<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:20388.wais]
GANG DETERRENCE AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION ACT OF 2005
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
H.R. 1279
__________
APRIL 5, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-50
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
CHRIS CANNON, Utah MAXINE WATERS, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
RIC KELLER, Florida ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DARRELL ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE PENCE, Indiana CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
STEVE KING, Iowa
TOM FEENEY, Florida
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Philip G. Kiko, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida MAXINE WATERS, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Jay Apperson, Chief Counsel
Michael Volkov, Deputy Chief Counsel
Elizabeth Sokul, Counsel
Katy Crooks, Counsel
Jason Cervenak, Full Committee Counsel
Bobby Vassar, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
APRIL 5, 2005
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia.......................................... 1
The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security........................ 3
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress
from the State of Michigan..................................... 5
WITNESSES
Mr. Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney, Northern
District of Illinois, U.S. Department of Justice
Oral Testimony................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Paul A. Logli, State's Attorney, Winnebago County, Illinois,
and President Elect, National District Attorneys Association
Oral Testimony................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Ms. Michelle Guess, Edgewood, MD
Oral Testimony................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Mr. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Emeritus Professor of Law,
University of Richmond School of Law, Richmond, VA
Oral Testimony................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, and
Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary..................... 42
Responses to Questions for the Record submitted by the Honorable
Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of
Illinois, U.S. Department of Justice........................... 44
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas............. 46
Letter from James D. Fox, Chief of the Newport News Police
Department to the Honorable J. Randy Forbes (March 29, 2005)... 48
Letter from Kenneth C. Bauman, member of the Board of Directors
for the National Association of Assistant United States
Attorneys to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April
29, 2005)...................................................... 50
Letter from Michael A. Fry, General Counsel, Major Cities Chiefs
Association to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (april
15, 2005)...................................................... 52
Letter from Roy L. Burns, President, Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
(April 20, 2005)............................................... 54
Letter from Wesley D. McBride, President, California Gang
Investigators Association to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 25, 2005)............................ 55
Letter from Eddie J. Jordan, Jr., District Attorney of New
Orleans to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 18,
2005).......................................................... 56
Letter from Donald Baldwin, Washington Director, Federal Criminal
Investigators Association to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 22, 2005)............................ 57
Letter from Chuck Canterbury, National President, Fraternal Order
of Police to the Honorable J. Randy Forbes (April 4, 2005)..... 58
Letter from Dennis Slocumb, International Executive Vice
President, International Union of Police Associations to the
Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Arpil 26, 2005)......... 59
Letter from James J. Fotis, Executive Director, The Law
Enforcement Alliance of America to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 19, 2005)............................ 60
Letter from Sheriff Michael J. Bouchard, Vice President,
Legislative Affairs, and Sheriff James A. Karnes, President,
Major County Sheriffs' Association to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 20, 2005)............................ 61
Letter from Richard Delonis, President, National Association of
Assistant United States Attorneys to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (May 2, 2005)............................... 62
Letter from William J. Johnson, Executive Director, National
Association of Police Organizations to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 15, 2005)............................ 63
Letter from Felipe A. Ortiz, National President, National Latino
Peace Officers Association to the Honorale F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 18, 2005)............................ 64
Letter from Thomas N. Faust, Executive Director, National
Sheriffs' Association to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner,
Jr. (April 19, 2005)........................................... 66
Letter from Casey L. Perry, Chairman, National Troopers Coalition
to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 19, 2005).. 67
Letter from Tyrone Parker, Laura W. Murphy, et al. to the
Honorable Howard Coble and the Honorable Robert C. Scott (April
11, 2005)...................................................... 68
Letter from National Hispanic Organizations to the Honorable F.
James Sensenbrenner, Jr. and the Honorable John Conyers (April
20, 2005 and May 10, 2005)..................................... 71
Letter from the Association of Oil Pipe Lines, Business Civil
Liberties, Inc., et al., to the Honorable Howard Coble and the
Honorable Robert C. Scott (April 12, 2005)..................... 75
Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Tonya McClary, et al., to the
Honorable Howard Coble and the Honorable Robert C. Scott (April
4, 2005)....................................................... 79
Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, and Jesselyn McCurdy,
Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union to the
Honorable Howard Coble and the Honorable Robert C. Scott (April
15, 2005)...................................................... 82
Letter from Julie Stewart, President, and Mary Price, General
Counsel, Families Against Mandatory Minimums to the Honorable
Howard Coble and the Honorable Robert C. Scott (April 8, 2005). 87
Letter from the Thomas W. Hiller, II, Federal Public Defender,
and Chair, Legislative Expert Panel, Federal Public and
Community Defenders to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner,
Jr. and the Honorable John Conyers (April 21, 2005)............ 89
Letter from Members of Congress to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. and the Honorable John Conyers, Jr. (April
19, 2005)...................................................... 92
Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference
of the United States to the Honorable Howard Coble (April 1,
2005).......................................................... 95
Letter from Janet Murguia, President and CEO, National Council of
La Raza to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. and the
Honorable John Conyers (April 13, 2005 and May 9, 2005)........ 99
Letter from Virginia Coalition for Juvenile Justice to the
Honorable J. Randy Forbes (April 4, 2005)...................... 103
Letter from Coalition of National and Regional Organizations to
the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. and the Honorable
John Conyers (April 8, 2005)................................... 106
Letter from Morna A. Murray, Co-chair, National Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Coalition to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. and the Honorable John Conyers (April 8,
2005).......................................................... 109
``Caught in the Crossfire: Arresting Gang Violence By Investing
in Kids,'' a report submitted by Fight Crime: Invest in Kids... 110
Jason Ziedenberg, ``What works to deter gangs?'' The Detroit Free
Press, April 12, 2005.......................................... 141
``DOJ Youth Violence and Youth Gang Prevention Best Practices
Protocols By Age''............................................. 143
QuickTime presentation, ``Adolescent Brain Development''......... 147
``Estimates of Prison Impact of H.R. 1279, '' submitted by the
United States Sentencing Commission............................ 153
``Childhood On Trial: The Failure of Trying & Sentencing Youth in
Adult Criminal Court,'' a report submitted by Coalition for
Juvenile Justice............................................... 156
Letter from David G. Wilson, Executive Director, Association of
Former Federal Narcotics Agents to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (July 23, 2005)............................. 255
Nancy Bartley, ``Lawmakers rethinking hard line on sentencing of
young offenders,'' The Seattle Times, April 14, 2005........... 256
H.R. 1279, GANG DETERRENCE AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION ACT OF 2005
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
presiding.
Mr. Forbes. I would like to call this meeting of the
Subcommittee to order, and let me first of all say good
afternoon to everyone who's here. I want to welcome you to this
important hearing to examine the issue of the problem of gang
violence in America.
The bill we are considering today sends a clear message to
gangs, which is basically this: It stops now. Gone are the days
of the Sharks and the Jets from the ``West Side Story.'' No
longer are fists and jeers the weapon of choice. Now, drive-by
shootings with semi-automatics, brutal group beatings, and
machete attacks are the standard.
No longer are gangs loosely-knit groups of wayward teens.
Today's criminal gangs are highly organized, highly structured
bodies whose ages range anywhere from elementary school to
middle-age. They are trained in military techniques and their
primary purpose is to commit illegal violent criminal
activities in furtherance of their gang organization. They are
in our schools, on our streets, and in our communities.
The problem of gangs is not a new one, but today it's a
different one and a bigger one and one that is growing more
rapidly and more uncontrollably than ever before. According to
the U.S. Department of Justice, there are currently over 25,000
gangs that are active in more than 3,000 jurisdictions across
the United States. Today, the FBI and the U.S. Justice
Department estimate that there are somewhere between 750,000
and 850,000 gang members in our nation.
Let me put this in perspective for you. Today, in our Army
and Navy combined, there are 859,000 active duty members. This
is virtually a one-on-one ratio to gang members in the United
States. You can even add the Air Force and the Marine Corps to
that figure and we would not reach a two-to-one ratio of
military personnel to criminal gang members. In fact, if the
criminal gang members in the United States were a military
force located in another country, they would comprise the
sixth-largest military in the world in terms of soldiers.
Gangs have declared war on our nation. They are ravaging
our communities like cancer, urban, rural, rich, and poor, and
they are metastisizing from one community to the next as they
grow.
There is no overriding societal value to being a member of
a criminal gang, and if you are part of a criminal gang, this
bill says two things. First, this bill puts the full force of
our nation's Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers
and prosecutors behind apprehending criminal gang members. If
you ask our nation's law enforcement officers what they need to
combat gangs, they will tell you this: our Federal law
enforcement officers have the resources, but not the
intelligence system to combat the gang problem, and our local
law enforcement officers have the intelligence network, but not
the resources to combat the problem. This bill will marry the
two and authorize the funding to make this partnership
successful.
Second, this bill says that if you are a member of a
criminal gang and you commit a violent gang crime, you are
going to jail for a minimum of 10 years, period. While some may
criticize mandatory minimum penalties as unduly harsh, such
penalties are invaluable tools to use against gangs to secure
cooperation from gang members and infiltrate tightly-knit
organized crime syndicates operating as sophisticated street
gangs.
Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Booker and Fanfan, rendering the guidelines as only
advisory, mandatory minimums are the only effective means to
ensure that fair and consistent sentences are imposed, and we
will see more of them unless something is done to reimpose a
mandatory guideline system.
This bill will create new criminal gang prosecution
offenses, enhance existing violent crime penalties to deter and
punish criminal gangs, and enact violent crime reforms needed
to effectively prosecute gang members. This is a tough bill.
Make no mistake about it, we recognize there are those who want
it softer. But criminal gangs in America are not soft, and the
crimes they commit are real, and they are hard. Only a tough
bill will stop these gangs and protect innocent victims from
the hard pain of these vicious crimes.
We are saying that the following is not acceptable in
America: gangs that fuel their activity with narcotics
trafficking, carjacking, and illegal gun trafficking; gangs
that engage in human trafficking, rape, and prostitution; gangs
that use firearms and other deadly weapons in the commission of
crimes; and gangs that brutally rape, kill, and maim.
This bill, when enacted, will bring a new force to bear on
gang activity in our country. It will provide increased Federal
effort to assist local law enforcement in targeting and
federally prosecuting violent criminals who are associated with
criminal gangs. The bill will encourage partnerships across all
levels of government and ensure the success of these
partnerships through the expansion of resources and
intelligence.
I want to take a moment to recognize Congressman Frank
Wolf, who has been a leader in Congress in the war against
gangs and gang violence. We owe him a great debt of gratitude
for his commitment to raising awareness of this problem and
laying out solutions.
I also want to thank Chairman Coble for agreeing to hold
this hearing and offer my sincerest condolences to him and his
family on the passing of his mother.
Finally, I want to recognize those on the front lines of
the gang wars, our law enforcement officers who are out there
day in and day out. They are the foot soldiers of this battle,
and to them we are very grateful.
I am anxious to hear from our distinguished panel of
witnesses and now yield to the Ranking minority Member of this
Subcommittee, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Bobby Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased to join you
in convening the hearing on H.R. 1279, the ``Gang Deterrence
and Community Protection Act of 2005.'' I also join you in
expressing our heartfelt sympathy for our Chairman and friend,
Chairman Howard Coble, and his family in their hour of
bereavement.
Now, I just want to start off by saying, Mr. Chairman, that
we are going to work together against base closings, funding
aircraft carriers, NASA research, and other programs, but we
must part company on this bill due to my concern that we not
waste money and increase crime.
This bill is chock-full of new mandatory minimum sentences,
ranging from a mandatory minimum of 10 years to mandatory life
or death and other provisions, which have been solidly proven
to be counterproductive in the fight against crime. They are
not criticized because they are harsh. They are criticized
because they are counterproductive. We have known that
mandatory minimum sentences disrupt order and proportionality
in sentencing. They discriminate against minorities and waste
taxpayers' money, compared to sentencing schemes where the
court can look at the seriousness of the crime and the
offender's role in the crime and background.
The Judicial Conference of the United States, which sees
the impact of mandatory minimum sentences on individual cases,
as well as the criminal justice system as a whole, has told us
time and time again that mandatory minimum sentences create
more harm than good from any kind of rational evaluation. In
its recent letter to Members of the Subcommittee on Crime
regarding this bill, the Conference noted that mandatory
minimum sentences create, quote, ``the opposite of their
intended effect.'' Continuing to quote, ``Far from fostering
certainty in punishment, mandatory minimums result in
unwarranted sentencing disparities. They treat dissimilar
offenders in a similar manner although those offenders can be
quite different with respect to the seriousness of their
conduct or their danger to society.'' And they finally say that
``they require the sentencing court to impose the same sentence
on offenders when sound policy and common sense call for
reasonable differences in punishment.''
Both the Federal Judicial Center in its report entitled,
``The General Effects of Mandatory Minimum Prison Terms: A
Longitudinal Study of Federal Sentences Imposed,'' and the
United States Sentencing Commission in its study entitled,
``Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice
System,'' found that minorities were substantially more likely
than whites under comparable circumstances to receive mandatory
minimum sentences. A Rand Corporation study entitled,
``Mandatory Drug Sentences: Throwing Away the Key or the
Taxpayers' Money?'' showed that mandatory minimum sentences are
far less effective than either discretionary sentences or drug
treatment in reducing drug-related crime and, thus, far
costlier than either.
Just how costly this bill will be is yet to be seen, but,
in response to an inquiry by my office, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission estimated that the prison impact of H.R. 1279 would
require an additional 23,600 prison beds over the next 10
years. At $75,000 a cell, that amounts to prison construction
costs of almost $2 billion, in addition to annual upkeep of
about $750 million based on $30,000 per inmate per year. That
is over and above what we are already scheduled to spend on
prison construction and prison inkeep in a country where the
prison population per person is higher than anywhere else in
the world. For proven juvenile crime prevention and
intervention programs, we are spending about half, about $400
million, of the annual inmate upkeep this bill will cost.
The worst problem with this bill is it provides for far
more juveniles being tried as adults. For years now, every
study of juveniles tried as adults has shown that juveniles
commit more crimes, more violent crimes in particular, when
they are released, if they are treated as adults. This is easy
to understand when you consider that juveniles who go to prison
will have as their role models hard-core murderers, rapists,
and robbers, whereas in the juvenile detention system they will
receive education and training, counseling, drug treatment, and
other assistance.
On March 14 of this year, coincidentally the same day that
H.R. 1279 was introduced, the Coalition for Juvenile Justice
released its study, ``Childhood on Trial: The Failure of Trying
and Sentencing Youth in Adult Criminal Court,'' showing that
even more definitively that trying--showed even more
definitively that trying juveniles as adults increased rather
than decreased the prospects that they would reoffend when
released and that with more serious offenses, as compared with
the youth tried in juvenile court. The study revealed that over
250,000 youth are charged as adults every year. Just as with
the application of mandatory minimums, the application of adult
court to juveniles falls heaviest amongst minorities, about 82
percent of youths tried as adults are youth of color.
For years, we have known that a continuum of services
geared toward the needs of at-risk youths prevents crime from
occurring in the first place. Many such proven crime prevention
programs have saved more money than they cost. Head Start and
other quality early childhood education programs, Boys and
Girls Clubs, and after-school recreational programs, Job Corps
and other intensive job training programs, all prevent crime
and save more money than they cost.
At a meeting I had with students at Monument High School in
South Boston, Massachusetts, last month, I told them about this
upcoming hearing and asked them what was needed to prevent gang
crime. They said kids join gangs for reputation, protection, to
feel wanted, to have friends, and to get money, and what is
needed to prevent them from joining gangs was ample recreation
for boys as well as girls, jobs and internships for training
and money, and assistance to allow their families to live in a
decent home.
Interestingly, I asked the same question to a group of law
enforcement officials I met in my district yesterday, and they
had very similar advice. Neither group said anything about the
need for more mandatory minimums or trying more juveniles as
adults.
