<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:29970.wais]
NEED FOR EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLICIT
DRUGS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-148
(Committee on the Judiciary)
Serial No. 109-228
(Committee on International Relations)
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
and the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov
and http://internationalrelations.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
CHRIS CANNON, Utah MAXINE WATERS, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
RIC KELLER, Florida ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DARRELL ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
MIKE PENCE, Indiana DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
STEVE KING, Iowa
TOM FEENEY, Florida
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Philip G. Kiko, General Counsel-Chief of Staff
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida MAXINE WATERS, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Michael Volkov, Chief Counsel
David Brink, Counsel
Caroline Lynch, Counsel
Jason Cervenak, Full Committee Counsel
Bobby Vassar, Minority Counsel
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
Vice Chairman GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
DAN BURTON, Indiana ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
ELTON GALLEGLY, California Samoa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
PETER T. KING, New York ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
DARRELL ISSA, California BARBARA LEE, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JERRY WELLER, Illinois GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
MIKE PENCE, Indiana ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan DIANE E. WATSON, California
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
CONNIE MACK, Florida RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., Staff Director/General Counsel
Robert R. King, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
RON PAUL, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
JERRY WELLER, Illinois, Vice GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
Chairman ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida Samoa
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
CONNIE MACK, Florida BARBARA LEE, California
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
Mark Walker, Subcommittee Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Professional Staff Member
Brian Wanko, Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress from the
State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary... 1
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, Committee on International Relations............... 3
The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the
Judiciary...................................................... 5
The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, Committee on International Relations....... 6
WITNESSES
Mr. Michael A. Braun, Chief of Operations, U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration
Oral Testimony................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Sandro Calvani, Representative, United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime, Bogota, Colombia
Oral Testimony................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Major Raul Fernando Lopez, Colombian National Police, on behalf
of the Honorable Rosso Jose Serrano, Ambassador of Colombia in
Austria and Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Office in Vienna
Oral Testimony................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Indiana, and Chairman,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on
International Relations........................................ 46
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
Committee on the Judiciary..................................... 49
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, and
Member, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on
International Relations........................................ 50
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Barbara Lee, a Representative
in Congress from the State of California, and Member,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on
International Relations........................................ 54
Post-Hearing Questions to Michael A. Braun from the Honorable
Sheila Jackson Lee............................................. 55
Post-Hearing Questions to Sandro Calvani and Michael A. Braun
from the Honorable Barbara Lee................................. 56
Post-Hearing Questions to Michael A. Braun, the Honorable Rosso
Jose Serrano, and Sandro Calvani, from the Honorable Sam Farr,
a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
Member, Committee on Appropriations............................ 61
Letter to the Honorable Henry Hyde, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on
International Relations, from Ambassador John Bruton, Head of
Delegation, European Union, dated September 15, 2006........... 62
Letter to the Honorable Henry Hyde, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on
International Relations, including Outline of Drug Policies of
the European Commission in Colombia from Ambassador John
Bruton, Head of Delegation, European Union, dated September 19,
2006........................................................... 63
Charts from ``Report on Progress in Colombia'' of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy from November 17, 2005 Briefing to
Foreign Press Center........................................... 66
NEED FOR EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLICIT
DRUGS
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security
Committee on the Judiciary,
and
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 12:07 p.m.,
in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable
Howard Coble (Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security) presiding.
Mr. Coble. Ladies and gentlemen, I apologize to you all for
the delay. We had a vote on the floor, and we have no control
over that. And we will commence very shortly. And thank you for
your patience.
Good morning, again, ladies and gentlemen. Again, we
apologize for the belated kick-off. I hope you all understand
that.
I want to welcome you all to this important joint oversight
hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security and the House International
Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere to examine the
increase in trafficking of Colombian cocaine into Europe and
the role of the European community in combating cocaine
trafficking from the Andes.
I recently traveled to Vienna, Austria--well, recently, 8
or 9 months ago--to meet with the European and South American
leaders to discuss narcotrafficking. This meeting was hosted by
Ambassador Rosso Jose Serrano, the Colombian Ambassador to
Austria, and one of the witnesses who was invited to testify
before us today.
Although I was encouraged to learn that U.S. cooperation
with Colombian officials and vigilant efforts by our own DEA
have reduced cocaine shipments into the United States, I was
furthermore alarmed to hear that the Colombian cartels are now
turning their attention toward Europe.
I hope our witnesses today might address the Geneva
Convention reporting requirements for precursor chemicals. I am
told that U.S. chemical companies are required to notify
Colombian authorities when precursor chemicals are sent to
Colombia.
Although these requirements apply to the E.U., not all
countries have complied. In fact, Germany and the Netherlands
have become notorious in the drug enforcement community for
supplying Colombia's drug lords with the essential chemicals to
make cocaine.
I think it is important that we begin a dialogue with our
European counterparts to gain their full cooperation on this
critical component of cocaine production.
Portugal and Spain function as gateway nations for
trafficking Colombian cocaine into Europe. Both nations are
reporting massive increases in the amount of Colombian cocaine
interdicted over the last year.
For example, in the first 6 months of 2006, the amount of
seized cocaine increased to 30 metric tons, almost double the
18 metric tons seized over the entire previous year. If the
rate in the increase of seizures remains constant, Portugal and
Spain will experience a 400 percent increase in cocaine
seizures between 2005 and 2006.
Just this past Monday, Dominican authorities seized 2,250
kilograms of cocaine, the largest amount seized by that
country, concealed in a shipping container bound for Europe. In
total, it is believed that between 40 and 50 percent of all
Colombian cocaine is now sent to Europe.
Colombian cartels have realized several advantages to
shifting their attention to Europe. Aside from being more
geographically convenient than the United States, the
implementation of open borders between E.U. member states has
enabled traffickers to access markets across the entire
continent with relative ease.
Perhaps the most attractive aspect of the European market
to the Colombian cartels is the substantial increase in the
profit margin. The price of a kilo of cocaine in Europe is
roughly three times than that would demand in the United
States.
Profits from the illicit exportation of narcotics are
funding violent terrorist organizations, such the FARC and AUC.
These organizations engage in brutal acts of violence against
the government and civilians of Colombia and create an
environment ripe for exploitation by the cartels.
While the United States has successfully prosecuted several
paramilitary leaders and helped destroy thousands of acres of
coca in Colombia, DEA officials report that FARC and AUC are
operating in Spain, an indication that these organizations have
turned their attention to Europe as an untapped resource.
Over the past year, I have often cited the extreme violence
exhibited by paramilitary groups engaged in narcotics
trafficking. I hope that our European counterparts recognize
the imminent danger that these groups pose.
I am not laying blame or casting fault, but I am
disappointed that the European Union has chosen not to
participate in today's hearing, to which they were invited.
I am encouraged to learn that the seven European countries
are creating a counternarcotics liaison center in Lisbon,
Portugal, modeled after the Joint Interagency Task Force in Key
West, Florida. I encourage the DEA to offer its support and
assistance to these countries and the creation of this center.
I believe it will be a valuable asset to our Key West
operation.
I look forward, as I am sure my colleagues do, to hearing
from today's witnesses.
And I am now pleased to recognize Mr. Dan Burton, the
gentleman from Indiana, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere. And I thank him and his Members if they in
fact join us.
And, Dan, if you will suspend a minute, as we normally do,
the opening statements will be restricted to the Chairmen and
the Ranking Members, and all Members will be allowed to
introduce their respective statements and be made a part of the
record.
The distinguished gentleman from Indiana?
Mr. Burton. Chairman Coble, I want to, first of all, ask
how your surgery went this morning. Did it go well? He had to
run out to the hospital.
Mr. Coble. Well, I just told Mr. Scott, I went to the
butcher shop this morning, but I think I am okay. Thank you for
asking.
Mr. Burton. Well, you look good anyhow.
As Chairman Coble pointed out, we are at a critical
juncture in the war on drugs. Just as we and our Colombian
allies are starting to make real progress in Colombia, we are
finding that the path to ultimate success is being undermined
by the growing demand for and consumptions of Andean narcotics
in Europe, especially Colombian cocaine.
During a recent fact-finding trip to Spain and Portugal, it
was discovered that as much as 50 percent of Colombian cocaine
is now going to Europe. I think some of this has been mentioned
by my colleague. This development should send alarm bells
ringing through the capitals of Europe, the European Union and
at our own State Department.
Spain, for example, is now the second-largest consumer of
cocaine per capita, just behind the United States. Colombian
cocaine is being trafficked from Colombia, Venezuela and other
nations in our hemisphere directly to Europe. Spain and
Portugal, unfortunately, are the portals for this trafficking.
With rising demand in Europe and prices per kilogram, as
the Chairman said, reaching as much as three times more than
here in the United States, it is no wonder we are seeing record
seizures of cocaine in that region.
But what is more disturbing is that the drug flow to Europe
is undermining every effort that we are making to reduce
production in Colombia, thus destroying any hope for peace and
stability in that region.
Since Mr. Coble outlined the problem in detail, I wish only
to take a short moment here to offer some possible strategies
that can be readily adopted by Europe and the United States to
stem the flow of drugs and perhaps prevent the kind of drug-
abuse epidemic characterized by increased crime rates, high
body counts and broken communities that we have suffered here.
I hope somebody in Europe might be paying attention, because
they ought to be here today.
First, I would like to, as I said, air my disappointment
that the European Union has again declined to participate in
such an important hearing. This decision follows a November of
2004 request when we asked the Europeans to dialogue with us on
this very issue. Then, like now, we were rebuffed. With 50
percent of Colombian cocaine going to Europe, it is hard to
fathom their apparent lack of interest.
It is clear that drug trafficking is no longer just an
American problem. It is a global problem that will require a
concerted effort on the part of the Colombians, the Europeans
and the United States to resolve.
