed geologic
repository at Yucca Mountain is not predicted to begin receiving
waste until at least 2017. Transporting all of the waste to the site
then would take more than 30 years. Meanwhile, spent fuel at
reactor sites remains vulnerable to accidents and attacks for
decades.
DOE's flawed scientific and quality assurance practices have
cast serious doubt on the validity of the work performed at Yucca
Mountain. Quality assurance (QA) is crucial to sound science and
engineering, especially for a project employing thousands and
spanning several decades. QA is used to verify methods and
results, and is the very backbone of scientific research and
engineering design. Since 1988, the Government Accountability
Office has issued eight reports repeatedly criticizing DOE's quality
assurance and model validation programs. An August 2006 report
by the DOE's Office of Inspector General concluded that DOE's
Corrective Action Program to identify and resolve the ongoing QA
problems "was not effectively managing and resolving conditions
adverse to quality at the Yucca Mountain Project," including
omitting problems from the Corrective Action Program, failing to
implement the corrective actions in a timely manner, and failing to
solve the underlying problem even when implemented.
New cases of scientific misconduct continue to surface. Some
of the more recent revelations include:
<bullet> In January 2006, the NRC staff released a critical report of
a Bechtel SAIC LLC (BSC) audit made last fall at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The Bechtel
audit was on research related to corrosion rates of the
metals to be used to construct the waste packages and drip
shields. The NRC found that researchers incorrectly
measured the amount of corrosion on the metals, and
overestimated the ability of the metals to isolate nuclear
waste in engineered packages. The NRC also found that
researchers failed to calibrate equipment, used equipment
beyond its verifiable accuracy range, and referenced
cancelled documents. According to the NRC's audit report,
"the NRC observers questioned whether the corrosion data
could be considered technically sound and defensible."
Because of the problems NRC discovered, DOE issued a
stop work order on all cask research.
<bullet> In December 2005, DOE instructed BSC, its main
contractor, to cease engineering work and safety assessment
on key areas of design, including the redesign of the surface
facility. This order was the result of QA and design control
deficiencies, which were revealed by a whistleblower.
Despite Bechtel's failings, DOE nevertheless extended its
contract for another year, with an option for a second year.
<bullet> In March 2005, it was revealed that U.S. Geologic Survey
(USGS) scientists studying water infiltration and climate at
Yucca Mountain in Nevada altered and omitted various
data related to QA of the modeling of water flow through
the ground at Yucca Mountain. Faster water movement will
cause increased amounts of radioactive waste to migrate
more rapidly through the ground to the aquifer. DOE hired
Sandia National Laboratory to create new infiltration
models redo all of the infiltration analyses that were a
primary basis for its 2002 Yucca Mountain Site
Recommendation.
The Administration's proposed "Nuclear Fuel Management and
Disposal Act" (H.R. 5360 and S. 2589) has the goal to "facilitate
the licensing, construction and operation" of Yucca Mountain, but
in fact it fails to address any of the project's fundamental
problems. Rather, this bill is about overriding public health and
safety laws and eliminating the role of science in determining
whether Yucca Mountain can safely isolate nuclear waste for
hundreds of thousands of years, as is required under the law. This
bill is fundamentally contrary to the findings and purposes of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (section 111), including a finding "to
ensure that such waste and spent fuel do not adversely affect public
health and safety and the environment for this or future
generations." Specifically, the bill:
<bullet> Weakens Public Health and Environmental Laws: If
enacted, the bill would waive state and local air quality
laws at the site, and preempt states' traditional authority to
manage its waters, setting an alarming precedent for other
DOE projects and sites. The bill would undermine the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by exempting
DOE from having to consider the need for the action,
alternative actions, or a no-action alternative-the key
analyses of an environmental impact statement-and
legislating that any action related to the site is "beneficial"
before an analysis of the action has been done under NEPA.
<bullet> Preempts State and Tribal Rights: All authority over the
transportation of radioactive waste would be given to DOE,
contrary to the National Academy of Sciences'
recommendation that state, local, and tribal governments
must play a central role in waste transportation. The bill
would pre-empt all states' authority over the management
of hazardous, mixed, low-level, and transuranic wastes
under the Resource Control and Recovery Act (RCRA) if
that waste is stored or transported in NRC-certified
containers, as is the waste transported to and stored at the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico.
<bullet> Politicizes Scientific and Technical Decisions: The bill
would codify NRC's Waste Confidence Rule that there will
be permanent disposal available for spent fuel "in a timely
manner," thereby bypassing what should be a scientific and
technical determination. This sets up the federal
government for additional lawsuits by the nuclear industry
for failing to meet its commitments. It also rewards DOE's
mismanagement of the Yucca Mountain project with direct
access to future revenue into the Nuclear Waste Fund, and
allows an unlimited amount of waste to be dumped at the
site, despite the lack of scientific site characterization
information necessary to support such a decision.
This bill should not be enacted, as it would be another failed
attempt to prop up this failed project.
Reprocessing
When the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) was first
announced in February of this year, the U.S. Department of Energy
presented it as "a comprehensive strategy to increase U.S. and
global security, encourage clean development around the world,
reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, and improve the
environment." The program was presented to Congress largely as
a research and development program to develop "advanced
recycling technologies" that would postpone the need to license
additional geologic repositories for the nation's high-level waste
until the next century. The key components of a reprocessing and
reuse program include reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication
facilities, and fast reactors, none of which have proven to be
commercially successful technologies in the United States or
abroad.
Since then, the program has morphed several times. In the most
recent reincarnation announced in August, DOE is now proposing
to two tracks:
1. Building a commercial-scale reprocessing plant and a fast
neutron reactor that uses plutonium fuel with existing or
soon-to-be-developed technologies.
2. Researching and developing transmutation fuel and its use
in fast reactors.
In other words, DOE is proposing to jettison most of its
research on "advanced recycling technologies" and to skip
demonstration facilities using what DOE claimed would be cleaner
and "proliferation-resistant" technologies.
U.S. and international experience clearly shows that
reprocessing is not going to solve our nation's radioactive waste
problem. Rather, reprocessing would dramatically increase the
threat from, and complexity of dealing with, nuclear waste from
power plants; undermine U.S. global nonproliferation efforts; and
cost U.S. taxpayers at least $100 billion.
Reprocessing was first used in the United States in the 1940s,
as part of the government's program to separate plutonium for
nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that it
will cost over $100 billion to clean up the reprocessing waste at
three nuclear weapons sites in the states of Washington, Idaho, and
South Carolina. This waste threatens to contaminate the
Columbia River and the Savannah River, two of the most
important water resources in the country. The only U.S.
commercial reprocessing facility was located in West Valley, N.Y.
It was an economic and environmental failure, closing in 1972
after taking six years to reprocess spent fuel that was initially
expected to take one year. It left behind a $5.2 billion cleanup
project that is still on-going more than 30 years later.
International experience is no better. France, England, Russia,
India, and soon Japan are the only countries in the world that have
commercial reprocessing facilities. China is in the design phase of
a pilot facility. All of these programs are heavily subsidized by
their governments. A July 2000 report commissioned by the
French government concluded that reprocessing and plutonium
fuel are uneconomical, costing nearly $1 billion more each year for
plutonium fuel use (in 20 of its 58 reactors) compared to a "once-
through" fuel cycle. Last year, 20 tons of uranium and plutonium
leaked from a pipe at the U.K. government-owned THORP
reprocessing plant. The plant, which was losing money even when
operational, remains closed and its future is uncertain. Meanwhile,
the Japanese company, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., recently started up
its Rokkasho reprocessing plant, which took 15 years to build and
cost US $20 billion, three times more than initially estimated.
Commercial reprocessing worldwide has resulted in about 250
metric tons of separated plutonium, which is vulnerable to theft.
This is equivalent to more than 30,000 nuclear bombs. When
GNEP was first proposed in February 2006, DOE stated that it did
not want to use reprocessing technology that results in separated
plutonium. According to Clay Sell, Deputy Secretary of Energy, on
February 16, 2006:
It is our goal to develop a technology that allows us to recycle
in a way that is proliferation resistant. And when I say proliferation
resistant, what I mean is pure plutonium is not separated as part of
the recycling process; it is bound together with the other long-life
actinides which makes the material of a sufficient quantity and of a
sufficient heat load that concerns about diversion as a
proliferation matter are greatly reduced, so that is a key
technology that we seek to develop in partnership with our
international partners -- advanced recycling. [Emphasis added]
The two reprocessing technologies (UREX+ and
pyroprocessing) that DOE is researching are not "proliferation-
resistant," because the resulting plutonium mixes from these
technologies are not sufficient to prevent theft. Moreover, both
technologies can easily be undone to obtain pure plutonium using
the old, 1940s technology (PUREX). Now, however, DOE is
proposing to use a technology that results in a mix of plutonium
with uranium, which is even less proliferation-resistant than
UREX+. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
plutonium-uranium mixtures are "direct use materials" and must be
secured like separated plutonium.
According to a 1996 report by the National Research Council,
costs of reprocessing and transmutation of spent fuel that has
already been discharged by existing U.S. reactors "easily could be
more than $100 billion" (1996 dollars). The French reprocessing
firm Areva hired The Boston Consulting Group to issue a report on
the cost of reprocessing and plutonium fuel use in light-water
reactors. The report concludes that reprocessing is economically
comparable to the once-through cycle, but it relies on unrealistic
assumptions that do not reflect real-world experience, such as
assuming that the facility will continuously operate at full capacity
with no technical problems or other delays and that its capacity can
be increased significantly without a large increase in capital or
operating costs. Notably, the Boston report contains the
following disclaimer:
This report was prepared by The Boston Consulting Group at
the request of AREVA. BCG reviewed publicly available
information and proprietary data provided by AREVA, but did not
undertake any independent verification of the facts contained in
those source materials. Changes in these facts or underlying
assumptions could change the results reported in this study. Any
other party using this report for any purpose, or relying on this
report in any way, does so at their own risk. No representation or
warranty, express or implied, is made in relation to the accuracy
or completeness of the information presented herein or its
suitability for any particular purpose. [Emphasis added.]
DOE is proposing to use fast reactors to convert long-lived
waste into shorter-lived waste in order to reduce the amount of
time that the radioactive waste is dangerous and must be stored in a
geologic repository. But this process, called transmutation, is
plagued by serious technical problems, such as low rates of
conversion from long- to short-lived waste, unproven fuel
fabrication systems, and dangers to workers making the fuel.
Countries, including the US, have been trying to develop fast
reactors for 50 years and the results have all been technical and
economic failures. Over twenty fast reactors have been built since
1951 in seven countries, all of which have been funded through
government programs. Eleven of the reactors were large-scale
designs (over 100 megawatt-thermal), eight of which have been
shut down as of 2006. Only three reactors still operate: the French
Ph�nix reactor, the Russian BN-600 reactor, and the small
experimental Joyo reactor in Japan.
Fast reactors are more prone to accidents than light water
reactors because they operate with faster-moving neutrons than
light water reactors, making them more difficult to control. In the
United States, the Fermi 1 fast reactor near Detroit had a partial
nuclear meltdown in October 1966 and a sodium explosion in
1970. The reactor was closed in 1972. The French and Russian
reactors also have had safety problems, such as leaking highly
flammable sodium. A serious accident at the fuel fabrication
facility for the Japanese plant resulted in the death of two workers
in 1999. Except for the Russian reactor, fast reactors have
operated less than 50 percent of the time as a result of the ongoing
safety problems.
More than $100 billion has been spent globally in the past 50
years on fast reactor construction, reprocessing and other efforts to
make plutonium a viable reactor fuel. More than $25 billion of
that has been spent in building fast reactors. Due to the materials
and the complexity of the design, the cost of building fast reactors
is significantly higher than the cost of light water reactors. The
Superph�nix reactor in France cost $9.1 billion to construct; the
smaller Monju reactor in Japan cost $5.9 billion.
To achieve GNEP's goal to reduce the volume of waste that
must be stored in a geologic repository, the U.S. would need
approximately one fast reactor to every three light water reactors.
This would cost an additional $80 to $100 billion for 20 to 25 fast
reactors to transmute the waste from the current 103 operating
reactors. Given the $12 billion in subsidies and tax breaks, along
with other incentives, that it has taken to convince U.S. utilities to
build new reactors (and not a single utility has fully committed at
this point), these fast reactors would require massive taxpayer
subsidies.
I would like to thank the House of Representatives for cutting
$130 million for GNEP in the FY2007 Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act (H.R. 5427). Existing
technology and our current level of knowledge do not provide
direct paths to nuclear recycling. For the foreseeable future, GNEP
is not a program that will reduce amounts of high-level nuclear
waste. Rather than being a part of the nuclear waste disposal
solution, GNEP will be a costly new problem for the future.
