<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:22984.wais]
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 23, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-27
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida Ranking Member
Vice Chairman HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
FRED UPTON, Michigan EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia BART GORDON, Tennessee
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ANNA G. ESHOO, California
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico BART STUPAK, Michigan
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
Mississippi, Vice Chairman GENE GREEN, Texas
VITO FOSSELLA, New York TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
ROY BLUNT, Missouri DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
STEVE BUYER, Indiana LOIS CAPPS, California
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire TOM ALLEN, Maine
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania JIM DAVIS, Florida
MARY BONO, California JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
GREG WALDEN, Oregon HILDA L. SOLIS, California
LEE TERRY, Nebraska CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey JAY INSLEE, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
SUE MYRICK, North Carolina
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Bud Albright, Staff Director
David Cavicke, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida, Chairman
FRED UPTON, Michigan JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia Ranking Member
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
MARY BONO, California BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
LEE TERRY, Nebraska GENE GREEN, Texas
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho JIM DAVIS, Florida
SUE MYRICK, North Carolina CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
JOE BARTON, Texas, (Ex Officio)
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Fennell, Janette E., President, Kids and Cars................ 57
O'Neill, Brian, President, Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety..................................................... 49
Pikrallidas, Susan, Vice President of Public Affairs, AAA.... 54
Runge, Jeffrey W., Administrator, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration...................................... 8
Webber, Frederick L., President, Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers.............................................. 31
Additional material submitted for the record:
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, response for the record 72
Runge, Jeffrey W., Administrator, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, response for the record............. 73
(iii)
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in
room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cliff
Stearns (chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Stearns, Radanovich, Bass,
Rogers, Otter, Myrick, Murphy, Blackburn, Barton (ex officio),
Schakowsky, Markey, Green, Baldwin, and Dingell (ex officio).
Staff present: Bud Albright, staff director; Andy Black,
deputy staff director, Policy; Julie Fields, special assistant
to the deputy staff director; Chris Leahy, policy coordinator;
Kelly Cole, majority counsel; Larry Neal, deputy staff
director, communications; Lisa Miller, deputy communications
director; Billy Harvard, clerk; Anh Nguyen, clerk; Chad Grant,
clerk; Jonathan Cordone, minority counsel; David Vogel,
research assistant; and Jodi Seth, press secretary.
Mr. Stearns. Good morning, everybody. I would like to
welcome everyone to this extremely important hearing on the
reauthorization of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, NHTSA, an agency that is critically important
to the health and safety of all Americans. I would like to
thank, in particular, the Administrator, Mr. Runge, for
rearranging his travel plans, and making time to be here this
morning.
Simply put, NHTSA is charged with reducing motor vehicle
crash fatalities and injuries on our national highways. This is
a formidable and complex task in a Nation of more than 235
million motor vehicles that travel almost 3 trillion miles per
year. In 2004, 42,800 people were killed on the Nation's
highways, up slightly from 42,643 in 2003. The rate of deaths
based on vehicle miles traveled, however, decreased from 2003
to 2004, from 1.48 to 1.46 deaths per million vehicles
traveled, miles traveled. In addition, there were 2.8 million
injuries related to motor vehicle crashes in 2004, representing
a 4.6 percent decrease from 2.9 million in 2003. These cases,
coupled with resultant property loss, cost the United States
economy about $230 billion in 2004 alone. Sadly, those numbers
do not begin to capture the personal anguish of those Americans
and those families affected by these deaths and these injuries.
Clearly, there is much work to be done.
The questions before us today include how best to deploy
intellectual, financial, and other resources to work toward
solving the most significant motor vehicle safety problems, how
to prioritize that work based upon the most accurate and
relevant data, and who should make those strategic decisions:
Congress, the experts at NHTSA, or both? This committee's
oversight responsibilities compel us to ensure that the
American public is benefiting from the best decisions from the
most qualified experts. With that rationale in mind, I believe
that NHTSA reauthorization provisions in the Senate version of
the transportation bill provide adequate support and guidance
for NHTSA and its dedicated experts to save lives and, of
course, prevent injuries. However, we must be certain that the
provisions negotiated provide enough flexibility to allow the
data to drive the need for mandated rules.
Without a doubt, 100 percent safety belt use still remains
the holy grail of motor vehicle fatality and injury prevention.
In fact, according to NHTSA's own calculations, if all
Americans wore their safety belts, an additional 7,000 lives
would be saved every year. But sadly, 56 percent of occupants
killed in crashes in 2004 were not even wearing their safety
belts. Safety belts remain the most effective safety technology
for saving lives and preventing injuries in motor vehicle
crashes. Fortunately, the safety belt use rate is trending up,
and was close to 80 percent in 2004, an increase of almost 10
percent from 2000. I would like to commend Dr. Runge for the
tremendous work NHTSA has done to develop both legal and
technological incentives to promote safety belt use.
Today's hearing will provide some key insights into the
current state-of-the-art in passive safety technology that
protects us in the event of a crash, airbags, crashworthiness,
as well as active safety or crash avoidance technology, which,
as the name implies, helps prevent crashes, and is becoming an
important tool for saving lives and preventing injuries. In my
opinion, electronic stability control, ESC, an active safety
technology, highlights the future potential of safety
technology to apply protection before it becomes critical for
survival. ESC typically works with a vehicle's anti-lock
braking system to maintain control in extreme maneuvers that
can cause a vehicle to leave the roadway, become tripped when
it turns sideways, and rolls over. A recent NHTSA study
concluded that ESC was associated with a 30 percent reduction
in single vehicle crash fatalities for passenger cars, and a 63
percent for SUVs, when compared to the same models sold in
prior years. These percentages translate into about 7,000 lives
saved annually, assuming 100 percent deployment. NHTSA is
developing a performance standard that would promote deployment
of ESC technology, and several automakers have already
voluntarily committed to broad ESC deployment by a date
certain.
My colleagues, I believe it is also--it is invaluable to
encourage voluntary action and industry-government cooperation
in safety matters, when appropriate. The open exchange of
quality information creates opportunities for gains at the
technical level, as well as we have seen in programs like the
stars system for crash test ratings. It can also result in
elegant, simple ways to make safety an important factor in
consumer purchasing decisions.
In closing, I would like to suggest a few general
principles that I believe would guide our discussion today.
One, advances in technology, no matter how significant, are
best promoted through performance-based standards that allow
consumers and the market to assist in establishing safety
advances as the standard, not the option.
Two, NHTSA's extremely important work is a data-driven
business, not a political one. Sound science, quality data,
objective cost/benefit analysis should be the major factors
used to establish priorities for advancing vehicle safety. And
last, the finite resources provided by the American taxpayer to
effectuate motor vehicle safety should be deployed to
promulgate rules and standards based on the size of the safety
and the likelihood of an optimal solution.
Again, I am glad that we have this opportunity to examine
more closely NHTSA's reauthorization conference provisions, and
help realize the shared goals of reducing death and injury on
our highways. I would like to welcome our distinguished panel
of witnesses.
Before I go to the ranking member, I would point out, in
deference to Mr. Runge, we are going to have opening statements
from myself, the ranking member, and the chairman of the Energy
and Commerce Committee. We will move to Dr. Runge, and then,
before the next panel, we will continue with our opening
statements.
And with that, Ms. Schakowsky.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Cliff Stearns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Clifford Stearns, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
Good morning. I would like to welcome everyone to this extremely
important hearing on the reauthorization of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)--an agency that is critically
important to the health and safety of all Americans. I would like to
thank, in particular, Administrator Runge for rearranging his travel
plans and making time to be here this morning.
Simply put, NHTSA is charged with reducing motor vehicle crash
fatalities and injuries on our national roadways. This is a formidable
and complex task in a nation of more than 235 million motor vehicles
that traveled almost three trillion miles last year. In 2004, 42,800
people were killed on the nation's highways, up slightly from 42,643 in
2003. The rate of deaths based on vehicle miles traveled, however,
decreased from 2003 to 2004 from 1.48 to 1.46 deaths per million
vehicle miles traveled. In addition, there were 2.8 million injuries
related to motor vehicle crashes in 2004, representing a 4.6% decease
from 2.9 million in 2003. Those cases coupled with resultant property
loss cost the United States economy over $230 billion dollars in 2004
alone. Sadly, these numbers do not begin to capture the personal
anguish of those Americans and their families affected by these deaths
and injuries. Clearly, there is much more work to be done.
The questions before us today include how best to deploy
intellectual, financial, and other resources to work towards solving
the most significant motor vehicle safety problems; how to prioritize
that work based on the most accurate and relevant data; and who should
make those strategic decisions--the Congress?, the experts at NHTSA?,
both? This Committee's oversight responsibilities compel us to ensure
that the American public is benefiting from the best decisions from the
most qualified experts. With that rationale in mind, I believe that the
NHTSA reauthorization provisions in the Senate version of the
transportation bill provide adequate support and guidance for NHTSA and
its dedicated experts to save lives and prevent injuries. However, we
must be certain that the provisions negotiated provide enough
flexibility to allow the data to drive the need for mandated rules.
Without a doubt, 100% safety belt use still remains the holy grail
of motor vehicle fatality and injury prevention. In fact, according to
NHTSA own calculations, if all Americans wore their safety belts, an
additional 7,000 lives would be saved every year. But sadly, 56% of
occupants killed in crashes in 2004 were not wearing safety belts.
Safety belts remain the most effective safety technology for saving
lives and preventing injuries in motor vehicle crashes. Fortunately,
the safety belt use rate is trending up and was close to 80% in 2004,
an increase of almost 10% from 2000. I would like to commend Dr. Runge
for the tremendous work NHTSA has done to develop both legal and
technological incentives to promote safety belt use.
Today's hearing will provide some key insight into the current
state-of-the-art in passive safety technology that protects in the
event of a crash (airbags, crashworthiness), as well as active safety
or ``crash avoidance'' technology, which, as the name implies, helps
prevent crashes and is becoming an important new tool for saving lives
and preventing injuries. In my opinion, electronic stability control
(ESC), an active safety technology, highlights the future potential of
safety technology to apply protection before it becomes critical for
survival. ESC typically works with a vehicle's anti-lock braking system
(ABS) to maintain control in extreme maneuvers that can cause a vehicle
to leave the roadway, become ``tripped'' when it turns sideways, and
roll over. A recent NHTSA study concluded that ESC was associated with
a 30% reduction in single vehicle crash fatalities for passenger cars
and 63% for SUVs, when compared to the same models sold in prior years.
These percentages translate into about 7,000 lives saved annually,
assuming 100% deployment. NHTSA is developing a performance standard
that would promote deployment of ESC technology, and several automakers
have already voluntarily committed to broad ESC deployment by a date
certain.
I also believe it is valuable to encourage voluntary action and
industry-government cooperation in safety matters, when appropriate.
The open exchange of quality information creates opportunities for
gains at the technical level and, as we have seen in programs like the
stars system for crash test ratings, it also can result in elegant,
simple ways to make safety an important factor in consumer purchasing
decisions.
In closing, I'd like to suggest a few general principles that, I
believe, should guide our discussion today:
Advances in technology, no matter how significant, are best promoted
through performance-based standards that allow consumers and
the market to assist in establishing safety advances as the
standard not the option.
NHTSA's extremely important work is a data driven business, not a
political one. Sound science, quality data, and objective cost/
benefit analysis should be the major factors used to establish
priorities for advancing vehicle safety.
The finite resources provided by the American taxpayer to effectuate
motor vehicle safety should be deployed to promulgate rules and
standards based on the size of the safety problem and the
likelihood of an optimal solution.
Again, I am glad that we have this opportunity to examine more
closely the NHTSA reauthorization conference provisions and help
realize the shared goal of reducing death and injury on our highways. I
would like to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses. Thank you.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Chairman Stearns, for holding
this hearing on the reauthorization of the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration, and the challenges NHTSA
faces as it works to meet its safety improvement
responsibilities.
I would also like to recognize and thank my ranking member,
Representative Dingell, who is hopefully going to be here
shortly, and I want to welcome our witnesses, who are here to
share with us their views on how to improve safety, reduce
fatalities and injuries, and better protect children.
Over the past 3 years, more than 125,000 people died in
motor vehicle crashes. Nearly 9 million more people were
injured during that time. Mind you, those numbers do not
include children who were injured or killed in and around cars
that were not in traffic. Currently, NHTSA does not track
injuries and fatalities in non-traffic, non-crash-related car
accidents. The best government statistics we can reference come
from the Centers for Disease Control, a CDC study, that found
that an estimated 9,160 children suffered nonfatal injuries and
78 children were killed in non-traffic accidents between July
2000 and June 2001.
Because there are no official statistics kept by NHTSA, one
of our witnesses, Janette Fennell, took it upon herself to
collect every report of every non-traffic accident she could
find, in order to paint a picture of how severe a problem it
is. After personally scouring news reports, she found that in
2004, there were at least 523 children who were involved in
non-traffic, non-crash-related incidents, and at least 165 of
those children died. Those numbers, reflecting only the stories
picked up by the press, are cause for alarm. Right now, we can
only imagine how staggering they truly are, and we can only
imagine how devastating each accident is to each family
affected.
Not only do I think we need to count every accident,
whether in a driveway or on the highway, I also think that we
must do everything we can in order to limit accidents that are
otherwise preventable, and ensure that vehicles on and off the
road are as safe as possible. While I think everyone is in
agreement with Dr. Runge and Mr. Webber, two of our witnesses,
that we need to do all we can to make sure that drivers and
passengers are wearing their seatbelts, and that impaired
drivers are off the road, manufacturers and NHTSA also need to
do whatever they can to make sure that the safety factors of
the vehicles are addressed as well.
Our witnesses are right. It will make a significant
difference in reducing the seriousness of injuries and numbers
of deaths on the road if we can increase personal
responsibility. However, I do not believe that manufacturers
and NHTSA are absolved of their responsibilities just because
drivers' behaviors contribute to accidents.
Increasingly, we are seeing problems stemming from the fact
that people are buying bigger and more powerful vehicles. In
fact, half of new vehicles purchased are SUVs, vans, and pickup
trucks. SUVs accounted for 1 in 4 cars sold in 2003 alone. This
has led to an increased number of rollover accidents. Deaths in
SUV rollovers increased by 7 percent between 2003 and 2004,
from 2,639 to 2,821. Between 1992 and 2004, rollover deaths in
SUVs increased by an astounding 238 percent. It is no surprise
that with increases like that, rollover deaths currently
account for one-third of all passenger occupant fatalities. And
with SUVs growing in size, their rear blind spots have also
become larger. Some SUVs have blind spots as deep as 50 feet,
so large that 20 children can be hidden behind them. In 2004,
we lost more than 100 children to back-over accidents alone,
because they went unseen. Many of these accidents were in
families' own driveways. We must approach the problem of
increasing rollovers and blind spots, along with other safety
issues we know about, by working on ways to prevent accidents
from happening, as well as improving protections for people in
the cases that do occur.
There are a number of good policy provisions in the Senate
highway bill that would address many of the safety issues with
which I am concerned, including a provision to collect
statistics for non-traffic accidents. I hope that we can work
out the most appropriate way to keep those provisions, that
protect people in and around cars, in the bill.
Additionally, I want to mention that a number of
contributing factors to non-traffic-related car accidents are
also addressed in H.R. 2230, the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and
Cars Safety Act, which I have introduced with Representative
Peter King again this Congress. I believe that by simply
requiring safer power window switches, better rear visibility,
and a reminder system that lets drivers know if passengers
remain in the vehicle, which our bill would require, we could
protect our most valuable cargo, our children.
Again, I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses,
and I appreciate, Congressman Stearns, your holding today's
hearing.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentlelady. Now, the distinguished
chairman of the full committee, Mr. Barton, the gentleman from
Texas.
Chairman Barton. Thank you, Chairman Stearns, for holding
this hearing today on the reauthorization of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Nearly every family in this country owns at least one car,
and in 2003, more than 40,000 members of those families died in
their cars. My family is one of those victims. My cousin from
Colorado was killed in a two car accident on an interstate
highway, when the car behind moved over and clipped her car as
she was attempting to exit to go home. So I know what I am
talking about when we talk about families that have to bear the
tragedy of deaths because of automobile accidents. When I say
cars, I don't mean literally cars. I mean every kind of
vehicle, from pickup trucks that fill the roads in my part of
the country, to taxis in New York, to the limos here in
Washington, over on K Street, every kind of four-wheeled, six-
wheeled, and eight-wheeled vehicle. Cars are part of our
culture and part of our lives. Thankfully, they are getting
better every year. I want to thank the automakers of this
country for improving vehicle safety over the last 20 years.
Every year, more people buckle up in their seatbelts. And
although there are more cars on the road every year, and they
all come in different shapes and sizes, the accident rate per
mile traveled continues to decline. Despite these advances,
does anyone doubt that the cars that we drive could be made
safer? I sure think they could be.
I also know that new technologies are taking safety to a
new level. In addition to shielding people from injury in an
accident, I am told that the next generation of cars may
actually help drivers to avoid a crash. A feature called
electronic stability control can prevent loss of control during
emergency maneuvers.
Two of our witnesses from NHTSA and the Insurance Institute
for Highway Safety have concluded recently that this technology
is particularly effective in dramatically cutting the number of
single vehicle crashes in SUVs. This translates into lives
saved.
The timing of this hearing is no accident. We are
negotiating a new transportation bill in the Transportation
Conference Committee, and I, along with Mr. Dingell, am a
conferee of that conference. The Senate has brought to the
table a bill that includes NHTSA provisions that would require
the agency to complete rulemakings on several safety
initiatives, including vehicle rollover, occupant ejection
mitigation, side crashes, and roof strength. I am anxious to
learn from each of our witnesses today about how this
legislative language perhaps could save lives on America's
roads and highways.
This committee shares jurisdiction over NHTSA, and in some
cases, has sole jurisdiction, such as in the issue of
automobile safety. The Senate highway bill provisions that we
are discussing today would be referred to this committee, if
they were a standalone bill. An option before us today is to
reject the items in the conference committee, and to consider
them in this committee in a standalone NHTSA reauthorization
bill. It is an option that has a lot of appeal to me. I look
forward to looking and listening to the witnesses, to see if
that is something that we should consider. I haven't made a
decision yet, and haven't--I have had some discussions with Mr.
Dingell about doing it as a standalone bill. So we are going
to, obviously, work together on that after the conclusion of
today's hearing.
The loss of life on our roads, in terms of rate of loss of
life, is decreasing annually, but the aggregate number is still
a huge number: 42,263 people died in automobile accidents in
2003. To put that into context, there is a legitimate concern
about the number of deaths of our soldiers, soldiers, sailors,
and airmen in Iraq, but the total number of deaths there, in
the time that we have been there, is under 2,000, and once
again, in 2003, we had 42,263 deaths from automobile accidents
on our Nation's highways and byways. There is great work to be
done to reduce that rate. The transportation conference is a
good place to start. This committee might be even a better
place to start. I look forward to being educated by our
witnesses today on these issues and others that they may wish
to bring before the committee.
Thank you, Mr. Stearns, for arranging for this hearing. I
look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joe Barton, Chairman, Committee on Energy
and Commerce
Thank you, Chairman Stearns, for holding this hearing today on the
reauthorization of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Nearly every family in this country owns at least one car, and in
2003, more than 40,000 members of these families died in their cars. By
``cars'' I mean everything from the pickup trucks that fill the roads
in my part of the country, to the taxis in New York, to the limos over
on K Street here in Washington. Cars are part of the culture and part
of our lives, and they're getting better every year. In particular,
automakers have dramatically improved vehicle safety in the last 20
years. Every year more people buckle their seatbelts. And although more
cars hit the road every year, and they come in all shapes and sizes,
the accident rate continues to decline. Despite the advances, does
anybody doubt that the cars we drive can be even safer? I sure don't.
I also know that new technologies are taking safety to a new level.
In addition to shielding people from injury in an accident, I'm told
that the next generation of cars may actually help drivers avoid a
crash. A feature called ``electronic stability control'' can prevent
loss of control during emergency maneuvers.
Two of our witnesses, from NHTSA and the Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety, both concluded recently that this technology is
particularly effective in dramatically cutting the number of single-
vehicle crashes in SUVs. This translates into lives saved.
The timing of this hearing is no accident. We are negotiating a new
Transportation bill in the Transportation Conference Committee, and I
am a conferee. The Senate has brought to the table a bill that includes
NHTSA provisions that would require the agency to complete rulemakings
on several safety initiatives, including vehicle rollover, occupant
ejection mitigation, side crashes, and roof strength. I am anxious to
learn from each of our witnesses today about how this legislative
language can save lives on America's roads and highways.
This Committee shares jurisdiction over NHTSA, and has sole
jurisdiction over automobile safety issues. The Senate highway bill
provisions we are discussing today would be referred to this Committee
as a stand-alone bill. One option before us is to reject the items in
the conference and to consider them in a stand-alone NHTSA
reauthorization bill. I have not come to a position on the provisions
or the procedure.
Although the loss of life rate on our roads decreases annually, the
actual number staggers the imagination: 42,263 people died in auto
accidents in 2003. Plainly, there is great work yet to be done, and the
Transportation Conference is a good place to start. I look forward to
being educated by our witnesses on these vehicle safety issues today
Thank you again, Chairman Stearns, for holding this hearing and I
look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the distinguished chairman, and as I
mentioned earlier, Dr. Runge had changed his travel plans so he
could be here. So he has made a sacrifice for us, so if the
members will realize that we will get to their opening
statements right after his testimony.
We welcome you, Dr. Runge, and thank you for making your
changes, so that you could be here, and we look forward to your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY W. RUNGE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Runge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Chairman
Barton, for calling this hearing today, and for giving us a
chance to talk to you about what we live and breathe in NHTSA,
which is motor vehicle safety. You did a very nice job of
summarizing my opening statement, so I will try to be brief.
Our mission is very straightforward, to prevent injuries,
and to save lives on our Nation's highways. You have heard the
number of 42,000 mentioned three times now. I think that that
simply does not capture the devastating losses that occur
personally to everyone, Chairman Barton and the other 42,000
families every year who are affected by this, not to mention
the cost to our economy of over $230 billion, and those were in
the year 2000 dollars, by the way.
There is no question that safety improvements in vehicles
have been a worthy role of government. Since its inception in
the 1960's, we estimate that the lives of 330,000 Americans
have been saved through vehicle technologies, but over half of
that 330,000 was saved by one simple technology, the safety
belt, 180,000 people. So today, there is much public attention
devoted to vehicle safety standards, yet over 90 percent of
crashes, well over 90 percent of crashes, are caused by human
factors, such as inattention, speeding, impaired driving, and
other physiologic impairment. So the largest gains in highway
safety yet to be realized are in the human factors area,
including how drivers interact with their vehicles and their
environment. So we have to devote our agency's resources to
where they can reduce the most fatalities, and we have to
prioritize our rulemakings and research activities in
accordance with that principle. To do otherwise, we believe,
Mr. Chairman, would be an irresponsible stewardship of the
public trust and the public's resources.
For these reasons, earlier this year, we published an
update of NHTSA's rulemaking priority plan, which sets the
agency's rulemaking goals through 2009. Now, this priority plan
was set using sound science, through a careful examination of
costs and benefits, through an iterative public process. This
plan is a living document, and we intend to update it
periodically. Our highest rulemaking priorities are those that
have the greatest potential to reduce death and injury.
Unfortunately, we likewise must give a lower priority to those
proposals not supported by sound data, or that involve large
costs to consumers with minimal impact on the safety numbers.