To do this, the Congress, the State Department and the Drug
Enforcement Administration must actively engage our European
allies to recognize the drug problem that they are suffering
and encourage them to become active players in the development
and pursuit of real solutions.
Europe, if you are listening, you can no longer sit on the
sidelines.
When Plan Colombia was first developed, it was believed
that the European Union would make good on its funding pledge
and support the non-security portions of the plan. This was the
so-called ``soft side'' assistance would have included
alternative development, educational initiatives, job training
programs and other programs designed to support farmers and
others who would leave the drug production business in Colombia
and elsewhere.
But much of the pledged assistance has never arrived. Now,
6 years later, the U.S. continues to pay the lion's share of
aid to Colombia, despite the fact that nearly half of all
Colombian cocaine is going to Europe.
It is time for Europe to revisit its previous commitment to
the soft-side assistance and begin a long-term relationship
with Colombia. For example, over the last few years, more than
40,000 members of the narcoterrorist groups FARC and AUC have
laid down their arms and are looking to re-enter society and
become good citizens with honorable work.
The European Union could contribute the necessary resources
to provide these most likely unskilled and untrained young
demobilized Colombians to have the education, job training and
other skills that they need to contribute to society.
I would like to thank the Dutch government for building a
demobilization center in Bogota, which now supports 600
demobilized fighters. We could use a lot more help like this
from the European Union.
Moreover, European law enforcement and other governmental
agencies in Europe can follow the lead of Spain as it works to
develop a joint European-Colombian law enforcement liaison
center in Lisbon, Portugal, much like our Joint Interagency
Task Force Center in Key West, Florida.
Putting such a center in Europe would allow law enforcement
officials from all over Europe to jointly operate with law
enforcement representatives from Colombia, Brazil and the DEA
here in the United States, where intelligence can be shared and
cooperative strategies to interdicting drugs can be developed.
To be successful, the U.S. Department of State should
provide assistance and operational support for the new
international police liaison center. In addition, all major
seizures of cocaine in Europe should be tested by DEA to see if
it is originating in Colombia, Peru or Bolivia. By taking these
simple actions and developing other cooperative programs, the
tide of drugs washing up on European soil can be reduced.
Europe is on the verge of a cocaine epidemic of historic
and tragic proportions. It is my hope that, by holding this
hearing, our friends and allies in Europe will receive the
message that it is high time to act and that their American
allies will stand with them to battle this deadly and mutual
enemy.
I agree with Mr. Calvani from the U.N. Office of Drugs and
Crime, whose testimony includes this quote: ``The international
community and the United States must share the responsibility
for reducing the world's biggest supply of cocaine. Cocaine-
consuming nations need to reduce drug demand, especially in
Europe, where abuse is rising rapidly.''
I ask unanimous consent that the letter sent by the E.U.
declining our invitation to testify in this hearing be entered
in the record, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, we have President Musharraf of Pakistan here,
and I have to run to that luncheon, but I will return just as
soon as the luncheon is concluded.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman. And, without objection,
that will be made a part of the record.
[The material referred to is available in the Appendix.]
Mr. Coble. I am now pleased to recognize the distinguished
gentleman from Virginia, the Ranking Member of our
Subcommittee, Mr. Bobby Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to join
you, Chairman Burton and Ranking Member Engel, our colleagues
from the International Relations Subcommittee, in convening the
hearing on the growing threat of cocaine in Western Europe.
It is my hope that Europeans will actually do a better job
than we have done in the United States in employing cost-
effective strategies in reducing the threat and impact of
cocaine and other illicit drugs.
In our so-called war on drugs, we have spent billions of
dollars annually over 20 years on supply-control strategies,
such as interdiction and law enforcement. At the same time, we
have spent very little comparatively on education and treatment
and other demand-reduction strategies, despite the fact that
all research shows those to be the most cost-effective
strategies by far in reducing illicit drug use.
If our goal is to reduce drug use, we should review the
1994 RAND study on controlling cocaine, when they estimated the
relative value and cost-effectiveness of four cocaine control
programs. Those four are source control, interdiction, domestic
law enforcement, and treatment.
This study answered the question: How much would Government
have to spend on each approach to decrease cocaine consumption
in the United States by 1 percent?
In brief, the study showed that, compared to treatment, it
cost seven times more to achieve the same result with domestic
law enforcement. It cost 10 times more to get those results
with interdiction, and 23 times more to achieve the results
using the strategy of source control.
The RAND study found that to achieve the 1 percent
reduction in cocaine use required $34 million if you use
treatment; $246 million for domestic law enforcement; $366
million using interdiction; and $783 million if you use a
strategy of source control to achieve the same 1 percent
reduction in cocaine use.
To be sure, there have been increasing successes on source
control, interdiction and law enforcement over the years. Plan
Colombia, on which the United States has spent billions, and
other crop eradication strategies such as the U.N. strategies
we will hear about today, have been a significant success.
However, during the same period, we have seen a steady
increase in production and supply, such that the quantity has
actually gone up in many areas and the price has actually gone
down.
There have been indications that there may have been
declines in United States use, but that is not because of a
reduction in supply. That is because the nature of the problem
we are dealing with is that even if you achieve a 90 percent
supply-side reduction, 10 percent is still available, and that
10 percent is so profitable that you can continue the trade.
Because the cost of the product is so low compared to the
cost at retail, illicit drug distributors know, just like
distributors in any other products know, that they can lose as
much as 90 percent of their cargo and still make a profit if 10
percent gets through.
So we must do something more than just be successful on the
supply-side control strategies to reduce and control illegal
drug use.
Now, I am not saying that we should reduce anything we are
now doing. Clearly, we must address criminal violation of our
drug laws. However, I am saying that we have the ability to
move forward from here based on knowledge and experience which
shows that we should be pursuing research-based strategies
using all of our approaches, which will actually reduce drug
supply and use, with the attention to the cost-effectiveness.
Clearly, our strategy of knocking off the big drug cartels
has not worked to reduce either supply or use. And ironically,
it appears that we may have actually increased the supply, in
that, with big ruthless cartels gone, we have many smaller
cartels and individual distributors who are even more elusive
than the large cartels were.
So, Mr. Chairman, I believe our advice to our European
colleagues in addressing the growing threat of cocaine is to
draw from our successes, failures, our research and knowledge
in crafting appropriate responses.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, and thank
you for convening the hearing.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, Mr. Scott.
And I am now pleased to recognize the distinguished
gentleman from New York, the Ranking Member from the
International Relations Committee, Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
thank you and Chairman Burton for calling this important
hearing, and my colleague, Bobby Scott, as well.
Today's Joint Subcommittee hearing focuses on the need for
European assistance to Colombia for the fight against illicit
drugs. I think it is good that we are having this joint
hearing. I think it highlights the importance that we attach to
this issue to have two Subcommittees from two different
Committees holding this hearing.
Obviously, stemming the trade in illicit narcotics is an
important topic that affects us all. It requires all nations to
participate fully if we are to roll back the tide of drug
violence and illegal drug abuse.
I am glad that our Subcommittee, in particular with
Chairman Burton, has been using the prism of our Subcommittee
to shine a bright light on the problem. It is important to hold
our Government's feet to the fire to make sure we are doing
everything possible to stop the flow of cocaine and other drugs
from Colombia. And I want to particularly thank Dan Burton for
his diligence and his interest.
But I think we have to be careful. I think we obviously
need the cooperation of Europe in many endeavors around the
world. We have a large number of shared interests with our
European allies, many of which rise to the level of vital
strategic concerns for the United States: We are working
together to halt Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. Our troops
are fighting shoulder to shoulder in Afghanistan to stamp out
the Taliban. We have troops under joint command in Kosovo,
where final status talks will soon reach their conclusion. And
the lists of shared interests of the highest order goes on from
there.
So I think I would like to emphasize our similarities and
our shared interests, rather than highlight any kind of
differences.
So I welcome the spirit of this hearing. With the enormous
range of shared strategic interests, it is possible that we
could also promote the goal of encouraging more European Union
cooperation in the fight against the Colombian drug trade, not
only through hearings, but through quiet meetings and
intensified diplomacy.
I am also a Member of the Europe Subcommittee, Co-Chair of
the European Union Caucus, and former Vice-Chair for the U.S.-
European Union Transatlantic Legislative Dialogue. I believe,
again, that it is important to have those dialogues.
And I hope that today's hearing will be viewed positively
on the other side of the Atlantic, because I know this hearing
is meant to be positive and helpful.
So, with that, I will again say that I share everyone's
interest in this problem. At a previous hearing, I raised the
question about Europe's effort in the fight against drugs. I
fully agree that this is a matter worth exploring. In the days
and weeks ahead, I have proposed that we work together to
approach our European allies.
And I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses.
Again, I hope that this hearing highlights the similarities
and what we are doing together to combat illicit drugs.
Obviously, it is never enough; we always need to be more
intense and to continue to work together. But I would like to
emphasize our joint interests and our joint cooperation, rather
than say, ``You guys aren't doing what you should be doing,''
because I think that we have much greater interests in working
together.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the distinguished lady
from Florida, has requested permission for her statement to be
made a part of the record. And, without objection, it will be
done.
[The material referred to is available in the Appendix.]
Mr. Engel. Mr. Chairman, if I might?
Mr. Coble. Yes, sir?
Mr. Engel. I also have something from Congressman Sam Farr,
who was a Peace Corps volunteer who served in Colombia. And he
also has a statement and some questions that I would like
unanimous consent to insert into the record.
Mr. Coble. Without objection, that will be done.
[The material referred to is available in the Appendix.]
Mr. Coble. Gentlemen, it is the practice of the
Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses appearing before it, so
if you would please stand and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Coble. Let the record show that each witness answered
in the affirmative.
You may be seated.