Private Fuel Storage
Without a permanent repository available in the near-term,
there has been interest in away-from-reactor dry cask interim
storage of spent fuel. The only site to be licensed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for away-from-reactor interim storage is
Private Fuel Storage (PFS) located on the Reservation land of the
Skull Valley Band of Goshutes in Utah, which now appears
unlikely to open. On September 7, 2006, the Bureau of Land
Management denied a right-of-way for a rail line to the site and a
proposal to transport the waste with heavy-haul trucks. More than
4,500 letters, primarily from people from Utah opposed to the
facility, were sent to the BLM.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs also denied approval of the PFS
lease of the tribal land, listing among other concerns:
<bullet> inadequate law enforcement support for the site,
<bullet> the lack of a transportation alternative,
<bullet> uncertainty about the availability of a permanent
repository, and
<bullet> the lack of an analysis on the environmental impacts of a
terrorist attack.
In a recent federal court decision, San Luis Obispo Mothers for
Peace, et al. v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court rejected the
NRC's claim that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
does not require consideration of the environmental effects of
potential terrorist attacks. The four grounds that the NRC used to
justify its claim were based on factors it used in rejecting the State
of Utah's contention that the environmental impacts of terrorism
should be analysed in the PFS EIS. The NRC had ruled that (1)
the possibility of a terrorist attack is far too removed from the
natural or expected consequences of agency action; (2) because the
risk of a terrorist attack cannot be determined, the analysis is likely
to be meaningless; (3) NEPA does not require a "worst-case"
analysis; and (4) NEPA's public process is not an appropriate
forum for sensitive security issues. The Ninth Circuit Court
concluded:
In sum, none of the four factors upon which the NRC relies to
eschew consideration of the environmental effects of a terrorist
attack satisfies the standard of reasonableness.
In its decision on the PFS lease, the BIA reviewed the Ninth
Circuit Court decision and concluded that "the court's sweeping
rejection of the same factors NRC relied on in rejecting the State of
Utah's contention in the PFS licensing proceedings leaves us
distinctly unsatisfied at best that the effects of a terrorist-initiated
event have been given adequate consideration."
Interim storage proposals in the FY2007 Energy and Water
Appropriations Bills
According to a 2006 study on spent nuclear fuel storage by the
National Research Council, "dry casks were designed to ensure
safe storage of spent fuel, not to resist terrorist attacks." The
NRC has not analyzed the environmental impacts of a terrorist
attack for any of the 42 sites for which it has granted dry cask
storage licenses. The current proposals in the Senate and House
FY2007 Energy and Water Appropriations bills also fail to address
the security threats posed by dry cask storage.
The Senate version of the FY2007 Energy and Water
Appropriations bill (H.R. 5427) contains an authorizing provision
that requires states with nuclear reactors to designate at least one
site in that state for 25-year interim waste storage, called a
Consolidation and Preparation (CAP) facility. The House FY2007
Energy and Water Appropriations bill (H.R. 5427) requires DOE
to "conduct a voluntary, competitive process to select one or more
interim storage sites" by either re-issuing Request for Expressions
of Interest for GNEP (interim storage at the "integrated recycling
facilities") or issuing a new Request for Proposals for interim
storage alone.
There are numerous reasons why away-from-reactor storage is
not even a temporary waste solution. First, creating away-from-
reactor surface storage sites would not meaningfully reduce the
number of locations where high-level radioactive waste is stored,
as long as most commercial nuclear power plants remain in
operation for decades to come. Nuclear waste generated at nuclear
power plants must be stored on site for at least five years to
thermally cool and radioactively decay before it can be transported
off site. Thus, any operating reactor will inevitably have at least
five years' worth of irradiated nuclear fuel - approximately 100
tons - stored on site.
Second, rather than reduce risks, centralized interim storage
would increase transport risks to public health, safety, and security.
Centralized interim storage would double the number of waste
shipments required, and greatly increase the number of shipment
miles to be driven, because the waste would eventually need to be
transported from the interim site to a permanent site. According to
a February 2006 National Academy of Sciences study on the
transport of nuclear waste, "an independent examination of the
security of spent fuel and high-level waste" needs to be performed
"prior to the commencement of large-quantity shipments."
[Emphasis added] The NAS report also concluded that "extreme
accident conditions involving very-long-duration fires could
compromise" waste shipping containers and advised that the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) do additional analyses of
such accident scenarios.
Third, interim storage at DOE sites would be contrary to legal
agreements made with States and tribes. DOE has committed to
cleaning up these sites, not adding more pollution to them. In
addition, DOE sites are not licensed by the NRC for commercial
nuclear waste storage. The only exception is at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, which has a storage license limited to
nuclear fuel debris from the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor
accident.
Fourth, given the extreme difficulty faced in opening this
country's first permanent repository, it is unlikely that additional or
alternative repository space will be available soon. Thus, "interim"
storage sites would become long-term "overflow parking" for
high-level radioactive wastes with nowhere else to go. In its
decision to reject the lease for PFS, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
concluded that the "uncertainty concerning when the SNF [Spent
Nuclear Fuel] might leave trust land, combined with the [Interior]
Secretary's practical inability to remove or compel its removal
once deposited on the reservation, counsel disapproval of the
proposed lease."
Tucked into a large appropriations bill, the Senate's CAP
provision would result in a sweeping change to the country's
nuclear waste policy without hearings or public debate. It also
provides an unreasonably short timeline: only 9 months to choose
sites, potentially in all 31 states with nuclear power reactors, and a
total of only 3� years for siting and licensing of those sites. The
bill also limits the scope of NEPA review to the 25-year license
period, which is contrary to 35 years of NEPA practice and does
not represent the actual long-term effects that could occur.
The bill also codifies the NRC's Waste Confidence Rule by
concluding that a permanent disposal for the waste would be
available "in a timely manner." As described in the section on the
Administration's proposed Yucca legislation, codifying Waste
Confidence would not change the reality that we do not have a
viable, permanent solution for nuclear waste. In its decision on
PFS, the BIA found that "The Commission's 1999 Waste
Confidence Decision restated the 1990 prediction that a permanent
facility might be available sometime within the first quarter of the
21st Century, but cited no compelling additional support for that
contention."
Thus far, at least four Governors, the Coalition of Northeastern
Governors, and 10 Attorneys General have sent letters in
opposition to the Senate provision. The National Conference of
State Legislators, the National Association of Counties, the
National League of Cities, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors
have also urged that the Senate CAP provision be removed from
the final bill.
Moving commercial irradiated nuclear fuel to indefinite
"interim" surface storage at DOE or other sites would simply
create the illusion of a waste solution. Instead, the safety and
security of waste storage at reactor sites across the U.S. should be
improved. Away-from-reactor storage of spent fuel, as proposed in
both the House and Senate versions of the FY2007 Energy and
Water Appropriations bill, should be rejected.
So what should be done to protect the public from the threats
posed by the current vulnerable storage of commercial spent fuel?
Public interest groups from around the country have developed
Principles for Safeguarding Nuclear Waste at Reactors, which are
being released for the first time today. The Spent Nuclear Fuel On-
Site Storage Security Act of 2005, introduced in both the House
(H.R. 4538) and Senate (S. 2099) by the Nevada and Utah
delegations, is a good basis for incorporating these principles into
law.
Principles for Safeguarding Nuclear Waste at Reactors
The following principles are based on the urgent need to
protect the public from the threats posed by the current vulnerable
storage of commercial irradiated fuel. The United States does not
have a near-term solution for the permanent storage of high-level
nuclear waste. The proposed Yucca Mountain site is unsafe for
geologic storage of nuclear waste and the program remains mired
in bad science, mismanagement, and yet another design overhaul.
Even if licensed, Yucca Mountain could not legally contain all of
the waste produced by existing reactors. Under the U.S.
Department of Energy's unrealistically optimistic scenario, Yucca
Mountain is not predicted to begin receiving waste until at least
2017 and transporting waste to the site would take more than 30
years. Meanwhile, irradiated fuel at reactor sites remains
vulnerable to accidents and attacks.
The undersigned organizations' support for improving the
protection of radioactive waste stored at reactor sites is a matter of
security and is in no way an indication that we support nuclear
power and the generation of more nuclear waste.
<bullet> Require a low-density, open-frame layout for fuel pools:
Fuel pools were originally designed for temporary storage
of a limited number of irradiated fuel assemblies in a low
density, open frame configuration. As the amount of waste
generated has increased beyond the designed capacity, the
pools have been reorganized so that the concentration of
fuel in the pools is nearly the same as that in operating
reactor cores. If water is lost from a densely packed pool as
the result of an attack or an accident, cooling by ambient air
would likely be insufficient to prevent a fire, resulting in
the release of large quantities of radioactivity to the
environment. A low-density, open-frame arrangement
within fuel pools could allow enough air circulation to keep
the fuel from catching fire. In order to achieve and maintain
this arrangement within the pools, irradiated fuel must be
transferred from the pools to dry storage within five years
of being discharged from the reactor.
<bullet> Establish hardened on-site storage (HOSS): Irradiated
fuel must be stored as safely as possible as close to the site
of generation as possible. Waste moved from fuel pools
must be safeguarded in hardened, on-site storage (HOSS)
facilities. Transporting waste to
interim away-from-reactor storage should not be done
unless the reactor site is unsuitable for a HOSS facility and
the move increases the safety and security of the waste.
HOSS facilities must not be regarded as a permanent waste
solution, and thus should not be constructed deep
underground. The waste must be retrievable, and real-time
radiation and heat monitoring at the HOSS facility must be
implemented for early detection of radiation releases and
overheating. The overall objective of HOSS should be that
the amount of releases projected in even severe attacks
should be low enough that the storage system would be
unattractive as a terrorist target. Design criteria that would
correspond to the overall objective must include:
<bullet> Resistance to severe attacks, such as a direct hit by
high-explosive or deeply penetrating weapons and
munitions or a direct hit by a large aircraft loaded with
fuel or a small aircraft loaded with fuel and/or
explosives, without major releases.
<bullet> Placement of individual canisters that makes
detection difficult from outside the site boundary.
<bullet> Protect fuel pools: Irradiated fuel must be kept in pools for
several years before it can be stored in a dry facility. The
pools must be protected to withstand an attack by air, land,
or water from a force at least equal in size and coordination
to the 9/11 attacks. The security improvements must be
approved by a panel of experts independent of the nuclear
industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
<bullet> Require periodic review of HOSS facilities and fuel
pools: An annual report consisting of the review of each
HOSS facility and fuel pool should be prepared with
meaningful participation from public stakeholders,
regulators, and utility managers at each site. The report
must be made publicly available and may include
recommendations for actions to be taken.
<bullet> Dedicate funding to local and state governments to
independently monitor the sites: Funding for monitoring
the HOSS facilities at each site must be provided to
affected local and state governments. The affected public
must have the right to fully participate.
<bullet> Prohibit reprocessing: The reprocessing of irradiated fuel
has not solved the nuclear waste problem in any country,
and actually exacerbates it by creating numerous additional
waste streams that must be managed. In addition to being
expensive and polluting, reprocessing also increases nuclear
weapons proliferation threats.
MR. HALL. All right. We thank you for that.
We will start, Mr. Wise, to ask you a question. I understand
that the Southern Company has indicated their interest in building
new nuclear plants in Georgia, and as Chairman of the Georgia
Public Service Commission, what do you think needs to happen
with regard to the spent fuel issue in order for the commission to
support any new nuclear construction?
MR. WISE. Well, there are two things, Mr. Chairman. I thank
you for the question. And we have been supportive of the early
plans for the company to start the process. In fact, we have
authorized some accounting order where the company can input
their expenses, and if in fact prudently incurred will be able to
recover them from the rate payer. But then to the issue of storage,
we think it is vital and Georgians have paid close to $1 billion with
paying into the Fund and the value of the Fund and the life of with
the expectation that we would have a national fuel repository with
the idea in mind that it was Yucca Mountain. And so we think it is
vital that Yucca Mountain is opened and that Georgians get what
they paid for.
MR. HALL. I thank you. Mr. Earley, among the additional
actions that you urged Congress to take is incorporation of features
in the repository development plan to maintain flexibility for the
future generations. Why don't you just expound on that a little
why you think that is important.
MR. EARLEY. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. We believe that
technology will change substantially over time. If we look at the
time frame between the passage of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954
and today, technology has changed tremendously, and we expect to
see tremendous changes in the future. And we should have a
repository that has the flexibility to take advantage of those
technology changes to either improve the technology for storage or
when we wake up at some point and say there is huge value in this
fuel to pull it out and reprocess it, we need to have the flexibility to
do that.
MR. HALL. I thank you. I recognize Mr. Boucher.
MR. BOUCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank
the witnesses also for their testimony here. Mr. Wise, let me just
confirm your view that if we are to have interim storage at one or
more facilities across the United States that the funding for that
should not derive from the Nuclear Waste Fund, but should derive
from other appropriations particularly devoted toward that purpose.
Is that your view?
MR. WISE. Yes, sir, that is exactly correct.
MR. BOUCHER. If we are to have interim storage, what role do
you see the governors of the various States playing in helping to
select sites or to comment on proposals that are made with regard
to where the sites should be?
MR. WISE. Well, one of the things that we would expect was
that the governors would play an active role in it. I am not sure
that they would be looking to help you select a site, but might in
fact be opposed to additional interim sites. Some would say that
because of the failure to open the national repository that we paid
for is that we have a form of interim storage in our State today at
our nuclear sites.