Because NHTSA bases this rulemaking on sound research and
real world data, the Administration is opposed to any
legislative mandates that would presuppose the outcomes of the
research necessary to underpin a rule, or displace a higher
priority regulatory action. We are concerned that arbitrary
deadlines in Congressional mandates could preclude the vital
research and analysis needed to avoid unintended and dangerous
consequences to deployment of technologies. The public deserves
regulations that are technically sound, practicable, and
objective.
Mr. Chairman, the provisions of our rulemaking priority
plan are detailed in my written testimony. Among the most
urgent is a vital upgrade to our side impact standard, designed
to protect occupants struck in the side, often by larger
vehicles. Of over 33,000 vehicle occupants killed, 9,000 are in
side impacts, and we think this rule will save 850 to 1,000
Americans each year, and avoid devastating brain injuries for
many, many others.
Another high priority for our Agency is rollover, which
causes the deaths of over 10,000 people a year. Nearly half of
those rollover deaths are the result of full ejections from the
vehicle, and nearly all of those ejected were not wearing
safety belts. We have a comprehensive plan to reduce fatalities
and injuries from rollovers, as no single regulation will
address this problem adequately. Our intention is to prevent
most rollovers from occurring in the first place through
technologies which were mentioned in the opening statements,
and protecting occupants when they--when rollovers do occur.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to bring up a topic not within
the jurisdiction of the subcommittee, yet it is the most
important thing that we all can do to save lives immediately.
There is a provision in the Senate version of H.R. 3 that will
save over 1,200 lives a year, and do it faster and cheaper, in
fact, for free, more than any other proposal you will consider
this Congress, and certainly within the highway bill.
I am referring to the Administration's proposal, passed by
the Senate but not contained in the House bill, which would
provide generous incentives to States to pass primary safety
belt laws, or to reach 90 percent safety belt usage. It seems
that--sorry. It seems a curious quirk of jurisdiction that this
subcommittee oversees the equipping of safety belts in
vehicles, but it ends there, not the use. Mr. Chairman, it can
not end there. If any benefit it to be realized by so equipping
those vehicles, Congress must act affirmatively to assist the
States in raising safety belt usage, or the cost and the lives
will be wasted.
Primary belt laws are necessary because States that enact a
primary belt law average a belt use of 84 percent, compared
with 73 percent in States without primary belt laws last year.
Every percentage point we raise belt use, Mr. Chairman, saves
270 lives, 4,000 serious injuries, and over $800 million in
economic impact to this country every year, for every
percentage in belt use.
Now, consider that NHTSA recently completed the 15
rulemakings that surrounded the TREAD Act. These regulations
cost consumers $1.2 billion and took years of NHTSA resources,
and for that, we expect to save about 120 lives a year. In
comparison, if the remaining 28 States pass a primary belt law,
we will save 10 times that many every year, by utilizing a
device already in the car that consumers have already paid for.
This economic efficiency of this potential Congressional action
stands in stark contrast to the mandated rulemakings in the
Senate version of H.R. 3 under your consideration.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, before coming to Washington,
as you know, I spent 20 years as an emergency physician in one
of our Nation's busiest trauma centers. To me, that 42,000
number, as Chairman Barton suggested, is not just an
abstraction. These are real people. Telling a family that their
mother or father or sister or brother or son or daughter is not
coming home again is all you need to understand the obligation
that we, as policymakers, have to bring those numbers down, and
to increase safety belt use in our Nation. So often, that
conversation would never have happened if that person had just
been wearing his safety belt.
So the facts are today, Mr. Chairman, if this committee
wants to make a real impact on the number of highway deaths,
there is one provision of SAFETEA that dwarfs all the others in
importance, and I thank you for letting me bring that to your
attention.
[The prepared statement of Jeffrey W. Runge follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeffrey W. Runge, Administrator, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Chairman Stearns, Congresswoman Schakowsky, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss reauthorization of the motor vehicle safety programs of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).
I want to express my appreciation for this Subcommittee's
longstanding support of motor vehicle safety programs. Transportation
safety is a top priority for Secretary Mineta and President Bush. Your
work has allowed NHTSA to advance motor vehicle safety. We are grateful
to this Subcommittee for its continuing leadership and for scheduling
this hearing.
NHTSA's mission is to save lives and prevent injuries. Motor
vehicle crashes are responsible for 95 percent of all transportation-
related deaths and 99 percent of all transportation-related injuries.
They are the leading cause of death for Americans in the age group 3
through 33. In 2003, the last year for which we have complete data,
42,643 people were killed in motor vehicle crashes. The economic costs
associated with these crashes also seriously impact the Nation's fiscal
health. The annual cost to our economy of all motor vehicle crashes is
$230.6 billion in Year 2000 dollars, or 2.3 percent of the U.S. gross
domestic product.
The motor vehicle safety law vests NHTSA with the authority and
responsibility to issue motor vehicle safety standards for new motor
vehicles and equipment that are performance-based, objective,
practicable, and repeatable, and that advance real world safety. These
standards reduce the number of motor vehicle crashes and minimize the
consequences of crashes that do occur.
The safety improvements in vehicles have been significant since
NHTSA's inception in the 1960s. We estimate that total lives saved by
vehicle technologies number about 330,000, over half of which are
attributable to safety belts. Today, there is much agency and public
attention devoted to vehicle safety standards, yet over 90 percent of
crashes are caused by human factors, such as inattention, speeding and
physiologic impairment. The largest gains in highway safety yet to be
realized are in the human factors area, including how drivers interact
with their vehicles. Relatively few lives will be saved in the future
by continuing a traditional focus on vehicle crashworthiness. We must
devote our agency's resources where they can reduce the safety problem
most effectively. And we must prioritize our rulemaking and research
activities in accordance with that principle. To do otherwise would be
irresponsible stewardship of public resources and the public's welfare.
When I came before this committee last year, I spoke of the
publication, in 2003, of the first ever NHTSA multi-year vehicle safety
rulemaking priority plan. Early this year we updated the plan, and it
now sets forth the agency's rulemaking goals through 2009. The
rulemaking and supporting research priorities were defined through
extensive discussions within the agency, taking into account the views
we have heard over several recent years at public meetings and in
response to rulemaking notices and requests for comment. We prioritized
potential new rules and upgrades of existing rules according to the
size and severity of the problems they address, and the best educated
estimates of the cost and effectiveness. The agency works closely with
Congress and the public to define our priorities.
We intend for our rulemaking priority plan to be a living document,
and will continue to update it annually. In addition, we are committed
to reviewing all Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards systematically
over a 7-year cycle. We decided that such a review is needed in light
of changing technology, vehicle fleet composition, safety concerns and
other issues that may require changes to a standard. Our regulatory
reviews are in keeping with the goals of the Government Performance and
Results Act, to ensure that our rulemaking actions produce measurable
safety outcomes.
Because of this careful process, and the need to make these
decisions based on current data, the Administration is opposed to
legislatively mandated rulemaking actions that displace deliberative
research and regulatory actions. The process that we have developed
will produce the best and most cost-effective solutions to our most
critical safety needs. The imposition of deadlines and mandated
requirements can preclude the completion of necessary research and
force premature judgments or the adoption of incomplete or only
partially developed solutions.
Furthermore, we have seen proposed mandates with technical elements
that have not proven viable. Several decades of vehicle safety
rulemaking have demonstrated that quality data and research produce
regulations that are technically sound, practicable, objective, and
repeatable. Our rulemaking priority plan was carefully considered, in
the context of concomitant research needs, and I ask for your support
in our pursuit of its objectives.
The overall safety priorities set by our agency at the outset of
this Administration are increasing safety belt use, reducing impaired
driving, addressing vehicle crash incompatibility, reducing rollovers,
and enhancing our data systems. In 2003, we carefully studied these
objectives and developed and published a roadmap for achieving them.
This Subcommittee has jurisdiction over the motor vehicle safety law,
which is central to our objective of reducing deaths and injuries
associated with crash incompatibility and rollover.
NHTSA's priority rulemakings for the immediate future include
enhanced side crash protection, preventing occupant ejection in
rollovers, electronic stability control systems, and upgrading our
standards relating to roof crush and door locks. Our longer-term
research priorities include a number of potential advances in crash
avoidance driver-assist technologies and addressing vehicle
incompatibility in frontal crashes. We have integrated our rulemaking
priority plan and our research plan to ensure that, as rulemaking
becomes necessary to advance safety in the future, we have the research
to support it.
In all of our efforts, we recognize the vital role that complete
and precise data play in identifying safety problems. With that in
mind, we have evaluated the important advances that electronic data
recorders can add to our crash data and our ability to assess safety
needs and benefits, and we are completing a final rule to address these
devices that we intend to publish this Fall.
I would like to turn, now, to a discussion of some of the specific
actions we are taking in accord with our rulemaking priority plan,
against the backdrop of the safety problems we must address.
Of the 33,471 passenger vehicle occupants killed in 2003, more than
9,000 were killed in side impacts. In side impacts involving two-
passenger vehicles, an occupant of the struck vehicle was about 8 times
more likely to have been killed than an occupant of the striking
vehicle. It's not hard to see why preventing deaths and injuries in
side-impact crashes is one of our highest priorities.
In May 2004, we published a notice of proposed rulemaking to
upgrade our side-impact standard. We estimate that this upgrade will
prevent many hundreds of deaths annually in these types of crashes. We
are now developing the final rule and hope to publish it in early 2006.
The growing popularity over the past ten years of light trucks,
vans, and utility vehicles (LTVs) has changed the mix of vehicles in
the fleet and the safety picture. More vehicle occupants are being
killed in crashes between passenger cars and light trucks than in
crashes involving only passenger cars. Passenger car occupants are over
three and one-half times more likely to die than LTV occupants in
crashes between the two vehicle types, both in front-to-front and in
side impact crashes.
NHTSA's 2003 integrated project team plan outlined our strategy of
addressing the issue of compatibility through partner-protection, self-
protection, lighting/glare and reforms to the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy program. We expect our upgraded side impact standard to provide
increased protection for occupants in vehicles struck by other
vehicles, and NHTSA is conducting research to determine good measures
of vehicle compatibility and alternative test barriers to improve
protection of occupants of struck vehicles.
Rollover crashes account for a substantial percentage of the fatal
crashes in the country. Even though only 2.5 percent of crashes are
rollovers, over 10,000 people die each year in rollovers. This is
almost a third of all passenger vehicle occupant fatalities and about
60 percent of sport utility vehicle (SUV) occupant fatalities. The data
show that nearly half of all rollover deaths are the result of ejection
from a vehicle, and nearly all of these occupants are unbelted.
We added dynamic testing of vehicles as part of our rollover
resistance rating system in accordance with the Transportation Recall
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act. Testing and
reporting of those results began with 2004 model year vehicles as part
of our New Car Assessment Program (NCAP).
We have already noticed improvements in vehicle designs and in
safety ratings. Manufacturers strive to obtain high safety ratings
under NCAP, because so many consumers rely on this information in
making their vehicle purchasing decisions. We have seen an increase in
vehicle manufacturers using NHTSA's star-rating information in their
product advertising. An informed public will be an effective catalyst
for improved rollover resistance. NHTSA's new web site,
www.safercar.gov, enhances the consumer's access to this safety
information.
To improve the crashworthiness of vehicles that do roll over in a
crash, we are working on improved ejection mitigation and roof crush
protection. Even as NHTSA is upgrading our side impact standard, all of
the major automobile manufacturers have committed over time to ensure
that their vehicles meet certain testing criteria for side impacts.
Those testing criteria are intended to encourage the installation of
side airbag curtains that protect against brain injury in side impact
crashes. An additional benefit of many side airbag curtains is that
they prevent potentially lethal ejections.
In addition to the attention we are giving our rollover and
compatibility priorities, we also intend to bring to Congress some
additional important safety initiatives. We believe the Secretary of
Transportation should be authorized to participate and cooperate in
international activities to enhance motor vehicle and traffic safety.
This would provide for NHTSA's participation and cooperation in
international activities aimed at developing the best possible global
safety research and technical regulations. Through participation in
these international efforts, the United States will combine its motor
vehicle safety initiatives with those of other countries, to ensure a
comprehensive approach to motor vehicle safety and to promote cost-
effective deployment of safety technologies.
A second area is our need to expand activities in crash prevention
and severity reduction. The most significant vehicle safety initiatives
in the future will be based on technology that avoids crashes, rather
than our traditional emphasis on crashworthiness. This would include
evaluations of crash avoidance technologies such as electronic
stability control, telematics, alternative braking, vision enhancement
systems, lane keeping systems, and collision avoidance systems.
We anticipate that our research into these and other driver
assistance technologies will reach significantly beyond the scope of
current agency research and development activities. The rapid advances
in these technologies will radically change the design and performance
of automobiles over the next 10 years and, coupled with the aging
driver population, present unique research challenges in human factors
engineering. Our goal is to hasten the introduction of vehicle-based
driver assistance technologies into the marketplace while ensuring
their safe performance across all demographics, through the development
of standards, voluntary guidelines, and consumer information. In doing
so, we will have to be mindful that with the proliferation of new
technologies comes the potential for increased driver distraction.
A third area is our need to engage in research and development in
fuel integrity of hydrogen powered vehicles. This includes risk
assessment studies and the development of test and evaluation
procedures, performance criteria, and suitable countermeasures.
This safety initiative would support the President's Hydrogen Fuel
Initiative and the FreedomCAR Program. In particular, the research
program would investigate the safety of the power train, the vehicle
fuel container and delivery system, the onboard refueling system, and
the full vehicle system performance. This research would evaluate leak
detection systems, determine the effectiveness of safety systems,
assess fire potential and flammability, and evaluate external hazards
to these systems. The onboard refueling system related research and
performance tests would evaluate fuel leakage, examine sparking and
grounding conditions of the refueling system, and examine conditions
under which fire could occur.
I would like to take a moment now to highlight NHTSA's important
and continuing role in the delivery of Emergency Medical Services
(EMS). For more than 3 decades, longer than any other Federal agency,
NHTSA has been the Federal Government's leader for EMS. Our first
Administrator, Dr. William Haddon, had a vision for EMS systems before
they existed, and recognized that caring for the injured would be
essential to decreasing the number of highway deaths. He also realized,
as we still do today, that the only sustainable EMS system is one that
addresses all emergencies. As EMS grew to include caring for people
with non-traffic-related injuries, NHTSA created an informal Federal
interagency EMS structure, partnering with the Departments of Health
and Human Services and Homeland Security, and national EMS
organizations to provide the leadership, coordination, and policy
guidance to enhance the national EMS system.
The needs of a comprehensive EMS system surpass the expertise or
funding of any one agency. This is why I urge you to adopt the
Administration's proposal, as contained in the Senate's version of H.R.
3, which would create a formal, ongoing mechanism with the authority to
coordinate Federal EMS activities. Such a committee, dubbed ``FICEMS''
(for Federal Interagency Committee on Emergency Medical Services) would
not only allow, but require EMS to continue to tap the expertise and
the resources of multiple departments.
Creating FICEMS avoids duplication, assures consistency of mission,
and maximizes the use of limited resources. Through the proposed EMS
grant program, which is also in the Senate bill, each State's EMS
office would receive formula grant funds for improving the capacity of
the entire EMS system. This would not duplicate funding provided by
other agencies, but would be the primary funding to support the basic
EMS infrastructure that these segments utilize.
Since 1966, NHTSA and the Department of Transportation have been at
the forefront of the Federal Government's efforts to support every
portion of the EMS system. I ask members of this Committee to continue
NHTSA's commitment to EMS for the next decades.
Finally, I want to bring up a topic that is not within the
jurisdiction of this Subcommittee, yet vital to saving lives. There is
a provision in the Senate version of H.R. 3 that will save over 1,200
lives a year, and do it faster and cheaper than any other proposal you
will consider in this Congress, and perhaps in this decade. If the
intent of this hearing is to hear what can NHTSA do now that will
immediately save lives, this is a provision I strongly urge the House
to adopt.
I am referring to the Administration's proposal, passed by the
Senate but not in the House bill, which would provide incentives to the
States to enact primary safety belt laws or reach 90 percent safety
belt usage. Why are primary safety belt laws important? Because States
that enact a primary safety belt law can expect to see their safety
belt use numbers rise by approximately 11 percentage points practically
overnight. If all States adopted a primary belt law, we would prevent
1,275 deaths and 17,000 serious injuries every year. No other safety
proposal I am aware of before Congress would save more than 1,200
people annually at practically no cost.
Consider that NHTSA recently completed the 15 rulemakings related
to the TREAD Act. The actions associated with that law cost consumers
$1.2 billion and took years to promulgate. In total, that law will save
120 lives annually. In comparison, if the remaining States enacted a
primary belt law, we would save ten times as many lives annually, by
utilizing a device already in the car, at no cost to the consumer.
It is one of the paradoxes of Congressional jurisdiction that this
committee oversees the equipping of safety belts in vehicles, but not
their use. There is no benefit to equipping vehicles with safety belts
unless they are worn. I want to stress that this proposal provides
incentives to the States, not sanctions. No State would be penalized
for not adopting a primary belt law.
Mr. Chairman, if the members of this Subcommittee want to save
lives and do it now, and I know every Member here shares that goal, I
urge you and your colleagues to adopt the Senate language for primary
belt incentives. No vehicle mandate, no elaborate rulemaking, no public
relations campaign would save as many lives as Congress giving the
States an incentive to pass primary belt laws.
I urge this Subcommittee to support all of these important safety
initiatives and our rulemaking goals as outlined in our priority plan.
I will be glad to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Stearns. I thank you. I will start with the questions.
I think a good example of what you are talking about is the
air safety bag. Back in, I guess, the mid-90's, it was sort of
a rulemaking that we had to make safety airbags stronger, and
in so doing, by making them stronger, then you are going to
actually increase the possibility of death to infant children,
and so Congress had to back off on that, and we had to indicate
this rulemaking is not appropriate. And that goes to what I
said in my opening statement.
There is a fine balance between Congress issuing a rule and
the optimum safety provided with the cost analysis, and what
the impact would be. And you are indicating this morning that
just these incentives, that is in the Senate bill, if it was in
the House bill, would provide safety--would eliminate the
deaths of 1,200 people, you are saying, just by giving
incentives to the State. And so I think that points up toward
this question I have.
I understand your agency is working on a rulemaking on
rollovers, occupant ejection, door locks, and side impacts.
What are the chances that these rulemakings will not be
completed, or will be completed?
Mr. Runge. Well, Mr. Chairman, the side impact rule, we--it
has been through the NPRM. It has been through the comment
period, and we expect to publish that early in 2006, I hope
before the crocuses pop through the grass. There is nothing
higher on our rulemaking priority plan. We believe that that is
850 lives a year. And keep in mind, Mr. Chairman, we don't have
a head--our side impact center does not recognize the brain,
even though 58 percent of our side impacts involve brain
injury. So this--we have to do this. This is absolutely a must-
do, and it will be done.
With regard to rollover, that is a little more complex,
because it involves not only structural integrity and safety
belt use and safety belt performance and ejection mitigation,
but also involves preventing the rollover from happening in the
first place. Hence, our emphasis on electronic stability
control and developing a performance test that will keep
vehicles on the pavement. Ninety percent of those rollovers--
that is a serious one there--90 percent of those rollovers
occur when the vehicle leaves the road and trips. So if we can
keep vehicles on the road with technology, then a lot of the
other improvements that we can make in the structure of
vehicles will be less important.
Mr. Stearns. Maybe I should ask this question first.
Generally, what do you believe that mandated rulemakings, I
mean your philosophy, are they in the best interests of your
agency coming from Congress? Perhaps what is the role of
Congress when it comes to your agency, you know, other than
just the, strictly, funding of your agency, what should be our
position on this rulemaking? You might just establish that from
the get-go.
Mr. Runge. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, we enjoy working with
the committee on things that are important to the members, and
we like to come over and share the data, and you know, lay it
all out, so you can see what the most important things are that
we believe, based on the data we have to do. The problem--and I
think we have done that. We have done that with the Senate
committee to the point that the language that is in the Senate,
I don't believe is going to be particularly harmful for NHTSA's
functioning.
However, you yourself pointed out that in the mid-90's,
NHTSA had to turn on a dime to address airbags that were
overpowered, and that consumed a tremendous amount of resources
in the rulemaking and the research part of our agency, which
is, again, not very big. So things got delayed. Now, if we
have, you know, 6 years worth of mandates, our ability to turn
on a dime and address emerging safety problems is severely
impaired.
So we would prefer to use a rulemaking priority plan to do
this, which again, we will update annually or at least
biannually with input from the committee, with input from
public comment, based on data and cost/benefit. That is the way
we would prefer to set our rulemaking priorities.
Mr. Stearns. Well, you hear from a lot of members who are
talking about back-over technology, cameras and radars that are
being evaluated. I guess is this an example of huge amount of
costs, huge--optimal solution not provided. In your opinion,
what is being done in this area, and how do you feel in terms
of if we moved in that area of rulemaking?
Mr. Runge. Back-over injuries and deaths are a serious
matter, and we take them very seriously. The difficulty is, and
you know, it is easy to be--to tell somebody you have got to
collect data on these things.
Mr. Stearns. Some automotive companies have already bought
these cameras, I think in Europe.
Mr. Runge. Yes. Well, there are some that are available in
the United States as well.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. So you can get it as an option----
Mr. Runge. Sure.
Mr. Stearns. [continuing] in your SUV.
Mr. Runge. There are vehicles that if a parent wants to--if
they are concerned about this, they can go buy those vehicles.
You know, my kids are 21 and 18 and out of the house. I have
less need of a back-over technology in my vehicle. So I may not
choose to pay that $1,500. So again, you know, we believe that
market forces can work in this area. The data collection is
difficult, because, you know--and we talked to Ms. Fennell
about this a lot, and her careful scouring of LexisNexis and
all the clips and so forth, but we have to rely on national
data. So we went to the National Health Statistics, NCHS, and
said we need all of the, you know, all the codes that could be
strangulation from power windows, back-overs, and so forth, and
you know, we just recently received 1998 birth certificates,
and we had a person who pored over every single birth
certificate, and you know, it was tremendously labor-intensive.
So if we do this, if Congress tells us to do this----
Mr. Stearns. You mean a death certificate instead of a
birth certificate.
Mr. Runge. Yes, I am sorry. Death certificate.
Mr. Stearns. Instead of a birth certificate.
Mr. Runge. Sorry. Sorry. I am just a physician. They pored
over these death certificates, and you know, were able to find
a small number of these incidents. Now, every incident is
important, and we don't want to diminish that by any means.
Mr. Stearns. Under 10, you mean?
Mr. Runge. Well, let us see here. There were 123 backing
deaths.
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Mr. Runge. 1998. 44 percent of those were children aged 1
to 4. So about 60 kids.
Mr. Stearns. Sixty kids.
Mr. Runge. In 1998.
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Mr. Runge. And many were adults over 70. Now, to--
technology--you know, we don't want to presuppose that a
technology is going to be 100 percent effective, either, at
preventing these things.
Mr. Stearns. No.
Mr. Runge. So you know, when you look at the cost and
benefits here, it gets a little tough to justify.
Mr. Stearns. Well, and also, I, you know, there is a lot of
politics involved here, so for us to tell you what to do in
this area, we need to hear your best judgment first, before we
just run it out, and you are saying right now that the public
can get this, if a mom and dad want this protection, for
$1,500. Instead of buying a new car, they can get a used car,
could they get it retrofitted or not?
