<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:27923.wais]
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 13, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-148
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
------ ------
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian/Senior Counsel
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
Dr. R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Analyst
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member
?
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
PATRICK T. McHenry, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DAN BURTON, Indiana BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN L. MICA, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota DIANE E. WATSON, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina Columbia
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Marc Wheat, Staff Director
Malia Holst, Clerk
Tony Haywood, Minority Counsel
(III)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on December 13, 2005................................ 1
Statement of:
Crye, Michael J., president, International Council of Cruise
Lines; Gregory M. Purdy, director of security, safety,
security and environment, Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.; and
Charles E. Mandigo, director, fleet security, Holland
America Line, Inc.......................................... 147
Crye, Michael J.......................................... 147
Mandigo, Charles E....................................... 178
Purdy, Gregory M......................................... 166
Swecker, Chris, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Rear Admiral
Wayne Justice, Director of Operations Policy, U.S. Coast
Guard, accompanied by Rear Admiral John Crowley, Judge
Advocate General, U.S. Coast Guard; and Rear Admiral James
E. McPherson, Judge Advocate General, U.S. Navy............ 81
Crowley, John............................................ 94
Justice, Wayne,.......................................... 94
McPherson, James E....................................... 109
Swecker, Chris........................................... 81
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Crye, Michael J., president, International Council of Cruise
Lines, prepared statement of............................... 151
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 131
Justice, Rear Admiral Wayne, Director of Operations Policy,
U.S. Coast Guard, prepared statement of.................... 96
Maloney, Hon. Carolyn B., a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, prepared statement of............... 6
Mandigo, Charles E., director, fleet security, Holland
America Line, Inc., prepared statement of.................. 180
McPherson, Rear Admiral James E.,Judge Advocate General, U.S.
Navy:
Daily Terrorism Brief.................................... 143
Prepared statement of.................................... 110
Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, prepared statement of.................... 215
Purdy, Gregory M., director of security, safety, security and
environment, Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., prepared
statement of............................................... 169
Ros-Lehtinen, Hon. Ileana, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Florida, prepared statement of................ 214
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut:
Prepared statement of.................................... 3
Various prepared statements.............................. 15
Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, prepared statement of.................... 9
Swecker, Chris, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared
statement of............................................... 84
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2005,
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, joint
with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations) presiding.
Present from the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations: Representatives
Shays, Duncan, Maloney, and Ruppersberger.
Present from the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources: Representatives Souder and
Cummings.
Also present: Representative Norton.
Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., senior policy advisor;
Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Marc LaRoche, intern; Tony Haywood,
minority counsel; Andrew Su, minority professional staff
member; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, this joint hearing of
the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations and the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources entitled,
``International Maritime Security'' is called to order.
Just 2 days ago, Coast Guard officials began conducting
search operations in the waters north of the Bahamas because a
cruise ship passenger was reported missing. In early November,
modern-day brigands fired mortars at a cruise ship off the
coast of Somalia. These are two recent additions to a growing
manifest of unexplained disappearances, unsolved crimes, and
brazen acts of lawlessness on the high seas. According to the
industry experts, a wide range of criminal activities,
including drug smuggling, sexual assaults, piracy, and
terrorism, threaten the security of maritime travel and trade.
Today we begin an examination of the complex web of laws,
treaties, regulations, and commercial practices meant to
protect lives and property in an increasingly dangerous world.
Ocean travel puts passengers and crew in a distant,
isolated environment and subjects them to unique risks and
vulnerabilities. Like small cities, cruise ships experience
crimes, from petty to profoundly tragic. But city dwellers know
the risks of urban life, and no one falls off a city never to
be heard from again. Cruise passengers can be blinded to the
very real perils of the sea by ship operators unwilling to
interrupt the party for security warnings. After an incident
occurs, a thorough investigation can be profoundly difficult
when the crime scene literally floats away, on schedule, to the
next port of call.
Jurisdictional and bureaucratic tangles can also impede
investigation and resolution of crimes at sea. For purely
economic reasons, most commercial ships fly under foreign
flags. Passengers cannot assume the protection of U.S. laws and
law enforcement will be available in time, if at all. When
events involve citizens of different nations in the territorial
waters of a third, all three can assert some jurisdictional
claim. While these legal and diplomatic niceties are being
resolved, the crime trail grows cold and crucial evidence may
go overboard or melt into the crowd ashore.
The recently promulgated National Strategy for Maritime
Security and the Global Maritime Response Plan should better
integrate and accelerate Federal agency assistance to those
attacked at sea. We will monitor implementation of these new
policies closely.
Lack of hard data on maritime crime rates and trends
engenders a false sense of security and frustrates efforts to
address emerging problems. Some companies report incidents
voluntarily to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or
international organizations. But others do not, and no truly
industry-wide data is available to help discerning customers
assess the real risks of transoceanic travel.
So we asked those most involved in responding to maritime
crises to describe current legal and operational security
standards. For instance, what statistics are kept and who keeps
them? What information is given to passengers on the risks of
international travel by sea? How are missing person reports
investigated? How and when is it determined if a crime is
involved? How are jurisdictional conflicts resolved? Are there
better practices and technologies that should be used to
protect passengers in the alluring but unforgiving marine
environment?
Last July, George Smith and his new wife, Jennifer, thought
they were launching their lives together on a honeymoon cruise.
But after only 10 days abroad George disappeared under
circumstances still being investigated by the FBI and Turkish
officials. His family, and many others who have contacted us,
seek closure, await justice, and ask that no more families
endure avoidable tragedies.
We hear their call for safer seas, are determined, are
absolutely determined to pursue this investigation, and we look
for much greater candor, accountability, and responsiveness
from those entrusted to carry precious cargo into a vast,
inherently hazardous realm.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7923.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7923.002
Mr. Shays. At this time the Chair would recognize Mrs.
Maloney, the Honorable Member from New York.
Mrs. Maloney. I thank the chairman. Elijah Cummings, the
ranking member, is on the floor at this point. He will be back
shortly.
I add my voice in thanking you, Chairman Shays, for holding
this hearing today about international maritime security and
the safety of cruise ship passengers, particularly American
passengers. Millions of people take trips on cruise ships every
year, and these Americans expect to have an enjoyable vacation,
yet they also may unknowingly face dangers, including drug
trafficking, smuggling, international piracy, and even
terrorist attacks.
We have seen media reports this year of passengers who have
disappeared while aboard cruise ships and allegations that
these ships did not make an effort to inform their families. I
want to say that there are roughly 300 large cruise ships that
operate mostly under foreign flags, but many of them embark
from New York City, the port that I am honored to represent.
They are important employers, important to the economy. But it
is also very important that our citizens be protected on these
ships.
I am astonished at the number of alleged international
piracy acts and even some terrorist attacks on cruise ships.
And I am also deeply concerned that there appears not to be any
statistics or hard data kept in an organized way on the safety
of certain ships on the incidents that happen and really
suggest that we include a cruise ship violence or deaths or
missing persons in the FBI CODIS international and national
data base that they now keep on other crimes in our country.
Due to the fact that we have such a distinguished set of
speakers and many panelists, I request to have the text of my
statement put in the record, and I am very hopeful that today's
hearing will shed important light on some of these issues and
will fundamentally lead to increased safety and protection for
Americans and others who enjoy these cruise ship vacations.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7923.003
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentlelady.
This is a joint hearing of both the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, which I chair. We have oversight over Defense, State
Department, Homeland Security, and Coast Guard. The
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources is chaired by Mark Souder. This is a joint hearing of
our subcommittees, and Mr. Souder was stuck in an airplane. I
didn't realize you would be back as quickly as you have been,
or I would have held up the hearing. I was told it would be a
little longer than that. So welcome. Mr. Souder has the floor.
Mr. Souder. I thank the chairman, and it is a privilege to
do this joint hearing. We are both senior members of Homeland
Security, too, so this cuts multiple ways. I appreciate his
efforts in particular in organizing this hearing, and I look
forward to addressing this important subject.
The security of the world's shipping lanes is a global
issue that impacts global economic growth and stability. The
United States needs to ensure that the oceans are safe for
lawful private and public activities.
In October 2005, the Department of Homeland Security, in
collaboration with the Department of Defense and the Department
of State announced the completion and final approval of eight
plans to promote maritime security. As we will hear today, one
of these plans, the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan,
aims to coordinate the U.S. Government's response to threats
against the United States and its interests on the high seas by
establishing roles and responsibilities that enable the
Government to respond quickly and decisively. The plan
identifies the lead U.S. agency for incidents that involve U.S.
citizens or interests, including counterterrorism operations,
the detection, interdiction, and disposition of targeted cargo,
people, and vessels, the attacks of vessels with U.S. citizens
aboard or those affecting U.S. interests anywhere in the world.
This new plan and process establishes the protocols and
procedures for achieving a coordinated response and ensuring a
desired outcome. I look forward to discussing these maritime
security issues today with representatives from the Department
of Defense, Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and hearing about the progress and improvements
we have made with regard to maritime threats and responsive
capabilities.
Piracy and criminal acts against ships are not only
happening in action adventure films. These incidents occur
regularly within the maritime domain. According to the most
recent International Maritime Organization's crime report, July
through September 2005, which compiles reports for the
worldwide maritime industry, in the last 3-month report period
there were 27 crew members that were held hostage or kidnapped;
15 crew members were assaulted; the fate of 11 crew member was
unknown; 7 crew members were injured; and 1 ship and 2 tugboats
and barges were hijacked or missing. All of these incidents
within a 3-month period.
The cruise ship industry is not immune to piracy or
criminal activity. On November 5, 2005, the Bahamian-flagged
vessel ship Seabourn Spirit was approached by two armed small
boats about 100 miles off the coast of Somalia. The cruise ship
was apparently able to thwart their attackers by maneuvering to
avoid being boarded, but only after rocket-propelled grenades
were fired by the pirates. The Seabourn Spirit had 43 U.S.
citizens on board.
The FBI reports that from fiscal year 2000 through June
2005, they opened 305 cases addressing crimes on the high seas.
Over the past 5 years, sexual assaults made up 45 percent of
the cases, and physical assaults were 22 percent of the cases
on cruise ships that were reported to the FBI. Missing persons
comprised 10 percent of the cases opened, and death
investigations made up 8 percent of the reported cases.
As common as these crimes are, the U.S. Government's
response to crimes in the maritime domain is oftentimes
complicated and the investigations are prolonged. In the case
of cruise ships, most are foreign-flagged and, thus, fall
outside of U.S. law enforcement jurisdiction when not in a U.S.
port and within U.S. territorial seas. Consequently, U.S.
Federal law enforcement agencies are required to seek
permission from the ship's flag state before they can board the
vessel and begin a criminal investigation. The U.S.
Government's response can also be dependent upon the type of
crime that was committed, the location of the ship when the
crime was committed, the nationality of the subject or victim,
and the United States' relationship with other affected
countries.
Once a crime has been discovered or reported on board a
cruise ship, any delay in preserving evidence can potentially
lead to the loss of evidence. I hope to learn today what
responsibilities the cruise ships bear in preserving the crime
scene and any related evidence until U.S. law enforcement
officials arrive on board and can begin investigating the
incident. Cruise ships are often compared to self-sustaining
floating cities. If the vast majority of passengers on board
the cruise ship are American citizens, is there a need for the
U.S. Government to require a continuous law enforcement
presence on board these mobile cities?
I look forward to discussing whether jurisdictional
conflicts are a major impediment to the security of U.S.
citizens while traveling on foreign-flagged vessels and if
Congress needs to change the laws to better protect U.S.
citizens. I would like to thank the panelists today for your
participation, and we look forward to your testimony and
insight into this important topic. Additionally, I would like
to thank the families of those who have been victimized on
cruise ships for being here today and for submitting written
statements for the record.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7923.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7923.005
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
At this time the Chair would recognize Congresswoman
Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank the two astute Chairs for understanding that the
relationship between the two subcommittees on this issue is
joined at the hip and that we need to both look at this matter,
not because we fear or want people not to go on cruise ships,
but because they are increasingly popular and our job is to
look at the safety of American citizens wherever they happen to
be.
You know, I have never been on a cruise ship. I feel very
deprived. And now I don't know whether I am supposed to be
afraid to go on one or not. Maybe this hearing will enlighten
me on that score.
A cruise ship is not a public conveyance, and normally, you
know, a private business that goes on the high seas, there is a
lot of incentive--namely, liability--if the passengers are from
the United States of America to take every precaution. But
here, of course, the interests of other nations are involved.
Once we get into the complicated conflict of laws area, have
mercy on us.
When I learned that more than 300 crimes were committed on
the high seas involving American passengers, I was at first
alarmed. But, you see, I don't know enough about what those
crimes involve, and I would rather much think that most of them
had to do with the kind of crimes that go on in the United
States of America, of Americans, by Americans, than terrorist
crimes, or else I would have heard about them. Therefore, this
notion that has been raised by my colleagues before me about
data could not be more important. We need to know more than we
know, and it needs to be readily available. In other words, I
need to know whether the problem is with thugs or terrorists,
and so do the people who run ships, because that way they can
decide perhaps more efficiently where their own resources
should go.
I have to tell you, though, that even one of these
incidents involving piracy is bound to be much larger than
life, to hurt the industry, and, for that matter, to say to
Americans here is yet another place you cannot go. You know, I
remember the Achille Lauro matter. That was so long ago I had
to kind of dredge my memory. But I read an article, and let me
just read a few of the words that I am sure others read as
well. This is from the Miami Herald. It spoke of the attack
that I think one of my colleagues has mentioned off the waters
of Somalia where crew members fended them off with hoses and
sonic devices that blast painful loud noises in a directed
beam. They were talking about pirates, because obviously a U.S.
ship or a passenger cruise ship, otherwise known as a luxury
ship, is an inviting target. In some ways it is an inviting
target, and apparently the challenge was taken up. Nobody was
injured or killed, unlike the horrible incident aboard the
Achille Lauro, but it is time enough now to look into the
nature of the crimes to see whether the industry is taking care
of it by itself and to see, importantly, if the interests of
the United States of America are taken care of in the way we
regulate these ships and indicate our expectations of them when
they have passengers of the United States of America aboard.
So I thank you again, both of you, for this hearing.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentlelady, and at this time the
Chair would recognize Mr. Duncan. Thank you for being here.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Shays, and
thank you for calling this hearing. I am now serving my 9th
full term and part of a 10th term. In all of that time I have
served on several committees and several subcommittees under
many different chairmen, both Democrats and Republicans, and I
have always felt that Chairman Shays was one of the most active
and one of the finest chairmen I have ever served under. And,
of course, Chairman Souder is a good friend of mine also. I do
not happen to serve on his subcommittee, but this hearing today
is another example of how this subcommittee that Chairman Shays
chairs is certainly one of the most active and interesting
subcommittees in the Congress.
It is good that we are hopefully going to learn more about
this. For instance, in skimming over the testimony of the
witnesses and also a report that we have from the staff, it
says that there are only about 50 crimes reported each year to
the FBI of the 10 million passengers who travel on the cruise
lines each year. In the last 2 years, there have been 13
missing people, and certainly we do not want to minimize the
tragedy, and I do not mean to do that at all, of anyone who is
killed or missing. On the other hand, there are some 2,000
people that go missing each day in this country, and from the
looks of some of those statistics it looks like that it is far,
far safer to go on a cruise than it is to just walk down the
street in any town or city in America.
On the other hand, Chairman Souder mentioned some crimes or
statistics that certainly should be of concern, and I guess one
question is, are we making sure that all of these crimes are
reported? And I understand the International Council of Cruise
Lines, there is some sort of agreement, I see from the staff,
that these crimes are required to be reported. But we have this
danger today of doing legislation or reacting in response to
what is being emphasized on the 24-hour news channels at a
particular time, and certainly the terrible tragedy that
happened to the newlyweds George and Jennifer Smith is
certainly a sad thing and a terrible thing. But, on the other
hand, I know that when Katrina happened, we immediately sent
down $10 billion, and then we came back and very quickly voted
another $62 billion, and then it turned out that people all
over the country thought we overreacted there and sent perhaps
too much money too fast, and then people started questioning
that.
So we cannot blame piracy on the cruise lines, I would not
think. The terrorism, of course, everybody has really toughened
up on that, as they should have, since September 11th. But I
understand that the passenger lists are being given to the
proper authorities and every piece of luggage that goes on one
of these cruise ships is being screened.
So maybe more needs to be done. On the other hand, if the
problem is consistent with these statistics that are in the
materials I have been given by the staff, then in some ways the
cruise line industry should be commended. But if we need to do
more or if something is not being reported or we need more
information, then that is good, too. If this problem is greater
than it appears on the surface, then certainly this hearing
should help show that.
So I thank both chairmen for calling this hearing today.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman for his thoughtful
comments, and that is the way we need to approach this hearing.
We need to go wherever the truth leads us. Whether it is an
issue of law or regulation or administrative efforts or
whether, in fact, it is getting the industry to just do a
better job, it may be some or all of the above.
But one thing I can assure the gentleman is this will not
be the only hearing, and it will be thorough, and everyone will
have an opportunity to state the issue as clearly as they can.
Mr. Duncan. Well, I certainly appreciate that approach, and
that is the approach that I assumed that you would take. Thank
you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, and I thank the gentleman for his
kind words.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Chairman Shays and Chairman Souder, I
want to thank you for focusing on this issue. I serve on both
your subcommittees, and you do go to the relevant issues.
I am familiar with port security. I represent the port of
Baltimore. I also am co-Chair of the National Port Security
Caucus. We have 539 ports in this country, and I am also on the
Intelligence Committee. So I deal a lot in these areas.
What is really relevant about this hearing today is that a
lot of our focus with respect to ports generally has been more
on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism and issues such as
that. So I think this hearing today is extremely relevant.
I also would like to acknowledge the Coast Guard, who I
think is one of the better agencies we have in this country,
and our country should be proud of their professionalism and
the dedication of the members of the Coast Guard. They have
done an excellent job. They showed that in Katrina. I think
they have done a good job.
Now, maritime security is a very complicated issue. There
are different times when different agencies and different
countries have the right to board vessels and protect the
people and the vessel. We must answer the questions, though,
about safety. What laws apply in what situations? The FBI and
the Coast Guard in our area, in our jurisdiction, share the
burden of enforcing maritime jurisdiction. But who takes the
lead? Who is ultimately responsible? What if there is a
difference of opinion?
I think Katrina is another issue that showed that we need
to have a plan and that we need to have someone in charge who
is going to determine what the system is and how we are going
to enforce it.
Now, it is important to determine who is in charge, as I
said, a system in place, when the cruise ships travel outside
of our jurisdiction and our borders. Each year approximately 10
million passengers take cruises. I think there are about 300
cruise ships that deal with these 10 million passengers, and
one-half, or 5 million of those passengers, come from North
America. So it is an extremely relevant issue to our country
and how we deal with the issue.
Now, in fairness to the cruise ship industry, I have been
told by the Coast Guard that the maritime travel on the cruise
ships is among the safest modes of transportation available.
The International Council of Cruise Lines should be commended
for maintaining standards as it relates to safety. But high
standards are not enough--the reason why we are here today--and
we must continually work to improve.
Now, one question that we can ask and that I think is
relevant--and I am going to ask it when we get to questions--is
the issue about deadlines. We know that there is a lot of money
involved in this industry. We know that when you leave one
port, that ship has to get back to another port to pick up
maybe 2,000 passengers. If they are late and they are not
there, there are going to be a lot of unhappy people. And I
just wonder what the system is as far as deadlines. Do we force
our captains of those ships to travel into storms and unsafe
places instead of waiting it out or taking another direction
because of deadlines, because we have to pick up the next
passengers? Because it is extremely important that the No. 1
priority should be safety, even if it means a delay. And I
would like to know what that system is because I have heard
many complaints about going through storms, you know, not
having a very positive experience, but the captain has to go to
the next port to pick up the new group that is coming in.
It is critical that we all work together, and that is why
we are here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
Let me take the opportunity to ask unanimous consent that
all members of the subcommittees be permitted to place an
opening statement in the record and that the record remain open
for 3 days for that purpose, and without objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses may be
permitted to include their written statements in the record,
and without objection, so ordered. And I am also going to ask
unanimous consent that Ms. Jennifer Hagel Smith, wife of Mr.
George A. Smith IV, and Mr. George Smith and Ms. Maureen Smith,
and Ms. Bree Smith, family of Mr. George A. Smith IV, be
allowed to submit a statement for the record; and Ms. Jean
Scavone, mother of Mr. James Christopher Scavone, be allowed to
submit a statement, and Mr. Michael Pham, son of Mr. Hue V.
Pham and Mrs. Hue T. Tran, be permitted to submit a statement;
and Mr. and Mrs. Kendall Carver, parents of Ms. Merrian Lynn
Carver, be permitted to submit a statement; and Ms. Rita
Sittig, mother of Mr. Christopher Caldwell, be allowed to
submit a statement; and also Mr. and Mrs. Ira Leonard as well.
And then we have two statements from attorneys, one
representing the Smith family and one representing the Dias
family, and without objection, their statements will be
submitted for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Their statements are also available to the
press, and before swearing in our witnesses, I want to say that
we considered having the families open up this hearing and some
of the families were willing to do it and some were wondering
if it was what they wanted to do at this time. We will have
another hearing in which all family members will participate.
We thought we would make this a more generic or more macro
hearing, not on particular cases right now, and then we would
decide how we would determine what hearings to have in the
future, and there will be other hearings that will follow this
one.
At this time we will swear in our witnesses, and first let
me acknowledge them: Mr. Chris Swecker, Assistant Director,
Criminal Investigation Division, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation [FBI]; Rear Admiral Wayne Justice, Director for
Operations Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, accompanied by Rear
Admiral John Crowley, Judge Advocate General, U.S. Coast Guard;
and another statement or a third statement submitted by Rear
Admiral James McPherson, Judge Advocate General for the U.S.
Navy.
Gentlemen, as you know, this is an investigative committee
and we swear in all of our witnesses, and I would ask you to
rise.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record all our witnesses responded
in the affirmative, and I am going to give the chair to Mr.
Souder, who will take care of chairing.
Mr. Souder [presiding]. Thank you very much.
Mr. Swecker, you will have the opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF CHRIS SWECKER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; REAR
ADMIRAL WAYNE JUSTICE, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS POLICY, U.S.