MR. BOUCHER. We do indeed. Let me get you to react to Mr.
Earley's recommendation that if we are to have interim storage the
number of sites be few, that Yucca Mountain be one, and that
perhaps the sites be chosen through an incentive-based process
with the idea being that interim storage would occur at the same
places where reprocessing might occur under the global
reprocessing initiative. That is not the exact term. But that there
be incentives put forward based upon the location of these
reprocessing sites in conjunction with interim storage. Do you
think that recommendation has value, and what would NARUC's
view of that be?
MR. WISE. Yes, sir. And, in fact, NARUC does take the
position that it should be--if there are interim sites Yucca should be
one of them, that there should be very few, and I don't believe that
we have spoken as a group to the incentive based concept that you
talked about on reprocessing.
MR. BOUCHER. What is your personal opinion?
MR. WISE. Personally, I am a big believer in incentive-based
regulation and compensation to encourage the right thing to
happen.
MR. BOUCHER. Mr. Earley, let me ask a couple of questions to
you. You have stated in your testimony that you would favor
offsetting collections legislation. This would be a means to assure
the integrity for the Nuclear Waste Fund, future contributions into
the Fund to assure that those monies are dedicated to the purpose
for which they are intended. That is the waste storage program.
What is your view with respect, and what is NEI's view, with
respect to the $19 billion that is the corpus of the Fund today based
upon rate payer contributions that have been made since the Fund's
inception? Should we take steps to protect that also?
MR. EARLEY. Absolutely, and that has been our position that
we should take steps to protect that and make sure that it goes for
its intended purpose, which was for the development of a waste
storage facility. My comments reflected the current bill that has
been proposed. We certainly support that as a first step, but we
also would support initiatives to make sure that we protect that
corpus.
MR. BOUCHER. Should we while we are considering the
Administration's bill amend it to have the protection for the $19
billion to make sure that that money goes to its intended purpose?
MR. EARLEY. We certainly would support that if we thought
that that was something that was feasible to be able to do.
MR. BOUCHER. Would you like to recommend some language
to us that might help achieve that?
MR. EARLEY. We certainly will be prepared to do that.
MR. BOUCHER. Thank you, Mr. Earley. Let me ask you also
the question about interim storage. I noted your support for the
idea of interim storage, and with respect to funding for interim
storage, do you believe that the funding should derive from the
Nuclear Waste Fund or should we require special appropriations in
order to finance that program?
MR. EARLEY. We would support using the Nuclear Waste
Fund for interim storage on this very narrowly focused, and we
think incremental approach that supports a move towards Yucca
Mountain. As I said, we support a repository at or certainly near
Yucca Mountain which would be an obvious first step to take fuel
there on an interim basis until the facility is ready to take the fuel.
And then the other piece, it would be no more than two or three
sites that would be obvious candidates for reprocessing
technologies where you are going to have to have interim storage
anyway before you reprocess that they would be candidates. So if
we are talking about two or three sites, and I agree with Ms.
Sproat's estimates that the cost of a facility, particularly at a
facility that already will have security and other infrastructure is
not large. You could pay for it with a couple days accrued interest
on the corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund. But we don't support
the broad proposals that would have 30 or more facilities that
really would have a potential for depleting the waste fund.
MR. BOUCHER. So I gather from those comments, you are not
particularly concerned about funding interim storage from the
Nuclear Waste Fund detracting from the larger Yucca Mountain
program for permanence.
MR. EARLEY. With the narrowly focused program that we
would suggest, no, we wouldn't be concerned.
MR. BOUCHER. Thank you, Mr. Earley. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
MR. HALL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Otter for 5 minutes.
MR. OTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Earley, I noticed
in your testimony that the industry urges Congress to consider this
interim storage. Would the State of Michigan be willing to
entertain a site for one of these interim storages?
MR. EARLEY. Well, as Mr. Wise said, Michigan already has
interim storage. We have four locations, three operating reactor
sites, and one decommissioned reactor site that has interim storage.
I can't speak for the State of Michigan but I certainly would be
supportive, but I don't think it fits in with our proposal. There are
no facilities in Michigan that are obvious candidates for
reprocessing. We don't have a national lab. We don't have a DOE
facility. So consistent with our proposal, Michigan would not be
an obvious candidate but if we had a national lab, if we had an
existing DOE nuclear fuel facility then I would say, yes, we ought
to be considering that.
MR. OTTER. So then your group would be in favor of
reprocessing enrichment?
MR. EARLEY. Yes, and we have gone on record as favoring
reprocessing as a long-term option, but again I want to make it
clear not as a replacement for Yucca Mountain but as a smart long-
term policy in addition to Yucca Mountain.
MR. OTTER. In your response to me you just indicated that you
already have several interim storages. How long are those good
for?
MR. EARLEY. Well, I am not sure of the exact dates. My own
firm nuclear plant, we run out of spent fuel pool storage capacity in
the 2009-2010 time frame. We are currently in the design phase
for a dry cask storage facility. There are dry cask storage facilities
at other nuclear plants including the decommissioned Big Rock
Point plant. Those facilities can be easily expanded at the existing
facilities.
MR. OTTER. And have you requested a license then from--
MR. EARLEY. Not for our facility yet, but we will be doing that
fairly shortly. Given the history about two-thirds of existing
nuclear plants have dry cask storage. The NRC has gotten the
licensing process down so that they move that process along fairly
expeditiously.
MR. OTTER. Mr. Wise, the same question about Georgia.
MR. WISE. That is outside my jurisdiction on whether they
apply for licenses or the extent that they will reach capacity. I am
aware of the fact and the jurisdiction falls back to the NRC and
others, and so I am not aware of how much capacity they have left.
MR. OTTER. I see. Ms. Boyd, I noticed in your testimony that
your group did not represent at least any ideas for solving the
problem, providing a solution. What is the Public Citizen's
recommendation for a permanent solution?
MS. BOYD. What we are recommending is a solution for the
security concerns that we have right today. All of the proposals
that are on the table right now, Yucca Mountain reprocessing,
interim storage, are all 10, 20 years away. In terms of actually
filling Yucca Mountain would be 41 years away. So what we are
talking about today is the security concerns we have about the
waste sitting at the sites today. To answer your question
specifically, there is no good solution at this point for long-term
permanent storage of nuclear waste. We very well may need a
geological repository, and, in fact, personally I do think we need a
geological repository, but Yucca Mountain is not the site.
The Department of Energy has had to change the parameters so
many times to try to make the square peg fit into the round hole.
And it is very clear that we will be here in another 10 or 20 years
arguing about Yucca Mountain if we do not stop and pull out and
stop funding Yucca Mountain and look and do a real legitimate
scientific research project whereby we will look for another
solution.
MR. OTTER. But as long as we continue to produce power with
nuclear plants, we are going to continue to create the waste.
MS. BOYD. That is very true.
MR. OTTER. So what is the solution? We know what you
don't like. Can you give us an idea of what you would like?
MS. BOYD. I came with a positive proactive proposal for
dealing with the waste that we are creating today.
MR. OTTER. Look for another site.
MS. BOYD. Well, no, the positive proactive solution I came
with today is to deal with the security concerns of the waste sitting
at the sites that is going to remain at the sites for at least another
couple of decades if not much longer.
MR. OTTER. And is your analysis then of Yucca Mountain
already seen some security breaches or potential breaches?
MS. BOYD. Yucca Mountain is not licensed yet so we haven't-
-
MR. OTTER. If it were to be licensed under that which we now
know, have you analyzed it well enough to know that there are
going to be some security breaches?
MS. BOYD. That is immaterial to the question about whether or
not the waste stays--
MR. OTTER. Well, it is still my question. It may be immaterial
to the question but if you are going to suggest Yucca Mountain
isn't the answer and that we really should be focusing on security
then what security problems do you see with Yucca Mountain?
MS. BOYD. The question isn't the security question. The
question is that Yucca Mountain is an environmentally unsound
site so the question is not about the security concerns about a
geological repository. The concerns are about dealing with the
waste, the problem that we actually have on our hands today,
which is waste sitting at all 103 and more sites. We have to deal
with that problem today, and so that is what the proposal I am
coming with to talk to you about is.
MR. OTTER. Well, I guess I still don't quite understand
because it is not unusual for us as technology advances for us to
employ that technology in ongoing construction no matter what the
project is. And Yucca Mountain has been a long time coming and
a long time in process, and as our technology advances for the
storage of waste, for the handling of waste, it doesn't seem to me
to be inconsistent with our desire to be as environmentally safe as
possible, and as safe as possible from a national security
standpoint, to make those changes. And so I don't see that
necessarily as a suggestion that Yucca Mountain is unsafe simply
because we have been able to accommodate and update our plans
as the technology advances.
MS. BOYD. The reason that Yucca Mountain is unsafe is
because it is scientifically shown that it cannot hold the waste for
as long as it needs to hold. That is a separate question, and the
question of the waste that is at the very best case scenario as Mr.
Sproat said today is going to be sitting in vulnerable spent fuel
pools and in dry casks open to the air for at least, at least 11 years
from now.
MR. OTTER. Well, as we know--I guess my time is up. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. HALL. The Chair recognizes Dr. Burgess.
MR. BURGESS. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman from
Idaho.
MR. OTTER. Well, I guess the last question that I would have
of the Public Citizen's representative here is how does the Public
Citizens feel then about reprocessing?
MS. BOYD. As I said in my statement, we oppose reprocessing.
We should learn from past experience. International and U.S.
experience has shown us that reprocessing is polluting, expensive,
and a proliferation risk.
MR. OTTER. We do know, if I may, if the gentleman will yield
further, yet we do know that about 97 percent of those fuel rods
that come out of the reactors is still good fuel and with
reprocessing we would be able to reduce the amount of actually
good fuel that we are burying. And if we could reprocess down to
where we use maybe say 50 or 60 percent of the available fuel in a
fuel rod, we would never have to worry about finding another
Yucca Mountain because we wouldn't be burying all that good
fuel.
MS. BOYD. Actually about 3 percent of the spent fuel rod is
plutonium so that is what you would be taking out and reusing.
The fact is that we do not have the technology or the economics
right at this point that reprocessing makes sense, and we have seen
that in other countries and the examples that they have. Japan just
completed a reprocessing plant. It took them $20 billion and 15
years to build a plant that is about half the size of what we would
need in the United States to deal with just our annual output of
waste.
MR. OTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Burgess.
MR. HALL. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Burgess.
MR. BURGESS. I thank the Chairman. Mr. Earley, if we could,
we were talking about reprocessing. Does it make any sense to
stall the development of Yucca Mountain in order to allow time for
reprocessing?
MR. EARLEY. Absolutely not. We should move ahead with the
Yucca Mountain as fast as we can, but as a country we ought to
continue to develop reprocessing technologies because the spent
fuel has significant value as fuel in the future. And as fossil and
other resources become less and less available to us, we can't
afford to waste that kind of fuel value.
MR. BURGESS. I am from Texas, and we got a lot of people
moving to Texas. Whether we like it or not, they are going to
come and they are going to need roads and they are going to need
hospitals, and they are going to need electricity to run their air
conditioners in the summer time in a big way. So we have had
proposals from well-thinking people who say they are going to
build 16 new coal plants, and that has got people upset because
what about the carbon dioxide, what about the global warming.
We have had lots of hearings on that here. And not to belabor that
point, we are going to have increasing resistance to producing
electricity that results in increased carbon in the environment.
Texas has a lot of wind and indeed we are working to capture
that but still under the best projections it is still single digit
percentages that we are going to be able to develop as far as wind
energy to provide air conditioning for all of those Yankees that are
moving to Texas over the next 50 years. So to what extent has the
development of new nuclear plants--does it depend upon solving
the spent fuel issue? It is really a critical issue where I live. We
got three companies now that are asking for licensing for new
plants. Are they going to be able to get those licenses while we
develop the or deal with the spent fuel issue?
MR. EARLEY. Progress on spent fuel is absolutely vital for
continued progress towards new nuclear plants. As I said before,
as I speak with my colleagues and from my own experience that
we have been willing to move forward and invest because we
through progress was being made. The work that this committee
did last year on the Energy Policy Act was a tremendous step
forward removing some of the barriers to new nuclear plants, but
nuclear waste continues to be that one barrier that we need to deal
with. And it doesn't have to be dealt with tomorrow, but it has to
be confidence that as a policy this country is going to move
forward and deal with this waste problem.
That is why passage of this bill in either this form or the
expanded form that we have recommended would continue to give
leaders in the utility industry confidence that the Government is
working through these issues and therefore we ought to be
investing our customers' money in more nuclear plants. But you
are absolutely right. As a company, 70 percent of our generation is
coal, about 10 percent of our generation is nuclear, and then we
have hydro and natural gas generation. But we have a team
working on looking at new nuclear technology because we can't
put all our eggs in the coal basket. This country needs a diversified
mix of energy sources and coal is going to be a part of it, but
nuclear ought to be a big part of it going forward.
