<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:24251.wais]
HURRICANE KATRINA: ASSESSING THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENTAL STATUS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
of the
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 29, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-77
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida Ranking Member
Vice Chairman HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
FRED UPTON, Michigan EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia BART GORDON, Tennessee
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ANNA G. ESHOO, California
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico BART STUPAK, Michigan
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
Mississippi, Vice Chairman GENE GREEN, Texas
VITO FOSSELLA, New York TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
ROY BLUNT, Missouri DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
STEVE BUYER, Indiana LOIS CAPPS, California
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire TOM ALLEN, Maine
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania JIM DAVIS, Florida
MARY BONO, California JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
GREG WALDEN, Oregon HILDA L. SOLIS, California
LEE TERRY, Nebraska CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey JAY INSLEE, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
SUE MYRICK, North Carolina
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Bud Albright, Staff Director
David Cavicke, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas HILDA L. SOLIS, California
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia Ranking Member
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona BART STUPAK, Michigan
VITO FOSSELLA, New York ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire LOIS CAPPS, California
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania
MARY BONO, California TOM ALLEN, Maine
LEE TERRY, Nebraska JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan JAY INSLEE, Washington
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho GENE GREEN, Texas
SUE MYRICK North Carolina CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma TAMMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
JOE BARTON, Texas, (Ex Officio)
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Falk, Henry, Director, National Center for Environmental
Health and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Department of Health and Human Services.................... 14
Gautreaux, Karen K., Deputy Secretary, Louisiana Department
of Environmental Quality................................... 37
Olson, Erik D., Senior Attorney, Natural Resources Defense
Council.................................................... 86
Peacock, Hon. Marcus C., Deputy Administrator, Environmental
Protection Agency.......................................... 8
Ragone, Stephen E., Director of Science and Technology,
accompanied by John H. Schnieders, Member, National Ground
Water Association.......................................... 79
Rutledge, William, Mayor, City of Pontotoc, on behalf of
National Rural Water Association........................... 73
Verchick, Robert R.M., Gauthier-St. Martin Eminent Scholar,
Chair in Environmental Law, Loyola University, New Orleans. 105
Woodley, John Paul, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army
Civil Works, Department of the Army........................ 22
Wright, Beverly, Executive Director, Xavier University of
Louisiana, Deep South Center for Environmental Justice..... 95
Additional Material Submitted for the Record:
Falk, Henry:
Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor...... 196
Written response to questions from Hon. John D. Dingell...... 202
Gautreaux, Karen K.:
Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor...... 203
Peacock, Hon. Marcus C.:
Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor...... 210
Written response to questions from Hon. John D. Dingell...... 215
Written response to questions from Hon. Tammy Baldwin........ 220
Olson, Erik D.:
Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor...... 221
Ragone, Stephen E.:
Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor...... 231
Verchick, Robert R.M.:
Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor...... 235
Woodley, John Paul, Jr.:
Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor...... 239
Written response to questions from Hon. John D. Dingell...... 244
(iii)
HURRICANE KATRINA: ASSESSING THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENTAL STATUS
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Environment
and Hazardous Materials,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:40 p.m., in
room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul
Gillmore (chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Gillmor, Hall, Deal, Bass,
Murphy, Barton (ex officio), Solis, Wynn, Capps, Allen, and
Green.
Staff present: Mark Menezes, chief counsel for energy and
environment; Tom Hassenboehler, majority counsel; Nandan
Kenkeremath, majority counsel; Jerry Couri, policy coordinator;
Peter Kielty, clerk; and Dick Frandsen, minority senior
counsel.
Mr. Gillmor. The committee will come to order, and I will
recognize myself for the purpose of an opening statement.
One month ago, Mother Nature forcefully and violently
visited the Gulf Coast of our country in the form of Hurricane
Katrina. This storm caused widespread flooding and significant
property and infrastructure damage in Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Alabama. In the process, the storm caused public health and
environmental problems for the residents that live and work in
that region.
Katrina may well have been the largest single environmental
disaster that our country has ever faced. We would like to
learn the extent of the environmental damage, how long it will
take to restore that environment, and even to what extent it is
possible to do so. We are still close in time to the disaster,
and at this stage, I do not expect that it will be possible to
have complete answers to those questions.
And also, as I made it clear when I called this hearing, I
did not want to pull anyone out of the field who is
participating in the cleanup or actively involved in these
efforts, but as people began to wade back into the Gulf Coast
to recover from this catastrophe, several reports have
variously characterized the state of the environment in the
areas damaged by Hurricane Katrina, and hopefully, this hearing
can help to distinguish between the rumors and the facts
concerning the status and the safety of the water and soil
along the Gulf Coast, and what is being done currently to
address the situation by public and private sources.
In the past, our subcommittee has explored issues that have
general importance to environmental protection. The matters
that we examine today, I think, are clearly the most
significant and urgent since our committee, in the wake of
September 11, helped establish Federal anti-terrorism
provisions for drinking water utilities in Title IV of the
Public Health, Security, and Bio-Terrorism Preparedness and
Response Act. That work, which became law 3 years ago, was
bipartisan, and I believe that should serve to instruct all of
us that Hurricane Katrina, like the terrorists piloting those
planes, did not sort out their victims by political party.
We are concerned about one thing, getting help to the
people impacted by the storm, and this hearing isn't a forum
for pointing fingers. I don't think it matters to the thousands
of people who no longer call New Orleans or Bay St. Louis their
home where blame lies. Now, I recognize a total understanding
of what has happened in these communities, and all the needs to
be met to remedy the environmental problems will take more
time, and that is going to require significant future
oversight.
I want to thank our witnesses, who have taken time to be
with us today. Each of your expert testimony is valuable to us
in understanding the situation as it is now, not as how it may
have been portrayed. And I especially want to thank our
witnesses from Louisiana and Mississippi, who have made
themselves available, whether in person or via the
teleconference arrangement we have, to give firsthand accounts,
and put a face on the real problems of people that are facing
in this area. You not only have our thanks, but also, our best
wishes, as you return to your work in reconstructing a vital
part of our Nation.
That concludes my opening statement, and I would like to
yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from California, Ms. Solis,
for the purpose of an opening statement.
Ms. Solis. Thank you, and good afternoon. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, Chairman Gillmor, for holding this very important
hearing today on the environmental impact of Hurricane Katrina.
I also want to thank the panelists that are here, and all the
witnesses that will be speaking. I know this is an item that
all of us are deeply, deeply concerned about. We know that
Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters
faced by our country.
The Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff recently commented: ``We are going to have to clean
probably the greatest environmental mess we have ever seen in
this country.'' It left in its wake a range of serious
environmental problems, including flooded and contaminated
drinking water and multiple oil spills, leaking underground
storage tanks, flooded sewage treatment plants, flooded
buildings, debris and contaminated sediment, and other sludge.
Hurricane Katrina impacted, as we know, more than 1,000
drinking water systems, and 172 sewage treatment plants, and at
least 2.4 million people were without access to safe drinking
water. Initial testing by EPA found elevated levels of E. coli
bacteria and lead levels that exceeded public health standards.
Based on the biological and the chemical water testing data,
EPA and CDC recommended that the public and emergency
responders avoid contact with the floodwaters and the sediment
deposited by the flood.
In all, though, Hurricane Katrina affected all populations,
the hardest hit area was in low income and underrepresented
communities. More than 100,000 in New Orleans, mostly poor
blacks and Latino residents, were without cars and were
stranded. Together with the elderly, disabled, and infirm, they
were unable to evacuate themselves. They were the ones who
lived in the greatest proximity to the major industrial
facilities and toxic waste sites, who suffered most from the
injustices of society's failure to consider the cumulative
impacts of living and working conditions prior to Hurricane
Katrina. These vulnerable communities are suffering
tremendously in the wake of this natural disaster. Hurricane
Katrina left hundreds of thousands of people without their
livelihood and their homes, and in many cases, their dignity.
I am concerned about the rush to waive health provisions,
safety, environmental, and social protections. This would
undercut longstanding health and environmental standards in the
name of hurricane recovery. The city's poor and other cities
that were affected will pay the price if we weaken those
cleanup rules. Cleanup and rebuilding efforts must ensure that
the burden of exposure to toxic releases does not fall solely
on minority and underrepresented communities.
All environmental justice and public health regulations
should be met during testing, monitoring, cleanup, recovery,
and reconstruction. Federal public health and environmental
statutes provide many opportunities to address environmental
risks and hazards in these communities. The crisis of this
hurricane and other such disasters should not be used to
weaken, waive, or roll back current Federal public health and
environmental protections. Weakening, waiving, or rolling back
Federal public health and environmental protections would
further threaten the heavily damaged area of the Gulf Coast,
negatively impacting the public health of those already
affected communities.
The public has a right to know about the cleanup and the
rebuilding effort and should be informed and involved in the
decisions on cleanup, recovery, and building. Hurricane Katrina
should be an opportunity for us here in the Congress to begin
the process of writing the wrongs of environmental justice, not
an opportunity to guarantee another generation that will live
under these current circumstances.
Today, I hope we learn more about the ongoing cleanup, and
the damage assessments, and about how long-term effects to
protect the health of all our communities needs to be taken
care of. We have an opportunity to rebuild these communities
and the economy in the Gulf region, and as a model of the
integrated, diverse, and sustainable society that all Americans
deserve.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I
personally want to just share briefly that in Los Angeles, we
also had some victims come visit us that are staying there. We
hope that they will get the attention that they need, and be
able to come back to their particular neighborhoods, but many
were concerned about cleanup, and what will happen to the
waste, to their homes that were destroyed, and to their
livelihoods.
So I hope that each of you, the panelists, will be able to
help us to discern that information. Thank you very much, and I
yield back.
Mr. Gillmor. The gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Hall. Chairman Gillmor, thank you.
I want to come from two areas. First, personally, I want to
thank each of you who are giving of your time here, not just
the time you spend in this room with us, but the time you spent
leading up to this, the time you spent preparing, the time you
will spend returning to where you go, because we rely on you,
folks like you, to give us testimony. You know more about it
than we do, and from your information and your knowledge and
your skill, we glean information with which we write the rules
of the road up here, so you are very valuable to us, your time
is valuable, and that is my opening statement.
Now, it is likely that the chairman of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Chairman Joe Barton, may not make this. He
several others going underway right now, and he was here until
12:45 last night on the Energy Bill. So if he comes, it will
just be special, but he has asked me to go ahead and give you
his statement.
So thank you, Chairman Gillmor, for holding this very
important hearing to assess the present environmental damage
and current situation in the Gulf South. Hurricane Katrina and
Hurricane Rita have devastated the lives of residents in
Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, and Florida, and
destroyed parts of our environment on an unprecedented scale.
Our hearts go out to all the citizens of these areas whose
lives have been forever changed by this horrific tragedy. We
are here today to try and put politics aside, and get a real
world glimpse at the current state of our environment in these
devastated regions. While I realize many of the cleanup efforts
are just beginning in New Orleans and in southwest Louisiana
and Texas from Hurricane Rita, one thing should be clear. The
health and safety of all the citizens of these areas who were
displaced and devastated, should have the necessary assistance
from the Federal Government to return to their normal lives.
As I have said before, I plan on using all the authority I
have as chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee to
help in any way I can. Having said that, our greatest assets
are people. Immediately following Hurricane Katrina, EPA sent
teams and equipment down to the area to assess the
environmental impact of the storm. Important as their job was
to investigate water and air contamination. Many of EPA's
personnel and equipment were used to rescue the lives of
hundreds of people from certain death. And I want to recognize
their courage and self-sacrifice to go beyond their normal
duties, to save our citizens in time of extreme danger. Our
environment is important, but not as important as the lives of
those that live within our environment.
I look forward to hearing testimony from all the witnesses
today, including EPA, the Corps of Engineers, and the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, and would like to
especially recognize Mayor Rutledge from Pontotoc, Mississippi,
and Karen Gautreaux, Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality, joining us by
teleconference, who represent areas of the country that have
been completely devastated by these storms.
Once again, our hearts go out to you and to your citizens
in this very difficult time. With that, I yield back on behalf
of Chairman Barton, his time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you, Mr. Hall, and let me also ask
unanimous consent that all members' statements, after the
conclusion of opening statements, be entered into the record.
Gentleman, the other gentleman from Texas. Were you next?
The gentlelady from California, I apologize. Texans are always
trying to be first.
Ms. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and----
Mr. Green. We are also gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, so----
Ms. Capps. I should say, Mr. Green is an ultimate
gentleman. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing,
and I thank the panel of witnesses, both panels, actually.
It is essential that this committee devote whatever time is
needed to review what has happened when Hurricane Katrina and
Rita, hit the Gulf Coast. The timing of this hearing, however,
is unfortunate; in fact, one could say alarming. It would have
been appropriate to hold this hearing before yesterday's markup
of new energy legislation in the Energy Subcommittee, which
under the guise, I would say, of the need to streamline and
weaken environmental, health, and safety regulations, to get
energy production back online as quickly as possible--I say
under the guise of, because it has never been demonstrated that
these regulations have interfered with energy production and
distribution--but that markup has already occurred with
decisions made to relax standards, standards in an area that is
clearly impacted by toxic waste spills, all kinds of hazardous
materials, that are now strewn throughout the environment in
the region that the hurricane impacted. And another committee
has already produced legislation, the Resources Committee, that
will be presented to the floor in the next several days, that
does the same thing. So we see, once again, that the Federal
Government's response to this whole situation has been
inconsistent at best; nevertheless, here we are today, and this
information that will be shared by our witnesses is critically
important to all of us as we make decisions.
People's lives are at stake. In this process of responding
to the hurricane, the Coast Guard did an admirable job. The
response of FEMA was pathetic and has cost lives. We don't want
to cost any more lives. The jury is still out on how we will
assess EPA's overall response to this tragedy, and it is
ongoing. As we look back at what has happened, we cannot take
our eyes off the present and ongoing response. Specifically, we
need to take a close look at the environmental health risks
left behind, to ensure that more people are not harmed.
As a public health nurse, I believe that it is important to
remember that environmental protection measures are an
important component of basic public health and safety. From the
date Katrina passed over the Gulf, report after report from
residents and the media has described oil spills and fires,
leaks from plants and storage tanks, the toxic water and
chemicals, raw sewage and sludge are a major cause for concern.
Yet we are only receiving vague and piecemeal information about
what threats to the public actually exist, what actions are
being taken and should be taken to protect the public, and what
measures people in the area should take to safeguard
themselves.
EPA has acknowledged that there is great uncertainty over
toxic hazards that remain in the flooded parts of New Orleans,
yet people are reentering the area. Their initial testing found
out elevated bacteria and lead levels, as well as some amounts
of long-banned pesticides in the water. Yet EPA's ``response to
Katrina'' webpage offers far too little information to ease any
uncertainty citizens might have. For example, an EPA press
release acknowledged the presence of fuel oils in soil deposits
left behind from the floodwaters, but EPA has not released
data, detailed data about which chemicals have been found in
the soil. Many fuel oils and other petroleum byproducts are
known carcinogens and can breach certain protective gear, yet
to my knowledge, EPA has given no warning of potential cancer
risks of exposure.
Over the next several months, EPA, the Coast Guard, CDC,
and State and local officials will be working to clean up this
mess. Throughout the process, we must guarantee that workers
and evacuees have the right to know about what they are
encountering, about the toxics found in the air and the soil
and the water. We must ensure that all cleanups are completed
to the highest possible health standard. How tragic it would
be, after one disaster, to have an additional disaster to be
uncovered years from now, as incidence of cancer and other
horrible situations arise when preventable measures are a part
of our knowledgebase. The public deserves the best that a
government has as it relies on information in the first line of
protection in such a crisis.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Gillmor. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman from
New Hampshire.
Mr. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for
scheduling this hearing, and we obviously all extend our
sympathies to the victims of both Hurricane Katrina and
Hurricane Rita, and I know that it is difficult right now for
you guys to be here. You have got a lot to do, and we
appreciate the fact that you have taken time to appear here
today.
However, I do think it is essential for us, as soon as
possible in this committee, to assess the possible public
health and long-term environmental threats to the Gulf Region.
As you all know, the hurricane, both of them, stretched over
90,000 square miles. A lot of infrastructure has been
destroyed, drinking water and waste treatment facilities are in
peril, and there is evidence of, obviously, release of
chemicals, oil spills, hazardous materials, and to the air and
soil in the area.
I am hopeful, and in fact, I believe it is imperative, that
we have a coordinated plan of recovery to deal with, I guess
there are over 575 Katrina-related spills of petroleum and
hazardous chemicals. There are 24 Superfund sites within the
affected areas, and of course, there are hundreds of thousands
of wells and water systems and waste treatment plants and so
forth that have been compromised. And I hope there is a plan in
place to properly remove and treat these areas, given the fact
that we have citizens moving back into these areas, and we
really may not be 100-percent sure how safe it is for them to
be there.
So it is a very timely hearing. I thank you all for being
here today. I know it is a sacrifice to do so, but we need to
know this information. I yield back.
Mr. Gillmor. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from
Texas.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to have my
full statement placed into the record, and just say----
Mr. Gillmor. Without objection.
Mr. Green. Having a district in east Harris County in the
city of Houston, and seeing what damage we had just from
Hurricane Rita, our hearts go out again to the folks in
Mississippi and Louisiana, and also southeast Texas or
southwest Louisiana.
The environmental concern we have for the New Orleans area,
and I know that is the focus of our hearing, but I will just
give an example in our own community. Baytown, Texas, in the
east part of Harris County, is part of our district, lost their
power supply for their water system, and so, we were concerned
that they would not have enough water for not only the
residences, but all the industry that is also in and served by
the Baytown community. On very short notice, things were done,
and they were able to restore the power, actually having a
different electricity provider serve across the boundary lines,
as we do in Texas, because we have our different providers, to
make sure, so not only do we have water for our residences, but
we had water for our industry, who are trying to get the
refineries back up, Exxon Mobil has a huge, the largest
refinery in the country in our district, and they needed water
to produce that gas, that we know we need it for our cars and
also aviation fuel.
But again, I am glad you are holding this hearing, so
hopefully, we can learn what we didn't do, and there but for
the grace of God, we won't have that problem in east Harris
County, where we also have some of the same industries that are
along the Mississippi River, but also in Southwest Louisiana.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you. We will now go to the gentleman
from Georgia, to whom I apologize for having skipped over
earlier.
Mr. Deal. That is all right, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
recognizing me.
I just simply wanted to say thank you to the witnesses, who
have taken time to be here. I think all of us recognize that no
community is going to be environmentally perfect at any point
in time. I am sure the area we are talking about here was not
environmentally perfect before this disaster, and certainly is
not now, and all of us want to simply know what is the best we
can do to correct the situation as soon as possible, and how
can we best put our resources to work?
I would be remiss if I did not express appreciation to all
of you, and to those who work with you, for the efforts you
have made in these very serious and drastic times that have
just preceded this hearing. Thank you for being here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you. I want to once again welcome our
witnesses, and tell you how much, we very much appreciate you
being here, and giving us your knowledge and expertise.
We will go first to Marcus Peacock, who is the Deputy
Administrator of EPA.
STATEMENTS OF HON. MARCUS C. PEACOCK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; HENRY FALK, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES
AND DISEASE REGISTRY, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION; AND JOHN PAUL WOODLEY, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY CIVIL WORKS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Mr. Peacock. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. There we
are. And good afternoon to you, and to members of the
subcommittee.
On September 6, 2005, I was appointed as the lead
coordinator at EPA for response activities related to Hurricane
Katrina, and I appreciate the opportunity to provide for today
with an update of EPA's response. Mr. Chairman, I request, if
it is all right, that my full statement be included in the
record.
Our hearts go out to the people of the Gulf region, and we
share with you a sense of duty and obligation to restore the
communities affected by Hurricane Katrina, and most recently,
Hurricane Rita. The response will require sustained long-term
coordination across all Federal agencies with the affected
State governments. My testimony today will provide you with a
brief description of EPA's immediate response to Katrina, and I
will then tick off our primary environmental concerns at this
point in time, including such issues as debris management, the
status of drinking water facilities, wastewater facilities, and
the like.
Just let me, first of all, talk about EPA's early response
to Hurricane Katrina. We pre-deployed personnel to the National
Response Coordination Center, and sent on-scene coordinators to
Florida, Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi before Hurricane
Katrina made landfall. After the hurricane hit, EPA joined
other organizations in urgent rescue needs, putting over 60
watercraft--these were EPA watercraft that are otherwise used
for environmental monitoring to work as search-and-rescue
vessels. But as soon as possible after that, EPA turned its
attention to its primary responsibilities under the National
Response Plan. These include providing guidance for debris
issues, assisting with the restoration of drinking water and
wastewater infrastructure, addressing hazardous releases and
oil spills, and providing environmental monitoring and
assessment support.
Just let me tick off the particular environmental concerns
we are dealing with today, and the first is debris. We are
working very closely with the Corps of Engineers to provide
guidance on disposing of debris that may contain, for instance,
PCBs or asbestos, and we will continue to provide site-specific
technical assistance in the disposal of hazardous and non-
hazardous wastes.
Let us next talk about drinking water. Many drinking water
systems were affected in the three States. The map showing the
systems is up there. All those dots are drinking water systems
that were in the swath of Hurricane Katrina. As of yesterday,
the states were reporting that approximately 80 percent of the
drinking water systems in the region are operational. Those are
all mostly the green dots. I know that may sound pretty good,
but we believe that an estimated 2.3 million people served by
facilities before the hurricane are not currently being served
by operational drinking water facilities.
Let us talk about wastewater. We have here similar map on
wastewater--these are wastewater facilities in the declared
disaster area. Based on what we know, as of yesterday,
approximately 90 percent of wastewater facilities in the
affected area are operational. Once again, while that sounds
good, we think there is an estimated population of 1.8 million
people that were being served by these facilities before the
hurricane that currently are not being served by operating
wastewater facilities. They are red dots on the map, which
includes, for instance, New Orleans. And getting 100 percent of
these dots, if you will, green, is a very high priority.
Let me talk about oil and chemical spills. EPA and the
United States Coast Guard are working together to address what,
so far, are about 400 oil and hazardous waste material releases
that have been reported to the National Response Center or
otherwise observed by emergency responders. Now, I know this
subcommittee in particular is interested in Superfund sites, so
let me address those. There are 24 Superfund sites, as shown on
the chart here, or NPL sites, located in the region affected by
the hurricane. We are working together with State health and
environmental agencies, and I just want to say here, the
relationship between EPA and the State agencies, including
LDEQ, has just been spectacular. We are really working side by
side, literally side by side. And both EPA and the states have
conducted rudimentary inspections--well, we conducted
rudimentary inspections of all these sites as soon as they were
accessible. Now, we recognize this was only a first look at the
sites, and we are in the process of assessing each one of these
in greater detail. Initial visual inspections and the
additional inspections we have been able to do to date indicate
a number of downed fences and some damage to groundwater
treatment piping. Thus far, no sites have been identified as
suffering significant damage, however, monitoring and
assessment are not over by any means.
Let us talk about floodwaters. In the aftermath of Katrina,
contamination of floodwaters was one of our leading concerns,
and of particular concern to rescue workers and residents who
might have still been in the area. The results to date, as
indicated before, show that floodwater has high levels of E.
coli and other bacteria. These are markers that you might find
in raw sewage. W ealso have found some contaminants which
exceeded drinking water assessment standards. Fortunately,
other than the bacterial elements we found, the contaminants
detected thus far have not been at levels that would pose an
immediate risk to human health. They could pose a long-term
risk, but the main issue here is, of course, the bacterial
contaminants, which could cause an infection.
Let me talk about sediments. As the floodwaters of New
Orleans have begun to recede, we are analyzing the sediment.
This map shows all the sediment sites we have sampled thus far.
Preliminary results from sediment sampling collected by both
EPA and once again, Louisiana, indicate that some sediments are
heavily contaminated with fuel oil, and once again, with
bacteria, which is not a surprise, since we found it in the
floodwaters. Human health risks may therefore exist from
contact with sediment deposited from receding floodwaters.
Let me just touch briefly on air monitoring. We have been
doing air monitoring. It will be of increasing importance to
continue to do that. This slide shows a number of the tools we
are using, including aircraft, as well as mobile monitors on
the ground and stationary monitors. As people start coming back
into the area, particularly rescue workers, we will continue to
monitor for contaminants, as well as possible dangers from
particulates.
Looking ahead, much remains to be done to help address the
public and health impacts of Hurricane Katrina, and some of you
may know I am fairly new to EPA, although on some days, it
doesn't feel that way to me. But the dedication with which EPA
employees have responded to this crisis makes me very proud to
be counted among them. As Senator Jeffords recently noted after
hearing what EPA personnel had done in response to Katrina, he
said: ``We have heard so much about what went wrong in
Katrina's aftermath. This is one example of what went right.
These EPA employees have my utmost respect and gratitude.''
Thank you very much for letting me appear today.
[The prepared statement of Marcus C. Peacock follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marcus C. Peacock, Deputy Administrator, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
introduction
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Sub-Committee. My
name is Marcus Peacock and I serve as the Deputy Administrator at the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). On September 6th, the
Administrator formally appointed me to lead the coordination of the
Agency's response activities for Hurricane Katrina and I appreciate the
opportunity to provide you today with an update on EPA's response.
Our hearts go out to the people of the Gulf region, and we share
with you an urgent sense of duty to help restore the communities
affected by Hurricane Katrina--and most recently by Hurricane Rita.
Over the past few weeks, natural disasters have left their mark on the
Gulf region; the loss of life and destruction is staggering. The
magnitude of Hurricane Katrina will require sustained, long-term
coordination across all federal agencies and with the affected state
and local governments. My testimony today will provide you with an
overview of EPA's role and activities in the affected Gulf region, our
impressive coordination with federal, state and local partners and a
snapshot of our primary environmental concerns. Early Response for
Hurricane Katrina
First, I want to briefly touch on EPA's early response to Hurricane
Katrina. Beginning on August 25th, EPA pre-deployed personnel to the
FEMA National Response Coordination Center and sent On-Scene
Coordinators to the Florida, Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi
Emergency Operations Centers before Hurricane Katrina made landfall.
The On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) is the federal official responsible for
monitoring or directing responses to all oil spills and hazardous
substance releases reported to the federal government. We sent
additional personnel to the affected areas as soon as travel into the
region was possible. In anticipation of Hurricane Rita, EPA also
dSeptember 20th. he number of EPA staff and contractors assisting with
recovery efforts is more than 500 in the affected Gulf region, as
indicated on the deployment map.
When EPA personnel arrived in New Orleans, it was clear that saving
lives was the first priority, and EPA joined other federal, state, and
local responders in urgent rescue needs, putting over sixty EPA
watercraft otherwise used for environmental monitoring to work as
search and rescue vessels. Our field staff and contractors--mostly
environmental experts equipped to address oil and hazardous substances
releases--joined the fire fighters, police, and other first responders
and rescued nearly 800 people in Louisiana.
epa role in federal response
After helping with urgent rescue needs, EPA turned its attention to
its primary responsibilities under FEMA's National Response Plan. EPA
is the lead federal agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #10,
which addresses oil and hazardous materials, and works with other
agencies to provide support for a number of other Emergency Support
Functions, including ESF #3, which addresses Public Works and
Engineering. Specifically, our responsibilities include preventing,
minimizing, or mitigating threats to public health, welfare, or the
environment caused by the actual or potential releases of hazardous
materials; testing the quality of flood waters, sediments, and air; and
assisting with the restoration of the drinking and waste water
infrastructure. Also under ESF #3, the Agency anticipates a growing
role working with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to address
final disposition of the large volumes of debris from homes, buildings
and other structures damaged by Hurricane Katrina. EPA, in coordination
with the States, is providing information to both workers and the
public about test results, as well as assisting communities with debris
disposal and hazardous waste issues.
debris management and disposal
The volume of debris left behind by Hurricane Katrina is huge. EPA
is working closely with other federal agencies (particularly the US
Army Corps of Engineers), state agencies, and local governments to
facilitate the collection, segregation, and management of household
hazardous waste, containers, and the larger debris.
To date, we have provided guidance on: identifying electrical
equipment that may contain PCBs; marking and storage of electrical
equipment that may contain PCBs; disposal of electrical equipment that
may contain PCBs; and handling and disposal of debris containing
asbestos. EPA has also provided the affected states with guidance on
burning debris. EPA personnel continue to provide site-specific
technical assistance in the disposal of hazardous waste and a wide
array of waste management debris left behind by the storm.
drinking water and waste water infrastructure
EPA is working closely with state and local officials and private
experts to assess damage and provide technical assistance to water
infrastructure systems in the FEMA designated areas. Two maps are
included which indicate the current status of these facilities. EPA's
mobile laboratories and regional labs in Mississippi and Louisiana are
also available to provide on-going water testing capabilities.
Many drinking water systems were affected in the three states.
According to local officials, many were disabled or impaired by the
loss of electrical power but the majority of systems are now operating,
some with ``boil water'' notices. Nonetheless, there are still some
systems that remain inoperable or in unknown condition. As of September
27th, the states reported that approximately 80% of the drinking water
systems in the region were operational. Prior to the hurricane, we
believe that an estimated population of 2.3 million people were served
by facilities that are not currently operational. Additionally, because
there are many private well owners in the affected region, EPA has
begun to distribute water testing kits in affected parishes in
Louisiana. EPA has issued a local advisory to let home owners know that
these kits are available.
Many wastewater facilities were affected, mostly in Louisiana and
Mississippi. Based on what we know as of September 27th, approximately
90% of these facilities in the affected area are operational. While the
information on wastewater treatment plants is not as readily available
as for drinking water facilities, we believe that an estimated
population of 1.8 million people were served by facilities that are not
currently operational.
Getting 100% of these facilities operational is a high priority.
EPA plans to maintain a strong partnership with health and
environmental agencies in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama as we move
forward.
oil spills and hazardous releases
There are hundreds of chemical and petrochemical facilities as well
as other sites of potential concern which are being inventoried and
assessed. EPA and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) are working
together to address oil and hazardous material releases reported to the
National Response Center or otherwise observed by our emergency
responders. As of September 21st, EPA and the USCG have responded to
over 400 reported incidents. Of these, there were five major oil spills
in the New Orleans area resulting in releases of over 8 million
gallons. These spills are also being addressed by EPA and the USCG.
superfund sites
There are twenty-four Superfund sites located in the region
affected by Hurricane Katrina. As indicated on the map of the Federally
declared disaster areas as of September 26th, there are fifteen
National Priority List (NPL) sites in Louisiana, three in Mississippi,
and six in Alabama. Working together with state health and
environmental agencies, EPA conducted initial visual inspections of
each NPL site as soon as they were accessible. Recognizing this was
only a ``first look'' at these sites, we are assessing the condition of
all of the affected NPL sites in greater depth as recovery continues.
The initial visual inspections indicated a number of downed fences and
damage to some groundwater treatment piping, however, to date, no sites
have been identified as having suffered significant damage.
sediment in new orleans
As flood waters in New Orleans again recede, we are analyzing the
sediment left behind. We are conducting biological and chemical
testing, specifically for volatile organic compounds, semi-volatile
organic compounds, total metals, pesticides, and total petroleum
hydrocarbons. Preliminary results from sediment sampling collected by
EPA and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ)
indicate that some sediments are contaminated with bacteria and fuel
oils. Human health risks may therefore exist from unprotected contact
with sediment deposited from receding flood waters and exposure to
sediment should therefore be avoided if possible. E. coli was detected
in sediment samples, which implies the presence of fecal contamination.
Some of the semi-volatile organic compounds, common to diesel and fuel
oils, were also detected at very elevated levels. The levels of metals
detected thus far have been below levels that would be expected to
produce immediate adverse health effects. Extensive sediment sampling
continues in the flooded areas of New Orleans.
flood water
In the immediate aftermath of Katrina, the potential contamination
of flood waters was among our leading concerns. EPA's initial plans to
collect water samples in the New Orleans flood zone were set aside to
assist in rescue operations, and were further delayed by limited access
due to security concerns. Nonetheless, EPA, in close coordination with
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, began water sampling
on September 3rd, and we continue to conduct biological and chemical
testing of the flood waters. Planned and actual sampling sites to date
are reflected on the map which shows the extent of the flood waters in
New Orleans as of August 30th.
The flood waters continue to be analyzed for over 100 chemical
priority pollutants as well as for bacteria. Results to date indicate
that the flood water has high levels of E. coli, and that some
locations tested had lead and arsenic levels which exceeded drinking
water assessment levels. Although other contaminants were detected,
none have been at levels that would pose an immediate risk to human
health. Throughout this process, EPA has taken great steps to ensure
scientific accuracy. EPA solicited the assistance the Science Advisory
Board to review the flood water sampling plan, and EPA and CDC have
routinely conducted a thorough data review, and interpreted the data
for potential human health affects.
water quality
EPA is working closely with its federal and state partners to
mitigate environmental impacts to Lake Pontchartrain caused by the
flood waters. As the Corps continues un-watering operations, skimming
booms are deployed to remove oil and debris from water prior to
pumping. After pumping, additional booms are being deployed in the
canals leading to the Lake to further reduce oil, debris, and solids.
Aerators are also being used in the canals to raise dissolved oxygen
levels in the water, prior to outfall to the Mississippi River.
Contaminated flood waters and sediment may adversely impact coastal
aquatic resources. As such, EPA and USACE are actively evaluating
options for directing the floodwaters. In addition, EPA is coordinating
water quality monitoring efforts with USGS, NOAA and our state partners
in the Mississippi Sound and the Gulf of Mexico. The poster behind me
reflects the coordinated post-Hurricane plans to monitor water quality
in the Gulf of Mexico.
air monitoring
Air monitoring networks normally in place for monitoring
particulate matter, ozone, sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, and
carbon monoxide under the Clean Air Act were mostly destroyed in New
Orleans and damaged and disrupted in coastal Mississippi. EPA is
working to restore monitoring systems in those regions, as well as to
deploy new monitors designed specifically to address potential air
quality impacts during the recovery from Hurricane Katrina. For
instance, as sediments from the floodwaters dry, EPA has conducted air
screening sampling with special monitors to assess potential inhalation
risks from particulates.
Specific to New Orleans, EPA, in coordination with our government
partners in Louisiana, makes daily tactical decisions regarding air
monitoring needs and works with an agency-wide team of air monitoring
professionals to address both emerging and source or location specific
issues as well as longer term regional air quality issues.
EPA has a number of tools to measure air quality. These include
DataRam 400, personal air monitoring devices, as well as use of a
remote sensing aircraft known as ASPECT to locate chemical spills that
needed emergency response to protect both water and air quality. EPA's
environmental surveillance aircraft were in operation since the early
days of the emergency, and the effort has now transitioned into
deployment of specific ground based preliminary screening over the
larger New Orleans area. We anticipate that ASPECT may also be used in
the areas affected by Hurricane Rita.
EPA's real-time mobile laboratory--the Trace Atmospheric Gas
Analyzer (TAGA)--is sampling air quality in the New Orleans area.
Initial screening results from the TAGA represent the beginning of
extensive sampling efforts. As this is a dynamic situation, general
conclusions should not be made regarding air safety based on results
from snapshots of data.
EPA and the affected states will continue to monitor for potential
inhalation risks and have plans to enhance their temporary monitoring
networks in the coming weeks to monitor and evaluate the air impacts of
recovery activities including the burning of debris.
reoccupation of new orleans
EPA and CDC formed a joint task force to advise local and state
officials of the potential health and environmental risks associated
with returning to the City of New Orleans. Their report, titled
Environmental Health Needs and Habitability Assessment, was issued on
September 17th and identifies a number of challenges and critical
issues for consideration prior to the reoccupation of New Orleans. The
task force is now incorporated into the Federal New Orleans
Reoccupation Zip Code Assessment Group (Zip Code Assessment Group),
which will provide information on a broad range of issues, ranging from
infrastructure to health issues. Their recommendations will assist
State and Local officials in their decisions regarding when to allow
residents to reoccupy the city. As part of this larger group, EPA will
continue to work to identify potential health and environmental risks
associated with returning to the city based on the Agency's ongoing
efforts to assess the quality of the air, water and sediment.
fuel waivers
EPA, in conjunction with the Department of Energy, responded
quickly to address disruptions to the fuel supply that have occurred
due to the damage to refinery and pipeline infrastructure in the Gulf
Region. To increase the supply of fuel and minimize potential supply
disruptions, the Agency has issued emergency waivers of certain federal
and state fuel standards. On August 30th, EPA granted waivers applying
to low sulfur diesel fuel requirements, Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP)
standards that control the volatility of gasoline during the summer
months, state gasoline sulfur limits, or reformulated gas (RFG)
requirements. On September 21st, EPA expanded this effort in order to
minimize potential fuel supply disruptions caused by Hurricane Rita. To
address each fuel supply situation, waivers have been granted for
various periods of time and have been applicable at the national, state
or local level, to the extent necessary to alleviate the fuel supply
disruption.