Mr. Runge. Well, there are cameras that will fit, for
instance, in the hitches, trailer hitches.
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Mr. Runge. There are mirrors. There are technologies that
people can use in their vehicles. And in fact, you know, we are
seeing--we just protected the 5.9 gigahertz spectrum for
vehicles and ultrahigh bandwidth radar. Mercedes just tested a
vehicle with us a few weeks ago, where it can actually detect
objects around the vehicle.
Mr. Stearns. This is a radar rather than camera. So in the
end, maybe radar is a solution as we move on, that radar could
make cameras obsolete, because the radars would be much more
efficient.
Mr. Runge. Certainly could be, but again, this is research
that will be done by the industry, and we will watch it very
carefully. But this is a tough problem.
Mr. Stearns. Yes. Thank you. My time has expired. The
ranking member.
Ms. Schakowsky. Are you opposed to data collection for non-
traffic accidents, then?
Mr. Runge. Certainly not.
Ms. Schakowsky. Okay. So I got the impression that it would
be overly difficult to collect that information.
Mr. Runge. Well, we don't know how we would do it right
now. In a--to get data sources that would be acceptable to the
Data Quality Act, which you all passed, and so forth. And we
would have to really look at this closely. Right now, the only
data source that we know or that we can rely on is the National
Center for Health Statistics, which is years behind in the
death certificate. And there is no word search capability that
we know of that will get to this problem. So we think we just
don't know how we would do this, other than the method that Ms.
Fennell uses, which is to scour press clips. And, you know, and
that has its own limitations.
Ms. Schackowsky. Although using that method, a private
citizen did find 523 children involved in those kinds of
accidents, 165 dead, in 2004 alone. I mean, I don't know how
big a problem has to get. And I don't know if you saw Good
Morning America, the segment where they had--I think on that,
the time I saw it, 17 children were huddled behind an SUV, and
with all the equipment on it that was available, you couldn't
see any of them. It was really just amazing. It was just
shocking. And they were saying how many kids do you think were
back there, and it turned out there were 17. And it seems that
minimally, collecting this information so that we do know the
scope of the problem ought to be a project that we begin
immediately. I wonder what kind of progress we can make on that
now.
Mr. Runge. That is a great question, and we would be happy
to work with the committee on that, Ms. Schakowsky. You know,
interestingly, over in the appropriations side, we got
appropriations language that just came out last week that
suggested we might be collecting too much data. So we have
really got to get together on this, and decide, you know, what
it is exactly that we should do. We are not authorized right
now, though we certainly could do this on our own, to figure
out some data system for off-road, off, out of traffic, motor
vehicle related injuries, but right now, that is not in our
mandate. And it is certainly within your power to change that.
Ms. Schakowsky. And I think it would--it is important that
we don't leave the impression that any car can be either
purchased with or retrofitted to include this technology right
now. Am I correct with that, that I can't go to an auto dealer
and say, and I want these features in my, I don't know, maybe
my Ford Focus wagon, I can do that. I don't know. But they are
not universally available. Isn't that true?
Mr. Runge. I believe that you can buy small cameras, and in
fact, I saw Ms. Greenberg here from Consumers Union. We were up
there in Connecticut at their facility a couple years ago,
looking at some of the aftermarket potential.
Ms. Schakowsky. Aftermarket, but----
Mr. Runge. Right.
Ms. Schakowsky. Originally, when I purchase a car, it is
not even an option in all cars, is it?
Mr. Runge. It is not an option in all cars. Neither is
anything else, for that matter, but there are vehicles out
there that you can go. If a back-over camera is important to
you, you can buy it, when you are ready to buy a new car.
Ms. Schakowsky. Yes, but seatbelts are available. Basic
safety features are available in all cars. I wanted to just
point out that while you emphasize that 90 percent of crashes
are caused by human factors, inattention, speeding,
psychological, physiological impairment, et cetera, of course
that is true, and that is why seatbelts, in some ways, take
account of that, take that into consideration, the fact that
human factors will lead people to accidents. But those built-in
safety features will mitigate against the result of those
personal human factors. And so I would think that we would want
to move as quickly as possible, in terms of rollover accidents,
the kinds of timetables that are in the Senate bill.
Now, I understand you gave an example of the airbags. That
was a special case, where you had to turn on a dime, but were
there not those kinds of special cases? Are you saying that the
timetables and the deadlines that are in the Senate bill are
unreasonable, that it is not possible to meet them? And if so,
what are your timetables for dealing with these issues?
Mr. Runge. The only one--the only deadline that is
absolutely preposterous is the implement labeling requirements,
the vehicle safety labeling requirements, the so-called stars
on cars, that tells us to issue a plan by January 1, 2006. And
I understand that--I hope that the committee will be sensitive
to that. The rest of the deadlines in the Senate language,
frankly, are certainly workable, and we, you know, we have
other, bigger fish to fry than worrying about those deadlines.
Ms. Schackowsky. And what would those be?
Mr. Runge. Than worrying about those deadlines. They are
not unreasonable.
Ms. Schackowsky. And what are the bigger fish to fry that
you mean?
Mr. Runge. If we get primary belt law incentives, your
State will get $31 million, and we will be able to get a lot
more primary laws in this country, and save 1,275 people a
year.
Ms. Schackowsky. So you see that as the--your No. 1
priority now is to do that. But you wouldn't oppose, other than
the October 1, 2006 deadline, in the Senate--no, it was--what
did you say?
Mr. Runge. January.
Ms. Schakowsky. January.
Mr. Runge. January 1.
Ms. Schakowsky. Yes. As a--those other deadlines would be
acceptable to you?
Mr. Runge. Yes, ma'am. The other deadlines are certainly
workable.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you very much.
Mr. Runge. Sure.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentlelady. Ms. Myrick is
recognized.
Ms. Myrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Runge is from my
district, and he literally has spent his lifetime working on
saving lives, because when he was at our largest hospital, in
charge of emergency and trauma, he really made our whole region
aware of what we needed to do, ourselves, to help save lives.
And so I was delighted when he came up here, because I knew
that he would do what he believes in, and that is, do
everything he can to save lives. And we appreciate the job
you've been doing at the agency, and I want to thank you.
But I wanted to ask. I know we don't want, a lot of us
don't feel strongly about mandating things, and you have
already said that causes you some difficulty. But are there
other tools or authorities that this committee might be able to
provide to you that would be helpful in your quest of saving
lives?
Mr. Runge. Representative Myrick, I am not used to getting
such a wonderful, open-ended question like that, and it frankly
sort of caught me on my heels. We do have a really good
relationship with your committee staff, and it is a
relationship that has developed over time, and I think that
there is a confidence that has developed mutually, about when
we see needs, we aren't shy. And in fact, neither is your
committee staff.
So if you would allow me the opportunity to think about
that a little bit, I would love to give you back a real answer.
Ms. Myrick. I appreciate it very much, and again, we are
glad you are here. Thanks for the good job you do. I am
finished, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentlelady. The ranking member of
the full committee, Mr. Dingell, is recognized.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your
courtesy. I begin by asking unanimous consent that I may be
permitted to insert an opening statement in the record.
Mr. Stearns. By unanimous consent, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John Dingell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Michigan
I am pleased we are holding this hearing on the ``Reauthorization
of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).'' This
will aid us in examining the resource needs of the agency, and its
current priorities. I have always viewed reauthorization of an agency,
which is for a fixed period of time, to be separate from decisions to
change the underlying laws which the agency administers. Should
Congress, during the reauthorization process, consider writing new laws
for the agency to administer, we should be guided by several factors:
First, we must guard against regulating before the experts have an
adequate understanding of both the problem we seek to solve and how
proposed solutions affect overall safety and public health. Time after
time, when NHTSA has been forced to regulate without a complete
understanding of the problem, the unintended consequences have been
grave. For example, the issue of air bags has been revisited more than
once to ensure that children and small adults are not harmed by a
system intended to protect. Good intentions alone are not sufficient
for regulating vehicle safety.
Second, we must not divert resources away from regulations and
innovations with the most potential to save lives. Every time Congress
mandates that NHTSA promulgate a rule on a specific subject, there are
fewer resources for NHTSA to spend on other safety priorities. As
information and research improve, we should allow the expert agency
adequate flexibility to determine what actions will save the greatest
number of lives.
Third, we must recognize that irresponsible regulation of the
automobile will sacrifice important manufacturing jobs in the United
States. At a time when this country is hemorrhaging jobs, we must take
extraordinary care to ensure that new regulations are both appropriate
and implemented wisely.
There are times when legislative action is necessary. We worked
diligently in this Committee on the TREAD Act, and that law continues
to yield fruit. The Early Warning System established under that Act
helps NHTSA and manufacturers identify problems sooner and recall
affected vehicles faster.
Due in part to the TREAD Act's success, times have changed. NHTSA
has established an aggressive agenda for vehicle safety that will be
implemented on a responsible timetable. I commend Dr. Runge for
establishing a multi-year priority plan for vehicle safety. NHTSA's
diligent progress toward implementing these safety initiatives and Dr.
Runge's personal efforts to increase seat-belt use are saving lives.
When the Senate proposed a NHTSA reauthorization last Congress,
Chairman Barton and I were profoundly concerned that it would supplant
the expertise of the engineers and scientists at NHTSA with the
opinions of lawyers and activists. The version presented to us this
Congress, however, appears to have moved in the proper direction and
deserves careful examination.
I look forward to working closely with Chairman Barton on this
important matter, and I thank the witnesses for their testimony today.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Runge, welcome to
the committee. You are asking for more resources for your
agency to do the job that we have commanded you to do. Would
you please identify what those are for the record. And so that
we can look to see what we have to do to help you do your job
the way you want to do it. Now, I would note that you want to
regulate hydrogen vehicles, and you want authority to harmonize
our regulations with those of foreign governments. Would you
submit for the record, please, some statements as to what it is
you want there?
Mr. Runge. Absolutely.
Mr. Dingell. Now, Doctor, with regard to the mandated
rulemakings that the Senate has included in its bill. First of
all, what amongst these are matters on which your agency is not
now working? Are there any of them?
Mr. Runge. Yes, sir, Mr. Dingell, there are. We--there are
several areas here, which we are working, but are not our
highest priority. For instance, back-over----
Mr. Dingell. What you are telling me is that some of these
are things that you don't view as being high priority. And I
guess you are telling me that establishing high priority for
things that you might have lower priority will, perhaps, deter
you from doing things that might be more important, in terms of
safety of motor vehicles and the safety of the motoring public.
Is that right?
Mr. Runge. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Dingell. All right. Would you submit that to us for the
record? Out of respect for our chairman, I don't want to
clutter the time of the committee with my questions and answers
if I can get it in the record. Now, would you tell us, also,
which of the Senate mandates are on your priority list, and
which are not on your priority list? Would you submit that to
us, please?
Mr. Runge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Now, I would note, Doctor, that if we work
with the Senate, we are going to have to address the question
of how the language should be best done. I think that you are
probably going to need a certain amount of flexibility in terms
of what the language would do. Is that correct?
Mr. Runge. We would prefer to be able to respond to
emergencies and turn on a dime, yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. For example, I note that the mandate is that
you come up with a final rule, and would it not be better that
you were to be mandated to come up with a final action?
Mr. Runge. That would certainly increase our flexibility.
Mr. Dingell. That would give you more flexibility, and you
would still have to come to a decision on matters prior to the
time.
Mr. Runge. That would be very helpful, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Now, I note that there are agreements
providing better and more information to the agency, which
might come faster than would occur without them. Is that--and I
am referring now to voluntary agreements that are executed
inside the industry with the insurance industry. Is that
correct?
Mr. Runge. There is no question that the industry can move
faster than we can regulate.
Mr. Dingell. And these have actually made for more safety,
faster and better. Is that not so?
Mr. Runge. We have good example of that. We also have
examples where we have gone slightly divergent, and see the
need to regulate. But yes, sir, the timing is absolutely
correct.
Mr. Dingell. So I assume, Doctor, that these voluntary
agreements inside the industry, and with the insurance
industry, and with your agency, enable the auto manufacturers
to accomplish your purpose of safety better. They enable NHTSA
to understand the problem, and to bring forward potential
solutions in a faster and more effective manner. Is that right?
Mr. Runge. Yes, sir. You know, the research community is
fairly small, and the research engineers know what each other
are doing, and we have a very constructive dialog with the
safety people in the industry.
Mr. Dingell. Do I have any reason to assume that the
mandates that are here would in any way interfere with the
voluntary agreements which you are executing with the
companies?
Mr. Runge. I would say, in general, sir, that the more
restrictive mandates are, the less we are able to evolve into
the best path. Some of these do presuppose that we already know
the answer to the question before we have adequately researched
it. Having said that, the most--as much flexibility as you can
give us, if you all see the need to mandate these particularly
safety problems, would be most appreciated.
Mr. Dingell. Now, Doctor, I note that you are beginning to
work on rollover prevention and crashworthiness. Will voluntary
standards help you here as you proceed about your efforts to do
the regulation of these questions inside the agency?
Mr. Runge. Mr. Dingell, in a couple of these instances with
rollover, I do believe that the industry deserves a level
playing field, and I do think that that is an appropriate place
for regulation, rather than voluntary standards. There are
always things that the industry can do voluntarily to go beyond
the minimum standard, but I do believe that manufacturers that
do the right thing, that might be a little more costly, deserve
a level playing field to make sure that they are not at a
competitive disadvantage.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you, Doctor. Mr. Chairman, I know I am
transgressing upon your time. I hope that you will forgive me
for one final question.
Dr. Runge, I want to refer to your experience with regard
to mandated regulations on specific subjects. And I have the
impression that this oft-time develops a situation where delay
with regard to product plans, for economic reasons, by the
industry, will occur until they understand what the new
requirements might be. And I would also ask while the mandates
in the Senate bill may be similar to your priority plans, is it
fair to say that a pattern of Congressional mandates would
discourage voluntary agreements in the future, and possibly
delay the advance in safety in motor vehicles?
Mr. Runge. If we get to a point where we think we know the
best answer, and it turns out not to be the wrong answer, after
public comment, but we are still under a rulemaking deadline
for a final rule, there are--it is very difficult to work
around those deadlines.
Mr. Dingell. So I guess, Doctor, that--in courtesy to our
chair, you are telling me yes.
Mr. Runge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the distinguished colleague. Mr.
Otter.
Mr. Otter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Doctor,
for being here today. We have, as you might recall, at the--met
in various capacities before, when I was on the Transportation
Committee, and even though I know most of your questions and
answers today have dealt with vehicle safety, I want to go to
another part of highway safety that I don't think we are paying
near enough attention to, and of course, it goes back over all
these years. I just did some figuring, and there is a section
of highway in Idaho, Highway 95, which runs, traverses from the
south, at the Nevada line, clear to Canada, some 680 miles, in
fact, in 1939, was designated as part of the Alcan Highway,
which was a total of 26,000 miles. But twice as many people are
killed on a small section of that highway as can hide behind an
SUV, every year. The biggest holdup that we have had on that is
our failure to streamline, as was promised in TEA-21, as ISTEA,
and now, TEALU, or the promise of, I should say, a streamlining
process where we can move forward on highway construction,
especially, where we are losing lives, and we are costing
people. There--and in the insurance industry. Is the
Department, has the Department begun moving forward to at least
help the Transportation Department and the construction side
now, and design now, I am talking about, move forward on some
streamlining, so that we are not 10 years waiting to find out
if a bug or a piece of grass or something like that is going to
be eliminated as a result of our widening or making our
highways more safe.
Mr. Runge. Thank you, Mr. Otter. I--this falls under the
jurisdiction of the Federal Highway Administration. But I can
tell you that Administrator Peters has had at one of her top
priorities to get effective environmental streamlining into the
reauthorization process. I am not expert in this, and I really
can't speak to the provision of the bill. I do know that it is
very high on our priority list.
Mr. Otter. I had noticed that some of the very same
communities that are so enthusiastic about designing what
Detroit puts out are the same communities that are resistant to
allow us to go forward with the design of our highways, with
the construction of our highways. In fact, the year that I
served on the Transportation Committee, 2001 and 2002, that
term, we had some $14 billion in highway construction funds
backed up waiting for a decision from some agency of the
Federal Government, relatively mostly to an environmental
consideration. Now, I think that is--in fact, as I recall,
Christie Todd Whitman's successor from New Jersey came and
testified that they had been waiting some 11 years for a
turnoff, an off-ramp, where they had been killing about 19
people a year, because of the absence of that turnoff. And I
still don't know yet today if they have been able to mitigate
two and a half acres of swamp in order to save 19 lives, and I
don't expect you to know that specific either. But I would just
hope that if it is not within your purview, I would just hope
that you wouldn't pass the opportunity to at least put an
asterisk at the bottom of a page, and say exactly what could be
done or should be done. No matter how many more seatbelts we
put in cars, or airbags we put in cars, or how wider we make
the track on a vehicle, unless they are running across a safe
highway, and safe as they can possibly be, it is not going to
make any difference what we mandate from Detroit, if we are not
mandating the same things, as far as the streamlining process
that we were promised in the past.
So I would just mention that, and I hope, if you get the
opportunity, that you could add to--the idea that no matter how
safe we make these vehicles, if our highways aren't also
enjoying the maximum amount of attention for their safety, it
is not going to make any difference. That is just a final
statement. I don't expect you to respond.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Stearns. I thank my colleague. Ms. Baldwin.
Ms. Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up
on two matters that our ranking member, Mr. Dingell, referred
to quickly, and just ask a little bit further on those. In your
written testimony, I was interested in your references to
hydrogen-powered vehicles, and pleased that there are plans to
make this a priority area for safety research, and I wondered
if you could provide some more detail regarding the timeline
for this research, when you would expect any rulemaking process
to occur, and whether you have sufficient statutory authority
to pursue this research and rulemaking.
Mr. Runge. Thank you. With respect to your last question,
yes, we do have the statutory authority. We have not had the
appropriation to do specific testing for hydrogen yet. However,
we have, you know, it is funny how this happens in the Federal
Government, we have found some money to begin research into
hydrogen fuel safety systems. You know, the idea here is, is
that the--that we hear from Europe and from the manufacturers
here that there is a lot of component testing going on, and you
know, 10,000 PSI tanks, 8,000 PSI tanks, they don't leak and so
forth. But we are not going to be happy until we do a test of
the full fuel system. We don't know exactly what the effects of
a 1,500 degree invisible flame will do to a vehicle or its
occupants, but we need to find out.
We already have test fleets that are on the roads of this
country right now, and frankly, we are behind. So we intend to
do full vehicle testing at some point, particularly crash
testing, but it will depend upon the availability of vehicles,
and there are so few right now, and they are so expensive that
we don't think that is practical. So we are going to continue
to look at the fuel delivery, both the low pressure and the
high pressure side, and try to get some science behind what
might turn into a future regulation.
Ms. Baldwin. On, I guess a related matter, you noted in
your testimony that the Secretary of Transportation should be
authorized to--quoting, authorized to participate and cooperate
in international activities to enhance motor vehicle and
traffic safety. Should I take from that that under current law,
the Secretary is not permitted to engage in such discussions?
Mr. Runge. There are two things that happen
internationally. One is vehicle regulatory harmonization, and
for that, we do have the authority, and we are--we have a very
active program of harmonized research and harmonized
rulemaking. When I found out about this, and I was educated on
it when I first got here in 2001, I suggested that, since
nothing had really happened on the 1998 agreement, which is
when this agreement was signed in Geneva, that perhaps we
should set a deadline of November 2004 for a global technical
regulation, and we, in fact, didn't meet that on a subject
which is door locks and retention systems, which is part of our
rollover injury prevention plan. So that is one side, and it is
working, it is slow, as international negotiations are, but it
does work.
The other place, though, that is much more, I think,
important to the Secretary, and frankly, where the fruit is
much lower hanging, is in the area of human factor vehicle
safety worldwide. And worldwide, we lost over a million people,
and that is a conservative estimate, because we just have to
use estimates. We don't have data collection systems in many
developing countries. But as countries motorize, which is the
second thing they do after they get money. The first is
telecommunications. Then, they start transportation. And the
easiest way for them to enhance their transportation is to buy
vehicles, without the road infrastructure, without safety
features, and so forth. So our intention is to participate with
the World Health Organization, to follow along on a U.N.
resolution which was passed in April of last year, to identify
best practices, to allow economies in countries that are
developing to try to stem the tide of traffic fatality in their
countries. We are seeing huge problems in places like China and
Thailand, and Indonesia, and all across Africa and Latin
America, where just the basics of a central agency of
government to help with this, or the use of safety belts, or
impaired driving, or pedestrian--separating pedestrians from
vehicles. All that is lacking. So this is part of the
President's good neighbor policy. We would like to reach out to
these nations, and to be able to provide technical assistance
and best practices for them.
Ms. Baldwin. Okay. One quick question. I am almost out of
time, so maybe you can answer in writing later. You have talked
about human factor. In my district, in Wisconsin, it is not
unusual for accidents to be caused by the animal factor. I see
white-tailed deer on the side of the road very frequently.
Obviously, it can be very dangerous. What sort of extent of
research do you have in that arena?
Mr. Runge. We have been party to testing of some of these
things, like whistles, that don't work. There are ideas about
reflectors that scare deer, and you know, we are aware of these
things, but it is a tough problem, you know. Once again, I
think that we are sort of faced with treating the animal like
any other obstruction that you might get, whether it is a tree
or a post or a guardrail, and that is, is to buckle up and
drive sober, and control your speed. And unfortunately, these
crashes are going to occur, and we really don't have a method
to keep those animals away from the roadway.
Mr. Stearns. The gentlelady's time has expired. The
gentlelady from Tennessee, Ms. Blackburn.
Ms. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
you for your well prepared and timely delivered testimony, that
allows us to kind of work ahead. I will have to tell you,
before coming to Congress, I was in the State Senate in
Tennessee, and part of the leadership team on our
Transportation Committee in the State, so was familiar with
reading your rules, the regulations, the memos that came down.
So it is nice to visit with you.
Ms. Baldwin was talking a little bit about human error, and
I find it so interesting, you know. In your testimony, you were
talking about 90 percent of the crashes, and the human error
factor there. And I want to talk with you about three quick
points, stability control, and the benefits of that technology.
In your testimony, I think you said it is 61 percent of the
vehicles now are--have the technology. Is that correct?
Mr. Runge. I don't think that is correct, and I don't have
the number, but it is much smaller than that.
Ms. Blackburn. Much smaller than that.
Mr. Runge. I am sure that Mr. Webber may be able to fill in
that hole for you.
Ms. Blackburn. Okay. So you are not sure of the exact
number of cars. In a situation like the stability control, it
seems that the market and the consumers' desire for safe cars
is pushing the technology forward in the vehicles, and is the
market driving that, or is--are you all, with forced
regulation, driving the desire for that, and what do you see as
your participation in that component?
Mr. Runge. I suspect--well, I don't suspect--I know for a
fact that many vehicles on the road do have electronic
stability control, but they are mostly at the higher end of the
price spectrum. Some manufacturers have voluntarily agreed to
put electronic stability control in all of their vehicles,
namely GM, by 2009. I think that Toyota said in their truck
fleet by 2007, and so forth. So it is spreading across the
manufacturers. For anything that has this much efficacy, has a
63 percent reduction in SUV fatal crashes, or a 30 percent
reduction in passenger car fatal crashes, this is the kind of
cost effectiveness that is smart government for regulating. And
we would want to level the playing field to ensure that
everybody who buys a car has access to technologies that keep
vehicles on the pavement.