MR. BURGESS. Mr. Wise, if I could just ask you under what
circumstances would it be appropriate for the Nuclear Waste Fund
to be used to fund interim storage activities?
MR. WISE. Okay. We firmly disagree with using the Fund for
interim storage.
MR. BURGESS. What is happening in other countries as far as
interim storage?
MR. WISE. Again, you are out of my league. I am sorry.
MR. BURGESS. Mr. Earley, do you have any thoughts on that?
MR. EARLEY. It is a mix, but of course there is reprocessing in
Europe and Japan. Of course, you have to have interim storage
before you put it through the reprocessing so it doesn't seem to be
the issue that it is here. People have recognized that nuclear waste
has to be dealt with.
MR. BURGESS. I was with the Chairman on a trip to Sweden
not too long ago and their interim storage is measured in centuries
so they have apparently dealt with it in a different manner. They
kicked the can down the field significantly. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I will yield back.
MR. HALL. Thank you, Doctor. I think that takes care of this
very capable panel. We will ask you to accept our thanks for your
preparation and for your participation here, and appreciate your
answers and your input. You are doing a lot of service to your
country on a very, very important issue. I might ask you if they
have Public Citizen over in Europe. Maybe that is the reason they
are getting along so easy.
[Recess]
MR. BURGESS. [Presiding] With a change in panel and change
in chair, we will call the hearing back to order and recognize the
Honorable Butch Otter.
STATEMENTS OF HONORABLE C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF IDAHO; AND HONORABLE ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
MR. OTTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for holding this important hearing today, and thank you also,
Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to testify. The committee is
considering H.R. 4377, legislation to extend the time required for
construction of the Arrowrock Hydroelectric Project in Idaho. You
are going to hear opposition to this legislation when the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission testified on my bill because of the
length of time since the original license was issued. I am going to
take the time of this committee to help them understand the need
for this legislation and why this project should receive an
extension.
Let me start with a little background on the project. It
originally was licensed in 1989. The licensees are small, not for-
profit, Idaho and Oregon irrigation districts. Revenues from the
project were to be used to offset operational costs for thousands of
water users. For a variety of reasons construction did not begin on
the project within the original 6-year deadline period, so the
irrigation districts received a legislative extension. After that
extension, bull trout were then listed as a threatened species under
the Endangered Species Act. The project was unable to meet the
March 20, 2005, deadline for the start of construction because the
Fish and Wildlife Service would not begin the consultation on the
project until after it completed consultation on all the Bureau of
Reclamation projects in the Upper Snake River Basin. That Upper
Snake consultation was a direct outgrowth of the requirements of
the Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004.
The Fish and Wildlife Service advised FERC in 2005 and 2006
that informal consultation with the licensees was complete, and
that the Service had received the necessary information from the
districts to complete consultation in a short period of time. The
Fish and Game and Wildlife Service then requested that FERC
initiate formal consultation. However, FERC did not approve or
respond. The irrigation districts finally had everything in place
and were on schedule to start construction last December, but the
license once again had expired. All they needed was a little more
time from FERC.
The Arrowrock Hydroelectric Project will be built at the
existing dam and will use existing flows from the dam. The
project has received certification of compliance with State water
quality standards and an Idaho water rights permit. The project has
been modified to reduce the impacts. Rather than tunneling
through the Arrowrock Dam, it will use the Bureau of
Reclamation's new valves, there will be a smaller powerhouse
footprint, and 10 miles of transmission lines have since been
eliminated. The irrigation districts have finalized a power sales
agreement with public utilities district to take all the power from
the plant. They have engaged an engineer of national reputation to
design and build the project. Lastly, they have financing lined up
and they are ready to go.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 contains several provisions that
encourage development of projects which meet both the
requirements of being a hydropower project built at an existing
dam and a hydropower project that is a conduit. In Idaho, this is
exactly what we are trying to do with the Arrowrock Hydroelectric
Project. This project has been given an extension in the past and
another is needed because of the circumstances out of the
licensees' control. Without this amendment, the irrigation districts
would have to completely start the FERC licensing process over
again. That would be a waste of resources by the agencies
involved as well as the irrigation districts because all of the
required collaboration and consultation is complete and the project
is now ready to move forward.
Mr. Chairman, I have supporting documentation that I have
made available to the committee and the committee staff to make
part of this permanent record. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. C.L. "Butch" Otter follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. C. L. "BUTCH" OTTER, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IDAHO
Thank you for holding this important hearing today Mr.
Chairman, and allowing me to testify.
The Committee is considering H.R. 4377, legislation to extend
the time required for construction of the Arrowrock Hydroelectric
Project in Idaho. You are going to hear opposition to this
legislation when the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
testifies on my bill because of the length of time since the original
license was issued. I am going to take this time to help the
committee understand the need for this legislation and why this
project should receive an extension.
Let me start with a little background on the project. It
originally was licensed in 1989. The licensees are small, not for-
profit, Idaho and Oregon irrigation districts. Revenues from the
project were to be used to offset operational costs for thousands of
water users. For a variety of reasons construction did not begin on
the project within the original six-year deadline, so the irrigation
districts received a legislative extension.
After that extension, bull trout were listed as a threatened
species under the Endangered Species Act. The project was unable
to meet the new March 20, 2005, deadline for the start of
construction because the Fish and Wildlife Service would not
begin consultation on the project until after it completed
consultation on all the Bureau of Reclamation projects in the
Upper Snake River Basin. That Upper Snake consultation was a
direct outgrowth of the requirements of the Snake River Water
Rights Act of 2004.
The Fish and Wildlife Service advised FERC in 2005 and 2006
that informal consultation with the licensees was complete, and
that the Service had received the necessary information from the
districts to complete consultation in a short time period. The Fish
and Wildlife Service then requested that FERC initiate formal
consultation. However, FERC did not respond.
The irrigation districts finally had everything in place and were
on schedule to start construction last December, but the license
once again expired. All they needed was a little more time from
FERC.
The Arrowrock Hydroelectric Project will be built at the
existing dam and will use existing flows from the dam. The
project has received certification of compliance with state water
quality standards and an Idaho water rights permit.
The project has been modified to reduce the impacts. Rather
than tunneling through Arrowrock Dam, it will use the Bureau of
Reclamation's new valves; there will be a smaller powerhouse
footprint; and 10 miles of transmission lines have been eliminated.
The irrigation districts have finalized a power sales agreement
with the Clatskanie PUD to take all the power from the plant. They
have engaged an engineer of national reputation to design and
build the project. Lastly, they have financing lined up and ready to
go.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 contains several provisions that
encourage development of projects which meet both the
requirements of being a hydropower project built at an existing
dam and a hydropower project that is a conduit. In Idaho, this is
exactly what we are trying to do with the Arrowrock Hydroelectric
Project.
This project has been given an extension in the past and
another is needed because of circumstances out of the licensees'
control. Without this amendment, the irrigation districts would
have to completely start the FERC licensing process over. That
would be a waste of resources by the agencies involved as well as
the irrigation districts because all of the required collaboration and
consultation is complete and the project is ready to move forward.
Mr. Chairman, I have supporting documentation that I would
like to ask unanimous consent to have entered into the record to
better detail the facts I have outlined.
Thank you again Mr. Chairman and I hope that the committee
will look favorably on this small but important piece of legislation.
MR. BURGESS. Without objection, so ordered. It will be made
part of the record.
[The information follows:]
<GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
MR. MOLLOHAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Ranking
Member, Mr. Boucher. Mr. Chairman, as you aware, I am seeking
to extend the time required for the commencement of construction
of a 100 percent privately financed hydroelectric project, an
extension to December 31, 2007. Mr. Chairman, this project is
located in Grafton, West Virginia. The Tygart Dam, which was
constructed in the 1930s for flood control on the Monongahela
Basin, would incorporate this project. The dam was built with
future hydroelectric capabilities in mind, requiring no major
infrastructure changes to open the water flow tunnel for
hydroelectric power.
During the time in which the City of Grafton's Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's license was valid, the contractor's
project economies were very tight and the contractor was unable to
secure utility cooperation to make the project viable. Those
dynamics have now changed and the contractor, National
Renewable Resources, is confident that more favorable market
conditions combined with acceptable interest rates makes the
project's economics work. The contractor is already negotiating
buyers for the electricity that would be produced at the proposed
facility.
This year, the contractor will have repaid the senior debt on
another very successful hydroelectric project in Pennsylvania, thus
freeing up additional capital to finance the Tygart Dam project.
The contractor's plan is to finance the Tygart project with
approximately 50 percent of its own capital and 50 percent with
long term financing. Design engineering for the project is
advanced stages, and the contractor has already bid out the
equipment package and construction of the project would begin
within 10 to 20 months of reinstatement of the FERC license. The
contractor believes the facility could be fully operational as early
as 2008.
A hydroelectric facility in Grafton would provide very real
near and long term economic boosts to the city. Local materials,
suppliers, and services would be utilized during the $20 million
construction phase. Approximately 200 construction workers
would be employed, totaling more than $1 million in monthly
payroll outlays during the construction period. Once completed,
the new hydroelectric plant would generate about $300,000 in
annual royalty revenues for the City of Grafton, or roughly $13.5
million over the 45-year anticipated project life. The City of
Grafton could expect to see royalty revenues in late 2008 or early
2009, and could be used at the discretion of city leaders.
The Congressional Budget Office scored S. 2028, the Senate
companion to H.R. 4417, and found that implementing it would
have a zero negative net effect on the Federal budget. Mr.
Chairman, the environmental standards have not changed since the
initial FERC approval was granted to the City of Grafton in the
1980s, and any re-approval by FERC will take vast amounts of
time and money at no benefit or little benefit. Generating
electricity by the force of falling water is obviously a proven
method, and one that holds as much validity now as it did centuries
ago. This project would be efficient to build, to operate, harms
neither the water itself nor the quality of the environment, and it
contributes to reducing the reliance on foreign energy, and adds to
another grand gesture for the public good. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Boucher, for allowing me to appear
here today.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Alan B. Mollohan follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WEST
VIRGINIA
As you are aware, I am seeking to extent the time required for
the commencement of construction for a 100% privately financed
hydroelectric project until December 31, 2007 in Grafton, West
Virginia. The Tygart Dam was constructed in the 1930's for flood
control on the Monongahela River Basin. The Dam was built with
future hydroelectric capabilities, requiring no major infrastructure
changes to open the water flow tunnel for hydroelectric power, and
simplifying its adaptive use.
During the time period in which the City of Grafton's Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) license was valid, the
Contractor's project economics were very tight and the Contractor
was unable to secure utility cooperation to make the project viable.
Those dynamics have now changed and the Contractor,
National Renewable Resources (NRR), is confident that the more
robust energy market that exists today, combined with acceptable
interest rates, makes the project economics work. The Contractor
is already negotiating buyers for the electricity that would be
produced at the proposed facility. This year, the Contractor will
have repaid the senior debt on another very successful
hydroelectric project in Pennsylvania, thus freeing up additional
capital to finance the Tygart Dam project. The Contractor's plan is
to finance the Tygart project with approximately 50 percent of its
own capital and 50 percent with long tem financing.
Design engineering for the project is already in advanced
stages, and the Contractor has already bid out the equipment
package and completed a number of civil drawings. Construction
of the project would begin within 10-20 months of reinstatement of
the FERC license and, the Contractor believes the facility could
fully operational as early as 2008.
A hydroelectric facility in Grafton would provide very real
near and long term economic boosts to the city. Local materials,
suppliers and services would be utilized during the $20 million
construction phase. Approximately 200 construction workers will
be employed, totaling more than $1 million in monthly payroll
outlays during the construction period.
Once completed, the new hydroelectric plant would generate
about $300,000 in annual royalty revenues for the City of Grafton,
or roughly $13.5 million over the 45-year anticipated project life.
The City of Grafton could expect to see royalty revenues in late
2008 or early 2009, and could be used at the discretion of the City
leaders.
The Congressional Budget Office scored S. 2028, the Senate
companion to HR 4417, and found that implementing it will have
ZERO NEGATIVE NET EFFECT on the federal budget.
The environmental standards have not changed since the initial
FERC approval was granted to the City of Grafton in the 1980's,
and any re-approval by FERC will take vast amounts of time and
money at little or no benefit.
Generating electricity by the force of falling water is a proven
method, and one that holds as much validity now as it did centuries
ago. This project would be efficient to build and operate; harms
neither the water itself nor the quality of the environment;
contributes to reducing the reliance on foreign energy; and adds
another grand gesture for the public good.
<GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
MR. BURGESS. Thank you both. The third panel then is
excused and we will--
MR. BOUCHER. Mr. Chairman, let me just briefly ask one
question. First, let me thank our colleagues for being here today.
Alan, all you are asking for is an extension to the end of next year
on the license, is that right?
MR. MOLLOHAN. That is correct.
MR. BOUCHER. And, Mr. Otter, the same?
MR. OTTER. Mine is very much similar, Mr. Boucher. For the
construction period is what we are asking for, and I think as I have
pretty well outlined in giving you the background it was
circumstances far beyond our control when the bull trout was
licensed--or was designated an endangered species, then that
stopped everything. And it stopped it during our permit period
during the period in which we were allowed to begin the
construction, the design and the construction of the hydroelectric
project.