In taking these actions, EPA used a Clean Air Act waiver provision
recently signed into law as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005
signed into law this year. This provision authorizes the Administrator
of EPA to temporarily waive fuel standards due to ``extreme and
unusual'' circumstances ``that are the result of a natural disaster, an
Act of God, pipeline or refinery equipment failure, or another event
that could not reasonably have been foreseen or prevented and not the
lack of prudent planning'' on the part of fuel suppliers.
informing the public
We view communication to the public, workers, and other agencies to
be a critical component of our response effort. The Occupational Health
and Safety Administration (OSHA) was on-scene early in the response
effort, distributing over 3,500 fact sheets by hand in the first two
weeks and conducting interventions that removed more than 850 workers
from serious or life threatening hazards. OSHA continues these
activities and on a daily basis, EPA response personnel and contractors
receive health and safety instructions regarding field conditions and
safe work practices. EPA's preliminary sampling results are also
provided to On-Scene Coordinators to facilitate field decisions and
ensure health and safety of workers.
EPA posts advisories on our website and also distributes them
through the Incident Command Post in Baton Rouge. We also have been
alerting communities through AM and FM radio broadcasts, particularly
on aerial mosquito spraying and how to avoid vector borne illnesses
such as the West Nile Virus.
future challenges
Looking ahead, much remains to be done to help address the public
health and environmental impacts of Hurricane Katrina. The safe
management of debris remains a high immediate priority, and the Agency
will assist our federal, state and local partners as they move forward
on debris removal. For its part, the Agency will strive to provide
sound and practical advice, participate in hazardous waste removal
where appropriate, and monitor air quality where open burning is
occurring. EPA will also continue to work with the USACE and others to
support the States and local governments in their efforts to repair and
restore public facilities including drinking water, waste water, and
waste treatment facilities. We will also continue to monitor air,
water, and sediment quality in the region and make sure that this
information is readily available to federal, state and local officials,
other responders, and the public.
conclusion
The nation faces an enormous task in restoring and rebuilding the
affected areas. Simply meeting many basic needs of people in the
region--including shelter, safe drinking water, sanitation, and
protection from disease and hazards--will require a broad partnership
across government agencies, the private sector and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). We expect that citizens and government agencies
will look to EPA and our Federal partners for technical expertise,
scientifically sound data, and practical advice on environmental and
public health conditions in the region for some time to come. We are
focused on meeting that challenge.
Finally, as local communities undertake the task of reviving their
economies and helping businesses restart their operations, EPA, in
partnership with other federal, state, and local agencies, will provide
technical expertise and guidance to assist in the recovery. Some of you
may know that I'm quite new to the EPA, but what I've seen in the past
few weeks makes me proud to be counted among them. I'd like to end by
reiterating a statement made by Senator Jim Jeffords after our briefing
of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee: ``We've heard so
much about what went wrong in Katrina's aftermath, and this is one
example of what went right. These EPA employees have my utmost respect
and gratitude.''
At this time I welcome any questions you may have.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you very much. We will go to Dr. Henry
Falk, who is the Director of the National Center for
Environmental Health and Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry. Dr. Falk.
STATEMENT OF HENRY FALK
Mr. Falk. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, Mr.
Chairman, and Congresswoman Solis, and members of the
subcommittee. My name is Dr. Henry Falk, and I am the Director
of the Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury
Prevention at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, ATSDR. ATSDR
is a sister agency to the CDC, and is part of the Department of
Health and Human Services. Because of our responsibilities
under the Superfund program, we work very closely with EPA, as
well as State and local governments, and with communities
across the country.
Hurricane Katrina is a huge public health emergency. It is
an unparalleled challenge to the public health community and
particularly to those of us in environmental health as we
grapple with so many complex and interwoven environmental
health issues. In New Orleans, the environmental health system
needed to support a major metropolitan area was severely
disrupted. This has also been true for many other cities and
communities in the storm's path. In addition, a substantial
proportion of residential structures, the homes for so many
people in New Orleans and elsewhere, have sustained severe
structural damage from flooding. On a personal level, we all
keep in mind the heart-wrenching nature of this tragedy and its
broad impact.
Shortly after Hurricane Katrina hit, Health and Human
Services Secretary Michael Leavitt and EPA Administrator Steve
Johnson asked me to go to New Orleans, Louisiana, to lead a
CDC/ATSDR and EPA taskforce to identify the overarching
environmental health and infrastructure issues facing New
Orleans. My first actual view of New Orleans was in a flyover
by helicopter. It was essentially an empty city still very much
underwater, and with great evidence of storm damage. For many
of us at ATSDR, CDC, HHS, and elsewhere, these scenes have
served as an overwhelming stimulus to respond to the best of
our abilities.
The 13 environmental health issues we initially identified
include drinking water, wastewater, solid waste and debris,
sediments, soil contamination, toxic chemicals, power and
natural gas, housing, the unwatering and flood waters,
occupational safety and health, vector rodent animal control,
road conditions, underground storage tanks such as gasoline,
and food safety.
The most striking feature of this disaster is the vast
array of key environmental needs and infrastructure services
that have been affected. These are complex and interrelated,
and they will need to be assessed by local elected officials
when making decisions about re-inhabiting New Orleans.
ATSDR staff have been valiant and dedicated in their
efforts, and worked tirelessly to assist the people affected by
Hurricane Katrina. At least 15 percent of our staff have been
deployed directly to Hurricane Katrina activities through the
CDC Emergency Operations Center or through HHS and the U.S.
Public Health Service auspices. Probably an equivalent number
have been backing them up at headquarters in Atlanta, and those
numbers continue to grow.
ATSDR staff works closely with EPA. We have staff stationed
in EPA regional offices, and we are assisting EPA in the field
and around the clock to mitigate environmental health issues,
including possible chemical exposures. CDC/ATSDR staff in the
field and at HHS and CDC headquarters are collaborating with
Federal, state, and local health officials to evaluate and
analyze the environmental data.
ATSDR is also actively participating on the Environmental
Impacts and Clean-Up Working Group, as part of a White House
taskforce on Hurricane Katrina. That working group is co-
chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Services,
and by my colleague to the right, Marcus Peacock, Deputy
Administrator of the EPA. The working group is particularly
focused on policy, has served as an important locus for
interagency discussions. ATSDR is particularly engaged with the
group, providing technical input by neighborhood and zip code,
on environmental issues related to the return of residents to
New Orleans.
In the future, ATSDR will continue to provide technical
assistance on issues related to potential exposure of the
public and of response workers to hazardous substances. We will
continue to provide toxicological expertise, and make
recommendations about ways to eliminate or control exposures to
hazardous substances in the environment. We will continue to
work closely with Federal, state, and local partners in working
through these difficult issues, and as the recovery progresses,
we hope to effectively serve the needs of the many people and
communities affected by the hurricanes.
Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Henry Falk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Henry Falk, Director, Coordinating Center for
Environmental Health and Injury Prevention, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services
introduction
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. My
name is Dr. Henry Falk and I am the Director of the Coordinating Center
for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention at the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)/Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (ATSDR). ATSDR is an independent agency within the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and a sister agency to
the CDC. Its relationship with the CDC's National Center for
Environmental Health (NCEH) is especially strong, because the Director
of ATSDR, Dr. Howard Frumkin, also directs NCEH. ATSDR also partners
extensively with the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).
This afternoon I will describe ATSDR's ongoing contribution to the
Hurricane Katrina response, based on its unique expertise and
experience in responding to emergency releases of hazardous substances
under Superfund.
ATSDR was established under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), to assess
and prevent or limit potential exposures to hazardous substances and
associated adverse health effects. Each year ATSDR conducts assessments
of potential exposures to hazardous substances, and potential
associated health impacts, at hundreds of sites around the Country.
Frequently these assessments are conducted in connection with an
emergency response, where ATSDR is called on to support response work
in communities impacted by acute releases of toxic chemicals. Through
25 years of experience in emergency response under Superfund the Agency
has developed a workforce with experience and expertise that is
directly applicable to assessing potential exposures and human health
threats from exposure to contaminated floodwater, soil and sediment in
the wake of a natural disaster.
The wealth of skills in our multidisciplinary workforce--from
physicians to toxicologists to epidemiologists to environmental
engineers to health education specialists and risk communicators--
coupled with the location of ATSDR field staff in EPA regional offices
around the country, allow ATSDR to mobilize quickly and coordinate
effectively with HHS and CDC and other agencies within the Department,
and with EPA and other government agencies, in a strategic response to
emergency situations. ATSDR staff in the EPA regional offices work
collaboratively with EPA and state partners to prepare for and respond
to chemical and other public health emergencies.
ATSDR performs emergency response activities under the National
Response Plan. ATSDR collaborates extensively with other federal
partners as part of the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) dedicated to
public health and medical services as well as oil and hazardous
materials responses. These correspond to ESF 8 and 10, respectively.
atsdr response to hurricane katrina
Working in close coordination with HHS and CDC, as well as with
EPA, ATSDR is providing critical expertise, resources and assistance to
the multi-level public health response to Hurricane Katrina. The
discussion below describes three primary components of ATSDR's ongoing
contribution to the response: (1) Participation in task forces and work
groups established by the Administration to assess environmental health
needs and related policy issues; (2) Playing an integral role in the
CDC Emergency Operations Center, and deploying staff to emergency
operations centers in HHS, FEMA and EPA; and (3) Working in the field
to assess the potential for exposure to hazardous substances that may
adversely impact human health.
(1) Environmental Health Needs & Habitability Assessment Joint Task
Force of CDC/ATSDR and EPA, and the Environmental Impacts and
Cleanups Working Group of the White House Hurricane Katrina
Task Force
One unique contribution by CDC/ATSDR to the Hurricane Katrina
response was leading a joint CDC/ATSDR and EPA task force that
developed an initial assessment report identifying the overarching
environmental health and infrastructure issues related to reinhabiting
New Orleans.
At the request of Secretary Michael Leavitt of HHS and
Administrator Steve Johnson of EPA, CDC/ATSDR and EPA established the
joint taskforce to conduct the assessment. I had the privilege of
serving as Chair of that joint taskforce, which was made of a
multidisciplinary and multiagency team with expertise in environmental
health science, environmental engineering, medicine, health and risk
communication, and administration/logistics. The initial eight-member
team consisted of personnel from CDC/ATSDR and EPA.
The team began its work on September 6, 2005, and completed it on
September 12, 2005. Our work was guided by six key questions:
1. What are the core environmental health issues to be addressed?
2. Which agencies and organizations at the federal, state, or local
level are responsible for, or involved in, the various
environmental health issues?
3. What progress has been made and what challenges exist?
4. What is the timetable to address these environmental health issues?
5. What resources exist or need to be brought to bear to address these
environmental health issues?
6. What are the key milestones and endpoints that define success?
Initially we made contacts with CDC leadership on the ground in New
Orleans, and with other key federal, state and local public health and
environment leadership. In addition, we completed air and surface level
tours of New Orleans to see firsthand the impact of Hurricane Katrina.
In conducting the assessment, CDC/ATSDR and EPA collaborated
extensively with a diverse group of federal, state and local officials
with expertise in public health and the environment, including the New
Orleans City Public Health Department, the Louisiana Department of
Health and Hospitals, and the Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality.
The taskforce identified 13 environmental health and public health
infrastructure issues to address. This initial assessment includes
drinking water, wastewater, solid waste/debris, sediments/soil
contamination (toxic chemicals), power, natural gas, housing, removal
of flood water, occupational safety and health/public security, vector/
rodent/animal control, road conditions, underground storage tanks
(e.g., gasoline), and food safety. The report also identifies a number
of barriers to overcome and critical decisions to make prior to
reinhabiting New Orleans. The mayor and city officials who will make
these decisions will be able to draw on the expertise of the
participants in the Joint Task Force and other partners. Dr. Howard
Frumkin, the new Director of ATSDR, was recently deployed to Louisiana
to continue the Agency's work.
ATSDR also is participating actively in the Working Group on
Environmental Impacts and Cleanup, which is part of the White House
Task Force on Hurricane Katrina. The Deputy Secretary of HHS and the
Deputy Administrator of EPA co-chair this working group. I have served
as co-chair of the New Orleans Subcommittee of this group, and other
ATSDR and CDC staff are members of the Guidelines, Sampling, and
Communications Subcommittees. The Working Group is particularly focused
on policy issues related to Environmental Impacts and Cleanup, and has
served as an important locus for inter-Agency discussions. The
Environmental Health Needs & Habitability Assessment Joint Taskforce
that I headed in Baton Rouge has now been consolidated within the New
Orleans Zip Code Assessment Group; this interagency group is providing
technical input by neighborhood or zip code on environmental issues
related to the return of residents to New Orleans.
(2) Emergency Operations Center
ATSDR leadership and staff serve as incident managers; provide GIS
mapping and services, tools we regularly use to identify areas of
potential or actual chemical exposure; and subject matter expertise for
public health and risk communication. For example, Dr. Tom Sinks,
Acting Deputy Director of ATSDR, served as CDC's public health lead in
the CDC Emergency Operations Center in Atlanta during the initial
phases of the hurricane response. Captain Scott Deitchman, USPHS, M.D.,
ATSDR's Associate Director for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency
Response, has taken over in this capacity in the on-going CDC/ATSDR
response.
As of September 23, 2005, at least 55 ATSDR staff have been
deployed to Hurricane Katrina response activities in the CDC Emergency
Operations Center or into field operations including the FEMA Regional
Resource Command Centers and the HHS Secretary's Emergency Response
Team. As an HHS agency, ATSDR has deployed many Commissioned Officers
through the Office of Force Readiness and Deployment/Commissioned Corps
Readiness Force.
Also, currently ATSDR regional representatives are located within
the EPA Headquarters Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Washington,
D.C., EPA Region IV EOC in Gulfport, Mississippi, EPA Region IV EOC in
Atlanta, Georgia, Region VI Joint Field Office (JFO), Baton Rouge,
Louisiana and in the EPA Region VI EOC, Dallas, Texas.
In addition, a significant number of staff at ATSDR headquarters in
Atlanta have been supporting a variety of Hurricane Katrina response
activities and back up those deployed into the field.
(3) Deployments to the field to assess potential for exposure to
hazardous substances with adverse health impacts
A significant number of CDC/ATSDR staff members have been deployed
into the field or serve as subject matter experts in the areas of
toxicology, sanitation, food and water safety, vector control issues
pertaining to aerial spraying of pesticides for mosquito abatement,
evacuation center operations, emergency response, epidemiology,
environmental engineering and public health infrastructure, community
relations, public affairs, and health education.
In addition, ATSDR regional representatives in Mississippi and
Louisiana are in the field with the EPA on scene coordinators
investigating chemical spills and providing technical assistance as
needed to resolve questions about the potential for exposure to
hazardous chemicals, and to assist the CDC senior management official.
ATSDR has been working with EPA to assess the condition of Superfund
sites and other industrial sites in the affected areas, and will
continue to participate in more detailed assessments in the future.
In the Joint Field Office in Baton Rouge, ATSDR staff is providing
support to EPA field deployed staff, serving on the debris removal and
health and safety committees formed by FEMA, and assisting the
environmental unit of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals.
In Texas, ATSDR regional representatives are coordinating with EPA at
the Dallas EOC on sampling and chemical release issues.
ATSDR also is working closely with CDC and the New Orleans Public
Health Department to re-establish basic public health services to the
residents of New Orleans at temporary facilities.
ATSDR will remain in close contact with federal, state, and local
partners to ensure that the public health expertise of this Agency most
effectively serves the needs of the people and the communities in the
affected areas. ATSDR will continue to provide technical assistance on
issues related to potential exposure to hazardous substances by the
public and response workers. We anticipate this need will continue for
at least several months. Additionally, ATSDR will continue to address
issues related to the assessment of potential health effects resulting
from exposure to hazardous substances in the environment.
Amidst the hurricane response work, ATSDR continues to focus
resources on priority Superfund activities. ATSDR is continuing to
pursue these activities, but recognizes that there may be some delays
as a result of on-going deployments and hurricane-related support.
ATSDR is taking steps to minimize disruption to other parts of its
program.
Thank you for the opportunity to talk to you today about ATSDR's
participation in the response to Hurricane Katrina.
At this time, I welcome your questions.
______
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/hurricanes/katrina/pdf/
envassessment.pdf
Environmental Health Needs and Habitability Assessment
Joint Taskforce, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention & U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, September 17, 2005
executive summary
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on Monday, August 29, 2005, as a
category 4 hurricane and passed within 10 to 15 miles of New Orleans,
Louisiana. The storm brought heavy winds and rain to the city, and the
damage breached several levees protecting New Orleans from the water of
Lake Pontchartrain. The levee breaches flooded up to 80% of the city
with water reaching a depth of 25 feet in some places.
Among the wide-scale impacts of Hurricane Katrina, the storm caused
significant loss of life and disrupted power, natural gas, water, and
sewage treatment, road safety, and other essential services to the
city.
Early in the disaster response and recovery, federal, state, and
local elected officials and public health and environmental leaders
recognized the significant role of environmental health in the post-
hurricane rebuilding of New Orleans.
At the request of the Secretary Michael Leavitt of the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and Administrator Steve Johnson of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Director of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Dr. Julie Louise
Gerberding, created the Environmental Health Needs Assessment and
Habitability Taskforce (EH-NAHT). The taskforce was charged with
identifying the overarching environmental health issues faced by New
Orleans to reinhabit the city.
The EH-NAHT collaborated extensively with a diverse group of
federal, state, and local partners, including the New Orleans City
Public Health Department, the Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals (LADHH), and Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
(LDEQ), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (USACE).
The team was guided by the following questions:
1. What are the core or fundamental environmental health issues to be
addressed;
2. Which agencies and organizations at the federal, state, or local
level are responsible for, or involved in, the various
environmental health issues;
3. What progress has been made and what challenges exist;
4. What is the timetable to address these environmental health issues;
5. What resources exist or need to be brought to bear to address these
environmental health issues; andWhat are the key milestones and
endpoints that define success.
The team identified 13 environmental health issues and supporting
infrastructure to address. This initial assessment included drinking
water, wastewater, solid waste/debris, sediments/soil contamination
(toxic chemicals), power, natural gas, housing, unwatering/flood water,
occupational safety and health/public security, vector/rodent/animal
control, road conditions, underground storage tanks (e.g., gasoline),
and food safety.
After the initial assessment, the EH-NAHT categorized these issues
by increasing time and complexity to full restoration of services
(Level 4, most complex and requiring the most time to restoration).
Part of the complexity relates to how specific and explicit the
criteria for the end points are for each function.
Level 1
Unwatering
Power
Natural Gas
Vector/Rodent/Animal Control
Underground storage tanks (e.g., gasoline)
Food Safety
Level 2
Drinking Water
Wastewater
Road Conditions
Level 3
Solid Waste/Debris
Sediments/Soil Contamination (Toxic Chemicals)
Level 4
Housing
Occupational safety and health as well as public security was
identified as cross-cutting all the other areas.
Long-term solutions to these many issues are critical to allow
resumption of normal life in New Orleans and to prevent reoccurrence of
such an event in this area.
The EH-NAHT has the following conclusions based upon our initial
assessment:
A complex array of environmental health problems exists in New
Orleans.
The most striking feature of the disaster is the array of key
environmental health and infrastructure factors affected all at
once. All key environmental health and related services are
being reestablished, and this work needs to be done in a very
coordinated and well-planned way.
The unwatering of New Orleans is a critical first step.
The unwatering is an essential first step to allow access for
assessment and repair of all basic services and habitability
barriers. Some significant assessments are not yet started
because of the continued unwatering, which could take an
additional 4 weeks to complete. These assessments may impact
the timing, resources and scope of the needed repairs/
replacements.
It is important to bring infrastructure systems in New Orleans back
on line.
Different timeframes are necessary to bring the various
infrastructure systems (e.g., drinking water, wastewater,
power, and natural gas) on line with varying degrees of
capabilities. Restoring drinking water systems and wastewater
treatment systems needs a planned approach, but full
restoration will be delayed by the many breaks in the
distribution and collection systems and by the need for upgrade
and repairs in older systems. Unanticipated delays must be kept
in mind in the process of unwatering and the scope and
complexity of the interdependent systems.
The cleanup of debris (including housing debris) and potentially
contaminated soil/sediment in New Orleans are rate-limiting
factors.
The timeline for debris treatment, disposal, containment, and
transport, as well as for the testing of potentially
contaminated soils/sediment, will slow or accelerate the rate
at which the city can be reinhabited. The potential
contamination of soils/sediments has great uncertainty attached
to it. A comprehensive sampling and testing of a broad array of
toxic chemicals will be required to identify any widespread
contamination or selected hot spots and to ensure the safety of
returning inhabitants or for redevelopment.
Intense interest will exist to reinhabit New Orleans.
Significant pressure will occur to allow rehabitation. A single
decision will not be made to reinhabit the whole city at one
time. Rehabitation is expected to be done neighborhood by
neighborhood IF it is possible to prevent access to the closed
areas of the city. Worker safety and health as well as public
safety and security are mandatory enablers for all of the
activities.
It is critical to address the housing issues in New Orleans.
Housing is likely the most critical issue in reinhabiting the
city because of the
Large percentage of city housing that was flooded and is not
likely to be viable;
Intense personal connection an individual has to their home;
Legal, jurisdictional, and procedural issues involved in the
decision-making process;
Large proportion of the city population that is displaced. Some
residents are a significant distance away from New Orleans
or may not intend to return;
Difficulty in establishing and maintaining communications with
the widely dispersed population;
Challenge of identifying acceptable methods and resources for
assessing such a large number of homes; and the
Scope of the demolition process and safe and efficient removal of
debris.
An immediate need exists to allow temporary or transient entry of
recoveryworkers, residents, and business owners.
In the immediate period, explicit guidelines are being developed
for safe entry of recovery workers to New Orleans, for brief
entry by residential and business owners to retrieve key
household or business items in neighborhoods of the city where
it is safe to do so, and for reinhabiting the least impacted
areas of the city where key environmental health and
infrastructure conditions are met.
Ensuring worker safety and health and public safety and security are
essential.
Public security and intensive efforts to achieve worker safety
and health for the very large recovery workforce, working often
in extraordinarily difficult and challenging conditions, is
essential to rebuilding New Orleans.
The criteria for short-term and long-term return to New Orleans
should be tailored to the timeframe and population.
Different criteria will be necessary for the short-term and long-
term return to the city e.g., use of bottled water in the
absence of potable water will be acceptable for recovery
workers and select others on a limited short-term basis versus
the general population, which includes children and the elderly
over the long-term).
The EH-NAHT has the following recommendations based on our initial
assessment:
It is important to involve state, local, and other stakeholders in
decision-making.
All the issues in reinhabiting New Orleans are interwoven,
complex, and cannot be addressed individually. It is extremely
important that decisions are made involving state, local, and
federal staff as well as all other stakeholders, particularly
the local population.
Developing a shared vision for the rebuilding (including
infrastructure) is critical.
Because of the magnitude of the devastation, it is critical that
decisions be guided by a clear, shared vision by all
stakeholders of what the rebuilt New Orleans should be. As
devastating as this event is, the vision of the future of the
city is critical in guiding development for such a widely
impacted area.
Federal, state, and local decision-makers should explore processes
used by other areas in devastating circumstances.
New Orleans should draw upon the experiences of other localities
that addressed devastating events--areas such as New York
(World Trade Center), Florida (repeated hurricanes), and San
Francisco (earthquake). Their experiences and solutions might
serve as examples to New Orleans on processes that can be used
for creating a broad vision for redevelopment, for identifying
key decisions and strategies, and for involving all
stakeholders (including the displaced population) in the broad-
impact, critical decisions that will have to be made.
Maintaining collaboration with involved agencies is essential.
Maintain, through FEMA and other mechanisms, broad collaboration
and a true sense of partnership in developing a very
coordinated and sustained effort to recovery.
Attending to the housing decisions is critical.
A number of critical decisions need to be made about housing.
These decisions include
Developing explicit guidelines for entry by recovery workers, for
brief periods of entry by residents and business owners to
retrieve essential belongings, and for reinhabiting
relatively undamaged neighborhoods of the city.
Creating a neighborhood-by-neighborhood approach for assessing
housing, cleanup/demolition, and reinhabiting/rebuilding.
Selecting method(s) for assessing large amounts of damaged
housing, with rapid methods necessary for severely damaged
housing.
Resolving legal, administrative, and procedural issues.
Fostering and maintaining ongoing contact with the large
displaced population--particularly for any actions that
might require owner authorization.
It is necessary to maintain a systems-level perspective.
Monitoring the progress in all key areas of environmental health
and infrastructure is important because reinhabiting New
Orleans depends on success in all areas. This initial
assessment identified 13 key areas that need to be tracked.
Resolving potential toxic chemical exposures is important.
It is important to resolve the questions about the potential for
toxic chemical exposure as quickly as possible. This issue has
the widest degree of uncertainty.
Officials should ensure public safety and security and worker health
and safety.
Maintain a central focus on public safety and recovery worker
health and safety throughout the rebuilding of New Orleans.
Engage and communicate with the displaced population.
Develop a mechanism to regularly and substantively engage and
communicate with the displaced population to provide a progress
update on city-wide activities as well as activities related to
neighborhoods and individual homes. This work could involve the
use of GIS, the Internet, and other innovative strategies.
Maintain a broad vision on issues affecting the rehabitation of the
city.
This initial assessment from the EH-NAHT focused on the immediate
issues related to reinhabiting the city--primarily those issues
that affect essential systems for safe living. As these
immediate issues are dealt with, it will be important to focus
on issues related to quality of life and social well-being and
how they are integrated into a redevelopment plan.
Create a long-term habitability strategy.
The long-term solution to the risk of flooding and the viability
of New Orleans depend on fully protective levee and unwatering
systems for the population returning to and reinhabiting the
city. It is extremely important to address the long-term
protection of the city from another such event of this
magnitude.
Federal, state, and local agencies and relief organizations are
responding heroically to the disaster. All organizations, including the
agencies represented on this task force, should be doing their utmost
to assist in recovery and rebuilding.
These conclusions and recommendations are current at the time of
writing. Because the situation is dynamic and changing daily, updates
on various topics will be given periodically by various organizations.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you, Dr. Falk, and next witness is the
Honorable John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the
Army Civil Works.
STATEMENT OF JOHN PAUL WOODLEY, JR.
Mr. Woodley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I have a
brief oral statement, and ask that my written statement be
included in the record.
Mr. Gillmor. It will be so included.
Mr. Woodley. Today, I am here to provide a brief background
update to the subcommittee on the environmental management
techniques the Army Corps of Engineers is using during the
ongoing unwatering, debris removal, and cleanup missions in the
greater New Orleans area.
Working with the city of New Orleans Water and Sewer Board,
private contractors, and even some foreign governments, Mr.
Chairman, the Corps continues to make steady progress on
pumping out floodwaters from the city of New Orleans. The
current estimate is that the city is more than 80 percent
unwatered, but the overall unwatering estimated to be finished
in early to mid-October, with a number of parishes actually
completed by tomorrow.
As the water drains to its final amounts, there may be more
concentrated levels of contaminants that will require special
attention and handling. The Corps is coordinating with EPA and
State agencies regarding this possibility. An interagency
technical group identified recommendations for preventive and
remedial mitigation management actions during unwatering. The
Corps has deployed booms at appropriate intake points, and I
have a photograph of the boom deployed on the 17th Street Canal
for the committee. The orange boom is the boom that is intended
to collect the debris. The white and somewhat discolored boom
is actually an absorbent boom that will absorb floating
contaminants, and skim floating contaminants from the water. We
have also deployed artificial aeration devices in the major
channels. This is a photograph of that at the London Avenue
Canal. This is intended to aerate the water, and provide
treatment for low levels of dissolved oxygen and also provide
the treatment benefits that aeration will provide.
After suspending pumping operations during Hurricane Rita,
the Corps resumed the aeration operations, and is coordinating
with the U.S. Coast Guard to deploy additional booms, skimmers,
and suction at pumping stations where oil has been observed.
Based on input from EPA, as Deputy Secretary Peacock indicated,
the Corps is also addressing bacteria, suspended solid, and
petroleum in the storm water runoff.
In support of FEMA, the states, and communities, the Corps
is also conducting an extensive debris removal effort in the
areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina. There is a very strong
communication among Federal, state, and local agencies
associated with this mission. The Corps also participates in a
multi-agency working group established by the EPA to coordinate
innovative debris management issues for recycling and reuse.
With respect to household hazardous waste, the Corps and
the EPA are assisting, collecting, and disposing of this
material. Again, the Corps is working closely with State and
Federal regulators on matters dealing with all types of debris,
including contaminated debris. As public rights of way are
cleared, and segregation of materials at curbside and staging
areas gets in full swing, recycling will increasingly become a
key component of debris strategy. Light goods, automobiles,
marine vessels, and clean, woody debris should be common
targets for recycling. Recycling can be effective in reducing
the volume of debris, and reducing the impact on landfills.
The Corps is implementing preventive management actions
during pumping to minimize additional ecological impact during
the balance of the unwatering effort, and also, is implementing
remedial management actions into the receiving waters to
continue to minimize ecological impacts of the floodwater
discharge. And we will continue to work with EPA, State and
local authorities to plan and manage potentially contaminated
residuals following the first flush of the region following the
rainfall. The current promising outlook for environment and
health, human safety and health, would not be possible without
the combined efforts of EPA, other Federal, state, and county
agencies, as well as the Corps of Engineers.
And Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for you, and to the
subcommittee for the opportunity of appearing today.
[The prepared statement of John Paul Woodley, Jr. follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
the Army Civil Works, Department of the Army
introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am
John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works).
I am honored to be testifying before your subcommittee today, on the
environmental aspects of the United States Army Corps of Engineers'
recovery activities related to Hurricane Katrina. My testimony today
will provide a brief background and update the Subcommittee on the
environmental management techniques the Corps of Engineers is using
during the on-going unwatering and debris removal and cleanup missions
in the greater New Orleans area. These efforts are a collaborative
effort of the Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, the Sewage
and Water Boards, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and
contractors to ensure impacts upon human and environmental well-being
are minimized to the greatest extent possible.
background
The Corps of Engineers is doing everything it can to get the water
out of New Orleans as quickly as possible, in an environmentally
acceptable manner. Everyone is concerned about the quality of water
being moved from New Orleans to Lake Pontchartrain, but the first
priority is health and safety of residents of New Orleans and all
responders as water is drained from the city. The Corps is working with
the EPA, including its on-scene coordinator, and state agencies to
ensure human health and safety. EPA is continually monitoring and
testing the water. Corps of Engineers personnel in New Orleans and
Baton Rouge are co-located with the EPA and the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality, and other state agencies since shortly after
Katrina to facilitate close interaction and coordination. The
headquarters and forward field offices of the Corps and EPA are fully
engaged in this collaborative effort.
status of unwatering mission
Working with the city of New Orleans Water and Sewage Board,
private contractors and even some foreign governments (Dutch and German
dewatering teams), the Corps of Engineers continues to make steady
progress on pumping out floodwaters from the city of New Orleans and
immediate vicinity into Lake Pontchartrain. The current estimate is
that the New Orleans area is more than 80 percent unwatered, with the
overall unwatering effort estimated to be completed in early to mid-
October, with a number of parishes completed by September 30th. As the
water drains to its final amounts, there may be more concentrated
levels of contaminants that will require special attention and
handling. The Corps is coordinating with EPA and state agencies
regarding this possibility. The unwatering effort will remove most, but
not all the water. The remaining isolated pockets of water should not
hamper recovery efforts such as debris removal, structural assessments
and restoration of critical services.
preventative and remedial management actions
An interagency technical sub-group (water quality/ecosystem
restoration management experts) collaboratively identified an array of
recommendations for preventative and remedial mitigation management
actions during unwatering for both inside and outside the levees.
Inside the levees the Corps has deployed sorbent booms with sorbent
skirts at appropriate intake points. There is a special management
strategy for appropriate containment and treatment of HOT-SPOT areas
identified by personnel on the ground as the water lowers. Though most
of the City is dry, the Corps still is treating water in the three main
canals, Orleans, London and 17th Street. The Corps has deployed
artificial aeration devices in major channels to reduce biological
oxygen demand (BOD) and support healthy dissolved oxygen concentrations
in the water column. Two aerators in each of the three main channels
draining to Lake Pontchartrain were strategically placed and operating
successfully prior to Hurricane Rita and 20 more aerators are being
placed in these and other strategic locations, even in the outfall
areas of Lake Pontchartrain. More aerators also are being planned--
about an additional 20, or total of 40. After a suspension of pumping
operations during Hurricane Rita the Corps has resumed the aeration
operations, and are coordinating with the U.S. Coast Guard to deploy
booms, skimmers, and suction at pumping stations where oil was
observed. Based on input from EPA, the Corps is doing its best to
address bacteria, suspended solids, and petroleum in storm water
runoff. Options include more booms, silt screens, aerators, and
possibly adding some mobile treatment plants. EPA and the Corps are
formulating approaches to manage known and suspected areas of hazardous
materials production and storage, and areas with contaminant
sequestration materials such as flocculation, disinfection, and
sorption. The Corps is working with EPA who is developing a
comprehensive non-point source control program to manage the first
flush of rainfall from contaminated residuals as well as developing and
executing program to clean streets, canals, storm drains of
contaminated residuals to minimize their flushing from receiving waters
during rainfall events. This approach is being formulated
collaboratively between the Corps and EPA to be coordinated with State
and Local governments and water boards.
In addition to the floodwaters, the EPA and State of Louisiana are
sampling and monitoring the sediments left behind from the New Orleans
floodwaters for possible contaminants and infectious agents.
Appropriate sampling and analysis are critical to effective evaluation
and characterization to assure proper handling and disposal. The Corps
and its contractors are working closely with the EPA and the state of
Louisiana to assure that this is achieved in a safe manner.
water quality results
EPA emergency response personnel are working in partnership with
FEMA and state and local agencies and the Corps to help assess the test
results and evaluate health and environmental conditions related to
water quality from Hurricane Katrina. In emergency situations such as
this, EPA serves as the lead Agency for water quality including the
cleanup of hazardous materials such as oil and gasoline. EPA national
and regional Emergency Operations Centers are currently activated 24
hours a day. The Corps has employees embedded with the EPA/LDEQ team in
Baton Rouge and onsite teams locally in New Orleans for rapid and
effective communication regarding water quality issues.
More than 190 water quality data parameters are constantly being
updated, reviewed and validated through an EPA quality assurance
process to ensure scientific accuracy. Fuel oils, as they are
encountered, are being skimmed by floating booms or other pick-up
mechanisms as monitored by the Corps, EPA, LDEQ and Coast Guard, but
contact with fuels and oils absorbed onto sediment is always a
possibility. With any of these water quality constituents, it is
recommended that contact with the area water be avoided, and if contact
is made, use soap and water to clean areas and remove contaminated
clothing.
The Corps teams in the field and at the Baton Rouge office will
continue to follow interagency guidance and accepted doctrine and
continue working collaboratively with the entire suite of human health
agencies to respond to health and human safety issues. The Corps will
follow OSHA/CDC guidance pertaining to human health and safety risk
associated with New Orleans floodwaters, sediment and related microbial
issues and continues to operate in the field under that guidance and
its internal guidance for emergency work zones.
debris management plan
In support of FEMA, the states and localities, the Corps is
conducting a comprehensive debris removal effort in the areas impacted
by Hurricane Katrina. There is very strong interagency communication
between the federal agencies, states and local agencies both vertically
and horizontally. Additionally, the Corps is a participant in a multi-
agency working group established by the EPA that meets twice weekly to
coordinate innovative debris management issues such as recycling and
reuse. That working group also includes state and private non-profit
and for profit entities. An output of this coordination is management
plans (by state) for hazardous materials and other debris.