So we know what works to prevent crime. Unfortunately, we
also know how to play politics. H.R. 1279 has been nicknamed
``Gangbusters.'' It reflects the politics of crimes where you
come up with a good slogan and try to codify it. It doesn't
matter whether it does anything to reduce crime or is
counterproductive, but, if it sounds good, it must work.
We have had the greatest success by putting aside the
politics of crime in favor of sound policy in the area of
juvenile justice, until this bill. Three years ago, we passed a
bipartisan juvenile crime prevention and bipartisan juvenile
early intervention bill. These bills were based on the advice
of judges, administrators, researchers, advocates, and law
enforcement officials, representing the entire political
spectrum. They all said the same thing, that the best way to
reduce and prevent juvenile crime and ultimately adult crime is
through prevention and early intervention programs geared at
at-risk youth. None of them said that we need more mandatory
minimum sentences nor that we need to treat more juveniles as
adults.
Both bills passed virtually unanimously in both the House
and the Senate, and yet the funding in these bills has been cut
in half since they passed, including the gang resistance
funding, and now we wonder why we have increases in gang
violence after we've cut all the funds to prevent it. We must
get back to the bipartisan, evidence-based, universally agreed-
upon approach to preventing juvenile crime and gang violence
and abandon the sound bite-based, politically-charged
approaches which cost billions of dollars and actually
increased crime and violence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Congressman Scott.
Now, I would like to recognize Mr. Conyers of Michigan for
an opening statement.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this
opportunity and note that this is your bill that we're hearing
here today, right?
Mr. Forbes. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir.
Well, obviously, there are two schools of thought in
criminal justice. One is that mandatory minimums have not been
discredited and the other is that mandatory minimums
sentencing, where they have been studied extensively, have been
proven to be ineffective in preventing crime, proven to distort
the sentencing process and proven to be a considerable waste of
taxpayers' money.
And so I'm asking at least three of the witnesses who may
feel inclined to respond to this part of my observation,
something's gone wrong in America. What we do is incarcerate
more people for longer periods of time than anybody else in the
world, 14 times that of Japan, eight times the rate of France,
six times the rate of Canada. $40 billion to go into imprisoned
offenders who could be at Yale University, where I'm going to
be Friday, at less cost and I'm sure a greater benefit to them.
So in a way, the die has been cast. Those who still believe
in locking them up and throwing away the key in the face of any
evidence to the contrary are going to advocate the ideas that
are found in the measure that is being examined before us
today. The costs keep going through the roof, and I'm struck by
the fact that now, in our State and Federal prisons, a tenth of
all of those incarcerated are serving life terms. In New York
and California, it's really almost 20 percent of those
incarcerated are serving life terms.
It seems to me that we're neglecting what the gentleman
from Virginia, Mr. Scott, has pleaded in his opening statement.
What about prevention? Is prevention so minimized that it
doesn't require us to give it any consideration here and that
we come up with a bill that is hugely distorted one way?
We lost, and tomorrow he will be memorialized, the late
Johnny Cochran, perhaps the most widely known trial lawyer in
this country at this moment. The interesting thing about Johnny
Cochran is that he was once a prosecuting attorney. In L.A. he
had the job of prosecution. He later became a defense attorney.
I had the privilege of having him before this Committee many
times.
So we'll be comparing your comments--and I urge that you
stretch for reasonableness and thoroughness. Is there something
about advocating mandatory minimums that would lead you not to
want to do that? I hope that you will.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and return the time.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Conyers.
Before I swear in the witnesses, I'd like to also introduce
a Member of the full Committee but not a Member of the
Subcommittee, Mr. Adam Schiff, who has done a lot of work in
the gang area both before he got to Congress and also here, and
we are glad to have him with us this afternoon.
Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire, Mr. Schiff is a
former U.S. Attorney, and I would ask for your consideration of
unanimous consent that he be permitted to make a few brief
remarks.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Conyers, I'd love to do that, except as you
know, I'm a substitute Chairman. I'm not the full Chairman. And
the rules that I was given under which Mr. Schiff was allowed
to sit here was that he could be a part of the Subcommittee,
but that the rules of the Committee were that if you're not a
Member of the Subcommittee, you cannot address questions. They
have to come through the Members. And I'd love to do it, but
they're not the marching orders that I've been given, so Adam,
I'm sure you'll be able to say whatever you want at the full
Committee meeting when we go at that particular point in time.
So it's the practice of the Subcommittee to swear in all
witnesses appearing before it, and I'd, at this time, ask the
witnesses if you would please stand and raise your right hand.
Do each of you solemnly swear that the testimony you are
about to give this Subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Fitzgerald. I do.
Mr. Logli. I do.
Ms. Guess. I do.
Mr. Shepherd. I do.
Mr. Forbes. Let the record show that each of the witnesses
answered in the affirmative, and please be seated.
We have with us today four distinguished witnesses. Our
first witness is Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney
for the Northern District of Illinois. As U.S. Attorney, Mr.
Fitzgerald serves as the District's top Federal law enforcement
official. He manages a staff of approximately 300 people,
including 149 Assistant U.S. Attorneys who handle civil
litigation, criminal investigations, prosecutions involving
public corruption, white collar fraud, narcotics trafficking,
violent crime, money laundering, and other matters. Prior to
this position, Mr. Fitzgerald served as an Assistant U.S.
Attorney in the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York, where he participated in the
prosecution of United States v. Osama bin Laden and others. He
is also a recipient of the Attorney General's Award for
Distinguished Service in 2002. Mr. Fitzgerald is a graduate of
Amherst College and Harvard Law School.
Our second witness is Paul A. Logli, President Elect of the
National District Attorneys Association. Mr. Logli is currently
serving as an elected State Attorney in Winnebago County,
Illinois, where he also serves as Vice President of the
Winnebago County Bar Association. Previously, he served as an
Associate Judge for the 17th Judicial Circuit in Illinois.
Additionally, he is a faculty member of the National College of
District Attorneys and Northwestern University's Center for
Public Safety. Mr. Logli previously served as a member of the
Governor's Commission on Gangs in Illinois. He is a graduate of
Loras College and the University of Illinois College of Law.
Our third witness is Michelle Guess. Ms. Guess is the
mother of nine children and lives in Maryland. Three years ago,
she moved with her late husband to Maryland from Philadelphia
in order to escape the crime and gang-infested neighborhood of
Philadelphia in which they lived. Ms. Guess and her family
suffered firsthand a horrible tragedy when her husband was
murdered by a gang member in Maryland. Ms. Guess works now as a
single mom supporting her nine children in the home restoration
business. She is also an advocate for law enforcement and
community efforts to eliminate gangs and the threats they pose
to our children and communities.
Our final witness is Mr. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Professor
Emeritus of Law at the University of Richmond. For his
introduction, I turn to the distinguished gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Scott, to make a few remarks. Bobby?
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you giving
me the opportunity to introduce Professor Shepherd. I've known
him a long time and we've worked on a number of issues going
back to my days in the Virginia General Assembly.
Professor Shepherd received his B.A. and L.L.B. at
Washington and Lee University. He served in the JAG Corps from
1962 to 1964 and was in private practice of law in Richmond
from 1964 to 1971. He was an Assistant Attorney General from
1971 to 1975, an Associate Professor of Law and Director of the
Juvenile Court Clinic at the University of Richmond from 1975
to 1978, and a full professor from 1978 to 2001, directing the
Youth Advocacy Clinic from 1978 to 1990. He is presently
Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Richmond.
He has served in leadership positions in juvenile justice
issues with the Virginia Bar Association, the American Bar
Association, the National Center for Juvenile Justice, the
Virginia Commission on Youth, and the Federal Advisory
Committee on Juvenile Justice. Let me just--he's received all
kinds of awards. We'd be here all day if I were to list them
all, but let me just say that he is the number one recognized
leader in juvenile justice policy in the Commonwealth of
Virginia, and we are welcomed and honored to have him here
today.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Scott, and I thank all the
witnesses for being here.
I also want to recognize two Members that have joined us,
Representative Lungren from California and Representative
Feeney from Florida and we are glad to have them with us.
And now, I'd like to recognize Mr. Fitzgerald for 5
minutes. And, as you know, based on the little indicators in
front of you, you'll get a warning light when you've got about
a minute left, and then the red light goes on. If you could try
to wrap it up after that time, as close as you can, we'd
appreciate it.
Mr. Fitzgerald, thank you for being here.
TESTIMONY OF PATRICK J. FITZGERALD, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Congressman Forbes, Ranking
Member Scott, the Members of the Subcommittee and the
Committee.
To give you a sense of the scope of the gang problem in
Chicago, it's estimated that there are approximately 70,000 to
100,000 gang members in Chicago. That compares with a police
force of roughly 13,000 police officers. So a multiple size of
the Chicago Police Department would give you an approximation
of the size of the gang problem in Chicago.
Two examples bring it home to me. In 1995, a list was
seized by the FBI from a Gangster Disciples. The list was a
list of the number of workers who sold drugs in Chicago. The
Gangster Disciples were highly organized. They had a board of
directors for inside prison, a board of directors for outside
prison. Under the directors, they had governors. Under the
governors, they had regents, and the lowest level was soldiers.
This list of people selling drugs was 39 pages long and had
7,700 members on it. So this Gangster Disciples drug
organization was larger than half the size of the Chicago
Police Department.
The other thing to bear in mind about gangs, another
example is the Black Disciples, who we recently arrested in
2004. They took over a housing project, and I mean that very
literally. They put up a fence, an iron fence around the
project. They put barriers to block people from entering. They
frisked everyone who came into the building to make sure that
they weren't wearing bulletproof vests and therefore might be
police. They put snipers on the roof. The snipers on the roof
had night vision goggles and had police scanners. And
basically, they took over a building.
At one point, we obtained probable cause to obtain search
warrants for 47 of 134 apartments in that public building. That
meant that more than one-third of that building could be
searched because there was reason to believe that there were
drugs or drug proceeds there. When we think about that
building, we think not of the third of the apartments that were
occupied by people dealing drugs, but the two-thirds of the
apartments where the people lived there were basically
imprisoned--a fence around their building, snipers on the roof,
night vision goggles, and being frisked if they wanted to go
into their home.
The Black Disciples also took over a Christian radio
station and pirated it so that someone listening to the radio
station driving through the neighborhood would hear gang
messages broadcast over the radio as to law enforcement
activity.
When we arrested the Gangster Disciples last year, we
arrested 47 members, the highest ranks in the Black Disciples,
and followed 2 weeks later, by the arrest of the Mafia Insane
Vice Lords, who operated 47 separate open air drug markets in
Chicago. At the same time we charged the 48 Federal defendants
in the Mafia Insane Vice Lords, 57 defendants were charged with
the State. I think that gives you a sense of what we are
talking about when you think about gangs that almost rival the
size of a police department and effectively take occupied
territory, which is federally-funded public housing projects in
Chicago, and make them off limits and effectively jail the
people who are not committing crimes.
Let me tell you about the Chicago approach. The first
approach has been to focus on Project Safe Neighborhoods, which
my colleague, Paul Logli, will talk some about, which is to
jointly have ATF, CPD, and the State's Attorney's Offices work
on guns. We next take gang strategy teams, which use the local
police departments, which have the best intelligence as to
where the gang problems are, to tell us where the most violent
and dangerous offenders are in the areas and form a joint
Federal-local strategy to attack those targets.
In the four most crime-ridden areas in Chicago, there are
monthly meetings involving Federal, State, and local officials,
and from that, a ``Top 20'' list is formed in Chicago where we
sit down with the Chicago Police Department, the Federal law
enforcement agencies, and make sure we go after the 20 most
dangerous and most violent gangs in Chicago, and already in 1
year, we have arrested and detained ten of the top 20 targets.
There is also another aspect of it which involves marketing
deterrence. We, too, believe we would rather have people not
commit crimes than incarcerate them, and one of the things we
do is send letters from Project Safe Neighborhoods to each
felon who is released in the State of Illinois. Every single
one receives a personalized letter that lets them know that the
Federal Government is watching, that they face heavy penalties
should they pick up a gun.
Secondly, we conduct parolee forums in the four most
dangerous areas inside Chicago. Thirty parolees at a time are
brought to a forum. They're randomly selected. They have no
choice but to go. And they face a carrot and stick approach.
They meet people from the U.S. Attorney's Office, from the
State's Attorney's Office, from the Federal law enforcement and
local police agencies who let them know the heavy penalties
they are facing if they mess up and carry a gun and commit a
crime. At the same time, in the same meeting, they meet people
who offer detox counseling, job training, employment,
education. At the end, they're told, you have a choice. You can
meet with the law enforcement again and go to jail for a long
time, or we can try something different.
And we found some remarkable results to date in two of the
districts where the recidivism rate was 23 percent with people
who didn't attend the forums. It's 4 percent for those who do.
For gun offenses, it goes from 3 percent to 1 percent. In two
other districts, the numbers are even better.
In addition to that, we're focusing on juvenile education
in the hot zones, where each of the children going to junior
high school are put through an 8-week program to educate them
about the dangers of drugs, and with that, I'll just end by
noting that the homicide rate in Chicago has paid dividends. It
was 666 in 2001. Just a few years later, 2003, it was under
599, which was the first time it went under 600 since I was 7
years old. And a year later, the homicide rate dropped--I'm
sorry?
Mr. Scott. What are those numbers?
Mr. Fitzgerald. In 2001, there were 666 homicides. In 2003,
there were 599, which was the first time in 36 years it went
under 600. And last year, in 2004, it went past 500 all the way
down to 448, which was a 25 percent drop in a single year. So
it's gone from 666 to 448 in 3 years.
And with that, I would simply say that it's not a problem
that's limited to Chicago. Gangs are a problem that affect
various regions of the country, and we seek to work together to
do our best to take down the rate of violence as a result of
gangs. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Fitzgerald.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fitzgerald follows:]
Prepared Statement of Patrick J. Fitzgerald
Chairman Coble, Ranking Member Scott, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I am Patrick Fitzgerald, the United States Attorney for
the Northern District of Illinois. It is an honor to appear before you
today to discuss the terrible problem of gangs that grips the nation's
third largest city, Chicago, as well as other areas in our nation, and
to discuss how the Department of Justice is partnering with other law
enforcement and the community to address this problem.
the nature of the problem
It is easy to underestimate the grip that gangs have on some or our
cities. But the sad reality is that their grip on urban life is lethal.
First, the sheer number of gang members is staggering. In Chicago
alone, there are estimated to be 70,000 to 100,000 gang members--
compared with about 13,000 Chicago police officers. Several ``super
gangs'' dominate: the Gangster Disciples, the Black Disciples, the Vice
Lords, the Black P Stones, the Mickey Cobras, the Latin Kings, the
Spanish Cobras, the Maniac Latin Disciples, and the Satan Disciples.
Each of these gangs controls large amounts of territory, engages in
large-scale drug trafficking, and uses gun violence to control its
territory and drug trade.
One may get a rough sense of the magnitude of the gang problem by
looking at the Gangster Disciples (GD's). The GD's have been the target
of a series of cases brought by the United States Attorney's Office in
Chicago beginning in the mid-1990's and continuing to today. Over two
hundred high ranking members, including its chairman, have been
convicted, with many receiving life sentences. The undisputed leader of
the gang was Larry Hoover, who is serving a life sentence after a
federal conviction.
Under Hoover, the GD's had a very sophisticated structure and
hierarchy. There were two Boards of Directors: one for gang members in
prison and one for those outside. (The existence of a separate board in
prison speaks powerfully both to the control that gangs can exert even
within a prison and to the fact that gang members anticipate
incarceration, but are not deterred by it.) Serving under the out-of-
prison Board of Directors were 14 ``governors.'' Each governor had a
geographic area assigned to him, and in turn, between 5 to 16
``regents'' who were assigned a smaller geographic area within his
governor's area. Then, under the regents were ``coordinators,'' who
controlled even smaller geographic areas within a regent's area; and
finally, the ``soldiers.'' Other ranks included the Chief of Security,
who was responsible for obtaining firearms for the soldiers and making
sure that armed soldiers guarded each drug selling location, to protect
against both rival gangs and the police.