COAST GUARD, ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADMIRAL JOHN CROWLEY, JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND REAR ADMIRAL JAMES E.
McPHERSON, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, U.S. NAVY
STATEMENT OF CHRIS SWECKER
Mr. Swecker. Good afternoon, Chairman Shays, Chairman
Souder, ranking members, and members of the subcommittees. We
appreciate the opportunity to come before you today.
As you know, approximately 10 million Americans are
expected to travel abroad this year on vessels that navigate
international waters. As a matter of course, some of them will
become victims of a crime. The FBI's ability to assist our
fellow Americans who may fall victim to crime in international
waters will be affected by a variety of factors, including the
type of crime that was committed, where the ship was when it
was committed, where the ship departed, where it arrives, and
under which nation's laws the ship is registered, the
nationality of the subject or victim, the laws of other affects
countries, international law, and the United States'
relationship with other affected countries.
Over the last 5 years, the FBI opened 305 cases of crime on
the high seas. Sexual and physical assaults on cruise ships
were the leading maritime crimes reported to and investigated
by the FBI, at 45 and 22 percent, respectively. Missing persons
cases comprised 10 percent of cases opened, and death
investigations comprised 8 percent. Recently, incidents of
piracy have been increasingly common in some parts of the
world, the most recent, of course, being the attack on the
cruise ship containing U.S. citizens off the coast of Somalia
in November 2005.
Missing persons cases are more sporadic in nature, and,
unfortunately, in 75 percent of these cases, a body is never
found. Most deaths reported occur on commercial ships. Death
investigations are less common on cruise ships and private
vessels.
Because these offenses occur in international waters and
involve the citizens or interests of other countries, the
exercise of the U.S. special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction will encroach to some degree on the interests and
sovereignty of another nation. Therefore, our diplomatic
relations with other involved countries, the existence and
applicability of any treaties with these countries, and the
extent to which we are ultimately dependent upon another
country's mutual cooperation and assistance will often
determine the actual extent of U.S. authority to investigate
and prosecute U.S. extraterritorial offenses against U.S.
citizens.
The principal law under which the U.S. exercises is special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction is set forth in Section 7
of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Under this statute, the United
States has jurisdiction over crimes committed on a ship if: the
ship, regardless of flag, is a U.S.-owned vessel, either in
whole or in part, regardless of the nationality of the victim
or the perpetrator; or the crime occurs in the U.S. territorial
sea, within 12 miles of the coast, regardless of the
nationality of the vessel, the victim, or the perpetrator; or
the victim or perpetrator is a U.S. national on any vessel that
departed from or will arrive in a U.S. port.
The most important point to emphasize in these matters is
that in all cases of suspected criminal activity or terrorism,
the FBI should be contacted by the ship's personnel or
passengers, regardless of potential jurisdictional issues. The
FBI now has approximately 59 legal attache offices around the
globe. These offices have developed close working relationships
with our international law enforcement partners to assist in
these investigations, and the number of these legal attache
offices will continue to grow in the coming years.
As in any other matter, the FBI will first determine if we
have jurisdiction to investigate the matter and, if so, what
assistance we will require from other U.S. or foreign law
enforcement authorities. If the vessel has docked or will be
docking in a U.S. port, FBI agents will be able to conduct the
investigation in much the same manner as in any other
investigation. If the vessel has docked or will be docking in a
foreign port, the FBI Legat office will work with and assist
foreign authorities to the greatest extent possible to protect
U.S. citizens and interests. They will not, however, be able to
conduct an investigation as if they were on U.S. soil. In many
cases, they will have to depend on the cooperation of foreign
authorities, who will actually conduct the investigation.
However, other countries may allow us to take a more active
role in the investigations. In general, most countries are
cooperative and work with us to develop evidence, to provide
that evidence to us, and to assist our efforts to prosecute
appropriate cases in U.S. courts.
As in any other investigation, the FBI will attempt to
conduct, or to have conducted, any necessary investigation and
preserve any potential evidence as soon as it is practically
possible or reasonable. The FBI will attempt to board vessels
prior to their docking or immediately upon their arrival in
port to begin an investigation, if that is reasonable and
practical. We will directly, or indirectly in cooperation with
foreign counterparts, conduct all interviews, collect all
evidence, and where appropriate, seek the indictment and
prosecution of the case in U.S. courts.
If the crime occurs within the reach of the U.S. Coast
Guard, we work together to address any criminal threat. The key
to this successful relationship has been and continues to be
effective communication, intelligence sharing, coordination,
and cooperation.
I would like to give you a quick overview of the FBI's
roles and responsibilities under the National Strategy for
Maritime Security and the Maritime Operational Threat Response
Plan.
The FBI's maritime responsibilities have not changed as a
result of the MOTR plan. However, in response to the
President's National Strategy for Maritime Security, we have
initiated a maritime security program to prevent, disrupt, and
defeat criminal acts of terrorism directed against maritime
assets and provide counterterrorism preparedness, leadership,
and assistance to Federal, State, and local agencies
responsible for maritime security. The FBI currently has
approximately 82 maritime liaison agents assigned to those
field offices that have active commercial ports. The MLAs
interact with private industry, State and local port
authorities, to include law enforcement and other Federal
agencies with maritime responsibilities, such as the Coast
Guard. MLAs are assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Force squads
in the field, and their ranks include special agents of the
FBI, Coast Guard Investigative Service, Naval Criminal
Investigative Service, as well as officers from local port
authority and police departments.
Chairmen and members of the subcommittees, thank you again
for the opportunity to testify today, and I am not sure if we
have time limits, but I am sure I am probably pushing mine
right now. So thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Swecker follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.
Admiral Justice, thank you for coming.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WAYNE JUSTICE AND ADMIRAL JOHN CROWLEY
Admiral Justice. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman,
distinguished members. It is a pleasure for me and Rear Admiral
John Crowley, the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Coast
Guard, to appear before you today to discuss jurisdiction and
coordination of assistance in the context of international
maritime security.
The maritime domain covers nearly three-quarters of the
Earth's surface and is, by far, the greatest defining feature
of our world. Plying this vast expanse are more than 40,000
large merchant ships and virtually uncountable numbers of small
craft carrying people from place to place and nearly all the
raw materials and finished products in modern trade.
As mentioned, on November 5th this year two armed boats
approached the Bahamian-flagged cruise ship Seabourn Spirit 100
miles off the coast of Somalia, fired rocket-propelled
grenades, and attempted to board the vessel, which had 43
American citizens on board. That crew implemented their
required ship's security plan and maneuvered to escape and
evade their attackers.
While no single nation has the authority or the resources
to patrol and secure the entire maritime domain, the United
States continues to lead the world's efforts to achieve greater
maritime security, and the Coast Guard is at the forefront of
those efforts. Indeed, immediately following September 11th,
the leadership and vision of the U.S. Government led to the
creation of a modern, international ship and port security
regime, ISPS, which appears to have contributed to thwarting
the attempted piracy aboard the Seabourn Spirit.
As the Nation's primary maritime law enforcement agency, an
armed force, and lead DHS agency for maritime security, the
Coast Guard has significant authorities and capabilities with
regard to international maritime security. However, the complex
jurisdictional challenges presented by the global shipping
industry and the vast size of the maritime environment require
extensive cooperation between nations, agencies, and industry.
Although there were 43 American citizens aboard Seabourn
Spirit, that ship was subject to the jurisdiction of the
Bahamas, and the U.S. citizens aboard here were, as a matter of
law, constructively in the Bahamas. In any case involving
suspect criminal activity directed at or aboard a foreign-
flagged vessel on the high seas, close and immediate
international cooperation is required to board the vessel at
sea, investigate the facts, collect evidence, and sort out the
jurisdiction of various states with interests in this matter.
In fiscal year 2005, working with our interagency and
international partners, the Coast Guard enhanced maritime
homeland security by seizing over 300,000 pounds of cocaine at
sea, much of it bound for the United States, and by bringing to
the United States over 360 foreign nationals from foreign-
flagged and stateless smuggling vessels for prosecution. This
regime for interdicting and prosecuting drug smugglers is a
model of success based on widely recognized international law
and strong domestic implementing legislation.
From a practical standpoint, the U.S. Government response
option is dependent on how quickly the U.S. Government is
notified of an incident and the availability of assets in the
particular region. If available, any warship or Government
vessel on non-commercial service may, with flag state consent,
conduct a boarding to investigate or suppress suspected acts of
piracy. Cases of piracy, like the Seabourn Spirit, are exactly
what recent amendments to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, or
SUA, address. The amended SUA provides unprecedented tools,
including an expanded list of offenses and a comprehensive
framework for boarding suspect vessels at sea to prevent and
suppress acts of terrorism, violence at sea, and illicit WMD
proliferation activities as they are committed.
I note also that the amendments to SUA support the
President's Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI], which
provides a framework for international cooperation to combat
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their means of
delivery, and related materials throughout a variety of
measures including maritime interdiction. The Maritime
Operational Threat Response [MOTR], Plan is part of the
President's National Strategy for Maritime Security. The
Maritime Operation Threat Response includes the deployment of
capabilities and the use of force required to intercept,
apprehend, exploit, and when necessary, defeat maritime threats
that affect U.S. interests anywhere in the world. MOTR
addresses the full range of maritime security threats,
including actionable knowledge of or acts of terrorism, piracy,
and other criminal and unlawful or hostile acts committed by
state and non-state actors. The MOTR plan establishes the
protocols and procedures for achieving a coordinated U.S.
Government notification and will improve the ability of the
United States to bring the right assets and authorities to bear
when a maritime threat affects American interests anywhere in
the world.
The operational response to counter threats to U.S.
citizens involving pirates or other non-state actors occurring
aboard non-U.S. vessels in waters not subject to U.S.
jurisdiction is operationally, logistically, and diplomatically
challenging. The ISPS Code, amendments to the SUA Convention,
the Proliferation Security Agreement, the National Strategy for
Maritime Security, and the MOTR plan are some of the
significant initiatives undertaken by the United States to
increase operational options and better protect U.S. citizens
and U.S. interests throughout the maritime domain in the 21st
century.
Thank you, sir, for the opportunity to testify today, and
Rear Admiral Crowley and I will be happy to answer any
questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Justice follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Admiral Crowley, do you have an opening statement as well?
Admiral Crowley. Mr. Chairman, I do not. I stand behind
Admiral Justice's.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Admiral McPherson.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES E. McPHERSON
Admiral McPherson. Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittees, good afternoon. My name is Rear Admiral Jim
McPherson. I am the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and it
is my pleasure to appear before you today as the Department of
Defense representative on the legal aspects of threats to
Americans on board vessels traveling outside U.S. territorial
waters. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you.
Protecting the United States, its citizens, and vital
interests from attack is our highest priority. Piracy is one of
the many forms in which such attacks can take place. Although
the term ``piracy'' conjures up images of historical lore, the
legal response to piracy is well settled and reflected in both
international obligations and our own domestic law. While
piracy is normally addressed within a law enforcement scheme
and both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Coast
Guard could be termed the first responders, the commanding
officer of every U.S. Navy ship has a duty and an obligation to
protect U.S. citizens from acts of piracy wherever they may
occur.
Again, thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral McPherson follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you.
First I would like to ask unanimous consent that we have
10-minute questioning periods so we can develop the questions.
Hearing no objection, let me start out. There are so many
different ways we could go, but let me start out first by
pointing out to the two Admirals from the Coast Guard that it
has been very helpful to have Commander Patrick DeQuattro on as
a detailee to our subcommittee. In general, it is helpful to
have the Coast Guard people on the Hill. And I want to say in
his defense any wonderful questions or comments I make today
are his. Any others that are off the wall are mine, and he
should not bear responsibility. I want to make that clear at
the beginning.
Admiral Justice, you did a pretty thorough job of
explaining how the new Marine Operational Threat Response would
work in the case of the pirate attack. How is this
substantially different than what we had in place in the
Achille Lauro?
Admiral Justice. Currently, since 1978, we have what is
called the PD-27 process. It is in use. We have coordinated
thousands of maritime responses to drug and migrant
interdiction on the high seas. As recently as yesterday, we
used this again to effectively capture 14,000 pounds of cocaine
in the eastern Pacific, one vessel.
However, the MOTR plan improves the PD-27 process. It
addresses a full range of maritime security threats, including
acts of terrorism, piracy, and other criminal, unlawful, or
hostile activities. The MOTR plan is a maritime-centric plan,
whereas PD-27 is not. It applies to all maritime threats
affecting U.S. interests, whereas PD-27 is non-maritime
incidents. And, finally, the MOTR places initial coordination
in the first responders' hands, whereas the PD-27 is a single
State Department hub for coordination. It is a better plan,
sir.
Mr. Souder. Let me first ask a technical question that came
up as I went through the information. Are there any crimes, Mr.
Swecker and all the Admirals, reported to the Coast Guard or
the Defense Department that would not be reported to the FBI?
In other words, when we see the universe of statistics in front
of us from the FBI, are those all the crimes that are reported
on the high seas? Or do you each have kind of stovepiped
information systems?
Mr. Swecker. Well, the short answer from the FBI's
perspective, is that we collect our own statistics based on
what we work. I do not know of any other data that we receive
or share regarding those crimes with the Coast Guard or the
Navy.
Mr. Souder. Admiral McPherson.
Admiral McPherson. Any crimes on the high seas that come to
our attention are reported to the FBI through our Naval
Criminal Investigative Service, through that law enforcement
connection.
Mr. Souder. Is it the same for the Coast Guard?
Admiral Crowley. Mr. Chairman, I would add that the
President's National Maritime Security Strategy here and MOTR
in the future advises all of us to report to each other
incidents and threats that occur, and there will be greater
coordination, therefore, leading to better consistency amongst
all of the reporting sources.
Mr. Souder. Admiral Justice, you made reference to how we
approach narcotics, which my subcommittee particularly focuses
on, and it is a pattern of how you are looking at some of the
international terrorism and piracy questions, also some of the
potential biological terrorism or nuclear terrorism. Could you
describe a little bit in that type of relationship how you
would interrelate with the Navy and the Defense Department and
where kind of the territorial waters of the United States, how
the Coast Guard and the military--Admiral McPherson, if you
could, too--interrelate as you move into international waters?
And does it depend on the type of threat? Is it whether the
threat is headed to our shores, whether it is a threat to the
military, whether it is the number of citizens on board? What
are some of the types of criteria? Admiral Crowley? Or whoever
best can take that question.
Admiral Crowley. I will jump in first, Mr. Chairman, and I
will say that there is a predisposition in the President's
strategy to act and as a first priority to protect American
lives; and that the on-scene responder, whether it be the
military unit, the Coast Guard unit, the FBI unit, the agencies
that you see here today are the leaders of the plan are to
respond, with the predisposition to take control and take a
leadership position, to be transitioned to a more appropriate
organization as the facts and information is developed. And so
I would answer the question to say that the first on scene is
predisposed to act and take control and protect lives, and then
we begin to sort out whether we need additional investigation,
additional on-scene law enforcement capacity, or there is a
defensive measure that needs to be taken.
Mr. Souder. If a fight broke out on a cruise ship and
violence started to occur, at what point would that principle
apply to that? American citizens, let's say a significant
number of American citizens, are on board. You have been
notified that it is not exactly a terrorist attack, it is not
piracy, but potential loss of life or loss of life has started.
At what point do you have the ability to board, and who would
do it? And would it be the closest? I mean, would the Navy go
on board in that situation?
Admiral Crowley. Mr. Chairman, certainly the United States
is authorized to respond to masters of cruise ships seeking
assistance for any life-threatening incident at sea with
respect to--and I would defer to colleagues here--another
agency's capabilities and authorities, but certainly it might
depend on the outcome of a boarding as to who the agency is
that conducts it. But certainly to take action to provide
assistance to either U.S.-flagged or foreign-flagged vessels is
a relatively easy bar to overcome.
Mr. Souder. You would need to be asked, however, by the
vessel, not by an individual on board who happened to reach
you?
Admiral Crowley. A U.S. vessel would be handled differently
than a foreign-flagged vessel, generally speaking that a
foreign-flagged vessel would be at the behest of the master or
the flag state, the recognized government.
Mr. Souder. Admiral McPherson, do you have any additional
comments?
Admiral McPherson. I think that is absolutely accurate.
Oftentimes it would be pragmatically who is closest to respond
to the call for assistance. And if it were a Navy vessel on the
high seas, we would respond and we would secure the scene. We
would protect lives and property, and then we would ask for
assistance from the Coast Guard or the FBI in consonance with
the facts.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Swecker, I want to ask you a couple of
questions, and I am sure we will rhyme with some coming,
particularly on the cruise ship incidents. You get called as
soon as an incident happens on the ship if they suspect foul
play, or does it happen when they are in port?
Mr. Swecker. If it is a vessel in U.S. waters, usually we
will get a phone call. It may be from the Coast Guard. As was
pointed out, whoever is in a position to respond the quickest
and get there. And then from there, much like a cop on the
street or an incident that takes place on land, it is whoever
can get there first and assess and triage the situation. We
could get a call from the ship. We could get a call from the
Coast Guard. We could get a call----
Mr. Souder. If there is a suspected killing on board, are
you to be notified as soon as that happened or when they get
into port?
Mr. Swecker. Just based on the general requirement to
report any crime, particularly if it is, as I said, in U.S.
waters or fits into our jurisdictional scheme.
Mr. Souder. Let's assume it is not.
Mr. Swecker. Yes, they should report it. There is no law
that requires that they report other than the general laws of
the United States.
Mr. Souder. What about securing evidence? Is evidence
supposed to be secured if there is doubt? Under U.S. law, even
if they are in international waters but it is a U.S. citizen,
do they have to secure the area of evidence? When they come
into port and you look at the area of evidence, do they--
obviously an investigation takes time, yet they have to get the
ship out again. There have been allegations here that a
potential crime scene was cleaned up and maybe even used by
others. Are there laws that govern evidence? I mean, they are
compared to floating cities, but at the same time I don't know
any city of 3,000 in the United States that could eliminate a
crime scene?
Mr. Swecker. I am not aware of any laws that require that
they preserve the crime scene. There are practical
considerations of when and how quickly we can get there to
process the crime scene, whether we wait for them to get to the
next port of call, or whether it is practical to get out to the
vessel via the Coast Guard or the Navy or some other means. But
I am not aware of a law that requires that they preserve
evidence. We would hope common sense would prevail in that
situation.
Mr. Souder. Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
Very troubling to me are some allegations that people have
been missing for a week, sometimes for a month, that it is
never reported that the person is missing. One would think that
common decency would be that you would call the next of kin,
you would call the port, you would call the FBI, you would call
the Army, the Navy, everybody, and report this. But I find that
very troubling if my daughter or son was on a cruise ship and
was missing and no one bothered to call to tell me.
Can somebody report on that? Should we pass a law that for
American citizens, that cruise ships at the very least inform
the U.S. Government and the families?
Mr. Swecker. I am not aware of issues regarding delays in
reporting, but we did not research that in preparation for the
testimony. But I will say that any--I mean, a requirement that
there be due diligence in reporting those crimes would be very
helpful.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, I am citing press accounts that I have
read in the papers that people have--and then obviously you
would secure the crime scene. There are allegations that the
crime scenes have been cleaned up and buffed up and the clothes
and belongings of the missing person are put in storage, and
there is no effort to find anyone to claim this, no reporting
anywhere. And certainly on American land, people report crimes.
You are required to report crimes.
And I would also like to ask the FBI about keeping
information. I think a lot of times we do not know there is a
problem until you have the data and the statistics to show that
there is a problem and something needs to be done. And in
reading press accounts, they state that there is no data
collection or information kept on the number of people that are
missing or, ``commit suicide or are murdered on cruise ships.''
Yet I know that many of my constituents tell me some of the
finest trips they have ever had in their lives were on cruise
ships, that it was a glorious experience and many people--I
would say many of these cruise ships are populated by Americans
on their various vacations.
I know that the FBI keeps the CODIS index system on DNA. It
is an international program. Every other day I am reading a
story about a crime that has been solved now some 20 years
later--rapes, assaults, all kinds of things--because of this
excellent program, I congratulate you, and also the NIBRS, the
National Incident-Based Reporting System. And my question to
you is: Should we start keeping statistics on this so that we
can gauge the extent of it? And also for the consumer to know
that on this particular cruise ship or cruise line, no one has
been missing ever, yet on another cruise line people seem to
disappear? Could you comment on keeping some type of data for
the criminal people, the people fighting crimes in our country,
to have access to and also for consumers to have some access
for their own safety? I can call and get a data system on
flights, which airlines have crashes. It is kept by precincts
in New York. You can get data of the number of murders, rapes,
assaults, robberies. By precinct we can get this information.
Why shouldn't we be able to get this by cruise ships?
I am coming back to it. I am terribly concerned about
reports that incidents have not even been reported to our
Government or to the families. I find that incredibly, almost
unbelievable that steps would not be taken immediately to try
to inform people, to try to find out what happened, and if
someone was hurt, to try to figure out how we can make sure
people are not hurt in the future.
So all those questions, if you could respond.
Mr. Swecker. Well, first of all, we can only collect data
on what is reported to us, and it is very difficult to quantify
what is not reported. We may be able to collect information
on----
Mrs. Maloney. Do you think we should require that this
information be supplied to the FBI on American citizens?
Mr. Swecker. Given that they sort of step in the role that,
for example, a police officer on the street would step into in
that situation, it would not be absolutely an idea.
Mrs. Maloney. OK. Thank you.
Would anyone else like to comment on any of the points?
Admiral Crowley. Ma'am, I would just offer that for general
safety and security issues, there is data captured certainly
for people to look at, whether a different array of data would
better meet needs of consumers, but with regard to safety
records of both flag states, shipping groups, and shippers,
there is information currently available.
Mrs. Maloney. Where is it available?
Admiral Crowley. That is on the Coast Guard's Web site for
port state control exchange information.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
Admiral Crowley. We can provide further information upon
request.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
Mr. Souder. Admiral Crowley, on the legal standpoint, and
maybe Mr. Swecker, too, in response to Congresswoman Maloney's
question, even though these are international vessels, couldn't
you get this by the licensing to go to a U.S. port? I believe
in your testimony a number of you referred to the nexus that we
would have because the port in the United States would not be
the way we would handle it?