Ms. Blackburn. Okay. And in that vein, getting that
information out about safe cars with safercar.gov website, what
are your efforts on advertising that? How are you working with
auto retailers and also the manufacturers on that effort?
Mr. Runge. We have a marketing plan, and I talk about it
everywhere I go, you know. It is on this lapel pin I have got.
It is everything that we do, we talk about safercar.gov. You
know, bless their hearts, the folks at Lowe's Motor Speedway
last month gave us a courtesy sponsorship for the Quaker State
and Lube 200 brought to you by Click It or Ticket, and we
talked about safercar.gov for 4 hours. You know, it is--you
know, we have a limited marketing budget, obviously, but you
are exactly correct. Unless consumers avail themselves of the
crash test ratings and the rollover ratings, it is very
difficult to get the message out. So yesterday morning, I was
on the evening news and the morning shows, talking about the
new rollover ratings. You know, 4--3 years ago, there was one
four star rollover rated SUV. Now, there are 24. So you know,
the market is working. For whatever reason, the manufacturers
are making vehicles that get better crash ratings, and I hope
that, in fact, it is market forces at work, and not simply my
bully pulpit.
Ms. Blackburn. Well, if you are blessing their hearts, you
have got a little Southern in your soul, so you must know about
driving some cars. All right. A couple more things before my
time expires. Looking at a couple of other components. When you
are--the Senate bill has--requesting a final ruling July 1,
2008, on the side impact crash improvements. And then, also,
power window switches by April 1, 2007. If these were removed,
when would you expect to make your ruling on this?
Mr. Runge. With respect to side impact, we will beat that.
We will leave it in the dust. With respect to power window
switches, you know, we just finished a final rule in September
that will require manufacturers to have switches that children
cannot kneel on and roll the window up, which in our review of
the death certificate data, is the problem. Now, there is a
political--there is some political movement toward getting us
to get rid of recessed rocker switches that a child's knee
cannot contact, because they might stick their toe in somehow,
and you know, lift it up, and entrap themselves, which we have
never seen a case of. So this is a mandate that we don't think
needs to be mandated. And you know, we will be happy to look at
it again, as we have been looking at it before, but the problem
is fixed. So if that goes away, the rule needs to go away as
well.
Mr. Stearns. The gentlelady's time has expired. And the
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Runge. I respect
your work, and I thank you for coming.
As you know, Doctor, I authored the original amendment to
the TREAD Act, which directed NHTSA to draft and implement a
new regulation that would require all motor vehicles to be
equipped with a warning system that would alert motorists when
a tire was significantly under-inflated.
Mr. Runge. I do have a vague recollection of that, Mr.
Markey.
Mr. Markey. And, of course, the reason it is important is
that when it is under-inflated, it could lead to de-treading of
the tire, and what we saw in the Ford Firestone incident is
that then causes accidents as the car goes off the road and
kills the passengers. As you know, there is a lawsuit that has
been filed by the tire industry and Public Citizen which raises
several safety concerns.
Right now, we are here in June of 2005, on an amendment
which I successfully authored back in 2000, which targeted the
original implementation of this critical safety provision for
2002. The delay, in my view, not only has repercussions for
consumer safety in the United States, but also represents a
financial hit to the companies and manufacturers that have
invested in this technology, and that have increased their
production levels in anticipation of a launch this year.
My question to you is whether NHTSA has considered other
potential avenues of action to address the concerns raised in
the suit, instead of fighting it in court, and facing the
specter of having to completely rewrite the regulations for a
second time. And is there any way, any other way, to resolve
this, other than through litigation at this point?
Mr. Runge. Mr. Markey, we believe that the rule that we
finally arrived at, which as you well know, is very similar to
the original rule that we wrote, which by the way, if that had
gone through, all vehicles would have TPMSes in them now, and
we wouldn't be having this conversation.
There is a real concern that if--that these--we don't want
them to false alarm, and to become an annoyance, and relive
1974 all over again with safety belt buzzers and this sort of
thing. Our engineers have done the best they can to make sure
that they have a balance between TPMSes that will warn people
when there is a safety problem and warn them when their tires
are under-inflated to the point where they are really under-
inflated but not a safety problem. They really believe that the
margins that they have constructed around the compliance test
are fully sufficient to correct the safety problem. And
manufacturers, when they make these things, they will make them
so that they alarm well before it gets to 25 percent under-
inflation, but that is the area that we are going to run the
compliance test on. We want to make sure that everyone does it
at least by then. And there are some issues with, you know,
whether it is--whether we let out 1 PSI or 2 PSI that are in a
world of arcane engineering minutiae that we are going to be
looking at very closely. And I think we will revisit some of
those technical engineering issues, but I think they are very
confident that they have solved the safety problem with this
rule, and I hope that it will stand, and I hope the court will
throw it out.
Mr. Markey. Will the vehicle manufacturers be required to
still begin phasing in the tire pressure monitoring systems to
their vehicle lines in October of this year, or will they be
able to postpone it due to the lawsuit?
Mr. Runge. The final rule is the final rule, and they will
still be required to phase them in October.
Mr. Markey. So beginning this October.
Mr. Runge. Yes.
Mr. Markey. And it will continue. Thank you. And you also,
in the Wall Street Journal, recently said that you are going to
do some new fuel economy standards that will save billions of
gallons of gasoline, and it will still be fair to the industry.
What is your timeframe for that overhaul?
Mr. Runge. We have a deadline for a final rule in April 1,
2006.
Mr. Markey. Have you consulted with the environmental
community?
Mr. Runge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Markey. What details can you share with us?
Mr. Runge. None.
Mr. Markey. Are you considering the sort of weight-based
CAFE standards approach that has one for SUVs, one for midsize,
and one for lower?
Mr. Runge. Well, if you recall, the advance notice of
proposed rulemaking, we ask for comment on attribute-based
systems, and that is certainly part of our deliberation.
Mr. Markey. I would recommend to you that you not move with
the different categories, that you keep the merged approach. I
think otherwise, we are going to wind up with 50 percent of all
people buying SUVs up in this higher category, and we are going
to wind up with, unfortunately, lower fuel economy standards in
totality. I think the goal has to be for us to improve the fuel
economy standards. SUVs, and we learn it again in today's
testimony, SUVs are huge gas guzzlers, which is an
environmental and import problem for us. They are more likely,
three and a half times more likely, to kill people, as--in
other cars, that we have learned, and they are also more likely
to back over kids, and to kill them. So this is an area where,
you know, SUVs are always looking for special treatment, that
we have to avoid it. And I will just say that when I was----
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr.--Dr.
Runge has to leave, and we have two other members----
Mr. Markey. Can I say----
Mr. Stearns. [continuing] and----
Mr. Markey. Mr. Chairman, I have gone over less than any
person thus far----
Mr. Stearns. I know, and what happens is----
Mr. Markey. [continuing] including the chairman, the
ranking members, and any of the other members.
Mr. Stearns. I[continuing] but--in all deference to you, I
have been in hearings where we have been generous, and I just,
out of deference to the other members, if you don't mind, if
you can sum up in the next 15 seconds.
Mr. Markey. I can do it in 15 seconds, and----
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Mr. Markey. [continuing] it will just be to----
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Mr. Markey. [continuing] say that I was run over by a car
when I was 5 years old. This SUV issue is huge. I drove an ice
cream truck working my way through college for every single
summer for 100 days. When you back a truck out of a backyard,
which is what I had, a huge ice cream truck, it is a magnet for
kids. But I was the only person in the neighborhood or the city
with that kind of a vehicle. We now have tens of millions of
SUVs backing out of driveways every day, and kids are just
there, and I had to go out a half a foot every time just to
keep making sure I wasn't hitting anyone, so this is a huge
issue. We have to deal with it, and----
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Stearns. And the gentleman from New Hampshire, Mr.
Bass.
Mr. Bass. I will pass.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman from New Hampshire passes. Mr.
Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. I know you have to go. Thank you for being here
just in 30 seconds. I understand you are going to Detroit.
Great place in the world. Spend a lot of time there, spend
money. Buy stuff while you are there, including a car.
One word of caution. There is some talk that you may go to
a watered down version of TPMS. Let me just give you my
strongest commendation not to do that. We have come a long way,
when you are in a process of putting this thing out. And I hope
it is soon, because this--the litigation is starting to kill
the folks who are involved in this, and I think you know that.
We need some resolution on this. Don't water it down. Have a
great trip to Detroit. Come back with a CTS Cadillac built in
Lansing, Michigan. Thank you.
Mr. Sterns. I thank my colleague. Dr. Runge, your patience
in helping us by changing your travel plans is appreciated, and
with that, we will conclude the first panel, and now, we will
move to the second panel, but before we do, as I mentioned
earlier, we will have opening statements from members who wish
to put their opening statements in the record, or to give them.
At this point, is there any member who would like to give an
opening statement who has not given one?
The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
As I was saying, when I was driving my ice cream truck,
that it really was like an attractive nuisance, okay. And I
realize that, you know, because you could not see little kids.
You just couldn't. And of course, I was especially sensitive,
because an ice cream truck is a huge electromagnet of ice cream
that draws kids from streets away.
And we now live in a world where, unlike automobiles, where
you can see out the back window, and you can see who's there,
you just can't. And we need to have some mechanism here by
which we deal with this very real problem that exists in this
SUV era. And of course, we are going to wind up with a
situation where SUVs are not going to be purchased as much as
they have been in the past, because the price of gasoline is
just skyrocketing. We are up to $60 per barrel now. Many people
believe that OPEC is targeting $70 or $80 a barrel over the
next year or 2. So we are going to see a change in behavioral
patterns. They are testing as a Nation to see how far we will
go before we will revolt. We obviously haven't revolted yet,
but when General Motors is at junk bond status, and Ford is at
junk bond status, you have a real problem in our country, and
so you are going to see a shift, somewhat, in the consumer
purchasing habits. But nonetheless, we will still have SUVs as
a big part of our marketplace, and these issues, especially the
issue that was mentioned earlier, where if you are in a
passenger car, you are three and a half times more likely to
die in a crash with a regular--with an SUV. An SUV passenger is
three and a half times more likely to survive than a passenger
vehicle in a regular automobile. There is a big issue,
especially if people start to buy Priuses and other cars that
are being manufactured by Toyota and Nissan and other
manufacturers.
So as people now say, I am--that they are going to respond
to the high price of gasoline, they buy smaller cars. The SUVs
are out there, still in gas guzzlers, and in the crash, you are
going to have thousands of people who die because we are not
building in the proper kinds of protections for these people.
So we have the greatest responsibility here, Mr. Chairman. We
can save more lives on this committee than just about any other
place in Congress or America. But we have to be cognizant of
it. People are going to be moving back to smaller cars. They
are going to be vulnerable. The SUVs will kill them, and we
need to have a discussion about it. Because the automotive
manufacturers, especially the American automotive
manufacturers, have not provided a safe alternative to the SUV
at this point. So it is a big discussion. This is the
committee, this is the place. We have the greatest
responsibility as Americans are being put in jeopardy,
especially as the price of gasoline pushes people toward these
smaller vehicles.
I yield back.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman.
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Cubin, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Wyoming
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The American consumer approaches any and all goods and services
with expectations of quality. When approaching motor vehicles, one of
the highest consumer expectations is occupant safety features, only
natural given the high incidence of crash-related injury and death on
our nation's roads and highways.
The subject of today's hearing is how effective the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has been in protecting
consumers from unreasonable risk of death and injury. We are light-
years ahead of where we were two decades ago in terms of vehicle and
occupant safety. But as fatality rates decrease, so too have consumer
expectations increased. Despite progress made, the United States still
experiences tens of thousands of deaths and millions of injuries on an
annual basis.
This hearing is especially timely given the NHTSA reauthorization
language included in the Senate-passed Transportation bill. The
language sets deadlines for the completion of rulemakings in relation
to side impact crash protection, rollover prevention, door locks, and
fuel economy labeling procedures, just to name a few.
We owe much of our progress in vehicle safety to technological
advances spurred on by heightened consumer expectations. There is no
denying we must continue considering practical and performance-based
standards, but some of the testimony we will hear today will caution
against costly and unproven federal mandates that hinder innovation,
and in some cases, force manufacturers to make safety tradeoffs.
I look forward to the insight today's panel will provide regarding
the viability of mandates contained in the Senate's NHTSA
reauthorization package. I am hopeful we will also be able to explore
alternative approaches to helping NHTSA achieve its consumer safety
mission.
With that, I wish to thank Chairman Stearns for scheduling this
important hearing. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas
I'd like to thank Chairman Stearns and Ranking Member Schakowsky
for holding this hearing today. I'd also like to thank our witnesses
for being here today to discuss the important topic of highway safety.
The U.S. Department of Transportation indicates there were 42,800
highway deaths in 2004 and a staggering 3 million injuries due to
traffic accidents. Unfortunately, on May 5th of this year, a good
friend of mine, Joe Moreno was killed when he lost control of his truck
and it rolled over several times. He was a state representative who
represented a part of Houston in my congressional district and was on
his way back to Austin for votes after having watched the Houston
Rockets play in the play offs.
Too many of us have stories like the one I just told you. However,
there are always many factors to consider when accidents occur. For
example, in the past, it has been determined that faulty tires have
resulted in serious accidents. Road conditions can change drastically
with changing weather, and unfortunately, most traffic accidents
involve human error, the most serious being driving while intoxicated.
A recent article in the Houston Chronicle reveals that Houston had
103,000 auto accidents with 215 fatalities reported to the Houston
Police Department. This does not include figures involving the State
Department of Public Safety or our county law enforcement officers who
also respond to traffic accidents. As of early this month, Houston
already had 100 fatalities for 2005. This issue is extremely important
to our community.
The charges handed to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration carry enormous weight to the public safety. This is why
I'm grateful that industry has been working closely with the NHTSA to
develop the best safety standards we can possibly have.
I support the provisions in the Senate version of HR 3. The
standards set forth in this version of the bill address safety issues
that often result in the most serious injuries such as roll overs, side
impact collisions and occupant ejection prevention.
These provisions will set goals and will hopefully give the NHTSA
the flexibility it needs to work with industry in bringing the best
design and technology to implement these higher safety standards.
I would also like to note that I support any incentive the federal
government can offer states to implement primary seat belt laws. I
agree with many of our experts that getting people to use their seat
belt is the quickest way to bring down the number of injuries and
deaths on our highways.
I'd also like to see states have tougher enforcement on drunk
driving laws. The fact remains that alcohol has been a factor in 40
percent of all traffic fatalities last year. Drinking and driving is
still a problem in our country and we should find a way to address it.
I look forward to working with my colleagues as we try to get the
best bill we possibly can for the public safety and for the auto
industry.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Stearns. Now, we will have panel No. 2. Please take
your seats. Mr. Frederick Webber is present, of Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers. Mr. Brian O'Neill is President of
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. Ms. Susan Pikrallidas,
Vice President of Public Affairs, AAA. And Ms. Janette Fennell,
President of Kids and Cars.
Mr. Webber, we will start with your opening statement, and
welcome to all of you.
Mr. Webber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning.
Mr. Stearns. Good morning.
STATEMENTS OF FREDERICK L. WEBBER, PRESIDENT, ALLIANCE OF
AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS; BRIAN O'NEILL, PRESIDENT, INSURANCE
INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY; SUSAN PIKRALLIDAS, VICE PRESIDENT
OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AAA; AND JANETTE E. FENNELL, PRESIDENT, KIDS
AND CARS
Mr. Webber. My name is Fred Webber, and I am President of
and CEO of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. I am
pleased to be afforded the opportunity to offer the views of
the Alliance at this important hearing.
Product safety is an area in which manufacturers compete
and seek competitive advantage. I think you coined this phrase,
Mr. Chairman, some time back when you said safety sells, and
manufacturers are leveraging their safety performance and
equipment in efforts to distinguish their products from
competitors. According to the J. D. Power and Associates 2002
U.S. Automotive Emerging Technologies study, nine of the top 10
features most desired today by consumers in their next new
vehicle are designed to enhance vehicle or occupant safety.
Manufacturers are responding to this increased consumer demand
for safety across their entire product line.
For example, among 2005 models, 99 percent of new vehicles
are available with antilock brakes, 51 percent are available
with electronic stability control, 74 percent are equipped with
safety belt pre-tensioners, 57 percent are equipped with rear,
center, lap, shoulder safety belts, and 75 percent are
available with side airbags with chest protection. But to get
it right, engineering decisions and future product decisions
must rely on good data. NHTSA's two key traffic crash data
programs, the National Automotive Sampling System and the
Fatality Analysis Reporting System, provide crucial information
to safety planners and vehicle design engineers. The NASS
program in particular has been chronically underfunded. On
October 17, 2002, the Alliance and various other safety groups
sent a letter to NHTSA Administrator Runge, outlining the
importance of sound crash and injury data. The Alliance
emphasized the need for additional funds for NASS in order to
evaluate the effectiveness of both behavioral and vehicular
safety measures.
Consistent with the need for more real world data, Alliance
members have voluntarily installed event data recorders in
their vehicles. EDRs provide improved data to assist safety
researchers, auto engineers, government researches, and trauma
doctors in their work. EDRs can improve our collective
understanding of crash events, and lead to improvements in
vehicle safety systems. Recording certain data elements in the
moments just prior to and during a crash can contribute to the
breadth and reliability of the crash data already gathered by
State and Federal Governments, and widely used by public and
private entities to study and improve transportation safety.
NHTSA and NTSB have noted the important safety benefits of
EDRs.
During the 2005 State legislative session, 15 States
considered legislation on EDRs. These bills either mandate that
EDRs be in vehicles, require on-off switches, or control the
use of EDRs, due to privacy concerns, a big issue. In 2004,
NHTSA proposed a rulemaking for EDRs, and a final rule is
expected by the end of this year. The Alliance believes that,
indeed, there should be a uniform national policy on EDRs.
Turning to the Senate provisions on the highway bill, the
Alliance supports the non-traffic incident data collection
provisions in Section 7255. Currently, there is little real
world data on the magnitude, contributing causes, and
circumstances of off-road events such as back-over accidents or
children being left unattended in vehicles. We need that data.
If safety resources are able to get to the most bang for the
buck, then we first need to understand the problems to ensure
that technological solutions are both effective and an
efficient use of scarce resources.
The Senate bill also mandates a number of major motor
vehicle safety rulemakings. Some of these rulemakings already
in process at NHTSA and consistent with its current safety
priorities, you heard this from Administrator Runge already. As
a matter of policy, however, while we support and participate
in the rulemaking progress, we believe that any final rule, if
appropriate, should be based on sound data, public comment, and
examination of alternatives, consideration of economic
consequences, and appropriate lead time.
By requiring that rules must be published, regardless of
the public rulemaking record on that subject, the Senate bill's
approach prejudges the outcome of the rulemaking process, and
deprives NHTSA of its authority to make safety-related
assessments and determinations of rulemaking priorities. We
cannot support any requirement that final rules must be issued
regardless of information provided to the agency through its
public notice and comment process. The complexity of safety
rulemakings requires that careful attention be accorded to the
inherent tradeoffs associated with regulations. The rulemakings
in the Senate bill require tradeoffs. One, whether stronger
roofs might be--might result in a higher rate of rollover,
because of added structure to the top of the vehicle, thereby
raising its center of gravity, and increasing rollover risk,
and two, whether window treatments to reduce ejections for
unbelted occupants could lead to increased head and neck
injuries to belted occupants. These safety tradeoffs are not
hypothetical situations or reasons not to act. Instead, they
are real, complex issues that need to be addressed by experts.
The expert agency established by the Congress to address these
issues, NHTSA, should make regulatory decisions based on a
sound public record, and not based on arbitrary deadlines or
anecdotal-based solutions.
In closing, I would like to respectfully remind the
committee that motor vehicle safety is a shared responsibility
among government, consumers, and vehicle manufacturers. Auto
manufacturers are more committed than ever to developing
advanced safety technologies to reduce fatalities and injuries
resulting from motor vehicle crashes. But as a Nation, we will
never fully realize the potential benefits of vehicle safety
technologies until we give vehicle occupants properly
restrained and impaired drivers off the road.
[The prepared statement of Frederick L. Webber follows:]
Prepared Statement of Fred Webber, President and CEO, Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers
Thank you Mr. Chairman. My name is Fred Webber and I am President
and CEO of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. I am pleased to be
afforded the opportunity to offer the views of the Alliance at this
important hearing. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance)
is a trade association of nine car and light truck manufacturers
including BMW Group, DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company, General
Motors, Mazda, Mitsubishi Motors, Porsche, Toyota and Volkswagen. One
out of every 10 jobs in the U.S. is dependent on the automotive
industry.
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TO REDUCE FATALITIES AND INJURIES
FROM MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN
Over the past 20 years, significant progress has been made in
reducing the traffic fatality rate. In 1981, the number of fatalities
per 100 million vehicle miles traveled stood at 3.17. By 2003, this
rate had been driven down by 53 percent to 1.48 fatalities per 100
million vehicle miles traveled. The level of competitiveness among
automakers, which key industry observers have described as ``brutal,''
has helped to accelerate the introduction of safety features ahead of
regulation, aiding in the progress made.
Safety is an area in which manufacturers compete and seek
competitive advantage. Safety ``sells'' and manufacturers are
leveraging their safety performance and equipment in efforts to
distinguish their products from competitors. According to the J. D.
Power and Associates 2002 U.S. Automotive Emerging Technologies study,
nine of the top 10 features most desired by consumers in their next new
vehicle are designed to enhance vehicle or occupant safety and
manufacturers are responding to this increased consumer demand for
safety across their entire product line.
Despite the progress made, however, data show that 42,643 people
lost their lives on U.S. highways in 2003 and almost 2.9 million were
injured. Tragically, 56 percent of vehicle occupants killed in crashes
were not restrained by safety belts or child safety seats. Alcohol was
a factor in 40 percent of all fatalities. This is unacceptable. As a
nation, we simply must do better.
The Alliance and our members are constantly striving to enhance
motor vehicle safety. And, we continue to make progress. Each new model
year brings safety improvements in vehicles of all sizes and types.
But, as the Government Accountability Office reaffirmed, vehicle
factors contribute less often to crashes and their subsequent injuries
than do human or roadway environmental factors.<SUP>1</SUP> We will
never fully realize the potential benefits of vehicle safety
technologies until we get vehicle occupants properly restrained and
impaired drivers off the road.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Highway Safety--Research Continues on a Variety of Factors
That Contribute to Motor Vehicle Crashes.'' United States Government
Accountability Office, GAO-03-436, March 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
INCREASED SAFETY BELT USAGE AND PREVENTING IMPAIRED DRIVING ARE
NECESSARY TODAY TO PREVENT NEEDLESS FATALITIES AND INJURIES
The single most effective way to reduce traffic fatalities and
serious injuries in the short term is to increase the use of active
occupant restraint systems, safety belts and child safety seats.
Members of the Alliance have a long and proud record in supporting
increased safety belt usage beginning in the mid 1980's with funding
for Traffic Safety Now, a safety belt advocacy group lobbying state
governments for the passage of mandatory safety belt use laws, to
participation in and funding of the Air Bag & Seat Belt Safety Campaign
(Campaign). The Campaign is housed in the National Safety Council and
principally funded by the voluntary contributions of motor vehicle
manufacturers. The effectiveness of the Campaign is reflected in the
increase in belt use from 61 percent, when the Campaign was formed in
1996, to today, with belt use at 80 percent.