This sophisticated hierarchy was used to sell drugs and control
drug trafficking. Each soldier participated in the sale of illegal
drugs and was required to pay a portion of his profits to the gang's
leadership. In return, the gang provided its members with a source for
illegal drugs; assured the members of a monopoly in drug sales in GD-
controlled territory; provided bail, attorney fees, and commissary
money for arrested or jailed members; and used gang discipline to
prevent arrested members from cooperating with law enforcement. Under
the gang's rules, cooperation with law enforcement was punishable by
death.
In 1995, FBI agents recovered in a search a computer-generated
organizational chart for the GD's. The chart went on for 39 pages. It
listed all governors and regents by street name and the number of
soldiers who were ``on count'' to each regent and therefore reporting
to the gang's hierarchy. Each of the governors and many of the regents
have been convicted. There were over 7,700 soldiers. Thus, the GD's
alone were half as big as the Chicago Police Department.
The GDs also had a political action committee which contributed to
favored political candidates and, on occasion, sponsored its own
political candidates--they achieved genuine political access and
influence.
There should be no mistake that gangs are violent. It is
conservatively estimated that 60% of the 448 homicides in Chicago in
2004 were gang-related. In any given year, gangs in Chicago are
responsible for far more murders than traditional organized crime in
Chicago (known as the ``Outfit'') has committed over the course of
decades. And if raw violence is not enough, the gang problem poses
unique threats of corruption. The gangs that control drug trafficking
in Chicago have at times corrupted police and other law enforcement--
some members actually have become police officers and corrections
officers. Those gang members who corrupt law enforcement undo the hard
and honest work of the overwhelming majority of law enforcement
officers.
Perhaps a better way to measure the harm gangs cause is to
appreciate what one gang did to a housing project in Chicago--and
people who tried to live there. The Black Disciples (BD's) a violent,
well-organized street gang, controlled buildings at certain public
housing projects. They actually put an iron fence around the buildings,
barricading the rear alley entrance, posted snipers on the roof, and
used police scanners and night-vision goggles to monitor police
activity. Persons entering the building were searched to make sure that
they were not law enforcement. Drug sellers wore ski-masks to prevent
being identified by undercover officers. At one point, law enforcement
obtained probable cause to search 47 of 134 occupied apartments in the
project building, and many other apartments were searched with the
consent of the tenants and housing authority. I recall being struck
that at the very time that American military forces fought valiantly to
establish a presence in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, a public housing
project in the city of Chicago was largely off limits because it was
occupied by a gang. The non-gang members were effectively jailed by the
gang.
A near fatal example of the lengths the BDs went to protect their
drug selling occurred in May 2001. An undercover Chicago Police Officer
approached a public housing building controlled by the BDs for drug
selling purposes. A BD member protecting the drug operation began to
search the officer and felt his safety vest. The BD pulled a gun,
fought with the officer, then shot the officer twice in the back.
Miraculously, one of the bullets lodged in the officer's vest, but the
other shot hit him, resulting in extensive medical treatment.
The BD gang even operated a pirate radio station to broadcast
information relating to gang activities--using a frequency belonging to
a Christian radio station. One defendant paid Donnell Jehan, one of the
BD ``kings'' and a federal fugitive, $80,000 per month for the heroin
franchise at one of the public housing buildings.
what law enforcement is doing: the chicago example
The Chicago story is not one without hope. Law enforcement in
Chicago--federal, state, and local--recognized the severity of the
problem and has fought back. We are making strides, though there is
much more to do.
project safe neighborhoods in chicago
The first step was to focus on guns as part of Project Safe
Neighborhoods (PSN), a national enforcement program, discussed further
below, whose greatest strength is that it is adapted to the needs of
each individual district. Through PSN in Chicago, we have substantially
increased federal prosecution of convicted felons caught carrying a gun
and have placed a special emphasis on areas of high violence and on
offenders who are gang members. There is an unprecedented partnership
between the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF),
the Chicago Police Department (CPD), the U.S. Attorney's Office, the
Cook County State's Attorney's Office, the Illinois Department of
Corrections, and local grass roots organizations serving their
communities. Whenever a convicted felon with a gun is arrested by
Chicago police in targeted police districts, state and federal
prosecutors and ATF agents sit down together and decide in which court
to prosecute cases. We tap every federal and local law enforcement
agency that has relevant knowledge in order to coordinate our attacks
on the gangs to which the offenders belong.
The second step was to organize ourselves to address the gang
problem. In my own office, we reorganized to recognize the reality that
gangs are the drug distribution network for the Chicago area. The
Narcotics and Gang section is split in half between prosecutors
investigating national and international narcotics rings and those
prosecuting the gangs dealing drugs in the Chicago area. We have found
that the wiretaps on the gangs have led to wiretaps on members of
Mexican cartels who use the gangs to distribute their drugs, and that
the wiretaps on international drug traffickers regularly lead to their
street gangs who control the wholesale and resale distribution of their
drugs in the region. Similarly, ATF, FBI, and DEA have dedicated squads
to combat gangs and the Chicago Police Department has formed a gang
intelligence section. ATF alone has dedicated two full-time groups that
focus exclusively on long term investigations of gangs in Chicago.
Working side-by-side with the Chicago Police Department officers
assigned to these groups, they utilize a variety of investigative
techniques to pursue RICO and complex conspiracy cases.
gang strategy teams
A third step was the formation of neighborhood-based Gang Strategy
Teams made up of all the law enforcement units--state and federal--that
investigate and prosecute gangs. Their mandate is to share more gang
intelligence on a regular basis, make greater use of technology, and
make coordinated, strategic decisions about how and where to use our
limited resources. Law enforcement partners who might otherwise be
tempted to compete instead put some of their crown jewels--key
informants--on the table to share in this battle.
Once a month, gang experts from CPD and each of the federal
agencies meet at the headquarters of the four gang-plagued police
regions (called ``Areas'') in Chicago to build a consensus about the
top gang targets in each Area, based on shared, filtered intelligence,
and to strategize about how to attack these targets (including what
resources are available to do so). Each Area has a separate Gang
Strategy Team. Since one of the primary goals of the Teams is to
establish trust and relationships so that the maximum amount of
intelligence is shared, each agency typically has the same participants
come to each monthly meeting for a particular Area. Our office has
assigned two Assistant United States Attorneys in the Gang Unit to each
Area, and we work closely with the Cook County State's Attorney's
office. There is also an analyst from HIDTA (High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area) assigned to each Team. The analysts work with CPD
analysts to map the gang territories, to do research on the top gang
targets, and to look for connections to other gang investigations.
The Gang Strategy Team's consensus on top gang targets usually
takes the form of a ``Top 10 Gang Target'' list, showing the worst gang
leaders in the Area, along with a determination as to the top 3
organizational gang threats in the Area. If individuals on the Top-10
list or gangs in the top 3 threat list are not being investigated by
anyone, the Team discusses which of the agencies at the table can begin
investigating the target. An investigation usually begins with CPD
dedicating a team to gather additional intelligence. The Team discusses
whether the target can be taken down by a simple investigation (e.g.,
an ATF or CPD confidential informant can buy guns or drugs from the
target, who would qualify for a mandatory minimum sentence under
federal drug or firearms laws), or whether a more sophisticated
investigation is required (e.g., the organization is sophisticated and
a wiretap is probably necessary). The top targets from the Gang
Strategy Teams serve as a type of ``minor league'' for the citywide
``Top Twenty Gang Target,'' discussed next.
the top twenty list
A fourth step was the creation roughly one year ago of a ``Top
Twenty'' list of violent gang offenders. In January 2004, the U.S.
Attorney's Office, FBI-Chicago, DEA-Chicago, ATF-Chicago, IRS-Chicago,
the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, and CPD formed a ``Top 20
Gang Target'' list for Chicago. The list was based on a consensus from
the Gang Strategy Teams and the various agencies as to the worst gang
leaders in Chicago. The group meets once a month to discuss the
investigations against the top 20 targets. Each of the federal agencies
takes turns taking responsibility for the federal part of a joint
investigation into each target. At times, there are cases in state
court that can be adopted and proved in federal court which will
incapacitate that gang member for a long stretch of incarceration.
Other times we must start from scratch and develop a case based upon
informants, undercover officers, and wiretaps.
The Top Twenty Gang Target list and the regular meetings around it
have proven very helpful in several respects. They help to focus
everyone's efforts on the worst gang leaders. They add urgency and
purpose to investigations because of the acknowledged importance of the
targets and the attention paid to the investigations. And they foster
an atmosphere of cooperation and partnership among all the agencies
that work on attacking gangs--an invaluable resource when problems or
disputes arise in gang-related investigations. Since the list started a
little more than one year ago, 10 of the top targets have been charged
federally and detained (including the heads of the Black Disciples and
the Mafia Insane Vice Lords, two investigations discussed below). The
tenth was detained last week. They are then removed from the list. When
a target is removed, the group votes on a replacement based on shared
intelligence as to the top gang leaders.
marketing deterrence
An equally important part of our strategy for ending the violence
caused by street gangs is to focus directly on our ultimate goal, which
is not merely sending people to jail but deterring young men from
joining gangs and carrying guns. For many gang members, their
affiliation draws attention that passes for respect on the street. We
are letting them know that being in a gang will get attention in the
police station and the federal courthouse and, then, far less attention
in a federal prison in a state far away from their gang. If the word
spreads that we are targeting gang members on parole who carry guns in
the neighborhoods where people fear going out at night, we can make a
difference in the futures of these neighborhoods.
To that end, the Illinois Department of Corrections mails
personalized letters to every parolee in the state upon their release
from prison, advising them that they are being watched, and if arrested
with a gun that they face strict federal sentences. Additionally, the
Chicago Police Department's community service arm, Community
Alternative Police Strategy (CAPS), has placed thousands of posters in
targeted neighborhoods warning felons: ``Don't Let This Happen To
You!'' In stark terms, the posters provide details about specific
felons from their neighborhoods who were caught carrying guns and are
now serving long federal prison sentences. Our PSN team has placed ads
on billboards and buses. Indeed, we have undercover recordings of gang
members discussing the ads--genuinely wrestling with the risks they
face by carrying guns. Given that gang members live in an environment
in which their instinct is to fear walking the streets without a gun,
we are successful when they start thinking of a gun as risk, not
safety.
In addition, in four designated police districts, the PSN partners
regularly conduct ``parolee forums.'' Some 30 felons at a time, each
convicted of a gun crime and recently paroled into these districts, sit
at the same table with law enforcement representatives and community
leaders. For many of these parolees, when they leave prison, they
return to the only things that they know--their neighborhoods, their
gangs, their drug dealing. But at the parolee forums, they are
presented with a straightforward message that they have a choice in
life: They can return to the gun-toting criminal life, or they can turn
to a constructive, non-criminal life. They hear from the law
enforcement community--the local police, state prosecutors, federal
agents, and federal prosecutors--who explain that we are focusing on
felons with guns, and that they face a lengthy sentence in a federal
prison if they pick up a gun. And they are given examples of PSN
defendants in their neighborhoods who are serving lengthy sentences.
Not infrequently, there are loud groans when they hear of a
neighborhood felon serving 20 years in a federal prison in Kansas for
the crime of possessing a gun. The idea of law enforcement telling each
person directly that if he returns to that way of life, the whole law
enforcement community will be watching is a direct and difficult
message.
At the same time, they hear community leaders speak about ex-
offender job programs, educational opportunities, and substance abuse
programs that are available to them. They also hear from a convicted
felon, someone who has stood in their shoes, who reiterates the message
that felons can succeed in turning their lives around, showing them by
his example that success is an option. These presentations are often
met with keen interest and follow-up questions from the parolees about
who they should call and what they should do.
A final, but important, part of our PSN program in Chicago has been
the involvement of researchers from the University of Chicago and
Columbia University, who are studying the program's effectiveness. Law
enforcement policies often are driven more by instinct and experience
than rigorous, statistically-based analysis. Because the stakes in
combating gang and drug violence are literally lives and neighborhoods,
we want to know everything we can about the effectiveness of our
efforts so that we can understand which strategies work and which do
not, and then adapt our tactics to use our limited resources as
effectively as possible. The researchers brief the PSN partners
regularly on their statistical analyses of homicide, gun violence, and
recidivism rates in the targeted PSN neighborhoods.
One startling result of the research to date concerns the
effectiveness of the parolee forums. The persons who are summoned to
attend the forums are randomly selected from the group of felons
paroled into the districts, and they all attend. Yet, when comparing
the recidivism rates of felons attending the forums with those who do
not, the results so far are staggering: 23% of those released between
2001 and 2004 who did not attend the forums were convicted of another
crime, while only 4% of those who attended the forums were convicted.
The rate of recidivism was thus less than a fifth of what it would have
been. As to recidivism rates for gun crimes, the numbers are as
follows: 3% of those who did not attend the forums were convicted of
another gun crime, while fewer than 1% of those who attended the forums
were convicted. The rate of gun crime recidivism was thus less than one
third of what it otherwise would have been. The key to the forums is
the synergy between the ``stick'' of citing specific examples to the
felons of persons who have been prosecuted for firearms offenses and
offering the ``carrots'' of alternatives to a life of crime. We
recently recorded a gang member in jail speaking to a gang member
outside jail about the crackdown on gang members and guns in Chicago;
both gang members agreed that the bottom line was that the member
outside of jail needed to go get a job.
We have learned that gang involvement begins at an early age and
the more work we can do with the juveniles in our community to
intervene when they make poor choices, the more likely we are in
successfully preventing their involvement in gangs. As such, we have
started a comprehensive juvenile education program in our ``hot zones''
where literally every junior high and high school student participates
in an eight-week program designed to increase their awareness about the
risks of gang involvement, encourage independent decision-making, and
enhance one's self image in order to increase the likelihood that they
will reject the lure of the gangs.
If one of the juveniles makes that first bad judgment call, we have
partnered with the Chicago Police Department and the Juvenile Justice
System in Chicago to create a program that will replace ``station
adjustments'' for first-time offenders who commit violent or gang-like
crimes. Rather than allowing them to slip through the cracks with a
slap on the wrist, a behavior that later escalates into more egregious
offenses, we have implemented a program in the new Juvenile
Intervention and Assessment Center that will require that each juvenile
who commits an offense indicative of violence or gang involvement to
enter a 90-day program designed to come down hard on the first offense
and enlighten the juvenile regarding the harmful impact that his or her
decision will have not only on his own life but on the lives of his
family and community. Each juvenile must sign a contract of commitment
to the anti-violence program that includes private counseling groups,
public participation in anti-gang presentations at schools, and
acknowledgment of the harm that they have inflicted upon their victims.
Failure to successfully complete the program results in prosecution in
the Juvenile Court System.
For adult offenders who may have committed their first gun offense
and have received a sentence of merely probation, we have also expanded
our parolee forums to probationers. Here the probationers hear the same
message as the parolees: ``if you pick up a gun, you will be
prosecuted.'' But again, we offer them opportunity for development. Our
commitment to combating the problem at the earliest glimpse of
potential gang involvement and escalating our attack as gang behavior
increases reflects our commitment not simply to incarcerate those who
offend but to actually decrease the number of offenders.
In talking about the effect law enforcement is having, let me
return to discuss the reign of terror at the public housing buildings
occupied by the Black Disciples. That reign ended in spring 2004 with a
47-defendant takedown, that included the arrest of the gang's entire
top leadership. The case was jointly investigated by the FBI, CPD, and
IRS. Our office worked closely with the Cook County State's Attorney's
Office on the investigation and prosecutions, with an Assistant State's
Attorney being designated as a SAUSA for the investigation and cases.