Admiral Crowley. We certainly have different mechanisms to
look toward acquiring information beyond the U.S. flag vessel.
They would include mechanisms for vessels calling on U.S. ports
as well as working through the International Maritime
Organization to get standards with the community. And we
certainly could explore those kinds of avenues.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Souder.
For 7\1/2\ years prior to coming to Congress, I was a
criminal court judge, and I tried the felony criminal cases,
the most serious cases, the murders, rapes, armed robberies,
burglaries, drug cases, etc. And I always tried to take into
consideration the feelings of the families, and I think that
they were pretty much satisfied with the sentences that I
handed down because I have always believed that we should be
very tough on serious crimes. And certainly if I had a family
member who was killed or injured in some serious way on one of
these cruise ships, I would certainly be concerned with it, and
I certainly sympathize with those people. On the other hand,
when I see the reports of 50 crimes and then Mr. Swecker's
testimony said 305 in 5 years, which is 61 crimes a year, 50 or
60 crimes, we always want to try and do better. That should be
the goal of everybody in regard to everything. But I don't know
if it is humanly possible to get much better than that 50 or 60
crimes when you have 10 million passengers a year and they are
not on there just for an hour or two. They are on there for a
week or sometimes even more.
So I am certainly not trying to minimize this, but I am
trying to look at it in a realistic way. And what I am
wondering about, Mr. Swecker, one thing I am wondering about,
there are hundreds of thousands of studies each year by
academic people, government people, and everybody else. Do you
know of any study or report or anything that, or do you have
any information that would lead you to believe that not many of
these--that many of these crimes are not being reported to the
FBI? There is apparently an agreement among the cruise lines
that requires that they be reported. Now, I realize that could
be being observed in the breach rather than in the practice.
Can you tell us any more specifically about that?
Mr. Swecker. I am not aware of any studies, but I am also
not aware of any systemic problems with them not reporting
crimes aboard their ships. I am not even aware of the media
reports that were just mentioned by the subcommittee member.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Admiral Justice or Admiral Crowley,
I understand that the cruise lines have taken measures to
screen all the bags and the passengers and so forth. Are there
any ways that you feel that their security should be improved
or any major or minor changes that you would suggest to improve
or increase the security on these ships?
Admiral Justice. I would like to say, sir, that it has been
my recent experience in the last 3\1/2\ years down in Miami
particularly where I have been stationed that there has been
remarkable improvements and a coordinated effort to improve--
you mentioned the screening of all bags. The Coast Guard and
the U.S. Government has promulgated security standards, and the
cruise ship industry has stepped up and met those standards in
a remarkably aggressive and thorough manner.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Thank you.
Admiral McPherson, a final question for you. I noticed in
your testimony that you have talked about the law in regard to
piracy, but I did not--and maybe it is someplace else in some
of the other witnesses' testimonies, but how many acts of
piracy are occurring each year on the high seas now? Do you
know or have that information?
Admiral McPherson. I do not have those statistics. We can
get back to you on that, if you would like, sir.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Swecker, could I clarify this question? One
of the most notable cases here, the Smith family, is a dispute
whether it is an accident or potential crime. Do accidents get
reported, and do you ever investigate that?
Mr. Swecker. I am sorry. I did not----
Mr. Souder. You stated in response to the question in your
testimony that--and it was suggested here that the cruise ships
themselves report crimes.
Mr. Swecker. Correct.
Mr. Souder. The question is: Do they report accidents? And
what happens when a dispute occurs between an accident and a
crime?
Mr. Swecker. I am not aware that they report accidents nor
any requirement to report accidents. But if there is any
question at all, it would seem that they should report and let
us take a look at it, at least open up a preliminary inquiry
and see if a crime has been committed. In these circumstances,
it was very appropriate for us to get an early look at it, and
it should have been reported very quickly.
Mr. Souder. And so I understand this, for the next panel,
because in my questioning and Mr. Duncan's questioning, it is
still a little unclear to me, is this real-time reporting or is
this when they come into port or a quarterly report that they
report crimes to the FBI?
Mr. Swecker. I think it varies. I think when they believe a
crime has been committed, I don't think they wait until they go
into the port. I think there are communication systems that
allow them to report that via the air waves.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, first, there are a lot of issues
that we can deal with here, but I think it is important to
break it down to the real reason we are having this hearing.
The scenario basically is that we have a cruise ship industry
where we have over 10 million people, half of those people from
North America, that are going for vacation. They are looking
for a good time. They bring probably more jewelry than they
might. They might bring tuxedos, whatever, because of the
dining room, and they are looking to have a good time.
Now, when you have a lot of people, you need systems and
regulations, and I think the three major issues we need to look
at now, first, the crimes on the cruise ships, on board,
whether they be theft--and I assume there is a lot of theft. I
am not sure whether it is being reported because it is an open
season for people when they are out on board and whatever. And
do we have a system there that we can identify where the theft
is? Is there a ring there? Other issues, I have heard rape,
whatever that is.
The second thing, the pirates on the high seas, I think we
know that. I don't think that we have as many areas, and I
think our intelligence shows that we stay away from certain
areas, like Somalia.
And the third is weather, and I referred to that in my
opening statement about are we forced because of an industry to
take chances when it is important to make a deadline than to
look at the safety.
Now, you know, there are some--we had a hearing here, if
you will recall, the baseball hearing on steroids, and at first
we all thought, well, are we really publicizing something. But
the more we got into it, the more that we saw children
involved, and then some of the issues were people telling the
truth. Baseball had to take a look at it, and we have talked
about how this industry is a good industry, but maybe there is
more to what we need to look at than what is there.
I know of, and have heard of, complaints when there is a
theft in your room that you get a letter back, sorry, we are
sorry that we cannot take care of your situation, whatever. And
what I am interested in more than anything is, first thing, do
we have a system in place--we know about the jurisdictional
issues when the FBI or Coast Guard have jurisdiction and what
do we do on the high seas and then what do we do. But do we
work with the industry itself? Do we have a system that deals
with the issue of safety? Do we have people who are certified
security officers on ship? Do we have a system, maybe within
that security program, investigators that will look at a theft
that might be on board or any other issue such as that?
I am not sure which one could answer that question, but how
closely do we monitor and work with the industry? Which is a
large industry. And why I mentioned baseball, because, you
know, the industry itself needs to step up if there are issues.
If they are not reporting crimes, how do we evaluate it? And I
am sure if they are not reporting crimes and they do not know,
they do not want the public to know about it. So let's deal
with that.
And then there is a situation, I am sure Congressman Shays
will deal with it, you know, which is extremely unfortunate,
with George Smith and the way that occurred and the way his
wife was treated and the fact that she was really told to go
off-board and didn't really feel she had the security that was
needed, and then who went to the crime scene, and not even
knowing what the issues are there. I am sure that those
issues--the Royal Caribbean would not want that to be out in
public because if it is, then it will hurt their credibility.
So I am asking them and other industries to work with us to
find out what is there.
Now, can you answer the question about the standards,
reporting of crimes? Do we have people on board that are
trained security officers? What do we have there when they go
beyond our jurisdiction?
Mr. Swecker. I can take a shot at it. There are protocols
worked out with the cruise lines, but I am not aware of any
formal training that we have provided. They may provide their
own training. We have met with the cruise lines and established
some basic protocols.
Standards, I think you hit on a pretty good issue here as
to setting some objective standards for them to meet when there
is a suspected crime, reporting those crimes and getting at
least some basic minimum standards set.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Does anybody else have a comment there?
Admiral Crowley. Sir, I would like to add that since the
implementation of the ISPS code and the Maritime Transportation
Security Act here in the United States, the Coast Guard has
worked with the industry to develop a model security officer
training program. I cannot speak to the details and the
standards that are inherent in that, but we continue to work
with the industry to develop a model program that they can then
execute.
Mr. Ruppersberger. But we do not know whether those
programs exist, we do not have a way of monitoring, like we do
in our airline industry, because I can guarantee you, 99
percent of probably most--at least the people in the United
States who go on these cruise ships, they are not thinking or
are they aware of what happens when they get beyond the United
States of America jurisdiction. And in a way, it is our
obligation--and that is why we are having this hearing today--
to maybe go to the industry and to maybe make sure that those
standards do exist and that we do have the proper people on
board. And there is another issue we haven't talked about--and
I do not want to get into it now because we could spend days on
this--which is the actual issue of terrorism itself and the
ability for, you know, members of al Qaeda or whatever to get
on a cruise ship, to come into a port or whatever. I mean, you
know, these are things that I think we better start buttoning
it up, and I am asking you as a member of this committee to
maybe review this with your different agencies, get with the
industry before this thing gets out of hand, because we do not
want to hurt the industry. There are a lot of people that enjoy
this. But if the industry does not police itself and set the
standards and we do not help them, then we are going to have to
step in, and I don't think that is what the industry is going
to want.
Do you have any opinions on whether you can start working
with them more in setting those standards and who else should
be involved? Anybody?
Admiral Crowley. Sir, the Coast Guard certainly continues
its partnership with the industry to work toward the safest
possible industry that is available.
Mr. Ruppersberger. What I am asking, I really have a
problem with a lot of these hearings, that we have these
hearings and there is no follow-through. So what I am asking is
that the Coast Guard, the FBI, and the Navy here--now, I am not
sure whether the Navy is involved as much, but you probably are
on the high seas--that we maybe pull together, because you are
probably the best experts we have to deal with this, and to
look at the industry and bring the industry in and talk about
these kind of standards. You know, the Coast Guard has said to
me that it is one of the safest modes of travel, but if you
happen to be somebody that is lost, like the Smith family, that
is not a very safe mode, and we need, I think, to really start
looking at standards that will not hurt the industry but allow
it to continue on, but to make sure we protect our Americans.
Any commitment to get back on that?
Mr. Swecker. Certainly we can get back to you on that. We
have a perfect vehicle to do that with our maritime liaison
officers, and they would be the points of contact to sit with
the Coast Guard, sit with the Navy, and sit with the industry
representatives, and work through some protocols and standards.
Mr. Ruppersberger. You have 300--I think it is 300--major
ships or, I guess--what do you call them--vessels--is it 300
companies that are out there that do the majority of the 10,
the 12 million? I mean, would you work through the
International Council of Cruise Lines? I mean, where do we go
here? I am trying to get specific. Where do you think we go?
Mr. Swecker. Working with 300 different companies would be
difficult. Working through the industry representatives through
ICCL would probably be the best idea.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I would suggest you find who the big
players are, too, and try to address that. And then if you set
standards, it can go from the largest players to the smallest.
But, Mr. Chairman, I am sure you are going to ask for this
to come back that we could have a report back on this. Thank
you.
Mr. Souder. Yes, we will.
Chairman Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I want to thank all of you for being
here, and I am wrestling with myself as to where to begin
because we are citing statistics that I think are meaningless
because I do not trust the statistics. Whatever they are, I do
not trust them. I do not feel we have all the statistics. I
think we have some of the statistics. So maybe you could start
by telling me, do you have all the statistics or do you just
get some of the information from some of the cruise line
industries, some of the cruise ships? Could we just start right
down the line?
Mr. Swecker. As far as crimes that have been reported, we
work everything that has been reported to us as at least a PI.
Mr. Shays. So, in other words, if they have not reported a
crime, you do not have a statistic.
Mr. Swecker. We do not know what they have not reported to
us. There is no way of knowing.
Mr. Shays. So the bottom line is, of the statistics you are
given, you can then share those statistics. But how can you
come to any conclusion that they mean anything?
Mr. Swecker. You can't. I mean, a lot of crimes on the
street do not get reported. We just have no way of quantifying
what is not reported to us.
Mr. Shays. But isn't there a difference, though, between
what might happen on the street and what might happen on a
cruise ship? Isn't a cruise ship--basically they are the judge
and the jury in a sense? They have their own police, their own
fire, and it is all--and nodding the head doesn't get recorded.
Mr. Swecker. I think you are right.
Mr. Shays. OK. If I could just go down the line, how
comfortable are you with the statistics that are presented?
Admiral Crowley. Mr. Chairman, I certainly would not claim
to have accurate statistics for all the crimes that this
subcommittee is concerned about today.
Mr. Shays. On cruise ships.
Admiral Crowley. On cruise ships. There certainly are good,
accurate--relatively accurate safety statistics in certain
areas that have been developed over years. What you are looking
at today I couldn't stand on very long.
With respect to what we could do, we certainly can continue
to look at that and figure out what it is----
Mr. Shays. We will come back to that. We will come back to
that.
Admiral McPherson.
Admiral McPherson. Yes, sir, there is no reporting
requirement to DOD by the cruise industry. In response to
Representative Duncan's statement, we can get back on the
number of piracy incidents that we have become aware of, but
there is no requirement for reporting those to----
Mr. Shays. I am going to put piracy aside for the time
being, because I just have this feeling that we will probably
have more accurate numbers on piracy than we would on whether
or not someone is missing.
Mr. Swecker, if someone is missing, is that a crime?
Mr. Swecker. Not necessarily. I would say in the context of
a cruise ship, it is certainly something that should be
reported.
Mr. Shays. But is it reported?
Mr. Swecker. I do not know.
Mr. Shays. I mean, you know it isn't, don't you?
Mr. Swecker. I am sorry?
Mr. Shays. You know it isn't reported.
Mr. Swecker. All I know is what is reported to us. If we
were aware of an instance where they did not report it, we
would probably independently----
Mr. Shays. But in your experience, are you aware that
people have been missing on cruise ships and it was never even
reported to the families that they were missing?
Mr. Swecker. I am not personally aware of those situations.
Nothing has been reported to me.
Mr. Shays. So you have never heard of an instance where
someone was missing that was not reported?
Mr. Swecker. That was not part of the preparation that I
did for this testimony.
Mr. Shays. Well, one of the things that would be wonderful
would be to have all of you read the statements of some of the
family members. While you were giving your statements, which I
really appreciate, I was just going through what some of the
family members had said. And when you go through what the
family members endured, you want to scream. At least I do. I
mean, when you hear the statement, read the statement of
Kendall Carver about Merrian Lynn Carver, she went on a cruise,
the steward was concerned because she was not in her cabin by
the second day and reported to his folks that he had to report
to on the cruise ship. When the cruise ship docked, they took
her possessions and sent them down to Miami and did not report
anything. Did not report anything. The family is learning that
their daughter is missing from her daughter. And then when they
try to find out, well, where is she, they find that she went on
a cruise. And then they continue to try to get more
information. They have to hire an investigator to check this
out. The investigator wants to talk to people on the cruise
ship, finds that at first they were willing to talk, and then
they were not willing to talk. Finally, he learns that the
cruise ship was very concerned--at least people on the cruise
ship after the second day. The family was never notified. They
never notified her parents. They never notified her children.
They never notified her former husband. They did not notify
anybody. They did not even record that she was missing.
So when I read that, and this is a reputable cruise line.
When I read that, everything about statistics mean nothing to
me. They are totally and completely meaningless to me.
Let me just understand from each of you, what is the
requirement of the cruise line industry to provide you accurate
statistics? What is the requirement?
Mr. Swecker. There are not any that I am aware of.
Mr. Shays. Admiral.
Admiral Justice. None, sir.
Admiral McPherson. I am not aware of any requirements to
report to DOD.
Mr. Shays. So there is no requirement that they provide you
statistics whatsoever. So can we agree that the statistics are
really meaningless, at least at this point? I mean, would you
agree, Mr. Swecker, that the statistics are meaningless if, in
fact, you cannot be assured you have all the statistics?
Mr. Swecker. I would say they are less meaningful.
Mr. Shays. Well, tell me how they are meaningful.
Mr. Swecker. We know what is reported----
Mr. Shays. I do not know what ``less meaningful'' means.
Mr. Swecker. Well, we have no way of knowing what is or is
not reported to us, so there is no way of defining the universe
of what is not reported.
Mr. Shays. So can you tell me that the statistics are
meaningful, then?
Mr. Swecker. I am not going to defend the statistics. I
cannot.
Mr. Shays. Are the statistics meaningful?
Mr. Swecker. I cannot defend them as meaningful----
Mr. Shays. I do not know what ``defend them'' or not means.
I need you to tell me--in other words, you have already
testified that the industry does not have to report anything to
you. No requirement, no legal requirement. The Admirals have
said the same thing. They do not have to report it to the Coast
Guard. They do not have to report it to the Navy. So there is
no requirement that they be reported. And yet I have been
listening to all these statistics. So should I have any comfort
in those statistics, Mr. Swecker?
Mr. Swecker. No.
Mr. Shays. Admiral.
Admiral Justice. No, sir.
Admiral Crowley. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Admiral.
Admiral McPherson. It doesn't seem so to me.
Mr. Shays. OK. So what we have to do on this subcommittee
is find a way to get accurate statistics. Why don't you each
suggest to me how we would get accurate statistics, just to
start?
Mr. Swecker. A requirement that they--and define what
crimes should be reported. For example, we have no statistics
on theft, so we know that no theft has ever been reported, at
least to the FBI. So we know all the crimes are not being
reported. So I think a requirement that you report crimes
either to the FBI or the Coast Guard, or both, would be a
start.
Mr. Shays. Admirals. Admiral Crowley.
Admiral Crowley. Mr. Chairman, it is clear that we have to
come to some agreement as to what the nature of reporting
requirements should be, work with both the Congress and the
industry and develop some standards that are helpful.
Mr. Shays. See, we are not even--and I appreciate your
responding to these questions, but we are not even into this
issue yet of what, you know, regulations we are going to put or
not put on the industry. We are just trying to understand what
the problem is to know whether laws are required, regulations,
just Government action with no need of regulation, or whether
we are just going to say to the industry you have to do a
better job and you have to do the following.
What legal rights do Americans have, Mr. Swecker, when they
are on board a cruise ship?
Mr. Swecker. Well, they are afforded all the legal rights
of any citizen in the United States.
Mr. Shays. If they are on a cruise ship that is foreign-
flagged, they still have all the rights of a citizen?
Mr. Swecker. By virtue of Title 18 in our extraterritorial
jurisdictional statutes, yes. I mean, as far as our ability to
investigate crimes against U.S. citizens--I don't know if they
enjoy, I guess, all the rights of a U.S. citizen if they are on
a foreign-flagged vessel, but they are going to receive the
protection and the investigation by U.S. law enforcement.
Mr. Shays. So if they get on a cruise ship in Italy or
Greece, they can feel comfortable they have all the rights of a
citizen, all the legal protections of a citizen of the United
States?
Mr. Swecker. Well, we go through all these different
jurisdictional scenarios. What they can expect is that U.S. law
enforcement will respond if we have a jurisdictional basis to
do so.
Mr. Shays. The ``if'' is the question. What does that
``if'' mean?
Mr. Swecker. We can only work what we have jurisdiction
over. I mean, there are some scenarios where it is not clear,
for example, if it is within somebody else's territorial waters
or their seas.
Mr. Shays. So if a crime is allegedly committed in the
territorial waters of another country, then you do or do not
have jurisdiction?
Mr. Swecker. Then that is subject to international treaty,
and that starts to get out of my area of expertise. But if
there is any arguable basis for U.S. jurisdiction, we will
respond and we will work through the host country.
Mr. Shays. I have real confidence that the FBI, if they can
find a way, will exercise their ability to involve themselves.
I just want to know if you do it by just the acquiescence of
the country in which the crime may have been committed or
whether you can actually demand it by right. Maybe the Admirals
can enlighten me.
Admiral Crowley. Mr. Chairman, you raise the question of
the further we get from a U.S.-flagged vessel calling upon a
U.S. port to a foreign-flagged vessel calling upon a foreign
port----
Mr. Shays. OK, let's take----
Admiral Crowley [continuing]. Never getting to the United
States at all, and there is certainly going to be a difference
in the ability of the United States to provide protections for
the cruise line rider that is more distant to the United
States. That doesn't mean they don't have rights as citizens
and together we won't work toward resolving issues. But there
are simply going to be differences in our ability to deal with
the problem.
Mr. Shays. Let me just isolate it first. Most cruise ships
are not U.S. based, or are?
Admiral Crowley. Most of them are not.
Mr. Shays. U.S.-flagged, they are not.
Admiral Crowley. Most of them are not U.S.-flagged.
Mr. Shays. OK. Let's just take those that are U.S.-flagged.
If a crime is committed in territorial waters of another
country, given that it is a U.S.-flagged vessel, we have pretty
certain rights?
Admiral Crowley. We would have a good ability to exercise
jurisdiction not only over the vessel, investigative with
colleagues from the FBI, but response from the Coast Guard, and
to establish requirements upon the shipper, the cruise line
itself.
Mr. Shays. If it was not a U.S.-flagged vessel, then?
Admiral Crowley. If it was not a U.S.-flagged vessel, then
while we could protect U.S. citizens' rights and investigative
means as has been discussed, our ability to influence the
standards on the cruise line are dependent upon two things: our
work with the industry, which is rather robust and continuous,
and our work within the International Maritime Organization, as
we have done with respect to security code at large, and to try
to extend the standards that the United States believes
important as far as we can through world shipping. In an
incredibly responsive way, IMO has continued to work with U.S.
delegations and passed in very quick time the security facility
and vessel code that we all know about following September
11th.
I do not want to paint a picture that we are helpless or
that the picture is so bleak, but I think it is important to
recognize that it is different when we are dealing with a
foreign-flagged vessel, and most different with a foreign-
flagged vessel that has relatively no connection to the United
States.
Mr. Shays. Well, whether you want it to be bleak or not is
not really the issue. The issue is you are just trying to be
truthful about what rights we have and what rights we do not
have and what rights citizens have and do not have.
I notice Mr. Cummings is here. I would like to have a
series of more questions, but I would be happy to yield back
and then just come back.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Crowley, tell me something. You know, we have had
all kinds of hearings in this subcommittee about all the things
that the Coast Guard has to do with regard to homeland security
and drug interdiction and, you know, doing the things that you
do, guarding the coast and what have you. But I am just
wondering, you know, where does this whole subject fall as far
as priorities are concerned?
Admiral Crowley. Well, sir, I think everywhere from the
National Strategy down to the code that, and I speak loosely,
but the code that every commanding officer adheres to, that the
safety of life at sea is preeminent. So the safety and security
of lives is always a preeminent concern.
