<DOC>
[110th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:33611.wais]
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S R&D BUDGET
PRIORITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 8, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-8
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington KEN CALVERT, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
NICK LAMPSON, Texas FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
JERRY MCNERNEY, California W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania JO BONNER, Alabama
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon TOM FEENEY, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BARON P. HILL, Indiana VACANCY
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation
HON. DAVID WU, Oregon, Chairman
JIM MATHESON, Utah PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
CHARLIE A. WILSON, Ohio JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky JO BONNER, Alabama
MIKE ROSS, Arizona ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
MIKE QUEAR Subcommittee Staff Director
RACHEL JAGODA BRUNETTE Democratic Professional Staff Member
COLIN MCCORMICK Democratic Professional Staff Member
SHEP RYEN Republican Professional Staff Member
AMY CARROLL Republican Professional Staff Member
MEGHAN HOUSEWRIGHT Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
March 8, 2007
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative David Wu, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Phil Gingrey, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 11
Written Statement............................................ 12
Prepared Statement by Representative Harry E. Mitchell, Member,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 13
Witnesses:
Mr. Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary of Science and Technology,
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 14
Written Statement............................................ 16
Biography.................................................... 30
Mr. Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 30
Written Statement............................................ 33
Biography.................................................... 37
Dr. Gerald L. Epstein, Senior Fellow for Science and Security,
Homeland Security Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Oral Statement............................................... 37
Written Statement............................................ 39
Biography.................................................... 45
Financial Disclosure......................................... 46
Mr. Jonah J. Czerwinski, Managing Consultant, IBM Global Business
Services; Senior Fellow, Homeland Security, IBM Global
Leadership Initiative
Oral Statement............................................... 47
Written Statement............................................ 48
Biography.................................................... 52
Ms. Marilyn Ward, Executive Director, National Public Safety
Telecommunications Council (NPSTC)
Oral Statement............................................... 53
Written Statement............................................ 55
Biography.................................................... 74
Discussion....................................................... 74
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary of Science and Technology,
Department of Homeland Security................................ 90
Mr. Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security................................ 96
Dr. Gerald L. Epstein, Senior Fellow for Science and Security,
Homeland Security Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies.......................................... 106
Mr. Jonah J. Czerwinski, Managing Consultant, IBM Global Business
Services; Senior Fellow, Homeland Security, IBM Global
Leadership Initiative.......................................... 109
Ms. Marilyn Ward, Executive Director, National Public Safety
Telecommunications Council (NPSTC)............................. 112
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S R&D BUDGET PRIORITIES FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2008
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. David Wu
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The Department of Homeland
Security's R&D Budget
Priorities for Fiscal Year 2008
thursday, march 8, 2007
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On Thursday, March 8, the Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation
of the Committee on Science and Technology will hold a hearing to
consider the President's fiscal year 2008 (FY 08) budget request for
research and development at the Department of Homeland Security. Agency
officials and outside observers will comment on budget priorities
within the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO).
2. Witnesses
The Honorable Jay M. Cohen (R.Adm., USN ret.) is the Under Secretary of
Science and Technology at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Mr. Vayl Oxford is the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) at DHS.
Dr. Gerald L. Epstein is the senior fellow for science and security in
the Homeland Security Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS).
Mr. Jonah J. Czerwinski is a senior fellow with the Global Leadership
Initiative at IBM. He is also a Senior Advisor for Homeland Security
Projects at the Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP).
Ms. Marilyn Ward (minority witness) is Executive Director of the
National Public Safety Telecommunications Council (NPSTC).
3. Brief Overview
<bullet> The FY 2008 budget request for the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is
$799.1 million. This is a $90.1 million (9.5 percent) decrease
from the FY 2007 enacted funding.
<bullet> The FY 2008 budget request for the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) is $569.1 million. This is an $80.9
million (17 percent) increase over the FY 2007 enacted funding.
The bulk of the increase is for research, development,
operations and systems acquisition.
<bullet> The S&T Directorate was reorganized into discipline-
oriented divisions in mid-2006. While the FY 2008 budget
request clarifies priorities among disciplines, there remains a
question of whether DHS' R&D portfolio is properly balanced.
The bulk of R&D funding goes towards biological and nuclear
detection research. It is unclear if these priorities are in
response to recognized risks or based on a completed risk
assessment.
<bullet> There is a problematic lack of balance between basic
and applied research and development. DHS dedicates the
majority (52 percent) of its R&D funding to ``product
transition'' (short-term development), while allocating only 11
percent to applied research and 13 percent to basic research.
The remainder funds operational activities. De-emphasizing
longer-term basic and applied research may curtail the ability
of DHS to react to emerging and future threats.
4. Background
Research and development at the Department of Homeland Security is
concentrated in the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate and
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The S&T Directorate has
responsibility for carrying out or coordinating nearly all federal
homeland security related research. DNDO was separated from S&T in 2005
to specifically coordinate all research, development, and operations of
technology to detect and report unauthorized transportation of nuclear
and radiological materials.