Less than two weeks later, we also charged the Mafia Insane Vice
Lords (MIVLs) street gang, one of the three most powerful factions of
the Vice Lords street gang. The MIVLs controlled 47 open-air drug
markets on the west side of Chicago, selling primarily heroin but also
powder and crack cocaine. Each drug spot earned $5-8,000 per day. A
total of 48 defendants were charged in the federal case, including the
``King'' of the gang, Troy Martin, and most of the remaining top
leadership. An additional 57 defendants were charged by the state at
the same time in closely coordinated prosecutions. This case was
investigated by DEA, CPD, and IRS.
the effect on the homicide rate
One of the best measures of the work being done in Chicago to
attack gangs, guns, and drugs--the homicide rate--shows very positive
results: in 2001, there were 666 homicides in Chicago. Two years later,
in 2003, there were 599 homicides, the first time in 36 years that
there were fewer than 600 murders in Chicago. A year later, in 2004,
there were 448 murders in Chicago a staggering 25% drop in one year,
though as noted, 60% of these were gang-related. After taking nearly
four decades to break the 600 mark, it took one more year to reduce
homicides to well below 500. And thus far in 2005, homicide numbers
have decreased another 25%. Something is clearly working. But law
enforcement in Chicago is not satisfied: gangs and guns still pose a
lethal threat to Chicago and most starkly to the honest people who live
in the neighborhoods where gang members vastly outnumber police and who
are the real victims of gang violence.
On that note, the fight against gang violence in Chicago has not
been a partisan effort. Persons of different party, ethnic, and
governmental backgrounds have been setting aside parochial interests to
address this problem. Our city and its law-abiding residents are safer
for that.
the department of justice's response to gangs
Chicago is not alone in taking on the problem of gangs. I know from
my colleague United States Attorneys that gangs threaten many other
cities and many other districts and that nationwide, the gang problem
is growing. Accordingly, federal, state, and local law enforcement have
been teaming up with community partners to take action in the way that
best suits each district. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is taking
notice of the threat posed by gangs and by encouraging these
collaborative efforts.
DOJ is constructing a national infrastructure that will continue to
enable reductions in violent crime. In October 2004, the Deputy
Attorney General established the Subcommittee on Violent Crime and
Gangs of the Department's Strategic Management Council to ensure that
DOJ is fully coordinating its efforts to fight violent crime and gangs.
The Subcommittee consists of heads of key offices within DOJ, as well
as each of its component law enforcement agencies. Just last month, at
the direction of the Attorney General, a symposium on gangs was held at
the Department of Justice attended by United States Attorneys,
officials from ATF, DEA, the Marshals Service, FBI, the Bureau of
Prisons and, most importantly, police chiefs and sheriffs from
different cities around the country plagued with gang problems. In
preparation for that conference, I had an opportunity to review
materials submitted by those various districts and was struck by the
extent to which areas not commonly associated with gangs--such as
Phoenix and Northern Virginia--are experiencing the gang problem,
normally associated with Los Angeles, Chicago, and other large cities.
At the symposium, best practices were shared, and the gathered
officials discussed what worked and what did not work in different
regions of the country.
Two things were clear from the symposium: the gang problem is
affecting many different regions of the country and there is no one way
to do it right that applies to every district. Fighting the Black
Disciples in Chicago is different than dealing with the Hells Angels
and the Outlaws motorcycle gangs in Arizona, the Bloods and Crips in
Los Angeles, or the MS-13 in Northern Virginia. One constant that did
emerge is the need for good intelligence and teamwork between federal,
state, and local partners.
No single initiative, no single investigative technique, no single
statute, and no single preventative measure will always be the most
effective. Therefore, the Department is taking a multi-disciplined
approach that allows each component agency to utilize the investigative
strategies and statutes to which a particular criminal organization is
vulnerable, as adapted for the local conditions in the relevant
district.
As a first step, the Subcommittee amassed a comprehensive catalogue
of DOJ's gang initiatives and enforcement efforts throughout the
country, so that the Department can ensure that all of those efforts
are operating in a coordinated, consolidated, and integrated fashion.
The Department recognizes the need to partner with state and local law
enforcement and prosecutors, as well as with community organizations
and leaders. State and local law enforcement officers, and the
communities they serve, will always be the first to detect when gangs
take root and when gang violence threatens the safety of a
neighborhood. The U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO) in each judicial
district is frequently the conduit to facilitate different agencies
coming together, coordinating their enforcement efforts by attacking
the gang problem from different sides, allowing each agency to use its
investigative expertise and legal authority to leverage the gang's
vulnerabilities to various statutes: firearms, narcotics, fugitive, and
immigration violations.
Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a great example of the
Department's success in partnering with state and local law
enforcement, prosecutors, and community organizations. PSN was based
upon the concept of creating a task force in each judicial district
that focused on identifying the unique violent crime problems of that
region and then directing the available law enforcement and community
resources toward eradicating those problems through a data-driven
strategic plan. The PSN task force coordinates strategy and resources
to focus on 1) dismantling violent organizations, 2) stopping illegal
gun traffickers, and 3) enforcing the law against prohibited persons
possessing firearms. PSN, from its inception, recognized that violent
criminal organizations, such as gangs, are frequently the most
disruptive force in many neighborhoods, and that responses to gangs
among various law enforcement agencies need to be coordinated and
proactive.
The PSN strategy used by a number of districts to reduce gang
violence is to identify and prosecute the gang members who pose the
greatest threat to the community. In some districts, the strategy
involves prosecutions of the individual gang member on firearms and
drug charges. Other districts use the PSN infrastructure to focus on
the entire street gang, bringing Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organization (RICO) Act and drug conspiracy charges. The PSN Task
Forces regularly apprize the Department's leadership of their
activities. In July 2004, 54 of the teams considered gangs to be one of
the key elements of their gun violence problem, 25 considered gangs to
be one of the two most important elements of the problem, and 37
reported a focus on gangs and criminal organizations. PSN has served as
a catalyst to develop localized strategies through the vigorous
enforcement of existing firearms laws.
During the spring of 2004, the Department of Justice identified 15
cities where homicide rates remained at unacceptable levels. ATF
responded with the creation of a Violent Crime Impact Team (VCIT)
concept, customized to mitigate the causes of each city's entrenched
level of violence. In the majority of the cities, gangs were identified
as a key component of the communities' violence problems. ATF leads
these teams, joined by other DOJ components. The U.S. Marshals
Service's participation allows these teams to leverage the fugitive
status of gang members. The DEA's participation allows the teams to
capitalize on the DEA's investigative expertise and statutory authority
when investigating gangs whose primary focus in drug distribution.
The VCIT concept was modeled on the collaborative successes of PSN
through the efforts of ATF and other federal, state, and local law
enforcement, with additional resources redirected from across the
United States. The VCITs target specific individuals and specific
locations for law enforcement operations, empowered through use of
technologies, such as the National Integrated Ballistic Identification
Network (NIBIN)--an ATF championed initiative, which matches shell
cases from unsolved shootings--and crime mapping from synthesized
firearms trace results. The use of additional resources and new
technologies are producing results: during the six-month pilot period
of operation, VCITs have recovered more than 3,000 firearms and
arrested more than 500 of the 900 identified as serious offenders.
Collateral to these focused efforts have been the seizure of over $2
million, the arrest of more than 2,500 other offenders, and the
apprehension of nearly 400 felony fugitives.
Based on preliminary results, the VCIT pilot program may be
contributing to a decrease in homicides. Firearms homicides in the
targeted areas dropped in 11 of the 15 cities when compared to the same
six-month period the prior year. And in total, overall homicides with
firearms for targeted areas in all fifteen cities dropped to 9%. In
specific cities, the results in targeted areas were even more dramatic:
77% drop in Greensboro; 67% drop in Chattanooga; 61% drop in
Pittsburgh; 59% drop in Tulsa; 50% drop in Albuquerque; and 46% drop in
Tampa.
As a result of the success of the six-month pilot program, the VCIT
program has been expanded and is now employed in a total of 20 cities.
ATF participates in task forces nation-wide that investigate gangs as
their primary focus, as well as those ATF groups dedicated exclusively
to gang investigations.
Firearms trafficking, the illegal diversion of firearms out of
lawful commerce and into the hands of prohibited persons (such as
convicted felons, drug dealers, and juvenile gang members), is often
the method by which gangs arm themselves. By using ``straw
purchasers,'' who are individuals not prohibited from legally
purchasing weapons, gang members acquire firearms from federally
licensed dealers. ATF's firearms trafficking investigation efforts
prevent gang violence by investigating and prosecuting individuals who
are illegally supplying firearms to the criminal gang organizations
committing firearms-related crimes.
The Safe Streets Violent Crimes Initiative (SSVCI) is another
collaborative drive to combat gangs. Initiated in 1992, it is a FBI-
sponsored, long-term, proactive task force program focused on
investigation of gangs acting as criminal enterprises crossing state
and international borders. The SSVCI encompasses 144 Safe Streets Task
Forces (SSTFs) across the nation charged with bringing the resources of
all participating agencies, federal and local, to bear on the
respective area's violent crime and gang problems. While local and
state law enforcement can obtain assistance in making an arrest across
state lines, the FBI has the ability to instantaneously cover a lead
anywhere in the country. SSTFs across the country enhance state, local,
and other federal law enforcement agencies by utilizing the FBI's
developed Enterprise Theory of Investigation (ETI). The ETI is an
approach supported by technology, which facilitates multi-subject
investigations of significant enterprises involved in patterns of
criminal activity, rather than concentrating resources on individuals
or separate acts.
Of the current 144 SSTFs, 108 of them are Violent Gang Task Forces
(VGTFs) located in 33 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico, which focus exclusively on FBI National Gang Strategy targets.
The VGTFs utilize a variety of investigative methods to identify and
attack a gang's hierarchy, including undercover operations,
surveillances, wiretaps, and controlled purchases of drugs, guns, and
other contraband. Wiretaps are frequently used by VGTFs in an effort to
capture criminal conversations, which can later be used as evidence to
prosecute the gang members for their criminal activities. In addition
to obtaining evidence for prosecution, wiretaps have proven to be
effective in preventing violent acts, including murders, from being
committed. VGTFs are effective at building federal and state cases
against gang members by applying the same methods used in the FBI's
successful war on traditional organized crime. VGTFs are developing
racketeering and continuing criminal enterprise cases to remove the
leadership and the most dangerous members of violent street gangs and
seize their assets. This investigative approach has been successful
around the nation, and it has had long-term, positive impact on
communities plagued by gangs.
The United States Marshals Service (USMS) is involved in numerous
gang-related law enforcement efforts as well, including sponsorship of
83 District Fugitive Task Forces throughout the country, plus five
regional fugitive task forces. These task forces include
representatives from hundreds of federal, state, and local agencies.
Violent fugitives with ties to gangs receive priority attention for
investigation. From 2003 to the present, the USMS has arrested more
than 600 gang members and associates. Of those arrested, approximately
37 percent were Hispanic gang members, 23 percent were members of Crips
and Bloods gangs, and 11 percent were members of outlaw motorcycle
organizations. In Chicago alone in 2004, U.S. Marshals arrested 353
gang fugitives. The USMS coordinates with federal, state, and local
agencies to focus on specific gang-related fugitives that are a high
priority because of their history of violence, threat to the community,
or risk of flight.
In an effort to prevent gang-related crimes within Bureau of Prison
(BOP) facilities, the Department participates with federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies in support of task forces and
intelligence units. Through the Central Office Intelligence Section,
BOP oversees and supervises multiple intelligence teams assigned to FBI
task forces throughout the United States, as well as conducts other
intelligence-related functions. The BOP also provides indirect support
and shared resources through its Special Investigative Staff, members
of which are assigned to each prison facility. The staff conducts or
manages complex criminal investigations involving gang-related
activities, such as homicides, assaults, and drug trafficking. The
BOP's primary focus on gangs revolves around threats to the safety of
inmates and BOP personnel, and the suppression of illegal activity
within BOP facilities.
h.r. 1279
I state my general support for the goals of this bill. I would also
note that it is important to maintain heavy penalties on gang members--
particularly higher echelon members and those engaging in violence--to
deter violent activity and to leverage cooperation from gang members
who are already conditioned to understand they will do some prison time
but often cooperate when faced with heavier prison time. Cases against
gangs proceed most effectively when the heavy penalties cause key
members of the gang to work with authorities to dismantle the
organization. Ultimately, severe sentencing of gang members results
more quickly in greater freedom for the community victimized by gangs.
As an example, during the BD investigation, several BD members and
associates were arrested on state drug or gun charges. When informed
that they would be prosecuted in the federal system for that conduct,
they agreed to cooperate, and provided extensive assistance in
gathering evidence against BD leaders, many times recording meetings
and conversations at great personal risk to themselves. This phenomenon
continued following the arrest and indictment of the BD leadership. A
large number of those indicted, including some of the highest ranking
members, have cooperated in the hopes of receiving a lesser sentence.
This cooperation has resulted in additional evidence against both
charged and as yet uncharged BD leaders, their drug suppliers, gun
suppliers, and money launderers. It also produced safer neighborhoods
for some of Chicago's most vulnerable residents. As I noted, much of
our work in Chicago depends on our ability to scare offenders into
going straight with the threat of mandatory sentences for drug and gun
crimes.
Along with my colleagues at the Department of Justice, I look
forward to working with you in the future on this legislation and its
particulars.
conclusion
I applaud this Subcommittee's efforts to address the war waged
against our communities by gangs. Thank you for your time and
attention. I appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important and
timely matter. I would be pleased to answer any questions the members
might have.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Logli, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL A. LOGLI, STATE'S ATTORNEY, WINNEBAGO COUNTY,
ILLINOIS, AND PRESIDENT ELECT, NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Logli. Congressman Forbes and Congressman Scott, thank
you for this opportunity, and Congressman Forbes, thank you for
sponsoring the Gang Deterrence and Community Protection Act of
2005.
Since the 1980's, the National District Attorneys
Association has endorsed the concept of Federal and State law
enforcement agencies and prosecutors working together to
address threats such as we are now facing with gangs. We
believe that what you've begun here, Mr. Forbes, would
establish a bedrock upon which to build a united effort to end
gang violence across the United States.
As with every problem, we've had our successes and failures
and we've learned in our dealings with gangs that plague our
communities that what works in one community may not
necessarily work in another community, but we know that working
together with our Federal partners, and I have the privilege of
being a local elected State's Attorney within the jurisdiction
of the Northern District of Illinois. Mr. Fitzgerald is the
U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. And we
have, in fact, worked together on Project Safe Neighborhood and
other initiatives to stem violence and gang activity in my
jurisdiction.
We know that we have come to look at stateless terrorists
as our enemy and we're developing ways to stymie those attacks.
And I would advance to you the theory that we are facing about
the same challenge and threats with the transnational gangs
that are almost freely operating within our borders. In my
jurisdiction, we have recently seen an increase of Hispanic or
Latino gangs that are now engaging in the typical turf wars and
war for drug dealing in our community. As a result of this type
of conflict, we've had firebombings and murders that are
scarring my community.
Now, the problem would have been worse in Rockford,
Winnebago County, Illinois, but were it not for the fact that
my local jurisdiction worked in unison with Federal authorities
in the mid-1990's and we took on a task of going after the
leadership of the Vice Lords and the Gangster Disciples and the
Latin Kings. We have eviscerated the leadership of those gangs.
And now, even 10 years later, our community is safer because
many of those leaders were rounded up in a joint operation and
we turned many of them over to the Federal authorities and they
were sentenced then under very tough sentencing guidelines.
Many of them went away for very long periods of time. And that
message that went out to the people in our community, that the
leaders were rounded up and sent away for very long periods of
time, lives on today as a positive anti-gang message in our
community.
We note--and nothing I say is to take away our support for
this bill, Mr. Forbes. We strongly recommend, however, that the
bill specifically contain language that would suggest to U.S.
Attorneys that they coordinate their efforts with local
prosecutors so that there is no left hand not knowing what the
right hand is doing. We would like to see language in there
that would reduce the possibility of conflict by not clearly
delineating a process to resolve Federal and local
responsibilities as we combat gangs together.