The Coast Guard has long worked with the maritime industry
both on the commercial side and on the private vessel side,
cruise lines as well as commercial carriers, to ensure the
safest transportation system that we can to leverage U.S.
standards as far into the world's shipping as we can. There is
an end to what that might be, and that is what your question
clearly goes to. And that is a different question, and there is
no easy answer, no good answer for the victims of the crimes
that call our attention today.
Mr. Cummings. Do you believe that the cruise industry
should bear more of the financial responsibility for security
and safety on these cruise ships?
Admiral Crowley. Sir, I believe that the cruise industry
bears the significant share of the responsibility today.
Mr. Cummings. I see you shaking your head, Admiral Justice.
Admiral Justice. Yes, sir, I would like to chime in here.
As we work not only in the regulatory and the preparation for
safety and all the things that we do with the cruise ship
industry before they sail, once the industry does sail, once
the ships are out at sea, the Coast Guard is also there. We
respond, particularly in the Caribbean, particularly throughout
the Bahamas, to medical evacuation situations on cruise ships
all the time, all year long, and we are ready to do that as
well as if there is some sort of a man overboard situation,
whatever it might be, which unfortunately happened again just a
couple days ago, we are out there immediately upon
notification, and we are flying and we are searching and we are
responding in partnership with the cruise ship to try to remedy
the situation.
Mr. Cummings. You know, I was sitting here and listening to
this thing about you all talk about reporting and statistics,
and I am just wondering--you deal with this kind of thing every
day, Mr. Swecker. What would be the ideal situation if you were
sitting in our seats and there was something that, you know,
you could do to make things better that are practical things so
that when people get on a ship they could feel--you are never
going to be completely secure, I don't care where you are, but
have maximum--you know, as maximum as practical security as
possible. What would you want to do? What would you do? Or
anybody else.
Mr. Swecker. Well, I would say that you would hope that the
industry and push the industry to police itself and establish
its own standards. We have talked about reporting. I think that
is very critical to at least know that if a crime occurs that
it is going to be duly reported and quickly reported. But as
far as the standard, security standards, protocols and that
sort of thing, you would hope and I would suggest pushing the
industry to set their own standards.
Mr. Cummings. And I am just curious, how would you suggest
that we do that? If I am going to report something that--and it
is so sad. It is so sad that so much gets down to dollars and
cents these days, not necessarily safety. And if I have an
industry where I am worried about the dollars and cents, hoping
and wishing is not probably going to do it. I was just
wondering, did you have anything that--I mean, you talk about
trying to force them or push them to do it. Us saying please do
this does not work. We could barely get trains. I sit on the
Transportation Committee. Just to get trains to put certain
safety glass in trains so that if there is an accident people
can get out is a major, major problem. I mean, it is like going
up against that wall there. And I was just wondering, how would
you--what kind of incentive would you throw out there?
I hate to put you in this position as a legislator, but you
are the FBI, so I figure that you might be able to help us.
Mr. Swecker. It is very difficult to step into the
policymaking role that you are asking, but, you know, as we
talked about, I am not aware of systemic problem because we do
not know what we do not know. And I think before you step in
and start regulating, you need to have a good understanding of
what the standards are and what is not being done. Is it a
systemic problem or is it an isolated set of circumstances in a
few instances? I do not know that. So it is very difficult to
step up and say, hey, we need to do this or this. I think at
bare minimum, I think it is a good start to simply require that
these crimes be reported. But if you are asking me for a
standard security standard, I cannot give you that.
Mr. Cummings. I got you. That is not what I was asking, but
it is OK.
What sanctions exist, if any, if a cruise line is
determined to be negligent or responsible for a serious crime
against one of its passengers?
Mr. Swecker. What sanction?
Mr. Cummings. Yes.
Mr. Swecker. Well, there is a whole host of laws, both
common law, depending on the district where you would find
jurisdiction, and also some maritime laws that would govern
that. They are also subject to the same laws of any citizen,
misprision of a felony, not reporting a felony. There are laws
on the books that can be applied if there is such gross
negligence that it reaches into the criminal realm.
Mr. Cummings. Now, with regard to the George Smith case,
the Turkish Government initially handled it, and then the case
was turned over to the FBI after, I think, 6 weeks or 7 weeks.
Is that true?
Mr. Swecker. I am not sure of the exact time period.
Mr. Cummings. Well, you know it----
Mr. Swecker. It was not right away.
Mr. Cummings. It was not right away. When were you all made
aware of that? Can you tell me that?
Mr. Swecker. No, I do not have that information, but I can
get back to you on it.
Mr. Cummings. And----
Mr. Swecker. I have also been asked by the U.S. Attorney
not to discuss the facts of the case.
Mr. Cummings. I understand. I am not trying to get that
deep into it. I am just trying to figure out whether I found
out about it before you did on CNN. And I am not trying to be
smart. I mean, I heard about it from CNN, and I was just
wondering--and what I am trying to get to is what kind of
cooperation do we get from these governments? Because that
sounds like something that is very important.
Mr. Swecker. Well, I was going to say in that case it was
very difficult to determine exactly when and where--what
territorial--if any particular territorial waters were
implicated and exactly where this happened. And that is one of
the threshold questions in terms of who has jurisdiction. So
there are some complexities there that get into the facts of
the case.
Mr. Cummings. And so then depending on where the ship was,
you could have--I mean, it could be a nightmare trying to
figure out who has jurisdiction. Am I right?
Mr. Swecker. I would defer to legal counsel on that one. He
is going to have a better understanding of that.
Admiral Crowley. Sir, it could be difficult, but I think
you touch upon an important point that we continue to make
improvements on all the time, and that is working with the
shipping authorities of different flag governments to try to
improve our ability once we know about a case--you have pointed
out a vulnerability to the process. But once we know about the
case, to work with the shipping authorities of the different
countries and acquire jurisdiction to facilitate, whether it be
Legats or Coast Guard boarding teams, to preserve scenes and to
continue the effort.
In several of the cases that we have noted, we have been
able to do that, but we have to know about the case before you
can make the step to contact the shipping authority.
Mr. Cummings. I would just ask this: Mr. Swecker said that
it is kind of difficult, and I am not try to put words in your
mouth. Correct me if I am wrong--to figure out whether we have
a problem and the extent of the problem if we do not have the
information. Am I right, Mr. Swecker? Is that what you
basically said?
Mr. Swecker. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Do you all consider this a problem? Do you
think that is a problem? You know, we have had witnesses come
before us, and we thought something was a problem and they did
not.
Mr. Swecker. It has not been brought to our attention as a
systemic problem.
Mr. Cummings. So you don't----
Mr. Swecker. You know, I will not say we have studied it
extensively either. I mean, this is one of many things that we
do, and it has not been brought, at least at my level, as a
systemic problem with the cruise industry.
Mr. Cummings. Anybody else?
[No response.]
Mr. Shays. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Cummings. Of course.
Mr. Shays. Since this was the line of question that I was
asking, I need you to elaborate on your answer, because it
sounds like you acknowledged the statistics are meaningless
because they are not complete and they are voluntary, and you
all four said they were meaningless. And yet you are saying you
did not think of it as a problem.
So I need you to kind of sort that out for me, just so we
have a record that we can act on.
Mr. Swecker. There just is not enough information to draw a
conclusion at this point. I mean, you are asking me to define
what we do not know.
Mr. Shays. Draw a conclusion about what?
Mr. Swecker. You were addressing reporting, and I just--we
don't know what we don't know. We don't know what hasn't been
reported to us.
Mr. Shays. OK. So you don't know whether you can make the
affirmative or the negative. But I will get into this again
because I want it clearly understood. I thought you all said
that these statistics were meaningless because they weren't
necessarily complete. And if you have a different answer to
add, then I need to make sure I know.
Now, what I also heard you saying to Mr. Cummings is that
you had not thought about it in the past, and what that says to
me is you have lots of issues on the table, and you have just
accepted these statistics and acted on them as being valid,
which says something else.
I thank the gentleman, but I really need to nail this down
before we adjourn this panel.
Mr. Cummings. Yes, just as my last question, this is a
followup on what Mr. Shays was saying. You know, the thing that
I guess concerns me is that--one of the things that makes me so
proud to be an American is that we take care of our people.
And, I mean, you all do a great job. You have men and women out
there that literally put their lives on the line. I have seen
it, I have heard them. And I guess, you know, I look at some of
the cases that happen, and it happens to one American who is
missing or who has a major problem, I think a lot of the reason
why other countries admire us is because we will go, we will do
whatever is necessary to try to get to that one person, no
matter where they are. I just want to make sure that we do
everything that we can to prevent having to have to go after
those persons as best we can. We are always going to have some
type of problems, and we just need to figure out, again, what--
I think there is a problem, figure out how to get the
information we need and then figure out how to use taxpayers'
dollars most effectively and efficiently to continue to do what
America is good at, and that is coming to the rescue of our
people.
You know, so perhaps this will in further questioning, you
know, flesh it out a little bit, but I think that is the goal
here.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you. I have some additional questions.
Would each of you report back to the subcommittee what type
of statistics you have in your agency, how many times the Coast
Guard has been involved not only on cruise ships but on piracy,
if it is related to theft, rape, or murder, same thing in the
Department of Defense, same thing in the FBI, so at least we
have what universe of statistics we are dealing with.
Second, just as a general statement that Mr. Cummings did,
let me ask this question. It is a pretty easy one, Admiral
Justice, but I want to give you the opportunity to say this on
the record. Since we expect you to pick up every sailboat that
tips over, we expect you to interdict all the drugs in the
eastern Pacific and the Caribbean and everywhere else in the
world, we expect you to guard every little thing that may be in
every container coming in on every ship in the United States,
and now we expect you to make sure everybody is safe on all the
international seas, do you have enough money?
Admiral Justice. Sir, as you know, we do the best we can
with what we have, and, Mr. Cummings, you know, you have our
continued commitment to keep doing that.
Mr. Souder. Bottom line, and I will say this, we in
Congress need to accelerate everything from Deepwater to others
because we have put you in so many missions, and now the
general public--I mean, we have been having these border
meetings for about 2 months and trying to figure out how to
deal with the U.S. border. And because you did a great job, and
Admiral Allen down in Katrina, they wanted to put you in charge
of the Southwest border. I know all the coasties really want to
do landlocked Southwest border things, but we cannot continue
to say the Coast Guard is going to do all this without giving
the Coast Guard resources. And I wanted to make sure I put that
into the record.
Admiral Justice. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Cummings made a comment and the response
was, Mr. Swecker, ``once we heard about the problem.'' You
know, ``once we heard about the problem'' just does not cut it,
because we have established here that there is no timely
reporting. In other words, you cannot respond to a problem if
you have not heard about it. You do not just look at TV and
respond. But you have identified a real critical thing here
because if it takes you 7 months to hear about it, what is a
crime scene going to look like? I mean, this is like every case
is a cold case.
You also said in your testimony that there were not
penalties other than the normal penalties. Let me ask a
question: If there is a crime scene in a town in Indiana, or
anywhere in the country--I happen to be from Indiana. But a
Wal-Mart security guard alters the crime scene, what happens if
private security changes a crime scene that could impact
whether or not a case can be prosecuted? And what if it was
deliberately altered, not necessarily to cover up the crime but
they knew it was a crime scene, they knew it was a potential
civil liberties violation of some individual, and they altered
the crime scene?
Mr. Swecker. A deliberate alteration of a crime scene would
be a crime. If it was not just negligence but done with
requisite intent----
Mr. Souder. What about a potential----
Mr. Swecker [continuing]. It would be----
Mr. Souder. What about of a potential crime? In other
words, there is a store, let's say, at the mall, somebody
alleges they were raped in the parking lot, but we are not sure
whether it was a rape or not, but somebody altered the crime
scene from a private security force. Would they have penalties?
Mr. Swecker. Then you get into nuances of intent. I hate to
delve too deeply into that, but the answer is it is a potential
crime, yes.
Mr. Souder. Is it on a cruise ship?
Mr. Swecker. If there is--yes. If there is a deliberate
intent to tamper with a crime scene, yes. Then you get into
legal issues----
Mr. Souder. The reason I am trying to get into it, because
deliberate intent here is really interesting, because at a
mall, it may be that you do not want a car with a bunch of
yellow tape over it saying, you know, rape victim there; you do
not want to have a store sealed off because something happened
in their store, because they would shut down during Christmas
season. On a ship, the problem here is they want to use the
berths and they do not want to sit in harbor waiting for the
crime scene.
So, if there is blood on the deck, that is not going to be
real comfortable for the next people going, hey, how come there
is blood all over this lifeboat and on the deck? So it is
certainly deliberate. The question is, are you saying
malicious?
Mr. Swecker. We would investigate it as a crime. I don't
know whether it would be convicted as a crime. We would have to
hold up those elements of proof, whatever statute we are
working with.
Mr. Souder. OK. I appreciate that. That clarifies that for
me.
In this question of are the statistics valid, and you kind
of suggested that--first off, you said overtly that we cannot
have any confidence in the statistics because we only know what
we know. At the same time you suggested it had not reached some
kind of threshold level that you were real concerned about it.
Let me ask another question. If I have a family member who
is missing and I report that, that they are missing from a
cruise ship, they went on a cruise and they are missing, does
that get counted in the cruise ship data, or how does that get
recorded? And does it depend who I report it to? If I report it
to the local police, would the local police not necessarily
even get it to the FBI unless it reaches a threshold? Could
different cases be lodged in different city departments, State
police, FBI? And do you mark it if it is a cruise ship?
Mr. Swecker. It is possible. I think most local agencies
would quickly refer it over to the FBI, you know, if it were
reported directly to them.
All I can tell you is whatever has been reported to us, we
have opened up as an investigation.
Mr. Souder. But you do not believe that a case--you do not
know or--what I am trying to sort out is, does the FBI get
cases outside of the cruise ship self-reporting that could be
cruise ship-related? And how does that mesh? Or don't you have
that statistic?
Mr. Swecker. I don't know if we have had indirect reporting
from other agencies that the cruise line did not report, but I
certainly can get back to you on that.
Mr. Souder. That would be helpful because that would be--
one of the questions is you presume if somebody was missing
from a cruise ship that there would be another method they
would report if the cruise ship didn't report it, and that
would be an interesting gap to see as well.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays [presiding]. Thank you.
We will get on to the next panel in just a second. We are
learning how to walk here on this case. We are looking at the
cruise ship industry, and we may have a serious problem. We may
not have the kind of problem that I think we have. But what I
am getting from this first panel and from you, Mr. Swecker, is
that given the statistics, you do not think there is anything
too out of the ordinary. This is how we started out. You know,
we have cities with crime that is worse and so on.
In the course of your responding to questions--and you made
it a point that you don't always have a crime told to you in an
urban area, for instance. But you did, in the course of
responding to some questions, acknowledge that all the
statistics you get are voluntary and that you have no certainty
whatsoever that you have all the statistics, all the facts. So
in response to that, asking the question, can you have any
comfort level that these statistics mean anything? I thought
your answer was, no, I can't have a comfort level that these
statistics mean anything. I may have asked the question
differently. If you want to--that is where I am leaving--that
is what I concluded from your response to me. If you want to
give a different response, then--do you have confidence that
these statistics are accurate and that you can draw any
conclusions given that you have no comfort that you have all
the facts and statistics?
Mr. Swecker. If you are asking if I have a personal comfort
level----
Mr. Shays. Not a personal--no, you are not here for
personal reasons. You are an FBI representative.
Mr. Swecker. And I am also trained to operate on facts, and
I don't have factual information to draw conclusions right now.
Mr. Shays. No, no, that is not--do you--you don't have any
factual information to draw a conclusion that the statistics
are accurate, correct?
Mr. Swecker. Correct.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Swecker. Nor inaccurate.
Mr. Shays. Fine. Therefore, when you start out by saying
the statistics are telling you that you don't have a problem,
do you want to withdraw that? Because you basically cannot make
that conclusion, correct?
Mr. Swecker. All I said was I am not aware of a systemic
problem with non-reporting. And I am not aware of a systemic
problem with non-reporting. But, again, you know, you are
asking me to draw a conclusion, and there is not enough
information to draw that conclusion.
Mr. Shays. Well, we are going to just start over again, and
I do not have a time limit here, and we can go on for half an
hour, we can go on for 2 minutes. And I know you want to be
cooperative, and I do not want to beat a dead horse here. The
bottom line is: Are these statistics reported to you
voluntarily?
Mr. Swecker. Yes.
Mr. Shays. OK. Do you believe that the statistics from the
industry represent every crime that has been committed? Do you
believe that you get all the statistics from all the cruise
lines?
Mr. Swecker. I do not have that information. I do not have
enough information to draw that belief one way or the other.
But I----
Mr. Shays. So the answer is----
Mr. Swecker. All I know is what has been reported to us. If
I had examples of non-reporting----
Mr. Shays. Well, let's pursue it differently----
Mr. Swecker [continuing]. I could draw a conclusion.
Mr. Shays. Is the cruise industry a disinterested party
here?
Mr. Swecker. No.
Mr. Shays. Does the cruise industry have any penalty if
they do not provide you accurate statistics?
Mr. Swecker. None that I am aware of.
Mr. Shays. OK. They cannot go to jail. It is all voluntary.
And so basically you are depending on the good will of the
cruise industry to provide you accurate information. Is that
correct?
Mr. Swecker. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. Is it possible that some of the information they
would provide you would embarrass them?
Mr. Swecker. It is possible.
Mr. Shays. Is it possible that some of the information they
could provide you might hurt their business?
Mr. Swecker. It is possible.
Mr. Shays. OK. So, so far, we are in agreement.
Can you state with any comfort level that given the
statistics that you are provided, you can say that we do not
have a problem in the cruise industry?
Mr. Swecker. No, I cannot.
Mr. Shays. OK. We will leave it at that. We will leave it
at that. I think that is fair. So you are not coming here
saying we have a problem or we do not have a problem.
Mr. Swecker. Correct. If I had more information for you, I
would be perfectly willing to draw a conclusion on that. But
I----
Mr. Shays. OK. Rear Admiral Justice, I am going to ask you
the same basic questions, and without me asking it, tell me
what the statistics tell you and tell me how dependable you
believe the statistics are. By the way, I thought this was like
the first question I would ask in the course of 20 others, and
that is why I am not eager to keep spending time on this. But
what comfort level do you have with the statistics that would
suggest that we do not have a problem with the cruise industry?
Can you draw a conclusion one way or the other?
Admiral Justice. I cannot.
Admiral Crowley. Mr. Chairman, if I could have your
indulgence and maybe answer the question a little differently--
--
Mr. Shays. Fair enough.
Admiral Crowley [continuing]. And see if it is responsive
to you. Over time, the Coast Guard has found a fair degree of
self-reporting from the cruise industry on safety matters such
as fire prevention from which additional fire protection
regulations were implemented within the industry, first within
U.S. carriers and then, through IMO, overseas.
On the other hand, through largely a wide body of anecdotal
information, investigations and efforts in the area of
environmental pollution were undertaken by the Coast Guard in a
different fashion.
So we have experience, is what I would offer you, in
dealing with both the industry dealing on its own behalf as
safety as an interest of theirs and self-reporting and making
adjustments to regulations, as well as understanding, where a
wide body of anecdotal information does exist, that law
enforcement and investigative efforts have to be undertaken and
pursued without the request of the industry. And I think there
is a track record, for example, in the environmental
enforcement area of holding individuals as well as corporate
entities criminally liable where it is applicable.
So that is approaching your question a little differently.
I don't know if that is helpful to you or not.
Mr. Shays. We will let it stand. Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral McPherson. Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense
has no regulatory or law enforcement relationship with the
cruise industry, so I am out of my lane in response to that.
But as a taxpayer, I would agree with you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, sir.
I thought that if a crime had been committed but stating
that someone is simply missing, it clearly reduces the level of
oversight on the industry. Would you agree, Mr. Swecker? I
mean, there is a big difference between someone being missing
and a crime being committed.
Mr. Swecker. There is a difference, yes. People go missing
every day within the United States, and it does not necessarily
translate into a crime. But it is in a different context on a
cruise ship because there is nowhere to go, so, you know, to me
a crime is implicated or some other event is implicated, a
serious accident.
Mr. Shays. Well, we have three choices basically, it seems
to me: a murder was committed, people were fooling around and
an accident took place, someone was drunk and did something
unwise and fell overboard, or they committed suicide. I have
four choices. Are there others that I should add to that?
Mr. Swecker. No. I think you have covered it.
Mr. Shays. But what is stunning for me is in speaking to
Mr. Carver and learning about Merrian Lynn Carver, in that
instance the industry did not even want to say she was missing.
That is what is so astonishing. I mean, missing is one thing.
They are not saying she was killed. And so I am just struck by
a feeling of uneasiness about the industry. That is, Mr.
Swecker, why you in your professional ability are not going to
make a conclusion one way or the other, I have suspicions. My
suspicions are that if they would do that to Merrian Lynn
Carver and have her young daughter calling her grandparents and
saying, ``Mommy is not home, I cannot find her,'' and then in
the course of having to get information, spend $75,000 to get
this information, to learn eventually, after being able to
speak to the steward, who they did not want them to speak with,
that he was concerned from day one. And from day one, they just
took her stuff and got rid of it, case closed. So they have a
little bit of a problem with me.
I am just sharing with you as to why we are intrigued and
interested and determined to pursue this. When you read the
statement from Jennifer Hagel Smith, you want to scream, you
want to cry, you want to say, ``I don't believe it.'' She was
basically told that her husband was presumed to have gone
overboard in a public place in front of other people who were
laughing and smiling and having a great time on a cruise ship.
She states there was no compassion, sympathy, or sensitivity
shown by the cruise line. She asked if she could contact
George's parents immediately. She says, ``The cruise line told
me not to call anyone; however, I couldn't bear the weight of
this nightmare alone.'' Hello.
``Finally, the cruise line permitted me to call my family.
My mother answered the phone''--and she describes that.
``The Captain of the cruise ship told me that I had to
leave the ship with the Turkish police.'' The captain promised
to her dad that ``I would leave the ship for only a short
period of time'' and that there would be two people--``He
promised my Dad that two ship security officers would accompany
me at all times. He ensured us that the officers would promptly
return me to the ship.''