S&T Directorate Organization
The S&T Directorate was reorganized into six divisions by Under
Secretary Jay Cohen in mid-2006. The discipline-oriented divisions are
intended to reflect specific threats to public safety and critical
infrastructure. They include:
<bullet> Chemical and Biological: detection and mitigation of
chemical and biological weapons threats
<bullet> Explosives: detection of and response to conventional
(non-nuclear) explosives
<bullet> Human Factors: social science research to improve
detection, analysis, and understanding of threats posed by
individuals as well as how communities respond to disasters
<bullet> Infrastructure and Geophysical: identifies and
mitigates threats to critical infrastructure
<bullet> Border and Maritime: develops technologies for
surveillance and monitoring of land and maritime borders
<bullet> Command, Control, and Inter-operability: research and
development support for inter-operable communications and cyber
security
In addition to the six independent divisions, three offices
coordinate the Directorate's R&D activities with extramural researchers
and technology customers (typically other Directorates of DHS) and
facilitate technology transfer. As part of the extramural research
portfolio, the S&T Directorate funds the University Centers of
Excellence program, which supports research across a broad variety of
homeland security-related topics at university-based centers across the
country.
DNDO Organization
DNDO was created to coordinate federal efforts to detect and
respond to unauthorized transportation of nuclear or radiological
materials into and within the United States. DNDO, which reports
directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security, was transferred from
the S&T Directorate in 2005. DNDO is responsible for coordination of
federal agency efforts at DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), the
Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI),
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the State Department to
prevent the transport of nuclear and radiological materials across U.S.
borders. It also works with international partners on detection and
interdiction activities.
DNDO is responsible for research, development, testing and
evaluation of detection technologies; acquisition of detection
technologies; threat assessments; and technical support and training
for State, local, and Federal Government partners and first responders.
In 2006, DNDO completed a catalog of currently deployed global nuclear
detection assets and an assessment of current detection capabilities,
including an analysis of capability gaps across federal agencies.
5. FY 2008 Budget Request
S&T Directorate
In FY 2008, requested funding for the Science and Technology
Directorate is cut by $174M or 17.8 percent to $799.1 million. (TABLE
1) As in previous years, the request is strongly weighted towards
biological and chemical countermeasures research. This division
represents 29 percent of the overall Directorate budget. Other
priorities include research into explosives detection and mitigation,
which represents eight percent of the overall budget; and command,
control, and inter-operability, which also represents eight percent.
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The S&T Directorate also categorizes its research by timeline,
defining ``product transition'' as short-term (0-3 years) development;
innovative capabilities as mid-term (2-5 years) high-risk, high-payoff
applied research; and ``basic research'' as long-term (>8 years), high-
risk fundamental science. The remainder of the portfolio, including
testing and standards, laboratory operations, and policy work is
classified as ``other.'' The FY 2008 budget strongly favors short-term
development (TABLE 2), with just over 10 percent of funding dedicated
to basic research. The balance of research funding is overseen by the
Office of the Director of Research, which is also responsible for
integrating internal and external basic research into DHS missions and
S&T Directorate divisions.
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Within the S&T Directorate, the Administration requests reduced
funding for nearly every division, with the only increases going to the
relatively small Human Factors division and a nearly flat budget for
the Command, Control, and Inter-operability division. Additionally,
funding is cut significantly for University programs. A summary of some
the major division and office budgets follows:
Innovation
A significant funding increase is provided to the Office of
Innovation, which manages the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) grant program. However, the funding increase
will mainly support advanced technology development and demonstrations
and does not provide funding for the basic and applied research
priorities included in HSARPA's mandate. Additionally, $7.5 million of
the total $59.9 million is budgeted for the Scalable Composite Vessel
Prototype, a project to develop an improved hull for Coast Guard
skippers.
Chemical and Biological
Funding for R&D in this division stayed flat, but $84.1M in funding
was transferred to the new Office of Health Affairs for the operational
(non-R&D) components of three programs (BioWatch, the Biological
Warning and Incident Characterization (BWIC) system, and the Rapidly
Deployable Chemical Detection System) which monitor for releases of
biological or chemical weapons. The remaining budget will support R&D
for the next generation of BioWatch, which is a monitoring program for
detecting release of biohazards. This division represents by far the
largest budget priority in the S&T Directorate.
Command, Control, and Inter-operability (C2I)
Funding for C2I stayed relatively flat from FY 2007, but follows a
41 percent reduction from FY 2006. This division covers research into
cyber security, communications inter-operability, surveillance and
investigative technologies, and threat assessment. In FY 2007, funding
was cut for the emergent and prototypical technologies and rapid
prototyping portfolios in this division, which limited the DHS' ability
to address threats outside the existing divisions, perform basic
research to identify vulnerabilities and countermeasures, and quickly
address DHS-specific requirements for technologies.