We also note that the Act calls for the establishment of
High Intensity Interstate Gang Activity Areas. I think that's a
good idea. I also believe, however, that many of those areas
would probably be the same areas as what we currently have
under High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, that gangs and
drugs go hand in hand, and we would suggest that the bill allow
perhaps the Attorney General to say that this gang, this High
Intensity Gang Activity Area, could be contiguous with the High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area so that we could combine
resources. Our local prosecutors' offices are already spread
thin. Instead of having two separate groups, we think that
there should be some mechanism that they could be combined,
since gangs and drugs operate hand in hand.
We've recently seen a spate of attacks on judges and
prosecutors and witnesses. We believe that this has been going
on for years as another form of trying to destabilize the
criminal justice system, and that deals with witness
intimidation. We note that your Act acknowledges the need to
provide funds to prosecutors for witness protection and efforts
to end gang violence, and we applaud that and look to the
possibility of providing funds not only to Federal prosecutors,
but also to local prosecutors to afford witness protection.
There's too much intimidation going on that is really
jeopardizing our prosecution of gang activity.
Finally, I do want to lend my support for the continuation
of funding on Project Safe Neighborhoods. I know that's not
part of this particular Act, but it goes hand in hand as we
fight gangs. We recently concluded a joint operation with the
U.S. Attorney's Office, Mr. Fitzgerald and my jurisdiction. We
rounded up over 30 people who were in possession or trafficking
in guns. We took nearly 100 very dangerous firearms off the
streets of my community, working in conjunction with Federal
authorities, much of the same type of cooperation that I
believe you envision under your Act, Mr. Forbes.
We believe, and in conclusion, we want to be proactive in
our communities to identify gang threats early. We want to
respond decisively. And I can tell you that we look forward to
working with our partners in the U.S. Attorney's Office to
combat the problems of gangs in our communities.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Logli follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul A. Logli
My name is Paul Logli and I am the elected State's Attorney in
Winnebago County, Illinois. I am now the President Elect of the
National District Attorneys Association and will become President this
July.
At the outset I want to thank Mr. Forbes for sponsoring The Gang
Deterrence and Community Prosecution Act of 2005 and you, Mr Chairman,
on behalf of the National District Attorneys Association, for the
opportunity to present our concerns about gang violence and share some
thoughts on the what we, and you the Congress, can do to counter this
threat to public safety. The views that I express today represent the
views of that Association and the beliefs of thousands of local
prosecutors across this country.
Since the late 1980's our Association has endorsed the concept of
Federal and state law enforcement agencies and prosecutors working in
unison to address threats such as we are now facing. I view the task
begun by Mr. Forbes as establishing the bedrock upon which to build our
united effort to end gang violence across the United States.
To place my remarks in context--let me briefly tell you about my
jurisdiction. Winnebago County is located about 70 miles west of
Chicago. It has a population of nearly 300,000 people living in a
diverse community. The county seat is Rockford--the second largest city
in the state. I have been a prosecutor for 18 years and am honored to
have served in my current position for 16 years, having been elected to
office 4 times. I previously served as a judge of the local circuit
court for nearly 6 years. I currently supervise a staff that includes
38 assistant state's attorneys. Annually, my office handles over 4000
felony cases.
local gang problems
Excluding adult gangs, motorcycle gangs, hate groups and other
``adult'' gangs the problem presented just by juvenile gangs is
staggering in and of itself. The 2002 National Youth Gang Survey,
published by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
of the Department of Justice depicts the gang problems we face in stark
reality.
It is was estimated that approximately 731,500 gang members and
21,500 gangs were active in the United States in 2002.
As with every problem we have our successes and our failures and I
want to illustrate the impact of gang violence, and what we can do
about it, by painting the picture as I have seen it in Winnebago County
during my tenure as State's Attorney.
My jurisdiction is situated within 75 miles of two major urban
centers, Chicago and Milwaukee. Like most jurisdictions of our size and
location, it has been combating the problem of street gangs for the
last several decades. More recently, Hispanic or Latino gangs have
become major players in drug and criminal activity. Inter-gang warfare
between several Hispanic gangs has resulted in fire-bombings and
murders. The gangs have become increasingly sophisticated and have
connections not only within this nation, but also with other nations in
our hemisphere. To reflect the increased sophistication and
organization of these gangs, the Rockford Police Department has changed
the name of its task force to the ``Organized Crime Unit,'' replacing
the previous title of ``Gang Unit''.
On a positive note, the gang activity would have been greater if it
had not been for large joint federal and state operations in the mid
90's that were effective in eviscerating the leadership of the most
active gangs during that period. The Gangster Disciples, Vice Lords and
Latin King gangs were the subjects of operations that involved numerous
arrests of those persons who had been identified as leaders of their
respective gangs. The major operations followed the most violent years
in the recent history of our community. 1993 and 1994 will go down as
the most violent years in regard to the number of homicides within our
jurisdiction. Fortunately, after the major joint federal and state
operations that took place in 1993 and 1996, the level of violence
dropped considerably and has leveled off over the last several years.
The large-scale operations were effective because they involved law
enforcement at all levels and concentrated on those individuals who had
been identified as leaders of dangerous criminal organizations.
Realize that this is my perspective from a single county in
Illinois. I think it important for you to understand that in addressing
this problem there is no single remedy just like there is no single
template for a gang. Gangs come from all ethnic persuasions and
communities and have grown transnational in scope. What works in
Winnebago County may not have equal success in Chicago only 70 miles
away. Our strategy must reflect flexibility and durability.
After 9/11 we have come to look at stateless terrorists as our
enemy and are developing ways to stymie their attacks and defeat them
on an international scale in a new mode of conflict that does not lie
in battling sovereign nations. I would advance to you the theory that
we are facing the same challenges and threats by the transnational
gangs that almost freely operate within our borders.
We also know that gang members are not dumb, inept or
technologically challenged. In one instance we know of gangs arranging
a confrontation by email and their use of cell phones and other state
of the art electronic gear is commonplace in their trans national
dealings. They even brag of their strength on DVDs and CDs.
Here are some of the problems we've been facing:
In northern Wisconsin, for instance, the Sovereign Nation Warriors
(SWN) are active on the Reservation. The professed leader was from the
Potowatamie tribe while the gang affiliation was associated with the
Chippewa band--basically an attempt to create a gang that was multi-
tribal in nature. The SWN has been tied into drug trafficking, arson,
burglary and gang related beatings. Many of those crimes are unsolved
because of the gang relationship and the refusal of individuals to
provide information on gang activity. Wisconsin is a state in which
most of the tribes have contracted away criminal jurisdiction. The gang
leader was to be prosecuted for arson and burglary of a home on the
reservation and the tribal police attempted to have the matter brought
federally because of the gang connection. The U.S. Attorney declined
prosecution and the Vilas County District Attorney, Al Moustakis,
prosecuted and convicted the leader.
Last year in Philadelphia the tragic death Faheem Thomas-Childs
provides another dimension to the problem. He was a third grader at and
on his way to school when he was caught in the crossfire of two rival
drug gangs as they fired dozens of shots at each other. Hit in the head
by a single shot he died five days later. A Crossing guard was also
injured in the shoot-out. The community surrounding the school had been
concerned about gunfire at night and the violence had come to a
crescendo the nights immediately preceding the killing but the
community refused to cooperate with police to end the gunfire. On the
day the Thomas-Childs was shot there were dozens of witnesses but few
came forward to help identify the killers.
In April, 2003 Charlotte, North Carolina, police investigated a
shooting at a public park in Mecklenburg County. One man was killed and
there were several men injured. The investigation revealed these men
and the men who shot them were part of a gang called Mara Salvatrucha
or ``MS-13'' and that these men were from Honduras and El Salvador.
Police issued eight warrants for individuals charging them with the
murder in the park; four of those men have been arrested but the others
are still at large.
After this incident, police charged other MS-13 members with three
other murders. Six (6) MS-13 members were charged with the murders of
two Hispanic males that happened one week prior to the shootings at
Copperhead Island Park. A number of those charged were either shot or
shot at the following week at Copperhead Island Park.
In New York City last week 80 Bloods and Crips showed up at the
International Auto Show and a fight broke out requiring police
intervention. No one was hurt in this very public melee but patrons of
the show had to flee to safety. Even a public forum couldn't abate
their violence.
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) leaves the body of a woman in the
beautiful Shenandoah River and the severed fingers of a boy in the
parking lot of a convenience store in Fairfax County. A Crip from St.
Louis, Missouri, comes to Virginia to recruit new members into the
gang. Hits carried out in Virginia by MS-13 have been ``greenlighted''
by leadership in California and a key witness was then intimidated when
his family members were threatened in El Salvador.
In Massachusetts an assistant state attorney general, Paul
McLaughlin was detailed to the Boston District Attorney's Office on
special assignment. He was one of just a handful of prosecutors on the
city's first anti-gang violence unit.
In the early autumn of 1995, he was prosecuting a defendant named
Jeffrey Bly. Nicknamed ``Black,'' Bly was the leader of what was
perhaps the city's most cold-blooded street gang, the Theodore Street
Posse, whose members were suspected in several murders. McLaughlin was
prosecuting him on a carjacking case, and after a couple of setbacks,
the case was finally ready for trial.
On the night of Sept. 25, 1995, after another day spent preparing
to hold Bly accountable for his crime, McLaughlin got off a commuter
train on his way home and walked to his car. As he reached the car and
was about to get in, a hooded figure approached, pointed a gun at
Paul's head, and fired several times. Paul, who was 42, died that
night, and a new line had been crossed in the annals of Boston's war
against gang violence.
A tireless investigation eventually led police and prosecutors to
Jeffrey ``Black'' Bly. As the investigation proceeded, chilling details
began to emerge about Bly's targeting of McLaughlin. In the days before
the murder, Bly had recruited another gang member to follow McLaughlin,
to learn his habits and his route home. One night, another Theodore
Street Posse member drove Bly to the train station. Little by little,
the evidence revealed a planned execution, designed and carried out in
an attempt by Bly to avoid prosecution. Evidence suggested that months
earlier Bly had decided to kill the prosecutor and a key witness in the
carjacking case. When the attempted murder of the witness was botched,
Bly turned his sights on McLaughlin.
In February 1998, a Suffolk Superior Court grand jury returned
indictments charging Bly with Paul's murder, and in May 1999, a jury
convicted Bly of first-degree murder. He is serving mandatory life
imprisonment.
In Rockford, Illinois my own jurisdiction-- a simmering gang
dispute erupted into gunfire in which gang members fired repeated
rounds into a home in which they thought a rival gang member had fled.
The result was the death of 8-year-old DeMarcus Hanson, shot in the
head and killed while sleeping in his own bed. The 3 gang members are
currently serving 50 year prison sentences after an aggressive and
effective prosecution by prosecutors from my office and the office of
the Illinois Attorney General. And in Illinois, 50 years for murder
means 50 years--not a day less.
the gang deterrence and community protection act
Before looking several aspects of The Gang Deterrence and Community
Protection Act I want to most wholeheartedly indicate my support for
what this bill accomplishes. My comments on the legislation are meant
to enhance its impact and are not to in any manner to detract from what
has been started by Mr. Forbes and the other cosponsors of the bill.
What you do here will serve as the foundation for all our efforts.
Unity of Purpose and Effort
One of out biggest concerns with this, or any, federal legislation
is to prevent conflict with local investigation and prosecution
efforts. Our concerns in this regard are centered on the proper
allocation of all too scarce resources at both the national and local
levels of law enforcement.
Local prosecutors are successful in prosecuting crime because they
have the expertise, experience and connection to the community that is
needed to combat the types of crimes that most affect the American
people, and, under consideration here, in combating gang violence.
Murder, drug dealing, sexual assault, robbery, auto theft, assault, and
juvenile delinquency are the kinds of offenses that we deal with on the
streets and in the court every day--over 95% of all violent crime is
prosecuted by local prosecutors.
That is not to say we do not need assistance from Federal law
enforcement. Federal law enforcement agencies and Federal law are
extremely useful when it comes to long-term, multi-jurisdictional
investigations and prosecutions. They have the resources and technical
capabilities many local agencies do not have or need only on rare
occasions.
Electronic surveillance, for instance, is beyond the capability of
many local law enforcement agencies and Federal support in this
sensitive area is extremely valuable to our mutual efforts. Another
example is the ability of the Federal system to impose stricter
sentences in some instances then can state criminal justice systems.
Federal mandatory minimum sentences have been successfully used to gain
leverage in taking apart otherwise close knit gangs. We have mandatory
minimums in Illinois and I know the impact they can have in developing
cooperation from an otherwise recalcitrant witness.
It is the ability to bring the respective talents and resources of
the local and federal authorities together at the appropriate times
that result in the successes we are all looking for in the fight
against gangs. I would urge that this become the hallmark of your
efforts in ending gang violence.
We have, over the course of the past 6 or more years seen effective
models of coordination in both PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOOD (PSN) and the
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA). These are prime examples
of team work between federal and local prosecution to achieve the best
results in any given case, dependent upon the strengths and weaknesses
of the respective systems.
To that end, however, the Gang Deterrence and Community Protection
Act does not contain any mandate to consult or coordinate with local
prosecutors prior to the assumption of jurisdiction by federal
authorities. This sets up the possibility of conflict by not clearly
delineating a process to resolve federal and local responsibilities
A provision requiring Federal agencies to ``consult and
coordinate'' with state and local prosecutors, would better serve to
ensure that federal and local efforts are complementary rather then
potentially adversarial. I would most strongly recommend that this
requirement be adopted as the standard in all the areas of your gang
suppression initiative that involve both federal and local efforts.
High Intensity Interstate Gang Activity Areas
In Title II, Section 201 the idea of a ``High Intensity Interstate
Gang Activity'' Area (HIIGA), the concept pioneered by the ``High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area'' (HIDTA), is developed as part of the
gang strategy. Cross designation of local prosecutors, sharing of
intelligence and cross-jurisdictional efforts have made the HIDTA a
very strong model upon which to base other efforts.
This approach has much to commend it but, I would suggest, needs to
be reexamined in light of the existing drug program.
A majority of gang enterprise centers on the drug trade, and while
there may be occasions where drug trafficking does not play a
predominate role in the economic enterprise of a gang; it is inevitable
that most HIIGA and HIDTA will be in large degree the same geographical
areas. Given the scarcity of resources it can be anticipated that there
will be a de facto* merger of HIIGA and HIDTA efforts as staff for each
wear more then one ``hat.'' To be very honest most of us don't have the
resources available to staff two over-lapping efforts of this nature.
I would suggest that the Community Protection Act should recognize
this overlap and provide for an existing HIDTA to assume the additional
role or responsibilities of a HIIGA, with additional resources as
appropriate. The Attorney General should be given the latitude to merge
the efforts when there is substantial overlap of effort.
We have seen what can occur when different agencies work the same
problem on a competitive basis. Much has been made of the failure of
the intelligence efforts by the various Federal intelligence and law
enforcement agencies after 9/11. This is the opportunity to prevent
this from occurring in fighting gang violence and drug dealing.
Attacks On Our Criminal Justice System
We've recently seen a spate of attacks on judges and new concerns
about the safety of those participating in our justice system. Judges,
prosecutors and even defense counsel have been the subject of threats
and attacks for years but I would offer to you the premise that these
attacks on our system of criminal justice have also been ongoing for
many years through witness intimidation.
Unlike many of our South American allies we have not yet seen the
systemic attack on court officials by organized gangs but we have seen
their efforts at intimidate and eliminate those who would witness
against them. It is not much of a stretch from murdering a witness to
the assassination of Paul McLaughlin.