She states, ``I was interrogated by a Turkish police
officer in an office at the port. I was then driven into the
city to a Turkish police station where I was mocked and taunted
as I sat crying and bewildered. Where were the two cruise line
security officers?'' That is what she asked. ``I was then taken
against my will, further from the cruise ship, to a hospital. A
man . . . I could not understand lifted up my shirt and looked
down my shorts without taking me to a private examining room.''
That last little part, ``without taking me to a private
examining room,'' is kind of meaningless. Why he was doing what
he was doing is unbelievable.
``The ship sailed without me that evening. I was left in
Turkey with no money, no plane ticket, no food, nothing . . .
The cruise line did not offer me help with a flight, hotel
arrangements, or anything. I could not speak the native
language and I felt abandoned.''
``I had to borrow money to pay for a hotel.''
So that is the statement of someone who could have said
this publicly. It is written. It is part of the document. And
so I am wrestling with how we can trust any statistic from any
cruise line that would do what they did to a young bride.
So help me, before we get on--and, by the way, Mr.
Cummings, would you like the floor for a bit? Let me recognize
you, Mr. Cummings. I am sorry.
Mr. Cummings. I just want to pick up on this. You know, I
read the statement that you just went over, and then I read the
statement of George Smith and Maureen Smith, the parents, and I
do not want to just zero in on this case because I know there
are a lot of cases. But, you know, one of us asked about the
crime scene situation, and in the statement of Mr. and Mrs.
Smith, they talk about the security ``failed to enter George's
cabin even after several complaints of a loud fight taking
place inside. If they had entered his stateroom, our son and
brother's life may have been saved.'' And this is what was very
interesting. ``The cruise ship was not locked down in Kusadasi,
Turkey, the next port of call after George's disappearance.
Passengers and crew members were free to disembark as usual,
potentially taking crucial evidence off of the cruise ship with
them.''
``The Turkish authorities were rushed off the boat prior to
completing a full investigation so that the cruise ship could
make the next port of call on schedule.''
This goes back to what I was saying a little earlier. You
know, we have a thing in this country about taking care of our
people. And then just adding on to what you just said about the
way this bride was treated, I mean, when I began to read it, I
felt chills to think that 1 day you have somebody being married
and going off happily to enjoy their life and looking forward
to children, and the next thing you know somebody comes to them
and tells them your mate is no longer here.
I think there is a problem. I think there is a major
problem. And I think there is some kind of way we have to do
better. Over and over again we see these wonderful commercials
of cruises, talking about the good life, how happy everybody is
going to be, and then we hear about these tragic situations.
And so, you know, we have just got to figure out a way. This is
not the American way. We can do better. And I am not trying to
take anything away from you all, but some kind of way we have
to figure out how we can use diplomacy, the tools that we may
have at our disposal, because there is one thing that we have
to keep in mind, that there is one thing that drives the
industry, and that is money. And if people begin to
understand--I mean, I tell you, if what you talked about a
moment ago, Mr. Shays, were out there truly in the universe, I
don't know whether that cruise line would get any business.
I think we have just got to look at a lot of options, but
we cannot allow this to continue the way it is, because there
is going to be another incident, whether we like it or not. So
as I was saying a little bit earlier, I think we just have to
find a way.
I don't have anything else.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Souder, do you want to make a point? I am going to have
a few more questions. Should I go to you and then come to me?
Mr. Souder. That is all right.
Mr. Shays. We are going to conclude here. I need you all to
help us out. I need you to tell us how we get a handle on this
issue, and I am certain that all of you have thought about it.
Where should we move this hearing to so we are not just voicing
concern, but making a difference? For instance, should we, and
can we legally do this to a foreign flag owner? Can we require
all statistics be provided and define what those statistics
are, what we want. Can we require that there be uniformity in
terms of when someone is missing, that they be treated as a
potential crime until determined otherwise? I mean, in other
words, what should we be doing to make this work? I am not
quite sure of the role of the Navy here. I just know my brother
was a pilot in the Navy, and I had a brother who was an officer
in the Coast Guard, so I love what you all do. Admiral, why
don't I start out with you? Tell me specifically what--I know
in your statement you did--but specifically what the role of
the Navy is in all the issues that we are discussing today?
Admiral McPherson. Our role is one on the high seas,
primarily in the area of piracy.
Mr. Shays. So primarily in piracy, which we are not
spending time, I am not spending time focused on. But I would
like to put a statement in the record from the Strategic
Forecast. It is a Daily Terrorism Brief dated December 13th. I
am going to submit this for the record, but they basically say
cruise ships also fit into the targeting criteria of many
militant groups. For certain militant Islamic groups a ship
full of Israeli tourists would be especially enticing.
I want to say that this is a huge issue, and I acknowledge
it. I know the cruise industry is very concerned about this and
doing what it can to protect itself. Because of the limited
time, I am focused more on the issue of missing persons and
crime. Thank you.
Admiral McPherson. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Shays. But when they are in the high seas, that is your
territory, right, in that area there?
Admiral McPherson. Yes, sir, and we are active in that
area, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Very active. We may just have a hearing,
frankly, just on the issue of the role that you play and the
concern we have about terrorism on cruise ships, and then you
will be feeling a lot more in familiar territory. So thank you.
Coast Guard and FBI, maybe tell me how you think we could
make a constructive effort here? Let me just ask all of you, do
you believe that we have a problem--you don't have to define
the problem--that this is an issue that we need to look at, Mr.
Swecker?
Mr. Swecker. Certainly it is an issue.
Mr. Shays. That we need to look at?
Mr. Swecker. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Admiral Justice.
Admiral Justice. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Admiral Crowley.
Admiral Crowley. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Mr. Shays. So we are in agreement with what we need to look
at. Just help us out a little bit as to the directions you
would suggest we go. Maybe, Mr. Swecker, you could start.
Mr. Swecker. Sir, I think you are onto a very significant
issue when it comes to reporting. I think you have a very valid
concern there. We share that concern, and my previous answers
were just centered around just not having enough information--
--
Mr. Shays. I think I understood you, and I am comfortable
with your position.
Mr. Swecker. All right. We see our role as to promptly
investigate these crimes when they are reported, and we
certainly have an interest in making sure that the crimes or
potential crimes are reported.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Admiral Justice.
Admiral Justice. Seeing as we are part of the regulatory
prevention side, and we are also, of course, part of the
response to challenges, and I would just say we are committed
to continuing to look at this.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Crowley, to add? Any suggestions on how we should
be looking at it?
Admiral Crowley. Mr. Chairman, Chairman Souder asked us to
provide statistics to the subcommittee, and I think that is a
good vehicle to offer further thoughts and deliberate
suggestions to the committee as to a way ahead in the way of
working with you to find a good direction.
Mr. Shays. I am just going to make an observation, and then
give the rest of the time to Mr. Souder. You know, there is
this intriguing commercial that says what happens in Las Vegas
stays in Las Vegas. I am getting the feeling that as we talk
about the cruise line industry, it is a fun place for people to
get away and sometimes just do things they might not do at
home. It is also a floating casino, a huge amount of dollars. I
am just wondering if there is not a way that they have less
dollars on board ship, that people not carry a lot of extra
dollars, that there be some way that they can do all that they
want to do without having cash.
The other area that I would have responded to this question
is, that I asked you, is I am struck by the fact that--I am
assuming that most, based on what I have read, that most of the
employees are not necessarily American citizens, in fact,
aren't, that they are looking for less expensive labor. My
sense is they don't go by OSHA laws. They work real hard on
board these ships, and it is pretty intense at times. But I am
just not quite comfortable with the vetting process, and we are
going to ask the industry how they vet individuals.
I am just struck with the fact that when Jennifer was
dropped off, that ship went on sailing with potential murderers
on board, and they still may be on board today, and that sends
a shiver down my back.
Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I wanted to make just a couple of
comments. We focused mostly on the cruise ships, but there are
national security concerns here, and maritime security in
general, and Chairman Shays and I actually did a joint hearing
in New York Harbor, what, 2 years ago, looking at
jurisdictional questions there and who was in charge of what,
and whether we were looking at control ships, and he is
specifically focused in this. I found it ironic. I went with
Chairman Curt Weldon over to Tripoli at a conference on
maritime security that was being held in Tripoli, the old
pirate coast where we used to face all these type of things,
and hopefully they have switched sides at this point, but it is
interesting to watch this growing concern around the world
about kind of quasi states. Like we see in narcotics and
terrorism, these terrorists work in their whole network, the
Nigerian networks around the world in diamonds and narcotics,
and worrying about the high seas and whether they are going to
be safe.
I also wanted to thank the Coast Guard again. I got to go
with what we used to call the Sea Marshals, which name, by the
way, I liked better, in that you board these cruise ships as
they come into these high-risk harbors because these are not
only cities, but potential bombs coming in. If control were
seized, or if the crews in fact aren't checked, or if there are
people who can get on and off, and the missing people question
looms large in these ships as to the security if they hit
particularly LA/Long Beach, where it would be a disaster with
those ships coming in.
But also, the reason I specifically asked to close is we
have over 20,000 people we know annually or more die a year
because of illegal narcotics, and Mr. Cummings and I have
worked on this issue a lot. I want to thank every FBI agent on
the street, all the members of the Coast Guard who do this, the
men and women in our armed forces in Afghanistan and Colombia
and on the high seas who work with drug interdiction, but in
particular, this morning the U.S. Navy lost a helicopter, and
our prayers go with the families and the people who are doing
the searching to see if there are any survivors. But every
person out there has been working to save lives on our streets,
and in the Eastern Pacific over 70 percent of the narcotics
coming into the United States come from that zone. I know it is
a terrible tragedy to those individuals, but they are out there
helping protect the rest of us, and we thank you, not only in
Iraq and Afghanistan and around the world, but also in the war
on illegal narcotics.
Mr. Shays. I would like to add my voice to what Mr. Souder
said. We both, in the positions we are in, travel a great deal
overseas where we see our men and women serving our country,
whether it is the State Department, whether it is in Coast
Guard, the Army, the Marines, the Navy, the FBI is overseas in
all our embassies. I am frankly in awe of the dedication and
the competence of the men and women who serve our country. And
so we thank them and we thank all of you, all four of our
witnesses. You have been excellent witnesses and we thank you
for your service to our great country. Thank you.
We are going to get to our next panel. Thank you for your
patience. Our next panel is Mr. Michael Crye, president,
International Council of Cruise Lines; Mr. Greg Purdy, director
of security, Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines; and Mr. Charlie
Mandigo, Holland America Lines, Inc. We appreciate them for
being here.
If you would remain standing, we will swear you in and then
hear your testimony.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.
Let me just say to all three of you, we thank you for your
cooperation with this subcommittee. We thank you for being
here. I have met with one or two of you, and I appreciate the
interaction we had. What I would request is that we have a
candid conversation. Obviously, there are particular cases
which you are not going to want to go into in any detail or
much detail, but I have a feeling this will not be the last
time you appear before us, and we would like to start off just
being as candid with each other as possible, and finding a way
to deal with whatever problems we perceive and you all
acknowledge that we can do, and do it together, rather than on
opposite ends.
Mr. Crye, why don't we start with you? We have 5 minutes,
but we will roll over it so you can keep going if you want to
make sure that you have something on the record. Obviously,
your statements are a part of the record, but we want to make
sure that you feel that you are able to say whatever you need
to say.
STATEMENTS OF MICHAEL J. CRYE, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL
OF CRUISE LINES; GREGORY M. PURDY, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY,
SAFETY, SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENT, ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD.;
AND CHARLES E. MANDIGO, DIRECTOR, FLEET SECURITY, HOLLAND
AMERICA LINE, INC.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. CRYE
Mr. Crye. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairmen and members of the
subcommittee. My name is Michael Crye. I'm the president of the
International Council of Cruise Lines. Thank you for the
opportunity to present testimony on behalf of the cruise
industry. I have provided a written statement to the
subcommittee that I would ask be entered into the record. Since
you have already done so, thank you, sir.
In my testimony today, I will explain our security
practices and jurisdictional protocols as I understand them,
and how many people have cruised safely over the past few
years. However, there have been a few passengers that have
regrettably had other experiences. My testimony cannot lessen
their pain. No matter how rare the incidents are that we talk
of today, it doesn't make them any less relevant or serious. We
recognize that and send our sympathies and condolences to those
passengers and their families.
The ICCL is a cruise industry trade association
representing 15 leading cruise companies, and approximately 100
companies providing goods and services to the member lines. Our
members carry approximately 90 percent of the passengers in the
North American vacation market. The mission of the ICCL is to
participate in the regulatory and policy development process
and promote all measures that foster a safe, secure and healthy
cruise ship environment. ICCL is the industry representative to
the International Maritime Organization and the International
Labor Organization. Our vessels operate around the globe at
approximately 800 ports worldwide.
Over the past 20 years the industry has grown at a rate of
approximately 8 percent per year with outstanding guest
approval ratings. The industry also has an enviable record when
it comes to safety and security. In 1995 the U.S. Coast Guard
published the Report of the Cruise Ship Safety Review Task
Force, and issued the following opinion: ``Passenger vessels
operating from U.S. ports are among the safest modes of
transportation available.'' I know of no reason for this
opinion to have changed in the past 10 years.
I also believe it is equally true for our member vessels
operating to and from foreign ports.
For many years the cruise lines have had on board security
plans and procedures in place. These procedures include x-
raying or examining every person, piece of luggage, and all
supplies loaded onto the vessels. All passengers are screened
prior to boarding and properly identified. Each crew member
holds a U.S. seafarer's visa, and has undergone a U.S. State
Department background check. In addition, the ICCL Security
Committee, comprised of the security directors of all of our
member lines, meets every 60 days to discuss security and meet
with law enforcement and intelligence agencies here in the
United States. These meetings have been going on for the past
decade.
In the aftermath of September 11th, Congress passed
landmark legislation, the Maritime Transportation Security Act,
and concurrently, a new international agreement called the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code was
finalized. These regulations became effective throughout the
world on July 1, 2004. In developing these legal regimes,
cruise ship security plans and practices were utilized as the
blueprint of those that are applicable today throughout
maritime industry.
All ICCL cruise lines maintain strict security protocols
and compliance with these United States and international
mandates. Each ship has a designated security officer and a
team of security personnel. Security personnel typically have a
military or law enforcement background, and are trained
specifically in respect to maritime security as well as the
basic principles of crime scene prevention--preservation.
Extensive security plans were in effect and approved by the
U.S. Coast Guard from 1996 through 2004. These plans were
updated in 2004 in accordance with ISPS Code requirements.
These plans enable the ship to increase its security measures
at a moment's notice. Each and every crew member on board and
in the management chain knows what his or her responsibilities
are, and has the training to accomplish these assignments.
These are the goals of any effective security plan, and we have
mature programs in this regard.
There has been some debate over international maritime law
and various jurisdictional issues with respect to providing
protection for U.S. citizens. Ships are mobile, and they cross
international boundaries. Therefore, a variety of governmental
entities exercise law enforcement authority over each ship
based upon where it is located. It becomes a matter of
diplomatic negotiation as to which country takes the lead in
applying its laws and which country follows.
Congress has recognized these well-established principles,
and has passed several laws that reinforce the notion that the
United States may enforce its laws on board ships wherever they
operate in the world when U.S. citizens or U.S. interests are
involved.
18 U.S.C., the Special Maritime and Territorial
Jurisdiction of the United States, has already been discussed,
and the Coast Guard's broad authority under 14 U.S.C. 89. The
United States can and does assert jurisdiction based upon the
residence and location of the victim or perpetrator, the site
of the incident, the nature of the act in question, our own
national interest in the matter, regardless of any other
factors such as the ship's registration or itinerary.
Any alleged criminal acts occurring on the high seas
involving U.S. citizens are reported to the appropriate law
enforcement agencies, which may include the FBI. Other
incidents affecting security are reported to the flag state, in
addition to any reporting requirements applicable in the United
States.
In 1999 our membership publicly adopted a policy of zero
tolerance for crime, that requires allegations of on board
crime be reported to the appropriate law enforcement
authorities, which for vessels calling on U.S. ports or crime
involving U.S. citizens would appropriately include the FBI.
To summarize, the cruise industry is one of the most highly
regulated industries in the world today. U.S. law protects
American passengers on board cruise ships. The U.S. Coast Guard
has jurisdiction over all ships entering U.S. ports, regardless
of flag. The FBI, by virtue of Federal statutes and
longstanding legal precedent, has jurisdiction to investigate
allegation of serious crimes on board ships. This power
specifically extends to incidents in international waters
involving Americans.
Regarding piracy. A cruise ship is comparable to a secure
building with a 24-hour security guard. Since vessels operate
in a controlled environment, access to the ship can be strictly
enforced. Available information indicates that crime on board
ships is extremely low compared to similar incidents reported
ashore, undoubtedly, due to the nature of a cruise environment
where passengers and crew are screened and access is strictly
limited. The recent attack on the Seabourn Spirit is the first
known attempt of piracy against a cruise vessel in the past 20
years, despite there being over 3,900 incidents against
commercial shipping in general throughout the world this year.
In the case of a piracy incident, cruise ships are fitted
with ship security alert systems to immediately notify a
competent authority of the attack. The security teams are on
board, are well trained in methods to prevent unauthorized
access to the vessel at sea or in port.
To conclude, cruising continues to be one of the safest
modes of transportation available today. Our highest priority
is the safety and security of our passengers, crew and vessels,
and our safety record is a testament. Over 90 million
passengers have safely sailed on cruise ships over the past 20
years. While incidents are rare, we are not dismissive, nor do
we shirk our responsibility as an industry to accomplish and
address such matters--to acknowledge and address such matters.
For those individuals, who are missing loved ones, the ICCL
and our membership, extend our deepest sympathies. While it is
impossible for an outsider to feel their pain, what we can do
as an industry is to do our best to minimize the chances of a
crime of any sort on our ships, and if that happens, to do our
best to ensure those crimes are properly investigated and
prosecuted.
Thank you very much, chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Crye follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Crye.
Mr. Purdy.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY M. PURDY
Mr. Purdy. Chairman Shays, Chairman Souder, Congressman
Cummings, my name is Greg Purdy. I am the director of safety,
security and environment for Royal Caribbean Cruises, Limited.
I am a graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and served
in the U.S. Coast Guard for 16 years in a variety of positions,
one of which was a commanding officer of a cutter. My
experience includes law enforcement activities, narcotics and
migrant interdiction and security matters both within the
United States and internationally. I have been with Royal
Caribbean almost 5 years, the majority of that time in my
current position.
The highest priority of our company is to ensure the safety
and security of all our guests and crew members. We care about
everyone on our ships, and we are truly concerned about their
well-being. We do this because it's the right thing to do, and
because it's just good business.
As you know, crime can touch any of us in virtually any
settings. This is one of the sad realities of our society
today. In terms of our ships, one crime is one too many. It is
impossible to be immune to crime. However, we work diligently
to prevent it, and we're committed to the safety and security
of everyone on board our ships.
Since the founding of our company some 35 years ago, we've
maintained a safety and security focused culture. This includes
close working relationships with law enforcement agencies in
the United States and throughout the world, extensive security
policies and procedures, a significant security staff and
infrastructure, and the utilization of state-of-the-art
security technology. Our company works regularly and closely
with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
State, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
as well as Interpol and various foreign authorities.
Likewise, Royal Caribbean actively participates in an
industry-based security committee, which is part of the
International Council of Cruise Lines. To facilitate these
activities involving various Federal law enforcement agencies,
members of our own staff have U.S. security clearances and
secure methods of communications provided by the Federal
Government. We work with these agencies as well as with private
security consultants to identify and mitigate security risks
wherever we operate.
Regarding our ships, our security measures include the
screening of all luggage, carry-ons, provisions. This screening
is conducted with x-ray machines, metal detectors, hand
searches, sniffer dogs and other methods. Every one of our
ships has a chief security officer who is a trained military
veteran or a career security specialist. Their sole
responsibility is to ensure the safety of our guests and crew.
These security officers oversee teams of trained security staff
who are responsible for security procedures on board our ships
24 hours a day. Surveillance cameras throughout our ships
assist in these efforts.
All of our ships use an access control system we call
SeaPass. The SeaPass system provides all guests and crew
members with an ID card similar to a credit card, which
provides us access to their digital photo and personal
identification information. Each time a guest or crew member
boards or departs a ship, they must swipe their card. Security
staff compare the photo and personal identification information
on a computer screen with the person standing before them. This
technology allows the ship to know which guests and crew
members are registered on board and which are not at any given
time.
All guests and crew members at all sailings are placed on
an official manifest. Ships sailing to or from the United
States submit these manifests in advance to U.S. Federal law
enforcement agencies for analysis.
Our company also maintains a strict zero tolerance policy
on crime. Whenever an allegation of crime involves a U.S.
citizen, it is our policy and our practice to report it to the
FBI. As I stated previously, on mattes related to safety and
security, we work closely with the FBI, the U.S. Coast Guard,
international authorities and private security consultants.
Cruise ships are one of the safest ways to travel, and
crime on board cruise ships is extremely rare. On those
occasions when an allegation does arise, we work very hard to
assist our guests or crew members as well as their families,
and we fully cooperate with any investigation conducted by any
law enforcement agency or prosecutor's office. Again, we do
this because it's the right thing to do and because we are
genuinely concerned about everyone on board our ships.
We understand the impact a crime can have, not only on the
victim, but also on family members and traveling companions. We
constantly work to prevent such events, but should they arise,
we cooperate fully with law enforcement agencies in their
investigation and assist those affected.
I would like to take a moment to address an issue of
particular interest to you, Chairman Shays, the matter of
George Smith. The Smith family has suffered a tragic loss, and
we extend our deepest sympathies to them.
We do not know what happened to George Smith, only that he
tragically disappeared from a cruise, but we continue to
cooperate fully with the FBI in hope that the agency will be
able to provide solid answers and some measure of closure for
the Smith family.
As to Royal Caribbean's efforts, we believe that despite
this terrible tragedy, the cruise line handled George Smith's
disappearance correctly and responsibly. Specifically, we
responded to the sole complaint made by a guest, we promptly
called in the FBI and local authorities to conduct an
investigation. We secured the Smiths' cabin and the metal
overhang, and we conducted a thorough search of the ship.
We subsequently interviewed guests and crew who had any
knowledge of the Smiths' whereabouts that night, and we
collected all possible evidence, from security camera tapes to
charge-card receipts, and provided it to the FBI.