MR. BOUCHER. Okay. All right. Thank you.
MR. MOLLOHAN. If I might add, this is a project that has not
been viable because of market conditions and obviously the market
conditions have changed, and with the price of fossil energy now
this project does become viable, and what they are doing is lining
up customers which are not finding a problem in lining up. It is
just an unfortunate situation that--well, in some ways for this
project it is an unfortunate situation in that the market wasn't more
favorable earlier, but it is now, and they are ready to go.
MR. BOUCHER. Both of you make your case very well. Thank
you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. BURGESS. I think with that we will see our fourth panel.
Do we have Mr. Robinson? Mr. Robinson, we welcome you to the
committee and look forward to your testimony. You are
recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF J. MARK ROBINSON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FEDERAL
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
MR. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman
Boucher. My name is Mark Robinson. I am the Director of Office
of Energy Projects. We are responsible for the authorization,
development of the record for the authorization of LNG terminals,
natural gas pipelines, natural gas storage, and more significantly
here today for the licensing, administration, and dam safety of
about 1,600 hydroelectric projects across the country. I am here to
make comments on five bills that generally would extend the time
frame for the start of construction relative to Section 13 of the
Federal Power Act.
Section 13 requires that projects start construction within 2
years of the license issuance date or if granted by the Commission
not to exceed one 2-year extension so there is a 4-year period
under law that the Commission can act to allow the start of
construction. The Congress, however, through the years on
different projects has extended that time period and the
Commission has not objected when that time frame does not
extend beyond 10 years from the time the project was licensed
until the start of construction actually commences. There are
generally two policy reasons for that. The first is that when the
Commission does take an action to license a project, it has
concluded that it is in the public interest to generate power from
that site. Ten years has generally been recognized as a reasonable
period to allow an applicant or at this point a licensee for that
project to take the actions necessary to get the financing, to get the
final designs, to start construction of that project that the
Commission has found to be in the public interest. Where that has
not occurred, the general policy consideration is that if they cannot
do it in 10 years, let us give someone else the opportunity to do so,
since it has been found to be in the public interest.
The second policy consideration is the record that is used for
the Commission to take those actions. After 10 years there is a
growing probability that the record that was developed to authorize
that project in fact may not still stand for determinations on the
size of the project, the economics of the project, the environmental
consequences associated with the project. And for those two
reasons the Commission historically, our chairmen, have opposed
extensions of time that go beyond 10 years. Having said that, I
would like to very quickly run through the five bills and give you
my opinion on those five bills, which is fairly predictable at this
point.
H.R. 4417 for the Tygart Dam project would extend the start of
the construction period to 12/31/2007 for a project that was
licensed in 1989. That would be a total of 18 years post licensing
and therefore I would oppose that bill. H.R. 4377 for the
Arrowrock Project in Idaho would extend the start of construction
for a 3-year period post the implementation of that bill, which date
we cannot determine, but to date there has been 16 years past since
the licensing of that project, and therefore I would oppose that bill.
H.R. 971 would extend the start of the construction period for
three projects, the Hale Project in Connecticut, where it would
authorize the start of construction in 2007 plus two additional 2-
year periods. That project was licensed in 1997. If you take that
provision and extend it out that would be a 14-year period post
licensing and therefore I would oppose that part of that bill. H.R.
971 also goes to the upper and lower Collinsville Projects also in
Connecticut. It similarly would extend the start of construction to
2007 plus two 2-year periods. Both of those would be
approximately 10 years out and therefore I do not oppose those
provisions of that bill.
S.176, Reynolds Creek in Alaska, would extend the start of
construction for three 2-year periods. That would start from the 4-
year term of the original license for a grand total of 10 years and
therefore I would not oppose that bill. And S. 244 for the Swift
Creek Project in Wyoming would similarly extend the start of
construction for three 2-year periods post the 4-year Federal Power
Act provision for a total of 10 years. Therefore, I would not
oppose, but I would mention here this particular bill goes to the re-
licensing of the project. The Commission has found in the past
that Section 13 does not apply to the re-licensing and therefore
there is no statutory limitation as far as the Commission is
concerned on granting authorizations for the start of construction
for a refurbishing of a re-licensed project, but we would not oppose
that bill. With that, after having run through those, I will be more
than happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of J. Mark Robinson follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. MARK ROBINSON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE
OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
The Office of Energy Projects (OEP) at the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission is responsible for non-federal
hydroelectric licensing, administration, and safety; certification of
interstate natural gas pipelines; and, authorization and oversight
over the construction, operation, and safety of Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) terminals.
This testimony concerns H.R.4417, H.R.4377, H.R. 971, S.
176, and S. 244, five bills, which would extend the deadlines for
the commencement of construction for seven hydroelectric
projects. H.R. 4417 would extend until December 31, 2007, the
deadline for the commencement of construction of the proposed
Tygart Dam Project No. 7307 in
West Virginia. H.R. 4377 would extend the deadline for
commencing construction of the proposed Arrowrock
Hydroelectric Project No. 4656 in Idaho. H.R. 971 would extend
the deadlines for commencing construction of the Hale
Hydroelectric Project No. 11547, the Upper Collinsville Project
No. 10822, and the Lower Collinsville Project No. 10823 in
Connecticut. S. 176 would extend the commencement of
construction deadline for the Reynolds Creek Hydroelectric Project
No. 11480 in Alaska. S. 244 would extend the commencement of
construction deadline for the Swift Creek Hydroelectric Project
No. 1651 in Wyoming.
Section 13 of the FPA requires that construction be
commenced within two years of license issuance and authorizes
the Commission to extend this deadline once, for a maximum of
two additional years. If construction has not commenced by the
deadline, the Commission is required to terminate the license.
Generally, enactment of bills authorizing commencement of
construction extensions for individual projects leaves the
development of an energy resource in the hands of an entity that
has shown an inability to develop a project, and therefore has not
been recommended. The current Commission Chairman and past
chairmen have opposed legislation extending commencement of
construction deadlines that would give an entity more than 10
years to develop a project, based on the notion that allowing one
entity that is not progressing in developing a project to control a
hydropower site for a longer time is not consistent with the public
interest in developing hydroelectric energy. In addition, the record
on which projects were originally licensed, including the
examination of environmental and developmental issues, may be
out of date. To ensure that the public interest is served would
require not simply reinstating the license and/or extending the
deadlines for commencement of construction, but reexamining and
updating the record.
Therefore, I oppose extensions for H.R. 4417 and H.R. 4377,
and do not oppose extensions for H.R. 971, S. 176, and S. 244.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is J. Mark Robinson, and I am the Director of the
Office of Energy Projects at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission. Our Office is responsible for non-federal
hydroelectric licensing, administration, and safety; certification of
interstate natural gas pipelines and storage facilities; and,
authorization and oversight over the construction, operation, and
safety of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals.
I appear today as a Commission staff witness speaking with the
approval of the Chairman of the Commission. The views I express
at this hearing are my own and not necessarily those of the
Commission or of any individual Commissioner.
Under Part 1 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), the Commission
issues licenses to non-Federal interests authorizing the
construction, operation and maintenance of water power projects
on federal lands, on navigable waters of the United States, which
utilize the surplus water or water power from a federal dam, and on
streams over which the Congress has jurisdiction. Licenses may
be issued under the FPA only if, in the judgment of the
Commission, the proposed project is best adapted to a
comprehensive plan for the development and utilization of the
water resources of the river basin involved for all public purposes.
The licenses are issued for terms of up to 50 years and contain
terms and conditions that are designed to ensure that the
comprehensive development standard is met.
The FPA requires that the licensee will proceed expeditiously
with the development and construction of the proposed project
once a license has been issued. Section 13 of the FPA requires that
construction of a licensed project be commenced within two years
of issuance of the license and authorizes the Commission to extend
this deadline once, for a maximum of two additional years. If
project construction has not commenced by the deadline, the
Commission is required to terminate the license.
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on H.R. 4417, H.R.
4377, H.R. 971, S. 176, and S. 244.
H.R. 4417 would (upon the licensee's request and subject to
the good faith, due diligence, and public interest requirements of
section 13, and the Commission's procedures) require the
Commission to extend until December 31, 2007, the deadline for
the commencement of construction of the proposed Tygart Dam
Hydroelectric Project No. 7307 and, if necessary, to reinstate the
project license.
H.R. 4377 would require the Commission to extend for a three-
year period beginning on the date of enactment of the bill, the
deadline for commencing construction of the proposed Arrowrock
Hydroelectric Project No. 4656, and, if necessary, to reinstate the
project license.
H.R. 971 concerns three hydroelectric projects. First, H.R. 971
would require the Commission to extend until May 30, 2007, the
deadline for commencing construction of the proposed Hale
Hydroelectric Project No. 11547 and (upon the licensee's request
and subject to the good faith, due diligence, and public interest
requirements of section 13, and the Commission's procedures
thereunder) to issue two additional two-year extensions of the
construction deadline. The bill would also require the Commission
to reinstate the project license. H.R. 971 would also require the
Commission to extend until May 30, 2007, and (upon the
licensee's request and subject to the good faith, due diligence, and
public interest requirements of section 13, and the Commission's
procedures thereunder) to issue two additional two-year extensions
for the commencement of construction deadlines for the
Collinsville Upper Hydroelectric Project No. 10822 and the
Collinsville Lower Hydroelectric Project No. 10823 on the
Farmington River, in Hartford County, Connecticut.
S. 176 would authorize the Commission to extend the
commencement of construction deadline for the Reynolds Creek
Hydroelectric Project No. 11480 for three two-year periods beyond
the date that is four years after the date of issuance of the project
license.
S. 244 would authorize the Commission to extend the
commencement of construction deadline for the Swift Creek
Hydroelectric Project No. 1651 for three two-year periods beyond
the date that is four years after the date of issuance of the project
license.
As a general matter, enactment of bills authorizing or requiring
commencement of construction extensions for individual projects
leaves the development of an important energy resource in the
hands of an entity that has shown an inability to develop a project,
and therefore has not been recommended. The last several
Chairmen of the Commission have had a policy of opposing
legislation extending commencement of construction deadlines that
would allow an entity more than 10 years to develop a project,
based on the notion that allowing one entity that is not showing
progress in developing a project to control a hydropower site for a
greater length of time is not consistent with the public interest in
developing clean, renewable hydroelectric energy.
In addition, the record on which projects were originally
licensed, including the examination of environmental and
developmental issues, may be out of date in various respects. To
ensure that the public interest is served would require not simply
reinstating the license and/or extending the license timeframes for
commencement of construction, but reexamining and, as
necessary, updating the record.
In view of these considerations, I will comment on each of the
bills in more detail below.
H.R.4417
H.R. 4417 would authorize the Commission to reinstate the
license and extend the deadline for the commencement of project
construction for the Tygart Dam Project No. 7307, located in West
Virginia, until December 31, 2007.
The Tygart Dam Project was licensed on September 27, 1989,
to the City of Grafton, West Virginia (Grafton). The license gave
Grafton two years from the issuance date, as permitted by Section
13, to start construction - that is, until September 27, 1991. On
December 17, 1990, the Commission issued partial stays of the
licenses for the Tygart Project and 11 other projects in the Ohio
River Basin, pending resolution of judicial appeals of the
Commission's licensing orders. On April 16, 1992, after the
orders were affirmed, the Commission issued an order lifting the
stays.
On November 4, 1992, pursuant to a request by Grafton, the
Commission extended the deadline for commencement of
construction to April 15, 1995. This represented the maximum
period for the commencement of construction (two years plus one
two-year extension) that the Commission could grant under FPA
section 13.
Subsequent legislation enacted as Public Law No. 104-246
directed the Commission to issue up to three additional two-year
orders granting further extensions of time to commence and
complete construction. After the Commission did so, September
26, 1999 became the final deadline to commence project
construction. On June 23, 1999, Grafton again requested a stay of
those license conditions that require pre-construction filings
because it was seeking another legislative extension of the
commencement of construction deadline. The Commission
dismissed this request on February 9, 2000.
Because the licensee did not commence project construction by
September 26, 1999, the Commission on November 19, 1999
issued a notice of probable termination of the license for failure to
meet the commencement of construction deadline. Grafton did not
respond to the notice. The Commission subsequently terminated
the license by order issued on March 27, 2000.
On July 24, 2000, Grafton subsequently filed an application for
a preliminary permit for the project, as a predicate for filing a new
license application. The Commission issued the requested
preliminary permit on March 16, 2001, for the Tygart Dam Project
No. 11851 (because the previous license had been terminated, the
preliminary permit received a new project number). Grafton made
very little progress toward developing the project, and the three-
year preliminary permit expired, by its terms, on February 28,
2004. The Commission denied a request for an extension of the
preliminary permit term on March 28, 2003.