This 19 percentage point increase in belt use is largely due to
high visibility enforcement Mobilizations coordinated by the Campaign
in cooperation with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), state highway safety offices and law enforcement agencies in
all fifty states. Recently, the largest Mobilization ever was conducted
with 12,243 law enforcement agencies providing stepped up enforcement
and close to $26 million in paid advertising to augment the enforcement
effort. Funding for the enforcement ads, both national and state, comes
from funds earmarked by Congress for this purpose. We believe that it
is important for Congress to continue to provide this funding.
Primary enforcement safety belt use laws are significantly
correlated with higher safety belt usage levels. States with primary
enforcement laws have average safety belt usage rates approximately 11
percentage points higher than states having secondary enforcement laws.
Currently, only 22 states and the District of Columbia have primary
safety belt laws. While the Campaign, through its lobbying efforts, has
contributed to primary enforcement legislation being enacted in several
states, further progress has been difficult to achieve. The
Administration has requested significant funding for incentives to
states passing primary enforcement laws. These incentives are part of
the Senate-passed highway bill and the Alliance strongly supports this
provision. See Attachment 1. This proposal has merit and should be
approved by Congress.
Impaired driving is also a significant highway safety problem.
While substantial progress in reducing impaired driving has been made
in the last quarter century, more must be done to prevent these
needless tragedies. Repeat offenders are disproportionately involved in
fatal crashes. The Senate-passed bill contains a provision that updates
the Section 164 Repeat Offender program, consistent with current
research. It aims to provide more effective treatments to High-BAC
drivers (drivers with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) level of 0.15
or higher, which is almost twice the legal limit of 0.08) and repeat
offenders. High-BAC drivers are involved in some 60% of alcohol-related
highway fatalities. The Alliance strongly supports this provision and
it should be approved by Congress. See Attachment 2 1n addition to the
priority areas of increasing safety belt use and reducing impaired
driving, Congress needs to provide adequate funding for the Section 402
State and Community Highway Safety Program.
ALLIANCE MEMBERS ARE AGGRESSIVELY PURSUING SAFETY ADVANCEMENTS,
COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY
Advancing motor vehicle safety remains a significant public health
challenge--one that automakers are addressing daily, both individually
and collectively. Alliance members make huge investments in safer
vehicle design and technology. Manufacturers not only meet, but also
exceed motor vehicle safety standards in every global market in which
vehicles are sold. Manufacturers alone, not as a result of any
regulatory mandate, implemented many safety features currently
available on motor vehicles in the U.S. Those who claim that vehicle
safety will not be advanced in the absence of regulatory requirements
are living in the past and are not paying attention to today's market
place. A partial list of voluntarily installed advanced safety devices
without or prior to regulation is attached. See Attachment 3.
The Alliance is pursuing a number of initiatives to enhance safety.
We have redoubled and unified our activities to collectively address
light truck-to-car collision compatibility. On February 11-12, 2003,
the Alliance and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)
sponsored an international meeting on enhancing vehicle-to-vehicle
crash compatibility. On February 13, 2003, the Alliance and IIHS sent
NHTSA Administrator Dr. Jeffrey Runge a letter summarizing the results
of this meeting, and indicating the industry planned to develop
recommendations that auto companies could take to enhance crash
compatibility.
Ten months later, on December 2, 2003, we delivered to NHTSA a
multi-phase plan for enhancing the crash compatibility of passenger
cars and light trucks. This plan was developed by an international
group of safety experts. At the same time, we also delivered to NHTSA a
commitment made on behalf of the world's automakers to begin to design
cars and trucks according to the performance criteria specified in the
group of experts' plan. This commitment will lead to significant
improvements in the protection afforded to occupants in crashes. It is
the most comprehensive voluntary safety initiative ever undertaken by
automakers.
For the North American market, front-to-side crashes, where the
striking vehicle is a light truck or SUV, represent a significant
compatibility challenge. We are placing a high priority on enhancing
the protection of occupants inside vehicles struck in the side by,
among other things, enhancing head protection of occupants in struck
vehicles. We expect our efforts to lead to effective counter-measures
that auto manufacturers can incorporate in their vehicles. We are
working on efforts intended to aid in the development of evaluation
criteria that will be established to drive improvements in car side
structures to reduce side impact intrusion and provide for additional
absorption of crash energy.
With regard to front-to-front crashes, our initial plan focuses on
specific recommendations to enhance alignment of front-end energy
absorbing structures of vehicles. Manufacturers have been working to
improve this architectural feature by modifying truck frames. The
voluntary standard will govern structural alignment for the entire
light-duty vehicle fleet and provide for an industry wide initiative.
In addition, we are developing test procedures that could lead to more
comprehensive approaches to measuring and controlling these crash
forces. These efforts to develop voluntary standards for crash
compatibility, when combined with an industry commitment to design
vehicles in accordance with them, is a model for voluntary industry
action. These programs have proven to be very effective in bringing
significant safety improvements into the fleet faster than has been
historically possible through regulation. The voluntary standards
process also has the flexibility to produce rapid modifications should
the need arise.
The best way to illustrate the benefits for such an approach is to
examine the development of the Recommended Procedures for Evaluating
Occupant Injury Risk From Deploying Side Airbags finalized in August
2000. In response to concerns about potential injury risk to out-of-
position (OOP) women and children from deploying side airbags, the
Alliance, the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers
(AIAM), the Automotive Occupant Restraints Council (AORC), and IIHS
used a joint working group to develop test procedures with injury
criteria and limits to ensure that the risk of injury to OOP occupants
from deploying side airbags would be very limited.
After an intensive effort, the working group developed a draft set
of test procedures. This draft was presented in a public meeting on
June 22, 2000. Comments were collected and the finalized procedures
were presented to NHTSA on August 8, 2000. Now, in model year 2005, 90
percent of side airbags have been designed in accordance with the
August 8, 2000 Recommended Procedures. More importantly, the field
performance of side air bags remains positive. These procedures and
public commitment were also used by Transport Canada as the basis for a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between automobile manufacturers and
the Canadian government.
Another Alliance initiative is assessing opportunities, to further
reduce the frequency and consequences of rollover. Rollovers represent
a significant safety challenge that warrants attention and action.
Alliance efforts to reduce the frequency and consequences of rollover
involve passenger cars as well as SUVs, vans, and pickup trucks. Our
efforts include developing a handling test procedure or recommended
practice that will focus on an assessment of the performance of
electronic stability control systems and other advanced handling
enhancement devices. A typical rollover is one in which the driver
becomes inattentive or distracted, loses control of the vehicle, and
then strikes something that trips the vehicle, causing it to roll.
Electronic stability control systems are designed to help drivers to
keep out of trouble in the first place. However, should a rollover
occur, the Alliance is assessing opportunities to enhance rollover
occupant protection, to determine the feasibility of developing test
procedures to assess the performance of countermeasures designed to
further reduce the risk of occupant ejection in rollover crashes, given
the large numbers of occupants ejected in such events. Of course the
most effective, simplest and least expensive means of reducing ejection
is for occupants to wear safety belts. Safety belts are 75-80 percent
effective in reducing ejections.
The most effective voluntary improvement in decades is electronic
stability control. Electronic stability control (ESC) uses sensors to
detect if a driver is about to lose control, and microprocessors
automatically apply individual brakes and/or reduce engine power.
Today, 51 percent of 2005 models are available with ESC, up 11
percentage points from 2004, and up 44 percentage points from 2003.
According to a NHTSA analysis, ESC showed a reduction in fatal rollover
crashes of 63 percent in SUVs and 30 percent in cars. A similar
analysis by IIHS also showed significant benefits--a 56 percent
reduction in single vehicle fatal crashes and a 41 percent reduction in
all single vehicle crashes. Stability controls, developed and installed
voluntarily by industry, is highly effective in reducing crashes,
especially those related to loss of control and subsequent rollover.
See Attachment 4.
Alliance members are also individually pursuing initiatives to
enhance motor vehicle safety. One such initiative that has received
widespread support is the installation of vehicle-based technologies to
encourage safety belt usage. Preliminary research on a system deployed
in the United States by one Alliance member found a statistically
significant 5 percentage point increase in safety belt use for drivers
of vehicles equipped with that system compared with drivers of
unequipped vehicles. NHTSA estimates that a single percentage point
increase in safety belt use nationwide would result in an estimated 250
lives saved per year. Beginning in model year 2004, all members of the
Alliance began deploying various vehicle-based technologies to increase
safety belt use. The rollout of these technologies will continue over
the next few model years.
COMPREHENSIVE AND CURRENT DATA ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE INSIGHTFUL AND
SOUND PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS
NHTSA's two key traffic crash database programs, the National
Automotive Sampling System (NASS) and the Fatality Analysis Reporting
System (FARS) provide crucial information to safety planners and
vehicle design engineers. The NASS program, in particular, has been
chronically under-funded. On October 17, 2002, the Alliance and various
other safety groups sent a letter to NHTSA Administrator Dr. Jeffrey
Runge outlining the importance of sound crash and injury data. The
Alliance emphasized the need for additional funds for NASS in order to
evaluate the effectiveness of both behavioral and vehicular safety
measures. See Attachment 5.
The Administration has proposed substantial funding to upgrade
state traffic records systems. Improved state record systems can help
improve the quality of FARS data and assist states in establishing
safety program priorities. The Alliance strongly supports upgrading
state and federal crash data systems and urges Congress to provide
appropriate levels of funding for them. The Alliance believes this
funding is critical because NHTSA rulemakings must be data-driven,
supported by scientifically sound evidence, and demonstrate the
potential for cost-effective safety benefits without undesired side
effects. We must ensure that our safety investments, from both
government and industry are achieving the largest benefits possible.
The Alliance also sponsors a significant amount of safety research
that is shared with the safety community. The Alliance is sponsoring a
program to collect real-world crash data on the performance of
depowered and advanced air bags at three sites around the U.S. (Dade
County, Florida, Dallas County, Texas, and Chilton, Coosa, St. Clair,
Talledega, and Shelby Counties in Alabama). This program adds valuable
information about air bag performance to the extensive crash data
already being collected by NHTSA through NASS. The Alliance is
committed to funding this program that will run through this year. The
current Alliance commitment for the advanced air bag research is $4.5
million over 4 years. The Alliance project will observe all the NASS
data collection protocols so that the Alliance funded cases can be
compared with, and evaluated consistently with, other cases in the NASS
dataset.
Consistent with the need for more real world data, Alliance members
have voluntarily installed Event Data Recorders (EDRs) in their
vehicles. EDRs provide improved data to assist safety researchers, auto
engineers, government researchers and trauma doctors in their work.
EDRs can improve our collective understanding of crash events and lead
to improvements in vehicle safety systems. Recording certain data
elements in the moments just prior to and during a crash can contribute
to the breadth and reliability of the crash data already gathered by
state and federal governments and widely used by public and private
entities to study and improve transportation safety. NHTSA and NTSB
have noted the important safety benefits of EDRs. See Attachment 6.
During the 2005 state legislative session, 15 states have
introduced bills on EDRs. These bills either mandate EDRs be in
vehicles, require on/off switches, or control the use of EDRs due to
privacy concerns. In 2004, NHTSA proposed a rulemaking for EDRs and a
final rule is anticipated by the end of this year. The Alliance
believes there is a need for a uniform national policy on EDRs.
HIGHWAY AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY PROVISIONS IN THE SENATE BILL
In addition to adequate funding for NASS, the Alliance believes it
important for NHTSA to have the resources necessary to conduct a
comprehensive study of crash causation similar to the multi year
``Indiana Tri-Level Study'' that was completed 25 years ago.
Researchers at Indiana University Bloomington's Institute for Research
in Public Safety conducted the Tri-Level Study of the Causes of Traffic
Accidents from 1972 through 1977. According to NHTSA officials, the
Indiana Tri-Level Study has been the only study in the last 30 years to
collect in-depth, on-scene crash causation data. NHTSA relies on it
today because other NHTSA data is collected from police crash reports
or collected days or weeks after the crash, making it difficult to
obtain causation data. Significant advancements in vehicle safety
technology and design have occurred since then, making this study
obsolete as a basis for regulatory decisions.
Therefore, the Alliance strongly supported the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's FY 2006 budget request for $10 million,
so that NHTSA can effectively update their crash causation data. An
updated study would help guide and enlighten public policy aimed at
reducing the frequency of traffic crashes, injuries, and fatalities.
This is a crucial step toward improving the quality of data available
to inform sound regulatory decision-making at NHTSA.
The Alliance supports the nontraffic incident data collection
provisions in the Senate bill (Section 7255). Currently, there is
little real world data on the magnitude, contributing causes, and
circumstances of off-road events such as back over accidents or
children being left unattended in vehicles. If safety resources are to
be able to get ``the most bang for the buck'' then we first need to
understand the problems to ensure that any technological solutions are
both effective and an efficient use of limited resources.
The provision in the Senate bill (Section 7257) on Automobile
Information Disclosure requires vehicle window labels include
information about safety ratings assigned and formally published or
released by NHTSA as part of the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP). The
Alliance supports meaningful consumer information and will work through
the rulemaking process to encourage a satisfactory outcome.
THE NHTSA MANDATED RULEMAKINGS IN THE SENATE PASSED HIGHWAY BILL
PREJUDGE THE RULEMAKING PROCESS
The NHTSA reauthorization provisions in the Senate passed bill
would mandate a number of major motor vehicle safety rulemakings. Some
of these rulemakings are already in process at NHTSA and consistent
with their current safety priorities. As a matter of policy, however,
while, we support and participate in the rulemaking process, however,
as a matter of policy, we believe that any final rule, if appropriate,
should be based on sound data, public comment, an examination of
alternatives, consideration of economic consequences and provide
appropriate lead-time. By requiring that rules must be published,
regardless of the public rulemaking record on that subject, the Senate
bill's approach prejudges the outcome of the rulemaking process and
deprives NHTSA it's authority to make safety related assessments and
determinations of rulemaking priorities. Thus, we cannot support any
mandate requiring that final rules must be issued, regardless of
information provided to the agency through its public notice and
comment process. There is no need for the Congress to order NHTSA to
both short-circuit its own governing legislation regarding the criteria
for establishing rules as well as the requirements in the
Administrative Procedures Act regarding responding to public comments.
The complexity of safety rulemakings requires that careful
attention be accorded to the inherent tradeoffs associated with
regulations. In the past, we have seen tradeoffs among adult high-speed
protection in frontal crashes and associated harm to children and
others in low-speed crashes. The March 6, 2004 IIHS Status Report,
notes that the 1997 rule issued by NHTSA that allowed manufacturers to
produce ``depowered'' air bags was the right decision then and still is
now. In designing occupant restraint systems, manufacturers must
carefully balance high-speed and lower-speed protection, protection for
belted vs. unbelted occupants, and protection for large adults and
smaller adults and children. All involve safety tradeoffs.
Another tradeoff acknowledged by the National Academy of Sciences,
and others, have pointed out the significant increase in highway
casualties that resulted from the downsizing and downweighting of
vehicles in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a result of the need to
rapidly increase fuel economy. Further, the rulemakings in the Senate
bill require NHTSA to make additional tradeoffs for example, (1)
whether stronger roofs might result in a higher rate of rollover
because of added structure to the top of the vehicle, thereby raising
its center of gravity and increasing rollover risk and (2) whether
window treatments to reduce ejections for unbelted occupants could lead
to increased head and neck injuries to belted occupants. These safety
tradeoffs are not hypothetical situations or reasons not to act.
Instead, they are real complex issues that need to be addressed by
experts. The ``expert'' agency established by the Congress to address
these issues--NHTSA--should make regulatory decisions based on a sound
public record, and not based on arbitrary deadlines.
THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF VEHICLE SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES CAN NOT BE FULLY
REALIZED UNTIL VEHICLE OCCUPANTS ARE PROPERLY RESTRAINED AND IMPAIRED
DRIVERS ARE OFF THE ROAD
Motor vehicle safety is a shared responsibility among government,
consumers and vehicle manufacturers. Auto manufacturers are more
committed than ever to developing advanced safety technologies to
reduce fatalities and injuries resulting from motor vehicle crashes.
But as a nation, we will never fully realize the potential benefits of
vehicle safety technologies until we get vehicle occupants properly
restrained and impaired drivers off the road.
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Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman. Mr. O'Neill.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN O'NEILL
Mr. O'Neill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. My name is Brian O'Neill. I am President of the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, which is a nonprofit
research and communications organization that identifies ways
to reduce motor vehicle crash injuries, deaths, and property
damage. I am here today to discuss various approaches to
improving vehicle safety.
If we look at the history, there have been three periods of
vehicle safety improvement. From the beginning of motorization
into the 1960's, safety improvements were voluntary and
limited. Crash protection features were rarely considered by
the industry.
The second phase began in the 1960's, as government
regulations started to require manufacturers to meet a
comprehensive set of performance standards. Many of these
standards for the first time addressed crash protection. Auto
manufacturers did not welcome this regulation, but they
accepted it as the only way many safety features would be
adopted. Manufacturers of that time believed safety could not
be sold, and safety advocates were convinced that Federal
regulation was the only way to force automakers to develop new
crash protection technologies such as airbags.
The third phase of safety improvements began with NHTSA's
initiation of the New Car Assessment Program, under which
vehicle crash tests are conducted with instrumented dummies to
provide consumers with comparative safety information by make
and model. Not long after this program was launched in the late
1970's and early 1980's, automakers began advertising their
NCAP crash test results. They also began advertising
availability of airbags. This marked an end to what has been
almost--what had been the almost universal view that safety
could not be sold.
Today, an abundance of independent information helps
consumers factor safety into their vehicle purchase decisions.
NHTSA's NCAP rates front, side crash protection and rollover
propensity. We at the Institute rate vehicles' front, side, and
rear crash protection. Manufacturers recognizing the power of
this consumer information have responded by improving the
safety performance of many of their vehicles. Examples are the
improvements in frontal crash protection, especially the
designs of vehicle safety cages and front-end crumple zones,
that have been made in response to the Institute's program of
offset crash tests. When various vehicle groups were first
tested by the Institute, relatively few models earned good
ratings, and many were rated by us as marginal or poor
performers. In contrast, virtually all new passenger vehicles
sold today now have good ratings in these tests. A few are
acceptable, and a handful of older designs are still rated
marginal, but not one single design in the marketplace today is
rated as poor.
Similar improvements are being made in response to the
Institute's more recently initiated side impact crashworthiness
program. In April 2004, we released the first side impact
ratings for 13 midsize cars. Among these, only two earned good
ratings, one was acceptable, and the other 10 were rated poor.
Following a second round of midsize tests earlier this year,
just 1 year after the first tests, we now have nine midsize
cars rated as good, four acceptable, four marginal, and seven
poor, and more improvements are on the way.
Auto manufacturers are responding to these programs because
they recognize the power of the safety marketplace. There is no
debate about whether safety sells cars any more. It does, and
the manufacturers and their suppliers are voluntarily
developing and installing new safety technologies. An example
is side airbags that protect occupants' heads. This technology,
which reduces driver fatality risk in side impacts by about 45
percent, was developed without regulation or even the threat of
it, and now, they are well on their way to becoming standard
equipment.
But there does continue to be an important place for
Federal rulemaking to establish minimum safety levels for all
new vehicles. One question that has been before this committee
is who should establish NHTSA's rulemaking priorities. Should
it be Congress, or should the agency set its own priorities?
Ideally, NHTSA should have both the commitment and the
technical expertise to set priorities and complete the
rulemaking process by issuing standards. But history has been
mixed in this regard. Few NHTSA Administrators have been
knowledgeable about highway safety when they were appointed, so
lags to accommodate learning frequently have slowed the
agency's progress. Plus, the political leadership sometimes has
been ideologically opposed to rulemaking.
I believe that NHTSA's present Administrator, Jeff Runge,
is competent, knowledgeable, and committed. Therefore, I
believe detailed Congressional dictates for new rulemaking are
not needed this time. Any Congressional mandates that may be
issued should be broad rather than specific. The goal should be
to facilitate safety outcomes rather than to try to tell NHTSA
in detail how to achieve those outcomes.
Today, automakers and their suppliers are developing a wide
range of new technologies, including many features designed to
prevent crashes, and in some cases, these are already being
marketed. We have already heard today about electronic
stability control, which the Institute and NHTSA studies show
to be very effective in preventing single vehicle crashes. But
other technologies beginning to be deployed and under
development include lane departure warning systems, blind spot
detection, night vision enhancement, adaptive cruise control
with stop/go braking, run-flat tires. Still more features, such
as brake boost assist, may prevent some crashes, and reduce the
severity of others. Systems are also being developed to
activate crash protection features before impacts begin.
Because of the slow pace of rulemaking, NHTSA can play only
a limited role, as far as regulations are concerned, in getting
this kind of technology in new cars. These new innovations pose
challenges for NHTSA and the rest of the safety community. We
do not have the equivalence of crash tests with instrumented
dummies to assess the performance of these new technologies. In
most cases, crash data bases do not provide sufficient and
reliable information to assess the potential benefits that can
be expected. We simply do not know how many crashes occur when
drivers drift out of their travel lanes, for example. We do not
know the extent to which suddenly deflating tires contribute to
crashes, nor do we know how drivers might respond to the
various new technologies. The absence of reliable data about
crash causation limits our ability to predict the potential
benefits of many of these new technologies. NHTSA, the auto
industry, its suppliers, and the safety community need to work
together to develop better data and new methods to assess such
technologies, so the most effective ones can be promoted.
Mr. Stearns. Mr. O'Neill, I need you to sum up.
Mr. O'Neill. I will, sir.
Today, vehicle safety is being improved through regulation,
consumer information, and voluntary standards. This mix means
that important safety improvements will be achieved much faster
than when we relied solely on the slow and deliberative
regulatory process. We must recognize today that we have
options in addition to Federal regulations to achieve vehicle
safety improvements.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Brian O'Neill follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian O'Neill, President, Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety is a nonprofit research
and communications organization that identifies ways to reduce motor
vehicle crash deaths, injuries, and property damage. I am the
Institute's president, and I am here to discuss various approaches to
improving vehicle safety.
For a long time the belief was widespread that vehicle safety could
not be sold. The only way to promote safety improvements was federal
regulation. This view no longer prevails. Crash test programs conducted
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety supply consumers with abundant
information to help them factor safety into their vehicle purchase
decisions. Manufacturers advertise safety because it is such an
important factor in the marketplace. The manufacturers and their
suppliers are not only responding to various consumer crash test
programs but also developing new technologies to secure a competitive
edge. These innovations are outpacing the deliberative federal
rulemaking process.
Many of the new technologies are intended to prevent crashes. These
pose a challenge for NHTSA and the larger safety community to develop
better data and new methods to assess the potential benefits so the
most effective technologies can be promoted.
History of vehicle safety improvements
There have been three periods of improvement. From the beginning of
motorization into the 1960s, the improvements were voluntary and
limited. Manufacturers improved crash avoidance features including
brakes, lights, etc., but crash protection features rarely were
considered.
The second phase of safety improvement began in the 1960s, as
government regulations began requiring manufacturers to meet a
comprehensive set of performance standards. Many of these standards
addressed crash protection. Auto manufacturers did not welcome this
regulation, but they accepted it as the only way many safety features
would be adopted. The manufacturers believed safety could not be sold,
and safety advocates were convinced that federal regulation was the
only way to force automakers to develop new crash protection
technologies such as airbags.