With respect to household hazardous waste, while the collection and
disposal of this material is an Emergency Support Function (ESF)-10
task, it is being conducted by both the Corps and EPA. We expect that
most hazardous and toxic waste will consist of containers filled with
fuel oil and propane tanks, containers of unidentified material, paint,
pesticides, spoiled food, freon removal and batteries. The Corps is
working closely with state and federal regulators on all matters
dealing with all types of debris including contaminated debris
As public rights of way are cleared and segregation of materials at
curbside and at staging areas gets in full swing, the Corps realizes
that recycling will increasingly become a key component of the debris
strategy. White goods, automobiles, marine vessels, and, in areas not
impacted by the Formosan Termite, clean woody debris should be common
targets for recycling. Recycling can be effective in reducing the
volume of debris and reducing the impact on landfills.
closing
The Corps is implementing preventative management actions during
pumping inside the levees to minimize additional ecological impact
during the balance of the unwatering effort. The Corps also is
implementing remedial management actions in the receiving waters to
continue to minimize the ecological impacts of the discharge of flood
waters. The Corps of Engineers is seeking a balance between pumping all
the water out of the city and minimizing ecological impacts during the
unwatering process. Strategies are being developed by the Corps and EPA
to manage the post-pump down flushes of potential pollutants and
potentially contaminated residuals. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
appreciates the tremendous cooperation of the EPA, Coast Guard,
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and other local officials
and agencies to carry out all of our public works missions under
Emergency Support Function #3. The current promising outlook for the
environment and human safety and health would not be possible without
the combined efforts of all that were mentioned.
This concludes my statement. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to
testify today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you very much, Mr. Woodley. And also,
we, at this hearing, as we always do, are probably going to run
out of time for questions. I would appreciate it if you would
be willing to answer any questions in writing that might be
submitted later. Thank you.
Mr. Woodley. Delighted.
Mr. Gillmor. We have been joined by the chairman of the
full committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Barton, for
questions.
Chairman Barton. Thank you, Chairman Gillmor, and I will
say at the outset that I think this is one of the most
important hearings of all the hearings we are going to do on
the aftermath of Katrina and Rita, because this directly
impacts public health, and it is not the sexiest hearing, but I
think it is one of the most important hearings.
I want to thank you three gentlemen for being here, and the
other panelists in the second panel. My first question would be
to Mr. Peacock and also to Dr. Falk. Given what we know today
about the status of the contaminants in the water that is in
the flood areas, or the areas that have been flooded, are there
any long-lasting, negative health effects of those areas, once
the waters recede?
Mr. Peacock. Well, Dr. Falk, I will let you, perhaps, grab
that first.
Mr. Falk. You know, I think there are several factors we
have to consider. The potential for any long-term effects
depends on the degree of exposure, and I think it is very
important, as we work through this process, to assess carefully
exactly what the exposures are, and how significant they are.
So first off, there is the issue of the floodwaters, which
have contained, as Deputy Administrator Peacock pointed out,
bacteria from sewage, and it has contained some chemicals, and
then, there is material in the sediments as that dries out, and
I think it is particularly important to think of how long
people will be exposed to those sediments. Are those readily
cleaned up, so that the exposures are short-lived, and in which
case, they would not be, you know, as significant for the long
term?
But I think also, one has to think of the broad area
sampling, that there are a lot of neighborhoods in an area such
as New Orleans. There are maybe localized exposures from
submerged sites, and I think it is important to actually fully
assess the area, and determine whether there are significant
exposures on an ongoing basis. So I think from what we have
seen so far, I don't think we would be able to say that there
are definite long-term effects, but I think it is important
both for us in assessing, and for everybody who lives there, to
be reassured that that sampling be comprehensive, that it fully
look at, particularly in areas where there might have been
localized exposures, for example, a Superfund site. We really
have to look at this, I think, in an intelligent fashion, to
make sure there aren't ongoing, persistent exposures that
affect people for the long term.
Chairman Barton. Dr. Peacock.
Mr. Peacock. Yes, Emily, if you could put up the flood
sampling map, where the samples have been taken. Dr. Falk
touched on the important issues. There has been a lot of
sampling of the floodwaters done, but the fact of the matter
is, in any particular instance, you may have contaminants that
may have not been caught by the sampling. Also, you can see
this is based on a scientific sampling method where we not only
try and get a representative sample, but also focus on
particular sites where we think there may be a problem. But you
can see that, by no means, is the entire area covered. We may
not know the chronic effects for quite some time.
Chairman Barton. Okay. Is there anything that we need to do
at the Federal level, in terms of reestablishing safe drinking
water supplies, in terms of special funds for new purification
plants, or anything like that?
Mr. Peacock. Well, right now--and Emily, if you would put
the drinking water plant map up. I am not sure the chairman was
here to see that. All those dots represent drinking water
plants. The green dots are plants we know are operational.
These were plants in the swath of Hurricane Katrina, but the
red dots and the yellow dots are plants where we know there is
a problem, or where we don't know whether things are right. And
in each of those cases, there is a team of people, including
EPA and State and local officials. I know CDC and the Corps of
Engineers send teams of people to each of these plants to do
assessments, and it is not just the plant, but it also includes
the distribution system, and it is going to be very difficult
to figure out what the needs are until those assessments are
done. And I think the time period for that is measured more in
weeks than it is in days.
Chairman Barton. My final question is to Mr. Woodley. I am
told that back in the early 1960's, Congress has approved the
Corps to build a hurricane-barrier project across Lake
Pontchartrain, and that got held up by some environmental
lawsuits. Finally, the Corps just gave up on it, but that had
been project been completed, it has at least been alleged that
we wouldn't have had the flooding in New Orleans. Can you
comment on that?
Mr. Woodley. Mr. Chairman, there was litigation concerning
an original 1960's-era plan, that was advanced by the Corps of
Engineers, and there was an injunction issued by the Federal
Court in New Orleans against elements of that plan, which
included a hurricane barrier, or storm surge barrier at the
mouth, or the outlets of Lake Pontchartrain. Subsequent to that
time, for that reason, and also, because of very substantial
local opposition that existed, that element of the plan was
rejected, and a new plan formulated that called for higher
levees along the shore of Lake Pontchartrain.
Chairman Barton. But if that plan had been implemented, has
the Corps or anybody else modeled what would have happened with
this hurricane?
Mr. Woodley. No, sir. We have not. And----
Chairman Barton. Is that something you could do?
Mr. Woodley. I believe that that is something that----
Chairman Barton. If this committee----
Mr. Woodley. [continuing] could be done.
Chairman Barton. [continuing] directed that it be done.
Mr. Woodley. I believe that that is within our capability
of modeling the effect of that, the storm that would, that
occurred on a hypothetical system of that nature. I believe
that could be done, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Barton. My time has expired. I thank the Chairman.
Mr. Gillmor. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Falk, first, I
would like to thank both the CDC and the HHS, because it was
amazing in Houston when we first received 150,000-plus evacuees
from Louisiana, and the effort on the ground from the CDC, and
also, from the Public Health Service. I just couldn't tell you
how many I met. It seemed like it was a couple dozen of folks,
both at the quick medical facility at the Reliant Arena area,
and then, later on, at the George R. Brown a couple days later.
One of my concerns that day was we found out that the folks
that were being triaged, because again, Houston area had no
idea who was on the buses, or what illnesses they had, is the
vaccinations that we were doing, you know, when people came off
those buses, any kind of vaccines to protect both the evacuees,
but also, for the medical personnel that were there trying to
treat them. And is there a certain list that you know of, or
what vaccinations you consider most important, both for the
evacuees, but also for the workers in the shelters and those on
the ground, affected even those folks who were still, are in
the New Orleans area?
Mr. Falk. Thank you very much, and I know Dr. Gerberding
spoke to the Health Subcommittee last Thursday, and she has
spoken to much of the CDC effort on the public health response,
and broadly is supporting the shelters, the local medical
facilities, and the guidelines.
I think, in particular, the greatest concern, I know for
all of us who went there, we all had to have, you know,
diphtheria, tetanus shots, and so Dr. Gerberding, I think, has
testified to that, and spoke exactly to those recommendations.
Mr. Green. Because I wasn't here. I actually went home----
Mr. Falk. Yes.
Mr. Green. [continuing] to prepare for Rita.
Mr. Falk. Yes.
Mr. Green. I know tetanus was the biggest concern, but----
Mr. Falk. Right. That is the main concern, and I think in
selected areas, there have been questions about hepatitis, but
I think it has been particularly in terms of the tetanus. And I
could get back to you exactly the guidance that they use in all
of the shelters.
Mr. Green. Okay. I would appreciate it.
Mr. Falk. We have had, I think, roughly 500-plus people
from CDC, ATSDR, that have participated in those various
efforts across the Gulf Coast region.
Mr. Green. I have to admit, I wanted to clone that clinic
that was put together on a day's notice at both facilities, and
move it into our district, because I was impressed at both
locally and all our hospital systems, and medical schools, and
again, the Federal effort from the CDC and the Public Health
Service.
Mr. Woodley, I mentioned in my opening statement about our
experience with Rita with water plants, and of course, I know
in Mississippi and Louisiana, it was much worse, because our
problem was the electricity to the reservoir, that they
couldn't send the water, you know, to Baytown, and ultimately,
to the residents and the industry. Does the Corps work directly
with this critical infrastructure? In fact, I think the
Wallisville Reservoir is originally a Corps project, and if so,
what steps does the Corps go through to respond to problems
like we saw with this, and again, it is probably magnified so
much more in the Louisiana and Mississippi area?
Mr. Woodley. Yes, sir. We have the mission under the
National Response Plan to provide temporary emergency power for
critical infrastructure.
Mr. Green. Do you have to get anybody's permission to do
that? Local, State officials, or even FEMA?
Mr. Woodley. Yes, sir. We produce, or we perform that
mission under the direction of FEMA and in cooperation with the
local emergency management agencies and local authorities.
Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we might be able
to somehow speed that decisionmaking along, because one of our
problems we found was that the local community, for example,
the mayor, the city manager had to go to the State, and the
State was dealing with such a big issue, but somehow, we can
short circuit that process that you have to go through, so the
Corps could actually be more responsive, and I know you want to
be, but you still have to go through everything that is
required, and I would hope one of the things we learn out of
this is we need to short circuit some of the bureaucracy, so
the people who can actually get the job done have that
opportunity to get out there, without 3 or 4 or 5 days delay.
And I would assume the mayor from Mississippi, and I apologize
for him having to sit through the first panel, but I know that
is the frustration that my local community feels, and again, we
weren't devastated near--our problems are nowhere near what
Mississippi and Louisiana did.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you. I have a question for Mr. Peacock.
There have been some stories in the press stating that the EPA
Administrator, Mr. Johnson, has said that the agency does not
need any other authority to respond to the disaster in the Gulf
Course, or the Coast, or the situation that is created, but
there have been some other press articles suggesting that, in
fact, EPA would be seeking some additional authority.
Could you tell me what the position of the agency and the
administration is as to whether you need additional legislative
authority?
Mr. Peacock. Sir, absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Not long after
the hurricane hit, we started looking at, particularly given
its scope and its unprecedented impact, started looking at
whether or not there were any legislative barriers to getting
our work done. And we continue that effort. We have not
offered, or sent up, any legislative changes or additional
authorities that we think we need yet, but we continue to
review whether or not that may be necessary.
Mr. Gillmor. Well, along that line, let me ask you, after
the activities of September 11, Congress created specific
legislative authority to help EPA guide drinking water,
utilities, in getting ready to prevent and respond to terrorism
activities. My question is, do you have similar direct
authority you can draw on for natural disasters, like a
hurricane, a tornado, or do you rely on just cobbling together
authorities under various provisions?
Mr. Peacock. Yes, I think you are probably referring to the
Water Sentinel Program, which helps in assessments, first of
all, and then helps local water authorities determine ways to
protect water supply sources, and drinking water plants. I am
not aware of any similar authority for natural disasters, but I
can certainly double check on that and get back to you.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. Dr.
Falk, what are your recommendations for State and local
officials, with respect to health and safety issues, as they
consider allowing residents back into New Orleans or other
areas, and how do you go about communicating those
recommendations?
Mr. Falk. So, we feel that there are a number of factors
that have to be considered, and this is a very complex
environmental situation, where there are issues with drinking
water, sewage treatment, chemicals and sediments, housing
issues, mold, and debris removal, and so on. So, I think first
off, you know, there is a sense, for say in local officials,
you have to consider the group of these various effects at, you
know, the decisions about return and so on are not based on a
single criterion, or a single issue. One really has to make
sure that the complex number of services that are sort of
necessary for urban living, or whatever, really are met. So, in
that sense, we try to emphasize going through the series of
issues and actually making sure that they are all addressed.
Second, the conditions vary. For example, within New
Orleans, they vary from one part of the city to the next, and
so, we have emphasized this is not like a single decision for a
whole metropolitan area, but this really has to be done, in a
sense, neighborhood by neighborhood, area by area, as the
conditions differ from site to site. So, and we have, you know,
tried to emphasize approaching it systematically, for the
different environmental issues, and addressing those, and
approaching that by the particular areas, and the particular
problems that are represented in each area.
Through EPA and ourselves and others, we have tried to set
up a Federal effort whereby we can discuss between the agencies
how we collectively come up with information on those areas,
and provide that technical input up the chain at the Federal
level, and working with our colleagues at the State and local
levels, so we are trying to share information that we have, and
provide technical input, and make sure that we are able to
convey whatever information we have that would be helpful.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you. One more question for EPA, Mr.
Peacock. One of the sadder stories of the elevated lead
concentrations we had in drinking water in the District of
Columbia, was how badly the City Water and Sewer Administration
had bungled its public outreach efforts, particularly threat
communication and water testing and water purifying kits.
You had mentioned that EPA is trying to both communicate
information and distribute water testing kits in the affected
parishes in Louisiana. Would you be able to tell us what
parishes and how many, and what EPA is doing to program for
threat communication and kit testing?
Mr. Peacock. Yes. And actually, a lot of this work is being
done by EPA and the state. Once again, there is just a very
close relationship there. I know there were, and this
information is now a few days old, so I will have to update it
for you, there were at least 700 test kits that were handed
out. There were also purification tablets for people who had
private wells, which I believe the State gave to people.
The interesting aspect of this is one of the lessons
learned from 9/11 is to improve risk communication, and
particularly, try and reach the people that need to get the
information. We are now communicating through AM and FM radio,
by going door to door, handing out flyers, and working through
neighborhood networks such as churches, local school districts,
and other means, to try and reach people.
But Mr. Chairman, I can get the detailed information
regarding test kits to you after the hearing.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you very much. The gentlelady from
California.
Ms. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Falk, I have two
questions for you, and one for you, Mr. Peacock, so of
necessity, I would hope that your answers would be brief.
The emergency responders, Dr. Falk, to Hurricane Katrina,
have been and will continue to be exposed to extremely
dangerous environments since the first day of rescue
operations, wading through contaminated waters filled with
sewage and hazardous materials. Following 9/11, the Federal
Government created a medical monitoring program for responders
to the World Trade Center tragedy.
Last week, I asked Director Gerberding if the CDC will be
setting up a long-term monitoring program for responders to
Katrina. She expressed openness to such a program, but
indicated they have not taken any steps in that direction. I
would ask you, does ATSDR intend to create a health registry
for first responders?
Mr. Falk. I think in terms of Dr. Gerberding's response,
clearly over the last several weeks, there has been a large
effort on the part of NIOSH, the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, which is a part of CDC, to
provide guidance for emergency response workers and others in
the area.
Ms. Capps. I am talking about a registry.
Mr. Falk. Right. And as she said, then, they have not made
any decisions in terms of a registry.
Ms. Capps. And that is still the case?
Mr. Falk. And I think, in terms of ATSDR, we primarily work
around hazardous waste sites, particularly with the
communities, and the active work at CDC that relates to workers
is really done through the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health. So, I think the most likely place where that
would be considered would be where the occupational safety and
health expertise is located, and that would be probably at the
NIOSH portion, so that is where that is likely to be
considered.
Ms. Capps. Okay. Next question. The Joint Taskforce, Dr.
Falk, on Environmental Health Needs and Habitability
Assessment, issued on September 17, 2005, was a useful and
helpful document on understanding the issues related to the
Katrina response. One of the key issues identified that affects
the rate at which New Orleans can be re-inhabited is the
testing of potentially contaminated soil. The report calls for,
``a comprehensive sampling and testing of a broad array of
toxic material, that will be required to identify any
widespread contamination of selected hotspots.'' In your
opinion, is there a comprehensive sampling and testing plan
that is fully funded, either yours, or one that you know of?
Mr. Falk. I think that at this point, we are working
closely with the EPA. We are evaluating the information so far.
We are looking at the sampling plans, and I think Deputy
Administrator Peacock has described, you know, their
development of sampling plans, and having them reviewed. We are
in the process of working with them on the sampling plan.
Ms. Capps. Okay.
Mr. Falk. So, my hope is that we will, you know, we will be
able to answer that question.
Ms. Capps. So the answer is no right now. And like, I am
thinking of a specific citizen or a family.
Mr. Falk. Right. Right.
Ms. Capps. They don't know yet whether it is actually,
literally, safe to return to their neighborhoods without short
or long-term health effects?
Mr. Falk. I think that is something we are all working on
now, and you know, it has only been so recently that some of
the areas of New Orleans, for example, have been unwatered.
Ms. Capps. And they are returning. Okay, Mr. Peacock. Under
statutes like the Solid Waste Disposal Act and Superfund, the
EPA is charged with protecting public health. In the face of
widespread oil and hazardous chemical release and contaminated
sediments in neighborhoods, is it EPA's responsibility to
protect the citizens' health? I am looking for----
Mr. Peacock. You are talking about a specific statute. I
see. I see. If they are----
Ms. Capps. I am looking for primary responsibility. I just
asked Dr. Falk similar kind of questions. Who is in charge?
Mr. Peacock. If you are looking at a person who wants to
reoccupy----
Ms. Capps. Yes.
Mr. Peacock. [continuing] New Orleans, and who is
protecting them. There are three layers of protection. There is
the mayor. There is the Governor. And then, there is Thad
Allen, all of whom are located in New Orleans, and have daily
discussions regarding whether or not a particular--and the
mayor is using zip code areas--whether or not a particular zip
code area can, for instance, have businessmen come in on a
daily basis, or perhaps, have residents come in on a daily
basis.
Ms. Capps. Well, now, I have heard, and this is only
anecdotal, but evacuees have reported that they are getting
different information from different officials, and from the
EPA. So----
Mr. Peacock. Well, I hope that is not the case.
One of the reasons those three people are in such close
contact is to make sure they are all on the same page. The
mayor, as you probably know, published a plan late yesterday,
and we have, across agencies, it is not just EPA and the CDC,
have been helping the mayor evaluate environmental and other
endpoints in those particular zip codes. And there is an
updated assessment, I think it was issued, that was given to
the mayor last night, which I would be happy to provide to you.
I hope you have the impression there is a systematic process--
--
Ms. Capps. Right.
Mr. Peacock. [continuing] for looking across these areas.
Ms. Capps. I guess that, first of all, I don't have a clear
answer as to whether the sample is complete, or if there is a
registry----
Mr. Peacock. I think I can help you with that, if, for
instance, for the sediment sampling, these are where we have
taken samples. There is a sampling plan in place.
Ms. Capps. Is there a result?
Mr. Peacock. Yes. And if you go, for instance, on our
website, and hit sediment samples, you will get the raw data.
And----
Ms. Capps. Right. It doesn't tell the citizen if it is
safe. Who is going to interpret the data, and issue a report
saying it is----
Mr. Peacock. That is up to the local health official and
the city's office, to determine whether or not a particular
house or room or neighborhood is safe for someone to go back
into. I mean, for instance, EPA, regardless of floods in the
past, has never gone into a particular neighborhood, house,
property, state, commercial property, and said it is safe to go
back in.
Ms. Capps. Mr. Chairman, I know I am going over time, but
could I finish this line of questioning? I just want to find
out, the mayor, you have the capability of analyzing, between
the Corps----
Mr. Peacock. Yes, and actually, the Corps and others.
Ms. Capps. And the Corps is--well, the three of you are
here because of expertise in sampling, creating data bases----
Mr. Peacock. Correct.
Ms. Capps. [continuing] and information. I understand----
Mr. Peacock. Yes.
Ms. Capps. [continuing] that the dispensing of it and
issuing the--yes, you can come, or no, you shouldn't, and here
is why. Somebody else needs to do that, but----
Mr. Peacock. Right.
Ms. Capps. [continuing] how does the mayor, does he have
access to your data? Is someone informing him----
Mr. Peacock. Yes, now this----
Ms. Capps. [continuing] on a regular basis?
Mr. Peacock. [continuing] is the zip code assessment group
Henry was referring to in his testimony. There is a group of
individuals down in New Orleans, Federal officials who, by zip
code, are assessing--it is currently six key areas; it is going
to be 13 key areas. And that information is provided to Thad
Allen, who then provides it to the mayor and to the state.
Ms. Capps. And advises them, so that there is one, so there
shouldn't be confusing information?
Mr. Peacock. There should not be confusing information.
Ms. Capps. They should know to whom they can go and that
they can trust that this has been fully vetted information----
Mr. Peacock. That is right. In fact----
Ms. Capps. [continuing] and substantiated.
Mr. Peacock. [continuing] we make sure any of the
information we provide goes through a rather rigorous, as Henry
would say, a quality assurance and quality control process.
Ms. Capps. Okay. Now, I guess one final question, and this
isn't your job, but we need to find out how the public knows
how to do this, how they, and all of us have to, even though we
are just in the background, we have to take responsibility that
these affects people's lives.
Mr. Peacock. Right.
Ms. Capps. And so, how is it getting to the public?
Mr. Peacock. Well, I can only speak for the Federal level--
and Emily, if you can show just the EPA advisories--I mean,
these are a list of advisories, announcements, EPA has done,
often in coordination with CDC, and once again, we tend to use
radio, we tend to use flyers, we have gone door to door. Of
course, we have a website, but a lot of people don't have
access to it.
Ms. Capps. And you are doing that part----
Mr. Peacock. We do have a crosslink, for instance, to CDC.
All of these advisories, for instance, are on our website, and
we have provided the information through, once again, press
announcements and radio.
Ms. Capps. So you are telling citizens what to do.
Mr. Peacock. Yes, that is exactly right.
Ms. Capps. But you just said you don't.
Mr. Peacock. No, we are telling people, for instance, if
someone is going to go into their home, we provide caution, in
terms of what they should look out for in their home. But in
terms of defining whether or not it is safe to go into a
particular house or neighborhood, we are not going to be doing
that.
Ms. Capps. Boy. Somebody is going to have to do that.
Mr. Peacock. Well, the only person who can lift an
evacuation is the person who has the power to put it in place,
and that is the mayor, and perhaps the Governor. I know less
about the State authorities.
Mr. Gillmor. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to
thank the panel for being here on this important issue.
I want to do a little follow-up on the question the
gentlelady from California was just asking. And that has to do
with, when someone is returning to their home, what would be
the checklist that you advise people to be aware of, what
they--let us say, just want to go there to get some belongings,
at least. What checklist do you want them to keep in mind as
they are approaching that, whoever would--Dr. Falk?
Mr. Falk. Let me start by saying that I think for all of
us, in addition to headquarters people that are involved, we
have a number of staff who are in New Orleans, who are in the
State of Louisiana, who are trying to work closely with the
Louisiana public health officials and with the New Orleans
public health officials in those areas.
So as they approach this on an area-by-area, neighborhood-
by-neighborhood, or zip-code approach, specific guidance is
developed for people going in, and I think that the staff that
we have in the field are trying to work closely with the local
officials in preparing that. So there is guidance that is given
out to people as they come back to those areas.
Mr. Murphy. That is not something that you would
necessarily recommend, but let the locals give that guidance
onsite?
Mr. Falk. Well, I think we are trying hard to make sure
that the local people will give that guidance on the site, but
we are trying to work with them, and provide the----
Mr. Peacock. Yes. The mayor's plan for reoccupation, which
was issued, I think, late yesterday, includes a long list, it
is really, you can look at it, it is a checklist of things for
citizens to be careful of. Make sure they bring water, for
instance, things like that, and that was informed by
information provided by the Federal partners and the state.
Mr. Murphy. Well, then let me step back, and then, say,
from your standpoint, so you are not--let us take it from a
broader perspective. With all that standing water in the region
with chemicals in it, what chemicals are we seeing there? Is
there any evidence of problems with exposure to that?
Mr. Peacock. The main problem, particularly with the
standing floodwaters, is the bacterial contamination, E. coli
and coliforms, which are indicative of what you would find in
raw sewage. It is a serious problem, and people should avoid
the water if they can. There have been, in particular places,
and once again, these are the floodwater sampling sites, where
there have been elevated levels of chemicals, and in some, I
think we have detected, of the over 100 chemicals, 47. In a
number of cases, lead, for instance, and arsenic, both have
exceeded drinking water assessment levels. Now, those levels
are set for someone who is drinking a fair amount of water
every day, and so, definitely nobody should be drinking the
floodwater. What the long-term effects of those chemicals are
is more of a question mark, but the main point is no one should
be in contact with the floodwater, particularly because of the
possibility of bacterial infection. Would you agree with that,
Dr. Falk?
Mr. Falk. Yes, and in addition, I think, for example, in
New Orleans, the health department itself has been severely
impacted by this whole disaster, and there is a lot of support
coming from CDC, Health and Human Services, EPA, and----
Mr. Murphy. Do we have sufficient support to monitor? No?
Mr. Falk. Sufficient support on the field, and to help
assist in various ways. So there are occupational safety and
health experts, say, from NIOSH and CDC, who are helping
prepare guidance for workers and emergency responders there.
Mr. Murphy. Are you also looking for particular groups who
may be at risk, pregnant mother, the elderly, people with
certain disease entities?
Mr. Falk. Yes, and I think in the first wave, we are, you
know, the mayor's guidance has been children and elderly are
probably not appropriate for the first people who are going in,
and so, I think that is probably very critical. You know, in a
sense, if there is guidance, for example, that we don't have
potable water, people can't use the water in their tap for
drinking. They have to use bottled water, boiled water, and so
on, you can't expect small children, maybe elderly, who might
be confused, to follow. So I think you have to tailor these
recommendations, and I think we have all been trying to work
with the local officials in developing that kind of guidance.
Mr. Murphy. Let me ask one other area, and that is, as
people go back to their homes, and even though there are
standing floodwaters, but as those subside, mold in the houses.
What sort of risks do we see with that?
Mr. Falk. Well, mold is a very critical area, particularly
in New Orleans, but I am sure in many other areas along the
Gulf Coast. Homes that have had standing water for some period
of time, there is extensive amounts of mold, and far greater
than we have probably seen in most any other situation. So, I
think the guidance, you know, for dealing with mold is very
critical, in terms of protection of skin surfaces, in terms of
respiratory protection. We just yesterday did a teleconference,
you know, for guidance on that. We have been working very much
with the local officials on assuring available information for
people as they enter the city on the appropriate ways to work
with mold, and when it is not appropriate to do it, and if they
are exposed to the mold, how they should do it, and the kind of
respiratory protection they should have.
So, I think that is really very critical. And we are also
very concerned that people who have preexisting respiratory
disease or asthma not be the persons doing the primary work on
mold. There are people who will certainly be more sensitive to
the mold, that really need extra precautions. So, we try to
convey that kind of information, how to approach those areas,
who should and who should not, what kind of protection, gloves,
skin covering, and respiratory protection for people who do do
this, and for homeowners who are going back and then,
particularly, for emergency responders or construction workers
on the occupationsite, who may be doing far more extensive work
with the mold. So that is a very critical point for us, in
terms of developing guidance, that we are doing together with
the local officials.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Doctor, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you, and that will conclude our first
panel, and once again, I want to express my appreciation to all
of you for your help. Thank you.
We will now proceed to our second panel, and to begin that,
I will be turning the Chair over to the gentleman from New
Hampshire, Mr. Bass, and we will get underway.
Mr. Bass [presiding]. Good afternoon. We are pleased to
have the second panel here, and the following individuals are
going to be testifying before the committee.
Ms. Karen Gautreaux, who is up on the video in front of us
here, Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality in Baton Rouge. To her left on the
screen, but obviously not physically, Mr. William Rutledge, who
is the mayor of the city of Pontotoc. Is that correct? On
behalf of the National Rural Water Association, Dr. Stephen
Ragone, Director of Science and Technology, accompanied by Dr.
John H. Schnieders, Member of the National Ground Water
Association. Mr. Erik Olson, in the center here, Senior
Attorney of the Natural Resources Defense Council. Ms. Beverly
Wright, Executive Director of Xavier University of Louisiana,
and Mr. Robert R. M. Verchick, Gauthier-St. Martin Eminent
Scholar, Chair in Environmental Law, Loyola University New
Orleans. Is that you in the screen, sir? The screen on the
left, are you Mr. Rutledge? Okay. Good enough. Thank you.
Mr. Rutledge. Yes, sir. Right here.
Mr. Bass. I saw the Tulane sign behind you. I want to
advise members that we are expecting votes around 3:45 this
afternoon, so we will proceed as quickly as possible with our
testimony. I hope that you will confine your remarks to 5
minutes, and submit your record, which we will accept by
unanimous consent, your full testimony for the record.
We will begin with Karen Gautreaux. Would you please
proceed?
STATEMENTS OF KAREN K. GAUTREAUX, DEPUTY SECRETARY, LOUISIANA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; WILLIAM RUTLEDGE, MAYOR,
CITY OF PONTOTOC, ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL RURAL WATER
ASSOCIATION; STEPHEN E. RAGONE, DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN H. SCHNIEDERS, MEMBER, NATIONAL
GROUND WATER ASSOCIATION; ERIK D. OLSON, SENIOR ATTORNEY,
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL; BEVERLY WRIGHT, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, XAVIER UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA, DEEP SOUTH CENTER FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE; AND ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, GAUTHIER-ST.
MARTIN EMINENT SCHOLAR, CHAIR IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, LOYOLA
UNIVERSITY, NEW ORLEANS
Ms. Gautreaux. Thank you, Mr. Bass, and good afternoon, Mr.
Chairman and ladies and gentlemen of the subcommittee. I am
Karen Gautreaux, Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Department
of Environmental Quality, and I want to thank you all very much
for allowing us to participate in this hearing, and especially
for allowing us to do so by teleconference.
Exactly 1 month ago today, Hurricane Katrina made landfall
in Buras, Louisiana, and forever changed the physical,
cultural, and economic landscape of our state, as well as
delivering severe blows to our neighbors to the east in
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. Last Sunday, Hurricane Rita
made landfall in the western side of the State in Cameron
Parish, severely impacting that portion of our coast, as well
as areas that had previously escaped the wrath of Katrina. Our
neighbors in Texas who had been kind enough to send 24 members
of a strike team to assist us had to return home and continue
their response efforts in their own state. No part of the Gulf
Coast has remained untouched this hurricane season.
Today, I will limit my remarks to our Hurricane Katrina
assessment and response efforts to date, as this is the focus
of your hearing. First, I would like to share with you an
observation about Hurricane Katrina that has been repeated by
experienced emergency responders from our staff and those of
other State and Federal agency partners. Simply, they have seen
nothing like it. The magnitude and diversity of the
environmental challenges presented by this storm have not been
seen before in the United States. I will attempt to give a
brief overview of those challenges, how they are being
addressed, and actions anticipated in the future.
One of the first things our department and our agency
partners did in order to best position themselves to assess and
respond to storm impacts was to establish and house a Unified
Command Center at LDEQ headquarters in Baton Rouge. This center
includes representatives from our staff, a large contingency
from the U.S. EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast
Guard, U.S. Geological Survey, NOAA, the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality, the Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinators
Office, and the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals.
Local government has also been involved. These representatives
are coordinating emergency response, hazard assessment, and
environmental sampling and planning activities. We better
recognize the value of that coordination in the degree of
readiness that we have experienced in response to Hurricane
Rita.
One of the key differences between the aftermath of Katrina
and other hurricanes was the continued presence of floodwaters
in the storm-impacted area. Because much of the area in New
Orleans is below sea level, water that falls or enters the city
must evaporate or be pumped out. As a result of the breaches
and overtopping of the flood protection systems, namely
floodwalls and levees, approximately 80 percent of the New
Orleans area and some of Jefferson Parish remained flooded
until the failed parts of the flood protection system could be
patched and those areas pumped out. This led to the floodwater
bowl that you may have heard referred to in the lowest
elevations of the city, where water sat for weeks. Hurricane
Rita re-flooded the areas that had most recently been
dewatered. In St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, low-lying
areas also suffered from overtopping and breaches of the levee
system, leaving them basically at sea level and subject to the
tides until the levees could be repaired and the dewatered, now
for the second time.
The areas north of Lake Pontchartrain experienced high
winds and flooding, and although the damage was significant, in
general, those areas are recovering more quickly than Southeast
Louisiana.
I will briefly go through a few of the results of the first
month's assessment and response activities--again this is the
first month--and mention issues that are being addressed, and
those that will continue to be priorities for the future.
First, the waters in the bowl in Orleans and Jefferson
Parishes: this water flooded homes, businesses, streets,
wastewater treatment facilities, and drinking water systems.
Initially DEQ and many of our agency partners, especially EPA,
focused on search and rescue. As people were trapped by the
floodwaters, and search and rescue efforts were hampered by
access, dewatering the area was an urgent public health and
safety priority. The decision was made to pump the floodwaters
to Lake Pontchartrain. EPA and DEQ coordinated sampling
efforts, excuse me, to characterize the floodwaters, and
measure the potential short- and long-term environmental
impacts to the lake. EPA sampled the floodwaters, and as DEQ
had a good deal of historical water-quality information on Lake
Pontchartrain, we took responsibility for sampling in the lake
and in two canals that are sites in the State's ambient water
quality program. USGS is currently sampling for bacteria in the
lake, and all the results are being shared by the agencies and
are available on the Internet.
To date, the sampling has revealed that the floodwaters had
characteristics common to most urban storm water events, with
contaminants of concern being high levels of fecal coliform
bacteria and levels of lead that would be a health concern if a
child were to ingest a liter of the floodwater a day for 6
years every day. These results are not surprising in an area
with a flooded wastewater treatment system, submerged vehicles
with lead batteries, and older flooded structures with lead
paint. I would like to mention that Lake Pontchartrain is not a
drinking water source for any community; it is a salty upstream
lake.
Early results of the lake sampling indicate common water
quality impacts caused by vegetative debris thrown into the
water by hurricane winds and storm surge. This has caused low
dissolved oxygen and fish killed in Northshore streams feeding
into Lake Pontchartrain. Fecal coliform bacteria counts are
slightly elevated in some of these areas as a result of flooded
sewage treatment facilities, flooding of urban sewage lines,
and flooding of pastures.
Organic compound sampling and analysis has shown mostly
non-detect results. Where detected, concentrations have not
exceeded water quality standards. Metals have been below water
quality standards, with the exception of one sample taken from
a New Orleans drainage canal. In general, Lake Pontchartrain is
maintaining good water quality, and the impacts to the lake
have been minimal. We are hopeful that the lake will be back to
normal within months, not years, but we will be monitoring for
years to come to ensure that is the case. More detail has been
provided here to particularly address the concern about the so-
called toxic soup being dumped into the lake. The floodwaters
were unhealthy, but to date, results show this to be an
inaccurate and alarmist characterization.
Initial sediment samples in the flooded areas indicate that
there are no acute health issues that would be expected from
the concentration of compounds to date. A summary of the
sediment sampling results is included for the record, and
sample results are available on the EPA website.
The results of 23 air toxic and particulate canister
samples in the storm-impacted area have also been encouraging.
One sample taken near a fire in New Orleans contained 56 parts
per billion benzene, the ATSDR minimum risk level is 50. Three
canisters in St. Bernard Parish showed slightly elevated levels
of benzene and some other related pollutants, but none exceeded
the ATSDR/MRL screening levels in the hydrocarbon profile
resembled gasoline and diesel. The sample was taken in an area
impacted by a spill. A summary of the air sampling results is
also attached to your record.
Of great concern are the impacts of a number of oil spills
resulting from Katrina. Currently, five major and five minor
oil spills are the subject of response efforts. It is estimated
that over 6.5 million gallons of oil have been released into
the environment, with more spills expected as pipelines and
facilities resume operations. Over 2.5 million gallons of oil
have been recovered as of September 28, with the Coast Guard
and LOSCO being the lead agencies in that effort.
One major priority is the reestablishment of the large
wastewater treatment plants. Out of the 25 in this area, five
are now inoperable. The Orleans Eastbank System, alone, was
capable of treating 144 million gallons of wastewater per day,
so this is a huge loss in capacity. Four other major facilities
that are currently inoperable are located in St. Tammany, St.
Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes. One of the big challenges of
restoring these facilities is rebuilding the infrastructure
associated with them, including miles of conveyances and
numerous lift stations.
Mr. Bass. Ms. Gautreaux.
Ms. Gautreaux. The health risks associated with untreated
water and wastewater----
Mr. Bass. If you could summarize, that would be great.
Ms. Gautreaux. Okay. Well, let me just go into----
Mr. Bass. Sorry.