We have three distinguished witnesses with us today--well,
actually four, but one will not be testifying.
Our first witness is Mr. Michael Braun, Chief of Operations
for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Since joining the
DEA in 1985, he has also served as its Deputy Assistant
Administrator for Intelligence and interim Director of the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Intelligence Fusion
Center.
In June 2003, Mr. Braun was detailed to the Department of
Defense for a special assignment in Iraq as the chief of staff
for the Interim Ministry of Interior Coalition Provisional
Authority, where he assisted in creating the new Iraqi National
Police Service and customs and border agencies.
Mr. Braun holds a B.S. degree in criminal justice from the
Southeast Missouri State University and attended the Senior
Managers in Government Program at Harvard University.
Our second witness today is Dr. Sandro Calvani,
representative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
Dr. Calvani previously served as director of the United Nations
Drug Control Program regional office for the Caribbean, with
responsibility for U.N. drug control coordination in 29
countries and territories.
Under his leadership, UNDCP facilitated the development of
the Barbados Plan of Action, an integrated drug control program
for one of the largest regions in the world, endorsed and
sponsored by more than 40 nations.
He is the author of 16 books on substantial development and
development education and has been repeatedly quoted and
interviewed on drug trafficking in the Americas by leading
publications across the globe.
Dr. Calvani received his M.S. in biological sciences at the
University of Genoa, pursued post-graduate studies at Colorado
State University, the University of Louvain in Belgium, and
Harvard University.
Our final witness is the Honorable Rosso Jose Serrano, who
is here in absentia. Ambassador Serrano has been a figure in
the war against illegal drugs in the United States, Bolivia,
Germany, Great Britain and, finally, the Dominican Republic.
Prior to entering the diplomatic arena, he concluded 45
years of service with the Colombian National Police Force in
the position of general director. As director of the MPS Anti-
Drug Unit, Ambassador Serrano distinguished himself in the
fight against drug trafficking by initiating the fumigation of
illegal crops in Colombia, which produced considerable results.
He declared a direct national fight against criminal
organizations, especially those involved in drug trafficking,
which resulted in the dismantlement of the notorious Cali
cartel.
Ambassador Serrano holds a Ph.D. in law and politics at the
University of LaGrande, Colombia.
Unfortunately, the ambassador could not be with us today,
and reading his statement and taking questions will be Major
Raul Fernando Lopez of the Colombian National Police.
And, Mr. Lopez, who is your colleague to your left?
Major Lopez. Lieutenant Colonel Tuahiti, head of the
National Interdiction Unit for the Colombian National Police.
Mr. Coble. And it is good to have you with us too, sir.
Gentlemen, we operate around here on the 5-minute rule, as
you all have previously been told. We have examined your
statements. And when you see the amber light appear on the
panel before you, that is your warning that the ice on which
you are skating is becoming thin. You will have a minute to go.
When the red light appears, your 5 minutes have expired, and no
one will be keelhauled at that point, but if you could wrap up
when you see the red light appear.
And then Mr. Scott and I impose the 5-minute rule against
ourselves, as well, so when we ask you all a question, if you
could reply as tersely as possible.
We thank you very much for being here.
And, Mr. Braun, why don't you kick us off?
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL BRAUN, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS,
U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Braun. Thank you, sir.
Good morning, Chairman Coble, Chairman Burton, Ranking
Member Scott, Ranking Member Engel, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittees.
On behalf of administrator Karen Tandy, I want to thank you
for your continued support of the men and women that make up
the ranks of the DEA. And I want to thank you, as well, for the
opportunity to testify about the cocaine flow from South
America to Europe and DEA's cooperative efforts with our
European counterparts.
DEA's international offices support our organizational
attack strategy by focusing our efforts on the world's most
notorious drug trafficking syndicates. Cocaine trafficking in
Europe is directly linked to South American and Mexican drug
trafficking kingpins, the same kingpins that the DEA has in its
crosshairs.
DEA's activities in Europe and around the world are
seamless and support our single most important strategic
objective: to disrupt and dismantle the world's most notorious
and wanted drug trafficking organizations that are impacting
the United States and our allies.
Let me take just a minute to describe in part how Colombian
and Mexican global drug trafficking syndicates operate.
First and foremost, they rule by fear. They rely heavily on
the hallmarks of organized crime: corruption, intimidation and
brutal violence.
They will start with corruption. If that doesn't work--and
by the way, they have hundreds of millions of dollars at their
disposal to corrupt with--then they will turn to intimidation,
sometimes subtle intimidation, other times with outright
defiance in public.
If intimidation doesn't work, then they turn to brutal
violence, never to be outdone by any of the global terrorist
organizations, by the way. They are just as brutal.
Their organizational structures are incredibly
sophisticated. In fact, they are identical to global terrorist
organizations. And they have evolved that way to thwart law
enforcement.
The corporate headquarters are established south of the
border, oftentimes in palatial surroundings where that
corruption angle allows them to operate in such a fashion. They
have established command and control cells on our side of the
southwest border and now in various locations across Europe and
West Africa.
Those command and control cells receive daily guidance and
direction from corporate headquarters. The command and control
cells in turn provide daily guidance and direction to
subordinate cells responsible for drug distribution,
transportation, security and money laundering. These
subordinate cells, the worker bees, if you will, are working
all over our country and throughout Europe, West Africa and
elsewhere. They are so highly compartmentalized that if law
enforcement takes down just one cell or a few cells, we have
virtually no impact on the larger organization in whole.
How do they do it? They rely on the latest in technology to
communicate that guidance and direction at every step of the
way, as their drugs move in one direction and as the money
flows in another. They also rely on the latest in technology to
navigate, to move their drug loads to virtually any place on
the globe with pinpoint accuracy. They operate most effectively
in weak nation-states, and they spend hundreds of millions of
dollars to corrupt in these environments.
Like any Fortune 500 organization, global drug trafficking
syndicates are always searching for new markets. And Colombian
traffickers hit the powerball jackpot when they expanded their
operations into Europe.
A kilogram of cocaine that sells for $20,000 in the United
States easily sells for $75,000 or more in some places in
Europe. And I am not talking about the movement of tens of
kilograms of cocaine. I am talking about multi-ton quantities.
It is important to understand that those who are ultimately
responsible for trafficking cocaine in Europe are also the same
kingpins responsible for trafficking cocaine in the United
States.
Thanks to our outstanding relations with our European law
enforcement agencies and many others in the global law
enforcement community, we have experienced tremendous success
in disrupting and dismantling global drug trafficking
syndicates.
By working closely with our foreign counterparts, to
include the sharing of highly sensitive leads, we add value to
their investigations, they add value to ours. The end result is
maximum impact against those responsible for global drug
trafficking organizations.
We press forward our organizational attack strategy
throughout our ranks. Virtually all of our major investigations
eventually lead us to these same targets abroad.
Thanks to you, no other nation in the world has more strict
drug laws than the United States, and the stiff sentencing
guidelines that accompany those laws are feared the world over.
The last thing that any global drug trafficker wants--and I
want to stress this--the last thing that any global drug
trafficker wants to face is justice meted out in a United
States courthouse.
And by the way, our foreign counterparts--I don't want to
speak for Major Fernandez, but our foreign counterparts deeply
appreciate those very strict drug laws and stiff sentencing
guidelines that all of you have enacted. And that is something
that you should all be very, very proud of.
In summation, sir, I would simply say that there is one
other troubling factor that I would be more than happy to talk
about as we move deeper into these discussions, and that is the
close nexus between drugs and terrorism. I am convinced in my
mind, after 32 years of this business, you cannot fight one
without fighting the other and expect to win.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Braun follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael A. Braun
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Braun. And, by the way, we will
continue to dialogue with you on this. This will not conclude
after we adjourn today, I can assure you. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Braun. Thank you.
Mr. Coble. Dr. Calvani?
TESTIMONY OF SANDRO CALVANI, REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME, BOGOTA, COLOMBIA
Mr. Calvani. Chairman Coble, Chairman Burton, Ranking
Members Mr. Scott and Mr. Engel, good morning. Thank you for
the invitation for briefing the Members of the two Committees
on issues so relevant for global human security.
Since two of the world's most distinguished law enforcement
institutions are here and they are going to report on the
proper enforcement measures, which I share, I will limit my 5-
minute introduction to two of the key points which I presented
in my briefing which has been distributed to you.
The first one is a warning sign coming out of the increase
of area under cultivation, 6,000 hectares last year, despite
large-scale eradication, 139,000 hectares which have been air-
sprayed. It is a warning signal to the Colombian government and
to those that have participated in the joint drug control
efforts.
The signal should alert us to refine drug control policies
in Colombia in order to take into account the more challenging
security environment and the inevitable difficulty of
destroying coca fields fragmented in size, now around one
hectare per field, dispersed on steep mountain slopes, embedded
in protected national parks, and grown in proximity to
international borders.
The overriding strategy of putting an end to the coca
cultivation through eradication must be pursued relentlessly.
However, there should be a change in tactics, using finer and
more sustainable instruments.
In particular, the second strong popular mandate received
by President Uribe should make it possible for his new
government to launch a major drive in favor of greater
assistance to farmers in coca cultivation areas, accompanied by
structural policies devised to redistribute land, especially
land seized from drug lords, to internally displaced people.
In Colombia, like in other countries, poverty in the
countryside and lack of government control in many areas enable
large-scale illicit activities and the resulting violence. Wide
air-spraying remains cost-effective and keeps pressure on
insurgents and organized crime.
Coca farmers need to be convinced to eradicate their own
fields. Eradication backed by strong economic incentives would
give farmers a greater sense of ownership in the government's
zero-coca policy and increase the chance of long-term success.
My second point that I want to stress is the Colombian
president's new program, Forest Warden Families Programme. The
main objective is to motivate farmers to abandon illicit crops.