The Gang Deterrence and Community Protection Act acknowledges the
need to provide funds to prosecutors for witness protection and efforts
to end gang violence. We understand that other efforts are being
considered to the crisis we are experiencing in protecting our system
of criminal justice and we want to work with you to ensure the sanctity
of our justice system.
project safe neighborhood (psn)
While outside the scope of consideration of the Gang Deterrence and
Community Protection Act I want to endorse the continuation of Project
Safe neighborhood as a very vital ancillary effort to what you are
trying to do today. As noted previously PSN is a collative effort
between federal and local law enforcement. It has become a very
important part of community crime fighting strategies in many part of
our nation. I would advance that it can become a keystone of your
efforts to fight gang violence but it must be noted that during the
last budget cycle the amounts made available for local efforts were
severely curtailed. If this is to truly be a keystone in the gang
violence effort then you need to provide resources to keep pace with
those available to the federal system.
Funding for Local Prosecution Efforts
We need to be proactive in our communities to identify gang threat
early and respond decisively. I can tell you that the resources of
every local prosecutor in the United States are stretched thin now.
To be very honest we need financial assistance to place local
prosecutors with the HIIGA; to get the computers to track gang efforts,
to conduct authorized electronic surveillance of gang members and to
train our line prosecutors in the dynamics of this threat.
To support what you envision with the ``Gang Deterrence and
Community Protection Act'' we will very desperately need the funding
assistance you offer.
On behalf of America's prosecutors I, and the National District
Attorneys Association, urge you to take steps to provide federal
assistance to state efforts to fight our gang problems and to provide
us with the resources to effectively protect those brave enough to
confront the gang criminals. As President next year I plan to make this
a priority issue for our members.
We look forward to continuing to work with you on addressing this
growing problem.
Mr. Forbes. Michelle Guess.
TESTIMONY OF MICHELLE GUESS, EDGEWOOD, MD
Ms. Guess. Good afternoon. My name is Michelle Guess. I am
here to tell you about the devastating impact of gang violence
in our community. My family and I have, and still continue, to
suffer from gang violence. We are, and always have been, law-
abiding people and rely on our faith to help guide us.
Three years ago, my family and I moved from Philadelphia
here to the State of Maryland in the suburbs. In Philadelphia,
we enrolled our children in charter schools because of the poor
education and the dangerous environment in the Philadelphia
public schools. We moved to the suburbs because we thought we
could get away from the dangers of life in Philadelphia. How
wrong we were.
My husband and I enrolled our children here in Maryland
schools. I have nine children, and my husband and I were
together for 22 years. My husband was a minister and was
planning to start our church just before he was killed. We
lived in a nice community, and, we thought, a safe one. Yet I
soon learned about the growing problems of gangs.
Just before this Christmas, a gang member killed my
husband, and he just happened to be a friend of my daughter,
went to school with her. These gangs in the community where I
live at, they don't look like the normal gangs, or dress like
normal gang people. They live in good homes, I mean, very good
homes. And their parents don't even know that a lot of them are
a part of these gangs. They're not even allowed to tell their
parents. And it is very hard in raising my nine children and
knowing I can't even allow my kids to go to any of their
friends' homes because I don't know who lives in their
household.
We had an incident where my daughter was over at a friend's
of hers home, and it was very hard for me to allow her to be
there. I literally went and dragged her out of their home
because we found out that the gentleman that was visiting is
from another State and he was a Blood, and, when I found out
that he was in that home, I went and dragged my daughter out of
there. I can't even allow my kids to go in any of my neighbors'
homes because I don't know who lives in there. You will not
recognize them just by looking at them.
My 10-year-old son's here with me. That last year, a friend
of his, they had reported that he'd possibly gotten shot or
whatever. He's 10 years old. And he told my son that he was a
part of a gang. He was like a runner, drug run for these--
because they don't expect the children. And when my son told me
that, that is very fearful for a mother, for any parent, that
in our community we can't even tell who's who. That's scary.
And we as parents and as authority figures have to protect
our children. We have to protect our community. We can't put a
price on the life of a child, the life of our children. We
can't.
When someone does something wrong, they must pay for what
they have done, regardless. Yes, I agree that we need to do
prevention, but we need to give them the opportunity. They must
make the decision, just like they made the decision to shoot my
husband. They made that decision, and, whatever decision they
make, there are consequences and we must understand that we
cannot put a price on our children. Our children are our
tomorrow.
They go to these gangs because these gangs promise to
protect them. Why don't our children come to us? Because we
turn our face from them and we put our hands under the table
and we let these gangs run the life of our children, our own
life, when we can't even live, we can't even enjoy life because
we allow them, because we want to put a price on the life. We
can't put a price on a life. When that life is taken from you,
you can never put a price on life.
We must do whatever. We have to, to protect our children,
our community, our neighbor. We have to. We have to. Thank you.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Guess follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michelle Guess
Good morning. My name is Michelle Guess. I am here to tell you
about the devastating impact of gang violence in our communities. My
family and I have, and still continue, to suffer from gang violence. We
are, and always have been, law-abiding people, and we rely on our faith
to help guide us.
Three years ago, my family and I moved from Philadelphia here to
the Maryland suburbs. In Philadelphia we enrolled our children in
charter schools because of the poor education and dangerous environment
in the Philadelphia public schools. Our neighborhood was controlled by
gangs and gang violence. Our schools were filled with gang members. We
moved to the Maryland suburbs because we thought we could get away from
the dangers of life in Philadelphia. How wrong we were.
My husband and I enrolled our children here in Maryland public
schools. I have nine children and I was married to my husband for 22
years. My husband was a minister and was planning to start his own
church in Maryland just before he was killed. We lived in a nice
community--we thought a safe one. Yet, I soon learned about the growing
problem of gangs. My children were threatened in school. They were
bullied and threatened to join a gang or suffer the violent
consequences. My children lived in fear--gang members made it clear
that if kids reported the gang's efforts to recruit new members, their
parents would be threatened.
Just before Christmas, a gang member killed my husband by shooting
him in the head for no reason other than complying with a gang
initiation requirement--murder of an innocent civilian. My husband was
working late driving a taxi and was lured by gang members to a
neighboring street to our home, where he was shot and killed--nothing
more than a random gang initiation ritual. My husband did nothing
wrong. He loved his family and all of his children. He was simply a
random and convenient victim of this violent gang.
I am here today because I believe so strongly that we need to stop
gangs now--and stop them dead in their tracks. My husband would be
alive today if the gang that killed him was in jail. We have to stop
gang behavior and the evil spread of gangs. Nothing we can do will
bring my husband back. But we can do something to stop gangs now. To
make sure that families like mine do not go through such a horrible
event, I am here today to tell you that the gang problem is real and
that we must do everything in our power to stop it so that our
communities can be safe.
Mr. Forbes. Professor Shepherd, you have 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT E. SHEPHERD, JR., EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF
LAW, UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND SCHOOL OF LAW, RICHMOND, VA
Mr. Shepherd. Chairman Forbes, Congressman Scott, Members
of the Committee, I thank you for this opportunity to be with
you. I feel very much at home with Congressman Forbes and
Congressman Scott, being two highly distinguished alumni of the
Virginia General Assembly, where I have appeared for many
years.
First, like Chairman Forbes, I would like to thank
Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia for his successful efforts
in 2004 as part of the appropriation process to fund anti-gang
activities which had been cut in the budget presented by the
President. These funds have helped to contribute to efforts to
suppress gangs in Virginia, especially in the Northern part of
the State.
I also want to thank Congressman Bobby Scott of Virginia
for his successful contributions through the years to
bipartisan efforts in support of the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act, which has been the best possible
vehicle for protecting society from anti-social behavior by
children and adolescents, and for enabling these youth to
become good citizens.
Second, I urge this Subcommittee and Congress to reject the
approaches taken in H.R. 1279 regarding juveniles, particularly
section 115, as being counterproductive to protecting the
safety of the community and as contrary to the best evidence of
what works well with youth who may engage in serious and
violent delinquent behavior.
My first concern is about the continued federalization of
the substantive criminal law, historically the domain of the
States. I share the concerns of the Judicial Conference of the
United States expressed in its letter of April 1 regarding the
specific problems presented by federalizing behavior by
juveniles. Federal courts are not really equipped to address
the particular issues and needs of adolescents, and Federal
correctional institutions do not have the programs suited to
young people, as the Judicial Conference readily acknowledges.
In fact, most youth tried and convicted in Federal courts end
up in State facilities because there is no Federal juvenile
justice facility.
Second, addressing specifically section 115, the increased
use of transfer to adult court of juveniles is unwise and
contrary to evidence regarding the implications of transfer or
certification. Every recent study by researchers in Florida,
Minnesota, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania are
consistent in showing that youth transferred to adult court and
tried as adults had higher recidivism rates. They reoffended
sooner after release from adult institutions. And their repeat
offenses were more serious than similar youth retained in
juvenile court for the same offenses in the same or comparable
jurisdictions.
I would also point out that in the context of this
particular issue, sending a juvenile convicted of gang activity
into an adult institution dominated perhaps by gangs may be
entirely counterproductive. Juveniles incarcerated in adult
institutions are also at greater risk of assaults, and the
research clearly shows that policies that increase the transfer
of juveniles to adult court have a disproportionate impact on
children of color.
Making the decision whether to transfer a youth charged
with gang-related violent behavior to the Federal court solely
a prosecutorial decision which is not reviewable by a court is
also unwise. I would note that that unreviewability might even
prevent an examination of whether the juvenile is competent to
stand trial.
The mandatory minimum provisions are also problematic.
Juveniles involved in gang activity may not be equally
culpable. They may have been lookouts rather than trigger men.
As Bob Schwarts of the Juvenile Law Center in Philadelphia is
fond of saying, Oliver Twist, the ``Artful Dodger,'' Bill
Sikes, and Fagin were not equally culpable in their criminal
activity in Dickens' London, but they would be under this bill.
A report released last year by Fight Crime: Invest in Kids
gives a good blueprint of what should be done from the
perspective of law enforcement about dealing with young people
in gangs, and I recommend it to the attention of the Committee.
In wrapping up, I would like to say to the Committee that
the best way of dealing with a lot of these issues, as many of
the other speakers have indicated, is through an effective
partnership between local prosecutors and Federal prosecutors,
supported by technical assistance and resources from the
Federal Government, especially through the Federal Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shepherd follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am Robert E. Shepherd,
Jr., Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Richmond Law School
in Virginia, and a former Chair of the Juvenile Justice Committee of
the American Bar Association. I am here to present testimony on H.R.
1279, the ``Gang Deterrence and Community Protection Act of 2005,'' and
I thank you for the opportunity to speak to you about this bill.
First, I would like to thank Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia for
his successful efforts in 2004 as part of the appropriation process to
fund anti-gang activities, which has contributed greatly to efforts to
suppress gangs in Virginia, especially in the northern part of the
state. I also want to thank Congressman Bobby Scott of Virginia for his
successful contributions through the years to bipartisan efforts in
support of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA).
That Act, originally enacted more than thirty years ago, has
contributed greatly to the prevention of delinquency, to early
intervention in the suppression of delinquency, to treating delinquent
behavior and rehabilitating delinquent youth so as to prevent future
delinquency, and to ensuring humane treatment of these young people in
the juvenile justice system. The Act, and its programs, is still the
best possible vehicle for protecting society from antisocial behavior
by children and adolescents and for enabling these youth to become good
citizens and successful adults.
Second, I urge the subcommittee and the Congress to reject the
approaches taken in H.R. 1279 regarding juveniles, particularly in
Section 115 concerning juveniles, as being counter-productive in
protecting the safety of the community and as contrary to the best
evidence of what works well with youth who may engage in serious and
violent delinquent behavior. My first concern is about the continued
federalization of the substantive criminal law, historically the domain
of the states. State and local governments are best informed about what
would be successful in addressing a crime problem locally or within a
state, although there may be an important federal role in providing
technical assistance and intelligence about unique problems. Virginia,
for example, has enacted a number of laws in recent years to address
gang-related criminal activity, including a gang registry, most of
which apply to juveniles as well as adults. I share the concerns of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, expressed in its letter of
April 1, 2005, regarding the specific problems presented by
federalizing criminal behavior by juveniles. Federal courts are really
not equipped to address the particular issues and needs of adolescents,
and federal correctional institutions do not have the programs suited
to young people, as the Judicial Conference readily acknowledges.
Indeed, most youth tried and convicted as juveniles in federal courts
are placed in state juvenile correctional facilities because there is
no federal counterpart.
Third, addressing specifically Section 115, the increased use of
transfer to adult court of juveniles, even sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds, is unwise and contrary to much evidence regarding the
implications of transfer or certification. Several recent studies, by
researchers in Florida, Minnesota, New York and New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania, are consistent in showing that youth transferred to adult
court and tried as adults had higher recidivism rates, they re-offended
sooner after release from adult institutions, and their repeat offenses
were more serious than similar youth retained in juvenile court for the
same offenses in the same or comparable jurisdictions. (Lanza-Kaduce,
Frazier, Lane & Bishop; Greene & Dougherty; Fagan; Mayers; Podkopacz &
Feld; Coalition for Juvenile Justice) Thus, treatment as an adult
created a greater risk for community safety in the long term than did
juvenile treatment. A Miami Herald study of the Florida experience in
2001 concluded that ``[s]ending a juvenile to prison increased by 35
percent the odds he'll re-offend within a year of release.'' (Greene &
Dougherty) Although there are no studies I know of on this particular
point, it seems logical that sending a juvenile tried as an adult for
gang-related offenses to an adult facility dominated by gangs would
intensify that reported effect.
Juveniles incarcerated in adult correctional institutions are also
at greater risk of assaults, both sexual and physical. Studies show
that such youth are five times as likely to report being a victim of
rape, twice as likely to be beaten by staff, and 50% more likely to be
assaulted with a weapon than youth in juvenile facilities and they are
eight times more likely to commit suicide. (Audi; Forst, Fagan &
Vivona) Would not the fear of such assaults drive the youth even
further into the arms of adult gang members in the same institution for
protection?
Policies that increase the transfer of juveniles to adult court
also have a disproportionate impact on children of color. Recent
studies have shown that more than seven out of every ten youth admitted
to adult facilities across the country were youth of color, and
minority youth are more likely to be treated as adults that white youth
charged with the same offenses. (Poe-Yamagata; Ziedenberg; Males &
Macallair; Coalition for Juvenile Justice)
Making the decision whether to transfer a youth charged with gang-
related violent behavior to the federal court for trial as an adult
solely a prosecutorial decision which is not reviewable by a court is
also unwise, and violates our basic concepts of due process and fair
play. The legislation also allows any other offenses committed that are
not covered by the Act to be tried as adult offenses, including lesser
included offenses, thus putting some perhaps trivial charges in federal
district courts as well. The bill provides no exception to non-
reviewability for jurisdictional issues such as non-age--a fifteen-
year-old mistakenly identified as being older--or for young people who
may not be competent to stand trial as an adult, a high risk scenario
as many youth who engage in risky behaviors have mental health
problems. The Virginia statute that allows a prosecutor to seek adult
handling provides that the juvenile court still has to find the
presence of probable cause and that the juvenile is competent to stand
trial. And the adult court can reconsider the prosecutor's decision and
treat the youth as a juvenile in making sentencing decisions.
Fourth, the mandatory minimum provisions in HR 1279 are also
problematic, especially for adolescents. Judges should have broad
discretion in sentencing adolescents, even when they are tried and
treated as adults. As noted above, Virginia does this as part of its
statutory framework for transfer. Juveniles involved in gang-related
activity frequently have less culpability than the adults they
associate with in antisocial behavior, they may be a lookout rather
than a triggerman, and yet the legislation denies the court the power
to discriminate among different levels of involvement and different
kinds of behavior. As Bob Schwarts of the Juvenile Law Center in
Philadelphia is fond of saying, Oliver Twist, the ``Artful Dodger,''
Bill Sikes, and Fagin were not equally culpable in their criminal
activity in Dickensian London, but they would be under this bill. Also,
longer sentences are not necessarily better and more protective of
society, especially where juveniles are concerned.
Fifth, although juveniles charged as adults with capital offenses
cannot be sentenced to death under the federal death penalty statute or
Roper v. Simmons, does this legislation still expose them to a ``death-
qualified jury,'' especially if they are tried jointly with adults?