On March 1, 2004, Grafton filed another application for a
preliminary permit for the Tygart Dam Project No. 12490. This
application was dismissed on March 28, 2005, for failure to
provide additional information related to Grafton's progress
toward developing the project. Currently, Grafton has pending
before the Commission a third application for a subsequent
preliminary permit for the Tygart Dam Project No. 12640. The
Commission also has before it a competing application for
preliminary permit filed on September 23, 2005, by Tygart LLC
for the Tygart Dam Project No. 12613.
The Tygart Project was licensed in 1989, and construction did
not commence in the 11 years before the Commission terminated
the license. Under these circumstances, I do not support
reinstatement of the license or further extension of the
commencement of construction deadline.
H.R. 4377
H.R. 4377 would provide for license reinstatement, if
necessary, and extend the deadline for the commencement of
project construction for the Arrowrock Project No. 4656, located in
Idaho, for a three-year period from the date of enactment of the
legislation. The Arrowrock Project was licensed on March 27,
1989, to the Boise-Kuna Irrigation District, the Nampa & Meridian
Irrigation District, the New York Irrigation District, the Wilder
Irrigation District, and the Big Bend Irrigation District (Districts).
The license gave the Districts the maximum two-year time
permitted by Section 13 to start construction -- that is, until March
26, 1991. On January 9, 1991, pursuant to Section 13, the
Commission granted the Districts' request for the one additional
two-year extension to commence construction permitted by the
statute, thereby extending the deadline for commencement of
construction to March 26, 1993.
Section 1701(c) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 subsequently
authorized the Commission to extend the deadline for
commencement of construction of the project for an additional six
years, until March 26, 1999. The Commission granted this
extension.
On March 23, 1999, three days prior to the expiration of the
extended deadline, the Districts requested a stay of the
commencement of construction and compliance deadlines, while
they sought Congressional legislation permitting further extensions
of the construction deadline. The Commission denied that request,
and on May 19, 1999, issued an order noticing probable
termination of the license for failure to meet the commencement of
construction deadline.
In June, 1999 legislation was introduced in the Senate (S.
1236) authorizing a further extension of the Section 13 deadline for
the project until March 26, 2005. Former Commission Chairman
James Hoecker submitted written testimony to the Senate Energy
and Natural Resources Committee on July 28, 1999 stating that
because this bill would extend the construction commencement
date beyond 10 years from the issuance date of the project license,
he did not support its enactment.
This legislation, which was subsequently enacted and signed
into law in October, 2000 as Public Law No. 106-343, authorized
the Commission, upon the Districts' request, to reinstate the
license, if necessary and, to further extend the deadline for
commencement of construction for three consecutive two-year
periods, to take effect on the date of the expiration of the last
extension issued by the Commission (i.e., as of March 26, 1999).
As requested by the Districts, the Commission thereafter
granted three extensions, making the new final deadline for starting
construction March 26, 2005.
On March 25, 2005, the Districts filed a request for a stay of
the license, and to backdate the stay for 120 days to allow them
time to comply with license articles containing requirements that
must be completed before start of construction.
On May 27, 2005, the Commission denied the request for stay
of license and, in the same order, issued notice of the probable
termination of the project license. The Commission denied
rehearing by order issued September 1, 2005.
The Arrowrock Project was licensed in 1989, and construction
did not commence in the 16 years before the Commission gave
notice of probable license termination. Under these circumstances,
I do not support further extension of the commencement of
construction deadline.
H.R. 971
H.R. 971 concerns Projects Nos. 10822, 10823, and 11547.
First, H.R. 971 would require the Commission to extend until May
30, 2007, the deadline for commencing construction of the
proposed Hale Project No. 11547, and to issue two additional two-
year extensions of the construction deadline.
In 1997, the Commission issued Summit Hydropower, Inc., a
license for the Hale Project, to be located on the Quinebaug River,
in Windham County, Connecticut. The City did not commence
construction within the two-year period specified in the license, or
within the additional two-year period which it requested and the
Commission granted. Consequentially, by letter dated May 2,
2002, the Commission notified Summit of the probable termination
of the license. By letter dated August 9, 2002, Commission staff
notified the licensee that it would not take further action to
terminate the license pending action on legislation to extend the
construction deadline.
The license for the Hale Project was issued nine years ago. The
required extensions of the commencement of construction deadline
could move that deadline to May 30, 2011, almost 14 years after
the project license was issued. I therefore do not support the bill in
this respect.
H.R. 971 would also require the Commission to extend until
May 30, 2007, and to issue two additional two-year extensions for
the commencement of construction deadlines for the Collinsville
Upper Hydroelectric Project No. 10822 and the Collinsville Lower
Hydroelectric Project No. 10823 on the Farmington River, in
Hartford County, Connecticut.
The Commission issued licenses to Summit Hydropower for
the Collinsville Upper and Lower Projects on February 23, 2001.
Summit did not commence construction of the projects during the
two-period provided in the license, or during the two-year
extension, which expired February 23, 2005, granted by the
Commission.
The extensions required by H.R. 971 would extend the
commencement of construction deadline for the two projects to
May 30, 2011, only a few months more than 10 years after the
project licenses were issued. Because the extensions would be so
close to 10 years from the date of license issuance, I do not oppose
H.R. 971 with respect to the Collinsville Projects.
S. 176
S. 176 would authorize the Commission to extend the
commencement of construction deadline for the Reynolds Creek
Hydroelectric Project No. 11480 for three two-year periods beyond
the date that is four years after the date of issuance of the project
license.
On October 24, 2000, the Commission issued Haida
Corporation a license for the proposed Reynolds Creek Project, to
be located on Prince of Wales Island, Alaska. Haida did not
commence construction during the two-year period provided in the
license, or during the two-year extension, which expired October
24, 2004, granted by the Commission.
The extensions authorized by S. 176 could extend the
commencement of construction deadline until precisely 10 years
after the project licenses were issued. Moreover, the bill would
authorize, but not require, the Commission to grant the extensions.
Therefore, I do not oppose S. 176.
S. 244
S. 244 would authorize the Commission to extend the
commencement of construction deadline for the Swift Creek
Hydroelectric Project No. 1651 for three two-year periods beyond
the date that is four years after the date of issuance of the project
license.
On December 19, 1997, the Commission issued Swift Creek
Power Company a new license for the existing, non-operating 1.5-
megawatt Swift Creek Project, located on Swift Creek, in Lincoln
County, Wyoming. Rehabilitation of the upper development
consists of adding one-foot stop logs to the upper dam, replacing
the penstock, and refurbishing the powerhouse and adding two
generators. Rehabilitation of the lower development consists of
dredging the lower dam, installing a 2,000-foot-long penstock,
building a powerhouse with 2 generators, and a new transmission
line. The project occupies 20 acres of federal lands within the
Bridger-Teton National Forest.
The original deadline in the license for commencement of
construction, December 18, 1999, was, at the licensee's request,
extended to December 18, 2001. Swift Creek did not commence
construction during the two-year period provided in the license, or
during the two-year extension, which expired December 18, 2001,
granted by the Commission. The licensee did not request any
further extensions of the deadline.
On November 29, 2002, Swift Creek and the Town of Afton,
Wyoming, filed a joint application to transfer the license from
Swift Creek to Afton. In response to the notice of the application,
the U.S. Forest Service filed on February 28, 2003, a motion to
intervene in the transfer proceeding, and commented that it
supported the transfer if it facilitated either placing the project back
into operation or removing the project works from National Forest
lands and restoring the lands. Action on the transfer remains
pending.
The Commission interprets the deadlines in section 13 as
applying only to an original license, authorizing initial construction
of a project. Project No. 1651 was in existence when the project
was issued a new (or relicense) license in 1997 so, -- although
refurbishment of damaged project works would entail substantial
new construction -- by the Commission's interpretation, the
licensee has not failed to meet a statutory commencement of
construction deadline. As a policy, the Commission has included
construction deadlines when it authorizes licensees to perform
major project renovations or to install additional new capacity
because it is in the public interest to have construction proceed
expeditiously.
I note that while the Project No. 1651 licensee is not subject to
Section 13 of the FPA, the Commission has rarely given a licensee
more than 10 years to commence new construction at an existing
project.
The extensions authorized by S. 244 could extend the
commencement of construction deadline until precisely 10 years
after the project license was issued. Moreover, the bill would
authorize, but not require, the Commission to grant the extensions.
Therefore, I do not oppose S. 244.
Summary
As I have indicated, I oppose extensions for H.R. 4417 and
H.R. 4377, and do not oppose extensions for H.R. 971, S. 176, and
S. 244.
I appreciate the opportunity to present my views to the
Subcommittee. Thank you, and I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
MR. OTTER. [Presiding] As a chairman, I think I will begin
the questioning. Mr. Robinson, you said under your two
conditions for extending licenses one was a 10-year period and the
other one was obviously the economic conditions. Yet I think you
heard the testimony from my colleague from West Virginia that
under the Tygart Project, it was indeed their economic analysis that
said it was now a viable economic project and so that is why
because of the increased cost in energy that now they wanted to go
forward with that project. The 10-year period, obviously they have
updated their considerations. They have updated the fact that they
are going to tunnel through that dam and to put in the penstock,
and also to make it a viable project. So my question would come
back is if we are so rigid on that 10-year period or that economic
consideration has not FERC ever extended beyond 10 years a
project for either one of those reasons?
MR. ROBINSON. We actually are not by law permitted to
extend beyond one 2-year extension on the Federal requirement to
start construction within 2 years. We have, however, where
Congress has specially authorized us to grant extensions beyond
that, we in fact have. I can't remember the project now but we had
two sets of extensions by Congress, one for 6 years that added to
the 10, and then a second one which I believe was for another 5
years, so we certainly have extended projects beyond the 10-year
period where Congress was giving us that authority.
MR. OTTER. And both of those have been successful?
MR. ROBINSON. No. There was only one that I remember, and
it was on the same project and that project is still not constructed.
MR. OTTER. The other one that went forward then was
successful?
MR. ROBINSON. There was only one that actually went beyond
the 10-year period where Congress designated a period beyond that
time frame.
MR. OTTER. Now of course on the Arrowrock Project it seems
pretty obvious to me that it was circumstances beyond the
licensee's control. It wasn't some environmental consideration
that they hadn't completed an EIS or an endangered--it was
because of the bull trout and the Endangered Species Act that
delayed that entire process, and then when FERC at a later time
was asked to go forward there was no response from FERC
themselves. So circumstances beyond the licensee's control that
allowed both of those permits to exhaust their time period would
seem to me that FERC would be able to give the consideration,
number one, because of its own inaction, and, number two,
because of the action of another Federal agency beyond the
licensee's control, I want to repeat, that should give it additional
consideration.
MR. ROBINSON. During the course of the 16 years that we have
been interacting with the licensees for this project and the
agencies, there have been numerous explanations for why the
project was not going forward, bull trout certainly being one of
them and being prominent here more recently. There are differing
views on where the ball laid on the bull trout issue. Was it with the
Fish and Wildlife Service, was it with the licensee, was it with
FERC, and it all goes to what information was available about the
project and what information the different agencies required.
The Commission has reviewed this twice. They reviewed that
issue very specifically on how the bull trout issue was handled by
the Commission staff and under the laws that we have to operate
under, and at this point has not accepted a request to stay that
license, which is one of the things that the Commission has done
where there are conditions beyond the control of the licensee and
the time period is running out. They have stayed the license and
effectively stopped the clock on even the 2 plus 2 years but
certainly within the 10 years. And I believe on Arrowrock they
actually did stay that project for a period of time as well.
MR. OTTER. Well, part of that project, the stay on that project
came about because of the old antiquated valves that were in there.
In order to complete the hydro project the Army Corps or the
BOR--
MR. ROBINSON. It is the Bureau of Reclamation.
MR. OTTER. Yeah, the BOR had to install the new valves
which then gave it the capacity for the hydro capability, and that
was started in 2002 and completed in 2004 so why wouldn't they
be granted credit for those 2 years plus the 2 years under the bull
trout consideration?
MR. ROBINSON. Well, again, given that there has been 16
years on this project, a number of different issues have held it up
over those 16 years. And there is another aspect to this project,
should this go forward and the bill be passed and the Commission
does grant the extension to start construction, the project that is
now being contemplated, which has been under discussion with the
Fish and Wildlife Service, is not a project that the Commission has
authorized. So there would be a review of this new project which
on its surface clearly has advantages associated with it in terms of
its footprint and how it would go through the same and all those
things, but there are issues associated with the project.
The record that we have currently doesn't match the project
that is being pursued, so we would go back and look at it whether
it would be an amendment to the license or however we would
handle it. The Commission would have to spend some time
looking at it, and we would work out the bull trout issue as well
during that period.
MR. OTTER. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
recognize the Ranking Member.
MR. BOUCHER. Mr. Chairman, I really don't have any
questions of Mr. Robinson. I want to thank him for stating very
clearly the position of the FERC on this matter, and I think you
have propounded to him all of the relevant questions. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
MR. OTTER. Okay. Thank you. Then you are excused, sir.
Thank you very much for your time. I appreciate it. Without any
further business, the committee is now retired.