Every family receives $265 per month for a 3-year period.
We have recently evaluated this program, and we have found
surprising data: 82 percent of coca crops are eliminated for
good. They never recur in the area where the program is
present; 23 percent of the reforestation; 66 percent of the
direct beneficiaries are women.
Twenty thousand million pesos, which is more or less $8
million, has been used by these families to finance their own
development projects. This is more than what they receive of
aid from Germany and the United Kingdom together.
Twenty-five percent of the families bought lands, which
means 32,000 hectares. This is more than what has been done by
the National Land Reform Institute in 4 years.
Zero-nine percent of these families would consider a
possibility to return to illicit crops as an economic
subsistence or response to any problem. That means that 99.1
percent of these people don't want to go back to illicit crops.
That means that it is possible, if we reach one-third of
the families who are doing coca, it is possible to reach the
other two-thirds and reach 100,000 families who are now dealing
with coca.
Due to very low international aid, in particular by Europe,
we have reached so far only 20 percent of the population
producing illicit crops.
As you have stated, Chairman Burton, the national community
and the United States must continue to share the responsibility
for reducing the world's biggest supplies of cocaine. And
cocaine-consuming nations need to reduce direct demand,
especially in Europe where this abuse is thriving.
The United Nations is there to help and to serve all its
member countries in this undertaking and this endeavor.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Calvani follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Sandro Calvani \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This briefing is based on UNODC Report. Colombia. Coca
cultivation survey. June 2006. (Adapted and updated).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The world's appetite for cocaine remains stable but uneven,
declining in the United States while increasing in Europe. In 2005 more
than two thirds of the supply came from Colombia (640 tons), where coca
cultivation increased by 8% over 2004: a discouraging outcome taking
into account the resolute efforts of the Colombian Government to
eradicate this illicit cultivation.
However, this increase should be kept in perspective. The overall
level of coca cultivation in Colombia remains almost 50% below the peak
recorded in 2000. Furthermore, country-wide aerial eradication has
become more difficult due to a growingly aggressive insurgency fuelled
by the narco-economy (and vice versa).
The two major armed groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), on the extreme political left, and the United Self-
Defence of Colombia (AUC), also called the `paramilitaries' on the
extreme right. The armed groups monopolize the purchase and sale of
cocaine base and poppy latex and determine the taxes it charges to the
traffickers, to the laboratories, the landing strips and the
``gramaje''. They also guarantee territorial control for the
production. The armed groups promote illicit cultivation in their areas
of influence because the income from drug trafficking provides the hard
currency required in the international arms market. Therefore, the two
illegal adversaries, the guerillas and the paramilitary, engage in a
continuous and fierce fight to secure their income and finance their
operations. According to a National Planning Department study, the FARC
obtains 60% of its income from drug trafficking and the AUC has
recognized that most of their financing depends on drug trafficking.
Reportedly, for each dollar of cocaine sold in any of the streets in
the world, 10 to 15 cents end up in the hands of Colombia's armed
groups to continue financing the war.
The perverse vicious circle of drug trafficking-illegal crops-
violence has resulted in a heavy burden on social and economic
development. During the past ten years the country's financial
resources were squeezed to provide greater resources to combat the
narcoterrorism nexus and the resulting problems such as human rights
violations, corruption, political instability and environmental
destruction, in detriment of social and productive investment.
On the other hand, the UNODC study about productivity of coca
fields and processing of coca base, suggest that there is more cocaine
on the international market than previously believed. This may help
explain why the price for cocaine has not gone up and the purity of
doses has not decline on the streets of consuming nations, despite the
halving in cultivation since 2000, the massive number of labs destroyed
(1.953 in Colombia alone in 2005), and the dramatic (and still under-
appreciated) increase in seizures world wide.
Clearly, the 2005 increase of the area under cultivation (6.000 ha)
despite large-scale aerial eradication (139.000 ha) is a warning signal
to the Colombian government and to those, that have participated in the
joint drug control efforts.
This signal should alert us to refine drug control policies in
Colombia in order to take into account the more challenging security
environment, and the inevitable difficulty of destroying coca fields
fragmented in size, dispersed on steep mountain slopes, embedded in
protected national parks, and grown in proximity to international
borders.
The overriding strategy of putting an end to coca cultivation
through eradication must be pursued relentlessly. However, there should
be a change in tactics using finer and more sustainable instruments. In
particular, the second strong popular mandate received by President
Uribe should make it possible for his new government to launch a major
drive in favour of greater assistance to farmers in coca cultivation
areas, accompanied by structural policies devised to redistribute land
(especially land seized from drug lords) to internally displaced
people. In Colombia, like in other countries, poverty in the
countryside and lack of government control in many areas enable large-
scale illicit activities and the resulting violence.
While aerial spraying is cost-effective and keeps pressure on
insurgents and organized crime, coca farmers need to be convinced to
eradicate their own fields. Voluntary eradication backed up by strong
economic incentives would give farmers a grater sense of ownership in
the government's zero-coca policies, and increase the chance of long-
term success.
Countries that have shown the best results in the fight against
illicit cultivations have found that alternative development is the
most effective and sustainable eradication strategy. Indeed, a good
alternative development strategy guarantees that the producer himself
will destroy the illegal crops and will replace them with legal ones.
Moreover, when this new activity is tied to a sustainable and
profitable economy, the producer will not revert to growing illicit
crops in a new location. Providing farmers legal and profitable
alternatives and improving the living conditions in rural areas,
villages and urban centers in regions affected by illicit cultivation
proved to be the most effective socio-economic interventions, in order
to reduce the scope of organized crime and their potential and indirect
engagement in the conflict. The results of alternative development are
not immediate but they are indeed sustainable.
Alternative development policies are rather new in Colombia, if
compared with the situation in other countries. As a consequence, they
are permanently adjusted to the new strategic priorities of the
government and to the new scenarios that predominate.
The Colombian government has an innovative Programme of voluntary
elimination of illicit crops and alternative development, called:
``Forest Warden Families Programme''. The main objective is to motivate
farmers to keep their land free of illicit crops. The Programme also
aims to recover the forest in areas that are ecologically and socially
vulnerable. The government and the families involved should sign a
contract, which establishes monthly payments of US$265 per family for a
three years period. The Forest Warden Families Programme has two main
components: First of all, the environmental component deals with the
preservation of the environment. This involves technical support of
expert entities, thus, training families on the establishment of
productive and sustainable projects. The second component deals with
the increase of the social capital, by a permanent training of families
in community saving, leadership, and projects managements among others.
The selection criteria for the areas of each project is based on
the identification of a number of districts within one or two
municipalities that constitute a geographic unit along with the
commitment of the inhabitants to keep all farms of his own district
free of illicit crops. A break of this commitment from just one family
in a given district implies the withdrawal of all families of that
district from the Programme.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Colombia works on
the close monitoring of this Programme bringing greater cohesion to
UNODC's priorities and strategies on the elimination of illicit crops.
Recently, UNODC could inform the Colombian president, Mr. Uribe, that
the Programme had achieved a reduction of 82% on coca crops and an
increase of 23% on reforestation. Besides, 66% of the direct
beneficiaries are women. As a result, farmers across the country have
saved 20 thousand million pesos (Aprox. 8 million dollars) to finance
alternative development projects. In addition, these families have been
able to buy their own land with the salary they receive monthly. 25% of
the families bought lands during the PFGB (around 32,000 hectares)
resulting of 7,500 new families with their own land. Among the warden
families only 0,9% would consider a possibility of returning to illicit
crops as an economic subsistence.
Moreover, UNODC has fully supported the Alternative development
projects of the Colombian government. After various years of technical
assistance in the field of human security in Colombia, UNODC can
conclude from that experience that its projects have contributed to the
generation of a strong local social and human capital in the areas with
a greater presence of illicit cultivation. The process to form social
capital has focused on strengthening peasant organizations in the eight
most affected departments: Cauca, Narino, Putumayo, Caqueta, Guaviare,
Meta, Bolivar and in Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. As a result, today
all the producers' organizations have marketing agreements for their
products and they participate actively in the planning and development
institutions in their departments.
The UNODC projects have achieved: From 1996 to date more than 8,000
peasant families have benefited from alternatives such as double
purpose livestock breeding (meat and milk), forestry and traditional
crops such as coffee, cacao, plantains, fruits and palm hearts, among
others. The products of the alternative development projects in
Colombia are known in Colombia as ``Peace Products'' due to the evident
positive effects which they produce in the country.
It is considered that if the creation of rural businesses which
produce traditional crops such as coffee, beans, cacao, plantain,
fruit, palm hearts, forestry, among others, and at the same time the
support of the private sector can be relied upon for the
commercialization of these products, we will be achieving more
sustainable and successful policies against drugs in Colombia. For the
time being, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has
managed to sign marketing agreements with nationwide supermarkets such
as Carrefour, CAFAM and Exito-Casino and at the same time count on the
support of commercial European organizations like Andines (in France)
to support the elimination of illicit cultivations of coca and poppy.
The drug problem is not only a Colombian problem. It required
shared responsibility at world level, of the countries with high levels
of consumption, of those countries which facilitate trafficking routes,
of those who launder the proceeds or produce the necessary base
chemicals for the production of cocaine or heroin.
The collaboration provided for the marketing of alternative
producers, for the so-called ``Peace Products'', will be very valuable
as it will allow the reduction of monies received by armed groups in
Colombia, and slow down the advance of illicit cultivations into
environmental ecosystems that are priceless to humanity.