That question seems to linger in the air, without any clear answer
provided in the bill.
Recent data show a stark reduction in the rate and seriousness of
juvenile delinquency in the past nine or ten years, contrary to the
dire predictions of many ``experts'' whose ominous writings shocked
legislators into abandoning the core principles of the juvenile system.
Those principles, separating delinquent youth from hardened criminals,
treating youth as developmentally different from adults, and viewing
young people as being inherently malleable and subject to change in a
rehabilitative setting, are still fundamentally sound. Indeed, as we
have learned more from the developmental and brain research in recent
years, we know better what does work in turning around these young
lives and correcting their behavior. Several treatment programs for
juvenile offenders, even those charged with serious and violent
offenses, have been thoroughly evaluated and work well in reducing
recidivism. (E.g., Functional Family Therapy, Multidimensional
Treatment Foster Care, and Multisystemic Therapy--all are community-
based and deal with the youth in several different dimensions of his or
her life.) And we know that trying them as adults is destructive and
counter-productive, especially with mandatory minimum sentences.
A report released last year by Fight Crime: Invest in Kids, a law
enforcement-based group, points to the effectiveness of many current
programs in preventing gangs--at the local and state level--and in
interdicting violent gang activity. That report, Caught in the
Crossfire: Arresting Gang Violence by Investing in Kids, offers much
useful advice about programs that work with the help of federal
investment in anti-gang programs through the JJDPA and other entities.
I respectfully urge you to continue your historical focus on
funding delinquency prevention and intervention programs through the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, supplemented by
further technical assistance to, and collaboration with, local
authorities by the Justice Department and its entities, rather than
increasing federal district court jurisdiction over young people with
their different perspectives and characteristics. The Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, utilizing JJDPA funds, is
assisting in the sponsorship of the National Youth Gang Symposium in
early June in Orlando, Florida to focus on effective anti-gang
strategies with juveniles, and this is an example of the more effective
federal role in addressing gangs.
references
Coalition for Juvenile Justice, Childhood on Trial: The Failure of
Trying and Sentencing Youth in Adult Courts (2005).
Audi, Tamara, ``Prison at 14: Teenage Girls Serve Time with Adult
Inmates,'' Detroit Free Press, July 10, 2000.
Fagan, Jeffrey, The Comparative Impacts of Juvenile and Criminal Court
Sanctions on Adolescent Felony Offenders (National Institute of
Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 1991)
Fight Crime: Invest in Kids, Caught in the Crossfire: Arresting Gang
Violence by Investing in Kids (2004).
Forst, Martin, Jeffrey Fagan & T. Scott Vivona, ``Youth in Prisons and
Training Schools: Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-
Custody Dichotomy,'' 40 Juvenile & Family Court Journal (1989).
Greene, Ronnie & Geoff Dougherty, ``Kids in Prison: Tried as Adults,
They Find Trouble Instead of Rehabilitation,'' Miami Herald, March
18, 2001.
Lanza-Kaduce, Lonn, Charles E. Frazier, Jodi Lane & Donna Bishop,
Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court Study: Final Report (Florida
Department of Juvenile Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, 2002).
Males, Michael & Daniel Macallair, The Color of Justice: An Analysis of
Juvenile Adult Court Transfers in California (Building Blocks for
Youth, 2000).
Mayers, David L., Adult Crime, Adult Time: Punishing Violent Youth in
the Adult Criminal Justice System (Sage Publications, 2003).
Podkopacz, Marcy R. & Barry Feld, ``The End of the Line: An Empirical
Study of Judicial Waiver,'' 86 Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology 449 (1996).
Poe-Yamagata, E., And Justice for Some (National Council on Crime and
Delinquency, 2000).
Ziedenberg, Jason, Drugs and Disparity: The Racial Impact of Illinois'
Practice of Transferring Young Adult Offenders to Adult Court
(Building Blocks for Youth, 2002).
Mr. Forbes. We want to thank all of the witnesses for their
testimony.
Now we're going to enter another round where we're going to
be able to ask you some questions, if you don't mind responding
to those questions. We'll each only have 5 minutes to ask the
questions, so if you can, keep your answers as concise as
possible because we've got a short period of time. And all of
your written statements will be admitted to the record, without
objection.
I'm also going to admit to the record, without objection, a
letter from the Fraternal Order of Police with their
endorsement of this bill.
[The letter from the Fraternal Order of Police follows in
the Appendix]
Mr. Forbes. Now I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fitzgerald, I want to come back to you. You heard what
Mr. Conyers said regarding heavy and mandatory sentences as
they relate to breaking up gang activities. You've been where
the rubber meets the road. Can you tell us your feeling about
heavy and mandatory sentences and the effect they have on
breaking up this kind of violent gang activity?
Mr. Fitzgerald. Yes, Congressman. One of the problems we
face is if you look at the statistics of the people who
actually commit murders, I believe 80 percent of the people who
commit homicides in Chicago have been arrested something like
seven or eight times before. Also, the victims, I think, have
been arrested almost as many times. And you have people who
have gone through a revolving door of being arrested and going
back out to the street and remaining are predators on the
street and posing a risk to others.
And if you identify those persons most likely to kill,
those are the people we seek to prosecute both by
incapacitating them, removing them from that housing project
where the other residents are held captive, and secondly, using
them to leverage, frankly, the deterrence value: to tell other
people in the community, you saw what happened to so-and-so who
had a reputation on the street. That person has now gone away
to Federal prison and he is serving time.
And, in fact, Johnny Cochran was one of the people that
participated in one of the Project Safe Neighborhood ads
showing people that if you carry a gun, these people are
serious. You're going away. I think he saw the value in
advertising and deterring what it is that we do by selecting
the most violent offenders, leveraging their penalties, and
using that to get them to cooperate and give up information
which lets us go up the food chain and get the gang leaders.
Mr. Forbes. Can you also tell us the Department of
Justice's opinion or their position regarding authorized direct
filing by prosecutors against 16- and 17-year-old juveniles who
are alleged to have committed criminal gang acts of violence
and what role, if any, that plays in dismantling violent gangs?
Mr. Fitzgerald. I'll start with the latter. I think the
Department of Justice is still working on the official
positions on the markup. I can tell you that if there were
direct file of juveniles, the volume of juveniles that would be
prosecuted would still be rather small. We are looking at
70,000 to 100,000 gang members in Chicago. In a good year,
where everyone works very hard, we're going to prosecute
hundreds of gang members, not thousands, not tens of thousands.
We do triage to pick out the worst offenders.
To prosecute a juvenile is still difficult, very difficult
now because of all the different procedures and the housing
issues. We would select out, certainly in my office, only those
offenders who merited the prosecution. If someone is committing
murders and they're at 17, compared to an 18-year-old, that's
an option we'd like to have to take out the most violent
offenders. We're not looking to make prosecution of juveniles a
volume business in the Federal Government. We can't, just by
the sheer numbers of gang offenders and the violence going on.
Mr. Forbes. Ms. Guess, can you tell us, the gang member
that shot your husband, can you tell us, the individual that
pulled the trigger, how old he was, and did he even know your
husband?
Ms. Guess. He was 17 years old and we believe he did know
who my husband was because he knew my daughter.
Mr. Forbes. Do you have any idea of the motive, why he
killed your husband?
Ms. Guess. Gang initiation.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Shepherd, you talked about in your written
statement and also in your verbal statements about prevention
programs. I know you've studied many of the prevention programs
in the United States Congress and the funding for those
programs, have you not, in your relationship as a juvenile
justice expert? And I certainly recognize what Mr. Scott said.
Can you tell us how much funding we should be spending for the
prevention programs for criminal gang activity at this
particular point in time?
Mr. Shepherd. Well, I think funding the authorization would
be a good place to start. What is authorized----
Mr. Forbes. Can you give me a dollar figure?
Mr. Shepherd. I don't know the exact figure. I'm----
Mr. Forbes. Can you give me a ballpark?
Mr. Shepherd. I can't. I'm sorry.
Mr. Forbes. So then right now, you really don't know how
much we're funding?
Mr. Shepherd. Well, I know that it's less than what is
authorized in the Act.
Mr. Forbes. Do you know how much is authorized?
Mr. Shepherd. The amount that's authorized in the Act would
be about $300, $400 million.
Mr. Forbes. If they were spending $300 or $400 million on
prevention programs, do you think that would be adequate?
Mr. Shepherd. Well, not adequate, but keep in mind that the
way that Federal money is used is with matching funds from the
State through the various State Advisory Groups, which I'm a
member of in Virginia, and we get matching funds from the
localities as well as from the State. So the Federal money is
basically seed money that helps to generate additional funds
throughout the Commonwealth of Virginia for a whole variety of
programs, including some of the Boys and Girls Clubs programs
and some of those programs are also earmarked under the Federal
Act directly, so the money comes into Virginia directly from
the Federal Government. But the programs basically are
generated by the Federal Government through the State to the
localities to target programs.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you. My time has expired.
I would like to now recognize Congressman Scott for 5
minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Logli, Ms. Guess has described a cold-blooded murder.
You don't need any new Federal legislation to prosecute such a
crime, do you?
Mr. Logli. Assuming it didn't happen on a military base,
something of that nature, we would handle it as a local matter.
In Illinois, we have mandatory minimum sentences and that----
Mr. Scott. For a cold-blooded murder like that, if a person
is caught and prosecuted, what would present law provide for
them?
Mr. Logli. He would face a mandatory minimum sentence of 20
years.
Mr. Scott. Without--and what would they usually get?
Somebody just shoots somebody in cold-blooded murder.
Mr. Logli. I think we'd be looking at 30 or 40 years, 50
years, perhaps. And in Illinois, we have truth in sentencing,
so with murder, they serve every day. There is no good time.
Mr. Scott. So what difference would this bill make?
Mr. Logli. I believe this bill may not make a difference in
that type of street murder----
Mr. Scott. Okay. I only have 5 minutes.
Mr. Logli. Okay.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Shepherd, are you aware of any peer-reviewed
studies that would suggest that the provisions of this bill
would actually reduce crime?
Mr. Shepherd. The techniques that are incorporated in this
bill have pretty well been proven not to reduce crime,
especially where juveniles are concerned, who are not
specifically deterred. I mean, they act, as the Supreme Court
noted in the death penalty case, on the basis of impulse.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. And Mr. Fitzgerald, are you aware of
best practices to actually reduce crime and whether or not
those provisions are in this bill or could be found elsewhere?
Mr. Fitzgerald. Best practices? We found that the best
practice is, for example, to go after the worst offenders, if I
give the example of the ``Top 20'' list----
Mr. Scott. Have you seen any published studies of best
practices, how to reduce juvenile crime?
Mr. Fitzgerald. We don't read published studies. We sit
down with the people enforcing the law and exchange ideas that
have been tried----
Mr. Scott. Does the Department of Justice have a website
that outlines best practices?
Mr. Fitzgerald. I know we had a conference which I helped
organize last month about best practices for gangs. As far as
juveniles, I'd have to get back to you on that, since----
Mr. Scott. Are those best practices reflected in this
legislation?
Mr. Fitzgerald. I'd have to get back to you on that, on
whether or not--what publications it might be, how it
corresponds to the bill.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Mr. Shepherd--well, let me ask, there's a
provision in here that provides for gang crimes and it appears
to suggest that if you belong to the gang, therefore, you would
be guilty. Everybody in the gang would be guilty. Do you read
it that way?
Mr. Fitzgerald. I don't believe so. I think that that
provision of section 521, and the Department of Justice is
doing a review of the bill, requiring, I think, that there be
three or more persons that have to participate in a crime. I
don't----
Mr. Scott. That to be found guilty, you would actually have
to have some participation in the crime?
Mr. Fitzgerald. In a crime or conspiracy, mere membership
alone would not be a crime, is my understanding.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Well, how is that different from the
conspiracy law now?
Mr. Fitzgerald. It depends on the offense you commit. In
conspiracy law, if there's a drug offense, you could be guilty
of a drug offense now, where if there's a non-drug offense, the
predicate offenses in the proposed bill would depend on the
violation you commit.
Mr. Scott. What kind of situation would exist where you
could prosecute somebody under the bill that you could not
prosecute them under normal conspiracy law?
Mr. Fitzgerald. Most likely, it would be where gangs are
not involved in drug trafficking. In Chicago, for example,
gangs are heavily involved in drug trafficking, but at that
conference I----
Mr. Scott. Help me out here. Let's talk about a specific
defendant. Let's talk about a specific defendant. If you can't
get them for conspiracy now, how could you get them under the
bill?
Mr. Fitzgerald. If the conspiracy to commit an offense--
conspiracy is a way to commit another offense--if the offense
that they're committing is not now punished under the drug
statutes, if it were a violent crime that's not directly
related to drug trafficking, that's my understanding. I
haven't----
Mr. Scott. So if a person has no involvement in a
particular crime that you can't get them for conspiracy, you
can get them roped in because they are a member of the gang?
Mr. Fitzgerald. No. What I meant to say was, if the gang is
not involved in drug trafficking or you can't prove the gang is
not involved in drug trafficking, you would not be able to
charge them with a drug conspiracy. But if they got involved in
extortions and robberies and assaults and attempted murders,
you would use--you could use that statute to charge that.
Mr. Scott. Even if the defendant had no role in the crime?
Mr. Fitzgerald. If the----
Mr. Scott. For which you could not get them for a
conspiracy.
Mr. Fitzgerald. No. I think I confused you. I meant, if you
couldn't charge them with drug conspiracy----
Mr. Scott. No, if a person--if you can't get a person for
conspiracy, can you get them under the bill for a crime for
which they could not be charged--but, I mean, you can jump
around and say, well, you might have charged them for this or
that, but if they're involved in a conspiracy, you've got them,
right?
Mr. Fitzgerald. A conspiracy is always tied to a specific
offense. We have to prove it to a jury.
Mr. Scott. Okay.
Mr. Fitzgerald. So if the conspiracy was for a crime that
isn't now a Federal crime for which there's Federal
jurisdiction, this would make a difference, and my example for
drugs is if you have a drug conspiracy, you could charge
someone now with a drug conspiracy. But if there're
conspiracies to get robberies and assaults carried out by an
enterprise of three or more members as part of a gang, that
would not violate the drug conspiracy laws because the assaults
may be unrelated to drugs.
Mr. Scott. That's right, but you could get them for
violating the robbery laws, couldn't you now?
Mr. Fitzgerald. But to get a Federal violation of robbery,
you need an interstate commerce element. So robberies are not a
Federal crime in and of themselves.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman's time has expired.
I would now recognize Representative Lungren for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very
interested in this subject. I think it does have issues of
Federalism. It does have issues of effective law enforcement.
As Attorney General of California, I was very much involved
with writing legislation in California dealing with violent
laws, or violent crimes. Actually, we utilized a number of the
things that are suggested in this bill at the State level. Over
an 8-year period of time, we saw the lessening of violent
crimes by about 35 percent and a drop in the homicide rate of
50 percent in 8 years utilizing many of the same things that
are in this bill, or that approach, at least, at the State
level.
I still am concerned sometimes about federalization of all
crimes, but I note also we've been extremely successful in
allowing participation of Federal prosecutors in those
appropriate places where oftentimes the penalties were greater
than they were on the State level going after the worst
malefactors involved.
Professor Shepherd, I wondered, in your written submitted
testimony, you assert that the objective of handling violent
and delinquent juveniles is a question of dealing with anti-
social behavior, and I'm always interested in that because that
suggests that a juvenile is involved in anti-social behavior
but an adult is involved in criminal behavior. Do you
distinguish between a 17-year-old, 6 months who commits a
murder like Ms. Guess's husband was the victim of and if he
were 18 years old and a day?
Mr. Shepherd. Well, we certainly make distinctions about
that in every other aspect of the law. When it comes to
contracts and now the death penalty and a lot of other things,
we draw arbitrary bright lines and every State does in its
jurisdiction. Obviously, States do have mechanisms for
transferring some juveniles to adult court for particular types
of behavior, and I don't find that inappropriate if it's used
judiciously. I think California does a better job of that than,
say, Florida does and some other States where it is, indeed, a
last resort rather than being almost automatic based on the
nature of the offense.