We know this is a traumatic time for George Smith's wife,
parents and other family members and friends, but we believe we
responded appropriately, and we will continue to work with the
FBI until George Smith's disappearance is explained.
In closing I would only reiterate that our company and our
industry maintain robust safety and security policies and
practices. However, as I previously stated, even one incident
is one too many.
We are committed to providing a safe and secure environment
for everyone on board our ships, and the well-being of our
guests and crew will always remain the highest priority.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I would be
happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Purdy follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Purdy.
Mr. Mandigo.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. MANDIGO
Mr. Mandigo. Thank you. Chairman Shays, Chairman Souder,
and subcommittee member Cummings, my name is Charlie Mandigo,
and on behalf of Carnival Corp., I wish to thank you for
inviting me to testify before you today regarding issues
related to international maritime security. I am here today in
my capacity as director of fleet security for Holland America
Line, Inc., a Carnival Corp. company, a position I have held
for over 2 years.
Immediately prior to joining Holland America, I served with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 27 years, working out
of offices in New York, Chicago, Washington, DC, and Seattle.
In my final assignment, I served as Special Agent in Charge of
the Seattle Office, where I was responsible for all FBI matters
in the State of Washington. I have been involved in numerous
high-profile domestic and international terrorism
investigations, including overseeing the investigation of Ahmed
Rassam, the so-called Millennium Bomber, who was convicted in
2001 for attempting to blow up the Los Angeles International
Airport during peak air travel in December 1999.
As director of fleet security, I am respondent for
overseeing the security of Holland America's 12 cruise ships
and three other vessels owned by another Carnival subsidiary,
Windstar Cruises. As you may know, Carnival Corp. and PLC
operate a fleet of 79 modern passenger vessels, making it the
largest cruise company in the world. The parent corporation's
12 widely recognized cruise brands serve markets in North and
South America, the United Kingdom and mainland Europe,
providing cruises to vacation destinations worldwide.
Because of its significant worldwide presence, Carnival is
attuned to the importance of international maritime security
and strives to provide a safe and secure cruise experience for
its passengers. We are in regular contact with governmental
authorities, other cruise industry companies, and the
International Council of Cruise Lines in order to assess
potential security threats and to deliver, develop preventive
measure and possible responses to those threats. As part of
this effort, we regularly participate in cruise industry
security meetings, share security information within the
industry and with governmental agencies, and interact with area
maritime security committees.
Cruise ship security standards have been under development
and improvement during the last 20 years. These requirements
have recently been strengthened with the adoption of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and
accompanying laws by the United States and other governments
worldwide. These new security regimes have advanced the
existing security measures for our passengers and our ships.
Carnival works closely with foreign countries in which its
vessels make port calls to assess potential threats to our
passengers, and to ensure that it is compliant with applicable
laws governing the security of our vessels.
In short, Carnival's highest priority is ensuring the
safety and security of its ships' passengers and crew.
My written testimony has been submitted for the record, and
I request it be accepted. I am pleased to be here to
participate in this hearing, and I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mandigo follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Mandigo, we appreciate your
testimony, Mr. Purdy and Mr. Crye, as well.
We will start out with Chairman Souder.
Mr. Souder. First, as I am sure you are aware, but in the
interest of full disclosure, I represent northeast Indiana and
there aren't a lot of cruise ships home ported in northern
Indiana. In fact, to use an Indiana expression, you could count
them on one hand and have more than enough fingers left to
bowl.
But we have a lot of Hoosiers who go on the cruise ships
all year long, whether it is up to Alaska or down in the
Caribbean. And so they are concerned. They have seen the things
on the news, and it is an opportunity for us to explore some of
these questions.
Mr. Crye, I wanted to first try to clarify something that
has confused me a little bit. We have talked about the
different legal standards, and you referred to your testimony,
about the different standards and different places. Would you
agree that a U.S. citizen has the most rights when they are in
U.S. waters?
Mr. Crye. I would.
Mr. Souder. You said, I believe, in your testimony, that
most of the time in the Caribbean we have agreements with that,
but there are some places that there aren't as many
protections.
Mr. Crye. I would say that under 18 U.S.C., the sections
respecting the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, the FBI, and by deputization, other agencies
of the Federal Government, have the authority to investigate
fully any accusation of crime on the high seas, particularly
for vessels that are calling on U.S. ports, but also under the
theory of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction for
vessels that do not call on U.S. ports.
Mr. Souder. Do cruise ship lines tell their customers which
areas they may be going into where their protections may be
more problematic because of past diplomatic, how fast they can
get clearance, because your testimony suggested there were
differences in the Caribbean, and you just stated that you
thought they were safest--you didn't say safest--you said the
most protections in the United States. Is there any way that a
person going on a cruise line could find out those relative--
admitting even that even in the worst cases, your statistics
aren't overwhelmingly bad. I am just asking you, if I wanted to
know where I would have the most rights, would I be able to
find that out?
Mr. Crye. Well, No. 1, sir, there is requirements under the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code for
publication of information regarding incidents of piracy,
incidents of lawlessness, etc., and that's a requirement that
is placed upon the vessel to ensure that they meet the
appropriate security level or they simply don't go there.
Mr. Souder. But you don't give that to consumers. If
somebody asks, would you tell them that, the different
countries?
Mr. Crye. The information is publicly available on the
International Maritime Organization's Web site regarding
higher-threat security areas. The Department of State of the
United States publishes traveler's advisories, etc., sir.
Mr. Souder. In pursuing this slightly differently, are
protections--are there different----
Mr. Shays. Could the gentleman just yield a second?
Mr. Souder. Yes.
Mr. Shays. When you say they publish, they don't publish
crimes, they publish piracy, correct?
Mr. Crye. They publish traveler's advisories. They also on
the International Maritime Organization's----
Mr. Shays. I want to make sure you are hearing my question,
and answer the question, then give me the details. They publish
warnings about potential terrorist activities, piracy and so
on, not about crimes being committed on a ship, correct?
Mr. Crye. Correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. I am sorry.
Mr. Souder. My understanding of your answer, which to me
illustrated what we were trying to do earlier, is that in fact,
you would have to really know what you are looking for to find
the data, other than going to the State Department and saying,
oh, you know, it is better not to go to Nigeria, or better not
to go to Ethiopia or Cuba. In other words, you don't give the
data. You don't voluntarily say there are different legal
standards in these different areas. You would have to know what
you are looking for to find that.
Mr. Crye. Well, sir, I think any international traveler
that goes on international travel, looks at the State
Department advisories; those types of advisories are readily
available to the public. Most cruises are sold through travel
agents, and those travel agents, we frequently communicate with
them about issues that should be of concern to them.
Mr. Souder. I am sorry. I don't have a dog in this hunt, so
to speak, but that answer is not acceptable. Now, it is one
thing to say there is a State Department threat that you are
going to go to a certain area, and that if you want to go
down--we have had warnings in Panama, for example. If you want
to go out in the jungle there with the Colombian guerrillas
coming over, that might be unsafe. But I don't think it is
generally known, somebody who goes on a cruise ship, that they
have certain rights in some areas, and there may be less rights
in other areas on the cruise ship when they are on a contained
ship. And that to suggest a comparison between the two is just
unfair.
I am not even suggesting it is a huge problem. I am just
saying that if I really wanted to find that out, I would have
to do a lot of digging, and I travel a lot. But I wouldn't have
thought--that would be like telling me if I go on a CODEL with
the military, that I am going to run into--or some kind of a
private trip, that I am going to run into whole bunches of
legal differences in different places. I was just asking a
question, and you are trying to tell me it is a State
Department thing. That doesn't have anything to do with my
question.
The question was, is that are there standards of evidence
procedure if I am sexually assaulted and so on? Am I going to
wind up in an international law different if I am going to some
Caribbean countries and other Caribbean countries? Obviously,
if I go as an individual and go off on my own and rent a car, I
am going to check that more. But when I am on a cruise ship, I
think most people assume there is some kind of uniform
standard, and what we are learning here is that there isn't,
that we don't know how serious a problem that is because we
don't have the data, but what you told me, and you are
continuing to say, is you are not going to give me that
information, I have to be able to figure it out as a traveler.
And part of the question is, is how much disclosure should
there be?
Mr. Crye. Sir, are you talking about on board the ship?
Mr. Souder. Yes, that was the----
Mr. Crye. Are you speaking of on board the ships?
Mr. Souder. I think anybody who is watching this hearing or
look in the record will show that you stated that you had the
most legal rights in U.S. territories. You stated in your
testimony that in most Caribbean countries, we have exchange,
which suggests that in some Caribbean countries there wouldn't.
And then you got off into a terrorism, State Department thing,
which is not what my question was. You answered the question.
Mr. Crye. Sir, I----
Mr. Souder. You said that we could go to the Maritime
Commission if we wanted to try to find out what the State
Department thing was, which clearly said--when I asked you the
overt question, do you publish the data of your legal rights
for different parts of your trip, basically, you told me no.
Mr. Crye. Sir, in the ticket package, you are advised of
your rights, your legal rights respecting the carriage. You're
notified of that when you enter into the contract with the
cruise line with respect to your legal rights, and the
responsibilities of the cruise line respecting the laws that
apply, as well as their responsibilities and your
responsibilities. Is that the question?
Mr. Souder. That is helpful. Now, let me ask you this
question. Do all the cruise lines have the same disclosure, or
does it vary by cruise line?
Mr. Crye. They have a responsibility under the laws of the
United States to disclose to their passenger what your rights
and responsibilities are of both parties to a contract, and
generally, it depends on where the ticket is sold, it depends
on where the passage occurs, it depends on where the vessel is
domiciled and flagged, etc.
Mr. Souder. Does your association have a standard that you
suggest to your members that says, this is the legal rights,
that you should do that, or when I sign up is it going to vary
by cruise line what they are telling me my legal rights are?
Mr. Crye. It's a matter of U.S. commercial law.
Mr. Souder. So it will be the same on each cruise line?
Mr. Crye. It will be the same with respect to the U.S.
citizens, where they buy their tickets, etc.
Mr. Souder. So there will be a difference. I wanted to know
whether it was everybody or just your members. So would you say
every cruise line anywhere based in the world, if you get on a
cruise, whether you board in Norway, you board in the
Caribbean, you board in Mexico, or board in the United States,
you are going to get informed of your rights as a U.S. citizen?
Mr. Crye. If the ticket is sold in the United States, the
U.S. commercial laws apply.
Mr. Souder. Would you then agree that you are more likely
to have your full rights if you buy your ticket in the United
States?
Mr. Crye. Sir, it depends on what you mean by full rights,
because different countries interpret full rights differently.
Mr. Souder. That in itself answers my question.
Mr. Crye. And there are those who would argue that the laws
of Norway or the laws of the United Kingdom, or maybe even the
laws of Bahamas are--provide you with more rights in a
commercial contract than you are provided in the United States.
Mr. Souder. Fair point, but the key thing here would be is
a buyer should know, based on where they are buying their
ticket, their rights may vary.
A second thing is that would in a similar way in the
different cruise ships, if you were in a cruise that you
boarded outside of U.S. law--I think you kind of answered this
already--but would laws of evidence collection, laws of
reporting, potential penalties if the cruise line didn't handle
something, would that be different than if you boarded in the
United States?
Mr. Crye. I'm not sure I fully understand the question.
Countries have different systems of law and different
evidentiary standards, depending upon whether a case is brought
in that country or not. I thought we were here today though
talking the enforcement of U.S. laws for U.S. citizens. I was
not prepared to talk about the rules of evidence in the Bahamas
or the United Kingdom, or the Netherlands, which are other flag
states of the cruise industry.
Mr. Shays. If the gentleman would yield, I think it is----
Mr. Souder. I am baffled because, of course, you are here
to talk about those things because your testimony, as your
testimony said, this went into international waters, there is
cross-jurisdictional. So I start to ask some cross-
jurisdictional questions, and you are saying that you weren't
prepared to answer those questions. I don't know how to ask a
question. I yield back.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. I will tell you, Mr. Crye, I have to ask you
this. Have you read Ms. Jennifer Hagel Smith's statement? Are
you familiar with it?
Mr. Crye. I read it briefly just at the beginning of the
hearing today, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Are you married?
Mr. Crye. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Cummings. One of the things that she says--I only have
one question of you because I want to talk to Mr. Purdy, but
here is a woman who has lost her husband, and it just seems
like she is treated in a way that is simply incredible. It is
hard for me to even imagine if that happened to my daughter. I
would have a rough time. But then if I read that Michael Crye,
president of the International Council of Cruise Lines--and I
am just reading from her statement, OK--blamed George's death
on both of us by stating, ``it's difficult if someone chooses
to do harm to themselves or to their companion.''
Then she goes on to say, ``I don't know if Mr. Crye is
married or if he has children of his own, but I find his
reckless remarks offending our reputations and character both
hurtful and irresponsible.''
Mr. Crye. May I address that?
Mr. Cummings. Yes, please.
Mr. Crye. There was a media interview that was a wide-
ranging media interview. It was not addressing the facts of the
George Smith case. It was addressing other cases and other
facts, and as it relates to one of the four possibilities that
Chairman Shays previously addressed, that was certainly one of
the possibilities, that people do harm to themselves. They do
it here in the United States every day. They do it in your
jurisdiction as well. It had nothing to do, the question, the
answer, in a media interview, had nothing to do with the George
Smith or Mrs. Smith situation.
Mr. Cummings. I guess the reason why I even brought it up
is because I think sometimes in these hearings, we are
certainly trying to find answers to prevent things, but then
there come some facts that sort of just comes, and it is like
shocking to the conscious, and you cannot rest until you try to
figure out why is this? I understand what you just said, and I
guess the thing that I was concerned about is whether we are
suffering from what Senator Obama calls ``an empathy deficit.''
I think that we just have to be very careful in circumstances.
I will tell you, just the thought of getting married 1 day
and then 10 days later on my honeymoon, it is a nightmare. It
is just very, very, very, it is painful to me just thinking
about it. I didn't even experience it.
Mr. Crye. I agree, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Let me go to you, Mr. Purdy. What is your
position?
Mr. Purdy. My position is director of safety, security and
environment at Royal Caribbean Cruises, sir.
Mr. Cummings. So that means you are the top law enforcement
person; is that an accurate description?
Mr. Purdy. Sir, we have two operating brands under our
company, and I work at the corporate level, developing policy
standards, conducting oversight, audits, and assisting if we
have serious situations, sir.
Mr. Cummings. What is the policy when it comes to a crime
scene? That has been an issue here. I am not trying to get into
the Smith case. I am just trying to figure out what is your
general policy?
Mr. Purdy. The general policy is first, once we establish
that there has been even any allegation, that we secure the
scene. We preserve the evidence and we make a report to the
authorities.
Mr. Cummings. I think you said that in the Smith case you
all promptly reported to the FBI; is that right?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir. In fact, this is indoctrinated in our
personnel that receive these calls. That call came from the
ship to Miami. Miami received the call, the duty person, at
approximately 3 a.m., and immediately, without questioning
further guidance, called the duty FBI person and notified them
of this allegation in this case.
Mr. Cummings. Now, when we have a situation where--I think
it was you who said it--where you said that there is some--
correct me, one of you said this--that sometimes the FBI is
notified and sometimes the FBI is not. Of course, I am talking
about where there is a U.S. citizen involved. Did one of you
say that?
Mr. Crye. Mr. Cummings, I believe that was myself. May I
elaborate?
Mr. Cummings. Yes, please.
Mr. Crye. First of all, sir, the FBI has provided the
industry some guidance on what they consider to be a case that
meets the threshold of their opening a case file. Second, there
are certain standing agreements with other agencies of the
United States, such as ICE, within the Department of Homeland
Security, Immigrations Customs Enforcement group, within the
Department of Homeland Security, with respect to reporting of
narcotics offenses. In the event that the FBI doesn't want to
take a report of a theft that doesn't meet their threshold,
then we must in fact report that to another authority,
typically the State enforcement authorities, or the port where
the vessel calls, etc.
In addition, given the fact that the FBI does not have a
great deal of resources in certain locations like Alaska, we
have a standing agreement to report offenses that occur on
board in Alaskan waters to the Alaska State Police, and other
situations that involve foreign nationals are not necessarily
reported to the FBI. Does that answer your question?
Mr. Cummings. That is very helpful, yes.
Mr. Purdy, what is the policy with regard to--let me just
tell you where I am going instead of going through the back
door. You have Ms. Smith, she leaves the ship and then she has
apparently left there in a foreign country to talk to the
Turkish police. Just give me a general idea of what your policy
is, because let me tell you something, I don't think there is
one Member of Congress, if somebody walked into our office and
slipped and fell, and let us say they were by themselves, I
guarantee you there is not probably one Member of Congress that
would not make sure there is a staff person that gets that
person to the hospital, stays with them, and sticks with them
until the issue is resolved. That is just for a slip and fall.
Here you have someone who has lost their husband in a
foreign country, so I am just wondering what is your policy
with regard to that?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir. This is the first time that I have
read that statement from Mrs. Smith. My understanding of this
is that she was required to go off the ship, along with our
ship's captain, several other officers, and some other guests
as part of the investigation.
Our policy is that we are very caring for people in this.
Safety is our highest priority. In this case, my understanding
is that we provided a female guest relations manager as an
escort. We also had an escort from the U.S. Consulate Office,
as well as the ship's port agent to provide for any, and to
assist with accommodations. We also offered Mrs. Smith the
ability to stay on board the ship until the next port of call
where she could depart the ship. I think it was her decision to
leave in Kusadasi, which meant flying out the next day. We left
her the contact information for the port agent should she need
anything.
That aside, if this happened the way it did, we regret any
action which made Mrs. Smith feel insecure or unsafe in any
way.
Mr. Cummings. I think she said she was left, she didn't
have any money, and she was basically stuck in a foreign
country. So what you are saying is that in reading her
statement, if that is what--I know you are denying you have
other information, I understand that. But what you are saying
is that if her statement was accurate, that would be contrary
to your policies?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Because you would not be in business.
Mr. Purdy. Absolutely.
Mr. Cummings. Just a few more questions. I just want to go
to the statement of George Smith and Ms. Maureen Smith. I want
to just figure out, what is your policy? Let's say a criminal
act, a suspected criminal act takes place. You have a crime
scene. Do you lock down the crime scene? Say, it is a room, for
example. I am just dealing with your policies, OK? What is your
policy?
Mr. Purdy. Our policy is that if there is any allegation of
a crime, that we will secure the scene, preserve the evidence,
contact the authorities and fully cooperate with the
investigation.
Mr. Cummings. I take it that you are saying also that the
crime scene would be preserved as best you could?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Is that made more difficult when you have a
floating crime scene?
Mr. Purdy. I would say that because of the environment
where we operate, it is perhaps more challenging; however, any
request from the authorities, we will do our best to honor that
request and cooperate.
Mr. Cummings. Who would be the authorities then?
Mr. Purdy. The authorities in this case, we were in touch
with the FBI because this involved a U.S. citizen. We also were
in touch with the Turkish authorities because the ship was in
Turkish port. We notified the Greek authorities because the
ship had sailed through Greek waters, and as a matter of fact,
they launched their own search. We also notified the U.S.
consulate in Turkey, and we also notified the Bahamas Authority
in London because our ship is a Bahamian registered ship.
Mr. Cummings. Let me ask you this. What is your policy
then, if you have a possible crime taking place, let's say you
know or you suspect that somebody on that ship may have done
something. Are people allowed to go on and off the ship?
Mr. Purdy. Sir, again, it's case by case, and we cooperated
with the authorities. In this case, the Turkish authorities
took the lead on the investigation in the initial stages, and
we complied with every request that the Turkish authorities
had, as well as being in communication with the FBI.
Mr. Shays. If the gentleman would yield?
Mr. Cummings. Please.
Mr. Shays. That is not really the question that he asked.
He basically asked you what is your policy, and what you sound
like is that your policy is whatever you have to do by the
authorities.
Mr. Purdy. Sir, our policy is to fully cooperate with the
authorities. If they determine that we need to lock down the
ship or do anything with that ship or the people, we comply.
Mr. Shays. But don't you have your own policy? I mean why
does the authorities tell you? I mean aren't there some basic
things--hold on 1 second, Mr. Crye, I will come to you--aren't
there some basic, just sound practices that you should do,
period, case closed, and aren't you trained and don't you train
your people to do them?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir, we do. In this case, our training is
again to secure the scene, to preserve the evidence and to
cooperate with the authorities.
Mr. Cummings. So going back to what Mr. Shays was saying,
you do have a policy with regard to that?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And that policy is written somewhere, is that
right?
Mr. Purdy. We have a comprehensive security management
system, and it does detail how our security need to preserve
crime scenes, or alleged crime scenes.
Mr. Cummings. I am going to ask that question again. Is it
written somewhere? You said you have a system that does this
and does that, but is it a written document?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir, it is written.
Mr. Cummings. I mean is it a book or volumes or what?
Mr. Purdy. It is a system of electronic manuals.
Mr. Shays. If the gentleman would yield?
Mr. Cummings. Sure, please.
Mr. Shays. We would like you to make sure that is submitted
for the record.
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. What is the document called?
Mr. Purdy. The document is our Safety Management System,
sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Crye. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings, the International
Safety Management System, which is part of the Safety of Life
at Sea Treaty, which is widely ratified throughout the world,
identifies the requirement to maintain a safety management
system. The safety management system controls many, many
protocols. There are certain things that would be contained
within the safety management system that should not be included
in a public record. But it is a requirement under international
law to maintain such a system. That system is audited by your
flag state, by your internal auditors, by your external
auditors, and is available for port state control inspectors
such as the U.S. Coast Guard, which would be the port state
control inspectors here in the United States. I am not sure
that you want an entire safety management system turned over to
you for the purposes of this record, and second of all, I am
not sure that you want to be a record that then becomes a part
of a public record of this hearing.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Shays can tell you what he wants. But let
me just tell you what I specifically asked, is it a book, a
volume, what is it? All I am saying is that I thought it was
something in the form of a manual or something that people,
when they come on board, when they begin to work for you in law
enforcement or whatever, regular employees, whoever, would
read. And you are saying it is something, an electronic kind of
thing; is that right?
Mr. Purdy. No, sir, it is a manual. We keep it updated just
electronically, but the crew members have access to this
document.