Ms. Gautreaux. [continuing] our current remaining
challenges. I will summarize. I apologize. But one of our big
remaining challenges are railcars. We have between 1,000 and
5,000 railcars that were displaced or we are unable to locate,
because of the storm. We ended up issuing administrative orders
and are planning to review that process, so that we are more
prepared to act in the event of another incident like this.
There are about 1,000 potentially impacted underground
storage tanks in the area, that will probably cost between $39
million and $97 million to repair and remediate.
And finally, the last challenge, but definitely not least
is the management of tons of debris, especially with the
social, legal, and personal issues associated with the
management of debris that have been referenced so far. To just
to give you an idea of the volume, normally, the Orleans Parish
Landfill disposes of about 1 million tons per year. In that
parish alone, the estimate is 12 million tons due to the storm.
We are working with local governments and our Federal
partners to try to get a debris management plan, and exercise
it, that matches the challenge. I wanted to particularly thank
EPA for the ability to prioritize our response efforts, such as
oversight, the ASPECT plane equipment that allowed us to pick
up hydrocarbons that are invisible to the naked eye, and it
helped us prioritize our response. So in general, we certainly
are still looking. We are now moving into the serious
assessment and response beyond the immediate storm phase, and
we are very grateful to our partners, and we look forward to
working with you and your committee, and I just guess one of
the last things that I would like to suggest to the committee
is that the coastal ecosystem that protects many of the issue
areas over which your subcommittee has jurisdiction, has been
severely damaged, and I hope that Congress will commit to the
rehabilitation of this fragile system soon.
And with that, I will apologize for running over, perhaps,
and ask that my comments be put into the record, and I will be
available for questions.
[The prepared statement of Karen K. Gautreaux follows:]
Prepared Statement of Karen K. Gautreaux, Deputy Secretary, Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and Ladies and Gentlemen of the
Committee. I'm Karen Gautreaux, Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality. Thank you very much for allowing
us to participate in this hearing, and especially for allowing us to do
so by teleconference.
Exactly one month ago today, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in
Buras, Louisiana, and forever changed the physical, cultural, and
economic landscape of our state, as well as delivering severe blows to
our neighbors to the East in Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. Last
Sunday, Hurricane Rita made landfall in the western side of the state
in Cameron Parish, severely impacting that portion of our coast, as
well as areas that had previously escaped the wrath of Katrina. Our
neighbors in Texas who had sent 24 members of a ``strike team'' to
assist us, had to return home and continue their response efforts in
their own state. No part of the Gulf coast has remained untouched this
hurricane season.
Today I will limit my remarks to our Hurricane Katrina assessment
and response efforts to date, as this is the focus of your hearing.
First, I'd like to share with you an observation about Hurricane
Katrina that has been repeated by experienced emergency responders from
our staff and those of other state and federal agency partners. Simply,
``they have seen nothing like it.'' The magnitude and diversity of the
environmental challenges presented by this storm have not been seen
before in the United States. I will attempt to give a brief overview of
those challenges, how they are being addressed, and actions anticipated
in the future.
One of first things our department and our agency partners did in
order to best position ourselves to assess and respond to storm impacts
was to establish and house a Unified Command Center at LDEQ
headquarters in Baton Rouge. The center includes representatives from
LDEQ, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, (EPA), the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps), the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Agency (NOAA), the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ),
the Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinators Office (LOSCO), and the Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals (LDHH). Local government has also
been present at the Center. These representatives are coordinating
emergency response, hazard assessment, and environmental sampling and
planning activities. We better recognize the value of that coordination
in the degree of readiness that we have experienced in response to
Hurricane Rita.
One of the key differences between the aftermath of Katrina and
other hurricanes was the continued presence of floodwaters in the storm
impact area. Because much of the area in New Orleans is below sea
level, water that falls or enters the city must evaporate or be pumped
out. As a result of the breaches and overtopping of the flood
protection systems, namely floodwalls and levees, approximately 80
percent of the New Orleans area and some of Jefferson Parish remained
flooded until the failed parts of the flood protection system could be
patched and those areas pumped out. This lead to the floodwater
``bowl'' in the lowest elevations of the city where water sat for
weeks. Hurricane Rita re-flooded areas that had most recently been
dewatered. In St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, low-lying areas
also suffered from overtopping and breaches of the levee system,
leaving them basically at sea level and subject to the tides until the
levees could be repaired and the area dewatered, now for the second
time.
The areas north of Lake Pontchartrain experienced high winds and
flooding. Although the damage was significant, in general those areas
are recovering more quickly than Southeast Louisiana.
I'll briefly go through a few the results of the first month's
assessment and response activities, and mention issues that are being
addressed, and those that will continue to be priorities for the
future.
First, the waters in the ``bowl'' in Orleans and Jefferson
Parishes. This water flooded homes, businesses, streets, wastewater
treatment facilities, drinking water systems. Initially DEQ and many of
our agency partners, including EPA, focused on search and rescue. As
people were trapped by the floodwaters and search and rescue efforts
were hampered by access, dewatering the area was an urgent public
health and safety priority. The decision was made to pump the
floodwaters to Lake Pontchartrain. EPA and DEQ coordinated sampling
efforts to characterize the floodwaters and measure the potential short
and long-term environmental impacts to the lake. EPA sampled the
floodwaters, and as DEQ had a good deal of historical water quality
information on Lake Pontchartrain, we took responsibility for sampling
in the lake and in two canals that are sites in the state's ambient
water quality monitoring network. USGS is currently sampling for
bacteria in the Lake. All results are being shared by the agencies and
are available on the internet.
To date the sampling has revealed that the floodwaters had
characteristics common to most urban storm water events, with the
contaminants of concern being high levels of fecal coliform bacteria
and levels of lead that would be a health concern if a child were to
ingest a liter of the floodwater a day for 6 years. These results are
not surprising in an area with a flooded wastewater treatment system,
submerged vehicles with lead batteries, and older flooded structures
with lead paint.
Early results of lake sampling indicate common water quality
impacts caused by vegetation debris thrown into the water by hurricane
winds and storm surge. This has caused low dissolved oxygen and fish
kills in Northshore streams feeding into Lake Pontchartrain. Fecal
coliform bacteria counts are slightly elevated in some areas as a
result of flooded sewage treatment facilities, flooding of urban sewage
lines, and flooding of pastures.
Organic compound sampling and analysis has shown mostly non-detect
results. Where detected, concentrations have not exceeded water quality
standards. Metals have been below water quality standards with the
exception of one sample taken from a New Orleans drainage canal. In
general Lake Pontchartrain is maintaining good water quality, and the
impacts to date to the Lake have been minimal. We are hopeful that the
lake will be back to normal within months, not years, but we will be
monitoring for years to ensure that is the case. More detail has been
provided here to particularly address the concern about the so called
``toxic soup'' being dumped into the Lake. To date our results show
this to be an inaccurate and alarmist characterization.
Initial sediment samples in the flooded areas indicate that there
are no acute health issues that would be expected from the
concentrations of compounds observed to date. A summary of the sediment
sampling results is included for the record, and sample results are
available on the EPA web site.
The results of twenty three air toxic and particulate canister
samples in the storm impact area have also been encouraging. One sample
taken near a fire in New Orleans contained 56 ppb of benzene, the ATSDR
MRL is 50. Three canisters in St. Bernard showed slightly elevated
levels of benzene and some other related pollutants, but none exceeded
the ATSDR MRL screening levels, and the hydrocarbon profile resembled
gasoline and diesel. The sample was taken in an area impacted by a
spill. A summary of the air sampling results in attached.
Of great concern are the impacts of a number of oil spills
resulting from Katrina. Currently 5 major and 5 minor oil spills are
the subject of response efforts. It is estimated that over 6.5 million
gallons of oil have been released into the environment, with more
spills expected as pipelines and facilities resume operations. Over 2.5
million gallons of oil have been recovered as of September 28, with the
Coast Guard and LOSCO being the lead agencies in that effort.
One major priority is the reestablishment of drinking water and
wastewater treatment systems. Five of the large waste water treatment
systems are now inoperable. The Orleans Eastbank system alone was
capable of treating 144,000,000 gallons of wastewater per day, so this
is a huge loss in capacity. Four other major facilities that are
currently inoperable are located in St. Tammany, St. Bernard and
Plaquemines Parishes. One of the big challenges of restoring these
facilities is rebuilding the infrastructure associated with them,
including miles of conveyances and numerous lift stations. The health
risks associated with untreated water and wastewater make restoring
these services a top priority. The Corps is working with local
government, LDEQ and LDHH, and other federal agencies to restore these
functions as quickly as possible.
Another remaining challenge is locating, assessing and addressing
between one and five thousand railroad cars that could have been
displaced by Katrina. LDEQ had difficulty in quickly obtaining
sufficient information from railroad companies to determine potential
threats to public safety and the appropriate response. As a result,
LDEQ issued 17 administrative orders demanding that information. While
more information has since been provided to us, the result of delays in
getting that information could have been tragic. LDEQ is continuing
efforts to locate and assess displaced railcars, as well as considering
how to improve this process in the future.
There are about 1000 potentially impacted underground storage tanks
(USTs) in the storm affected areas, with potential costs of between
$39,000,000 and $97,000,000 to repair and remediate underground storage
tanks. Final costs will depend upon the level of damage to sites from
the storm, as well as disrupted efforts and additional damage at sites
that were being remediated. LDEQ is continuing reconnaissance efforts
in the storm impact areas, and has developed a draft UST Evaluation
Plan to help UST owners and operators identify and address storm
related problems.
Finally, not the last challenge by any means, but probably the most
daunting task of all, the management of the tons of debris in the storm
impact area. Current estimates of the amount of woody waste and
construction and demolition debris are about 22,000,000 tons. To give
an appreciation of the volume, the landfill used by Orleans Parish
disposed of about 1 million tons in an entire year, and in that parish
alone the estimate is 12,000,000 tons. The total does not include
approximately 350,000 vehicles from which fuel tanks, oil, batteries
and mercury switches must be removed, about 60,000 boats. OF The140,000
to 160,000 homes likely include materials that have to be segregated
prior to disposal.
In addition to the sheer logistics challenge, much of this total is
or was the personal property of someone who may or may not be with us
anymore, or may or may not be able to come back to Louisiana. The
property may have been left behind in an evacuation with an intention
to return, it might or might not be insured, and perhaps is the
property of a person who is now a thousand miles away. There are a
myriad of issues to be addressed, and a plan that balances public
safety, the environment, and legal and social considerations will have
to be the ultimate goal. A FEMA debris management team, of which LDEQ
is a partner has developed a debris management plan. LDEQ has
responsibility for technical support primarily in evaluating sites that
have been identified by local government for debris management. DEQ is
also responsible for ensuring that disposal is in accordance with
existing regulatory requirements and emergency declaration
requirements. Local government will play a large role in the management
of debris, particularly with regard to recommending sites and protocols
for this effort.
EPA is the lead for the collection of hazardous wastes, both
orphaned containers and household materials. Hazardous waste
collections have been on-going on the Northshore, and collections will
begin soon in the other impacted areas.
With regard to RCRA or hazardous wastes, our initial efforts have
been to identify permitted facilities, our large quantity generators,
and the Tier II facilities. To date, we've contacted facilities to
determine which are operating, in the process of re-opening, or shut
down, and will determine what future actions need to take place.
One of the benefits of our response efforts has been the use of
fairly new technologies that allowed early and effective reconnaissance
when access to sites was an issue. Access continues to be an issue in
some areas. EPA arranged for overflights with a helicopter equipped
with a HAWK camera that can detect hydrocarbons that are invisible to
the eye. Leaks that might otherwise go unnoticed can be detected and
response prioritized. Similarly, the EPA ASPECT plane could detect
compounds from the air, which was especially useful with fires in
determining what compounds were being emitted and the appropriate
response. EPA also has provided two TAGA vans with house very
sophisticated air monitoring instruments. We shared this information
with other response agencies, and this information was very valuable in
the days immediately following the storm.
It is very difficult to encapsulate the environmental issues
associated with Katrina. To help in that regard, I have also provided
the committee with a copy of the preliminary estimates of costs for
response, assessment and recovery from environmental damages from
Katrina. This was an estimate we were asked to provide to our
Congressional Delegation within a week or so after the storm. We are
currently reviewing those numbers in light of our experience, and would
be pleased to forward to the committee a revised version when that work
is complete. Besides the numbers, I think one of the values of the
document is the systematic identification of issues, that go beyond my
time for testimony.
The only other thing I'd like to add that we did not address in our
costs estimates document, but are very much concerned about, is the
dramatic loss of coastal habitat from the winds and waves of Katrina.
We believe that the blow sustained by this fragile ecosystem will
likely be among the greatest negative long term impacts to our state
and nation, and are hopeful that efforts to rehabilitate this system
will commence soon. We realize this is out of the committee's direct
jurisdiction, but please be aware that this system provides protection
in areas that are directly under your jurisdiction.
With that I'll thank you again for allowing the state of Louisiana
to participate in your hearing today, and look forward to your
questions and comments.
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Mr. Bass. Your comments will be made a part of the record.
I thank you for your very important testimony. I understand
that you have a lot to say, and we will review it very
carefully. I appreciate your testimony. Mr. Rutledge.
STATEMENT OF BILL RUTLEDGE
Mr. Rutledge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Bass and the
committee. First off, I would like to introduce myself. My name
is Bill Rutledge. I am the mayor with the city of Pontotoc, in
the northern part of the state. The population of my small town
is 5,253, but what makes this so close to home, back in 2001,
we had a devastating tornado that came through our community.
It destroyed 10 percent of our town. By saying that, one of the
sister cities that we have, that we started in the State of
Mississippi through the Municipal League is adopt a city
program. One of those cities, the city of Pontotoc, along with
other towns have adopted Bay St. Louis. Unfortunately, my mayor
brother couldn't be here with us today, Mayor Eddie Favre, but
Mayor Favre wanted me to share with you, his town, which is
made up of 8,200 people, actually 5,000 of those families'
homes were on the Bay and 60 percent of those were totally
destroyed, most of them with the 25 foot tidal wave, or surge,
or whatever you want to call it.
Saying all this, I want to bring something very clear to
you, that a number of comments have been made about the local
government, and who is in charge, or what should we do. The one
thing that I want the people to realize is for the first 2 or 3
days, you have got to depend on your local people. And we found
that out very quickly, and that is why one of the things that
the small cities in north Mississippi did, we strictly went
past the red tape, crossed the line, went straight to the
officials of those communities ourselves to find out what their
grocery needs were, buster pumps or chlorinators, backhoe tires
for backhoes, water, food, whatever they needed, and what we
did collectively, of all of north Mississippi, we provided
those supplies to bring down.
But another thing that we need to make clear, though, that
we have got so many good resources in the State of Mississippi
that how we work together, and one of those that I want to
bring attention to is the Rural Water Association. The
technical assistant program, which actually brings in and helps
evaluate with the local officials. We know what the problems
are, we just need to know where to get the parts, and have the
resources to go out there and get those parts. Rural Water, the
Operators Association in other towns around is actually, we
came first response with them.
I can't say enough good things about the military. The
military did an outstanding job. In fact, it really helped us
coordinate all of the efforts out there, but one of the
problems that we run into, it seemed like there was so much
paperwork or so many strings attached to everything that we are
having to wait on somebody to tell us this is what we can do.
Well, I can promise you small communities, we know what to do,
we just need to know how where to get the supplies from and you
know, how we are going to get them to us, and again, another
source of resources that we had was the local churches, how
they came together, how they provided the supplies and the
needs that they have, and without the churches feeding them,
bringing in the materials and stuff, and supplies, we don't
know.
Right now, kind of give you some background on where the
State of Mississippi is right now, during the hurricane that
hit, 97 percent of the 43 counties, the wastewater systems were
out of operation. Today, as of about 2 hours ago, there is only
one public wastewater facility that is not in operation. Now, I
am not saying all of them are 100 percent, but I am saying that
they are treating our public waste. Out of the 1,369 water
systems, 486 were affected. Today, 82 of those systems are
still under a rural water notice, but most of those are on a
voluntary, so one of the things that we wanted to make sure was
just like you all are, is to make sure we got treated, good
quality drinking water, and a place to discharge.
And like with Bay St. Louis, instead of discharging into
the bay or into the channels, they have a backup system where
they can discharge into a lagoon, which is actually held until
it can be discharged in their regional wastewater facilities.
But again, I would like to only suggest that maybe--is you all
meeting, is you all come up with ideas and selections. We need
to never forget about the local officials, and the local folks
there, because having strangers coming in and making decisions,
you know, the people are going to be looking for the mayors.
They will be looking for their aldermen or their supervisors,
because that is who they trust. That is who lives there.
And I want to thank you for allowing me to be here. I thank
you for all your prayers and your comments about the coastal
area, and we do need those.
[The prepared statement of Bill Rutledge follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mayor Bill Rutledge, City of Pontotoc and Mayor
Eddie Favre, City of Bay St. Louis on behalf of the National Rural
Water Association
[Note: This testimony was completed in one day, while we
concurrently operated a full-time relief operation, and we ask the
Committee for all deference in our ability to document and assess the
situation and make our points. We believe we can appear before the
Committee without compromising our relief operations and appreciate the
opportunity to testify.]
Background of Mayor Rutledge
Mr. Chairman, my name is Bill Rutledge; I have been the mayor of
the City of Pontotoc, Mississippi, since 1997 (currently in my third
term). Pontotoc is the northern part of the state and has a population
of 5,200. I am vice president of the Mississippi Municipal League, one
the board of directors of the Mississippi Rural Water Association, and
a member of the Northern Mississippi Mayors Association. My background
includes 27 years of military service, including the National Guard.
Before becoming mayor, I was a Circuit Rider, a job that required me to
travel to over 500 drinking water supplies in the state and assist
those communities with operation, maintenance, and compliance with
their drinking water systems. My city has had firsthand experience with
disasters. In 2001, a tornado hit my community (and county) and
devastated us; it wiped out 10% of our downtown area, killed six
citizens, cut a swath a mile wide for 23 miles across the county, and
destroyed 350 homes (not counting businesses).
Objective of My Comments
I hope to provide the Committee with the following key points in my
comments:
Illustration of what many communities experienced that were hit by
hurricane Katrina.
Explanation of what communities face in recovering from Katrina's
impact.
An attempt to provide a status of recovery of the communities in the
region.
Explanation of what the local communities see as the public health
and environmental conditions of the region, and the progress
that is being made on that front.
Our (from the local perspective) initial thoughts on what has worked
for recovery and why, and what we think federal policy makers
should know in order to be better able to enhance federal
emergency policy (both preparedness and response).
For much of my testimony, I will use the example of the City of Bay
St. Louis, Mississippi, to illustrate my points and give a clear
example of the situation. Bay St. Louis was one of the harder hit
communities on the Gulf Coast. My community has been working with Bay
St. Louis on response and recovery from the initial hours after the
hurricane hit. Through our state municipal association, our cities have
been paired up to provide this assistance in our ``Adopt a City''
initiative which has been a key effort to aide Bay St. Louis and which
I will expand upon later. I am joined here today by my friend and
colleague, Eddie Favre, who is the mayor of Bay St. Louis. I will read
a joint statement to the Committee and both of us are happy to answer
any questions.
A key objective of both of us, here today, is not to gratuitously
criticize relief operations and/or federal agencies. We don't think
that would be of any service to our communities. We are interested
detailing what did work and providing the Committee with a local
perspective of public health and environmental conditions.
Background of Mayor Favre
Eddie Favre is in his fifth term as mayor. Before he became mayor,
Eddie worked in the city administration and is a certified public
accountant. Bay St. Louis is a community of 8,200 (currently 5,000)
population on the Bay of St. Louis (on the Gulf Coast). The community's
water supply is provided by two wells and the wastewater service is
maintained by 40 lift stations (sewer pumps) of varying sizes, located
around the communities, with the effluent pumped to a regional
wastewater system for treatment.
Summary of Katrina Impacts in Bay St. Louis
The night before the hurricane, the city staff was preparing for
the water and wastewater system for the hurricane by checking the
generators at the well sites and moving equipment and sensitive
electrical facilities to secure areas. However, the hurricane flooded
the community more than any imaginable level (significantly more than
hurricane Camille, which had been the previous standard for flooding
maps). Almost all of the city was under water of varying depths, some
areas as much as 25 feet. Mayor Favre's own home was in the one of the
hardest hit portions of the city and all that is left now are a few
pilings. He has been living in the fire station since the Sunday before
the hurricane, where city officials and police stayed through the
storm, and where they are staging relief operations. The extreme
flooding lasted approximately five hours and, combined with the
approximately 150-mile-an-hour winds, devastated the city: ripping up
roads, piling houses on top of each other, toppling the largest trees,
destroying a few thousands homes, destroying approximately 75% of the
tax base, making approximately 60% of the homes in the community
uninhabitable, etc.
The hurricane knocked out electrical service and flooded all 40
sewer lift stations, making them inoperable and destroying almost all
the electrical components in the lift stations. One lift station was
thought to be safe and emergency response equipment was stored there.
However, even this station was flooded, destroying approximately
$500,000 of equipment (generators and backup electrical systems which
the city desperately needed in the aftermath.
Immediately after the worst of the impacts (approximately midday on
Monday), the condition of the water and wastewater system was dire.
There were numerous breaks in lines; thousands of houses had been
destroyed which tore lines from the ground; downed trees brought up
lines; washed out roads left main lines exposed and damaged; both wells
were down without power; etc. City officials started assessing damage
and repairing the water supply by Monday afternoon. By Tuesday morning
they were valving off lines and restoring the wells from generated
power. Valving off lines is the first measure taken in restoring the
water supply (restoring water pressure to portions of the system). This
simply prevents the water from flowing out of the system through the
breaks (which there were too many to count). Contamination can flow
into the system through line breaks, and lack of pressure makes it very
difficult or impossible to maintain the necessary disinfectant in the
system. Of course, through this process, the entire system was under a
boil water order. By Wednesday (day 2), some portion of the water
supply was being restored to houses that were inhabited. The process of
valving off sections of the communities in order to maintain pressure
and find/fix leaks continued round the clock for the next 3-4 days.
This process was very labor intensive. Any particular valve which
needed to be shut off to return water service could be buried under a
series of houses (many feet deep), buried by very large trees, or
ripped from the earth from collapsed buildings. Much of this work
required heavy machinery (backhoes, tree removal cranes, numerous chain
saws, etc.) and it could sometimes take a crew the better part of a day
to remove all the stacked houses and dig for the valve.
After initially stabilizing the water system, the city public works
staff began assessing the needs of the wastewater systems. Each lift
station had to be rebuilt, as the electrical control panels had been
destroyed by water. New parts had to be ordered and installed in each
station to begin wastewater service. Waste service was partially
restored in a week (at approximately 2:00 am the following Monday, the
primary lift station was in service). Another 25 stations were
operational by the following Friday. Every control panel had to be
changed in the lift stations.
Wastewater has to go somewhere in a disrupted system--it was
impossible to control all untreated effluent from the wastewater system
at all times. The wastewater system was inundated with flood water.
This, combined with restored water service and torn up sewer lines
(opening them to be filled by sand, wood, kitchen sinks, tires, bricks,
debris, etc), caused some isolated overflows or untreated wastewater.
This overflow was highly diluted with rainwater, and the city initiated
some ad hoc emergency treatment of the overflows by placing chlorine
tablets directly into the overflow streams as they ran off from the
wastewater system. Much of the runoff was being absorbed by receiving
waters contaminated by the hurricane with dead animals, vehicles, and
other debris washed into them. The city posted notices to stay out of
the bay waters that had been contaminated from the general runoff and
dead animals in the bay. Some people in distress had been washing items
and bathing in the bay water.
Electrical power was restored 10 days after Katrina hit--for those
9 days the systems were operated on emergency generated power.
Current Status of Water and Sanitation
Currently, the water system is up and pressurized; however, we are
finding new leaks every day and, as we restore new portions of the
system and increase pressure, new breaks occur. The stress that is
being placed on the water distribution system makes it fragile and
prone to breaks. Loss of pressure means safety of the drinking water
could be compromised. The water quality tests for coliform
contamination have been met--the water has passed those tests, and the
pressure is adequate, however fragile. And we are maintaining the
necessary residual amount of chlorine disinfectant in the system. All
this means the boil water order could be lifted. However, it is the
decision of the local city officials not to lift the boil order at this
time because the distribution system is (in the mayor and public works
staff's opinion) still too fragile and vulnerable. The order could be
lifted in the coming days. As recently as Monday of this week, a main
pump had electrical failure, which caused loss of pressure. Almost all
the people in the area (upwards of 5,000) are drinking bottled water
and only using the city water for washing, toilets, and household
needs.
Currently, the wastewater system is operating, pumping all sewage
possible to our regional treatment works. The wastewater system has
experienced limited, isolated overflows from broken or backed-up
service lines; however, this is minimal and decreasing each day. There
is a backup system for all the centrally collected sewage, in the event
that the regional treatment plant can't accept our wastewater stream.
As a backup, the old lagoon is available to store and treat practically
any wastewater overflow from the central collection systems. This
backup could handle a number of days of the sewage without any
discharge to the environment.
Immediate Technical Assistance and Equipment Is Needed (Environmental
Regulation is Not Needed, Nor Appropriate)
Bay St. Louis has been helped through the recovery from the initial
moments following the hurricane. Numerous technical response crews have
been working in the community to restore water and sanitary service.
The city has had Mississippi Rural Water Circuit Riders working every
day for two weeks without break. Rural Water organized most of the
personnel logistics in Bay St. Louis and in the other coastal counties.
Rural Water Director Pete Boone and his staff were responsible for
coordinating much of the recovery and providing technical personnel.
Numerous utility crews have been working in Bay St. Louis from the City
of Pontotoc; Clearwater, Florida; Fort Myers, Florida; Davenport, Iowa;
Navy electricians (Seabees); Air Force Red Horse Squadron; American Gas
Association; Yankee Gas; the Town of Cornett, Mississippi; and others
that should mentioned.
What is needed in this crisis and future crises is immediate access
to technical personnel and equipment. Communities know the water is not
safe long before it is declared not in compliance, and no one wants to
restore safe water more than the local officials. We don't need someone
to tell us we must comply, but rather, we need the help and know-how to
fix the problem. The problem to solve is purely a RESOURCE problem not
a REGULATORY problem. This is why regulators are of little help in
these situations. The type of people that are needed are: experienced
operators, electricians, machinery crews, machine repair crews, expert
pipe repair personnel, contractors, etc. Mandating progress is easy; it
is the ``how-to'' that is hard and essential to limiting harm to public
health and the environment. For the ``how-to,'' the city relied on the
help from the previously mentioned volunteers.
From the mayor's perspective, water is about the most important
service for public welfare. Sanitation is critical, however, a
community can get by for some time with loss of sanitation. Electricity
is perhaps equally as critical as water, and the return of electrical
power is typically the sign that things are being pulled together, but
drinking water is an immediate and essential public health and welfare
service.
I was the second person Mayor Favre called after Katrina's impact
in Bay St. Louis. Using resources from the City of Pontotoc, our crews
loaded cargo trucks and city vehicles with backhoe tires and parts,
washers, refrigerators, buster pumps, chlorinator parts, baby food,
baby clothes, blankets, plastic tarp coverings, diesel fuel, oil, gas
cans, grills, cooking trailers, etc., along with four-man crews, and
immediately headed for Bay St. Louis. Pontotoc has been shifting in
three-man crews to Bay St. Louis and the neighboring hard hit city of
Waveland every four days.
These crews and the technical crews from the mentioned
organizations can operate heavy machinery, repair the machinery,
isolate and fix leaks, install and repair pumps, dig up mains, etc.
These crews have the experience to bring the water pressure up without
damaging other parts of systems. The process of valving off sections of
the system, repairing the lines, bleeding out the air, and returning
pressure takes skilled technical personnel. Repairing of backhoe tires
proved to be a desperately needed service and critical to recovering
water and sewer.
One technical field person from Florida reported the following when
asked what common technical assistance is needed in damaged
communities:
``Much more complicated [than just generators]. Electrical
components cleaned and replaced; control panels rebuilt;
electric motors and pumps replaced or rebuilt; bypass pumps
installed; generators wired direct; lift stations cleaned with
vacuums or jet cleaned; leaks located and repaired with
backhoes brought out from Florida; valves located and closed/
opened or valves inserted to isolate areas of system; lift
stations rebuilt; wastewater plants made to work with baling
wire, rubber bands, bubble gum, or anything laying around. For
example, wire is needed to bypass missing electrical controls
so crews can go into rubble of destroyed houses and pull out
wire to rewire water and wastewater plants. Think in terms of
50 McGuyvers doing whatever it takes to get water to folks and
stop wastewater in the streets, in the Gulf, etc. At one plant,
Florida crews walked around the destroyed warehouse/supply
building to find circuit boards, fuses, whatever they needed
and could find to get plant online. They even took circuit
boards found and cleaned up best they could, so they could be
used. These are master electricians, instrument techs, and top
professionals in there areas.''
Other crews from Pervis, Lamar County, and Monticello have
responded to other Gulf Coast communities. In all of their cases of
critical response, there was no approval process, forms, or red tape--
just neighboring communities (already familiar with each other through
participation in common associations, including municipal leagues and
rural water associations) responding with the know-how and immediacy
regardless of potential reimbursement.
What we have witnessed in this relief operation is the necessity of
familiarity among the needy and contributing communities. It has been
apparent that strangers can't have the relationship, familiarity, and
trust needed to be helpful in an emergency situation. Our two cities
have been working cooperatively for years, eliminating any learning
curve which could cause delayed response and the trust deep.
Working with partners in professional associations resulted in
access to a network of experts. The Rural Water Circuit Riders were
able to use their contacts across the state to acquire parts, plumbers,
gas technicians, pipe, etc., that only comes from networking in the
association of water and wastewater utilities. By networking within the
association of mayors, Bay St. Louis and other cites were able to find
immediate expert contractors and volunteer crews.
This familiarity and peer assessment/review also acts as a check
against any fraud. Because we have all of the leadership of the
communities in the state cooperative looking at the actions of all the
other communities, it acts as an effective self-policing filter (a
system of checks and balances).
Structural reasons that these volunteer and professional
associations were so critical and effective in responding to the crises
include:
The fact that the associations' functions are directly accountable to
their members (the communities), ensuring that they act in a
manner most favored and beneficial to the membership.
An understanding that time is a function of success (i.e., delayed
response can significantly harm the public). In Louisiana, the
EPA is conducting an in-depth assessment of every water supply
(even communities with no reported problems). This type of
inquiry has delayed what the communities believed was their
immediate pressing need for equipment and technical
assistance--to maximize public health protection. For example,
while the EPA was just starting their intensive reporting
assessment, communities where seeking out help where they could
get it, and couldn't wait for EPA to complete its assessment.
In Livingston Parish, a Circuit Rider found much of the
parish's utilities without energy immediately following the
hurricane. After coordinating with local officials, including
fire officials and parish emergency offices, to target the most
severely impacted utilities, the Circuit Rider was able to
communicate with those operators via Nex-Tel (all phone
communications were lost). Unable to procure water bladders
from FEMA or emergency organizations, he was able to find
approximately 20 water storage tanks and a colleague with a
flatbed tow truck and started delivering the filled, large
potable water storage containers to at least seven communities
(Port Vincent, Paradise Ponte Island, Springfield, Head of
Island, Killian, Bayview, and Vincent Acres). Working around
the clock to keep the containers filled (10-hour supply), the
pressure in the water systems was maintained. The tow truck
operator was able to lift the main container on the truck high
enough to create a siphon to fill the container left on-site.
All authority is localized. There is no need to seek approval from a
centralized hierarchy that is not in the middle of the
situation--and real-time changes to plans and polices can be
made to react to local conditions and variables.
What I have just described is the relief operations for
communities' environmental services. However, there has been an
allegorical response to our citizens' immediate individual human needs.
The local churches have been the main response on this level. We have
seen churches providing widespread operations to assist families and
individuals. I personally witnessed a caravan of 71 church vehicles
bringing relief to the Gulf Coast communities on one drive down highway
49 to Biloxi. In these communities, churches have been preparing meals
for citizens and law enforcement officials tired of eating MREs,
cooking on-site, carrying meals to people who won't leave their houses,
taking in refugees, and all other acts of human kindness. There is not
a church in my county that hasn't contributed to the relief.
Overall Assessment of Region's Environmental Impacts From Loss of Water
and Sewer Service
The assessments from Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are
detailed in the following appendix.
Mr. Bass. I thank you very much, Mayor Rutledge, and I just
want you to know on a personal note, I established, in my
hometown of Peterborough, New Hampshire, a program to adopt the
city of Collins, Mississippi. We have sent an assessment team
from Peterborough, New Hampshire down there. I wish you would
convey my best regards to Mayor V. O. Smith, who is a wonderful
fellow. My hometown of Peterborough is going to provide them,
we hope, with $100,000 in cash to help rebuild the town by the
end of October.
With that, I would like to move Dr. Ragone, please, sir.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN E. RAGONE
Mr. Ragone. Mr. Chairman, just a correction. I am the
Director of Science and Technology with the National Ground
Water Association, and Dr. Schnieders is a member of the
National Ground Water Association.
Mr. Bass. Fair enough. Please accept my apologies.
Mr. Ragone. Oh, I like that other group very much. Just for
the record, too, the NGWA is an organization of approximately
15,000 scientists, engineers, contractors, manufacturers, and
suppliers. Our overall mission is to provide and protect
groundwater.
What we have learned so far is that the situation resulting
from Hurricane Katrina is understandably chaotic. Our members
report that many of the hardest hit communities still do not
have electricity, generators, or operational water pumps. Some
report that access to these communities has been restricted.
We have learned that difficulties remain in contacting
local water supply employees. People with private wells, we are
told, have been left on their own to fix their water problems.
More than 230,000 residents in the impacted area rely on
private wells for drinking water. So far, we have heard that
saltwater is in some of these wells. NGWA members are in the
process of addressing these situations. We anticipate that
complaints of contamination, or water supply problems will be
reported as residents return home, and find they have no water
or poor water quality.
Reports from areas less impacted by the storm indicate that
strides are being made to return public and private water
systems to operation. A concern is whether the municipal
distribution infrastructure, the water pipes, remains intact,
as contamination could result through breaks in the
distribution pipes. Our members expect that the impact of the
hurricane will be minimal even in the heavily inundated areas,
for those who have properly constructed and maintained wells.
We are aware of efforts being taken to obtain baseline
information and provide assistance, and we have included that
in our longer written testimony. However, it is our general
impression from contacts with our members in the affected
region that communication problems, citizen displacement, and
other storm-related disruptions, have slowed efforts to
determine the scope of the problem, and to take corrective
measures. It appears that improved pre-disaster planning,
training, and coordination between government officials and
private sector water well professionals could have improved
response time. Planning, coordination, and training of local
officials and private sector entities prior to the disaster
seems to be a critical missing component in helping to make
recovery efforts more effective.
Although standard disinfection protocols are being
distributed by many agencies in the area, we believe that
additional disinfection protocols may be required, in order to
mitigate the varying levels of contamination. For example,
shock chlorination, the traditional approach to well
disinfection, does not always solve the problem for those with
inundated wells, or where general groundwater quality has been
impacted. In fact, shock chlorination can cause more long-term
harm than good. This is especially true when floodwaters
contain very high loads of sediment, debris, or chemical and
biological contaminants. Also, and very importantly, studies
have shown that older wells are more susceptible to
contamination and flooding, and may require different
decontamination protocols than more modern wells.
The National Ground Water Association, under a contract
with FEMA, presented a report to the agency in 2002, entitled
``Field Evaluation of Emergency Well Disinfection for
Contamination Events.'' This field study examined Hurricane
Floyd's impact on wells in North Carolina and adjacent Atlanta
coastal areas, and specifically, well-disinfection efficacy.
Some of the recommendations included in that report are
attached to my written testimony as Appendix 1.
The recommendations highlight our concern that a more
strategic, community-based approach is needed to prepare for
and respond to natural disasters and terrorist acts. If you
would like a copy of this report, we would be happy to provide
it. The NGWA has been working to provided needed information
and protocols for emergency response. We have developed website
products, certified professionals, offered training programs
and materials, as well as undertaken our own research to help
prepare the industry, well owners, and government officials.