Explosives
Funding for the explosives portfolio is reduced by $41.5 million or
40 percent from FY 2007 to $63.7 million. A portion of this reduction
in funding is a result of the completion of the Counter-MANPADS
program, which developed an airplane based defense against shoulder-
fired missiles. If the Counter-MANPADS program is not considered in the
budget calculation, the total funding for explosives countermeasures is
decreased from $86.6M to $63.7M, a reduction of $22.9 million or 26.4
percent.
Testing, Evaluation, and Standards
The requested funding for this division is $25.5 million, which is
relatively flat compared to FY 2007. This division is responsible for
activities that include coordinating the development of metrics for
equipment performance and certification, protocols for testing and
training, and evaluation of equipment.
University Programs
Funding for University Programs is reduced by $9.9 million (20
percent) from FY 2007 to $38.7 million. The S&T Directorate plans to
establish four new University Centers of Excellence--in spite of the
reduced funding--and improve the capabilities of Minority Serving
Institutions (MSIs) to conduct research in homeland security related
areas and incorporate MSIs into the University Centers program.
DNDO
In FY 2008, the Administration requests $561.9 million for DNDO
(TABLE 3). This request increases total funding for the Office by $80.9
million or 17 percent. The budget is increased for every component of
DNDO, with the bulk of the increase going towards Research,
Development, and Operations and Systems Acquisition.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
A summary of the major categories follows:
Management and Administration
The $3.5 million increase for Management and Administration
provides reimbursement to other federal agencies providing staff
members to DNDO as detailees and goes toward creating additional full-
time positions. Many of these staff support research, development, and
operations activities and aviation and maritime security activities. A
larger full-time, non-detailee staff will improve DNDO's ability to
conduct testing and evaluation and support improved acquisition
protocols that will result in use of better detection technology.
Research, Development, and Operations (RD&O)
Research, development, and operations (RD&O) activities within DNDO
include engineering and architecture for detection systems, high-risk
transformational R&D, technology assessments, operations support for
government partners, and the National Technical Nuclear Forensics
Center. Together, these components aim to support a seamless system of
nuclear detection from basic research through technology development
and implementation. The requested funding increase of $47.4 million or
17 percent will go primarily to transformational research and
development (up $22.9 million or 30 percent).
Within the transformational R&D portfolio, the FY 2008 priority
will be the initiation of several Advanced Technology Demonstrations
(ATDs). For example, one of the ATDs will focus on radioactive material
detection in various transit systems such as ship or airplane transit.
Other priorities will be port security, training for State and local
law enforcement, and assessing hand-held detection technologies.
Systems Acquisition
The budget request for systems acquisition activities of $208
million includes funding for deploying radiation monitors at ports of
entry and the Securing the Cities Initiative, which is a program to
deploy nuclear detection equipment at entryways into a city, including
ports, highways, and airports. New York City was the pilot city in
2006, and the Administration requests funding in FY 2008 to expand the
program. The requested $30 million (17 percent) increase in funding for
Systems Acquisition will go entirely toward this second phase of the
Securing the Cities Initiative.
6. Issues and Concerns
How does the Department of Homeland Security use risk assessments to
determine R&D priorities? The budget request for R&D at DHS raises a
number of concerns, some of which are ongoing from the inception of the
Department. The Department's mission is to reduce the vulnerability of
the United States to--and mitigate the effects of--threats, both
manmade and natural, but the overall justification of the DHS R&D
portfolio makes no indication that there was any threat used to inform
how research areas were prioritized. The S&T Directorate plans to issue
a five-year strategic plan in April 2007 that will include some input
from the Homeland Security Institute, a policy advisory board, on risk.
The lack of investment in risk assessment is wasteful at best and
potentially dangerous, as there is no basis for prioritizing
unexpectedly urgent threats. In one example cited by the Under
Secretary, following the liquid explosives threat to airplanes in
August 2006, it took the S&T Directorate two months to set up a
research program to evaluate the risks of and countermeasures against
liquid explosives. This delay hampered the ability of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to develop guidelines for
transporting liquids on planes, causing countless delays and problems
for travelers and airlines.
Is the balance between short- and long-term research at DHS
appropriate? What criteria does DHS use to determine the balance
between long- and short-term research? While the requested funding for
basic research within DHS S&T has more than doubled from FY 2007 to
approximately 13 percent in FY 2008, the Department's R&D portfolio
remains strongly weighted towards end-stage technology development with
funding for basic research well below the Under Secretary's goal of 20
percent of all research dollars. Likewise, DNDO does not give adequate
priority to basic research, requesting $100 million for
transformational R&D but only directing 11 percent ($11.1 million) of
that funding to basic research. The remainder funds technology
development.
The large proposed cuts to the University Centers of Excellence
program further reduce investment in basic research. Funding for
emergent and prototypical technologies, cut significantly in FY 2007,
also remains low. Emphasizing short-term research makes the Department
significantly less agile and responsive, locking it into a single
technological response to emerging and future threats.