[Whereupon, at 4:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF THE HON. EDWARD F. SPROAT, III,
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BARTON
Q1. Are you familiar with the interim storage provision in the
Senate's Energy & Water Appropriations bill? If that were to
become law, what resources would you need to meet those
requirements without detracting from progress on the
repository? How would that compare to the resources needed
to meet the requirements of H.R. 5360, the Administration's
legislative proposal?
A1. The Department has not estimated what resources would be
necessary to implement the interim storage provisions in the
Senate's Energy and Water Appropriations bill, but believes
additional resources would be required to license, manage,
operate and construct the interim storage facilities even if the
Department primarily utilized existing facilities at reactor sites.
Implementation of the provisions in the Senate's bill would not
reduce the resources needed to license, construct, and operate
the Yucca Mountain site. To the extent resources are limited,
work on interim storage could delay completion of the
repository.
Q2. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act limits the size of the Yucca
Mountain repository to 70,000 metric tons, but what is the
physical capacity? What are the scientific and technical
factors that would determine the maximum capacity?
A2. The Department has not determined a maximum physical
capacity for the site but believes that, at a minimum, the
estimated amounts of spent nuclear fuel expected to be
generated by the current fleet of commercial reactors
throughout their life time and all existing Defense spent
nuclear fuel and high-level waste could be disposed of at
Yucca Mountain. The maximum technical capacity of the
Yucca Mountain repository is dependent on the physical
characteristics of the areas of the site that have not yet been
thoroughly evaluated, as well as the radionuclide content,
volume, and form of materials to be disposed.
Q3. The Electric Power Research Institute conducted a preliminary
analysis of the maximum disposal capacity in a Yucca
Mountain repository this spring. This analysis suggested that
the repository could hold between 4-9 times the current
legislated limit if expanded and redesigned. Has DOE
reviewed this analysis and are you aware of any other studies
regarding the potential capacity for the repository?
A3. The Department is aware of but has not reviewed the Electric
Power Research Institute estimates. The Department is not
aware of any other studies regarding the potential capacity of
the repository at this time.
Q4. If interim storage was authorized by Congress, would it make
operational sense to move used fuel in proximity to the
planned repository? Why?
A4. Yes, if authorized by Congress, it would make operational
sense for interim storage facilities to be near the planned
repository to avoid additional transportation of waste to the
repository. The advantages of consolidating spent nuclear fuel
at the repository site prior to permanent emplacement would
be the avoidance of multiple transportation campaigns and the
security of a single Federal site in a remote desert
environment.
Q5. Why are the provisions of Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) unnecessary for the Yucca Mountain
project?
A5. The requirements for containment of spent nuclear fuel
imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are
considerably more stringent than any standards that might be
imposed under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA). Specifically, NRC requires the use of NRC certified
containers to transport, store and dispose of spent nuclear fuel
and the permanent isolation in a deep geological repository in
a manner that limits potential radiological exposures to no
more than 15 mrems annually over a 10,000 year period.
Passage of the Administration's proposal would avoid a
duplicative regulatory structure, by making the NRC the only
regulatory authority for the repository facility.
Q6. Why would it be appropriate to require DOE to submit details
on only the surface facilities needed for initial operations in the
license application?
A6. NRC regulations require DOE to submit details on both
surface and sub-surface facilities with its initial license
application which DOE intends to do. During the life of the
repository operations, the Program plans on additional surface
facilities to handle additional amounts of spent nuclear fuel
and high-level waste. The Administration's legislative
proposal clarifies that DOE need not include these additional
surface facilities in its initial license application. The proposal
does not eliminate the need for NRC to approve the
construction and operation of these additional facilities at the
appropriate time.
Q7. What are the advantages to developing site infrastructure prior
to receiving a construction authorization from NRC? What are
the drawbacks?
A7. Site infrastructure improvements are necessary to maintain
safety and the protection of workers, regulators, and visitors.
Infrastructure upgrades will enhance safety and enable DOE to
safely continue ongoing operations, scientific testing, and
routine maintenance. Moving forward with the necessary
safety upgrades and infrastructure would significantly facilitate
the timely opening of the repository.
QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE ALLEN
Q1. Mr. Sproat, an important issue to me that you did not discuss is
the so-called "clean canistered" program developed under the
watch of your predecessor Acting Director Golan. As I
understand it, this program envisions the development of new
transportation, aging and disposal, or TAD, canister systems
that DOE would utilize in meeting its spent fuel acceptance
obligations.
I have concerns with DOE's TAD concept in light of the
impact that it could have on your ability to meet your spent
fuel acceptance obligations for contract holders, such as Maine
Yankee, who have undergone decommissioning and are
utilizing existing, NRC licensed dual purpose storage and
transportation systems. Further, so called "dead plants" are
decommissioned and therefore do not have any remaining
infrastructure within which to make transfers of waste from
existing licensed dual purpose canisters to new canisters.
Q1(a). What role do you envision for the TAD system in the new
program plan and schedule you have laid out for the
Committee?
A1(a). The transport, aging, and disposal (TAD) system is a vital
component of the new Program plan and schedule. The
license application will reflect the use of the TAD system
and the repository is being designed to reflect the use of the
TAD system as the primary mechanism for accepting
commercial spent nuclear fuel. The TAD concept will
significantly simplify spent nuclear fuel handling
operations at the repository. Under this approach, most
spent nuclear fuel will be packaged for disposal by the
utilities. This approach offers the advantage of having
those who know most about the fuel, the generators,
responsible for canisterization and packaging. This
approach will take advantage of commercial reactor sites
with existing capability and spent nuclear fuel handling
expertise. Thus, it will limit the need to build new
equipment and train operators for a capability that already
exists in the private sector. The Department has been
working with industry to develop the performance
specifications for canisters that can be transported, aged,
and disposed of successfully within the waste management
system. Also, the facilities needed to support the handling
of TAD canisters at Yucca Mountain will be fewer, less
complex, and more efficient.
Q1(b). Are you planning to develop surface facilities at the Yucca
Mountain site that are capable of receiving material
transported to the site in existing dual purpose technologies
as well as TAD systems? Will these facilities be the same
for both existing and future TAD technologies? If these
facilities are not the same and one is to be phased in after
the other, which gets built first under your current thinking
and what are the relative time frames you are looking at for
their construction?
A1(b). The repository surface facilities are being designed to
include the capability of receiving material transported to
the site in existing dual purpose technologies, including
those currently in use at shutdown reactors sites, as well as
TAD systems. Different facilities will be needed for the
existing dual purpose technologies and the TAD systems.
The dual purpose canisters will require opening and
repackaging in waste packages licensed for disposal in a
repository. The benefit of the TAD system is its ability to
be disposed of directly in the repository with minimal
packaging steps. The opening and re-packaging of spent
nuclear fuel contained in dual purpose technologies will
require a wet handling capability that the TAD system does
not require, and as a result, a separate building will be
utilized that includes a spent nuclear fuel handling pool.
The Department is planning on the construction of the
facilities to receive TAD canisters early in the repository
construction schedule, and the facilities to open dual
purpose canisters later.
Q1(c). Why do we need a new canister system? Is there any
reason that existing NRC licensed dual use canisters are not
acceptable for transportation and storage at Yucca
Mountain?
A1(c). The Department has elected to proceed with a primarily
TAD based system for the reasons set forth in A1(b) above.
Q2. I am very concerned that the DOE might be headed down a
path that would penalize, rather than reward, those facilities,
especially single unit decommissioned sites, that have invested
in technologies to safely and responsibly store and manage
their spent fuel inventory. The Nuclear Waste Technical
Review Board has raised "an overarching concern" that the
existing litigation between the DOE and utilities "is a
significant impediment to the technical resolution of key
issues" relating to spent fuel acceptance and management
leading to disposal. What assurances can you give us that you
will make it a high priority to actively seek a realistic
resolution of these issues? Will you commit to working with
me and other interested Members of this Committee to seek
resolution of these issues?
A2. The Department believes that, notwithstanding the ongoing
litigation, meaningful technical discussions can and do take
place. This was demonstrated by recent technical interactions
with the industry on the development of the TAD system
performance requirements. The Government has also been
actively negotiating settlements and has reached a settlement
agreement with companies representing over 20% of the
nuclear industry. It is to the advantage of both parties to seek a
settlement agreement and we fully expect additional
settlements to be negotiated. I would welcome the opportunity
to work with you and other interested Committee Members to
resolve these issues.
RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF LUIS A. REYES, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
October 17, 2006
The Honorable Ralph M. Hall
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and
Air Quality
Committee on Energy and Commerce
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission appeared before the
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality on September 13, 2006.
From that hearing, you forwarded questions that were submitted
for the hearing record. The responses to your questions are
enclosed. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Rebecca L. Schmidt, Director
Office of Congressional Affairs
Enclosure:
As stated
cc: Representative Rick Boucher
RESPONSE TO THE HONORABLE JOE BARTON
QUESTION 1.
You state that the Commission has certified a number of
package designs for the transport of nuclear fuel. Does the
Commission have concerns about the Department's proposal
for new transport, aging and disposal canisters (TADs) for fuel
already in NRC approved transportation packages? Are there
safety concerns and does it make sense to repackage the fuel
into TADs, especially at decommissioned sites that no longer
have spent fuel pools available in which to facilitate the
transfer?
ANSWER.
The Department of Energy (DOE) has informed us that it plans to
develop the performance specifications for the transport, aging and
disposal canisters (TADs) design by late calendar year 2006. To
date, neither DOE nor any NRC power plant licensee has proposed
packaging or repackaging fuel into TADs. Therefore, NRC has not
taken a position on the logistical approach regarding use of the
specific TADs contemplated by DOE. DOE has advised the NRC
staff that it is considering, in their design of the repository, the
capability to receive spent fuel in non-TAD packagings and to
repackage spent fuel into TAD canisters at Yucca Mountain. If
DOE's license application has such a proposal, the NRC staff will
review it. We would note, however, that in a letter to Dr. Margaret
Chu, Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
dated February 20, 2004, the NRC stated, "The NRC believes that
NRC-approved dual-purpose casks can be used to transport spent
fuel to the potential Yucca Mountain repository. In addition, NRC
is currently permitting decommissioning power reactor facilities to
demolish their spent fuel pools after all spent fuel is loaded in
NRC-certified dual-purpose storage casks. Obviously, it would be
preferred, for safety as well as economic reasons, not to re-pack
the fuel loaded in these casks. Thus, early resolution of cask
selection and cask certification is important to the NRC's
regulatory activities." [Emphasis added] This continues to be
NRC's position on this matter. As noted above, DOE has advised
the NRC staff that it is considering, in their design of the
repository, the capability to receive spent fuel in non-TAD
packages and to repackage spent fuel into TAD canisters at Yucca
Mountain. This would clearly be the preferred solution for loaded
dual-purpose casks at NRC-licensed sites, particularly
decommissioned sites.
QUESTION 2.
With respect to preparations for a repository license
application, how many people has the NRC hired in the last
two years for this project and how many does it expect to hire
in the next two? How much of the NRC's annual
appropriation for High Level waste management has it spent
over this and last year and how much has it and will it carry
over to next year?
ANSWER.
From 102 positions in FY 2004, the number of NRC HLW staff
decreased by 11 positions in FY 2005. With the delay in the
receipt of a license application, the number of NRC HLW staff
positions remained level throughout FY 2005 and FY 2006. The
number of positions is projected to remain nearly the same in FY
2007 (FY 2008 projections are not included in our response, since
the FY 2008 budget is currently with the Office of Management
and Budget).
In FY 2005, the NRC was appropriated $68.5 million from the
Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF). The agency obligated $46 million
and had an unobligated carryover of $23.7 million, of which
$1.2 million was from prior year appropriations. In FY 2006, the
NRC was appropriated $45.7 million from the NWF, of which
$43.7 million was obligated. At the end of FY 2006, the agency
had $25.7 million in prior year NWF appropriations that remained
unobligated. It should be noted that the unobligated carryover
amount is a cumulative total of all prior-year NWF appropriations.
RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF THE HON. STAN WISE, CHAIRMAN,
GEORGIA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
The Honorable Joe Barton
1. Does it make sense to stall the development of Yucca
Mountain in order to allow time for reprocessing to be
developed and implemented?
Mr. Chairman, I see the development of a repository as
largely independent of a future decision to shift to a
reprocessing scheme for spent fuel management. First,
whether spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed or not, there will
remain some highly radioactive waste products of
reprocessing-as I understand it from the experts and
DOE-that will require disposal in an underground
repository. Plus, there is some defense high-level
radioactive waste for which disposal is required and, to my
knowledge, which is not suitable for reprocessing.
Additionally, earlier this year when the GNEP initiative
was first introduced, I understood Deputy Energy Secretary
Clay Sell to say that spent fuel that had been out of the
reactor for more than 15 years may not be a candidate for
reprocessing. If this is the case, by the time the government
has reprocessing fully operational, it would appear that
there will be a large amount, of spent fuel that will have
been out of a reactor for more than 15 years that is still in
need of disposal and not suitable for the reprocessing
program.