We estimate that approximately 6,000 hectares of illegal crops have
been eradicated and more than 50,000 hectares of legal cultivations
have been installed by UNODC projects. The commercialization agreements
with the private sector have generated important changes of the
socioeconomic and market conditions. In fact, with a permanent
``demand'' for legal products in the same producing areas and the
possibilities to compete against the illegal crops became real and the
concept of `illicit crop-free economy' became self-evident and no
longer an abstract dream, former illicit crop producers have now
abandoned for good any form of illegality and informality. They have
become proud shareholders of sustainable and successful peasant
companies. Carrefour and UNODC professionals could not ask for a bigger
prize.
Yet, despite of the facts mentioned before, most of the alternative
development projects have not achieved to consolidate an economic
alternative to more than 20% of the population producing illicit crops.
It is calculated that about 100.000 families live in Colombia with coca
crops; thus, more international support is crucial in order to
eliminate narco-traffic in Colombia. In the past decade, United States
funds have been of great support (US$7 million = 42% of UNODC/Colombia
total funds compared to 58% of Europe as a whole) but yet more
international contribution is necessary to win the war against drugs
(See Attachment 1).
The international community and the United States must share the
responsibility for reducing the world's biggest supply of cocaine.
Cocaine consuming nations need to reduce drugs demand, especially in
Europe where abuse is rising.
Thank you very much.
Attachment 1
INTERNATIONAL DONORS \2\
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
\2\ This information is only referent to international donor's
contribution, without taking into consideration Colombia as a donor.
However, Colombia is an important economic donor of UNODC/Colombia.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Dr. Calvani. I appreciate that.
Major Lopez?
TESTIMONY OF MAJOR RAUL FERNANDO LOPEZ, COLOMBIAN NATIONAL
POLICE, ON BEHALF OF THE HONORABLE ROSSO JOSE SERRANO,
AMBASSADOR OF COLOMBIA IN AUSTRIA AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN VIENNA
Major Lopez. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Congressmen, I
want to thank you for the invitation to attend the hearing
today. I want to thank you for allowing me to read General
Serrano's statement. I am going to read the most important
facts.
I will seize the opportunity to express my gratitude for
the great support that the Congress and the Government of the
United States has given Colombia and its government to
neutralize drug trafficking in my country, and especially for
the support rendered to the National Police of Colombia.
I have witnessed at first-hand the ill-fated evolution of
the global problem of illicit drugs. Now, as permanent
representative to the United Nations office in Vienna, I have
to come to grasp with the global panorama of this scourge from
another and clearer perspective.
It is undeniable that progress has been made. The
international community is beginning to understand that this
phenomenon is by nature transnational and that it is
consequently necessary to confront it in a joint, supportive,
committed manner. The times where countries pointed to each
other have passed, and now we are in the era of shared
responsibility.
Transnational drug trafficking is an ever-changing
phenomenon. Drug traffickers are constantly modifying their
operations in order to mock the authorities, who do not always
have the necessary capacity to adapt or to react.
These delinquents live in a permanent search for the line
of least resistance in order to introduce their drug to those
markets where control is most weak. This is what we see in the
case of cocaine in Europe and other regions.
The statistics contained in the 2006 World Drug Report,
published by the United Nations, clearly shows a tendency
toward consumption increase of cocaine in Europe--Spain and the
United Kingdom being the most affected.
A particularly dramatic case is Spain, whose annual
prevalence of cocaine use among the population between 15 and
64 years increased from 1.6 percent in 1997 to 2.7 percent in
2003. In the United Kingdom, the annual prevalence went from
0.3 percent in 1992 to 2.4 percent in 2004.
These statistics are based on government surveys and demand
for treatment in specialized centers. A similar study was
carried by scientists of the Mario Negri Institute of Milan for
Pharmaceutical Investigations, who took water samples from the
Thames River. The results suggest that at different points in
the river, cocaine consumption could be between 8 and 15 times
above the official estimates.
These results allow for the supposition that the statistics
that are officially administered concerning cocaine consumption
in the main European cities are a pale reflection of the
worrying reality.
In its 2005 report, the International Narcotics Control
Board indicated, ``The total volume of cocaine seizures in
Europe continues to grow, which might indicate that the illegal
use of this substance is widespread. Increase in the demand for
treatment of cocaine addiction in Western Europe also indicates
this situation.''
The greater part of cocaine destined for Europe enters via
Spain or the Netherlands, although in recent years its entry
via other countries with less important ports has increased.
Spain is a thermometer that allows measurement of the
tendencies in the rest of Europe. It is the principal entry
port of cocaine on the continent. The greatest part of cocaine
seizures in Europe occur in this country, and it is the third
country worldwide in drug seizures.
In view of the improvement of authority control, drug
traffickers have developed new routes. An increase of
trafficking via African countries has been evidenced, and also
the creation of alliances between mafias and the use of
traditional routes of other drugs such as cannabis, hashish and
heroin.
Cocaine prices in Europe are also an important indicator of
drug availability. According to the World Drug Report, a
tendency toward the reduction of cocaine prices has been shown,
as much in wholesale as in street price.
In conclusion, it is important to caution the European
Union of this serious problem, which has not been dimensioned
in its true magnitude. If these countries do not take the
necessary corrective measures, the cost they will have to
assume in social costs and in terms of public health will be
incalculable.
It is necessary to make Europe aware of the high cost that
Colombia is paying in trying to avoid that illicit drugs reach
their markets. This effort must be compensated by a true will
for demand reduction.
The European Union should, in the framework of shared
responsibility, increase its support and renew its commitment
toward the battle of our country against illicit drugs.
Drug trafficking is related to terrorism, and it is
important to understand this relationship and to strike at this
fountain of resources for terrorist groups.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Serrano follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Rosso Jose Serrano
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Major.
Mr. Braun, Portugal may exceed Spain as the leading gateway
nation for Andean cocaine headed for Europe, yet DEA has no
presence there. Does DEA plan to assign a permanent DEA agent
or agents to the embassy of Portugal?
Mr. Braun. We are looking into that, sir, right now.
But I can tell you that, with respect to personnel and
resources, we are strapped. We are under a hiring freeze right
now and don't expect to be hiring any additional agents for
probably the next couple of years.
But we are looking at it. We are exploring it.
I can tell you, the good news is that we visit Portugal on
a regular basis. Our agents visit Portugal on a regular basis
from our office in Madrid. And we will continue to do that.
Mr. Coble. Irrespective of where the cocaine from Colombia
is headed, either here or Europe, what role are illegal drugs
playing in financing the global terrorist movements? And are
the consumer nations, like those now in Europe, helping to feed
that financial support?
Mr. Braun. Thank you for the question, because this is
something I am real passionate about. And if you can, let me
just give you a 30,000-foot view of this nexus between drugs
and terrorism that I believe is growing at rates faster than
most want to admit.
Eighteen of our nations, 42 global terrorist organizations,
are tied to some aspect of drug trafficking activity. That can
be something as simple as taxing farmers, or it can be
terrorist organizations such as the FARC that are involved in
virtually every aspect of the drug trade.
State sponsorship, now, let's tie this part in. This is
important. State sponsorship for terrorism is decreasing, and
it has steadily decreased since after 9/11. And I believe the
actions we took in Afghanistan and Iraq play a big part in
that. That is one man's opinion. These organizations are being
forced to seek out other ways to finance their operations.
Many folks, my colleagues who are involved in
counterterrorism, are saying that they are seeing less and less
of a corporate terrorist cell structure, and what they are
seeing more of now is a franchise cell structure.
By that, I mean franchise cells that they may subscribe to
the theories and the ideology of, say, the al-Qaeda or some
other terrorist group, but for the most part they are not
taking direct guidance and direction from corporate
headquarters. They are pretty much out there on their own as a
franchise. Those franchise cells absolutely have to fund their
operations.
Now, let's talk about the estimates for global drug trade.
The U.N. estimates, I believe--Doctor, correct me if I am
wrong--but about $322 billion a year is generated in the global
drug trade. ONDCP, closer to home, estimates that about $65
billion is generated right here in the United States by the
global trade.
If you look at what happened in Madrid, the Madrid train
bombing was funded, my Spanish colleagues tell me, almost
entirely by or through the sale of ecstasy and through hashish.
It cost about $70,000 to pull that operation off. Again, you
know, trying to put it all into perspective here.
Something that is even more troubling to us is, let's just
look at the tri-border area of South America. The experts agree
it is a breeding ground for terrorist organizations and
potential terrorists. You can purchase a kilogram of finished
cocaine product in the tri-border area for about $5,000 a
kilogram. And that same kilogram can be sold in Saudi Arabia,
Israel or the UAE for upwards of somewhere between $150,000 to
$175,000 per kilogram.
So, in essence, you can take, with a $35,000 investment in
the tri-border area, you can take that investment in seven
kilograms of cocaine, put it into one suitcase, a normal-size
suitcase, and ship it to another part of the world, and you
have $1 million in profit. Okay? That is extremely troublesome
to us.
Now, some----
Mr. Coble. My time has expired, Mr. Braun, so I may have to
get back to you. We will have a second round.
And, Doctor, I will get with you and the major
subsequently.
But now I want to recognize the distinguished gentleman
from Virginia, Mr. Bobby Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think your line
of questioning really points out what we ought to be looking
at, in terms of strategy.
How much are we spending trying to do source control of
drugs in Colombia?
Mr. Braun. The United States?
Mr. Scott. The United States.
Mr. Braun. I don't have that number for you, sir, but I can
certainly get it.
Mr. Scott. A lot? Billions?
Mr. Braun. Sure. I would say a lot.
Mr. Scott. Billions?
Mr. Braun. Over time, yes, certainly.
Mr. Scott. What is the trend in cocaine price on the street
in the United States?
Mr. Braun. The trends, I am guessing you are talking about
price and purity? Pricing remains, I believe, about the same.
And the purity, ONDCP has reported that the purity has
declined. But the price, I believe, remains the same, or we may
have even seen a slight increase.