However, we recognize that much more needs to be done. We
look forward to working with Federal, state, local, private
sector partners to fill research, training, and information
gaps. The NGWA is happy to have had the chance to participate
in this hearing. An important reason for being here, beyond our
concern about the immediate crisis caused by Hurricane Katrina,
is to encourage the development of a strategy that will ensure
immediate, cost effective, and appropriate community-based
responses to future disasters and terrorist acts that may
disrupt our drinking water supplies.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Stephen E. Ragone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen E. Ragone, Director of Science and
Technology, The National Ground Water Association
introduction
Good morning. My name is Dr. Stephen Ragone. I am the Director for
Science and Technology for the National Ground Water Association
(NGWA). The NGWA is an organization of approximately 15,000 scientists,
engineers, contractors, manufacturers and suppliers. The NGWA's overall
mission is to provide and protect ground water. I would first like to
thank the Committee for this opportunity to speak and acknowledge my
colleague, Dr. John Schnieders, principal chemist for Water Systems
Engineering, Inc. who helped me prepare these remarks.
Approximately 52% of Alabama's, 100% of Mississippi's and 75% of
Louisiana's populations regularly depend on ground water for their
drinking water supply.<SUP>1</SUP> Over 513,000 wells are used to
provide drinking water to the three states' residents (Table 1). Of
those, an estimated 234,545 household well systems in Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi counties are estimated to be in areas
impacted by Hurricane Katrina and are eligible for individual disaster
assistance funds from FEMA (Table 2). At this time we cannot provide
the Committee with a number of wells that have been flooded versus
other levels of impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. Geological Survey, March 2004 report on 2000 water use
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
what do we know
What we have learned so far is that the situation is,
understandably, chaotic. Our members report that many in the hardest
hit communities still do not have electricity, generators or
operational water pumps. Some report that access to these communities
has been restricted. There also have been reports of saltwater in some
wells. NGWA members are in the process of addressing these situations.
However, as more residents return, it is anticipated that complaints
will continue to come in when people find they have no water or poor
quality water. Reports from areas less impacted by the storm are that
strides are being made to return public and private water systems to
operation. A top concern is whether the municipal distribution
infrastructure--the water pipes ``remains intact as contamination could
result through breaks in the distribution pipes. We've heard that
difficulties remain in contacting water system employees. Members
expect that the impact of the hurricane will be minimal--even in
heavily inundated areas--for those who have properly constructed and
maintained wells.
We are also aware of efforts being undertaken to obtain baseline
information or provide assistance. For example the Louisiana Department
of Health and Hospitals, in conjunction with the U.S. EPA and the
Louisiana Rural Water Association, are offering free water testing to
residents in certain Louisiana parishes with flooded household wells.
As part of this effort, residents are being provided with information
on sample collection and water system disinfection. The U.S. EPA and
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) have
information regarding well-testing and disinfection on their website.
Additionally, the U.S. Geological Survey is testing wells in inundated
areas to assess whether brackish water has entered into the subsurface.
We also have reports that Louisiana DEQ is in the initial stages of
doing some VOCs testing. A report we received from the Louisiana
Department of Transportation and Development indicate they are
currently testing public water supplies but an inventory of flooded,
and or damaged domestic wells is not yet available. However, our
members in the Louisiana Ground Water Association reported that well
drillers are working around the clock to return household wells to
potability.
It is our general impression from contacts with our members in the
region that communication problems, other relief efforts, and citizen
displacement remain challenges to identifying the scope of the problem
and remediating affected wells. It appears that improved pre-disaster
planning, training, and coordination between government officials and
private sector water well professionals could have lessened the
challenges.
Planning, coordination, and training of local officials and private
sector entities prior to the disaster seem to be critical missing
components in helping to make existing efforts more effective. Beyond
initial and standard protocols being distributed, long-term strategies
should ensure that appropriate de-contamination protocols are available
for varying levels of contamination, well design, well size, and
hydrogeologic variables. For example, shock chlorination--the
traditional approach to well disinfection--does not always solve the
problem for those with inundated wells or where general ground water
quality has been impacted. In fact, shock chlorination can cause more
long-term harm than good. This is especially true when floodwaters
contain very high loads of sediment, debris, as well as, chemical and
biological contaminants. In such cases the wells, both public and
private, may require different and/or additional cleaning procedures.
This concern is exacerbated in several areas impacted by Hurricane
Katrina where refineries and other industries are present. Studies have
also shown that older wells are more susceptible to contamination and
flooding, and may require different approaches than more modern
wells.<SUP>2</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. A Survey of the
Quality of Wter Drawn from Domestic Wells in Nine Midwest States.
September 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
future strategies require coordination
The National Ground Water Association, under a contract with FEMA,
presented a report to the agency in 2002 entitled ``Field Evaluation of
Emergency Well Disinfection for Contamination Events.'' This field
study examined the 1999 Hurricane Floyd's impact on North Carolina and
adjacent Atlantic coastal areas--specifically well disinfection
efficacy. We also included in the report recommendations on how to
address household water wells in future natural and manmade disasters.
If you would like a copy of this report please let us know. (Appendix
I).
Our recommendations outline a plan that educates and trains local
private sector personnel to complement government efforts in a forward
thinking manner. We discuss the development of county/district teams
trained and equipped to evaluate, help and conduct needed immediate
repairs of wells as needed to restore private water supply function and
potability. These teams would include local government environmental
health staff, private-sector personnel experienced in well and pump
service and other people with specific knowledge of local ground water
quality and occurrence, such as hydrogeologists. The teams would be
trained in both evaluation and pump repair. Additionally, these teams
would work to train retail workers and ``neighborhood helpers'' who
work with pumps, plumbing, chemical selection and/or generally
mechanical to aide in post-emergency efforts. As for disinfection
efficacy, as discussed previously, there are standard disinfection
methods but it will be important that residents and water suppliers
follow the appropriate protocols for the appropriate water supply and
take into account contaminants present, size of well, aquifer hydraulic
conductivity, and flood water depth and quality. Local health and water
entities, both governmental and private-sector, should have this
information readily available for themselves and the public at large.
The NGWA has been working in this area. We have developed web site
products, certified professionals, offered training programs and
materials, as well as undertaken research to help prepare the industry,
well owners and government officials. However, more has to be done. We
are looking forward to working with our federal, state, local and
private sector partners to fill research, training and information gaps
and enhance state and local response planning.
The NGWA is happy to have had the chance to participate in this
hearing. An important reason for being here, beyond our concern about
the immediate crisis caused by Hurricane Katrina, is to encourage this
country to develop a strategy that will ensure immediate, cost-
effective and appropriate responses to future natural disasters or
terrorist's acts that disrupt our drinking water supplies. We look
forward to working with you and serving as a resource as more
information on the impacts of Katrina on ground water supplies is
collected and analyzed.
Table 1
State Well Numbers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Community Wells Household Wells
State \3\ \4\ Total for State
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama................................................ 764 201,111 201,875
Mississippi............................................ 2,712 122,452 125,164
Louisiana.............................................. 3,338 182,926 186,264
Total.................................................. 6,814 506,489 513,303
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ US EPA, 2004
\4\ Based on 1990 Census data, last year in which household wells were counted.
Table 2
Estimated Household Wells in Designated Disaster Counties
(counties where individual assistance available)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama Louisiana Mississippi
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baldwin......................... 11,902 Acadia............. 6,279 Adams............. 378
Greene.......................... 1,034 Ascension.......... 9,942 Amite............. 1,755
Hale............................ 1,301 Assumption......... 92 Attala............ 807
Mobile1......................... 4,708 Calcasieu.......... 10,012 Choctaw........... 200
Pickens......................... 1,378 Cameron............ 472 Claiborne......... 162
Tuscaloosa...................... 3,446 East Baton Rouge... 1,031 Clarke............ 1,144
Washington...................... 2,941 East Feliciana..... 1,041 Copiah............ 674
Iberia............. 4,392 Covington......... 414
Iberville.......... 638 Forrest........... 853
Jefferson.......... 54 Franklin.......... 1,280
Jefferson Davis.... 1,904 George............ 4,289
Lafayette.......... 13,311 Greene............ 1,323
Lafourche.......... 3 Hancock........... 5,424
Livingston......... 7,874 Harrison.......... 12,726
Orleans............ 1,024 Hinds............. 1,246
Plaquemines........ 37 Jackson........... 8,723
Pointe Coupee...... 1,162 Jasper............ 199
St. Bernard........ 10 Jefferson......... 142
St. Charles........ 33 Jefferson Davis... 352
St. Helena......... 1,016 Jones............. 640
St. James.......... 56 Kemper............ 184
St. John........... 239 Lamar............. 1,470
St. Martin......... 2,482 Lauderdale........ 2,276
St. Mary........... 441 Lawrence.......... 483
St. Tammany........ 21,787 Leake............. 860
Tangipahoa......... 14,035 Lincoln........... 4,372
Terrebonne......... 23 Lowndes........... 3,167
Vermilion.......... 9,867 Madison........... 506
Washington......... 6,594 Marion............ 1,757
West Baton Rouge... 147 Neshoba........... 599
West Feliciana..... 59 Newton............ 1,603
Noxubee........... 1,128
Oktibbeha......... 320
Pearl River....... 5,957
Perry............. 870
Pike.............. 4,344
Rankin............ 871
Scott............. 487
Simpson........... 736
Smith............. 329
Stone............. 1,594
Walthall.......... 2,204
Warren............ 389
Wayne............. 1,388
Wilkinson......... 499
Winston........... 180
Yazoo............. 474
36,710 116,057 81,778
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix I
excerpt from field evaluation of emergency well disinfection for
contamination events: final project report
plan for returning water supply wells inundated by flood
The following is a set of recommendations for planning and
implementing a program of returning water supply wells inundated by
flood to potable status. Implementing these activities will require
coordination among county departments and among local jurisdictions,
the state, and supporting federal agencies such as FEMA, and also with
the private sector. An appropriate organizational umbrella under which
this process could operate is state/county emergency management.
1. In each county/district of local government environmental
health, teams will be trained and equipped to evaluate, help and
conduct needed immediate repairs of wells as needed to restore private
water supply function and potability. The team should include
government environmental health staff, private-sector personnel
experienced in well and pump service, and other people with specific
knowledge of local ground water quality and occurrence, such as
hydrogeologists. The teams need to be trained in both a) evaluation and
expedient fixes (pump repair) and b) human interaction (customer
relations). Private sector team's members should be on retainer or
standing purchase order.
2. These teams in turn should train a) retail workers, such as
those working in hardware stores and home-improvement superstores who
work with pumps, plumbing, and chemical selection and b) ``neighborhood
helpers''--those people found in any neighborhood or community who are
capable, helpful and competent in fixing things--to assist people with
basic pump repair and well disinfection. Train them to safely and
effectively deal with the well problems that do not require contractor
equipment, such as jet pump repair or shallow well disinfection, the
specifics of safety issues, and water sampling. Such trained personnel,
upon passing a practical examination, would be awarded a limited-time
certification in emergency water supply assistance. The local
environmental health agency would maintain and publicize a current list
of stores with such certified personnel available. Certified
neighborhood helpers would identify themselves to emergency response
personnel and neighbors, and be known to well ERP team members. All
such responders must be insured or otherwise protected under state
``good Samaritan'' provisions to the extent appropriate.
3. Draft and supply simply worded and illustrated fact sheets with
detailed recommendations for safe pump function restoration, well
flushing, and well disinfection, with versions in both English and
widely used secondary languages such as Spanish.
4. In support of activities triggered under the local well
restoration ERP:
A. Have wells spotted and located on county GIS plat maps, with a
database of essential well characteristics (type, depth,
diameter). Hard-copy maps and GIS electronic file backups
should be generated regularly, made available to the well
response teams, and stored safely in case of emergency.
B. Collect data on hydrogeology (aquifer tapped by wells, protective
layers, water tables) and a suite of physical-chemical and
microbial ecology parameters that provide a basis for
understanding an ambient baseline condition. With such an
ambient baseline recorded, deviations from the expected
hydrogeochemical profile of a well can be recognized, even if
basic regulatory parameters are negative or inconclusive.
Include this hydrogeochemical data in the GIS database and as
map layers for use by the well ERP team.
C. The plan should include a well triage strategy for use in the event
of an emergency, as follows:
Start with a rapid survey (aided by having wells finely located)
to assess the situation and to formulate a response.
Accurately mark and bypass 2-in. deep wells with in-line jets,
and 2-in. jetted or driven wells, and other wells requiring
specific training and equipment to restore. Have people
pump them, but leave treatment or replacement to an
equipped contractor.
Instruct people on how to treat shallow bored wells.
Sample wells for total coli form once restored to function and
pumped. Certified helpers would supplement environmental
health in this.
Plan and implement follow-up testing and additional response,
such as ordering and assisting impaired well replacement.
5. Equip response teams as follows:
A. A supply of pump sets for circulating chlorine and pumping, equipped
as needed (hoses, valves, fittings) and working. Include a
generator, tools, parts and instructions to install functional
systems on typical installations. Provide and periodically
update reliable telephone numbers for troubleshooting and
installation assistance.
B. As only Ca(OCl)2 has a lengthy shelf life (when stored cool and
dry), keep some of this on hand in various forms for use until
trucks can bring in sodium hypochlorite. Include any associated
treatment chemicals such as vinegar for acidizing. Rotate
stocks semiannually. Have on hand measuring cups and laminated
sheets with information on dosing volumes for wells by diameter
and depth.
C. Well water testing equipment similar to that used in this study--
maintained, calibrated, and with fresh batteries--and sampling
supplies for (limited) onsite and laboratory analysis of TC,
nitrates, and selected other contaminants. Testing should be
part of triage and follow up.
6. Local environmental health jurisdictions should aggressively
work to reduce the number of substandard and unsafe private water
supplies vulnerable to flooding inundation.
A. Begin a public information campaign to educate well owners and users
about safe and unsafe or vulnerable water supplies and how they
can be tested and improved.
B. Deficiencies in specific well and pump installations (poorly
designed, vulnerable to inundation or damage during credible
flooding events, or otherwise unsafe in addition to not meeting
state rules) identified during mapping efforts should be called
to the attention of property owners and responsible parties,
with procedures and schedules for resolution provided.
7. This inspection and response plan should have a regular review
and revision cycle with measurable goals set.
Immediate Response and Prioritizing Follow-up Response
1. Determine that an emergency exists, assess its magnitude and
implement the well restoration ERP elements appropriate to the
emergency.
2. Broadcast instructions for safely restoring well function and
activate the network of certified well responders and professional
contractors. Make instructions for disinfection that can be attempted
by well owners and contacts for assistance available to affected
residents.
3. As soon as it is safe, well ERP teams begin the reconnaissance
to determine necessary responses for specific wells and assign them to
the appropriate responders. Use the predetermined well designations
from disaster-preparedness inspections (Section 7.1).
A. Inform residents of the response plan and schedule. Provide a point
of contact for residents, and assist them as needed in
obtaining emergency potable and wash water.
B. In a site visit: 1) Identify and record (narrated video or by
photography with notation) problems for follow up later. 2) As
soon as possible, restore well function and instruct residents
to pump wells several hours to clear contamination. 3) Sample
for contamination parameters.
4. If analysis results indicate that contamination has occurred (or
may have occurred), implement disinfection as follows.
Emergency Disinfection Methods
While disinfection procedures are somewhat specific to the
individual well's dimensions, design and conditions, the following are
general requirements of emergency disinfection in response to
inundation.
1. As needed, restore pump function as needed and pump inundated
wells clear for several hours to clear dirt and flood water
contaminants. Do not pump flush water through treatment and
distribution systems, but discharge from the first flushing tap. The
time required is dependent on well size, aquifer hydraulic
conductivity, and flood water depth and quality. As few as three hours
and as many as 24 may be needed, and reasonable numbers should be
determined for local conditions.
2. In a clean mixing tank or container, mix a solution with 100 mg/
L (ppm) chlorine, maximized for hypochlorous acid: In the appropriate
volume (one well bore volume--determine by well diameter, depth, and
depth to water level) of clean water, acidify with white distilled
food-grade vinegar or more concentrated food-grade acetic acid to
approximately pH 5.9 (varies according to water pH and buffering
capacity). Then mix in the sodium hypochlorite solution (generally 5-12
%) volume needed to make a 100-ppm solution. Adjust pH as needed to pH
6.5 or less. Alternative: Use powdered or granular calcium hypochlorite
for chlorine and muriatic or sulfamic acid for acidifier. People
conducting this mixing must be trained in the specific chemical safety
issues of these chemicals and mixtures and their use and be equipped to
avoid injury and to respond to spills.
3. Drain or pump to the bottom of the well.
4. Start agitation or pumping to pull solution upward throughout
the water column.
5. Allow to react up to 24 hr.
6. Pump off to waste, avoiding environmental harm, until measured
total chlorine is <0.2 mg/L.
7. Conduct water system disinfection per state rules or
recommendations.
8. After one week, test for total coli form bacteria and nitrates.
In the interim, instruct residents to boil water for drinking and
cooking. Exception: Boiling should be avoided if a history of high
nitrates exists, substitute filtration.
9. If wells are substandard at inspection, or do not respond to
treatment, follow up with action to require replacement or repair, and
provide the appropriate assistance to make this happen.
Specific steps for a 2-in in-line jet well)
1. Pump clear 3 well volumes or fresh ground water by parameters
2. Mix in large plastic tubs: vinegar for acidifying and sufficient
NaOCl to treat 2 well volumes
3. Pull in-well pipe and jet (inspect and clean)
4. Displace in chlorine solution: Air used to displace solution
downward and a bailer to pull solution upward through the water column
5. Wait 24 hr
6. Reinstall pump components and hook up jet pump
7. Pump off to clear
8. Pump one well volume + after Cl is < 0.2 mg/L and test for TC
and ion parameters.
9. In one week, test for indicator parameters.
Specific steps for a bored well:
1. In clean, new 32-gallon plastic trash cans, mix vinegar and
NaOCl or Ca(OCl)2 to make a well-bore volume of 100-mg/L solution, and
permit residues to settle.
2. Pump well down and clear.
3. Dose with chlorine solution and brush well walls
4. Let refill if slow to respond after emptying
5. Recirculate with jet pump
6. Wait 24 hr
7. Pump clear (to < 0.2 mg/L by chlorine test kit)
8. Pump more than one well volume, then test for indicator
parameters
Follow up
1. Take steps to replace vulnerable and substandard well water
supplies, with specific plans, goals and schedules, developed through
consultation with the public, regulatory officials, stakeholders, and
funding sources, and prevent installation of at-risk private water
supplies in the future.
2. Review the well restoration ERP and its implementation and make
adjustments needed.
The above recommended protocols should be viewed as being
preliminary and subject to review and revision by the implementing
agencies.
Mr. Bass. Thank you very much, Dr. Ragone. Mr. Olson, you
are next.
STATEMENT OF ERIK D. OLSON
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and thanks for inviting me to testify. I am with the
Natural Resources Defense Council, but I also wanted to mention
that we have been working closely with a variety of
organization from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, to get
input in daily calls and so on, with Dr. Beverly Wright, to my
left, and with a variety of other groups, including Louisiana
Environmental Network and many others that are expert in
observing what is happening every day.
We believe that Katrina really is, perhaps, the single
worst environmental catastrophe that has ever befallen the
United States from a natural disaster. And obviously, there
have been many environmental disasters, but the impacts of
this, we are just beginning to learn. We have heard a lot of
anecdotal reports, at least, of health effects in people that
have been exposed, police officers, first responders, and the
public that are reporting rashes and blisters, as a result of
touching some of the water. Open sores that are not responsive
to antibiotics. Fumes that are causing asthma and respiratory
problems.
We strongly believe that this shouldn't just be anecdotal
reporting. There should be ongoing surveillance of people that
are going back into these communities. We have heard about a
young man who went into some of the water with hip waders, and
had a small amount of water splashed into his hip wading boots,
and came out with blisters the same day. So, clearly, there are
problems. There is not safe drinking water, as we just heard
EPA testify, for, I believe they said 2.3 million people to
this day. In New Orleans proper, the water is not safe to
drink, yet hundreds of thousands of people are being told that
they can come back into town.
American Water Works Association last week released an
estimate that it was going to cost $2.25 billion just to
rehabilitate the drinking water supplies in this area. There
are widespread toxins as well. What I have primarily been
talking about are some of the bacterial and related problems,
but the toxic problems and the oil spills are a serious issue.
By some counts, we heard just moments ago a witness say that it
was around 400 oil and hazardous chemical spills. Previous
estimates posted on government websites were there were 575
recorded oil and hazardous chemical spills, over 7 million
gallons being spilled.
Just imagine 350,000 automobiles that have been destroyed
by this. How much oil, how much gasoline, how many toxic
substances are released there? Also, hundreds of industrial
facilities, dozens of hazardous waste and other related
facilities that were inundated. We are very concerned about the
long term effects of this.
I wanted to mention a couple of important points. One is
the air monitoring that has been released. I have in my
testimony a table, which is derived directly from the EPA's
website. On page 3 of our testimony, we compare the levels of
benzene, a known human carcinogen, and a toxin to the human
system, we compare the levels measured by EPA in New Orleans
proper, to the 2 week safety standard, in other words, the
standard that you could be safely exposed to for around 2
weeks. That safety standard is five parts per billion, and over
half of the samples taken in the city were over that standard.
And we list many sites where it was more than double the safety
standard.
We are very concerned that some public statements of the
agency official suggest that it is safe to return, yet their
own monitoring is showing that it is well over the 2 week, or
so-called intermediate safety standard. It might be safe to go
in for a day and come back out, but it is not safe to stay
there for a period of time.
In addition, returning citizens are really not getting the
kind of information they need about what is safe and what is
not. We just heard witnesses say that it is the local
government's responsibility ultimately. We strongly disagree
with that. We believe that the Federal Government, the Federal
EPA, has the legal authority and the responsibility, both as a
legal matter and as a moral matter, to make sure that when
people are returning to these communities, that they are going
to get accurate information, and that they will be safe.
Certainly, I am sure as Dr. Wright will testify to, we are
very concerned about the disproportionate effects of some of
these toxins. We are concerned that cleanup be certain to clean
up the low income and African-American communities, as well as
the rest of the community. We want to make sure there is full
community involvement in those cleanup decisions.
We need expanded testing. The testing EPA showed up on the
map just moments ago is certainly, there are a lot of samples
that have been taken in New Orleans proper. What about the
hundreds of other locations where there are industrial
facilities, all across the three states? What about all of the
locations where we know drinking water supplies are knocked
out? What about all the underground storage tanks that have
been knocked out? What about the millions of gallons that have
been spilled elsewhere? Are we monitoring that, and making that
information available to the public in Mississippi, in Alabama,
in locations other than New Orleans?
And finally, I wanted to summarize the other major concerns
we have, including the enormous amount of debris, 100 million
cubic yards by some estimates, of debris. Is that going to be
burned, as some are suggesting? It is a very deep concern that
if there is going to widespread open burning. And in addition,
we are very concerned that the cleanup standards be very high,
and that we not adopt wide waivers. We heard EPA say that they
have not yet identified any need for broad waivers. We have
identified no need, and we are happy to submit to the record
the numerous examples of waivers that are already allowed under
current law.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Erik D. Olson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Erik D. Olson, Senior Attorney, Natural Resources
Defense Council
Introduction
Thank you for the opportunity to present testimony today. I am Erik
D. Olson, a Senior Attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), a national non-profit public interest organization dedicated to
the protection of public health and the environment, with over 500,000
members. As part of my work at NRDC, I have been helping to coordinate
our response to Katrina. We have been working closely in this effort
with a large number of other environmental, environmental justice,
public health, medical, water industry [what's ``water industry''??],
and other groups, including many organizations from Louisiana and
Mississippi. I am in daily touch with hurricane survivors and with
experts and others who are tracking the effects of this devastating
storm, including my son who is assisting with hurricane relief efforts
in Louisiana. In addition, I serve as chair of the Campaign for Safe &
Affordable Drinking Water, an alliance of over 300 public health,
consumer, medical, nursing, environmental, and other groups that works
to ensure that all Americans have safe drinking water, and that has
taken a special interest in the impacts of Katrina. Today, however, I
appear only on behalf of NRDC.
Mr. Chairman and other members of the Subcommittee, Katrina is
perhaps the single worst environmental catastrophe ever to befall the
United States as a result of a natural disaster. As any of the brave
and stalwart citizens of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama who
survived Hurricane Katrina will tell you, this disaster has left an
indelible mark on them and their families, communities, and
environment. The loss of human life and widespread human misery that
Katrina caused and continues to cause as we sit in this room today, are
simply unfathomable.
I have been asked today to focus on the environmental effects of
Katrina--and in particular on the potential effects of toxins in the
storm-ravaged area. Specifically, I intend to focus primarily on the
known and potential human health effects of the widespread releases of
raw sewage, petroleum, and other toxins into the environment.
Reports of Severe Pollution and Illnesses
We are receiving regular, albeit anecdotal, reports of police,
rescue workers, and ordinary people who have returned to or stayed in
flooded areas and have become ill after contact with the flood water or
muck. Reports of rashes and blisters where skin has contacted polluted
water, infected sores that are not responsive to antibiotics, nausea,
and vomiting are legion. Respiratory problems--including asthma among
many people exposed to fumes in contaminated areas--also are being
reported.
One woman's brother returned to his home to try to recover a few
belongings, only to vomit three times upon entering the home due to the
stench of sewage, decay, and chemicals. I spoke to the mother of a
young man who wore hip waders into floodwaters, but whose skin came in
contact with the toxic water. The same day, he developed a rash and
blisters where his skin had touched the water. We have heard from many
local citizens about police officers and other emergency workers who
have come into contact with the polluted flood water, only to develop
rashes and other symptoms. The long-term effects of this toxic exposure
are unknown, and of profound concern to us and to many local citizens.
One public health nurse working with the Red Cross spoke to us and
reported that she had seen, by her count, over a thousand evacuees in
Mississippi, but she had no tetanus or hepatitis vaccine to give to
evacuees who were planning to return home to their water-soaked
communities.
As the flood water recedes, and the toxin-laced sediment and
residue dries, a fine dust begins to swirl with wind or disturbance.
This fine, toxic dust presents a serious risk to citizens if inhaled.
In many of the hardest-hit areas, people returning home do not have
access to emergency medical services, nor to nearby health clinics,
physicians, or hospital emergency rooms. Communications also remain
difficult. It is therefore difficult to determine how widespread and
serious these problems are, but it is likely that many people are
suffering without appropriate medical care. There is an urgent need for
better-coordinated and more comprehensive medical care and for ongoing
disease surveillance.
There are enormous health hazards from the runoff, which contains
staggering quantities of untreated human and animal waste and decaying
plants and animals. These risks are particularly pronounced as hundreds
of thousands of people return to areas where the muck and standing
water are a teeming stew of parasites and dangerous bacteria.
Spills and Leaks of Oil and Toxic Chemicals are Numerous and Widespread
According to U.S. Coast Guard and EPA data, as of September 18, 575
Katrina-related spills of petroleum or hazardous chemical had been
reported. Just eleven significant spills released approximately 7
million gallons of oil, a portion of which was contained or cleaned up,
but much of which was not.
We also understand that there are 350,000 or more ruined
automobiles and other vehicles caught by the flooding that will have to
be dealt with. The amount of gasoline and toxic fluids in these
vehicles alone is enough to give one pause; if each gas tank contained
approximately 8 gallons of gasoline, this adds nearly 3 million
additional gallons to the 7 million-gallon total noted above. By
comparison, 11 million gallons of oil were released in the Exxon Valdez
disaster.
Moreover, at least four Superfund hazardous waste sites in the New
Orleans area were hit by the storm. Across the storm-ravaged areas of
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama dozens of other toxic waste sites,
major industrial facilities, ports, barges, and vessels that handle
enormous quantities of oil and hazardous chemicals took a direct blow
from Katrina.
In addition to oil and chemical spills, and potential releases from
toxic waste or industrial facilities, one major source of toxins that
has received very little public attention to date is the toxic sediment
that has accumulated at the bottom of many of the lakes, rivers, and
streams in industrialized areas over many decades due to industrial
spills. These toxic underwater hotspots have long been of concern to
state and federal officials. According to experts with whom we have
spoken in Louisiana, many of these toxic hotspots have now been stirred
up, and toxic sediment has been re-suspended, and re-deposited across
large land areas, including in residential communities, by storm surge
and floodwater.
To date, virtually no public information is available about toxic
chemical levels in areas outside of New Orleans area. Moreover, there
have been virtually no public reports of the results of chemical
testing or inspections of storm-damaged industrial facilities outside
of this immediate area.
EPA Monitoring Shows Dangerous Levels of Air Contamination from Spills
& Releases, but Agency Public Statements Offer Misleading
Reassurances to the Public About Safety
Agency data also show that elevated levels of toxic chemicals such
as benzene and xylene, in some cases levels above the 24-hour safety
limits, have been found in the air adjacent to spills.
Perhaps more troublingly, EPA has released air monitoring data from
its Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyser (TAGA) buses and other monitors used
across New Orleans, showing that contaminants are at unsafe levels for
rehabitating certain parts of the city. NRDC has reached this
conclusion by comparing benzene monitoring results, posted on EPA's web
site, to levels that the National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences (NIEHS) established to protect people from intermediate-term
(e.g., two-week) exposures to this chemical--a level of 4 ppb.
Significantly, in 25% of the areas sampled in New Orleans, EPA
monitoring shows levels of benzene more then twice this NIEHS
intermediate safety level. Yet EPA's charts and discussions on its
website only compare elevated air pollution levels to the much higher
(50 ppb) acute NIEHS safety level--that is, to a level that is only
considered safe for very short-term (e.g., 24-hour) exposure. Moreover,
no air or other sampling has been publicly reported for most areas
around spills or chemical facilities outside of New Orleans.
New Orleans Sampling Locations with More than Twice the NIEHS Safe Level
of Exposure for Benzene
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Location PPB
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Murphy Oil Refinery....................................... 88.0-170.0
LaSalle and Tulane Ave.................................... 8.2
Weidman and Monroe........................................ 8.5
Tall Timbers before Silver Maple Ct....................... 8.6
Cleveland St. and South Johnson........................... 18.0
Barataria Blvd between Jessie St. and Rt. 18.............. 11.0
N. Rampart and Canal...................................... 14.0
Wall Blvd and Pace........................................ 15.0
Tullis and Woodland near Cypress Grove Ct................. 15.3
Glenwood Drive & Fairmont................................. 11.0
Avenue A and Hector....................................... 21.0
Duplessis St. and Park St................................. 16.5
E. Maple Ridge Dr. and Maple Ridge Oak.................... 9.0
Convention Center Blvd.................................... 9.8
Oak Lawn and Veterans..................................... 8.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: NRDC compared sampled concentrations to safe levels (4 ppb) for
exposure over a two week period as calculated by NIEHS. This
comparison is discussed in our testimony.
Despite the inadequacy of these test results, EPA asserts in its
public materials that, ``[t]he screening results indicated that
chemical concentrations in most areas are below ATSDR health standards
of concern.'' http://www.epa.gov/katrina/testresults/air/taga.html.
These kinds of agency statements have undoubtedly led to widespread
confusion and may have misled the public and local officials about the
safety of returning to polluted areas.
Returning Citizens and Many Responders Do Not Understand the Risks and
Are Not Using Protective Clothing or Gear
In light of the lack of adequate and accurate public information,
people are returning to toxin-soaked areas without understanding the
risks, and without being provided the proper protections, warnings, or
knowledge. We are extremely concerned that there may be widespread
illnesses and toxic exposure effects as toxin-soaked areas are
repopulated.
Many citizens are returning to petroleum or other toxin-tainted
areas, generally using no masks or special protective clothing. EPA
data show that not only does air pollution present a risk, but flood
waters contain high levels of bacteria and other waterborne pathogens
from raw sewage, and in many areas contain elevated levels of
petroleum, lead, and other toxins.
Many people--both ordinary citizens and emergency workers or police
personnel--are breathing petroleum vapors, swishing through petroleum
and other toxin-polluted water, or cleaning up polluted homes,
businesses, and debris, with little or no personal protection. Whereas
contract cleanup workers don Tyvek ``moon suits'' to go about their
business of cleaning up oil and hazmat spills, the public generally is
using no protection even though they may well experience dangerous
levels of exposure. The National Contingency Plan and EPA and OSHA
regulations require that anyone working on response to an oil or
hazardous substance spill be provided with appropriate protective gear,
and contract cleanup workers are in some cases wearing protective gear.
But according to reports we have received, many local police and other
emergency workers in the area are not wearing protection such as
respirators and protective clothing.
Environmental Injustices Will be Exacerbated Unless Cleanup and
Rebuilding Changes
There is a longstanding legacy of unfair and disproportionate toxic
exposures to low income, predominantly African American communities in
the New Orleans area and in much of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama. This has resulted from years of industrial activity and waste
disposal practices that hit these communities far harder than higher
income, predominantly white communities. TRI and superfund facilities
are located more often in low income areas and therefore are at greater
risk to post-Katrina exposure. As cleanup proceeds and rebuilding
begins, every effort must be made to remedy these environmental
injustices through full cleanup, fair rebuilding practices, and full
partnership with affected communities.
Toxics Testing Must Be Enormously Expanded, and Results Must Be Widely
and Immediately Disseminated in a Publicly Accessible Format
EPA has released a limited amount of water, sediment, and air
testing for the New Orleans area. There are literally hundreds of
reported oil and toxics spills, industrial waste dumps, and industrial
facilities that handle substantial quantities of toxic chemicals across
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama that were hit hard by Katrina, but
for which there has been no reported toxics testing.
In addition, even in those areas around New Orleans that were
tested, often only a few samples have been reported for most locations,
triggering concern that as water recedes or washes in from other
locations, as re-flooding from Rita occurs, as leaks or spills spread,
as waste leaches, or as other conditions change, toxic levels are
likely to change as well.
We also are deeply concerned that EPA has delayed reporting many of
its test results. As hundreds of thousands of people are returning to
evacuated communities, it is critical that EPA release its data
immediately upon receiving them, to assure that the public and local
officials are informed about the risks.
In addition, we have heard from many local citizens that EPA's
method of releasing the test results--on the web--is not an effective
way to get information to the vast majority of evacuees who do not have
internet access and are often not able to digest and understand the
data. EPA and CDC's press conference warning of the risks of coming
into contact with the flood waters was helpful, but came so long ago
that it is for many a distant memory that does not touch upon the
hazards today from the water, sediments, mold and other toxins citizens
are likely to encounter as they return.
The lack of regular, understandable, and repeatedly-reiterated
information through the mainstream media about the toxics threats and
the need to take appropriate precautions (e.g. rubber boots, Tyvek
suits, masks or respirators, impermeable gloves) is likely to lead to
continued widespread misunderstandings and health threats.
EPA and Federal Officials Have ``Punted'' Their Responsibility to
Assure the Safety of Returnees
EPA is the nation's primary repository of expertise and regulatory
and enforcement authority for controlling and responding to
environmental toxin threats to the public's health. As such, the agency
must assume the responsibility for assuring, after the massive spills
and releases of oil and hazardous substances in the wake of Katrina,
that the health of citizens living in or returning to the affected
communities is fully protected.
Under such laws as the Clean Water Act (CWA), Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, or Superfund), and Oil
Pollution Act (OPA), and under its own National Contingency Plan (NCP)
regulations, EPA bears the lead responsibility for evaluating and
acting to remedy environmental health threats. With respect to the
Katrina response, EPA has the legal authority and both the moral and
legal obligation to ensure that the health of citizens potentially
exposed to toxic chemicals as a result of hazardous substance or oil
releases is fully protected.
The NCP regulations impose numerous obligations on the agency to
ensure that its response to releases of hazardous substances or oil
protect exposed citizens. For example, the NCP requires that after an
oil spill, ``[d]efensive actions shall begin as soon as possible to
prevent, minimize, or mitigate threat(s) to the public health or
welfare of the United States or the environment.'' 40 C.F.R.
300.310(a)(emphasis added). Similarly, if ``the discharge poses or may
present a substantial threat to public health or welfare of the United
States, the [EPA representative] shall direct all federal, state, or
private actions to remove the discharge or to mitigate or prevent the
threat of such a discharge, as appropriate.'' Id. 300.322(b)(emphasis
added).
Similarly, under RCRA section 7003(c)(emphasis added),
Upon receipt of information that there is hazardous waste at
any site which has presented an imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health or the environment, the [EPA]
Administrator shall provide immediate notice to the appropriate
local government agencies. In addition, the Administrator shall
require notice of such endangerment to be promptly posted at
the site where the waste is located.
Thus, it is not only EPA's moral obligation to assure that citizens
potentially at risk from an oil or hazardous substance release are
adequately warned and protected, but also the agency's legal
obligation.
Unfortunately, EPA apparently has decided to ``punt'' to local
authorities the responsibility to protect citizens' health in the wake
of the massive Katrina-related oil and hazardous chemical releases.
Generally, these local authorities do not have a significant staff of
environmental health experts available, nor do they enjoy access to the
array of expertise and scientific information that EPA has. They also
are under enormous political pressure to allow rapid repopulation of
the toxin-soaked areas.