There is another consequence for the continued delay in
moving the spent fuel to a repository-or until some away-
from-reactor interim storage is available. The lawsuits by
the utilities for waste acceptance delay damages have yet to
be decided, but for those that have, they provide for
continuing government liability until the government
eventually performs to its contractual obligation to accept
the spent fuel.
There is no reason that I can see why the repository
development has to be delayed because of the consideration
to reprocess spent fuel in the future. Certainly the annual
fee payments are not being delayed. Ratepayers are paying
for waste disposal; the government needs to provide the
disposal that was promised.
2. Under what conditions would it make sense to send
defense waste to the repository first, ahead of commercial
spent fuel?
Mr. Chairman, actually I believe there are more reasons for
commercial spent fuel to be moved ahead of defense waste.
Defense waste is already presumably safely and securely
stored. In contrast, in 36 locations the spent fuel
accumulating at commercial reactors exceeds the storage
capacity of the cooling pools and the utilities have had to
build dry cask storage (for which the lawsuits seek
damages, as mentioned before.) With the recent
announcement that the earliest that Yucca Mountain will be
ready to begin to accept spent fuel is 2017, I would imagine
that more and more utilities will be seeking more and more
dry cask storage. That has certainly been our experience in
Georgia, as I discuss in more detail in my response to your
Question 4.
There are 3,800 tons of spent fuel now stored at shutdown
reactor storage sites. I am sure that the owners of those
shutdown reactor sites have to meet all the terms of their
storage licenses under NRC requirements, including
security. You don't have to be an expert in homeland
security to conclude that shipping this spent fuel to the
repository, whether for disposal or interim storage, is
preferable to keeping it at these otherwise shutdown
facilities. I know of no comparable perceived risk for
current defense waste storage.
There seems to be no economic or security advantage to
sending defense waste to the repository ahead of
commercial spent fuel. The only advantage I can see-if,
for some reason the commercial spent fuel were not ready
for shipment-would be to have DOE demonstrate (what
we already know, but much of the public may not) that
nuclear waste transportation can be planned and
implemented safely. This would help build public
confidence (as would shipping commercial spent fuel; of
course.)
3. Under what circumstances, if any, would it be appropriate
for the Nuclear Waste Fund to be used to fund interim
storage activities?
Mr. Chairman, first, the appropriations stranglehold on the
Nuclear Waste Fund-in which $750 million is collected in
fees, yet only a small fraction is appropriated for its
intended purpose-would have to be fixed. Otherwise,
dollars for interim storage are provided at the expense of
the repository.
There are some expenses associated with interim storage
that are likely to be appropriate for the Nuclear Waste
Fund. Procurement of transportation casks and expenses of
transferring spent fuel into them are expenses that would
eventually be required for shipment to the permanent
repository. The closer the interim storage site is to Yucca
Mountain, the more the transportation costs would also
seem fundable from the NWF.
In terms of "cost to the government," it seems likely that
development of a sizable central interim storage facility to
be built and operated by DOE would be more economic
than for the utilities to continue to build and manage more
dry cask storage at individual reactor sites. It was that
"economies of scale" premise that led some of the utilities
to form the consortium Private Fuel Storage LLC, which
seeks to build and operate a private temporary spent fuel
storage facility in Utah. To the extent that a DOE central
interim storage could achieve similar economies and DOE
will have accepted title (and financial responsibility) for the
spent fuel stored there, that would bring a halt to the federal
liability for that fuel for the former owners' storage
expenses. However, since the liability for those expenses is
not against the Nuclear Waste Fund, should not the same
source of funding be used to pay for interim storage that
would experience a cost reduction? As you know, the
Eleventh Circuit of the Federal Court of Appeals ruled in
2002 that the Department of Energy could not use future
NWF fee reductions to pay damages in the waste
acceptance delay storage cost lawsuits (because the
Secretary lacks the authority to make fee adjustments for
individual utilities and because the NWPA makes clear the
utilities are responsible for reactor-site fuel storage costs.)
It is my understanding that the damages awarded to date
and the settlement agreement with Exelon are being paid
from the Judgment Fund and not the Nuclear Waste Fund.
It follows that the Department of Energy should use other
appropriations than the NWF for interim storage.
4. I understand that the Southern Company has indicated
their interest in building new nuclear plants in Georgia.
As Chairman of the Georgia Public Service Commission,
what do you think needs to happen with regard to the
spent fuel issue in order for the Commission to support
new nuclear construction?
Mr. Chairman, first and foremost, let me say that pursuant
to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated 46-3A, all new
supply-side capacity is identified in the utility's Integrated
Resource Plan and subsequently must be certified by the
Commission. Although this certification process is not
driven solely by the spent fuel disposal issue, this issue
does figure into the overall certification process since the
certification process includes decisions on type of
generation, construction, operation and maintenance costs
of the resource, number of megawatts needed, and when
the capacity is needed.
Nuclear expansion has great appeal for meeting forecasted
demand for baseload generation due to improved reactor
technology. New nuclear units will have advantages over
coal such as protection from fuel price instability and no
carbon emissions. However, I can foresee the lack of
certainty surrounding the spent fuel disposal problem being
factored in to the overall certification decision.
Resolution of the spent fuel issue will figure prominently
into the overall cost of the new unit. It is my understanding
that during the planning stage, it is easier to design greater
spent fuel pool storage capacity than it is to retrofit the pool
at the existing reactor site. The Georgia Public Service
Commission is especially concerned about this issue since
as of December 2004, the costs incurred at Georgia Power
Company's Plant Vogtle attributable to spent nuclear fuel
storage are $8.7 million for additional racks within the
spent fuel pool. Given the existing capacity for spent
nuclear fuel storage at Plant Vogtle, Vogtle's storage pool
will begin to lose its reserve capacity in the year 2015 - at
which time Vogtle will begin to transfer assemblies to dry
cask storage on site. As you indicated in your question,
Southern Company is considering the Plant Vogtle site for
a new nuclear generating unit, so spent fuel storage and
disposal will likely figure notably into the Commission's
decision to certify a new nuclear unit.
This concern applies to siting future dry cask storage as
well to perhaps store the entire inventory of spent fuel for
the life of the reactor. As of December 2004, the costs
incurred at Georgia Power's Plant Hatch attributable to
spent nuclear fuel storage are $77 million. Given the
present capacity for spent fuel storage, Hatch will reach its
capacity of 48 dry casks in the year 2011. Southern
Nuclear intends to begin the expansion of the pads in 2009.
Here in Georgia, this is a real issue that deserves serious
consideration.
It is also my understanding that a revised waste acceptance
"standard contract" will need to be presented as part of the
Construction and Operation License application that meets
the requirements of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act more
realistically than the existing contracts.
Finally, it goes without saying that development of a
permanent repository and providing secure, complementary
interim storage would certainly make it easier to support
new nuclear plants.
RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF ANTHONY F. EARLEY, JR.,
CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, DTE ENERGY
COMPANY, ON BEHALF OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE
Anthony F. Earley, Jr.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
DTE Energy Company
2000 2nd Ave., Detroit, MI 48226-1279
Tel: 313.235.8600
October 13, 2006
The Honorable Joe Barton
Chairman, Energy & Commerce Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Chairman Barton:
Thank you for allowing me to testify before the Subcommittee on
Energy and Air Quality on Wednesday, September 13, 2006,
regarding the storage and disposal policy for nuclear waste. It is
my pleasure to respond to additional written questions for
inclusion in the hearing record.
The attached sheet provides my responses to your questions. If I
can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to call me. I
appreciate the opportunity to present our comments.
Sincerely,
Anthony F. Earley, Jr.
Attachment
cc: The Honorable Ralph Hall
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality
House Energy and Commerce Committee
The Honorable Joe Barton
Q1. To what extent is the development of new nuclear plants
dependent on solving the spent fuel issue?
A: As I stated in my testimony, unless progress is made on nuclear
waste issues, spending on new plants could slow and eventually
grind to a halt. To date, executives in the industry have been
willing to make investments to plan for nuclear plants. But as the
time approaches for commitment of larger sums, more certainty is
needed on the spent fuel issue. If the Department of Energy makes
visible and measurable progress on implementing a national used
fuel management strategy, with Yucca Mountain as a critical
component, companies will continue to move ahead, and the
financial markets will have the necessary confidence to support
these investments.
Q2. Under what conditions would it make sense to send
defense waste to the repository first, ahead of
commercial spent fuel?
A: It is important for the government to expeditiously meet its
already overdue contractual obligations to take title to and move
used nuclear fuel from existing plant sites. The federal
government could meet this obligation by consolidating storage of
used fuel at a very few surface facilities, perhaps including one in
Nevada. This might be done in order to better address potential
changes in the fuel cycle such as recycling. Under such a scenario,
it might make sense to consider emplacing defense waste in the
repository first.
Q3. Does it make sense to stall the development of Yucca
Mountain in order to allow time for reprocessing to be
developed and implemented?
A: No. Yucca Mountain will be needed in any fuel cycle we may
ultimately adopt and we must work to meet the recent schedule set
forth by the Department of Energy. In addition, there is a need for
timely disposal of both defense waste and older "legacy fuel" that
will not lend itself to cost-effective recycling. We should
structure repository operations that maintain flexibility to respond
to potential fuel-cycle developments, but we should not delay the
program based on expectations of future developments.
Q4. Among the additional actions you urge Congress to take
is incorporation of features into repository development
plans that maintain flexibility for future generations.
Why do you believe this is important?
A: It is very important for this nation's energy security that we
maintain a significant role for nuclear power through the 21st
century and beyond. There are two reasons that flexibility in
repository development can support this goal. First, technological
developments may allow us to better utilize the potential energy
that remains in used nuclear fuel, and to enhance the capacity of
Yucca Mountain to handle waste products. Second, while there is a
high degree of confidence that the repository will meet or exceed
regulatory requirements, it is prudent to monitor the facility's
performance for an extended period to further verify that
performance and take advantage of potential improvements in
waste disposal techniques.
Matthew L. Wald, "Big Question Marks on Nuclear Waste Facility," New York Times, February
14, 2006.
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, "Audit Report: Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management's Corrective Action Program," August 2006, DOE/IG-0736,
http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/IG-0736.pdf.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Observation Audit
Report No. OAR-05-05, Observation Audit Of Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC Internal Audit BQAP-
BSC-05-07," January 9, 2006.
Jeff Beattie, "Quality Control Issues: DOE Stops Work On Key Parts of Yucca Mountain," The
Energy Daily, Volume 34, Number 6, January 10, 2006.
National Research Council of the National Academies, Going the Distance? The Safe Transport of
Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States, 2006.
U.S. Department of Energy, The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: Greater Energy Security in a
Cleaner, Safer World, http://www.gnep.energy.gov/pdfs/06-GA50035b.pdf.
United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, Nuclear Waste:
Challenges to Achieving Potential Savings in DOE's High-Level Waste Cleanup Program, GAO-03-
593, June 2003.
U.S. Department of Energy, West Valley Demonstration Project Draft Waste Management
Environmental Impact Statement, May 2003.
Annie Makhijani, "French Report Doubts Merits of Reprocessing and MOX," Science for
Democratic Action Vol.9 No.2, February 2001, http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_9/9-2/charpin.html.
Steve Fetter and Frank N. von Hippel, "Is U.S. Reprocessing Worth the Risk?", Arms Control
Today, September 2005, p. 6-12. Irradiated fuel is extremely radioactive, which acts as a protective
barrier to theft of plutonium. Separated commercial plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons
and so-called "dirty bombs."
Clay Sell and Robert Joseph, Presentation on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) at
the Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, DC, February 16, 2006,
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/61808.htm.
IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-
3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf.
U.S. National Research Council, Committee on Separations Technology and Transmutation
Systems, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, National Academy
Press, Washington DC (1996), http://newton.nap.edu/catalog/4912.html
Economic Assessment Of Used Nuclear Fuel Management In The United States, Prepared by the
Boston Consulting Group for AREVA, July 2006,
http://www.bcg.com/publications/files/2116202EconomicAssessmentReport24Jul0SR.pdf
Arjun Makhijani, Plutonium End GameManaging Global Stocks of Separated Weapons-Usable
Commercial and Surplus Nuclear Weapons Plutonium, Institute for Energy and Environmental
Research, January 2001, p.27, http://www.ieer.org/reports/pu/index.html.
Ibid., p.21.
Thomas Cochran and Christopher Paine, Peddling Plutonium: Nuclear Energy Plan Would Make
the World More Dangerous, Natural Resources Defense Council, March 2006.
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record of Decision for the Construction and Operation of an
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) on the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of
Goshute Indians (Band) in Tooele County, Utah, September 7, 2006, page 22.
National Research Council of the National Academies, Safety and Security of Commercial Spent
Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report, 2006, page 64.
National Research Council of the National Academies, Going the Distance? The Safe Transport of
Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States, 2006.
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record of Decision for the Construction and Operation of an
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) on the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of
Goshute Indians (Band) in Tooele County, Utah, September 7, 2006, page 29.
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record of Decision for the Construction and Operation of an
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) on the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of
Goshute Indians (Band) in Tooele County, Utah, September 7, 2006, page 28.