<DOC> [109th Congress House Hearings] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access] [DOCID: f:25259.wais] DOE/ESE SECURITY: HOW READY IS THE PROTECTIVE FORCE ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ JULY 26, 2005 __________ Serial No. 109-104 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ index.html http://www.house.gov/reform ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 25-259 WASHINGTON : 2006 _____________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ÿ091800 Fax: (202) 512ÿ092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402ÿ090001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York KENNY MARCHANT, Texas ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia Columbia PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ------ CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina (Independent) ------ ------ Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director Rob Borden, Parliamentarian Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman KENNY MARCHANT, Texas DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania Ex Officio TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel J. Vincent Chase, Chief Investigator Robert A. Briggs, Clerk Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on July 26, 2005.................................... 1 Statement of: Aloise, Gene, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office, accompanied by James Noel, Assistant Director of Natural Resources and Environment, and Jonathan M. Gill, Senior Analyst, Natural Resources and Environment; Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General, Department of Energy; Glenn S. Podonsky, Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, Department of Energy; Dr. Lawrence Brede, Wackenhut, DOE Operations; Dr. Glenn Adler, Security Policy, Service Employees International Union; and Robert Walsh, Security Manager, Office of Energy, Science and Environment, Department of Energy....................................... 7 Adler, Dr. Glenn......................................... 73 Aloise, Gene............................................. 7 Brede, Dr. Lawrence...................................... 62 Friedman, Gregory H...................................... 27 Podonsky, Glenn S........................................ 40 Walsh, Robert............................................ 86 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Adler, Dr. Glenn, Security Policy, Service Employees International Union, prepared statement of................. 76 Aloise, Gene, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of.... 10 Brede, Dr. Lawrence, Wackenhut, DOE Operations, prepared statement of............................................... 64 Friedman, Gregory H., Inspector General, Department of Energy, prepared statement of.............................. 29 Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a Senator in Congress from the State of Iowa, prepared statement of....................... 5 Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, Department of Energy................ 43 Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3 Walsh, Robert, Security Manager, Office of Energy, Science and Environment, Department of Energy: Followup question and response........................... 110 Prepared statement of.................................... 89 DOE/ESE SECURITY: HOW READY IS THE PROTECTIVE FORCE ---------- TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2005 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Turner, Shays, Burton, Marchant, Dent, Maloney, Kucinich, and Ruppersberger. Staff present: Laurence Halloren, staff director and counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; Robert Briggs, clerk; Sam Raymond and Eric Vaughn, interns; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk. Mr. Turner. The hearing of the National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations hearing entitled, ``DOE/ ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force?,'' is called to order. This hearing continues the subcommittee's examination of security programs at Department of Energy nuclear sites. Previous testimony described substantial institutional, technical and fiscal challenges confronting efforts to develop and implement a strengthened post-September 11th security standard called the design basis threat [DBT]. Today we focus on the substance and pace of DBT implementation at five sites outside the active weapons complex managed by the Department's Office of Energy, Science and Environment. Without question, ESE research labs and decommissioned sites are attractive targets for terrorists determined to turn our technology against us and willing to die while doing so. The materials at these facilities pose a threat and can be used either as part of a weapon or a health threat directly. As DOE succeeds in hardening weapons production facilities and labs, ESE sites form the next tier of soft targets for nuclear terrorists following the path of least resistance. But as we have heard before, ESE facilities housing substantial quantities of nuclear materials face unique problems implementing and sustaining enhanced security programs. The already vexing measure of how much security is enough against an uncertain threat becomes only more difficult when evaluating the costs and benefits of capital improvements and protective force enhancements at decommissioned facilities DOE hopes to close sooner rather than later. At the request of our chairman, Christopher Shays, the Government Accountability Office assessed the current readiness of protective forces at ESE sites and the steps still needed to defend those facilities against the larger, more capable attackers postulated in the DBT. Their findings, released today, point to a generally proficient guard staff prepared to meet existing standards. But the way forward to meet the higher DBT threat level is far less clear. Efforts to deploy an elite protective force, utilize new security technologies and effectively manage ESE security initiatives require coordination and resource commitments that GAO is not sure will materialize. Plans to blend down and consolidate nuclear materials appear stymied by bureaucratic stovepipes and uncertain cost projections. Even under the best assumptions, security enhancements demanded by the 2004 DBT will not be completed before 2008, if then. The new security imperative demands implementation of a denial strategy to thwart access to nuclear materials, not just contain or catch intruders. But in many ways, ESE seems stuck in denial about organizational and fiscal demands of a DBT-compliant strategy. Tactical training on assault scenarios lack vigor or realism. Communications equipment may be unreliable. Exceptions to training and equipment standards create inconsistencies and gaps in ESE safeguard systems. A diffused ESE security management structure frustrates efforts to implement and coordinate DOE-wide security policy securities. Almost 4 years later, the undeniable realities of the post- September 11th world are not yet fully reflected in ESE security policies or practices. Our witnesses this morning will describe plans to implement the more stringent DBT and the steps needed to sustain those efforts against an undeniable dynamic threat. We appreciate their contribution to our ongoing oversight of DOE nuclear security, and we look forward to their testimony. Gentlemen, as you are aware, it is the policy of this subcommittee to swear in our witnesses. If you would please stand and raise your right hands for the oath. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Turner. Please note for the record that the witnesses have responded in the affirmative. And I will acknowledge that Mr. Ruppersberger was in attendance at the commencement of this hearing. And I ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place any opening statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered. I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statements in the record. Without objection, it is so ordered. I ask further unanimous consent to place a statement from Senator Grassley, a co-requester on the GAO study to be discussed today, in the hearing record. Without objection, it is so ordered. [The prepared statements of Hon. Christopher Shays and Hon. Charles E. Grassley follow:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.002 Mr. Turner. Our witnesses today for this panel include Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Mr. James Noel, Assistant Director of Natural Resources and Environment; and Mr. Jonathan M. Gill, Senior Analyst, Natural Resources and Environment. We also have Mr. Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General, Department of Energy; Mr. Glenn S. Podonsky, Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, Department of Energy; Dr. Lawrence Brede, Wackenhut, DOE Operations; Dr. Glenn Adler, security policy, Service Employees International Union [SEIU]; and Mr. Robert Walsh, Security Manager, Office of Energy, Science and Environment, Department of Energy. And if I have mispronounced any of your names, please correct the record when you give your testimony. We will begin our testimony with Mr. Aloise. STATEMENTS OF GENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES NOEL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, AND JONATHAN M. GILL, SENIOR ANALYST, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT; GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; DR. LAWRENCE BREDE, WACKENHUT, DOE OPERATIONS; DR. GLENN ADLER, SECURITY POLICY, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION; AND ROBERT WALSH, SECURITY MANAGER, OFFICE OF ENERGY, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY STATEMENT OF GENE ALOISE Mr. Aloise. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on nuclear security at DOE's Energy, Science, and Environment sites. A terrorist attack on one of these sites, containing weapons- grade nuclear material could have devastating consequences for the site and nearby communities. Mr. Turner. Excuse me. These mics are relatively directional. Could you pull the mic forward? And if you would twist it just a bit so that it is pointed directly at you, that would help us. Mr. Aloise. These consequences could include theft of nuclear material, explosion of an improved nuclear device, and use of the material in a dirty bomb. To protect these sites, an effective security program is essential. DOE's security program begins with a document known as the ``design basis threat,'' which identifies the size and capabilities of potential adversaries. The 2004 design basis threat identified a much larger terrorist threat than before, and it could cost between about $400 million and $600 million to develop the force necessary to defeat this larger threat. DOE is allowing its sites until October 2008 to fully meet the new design basis threat. My remarks, which are based on the report we are issuing for the subcommittee today, will focus on whether ESE protective forces are meeting current readiness requirements and what actions are needed to defend against a larger October 2004 design basis threat. Regarding readiness, we found that protective forces at the five ESE sites, with weapons-grade nuclear material, generally meet readiness requirements. Specifically, protective forces at the Savannah River site, Hanford site, Idaho, and Argonne West, and Oak Ridge National Lab generally comply with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness and equipment, and had the required training programs and facilities. However, we did find weaknesses that could impact the protective forces' ability to defend their sites. For example, most officers we spoke with were concerned about the quality and realism of their training. Further, because DOE neither sets standards for, nor tracks individual participation in force-on-force exercises, it was difficult to determine how many officers had this important training. Another weakness identified by protective force officers at all five sites concerned problems with their radios. Some said that the radios could not be relied on in the event of a terrorist attack. In addition, although most protective forces are required to have access to body armor, at one site we found that body armor had not been issued for most officers. Another site did not have its own special response team. In the event of an attack, one of the jobs of a special response team would be to recover stolen nuclear material. In addition, the capability of some of the protective forces to fight during a chemical or biological attack varied. Specifically, two sites expected and provided equipment for most of their forces to fight in contaminated areas. Another site did not provide any equipment. Indeed, it expected its teams to evacuate the site with other workers. Yet another site expected its forces to fight in a chemically contaminated area, but did not provide protective gear. Another weakness we observed was that only one of the five sites had armored vehicles. In contrast, all six NNSA sites with weapons-grade nuclear material have armored vehicles. Now regarding actions needed to meet the 2004 design basis threat. In our view, DOE needs to develop and implement a comprehensive Department-wide plan which addresses, among other things, the transition to an elite fighting force, investments in emerging security technologies, and the consolidation of weapons-grade nuclear material. Further, DOE needs to establish a centralized security office within ESE to help meet the challenges of implementing the new design basis threat. While I am pleased to note that DOE has accepted our report recommendations, DOE's response to our recommendation to develop a comprehensive plan to meet the new design basis threat does not go far enough. DOE has cited only individual efforts to address the new threat, and not the larger plan we are calling for. Without such a plan, DOE may not be successful in meeting the requirements of the 2004 design basis threat by October 2008. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have. [Note.--The July 2005 GAO report entitled, ``Nuclear Security, DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-05-611,'' may be found in subcommittee files.] [The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.009 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.019 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.021 Mr. Turner. Thank you. Mr. Friedman. STATEMENT OF GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN Mr. Friedman. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here, at your request, to testify on recent reviews conducted by the Office of Inspector General regarding security programs of the Department of Energy. This is the latest in a series of testimonies that we have provided to the Congress on this important subject. The issues addressed have included training, physical security, and performance testing. A number parallel those addressed in GAO's just issued report. Between 2003 and 2005, we identified issues regarding protective force overtime and training. In one review, which included five Department sites, we found the Department faced significant increases in unscheduled protective force overtime. Further, we noted protective force morale and retention problems due to mandatory overtime and reduced training opportunities. In a review with the Department's Oak Ridge Reservation, we found that contractor protective force personnel spent, on average, about 40 percent less time on combat readiness refresher training than that specified in the training plan approved by Federal site managers, and that the personnel worked in excess of the Department's optimum 60-hour per week threshold. In a third review we found that 10 of the 12 sites made significant modifications to the Department's established protective force core curriculum. This raised questions about the effectiveness of the training received by the affected protective force personnel, as well as the validity of the core curriculum. In June 2005, we examined physical security at two DOE facilities. In the first review we found that foreign construction workers using false identification documents gained access to the Oak Ridge Y-12 National Security Complex. During our field work, management issued a revised access policy. Nonetheless, we were concerned, and are concerned, that similar conditions may exist at other sensitive Department sites. Therefore, we recommended that management determine whether agency-wide actions are warranted. The second review concerns security at the Strategy Petroleum Reserve. The Reserve, which the Department has designated as part of its critical infrastructure, contains about 695 million barrels of oil valued at about $36 billion. We concluded that physical security at the Reserve could be improved. Specifically, we found that 87 percent of the non- protective force contractor employees of the Reserve, some with the ability to access sensitive areas unescorted, had never been processed for any level of security clearance. Therefore, in our judgment, the Reserve's level of protection against the ``insider threat'' may not be consistent with its critical infrastructure designation. We also found the Reserve's deadly force policy may also not be consistent with the Reserve's critical infrastructure designation; and, finally, we identified opportunities to make site protective force performance tests more realistic. Protective force performance testing was also the subject of a January 2004 report, where we found that a performance test at Y-12 was compromised as a result of certain protective force personnel being allowed to view computer simulations of the test scenarios prior to the test, and there was an apparent pattern of actions by Oak Ridge Reservation security personnel going back to the mid-1980's that may have negatively affected the reliability of site performance tests. In another 2004 report concerning Oak Ridge, we identified that the two local Department management offices, the Oak Ridge office and the Y-12 site office, were developing separate radio communications projects. The two projects as designed would have created gaps in radio coverage and would have prevented Y- 12 protective forces from maintaining communications with the rest of the Oak Ridge Reservation and their own dispatcher. These findings were similar to an earlier review at four other Department sites, in which we found that three of the four sites did not have direct radio communication with local law enforcement agencies. These agencies would have been called upon to assist in the pursuit of suspected felons or terrorists fleeing Department sites. We also have a number of ongoing and planned security reviews relevant to the topics discussed during this hearing. This includes an intensive effort to review the Department's security program and its progress in meeting the threat posed in the revised design basis threat document. The Department is working to address many security concerns and is doing so at a substantial cost. The Office of Inspector General will continue to examine the Department's security apparatus with the goal of providing recommendations to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Friedman follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.023 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.032 Mr. Turner. Thank you. Mr. Podonsky. STATEMENT OF GLENN S. PODONSKY Mr. Podonsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding the readiness of protective force to defend Office of Energy, Science and Environment facilities in light of the GAO's recent report on their examination of protective force training and equipment at five ESE sites. I will highlight relevant aspects of the GAO report from the perspective of the Office of Independent Oversight within my Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. These issues are addressed in greater detail in my written statement. The Department considers its responsibilities to protect national security assets in our custody to be crucial. Secretary Bodman and Deputy Secretary Sell have demonstrated an intense interest and strong support for our security programs, and have continued the significant initiatives begun by their predecessors. This support includes the policy of holding line managers responsible for security program implementation and effectiveness, to include achieving established milestones for meeting the requirements of the Department's design basis threat. While ESE site missions are generally associated with basic and applied scientific research and environmental remediation, rather than with national security matters, some ESE sites and, in particular, the five sites addressed in the GAO report-- currently possess significant quantities of special nuclear material. We agree with the GAO's general conclusion that protective forces at ESE facilities visited are adequately trained and equipped to protect the facilities under the current requirements. But there are some weaknesses that must be addressed. This conclusion is consistent with our own previous independent oversight inspections of these facilities. We believe that ESE line managers and security professionals at all ESE organizational levels will move quickly and effectively to address the protective force training and equipment shortcomings outlined by the GAO, and will likely respond positively to recommendations contained in the draft report. We anticipate efforts to do so will be integrated with many other actions necessary to meet the requirements of the design basis threat. We are confident that the new Under Secretary, Dave Garman, together with the newly appointed ESE Director of Security, Bob Walsh, will provide the immediate and sustained high level of attention necessary for these efforts to be successful. We are currently pursuing a number of Department-wide initiatives designed to assist ESE in meeting its security challenges and obligations. Two, in particular are aimed at achieving affordable security upgrades to meet the design basis threat requirements. One of these is the Elite Force Initiative, by which we intend to enhance the tactical capabilities of those protective elements responsible for protecting our most critical national security assets. We believe that to effectively defeat current and future threats, we need protective force elements possessing the advanced training, weapons, equipment, and tactics that will enable them to conduct a coordinated and intense offensive and defensive tactical operation at skill levels comparable to those of elite military units. While achieving this goal will require some modified training and some upgraded equipment, together with policy changes, it should not require significant changes in manpower levels. Many of our current special response team personnel already possess high levels of tactical skills and are well armed and equipped. And this initiative is more about changing how we use some protective force resources than it is about adding more resources. Further, this initiative will not directly involve protective forces at all ESE sites, especially those that do not possess critical national security assets, and may involve only a portion of the forces at sites protecting such assets. We have a number of activities under way to determine required changes in policy, defensive strategy and tactics, training, weapons, equipment, and supporting technologies that will enable us to effectively implement the elite force concept as envisioned on schedule. Intertwined with the Elite Force Initiative is another complementary initiative, involving the increased use of security technologies to effectively and efficiently upgrade our protection systems. Through the prudent application of appropriate technologies, we expect increased use of those security technologies to provide cost savings and improved effectiveness over manpower intensive alternatives. It is important to clarify that when we refer to security technologies, we do not refer exclusively to expensive, high technology and delicate electronic sensors. While such devices are certainly included, security technologies also include many other categories of items, such as improved barrier systems, materials that provide ballistic protection, advanced protective force weapons and equipment, and improved construction techniques. We expect the security technologies initiative to benefit all of our facilities. The application of appropriate security technologies can improve effectiveness and efficiency of any protection system. Therefore, we believe all ESE sites are candidates for security technology upgrades, although we would expect more intensive investment in the benefits of such technologies at sites protecting our more critical assets. I wish to note that the Idaho site within ESE has actually been extremely proactive with our security technology deployment initiatives and has recently submitted an impressive design basis threat implementation plan. Through our technology deployment program, our site assistance visit effort, and our development activities, we are making progress in identifying and evaluating new technologies for site-specific applications. In summary, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we agree with the general results, conclusions, and recommendations of the GAO report, and believe that ESE line managers under the new ESE leadership will address the issues identified by the GAO and the IG as they address the challenges associated with implementing the design basis threat. We believe that our elite force, security technology, and other security initiatives will assist ESE meeting those challenges within the parameters established by Secretary Bodman and Deputy Secretary Sell. But they are challenges, and the ultimate success of the effort will in fact require the attention and support of ESE line managers at every level. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.038 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.046 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.047 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.049 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.050 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.051 Mr. Turner. Dr. Brede. Also, I want to acknowledge that Carolyn Maloney has joined us. Mrs. Maloney. Thank you. Mr. Turner. Dr. Brede. Dr. Brede, I don't think your mic is on. STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE BREDE Dr. Brede. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to offer my views on the readiness of Department of Energy Office of Energy, Science and Environment protective forces to meet the terrorist threats identified by the intelligence community. The perspective I bring to the table is that of a senior contract manager for a protective force and a soldier. Until recently, I served as General Manager of the Savannah River site protective force contract, one of the five sites recently reviewed by the GAO. I served in that capacity for more than 12 years. And prior to my DOE service, I spent 26 years as an Army officer with three combat tours, including service with elite units. Let me say up front, for the record, that our protective forces are well trained and, as a group, are as capable as any of the military units with which I have served. In fact, the majority of protective force officers with whom I am familiar come from a military background and bring with them the skills necessary for the protection of critical DOE assets. Anecdotally, the winner of two annual recent National Level Tactical Competitions comes from a DOE ESE site. In these competitions, they scored consistently higher than military, law enforcement, and Federalized forces in tests of shooting, physical fitness, and tactical skills. With reference to the GAO report, I believe it provides a balanced assessment of ESE protective force readiness to defend their respective sites. The report's conclusions, that protective forces generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements and comply with DOE standards, firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and equipment standardization are accurate ones. At the same time, the report's identification of possible weaknesses and actions needed to correct these could serve to enhance our abilities to defend against the 2004 design basis threat. Because it matters not how capable we are today, we ought to work at being better than we are. Our sites can and are addressing the weaknesses in training and equipment identified in the GAO draft report. I would submit if the GAO would conduct a review today on force readiness at ESE sites, the results would be significantly different than the snapshot taken when the last review began in March 2004. Today's picture would reflect more tactically focused training, the employment of more advanced weapons systems, communications, and armored vehicles, and a host of other actions related to meeting the 2004 DBT. Similarly, I believe that site contractors understand the necessity to take our protective force readiness and capabilities to the next level. That is, we need to transform certain segments of our legacy force to an elite force. Based on secretarial guidance and Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance initial efforts, some sites--and the Savannah River site among them--have already taken actions to transition to this elite force with challenging training, increased performance standards, and tactical reorganization. I also believe that the transformation to an elite force can be facilitated by policy considerations in four areas: more challenging physical fitness qualification standards; introduction of height, weight, and body composition standards; identifying appropriate safety performance expectations; and considering a uniform retirement plan to allow for cycling of human capital through elite force units. In conclusion, I believe that ESE protective forces are sufficiently trained and equipped to meet existing DOE readiness requirements. Site implementation plans identifying how sites will meet the increased challenges presented by the October 2004 DBT have been provided to DOE ESE and are being reviewed for approval. Meanwhile, my experience indicates we are being provided the resources necessary to support the phased implementation of measures to meet 2004 DBT protective force requirements. While addressing certain policy issues will certainly enhance our force readiness, I have confidence in our protective forces' ability to counter today's and future threats. Simply stated, I am as proud to serve as these forces as I was to serve with America's sons and daughters in my military experience. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Dr. Brede follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.052 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.053 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.054 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.055 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.056 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.057 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.058 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.059 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.060 Mr. Turner. Dr. Adler. STATEMENT OF DR. GLENN ADLER Dr. Adler. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Glenn Adler, and I work for the Service Employees International Union. I have submitted a statement for the record and will summarize the main points. We have three main concerns. The best standards in the world will not improve security if contractors elude them if DOE's oversight is weak, or if DOE lacks the will to weed out poor performers or to avoid choosing them in the first place in the procurement process. SEIU is one of the largest trade unions in the United States, with more than 1.8 million members. We are the largest union of security officers in the country. I am responsible for coordinating research and policy work in the Federal sector, including in DOE nuclear facilities and NRC regulated commercial nuclear power plants. On September 11th, our security officers and janitors at the World Trade Center, were among the first responders to that terrible tragedy, working side by side with the NYPD and the firefighters in a cause to which many of our members gave their lives. But well before the horrible events of September 11th, SEIU had been raising the issue of security standards, most notably for airport security screeners. We have partnered with responsible contractors, building owners, mayors, and Governors, to raise standards and improve performance. We know DOE's regulations for training and performance are, as they should be, far beyond the standards in the commercial office world. But the GAO report, on the table today, tells us that contractors are in significant ways not living up to them. Consider one failure identified in the report and then echoed in the fine presentation by the Inspector General, undependable radio communications. This may sound like a minor matter to some people, but it may contribute to serious problems. In fact, one may have already occurred. According to the New York Times, in 2004, poor radio communication played a role in the confusion of a near friendly fire incident at the Y-12 plant in Tennessee. Officers are courageous people, people doing difficult and important work. They are heavily armed, and they go out into the night and we learn that perhaps their radio communication doesn't allow them to talk to each other. To what extent is DOE's multibillion dollar security budget compromised by poor radios and dead batteries? A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. This problem is directly connected to issues that are not directly addressed in the GAO's report, the oversight and accountability of contractors' behavior. SEIU believes security should be of the highest standard, whether performed by public authorities or by private companies. We are not opposed to privatization. But contractors' interest in the bottom line may encourage cheating and cutting corners. In response, we expect government to check and balance their behavior, and to change the incentives that may lead to cutting of corners. But the Department sometimes contributes to these irresponsible outcomes. The GAO has consistently warned DOE about problems, for example, with their award fees. Yet, these problems persist today. You are all familiar with last year's IG report on cheating by the foreign-owned contractor Wackenhut during a security drill at Y-12. The incident cost the contractor about $200,000 in fees. But the company still received a good performance grade from DOE and a $2.3 million award fee. Rather than a multimillion dollar award fee, such outrageous practices demanded serious sanctions from the DOE, including the consideration of canceling the contract, suspension, or debarment. Remember, this is cheating at a facility that contains special nuclear material. We have heard from multiple security employees at other DOE ESE sites that these practices are not confirmed to Y-12. And some security officers told us the motto is ``if you ain't cheating, you ain't competing.'' Oversight exercised by the Inspector General is critical to corralling this sort of behavior, but their oversight has been subject to continuous public criticism by contractors. After the recent IG report on training problems at Oak Ridge, which is referenced in the GAO report and which was mentioned by the representative from the IG, a Wackenhut spokesman mocked the IG as ``bean counters who didn't understand security practices.'' Such comments indicate contempt for the agencies, including Congress, to whom the IG reports, who are charged with oversight of these facilities. They create an impression, in the minds of the public, at least--at odds with expectations of oversight and accountability. To us, the conditions described by the GAO report are shocking but not entirely surprising, since we encounter very similar problems in other contexts: NNSA sites, commercial nuclear power plants, and U.S. military bases. However, today's report and other GAO and IG investigations tend to mirror the structure of DOE itself, taking a piece of the puzzle and looking at it in depth. We believe it is important to complement these perspectives by assessing the contractors, and not just the agencies, and looking at their entire record across different settings to learn whether a problem reported at one facility is an isolated event or part of a broader problem and pattern of poor performance. This will help in oversight of current contractors and, if applied during the procurement process, will help weed out poor performances before they are even awarded a contract. In conclusion, the best standards in the world will not improve security if contractors elude them, if DOE's oversight is weak and if DOE lacks the will to get rid of poor performers or to avoid choosing them in the first place. We make a few recommendations: One, that DOE urgency implements an effective process to monitor performance and weed out poor performers, rather than reward them; a review of award fees and the robust use of penalties to enforce compliance; DOE must have a dramatically lower tolerance for cheating and cutting corners, making it too expensive for a contractor to risk this kind of behavior; and, faintly, DOE acquisition processes should be strengthened to ensure contracting officers do the proper due diligence by assessing security contractors' past performance and their record of business integrity and ethics. This is already in the Federal acquisition regulars, but is not always applied in practice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Dr. Adler follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.061 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.062 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.063 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.064 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.065 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.066 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.067 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.068 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.069 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.070 Mr. Turner. Mr. Walsh. STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. WALSH Mr. Walsh. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. On behalf of Under Secretary David Garman, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to discuss the readiness of DOE protective forces at facilities which are under the operational oversight of the Energy, Science, and Environment programs. My name is Robert Walsh. I am currently the Director of Security for Energy, Science, and Environment programs for the Department of Energy. This position was created last year by former Deputy Secretary Kyle McSlarrow, pending the nomination and confirmation of an Under Secretary. The purpose of creating this position was to bring focus and management oversight to security programs on the ESE side of the Department, similar to what the Office of Nuclear Security provides for the National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA], and to ensure that ESE interests are appropriately represented in the security management decisions of the Department. Subsequent to his confirmation on June 15th, and his swearing in approximately 1 month ago, on June 23rd, Under Secretary Garman directed that this position be formalized as a permanent part of the staff of the Office of the Under Secretary. The objective and intent of this position is to provide executive management focus for DOE security initiatives as they apply to ESE programs, and to ensure participation and coordination, together with Mr. Podonsky's organization and NNSA, in security decisions and management oversight of DOE security programs. Although ESE security directors have had two informal meetings since last October, we have taken advantage of the scheduling of this hearing to convene our first official meeting of the ESE Security Management Team since Under Secretary Garman's confirmation last month. In that regard, I am pleased to have with me today security representatives from each of the ESE programs--Environmental Management, Science and Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology--and ESE sites, including Idaho, Savannah River, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Richland, which specifically were the subjects of the most recent Government Accountability Office report regarding ESE protective force readiness. Mr. Chairman, we are here before you today to discuss the readiness of protective forces at DOE's ESE sites. The Government Accountability Office has indicated that they believe that ESE security forces generally do meet readiness requirements as defined by DOE policy directives, and we agree with this assessment. We are extremely proud of the men and women who comprise the protective forces which are responsible for protecting DOE facilities on a daily basis. These officers are our first line of defense against any active aggression from any number of malevolent sources, and we believe they do an excellent job. One indication of the overall readiness of protective forces at ESE sites is the fact that special police officer teams from two ESE sites placed first and second at this year's annual Security Protection Officer Training Competition [SPOTC], which was held last month in Albuquerque, NM and was previously referenced in Dr. Brede's testimony. Our team from Savannah River finished first among 11 teams, representing ESE and NNSA sites from across the country, with the Hanford Patrol team taking second place in the overall competition. In addition, this year's Police Officer of the Year, Ryan Strader, hails from Savannah River, as does Ryan's colleague, Allen Ford, the second place finisher in the overall individual competition. We are very proud of Ryan and Allen, and the teams from Savannah River and Hanford for their outstanding showing in this year's competition, and I am pleased to recognize them here this morning. The GAO also identified a number of areas which they felt needed to be addressed, and DOE has either corrected or is working to correct the weaknesses that GAO has identified. I would like to take a moment to briefly summarize our efforts with regard to GAO's specific findings in this report. First, GAO identified that current DOE policy does not require all protective force officers to participate in every force-on-force exercise, and that sites were not required to formally track individual officer participation in those exercises. GAO recommended that DOE develop policy requirements to ensure officer participation and to require sites to track individual officer involvement. DOE agrees with these recommendations, and Mr. Podonsky's office has committed to developing and issuing DOE-wide policy to address both issues by the end of this calendar year. We plan to work closely with Mr. Podonsky and his staff to ensure that this is completed. It should be noted that some ESE sites are already requiring this participation in force-on-force exercises and are keeping track of that participation. Second, GAO found weaknesses or deficiencies at some ESE sites with regard to equipment issuance or operability, including radio communications, body armor, chemical protective gear, and availability of armored vehicles. We have conducted a comprehensive review of each identified category at each ESE site. We have corrected, or are in the process of correcting each weakness, and we believe that each ESE site is currently in compliance with DOE policy requirements in each case. Mr. Chairman, we can provide more specific information regarding protective force equipment at your convenience. GAO has also recommended that ESE develop Department-wide multi-year fully resourced implementation plans to meet the requirements of the new design basis threat. Three of the four ESE sites have participated in the jointly conducted site assistance visits to determine current and future resource requirements of the current DBT. The fourth site, Hanford, is scheduled to be completed in September. In addition, together with staff from Mr. Podonsky's office, we are currently reviewing the DBT implementation plans from each ESE site. These plans include projected resource requirements and specific timelines, and we believe we are currently meeting all requirements as they have been defined. We expect to complete our review and submit the plans to the Deputy Secretary for his approval by the end of this week. Last, GAO recommended that the Under Secretary for ESE establish a security organization to provide management oversight and coordination for security initiatives within ESE programs. As stated earlier, Under Secretary Garman has formalized the position of Director of Security for ESE as a formal part of his management team. We believe that this initiative is responsive to GAO's recommendation in this area. Once again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the committee for the opportunity to appear before you this morning, and I would be happy to answer any questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.071 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.072 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.073 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.074 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.075 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.076 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.077 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.078 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.079 Mr. Turner. Thank you. We will begin questions for the panel with our chairman, Chairman Christopher Shays. We will begin with a 10 minute round of questions. Mr. Shays. I thank the chairman for giving me this opportunity to ask questions and to say I was in Iraq 24 hours ago, so I am trying to listen, but it is a little difficult. We have had three hearings with the Under Secretary for the National Nuclear Security Administration, and this is our second hearing on the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment. There are only two Members here. I don't know that is an indication that people think we are doing well or whether there are just so many things to focus on. However, I happen to think this is a hugely important hearing, and I thank you all for being here. I am not sure if the chairman and I will direct questions to everyone, so I have no problem with others jumping in if they want to respond to questions. Mr. Podonsky, you seem to come to either hearings we have, given that you are involved in both areas, is that correct? Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir. Mr. Shays. How would you evaluate ESE's efforts to implement the design basis threat denial of access security strategy? Mr. Podonsky. Until Under Secretary Garman was confirmed and until Director Walsh was put into his position, I would characterize ESE as being somewhat slower in what we had anticipated or hoped for implementation of the DBT. Part of that we believe is because the ESE organization was made of very strong, sincere individuals for their security programs within ESE, science, nuclear energy, environmental management, fossil energy. The reality is they were all doing what they thought was prudent for their particular sites. We did not see the rapidity that we felt that was needed to implement the design basis threat, but they all had their individual perspectives on what their priorities were. I don't want to speak for what their priorities---- Mr. Shays. Let me get to the next question. Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir. Mr. Shays. How do you evaluate the ESE? Are you optimistic that they are going to meet their 2008 deadline on the design basis threat? Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir, we are guardedly optimistic that they will because they have the new leadership that they have not had in the history of the ESE before. And that guarded optimism comes from the implementation plans that we have recently read from Idaho and one of the other sites within ESE. We hadn't seen that enthusiasm before. Mr. Shays. What kind of program office resistance have you encountered regarding the implementation of the design basis threat? Mr. Podonsky. If I said resistance, I misspoke. I think what we have seen is extremely careful analysis of what the design basis threat was and how it applied to their sites. The other thing that I think, in all respect to the Department, the design basis threat from May 2003 changed in October 2004. So we would expect that ESE sites, like the NNSA sites, should be moving toward completion of the 2003 DBT numbers in 2006 for completion. Mr. Shays. I have a sense that the Department is reluctant to implement the design basis threat. You don't think there is a reluctance? Mr. Podonsky. We have seen a hesitancy in terms of the Department---- Mr. Shays. That is called a reluctance. Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir. Mr. Shays. OK. So you have seen that. Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir. Mr. Shays. OK. Why did DOE change the design basis implementation deadline from October 2007 to October 2008? Mr. Podonsky. I am not familiar with the October 2007 deadline being changed to 2008. There was a review that former Deputy Secretary McSlarrow asked for to be conducted at the end of a series of this committee's hearing and the GAO report on the NNSA facilities. Mr. Shays. I will throw this out to you and then anyone else who wants to answer. The design basis threat, if it isn't met until 2008, we are basically stating that we are vulnerable. That is what it says to me. In other words, we can't meet what we believe is the threat. So I guess what I have a hard time understanding is why does it have to take 3 years? It doesn't seem like it is rocket science to me. It seems to me it is just a matter of doing it. And I am going to throw this out to anyone else who wants to answer. Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Shays, if I could start off, if my colleagues here at the table will permit me. From an NNSA perspective, my organization, that has both policy and oversight of the Department, safeguarding security and cybersecurity, to name a few subjects, we don't disagree with the perception and the reality that if you have a threat today, how can you not meet it until 2008 and beyond. What we believe has been a great distraction for this body, as well as the executive branch, is the focus on the policy of the design basis threat, when in reality it should be about implementation: the application of new technologies, the elite force that we have mentioned in our testimonies here today, how we apply our security strategies at our sites, and, equally as important, nuclear material consolidation. It gets confused between both the legislative arm and the executive branch on focusing on the policy and the threat, when in fact we need to have our sites implement a more robust security posture than we currently have if we are going to meet today's challenges that we see throughout the world. Mr. Shays. I don't really feel that you have given me an answer to the question, though. Why does it have to take so long? Mr. Podonsky. I don't have an answer why it should take so long. Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Walsh. Mr. Walsh. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add is, and I spent some time in intelligence and working on postulated threat and design basis threat. The design basis threat is, and we have to be careful that we don't wind up getting into anything classified, and make sure we don't. But the design basis threat is a generic threat on which you design your protective forces and your protection strategy over a very long period of time, usually 15 or 20 years. For many years the design basis threat was fairly stable. I think post-September 11th, realistically, we have to take a very close look at that. Mr. Shays. Well, you had to take a close look. For instance, if you believed that people who came in to get one of the resources that we were protecting, if you believed that they didn't want to lose their lives, were willing to risk losing lives, but didn't want to lose their lives, you believed that they also had to get out with the material. So you had a design basis threat that said, well, maybe they can get in, but they are not going to get out. Mr. Walsh. Right. Mr. Shays. But if you, all of a sudden, realize that they don't care if they get out, if they are willing to blow themselves up onsite, the design basis threat changes, correct? Mr. Walsh. Parts of it change. The strategy may change. Mr. Shays. Well, wouldn't it mean that you might have accepted their getting in, but now you can't even let them get in? And doesn't that mean, then, that your whole resources have to change and your whole strategy has to change? Mr. Walsh. Well, they do. But it is more than just the strategy of your adversary; it is the numbers of adversaries and numbers of other things, and their capabilities that go into---- Mr. Shays. Right. But if you feel, for instance, that the design basis threat was that they were only going to have one insider who is helping, and you decide that there is going to be two out of the logic that there could be two---- Mr. Walsh. That would change it. Mr. Shays [continuing]. Then your design basis threat has changed, correct? Mr. Walsh. That would change it. Mr. Shays. My question, though, is given that this is an incredible resource that we are trying to protect, why would we tolerate having to wait 2, 3, 4, or 5 years? That is what I don't understand. Mr. Walsh. I know I am not understanding your question, but---- Mr. Shays. But you aren't answering the question. But why? What is so difficult about a design basis threat that it has to take 4 or 5 years? I will leave that on the table and go to the chairman. I am going to come back to that. Mr. Walsh. OK. Mr. Turner. Well, to pick up where the chairman has left off, Mr. Podonsky, you made a statement that troubled me. You said that this body has a design basis threat focus. And I was just conferring with counsel here. My recollection is the design basis threat process is not one that Congress has imposed upon you. You have just acknowledged that is the case. So we are left in doing an evaluation of whether or not you are sufficiently protecting these very dangerous assets. In reviewing your bureaucratic processes--and that is what concerns me most, is that we are talking about a bureaucratic process--you come up with a design basis threat and you determine whether or not you are going to meet it. You go through a process to assess what it is going to take to meet it. And I think that sometimes people don't get their heads up from their desks enough to look out of the window and say if you are actually sitting in front of this body and saying you are not going to meet the design basis threat until 2008, and it is a threat that we all acknowledge exists today, not in 2008--Mr. Walsh, I disagree with your statement of a 15 or 20- year time period. You are not projecting what the threat is in 2008; you are projecting what the threat is today, and you are trying to meet it by 2008. Is that correct? Mr. Walsh. You are making an assessment of the most likely or representative threat that you need to protect against and you need to design your protection strategy against that. Because of the nature of the design basis, it should stay fairly stable over a long period of time. Mr. Turner. Does the design basis threat that you are currently trying to meet in 2008 represent a capacity for a threat at these facilities today? That is a pretty easy question. Mr. Walsh. Well, not really. Mr. Turner. I mean, either you believe that what is currently in your design basis threat that you are projecting to meet in 2008 is not a threat that is lurking out there today or you think it is. And if you think it is, and you are saying that you are going to meet it by 2008, then what you are saying is that DOE is not currently meeting the threat that is out there today. Mr. Walsh. Well, first let me say that we on the ESE side, as well as NNSA, are committed to meeting the design basis threat, as it is presently laid out for us in the 2004 policy that we have; and that is what we are moving toward meeting. Now, the question of validity, what I can tell you is---- Mr. Turner. Well, perhaps let me ask it again. Are you telling me, then, that you do not believe that the design basis threat that you are attempting to meet by 2008 represents the threat that exists at these facilities today? Mr. Walsh. The most likely or most representative threat? Mr. Turner. Does it meet a threat that you are facing today? It is either yes or no. Mr. Walsh. No, I am sorry, Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner. If you don't believe it is out there, then that is a whole other issue for us to pursue. Do you believe that the design basis threat, that you are trying to meet by 2008, represents a threat that exists to these facilities today? Mr. Walsh. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, it is more than a yes or no answer. It has a lot to do with the numbers and the capabilities and the strategies that you address with the numbers of people that you assume are going to come at you. It is not really a yes or no answer. And it is based on intelligence assessments and postulated threats. So I apologize, but it is more than a yes or no answer. Mr. Turner. Well, I disagree. And I am very disappointed in the position that you have for security in DOE, that you would say that you can't answer yes or no. So we will just go down the panel. Mr. Aloise, do you believe that the design basis threat that they are attempting to meet by 2008 represents a threat that exists to these facilities today? Mr. Aloise. In our view, that is DOE's criteria, and that is what we measure them against. Mr. Turner. Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman. That is my understanding of the criteria for the construction and development of the design basis threat essentially, yes. Mr. Turner. Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Podonsky. It was written by my office, so my answer is yes. Mr. Turner. Dr. Brede. Dr. Brede. That is a policy question from an implementation standpoint. We are preparing to deal with that threat today. Mr. Turner. That is not an answer. Dr. Brede. We posit that threat exists today. That is my opinion. Mr. Turner. Thank you. Dr. Adler. Dr. Adler. I will pass and say the last time I looked the DBT was classified information, and I lack a security clearance, so I am not capable of answering it. Mr. Turner. It is just an opinion as to whether or not you think that the threat is out there today. Dr. Adler. Again, the specifics of what the DBT consists of are not something that is shared with ordinary citizenry. What I would say is what is put out in the news about what this could consist of isn't something that will happen in the future, it has already happened. We have already been attacked by such force. Mr. Turner. Mr. Walsh. Mr. Walsh. Yes, sir. Mr. Turner. Do you want to change or supplement your answer, or is your answer still so complex that I can't decide if it is yes or no? Mr. Walsh. Well, two of the previous answers said that it is the criteria that they measure to. Mr. Turner. That is why I found your answer confusing, because my understanding of what the design basis threat was based on today's threat, not a projection of the threat in 2008. And your answer was that it was the threat 10, 15 years out in the future. Mr. Walsh. It is a generic threat by which you design your protective forces and your protective strategies that you hope will be static for a number of years, 15 or 20 years. Now, you have to adjust that, and we have a review process for that every year. But the design basis threat is your most likely or most representative threat over a long period of time. I agree with two of the---- Mr. Turner. So does it represent a threat that these facilities have today? Does that long period of time that you are describing to us include today? Mr. Walsh. If you are asking if the design basis threat is the most representative or most likely threat against DOE facilities today, I would have to say I am not sure. We are going through a review right now. Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. Mr. Walsh, you are trying to answer honestly, but I feel like you are Mr. Ford, telling us well before Eastern Europe was free, that it is free. And I would like you to kind of catch your breath a second. Mr. Walsh. OK. Mr. Shays. It is not a difficult question to answer. The design basis threat is the threat we believe exists today and will exist in the future. We constantly are changing the design basis threat. The fact that we can't be ready until 2008 means that we are not ready. And that gets to a question that I am going to pursue again. But, frankly, your answer is alarming. Or it just shows that you don't believe in the design basis threat. In other words, obviously, in the end, it is an opinion. It is an opinion, with a lot of different people, that this is the threat that we have to protect against. If you, in your mind, think that it doesn't represent an accurate threat, that is an answer that you can say, and you disagree with the design basis threat. So let us go there. Do you agree with the design basis threat or do you disagree with the design basis threat, that is, we are not going to talk about what it is, but do you agree with it? Mr. Walsh. Once again, let me state for the record that we are committed to the design basis threat as it is stated and we are moving toward preparing for that through 2008. Mr. Shays. I hear you. Mr. Walsh. Because that is the Department policy. The Deputy Secretary has asked us to review that right now, and we are undergoing an internal review of the DBT. But to restate it, if you are asking me if I think the design basis threat right now, as it is stated, is the most likely or most representative threat against a DOE facility---- Mr. Shays. I didn't really ask it that way, because the design basis threat isn't necessarily the most likely. Mr. Walsh. It is the most representative. Mr. Shays. No. The most likely, it also has to be what we believe we ultimately have to protect against. Mr. Walsh. Right. Mr. Shays. It may mean that the design basis threat includes what we think is not as likely as something else, but we at least have to get up to that level. We may think it is more likely that--and since I haven't looked at the design basis threat, the numbers I am throwing out right now these numbers are made up. But, for instance, if we thought the design basis threat involved the fact that you could have two people on the inside working with people on the outside, but we think it is more likely it will be one, but we still have to prepare for two, yes, it is more likely that it may be one, but we still believe that we have to have our design basis threat to deal with two because it is still a possibility that we know we have to protect against. So when you say what is most likely, that is not really what I am asking. I am asking you a question: are you working in this administration and are you on that side of the equation that disagrees with the design basis threat, and is that shaping your response? Because that is the only way I can justify your answer. Mr. Walsh. Well, the only thing I can say, sir, is that I think that it is worth it to make sure that whatever the design basis threat is, that it is right, that we get it right. Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Walsh. And we are in the process of reviewing it now. It might very well---- Mr. Shays. And the question I have is do you disagree with the present design basis threat? That is not top secret, you can say yes or no. I haven't asked you what it is. Mr. Walsh. No, I understand that. Mr. Shays. OK. So are you on that side of the equation that disagrees with it? Mr. Walsh. I am not totally convinced that the current intelligence foundation that really does go into developing a design basis threat supports where we are right now. Mr. Shays. That is a fair question. Now, if that is shaping your response to the first question---- Mr. Walsh. I believe it is. Mr. Shays. OK, but it shouldn't, because the real question is, in terms of policy, the design basis threat--the answer to the question is the design basis threat is what we believe, based on what we have agreed to, is a threat that we have to protect ourselves against; not necessarily the most likely, it is a threat we have to be able to protect ourselves against, and we test ourselves against that. Mr. Walsh. Right. Mr. Shays. Then the answer to the question is a single yes, it exists today. That is the simple answer to the question. The design basis threat is the threat we believe exists today. Is that not true? Mr. Walsh. That is true. Mr. Shays. Yes. And that is the better answer. Mr. Walsh. That is true. Mr. Shays. So we are going to sort out all your past answers and that is an---- Mr. Walsh. OK. Thank you, sir. Mr. Shays. And we are not badgering you into giving us that answer; that is the answer. Mr. Walsh. I appreciate that. Mr. Shays. OK. And I appreciate your disagreement with the design basis threat, and that is fair. You have a right to disagree. And you have a responsibility to tell us if you disagree. So that is an honest dialog. But what I am having trouble with is given that we think the design basis threat is the threat we believe exists today, waiting until 2008 or 2007 to protect ourselves against it is a little unsettling. My question, and I will go with GAO and our Inspector General to start us off in this--it seems to me that obviously, if you change the design basis threat and you say that it is two insiders instead of one, all of a sudden everything changes. Isn't that correct? I mean, if you are protected against one, and now you have changed it so you have two insiders, then you have a different task? Can both of you agree? Mr. Aloise. Yes. Mr. Shays. Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman. Yes, I agree, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. OK. Or you may decide that if you said it was going to be 15 people, and now we think potentially 20 people might attempt in some way to come in, that may change the design basis threat. Is that correct? Mr. Aloise. Yes. Mr. Shays. A nodding of the head doesn't get recorded. Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman. Yes. Mr. Shays. Thank you. If you believe that someone might use aircraft in a way that we didn't anticipate, but now we say they may use aircraft, that changes the design basis threat as well, is that correct? Mr. Aloise. That is correct. Mr. Friedman. I think it does, yes. Mr. Shays. OK, both responded in the affirmative. Now, given whatever caused us to change it, tell me what I need to know beyond this: you may need more people or you may need those people trained differently; you may need some technical capabilities that you didn't have in the past; or you may have to do structural things just with the site. In other words, candidly, when we were looking at Mr. Brooks' operation and one of the sites there, we thought a lot of old buildings, not a lot of clear sight lines. You need to get rid of some of these buildings; there are a lot of places to hide. So is there anything other than structural, technical, or people that go into responding to a design basis threat? And I am not saying that there isn't; what other ones out there? I am just trying to understand why it is difficult, why you have to take 3 years. That is what I am trying to understand. So you want to give me a---- Mr. Aloise. That about sums up a lot of what you would need to do. Mr. Shays. Is your mic on, sir? Mr. Aloise. Excuse me? Mr. Shays. Is your mic on? Mr. Aloise. Yes. One thing would be also the consolidation of materials in fewer places would increase security, and you could develop your design basis threat around that as well. Mr. Shays. And that could take time to consolidate. Mr. Aloise. Sure. Yes. Mr. Shays. But it is also true that in the short-run you might over-utilize people to compensate for the fact that in the future you can consolidate and even use less people than you are using presently. In other words---- Mr. Aloise. You would use less people, of course, at the places where you took the material from. Mr. Shays. When you consolidate, that enables you to focus your attention; collectively you are using less people. But in the short-run, until you consolidate you may have to use more people. Mr. Aloise. Right. Mr. Shays. Even more than exists right now. In other words, you look at it and say we have this number of people and they are trained, but the challenge is we think that we are vulnerable with this new design basis threat. We can do it two ways: one is we can add more people or we can take these three sites, make them one site, or two sites and make them one, and even use less people. But one takes longer, so you might have a short-run solution until you get to the long-run solution. Which gets me to this basic point: Why does it have to take 3 years to protect ourselves? I will throw that open to anyone. Mr. Friedman. Mr. Shays, can I? I come here as an IG, of course, wearing several hats, but one of which is ensuring that we spend our money prudently and in the right way. While I agree the ideal is once you have an agreed upon, approved design basis threat that is based on sound intelligence and all the rest, the ideal is to have virtually an instantaneous defense for the threat that has been postulated in the design basis threat. That is, where we should be looking for. And I am not sure that the time that we have currently have in mind is an acceptable level, and I agree with your point on that. But we want to make sure, as well, that we spend the money wisely and get the money. We have to get the money, we have to spend it wisely, and make sure it is spent in the right locations and it is prioritized properly. And there are some time constraints that are involved there. I was going to mention the consolidation of material as well. That is not an overnight process, and you have analyzed that quite properly, I think. So while I am not here defending the Department, I am here trying to make sure, as well, that we spend the money appropriately, we award contracts properly and do all the things that have to be done in Government---- Mr. Shays. Mr. Friedman, let me just be very clear. As Inspector General, I don't ever view that your job is always to criticize the Department. Sometimes you criticize it and sometimes you defend it. And you should never be embarrassed by defending the Department, helping us understand. Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Shays, if I could offer an alternate view, and it goes back to my earlier statement that Mr. Turner responded to. If I might go there first, because of my bringing in the legislative arm and the executive branch. I was not criticizing either body; I was making an observation that we are focused on a policy that is important, but I too don't have the responsibility for programmatic implementation. So it is easy for me to criticize, as an independent overseer, and my criticism from my organization is the following: It shouldn't take enormous sums of money to meet the threat that we think we are dealing with if we start out with changing our protective strategies, if we start applying new technologies that are actually some off-the-shelf, if we begin changing the way we train our elite force that we already have in place--not our elite force, but we already have our special operation forces that are trained to be responsive to different events. We need to start training them differently, similar to the way my oversight trains its composite adversary team. The nuclear material consolidation piece is in fact probably the more daunting challenge because of State requirements and regulations, and where we are going to put all the material. But I would offer to you we also, in SSA, share the same concern about the length of time that it takes to implement the new DBT, which is connected to budgetary cycles because people think that they need an enormous amount of more money. My colleague in the Inspector General's office thinks it is going to take an enormous amount of money; our colleague at GAO thinks it is going to take a lot more money. And I would offer to you that, yes, there will be more money, but not the amount of money that everybody is talking about if we use the resources we have at our sites today and use them in the 21st century. Mr. Shays. My time has run out for this line, but let me just say the feeling that I get when I think that a design basis threat can take 3 to 4 years to get up to, it really says to me that it is almost the attitude that Mr. Walsh has, that, you know, the design basis threat almost represents the extreme and not the unlikely; and, therefore, we don't mind if it takes 3 years. That speaks volumes to me about the attitude. It is really a statement that says that we can do that and take that lump. Mr. Turner. I recognize Mr. Dent from Pennsylvania. Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Podonsky, my question is directed to you. GAO believes that the ESE will not be able to field an elite force by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline. You disagree. Why is that? Mr. Podonsky. I disagree that the Department will not be able to have the elite force requirements and policies in place as scheduled. The elite force concept was a concept that was born last year under previous Secretary Abraham's security initiatives, and the concept originally started out as whether we should Federalize the forces or have them as contract guards. And through an evolution of discussions with both ESE and NNSA and field implementers, it was determined that what is really needed at our sites is the capability to respond differently to the different events at our sites. Specifically, whether it be NNSA sites or ESE sites, the traditional response by this Department has been more of a law enforcement ``respond to the bank robbery'' response as opposed to more of a military tactical response. We are moving toward that tactical implementation now. For the last year, since the anouncement of the initiative of the elite force became a reality in terms of the initiative taking hold, there have been multiple meetings and policy implementation changes, and by the end of the year the part that I own and am responsible for the Department, in terms of issuing policy, putting out new standards, that will be done. Now, whether or not ESE and NNSA step up to the requirement, I can't speak for the implementers; that would be better answered by Mr. Walsh or by Mr. Desmond from NNSA. Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Aloise, I have a question for you. How would you evaluate ESE efforts to implement the DBT denial of access security strategy, and do you think we can make the 2008 deadline for the DBT implementation? Mr. Aloise. Not by business as usual. We are calling for a comprehensive plan that outlines how they are going to develop the elite force, how they are going to consolidate materials, how and where they are going to develop and deploy technologies. We believe that this is a big endeavor, and you need a very smart plan to show Congress and others how you are going to get there. Mr. Dent. Thank you. No further questions. Mr. Turner. Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Kucinich. I thank the Chair. Sorry I wasn't in earlier; there was a trade bill on the floor I was in debate on. So I appreciate the chance to ask some questions. I would like to begin with Mr. Podonsky. There have been hundreds of news stories over the last year related to security incidents at the Department of Energy facilities guarded by Wackenhut, specifically the Nevada test site and Y-12. There have been at least four Inspector General investigations in the past year relating to Wackenhut's performance. And I understand the Nevada test site security contract, currently held by Wackenhut, is out to bid right now. I also understand from recent news reports that the two security contracts held by Wackenhut in Oak Ridge are to be put out to bid together this summer. In the face of questions over Wackenhut's performance, what is the tolerance at DOE for a security contractor that creates an image problem, if not a security risk? Mr. Podonsky. I think that question would be more appropriate for Mr. Walsh, but let me start out with giving you the perspective from the SSA. We oversee the Department in terms of its performance, and the performance tests that we have run over the many years have demonstrated a mixed review on the capabilities of the Wackenhut guard force. But when we have done these inspections, like at Nevada test site, the corrective actions we have seen taken by both the Federal and the contractor, have been appropriate to resolve our concerns, and then we go back and retest them. Mr. Kucinich. So you are telling this subcommittee you really don't have any concerns about Wackenhut right now? Mr. Podonsky. We don't look at Wackenhut as a corporation for concerns. We look at the performance at each site. Mr. Kucinich. About their performance. Well, of course. That is what I am talking about. Mr. Podonsky. But as a corporation or as a contractor, that would be better answered by Mr. Walsh. Mr. Kucinich. OK, Mr. Walsh. Thank you, Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Walsh. Mr. Walsh. I am sorry, Mr. Kucinich, I wouldn't have any information on that. We work on the ESE side, and you mentioned the Nevada test site, which I don't really have any knowledge of. I can only say that the few times that I have been involved with direct oversight of Wackenhut contracts, for instance, at headquarters, I felt that they performed in more than an adequate way. So that would be the only information I have. Mr. Kucinich. Well, let me ask you this, either you or Mr. Podonsky, if you could answer this question. You had the recent IG report on training and overtime problems at Oak Ridge. Mr. Walsh. Right. Mr. Kucinich. And it recommended that the managers of Oak Ridge and Y-12 site officers, ``evaluate the impact of the issues discussed in this report on Wackenhut's award fee.'' Can you or Mr. Podonsky inform this subcommittee of the progress of this recommendation since the report was issued? Mr. Podonsky. I can tell you relative to answer your question. Our inspection team went down to Y-12 recently, in the last couple months, and we saw a vast improvement over the last three inspections of the performance at Y-12. Specific to the recommendation, I couldn't give you a current status, but I can tell you that the performance of the protective force that we saw at Y-12 far exceeded the last 6 years of our inspections. Mr. Kucinich. You say you can't give us an evaluation in current performance? Mr. Podonsky. No, I gave you the evaluation of the performance of the protective force in performing their duties through the force-on-force test that we conducted and the training that we reviewed. But relative to award fee and any other recommendations, I couldn't tell you where the program office is on that. Mr. Kucinich. Is there any way you can get that information and get it to the committee? Is anyone here responsible for that who could get that information to this committee? Mr. Walsh. We can take it for the record, sir, absolutely. Mr. Kucinich. Can you do that? Mr. Walsh. Yes, sir. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.080 Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, I just want that acknowledged. And, finally, Mr. Podonsky, many of the Department's security upgrades could be limited by consolidating the nuclear materials. Indeed, a few weeks ago a DOE task force proposed just that for DOE nuclear weapons research sites, moving all sensitive nuclear materials to a new manufacturing site. What are your views on the report of the task force and have you considered similar consolidation removal of Category I nuclear materials at ESE sites? Mr. Podonsky. Again, Mr. Kucinich, from our perspective, from oversight, we think consolidation of nuclear materials is a must for the Department if we are going to change our safeguards posture and if we are going to continue to meet the evolving and potential threat against the Department. Mr. Kucinich. It is my understanding, though, if I may, that according to a GAO report, neither ESE nor DOE has developed a comprehensive or coordinated plan. Are we going to see one forthcoming? Mr. Podonsky. Again, I am not the program office, but I will attempt to give you an answer from my perspective, and that is that the Secretary of Energy, Secretary Bodman, has in fact put together a nuclear material consolidation task group to take a look at where the possibilities are for consolidation across both ESE sites and NNSA sites. So I have every expectation that, between the two Under Secretaries and the Secretary's focus, that the Department will come up with a plan. Mr. Kucinich. I would like to ask the GAO, have you heard any feedback from the Department that they are anticipating bringing a plan to you? Mr. Aloise. Not specifically, but we are aware of the task force. We think the plan, again, is what is needed, because we have looked at individual plans and, in some cases, they conflict with each other, site-to-site. Mr. Kucinich. OK. Mr. Friedman, the reaction to your June 2005 report that raised concerns about the excessive oversight of security officers at Y-12, the Oak Ridge, TN facility, was strong. One employee of a contractor, Wackenhut, called your inspectors a bunch of bean counters who didn't understand security practices. Would you care to comment on the reaction by the NRC and Wackenhut officials to the June report? And, also, do you believe security guards are as effective if they work more than 75 hours per week? And is hiring more guards the only solution? Mr. Friedman. Mr. Kucinich, I knew three of my grandparents who were immigrants and didn't have a great deal of formal education. They all told me to be the best. Whatever I did, they were satisfied to be the best that I could be. So if I am a good bean counter, I accept that manifold from Wackenhut. And I would rather not comment on it. I think our reports speak for themselves, and I think that comment speaks for itself. With regard to your second question as I understood it, clearly the Department itself--and this is its criteria, not mine--has said there are a maximum number of hours that a protective force officer can work before they become ineffective. They are just too tired physically. And we found, in a disproportionate number of cases, that the guards were working beyond the maximum threshold that the Department had established, and the risks, I think, are fairly obvious. Mr. Kucinich. Well, they are not obvious. What are the risks? Mr. Friedman. The risks are that physically and mentally they are not capable of performing their duties. Mr. Kucinich. And what does that mean? Please, help this subcommittee understand what the implications are. Mr. Friedman. Well, I think the implications are fairly clear, and that is if the guard force, which is there to protect the facility and protect the material, if the guards are tired, if they are overextended, then I think there is a potential degradation of the security of the facility and the material. Mr. Kucinich. So the greater the stress that is put on the guards, the more there is a possibility of a breach of security? Is it possible to say that? Mr. Friedman. Well, I am not a physiologist, so I can't speak with authority in that regard, but I think that is the conclusion I would reach, yes. Mr. Kucinich. OK. I guess that is it for now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Turner. Mr. Walsh. Mr. Walsh. Yes, sir. Mr. Turner. In your discussion with Chairman Shays---- Mr. Walsh. Yes, sir. Mr. Turner [continuing]. I understood your answer to be that you have some disagreement with the current design basis threat based upon available intelligence. And if my understanding is incorrect, could you please tell me what a correct understanding would be? Mr. Walsh. What I hope to have said was that ESE programs are committed to implementing the design basis threat as provided to us, as it currently stands. We are committed to moving out and doing the things necessary to make sure that we protect against that design basis threat. I think whether or not the---- Mr. Turner. Let me ask it again. I have to get back to this because your answers concern me because I have a followup question I want to ask you. What I was asking you is the design basis threat a threat that the facilities are experiencing today, is the threat that is out there. And you did not give a yes or no answer, and Chairman Shays said to you, I believe, that one reason why you could not believe that you could give a yes or no answer is if you disagreed with the current design basis threat, that you thought that the current design basis threat was either insufficient or incorrect. Mr. Walsh. Right. Mr. Turner. And I thought I heard you say that you did have some concerns about the current design basis threat. Mr. Walsh. I said that I was not 100 percent certain, and I believe that it is very important for us to make sure we get that right, we get the DBT right, no matter what it is. But I am not 100 percent certain at this time that the fundamental intelligence that supports and that goes into the process of deciding what the design basis threat is is sufficient, in my mind, that I have seen so far. And there might be other things out there that I haven't seen. But what I have seen, I am not sure it supports the level that we currently have as what I consider to be the most representative threat against DOE facilities or nuclear facilities in general. Mr. Turner. Thank you. Which gets me to my question. Mr. Walsh. OK. Mr. Turner. Do you believe that the current threat is higher or lower than the current design basis threat? Mr. Walsh. It is very difficult, until we do a more complete review, including a review of all the intelligence that is there. I would really be going out on a limb as to whether I thought it was higher or lower. I would really like to take part in the internal review that we are currently conducting at the request of Deputy Secretary Sell and get that done, and then I will come back and give you a good answer. Mr. Turner. Fair answer. Mr. Friedman, you referenced in your written testimony the non-U.S. citizens that were improperly allowed access to leased facilities at Y-12. Your testimony references it in the plural. Could you tell us how many, if you know? Mr. Friedman. Mr. Turner, I know the answer to the question, and it doesn't come to me to recall. It was between 20 and 30. Mr. Turner. Non-U.S. citizens---- Mr. Friedman. That is correct. Mr. Turner [continuing]. That used false identification. Mr. Friedman. That is right. Mr. Turner. Can you say the number again? Mr. Friedman. It was about 30. Mr. Turner. Dr. Brede, one of the issues that has come up in this hearing as a point to discuss is Wackenhut's foreign ownership. Could you please go over the current foreign ownership structure of Wackenhut and also, if you will, tell us what businesses the parent corporation and affiliate corporations to Wackenhut are engaged in internationally? Dr. Brede. Yes, sir. The parent organization is currently British owned. We formed essentially a separate government services organization with a firewall between WSI, which is Wackenhut Services Inc., the government arm of Wackenhut, and the remainder of PWC, or the Wackenhut Corp. In doing so, we went through the FOCI, or foreign owned and controlled process implemented by the Department--not only the Department of Energy, but the Department of Defense--to meet the specific requirements for parent organizations like ours. We are essentially in the security and emergency services business. We provide firefighting and emergency medical and security services throughout the world. Mr. Turner. Mr. Podonsky, in the number of hearings that we have had on these issues, of DOE security, I have always appreciated your forthcoming positions on both concerns and issues where you believe that DOE is performing. And in the materials that we have concerning the GAO report there are a number of references to surveys that have been taken of the officers that are actually providing the security services. I am just going to review a few of those and then I would like your thoughts on this, because when the GAO sites the issue of morale, and then when you look at these specific survey statistics, they do not rate well. And I will give even the positive ones and the negative ones. Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers GAO interviewed say that they believe that they understand what was expected of them. Sixty-five of the 105 officers rated the readiness of their site's protective forces high, while 20 officers rated their protective forces somewhat or moderately ready to defend the site. Only a minority of the officers, 16 of the 105, rated the readiness of their force to defend their sites as low. Then when you go to the other numbers, when you look at the critique of the force-on-force analysis, 23 of 84 protective force officers that had participated in these exercises believed that they were realistic. While 23 said they were somewhat realistic, in contrast, 38 officers believed they were not realistic. Then on the communication equipment, 66 of the 105 protective force officers reported that they did not always have dependable radio communications, with 23 officers identifying sporadic battery life, 29 officers reporting poor reception at some locations on the site as the two most important problems. And when you go to the issue of protective force vehicles, 14 out of 30 of the protective force officers interviewed at two sites reported patrol vehicles were old, in poor physical condition, and not suitable for pursuit and recovery missions. On the creation of an elite force, 74 out of 105 reported that they are not at all confident in their current ability to defeat the new threats contained in the design basis threat. Could you comment on the officers' survey responses? Mr. Podonsky. The responses from the individuals interviewed by the GAO are often alarming to me in my role in the Office of Oversight and Policy. First and foremost, the elite force, we do believe that the training is important, that we get that to those identified to play that role at their particular sites. Our national training center in Albuquerque, NM is setting up new curricula for that purpose so that we do get the training out to the sites. In terms of equipment, we have experienced ourselves, during our inspections, that there have been equipment issues, both in protective gear as well as radios, and we have seen that the sites have acknowledged that and are in the process of procuring equipment to fix those issues that were identified. Relative to the lack of confidence that the force-on-force exercises are realistic, having done force-on-force exercises for my organization for 20 years, I would tell you that the exercises that are our independent oversight runs have a balance between safety and security. But they are as realistic as humanly possible, considering the safety constraints. We don't use real bullets; we use laser. But we have employed in our organization former Navy Seal Op 6, Delta Force, Army Rangers. We bring people in from real world who--Mr. Shays just came back from the Middle East. We employ people who have served time there so that we can put into place a realistic testing of the forces. Now, whether the sites, when they do their force-on-force exercise, follow all that same realism, you are probably going to get a mixed story there. So we don't disagree with the findings or the interviews that the GAO has. We take that on from my policy organization and my oversight organization as the challenge to fix the problems; get out there and find out why the implementation isn't taking place in terms of robust force-on-force. Or, if it is, then let us see how better we can fix it. Further, make sure that the equipment is provided to the security officers. Obviously, I sit in an interesting situation because we don't implement the policy, we don't fund the equipment; we just criticize what sometimes needs to be criticized, very similar to the Inspector General's Office, but from a different perspective. But one thing I would also add, the commitment that we have in SSA that I would like this subcommittee to know, we have put in our budget the deployment of new technologies at four sites, both two at NNSA and two at ESE. And the reason we have done that, using money that the Congress has given me for technology deployment and technology development, is to get it out there now and to demonstrate to the program officers that it can be done. Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, once again, I want to thank the Chair for calling to the American people's attention some of these very serious security issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Of course, we are here to talk about what the actions are must be taken that are needed by the DOE to improve security of weapons grade nuclear material at our Energy, Science, and Environmental sites. And it is necessary to focus in on those who are providing the security in order to come to some kind of a conclusion about how secure these sites are. So in that regard I would like to focus some questions on Dr. Brede from Wackenhut, first of all, to kind of get an idea, for those people who aren't as familiar with Wackenhut as certainly you are. What are Wackenhut's annual sales and their revenue? There was a profit last year. Could you tell us a little bit about the financial strength of the Wackenhut Corp.? Dr. Brede. I cannot. I can certainly take that for the record. Initially, in my opening statement, I indicated that I had just come from, as the general manager of the Savannah River site. And I can speak to those financials, but I am not prepared, sir, to address those. However, I am willing to take it for the record. Mr. Kucinich. Because I think, as a matter of record, if we have a corporation that is charged with providing security at these sites, we certainly want to know what kind of financial condition that corporation is in. We not only want to know their ownership; we want to know if they are vulnerable to takeover; we want to know if they are making a profit, if they are experiencing a loss; we want to know what their partnerships are. Because we are talking about security, and we have to look at the architecture of security. Can you tell the subcommittee, Dr. Brede, the security guards who are the subject of some of the discussions here in front of the committee, how much do they make an hour? What is their hourly pay? Dr. Brede. It varies. At the Savannah River site they earn something like $19 an hour, with overtime differentials and that sort of thing. Mr. Kucinich. That is every security personnel who is working there makes $19 an hour? Dr. Brede. No, sir. It is based on--we have unarmed---- Mr. Kucinich. What is the lowest that a security guard would make? Dr. Brede. Somewhere in the range of $12 to $13 an hour. Mr. Kucinich. Is the lowest. And do these individuals also have full health benefits? Dr. Brede. Yes, they do. Mr. Kucinich. And are there any deductibles or co-pays? I mean, is it fully paid health benefits, is that what you are saying? Dr. Brede. There are some minor co-pays. Mr. Kucinich. And are these people who get paid time and a half for overtime, double time for holidays, and things like that? Dr. Brede. Shift differentials, yes, sir. Mr. Kucinich. They get that? Are these people who have retirement benefits, do you know? Dr. Brede. Essentially, their retirement plan at the Savannah River site is a two-pronged plan. One is there is an annual contribution made to a pension plan and, second, there is a 401(k) matching plan. One of the things that I pointed out in my opening testimony is that as we build this elite force, one of the things that needs to be looked at is a uniform benefit and retirement plan across the complex, if we are going to effectively recycle human capital through the elite force. Mr. Kucinich. And how long have you been with Wackenhut? Dr. Brede. I have been with Wackenhut for 12 years, sir. Mr. Kucinich. And what about these security guards, do you know generally how long these security guards have been with the Wackenhut Corp.? How long the security guards who are the subject of some of the discussions today, how long they have been with Wackenhut? Dr. Brede. I cannot speak to those at other sites. I can say that those at the Savannah River site have been with us anywhere from 21 years, as long as 21 years. More recently I believe our last class was run less than 2 years ago. Mr. Kucinich. Because I think it would be instructive for the subcommittee to see what the length of service is of the people that we are talking about so we could be able to make some kind of a determination as to whether or not some of the difficulties that may be experienced at some of these facilities might happen to be with a work force that perhaps is not as well trained. Now, I would like to ask what is your doctorate in? Dr. Brede. It is in criminal justice. Mr. Kucinich. Criminal justice, OK. OK, that is important for this next question. What about this issue of guards who are routinely working in excess of 60 hours per week? And that is in direct violation of DOE policy. Do you think that is appropriate? Dr. Brede. Actually, what the DOE manual really says is that it imposes a limit of 60 hours, but goes on to say unless there are alternate arrangements based on collective bargaining agreements between management and the unions, which in the case cited, Oak Ridge, there does happen to be an agreement between the unions there and management. Mr. Kucinich. So which unions are you talking about here? Dr. Brede. The IGUA and the SFPFA, Security, Police, and Fire Professionals of America. Mr. Kucinich. OK. So you are saying you have an agreement with this organization and they say 60 hours is OK. Well, as someone who is a Ph.D. with a background in criminology, do you think having guards working in excess of 60 hours per week is a sound policy? Dr. Brede. Our preference would be that they work less than 60 hours a week. However, beginning with the situation we found ourselves in following September 11th, we actually, in some cases, worked much more than that to meet what we perceived as the increased threat. We are hiring additional officers at that particular site, incidentally, to minimize the necessity for overtime. Mr. Kucinich. Do you think guards who are working that many hours are as effective as guards who work, let us say, a 40 hour week? What is your experience in that as a criminologist? Dr. Brede. Well, I think my more pertinent experience perhaps is my military experience. Are they as effective? I believe the answer is no. But are they sufficiently effective to provide a defense against the threat? I believe they certainly can be based on their training. Mr. Kucinich. Well, this subcommittee, at least staff, has provided information that says that these guards are working in excess of 60 hours a week, week after week, month after month. What can you tell this subcommittee about Wackenhut's determination to make sure that these facilities are receiving optimum protection from a work force that is not being ground up? Dr. Brede. I would submit to you, sir, that this is not necessarily a Wackenhut issue, but, rather, a protect---- Mr. Kucinich. Well, let us talk about it in terms of Wackenhut, though. Dr. Brede [continuing]. A protective force issue. We are saying we saw the same difficulty across the board at many of our sites following September 11th. One of the problems that we experienced, again, througout the complex, is that when an officer goes through his or her basic training and are employed, we must wait on security clearances. So there is not an immediate resolution to the overtime problem. We await security clearances and human reliability program clearances before we can always put an officer to work. That does operate to alleviate the problems that we are experiencing with overtime. Mr. Kucinich. Well, let me just say this becomes critical to the concerns of this subcommittee about improving security at these nuclear facilities, because if we have a work force that is overextended, that is tired, that doesn't get relief, is working long hours week after week, month after work, you have a work force that is not going to be as alert. Now, it occurs to me that, notwithstanding Wackenhut's desire to be of service to the United States of America, that it might be, Mr. Chairman, based on the record, that you have an overextended work force here in a contractor who may desperately want to be holding onto a contract, keep working the workers, put in more hours and more hours, but not really be able to meet the terms which we expect to protect. I mean, either you need more people doing it or you need a whole different arrangement that isn't reflected by what Wackenhut is doing, with all due respect. I have one more question before we move on, and that is for Dr. Adler. Given the number of security problems and other incidents that have been revealed in the last 15 months at DOE facilities guarded by Wackenhut, do you believe that DOE could be better served by hiring a different security contractor or providing security through another kind of protective force or protective force structure? Could you just give us an opinion? Then I will yield to the chairman. Dr. Adler. Thank you very much, Mr. Kucinich. Our comments don't go to the security force structure per se; it goes to the way things are organized at present. No contractor is a saint. Everyone makes mistakes. And if they didn't make mistakes, you wouldn't test. We test to find the mistakes and correct them. The question that I have is what do you do when you find a mistake. Do you admit it honestly? Do you try to discover the roots? Do you attempt to redress the problems and resolve them and move forward? What we see, however, here is not just a mistake, one or two, a snapshot, as my fellow panel member said. We see something more like a full-length motion picture; and it is not a comedy. What we see here are a series of problems, often on the same themes, that are not being adequately addressed. They are not being adequately addressed by the contractor, nor by those directly responsible for---- Mr. Kucinich. Well, that is why we are having this hearing. Dr. Adler. Yes. And I think the oversight that is being provided by this hearing here is to air these problems. Let us take, for example, the training issue. There is nothing new in the fact that training is not realistic. The IG made a comprehensive review of this over a year ago and identified training cutbacks and deviations from policy at a number of DOE facilities. We would think that would get people alert, that the practice would be stopped and people would conform with policy or indicate where they are not in conformance. Well, the IG now reports in June that, in fact, at Y-12 and at Oak Ridge, both facilities, there are deviations from the training. They said in excess of 40 percent of the planned hours are not actually being used for training. Now, why is that the case now? What we would expect is for those careful reports to be acted on and for heads to roll, frankly. For a regime to be set up where there is no tolerance for this sort of behavior, and those who are responsible for it to be appropriately punished so that it is too expensive for them to do it. Mr. Kucinich. I want to thank the gentleman. I want to thank the Chair for his indulgence, and appreciate the committee. Thank you very much. Mr. Turner. Mr. Burton. Mr. Burton. I understand that this hearing is not about the question that I am going to ask, but maybe somebody can answer it anyhow. And I apologize for my tardiness. I understand we have 65 nuclear power plants, and I was just told by our staff that there are 103 nuclear reactors. Can anybody tell me what measures are being taken to protect those facilities from either a ground attack or an air attack? One of the reasons I ask that question is not too long ago, well, twice in the last couple months, we have had scares here in the Capitol, where they had to evacuate the Capitol and other facilities around the Capitol because they thought there might be a plane heading toward the Capitol. And I would just like to know, with the nuclear exposure we have at these facilities, what measures are being taken to protect those facilities so that if a plane does try to go in there, or they make an attack on one of these power plants, that we don't have a nuclear disaster that spreads nuclear material all over the place. So anybody that can answer that for me, if you can, I would really appreciate it. Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Burton, I don't think any of us could directly answer that question because the facilities you are talking about are licensed under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And while we have some relationships with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in terms of our exchange on material control accountability, and we are looking at physical security now, I shouldn't speak for everybody, but we could not give you a direct answer. Mr. Burton. Who would I address that question to? Does GAO have any information on that? Has GAO looked into that? Mr. Aloise. Currently, we do have some work going on now looking at it. We have not finished our work, it is ongoing. NRC has its own DBT, design basis threat, by which it guards its facilities, similar to DOE's design basis threat, although it is not exactly the same. Mr. Burton. Maybe I could just ask the chairman, because the chairman is up on all this. Mr. Shays. I would say to the gentleman that what the GAO is doing is a request of ours. Maybe others have requested it as well. We will be having a hearing on the GAO report. We encounter a lot of different issues when we are looking at our nuclear electrical generations plants, whether the security there--for instance, the very people who are defending it also have contracts to try to infiltrate on both sides of the equation, and that is of concern to us. We have a lot of concerns, frankly. Mr. Burton. Well, I would like to talk to you about that, because that has been one of my concerns. That is one of the reasons I came down today. Maybe we could do a hearing down the road on that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Shays. We are almost done here. We had a hearing one time about whether our troops were exposed to chemical weapons, and we asked the question and DOD said there has been no offensive use of chemicals in Iraq. This was in the first Gulf war. We then learned and had films of how our troops were exposed in Camassia. And when we contacted DOD, they came back to us and said, well, our troops hadn't been exposed to offensive use, they were exposed to defensive use. And it made me realize sometimes how you almost get in a word game. I mean, they knew the intent of the subcommittee. And that is why we tend to focus a little bit on how you are answering these questions to understand really what are you saying. Dr. Brede, when you said that your company is currently owned, you weren't trying to imply that it won't be currently owned in the future? It is in fact owned by---- Dr. Brede. Absolutely. Mr. Shays. And it just raises the question your people are aware--let me ask you this. Do some of your folks have security clearances or do all of them have security clearances? Dr. Brede. The majority of our people do have security clearances. Mr. Shays. And that is because they are in a facility where, if they were on the wrong side of the equation, could do tremendous harm, correct? Dr. Brede. Yes. Mr. Shays. So we care greatly about their capabilities. We care about how much they are paid, because we want to make sure you are able to attract good people; people that might want to go somewhere else, but they are paid so well they stay there. Do you have a significant turnover rate? Dr. Brede. No. In fact, we do not. At the Savannah River site, for example, the turnover rate there is somewhere in the neighborhood of 2 percent. At the Oak Ridge site, if I may---- Mr. Shays. Two percent over what period of time? Dr. Brede. Sorry? Mr. Shays. Over what period of time? Is there a time relating to the 2 percent? Two percent means what? Dr. Brede. Two percent means we average about 2 percent turnover per year. Mr. Shays. Per year. OK. Dr. Brede. And if I recall correctly, at the Oak Ridge site, it is in the neighborhood of 3 to 5 percent. There was an up-tick back in 2001, 2002, where the air marshals were hiring, and some of our officers left to go there. But that has since dissipated and the numbers are much lower now. Mr. Shays. And there is obviously logic to wanting people to have expertise. I mean, if we are training them, to have them leave after they have been trained is not a great use of our resources, or yours. Dr. Brede. No, it is not. Mr. Shays. Dr. Adler, your employees work both as government employees and for private contractors, both? Dr. Adler. That is correct, sir. Mr. Shays. Do any of them work for Dr. Brede's company? Dr. Adler. A small number. Mr. Shays. Is there anything, before this hearing ends, that you would like to add about the employees you represent and the concerns they have? Dr. Adler. I think the key point would be that our union has been seeking partnerships with employers, with mayors, Governors, and their clients on consistent ways to raise standards in the security industry, and we have been doing it for a long time. And we do this with the biggest security companies in the country. The kinds of problems we are talking here today, some of them are large-scale, but the lion's share of them, particularly, I think, around an elite training force, are problems that can come right through consultation with the people involved, if there is a willingness to admit the difficulties and work hard to overcome them. What I have heard today--and I should say I have heard it from both sides, from the contractors and those responsible-- is, to some extent, denial; to another extent I think it is not wishing the problem away, but pretending that the problems have solved themselves. What we have been presented by the GAO and the IG are serious problems. We have encountered these in the private sector, and they are surmountable problems. But it is not a resource problem; the officers aren't poorly paid, and Mr. Podonsky has seconded this. The problem is a matter of will. Mr. Shays. Is what? Dr. Adler. The problem is a matter of will, of a willingness to confront these problems and overcome them in consultation with those most directly involved, and in this case I mean the guards. I don't see that emerging from this discussion or from the practices of the Department over the last number of years. Mr. Shays. Is there a difference of approach when the government hires the employees and when the contractor, or is it pretty much similar? Dr. Adler. Well, I think the pressure on the private contractor to cut costs is greater than it is in government, particularly if they have to report to a foreign owner who is publicly traded. I think that pressure is there anyway, but I think it is very sharp in the private world. We encounter it all the time in the commercial office world. And those pressures can only be lifted, I think, in an effective regime of oversight that punishes those kinds of cost cuttings. Mr. Shays. GAO has said in their statement, ``However, DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force officers participation in these exercises, nor requires sites to track individual participation.'' This is under the heading ``Performance Testing and Training.'' In your statement it is not that much different, you said ``Most officers we spoke with were concerned about their quality and realism of their training,'' which gets me to your point. ``Further, because DOE neither sets standards for nor tracks individual participation for its exercises, it was difficult to determine how many officers had this important training.'' I am asking the question why not, and I think it goes to you, Mr. Podonsky, and it goes to you, Mr. Walsh. Why does DOE neither set standards for, nor track individual participation for its exercises? So I will start with Mr. Walsh first. Mr. Walsh. Mr. Shays, we do need to track that, and we agree 100 percent with those recommendations. We are going to work with Mr. Podonsky's office. We have already been in contact with each other to commit to develop policy requirements to do that by the end of this year on both of those cases. Mr. Shays. Good. Thank you. Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Shays, I would tell you candidly I am embarrassed that 17 months ago I took over the policy group and I did not know until the GAO report that the individual tracking of participants in DOE was not taking place. I will tell you that I was under the wrong assumption for 20 years, when my oversight was conducting these tests, that all the sites were tracking and following the performance of each individual. We are changing that. Mr. Shays. That is one reason we have the GAO and an Inspector General, and my attitude is if they point out things that need correction and there is a willingness to jump right in and deal with it, that is when I think the system works the best. We never can make an assumption that they are not going to find things that need work. So I am happy to end on that note as far as my questions. Mr. Turner. Mr. Burton. Mr. Burton. First of all, I don't want to belabor this point and discuss something that is not on the agenda today, but about 2\1/2\ years ago, I think, according to the staff, you had a hearing on one of the nuclear plants and how they protect them. And according to what your staff expert said was that nuclear plant could withstand an air attack of some magnitude without disbursing a lot of nuclear material into the atmosphere. I have a television show I do about every couple months, and I had Curt Weldon on, Congressman Weldon, who is an expert in a lot of areas on the National Security Committee. And he brought on a briefcase that the Soviet Union--it was a replica of a briefcase the Soviet Union had made. There were 65 or 70 of them manufactured, and there were nuclear weapons in a briefcase; they weighed about 50 pounds. And I was told by him and other experts that would destroy an area of about five city blocks if it was ever detonated. Now, several of those briefcase nuclear devices have never been accounted for by the Russians, and there may be others that have been manufactured. So what I would like for GAO to find out is--and I understand from staff that the FAA has some real problems with creating areas around these nuclear power plants where planes can't fly, I guess because of the air lanes that we have. But it seems to me if a nuclear device can be put in a briefcase, it can certainly be put on a small plane. And if it would destroy five square blocks, it certainly could penetrate and do a lot of damage to a nuclear power plant. I would like to find out if there is anything we could do to protect those nuclear power plants from that kind of air attack. Because if there is an air attack and you do have something like Chernobyl take place because of that air attack, you are going to have tens of thousands of people dying of radiation poisoning or ancillary diseases, cancer or whatever it happens to be. So I don't know if you guys have ever looked at that at GAO, but I would like--I understand you are doing a research project right now. Could you include that in your research project? Also, I would like to, in that research project, if you could, there may be some air restrictions by FAA that we could live with, but when you are talking about low-flying aircraft that gets down below, say, 1,000 or 2,000 feet, there might be some way to protect that nuclear facility against that, if it gets within a certain radius that might endanger that area. There is no question in my mind that small nuclear devices could be produced and put on a small aircraft that could penetrate those, no matter how strong they are, if what I have been told in the past is accurate. And I would just like to find out if there is any way to protect those 60-some nuclear power plants and those 100-some reactors we have from that kind of an attack. So, Mr. Chairman, I would really like to look into that. And if we could have that study expanded to include that, I would really appreciate it. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. If the gentleman would yield. Mr. Burton. I will yield to my colleague. Mr. Shays. My understanding is the NRC is looking at flight zones right now and are looking at the vulnerability. But maybe you could be responsive to the issue, without delving into too much, to say whether, in this mix of looking at the postulated threat and the design basis threat, whether we obviously take a look at aircraft and the possibility of their being able to do damage. Maybe you could respond, someone, to that question. Mr. Podonsky. At 1:45 today we are meeting with Deputy Secretary Sell to have the detailed discussion on the latest review of the design basis threat, and part of that is looking at not only the numbers that we have talked about, around, but also in looking at all that encompasses and what kind of threats are realistic today that we really need to protect against. Mr. Shays. Including---- Mr. Podonsky. Including aircraft and what can we do. Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Turner. Mr. Friedman, you indicated you wanted to respond? Mr. Friedman. I appreciate the courtesy, Mr. Chairman. You asked an important question before about the number of illegal aliens and regarding Y-12, and I misspoke. I wasn't sure that I recalled the answer, and I recalled it incorrectly. The correct answer is 16, and I would like to correct that for the record, if you don't mind. And I thank you and I apologize. Mr. Turner. I thank you for that number, and I appreciate your trying to accommodate us with an estimate. So thank you for the correction. Dr. Brede, Dr. Adler was raising the issue, when we have security that is being provided by a private company, that, unlike in the operations of government-provided security, you have the issue of the bottom line that is more prevalent and, therefore, pressures to cut costs. My thought is that you also have the pressure to increase revenue. And with the series of questions and concerns that have been raised about the extensive time that some security personnel are working it made me wonder about the current construct of your contract. The contract under which you are paid for the services, is it a cost-plus contract? Dr. Brede. It varies with each site. At Oak Ridge I believe it is a fixed price contract; at the Savannah River site it is a cost plus award fee contract. Mr. Turner. And the award fee, is that a percentage of your expenses? Obviously, if you are encouraged to---- Dr. Brede. It is not a percentage, sir, it is an agreed- upon figure agreed upon at the initiation of the contract, and adjusted based on as missions are added or, in some cases, go away. Mr. Turner. OK. Well, for the record, if any of you, Mr. Walsh, Mr. Podonsky, or Dr. Brede, want to supplement the answer, what I am looking for is any financial incentive that you might have as a private contractor to encourage overtime such that the government's expenses go up and therefore your profit goes up, I would be interested in knowing, because it doesn't seem to me, in reading this information about the work week of these security officers, that it makes a whole lot of sense that, certainly, security is not served by officers working in excessive hours. So I would like to know what else might be at play here. And if there is any increase in revenue to your company as a result of excessive hours of security guards, I would like to know it. Dr. Brede. There is not in the two contracts with which I am familiar. Mr. Turner. In that, we are going to close, and I will just give everyone an opportunity if there is anything that you want to add to the record before we close. Mr. Podonsky. I would, Mr. Chairman. We have talked about the DBT extensively, and I just want to make it clear for the record, from the SSA perspective, that the DBT is in fact the current threat, and it should be met as soon as possible utilizing all the areas that I have talked about previously, to include elite force, training, technology application, nuclear material consolidation, as well as strategies. And we believe that while we need to meet that as soon as possible, we also recognize hiring new guards, you have to hire cleared guards, and cleared guards take some time. Putting in technology costs some money. But there is no reason in the world that we shouldn't be further along than we are right now. Dr. Brede. Yes, I would also offer a statement in closing. Throughout this hearing we have heard allegations of poor performance, of cheating and so on by protective force contractors. I would point out that these have been investigated by the DOE, and refuted in writing and, indeed, in previous testimony by both DOE and contractors. I would submit to you our forces are not perfect. They do make mistakes. But our training is designed so that these human errors are the exception rather than the rule. And I believe their demonstrated performance in competitions, in reviews by Mr. Podonsky's organization prove that out. Thank you, sir. Mr. Turner. I would just like to note, Dr. Brede, I don't think that anyone questioned the individual security officers. I think they questioned the management and the effective management and the effective providing of resources, which would be your company, and not the individuals who are providing the services. I think the GAO report speaks for itself as to the areas of criticism that it identifies. Thank you. With that, we will be adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] <all>