EPA has repeatedly stated that it is not the agency's obligation to
decide whether environmental conditions in New Orleans and other areas
affected by toxins and oil pollution are so dangerous as to warrant
continued quarantine or additional cleanup prior to general
repopulation of the affected areas. Instead, EPA and FEMA say these
decisions are a local responsibility. EPA has even refused to make an
explicit public statement about whether it is safe for the public to
return to New Orleans and other hard-hit areas. The agency has neither
the legal nor the moral right to pass the buck in this way,
particularly since local authorities are working under difficult
conditions, with communication limitations, displaced staff and other
unimaginable challenges.
Enormous Debris Disposal Operations, Including Proposals for Open
Burning, Pose Huge Hazards
According to recent reports, an estimated 100 million cubic yards
of debris have been generated by Katrina--enough to cover over 1,000
football fields 50-feet-deep with waste. This far exceeds the waste
generated by any previous hurricane, and dwarfs the 1.5 million tons of
debris from the World Trade Center attacks on 9/11.While some of this
debris is merely downed trees or vegetation, much of it is destroyed
housing, commercial buildings, 350,000 ruined vehicles, and a wide
array of other detritus, much of which has been soaked by petroleum or
other toxic chemicals, and much of which is intermixed with plastics
and other materials that will become toxic if burned. Disposal of this
material presents an enormous challenge with no easy answers.
Clearly, every effort must be made to recycle what can be salvaged.
For example, ``white goods'' such as refrigerators, washers, dryers,
air conditioners, etc., should, if possible, be recycled and any Freon
removed. Steel and scrap metal from ruined vehicles and many destroyed
structures also can be recycled. But clearly, there is not yet a
disposal site for much of the rest of the waste. Reportedly, contracts
for over a billion dollars for debris hauling and disposal have been
issued.
The open burning of some debris has already begun, according to
eyewitness accounts. In addition, state officials have begun to waive
air pollution requirements and open burning bans. Much of the burning
will occur in open pits with ``air curtains,'' which have been
advertised to control air emissions. Yet air curtains do not collect
the air pollution--they blow air over the fire to improve oxygen flow
and burning efficiency, but they do not collect the fumes or smoke.
There are a few mobile incinerators with air pollution controls, but
clearly these incinerators do not have adequate capacity to handle most
of the debris.
We are deeply concerned about the public health impacts of
widespread open burning of materials that are likely to generate large
amounts of toxic gases and particulate matter. There are anecdotal
reports that open burning of debris after previous hurricanes lead to
increases in admissions to hospitals due to respiratory ailments.
People whose health is already threatened by immediate exposure to
toxins from spills and leaks and polluted water will only be put at
greater risk.
Waste industry experts report that waste is being hauled to staging
areas across Mississippi and Louisiana, and that Katrina waste disposal
will occur not only in these states but also throughout the South. It
is important that such disposal not add to the health threats and
environmental injustices already suffered by many low-income and
minority communities. For example, the Agriculture Street landfill in
New Orleans, a controversial Superfund site that already threatened the
health of a low income, predominantly African American community,
received much of the waste from previous hurricanes, and was flooded
after the recent levy breaks. As we plan the disposal strategy for
wastes left by Katrina, we must consider the very real possibility that
future storms will similarly inundate local disposal sites.
Ecological Impacts of Katrina and Rita
We are not only concerned about the enormous public health risks
posed by Katrina and exacerbated by Rita, but also the ecological
effects of these storms. The associated spills, storm surge, and
floodwaters often have carried salt water and pollution into sensitive
and ecologically important waters and marshes that serve as the nursery
for many rare birds, as well as fish, shrimp, and other forms of life.
Reports are beginning to trickle in that serious saltwater
contamination of freshwater wetlands is widespread in the storm-ravaged
areas. In addition, huge oil and hazardous substance spills are likely
to add to the adverse impacts. It is important that recovery efforts
address these problems, and that natural resource damage assessments
are funded and completed to determine the extent of the harm.
Cleanup and Rebuilding Should Proceed With Strong Health Protections;
Waivers of Environmental Laws Would Kick Hurricane Victims
While They Are Down
New Orleans and the other storm-ravaged areas of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama must be cleaned up and rebuilt to become
healthy, thriving communities once again. Throughout this effort,
cleanup standards and other health safeguards must be kept strong, to
assure that people made vulnerable by the storm are not further
threatened by inadequate cleanups or irresponsible reconstruction
practices.
Accordingly, we and the local citizens with whom we have been in
constant contact strongly oppose proposals to weaken cleanup or
pollution standards--in the Gulf states or anywhere else in the
country. Such an approach would kick these communities while they are
down. It also would unnecessarily and unjustifiably threaten public
health and the environment in other parts of the country. Already,
there are several harmful bills introduced in Congress that would allow
further harm to the health of the hurricane victims, while jeopardizing
public health and environmental safeguards across the nation. While
there may be the need for very limited, time-restricted waivers of
certain requirements in consultation with the public, current law
provides such authorities to EPA and often to state authorities.
Sweeping waivers or weakening of current health and environmental
protections are ill-advised and will only further hurt the victims of
Katrina and Rita.
Local Citizens, Including Low-Income and Predominantly African-American
Communities, Should Be Fully Informed and Integrated into
Cleanup and Rebuilding Decisions
It is critically important that local citizens be fully informed
about the risks they face, and that these citizens be included as full
partners in cleanup and rebuilding decisions. Involvement of all
communities, including the low-income and predominantly African
American communities hardest hit by Katrina, is critically important to
a successful rebuilding effort. The National Contingency Plan requires
public disclosure of information and involvement in cleanup and
response efforts, and many federal laws, such as RCRA and CERCLA, as
well as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), require public
involvement in government decision making about environmental cleanup,
waste disposal, or rebuilding efforts. Without this involvement, there
will be widespread suspicion and anger from the very communities that
the response actions and rebuilding are intended to help. Further
disenfranchisement of already disenfranchised communities will
seriously undermine the success of any government cleanup and
rebuilding program.
After Katrina: New Solutions for Safe Communities and a Secure Energy
Future
NRDC recently published a report,
After Katrina: New Solutions for Safe Communities and a Secure
Energy Future, which I am attaching to this testimony. This report
addresses many of the reasons why past poor environmental policies made
Katrina worse, and makes a series of recommendations for responding to
the disaster, rebuilding better and safer communities, and developing a
more responsible energy program that would reduce the threat that such
catastrophic disasters pose to our energy supply and nation. Below, we
summarize this report.
Katrina's Lessons
Hurricane Katrina exposed shocking holes in both our social fabric
and our security safety net when she tore through the Gulf Coast. The
storm also carried important lessons about management--or
mismanagement--of essential health and environmental safeguards.
Hurricanes are a fact of life on the Gulf Coast, and, invariably,
some turn deadly. But decisions made by policymakers and elected
officials have tremendous influence on our ability to absorb a storm's
brute force. Their choices will also determine how quickly and how well
communities cope with Katrina's environmental fallout, and whether low-
income people of color will suffer as disproportionately in the
aftermath as they did in the storm itself.
A century of poor planning and industrial abuse has stripped away
much of the Gulf Coast's natural protection against storms and
flooding. More than 1 million acres of coastal wetlands in Louisiana
have been drained, lost to development, or starved of the Mississippi
River sediments they need to survive.
These wetlands could have absorbed storm surge and floodwaters,
substantially reducing the storm's impact. When the storm came ashore,
it swamped aging, underfunded drinking water and sewage systems and hit
more than 60 major industrial facilities and four Superfund waste sites
hard in New Orleans alone, adding unknown toxins to the stinking, toxic
flood.
Katrina caused nine oil spills totaling more than 7 million
gallons, together ranking as one of the biggest U.S. spills in history.
By contrast, the price shocks still rippling though the oil markets are
not ultimately of Katrina's making. Rather they are due to soaring
energy demand caused by years of official refusal to tackle our
nation's energy dependence by diversifying our energy sources and
improving fuel economy performance standards.
Fixing these problems will make Gulf Coast communities safer and
more secure and reduce the longterm cost of coping with the disaster.
Lessons from Katrina will pay dividends in other regions subject to
extreme weather disasters as well.
Planning for a Change
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) has assembled a team
of its best experts on public health, toxic waste, urban design,
coastal protection, energy security, and global warming to present a
set of policies and practices to protect the safety and well-being of
Gulf Coast residents--today, during the recovery, and onward into a
healthier, more sustainable future.
Protect Gulf Coast Communities from Toxic and Biological Hazards
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, and independent experts should immediately
broaden toxicity testing of water, sediments, and soils, as well as
biomonitoring and health surveillance of responders and the public.
Immediate widespread testing of water, sediment, and dried mud is
critical to ensuring the safety of cleanup workers and returning
residents, and for identifying toxic hot spots for containment and
cleanup. Big industrial facilities, Superfund sites, and other toxic
hotspots should be catalogued and evaluated, and any dangerous releases
contained immediately. Immediate public disclosure of all information
is also critical.
Quickly Restore Safe, Clean Drinking Water Supplies
More than two weeks after Hurricane Katrina hit land on September
17, 2005, 186 public water treatment systems in Louisiana and 229 in
Mississippi were seriously compromised, completely out of commission,
or unaccounted for; and 172 sewage treatment plants were not fully
functioning. Hundreds more in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama were
operational but expected to need repair or reconstruction. New Orleans'
drinking water system was completely knocked out but has started
pumping non-potable water in some areas for fire control.
All told, at least 2.4 million people were without access to safe
drinking water and bacteria levels in floodwaters greatly exceeded
public health standards shortly after Katrina. All these systems will
need financial and technical assistance to get back into full, safe
operation.
Restore Natural Coastal Buffers to Protect Against Storms
Natural coastal barriers on the Gulf have nearly been destroyed by
decades of industrial misuse and government-sponsored re-engineering
gone awry. We must adopt a major coastal wetland restoration program in
the wake of Katrina to build back what we ourselves destroyed. It is
also critical to ensure that flood control projects ordered by Congress
and developed by the Army Corps of Engineers are prioritized to protect
population centers and serve legitimate flood control purposes, not the
call of pork-barrel politics.
Rebuild for a Safe, Secure, Sustainable Future
Now is a chance to restore New Orleans' 19th century elegance using
today's know-how and technology. That means energy-efficient, weather-
resistant housing designed according to voluntary federal standards
that save money and improve comfort for people who live there, no
matter what their income. And it means family-friendly, mixed-use,
mixed income walkable communities like many affected areas had in
earlier days.
Maintain Health and Environmental Safeguards
Lobbyists and their congressional allies are already lining up
hoping to undercut long-standing health and environmental safeguards in
the name of hurricane recovery. In a few select cases, it may make
sense to make temporary accommodations in federal health and
environmental rules to address legitimate needs. But nearly all of
these can be accommodated without changes in current law, much less the
blanket suspension legal safeguard being proposed by special interests.
Repair the Racial and Economic Inequity of Health and Environmental
Risk
Environmental injustices have long plagued New Orleans and the Gulf
Coast region. Cleanup efforts should adhere firmly to the standing
Federal Executive Order designed to ensure environmental justice for
communities of low income and color that are exposed to inequitable
amounts of toxic pollution. In the rebuilding process, local
governments' exercise of eminent domain powers should not be used to
take properties in low-income communities of color.
Permanently Protect American Consumers from Energy Price Spikes
In the wake of Katrina, oil and natural gas prices were
skyrocketing. Although the worst of the panic induced run-up has
abated, prices remain extremely high and experts are predicting a
painfully expensive winter heating season. We cannot drill our way to
energy security. The only real solution is to reduce the amount of
energy we need to keep the economy humming. That means stronger fuel
economy standards and rules requiring more efficient heating and air
conditioning equipment and other energy conservation technologies.
Prevent the Added Threat of Global Warming
Global warming didn't cause Katrina. But experts agree the warming
climate caused by heat-trapping pollution is adding fuel to tropical
storms--elevating category 3 storms into category 4 and so forth.
Hotter climate also means more flood risk due to rising sea levels.
There is growing bipartisan support in Congress and many states for
concrete, market-based limits on global warming pollution.
Mr. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Olson. Ms. Wright, Dr.
Wright.
STATEMENT OF BEVERLY WRIGHT
Ms. Wright. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Good
morning, Mr. Chairman. I am Dr. Beverly Wright, Director of the
Deep South Center for Environmental Justice at Dillard
University in New Orleans, Louisiana, formerly at Xavier
University. Regrettably, both of these historically black
colleges are underwater now, and temporarily closed due to
Hurricane Katrina. I have prepared a statement to present,
taken from my testimony, but after listening to Mr. Olson, I
decided that I would just, rather just give you some additional
information that is of great concern to me and the people that
I work with.
I am a lifelong resident of New Orleans, Louisiana, went
away to school to New York, but always loved that city, and
found my way back. Today, I find myself extremely distressed
over what has happened to my city, and what has happened to my
people. Some of you may be aware, and may be not, but the
majority of the city, two thirds of that city, that has, in
fact, been destroyed, where some of us believe we may be
permanently displaced, were where African-Americans lived.
And there were two significant areas that were impacted,
the Lower Ninth Ward, that you hear so much about, and what
people may not know is that those person in the Lower Ninth
Ward, though poor, were working poor, and they owned all of
those houses in that area, and have been there for many years,
and it was a very strong voting population. The other part of
the city that was destroyed is where I lived, and where
everybody that I know and love lived, and that is Eastern New
Orleans, which was made up of most of your black professionals,
doctors, lawyers, teachers, and even those of us who had
managed to become extremely wealthy. That particular part of
the city has also been destroyed.
I hear all kinds of conversations about testing and people
going back in, but no one is talking about New Orleans East or
the Lower Ninth Ward, and just how devastated those areas are.
The fact that we have been displaced will dramatically change
the racial composition of that particular city, a city that I,
where I can trace my ancestry back to Free Coloreds. Me and my
family have lived there all my life, and never planned to
leave. We have now been forced out.
One of the real concerns that I have is what is happening
as it relates to persons going back into the city to try to
recoup any or all of what they can of their lives. For example,
my mother passed away in April. I was in the process of
collecting all of her pictures from childhood, and those
pictures have been destroyed completely. I have nothing left of
her. So, when you hear people talk about wanting to go home,
even when things are dangerous, you have to understand the
emotions that go along with trying to get back to your house. I
am concerned, because no one seems to be telling people how
dangerous it is. The reports of the mold are unbelievable,
reports of mold are unbelievable. I mean, they have completely
consumed our homes, and it is now climbing upstairs. If you had
a two story house, it is moving upstairs. It is covering every
piece of furniture, and the mold is of every color that you can
imagine. And of course, we are wondering about black mold.
People in New Orleans will be returning there on the 5th of
September. I believe that is part of this supposed organized
plan, I can tell you that plan is chaotic. There are meetings
once a week at the City Capital and people are just turning up
at those meetings in hundreds, trying to find out when they can
get in, how they can get in, but no one is giving them any real
scientific information about what the place is like. I am
hearing words of people who are going in and then becoming
extremely depressed, because they are going in expecting to see
what they saw after Betsy, because as you know, people in New
Orleans are kind of used to hurricanes and water rising, but
this is not like anything that we have ever seen.
I am very concerned that people will become ill. People are
taking out clothing covered with mold. They are finding back
ways into the city. Any way that they can get in, they are
going. We really and truly need to have some kind of Katrina
survivor kit, or something that people are given before they go
into the communities. I am told that they are given a handout.
I have not seen it. Nobody has any information that I know.
People that I know have nothing to warn them about what is
going on, what the hazards are when they get there, or what
they should do once they are inside.
There is almost terror in the eyes of so many people, when
they, in fact, think about never returning home. Some kind of
structured response needs to go forward, and African-Americans
in the city of New Orleans, those of us who have worked all our
lives for what we have, and we have lost it, need to be told
something. I am really begging the Environmental Protection
Agency to do a better job than what it is doing. I have worked
with EPA for years. I have fought with them, and fought with
them. On this particular issue, I have to tell you I am very
disappointed.
I hear words about Lake Pontchartrain. Well, you know, that
is a really big lake, and so if a lot of nasty stuff flows into
it, it may survive, but my house won't. And so, all of those
chemicals that were going into a huge lake that is a lot of
water, have also gone through my house, and I have nothing to
wash it away. There is nothing to decrease the amounts of the
contaminants in my house, or the houses of those people that I
love.
I know I am forgetting something really important, because
I am getting a little emotional, but I thank you for allowing
me to speak. And this one last thing: I almost forgot. There
are counties in Mississippi, and we have been getting calls
from them, who have not received any help from the Red Cross or
anybody. They have no electricity. They have no water. They
have no ice. They have no food. And we are getting these calls,
and people are trying to respond. We would like to know how we
can advocate on their behalf, to make sure that these
communities in Mississippi, rural communities, that are sitting
way back someplace that most people don't know about, trees are
down, wires are down, and they are really suffering.
Mississippi was hit very hard, just as Louisiana was, and
so was Alabama. New Orleans was hit in a different kind of way,
one that is really devastating for us, but all of the people of
the Gulf Coast need to have better attention made, given to
them, especially as it is related to them, their being able to
return home.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Beverly Wright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Beverly Wright, Director, Deep South Center for
Environmental Justice and Co-Chair, National Black Environmental
Justice Network
Good morning Mr. Chairman. I am Dr. Beverly Wright, Director of the
Deep South Center on Environmental Justice at Dillard University,
formerly at Xavier University. Regrettably, both of these Historically
Black Colleges are underwater now and temporarily closed due to
Hurricane Katrina. I am also here today representing the National Black
Environmental Justice Network (NBEJN), which was founded in New
Orleans, LA in December 1999. People of African descent in the United
States organized ourselves in response to what we know is a State of
Emergency in Black America.
NBEJN members founded the organization in New Orleans because we
felt then, as now, that Louisiana and the Chemical Corridor between the
City and Baton Rouge are under siege from and epitomize environmental
and economic assaults. These assaults are costing Black people their
very lives. NBEJN believes in the sacred value of every human life
regardless of race, ethnicity, religion or socioeconomic status. We see
in the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita and the aftermath a
unique opportunity to shape the conversation and dialogue about
rebuilding of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region with the goals of
environmental and economic justice for everyone.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on
critical issues of concern in the aftermath of the hurricanes. My
professional and personal experiences of growing up, living and working
in the City of New Orleans greatly influence my perspective and
testimony.
Who We Are
The Deep South Center for Environmental Justice (DSCEJ), at Dillard
University in New Orleans, formerly at Xavier University of Louisiana,
is now temporarily relocated in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
The Deep South Center was launched in 1992 in collaboration with
community environmental groups and other universities within the
southern region to address environmental justice issues. DSCEJ provides
opportunities for communities, scientific researchers, and decision
makers to collaborate on programs and projects that promote the rights
of all people to be free from environmental harm as it impacts health,
jobs, housing, education, and general quality of life. A major goal of
the Center is development of minority leadership in the areas of
environmental, social, and economic justice along the Mississippi River
Chemical Corridor. The Deep South Center for Environmental Justice is a
powerful resource for environmental justice education and training.
DSCEJ has developed and embraces a model for community partnership
that is called ``communiversity.'' The essence of this approach is an
acknowledgement that for effective research and policy-making, valuable
community life experiences regarding environmental impacts must be
integrated with the theoretical knowledge of academic educators and
researchers. The Deep South Center for Environmental Justice has three
components in terms of reaching our objectives: (1) research and policy
studies, (2) community outreach assistance and education; and (3)
primary, secondary, and university education.
Target Aea and Population Served
DSCEJ is national in scope with emphasis on the Mississippi River
Chemical Corridor and Gulf Coast Region and global emphasis on
communities impacted by the petrochemical industry. The major
populations served include people of color with special concentration
on African Americans and the African Diaspora, students and faculty at
Historically Black Colleges And Universities/Minority Serving
Institutions (HBCU/MSI) and public school teachers in urban areas.
DSCEJ has forged collaborations with other major research institutions
and governmental agencies that can assist in the development and
implementation of the center's work.
Center Objectives
DSCEJ principal objectives include: (1) development of minority
leadership in the field of environmental justice; (2) development of
culturally sensitive training models for minority residents in at-risk
communities; (3) development and distribution of culturally sensitive
environmental justice education materials and training modules; (4)
increasing environmental justice literacy among college students at
HBCU/MSI's; (5) development of a pipeline creating a new generation of
environmental justice leaders at HBCU/MSI's; (6) development and
implementation of a K-12 teacher training program in environmental
justice; (7) conducting research to determine the impact and extent of
toxic exposure for minority communities as it affects health and the
environment; (8) investigating means of addressing these problems
(i.e., brownfields redevelopment, toxics use reduction, climate change,
clean production and green chemistry, and economic development; and (9)
creating linkages between impacted communities, scientific researchers,
and government officials to address environmental justice issues as
they impact health, jobs, housing, and overall quality of life.
Katrina Aftermath
As the floodwaters recede in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region,
it is clear that the lethargic and inept emergency response immediately
following this devastating storm was the real disaster that nearly
overshadowed the actual storm. We were all left nearly paralyzed in
front of our television sets completely unable to continue with our
daily lives watching the unbelievable events unfold right before our
eyes. Americans were shocked beyond belief that this could happen in
America, to Americans. It also raised lingering questions and doubts
about our overall security. Is government equipped to plan for,
militate against, respond to, and recover from natural and manmade
disasters? Can the public trust government's response to be fair? Does
race matter?
Examination of historical data reveals that emergency response
reflects the pre-existing socioeconomic and political structures of a
disaster area and is based on race and class differentials. Generally
communities of color receive less priority in response time than do
their white counterparts where emergency response is required.
Before Hurricane Katrina--Pre Existing Vuknerabilities
Katrina struck a region that is disproportionately African American
and poor. For example African Americans make up twelve percent of the
United States population. New Orleans is nearly 68 percent black. The
African American population in the Coastal Mississippi counties where
Katrina struck ranged from 25 percent to 87 percent black. Some 28
percent of New Orleans residents live below the poverty level and more
than 80 percent of those are black. 50 percent of all New Orleans
children live in poverty. The poverty rate was 17.7 percent in
Gulfport, Ms. And 21.2 percent in Mobile, Al. in 2000. Nationally, 11.3
percent of Americans and 22.1 percent of African Americans live below
the poverty line in 2000.
New Orleans is prototypical of environmental justice issues in the
Gulf Coast region. Before Katrina, the City of New Orleans was
struggling with a wide range of environmental justice issues and
concerns. Its location along the Mississippi River Chemical Corridor
increased its vulnerability to environmental threats. The City had an
extremely high childhood environmental lead poisoning problem. There
were ongoing air quality impacts and resulting high asthma and
respiratory disease rates and frequent visits to emergency rooms for
treatment by both children and adults. Environmental health problems
and issues related to environmental exposure was a grave issue of
concern for New Orleans residents.
The African American community in New Orleans was already grappling
with the nationally identified health disparities for minorities
reported by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). These conditions
were exacerbated by environmental conditions triggering asthma and
exposing children to lead. High blood pressure, diabetes and cancer
were also prevalent in the African American community.
Displacement Post Katrina
Residents in the Gulf Coast region fled the hurricane zone. More
than a million Louisiana residents fled Hurricane Katrina. An estimated
100,000 to 300,000 Louisiana residents alone could end up permanently
displaced. Nearly 100,000 Katrina evacuees are in 1,042 shelters
scattered in 26 states and the District of Columbia. Katrina has left
environmental contamination in Gulf Coast neighborhoods that will have
to be cleaned up before residents can move back. An estimated 150,000
houses may be lost as a result of standing in water from Katrina. We
are still grappling with understanding the full impacts of both
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Thousands of hurricane survivors along the Gulf Coast must now cope
with the loss of relatives and friends, homes, and businesses and, what
we term, loss of community. Katrina displaced just under 350,000 school
children in the Gulf Coast. An estimated 187,000 school children have
been displaced in Louisiana, 160,000 in Mississippi and 3,118 in
Alabama. Katrina closed the entire New Orleans school system
indefinitely. One hundred and twenty-five thousand New Orleans children
alone are attending schools elsewhere. Over 93 percent of New Orleans
schools students are African American. Evacuees' children are being
enrolled in schools from Arizona to Pennsylvania, including almost
19,000 who will be attending schools in Texas.
For the survivors who lost everything, it involves coping with the
stress of starting all over. Two weeks after Katrina struck, more than
2,500 children were still separated from their families. One can only
imagine the mental anguish these families are going through. On the
heels of this disaster, Hurricane Rita struck the coastal areas again.
Environmental Damage
New Orleans and outlying areas suffered severe environmental damage
during Katrina, the extent to which has yet to be determined. The post-
Katrina New Orleans has been described as a ``cesspool'' of toxic
chemicals, human waste, decomposing flesh and surprises that remain to
be uncovered in the sediments. Massive amounts of toxic chemicals were
used and stored along the Gulf Coast before the storm. Literally
thousands of sites in the storms path used or stored hazardous
chemicals, from the local dry cleaner and auto repair shops to
Superfund sites and oil refineries in Chalmette and Meraux, La, where
there are enormous stores of ultra-hazardous hydrofluoric acid. In the
aftermath of the storm some sites were damaged and leaked. Residents
across the Gulf Coast and the media reported, ``oil spills, obvious
leaks from plants, storage tankards turned on end and massive fumes.''
Short-term rebuilding objectives must not outweigh long-term public
health protection for all Americans and the environment they depend
upon. Some of the legislative proposals now under consideration in the
aftermath of Katrina do not adhere to this principle. Congress must act
now to protect our most vulnerable populations and preserve our most
unique and irreplaceable resources. It is imperative that Congress
responds quickly and effectively to the devastating aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. It is also important, to temper our haste
to rebuild with balance in our response to ensure appropriate respect
for public health and the environment. Moreover, the public has a right
to clean air and water and it must be protected.
There is much speculation about what the new New Orleans will look
like: whether the Mississippi Gulf Coast should now consider land-based
Casinos versus riverboats; the social economic and political structure
of ``New'' New Orleans; rebuilding a green and sustainable Gulf Coast
region that embraces innovative green building technologies and
principles; construction of a levee system that will protect New
Orleans; and development of environmentally and economically
sustainable communities must all be explored simultaneously. None of
these concepts are relevant unless the cleanup in the region is
properly conducted and completed. This conclusion is not based on
speculation. The community of Agriculture Street Landfill in the City
of New Orleans has lived the nightmare of discovering that their homes
were built on top of a landfill that was reopened to dispose of the
tons of debris resulting from Hurricane Betsy.
Hurricane Betsy--New Orleans, Louisiana
Hurricane Betsy struck the State of Louisiana and the City of New
Orleans in 1965. Betsy was then the ``most destructive hurricane on
record to strike the Louisiana coast.'' <SUP>1</SUP> The damage and
flooding throughout the State covered 4,800 square miles, killed 81
persons, caused the evacuation of 250,000 persons, and disrupted
transportation, communication, and utilities services throughout the
eastern coastal area of Louisiana for weeks. Betsy hit the mostly Black
and poor New Orleans Lower Ninth Ward especially hard. This is the same
neighborhood that was inundated by floodwaters from Katrina and then
suffered the indignity of a second flooding by Rita. Over 98 percent of
the Lower Ninth Ward residents are Black and a third live below the
poverty level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Craig E. Colten and John Welch. ``Hurricane Betsy and Its
Effects on the Architecture Integrity of the Bywater Neighborhood:
Summary.'' May 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many Black New Orleans residents still believe that white officials
intentionally broke the levee and flooded the Lower Ninth Ward to save
mostly white neighborhoods and white business districts. In 1965, a
disproportionately large share of Lower Ninth Ward residents did not
receive adequate post-disaster financial assistance in the form of
loans and other support to revitalize the area. Betsy accelerated the
decline of the neighborhood and out-migration of many of its longtime
residents. Debris from Betsy was buried in the Agricultural Street
Landfill--located in a predominately Black New Orleans neighborhood.
Over 390 homes were built on the northern portion of the site from
1976-1986. The Agricultural Street Landfill neighborhood was added to
the National Priorities List as a Superfund site in 1994.<SUP>2</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Public
Health Assessment--Agriculture Street Landfill, New Orleans, Orleans
Parish, Louisiana, Atlanta, GA: ATSDR (June, 1999); Alicia Lyttle,
Agriculture Street Landfill Environmental Justice Case Study,
University of Michigan School of Natural Resources, Ann Arbor, Michigan
(January 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Orleans Agriculture Street Landfill Community
Dozens of toxic time bombs along Louisiana's Mississippi River
petrochemical corridor, the 85-mile stretch from Baton Rouge to New
Orleans, make the region a major environmental justice battleground.
The corridor is commonly referred to as Cancer Alley. Black communities
all along the corridor have been fighting against environmental racism
and demanding relocation to areas away from polluting
facilities.<SUP>3</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Robert D. Bullard, The Quest For Environmental Justice: Human
Rights and the Politics of Pollution (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books,
2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two largely Black New Orleans subdivisions, Gordon Plaza and Press
Park, have special significance in terms of environmental justice and
emergency response. Both subdivisions are built on a portion of land
that was used as a municipal landfill for more than 50 years. The
Agriculture Street Landfill, covering approximately 190 acres, was used
as a city dump as early as 1910. Municipal records indicate that after
1950, the landfill was mostly used to discard large solid objects,
including trees and lumber, and it was a major source for dumping
debris from the very destructive 1965 Hurricane Betsy. It is important
to note that the landfill was classified as a solid waste site and not
a hazardous waste site.
In 1969, the federal government created a home ownership program to
encourage lower income families to purchase their first home. Press
Park was the first subsidized housing project of this program in New
Orleans. The federal program allowed tenants to apply 30 percent of
their monthly rental payments toward the purchase of a family home. In
1987, seventeen years later, the first sale was completed. In 1977,
construction began on a second subdivision, Gordon Plaza. This
development was planned, controlled, and constructed by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Housing
Authority of New Orleans (HANO). Gordon Plaza consists of approximately
67 single-family homes.
In 1983, a portion of the Agriculture Street Landfill site was
purchased by the Orleans Parish School Board as a site for a school.
The fact that this site had previously been used as a municipal dump
prompted concerns about the suitability of the site for a school. The
school board contracted engineering firms to survey the site and assess
it for contamination and hazardous materials. Heavy metals and organics
were detected.
Despite the warnings, Moton Elementary School, an $8 million state-
of-the-art public school opened with 421 students in 1989. In May 1986,
EPA performed a site inspection (SI) in the Agriculture Street Landfill
community. Although lead, zinc, mercury, cadmium, and arsenic were
found at the site, based on the Hazard Ranking System (HRS) model used
at that time, the score of 3 was not high enough to place them on the
National Priority List (NPL).
On December 14, 1990, EPA published a revised HRS model in response
to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986. At
the request of community leaders, in September 1993, an Expanded Site
Inspection (ESI) was conducted. On December 16, 1994, the Agriculture
Street Landfill community was placed on the NPL with a new score of 50.
The Agriculture Street Landfill community was home to approximately
900 African American residents. The average family income is $25,000
and the educational level is high school graduate and above. The
community pushed for a buy-out of their property and to be relocated.
However, this was not the resolution of choice by EPA. A cleanup was
ordered at a cost of $20 million, the community buy-out would have cost
only $14 million. The actual cleanup began in 1998 and was completed in
2001.<SUP>4</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Alcia Lyttle, ``Agricultural Street Landfill Environmental
Justice Case Study,'' University of Michigan School of Natural Resource
and Environment found at http://www.umich.edu/snre492/Jones/
agstreet.htm. (Accessed on October 6, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Concerned Citizens of Agriculture Street Landfill filed a class
action suit against the City of New Orleans for damages and relocation
costs. It took nine years to bring this case to court.<SUP>5</SUP> The
case was still pending before Katrina struck. It is ironic that the
environmental damage wrought by Katrina may force the cleanup and
relocation of the Agriculture Street Landfill community. But nothing
can give them back their health and well being, or replace the family
members and friends who might still be with them were it not for the
health effects of living on a landfill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Robert D. Bullard, The Quest For Environmental Justice: Human
Rights and the Politics of Pollution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Have we learned anything over the last 40 years, since Hurricane
Betsy struck, that should guide our decisions after Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita? Much of the proposed legislation concerning rebuilding the
Gulf Coast region strongly suggests that we have not. In fact, it seems
that some are using the crisis of Hurricane Katrina to advance their
political and policy agenda, including weakening, waiving and rolling
back public health, environmental justice and environmental laws and
regulations.
It is ironic that the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina is being used to
justify sweeping waivers of public health, safety and environmental
laws. S. 1711 would confer on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) sole and absolute authority to waive federal or state laws
anywhere in the country for up to one and a half years. In addition,
the waiver authority would extend well beyond environmental laws. EPA
need only claim such waiver is in the public interest and is somehow
linked to Hurricane Katrina. The Agency need not demonstrate that
waivers are required to protect public health and safety, and there is
no requirement that EPA provide any public health protection in
exchange for granting waivers.
Foremost, Senate Bill 1711 and other legislation of this ilk
threatens the most vulnerable communities in the Gulf Coast, and those
living in the shadows of oil refineries, by authorizing the elimination
of protection that ensures that residents have clean water to drink,
clean air to breathe, and the right to live in a toxic-free community.
With the hurricane devastation disproportionately hurting poor and
minority residents already, this bill adds insult to injury by allowing
private industry to operate above the law and risks more suffering on
the part of people most affected by the hurricane. Remember the lessons
of Betsy and remember the Agriculture Street Landfill community.
EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson told Congress on September 13,
2005 that the Agency has all the authority needed under existing law to
respond to Hurricane Katrina and has already used that authority to
relax some environmental programs. Granting EPA unlimited waiver
authority and opening the door to risking the health and safety of
millions of Americans is not the way to help Gulf Coast states recover
from Hurricane Katrina.
According to EPA tests, the biological threats from the flood
include elevated levels of E coli bacteria and toxic mold.
Contamination from industrial facilities pose a more troubling long-
term concern with more than 40 oil spills recently reported in
Louisiana by the Coast Guard and thousands of chemical containers
spotted bubbling in the region's flood water. The oozing sediments that
coat flood impacted areas may yield an even greater danger in the
coming months as the ground dries, releasing airborne contaminants like
harmful organic gases such as the highly toxic methane and fuel vapors.
The potential health effects range from allergic reaction to organic
damage.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has released test results
for toxic chemicals in floodwaters for less than 30 sampling sites, all
in downtown New Orleans, far from hot spots in outlying areas. Even
these ``limited results were weeks old despite'' ever-increasing
numbers of clean-up crews and residents pouring into surrounding
parishes. EPA's Response to Katrina web page indicates only a ``few
hazardous'' chemicals having been found in quantities over their
acceptable limits none of which present a substantial risk to the
public.
Also, risk to human health posed by hazardous chemicals likely to
be present in flood-ravaged areas is conspicuously absent from publicly
available information. EPA's website provides no information that would
help someone identify symptoms of potentially life threatening or
debilitating exposures to hazardous chemicals as they do for bacterial
contaminant exposures such as E coli.
In closing, and speaking as a life long resident of the City of New
Orleans, for the last fifteen years, I have fought for a better quality
of life for New Orleans citizens and those living along the Mississippi
River Chemical Corridor, infamously known as Cancer Alley. I have
worked with government to ensure environmental protection for
communities. I have fought against environmental racism and for
environmental justice for all, and I am greatly concerned about what I
have seen in response to Katrina. What local communities in the Gulf
coast region need now from government agencies is the truth even if it
hurts. Please level with the American people before we return to our
homes or send our children back to school, so that we can make the best
possible choices under these circumstances.
The right thing to do is to expand chemical testing, provide more
timely and forthcoming test results, and engage stakeholders,
especially those from the impacted region. Under this approach, EPA and
other government agencies might be successful this time in carrying out
their charge of protecting the public. If Katrina has taught us nothing
else, it has shown us how essential access to information is to our
ability to deal with crises. By not being forthcoming with information
and not providing transparency in the process, agencies endanger
American lives and further tarnish their own credibility.
In the wake of Katrina, there should be:
Timely and accurate information about risk and a coherent plan to
address hazards;
EPA and Congress should provide enhanced air and water quality
monitoring to both inform the clean-up process and to give
confidence to citizens and businesses returning and rebuilding
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast;
Citizens should know that their health is being protected by EPA and
government agencies; and
Citizens should be given clear and accurate instruction on procedures
for reentering the City and other areas in the Gulf Coast
region to protect their health.