Mr. Scott. Well, if we are going to have a rational
process, we ought to have some goal in mind in order to have
some cost-effective measure.
How much more would we have to spend to have a meaningful
impact on the cost of cocaine on the street?
Because if you are catching 10 percent or 20 percent or 50
percent, and the price of the product is a very small portion
of the price on the street, how much would we have to catch or
reduce coming into the United States to have a meaningful
effect on the price of cocaine on the street? A lot? Can we get
there?
Mr. Braun. Look, I am convinced we can get there. If I
wasn't convinced that we could get there, I would have----
Mr. Scott. Well, you asked for some more money. I mean, are
you representing that you can have a meaningful impact on the
cost of cocaine on the street to the point where a drug addict
approaches his dealer and the dealer says, ``Well, you know, I
just can't get any, it's not available''?
Mr. Braun. Well, I don't measure it, quite honestly, by
price and purity. I measure our success, the DEA's success, in
more than one way. But, you know, we are----
Mr. Scott. Well, tell me some ways that you measure your
success.
Mr. Braun. Well, we measure our success by the number of
major drug trafficking syndicates that we have either
significantly disrupted or the numbers that we have dismantled.
Mr. Scott. And what difference did that make to the
availability of drugs? I mean, I think our goal is to reduce
drug use in the United States. When you bust a drug cartel, how
much difference did that make?
Mr. Braun. Okay, well, again, I don't base it on just price
and purity. We have seen or experienced a reduction in the
abuse of cocaine in the United States over the past few years.
The most recent household survey from the University of
Michigan indicates that, I believe for, like, a third straight
year now, we have seen teenage abuse of cocaine continually
decline.
Mr. Scott. Now, how much of that can be attributable to
what you are doing? And how much can be attributable to other
things, the most cost-effective ways that we are dealing with
drug abuse?
Mr. Braun. I don't know if there is any way that we can
determine exactly what credit enforcement would receive versus
prevention and education or treatment.
Mr. Scott. Well, if the cost hasn't gone down and the same
amount of cocaine is available, the only variable appears to be
demand. The supply will meet the demand. And that there is
virtually nothing that you have done or propose to do that is
going to affect the ability of the cocaine dealers to meet the
demand. Is that right?
Mr. Braun. Look, here is what I believe most experts would
agree on: A successful strategy is a three-legged stool.
Enforcement has to be relentless and aggressive. You can't back
away from it. You have to have prevention and education, and
you also have to have treatment.
Mr. Scott. In my remarks, I mentioned that the costs of
reducing drug use in the United States can be achieved, 1
percent reduction can be achieved with $34 million if you are
dealing in treatment, but hundreds of millions, almost a
billion, if you are trying interdiction.
Doesn't it make more sense to invest the next dollar that
we spend in prevention and not fund spinning your wheels doing
interdiction and source control?
Mr. Braun. I believe many experts would disagree with your
figures and your numbers.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Do you have any study that disagrees with
the RAND study of 1994?
Mr. Braun. Off the top of my head, I don't have.
Mr. Scott. Okay.
Thank you.
Mr. Coble. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The distinguished gentleman from Ohio. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
holding this important hearing.
If I could start out by discussing a trip that I made with
one of my colleagues, Judge Louie Gohmert. Earlier this year,
we had the opportunity to see first-hand what the situation is
relative to the battle against drugs in Colombia.
And I know, Major Lopez, we had an opportunity to meet
there and saw and learned an awful lot. I want to thank you for
that experience.
One of the issues, I remember when we were flying over some
of the national parks, we would see smoke, which was where the
drug dealers had burned an area, and then they would plant
cocaine there and then they would keep an eye on it and harvest
it later on. It was in patches throughout the park.
And there is an aerial spraying program down there. And our
Government, because of a policy--and my understanding of it is
that especially European countries objected to spraying in
parks, and they had sort of adopted that environmental
protection attitude. And it made it very difficult to get at
some of these places where the drug dealers were going
literally into the parks and planting it on park land.
And there were a number of instances where you had to go in
and hand-eradicate, you know, pluck the plants out or chop them
down or whatever one does to get rid of the stuff. And a number
of the people doing that were either wounded or, in some cases,
even killed, because it is a very dangerous endeavor and would
be a lot safer if you could just hit that particular patch from
the air.
And it is basically my understanding it is like Roundup,
the same stuff we use here in this country. So it is not like
it is unknown what type of material one is using and it might
be very dangerous or something.
Could you discuss what the status is of that program
relative to eradication from the air, especially with respect
to the parks when the drug dealers go in there?
And are you able to now hit those places from the air? Or
do you still have to do this in the very expensive and time-
consuming manner and dangerous manner of doing this by hand?
Major Lopez. Sir, we just finished to spray one of the--not
to spray. We were doing manual eradication in one of our
national reserve parks, which was in the Macarena. That is in
the east side of Colombia. There was about 2,000 hectares of
coca. We were doing manual eradication.
Mr. Chabot. And the manual eradication is doing it by hand?
Major Lopez. Yes. We were doing it, but what we found out,
sir, is that the terrorists were tying the landmines to the
plants, so when the people were pulling the plants, they were
getting blown up.
Since January, we have lost 19 military soldiers. We lost
12 policemen and 18 civilians that were working with us on the
Macarena park work.
Mr. Chabot. These were killed?
Major Lopez. Were killed.
Mr. Chabot. Nineteen soldiers, 12 policemen and 18
civilians?
Major Lopez. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chabot. So they would be pulling a plant up or chopping
it down or whatever, and it would be boobytrapped with a mine?
Major Lopez. Yes. In the last attack, it was a bomb. It was
like a can full of explosives, and eight workers were killed.
So, at the end, we had to spray, because a lot of our work
people were at risk and a lot of our work people were being
killed.
Mr. Chabot. And it is much more expensive and time-
consuming, as well as dangerous, to do it that way.
Major Lopez. Yes, sir, because in order to do the manual
eradication, we had to move a lot of policemen and soldiers
just to do 2,000 hectares of coca manual eradication.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Now, is the change to eradicating from
the air, is that now the policy elsewhere as well?
Major Lopez. That is something that had to be decided by
our government. We just execute the policy, sir.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Do you know what the government policy is
at this point with respect to aerials? Or perhaps Dr. Calvani?
Mr. Calvani. Yes. This discussion has been held at the
president level. The policy is still not to spray the national
parks, continual manual eradication, with the only exception of
Macarena for the reason that the major has explained.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Because for what it is worth, just as an
American legislator here--and we send a fairly significant
amount of dollars down there, and we want the dollars to be
used as efficiently as possible--I would strongly urge, it was
the one thing I brought back that seemed, for both safety
reasons for the people doing it and efficiency, that we ought
to encourage that.
Mr. Braun, did you want to comment on that?
Mr. Braun. Sir, I mean, with all due respect, eradication
is about as far outside of my lane as possible. I am an
enforcement guy, and I always have been.
Look, I can tell you, though, that I think the most
important point to be made here is that our counterparts, our
Colombia National Police counterparts, whom we work very, very
closely with, have shown, I think are a model, have shown that
the Colombian people have the will to win.
These guys and gals have lost over 3,000 police officers in
just the past few years, but yet they go out and they continue
to face that beast day in and day out.
And they are winning. If you look at what is happening in
Colombia, the numbers of bombings have been reduced
significantly. The numbers of kidnappings have been reduced.
The numbers of homicides have been reduced. The numbers of, I
believe, even sex crimes, talking about rape, have been
reduced. And that has all taken place over just the past few
years.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent for an
additional 2 minutes, if I could.
Mr. Coble. Without objection.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you.
With respect to what you just said, Mr. Braun, I also want
to make that observation to Major Lopez, that we were all very
impressed with the dedication of the personnel, both military
and police personnel, that we met with. Everyone involved was
just exemplary.
And we had the opportunity to go, for example, to the
police memorial with all the many, many, literally thousands, I
believe, that have been killed. We went to the hospital and saw
the most horrendous wounds that had been suffered by these very
brave personnel.
So we want to thank you and commend you and your fellow
workers in that respect.
Mr. Braun, if I could just conclude by asking you, the
Europeans are planning a counter-drug liaison center in Lisbon,
modeled after our JIATF in Key West. What role will DEA play in
the center? And will you have a presence there in Lisbon?
Mr. Braun. It is still in the planning stages, is my
understanding, sir, and we have not been invited to
participate. However, I am sure I will.
The problem that we face is, once again I am going to go
back to human resources, where we are having a tough time
staffing domestic and foreign positions as we speak, because of
the hiring freeze that we are under.
And, you know, I can tell you without any hesitation or
reservation, however, that if this thing is stood up quickly
and if we cannot have a permanent presence, if we find that we
are not able to do it permanently, I assure you that we will
have our folks from Madrid visiting the center on a regular
basis. And I can assure you that the intelligence from the DEA
will flow into that center, as we are doing daily with our
European counterparts.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, as my time concludes, if I could just
conclude by saying that we had an opportunity also at the
American embassy in Bogota to discuss and talk about the three
Americans that are still being held down there. And I know that
everyone there and everyone is committed to trying to get them
back here to their families as soon as possible, safely. So we
want to encourage anything that we can do to help in that
effort.
Thank you.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
The distinguished gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel?
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to briefly talk a little bit about Plan Colombia. I
want to start with Mr. Braun, in asking you, is the U.S.
counter-drug strategy working in Colombia? Has the price and
purity of cocaine decreased on the U.S. street since the
inception of Plan Colombia? And could you briefly tell us a
little bit about Plan Colombia?
Mr. Braun. Well, first of all, as far as the price and
purity, again, I believe we need to have the experts from ONDCP
here, or maybe at some future meeting, to discuss that. They
are the folks that really track those numbers.