The third phase of safety improvement began with NHTSA's initiation
of the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP), under which vehicle crash
tests are conducted with instrumented dummies to provide consumers with
comparative safety information by make and model. Not long after this
program was launched in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some automakers
began advertising airbags and, later, their vehicles' NCAP crash test
results. This marked an end to what had been the almost universal view
that safety could not be sold.
Today an abundance of information helps consumers factor safety
into their vehicle purchase decisions. NHTSA's NCAP rates front and
side crash protection and rollover propensity. We at the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety rate vehicles' front, side, and rear crash
protection. Manufacturers recognize the power of this consumer
information, and they have responded by dramatically improving the
safety performance of their vehicles. Examples are the improvements in
frontal crash protection, especially the designs of vehicle safety
cages and front-end crumple zones, that have been made in response to
the Institute's program of offset crash tests. When the various vehicle
groups first were tested, relatively few models earned good ratings.
Many were marginal or poor. In contrast, virtually all passenger
vehicles now earn good ratings in frontal offset crash tests. A few are
acceptable, and a handful of older designs still are rated marginal.
None is poor.
Tests of three Saab models illustrate this progress. The 1995 Saab
900's front-end structural design was very poor. It allowed major
collapse of the occupant compartment in the offset test. The structure
of the 1999 Saab 9-3 was somewhat improved, mainly in the foot region.
There was less structural collapse. The 2003 9-3 was improved even
more, so that this model now has excellent structural design.
Similar improvements are being made in response to the Institute's
more recently initiated side impact crashworthiness program. In April
2004 we released the first side impact ratings for 13 midsize cars.
Among these only 2 earned good ratings, 1 was acceptable, and the other
10 were rated poor. Following a second round of tests of midsize cars
earlier this year, there now are 9 rated good, 4 acceptable, 4
marginal, and 7 poor.
Auto manufacturers are responding to these crashworthiness
evaluation programs because they recognize the power of the safety
marketplace. There is no debate about whether safety sells cars--it
does--and the manufacturers and their suppliers are voluntarily
developing and installing new safety technologies. An example is side
airbags that protect occupants' heads. This technology, which reduces
driver fatality risk in side impacts by about 45 percent, was developed
without regulation or even the threat of it.
Side impact airbags initially were introduced in more expensive
passenger vehicle models. Now they are well on the way to becoming
standard equipment, in part because of the Institute's crashworthiness
evaluations and in part because automakers are addressing the issue of
the harm that SUVs and pickups inflict on car occupants, especially in
side crashes.
As powerful as the safety marketplace is, it cannot fully address
issues such as the harm that light trucks pose to car occupants. In
February 2003 NHTSA Administrator Jeffrey Runge challenged automakers
to address this issue. The response is an effort, led by the Institute
and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, to develop voluntary
standards to reduce the risks. To begin the process, experts from
around the world presented the latest research on crash compatibility
at a technical meeting convened in Washington, D.C. Then two groups of
engineers and other technical experts from car companies and safety
organizations began meeting weekly, one group addressing
incompatibility in front-to-side impacts and the other addressing
front-to-front crashes. Within months the working groups completed the
first phase of their work, and all of the major automakers agreed to
adopt the performance and design requirements developed by the two
groups.
The requirements addressing front-to-side crashes will improve
occupant head protection in such collisions. In effect, auto
manufacturers have agreed that by September 2009 they will equip all of
their new vehicles with side impact airbags that protect occupants'
heads. To address incompatibility in front-to-front crashes, automakers
agreed that by September 2009 all of their new pickups and SUVs will
have front-end energy-absorbing structures that overlap the federally
mandated bumper zone for cars. This is a necessary first step toward
reducing the chances of override and underride, thus enhancing the
ability of the front ends of both vehicles to absorb crash energy and
keep damage away from the occupant compartments. In effect, this
particular agreement sets geometric design restrictions for the front
ends of SUVs and pickups--something that would be harder and more
complicated to achieve through the NHTSA rulemaking process because
federal motor vehicle safety standards must specify performance, not
design, requirements.
This is not the end of the collaborative effort. In fact, it is
more like the beginning. The current research phase is expected to lead
to additional performance requirements addressing front-to-front crash
compatibility. A series of barrier and vehicle-to-vehicle crash tests
will be conducted to develop procedures to measure the distribution of
crash forces across the front ends of vehicles. This should lead, in
turn, to requirements that will match front-end forces in head-on
crashes between cars and light trucks. Similarly, research planned for
side impacts is expected to lead to performance criteria for body
regions in addition to the head as well as evaluations of advanced
dummies for use in side impact testing.
It should not be assumed that achieving these kinds of voluntary
standards is an easy process. Virtually every major automaker
participated in the compatibility meetings, and there were frequent
disagreements. Exchanges sometimes became contentious as we negotiated
our way through the collaborative process. To achieve consensus we met
frequently, conducted teleconferences, debated myriad options, and
revisited thorny issues again and again.
We at the Institute signed on to this process knowing our
credibility would be at stake if the outcomes of the collaboration
turned out to be standards reflecting the lowest common denominators.
So we were committed to making sure the process led to important safety
improvements. I believe such improvements will happen, especially as
the research phases of this initiative progress and we develop new
knowledge about countermeasures to reduce crash incompatibilities.
Establishing rulemaking priorities
Although today we can address some vehicle safety issues on a
voluntary basis, there continues to be an important place for federal
rulemaking to establish minimum safety levels for all new vehicles. A
question is, who should establish NHTSA's rulemaking priorities? Should
it be Congress, or should the agency set its own priorities? Ideally
NHTSA should have both the commitment and the technical expertise to
set priorities and complete the rulemaking process by issuing
standards. But history is mixed in this regard. Few NHTSA
administrators have been knowledgeable about highway safety when they
were appointed, so lags to accommodate learning frequently have slowed
the agency's progress. Plus the political leadership sometimes has been
ideologically opposed to rulemaking, which has further slowed progress
toward vehicle safety improvements.
A good example involves the side impact protection rule. Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 214, first issued in 1970, was an
adaptation of internal General Motors requirements for beams in car
doors to resist intrusion. Somewhat later NHTSA conducted extensive
research aimed at upgrading the standard to include crash testing with
instrumented dummies. This research increased knowledge about vehicle
performance in side impacts, but largely for political reasons NHTSA
was not pursuing many new rules during the 1980s. Upgrading side impact
requirements was put on hold. In November 1989 the newly appointed
administrator, Jerry Curry, responded to what was by then strong
political pressure to move forward with an upgrade, and he committed to
do so early in his tenure. An upgraded rule was issued within a year of
his arrival at NHTSA. Because of continuing technical controversy about
the adequacy of the new side impact test dummy, Curry acknowledged when
he issued the rule in October 1990 that it was not perfect. But adding
that waiting for a perfect rule would only delay the timely
establishment of a good rule, he said he expected the agency to pursue
further upgrades as new research became available.
NHTSA recently issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to further
upgrade FMVSS 214 by adding crash tests and test dummies. The new
standard will, in effect, require head protection. In the meantime, the
Institute's side impact crashworthiness program and the voluntary
agreement on front-to-side compatibility already are accelerating the
installation of side airbags that protect people's heads. By the time
any FMVSS 214 revisions can take effect, virtually all cars already
will meet the new requirements. So in this case marketplace demands and
voluntary standards will have superceded agency action.
As this example indicates, the rulemaking process has not always
proceeded as expeditiously as it should. Sometimes this is because the
agency's leadership has failed or because Congress has changed the
agency's own priorities. I believe NHTSA's present administrator, Jeff
Runge, is competent, knowledgeable, and committed. Therefore, I believe
detailed Congressional dictates for new rulemaking are not needed at
this time. Any Congressional mandates that may be issued should be
broad rather than specific. The goal should be to facilitate safety
outcomes rather than to tell NHTSA how to achieve those outcomes. And
in all cases Congress should ensure that what it legislates NHTSA to
undertake is feasible and based on sound science and adequate data.
Challenge of new safety technologies
Automakers and their suppliers are developing a wide range of new
technologies, including many features designed to prevent crashes, and
in some cases these already are being marketed. An example is
electronic stability control, which NHTSA and Institute studies show to
be effective in preventing single-vehicle crashes. Other examples
include lane departure warning systems, blind spot detection, night
vision enhancement, adaptive cruise control with stop-and-go braking,
and run-flat tires. Still more features such as brake boost assist may
prevent some crashes and reduce the severity of others. Systems also
are being developed to activate crash protection features before
impacts begin.
These innovations pose challenges for NHTSA and the rest of the
safety community. We do not have the equivalents of crash tests with
instrumented dummies to assess the performance of the new technologies.
In most cases crash databases do not provide sufficient and reliable
information to assess the potential benefits that can be expected. We
simply do not know how many crashes occur when drivers drift out of
their travel lanes, for example. We do not know the extent to which
suddenly deflating tires contribute to crashes. Nor do we know how
drivers might respond to the various new technologies. The absence of
reliable data about crash causation limits our ability to predict
potential benefits of many of these new technologies. NHTSA, the auto
industry, its suppliers, and the safety community need to work together
to develop better data and new methods to assess such technologies so
the most effective ones can be promoted.
Conclusion: a range of complementary approaches
Today vehicle safety is being improved through regulation, consumer
information, and voluntary standards. This mix should mean that
important safety improvements will be achieved much faster than when we
relied solely on the slow and deliberative regulatory process. Federal
standards set minimum levels of safety, but in some areas the
manufacturers are designing vehicles substantially beyond these
minimums to earn good ratings in consumer crash test programs. New
safety technologies are being developed. But not every vehicle safety
issue can be addressed in the marketplace. For example, it is hard to
imagine consumers demanding vehicles that are less aggressive, or
harmful, to people in other vehicles. So alternatives are needed. One
such approach is for automakers to collaborate on voluntary safety
standards. The main reason the Institute has signed on to collaborative
approaches is that sometimes they can offer a faster track toward
improvements than federal rulemaking would allow.
Voluntary approaches do not replace rulemaking, which is and will
continue to be an important NHTSA function. While the agency need not
address every issue with a standard, it should have in place a long-
term program to review and upgrade--or in some cases to eliminate--its
standards. If the agency adheres to such a course, there should be no
need for Congressional dictates on rulemaking.
What is important to recognize is the range of options available
today to achieve vehicle safety improvements. The wisest course is to
proceed on a case-by-case basis, making full use of the most
advantageous approach in any given situation.
Mr. Stearns. Thank the gentleman. Ms. Pikrallidas, welcome.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN PIKRALLIDAS
Ms. Pikrallidas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Susan
Pikrallidas, and I am Vice President of Public Affairs for AAA.
The focus of this hearing is--has been on NHTSA's safety--
the--I am sorry, the safety provisions in the transportation
reauthorization bill. However, AAA was specifically requested
to provide information to the committee on a consumer
protection issue in the bill, and that is what I will be
addressing my remarks to. I am referring to the requirement in
Section 7260 that the Environmental Protection Agency, in
consultation with NHTSA, revise the process used to determine
fuel economy estimates for vehicle labeling purposes to reflect
the actual mileage vehicles achieve under real world
conditions.
The summer driving season is upon us. Next week, AAA will
release its travel projections for the July 4 holiday weekend,
and we expect Americans will be traveling in record numbers.
Nevertheless, gasoline prices remain high, as we discussed
earlier today, and with the cost of gasoline well over $2 a
gallon, the family travel budget is going to feel a pinch.
AAA members have asked us what they can do to conserve
fuel. We provide a number of driving tips, vehicle maintenance
suggestions, and other information to help them save money and
conserve fuel. One suggestion relates to purchasing more fuel
efficient vehicles. Unfortunately, new car buyers wishing to
factor fuel economy into their purchasing decisions are short-
changed by the information they see on the window sticker. In
too many case, they experience a different kind of sticker
shock when they take their new car on the road.
Truth in advertising is what the Senate provision seeks to
achieve, nothing more. AAA views this provision as a simple,
straightforward directive to the Federal agency charged with
administering test procedures that produce mileage ratings
consumers see on the window stickers of their new cars. By
EPA's own admission, existing procedures are outdated, and
Agency officials agree that test procedures must be revised.
Section 7260 of the Senate-passed transportation bill provides
Congressional direction, so that EPA will do what it has said
it should do, and that is to update their existing test
procedures.
Why do we need this change? Mr. Chairman, consumers are
misled when they read these mileage ratings on window stickers.
They have every right to believe that the ratings produced by a
federally mandated test accurately reflect what they will see
once they drive the vehicle off the lot. Real world experience
often produces a different reality than a laboratory test.
EPA's fuel economy tests are 30 years old, and are out of step
with current driving habits and traffic patterns. They do not
take into account higher speed limits or the effects of driving
on congested roads. Tests are run with the air conditioning
system off, even though virtually every vehicle comes with air
conditioning, and most drivers use it.
Mr. Chairman, experts from the Energy Information
Administration have said EPA's current methods ``may be
inappropriate for evaluating vehicles used today,'' and the
National Academy of Sciences' National Resource Council says
``most drivers experience lower fuel economy than suggested by
EPA's results.'' But the most persuasive evidence comes from
consumers themselves, who are frustrated when the mileage they
actually see is less than what they were led to believe when
they bought their vehicles.
Over the last several months, considerable work has been
done to craft a compromise provision that achieves objectives
everyone supports without the additional costs of creating new
tests. When this issue was raised on the House floor during
debate on the energy bill, it was the concern that new tests
would need to be created that derailed an amendment and the
intent of what consumers were trying to achieve. Since then,
AAA, along with other stakeholder groups, worked with majority
and minority staffs in the Senate and reached agreement on the
language that is now found in Section 7260 of the Senate
transportation bill.
Truth in advertising can be achieved by utilizing existing
EPA tests that are used for other purposes such as emissions
testing. We believe that allowing EPA to use a combination of
these existing tests, rather than the outmoded fuel economy
labeling test, will achieve the desired results. EPA is not
required to develop a completely new test. The language in the
bill makes clear that EPA will be given the flexibility to
``update and revise the process used to determine fuel economy
for labeling purposes only,'' and can be adjusted for factors
such as speed limits, acceleration rates, braking, variations
in weather and temperature, vehicle load, use of A/C, driving
patterns, and use of other fuel consuming factors.
Mr. Chairman, this approach was carefully crafted to meet
the concerns of all parties, consumers and manufacturers. It is
a win-win solution that will lead to consumers getting what
they deserve, accurate information on which to make informed
purchasing decisions.
We have only one last hurdle to cross. That is a decision
on the part of House conferees to accept the Senate language in
the transportation bill. A positive signal of support from this
subcommittee will send the right signal to conferees and their
consumer constituents.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Susan Pikrallidas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Susan Pikrallidas, Vice President of Public
Affairs, AAA
Mr. Chairman: my name is Susan Pikrallidas, and I am the Vice
President of Public Affairs for AAA. On behalf of our association,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss one small, but important
provision in the Senate version of the transportation reauthorization
bill. I am referring to the requirement in Section 7260 that the
Environmental Protection Agency, in consultation with the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, revise the process used to
determine fuel economy estimates for vehicle labeling purposes to
reflect the actual mileage vehicles achieve under ``real world
conditions.''
The summer driving season is upon us. Next week AAA will release
its travel projections for the July 4th holiday weekend, and we expect
that Americans will be traveling in record numbers. Nevertheless,
gasoline prices remain high. With the cost of gasoline well over $2.00
a gallon, the family travel budget is going to feel a pinch.
AAA members have asked what they can do to conserve fuel during
periods of high gas prices. We provide a number of driving tips,
vehicle maintenance suggestions, and other information to help them
save money and conserve fuel. One suggestion relates to purchasing more
fuel efficient vehicles. Unfortunately, new car buyers wishing to
factor fuel economy into their purchasing decisions are short-changed
by the information they see on the window sticker. In too many cases,
they experience a different kind of sticker shock when they take their
new car on the road.
``Truth-in-advertising'' is what the Senate provision seeks to
achieve--nothing more! AAA views this provision as a simple, straight-
forward directive to the federal agency charged with administering test
procedures that produce the mileage ratings consumers see on the window
stickers of new vehicles. By EPA's own admission, existing procedures
are outdated, and agency officials agree that test procedures must be
revised. Section 7260 of the Senate-passed transportation bill provides
Congressional direction so that EPA will do what it has said it should
do, and that is update their existing test procedures.
Why do we need this change? Mr. Chairman, consumers are mislead
when they read these mileage ratings on window stickers. They have
every right to believe that ratings produced by a federally mandated
test accurately reflect what they will see once they drive the vehicle
off the lot. Real-world experience often produces a different reality
than a laboratory test. EPA's fuel economy tests are 30 years old and
are out of step with current driving habits and traffic patterns. They
do not take into account higher speed limits or the effects of driving
on congested roads. Tests are run with the air conditioning system off,
even though virtually every car comes with A/C and most drivers use it.
Mr. Chairman: experts from the Energy Information Administration
have said EPA's current methods ``may be inappropriate for evaluating
vehicles used today'' and the National Academy of Sciences' National
Resource Council says ``most drivers experience lower fuel economy than
suggested by EPA's results.'' But, the most persuasive evidence comes
from consumers themselves who are frustrated when the mileage they
actually see is less than what they were led to believe when they
bought their vehicles.
Over the last several months, considerable work has been done to
craft a compromise provision that achieves objectives that everyone
supports without the additional costs of creating new tests. When this
issue was raised on the floor of the House during debate on the energy
bill, it was the concern that new tests would need to be created that
derailed an amendment and the intent of what consumers were trying to
achieve. Since then AAA, along with other stakeholder groups, worked
with Majority and Minority committee staff on the Senate side and
reached agreement on the language that is now found in Section 7260 of
the Senate transportation bill.
Truth-in-advertising can be achieved by utilizing existing EPA
tests that are used for other purposes such as emissions testing. We
believe that allowing EPA to use a combination of these existing tests,
rather than the out-moded fuel economy labeling test will achieve the
desired results. EPA is not required to develop a completely new test.
The language in the bill makes clear that EPA will be given the
flexibility to ``update and revise the process used to determine fuel
economy values for labeling purposes only'', and can be adjusted for
factors such as speed limits, acceleration rates, braking, variations
in weather and temperature, vehicle load, use of A/C, driving patterns,
and use of other fuel consuming factors.
Mr. Chairman: this approach was carefully crafted to meet the
concerns of all parties--consumers and manufacturers. It's a win-win
solution that will lead to consumers getting what they deserve:
accurate information on which to make informed purchasing decisions.
We have only one last hurdle to cross: that is a decision on the
part of House conferees to accept the Senate language in the
transportation bill. A positive signal of support from this
subcommittee will send the right signal to conferees and their consumer
constituents.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. Thank the gentlelady. Ms. Fennell.
Ms. Fennell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is this on? Thank
you--is that on?
Mr. Stearns. You don't have it on. There you go. Just push
that button.
Ms. Fennell. How is that?
Mr. Stearns. That is good.
STATEMENT OF JANETTE E. FENNELL
Ms. Fennell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee,
for holding this hearing, and inviting me to speak on behalf of
Kids and Cars. I come here from a different perspective than
the other panel members, as a mom, and as a person who has
lived through a life-threatening situation where my family were
kidnapped, locked in the trunk of a car. All this happened when
we didn't know what happened to our then 9 month old baby. So
it is from that perspective that I have learned about these
situations.
Mr. Stearns. Your 9 month old daughter was locked in the
trunk of the car?
Ms. Fennell. No, my husband and I were locked in the trunk
of the car.
Mr. Stearns. You were locked in the trunk of the car.
Ms. Fennell. Right. And during that kidnapping episode, we
had no idea what our abductors had done then, during----
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Ms. Fennell. [continuing] with our baby.
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Ms. Fennell. But I am here today as a testament that we did
survive, and it is because my family was so blessed that I have
dedicated my entire life to try to make cars safer for people,
but in particular, children.
Kids and Cars is a nonprofit organization, and we have
tried to bring light to this issue of non-traffic, non-crash
incidents. We collect data about children less than 14, but
predominantly, what we find, are these incidents are happening
to children five and younger.
Dr. Runge spoke earlier about a situation where this data
would not be easily assessed, and I am here to tell you that
this information is available. When a child dies in the United
States of America, a police report is written. What is the
difference right now is that those reports, because the
government has said they are not looking at non-traffic, non-
crash incidents, are shredded and go away. The information is
there. It is available through police reports, through child
death review teams, and I would be more than happy to be a
consultant, and teach them how to collect these data.
These type of incidents also are in NHTSA's jurisdiction,
by their own admission. So that is very important. We are only
asking them to do something that is already in their charter.
The first thing I would like to do, because like I said, I am a
mom, and I am very concerned about this, is talk about from the
perspective of a child, just a little book we have put
together, and the title of it is ``Making Funny Pictures in the
Driveway.'' It is a one page book. ``Sally draws a funny face.
Daddy begins to back up the car. Sally doesn't see Daddy. Daddy
doesn't see Sally. The end.'' Sometimes, stories about kids and
cars end badly. In the U.S., more than one--more than two
children are backed over and killed every week in a driveway or
parking lot. The CDC tells us that over 48 children are treated
in emergency rooms every week, because they have been backed
over by a vehicle. This is something we need immediate
attention on. As I go home, and I turn on my computer and
answer my phone, I will be dealing with two more families every
week that have lost a child, and what really puts this in
perspective, in over 70 percent of those incidents, it is a
family member behind the wheel of the vehicle that kills that
child.
The next provision has to do with not leaving children
alone in cars. We need to collect that data. They are being
left behind, because they are out of sight, out of mind. We
talk about power window strangulations, and Dr. Runge talks
about a rule, but the rule is not going to fix the problem. All
they did was say that these dangerous rocker and toggle
switches should be recessed. We need to ban them, and we need
auto-reverse. Children never have to die, and it is not just
children leaning out of windows. Other people activate power
window switches, unbeknownst to the other person, and can very
severely injured children and adults.
The other situation we deal with is vehicles set into
motion. Again, we have another book for that, ``Playing in
Daddy's Car is Fun,'' and it is a one page book, and it just
says: ``Little Bobby presses many buttons. He pretends to
drive. It is lots of fun. Then, the car begins to roll down the
hill. The end.'' One would think that the voluntary standard of
a brake shift interlock, which means that you have to have your
foot on the brake before you can engage a car into gear would
have taken place many years, because car manufacturers did it
voluntarily. But that is one of the problems with a voluntary
mandate, is not all cars have that. There are cars on the lot,
2005 vehicles, that have no brake shift interlock.
Unfortunately, I get the calls, I find the stories where little
children knock the car into gear, they become afraid, jump out,
the car runs over them, and they are killed. We really urge the
House to enact the legislation, and address these safety
issues.
There is also another bill, H.R. 2230, the Cameron
Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act, that would improve the
power windows, that would help to remind people to bring
infants with them. Our cars already tell us if we have left our
keys in the ignition. They tell us if we have left our
headlights on. What could be more important than leaving a
little child behind? We need NHTSA to collect that data, and we
want regular collection of the data, so we can really
understand how large this problem is.
There was a voice earlier about the possibility of making
this a separate bill. I urge you, please don't do this. We need
these things to move forward, and we need this to move forward
just as soon as possible. We understand human factors, but
there are some things that our vehicles can do through vehicle
design to help prevent these very preventable tragedies that
are happening to children in particular. We can't wait any
longer.