I have attached for your consideration a Resolution issued by the
National Black Environmental Justice Network which outlines the full
range of issues and recommendations that should be addressed in this
post-hurricane cleanup and rebuilding process. We urge Congress to
oversee federal agencies responding to the hurricanes in terms of: (1)
prohibiting discrimination based on race, income, religion and national
origin; (2) compliance with the Executive Order 12898 on Environmental
Justice; and (3) compliance with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
which, in general, prohibits discrimination in programs funded by
federal dollars.
Finally, I to draw your attention to the many vulnerable
communities of color that exist in the shadow of chemical and petro
chemical facilities along the Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Texas Gulf Coast, who are especially in harms way at this time. Don't
forget those places in assessing the devastating impacts of both
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Too much focus is on the structural
integrity of chemical plants, oil refineries, and oil rigs and
insufficient attention is focused on the devastating impact that
communities have suffered as a result of proximity to these facilities.
These people may never be able to return to their homes. These
communities warrant our attention, our resources, and the full efforts
of all branches of government to ensure their survival and protection
in the future.
NATIONAL BLACK ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE NETWORK
Resolution On Environmental and Economic Justice In The Gulf Coast
Region Environmental Cleanup, Restoration And Rebuilding Sustainable
Communities Post-Hurricane Katrina and Beyond<SUP><dbl-dagger></SUP>
The National Black Environmental Justice Network (NBEJN) was
founded in New Orleans, Louisiana in December 1999 in response to a
State of Emergency in Black America. New Orleans was selected as the
ideal location to launch NBEJN since the City of New Orleans, Louisiana
and the Chemical Corridor, encompassing the area up to Baton Rouge, are
under siege due to wide ranging environmental and economic assaults.
These assaults are costing Black lives.
NBEJN values as sacred every human life regardless of race,
ethnicity, religion or socio-economic status. We view the tragedy of
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath as a unique opportunity to shape
the conversation and dialogue about rebuilding the Gulf Coast region
including Gulf Coast states and Greater New Orleans in ways that
provide environmental and economic justice for the entire affected
population.
WHEREAS, race and class intersected with the Katrina disaster in
ways that compound the impacts on Black communities and issues of race
and class will affect environmental cleanup and restoration, public and
environmental health, regional equity, community development and
economic recovery;
WHEREAS, NBEJN is committed to alleviating and remedying the
impacts of Hurricane Katrina on Black families, in particular,
environmental, public health and economic consequences of the storm and
its aftermath on the health and well being of survivors;
WHEREAS, the NBEJN post-hurricane focus centers on research, policy
development and education advocacy, communications and media, outreach
and networking in the areas of environmental justice; economic justice;
environmental health; protection of public health; regional equity,
sustainable development; cultural preservation; climate justice;
homeland insecurity; and emergency responses;
WHEREAS, NBEJN and its members will monitor hearings and
investigations convened by Congress, state legislatures and
governmental agencies about Hurricane Katrina to ensure that the
environmental and economic justice aspects of the disaster are
prominent;
WHEREAS, there are urgent needs in hundreds of Black communities
throughout the Gulf Coast region in terms of moving forward on
environmental cleanup, habitability, restoration and rebuilding those
areas devastated and/or destroyed by Hurricane Katrina and the Lake
Pontchatrain levee breaches;
WHEREAS, worker safety and health and public safety and health and
public security are essential;
WHEREAS, concern about homeland insecurity among African American
communities pre-dates Hurricane Katrina and these communities are
uniquely affected due to their close proximity to petrochemical and
chemical plants and other environmentally harmful facilities;
WHEREAS, all local, state and regional emergency preparedness plans
must be designed to address the needs of people with low-incomes who
don't have resources to evacuate themselves and their families in the
event of natural and other disasters;
WHEREAS, there must be a governmental inventory, assessment of and
response to the impacts of Hurricane Katrina on potentially hazardous
permitted and non-permitted operations including treatment, storage and
disposal facilities, Superfund sites, chemical weapons stockpiles,
pesticide and chemical storage facilities, refineries and manufacturing
plants, and other existing and potential environmental hazards in the
Gulf Coast region;
WHEREAS, local zoning ordinances must be promulgated to prohibit
siting, permitting and operation of heavy industrial facilities
adjacent to, in or near residential areas,
WHEREAS, there must be continuous testing and monitoring of
drinking water and water quality in and around Greater New Orleans and
the Gulf Coast region and testing must occur short- medium- and long-
term;
WHEREAS, global warming and climate change have dire health and
environmental consequences in vulnerable African-American communities
in the Gulf Coast region and elsewhere;
WHEREAS, wetlands preservation, restoration and erosion control
must be accelerated to protect the Gulf Coast Region and in the
Mississippi River chemical corridor;
WHEREAS, in consultation with affected communities, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and engineering experts should be delegated the
responsibility of designing, constructing and maintaining a better,
more effective system of levees, improved drainage, and rerouting of
the flood control systems that continually inundate the lower 9th Ward
community;
WHEREAS, the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Interior
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency should ensure that these
re-engineering, wetlands preservation and restoration, and flood
prevention and drainage efforts are fully funded;
WHEREAS, expediency in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina cannot be
a pretext to weaken or waive environmental authorities in the Gulf
Coast region or elsewhere in the United States including all existing
local, state, regional and federal environmental laws and regulations;
WHEREAS, environmental cleanups must be conducted fairly and
equitably in every affected community including decisions about areas
wherein the most stringent cleanup levels will be applied during
restoration, redevelopment and rebuilding;
WHEREAS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security must comply with Executive Order
12898 on Environmental Justice including immediate action on new
disaster preparedness models that address the needs and challenges of
the lowest income person in every community;
WHEREAS, fair and equitable access to and distribution of resources
is paramount in all post-hurricane operations and activities, minority
businesses in the environmental, community development and construction
sectors must be utilized in the short- medium- and long-term cleanup
and rebuilding efforts;
WHEREAS, there must be a public process to develop a broad,
socially and equitably just vision for a new, revitalized Gulf Coast
region and Greater New Orleans, encompassing prominent roles for poor,
low and moderate income African-Americans in designing and implementing
the vision and the rebuilding plans;
WHEREAS, economic parity is a cardinal objective in a revitalized
and renewed Gulf Coast region and Greater New Orleans, cultural
preservation, poverty alleviation and sustainable development are
highly valued, central facets of every revitalization strategy;
WHEREAS, local jurisdictions in the Gulf Coast region must not use
eminent domain in the rebuilding process in ways that result in taking
of properties in Black communities in order to convert them to public
or other uses;
WHEREAS, redevelopment and revitalization plans and rebuilding
infrastructure must benefit those communities most affected by the
hurricane, these efforts cannot exacerbate gentrification in ways that
result in more residential and commercial displacement for Black
people, many or whom are poor;
WHEREAS, rebuilding activities in the Gulf Coast region must first
deploy local businesses and hire local Black workers and local low-
income workers to participate in the rebuilding efforts;
WHEREAS, jurisdictions in the Gulf Coast region must focus on
creating sustainable low and moderate income housing (concentrating on
historic and cultural preservation), and address the fair housing
issues embedded in the temporary and long-term resettlement of
surviving evacuated Black families;
WHEREAS, the private sector must exercise caution in real estate
and business financing and property-casualty insurance practices to
prevent insurance and lender redlining and price-gouging and to ensure
that insurance claims are paid fairly and equitably;
WHEREAS, local, state, regional and federal government agencies
must exercise oversight to ensure that post-hurricane insurance and
banking practices are fair and equitable;
WHEREAS, continuing the education of the young survivors of the
hurricane, children and youth, must be a priority at the levels of pre-
kindergarten, elementary, high school, secondary and post secondary
education;
WHEREAS, full employment, job placement, job training and worker
re-training programs are key to restoring the lives of Gulf Coast
survivors and achieving economic justice;
WHEREAS, a Reparations And Victims Compensation Fund should be
established to benefit all persons displaced by Hurricane Katrina and
African-Americans should receive just and equitable compensation from
such a fund;
WHEREAS, special outreach efforts must address and assist
undocumented persons and other immigrants in a time of disaster
including those who don't speak English;
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the National Black Environmental
Justice Network (NBEJN) is committed to rebuilding the Gulf Coast
Region including Greater New Orleans in collaboration with
stakeholders, local, state, regional and federal elected officials,
governmental agency officials and other entities in the public and
private sectors;
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the National Black Environmental
Justice Network calls on stakeholders, local, state, regional and
federal elected officials, governmental agency officials and other
entities in the public and private sectors to adopt environmental and
economic justice principles and approaches in the Gulf Coast Region
cleanup, restoration and rebuilding efforts; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that all federal and state efforts should
comply with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Executive Order
12898 on Environmental Justice, and United Nations directives on
displaced persons.
Copyright 2005 All Rights Reserved.
Mr. Bass. Thank you, Dr. Wright. Mr. Verchick.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK
Mr. Verchick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I
testify as an expert in environmental law and policy, a
resident of New Orleans, and a board member of the Center for
Progressive Reform.
Last week, or rather, earlier this week, the Center
released a 56 page report titled ``An Unnatural Disaster: The
Aftermath of Katrina,'' along with a separate report on the
Army Corps' proposed barrier project, which was talked about
earlier in the first panel. I ask that both of these reports,
along with my oral testimony today, be entered into the
Congressional Record.
I am an evacuee, like Dr. Wright, and lost part of my
house. I am teaching in Houston now, my family is in Washington
State, and I am hoping to return in January. I have three young
boys, and I am not sure they will be able to. And part of that
is what is motivating me to be here today.
The first thing I would like to do is talk about something
that occurred in the panel just before, because as a law
professor, I am especially sensitive to legal inaccuracies, and
I want to just make one thing perfectly clear. It is, I think,
false to suggest, in terms of the Army Corps' sea gate barrier
project, it is false to suggest that a small, grassroots
organization in the 1970's overturned the will of the
Department of Defense and the Army Corps of Engineers. I want
to explain exactly, as a legal matter, what happened about
that. It involved a 1977 lawsuit against the Army Corps of
Engineers, in a proposal to build a sea gate. They were
required, the Army Corps was, to have an environmental impact
statement. Their impact statement was based on models 10 years
old. All of its biological analysis was based exclusively on a
phone call with a single marine biologist, and the Corps' chief
engineer himself wanted more information about the sea gates
and the models. Based on this information, a court in 1977
struck the EIS, the environmental impact statement, and invited
the Corps to update the hydrological models so that the plan
could move forward. Then, instead of fixing the EIS, the Corps
in the 1980's, under a different Administration, dropped the
barrier plan entirely in favor of an upgraded levee plan
because, among other reasons, it was, and this is according to
the GAO, it was: ``It would cost less to do the levee system
instead.'' I simply want to make the point that whether or not
you favor sea gates, one has to understand that the decision
about sea gates belonged to the Army Corps of Engineers and no
one else. And if Congress is interested in more sea gate
technology, it should know that the Army Corps last year, in
fact, has another sea gate proposal, that it is working on
planning, and it may or may not be something that the Congress
wants to fund. But I simply want to point that out.
I want to move on now to what I originally planned on
talking about, which is points having to do with the toxins,
and I have three points that I want to make. One, the
environmental contamination left in the wake of Katrina is
extremely serious. It must be investigated thoroughly, and
remedied adequately before people are allowed to occupy the
city again.
My second point is that to have credibility, and to
accomplish this difficult task, the investigation must ask
questions that are conducted by an independent, bipartisan
taskforce, similar to the September 11 commission.
And third, now is not the time to repeal, roll back, waive,
any of our crucial environmental laws, as some members of
regulatory industries have suggested. This is not a time for
anti-regulatory profiteering at Louisiana's expense. We need
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water
Act, RCRA, Superfund, and so on, and we need them funded. The
problem with the floods has something to do with the fact that
a lot of the controlled industries in that area did not
adequately have charge of the contaminants to begin with. To
talk just a little bit about the contaminants, in the small
time that I have left, I want to just point out a few things.
There is no way for anyone to know if the risk is tolerable or
safe at this point. I know this, because Dr. Falk and Mr.
Peacock said as much. In fact, there has been little or no
testing on long-term contaminants, so it doesn't do any good to
say the mayor and the Governor and Mr. Allen will get together
and decide if it is safe. They can't, because we don't have the
information yet, and until we have that information, with a
city that had a population of a quarter disabled, we should not
bring those people back into the city, when there is no
information.
I have been there. I have unloaded basements, helped my
neighbors. Nobody knows anything about what is going on. No one
has the gear. A lot of people can't afford the gear. You go to
Wal-Marts up and down the state, you won't find rubber boots
and rubber gloves. There is no way to do it. My time is up, but
I simply want to reinforce the idea that I desperately, along
with many others, want to go back to my city with my children,
and I have no idea whether it is safe or not, because the
government has no idea whether it is safe or not, and they owe
that explanation to the people before they allow or encourage
people to move into the city of New Orleans.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Robert R.M. Verchick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert R.M. Verchick, Gauthier-St. Martin Eminent
Scholar Chair in Environmental Law, Loyola University New Orleans
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to testify on Hurricane Katrina,
its historic roots, and its current status. I testify today as an
expert in environmental law and policy and a resident of New Orleans.
As you know, I am an evacuee. My wife and children are living this
fall in the state of Washington, and I have taken up temporary
residence in Houston, Texas, where my Law School, Loyola New Orleans,
is about to begin its fall semester in space donated by the University
of Houston. Several days ago, I was lucky enough to be able to return
to New Orleans to check on our house (partially flooded, but remarkably
intact) and my university's campus (now partially occupied by the
National Guard). I do not know when my family or I will be able to
return, nor do I know for certain when the Law School will be able to
resume its mission in its own building.
Like most New Orleans evacuees, my heart and my mind remain with
the City. I monitor the worldwide Web constantly, I speak on the phone
or e-mail with people who have remained in the area several times a
week, and I regularly read the local blogs, including those associated
with my city's newspaper, television stations, and schools. This is a
tragedy that will stay with my family and me for quite a long time and,
it now appears, with the country.
My testimony today focuses on the environmental ramifications of
Katrina that involve the dispersal of toxic chemicals throughout the
environment. Although I understand you want and need a briefing on
conditions as they stand today, I am also going to trace some of the
history of how we ended up in this mess. Mother Nature is
overwhelmingly powerful, to be sure, but we made mistakes that rendered
the situation much worse, and that must be corrected before we rebuild
the city. My message today boils down to three points:
One. The environmental contamination left in the wake of Katrina is
very serious and must be investigated thoroughly and remedied
adequately before people are allowed back into affected areas of New
Orleans. We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the past, many of
which were rooted in the policies of neglect and racial and economic
discrimination that were on full display in the immediate aftermath of
the hurricane.
Two. To have credibility and to accomplish this difficult task, the
investigation must ask the right questions and be conducted by an
independent, bipartisan taskforce modeled along the lines of the
September 11 Commission. A major goal of my testimony is to suggest the
critical questions such an investigation must address.
Three. Now is not the time to repeal, roll back, or waive any of
our crucial environmental laws, as some opportunistic members of
regulated industries have suggested. We need the Clean Air Act, the
Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, and the Superfund law more than ever to make sure
that people and natural resources are safe as New Orleans is rebuilt.
Katrina's Environmental Aftermath
Katrina left nine categories of environmental problems in her wake:
1. flooded and contaminated drinking water supplies;
2. several oil spills, typically from above-ground tanks;
3. leaking underground tanks containing fuel and other chemicals;
4. flooded sewage treatment plants;
5. flooded buildings, lagoons, lots, and individual containers
containing a wide array of toxic chemicals that were washed out
into the ambient environment;
6. the concentrated residue of many fires spread into the environment;
7. building debris that is cultivating harmful molds;
8. contaminated sediment and other sludge throughout the city; and
9. toxic exposure of cleanup and other workers as a result of this
pollution.
On September 19, 2005, EPA estimated that in Louisiana, 498 of 683
drinking water facilities are operational and meeting EPA standards; 26
are operating on a ``boil water notice''; and 159 are either inoperable
or their status is unknown.<SUP>1</SUP> Together, the 683 facilities
serve 2.5 million people. In Mississippi, 1,073 of the 1,368 drinking
water systems are operational; 231 are operating on a boil water
notice; and 64 are either inoperable or their status is unknown. The
1,368 systems serve 3.2 million people. In Alabama, 72 drinking water
systems serve approximately 960,000 people. Seventy-one are
operational, and one is operating on a boil water notice.
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\1\ All of the figures in this paragraph were reported in EPA,
Response to Hurricane Katrina Update (Sept. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.epa.gov/katrina/activities.html#sep13 [hereinafter EPA,
Response Katrina].
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EPA estimates that there were five major oil spills in the New
Orleans area to date; <SUP>2</SUP> one newspaper reported that six
spills had occurred.<SUP>3</SUP> The Coast Guard has estimated that the
spills involved 160,000 barrels, and that it has recovered 50,000
barrels to date (a barrel holds 42 gallons).<SUP>4</SUP> Additional
petroleum contamination has resulted from the flooding of an estimated
350,000 vehicles. The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
reported that oil storage tanks located near the Mississippi River,
with a combined capacity of two million barrels, appeared to be
leaking.<SUP>5</SUP> The Coast Guard has estimated that more than seven
million gallons of oil may have been spilled from industrial plants,
storage depots, and other facilities in southeastern Louisiana as a
result of Katrina.<SUP>6</SUP> These spills have caused as-yet unclear
damage to the Gulf and the River.
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\2\ Id.
\3\ Marla Cone and Ashley Powers, EPA Warns Muck Left by
Floodwaters Is Highly Contaminated, L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 2005,
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-
091605nola--lat,0,5316762.story?coll=la-home-headlines (last visited
Sept. 21, 2005).
\4\ Id.
\5\ Ryan Parry, Mississippi Burning: Pollution Hells as Fires,
Explosions and Oil Spills Follow, The Daily Mirror (U.K.), Sept. 3,
2005, at 6, 7; see also Sewell Chan & Andrew Revkin, Water Returned to
Lake Pontchartrain Contains Toxic Material, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 2005,
at A1. The two spills occurred at a Bass Enterprise storage depot in
Venice and at a Murphy Oil facility in Chalmette. The Bass spill was
estimated at about 68,000-78,000 barrels and the Murphy spill at about
10,000 barrels. See Reuters, Jim Loney, It's Almost Unimaginable, the
Things We Are Going to Have to Deal With, Sept. 6, 2005, available at
http://hartmannwatchwatch.blog
spot.com/2005/09/its-almost-unimaginable-things-we-are.html (last
visited Sept. 21, 2005); Susanne Pagano, EPA Finds Louisiana
Floodwaters Contaminated with Lead, Coliform, 36 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1870
(Sept. 9, 2005).
\6\ Associated Press, Katrina and the Environment, Sept. 16, 2005,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/16/katrina/
main855409.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
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As for the floodwaters that swept New Orleans and coastal
communities in Mississippi and Alabama, the most immediate threat to
human health is biological contamination.<SUP>7</SUP> Experts have
likened the bacterial concentrations in the floodwaters to untreated
sewage.<SUP>8</SUP> EPA also stated on September 19, 2005 that E. coli
levels in flood waters are ``greatly elevated'' and remain ``much
higher'' than EPA's recommended levels for contact. Those exposed to
the bacteria-laden floodwaters could contract diseases such as
hepatitis-A and salmonella poisoning.<SUP>9</SUP> Intestinal diseases
can be transmitted by ingesting sewage or simply by being in the water
without adequate protective clothing.<SUP>10</SUP> These risks are
particularly acute for children, the elderly, or those with compromised
immune systems.
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\7\ The Administrator of the federal Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has indicated that all tests conducted by EPA of waters in
the flooded residential areas of New Orleans exceed by at least ten
times the levels determined by EPA to be safe for human exposure for
bacteria that include E. coli and fecal coliform. See Pagano, supra
note 5 (indicating that EPA stopped measuring the amount of bacteria in
the water when the levels reached the ten-fold point). See also Press
Release, EPA, EPA and LDEQ Report Potential Health Risks from Sediments
(Sept. 16, 2005), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/
d9bf8d9315e942578525701c005e573c/387f
99c6a7a0b7808525707e0062479d!OpenDocument. By some accounts, fecal
coliform has been found in some of the floodwaters at levels thousands
of times higher than the levels designated by EPA as safe. Dina
Cappiello, Tainted Water, Hous. Chron., Sept. 13, 2005, available at
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/nation/3351081 (last visited
Sept. 21, 2005). Several people have already died from exposure to
bacteria closely linked to cholera and some people have fallen ill with
Vibrio vulnificus, a common marine bacteria. Genevieve Roberts,
Bacteria in Floodwater Blamed for Three Deaths, The Independent, Sept.
8, 2005, available at http://news.indephttp://www.ezilon.com/
information/article--9255.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2005); CNN, At
Least 30 Found Dead in Nursing Home, Sept. 8, 2005, available at http:/
/www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/07/katrina.impact/index.html (last visited
Sept. 21, 2005); Pagano, supra note 5.
\8\ See Cappiello, supra note 7.
\9\ Marla Cone, Floodwaters a Soup of Pathogens, EPA Finds, L.A.
Times, Sept. 8, 2005, at A18, available at http://www.latimes.com/
features/health/medicine/la-me-bacteria8sep08,1,7707135.
story?coll=la-health-medicine (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
\10\ Pagano, supra note 5.
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The bacterial contamination that creates these risks of infectious
disease resulted in part from damage to sewage treatment plants located
in the three states most directly affected by the storm, hundreds of
which were damaged or rendered inoperable. Leaking sewage lines added
to the problem.<SUP>11</SUP> The decomposition of dead people and
animals contributed still further bacterial contamination to the
floodwaters.
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\11\ Cone, supra note 9.
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The waters covering New Orleans' streets are also contaminated by a
range of toxic chemicals, <SUP>12</SUP> posing significant health and
safety risks. Significant amounts of lead, a heavy metal that creates
risk of brain damage in young children, have been detected in the
floodwaters. At one location, lead was detected at concentrations
nearly 700 times higher than EPA standards for safe drinking
water.<SUP>13</SUP> Tests conducted by EPA and the Louisiana Department
of Environmental Quality also found high levels of arsenic and
hexavalent chromium.<SUP>14</SUP> Other chemicals discovered in the
floodwaters have been a variety of heavy metals and polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons, all of which have been linked to cancer risk or
developmental problems.<SUP>15</SUP> Some experts have stated that they
would be surprised if continued testing fails to detect unsafe levels
of some of these contaminants.<SUP>16</SUP>
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\12\ E.g., Andrew Gumbel & Rupert Cornwell, After Katrina: The
Toxic Timebomb, The Independent, Sept. 7, 2005, available at http://
www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0907-03.htm (last visited Sept. 21,
2005).
\13\ See Cappiello, supra note 7.
\14\ Associated Press, EPA: Bacteria, Lead in New Orleans
Floodwaters, Sept. 15, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/
science/09/14/katrina.environment.ap/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
\15\ Juliet Eilperin, Flooded Toxic Waste Sites Are Potential
Health Threat, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 2005, at A15.
\16\ Cone, supra note 9. Some of these chemicals are known to cause
or are suspected of causing adverse health effects such as cancer,
birth defects, and neurological problems. Rebecca Claren, ``The Entire
Community Is Now a Toxic Waste Dump,'' Salon, Sept. 9, 2005, available
at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/09/09/wasteland/index.html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
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Some of these contaminants came from the kinds of products found in
most homes and commercial businesses, such as chemical cleaners,
bleach, and pest control products.<SUP>17</SUP> EPA reports that it has
collected 20,934 ``orphan'' containers with unknown contents--barrels
lying in common areas with no apparent owner--throughout the affected
region.<SUP>18</SUP> Others undoubtedly originated from inundated
industrial facilities subject to environmental regulatory programs or
from sites that managed hazardous chemicals improperly in the
past.<SUP>19</SUP>
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\17\ Sewell Chan & Andrew Revkin, Water Returned to Lake
Pontchartrain Contains Toxic Material, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 2005, at
A1.
\18\ EPA, Response Katrina, supra note 1.
\19\ A few days after the hurricane hit New Orleans, an explosion
occurred at a chemical factory located 15 blocks from the French
Quarter and two miles from the Superdome and the Ernest N. Morial
Convention Center, which housed the bulk of the city's refugees. Ryan
Parry, Mississippi Burning: Pollution Hells as Fires, Explosions and
Oil Spills Follow, The Daily Mirror (U.K.), Sept. 3, 2005, at 6, 7.
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These problems are daunting, and will take months, even years, to
clean up. Chemical contamination in many areas is likely to return
existing hazardous waste sites to ``imminent endangerment'' status, and
create brownfield sites that are unsuitable for redevelopment. Although
our immediate focus is properly on the significant risks to human
health and safety, it is worth noting that in the ensuing months, we
will have to also confront the environmental impacts of this
contamination: reports of a toxic plume moving through the Gulf of
Mexico are already raising serious concerns about the environmental
consequences for pristine and fragile resources surrounding south
Florida, including its coral reefs and areas surrounding the Dry
Tortugas.
Government officials responsible for removing the floodwaters from
the city face a Hobson's choice: they could wait to pump the water out
of the city until a mechanism was put in place to remove at least some
of the contamination, or they could pump the contaminated water back
into Lake Pontchartrain and the Gulf of Mexico. Both the risks that
would result from waiting to remove the water until it could be
decontaminated and the costs of constructing the necessary
bioremediation facilities were deemed unacceptably high.<SUP>20</SUP>
The pumping of floodwater with so much bacterial waste, however, is
likely to lower the dissolved oxygen content of the Lake and the Gulf,
creating a risk that many fish and other water-dependent organisms will
die.<SUP>21</SUP> Moreover, the intentional discharge of this
contamination is a sad sequel to hard-won success in cleaning up Lake
Ponchartrain to the point that portions were recently deemed safe for
swimming.<SUP>22</SUP>
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\20\ See Reuters, Jim Loney, Few Choices to Rid New Orleans of
Poisoned Water, Sept. 6, 2005.
\21\ Gumbel & Cornwell, supra note 70.
\22\ Amy Althans, Presentation to Focus on Revival of Lake Basin
Foundation, Chief Talks to AAUW, Times Picayune (New Orleans), Jan. 13,
2005; Leslie Williams, Beach Group Has Game Plan, Natural Feel Desired
for Area Along Lake, Times Picayune (New Orleans), Sept. 6, 2004.
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EPA has deployed hundreds of workers to the Gulf Coast and is
working against the clock to test floodwaters, soil, air, and drinking
water sources to determine whether they pose unreasonable risks to the
environment. When the Agency discovers hazardous conditions, it will
face the challenging tasks of figuring out to remove, neutralize, or
contain the contamination before people return to the area. All
decisionmakers should defer to this expert judgment.
environmental enforcement and superfund
Two fundamental issues warrant serious investigation in the wake of
this disaster: first, could any of the harm to health and the
environment have been avoided; and second, how to conduct and fund an
adequate cleanup of the contamination.
Compliance Issues
On the first question, one important inquiry is into the degree of
compliance with the Clean Water Act requirement that facilities that
store petroleum products in above-ground containers prepare Spill
Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plans. Such plans must include
physical containment, as necessary, to prevent oil spills because,
among other things, it is a civil and criminal violation of the Act to
allow such spills either intentionally or negligently. Similarly, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requires virtually all
facilities that manage, store, or dispose of hazardous waste to have
emergency plans that prevent the waste from escaping into the
environment in the event of an accident, including foreseeable events
like a hurricane. Once again, the aftermath of Katrina must include an
investigation of the compliance by New Orleans businesses with these
important requirements.
With hindsight, it also seems appropriate to consider questions
such as: Were factories and oil storage facilities located too close to
the Coast? Did responsible industries secure them sufficiently in
anticipation of a natural disaster that had been predicted for years?
Were efforts to clean up toxic waste dumps before the hurricane
adequate, or did superficial cleanups leave these dangerous sites
vulnerable to the inevitable floods? The Clean Water Act and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act could have prevented the
environmental damage caused by Katrina if they had been implemented
effectively,
Superfund Sites
Finally, there is the troubling question of flooded Superfund
sites, with damage that was exacerbated by poor initial cleanups. There
are three National Priorities List sites that lay in the path of the
hurricane, and the Washington Post reported on September 10, 2005 that
one site in the northeast section of New Orleans is submerged in water
and that two sites are flooded, with their dangerous contents joining
the sewage and household hazardous chemicals in the water that will
soon be pumped into the Gulf of Mexico or Lake
Ponchartrain.<SUP>23</SUP>
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\23\ Eilperin, supra note 15.
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As you are well aware, the National Priorities List (NPL) is
limited to the 1238 worst abandoned toxic waste sites in the country.
In an interview with CPR, long-time Louisiana environmental consultant
Wilma Subra confirmed the accuracy of the Post story, as well as the
following analysis of its implications.<SUP>24</SUP>
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\24\ Ms. Subra is a nationally recognized expert who testified
before the U.S. Senate Environment & Public Works Committee on
Superfund Reauthorization in 1997. The testimony is available at http:/
/epw.senate.gov/105th/sub--9-04.htm. She can be reached at either (337)
367-2216 or (337) 578-3994.
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Agriculture Street Landfill--The Black Love Canal
The site that was the hardest hit by Katrina is the Agriculture
Street Landfill, sometimes referred to as the ``black Love Canal.'' The
95-acre site, located three miles south of Lake Pontchartrain in a
community that is 60-80 percent African-American, is an old municipal
landfill where ordinary garbage was mixed together with liquid
hazardous waste to a depth of between two and 32.5 feet.<SUP>25</SUP>
In 1969, the City of New Orleans built a low-income housing project on
top of the site, as well as the Moton Elementary School.<SUP>26</SUP>
In 1993-94, after community leaders demanded that EPA conduct a full
investigation of the site, the Agency decided that contamination at the
site warranted an emergency cleanup and placement on the NPL.
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\25\ It operated from 1912 until 1959, but was reopened in 1965 to
receive debris created by Hurricane Betsy. The combination of garbage
and service station oil waste often caused fires at the site, and
during that period, local residents called it ``Dante's Inferno.''
\26\ Among the issues surrounding the site, in addition to the
inadequacy of the remedy, explains Darryl Malek-Wiley, an environmental
justice organizer with the Sierra Club, is the government's role in the
1970s in ``encouraging first-time black homebuyers'' to settle in a
development that residents later learned to be on top of the former
landfill. Eilperin, supra note 15.
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In a health assessment prepared for the site by the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a unit of the Centers
for Disease Control, experts concluded that the undeveloped portions of
the site posed a ``public health hazard'' and that if the land was ever
used for residential housing, exposure to lead, arsenic, and polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in the soil could pose an ``unacceptable
health risk.'' <SUP>27</SUP> All of those toxic materials are now
floating through the streets of New Orleans.
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\27\ Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Public
Health Assessment: Agriculture Street Landfill, available at http://
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/PHA/agriculturestreet/asl--p1.html.
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EPA's choice of a remedy for the site has significantly exacerbated
this damage. Instead of excavating the site, treating contaminated soil
in situ, or even installing a liner that would prevent the landfill's
contents from washing away, EPA decided that its final remedy would be
limited excavation of less than two-thirds of the site and the
placement of two feet of ``clean fill'' on top of the buried
waste.<SUP>28</SUP>
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\28\ EPA picked up 52,615 tons of soil, or an average of 86 tons
per acre, and put down 177,293 cubic yards of clean fill in its place.
See EPA, Agriculture Street Landfill NPL Update (Sept. 2005), available
at http://www.epa.gov/earth1r6/6sf/pdffiles/0600646.pdf.
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Residents asked to be relocated from their housing on top of the
site, a project that would have cost approximate $12 million, and have
even filed suit demanding that relocation. EPA refused and has instead
spent $20 million on the cleanup described above. In desperation, a
delegation traveled to Geneva Switzerland in 1999 to ask for help from
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.<SUP>29</SUP>
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\29\ For an account of the trip, see http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/
unchr--ej.htm. For further information about environmental justice
issues at Superfund sites, see infra The Two Americas: Race, Class, and
Injustice; Alicia Lyttle, Agriculture Street Landfill: Environmental
Justice Case Study (U. Mich., Jan. 2003, available at http://
www.umich.edu/snre492/Jones/ag
street.htm; http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/POCEG-02.PDF; and Robert D.
Bullard, Environmental Justice in the 21st Century (Envtl. Justice Res.
Ctr.), available at http://assets.cambridge.org/052166/0629/sample/
0521660629ws.pdf.
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Bayou Bonfouca
This 54-acre site located in Slidell, Louisiana, was a wood
treatment facility using creosote that operated since the late 1800s.
Some 26,000 people live in the community, and the house nearest the
site is 400 feet away.<SUP>30</SUP> Even though the site is supposedly
cleaned up, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality warns
citizens not to swim, and to avoid contact with over seven miles of
Bayou Bonfouca, identifying the pollutant of concern as
creosote.<SUP>31</SUP> The ATSDR health assessment concluded that the
site is a ``public health hazard'' and worries that because swimming
advisories are ``voluntary,'' the potential for immediate skin burns
and long-term illnesses is ongoing.<SUP>32</SUP> The companies that
created the site paid to install a fence around it. EPA then used the
site to burn hazardous wastes from another nearby Superfund site,
ultimately burying the concentrated ash from that process in Bayou
Bonfouca. The only ``remedy'' installed at Bayou Bonfouca was the
construction of a plastic and clay cap over the top of the creosote
piles, the remnants of which were likely washed out in the flooding.
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\30\ See EPA, Madisonville Creosote Works NPL Update (Sept. 2005),
available at http://www.epa.gov/region06/6sf/pdffiles/0600653.pdf
[hereinafter EPA, Madisonville Creosote Works].
\31\ See LA Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Fish Consumption and Swimming
Advisories (Jan. 11, 2005), available at http://www.deq.state.la.us/
surveillance/mercury/fishadvi.htm#table.
\32\ See Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Public
Health Assessment: Bayou Bonfouca, available at http://
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/PHA/bonfouca/bon--p3.html.
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Madisonville Creosote Works
This 29-acre site is also a former wood treatment
facility.<SUP>33</SUP> EPA excavated some contaminated soil, treated
it, and put it back down at the site. To cope with the thousands of
gallons of creosote waste still under the surface, the Agency installed
``recovery'' trenches beneath the surface that would capture the
creosote waste, keeping it out of local drinking water supplies.
Flooding is likely to have disrupted those trenches, potentially
spreading contamination into the community's water.
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\33\ See EPA, Madisonville Creosote Works, supra note 30.
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Why did the cleanup of these three sites turn out to be so
vulnerable to a foreseeable and foreseen natural disaster like Katrina?
The Superfund created under that statute was intended to provide the
necessary legal authority to enable an adequate response to releases of
hazardous substances into the environment. However, the Superfund
program has been critically weakened in recent years, just when it must
play a central role in cleaning up after the disaster.
Among the sources of revenue for the Superfund toxic waste cleanup
program were taxes on the production of crude oil and the manufacture
of feedstock chemicals, as well as general tax revenues. The industry
taxes that provide the bulk of the program's funding expired in 1995.
Since the taxes expired, the program has limped along on limited funds
from general tax revenues and cost recovery actions against companies
that created the sites.<SUP>34</SUP> The industry taxes provided about
$1.45 billion in annual funding from 1990-1995.<SUP>35</SUP> Current
levels of general revenue funding are $1.3 billion.<SUP>36</SUP> The
cost of the remediation of toxic waste washed out by Katrina remains to
be determined.
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\34\ Unfortunately, there are no ``deep pocket'' corporations in
evidence around the three sites described above, and the only
alternative is for the Superfund to pick up the tab.
\35\ Meredith Preston & Susan Bruninga, Amendment to Reinstate
Industry Tax to Support Trust Fund Defeated in Senate, 35 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 536. For more information on the battle to reinstate the tax, see
Dean Scott, Senators Criticize Cut in EPA Water Fund, Challenge Pace
for Superfund Cleanups, 36 Env't Rep. (BNA) 263.
\36\ President Bush has recommended holding Superfund spending
level, adding only $32 million to the program in his most recent
budget. Because of the missing money, EPA will only be able to address
40 sites in the upcoming year, down from an average of 80 during the
Clinton Administration. Id.
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The result of this disastrous set of policies has been to shift a
significant share of the burden of financing hazardous substance
cleanups away from the industries that generate the bulk of the
substances found at contaminated sites and onto the shoulders of the
taxpaying public. The limited funds available in the Superfund have
unintended consequences, it can delay cleanups and lead EPA to choose
remedies that are not adequately protective of human health. With
reduced funding, EPA may be tempted to reduce its expenses by choosing
remedies that are temporary and very vulnerable to bad weather along
the Gulf Coast. Indeed, the remedies installed at the three sites in
the New Orleans area were fated to fail.
the two americas: race, class, and injustice
The devastating effects--the lost lives, the demolished homes, the
shattered communities, the affronts to dignity--were suffered
disproportionately by people of color and low-income people in New
Orleans. ``Natural disasters'' such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and
floods are sometimes viewed as ``great social equalizers:'' they strike
unpredictably and at random, affecting black and white, rich and poor,
sick and well alike. However, as Katrina has laid bare, the harms are
not visited randomly or equally in our society. A reporter for The New
York Times put it bluntly: ``The white people got out. Most of them,
anyway . . . it was mostly black people who were left behind.''