But I can tell you, based on what I know from my Colombian
counterparts and from personal experience back in the mid-
1980's to almost the mid-1990's, I spent a lot of time in Peru,
Bolivia, Colombia, through the northern-tiered countries of
Central America, working shoulder to shoulder with host-nation
counterparts on counter-narcotics operations, hitting
laboratories, cache sites, transshipment points, those kinds of
things.
And I can tell you that--and I believe our Colombian
colleagues encounter this to this day; it has never changed--
that when we hit the traffickers hard, they have the ability to
re-establish operations. They have laboratories that lay
dormant for perhaps months, if not years, that are ready to go
if they take a major hit anywhere in that Andean region.
And as long as you can produce cocaine finished product for
$600 to $1,000 a kilogram and sell it in, let's just talk about
our country, for, say, $20,000 or $25,000 a kilogram, there is
a tremendous potential margin there. And they can quickly over-
produce.
So, again, I don't rely, as far as success, on price and
purity. I don't think price and purity actually tells you a
whole lot.
Mr. Engel. Since you mentioned Peru and Bolivia, let me ask
the major, to what extent has Plan Colombia resulted in drug
cultivation increases in neighboring countries such as Peru and
Bolivia?
Major Lopez. I don't have those numbers, sir.
Mr. Engel. Okay. Do you have any feel about it? Has it
resulted in increases?
Major Lopez. Well, we have seen surveys that they are
requesting more support from our units to go there and help
them to support their operations, sir.
Mr. Engel. All right. Thank you.
Dr. Calvani, Plan Colombia has reportedly been
controversial in Europe, especially among some European
policymakers. Can you tell us what are some of the criticisms?
And has European opinion shifted over time?
Mr. Calvani. Maybe I am not the best to report on that
subject, however, living in Bogota. I regularly listen to the
ambassadors of the European Union and the European Union member
countries.
The most common comment that they make is that the United
States does not consult and the Colombian government does not
consult with European members before deciding their own
bilateral program. That is the reason why European members
don't think that they are involved, or they can't share that
kind of responsibility.
Another issue is that they are willing to apply to Colombia
the same measures of alternative development which have been
successful in other countries, in more than 10 countries around
the world, which have eliminated illicit trafficking in a
sustainable way. The most recent experience being Thailand,
Vietnam, Laos, where the United Nations has certified complete
elimination of illicit crops after a sustained alternative
development initiative.
I wish also to take this opportunity to answer a question
by Mr. Scott to Mr. Braun before, with reference to how much
the Colombian program has reduced the trafficking in Colombia.
The study of the Colombian government has stated that only
9 percent of coca farmers now receive international assistance.
While the coca crop has been eliminated completely through air-
spraying, only 9 percent of the peasants have received the aid.
The total value or the potential farm aid value of coca
products in Colombia is $840 million U.S.
So for Mr. Scott, this is actually what we have to replace.
It is not the cost of trafficking, because that is money which
does not come directly to Colombia. And presently we don't
reach $200 million spent in alternative development. As I have
stated in my introductory comments, we have to reach the other
two-thirds of people who have not been reached.
If we reach those people, those people really renounce for
good. They never go back to the illicit crops. That is also
demonstrated in the manual eradication program. In the manual
eradication program, the level of re-cropping is extremely low.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman from New York.
And we will start our second round of questioning now.
Dr. Calvani, I don't believe this has been asked to you.
You mentioned that Colombian coca cultivation in 2005 increased
by 8 percent over 2004. To what do you attribute the increase,
A? And B, why has the eradication of coca become more
difficult?
Mr. Calvani. It is difficult to have scientific evidence.
However, from the 55 monitors we have in the field every day,
they visited last year 1.5 million hectares, and they have a
database of 32,000 families, interviewing all of these people.
The result of this survey suggested that the reason why we
got the very slight increase--I must remind you that this comes
after a reduction of 51 percent of hectares in the last 5
years. So the trend was extremely down, then a little bit going
up does not mean so much.
Anyhow, this going up might be due to the fact that
alternative development programs have been significantly
reduced in the past years. The aid that we receive from the
USAID has been reduced significantly. And we are no longer able
to reach a significant part of the coca peasants.
And that is also the reason why, since the demand has not
gone down, particularly in Europe, that is the reason why the
crop has also increased in the past years a bit in Peru and
Bolivia. And the crop which has gone up in Colombia is now
instead found an opposite balloon effect in Bolivia and Peru.
And then the second question was?
Mr. Coble. Why was it difficult?
Mr. Calvani. Why is it difficult? Because the people are
moving inside the forests. Instead of having like they had
before, two or three hectares per family, now they go inside
the forest and they do very small crops. Now they are becoming
one hectare. So it is very difficult to hit by air-spraying one
hectare spread in 86,000 spots.
Mr. Coble. Yes. Thank you, Doctor.
Major, I will really put this question to you. Mr. Braun
may want to weigh in. The cocaine flow to Europe is massive, as
we have learned. And Spain appears to be the main gateway point
into Europe for those drugs.
How many Spanish anti-drug police are in Bogota? And how
often do you work with them, as you do our DEA?
Major Lopez. Sir, at this moment, about 2 months ago, just
one guy arrived. From DEA, it is about 125 DEA agents working
with us on a daily basis.
Mr. Coble. One Spanish anti-drug?
Major Lopez. Yes, sir.
Mr. Coble. Okay. And how many DEA agents are in Bogota?
Major Lopez. It is about 125.
Mr. Coble. About 125. Thank you, Major.
Mr. Braun, let me put this question to you. What percentage
of the cocaine seized by the excellent Colombian National
Police at El Dorado Airport in Bogota is headed for Europe? And
what does that tell us about trafficking trends?
Mr. Braun. Sir, I believe it is about 80 to 85 percent of
all the seizures at the airport are destined for Europe. I
mean, I would have to stress that many of these are small
quantities.
Mr. Coble. What was the percentage again?
Mr. Braun. Somewhere between 80 and 85 percent.
Mr. Coble. Okay.
Mr. Braun. These are small quantities, though. These are
typically one to two or three kilograms that are body-carried
onto a flight destined for somewhere in Europe.
Mr. Coble. This may sound like a stupid question, but does
that tell us that consumption inevitably is being reduced in
our country?
Mr. Braun. Well, again, the facts and figures clearly
indicate that cocaine consumption is on the decline in the
United States.
Mr. Coble. Well, common sense would tell me that, because
heretofore we would have been the Europe beneficiary, in the
older days.
Mr. Braun. That is a good point. It appears to have shifted
significantly.
Mr. Coble. Major, let me come back to you before my red
light comes on. What are authorities in Bogota doing to
dismantle the paramilitary groups and to cut off communication
to their trafficking networks?
Major Lopez. Excuse me, sir. Can you repeat the question,
sir?
Mr. Coble. Yes. What are the authorities in Bogota doing to
dismantle the paramilitary groups and to cut off communication
to their trafficking networks?
Major Lopez. Sir, we have been treating the AUC as FARC,
and we doing operations against them, against their labs, their
cultivation, sir. So we are getting very good results with
them.
Mr. Coble. And you feel that it is effective?
Major Lopez. Yes, sir. It is working.
Mr. Coble. All right. I see the red light is in my eye. Now
I will yield to my friend from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, our goal is to try to reduce the amount of drug use
in the United States, and I think we are all looking at our
districts.
If we were to eliminate cocaine coming from Colombia, are
there other sources of cocaine?
Mr. Braun. All the cocaine in the world is being produced
in the Andean region, primarily Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. So
if you cut Colombia completely off, you are still faced with a
flow out of Peru and out of Bolivia.
Mr. Scott. Would that be sufficient to meet the demand in
the United States?
Mr. Braun. I am not sure. I would have to get back with
you.
Mr. Scott. We have heard suggestions that the cocaine use
has been going down in the United States. Is that because
people are using less drugs generally, or using meth, ecstasy,
hash and other drugs instead?
Mr. Braun. I believe the numbers across the board are
declining, but let me check with ONDCP and get back with you on
that.
Mr. Scott. Is the use of meth going up or down?
Mr. Braun. Again, I would have to check with ONDCP.
Mr. Scott. Could somebody comment on the health
implications of the spraying program in Colombia? Is it healthy
or unhealthy for the residents of Colombia to be subjected to
all of the spraying? Are there health implications involved?
Mr. Calvani. A number of studies are available on the
Internet, sir, done by reputable international organizations,
including the Organization of American States, suggesting that,
so far, it has not been possible to detect any unhealthy impact
of the air-spraying.
Also because, by the way, glyphosate, which is the
substance used for spraying, is largely used in Colombia for
other purposes. Ninety-percent of glyphosate used in Colombia
is not air-spraying. It is normal agriculture use. And
glyphosate is also largely used in the United States for normal
control of golf courses, of cornfields and so on. It is a very
common substance.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that
a statement from Representative Barbara Lee be submitted for
the record. And she had questions that she would like submitted
to the witnesses. If these could be submitted on her behalf, I
would appreciate it.
Mr. Coble. Without objection.
[The material referred to is available in the Appendix.]
Mr. Coble. I would also like to make a part of the record
the report on Progress in Colombia published by the Office of
National Drug Control Policy, Mr. John Walters, director.
[The material referred to is available in the Appendix.]
Mr. Scott. And, Mr. Chairman, a statement from the
representative from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee. She has an
opening statement she would like part of the record.
Mr. Coble. And that will also be made a part of the record.
[The material referred to is available in the Appendix.]
Mr. Coble. If you all will suspend just a moment, John,
what did you have to say?
I have some questions for Mr. Burton that I will ask. Mr.
Scott and I may go a third round.
Let me ask you all this before I forget it. Let me depart
for a moment from Colombia. To what extent, if any, or what
impact, if any, does organized crime in Russia have to do with
the increased trafficking in Europe? Or do you know?