How do DHS R&D priorities reflect the needs of customers, including
other Directorates within DHS, interagency partners, and State and
local governments? Under Secretary Cohen has said that the research
priorities of the S&T Directorate should directly serve ``customers''--
defined as users of DHS' research results and developed technologies.
To that effect, the Under Secretary established ``integrated product
teams'' comprised of officials from other DHS components who advise the
S&T Directorate on their technology needs, thus informing specific
research priorities. While these interdisciplinary teams are a step in
the right direction, the Department needs a much stronger focus on
integrating the opinions of interagency and outside partners. At least
10 agencies, including the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the
Department of Transportation (DOT) and others perform homeland
security-related R&D. However, there is no formal mechanism for
leveraging the R&D work of other agencies within DHS. Both the S&T
Directorate and DNDO have been criticized for ignoring the work and
advice of other federal agencies. Similarly, State and local officials,
including first responders, have complained that DHS is not responsive
to their requests and recommendations related to technology
development. The Department must development a formal mechanism for
responding to the final users of the R&D it supports.
Chairman Wu. I would like to call the Subcommittee to
order. We want to welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on
the fiscal year 2008 Research and Development budget for the
Department of Homeland Security. I want to offer a special
welcome to Under Secretary Jay Cohen, who joined the Department
of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate in
August, 2006. Your reputation as a problem-solver precedes you
from the Office of Naval Research.
I also want to welcome our other witnesses, who represent a
valuable pool of expertise across Homeland Security related
topics. Mr. Vayl Oxford is the Director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office at the Department of Homeland Security. Prior
to his appointment at DNDO, Mr. Oxford served as the Director
for Counter Proliferation at the National Security Council.
Dr. Gerald Epstein is a senior fellow for Science and
Security for Homeland Security at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. He has served at the Institute for
Defense Analysis and with the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy.
Mr. Jonah Czerwinski is a senior fellow for Homeland
Security with IBM's Global Leadership Initiative. He is also a
senior advisor for Homeland Security projects at the Center for
the Study of the Presidency.
Ms. Marilyn Ward is the Executive Director of the National
Public Safety Telecommunications Council; Representative
Gingrey will tell us a little more about her background in a
moment.
We look forward to hearing your thoughts on how to support
a world class R&D enterprise at the Department of Homeland
Security that keeps our communities safe.
When the Science Committee helped write the legislation
authorizing the R&D Programs at DHS, we envisioned an
organization that would support the Science and Technology
needs of people on the front lines of domestic security; from
first responders to computer security professionals, from
medical workers to civil engineers. Frankly, it has been a bit
of a rough start. We are familiar with management problems that
have caused a lack of focus on important R&D priorities and the
attrition of some of the best and brightest minds from the S&T
Directorate.
I have also heard some concerns from communities and cities
and users of some of the DHS technology, which feel that DHS
R&D Programs at the S&T Directorate and at DNDO have not been
entirely responsive to their needs.
But I do remain hopeful. Under Secretary Cohen has launched
an ambitious new management structure to insure a more cohesive
S&T Directorate. Hopefully the R&D results will flow smoothly
from the earliest research concepts to the most advanced
technology development. Only time will tell.
Under Secretary Cohen has admirably acknowledged the
problems within the S&T Directorate which is the first step in
formulating solutions. This committee stands ready to work with
all of you and your staffs to insure that we have a strong and
responsive research operation at DHS.
I am concerned, though, about the lack of a strategic plan
based on risk assessment that should be the basis for research
priorities within DHS. We can fund billions of dollars in
research, but if we don't pay attention to the risks we should
be addressing, we won't have the answers we need when we need
them. We can base research on anecdotal impressions of need,
but that is not the scientific approach that the American
people have a right to expect.
I strongly encourage you to carry out a detailed,
systematic, scientific risk assessment soon so that we know
whether our investments are in the right place. Nuclear threats
will obviously be a major part of any threat assessment. I am
especially eager to see signs of close cooperation between the
S&T Directorate and the DNDO. It is imperative that you all
take advantage of the complementary efforts of your offices and
avoid duplication.
I am committed to working with the Department to insure
that our R&D efforts there are successful in increasing our
knowledge of how to confront catastrophes, whether from human
or nature causes.
I look forward to hearing all of the witnesses' thoughts on
the fiscal year 2008 budget request and how that budget
supports science and technology to make our nation safer.
I now want to recognize my colleague and the Ranking Member
from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey, for his opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Wu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman David Wu
I would like to call the Subcommittee to order.