<SUP>37</SUP>
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\37\ Jason DeParle, Broken Levees, Unbroken Barriers: What Happens
to a Race Deferred, The New York Times, Section 4, Page 1 (Sunday,
Sept. 4, 2005).
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Twenty-eight percent of people in New Orleans live in
poverty.<SUP>38</SUP> Of these, 84 percent are African-
American.<SUP>39</SUP> Twenty-four percent of the adults living in New
Orleans are disabled.<SUP>40</SUP> An estimated 15,000 to 17,000 men,
women and children in the New Orleans area are homeless.<SUP>41</SUP>
The lowest lying areas of New Orleans tend to be populated by those
without economic or political resources.<SUP>42</SUP> The city's Lower
Ninth Ward, for example, which was especially hard hit and completely
inundated by water, is among its poorest and lowest lying
areas.<SUP>43</SUP> Ninety-eight percent of its residents are African-
American.<SUP>44</SUP> As Craig E. Colten, a geologist at Louisiana
State University and an expert on New Orleans' vulnerable topography
explains: ``[I]n New Orleans, water flows away from money. Those with
resources who control where the drainage goes have always chosen to
live on the high ground. So the people in the low areas were the
hardest hit.'' <SUP>45</SUP>
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\38\ U.S. Census, ``Louisiana Quick Facts,'' (2000), available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/2255000.html.
\39\ U.S. Census, ``Poverty Status in 1999 by Sex by Age,'' (2000),
available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?--
bm=y&context=dt&-re . . . -geo--id=16000US2255000
&-search--results=01000US&-format=&---lang=en.
\40\ U.S. Census, ``Social Characteristics: 1990,'' available at
http://factfinder.census.org/servlet/QTTable?--bn=n&lang=eng&qr--
name=DEC--1990--STF3--DP2&ds--name=DEC-1990--STF3&geo--id=05000US22071.
\41\ City of New Orleans Health Department, ``Homeless
Healthcare,'' available at http://www.cityofno.com/
portal.aspx?portal=48&tabid=6.
\42\ Jason DeParle, supra note 37 (quoting Craig E. Colten,
Louisiana State University).
\43\ Id.; Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, ``Lower Ninth
Ward Neighborhood: Income & Poverty,'' available at http://gnocdc.org/
orleans/8/22/income.html (poverty rates in the Lower Ninth Ward ten
percent higher than in Orleans Parish generally).
\44\ Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, ``Lower Ninth Ward
Neighborhood: People and Household Characteristics,'' available at
http://gnocdc.org/orleans/8/22/people.html.
\45\ Jason DeParle, supra note 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moves to eviscerate government protection of health, safety--and
the environment are most tenable where those burdened can be viewed as
``other'' or where their--circumstances are not lived or imagined--by
many Americans.<SUP>46</SUP> The current Administration in particular
has endorsed a shift in responsibility for basic health, safety and
environmental protections. It has sought to diminish the government's
role in assuring even minimally healthful conditions for all, leaving
it to those at risk to protect themselves. The effect of this shift is
to burden people of color and the poor--because these groups are
disproportionately the ones who are most exposed and most vulnerable,
they will be the ones left to fend for themselves.<SUP>47</SUP> They
are also the ones with the fewest resources to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ See, e.g., Catherine A. O'Neill, Risk Avoidance, Cultural
Discrimination, and Environmental Justice for Indigenous Peoples, 30
Ecology L. Q. 1 (2003).
\47\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Katrina also raises questions of justice in cleanup and rebuilding.
Community members and environmental justice leaders have raised
concerns about when and how these contaminants will be cleaned up,
citing evidence of inequities in environmental cleanups more generally.
They and others have also questioned the rush to waive standard health,
safety, environmental and social protections. While it might have been
important to waive normal Clean Water Act permits to allow the waters
to be pumped out of a flooded city as quickly as possible, other
waivers are unjustified.<SUP>48</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ See, e.g., Michael Janofksy, Bill Would Let E.P.A. Relax Rules
for Cleanup, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 2005, at A18 (national edition).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
In the aftermath of Katrina, we must rethink our past policies and
priorities in order to avoid similar disasters in the future. We must
be sure that EPA and other relevant agencies have adequate resources to
respond to the unavoidable consequences of future disasters. We urge
the Committee to support the creation of an adequately funded,
bipartisan, and independent commission to address the following
critical questions:
Critical Questions
1. Katrina caused serious damage to the infrastructure that
supports oil and gas production, as well as hundreds of facilities
handling significant quantities of hazardous chemicals.
a. How does EPA plan to conduct an independent assessment of the
environmental releases that occurred at such facilities,
including air emissions, spills of chemical product and waste,
and fires caused by such events?
b. What monitoring is being undertaken and what additional monitoring
should be planned to adequately determine the nature and extent
of hazards to health and environmental contamination?
c. Is information from all appropriate government and non-governmental
sources being incorporated into assessment of the releases?
2. What are the protocols for testing drinking water for the
broader suite of chemicals likely to have migrated into supplies as a
result of the storm and how are federal and state authorities ensuring
that such testing gets done?
3. What plans have been made to rebuild the area's publicly owned
treatment works so that they can deliver adequate services before the
city is re-populated?
4. How will EPA ensure that the re-habitation of New Orleans,
Mississippi, and other areas affected by Katrina is safe in light of
remaining toxic deposits in soil and water?
5. Is all information relevant to public health and safety being
shared with the public in a timely fashion?
6. To what extent did the chemical and biological contamination
that has been discovered in New Orleans since Katrina result from
noncompliance with or inadequate enforcement of the federal
environmental laws described above?
7. Have the EPA and Congress undertaken the necessary assessment of
the funding needed to fully implement and enforce federal environmental
laws in order to protect public health and the environment in cases of
natural and manmade disasters and reduce potential future cleanup
costs?
8. Had state and local officials complied with their planning
responsibilities under EPCRTKA, and, if not, did inadequate planning
exacerbate the risks to health and safety now facing New Orleans?
9. A long, intentional, and successful effort to weaken the
Superfund program has left it without adequate funds to address the new
dimensions of risk posed by Superfund sites that Hurricane Katrina has
made apparent. In addition, the aftermath of the hurricane has created
need for an emergency response and may produce new sites that warrant
cleanup under Superfund.
a. What is the vulnerability of all Superfund sites, including those
near waterbodies, to natural and manmade disasters? Does EPA
have adequate funding to undertake such an assessment?
b. How will EPA and the states deal with the potentially responsible
parties who created the sites in the first place, and either
never stepped forward to pay for cleanup, or paid for a remedy
that now appears inadequate?
c. What sources of funding will EPA employ in its broader response to
the contamination in the wake of the hurricane?
10. What steps must be taken to ensure that race or class
disparities don't affect the cleanup methods selected and used in
different areas?
11. What steps are being taken to ensure that the affected
communities have adequate opportunities to participate in the relevant
decision-making processes?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
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Mr. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Verchick. You asked for
unanimous consent to add some information to the record. Is
there objection? Without objection, so ordered.
I am going to ask just one question. Mr. Verchick has
already answered it. I would like to ask it of Mr. Olson, Dr.
Wright, and Secretary Gautreaux. Is it safe for people to move
back into New Orleans today? Mr. Olson?
Mr. Olson. Well, I would agree. I would agree with what Mr.
Verchick said just moments ago, which is that for many areas,
there is no data available at all to answer that question. For
some areas, the data available suggests that it is not safe,
for example, some of the air monitoring data that is in my
testimony shows that for someone to stay for more than 2 weeks
is not safe, according to Federal guidelines. So, some areas,
maybe it is, if we did additional testing, but we are not.
Mr. Bass. Dr. Wright.
Ms. Wright. Based on the information that I have, which is
none, I would have to say it is not safe, because we don't
know. And also, the fact that there is so much mold around,
just growing everywhere, I think that that is a problem in
homes across the river in Algiers, where people, some people
never left, and people are still there. I have a distant
relative there, and her house just reeks of mold, and she
didn't even get the water that others got. That can't be a good
thing. I don't believe it is.
Mr. Bass. Secretary Gautreaux.
Ms. Gautreaux. I would just say that in general, where you
don't have potable drinking water and wastewater treatment,
there are health risks associated with that. There are some
areas where that is available, and I think you have to consider
that, as well as individual risk factors, respiratory problems,
pregnancy, anyone who immuno-compromised. If you are going for
health reasons, consider those things, and I think the
population should also consider things like the communications
911 network, available hospitals, and other factors. I read a
statistic the other day that 75 to 70 percent of hurricane
injuries are typically associated with the recovery. So, I
think all of that has to be considered.
Mr. Bass. Thank you very much, Secretary Gautreaux. The
Chair now recognizes the ranking member, the gentlelady from
California, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Solis. Thank you very much. Sorry I came in late to
hear some of your testimony, but I know that the concerns that
you have are very similar to what some of the members I know on
our side of the aisle have as well. I am interested to get your
opinion on quality and access of information from EPA. Either
one of you on the panel can respond. EPA talked about getting
out information, they handed out 3,500 fact sheets in the first
2 weeks, conducting interventions that removed more than 850
workers from serious, life-threatening hazards. I am wondering
if there was any other materials or outreach efforts on the
part of EPA regarding households, not just the workplace, but
households, and what kind of information are you aware of that
was put out there? I know they have a website. I don't know how
many people are able to access that website, and second, have
you seen any of these handouts or kits that were given out? Dr.
Wright, why don't you start?
Ms. Wright. Yes. I would just like to say that there is a
serious problem with communication, especially for many of the
200,000 people who have been scattered across the United
States, who also would like to have some information about what
is going on at home. We haven't gotten any. Now, I am a little
more mobile than most people that I know, and so, I am here in
Washington, D.C. I am on the phone with enviros every day, so
yes, I have seen one flyer put out by our Governor, but that
was given to me by one of the enviros, and I was able to pull
it down off of the website.
There are a lot of people who don't have access to any of
those kinds of things. Another important thing that I would
like to say is that there are some cultural differences between
blacks and whites, and sometimes, the way that information is
delivered determines whether or not it is received properly. I
haven't seen any what I would consider culturally sensitive
materials delivered on Katrina. I do know, because of the
groups that we work with, that local organizations have been
working to develop information. The Deep South Center, and the
National Black Environmental Justice Network are, in fact, as
we speak, trying to develop flyers to disseminate in different
places where large numbers of evacuees are.
I would say that is a real weakness of the whole rebuild,
return, come back home project, whatever you would like to call
it.
Mr. Verchick. My experiences reflects what Dr. Wright would
say. I would simply say walking the city, as I have been, in
many different areas, and talking to lots of people who have
been there, no one really has any idea of the type of
environmental contamination, especially the kind that could be
airborne, when it dries up, on that sludge, and then floats
around.
A really good indication, if you want, is to look at the
local blogs, which I do daily. Channel 4, a local TV station,
and the Times-Picayune both have excellent blog sites. You can
look and see what people are talking about. That is where they
trade all kinds of information about what they do in the city.
It is rarely talked about. The people that do talk about
contamination are very misinformed much of the time. They are
misinformed about a lot of things, incidentally, on those
blogs. And I look at it, and it makes my blood run cold,
because I know that people are operating a set of instructions.
Whether or not that stuff is on EPA's site, I have seen it. It
takes me a while to find it. I am not convinced that many
people are getting it. What does trouble me about the CDC, EPA
sites is sometimes, they will say things like we have no
evidence of X, but what they don't say is we haven't tested for
it yet. And that is a very misleading statement to say there is
no evidence of long-term health risks when they haven't tested
for long-term health risks.
Ms. Solis. My time is running short, but I want to throw
this out there as well. We heard earlier from the EPA
representative that about 80 percent of the drinking water
system is back. However, 2.3 million people still don't have
access, so my question is directed at our water experts here,
was our system adequate before Katrina, and what is it that we
could have done to help, knowing that Katrina was coming?
Mr. Ragone. Well, I think the real reason, as I said in the
last paragraph of my written testimony, for being here, is to
start thinking proactively about the next one. Certainly,
Katrina is a terrible disaster. We have to take advantage of
what we have learned there, and get a proactive strategy in
place that prevents these things from happening anywhere in the
country, be it natural disaster or terrorist act. We have to
think proactively.
One of the concerns in many places in the country, with
regard to household wells, is that poor people living in old
houses have inadequate wells. What we have to do as a proactive
measure is provide poor people with adequate wells, and some
understanding of how to maintain them. If we do that, if we
could keep people in their place, if they had drinking water,
the catastrophe in the Katrina-affected area would have been
lessened.
We don't want to make vagrants of our communities if we
don't have to. If we installed a deep well in a firehouse, with
a stand alone generator that was safe from floodwaters, raised
up some way, we could have provided a water resource for these
people, and we wouldn't have people migrating, swimming for
tens of miles through muck and this contaminated sediment, to
get somewhere that was nowhere.
We just have to start thinking proactively. And the last
point is, we have two types of water in this country that are
managed differently, surface water, and groundwater. If you put
them together, they have a complementary function that can save
us during disasters. If we use ground water when surface water
is contaminated, we benefit. If there is excess surface water,
we can put it in the ground. We benefit. We have a bureaucracy
now, a national and local bureaucracy, that separates those
functions, and takes away that complementary benefit, and that
is put at risk in places.
Ms. Solis. They even compete with each other.
Mr. Ragone. They can help each other.
Ms. Solis. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Ragone. And right now, they are not. They are competing
with each other.
Mr. Bass. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Dr. Murphy, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am certainly moved
by your testimony, Dr. Wright. My dad was born in Louisiana,
and when I traced the Murphy family roots, I look back in the
19th Century, the thousands of Irish that came to New Orleans
and died, because they were seen as animals, and even lower
than slaves, as they helped to build that city in the list of
the thousands who died there trying to do that. So, my heart,
and that of Pennsylvanians, also go out to all of you, in as I
want to make sure that we don't re-victimize the victims, and
by that, I mean that we look to the people throughout the
entire area affected by Hurricane Katrina as survivors and not
victims. And to me, it is important, the way we don't re-
victimize them is to turn this into a political game of who is
to blame. And let us attack, and let us talk about it has to be
an independent commission, as opposed to something Congress can
do? Because I believe that automatically assumes that people in
Washington, or Members of Congress, do not have the care and
compassion to do that. And I would like to get that away from
politics, and let us just talk about finding the right answers
here, because I think you both are from Jesuit universities,
too, which I am, as well, and I respect that, because of a need
to ask questions.
But let me ask a very tough question on this, of this
panel. Well, some of you have said the health problems are so
bad, it is no way habitable now, and I believe I am not sure
when it will be in a situation to be habitable. In the North,
we have areas of brownfields, where mills have been for years,
where perhaps some oil and gas work have done, and basically,
the EPA and the Department of Environmental Protection in
Pennsylvania comes in and says you know what, it is never
habitable for homeowners. Maybe you can do an industrial site
here, maybe you can do some commercial development here, and
pave it all over, but it is never going to be right for
homeowners again, so don't consider that. If it is so serious,
I mean, I think of the, what, hundreds of thousands of
vehicles, that as the water came into the gas tanks, the gas
flowed out. As the chemicals leaked from there, and all of the
everything else, is it really to the point where someone has to
ask that question, will it ever be habitable? I open it up to
the panel.
Ms. Wright. Well, I have been working in this area with
people who have lived on top of hazardous waste site, Superfund
sites, and all kinds of sites, and each time, we have been told
by EPA that there is a possible cleanup for these types of
sites. So, I don't believe that the city of New Orleans is so
contaminated that it will never be habitable again. But I do
know that if we don't clean it up right, we will end up with
two thirds of the city being a Superfund site, as we have, in
fact, experienced with the Agriculture Street Landfill
community in the city of New Orleans, that was built on top of
the New Orleans Landfill, where all of the debris from
Hurricane Betsy was put. And 20 years later, you know, it is a
Superfund site, with people sick and dying. So, my real concern
is that the appropriate testing is done, and the right
remediation is put in place and completed, and that there are
no differentials in the way that is done, based on race and
class. Those things, I am very interested in.
Mr. Murphy. Are you suggesting Congress would act that way,
based on race and class?
Ms. Wright. No, I am not. I am saying that things have been
done that way where I live.
Mr. Murphy. Well, we want to make sure that doesn't----
Ms. Wright. I wasn't talking about Congress.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I want to make sure we don't do that, but
part of it, as we are looking at tens of billions of dollars
here, I am real concerned, as you are, about the safety of the
folks, and I want to make sure we protect them, and part of the
question is, and people are raising it around the country, and
because you are there, it is so important for me to hear
directly from you on this, all of you on this. Are we better
off relocating the city, rather than rebuilding it there? I am
opening it----
Ms. Wright. Are you asking me that?
Mr. Murphy. Well, I am asking all of you that. I mean,
certainly, if I lived there, I would say I want to go home, but
part of it is I am really very concerned about the public
health issue you are raising, and what it would take, and if it
is not--I don't know. I am asking you as experts in these
issues, if it is solvable, asking all of you that. And that is
a question Congress has to ask. How do we make it safe for the
public, so people go home there, but we are not just simply
saying--because here is the thing: I would think there is a
couple issues. We would be wrong if we simply said well, we
will fix it up, but go back there. We know you are going to get
sick again. I think that would be a terrible thing. Or what is
it going to take to fix it to the level where people can be
protected, or their health. I need to know the answers----
Ms. Wright. Are we asking everyone in California to leave,
because of earthquakes and all of these things that we deal
with every year? I mean, that is really a strange question to
me.
Mr. Murphy. Let me answer this, because I mean no harm in
this. I am trying to find out--it is much like when people live
along the Mississippi River and it floods, and FEMA comes in
and pays them, and it floods again, and FEMA says you are in
high-risk area. We can't keep doing this. It is a matter,
because we have such a huge public health concern there, I want
to make sure we are not sending back to an area where they are
going to get harmed. I think that would be the worst thing that
we could put them in a harmful situation, and yet, we want to
be compassionate, because they want to go home. I would love to
see that. I am trying to find the balance. I don't mean harm in
that. Please understand. I want to find how we can solve that.
Mr. Verchick. I think the short answer is we have to save
New Orleans, and that we can. We can protect it through
engineering from the floods. We can scoop up, change, pull up
the contaminated areas, and over time, as we learn more, we
will know what we are dealing with, and I think we will be able
to do it.
One difference between the Mississippi coast and the
Alabama coast and New Orleans is that New Orleans is a city
over 300 years old, a cultural gem in the world, just like
Venice, and just like the Netherlands, both of which are also
sinking. We have the technology to save it.
Mr. Bass. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has
expired. The Chair would----
Ms. Wright. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bass. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Wright. I would like to be excused. I have to catch a
plane at 5.
Mr. Bass. Absolutely.
Ms. Wright. Thank you.
Mr. Bass. The Chair will excuse Dr. Wright. Thank you very
much for your testimony. I would also like to ask unanimous
consent for members to submit questions to witnesses in
writing. If there is no objection, so ordered. And the Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Maine, Mr. Allen, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you
for being here today. A special thanks to Secretary Gautreaux
and Mayor Rutledge. I have done what you are doing today.
Sometimes, it is like watching grass grow, to not be in the
room during this kind of conversation. I very much appreciate
your being here.
I would like to ask some questions growing out of Mr.
Olson's testimony, about EPA's role and how EPA is acting, and
whether or not it is living up to its responsibility, to
basically make sure that you all are safe, and the public is
safe. EPA has said that it is doing testing, but the decision
on whether or not it is safe to return will be left to local
authorities. It is unclear, from Mr. Peacock's testimony, who
would do the analysis upon which to base those decisions.
I mean, is this a case where we have multiple people out
trying to analyze a smattering of data, or what? I mean, how
are we going to get there? And built into this question is
really another question about, I guess this is probably for the
mayor and Secretary Gautreaux, what your experience has been
dealing with the EPA in the course of your efforts to get your
feet back on the ground. And so, I guess maybe, Ms. Gautreaux,
why don't we begin with you?
Ms. Gautreaux. Okay. Well, today, again, repeating what we
said earlier, when you can officially come back in, a complex
one that involves a lot. I will tell you from our perspective
in Louisiana, EPA has been very helpful to us. We have decided
on long and short-term sampling strategies. We are coordinating
on information, and these are the types of things that we are
providing to the public officials. We have the same concerns
that have been expressed earlier about the water, drinking
water systems down. People do need to be careful, especially if
they are sensitive, when they go in the areas. From our
perspective, EPA has not only helped in terms of strategizing
and helping carrying out sampling, they also provided
equipment, such as the TAGA monitoring vehicles that go through
neighborhoods, planes that are able to fly over and detect
leaks in facilities, and also, different components in fires.
Actually, we have about 100 EPA employees over here, and we
meet, and it is not just a meeting. We have them throughout the
day, but every day, we get together with our other State and
Federal partners, and say what is the issue, how are we going
to approach it? How are we making progress in the areas that we
think are directly related to public health and safety?
So, I hope that answers some of your questions.
Mr. Allen. Thank you very much. Mayor Rutledge, I don't
know if you have had similar kind of contact, but can you
comment on what it is like from your community?
Mr. Rutledge. Well, sir, the monitoring is very important.
The key to it is, is we are getting those tests back, or those
results back. It is important for us to know what they are,
because we can turn around and share that with the public. What
is happening right now, there is a gap, because the people,
they are looking for somebody to give those answers. And of
course, what they are doing, they are calling the local
officials, and they are calling their local people, saying
well, where are they? How safe are we? No one is going to allow
anyone to go back in their home. No one is going to allow
anyone to go back into the community unless it is safe. And I
think we all need to be thinking about that, No. 1, but you
know, when you talk about people that don't have a home any
more, that don't have a place to go, then it is going to be
hard for you to keep that person out of that little block of
land. It belongs to that person. Because a lot of times, you
know, you adapt to the situation regardless if you want to or
not.
Mr. Allen. Okay. Thank you. Other panelists here, any
reaction to that? Mr. Olson?
Mr. Olson. Well, I will just say a couple things. One is
that I don't think there is anybody that would argue that EPA
should not be much more comprehensive testing. Well, there
probably are people that would argue that. But that there needs
to be fair testing, wherever people are going to be returning.
And that testing needs to not just be released on a website.
Most of the folks that have been displaced can't log onto the
web, and even if you read what is on their website, you know,
you would practically have to have a Ph.D. in chemistry to
understand some of what is in there. So, it is important to
have understandable information accessible to people, and to be
public with that, and much more comprehensive in the testing.
And we believe EPA, under the National Contingency Plan and
other legal requirements, does have a legal obligation to
decide whether it is safe or not. If you have got 2.3 million
people with unsafe drinking water and no sewage treatment, I
mean, is it really safe to be sending people into that with
toxic muck, we have heard, four feet deep in many communities.
You know, is that really a place people should be returning.
Maybe you don't block them, but certainly, you give them
protective gear, and you give them the information they need.
Mr. Allen. So your bottom line is you don't think EPA is
fulfilling all those responsibilities.
Mr. Olson. Well, they certainly have been trying, and I
don't want to say that they are not doing anything. They
certainly have got a lot of people there that are working very
hard. The problem has been communications and extent of the
testing, and making sure the information is getting put forward
in an accurate way, and ultimately, stepping up to the plate
and saying, yes, it is safe, or no, it is not. And we don't
think they have really been fulfilling that obligation.
Mr. Allen. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I wondered if
any of the other panelists could just answer the question?
Mr. Ragone. Just one thing. I think there is a matter of
distribution of labor here that has to be considered. I used to
be with U.S. Geological Survey, and I was happy to know that we
provided information to the benefit of society. EPA's research
has to do the same kind of thing, and one of the limitations of
funding with EPA is maybe what are the health implications of
compounds A, B, C, D, and that list gets longer and longer. I
think EPA has a major responsibility to know health
implications of a variety of contaminants that we are facing
all over the world. I think, in terms of distribution of labor,
it should be the local communities, the health departments.
Mayor Rutledge said this. He wants his own people and his
own communities solving the problems, but that requires
training and opportunities to gain knowledge, and to exchange
that research caliber information with EPA, it is just another
organization, CDC and the like, and put it on the ground
locally, so those communities can solve the problems in the
context of their community. You will never get enough money to
any Federal agency or to any community.
Mr. Allen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bass. Thank you very much. I would like to ask one more
question. We apparently haven't had votes yet, so we got a
couple more minutes. If you ladies and gentlemen would be good
enough to wait around for a second.
Long-term impact on Lake Pontchartrain and the Gulf of
Mexico. Do we have any idea what the assessment is at this
point? Any brief observations as to what our options are, and
what the impact is going to be? I didn't even know Lake
Pontchartrain existed a month and a half ago, and now, we
understand exactly what the problems are and the priorities. It
is my understanding that prior to the hurricane, it was
swimmable, there had been a long history of trying to clean it
up. Is that gone now? Perhaps. Secretary?
Ms. Gautreaux. Would you like me to address that?
Mr. Bass. Yes, please.
Ms. Gautreaux. Okay. We have actually been a partner with
the local governments in the parishes that surround Lake
Pontchartrain and others in improving water quality. We were
very disappointed, although we understood the priority had to
be to get the water off of the flooded areas in New Orleans,
for public health and safety reasons.
To date, what we have seen has actually been very
encouraging. The water quality samples that have been taken
have been pretty parallel with big storm water events, and we
are confident that the fecal bacteria will die off within a
couple of days. It is salty water in Lake Pontchartrain. It is
an estuarine lake. Organics will eventually decompose. We may
see some fish kills associated with the oxygen being eaten up
during the decomposition process, for lack of a technical
explanation, and also, that metals will ultimately adhere to
sediments and be buried. This wouldn't have been our
preference, but we are very encouraged, as are the local
citizens organizations. I say citizens--elected officials, a
group, a cross-section of people of the Lake Pontchartrain
Basin have been very encouraged about the results to date, that
we will see a healthier lake in a few months, but we are
certainly setting up, and they are helping us with a fairly
comprehensive monitoring strategy in case we do see something
that needs to be addressed. But so far, we are very encouraged,
actually surprisingly so at the resilience of the lake, and the
results of sampling to date.
Mr. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Olson. Could I just add one thing? There are a couple
of significant issues here that need to be addressed. One is
the sediments that were just mentioned. We are very concerned
about the heavy metals and other organics and so on, that are
going to be adhered to the sediments, some of which washed up
into the Lower Ninth Ward and elsewhere, and people are going
to be exposed to this. So some of it that dries up is going to
turn into dust, and people may inhale it, but at the bottom of
Lake Pontchartrain, we are also very worried about what is
going to happen with those sediments.
The other point, you asked about the Gulf. As you probably
know, there is already an area in the Gulf that is known as the
Dead Zone, which grows and shrinks, but at some points is, I
have heard, larger than your state, which is a pretty
significant size of an area that is sort of unfishable. A lot
of that is from the upper Midwest pollution coming down, and
too many nutrients. The concern is, of course, that may have
been exacerbated by this flood, and I don't know if you had
more to say about that.
Mr. Verchick. The only thing that I would add is that more
testing has to be done about the heavy metals that are in Lake
Pontchartrain to say that if they sink to the bottom and get
buried in the sand, that neutralizes them somehow is not true,
particularly when you consider that the lake itself is very
shallow, about 15 feet, 20 feet deep maximum. And so, if you
have got dredging going on, or other things going on, that will
affect the bottom, you are going to have all that stuff coming
back up in the water.
Mr. Bass. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes the
gentlelady from California for a second round for 5 minutes.
Ms. Solis. Thank you. I missed my opportunity to ask EPA
regarding testing around Superfund sites and landfills, and I
would like to get feedback from you all. If you feel that, you
know, what your opinion is about what EPA has or has not been
doing in those particular areas, given that we have such a
large number of Superfund sites in this area.
Mr. Olson.
Mr. Olson. Well, we feel that the testing that has been
done so far has not been adequate, not just with Superfund
sites. I believe there are four in Orleans Parish, one of which
was the Agriculture Street Landfill that we have heard about,
and they did do testing, at least one test, right around there.
We think you need to do ongoing testing, first of all, and make
sure you are testing the whole area for a suite of chemicals.
But what we are worried about is all these other areas that
nobody is talking about. There are a large number of areas with
industrial waste, with industrial facilities, tanks that have
been floated and crumpled, as a result of the flooding, where
there are no tests whatsoever that have been announced. We are
very concerned about what that means, and what all these toxic
sediments being washed up means. So that is where there needs
to be independent testing, we believe, and more comprehensive
testing.
Ms. Solis. One of the concerns I have is if we are going to
be having a lot of reconstruction going on, obviously, and I am
very fearful of what I am hearing, that we are not doing enough
testing. We are going to be bringing people in there, to
relocate and help us restore--and what kind of appropriate
safety measures are we taking for this new influx of people,
who are coming from different parts or regions of the United
States, to come in there and work, and we are, at the same
time, lowering standards. We are relaxing some of those
environmental standards, as well as prevailing wages.
So I am very concerned, and would love to get your opinion,
from any one of the panelists.
Mr. Verchick. One thing to watch, when you have got a lot
of construction going on, and I noticed this the last time I
was in New Orleans, is you have got this dried muck now, that
may have heavy metals in it, it certainly has bacterial things
and so on. And you have got lots of large machinery moving
through the city now, Humvees, big trucks, you are going to
have, of course, more and more of that as construction begins.
That pushes all that dust up into the air, and it is landing,
now, in places that look like they had no standing water
before. I mean, places that never got water, and that looked
completely normal, under the circumstances, EPA has found
through its air monitoring, has alarming levels of particulate
matter in them. And so you know, where my kids used to go to
school, which didn't get flooding, now has air that children
are told they shouldn't be breathing. And you have got to keep
an eye on that, and that is going to be happening many months
from now, with all of the construction going on.
Ms. Solis. Any other comments on infrastructure? That, for
me, is a big issue area. We have had some discussions in our
subcommittee on the fact that, perhaps, the Congress could have
done, or could do much more, in terms of helping to develop a
better infrastructure, and underground storage tank
protections, and a lot of things, obviously, that are going to
affect our drinking water supply.
Mr. Ragone. Yes, we didn't have time to put everything in
our testimony, but even such things as strategic ground water
reserves, that you identify well in advance of any need, as a
place to go when you need water, when surface water is
contaminated, you have a strategic groundwater reserve in a
deep, confined aquifer, protected from environmental issues.
Put a well into that. Secure that well from terrorists, from
hurricanes, from everything. And then, when you need it, you go
there, you put it on, you pump that water, just like a
strategic oil reserve. It is an emergency source of water. It
could be brackish water. It doesn't have to be the best water.
You know, oh, it tastes a little salty. As long as the people
have something to drink, to flush out distribution lines, to
fight fires, we don't think about that. New York City relies on
a surface water supply only. What happens there if that goes
down for some reason? What are they going to drink? If they had
a backup groundwater system that they could rely on, not nearly
as much water, not nearly as good quality, they would be safe
in their place. And that is a big issue.
Regarding the first point you make, this is a little bit
out of the national ground water, but it is my old USGS hat. I
think Congressman Murphy brought up brownfields. There might
be, in New Orleans, a redefinition of what a Superfund is, in
terms of its geographical distribution, and what a brownfield
is, in terms of its geographical distribution. These
contaminants you talk about floating in the air, coming back
down in the soils, you could be redefining the boundaries of a
brownfields based on the redistribution of a contaminant load.
You could be redefining a Superfund site based on the
redistribution of a contaminant load, and I think you don't
want anybody living in a brownfield, you don't want anybody
living in a Superfund site, and so that is part of the
considerations of where do you rebuild, and where you don't
rebuild, and what do you remediate, and what you don't
remediate. You have to set priorities, and I think the best way
to set a priority is define your zones of contamination, define
the risks to people in those zones of contamination, and design
a remediation plan for the city of New Orleans, with an
understanding of how to protect people with these zones of
contamination residing all around them.
Mr. Bass. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Dr. Murphy, for another 5 minutes.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one
question, because I didn't get Secretary Gautreaux's response
to the question I was asking before, if she thought that the
New Orleans area, with all these contaminants that we have
heard about, and bacterial issues, if that area would be
reinhabitable, and how long that would take, and I would love
to have your response, please.
Ms. Gautreaux. It will definitely depend on why the area is
not being inhabited at the time. People are correct when they
said we don't have a lot of sampling information in some areas,
particularly industrial areas. Actually, those were some of the
last areas we could get access to. We were preparing to go in
those areas when Rita struck, so I think you will see a lot
more sampling throughout the city. We may very well find areas
that need to be remediated, and that needs to be noted, and
properly remediated. In terms of large areas, I have heard
references to the new Love Canal. We have not seen that to
date, but we fully expect to find contaminated areas that need
to be remediated. That is part of the assessment that is the
next level of effort right now. So I hope that helps, but to
date, we have not seen, especially in residential areas,
indications that people will not be able to return to those
areas. There may not be structures there, but so far, we have
not seen large areas that won't be inhabitable.
Mr. Murphy. So you are saying that--Mayor, it looks like
you are nodding your head. Do you have similar thoughts, or you
are--Mayor Rutledge?
Mr. Rutledge. Yes, I would have to agree with that in
Mississippi, also. Right now, is it being monitored and
surveyed? Right now, there is not any place that the people
can't come back home, but like the lady said, there might not
be anything to come back home to.
Mr. Murphy. And so my understanding is, from what you are
saying, Secretary, is that you will be evaluating that. It is
too soon to tell, but you will be watching that, and make
decisions based upon that? Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Gautreaux. Exactly. We expect to find areas that need
to be remediated.
Mr. Murphy. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Gautreaux. And we will make decisions.
Mr. Bass. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maine for
5 minutes. It is my feeling--are there going to be any more
questions after this, or are we done? Okay. Very well. This is
the last 5 minutes, and then we will adjourn the hearing. The
gentleman from Maine.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask a
question based on the daily printout from the EPA. There is a
printout here, which speaks to debris assessment and
collection, and it says that EPA personnel continue to offer
technical assistance in the disposal of hazardous wastes and
other debris left behind by the storm. This is throughout the
area. As of 9/22, EPA has collected over 37,500 orphaned
containers throughout the affected region, that are household
hazardous wastes. I don't know if that is a bottle of bleach,
or if it is an oil tank, really, and I wondered if anyone
could--I mean, I don't mean an oil tank. I mean, a barrel of
oil. And I wondered if anyone on the panel could speak to that.
Ms. Gautreaux. Well, I can volunteer that EPA has been very
active, particularly in the parishes north of Lake
Pontchartrain, where access has been possible. They have been
very aggressive in terms of collecting orphaned containers. You
are right, it might be a barrel of pesticide. It could be
something you would normally find beneath your sink, that
qualifies as a household hazardous waste. They are preparing to
do similar sweeps in the parishes that have been more heavily
impacted by the floodwaters. As they get strategies to move
into neighborhoods in New Orleans, they are preparing to do the
same, and in St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes. They have
also been going to places like Home Depot, some of their public
information officers, just an example where people would go
when you are typically rebuilding and repairing, handing out
literature, so that has actually been a very active effort to
date, and it will step up as access is increased.
Mr. Allen. Thank you. Anybody else? Mr. Olson?
Mr. Olson. Yes, I would just like to add the point, which
is we have also heard anecdotal reports of widespread small
spills and small sheens all over the place. It might be from
underground storage tanks that are leaking. It might be from
cars. It might be from a variety of things. We are very
concerned about the long-term effects of that.
And I just wanted to add one point, which hasn't been
raised, which is directly responsive to a previous question.
EPA and the State of Louisiana were both under an obligation,
under the Safe Drinking Water Act, there hasn't been much
discussion of this, since 1996, to adopt and implement an
adequate plan for provision of safe drinking water under
emergency circumstances, including earthquakes, floods, and
hurricanes. That was supposed to be in place after the 1996
law. It will be interesting to see why that never happened, and
what is going on in other states that might have a similar
situation in the future.
Mr. Allen. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Allen, and I want to
thank all of our witnesses here today. I want to especially
thank the two of you who have been very patient. It isn't easy
to conduct the kind of testimony that we have had, but it has
been exceedingly informational and helpful to us. We have some
big challenges ahead of us. That is clear. And I want to thank
the members who were here today. And we will be submitting some
questions in writing. So if there is no business to come before
the subcommittee, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
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