Kids and Cars urges the members of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee to support enactment of the Senate motor
vehicle safety provisions included in H.R. 3, and quickly pass
H.R. 2230, the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Janette E. Fennell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janette E. Fennell, Founder and President, KIDS
AND CARS
Mr. Chairman, my name is Janette Fennell and I am the founder and
president of KIDS AND CARS, an organization dedicated to improving the
safety of children in and around motor vehicles. I wish to thank you
and the members of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce for inviting
me to appear before you today to testify on the important issue of
child safety. I come before you today because there are a number of
legislative measures that Congress can enact this summer that will save
the lives of thousands of people, especially children, each year. KIDS
AND CARS appreciates the opportunity to express our views on the
reauthorization of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA).
Motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for children
three years of age and older, and children are often victims of non-
traffic, non-crash incidents as well. Children, especially young
children, are unaware of the dangers that they can encounter each day
in and around motor vehicles, even vehicles that are not moving. While
it is the responsibility of parents and other adults to protect our
children, many parents are themselves unaware of the risk presented by
power windows or the simple act of backing the family car out of the
driveway. These type of incidents are within NHTSA's jurisdiction as
the agency itself admits, ``NHTSA is also responsible for motor vehicle
safety when there is not a crash or the event occurs off the public
traffic way.'' <SUP>1</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data Collection Study: Deaths and Injuries resulting from
certain non-traffic and non-crash events' NHTSA (May 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
KIDS AND CARS was founded in 1999 to address the often overlooked
problem of nontraffic, noncrash incidents and focuses on dangers
encountered by children in and around passenger vehicles. Children can
be harmed when they are inside vehicles whether or not the engine is on
and the vehicle is moving. We collect data involving children 14 years
of age and younger, the majority of cases involve children under the
age of 5. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported
that over 9,100 children were treated in emergency rooms from July 2000
to June, 2001, due to nontraffic noncrash events.<SUP>2</SUP> This is a
weekly average of 176 injuries per week, each and every week. Although
some say that the issue of children being injured and killed in and
around motor vehicles is not a serious and significant safety issue,
the CDC report refutes this view. KIDS AND CARS has compiled a national
database that is recognized as a source for fatality and injury
information and is thoroughly documented. We know that our database
doesn't capture all such incidents since we do not have the resources
to conduct a census. As a result these incidents are vastly
underreported to state, local and federal authorities. For over five
years, we have urged NHTSA to track on an annual basis child fatalities
and injuries. Yet, the NHTSA does not include the reports of these
kinds of child fatalities or nonfatal serious injuries in federal
traffic safety databases. It seems that we literally need an act of
Congress to get NHTSA to begin tracking these incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Injuries and Deaths Among Children Left Unattended in or Around
Motor Vehicles--United States, July 2000-June 2001, MMWR, 51(26); 570-
572 (Jul. 5, 2002). Copy of study attached to testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Power windows are one source of injury for children in motor
vehicles. Children can be injured or killed by power windows even when
responsible adults are in the vehicle. Last year alone, 8 children died
after being strangled by power windows.
Another danger to children is heatstroke. Last year 35 children
died from hyperthermia after being left in hot cars, many times by
caring, loving parents who inadvertently left the child inside the car.
From 1998 through 2004, at least 230 children have perished in this
manner.
Children are also in jeopardy due to blind zones that are a result
of poor vehicle design. While all passenger vehicles have a blind zone
to the rear of the vehicle, the size of the zone increases dramatically
in light trucks, especially sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and pickup
trucks. I have attached a chart from Consumer Reports depicting the
rear blind zones for a popular sedan, minivan, SUV and pickup truck.
According to our data at KIDS AND CARS, at least 101 children were
backed over and killed in 2004, at least 91 children were backed over
and killed in 2003, and at least 58 were killed in 2002. In addition a
February 2005 report from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) found that for each of the years 2001 through 2003 an
estimated 2,492 children per year were treated in emergency rooms for
nonfatal motor vehicle backover injuries-a total of 7,476 children over
a three year period injured in backover incidents.<SUP>3</SUP> Our data
indicates that at least 2 children are backed over and killed every
week in the US. Furthermore, the CDC data tell us that an additional 48
children are treated in emergency rooms after being backed over each
week. These data confirm that backover incidents are a regular and all
too frequent occurrence. The tragedy is that they are preventable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Nonfatal Motor-Vehicle-Related Backover Injuries Among
Children--United States, 2001--2003, MMWR, 54(06); 144-146 (Feb. 18,
2005). Copy of study attached to testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If children were dying by the hundreds in airplane crashes or due
to food poisoning this Congress would be racing to enact legislation to
correct the problem. Right now, the House of Representatives has two
golden opportunities that would improve the safety of children and save
lives.
The Senate amendment of the House-passed federal-aid highway
reauthorization bill, H.R. 3, the Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy
for Users (TEA-LU), includes a number of important child-friendly
safety provisions. In the Senate version, Section 7254 provides for a
study of technologies to prevent backover incidents in which people,
especially children, are run over because they are in the blind zone
and the driver was unable to see them when backing up. Currently there
are no standards whatsoever that regulate what a person should be able
to see when backing their vehicle. Section 7255 would have NHTSA
collect non-traffic, noncrash incident data at least biennially, a
critical step if we are to understand the true size and scope of this
problem. In addition, Section 7258 of the Senate amendment would make
power window switches less prone to inadvertent use and thus reduce
some, although not all, of the danger to children in vehicles with
automatic power windows.
Since the House passed bill, H.R. 3, has no comparable provisions
to protect the safety of children on these issues, I strongly urge the
members of the Committee to support adoption of these Senate child
safety provisions as part of the final bill.
The House also has the opportunity to build on the H.R. 3
provisions by moving expeditiously to pass H.R. 2230, the Cameron
Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2005, which addresses four
critical safety issues for children. H.R. 2230 will: 1) provide a more
comprehensive improvement in power window protection for children and
adults; 2) remind drivers to remove infants when they leave the
vehicle; 3) protect children, the disabled, and others by ensuring that
drivers have good rearward visibility and an unobstructed view behind
their vehicle when backing up; and, 4) ensure the regular collection of
death and injury data in non-traffic, non-crash events involving motor
vehicles. The American Academy of Pediatrics endorses these life saving
measures. I have attached a copy of their letter of support to my
testimony. These reasonable measures should be adopted.
For many years, parents have been told to transport their children
in the back seat of vehicles because they are much safer there. Until
recently, voluntary action by auto manufacturers without the benefit of
government regulation resulted in most rear center seating position
being equipped with only a lap belt. The use of lap belts alone by
children is well known to result in serious abdominal and spinal
injuries. It took an act of Congress to force NHTSA to require lap/
shoulder belts in all rear center seating positions. The issue of
nontraffic, noncrash injuries should not be left to chance. Children
will continue to die needlessly unless and until Congress directs the
agency to regulate in this area.
Children are also killed and maimed every day in the epidemic of
motor vehicle crashes that recurs on our nation's highways every year.
According to government data, in 2002 motor vehicle crashes were the
leading cause of death in the U.S. for children 3 years and older,
indeed for all Americans ages 3 to 33. Vehicle crashes were the second
leading cause of death among toddlers, ages 1-3. In 2003, 1,198
children under the age of 10 were killed in motor vehicle crashes and
147,000 more suffered injuries, 14,000 of which were incapacitating
injuries.<SUP>4</SUP> These statistics do not include any of the data
that KIDS AND CARS and other organizations have collected about
nontraffic, noncrash incidents. Some studies have shown that young
children could be in more danger in their own driveways than as
passengers of automobiles. In addition, children 10 to 15 years of age
suffered 1,372 deaths, as well as 145,000 injuries and 14,000
incapacitating injuries in motor vehicle crashes in the same
year.<SUP>5</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Traffic Safety Facts 2003, at 86, NHTSA (DOT HS 809-775).
\5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adults and teens also suffer the ravages of motor vehicle crashes.
Current projections indicate there were a total of 42,800 traffic-
related deaths in 2004. In order to protect children and all vehicle
occupants, long-overdue safety initiatives must be adopted to stem the
rising tide of motor vehicle fatalities. Fortunately, the Senate-passed
version of H.R. 3 contains a number of measures that will substantially
improve safety for every person and family members across the country.
Over 10,000 people die each year in rollover crashes. Unbelted
occupants are often fully ejected, but even belted occupants can be
partially ejected, through windows that break, and doors that open.
Section 7251 of the Senate amendment to H.R. 3 addresses both rollover
prevention and enhanced protection for occupants in rollover crashes.
Under Section 7251, NHTSA will issue rollover prevention
performance criteria consistent with stability enhancing technologies.
Safety technologies, such as electronic stability control (ESC)
systems, have had clear success in reducing crashes in a number of
large studies in the U.S. and Europe. ESC is particularly effective in
preventing SUV rollover crashes. And this technology is already
standard equipment in most European-built vehicles and is available as
either standard or optional equipment in many U.S. models. But not all
ESC systems are created equal. Testing by Consumer Reports, for
example, has found that some systems are more effective than others in
preventing vehicle rollover. The bill will direct NHTSA to evaluate
existing systems and establish minimum performance criteria for those
systems. Automakers indicated earlier this year that they plan to make
ESC standard equipment in most SUVs, to be phased in over the next
several model years. NHTSA's rulemaking agenda already indicates the
agency plans to develop test procedures for ESC and to make a decision
on rulemaking this year.<SUP>6</SUP> While adopting ESC technology may
be on NHTSA's rulemaking agenda with plans to develop test procedures
for ESC and to make a rulemaking decision this year, direction from
Congress is necessary to ensure that these actions are carried out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ NHTSA Vehicle Safety Rulemaking and Supporting Research
Priorities: 2005-2009, Section II.A.--Preventing Rollovers, NHTSA (Jan.
2005) (Priorities Plan).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Occupants stand a much better chance of surviving a crash if they
are not ejected from the vehicle. Section 7251 directs NHTSA to develop
a standard to reduce full and partial occupant ejection because while
ESC looks like it will prevent many rollover crashes that lead to
ejection, it will not eliminate them all. According to the agency, from
1999 to 2003 there was an average of 8,584 deaths (and 39,000 injuries)
due to occupant ejection, both partial and full ejection, annually.
Two-thirds of these ejections occurred in rollover crashes. According
to NHTSA's Priorities Plan, reducing occupant ejection is also on the
agency's rulemaking agenda. The Senate provision gives the agency until
October 2009 to issue a final rule on ejection prevention, and 30
months to complete an already pending rulemaking to ensure that sliding
doors on vans remain locked and do not open during a crash. These
timelines are considerably beyond NHTSA's own schedule for action.
Finally, Section 7251 addresses the need to update the roof
strength standard. This standard has not been improved since it was
first adopted some 34 years ago and is widely recognized as failing to
provide basic crashworthiness protection during rollovers. The agency
has stated it plans to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking on roof
crush this year and to issue a final rule in 2006. Because such
promises have not been fulfilled in the past, the Senate provision
calls for a proposed rule by the end of this year and a final rule by
July 2008. Once again a generous timeline is provided.
The Senate legislation addresses rollover, roof crush, and ejection
in a single provision because these safety issues are interrelated. In
a rollover crash sensors developed for ESC systems can be used to
trigger safety belt pre-tensioners and side impact airbags. If the roof
fails, however, not only is there intrusion into the passenger
compartment but other safety systems will not function properly. Roof
failure can affect the geometry of the safety belt system and result in
the side impact air bags not providing effective protection. In
addition, roof crush will cause the vehicle side windows to break
allowing occupants to be fully or partially ejected. NHTSA has
historically approached each of these safety problems as separate
issues. The Senate bill encourages the agency to take a comprehensive
and unified approach to solving these interdependent safety problems.
Another important safety provision, Section 7252, is intended to
ensure that NHTSA completes its pending side impact rulemaking
proceeding. This rulemaking is vitally important because it is expected
to assure that side impact air bags for head protection are available
as standard equipment. Studies have shown that side impact air bags can
make the difference between living and dying for occupants inside a
vehicle struck in the side by an SUV or pickup truck. The Senate
deadline is July 1, 2008, for issuance of a final rule. Given that the
proposed rule was issued on May 14, 2004, over a year ago, the Senate's
allotment of an additional three years for a final rule is quite
reasonable.
The modest measures included in Sections 7251 and 7252 are
necessary for safety. They do not dictate the outcome of any rule--
leaving the specific requirements for the agency to determine.
Furthermore, the provisions address only issues that NHTSA has itself
identified as core safety priorities. In all of these areas, the agency
has already issued a proposed a rule or plans to issue one in the near
future. However, as we all know, the attention and even the good
intentions of federal agencies do not necessarily result in the
accomplishment of internal plans and policies. To ensure that the NHTSA
remains on track and carries through with its plans, it is essential
that Congress provide the added incentive and certitude that comes with
legislative goals and deadlines. In an editorial entitled Reducing
Rollovers, the Washington Post strongly urged the House to accept the
Senate measures, concluding that under the circumstances
``congressional prodding is not interference, it is in order.''
<SUP>7</SUP>
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\7\ Reducing Rollovers, Washington Post, Saturday, June 18, 2005,
p. A18.
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Also significant is the section on 15-passenger van safety
improvements. The safety of these vehicles is another issue of critical
importance for children because of the high percentage of such vans
that are used to transport children to and from schools and during and
after school to extra-curricular activities. The House should agree in
conference to adopt the eminently reasonable requirement that 15-
Passenger vans be rated for rollover resistance as part of NHTSA's New
Car Assessment Program (NCAP). The House should also support the Senate
bill's restrictions on the use of such vans as school buses unless they
comply with the safety standards applicable to school buses.
We cannot wait any longer or continue to stand by while families
needlessly suffer the death or serious injury of a loved one. Every
day, I work with parents who have had to bury a child and who cannot
understand why feasible and affordable safety systems are not standard
equipment on every car sold in the United States. When we develop
vaccines to protect children from deadly diseases, we make them
available to everyone. Now is the time to make these motor vehicle
safety vaccines available to every family. I can think of no more
eloquent statement on the need for basic safety features in all
vehicles than the one from Automotive News, the publication that covers
the automotive industry, ``All safety-related devices should become
standard equipment on all vehicles. No choice. It's not an economic
decision; it's a moral decision. When the choice becomes profit vs.
lives, the decision should be simple.'' <SUP>8</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Automotive News (Nov. 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
You have the power to help prevent the tragic injuries and
fatalities that families are suffering everyday from the death or
serious injury of a loved one in a motor vehicle related tragedy.
I urge the Members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee to
support enactment of the Senate motor vehicle safety provisions
included in H.R. 3 and to quickly pass H.R. 2230 the Cameron Gulbransen
Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2005.
Mr. Stearns. I thank you.
Let me just clarify, just for the record. On your opening
statement, I didn't see a part of your opening, your written
statement. You said that you and your husband were locked in
the trunk of a car. For how long?
Ms. Fennell. We were put in the trunk of car, taken to a
secondary location, and that is where we were assaulted,
robbed, and left basically for dead in the trunk. Fortunately,
we were able to escape the confines in the trunk. Probably
total we were in there 2 hours.
Mr. Stearns. Today, we do have releases on the trunk, so--
right, so that if people are locked in the trunk, they can
voluntarily get out of the trunk.
Ms. Fennell. Yes. That was my----
Mr. Stearns. Was that because of your----
Ms. Fennell. Actually, that was something I worked for.
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Ms. Fennell. Again, because my family was blessed, I found
out there wasn't data about people being locked in the trunk. I
built a data base. I showed that it was a problem.
Representative Stupak had a bill. We got to study the problem.
It is now a regulation that all vehicles purchased or leased in
the United States must have an inside trunk release. These type
of incidents are no different than trunk release. I can only
tell you the problems are much, much, much bigger.
Mr. Stearns. So you are trying to make the same argument
for the trunk release for your other items.
Ms. Fennell. Absolutely.
Mr. Stearns. Yes.
Ms. Fennell. It is non-traffic, it is non-crash. Nobody
knows how big the problem is.
Mr. Stearns. Probably, one of the reasons why it is
difficult to get a lot of accurate information is because a lot
of these, the cars coming out of the driveway, occur on private
property, and probably, the police are not called in as a
traffic statistic, but perhaps, it is done through the
insurance companies, so it might be more difficult to find
that. Has that been true? How do you track--because you seem to
be much more concerned about it than Dr. Runge, who--his
LexisNexis showed there was very little statistics on this. How
do you get your statistics? Is it because families call you?
Ms. Fennell. Well, it is a really sophisticated system, but
it is very objective, of course. We have a clipping service. We
do LexisNexis searches. We have people all over the country
that know the work that we do, and bring these to our
attention. We also work with child death review teams. It seems
as though many people don't understand that when a child in the
United States has died, in most cases, there is a review. But
there are police reports when children die. The problem is, as
they get rolled up into the system at the State level, the FARS
data base says, No. 1, if it wasn't a crash, No. 2, if it
didn't happen on a public road or highway, it doesn't get
included in our data.
Mr. Stearns. Yes.
Ms. Fennell. That is where those reports are being
shredded. So the information is there. All we need to do is
change the purview, and say please collect all fatalities. The
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is our agency to
keep us safe, and make sure the vehicles that we drive are
safe. It shouldn't matter where these things are happening.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. Mr. Webber, when I was looking at this,
I was reminded of the passive safety versus active safety, and
I guess the question is, and Ms. Fennell mentioned that you
cannot leave your car without a buzz, if you leave the keys in
the car. You know, if doors are cracked, you have an indication
on the dashboard. Do you think the passive safety technology
has sort of reached its limit, in terms of saving lives and
preventing injuries, and now, the automobile industry needs to
move to more active safety, to the next level in motor vehicle
safety? Or what is your feeling on that, and of course, I am
talking about, you know, what has been done for the rollover?
When I was in Detroit at the auto show, they put me in a
simulated vehicle, where a deer came out in front, and I
obviously turned to the left very quickly to avoid the deer,
but at that point, the car took over, and rather than me
causing me a spin or possibly a turnover, the car, through
stability control, was able to stabilize the vehicle. So do you
think we are moving into this whole new area where the passive
safety has gone as far as we can, and we need to move into
active safety?
Mr. Webber. Well, I wouldn't say passive safety has gone as
far as it can. I want to go back to Ms. Fennell's statement. We
are very sensitive to not only what went on in her life
personally, but what is being recommended, especially in H.R.
2230, and I just want to make a point here. We have examined
that proposal very, very carefully. There are a lot of mandates
in that bill, and one of those mandates, for example, mandates
a technology that just doesn't exist, and I am talking here
about sensors for cars for parents who leave their kids in the
car. We don't have that technology yet. It is one thing to
mandate it, but if you don't have it. Now, are we going to have
it some day? Perhaps, but we need time. Everything needs time,
and it is just not there.
I want to point out, by the way, and you are probably
familiar with this, that there is a program in Utah that is
working pretty well. It is called Spot the Tot. And as people
walk around, whether you are in a shopping center, wherever,
shouldn't we all be constantly alert looking for something that
is alive, whether it is a child or animal in an automobile that
may be buttoned up on a hot day? But those sensors are not
available yet. They are passive in nature. I suspect the
automobile industry, like any other industry, takes that
seriously, and down the road, perhaps. Perhaps we will have
that technology.
To your question directly about electronic stability
control, and yes, we have done a lot of work voluntarily on
this, and it is very exciting, and I have been on test sites,
and have gone through the maneuvers, and have seen or felt the
car taking over to avoid the crash. It is wonderful technology.
It is not cheap, but as you know, some of the manufacturers now
are making it standard equipment. We believe in voluntary
programs. We have a long list of what we have done voluntarily,
in terms of crash avoidance, and that is in Appendix 3 of my
lengthier statement, but I want to say that in this case, we
really need a rule to level the playing field. And that is why
we are working with and supporting NHTSA's effort in this area.
Crash avoidance is very, very critical, and this is one of the
ways to avoid crashes, to have the ESC in place in every
vehicle.
Mr. Stearns. Mr. O'Neill, how do you compare NHTSA's
provision in this bill, in the Senate bill, with those from
last year's NHTSA highway bill? Has the bill improved, in your
opinion?
Mr. O'Neill. They certainly are much less specific, and I
think that is an improvement. I think there is nothing wrong
with Congress giving NHTSA general directions. I think Congress
should really avoid the specifics, and not get into deadlines,
at least when we have an agency that is run by a very competent
Administrators, as we do now.
Mr. Stearns. My last question is directed to you, Ms.
Pikrallidas, is basically, you have mentioned this EPA
labeling. There is some concern that revising EPA labeling will
affect fuel economy calculations on the CAFTA program. Is that
your intent--CAFE.
Ms. Pikrallidas. No, not at all. This is--this amendment
and this language is simply about labeling. All it does is
essentially ask EPA to use existing tests that they already
have that are much more modern, to use adjustment factors to
put onto labels of new cars accurate fuel miles per gallon
ratings. It has nothing to do with CAFE standards. It has
everything to do with just putting on the cars what the actual
miles per gallon is.
Mr. Stearns. All right. My time has expired. The
gentlelady, Ms. Schakowsky.
Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Webber, you talked about, you
associated yourself with the notion of safety sells. And so
with that in mind, why not have some of those items as standard
features, rather than upgrades or optional features? Wouldn't
those be good marketing tools for automobiles?
Mr. Webber. I suppose we could load up every automobile
with everything we can possibly think of. There are always
tradeoffs.
Ms. Schakowsky. I am not talking about sun roofs. I am
talking about things like we did airbags.
Mr. Webber. I understand.
Ms. Schakowsky. We did seatbelts.
Mr. Webber. I understand. A lot of that technology is
expensive. You could price the car out of the range of the
typical consumer, if you are not careful. I think the task of
the industry is going to, as they continue to develop safer
cars, and cars with more safe technology in them, is to get
that price down, so that the typical consumer can avoid that,
and to make sure, too, that that safety technology applies to
an area where there really is a good, sound data and statistics
backing the need for that.
Ms. Schakowsky. Well, I wanted to ask you about----
Mr. Webber. I think we are on the----
Ms. Schakowsky. [continuing] the question of price. Isn't
it true that when technologies become standard features that
those prices really drop? Like what was the price of an airbag
before and after the issue of standard features?
Mr. Webber. Before it became standard equipment?
Ms. Schakowsky. Uh-huh.
Mr. Webber. I am told that originally, we were talking
about $400 or $500 for that airbag. That has come down
substantially, correct. And I suspect on some of these safety
technologies that is what is going to happen over a period of
time.
Ms. Schakowsky. I am looking at price comparisons of
vehicle technologies put out by the advocates for highway and
auto safety, and they are talking about stronger roof systems,
prevent roof crush in rollover crushes, $25 to $50. Don't you
think most consumers, for a number of things, safety belt pre-
tensioners, takes the slack out of seat belts, $35 to $50.
Vehicle safety label, $0.01. I mean, there is a number of
technologies, a number of items that could be added at
relatively low cost.
Mr. Webber. And indeed, they are being added. Many of them
depend on the choice of the consumer. These are assessable. The
consumer can purchase those and add them to the base price of
the automobile. That is the real, on the good news front, and
by the way----
Ms. Schakowsky. As optional features, you are saying.
Mr. Webber. Many of them optional features. More and more
becoming standard features. ESC is a good example of how that
eventually, we come a standard feature, in my opinion, in all
vehicles, if I follow the rulemaking on the part of NHTSA
correctly. So that trend, it is a good trend, and that trend
will continue.
Ms. Schakowsky. Okay. I wanted to--I am glad you believe
that we need to have some rules, and that we need to have some
required features.
Mr. Webber. On electronic stability control, specifically,
yes.