I want to welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on the FY08
research and development budget for the Department of Homeland
Security. I want to offer a special welcome to Under Secretary Jay
Cohen, who joined the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate in August 2006. Your reputation as a problem-
solver precedes you from the Office of Naval Research. I also want to
welcome our other witnesses, who represent a valuable pool of expertise
across homeland security-related topics. Mr. Vayl Oxford is the
Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at the Department of
Homeland Security. Prior to his appointment to DNDO, Mr. Oxford served
as the Director for Counter-proliferation at the National Security
Council. Dr. Gerald Epstein is a senior fellow for science and security
in the Homeland Security Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. He has served at the Institute for Defense
Analyses, and with the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy. Mr. Jonah Czerwinski is a Senior Fellow for Homeland Security
with IBM's Global Leadership Initiative. He is also a Senior Advisor
for Homeland Security Projects at the Center for the Study of the
Presidency. Ms. Marilyn Ward is the Executive Director of the National
Public Safety Telecommunications Council. Representative Gingrey will
tell us a little more about her background in a moment.
We look forward to hearing your thoughts on how to support a world-
class R&D enterprise at the Department of Homeland Security that helps
keep our communities safe.
When the Science Committee helped write the legislation authorizing
the R&D programs at DHS, we envisioned an organization that would
support the science and technology needs of people on the front lines
of domestic security--from first responders to computer security
professionals, from medical workers to civil engineers. Frankly, it's
been a rough start. We're familiar with management problems that have
caused a lack of focus on important R&D priorities and the attrition of
the best and the brightest minds from the S&T Directorate. I've also
heard from communities and cities which feel that DHS R&D programs at
the S&T Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)
have not been entirely responsive to their needs.
But I remain hopeful. Under Secretary Cohen has launched an
ambitious new management structure to ensure a more cohesive S&T
Directorate. Hopefully, the R&D results will flow smoothly from the
earliest research concepts to the most advanced technology development.
Only time will tell whether the changes Under Secretary Cohen has made
will bring about the radical improvements to the S&T Directorate that
our nation needs. Under Secretary Cohen has admirably acknowledged the
problems within the S&T Directorate, which is the first step in
developing a solution. This committee stands ready to work with Under
Secretary Cohen and all of his staff to ensure that we have a strong
and responsive S&T Directorate.
I am concerned though about the lack of a strategic plan or risk
assessment that should be the basis for research priorities within the
Department of Homeland Security. We can fund billions of dollars in
research, but if we don't pay attention to the risks we should be
addressing, we won't have the answers we need when we need them. We can
base research on anecdotal impressions of need, but that is not the
scientific approach that the American people have a right to expect. I
strongly encourage you to carry out a detailed, scientific risk
assessment soon, so that we know whether our investments are in the
right place. Nuclear threats will obviously be a major part of any
threat assessment. I am especially eager to see signs of close
cooperation between the S&T Directorate and Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office. It is imperative that you take advantage of the complementary
efforts of your offices and avoid duplication.
I am committed to working with the Department of Homeland Security
to ensure that R&D investments are successful in increasing our
knowledge of how to confront catastrophes, whether from human or
natural causes. I look forward to hearing all of the witnesses'
thoughts on the FY08 budget request and how that budget supports
science and technology to make our nation safer.
I now want to recognize my colleague and the Ranking Member from
Georgia, Dr. Gingrey, for his opening remarks.
Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you and in the interest of
full disclosure I want to say that I do know Dan Quayle, and I
am a lot like him. I can't spell tomato or potato, and I don't
know if I could give the best impersonation of him like my
colleague did of President Clinton, but if I stumble, forgive
me. It is my staff. They gave me remarks that are written in
very small type, and I will talk to them about that later.
Great to be with my Chairman this morning at this important
hearing. I want to thank him for holding the hearing on science
and technology developments at the Department of Homeland
Security, and also a special thank you to our esteemed panel of
witnesses, taking time to dialogue with us about the role that
science and technology is playing in securing our nation.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe our nation's scientific
enterprise remains a critical component of national security.
The efforts of the Science and Technology Directorate and the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office contribute to the
preparedness of our nation against terrorism and nuclear
disasters. These organizations tap into the limitless
creativity of our nation's scientists and engineers to bring
cutting-edge technology to those defending our nation, from
servicemen and women to border patrol agents and first
responders.
I am particularly pleased to welcome Under Secretary Cohen
and Mr. Vayl Oxford to this subcommittee hearing. Gentlemen,
your service to our great nation is greatly appreciated. I very
much enjoyed meeting both of you earlier this week. That was my
pleasure, and I look forward to continuing the conversations we
started in regards to the exciting opportunities that
scientific research is providing to securing our homeland. This
committee is committed to supporting your work and helping you
create both a balanced and innovative research portfolio.
And I would like to take this opportunity to thank Ms.
Marilyn Ward for joining us today to take part in this
discussion. Ms. Ward's organization, the National Public Safety
Telecommunications Council, includes representatives from many
different first responder communities. Such representatives
include the International Association of Chiefs of Police,
emergency managers, as well as fire chiefs. Ms. Ward, I look
forward to hearing from you on how the Department's research
and the development activities can further support our nation's
first responders.