Mr. Lungren. As I understand here, this section 115 of this
proposed legislation would authorize the Attorney General to
charge as an adult in Federal court a juvenile who is 16 years
or older and commits a crime of violence, but not mandate it.
Mr. Shepherd. That's correct.
Mr. Lungren. So that would be judicious application, you
would hope, by the Attorney General. You wouldn't object to
giving him that authority, would you?
Mr. Shepherd. I have some concerns about it because of the
broad implications of what may be gang activity where the
juvenile's involvement may be far less than it would be if he
were being charged with the specific offense the person engaged
in.
Mr. Lungren. Even though, under section 115, it requires
the commission of a crime of violence.
Mr. Shepherd. Yes, it does, but he could be a lookout for a
crime of violence, and, in most States, that could be weeded
out through the judicial transfer process.
Mr. Lungren. In California, actually--you said positive
things about California--we allow, for certain violent crimes,
juveniles as young as 14 to be considered for adult court.
Initially, when I became Attorney General, I didn't support
that, but over the course of the period of time that I was
Attorney General, I saw the violence that was visited upon our
communities by gang members who were ever and ever younger,
and, actually, I championed and actually wrote the legislation
to allow that to occur.
And I think we're confronted with something that Ms. Guess
talks about, which is it makes very little difference to the
victim whether the perpetrator is 16 or 17 or 18. They're just
as damaged or just as dead. And I'm not trying to suggest it's
an easy question, but it is something that I have mulled over
in my mind as we had to deal with the tremendous violent
problem that we had, and I must say that, contrary to what you
suggest that this approach doesn't work, at least the facts
bear up in California where you have a 50 percent drop in
homicide rate among adults and among juveniles that I think
there were lives saved and there were people that were much
safer as a result.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Congressman.
Now we'd like to recognize for 5 minutes Mr. Conyers.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you very much.
See, the problem that we're having is that while we're
talking about transferring more punitive legislation to the
Federal level, we're cutting Federal funding for juvenile
justice, and I don't think that is going to work out too well.
We've found that this kind of a problem is going to lead us
into the two schools of thought, the one that an enlightened
former Member, Congressman Lungren, had which descended into a
very narrow, restricted, punitive type attitude which I hope he
is now reconsidering in coming back into the fold of those of
us who support bringing some sense to this problem, not just
punishment. As Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out, you can't get at all
of them through the courts. It's just too many. We've got to
begin to look more at some of these other problems that cause
it.
Mr. Paul Logli, did you know former Police Chief of Los
Angeles, Mr. William Bratton?
Mr. Logli. I'm certainly familiar with the name and his
reputation, sir.
Mr. Conyers. Sure. Right. What about the late Johnny
Cochran, the lawyer?
Mr. Logli. I'm certainly familiar with him, as well.
Mr. Conyers. Well, they're all recommending reports that
I'd like to commend to my colleagues on the Committee as well
as the witnesses, a report from Fight Crime: Invest in Kids,
and another, ``Childhood on Trial: The Failure of Trying and
Sentencing Youth in Adult Criminal Court.''
Mr. Fitzgerald, you would prefer, I assume, to keep most of
these trials, wherever practical, in the State courts?
Mr. Fitzgerald. I would presume that we would select out
those juveniles that we think merit particular attention for
Federal prosecution. That's why, as I think Congressman Lungren
pointed out, the bill talks about authorizing the transfer to
Federal court, not mandating it, because it would be for the
prosecutors to select those cases that are most egregious that
warrant Federal prosecution, such as a murder by a 17-year-old.
Mr. Conyers. Congressman Robert Scott has let me look at a
letter from the Judicial Conference of the United States dated
April 1 of this year to the Chairman of the Subcommittee, and
they make a point that I'd like to see if you'd agree with.
As you know, the primary responsibility for prosecuting
juveniles has traditionally been reserved for the States. The
Federal criminal justice system has little experience and few
resources to deal with more than the handful of juveniles that
currently are in the Federal system. The Judicial Conference
has maintained a longstanding position that criminal
prosecution should be limited to those offenses that cannot or
should not be prosecuted in State courts. At its September 1997
meeting, after similar legislation had been proposed by
conference, the Judicial Conference affirmed that this policy
is particularly applicable to the prosecution of juveniles.
Does that comport with your general view on the subject?
Mr. Fitzgerald. No, but I would say this, Congressman.
Here's what I have in mind. In the situation where there's a
housing project taken over by a gang and requires a Federal
prosecution to dislodge the gang from the project so that
everyone else who lives there can be sort of free, in that
circumstance, if we arrested 15 members who were involved in
murders and attempted murders and one was a 17-year-old, to
take the system and prosecute 14 people in the Federal system--
--
Mr. Conyers. Okay. Let me ask Professor Shepherd, what do
you think of the judges pleading with the Congress not to do
any more juvenile justice specialties out of judiciary because
they don't want it, they can't handle it, and it's more
appropriate at the State level?
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Shepherd, if you would respond to that
question--the gentleman's time has expired--we will put that
document in the record, without objection.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
Mr. Shepherd. I think that's been a consistent position,
Congressman Conyers.
Mr. Forbes. Now we recognize Congressman Delahunt from
Massachusetts for 5 minutes.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, I hope we have another round
here. This has been very informative.
I have a question for my colleague from California, Dan
Lungren, because he speaks to the issue of transfer from
juvenile to adult, my understanding is that in California, it's
not the prosecutor's call. There is judicial intervention in
the juvenile justice system that allows for transfer to the
adult system. I think that's the case in most States.
I served 22 years as the District Attorney and I certainly,
on the right kind of occasions, and I think that's what you're
referring to, Mr. Fitzgerald, aggressively pursue transfer to
the adult correctional facility because there are situations
where they are 17 or under, but given the right criteria, they
deserve to be prosecuted in the adult system.
So I think we've got to be very, very precise here.
District Attorney, is it Logli?
Mr. Logli. Logli.
Mr. Delahunt. Logli. I tend to agree with the former
Attorney General of the United States, who also was from
California, Mr. Meese, about the federalization of State
crimes. I mean, what's the position? You represent the National
District Association, the NDA here, and----
Mr. Logli. Thank you, Congressman. First off, we believe we
can handle the typical juvenile type of crime that we've been
discussing. But I looked at this legislation as more
importantly dealing with these transnational gangs, the adult
gangs, the violent gangs that are not only in this nation but
also come out of other nations in this hemisphere. And when I
looked at this bill from the standpoint of a local prosecutor,
I looked at the resources that Federal authorities, if they
have jurisdiction on certain crimes committed by these
transnational adult violent crimes, they can bring their
technical resources to bear that many States--our technical
resources are not as great as the Federal resources--wire taps,
eavesdrops, that type of thing.
Mr. Delahunt. I understand that, and that makes good sense.
Mr. Logli. Thank you.
Mr. Delahunt. But I mean, that can happen now. I mean, we
all, I'm sure in your experience and the U.S. Attorney's
experience, we've all worked with task forces. You know, I
don't know whether this adds anything to a particular task
force. We have a task force on gangs in the Boston area. We
have a task force on drugs. We have a task force on serious
things where we bring to bear, if you will, Federal resources
and where there are violations of criminal statutes and
violations of State criminal codes, we sit around the table and
talk and figure out where it goes.
I don't know what this really adds, particularly when you
give--I think in response to a question by Mr. Scott, we're
cutting juvenile justice funding. I mean, is this kind of a way
to paper over the fact that we're not committing the resources
that are necessary for local and State prosecutors, working
with U.S. Attorneys, to go out and to make sure these gangs are
disassembled? I mean, we can talk about mandatory sentences. We
can talk about a lot of different things. But the reality is,
what we're trying to do is reduce crime, and again, given the
observations made by my friend and colleague from California,
the former Attorney General in that State, I dare say, we don't
have a lot of mandatory crimes in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, but we did one, I think, outstanding job in
terms of reducing the incidence of homicide and all kinds of
violent crime to a point that was historical in nature because
we funded a comprehensive approach to juvenile justice.
Mr. Fitzgerald, do you have any comments?
Mr. Fitzgerald. I guess----
Mr. Delahunt. By the way, does RICO apply?
Mr. Fitzgerald. We can----
Mr. Delahunt. What about using--don't we have a RICO
statute? I mean, we're talking about gangs. Where's the
utilization of the RICO statute in terms of gangs?
Mr. Fitzgerald. I'll answer the two questions. The first
question, the reason why we'd need the option, for example, for
prosecuting a juvenile would be in the situation if there were
multiple murders or a murder with multiple perpetrators. If
there were five people who committed the murder and one was a
juvenile, it wouldn't make sense, if this was a Federal
prosecution at that housing project, to say, okay, we're going
to try this twice and put the victims and the witnesses through
the pain of two----
Mr. Delahunt. With all due respect, let me tell you
something, okay. If you come into my jurisdiction, when I was
the District Attorney in the greater Boston area and there were
five murders, you're not going to prosecute murders. You're
going to be part of a task force and I'm going to prosecute the
adults and the juveniles and most likely will prosecute the
juvenile in the adult system. So we don't need any Federal
statute to tell local prosecutors that they can't try murder
cases because, believe me, with all due respect to U.S.
Attorneys, they do a far superior job in prosecuting crimes of
violence than most U.S. Attorneys.
Mr. Fitzgerald. And I'll give you an example. What we do,
when we have prosecuted RICOs for drug offenses and murders
included, we often do that jointly with the State, bringing in
Assistant State's Attorneys as specials.
Mr. Delahunt. Cross-designations.
Mr. Fitzgerald. Cross-designation, and we decide which is
the most appropriate forum. When we took down the Mafia Insane
Vice Lords, we took 47 Federal and 58 State. My point is to say
that if we decide with the State's Attorney's Office, perhaps
with them joining our team in court to prosecute in Federal
court a RICO that involves drugs and murders, if there's one
juvenile in there and there are eight adults, it would put
everyone, the court system as well as the victims and
witnesses, through double the pain and the cost and the time if
we had to separate the juvenile out.
Mr. Delahunt. But there is concurrent jurisdiction, Mr.
Fitzgerald.
Mr. Fitzgerald. Yes.
Mr. Delahunt. And oftentimes, in my experience working with
the U.S. Attorney's Office in Boston, there would be concurrent
prosecutions. We would sequence them so that the State would
proceed first in cases where there was traditional State
jurisdiction, and if there were Federal violations
thereafterward, we'd have them incarcerated, and then if the
Feds wanted to prosecute them so that they can secure and on
and after sentence, that's what they would do.
Mr. Forbes. And with that closing statement, the
gentleman's time has expired.
I'd like to thank the witnesses for their testimony. The
Subcommittee very much appreciates your contribution.
In order to ensure a full record and adequate consideration
of this important issue, the record will be left open for
additional submissions for 7 days. Also, any written questions
that a Member wants to submit should be submitted within the
same 7-day period.
This concludes the legislative hearing of H.R. 1279, the
``Gang Deterrence and Community Protection Act of 2005.'' Thank
you for your cooperation. The Subcommittee----
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, we have letters----
Mr. Forbes. Oh, I'm sorry. All the letters will be
submitted, without objection, and will be recognized in the
record, and you have 7 days for any additional ones that you'd
like to put in.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:21 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on
the Judiciary
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Responses to Questions for the Record submitted by the Honorable
Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of
Illinois, U.S. Department of Justice
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Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas
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Letter from James D. Fox, Chief of the Newport News Police Department
to the Honorable J. Randy Forbes (March 29, 2005)
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Letter from Kenneth C. Bauman, member of the Board of Directors for the
National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys to the
Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 29, 2005)
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Letter from Michael A. Fry, General Counsel, Major Cities Chiefs
Association to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 15,
2005)
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Letter from Roy L. Burns, President, Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 20, 2005)
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Letter from Wesley D. McBride, President, California Gang Investigators
Association to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 25,
2005)
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Letter from Eddie J. Jordan, Jr., District Attorney of New Orleans to
the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 18, 2005)
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Letter from Donald Baldwin, Washington Director, Federal Criminal
Investigators Association to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
(April 22, 2005)
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Letter from Chuck Canterbury, National President, Fraternal Order of
Police to the Honorable J. Randy Forbes (April 4, 2005)
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Letter from Dennis Slocumb, International Executive Vice President,
International Union of Police Associations to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Arpil 26, 2005)
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Letter from James J. Fotis, Executive Director, The Law Enforcement
Alliance of America to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April
19, 2005)
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Letter from Sheriff Michael J. Bouchard, Vice President, Legislative
Affairs, and Sheriff James A. Karnes, President, Major County Sheriffs'
Association to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 20,
2005)
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Letter from Richard Delonis, President, National Association of
Assistant United States Attorneys to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (May 2, 2005)
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Letter from William J. Johnson, Executive Director, National
Association of Police Organizations to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 15, 2005)
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Letter from Felipe A. Ortiz, National President, National Latino Peace
Officers Association to the Honorale F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April
18, 2005)
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Letter from Thomas N. Faust, Executive Director, National Sheriffs'
Association to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 19,
2005)
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Letter from Casey L. Perry, Chairman, National Troopers Coalition to
the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (April 19, 2005)
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Letter from Tyrone Parker, Laura W. Murphy, et al. to the Honorable
Howard Coble and the Honorable Robert C. Scott (April 11, 2005)
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Letter from National Hispanic Organizations to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. and the Honorable John Conyers (April 20, 2005 and
May 10, 2005)
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Letter from the Association of Oil Pipe Lines, Business Civil
Liberties, Inc., et al., to the Honorable Howard Coble and the
Honorable Robert C. Scott (April 12, 2005)
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Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Tonya McClary, et al., to the Honorable
Howard Coble and the Honorable Robert C. Scott (April 4, 2005)
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Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, and Jesselyn McCurdy,
Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union to the Honorable
Howard Coble and the Honorable Robert C. Scott (April 15, 2005)
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Letter from Julie Stewart, President, and Mary Price, General Counsel,
Families Against Mandatory Minimums to the Honorable Howard Coble and
the Honorable Robert C. Scott (April 8, 2005)
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Letter from the Thomas W. Hiller, II, Federal Public Defender, and
Chair, Legislative Expert Panel, Federal Public and Community Defenders
to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. and the Honorable John
Conyers (April 21, 2005)
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Letter from Members of Congress to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. and the Honorable John Conyers, Jr. (April 19, 2005)
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Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference of
the United States to the Honorable Howard Coble (April 1, 2005)
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Letter from Janet Murguia, President and CEO, National Council of La
Raza to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. and the Honorable
John Conyers (April 13, 2005 and May 9, 2005)
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Letter from Virginia Coalition for Juvenile Justice to the Honorable J.
Randy Forbes (April 4, 2005)
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Letter from Coalition of National and Regional Organizations to the
Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. and the Honorable John Conyers
(April 8, 2005)
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Letter from Morna A. Murray, Co-chair, National Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Coalition to the Honorable F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. and the Honorable John Conyers (April 8, 2005)
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``Caught in the Crossfire: Arresting Gang Violence By Investing in
Kids,'' a report submitted by Fight Crime: Invest in Kids
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Jason Ziedenberg, ``What works to deter gangs?'' The Detroit Free
Press, April 12, 2005
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``DOJ Youth Violence and Youth Gang Prevention Best Practices Protocols
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QuickTime presentation, ``Adolescent Brain Development''
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__________
``Estimates of Prison Impact of H.R. 1279, '' submitted by the United
States Sentencing Commission
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``Childhood On Trial: The Failure of Trying & Sentencing Youth in Adult
Criminal Court,'' a report submitted by Coalition for Juvenile Justice
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Letter from David G. Wilson, Executive Director, Association of Former
Federal Narcotics Agents to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
(July 23, 2005)
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Nancy Bartley, ``Lawmakers rethinking hard line on sentencing of young
offenders,'' The Seattle Times, April 14, 2005
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