Dr. Calvani may be in a position. Or do you know, Mr.
Braun?
Mr. Braun. Russian organized crime is not--I am not going
to tell you that they are not involved in some trafficking in
Europe, but they are not viewed as a significant threat in the
trafficking of cocaine in Europe.
Mr. Coble. Okay. How about other drugs? Doctor, do you want
to weigh in on that?
Mr. Calvani. Yes, I can confirm that. They are not involved
in cocaine trafficking, but they are heavily involved in other
drugs, including, in particular, heroin from Afghanistan.
Mr. Coble. Heroin?
Mr. Calvani. From Afghanistan.
Mr. Coble. Yes. We know that Colombia, of course, is the
main arsenal for cocaine. I assume that Afghanistan continues
to be the main source of heroin. Is that correct? What would be
the second-largest producer of heroin?
Mr. Calvani. Myanmar, sir.
Mr. Coble. Pardon?
Mr. Calvani. Myanmar, former Burma.
Mr. Coble. Okay. Thank you.
Now, let me read this question for Mr. Burton. If the
Colombians are getting two or three times more per kilo for
cocaine in Europe than in the U.S. and we are reducing their
cocaine production in the country, doesn't what we see
happening in Europe with cocaine seriously undercut our
Colombian policy and doesn't the DEA have to now change some
thinking and staff allocations?
This was from Mr. Burton.
Mr. Braun?
Mr. Braun. I am going to have to really think about that
one long and hard, and----
Mr. Coble. Well, and you can get back to him. We are going
to leave the record open for 7 days.
Mr. Braun. Yes, sir. We will get back with you on that.
Mr. Coble. The bell is sounding, which means we are going
to be called to the floor.
Mr. Scott?
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that questions on
behalf of Ms. Jackson Lee be submitted to the witnesses.
Mr. Coble. That will be done.
Gentlemen, we again thank you for your testimony today.
This will be ongoing, folks. We are not cutting you loose after
today. We will stay in touch, but we thank you for your
testimony.
In order to ensure a full record and adequate consideration
for this important issue, the record will be left open for
additional submissions for 7 days. Any written question that a
Member wants to submit should be submitted within that 7-day
period.
This concludes the oversight hearing on the need for
European assistance to Colombia for the fight against illicit
drugs.
Thank you, again, for your cooperation.
The Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:27 p.m., the Subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Indiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, Committee on International Relations
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on
the Judiciary
Mr. Chairmen, I move to strike the last word. I thank the Chairmen
and Ranking Members for holding this hearing.
The purpose of the hearing is to examine the dramatic increase in
trafficking of Colombian cocaine into Western Europe and the role of
the European Community in combating cocaine trafficking.
We are fortunate to have appearing before us today as witnesses Mr.
Michael Braun, Chief of Operations, U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration and Mr. Sandro Calvani, Representative, United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime. I understand that the Honorable Rosso Jose
Serrano, Colombian Ambassador to the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, is not able to be with us this morning but has submitted a
statement that will be presented by Major Raul Fernando Lopez of the
Colombian National Police.
Mr. Chairmen, Western Europe is experiencing a surge in cocaine
trafficking from Columbia. What used to be seen solely as an American
problem is now increasingly becoming a European problem. Roughly 40 to
50% of all Colombian cocaine is now sent to Europe. As a result, the
European Community is experiencing unprecedented seizures and rising
cocaine addiction rates. European officials consistently report that
the primary illicit drug used to be heroine from Afghanistan. While
heroine is still prevalent, law enforcement officials now report that
cocaine has surpassed heroine as the drug of choice for both
traffickers and users.
Portugal and Spain are the primary ``gateway nations'' for
trafficking Colombian cocaine into Europe. In recent months, both
nations have reported major cocaine seizures from Colombia. In just the
first six months of 2006, seizures have doubled to nearly 30 tons. It
is estimated that these seizures account for only \1/3\ of the total
amount of drugs trafficked into Europe.
Large quantities of Colombian cocaine are brought by ship from
Columbia, Venezuela, and Brazil. The cocaine is then transferred out at
sea to smaller ``fast boats'' that in turn bring it to shore. This
method presents several hurdles for law enforcement, not the least of
which is equipment and manpower to seize the cocaine before it is
transferred to the fast boats.
Africa also plays a significant role in cocaine trafficking into
Europe. From North Africa, fast boats are now using long-standing
hashish routes to bring in cocaine. Although these routes are well
known to law enforcement, the fast boats are extremely difficult to
locate and interdict. West Africa is a staging ground for processing
raw coca into street-grade cocaine and for smuggling smaller quantities
of cocaine via commercial aircraft. This is particularly significant
for Portuguese-speaking nations such as Cape Verde, which is a large
transit point between Columbia and Europe.
Mr. Chairmen, Europe is a much more attractive target for cocaine
trafficking than the United States for several reasons: 1) it is
geographically more convenient; 2) Europe now has open borders between
EU member states, and 3) a kilo of cocaine garners three-times the
profit in Europe than in the U.S. This increase in drug trafficking has
produced an increase in violent crime, particularly in Spain and
Portugal, an increase in illegal immigration, and an increase in
document fraud. Spain and Portugal require visas for Colombian
nationals but not for Brazilian or Venezuelan nationals. Thus, many
Colombian drug traffickers are entering Spain and Portugal using forged
Brazilian and Venezuelan passports.
The rise in Colombian cocaine into Europe has serious implications
for America's efforts to end Columbia's cocaine legacy and, most
significantly, the use of cocaine profits to fund the terrorist
activities of organizations. The fledgling yet ever-expanding cocaine
market in Europe serves to undermine America's efforts to dismantle
narco-terrorism in Columbia.
There are currently 125 DEA agents assigned to the Bogot Country
Office (BCO) who assist Colombian authorities with identifying and
dismantling drug cartels. According to a 2005 report by the Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), cocaine purity is declining while
price is increasing. Every acre of coca destroyed and every kilo of
cocaine seized means less money for the drug cartels and para-military
groups. It is clear that the cartels have turned their attention
towards Europe as an untapped resource for cocaine distribution to
finance their terrorist activities.
I am looking forward to hearing from the witness and considering
their responses to the subcommittee's questions.
Thank you. I yield the balance of my time.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, and Member,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on International
Relations
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Prepared Statement of the Honorable Barbara Lee, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California, and Member, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, Committee on International Relations
Today's hearing is the first subcommittee hearing since Dan Getz,
the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee's professional staff passed away.
And I would again like to express my condolences to Chairman Burton,
his staff and Dan's family on the loss of such a kind-hearted and hard-
working young man. His untimely passing shocked members and staff on
both sides of the aisle and his absence is felt by all.
I would like to thank Chairman Burton, Chairman Coble and Ranking
Members Engel and Scott for hosting today's hearing on the European
Union's role in Plan Colombia.
Like the vast majority of my constituents. I strongly believe that
Plan Colombia is an initiative that fails to provide security or relief
for Americans, Colombians or others in the region. And those who put
blinders on to hail the successes of this failed policy are simply
ignoring a few blazing facts.
First, the European Union understands the importance of alternative
development. Without providing social and economic alternatives, there
simply is no incentive to deter coca production or to keep drug money
out of politics.
Second, many of us who serve on the International Relations
Committee have been horrified as the human rights abuses and violence
continues to spread into new regions--especially in Afro-descendant and
Indigenous communities. Colombia has the highest number of internally
displaced persons in the hemisphere and is second only to Sudan in the
world. In April, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees stated
that some Indigenous communities are facing extinction. And when
violence armed groups invaded the Narino community early this year, the
vast majority of displaced persons--90 percent--were Afro-Colombians.
And finally, there continues to be little faith in the Colombian
governments' ability to provide basic civil and social services in
rural communities or to hold those responsible for violence and
intimidation responsible. Instead, we hear increasing reports of drug
money's infiltration into local communities, like when Orlando
Valencia, an Afro-Colombian activist was kidnapped and murdered last
October and the fact that police officers' played a role in the act.
There continues to be a clear sense of impunity when it comes to the
role of public officials in human rights abuses when the victims are
poor and or of Afro or Indigenous descent.
Why should we have low standards for accountability and justice,
continue to pump ridiculous amounts of money into the military, and be
shocked that the cost of crack and coke is the same in our cities
across the country and that the market is increasing across the globe?
Simply said, if we want to be effective in combating and containing
what began as a national problem, developed into a hemispheric issue,
and will eventually become a global crisis, we need to rework the
formula. Ninety percent of assistance to Colombia is for military
assistance. Six years and $ 4.6 billion later what have learned? Simply
that the status quo isn't cutting it.
Post-Hearing Questions to Michael A. Braun from
the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee \1\
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\1\ The answers to these post-hearing questions had not been
received by the Committee at the time of the printing of this hearing.
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Post-Hearing Questions to Sandro Calvani and Michael A. Braun from the
Honorable Barbara Lee \1\
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\1\ The answers to these post-hearing questions had not been
received by the Committee at the time of the printing of this hearing.
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ATTACHMENT
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Post-Hearing Questions to Michael A. Braun, the Honorable Rosso Jose
Serrano, and Sandro Calvani, from the Honorable Sam Farr, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Member,
Committee on Appropriations \1\
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\1\ The answers to these post-hearing questions had not been
received by the Committee at the time of the printing of this hearing.
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Letter to the Honorable Henry Hyde, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International
Relations, from Ambassador John Bruton, Head of Delegation, European
Union, dated September 15, 2006
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Letter to the Honorable Henry Hyde, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International
Relations, including Outline of Drug Policies of the European
Commission in Colombia from Ambassador John Bruton, Head of Delegation,
European Union, dated September 19, 2006
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Charts from ``Report on Progress in Colombia'' of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy from November 17, 2005 Briefing to Foreign
Press Center
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