In particular, your appearance will allow us to examine one
highly-influential program in the Science and Technology
Directorate, and that is the Office for Inter-operable
Communications, and I know you will tell us about that. This
office has worked for the last several years with first
responders to improve the inter-operability of communication
equipment, and that work continues today in cooperation with
the new Office of Emergency Communications within DHS
Preparedness Directorate.
I am eager to not only hear from our witnesses how Science
and Technology efforts save or are yielding immediate benefits
to the defense of our nation but also ways we can improve upon
your efforts. The President has requested over $1.3 billion in
funding for the two organizations before us today for this next
'08 fiscal year. How that funding is allocated across the
various programs and projects in your organization no doubt is
a difficult task, considering the reality of the world that we
now live in. Whether the greatest threat to our country is a
radiologic device coming through our ports or an infectious
disease outbreak or a cyber attack on our nation's financial
infrastructure, the fundamental challenges before us how to
best distribute the limited funding in the face of these
highly-uncertain and varied threats.
In addition to prioritizing these various threats our
country now faces, we must also consider the nature of research
performed to combat them. Do we focus federal spending towards
long-term basic research? What percentage of the funding do we
allocate towards incremental improvements to our current
capabilities? With these overarching questions in mind, I look
forward to delving more deeply into the activities of Science
and Technology Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office.
I once again thank all of the witnesses for taking the time
to be here with us today. I anticipate this hearing will yield
a fruitful and productive conversation. Mr. Chairman, I look
forward to hearing from them and continuing to work with you on
this very important subcommittee, and with that I will yield
back to the Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gingrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Phil Gingrey
I first want to thank Chairman Wu for holding this critically
important hearing on the science and technology developments at the
Department of Homeland Security. Also, a special thank you to our
esteemed panel of witnesses for taking time to dialogue with us about
the role science and technology is playing in securing our nation.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe our nation's scientific enterprise
remains a critical component of homeland security. The efforts of the
Science and Technology Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office contribute to the preparedness of our nation against terrorism
and natural disasters. These organizations tap into the limitless
creativity of our nation's scientists and engineers to bring cutting
edge technology to those defending our nation from servicemen and women
to border patrol agents to first responders.
I'm particularly pleased to welcome Admiral Cohen and Mr. Vayl
Oxford to this subcommittee hearing. Gentlemen your service to our
great nation is greatly appreciated and I very much enjoyed meeting
with you both this week. I look forward to continuing the conversations
we started in regards to the exciting opportunities scientific research
is providing to the securing of our homeland. This committee is
committed to supporting your work and helping you create both a
balanced and innovative research portfolio.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank Ms. Marilyn Ward for
joining us today to take part in this discussion. Ms. Ward's
organization, the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council
includes representatives from many different first responder
communities. Such representatives include the International
Associations of Chiefs of Police, emergency managers, as well as fire
chiefs. Ms. Ward, I look forward to hearing from you on how the
Department's research and development activities can further support
our nation's first responders. In particular, your appearance will
allow us to examine one highly influential program in the Science and
Technology Directorate, the Office for Inter-operable Communications.
This office has worked for the last several years with first-responders
to improve the inter-operability of communications equipment and that
work continues today in cooperation with the new Office of Emergency
Communication within the DHS Preparedness Directorate.
I am eager to not only hear from our witnesses how science and
technology efforts are yielding immediate benefits to the defense of
our nation, but also ways we can improve upon these efforts.
The President has requested over $1.3 billion dollars in funding
for the two organizations before us today for fiscal year 2008. How
that funding is allocated across the various programs and projects in
your organizations, I have no doubt, is a difficult task considering
the reality of the world we now live in. Whether the greatest threat to
our country is a radiological device coming through our ports, or an
infectious disease outbreak, or a cyber attack on our nation's
financial infrastructure; the fundamental challenge before us is how to
best distribute limited funding in the face of these highly uncertain
and varied threats.
In addition to prioritizing these various threats our country now
faces, we must also consider the nature of research performed to combat
them. Do we focus federal spending towards long-term, basic research?
What percentage of funding do we allocate towards incremental
improvements to current capabilities?
With these overarching questions in mind, I look forward to delving
more deeply into the activities of the Science and Technology
Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. I once again
thank all the witnesses for taking the time to be here today and
anticipate this hearing will yield a fruitful and productive
conversation. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to continuing to work with
you on this subcommittee, and with that I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Wu. Thank you, Dr. Gingrey. Other Members who wish
to submit opening statements, the opening statements will be
added to the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Harry E. Mitchell
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
As you know, we have a problem in Arizona. Our border is broken and
the Federal Government is failing to fix it. The border is porous, and
monitoring is inadequate. We have deployed systems and technology to
help, but not nearly enough to stem the flow of illegal immigrants,
drugs and threats of terrorism.