Mr. Cummings. That is what I am interested in. Mr. Shays
may want something else.
You were just talking about this system. Does the system
talk about how you prevent evidence from being taken off of the
boat? Let me tell you why I ask you that. Mr. George Smith
talks in his statement about the cruise ship was not locked
down in a certain city in Turkey, the next port of call after
George's disappearance. Passengers and crew members were free
to disembark as usual, potentially--listen to what he says--
potentially taking crucial evidence off the cruise ship with
them. If that were true, and I am assuming it is, would that be
contrary to that policy that you just talked about?
Mr. Purdy. For our company, sir, because they have
identified, in working with the authorities, that the alleged
scene was the cabin, we had posted a guard in front of the
cabin and the overhang, secured those areas until they
completed their investigation, and nobody had access to those
areas.
Mr. Cummings. All right, thank you.
Mr. Shays. Could I say something to you, Mr. Purdy?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. I mean I know I can. I want to say something to
you. I want to make sure that you are telling me fact and not
policy, because you are under oath, and we need to make sure
that everything you put under oath is really accurate. If you
have total confidence in what you just said, that is good. I
just hope you are not being set up by someone. Do you know for
a fact that it was totally secured, no one else went in there
except those people who were authorized?
Mr. Purdy. That is my understanding, sir.
Mr. Shays. And your understanding is based on what?
Mr. Purdy. My understanding is on reviewing with our staff,
who were involved in the actual case.
Mr. Shays. Their accusation is that may not be true, so I
just want to make sure you are comfortable. You are saying the
staff that is involved with the security has told you that this
was totally controlled, no one got into it except whom? Who got
in there?
Mr. Purdy. To my knowledge, the Turkish authorities along
with the security staff were the only ones who had access to--
--
Mr. Shays. Security staff of whom?
Mr. Purdy. Of the ship, sir.
Mr. Shays. Your own security staff?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Would you define that security staff as 1, 2, 5,
10, 20 people, how many people?
Mr. Purdy. I know we had one security staff posted to
secure the cabin. I am not aware of how many were there that--
--
Mr. Shays. Because the more people that go in, the more it
gets disturbed. What comfort level should I have that--you
know, how you define your own security staff? I mean there are
police officers, and there are detectives, and there are people
in our country who have greater knowledge of what happens on a
crime scene. You are saying that the only people who had access
were the Turkish officials and your security staff. I am going
to get into how your security staff are trained, to know the
number and so on.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
The first thing, I think the Smith incident was very
unfortunate. The facts will come out, and I am glad we are
reviewing this. Unfortunately, for the family it might be
difficult, but we need to learn from past incidents.
I am interested though from my perspective, we are talking
about over 5 to 6 million Americans that are involved in your
industry, and I think so far that your industry has been very
positive. It has allowed a lot of people to have pleasure, to
go places they normally would not be able to go. But whenever
an incident, even if it is a small amount of cases and a trend
starts, I think an industry such as yours that does so well and
has basically a good safety record except for some of these
incidents, that you have to reevaluate where you are. I asked a
question of the first panel: would they be willing, that was
the Coast Guard, the FBI and the Navy, to meet with your
industry, and to review what the standards are.
I knew there were some issues, international law requires
you to have certain protocols, and there is an audit, and I
think that is important because I think everybody needs to be
held accountable, but maybe we need to reevaluate that, at
least on behalf of the 5 million Americans that we represent
that are within that industry.
So what I am going to ask you--and then I will take your
question--I am going to ask you, will you work as an industry
with the members of the FBI, and our subcommittee? You say that
you don't want what we want. I am on the Intelligence
Committee. There is a lot I can't talk about, but I would like
our staff here to review and evaluate under direction of
Chairman Shays, and to find out what issues need to be dealt
with so we can make sure that all Americans who use your
industry. A lot of you are not American ships, so we might not
have the same authority or not. So I am asking the question.
Where are you from, Mr. Crye? I had to move in and out in this
hearing.
Mr. Crye. I am the president of the trade association, sir,
of the International Council of Cruise Lines.
Mr. Ruppersberger. How about you, Mr. Purdy?
Mr. Purdy. I am from Royal Caribbean Cruises, sir.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Mr. Mandigo.
Mr. Mandigo. Holland America.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Would you all be willing----
Mr. Crye. Can I answer your question?
Mr. Ruppersberger. I am asking the question, so I would
love an answer.
Mr. Crye. We do so every 60 days. We meet today, every 60
days here in Washington with the U.S. Coast Guard, the
Department of Transportation, the Office of Naval Intelligence,
the Department of State, the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department
of Defense--the Central Intelligence Agency sometimes comes--
the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation
Security Administration. And every 60 days in a meeting that we
host here in Washington to discuss specifically the issues that
you address, and we would be glad to include your committee
staff.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I think that is great. By the way, you
have a good record. But here is what I would like to see more.
I think you are dealing with those different groups, and you
are talking about issues involving terrorism and safety and
things of that nature. I understand that. I am more interested
though--and sometimes we think about this--in your standards of
your employees on the ships. I am more interested to know, do
you have security? What is the background? What is their
training? What happens when there is an incident, either a
crime committed on board by other people on board, whether or
not there are people who go on cruise ships just to rob people.
That happens wherever there are people. Do you have standards
as it relates to medical? I think you do. But we might need
other standards.
I think an industry that is so popular as your industry,
would want to even take it a step further, and I think that is
what we are getting to here, at least what I am getting to here
on your industry. Once the camel's nose gets in the tent,
sometimes it gets bigger and bigger. We don't want to get it to
that level. You seem to be cooperative. We are not here to give
you a hard time, but there are some incidents that have to be
dealt with, and more and more there is a problem.
Another issue I want to ask about too, because I had a
personal experience, but I am not going to get too much into
it. I see that because you are so popular and you have to keep
getting back and forth to your ports, what about the issue with
respect to weather? I am not talking about hurricanes, nobody
is going to go into a hurricane, but the standards when a
captain has to make it to a certain port to get there,
notwithstanding the fact that it could be one of the bumpiest
rides that you will ever have in your life? What are your
standards with respect to having to make your deadline to get
to the port to pick up the new group and drop the group off? Do
you have any standards as it relates to weather with respect to
any safety?
Mr. Crye. Safety of life at sea is the ultimate
responsibility of every captain, and he will not compromise the
safety of that vessel to meet any schedule whatsoever. That is
the responsibility of each master on board the ship.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Does he have incentives or deadlines
that he has to get back to another port on time?
Mr. Crye. If it is a matter of safety, those deadlines
don't apply.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Do you call safety when you are maybe
going through a storm and for over an hour it is almost you are
thrown out of bed? Is that considered safety or non-safety, or
how do you define safety, the ship just won't go over, but
unfortunately you are going to have to deal with that? I am
just asking the question. I am not criticizing.
Mr. Crye. Unfortunately, we are talking about the ocean,
and occasionally there is significant waves, there are
significant weather events that occur. Fortunately, today we
have pretty effective methodology to predict the course of
storms, and to avoid those, the paths of those storms. But
occasionally there will be the event where you are transitting
through rougher ocean. We do everything that we can to minimize
that from happening, but occasionally it happens.
Mr. Ruppersberger. It is like the airline, the pilot versus
the captain, the pilot of the airline, and that is their
judgment, based on weather and radar and things of that nature.
Let me ask you this, Mr. Chairman. We need, I think, to
really try to talk a little bit more about standards of a
system that is set up as far as not--I really applaud you for
meeting with the FBI and the different groups that you are
talking----
Mr. Shays. If the gentleman yields on that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes.
Mr. Shays. I am uneasy with your description of the purpose
of those meetings. The purpose of those meetings are basically
dealing with security issues, intelligence about criminal
people, terrorist concerns and so on, correct?
Mr. Crye. In addition we have manifest requirements,
automated manifests that must be filed with the U.S. Coast
Guard, the Department of Homeland Security----
Mr. Shays. No, no. Mr. Crye, his question related more
about getting together to set up new standards I think.
Mr. Ruppersberger. A standard, and you know, you can market
this too. It is a marketing tool so people feel secure. I am
talking about it is great to find out if there is a chain of
burglars or if we have terrorists that are trying to move in
and out or get in through different areas. I am talking about
basically, in medicine you have a standard, accounting you have
standards. You also need accountability. I am asking who are
your employees? Do we have a standard of certain qualifications
that when you are dealing with so many people on a ship, that
in the event an incident occurs, whatever that might be, that
you have the people with the expertise to deal with it on the
ship, and other than just hiring this person who might have
been working in one area, now another area. That is why a lot
of former FBI agents are hired, and that is why former police
officers are hired.
We are talking about the security of the people that get on
the ship that rely on that, and I don't think you are doing a
bad job, but I am worried about the trends, and I think that we
had better evaluate it so that you can keep an industry that a
lot of people love. Five million people in this country do it
every year.
Mr. Crye. Yes, sir. We constantly look at those types of
standards and procedures and industry protocols. In addition, I
mean, we developed our zero tolerance for crime policy in 1999,
where all incidents of any kind of allegation of crime, would
be reported to the appropriate authorities, and----
Mr. Shays. Excuse me, I have to interrupt here. Hold on
just a second. Zero tolerance of crime?
Mr. Crye. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. So if there is someone has lost $7,000 instead
of $10,000, it will be reported?
Mr. Crye. My understanding, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Your understanding. Isn't the threshold $10,000?
Mr. Crye. The threshold for the FBI to accept the report is
$10,000.
Mr. Shays. Right. So they are not notified if it is less
than $10,000.
Mr. Crye. The FBI, no, sir.
Mr. Shays. So describe to me zero tolerance for someone who
had $7,000, and they were told by one of your companies that it
didn't meet the threshold.
Mr. Crye. For reporting to the FBI.
Mr. Shays. Yes. That doesn't sound like zero tolerance for
crime.
Mr. Crye. That doesn't mean it wasn't reported, sir. I
don't know of this particular circumstance at all.
Mr. Shays. I am sorry to interrupt.
Mr. Crye. That doesn't mean it wasn't reported to the
appropriate law enforcement authority. It may not have been
reported to the FBI because of their guidelines regarding what
they would accept for a report, but that doesn't mean that it
wasn't reported to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.
Mr. Shays. In a letter from Royal Caribbean when they
complained about a problem that they had with theft of jewelry
for $7,000. It was addressed to Ira and Myrtle Leonard, who
complained, from Hamden, CT. It then said, ``Dear Guests, As
per our conversation today, I have explained that we are not
required to report alleged thefts with a value less than 10K.
Although we genuinely sympathize with you for your loss, we
regret we are unable to compensate you for your personal items.
All claims are evaluated according to your passenger ticket
contract, which we suggest you review for further
clarification. If you have not done so already, we suggest you
consider your claim to your travel or private insurer for
consideration.''
It just strikes me that doesn't sound like zero tolerance.
Mr. Crye. Sir, I think that specific case should be taken
up for us to determine exactly what was done in that
circumstance, and where Royal Caribbean----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Using that specific case, there is an
example of setting up the system. It is like managing anything.
You have a system. You have people who are managers. You hold
people accountable. You have audits, that type of thing. But it
is about a system.
One of the things I find frustrating in being a Member of
Congress sometimes, is that we have these hearings, and then we
don't have follow-through. I think this is a case that would
benefit your industry and also Members of Congress that are
looking after people, to really start talking about it, and
especially because there are a lot of ships that are not
American ships--Royal Caribbean is one--that if we can set up a
standard that may be international. I think you need more. You
need job descriptions of who is on there, what is on there,
what happens with the standards. You probably have a lot of
that now, but I think you need to look at it so that we can all
feel secure. Sometimes perception becomes reality and we need
to deal with this.
One other thing.
Mr. Crye. Yes, sir. I think we would be pleased to work
with that.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I would like if the chairman could have
staff maybe follow through what we are talking about, Mr.
Chairman, and maybe we could do something here that would
benefit both.
One other thing. I don't know if this question has been
asked, but it is a situation you are going to have to deal with
from a public relations point of view, and I just want to ask
this question. It might have been asked. I am sorry, I had
other meetings I had to go back and forth to, and maybe you
can't answer the question or you have. We have read the report
where Mrs. Smith was put off the ship. Why wasn't she given
more help and cooperation when she was told to go to Turkey? I
know the report said that two members of security took her to
see the authorities, but basically other than, wasn't given
money or anything of that nature. I read the report. If the
question has been answered, then that is OK, but I would like
to know from my perspective what happened, and is that
something you are looking at, evaluating, bad judgment? What
happened there?
Mr. Purdy. Sir, I will answer that. We did discuss this.
This was information I saw for the first time today. We will
take it back and go through it. Our understanding was that we
did provide a female guest relations manager, U.S. consulate,
ship's port agent, all of this in an event to make
accommodations. And we expressed our regret if there was in any
way if Mrs. Smith felt insecure or unsafe. It certainly is not
our company culture, and it should not have happened if it did.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And if it didn't, you look at it, and
that is why we need standards again, certain systems and
standards. OK, thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
The concern I have is the same kind of marketing that goes
on in Las Vegas that says, what goes on in Las Vegas stays in
Las Vegas. When I attribute it to your industry, I feel like
everything on board stays on board the ship, including
disclosing bad information. So I am candidly, very suspicious
of the statistics that are presented. I think there is a
disincentive for you to provide statistics, and I have a number
of questions that relate to that issue, but also just security
in general. I am separating the whole concern I have about
terrorism and how we deal with terrorism and piracy and all of
that, which I know this industry is working night and day to
deal with.
I would like to know, to start, how many security people
you usually have on board ship, or if it is a city, if it is a
city--maybe, Mr. Crye you can start--if it is a city in general
and you have 2,000 guests, you have, what, 1,000 employees? Is
it a 2 to 1 ratio? What is the ratio of employee?
Mr. Crye. It depends, sir, on the type of vessel. If it is
a vessel that is more mass marketed, the ratio is lower.
Mr. Shays. So what would that be, a mass market?
Mr. Crye. It would be 2 to 1, 3 to 1.
Mr. Shays. OK, but you could have----
Mr. Crye. To more than 1 to 1.
Mr. Shays. Let's just take a ship with 2,000 guests, 1,000
employees. Is there a ship like that?
Mr. Crye. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. How many of them would be security? And then
define security to me.
Mr. Crye. I can tell you, sir, that under the International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code, that all of the crew
members, all 1,000 have a security function, and have a certain
amount of training and orientation as it relates to security.
Mr. Shays. Is it security though in terms of fire, in terms
of having to abandon ship, that kind of security?
Mr. Crye. And also security as it relates to securing the
vessel from different situations, but there is also, under the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, the
requirement for a security officer whose sole function is that
job, as well as a security staff who works for him whose job--
him or her.
Mr. Shays. Let's focus on them then. How many are solely
focused on security and how many of them carry weapons?
Mr. Crye. To answer that question would potentially
compromise the security plans. I can certainly answer those
questions for you candidly----
Mr. Shays. I am smiling in a way because if I----
Mr. Crye. I would be pleased to answer those questions to
you in a closed session----
Mr. Shays. I am smiling because in Darien, CT, I can name
you how many police officers exist. I don't think we endanger
the people of Darien, CT, when I tell you the number of police
officers. It is printed in the newspaper. I don't think it
endangers the city. Yet this is a city, and so tell me why--
don't tell me the number. Why would it endanger to know how
many officers, because you don't have enough?
Mr. Crye. If you were a terrorist, sir, and as a result of
this public record, you said, ``OK, all I have to do is have
that many security officers plus five, or that many security
officers plus 10 to overcome the--and we can go on and on and
on with respect to the defense mechanisms on board the ship,
and you can ask me all of those questions. And the more of
those questions I answer, I'm giving the bad guys a blueprint
for exactly how to go about attacking that vessel.''
Mr. Shays. I agree with that in one way, or I could say it
another way. If you gave me a number that was pretty large, it
might tell me I would never want to attack your ship, so it
could be a plus or a minus. If you gave me a low number, yes,
it would be very tempting, and that is what makes me concerned.
If your number was a high number, I don't think we would
endanger the public. I think you would basically say you don't
want to fool around with us.
Mr. Crye. That's why, that's one reason why I told you that
every crew member on board that vessel has a security function.
Mr. Shays. We will get into that in a private way.
Mr. Crye. We'd be pleased to do so, sir.
Mr. Shays. I know you will, but I will tell you that my
folks have gone on cruises, my friends obviously have. I
haven't yet, and want to someday when I can get a week. But
what I am told is that if there are security people around,
they are hard to see. So is it your practice basically to have
most of your people undercover?
Mr. Crye. No, sir, it isn't.
Mr. Shays. Do you have some security folks who are clearly
just security and labeled so? I mean would they look like a
police officer on board a ship, Mr. Purdy?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir. They would have badges on and
uniforms, and their sole function on board is traditional
police type security.
Mr. Shays. And they don't carry a weapon?
Mr. Purdy. Sir, we, again, would rather not discuss the
measures that they have for their defense, but we're happy to
in a private session.
Mr. Shays. OK. How do you secure the security of your
guarantee that the employees that you hire are above reproach?
Mr. Purdy, how do you do that?
Mr. Purdy. It's a standard for the industry, I believe, but
every crew member that we hire has to--we require them as a
company to get a (c)(1)(D) visa, a seafarer's visa. That means
that the hiring partners, besides the background checks that
they conduct, also send them over to the U.S. consulate in that
country to provide their information, and then that is vetted
through the U.S. State Department. We do that whether the ship
is actually working in a U.S. port, or even a ship that's just
in Europe the whole summer. We require all crew members to have
a U.S. seafarer's visa.
Mr. Shays. Who issues that visa?
Mr. Purdy. Those visas are issued by the U.S. consulates in
the different countries. We also submit those----
Mr. Shays. How does that guarantee that these people are
above reproach?
Mr. Purdy. Well, it guarantees that they, that they are not
on any--that they are vetted by the U.S. Government. We also
submit all the crew names, along with the passenger names, to
the U.S. Government for vetting on the ship manifest, sir, each
time the ship sails.
Mr. Shays. Say that last part. Each time the ship sails,
what? I am sorry.
Mr. Purdy. We submit a manifest with all the names and date
of birth, passport information, and what-have-you, to the U.S.
Government, specifically to Customs and Border protection, and
to the U.S. Coast Guard for analysis.
Mr. Shays. Sir, do you do background checks on all of your
employees?
Mr. Purdy. We don't do background checks ourselves, but we
have hiring agents in various parts of the world that are
responsible for the background check, and again, we use the
(c)(1)(D) visa process as a standard so that everybody goes
through the U.S. screening and vetting process.
Mr. Shays. We will learn how difficult it is to get the
visa, but I am unclear from your answer as to--what I am
hearing you say is that you do not do the security checks for
your employees.
Mr. Purdy. My answer is that it's not centralized from our
Miami office, sir, but we have requirements on the various
hiring partners that we have relationships all over the world.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Mandigo, tell me what you all do.
Mr. Mandigo. Mr. Chairman, we essentially do the same
thing, that we have manning agencies, hiring partners, as you
would call them, in different parts of the world.
Mr. Shays. Do they get a commission?
Mr. Mandigo. They are paid by us for their function, yes,
sir.
Mr. Shays. Do they get a commission for every employee they
hire?
Mr. Mandigo. I do not know the answer to that question,
sir. I mean we certainly pay them for their services for
providing crew for our ships.
Mr. Shays. But you are not aware that they are not paid
commission. Mr. Purdy, are they paid a commission for----
Mr. Purdy. I'm not sure of the answer, sir.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Crye.
Mr. Crye. I don't know, sir.
Mr. Shays. But anyway, you pay them to find people.
Mr. Mandigo. That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. And so they have an incentive to find people?
Mr. Mandigo. Well, they have an incentive to find people,
but we set the qualifications as who those people are. They
have to have certain skills, certain abilities, and they are
required to have a background check done on those people, and
we do conduct audits of our hiring partners or our manning
agencies periodically to determine if they are complying with
our requirements.
Mr. Shays. When you find an employee that you found was not
properly vetted, what happens?
Mr. Mandigo. We would immediately dismiss that person, and
we would go back to the hiring agency, and if we determine it
was egregious, that we would change our hiring agency, and we
have done that before.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Purdy.
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir, that would be our same practice. It's
a human resources function to visit the hiring partners
throughout the world and assess how they're operating, and
conduct the audits and review of records.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Crye. Sir, also depending upon the nature of the
particular position that an individual holds on board the
vessel, they may be subject to additional scrutiny that
requires additional background checks beyond a hiring
background check.
Mr. Shays. The previous panel discussed someone who is
missing can be missing for a variety of reasons. I stated the
ones I thought. I would like you, Mr. Mandigo and Mr. Purdy and
Mr. Crye, in that order, to tell me the potential for why
someone is missing.
Mr. Mandigo. Mr. Chairman, that over the past 2 years, the
Carnival Corporation Cruise Ships have carried over 12 million
passengers. In that time period we have had 6 passengers go
missing. None of----
Mr. Shays. Six in twelve.
Mr. Mandigo. Six missing. Actually, a seventh person that
was rescued at sea.
Mr. Shays. You said in 12 years?
Mr. Mandigo. In 2 years, the last 2 years, six people,
three each year. In none of those circumstances have we found
information to indicate that foul play was a factor in those
missing persons.
Mr. Shays. I don't know what that means. In other words,
so--tell me what that means. I will tell you why. If Mr. Smith
had fallen overboard and they hadn't found blood, you would
probably say no----
Mr. Mandigo. That is possible, sir. And, Mr. Chairman, as I
indicated, in those situations, in some of them there would be
information that would indicate that it was potentially a
suicide. For instance, that the shoes of the person were lined
up very neatly alongside the railing, and items in their cabin
were neat. There may have been a note left behind. So it would
indicate the potential that may have been----
Mr. Shays. Of those 6, you determined, in the 2-years, why
were they missing?
Mr. Mandigo. That four of them, that we believe we know
what the circumstances were. Two of them are as yet
undetermined.
Mr. Shays. And what were the four circumstances, without
details? What were they?
Mr. Mandigo. Without going into names or identities, that
four of those situations, based on all the information
available that we have seen, that the belief is that they were
probable suicides.
Mr. Shays. What I would like is for you to walk through
those cases with my staff so we can see how you all determined
that. It would be helpful.