Ms. Schakowsky. Ms. Fennell, I wanted to ask you what are
the costs of a number of the safety features that you are
advocating, and how do they compare to luxury features, for
example, in automobiles?
Ms. Fennell. The type of things we are looking for is an
auto-reverse on power windows, and that would be $8 to $10 a
window. When you look at either a rear camera or rear sensors,
you know, once it would become a standard feature, I am
thinking that comes way, way down below $100. The--it is very
important that people understand that there is no performance
standard whatsoever on what you should be able to see when you
are backing up your vehicle. Nothing exists. So when you are
backing up, you are backing blind, and it is not like people
try to do this on purpose, but it really is the fact that
because we are driving higher, wider, longer, bigger vehicles,
that blind zone that you saw demonstrated on Good Morning
America is what is happening in America. You cannot see little
children when they are in that area.
Ms. Schakowsky. On the auto-reverse, I heard Dr. Runge say
that the recessing is sufficient, and that there is absolutely
no evidence that there is any problem that recessing won't
solve.
Ms. Fennell. That is not correct, and Dr. Runge could just
go to the Office of Defects Investigation and read the reports
where not only children, but let us say someone else in the
vehicle has raised a window not knowing that someone else's
fingers or hands, I mean, there has been amputations. There is
a problem, of course, with children leaning out, and they are
strangled to death. But there is many, many other things that
happen, and it is not just through that person actuating the
power window on their own.
Ms. Schakowsky. Can you make sure that I get that
information, and that we communicate that to Dr. Runge? One
other thing. There is--seems to be a difference of philosophy
here on whether or not we should include, for example, in the
transportation bill, or whether at all, it is necessary to have
statutory requirements. You are saying now that it is required
for trunks, since your horrifying incident, should we be
including those requirements that are now in the transportation
bill, and why do you feel that those arguments that they are
unnecessary are not valid?
Ms. Fennell. I feel we absolutely need to have these
regulations, and I feel that all of the things that are in the
Senate bill are very generous in the timeframes. Dr. Runge
himself said they are almost all very doable. The reason we
need timelines and timeframes is then we know that they will be
done. You know, trunk entrapment was something that was
suggested 30 years ago, and it never happened, until we were
able to get it, you know, to get it together and make it
happen. So I think it is very important that the deadlines are
set. I don't think we need to be proscriptive, but I think we
do need performance standards, and let the industry and NHTSA
figure out what is the best way, as a for instance, to make
sure when we are backing our vehicles, we are not driving
blind.
Ms. Schakowsky. My concern, Mr. O'Neill, with your view
that as long as you have someone who is as--an activist on
these issues as Dr. Runge is, then we don't need to do
anything. But of course, that is not how government works. I
mean, we don't know how long he is going to be there. We don't
know what the view or the level of activity of anyone who would
follow him. So I am actually very surprised that your industry
would want to set policy based on individuals.
Mr. O'Neill. Well, we are not saying that nothing should be
done, or there should be no dictates. What we are saying is
they should be broad, rather than specific. For example, I am
not at all familiar with the issues on power windows. Ms.
Fennell is. But it seems to me that it is not necessary to
conclude that a rule is the final solution. Maybe, the agency
could be told that this is an issue that they should address,
and maybe with voluntary agreements with the manufacturers, we
could get action faster than the process of rulemaking, which
is very slow and very deliberative, by design.
There are alternative ways, in many cases, to address
problems without mandating a rule. It may be that a rule is
appropriate. It may not be. I think what we should be saying to
NHTSA is these are issues that should be addressed, and
addressed in the most efficient and fastest way possible.
Mr. Stearns. The gentlelady's time has expired. The
gentleman from New Hampshire, Mr. Bass.
Mr. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For Mr. Webber and/or
Mr. O'Neill. There are--a couple of you may have mentioned
this, I think you mentioned it in your statements. There are
market forces involved in safety, and I am wondering to what
extent market forces are pushing automobiles to become safer,
and second, insurance companies providing incentives, i.e.,
rebates, discounts, et cetera. To what extent are--is the
industry moving the process forward?
Mr. Webber. Well, as I said in my opening statement, Mr.
Bass, market forces are playing a very big role when it comes
to safety. And again, nine of the top 10 top features most
desired by consumers as they purchase new automobiles today are
to enhance vehicle or occupant safety, and the industry is
responding to it. The industry is acutely aware of it, and the
industry is going to do everything it can to meet that consumer
demand.
Mr. O'Neill. I think there is no question that today,
market forces are very important. You heard from Dr. Runge that
they expect to issue a new side impact rule very soon. That
side impact rule will, in effect, require manufacturers to
provide airbags, side impact airbags that protect the head. I
think by the time that rule becomes effective, virtually every
new car being sold in America will already have those airbags
because of market forces. So market forces are very important
and very effective. They are promoting safety technology very
fast. Unfortunately, when it comes to insurance mechanisms for
incentives, most of your insurance premium for injuries is for
liability. That is for injuries that you cause to people in
other vehicles. So the first party, third party insurance
system does not allow much room for incentives for you to be
purchasing a safe car, because your insurance is primarily
paying for injuries that are occurring in somebody else's car,
if you are at fault in a collision.
Mr. Bass. Do you have any suggestions as to how we might
change that? What are our options? Clearly, a safer car, you
ought to have lower insurance rates, and that would be an
incentive to--for consumers to want them.
Mr. O'Neill. Well, the problem with insurance is that most
of your premium is not for injuries inside your car, but for
injuries you may cause in an at-fault collision----
Mr. Bass. Yes.
Mr. O'Neill. [continuing] in other cars. If we had a true
no-fault insurance system, then there would be much more room
for incentives for persons to buy a safe car.
Mr. Bass. Ms. Fennell, you--I just want to confirm that you
think the top priority for new safety is the automatic window
stop mechanism, that is No. 1, and then second, is the backup
protection?
Ms. Fennell. No, I would say that the backup protection is
No. 1, just because of the true numbers. Again, we know that
many more children are dying because they have been backed
over, and you know, many more injured. In 1998, the data that
Dr. Runge referred to, when they collected the death
certificates, that is actually before this huge change in the
vehicle mix, where you know, we used to all be driving sedans
back in 1998. Now, everyone is driving these larger trucks and
SUVs. So with the over 120 people identified at that time
point, I also used that to bench my data. I know what I find is
the bare, bare minimum, vastly underestimates the true
magnitude of the problem, and probably is 2 to 3 times bigger
than the numbers that I report. I think it is really important
to understand on all of these issues, that we know that there
is a problem. The technology already exists today. It is not
something we have to invent. The legislation is here. We have
very well-crafted legislation, and now, what we are really
looking for is that political will to move this forward, to
move it forward as quickly as we can, because it has taken so
many years to even get to this point, and with that, we will
save the lives of many people----
Mr. Bass. Okay. Real quickly----
Ms. Fennell. [continuing] especially children.
Mr. Bass. Okay. Just going down the panel. There are three
levels of control of safety, voluntary, relying on the
industry, rulemaking through NHTSA, and Congressional action.
Where do you all stand in terms of what is the preferred route
for assuring that automobiles are safe, and you reach--and you
attain that balance between safety, economy, and cost? Rule,
volunteer, Congress prescribes. Just real quick, because I only
have 1 second left.
Mr. Webber. Voluntary action.
Mr. Bass. Okay.
Mr. Webber. It is quicker, and sometimes, a lot more
competent.
Mr. Bass. Mr. O'Neill?
Mr. O'Neill. I think we need a mixture of all of these
approaches, and I will just give one example, at the risk of
prolonging it. The backup issue also involves rear visibility,
and we do have a problem with rear visibility in vehicles. We
need some better standards or performance for rear visibility,
because some SUVs actually put spare wheels blocking part of
the rear window. So it is not just cameras and backup warning
devices. It is being able to see more out of the back of a
vehicle when you are looking rearward, and so a broad mandate
would address this issue, rather than----
Mr. Bass. Ms. Pikrallidas, do you have any comments on it
or not?
Ms. Pikrallidas. Our expertise in AAA----
Mr. Bass. Okay. If you don't, don't worry about it. And Ms.
Fennell, I think you like as much--you want to see
Congressional action, because you support the legislation that
you have outlined, correct?
Ms. Fennell. Well, because I am very fortunate to be
working in a coalition with the insurance industry, auto
suppliers, consumer and health organizations, of course, I
support this. But this bill is needed to assure that the public
will benefit in a timely way from cost effective and feasible
safety improvements. Voluntary solutions are not appropriate in
these areas, such as rollovers. They kill 10,000 people every
year.
Mr. Bass. Okay. I have got to yield back. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
panelists. Ms. Pikrallidas, is that right? Did I get that
right.
Ms. Pikrallidas. Pikrallidas.
Mr. Rogers. Pikrallidas. Did I get that right? Okay.
Thanks. My--is it Greek?
Ms. Pikrallidas. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. My Greek is awful, but thank you very much. I
do love the flaming cheese, though. Wonderful thing. In your
testimony, you describe the Senate's language on fuel economy
labeling as a win-win solution, and as carefully crafted to
meet the concerns of all parties. I found that a little
curious, as I was--the language that was changed was mine, of
which we were not consulted in that particular round of all
parties, apparently. And you added something, at least were
involved in the adding of the word processes, and let me quote
you in the language. ``Update and revise the process used to
determine fuel economy values for labeling purposes.'' Can you
describe what processes means? What do you mean by that?
Ms. Pikrallidas. Essentially, what--we--the Senate language
tries to accomplish is to suggest that the existing tests are
30 years old and they are outdated. They don't measure a lot
of--they don't measure real world driving conditions. What we
are asking is that EPA use tests that they already have, for
example, USO6, that was set up and designed to simulate real
world driving conditions. To add the adjustment factors which
you discussed in the House energy bill. To add those adjustment
factors to more modern tests that do simulate real world
driving conditions, to come up with a more accurate miles per
gallon labeling system. In other words, that comes up with
miles per gallon that, a labeling system that gives you, gives
the consumer essentially what they are going to get on the road
when they drive it.
Mr. Rogers. One of the concerns that I have, and the reason
we came up with the language that we did was that we believed
that there may be an inadvertent impact on CAFE standards, and
I think we all understand that CAFE standards is an issue that
should be looked at. We need to address it, but we should do it
in a very careful and calculated way, given the understanding
of weight and design, and lead time for design factors. Our
next models--I mean, there is a lot that goes into this, and it
is quite frankly, an old and antiquated formula that was fairly
arbitrary. So we need to be smart about that to not have a
negative impact on economic terms from these automakers who are
trying to play by the rules. Right? So we got to this thing. We
said this is--we don't want any vagueness in this language, and
when you add process, even by your own description, you have
left the door open a mile wide. And would you support, would
AAA support making it very, very clear in that language that it
would not, in fact, impact CAFE standards by the change of
this? I mean, we want to make efficient tests. We didn't want
multiple tests. It made no sense to do that. Tests need to be
modernized. We think we can do that with one test. Would you
support that language to clarify very certainly that this does
not impact CAFE standards?
Ms. Pikrallidas. Mr. Rogers--and you made these points very
eloquently during the House debate--we--I would agree with you,
we would agree with you, that CAFE is a whole other issue. It
is an issue that, as you have just said here, needs looking at
in a very serious way. Those standards are very old as well. I
think we would be open to looking at language that would
clarify that we are looking at only the labeling. We would want
to make sure that the language doesn't do anything to prohibit
getting more accurate labeling. But that is our intention. What
we are looking for in this bill is simply making it possible
for a consumer to go buy a car, read the labeling stickers, and
then drive out on the road, and get those miles per gallon
ratings. That is really all we are trying to accomplish in this
bill, accurate labeling, so that consumers know what they are
buying, particularly in an age of high energy prices.
Mr. Rogers. You bet. And I think that is exactly the intent
of the language that we proffered on the House floor, to do
exactly that. That is what we wanted as well, because we do
think it is important that you have an understanding of the
mileage that you are buying, because we want mileage to be part
of market forces, right? That is what we are all shooting for,
because we think that is good for the auto companies. We think
they are going to make voluntary changes in their design
features, that keeps people safe, and allows them to get more
gallons, better gas mileage.
Ms. Pikrallidas. And if I could just--and the only concern
we have with the House language was that it was adding
adjustment factors to old tests. We just think there are newer
tests that simulate real world driving that EPA already has.
Not new tests, there are existing tests. They should be used.
That is what the adjustment factor should be applied to, and
that was a part of that.
Mr. Rogers. But you didn't say that in your language. You
made it--it is fairly vague. Process, processes. What does that
mean? It could mean a whole bunch of things. And if I am
somebody over, who has got the sharp pencil, and get to figure
that out, it might look completely different from your
intention. We need to be very, very careful on this. You know,
our automobile economy in the United States is at a very
interesting place in its history. And the unintended
consequences of being vague in language like this could be
catastrophic. And I think that you ought to go back to the
drawing board and be supportive of very clear language on this,
so that we get exactly what we both want, very clear labeling,
realistic labeling, that does not impact CAFE. That is another
debate for another day, that needs to be very, very carefully
looked at. So I will take your response today that AAA does, in
fact, support language that is very clear that this does not,
in any way, impact CAFE standards.
Ms. Pikrallidas. That is our intent. I mean, I don't have
legislative language in front of me, so I am at a disadvantage
there, but our intent is to deal with labeling. That is the
intent of what we are trying to get through the Senate bill, or
through the Senate language.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Thanks for your--I know that was a
fun exchange. I know you really enjoyed that. I do appreciate
all of you, and unfortunately, we are going to need to go vote.
But this is very, very important, and I am just glad to hear
Mr. Bass ask the question, and I wish Mr. Markey were still
here. You know, the automobile companies, and I would encourage
all of you, and even those listening, to come and see what kind
of design work that they are doing on their own for vehicle
safety, for better gas mileage, for a car that has technology
that actually matches what the consumer wants.
There is this great myth out there that overnight at the
stroke of a pen, things can change, and you are going to get a
car that gets 65 miles to the gallon that is as big as an
Excursion, that you are going to want to drive. I wish that
were so, because if it were so, believe me, you would have a
car out there right now that looked exactly that. And I give my
hats off to all the automakers, both foreign and domestic, who
are aggressively pursuing technology that matches what people
want. There is a reason that people are buying SUVs. They are
safer, and they are bigger, and you can take your whole family.
Mom can pack up groceries and a bike and drive her kids to six
different places in the same day, and have a vehicle that meets
those needs of that particular family. And by this rush by some
to say that we are doing--the automobile industry is a horrible
thing, doing horrible things to people, I think is--well, it is
wrong at best, and it may be worse. They are not doing those
kind of things, and I would encourage all of the folks, other
members, everybody, to come out and see what these automobile
companies are doing for vehicle safety and for our environment.
It is pretty exciting stuff, and to meet these actual designers
and people who are in the back room trying to make this work,
and to hear their excitement and their enthusiasm is pretty
neat.
They are not the victims. I understand that, Mr. Chairman.
This is awful important.
Mr. Stearns. We have about 3 minutes left to vote.
Mr. Rogers. And I would--at that, sir, yield back my time.
Mr. Stearns. Very good. Very good. I thank the gentleman. I
thank him and his patience for staying and making his points,
and with that, the subcommittee will adjourn. I will thank the
witnesses for their forbearance, too.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
Response for the Record by the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
Question 1: What are the problems you foresee with Congress
mandating that NHTSA promulgate a final rule by a certain date?
Response: Our concern over legislatively-mandated rules is not over
improving safety--indeed, industry is competing vigorously and moving
rapidly to provide ever-increasing levels of safety in its vehicles--
but over process. Safety rulemakings are often complex, involving
myriad technical details, analyses of data, complex occupant safety and
other tradeoffs, and consideration of necessary leadtime. Mandates for
rules to be issued by specified dates can short-circuit the necessary
analyses and potentially lead to unintended adverse safety
consequences, as we have seen in prior situations and as the NHTSA
Administrator has testified.
The NHTSA mandated rulemakings in the Senate passed highway bill
prejudge the rulemaking process. By requiring that rules must be
published, regardless of the public rulemaking record on that subject,
the Senate bill's approach prejudges the outcome of the rulemaking
process and deprives NHTSA of it's authority to make safety related
assessments and determinations of rulemaking priorities. Thus, we
cannot support any mandate requiring that final rules must be issued
regardless of information provided to the agency through its public
notice and comment process. There is no need for the Congress to order
NHTSA to both short-circuit its own governing legislation and
Presidential Executive Orders regarding the criteria for establishing
rules as well as the requirements in the Administrative Procedures Act
regarding responding to public comments. We believe that the Congress,
through oversight and other hearings, can influence NHTSA regulatory
actions without mandating the promulgation of specific rules.
The complexity of safety rulemakings requires that careful
attention be accorded to the inherent tradeoffs associated with
regulations. In the past, we have seen tradeoffs among adult high-speed
protection in frontal crashes and associated harm to children and
others in low-speed crashes. The March 6, 2004 IIHS Status Report,
notes that the 1997 rule issued by NHTSA that allowed manufacturers to
produce ``depowered'' air bags was the right decision then and still is
now. In designing occupant restraint systems, manufacturers must
carefully balance high-speed and lower-speed protection, protection for
belted vs. unbelted occupants, and protection for large adults and
smaller adults and children. As NHTSA itself has testified, there are
complex interactions between roof strength and rollover propensity and
glass-plastic glazing to reduce ejections for unbelted occupants vs.
the possibility of increased head and neck injury to belted occupants.
All involve safety tradeoffs. Also, tradeoffs exist between safety and
fuel economy. The agency must be able to correctly balance these
complexities and arbitrary deadlines by which rules must be issued are
inconsistent with this need.
Question 2: Can you comment on Dr. Runge's testimony as to
harmonization of safety standards internationally, as well as the need
to engage in research and development in fuel integrity of hydrogen
powered vehicles?
Response: The Department seeks to clarify its authority to
participate and cooperate in international activities to enhance motor
vehicle and traffic safety worldwide. This would allow NHTSA's
participation in international activities aimed at identifying the best
practices for reducing traffic fatalities and injuries, particularly in
developing countries. Recognizing that motor vehicle safety is a shared
responsibility of governments, manufacturers, and consumers, the
Alliance agrees with NHTSA that combining motor vehicle safety
initiatives being pursued in the United States with those of other
countries can help to promote the cost-effective deployment of safety
technologies worldwide, including in developing countries.
International cooperation and collaboration in the development of
global safety standards permits participating governments to leverage
research investments from other countries and economic communities
thereby increasing the scientific data and innovation pool on which
regulations can be based.
The Department seeks funding to engage in fuel system integrity
research involving hydrogen powered vehicles. This initiative would
support the President's Hydrogen Fuel Initiative and the FreedomCar
Program. Ultimately, this research would facilitate science-based
evaluation for the need and scope of any fuel system integrity
regulations for hydrogen powered vehicles. Such regulations already
exist for vehicles fueled or powered by gasoline, compressed natural
gas, and electricity. The Alliance is supportive of science-based
rulemakings as well as the President's Hydrogen Fuel Initiative and the
FreedomCar Program and thus, supports the funding requested by NHTSA.
______
Response for the Record by Jeffrey W. Runge, Administrator, NHTSA, to
Questions Submitted by Hon. Tim Murphy
Dr. Runge, I would like to ask you a few questions about
the Early Warning Reporting requirements. It is my
understanding that manufacturers of more than 500 vehicles per
year must submit detailed data on a quarterly basis, while
manufacturers of less than 500 vehicles have less burdensome
reporting requirements. The TREAD Act states that regulations
such as the Early Warning Reporting requirements shall not
impose requirements unduly burdensome taking into account the
manufacturer's cost of compliance and NHTSA's ability to use
the information in a meaningful manner.
Question 1: While I recognize that NHTSA has a simpler
report for small manufacturers, when a manufacturer produces
500 or more vehicles per year but still does so in limited
quantities of an individual vehicle model, i.e. custom or semi-
custom built, will you be able to realistically use that
detailed data in a meaningful way?
Response: Yes. The agency's current methods for analyzing
Early Warning Reporting (EWR) data take into account the volume
of production. Thus, even though the production of some models
might be small, NHTSA adjusts the data to reflect production.
In the past, the agency's investigations have influenced safety
recalls where the vehicle population was substantially lower
than 500. During the EWR rulemaking, NHTSA presented an
analysis of recalls conducted by manufacturers with an annual
production between 500 and 1500 vehicles to gauge the nature of
the impact that small manufacturers have on motor vehicle
safety. This analysis found that small manufacturers have
significant safety-related defects that can have a significant
impact on motor vehicle safety.
Question 2: How many vehicles need to be produced in a
given year for there to be some real statistical significance
to the individual model data they provide you under the EWR
requirements?
Response: Statistical significance is not a necessary
component for detecting a potential safety defect. The Agency's
investigative staff relies on historical trend data to develop
comparison information as an indicator of potential defects.
The current method used to analyze EWR aggregate data produce a
ranking of make, model, and model year vehicles for each
component category. This ranking is used by agency
investigators, along with other agency data, to determine which
issues warrant investigations. However, NHTSA statisticians are
continuing to evaluate statistical methods that may be
appropriate to effectively analyze the EWR data.
The EWR data is being evaluated to assess its ability to
identify trends that are potentially related to a safety
defect. The assessment will evaluate a number of different
issues including whether safety-related defect trends can be
identified in individual models produced in limited quantities.
Question 3: What analysis did you do during the EWR
rulemaking process to determine that 500 vehicles per year is
the best dividing line between a small volume manufacturer and
a large one? Why have you defined a small volume manufacturer
as one producing 5,000 or more vehicles in other rulemakings,
specifically the advanced airbag regulations and the recent
tire pressure monitoring system regulations?
Response: As noted in response to Question 1, above, the
agency analyzed both recalls and investigations and determined
that manufacturers who produce between 500 and 1500 vehicles
produce products that contain serious safety defects. Thus, to
exclude this category of manufacturers would potentially allow
serious safety hazards to go unremedied.
Every rulemaking is unique. Therefore, the underlying
considerations that determine the number of manufacturers that
will be subjected to one rule are not necessarily the same as
those that determine who will be subjected to a different rule.
For instance, the requirements for advanced air bags are more
complex and difficult to adopt than the requirements to report
EWR aggregate counts. Moreover, the exclusions in the advance
air bag rulemaking simply deferred compliance by low volume
subsidiaries until the end of the phase-in period. It did not
exclude them from adopting the requirements as would be the
case if the reporting threshold for EWR where raised to 5,000
vehicles.
Question 4: What analyses, if any, have been published
based on the EWR data you have been collecting? Has NHTSA
identified any previously undetected defects on its own as a
result of this data?
Response: To date, the agency has not published any
analyses based on EWR data. We are unable to publish an
analysis of the data reported by manufacturers pursuant to the
EWR regulation because the data is confidential by regulation.
The agency has publicly stated that the EWR information
alone is not sufficient by itself to determine whether the
product contains a safety-related defect. The usefulness of the
EWR data is to identify trends that are potentially related to
a safety-related defect. If the agency's assessment of the EWR
data taken with all other available data obtained by the agency
indicates a possible trend, the agency will open an
investigation. Since manufacturers started reporting EWR
information in late 2003, EWR has assisted in identifying some
potential safety-related trends. Some of these investigations
remain open. One was closed. Some investigations influenced
safety-related recalls and one service campaign. Also in 2004,
the agency influenced some domestic recalls based on
information from submission of foreign recalls or foreign
campaigns.
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