We should be investing in border-related research and development,
but unfortunately, the budget proposal before us today, seeks cuts.
This just doesn't make any sense. Not for Arizona, and not for our
country.
Budgeting is about priorities, and I believe our priorities should
be based on solid risk assessment. Unfortunately, it doesn't look like
today's proposal does that.
Clearly biological and nuclear threats deserve our attention, but
so do University Centers for Excellence and much of the long-term
research and development that our Federal Government undertakes to
protect us from future risks. Not to mention the border.
I look forward today's testimony.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Wu. And I now turn to our witnesses. As each of
you all already know, please try to keep your testimony to
within approximately five minutes or so, summarizing your
substantial written testimony. And after your testimony the
Members of the Committee will have a rotating period of five
minutes each to ask questions. And we will start with Under
Secretary Cohen.
STATEMENT OF MR. JAY M. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cohen. Good morning, Chairman Wu, Congressman Gingrey,
and Congressman Bonner. I can tell you it is a personal honor
to appear before the distinguished Science Committee, and I
have had the opportunity to testify in the past. I note that
both the chairman and the Ranking Member went to medical
school, so you will appreciate I may limit my comments here.
Chairman Wu. One of us finished, one of us didn't. Since
his title is doctor, you can take your guess.
Mr. Cohen. Well, I won't venture----
Chairman Wu. The one that didn't finish went on to become a
rich man.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Wu. And the other one is struggling.
Mr. Cohen. I won't venture to guess who is smarter. And I
am also humbled to be sitting in a panel with such
distinguished individuals as are sitting before you. But I am
here to update you on the progress that the Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate has made
and discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year
2008, and how I believe it will position us to develop and
transition technology to protect the Nation from catastrophic
events as the Congress and the Administration wisely envisioned
in the 19 pages of enabling legislation for the Department of
Homeland Security.
As the Chairman has already indicated, my directorate is
committed to serving our customers. Those are the 22 DHS
components and their customers, the customers of my customers,
our heroes, the first responders, the police, fire, and EMT.
But the customers as customers are greater than that. For the
Coast Guard, they are the guardsmen who sail in harm's way, for
the Border Patrol, the agents who man the border, and for the
TSA, the screeners. They are the hardworking men and women on
the front lines of Homeland Security, and they appreciate your
support, and in prior testimony I commented on Chairman Bennie
Thompson's very kind e-mail to those many hardworking people,
appreciating what they have done.
I greatly appreciate the support and the leadership of the
Congress. Last year you took a very hard and strong decision in
September to restore the fiscal year 2007 funding. That has
been enormously helpful to me in kick starting the directorate
to achieve the results that we all desire, and I am especially
grateful of that in what I know is a difficult election year.
So thank you so much.
And I also want to thank the staff, special staff of the
Science and Technology Committee, but all the staffs of the
committees that I work with who have worked with me, have tried
to educate me, and it is a very professional relationship. And
I congratulate you both on the selection of the new staff for
the Science and Technology Committee.
As you are aware, the focus of my first months on the job
have been laying the foundation to align the directorate for
success, and that was to excel in four key areas, and I shared
this with you last September when I testified previously. It
was to get the organization, the people, the books, and the
content of the program right. Those were my four gets. But they
were focused on the threats as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, and
the threats as I defined them simplistically were bombs,
borders, bugs, and business. And bombs, borders, and bugs we
can all feel, we can all sense. They are tangible, but the
business is really about the cyber backbone that enables this
incredible technology-focused economy that we have. And if the
bad guys that you have mentioned can take that away from us, we
will have as much panic as I believe we would from a nuclear
device.
I believe the record will show that we made good progress
in my first six months on the job in all of these areas and
just to give a quick highlight, we have, in fact, with the
approval of the Congress and Secretary Chertoff in the first
month realigned the directorate. I have a strong leadership
team in place where all the key positions are filled. We have
welcomed over 20 new highly-qualified scientists and engineers,
subject-matter experts, and professionals into the directorate,
and four Government Service personnel who left the directorate
last spring have asked to come back and are now back on board,
and welcome them and the continuity that they bring.
I am basically two-thirds manned of where I need to be by
the end of this fiscal year and we are making very good
progress. I have no shortage of volunteers. Even some who want
to work pro bono I am trying to figure out how I do that.
The six technical divisions are all led by veteran S&T
members. My three research investment portfolio directors for
research, basic research, transition, and innovation, my high
risk, provide the crosscutting coordination amongst those six
divisions so I don't end up with stovepipes.
And finally, those divisions are focused on what I believe
you have mandated and the public expects are the high priority
issues of explosives, things that go bang, of the nuclear
radiological, that is Mr. Oxford, but we work closely together,
chem bio, half of my budget, and it is a threat which I believe
the other witnesses will indicate is as significant as the
nuclear radiological threat in today's world. Command, control,
and inter-operability, and I know you will ask more about that.