So none of it was drunkenness. It was all, in your
judgment, four out of the six was suicides?
Mr. Mandigo. Yes. And I'd also add, Mr. Chairman, that all
of these would have been immediately reported to the FBI for
the FBI to pursue as they saw appropriate, given the
circumstances.
Mr. Shays. What, the four, the four?
Mr. Mandigo. All six of them would have been reported as--
--
Mr. Shays. Why? Why would you have reported all six?
Mr. Mandigo. It's a missing person, and it's standard
practice, if we have a missing person, to report that to the
FBI if it's a U.S. person.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Purdy.
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir. Generally the same. I would have the
categories----
Mr. Shays. Oh, no, how many in 2 years? Give me a number.
Mr. Purdy. For the 2-years, sir, we have had 4 people, and
that's for 29 ships, 7 million passengers during that period.
Mr. Shays. I believe it was Merrian Lynn Carver on your
ship, one of your ships?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. So she wasn't reported missing. So how does that
come into the equation?
Mr. Purdy. First of all, we'd like to extend our hearts to
the Carver family. This was a horrible tragedy, and the fact is
we didn't realize that she was missing. Our cabin steward did,
as all our crew members are trained--report something
suspicious, that this woman had not been using her room. He
reported that to the supervisor. The supervisor questioned it,
went to the computer system to see if she was registered on
board. He verified that she was on board, and he didn't think
anything else of it, and that was where he used extremely poor
judgment in not reporting that up the chain.
Mr. Shays. So what happened to him?
Mr. Purdy. He was terminated, sir. He was terminated for
this. Nevertheless, this is an incident that--we regret that we
had caused this family additional anguish because of the delay
in figuring this out. And once we did realize this, after going
back and forth with the Cambridge detective who was working on
this case, we ensured that again we notified the FBI, albeit 5
weeks later. And since then we've taken other steps to ensure
this doesn't happen again.
This means now we've started having our ships having, when
people disembark at the end of the cruise, also checking out on
our SeaPass system so we can tell that, yes, in fact, everyone
was cleared. We also have established in our company an
anonymous hotline for any employee who has any question about a
safety issue, security issue, environmental issue that's not
being addressed properly through the on board team. They can
call anonymously and that will get fully investigated from our
shoreside staff.
Again, our hearts go out to the family. This is----
Mr. Shays. The reason why--you know, rather than your
hearts going out to the family, which is important for you to
say, particularly at this hearing, it would be better if you
cooperated with the family, and didn't make them have to seek
this information the way they sought it, having to spend
literally tens of thousands of dollars. So your actions would
speak more loudly than your statement, frankly, and your
actions appear not to support your sorrow. Your actions on what
you did to your employee, I think, are significant, because
Lord knows that employee needed to leave.
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir. My understanding is this is under
litigation. However, despite that, we have provided them with
all the information that we have on the case, and the fact is,
is there just isn't that much information. She booked the
cruise 2 days before, came on with very few belongings, and
that also contributed to us not realizing that she left. There
was no cabin baggage. There was nothing for anybody else to
understand that she was in fact missing, and we regret that
deeply.
Mr. Shays. So the four things that could happen in missing,
would be what?
Mr. Purdy. I'm sorry, sir. Accidents, which could happen, a
homicide which could happen, and a suicide which could happen,
as far as someone who could go missing.
Mr. Shays. Right. There are two kinds of accidents,
accidents where someone did something stupid----
Mr. Purdy. Like horseplay, yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. And so it is negligent homicide in that case.
When someone is drunk, and they are walking outside, how do you
protect those people? I mean you do encourage them to drink,
and you do encourage them to have fun and so on. What is their
protection if they are really drunk?
Mr. Purdy. Initially, sir, we protect them by just the
construction of the ship. They're built to be inherently safe.
So the rails are at a height that it would be very difficult to
simply fall over. The swimming pools would have nets over them
if they weren't filled with water. In every aspect of the ship,
there's safety considerations, because we know that this is the
case on board. People are in a celebratory mood. It's the
nature of the cruise.
Mr. Shays. Why wouldn't you have cameras at every outside
area so that you would be able to reconstruct when someone fell
overboard whether they were pushed, thrown or just jumped? It
seems to me that would be overall a fairly modest expense, and
it would seem to me that it would discourage a crime because
you would be on tape.
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir. We do believe CCTV is an effective
deterrent as well as a tool for us, and we have----
Mr. Shays. Well, why don't you use it?
Mr. Purdy [continuing]. Had CCTV systems on our ships for
the past, really I think, about 10 years. So all our ships have
CCTV systems, and we are continuously bringing that technology
forward. Our fleets alone started this year in transforming all
of these systems from a regular analog tape system to a digital
system, so we're continuously improving the system.
Mr. Shays. But I mean the more I think about it, the more
amazed I am. I mean you could basically have security, and for
terrorism as well. You would basically be able on a screen to
see if there was any foul play, and you would immediately be
able to send someone to the area where there may be foul play,
or if people are getting into an argument, you would be able to
go quickly and break it up. Mr. Mandigo, why aren't TV screens,
videos, available everywhere?
Mr. Mandigo. Likewise, as my counterpart, we do have a
number of CCTVs on cruise ships, but we do have issues of
privacy. You're talking about multiple decks on a ship. You're
talking about balconies on many of the cruise ships.
Mr. Shays. That is true.
Mr. Mandigo. It would be a challenge, although it could be
done.
Mr. Shays. I understand. What you are saying is on a
balcony, that is a private balcony?
Mr. Mandigo. It's private balconies and you have privacy
issues, and----
Mr. Shays. No, I hear you.
Mr. Mandigo. And being new to the cruise industry and being
on cruise ships, they are very massive, and to put that kind of
coverage throughout the ship would be a challenge, but
certainly could be done. But some of the things though that we
do that address people for imbibing, drinking, is that our
bartenders have training, you know, on how to spot people that
have been drinking too much. They have training on what to do
with those people. You know, we will escort them back to their
cabins.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough. We are coming to a close here. Let
me just understand what rules supreme in terms of
investigating, and who has jurisdiction. One issue is the
citizen of the individual involved who may be missing. Let's
just say a crime has been committed and they have been killed.
One issue is the port of departure. Another issue is where the
ship domiciles. Another issue is what flag it is under. Another
is who owns it. And another issue could be where the ticket was
sold. Are there other issues that come into play in terms of
making this a confusing issue to have an investigation?
Mr. Crye. Sorry. I hope that I didn't necessarily mislead
you with respect to the issues of jurisdiction under
international law. The jurisdiction under international law is
based upon territory. It's based upon nationality. It's based
upon protective principles----
Mr. Shays. Nationality of the individual?
Mr. Crye. Both the individual, as well as a potential
perpetrator. And certainly generally a ship is considered to be
the territory of the flag that it flies. However, that
jurisdiction may be shared by others based upon these other
factors.
From a commercial perspective, which I think I was trying
to address earlier, the issue becomes where the ticket was
sold, what are the rights and responsibilities of the vessel
and the passenger under the laws of that location. That's a
different issue than the issues of jurisdiction under
international law. There's a commercial contract that is issued
as it relates to the rights and responsibilities of that
vessel, of that individual under U.S. commercial law if that
ticket is sold in the United States.
Mr. Shays. Well, I am wrestling with a lot of different
factors that come into play, and I don't know which ones carry
the greatest weight. For instance, I am just trying to
determine, you represent companies that service basically 90
percent of the cruise trade; is that correct?
Mr. Crye. Yes, sir, in the United States; 90 percent of
North American.
Mr. Shays. OK. So when a ship is leaving port--I guess what
I am trying to determine is--not that you would want it, but
you are going to give me an honest answer--what capabilities
does the Federal Government, Congress, the White House have
over your industry? What basic legal authority do we have over
this industry to put forth, for instance, I am not comfortable
with voluntary submission of statistics. I want to require it.
I don't want there to be any doubt. I don't want there to be
any ambivalence, ambiguity. I don't want there to be any,
``Well, we did not do it, and we are sorry, and we fired the
employee.'' I want to make sure it happens, and then I want to
be able to trust those statistics. What capabilities----
Mr. Crye. Are you thinking of gathering statistics for any
ship, anywhere that carries U.S. passengers?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Crye. I don't think that you can compel, for instance,
a Greek ship that operates only in Greece that might sell a
ticket in the United States, that a U.S. citizen goes and flies
to Greece to get aboard that ship. And that ship, or the
operating company that operates that ship, has no nexus to the
United States other than a U.S. citizen chose to go to Greece
to go on board that vessel.
Another analogy might be a ferryboat. It's a passenger
vessel operating in the Baltic that carries passengers between
Norway and Switzerland--or Norway and Sweden. That is a vessel,
and the voyage has to nexus to the United States.
Mr. Shays. But basically the folks that are part of your
organization do come under our authority, North America.
Mr. Crye. To varying extents. Some operate routinely from
the United States. Some operate with the majority of American
passengers. Some operate on large international voyages that
are around-the-world voyages, that infrequently, if ever, come
to the United States. Others are primarily European operators
who may come and sail from the Dominican Republic in the
winter. Might that be a sufficient nexus to obtain the type of
statistics that you're describing? There are varying degrees of
nexus to the United States, is the point I'm trying to make.
I'm not trying to be uncooperative.
Mr. Shays. No, I understand.
Mr. Crye. I'm just trying to tell you----
Mr. Shays. You gave me an honest answer to a question and I
appreciate it.
Mr. Crye. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. I think that the way we are going to leave it is
that we will have you meet with the staff to talk about
security, the number of folks that you have on board. Do you
have a jail on board your ships?
Mr. Purdy. Sir, for Royal Caribbean and Celebrity, we have
what would be an isolation room on board the ships. On some of
the older ships that do not have that, we would utilize a cabin
with a guard posted at the front.
Mr. Shays. OK. But what we will do is we will try to
understand how you secure your vessels both from terrorists as
well as how you try to maintain law and order. And I am
comfortable doing that in closed doors. But, frankly, we will
do it just with staff. I think that would be sufficient.
We are----
Mr. Crye. Sir, could I give you the industry-wide
statistics?
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. Crye. Our membership, we surveyed our membership for
the number of missing persons who went overboard in the past 2
years. We obtained a fair and accurate report that 13 people
have gone overboard, or are missing over the past 2 years, and
during that period we carried almost 20 million people, so that
is a ratio of something more than 1 in a million, something
more like 1 in 1.4 million.
Mr. Shays. So it is a million different passengers but only
for a week or two. In other words, it is a million passengers,
but only for a week or two, correct, that you carried them? In
other words, you don't have--I am saying the obvious, I am just
trying to make sure we don't get overly impressed with that
statistic, 20 million people.
Mr. Crye. We have approximately 200,000 berths on board our
ships. So if you equated those statistics to a town of 200,000,
then you would be comparing apples to apples.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough. That is my point. I don't want to
compare it to a community of 20 million or a State of 20
million. I really need to compare it to a community of 200,000.
Mr. Crye. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough. And that these statistics were
voluntarily provided.
Mr. Crye. By our membership to the trade association.
Mr. Shays. Did everyone participate?
Mr. Crye. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. What I would like is if you would give those
statistics for each of the cruise lines to my staff, if you
would provide that, so in other words, we will know how many
from each cruise line.
Was there a disproportionate amount in one cruise line
versus another?
Mr. Crye. You've heard the majority of the statistics
reported by the two cruise lines that are here present today.
Mr. Shays. OK. But at any rate, we just want a breakdown of
the 13, and you don't have to give it right now, but we will
want it later. We want the 13 and what cruise ships they were.
Actually, why don't you give it to us right now? What were
they; 13 missing, and what were the cruise ships that the 13
were missing?
Mr. Crye. You've heard from Carnival Cruise Lines.
Mr. Shays. Carnival was again how many, six?
Mr. Mandigo. We had six for all the brands within Carnival.
Mr. Shays. Over 2 years, right.
And, Mr. Purdy.
Mr. Purdy. Four, sir.
Mr. Shays. So we have three left. It is not a trick
question. We just want to get it on the record. Thank you.
Mr. Crye. The other four--three we would like to provide to
you.
Mr. Shays. Would you do that?
Mr. Crye. Because----
Mr. Shays. Let me explain why, so that later on if someone
contacts us and says my brother or sister was missing on this
particular cruise ship, it will just reinforce and give us
faith in the statistics you are providing. So that is why it
would be helpful to have.
Mr. Crye. Thank you, sir. We will be pleased to provide
that for you.
Mr. Shays. OK, thank you.
Is there any question that we should have asked you, any
question you prepared that you would like to put on the record?
Any question we should have asked you that we didn't? You can
ask yourself the question and then answer it. I, frankly, learn
a lot from the questions that you may think we should have
asked that we didn't, a lot. So is there anything that you
would like to ask yourself or just put on the record?
Mr. Mandigo. At risk, Mr. Chairman, I would add that, 27
years in the FBI, that we always struggled over jurisdiction,
and I was very happy in the cruise industry that we solved that
problem fairly easily by simply taking the position that if it
was a serious crime, we would report it, and then we did not
have to worry about jurisdiction.
Mr. Shays. You report it to whom?
Mr. Mandigo. To the FBI if it was a serious crime.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Purdy, any point that you want to put on the
record?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir. I would just like to clarify two
points on the George Smith case that have been widely
misreported.
Mr. Shays. Yes, thank you.
Mr. Purdy. Those points being our security, or our guest
relations staff received the loud noise call at 4 a.m. It was
not a call talking about a fight or any kind of violence. It
was loud noise, sounded like partying sounds. Our security
responded. Once they were there, they knocked on the door. The
situation was, it was quiet, and that's their procedure for
handling a noise complaint.
Had there been a report of a fight, any kind of violence,
our procedure is that they go in and physically verify that the
occupants are OK. So I want to clarify that point.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Purdy. The second point is that the overhang, which has
been reported as being cleaned immediately, was secured along
with the cabin. The Turkish authorities came on board, after,
again, we had notified the FBI as well. FBI was in Kusadasi at
the time. The Turkish authorities conducted their forensic
investigation, and they released both the overhang and the
cabin to us for cleaning at approximately 6 p.m. They also
released the ship to us to sail at 7 p.m. The overhang was
cleaned at that time. However, we kept the cabin secured for
the following 6 days while we were in communication with the
FBI.
Mr. Shays. Secured, but any of your own security people
could walk in----
Mr. Purdy. Meaning sealed off and nobody allowed to go in,
sir.
Mr. Shays. So even your security people couldn't go in?
Mr. Purdy. Yes. I think our security people could go in,
sir, but I would have to check whether anybody did, but it was
secured.
Mr. Shays. This raises an interesting point for me at
least. I don't have a sense of how you involved the FBI. I
mean, would it have been wise to wait for the FBI to come and
let them do what they----
Mr. Purdy. Sir, we were in communications with the FBI, and
at that point there's a lot of diplomatic channels that we're
not a party to that have to happen for that to happen----
Mr. Shays. Wait a second. There is no noise from the
audience on this issue. This is a hearing.
But what I would like to know is this. We are talking about
American citizens. I will tell you I have a lot more faith--
with no disrespect to the Turkish Government. I have met so
many fine people in Turkey and government officials, but for
them to have released it, and then you destroyed, frankly, some
of the evidence once the Turks had basically allowed you. When
does the FBI come? Had the FBI been on board the ship to check
it out?
Mr. Purdy. Sir, we have been asked not to discuss the FBI's
investigation.
Mr. Shays. That is fair enough. I am not going to ask you
other than this, and let me ask you a general question. I am
losing a sense of the significance of the FBI if you would
destroy evidence before the FBI had given you approval. If you
are telling me the FBI had given you approval, I would say,
well, I have a comfort level with that. You are telling me the
Turkish Government told you you could take care of it, then I
have a problem with that.
Mr. Purdy. Sir, we were in communications with the FBI, and
they made no request to take any other actions at that time.
Mr. Shays. OK. So let me just ask in general. Forget the
Smith case.
Mr. Purdy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. How do you involve the FBI if you are overseas
in Greece? Do you get them from the Greek Embassy? I mean we
have FBI agents--where do they come from?
Mr. Purdy. If we have an allegation, we report it both
through the Miami office to the FBI----
Mr. Shays. So they meet you in the next port or do they----
Mr. Purdy [continuing]. As well as the U.S. consulate.
Mr. Shays. You notify them. Help me out. Anybody can answer
this. I should ask them. Does the FBI fly to your ship in a
helicopter and immediately take control, or do they wait till
you come to the next port? Do they just talk to you on the
phone? What do they do?
Mr. Purdy. Ultimately they handle it on a case-by-case
basis. On the case which happened over the weekend, the FBI
required a request from the Canadian authorities to step in
upon our notification, which they did, and they have started an
investigation.
Mr. Shays. What does step in mean, that they got involved
or they landed on the ship?
Mr. Purdy. Excuse me, sir?
Mr. Shays. Getting involved isn't helping me understand. I
want to know what getting involved means. Did they actually
take control of whatever room that the needed to get, or place
that they needed?
Mr. Crye. Perhaps I could try to address that, sir.
Mr. Shays. Were they personally there? Mr. Crye.
Mr. Crye. I'm not speaking of the George Smith case, per
se.
Mr. Shays. No, I know that.
Mr. Crye. I am talking about the different authorities that
each arguably have jurisdiction, different countries. Bahamas
might have jurisdiction. Greece might have jurisdiction. Turkey
might have jurisdiction. And the United States might have
jurisdiction. In the sorting of that out to determine who is
the lead and who is taking control, there may be a lapse before
the United States decided that it wants to be in the lead on
the investigation. If that is the case, then the authorities of
another government would be in the lead, and the FBI might be
consulted with about whether they agree to release the
potential crime scene, or they might not be. If Turkey says,
``We are in control,'' and the FBI accedes to that control, and
Turkey allows the release of the vessel, that is solely Turkish
law enforcement authority's decision. And in fact, much has
been made today about the Turkish officials----
Mr. Shays. Just suspend a second. Just so you don't go on
to a new thought, keep your thought. The issue, I can
understand the Turkish authorities saying you can wash the
blood off, but I don't understand why you have to, and I could
understand why you might want to leave it there until American
authorities had a chance to look at it. So their saying you can
doesn't mean you had to. That is the only issue. And I am
trying to understand what your policy is. I would like to think
your policy would be--and forget the Smith case. I have
specifically not asked the FBI anything about the Smith case. I
haven't even asked the families about the FBI and the Smith
case because--I have spoken to the families, but I haven't
asked them about anything with the FBI, because, frankly, I
don't want to know. I want to be able to ask my questions and
not have to know that.
What I would like to know is the policy of the shipping
industry. What I am hearing you saying, Mr. Crye--and I am not
trying to interrupt you, but I just want to make sure you are
hearing me--what I am hearing you say is the FBI may be
predominant or not. Being predominant or not doesn't
necessarily mean that you should destroy evidence until the
FBI, who may take a secondary role, has a chance to look at it,
and I am just wanting to know if an America carrier, basically
a company that caters mostly to Americans, if they are going to
give a little benefit of the doubt to the FBI. That is kind of
where I am at.
Mr. Crye. I would think that each cruise line, if the FBI
exercised their prerogative and said, ``We don't care what the
Turkish authorities have done, we want you to do this,'' that
each one of our cruise lines will cooperate fully with that----
Mr. Shays. Mr. Purdy, is that true?
Mr. Purdy. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Mandigo.
Mr. Mandigo. Absolutely. I am aware of no instance where
the FBI has been denied full access at their request, or for
that matter where they have been on board, if it has been
necessary to delay the ship, the ship has been delayed.
Mr. Shays. Anything else you want to put on the record, Mr.
Crye?
Mr. Crye. The second part of that, sir, is that I am
unaware of any instance when a flag state interfered with the
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction on board a cruise ship when a
U.S. citizen was involved.
The thought that I wanted to finish earlier, was under the
port State control authority. If the Turks had an active
investigation and they wanted to detain that ship or lock that
ship down, or prevent that ship from departing, they certainly
had the authority to do so if that was their wish. What the
Turks did in this circumstance, as I understand it, based upon
what Mr. Purdy just testified to, was released the ship back to
the master to depart. There was no commercial decision
involved. The Turks had said, ``We have completed our
investigation of that awning and that cabin.''
Mr. Shays. But they did not, I don't think--well, never
mind, because I don't really know the issues involved. I won't
speculate.
What leaves me uncomfortable is that I could be on a cruise
ship where a murder may have been committed, and I may be off
to a new port with a murderer on board. That doesn't leave me
very comfortable. Forgetting whatever happened, obviously, the
tragedy that happened with the Smiths, if a murder was
committed, if it was done by someone who was staff or someone,
a guest still on board, you still have the murderer on board. I
am not quite sure what the solution is----
Mr. Crye. The policy of the industry is to fully cooperate.
If the Turks had chosen to stay on board and sail with the ship
because they had suspicions, they could have done so, and we
would have been more than welcoming. If the FBI had chosen to
go board that ship that day--and there was an FBI agent at the
consulate--if they had chosen to go aboard that ship that day
and exercise their jurisdiction, the cruise line would have
been more than willing to accommodate them.
Mr. Shays. So bottom line, based on the statistics we have,
we have 13 missing folks in the last 2 years in a city
ultimately year long of about 20,000----
Mr. Crye. 200,000.
Mr. Shays. 200,000 people. And your point to me would be
that would be a comparable statistic pretty much in the general
public.
Mr. Crye. I think that various cities in this country
measure statistics very variably also, because you certainly
have locations throughout the United States where tourism is a
very big factor also, just as they are on a cruise ship where
visits of a certain period of time are measured. If you are
measuring 52 weeks a year, full time, how many people, then
you're probably comparing to a city of 200,000.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough.
Mr. Crye. Roughly, for the North American cruise market and
our membership.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
This will be continued. We appreciate your cooperation. We
will make sure we sit down with you on the statistics of your
security, and I would love it if you, Mr. Crye--I would
appreciate, if you, Mr. Crye, Mr. Purdy and Mr. Mandigo, would
look at the statements of the families that have been
victimized and have suffered loss to see if there is anything
that you should be reconsidering about your policies or about
particular cases and deal with it appropriately. That would be
appreciated.
Mr. Crye. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you all very much. You have been very
excellent witnesses and I appreciate it.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statements of Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and
Hon. John L. Mica follow:]
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