Borders and maritime. I initially thought about that as two
divisions, but our borders on the west coast are sea on the
north land, sea on the southeastern land and the southwest,
48,000 border patrol, 40,000 Coast Guardsman. The synergies
there are impressive. It is one division, but the comment of
the Coast Guard has detailed an active duty Coast Guard captain
to be my deputy director so we are seamless. And at the end of
the day the more we can do to remove seams, the safer we will
be against a terrorist.
We have established a division of human factors. Dow
Chemical has a wonderful commercial today about the human
element. It is hostile intent, the psychology of terrorism.
These may be the light sciences, but they are critically
important if we are going to defend the country. I came on
board on the 10th of August. That was the day of the liquid
explosives plot in England. The Brits did it right. They got
the bomber. You get the bomber, you don't have to worry about
the bomb, but regrettably, there may always be leakage, so we
do worry about the bomb. But human factors, like command,
control, and inter-operability, crosscut.
And finally, infrastructure protection and geophysical
sciences. I am responsible, as you have noted, for all hazards,
not just man-made. And so tsunamis, hurricanes, fire, flooding,
earthquakes, we have got to do a better job of protecting
against those.
Now, there is much more I could say, but I will reserve
that for the question and answer period. I did want to note a
statement that I have been making. Chairman Wu, I know I
finally arrived because I am in a blog now, last Friday, when I
said that we are in crisis in science and technology. In the
middle schools, kids are turning away from math and science.
You know this better than I do. And Congressman Bonner, I was
so pleased to see Governor Riley's State of State Address,
where he devoted nearly half of his message, and we are seeing
that in so many states; Kentucky, and there were hearings
yesterday on the Hill. But we are in crisis, and if we don't
get the kids to take the hard subjects of science and math, we
will not enjoy the economic society, the technological
dominance that we have enjoyed for so long. And so I compared
it to the Play Station society or the Play Station generation,
and some people viewed that as derogatory, but I stand by those
remarks. And we want instant gratification, but science and
technology require much more.
So we are moving forward on Centers of Excellence. We
currently have seven. We are realigning them to be in line with
my divisions. We have broad agency announcements out for an
additional four to meet the needs that we weren't meeting, and
I am allotting my very robust thanks to you, Scholarship and
Fellowship Program, to those Centers of Excellence, which
currently include over 80 universities and colleges in the
states but shortly will include more than 100. This is
exciting. The S&T Directorate appreciates the many demands on
the taxpayers' precious dollars. We are committed to being wise
stewards of those public monies that you have and will entrust
to us. I appreciate the Science and Technology Committee's
support. I welcome your oversight, and I will be happy to take
your questions. Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jay M. Cohen
INTRODUCTION
Good Morning Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you today
to update you on the progress of the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) realigned Science and Technology Directorate (S&T Directorate)
and discuss how the Directorate's priorities in the President's Budget
Request for Fiscal Year 2008 will position us to develop and transition
technology to protect the Nation from catastrophic events.
The S&T Directorate is committed to serving our customers, the
components that comprise the Department of Homeland Security--and their
customers--the hardworking men and women on the front lines of homeland
security, especially the first responders, who need ready access to
technology and information to perform their jobs more efficiently and
safely. I am honored and privileged to serve with the talented
scientists, engineers and other professionals who support these
dedicated Americans in our shared mission to secure our homeland and
defend our freedoms.
First and foremost, I am very appreciative of the leadership of the
Congress in its support of the S&T Directorate, and of me personally,
as I assumed the role of Under Secretary for Science and Technology
last August. The informed counsel of Committee Members with homeland
security oversight, and that of their staffs, has been invaluable to my
efforts to position the S&T Directorate for accountability, tangible
results and success, both for today and in the future.
Also, thank you for your vote of confidence in the Directorate,
evidenced by the decision to appropriate $848 million in FY 2007. This
has been enormously helpful in my efforts to better align people with
our mission to develop a robust science and technology capability to
protect the Nation as Congress envisioned in the enabling legislation
for the Department. We look forward to working with the 110th Congress
in a bipartisan and non-partisan manner to use science to better secure
the Nation.
I am also grateful for the leadership of the President and Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and for the vision and guidance
that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson have
contributed to the realignment process.
THE FIRST 180 DAYS--ALIGNED AND OPEN FOR BUSINESS
My first six months on the job have been focused on laying the
foundation in organization, people, and processes to enable the
Directorate to skillfully apply the resources you have wisely provided
in ways that best serve the American people and better secure our
homeland. I am pleased to report that we are ``open for business,'' and
your support of the President's FY 2008 Budget Request will allow us to
build upon that momentum.
As I've said on many occasions, the S&T Directorate must excel in
four key areas if we are to accomplish these goals: We must get the
organization, the people, the books, and the program content right.
These four ``gets'' are the cornerstones of the realignment effort and
we've made significant progress in each of these areas. In addition to
the four gets, the four Bs--bombs, borders, bugs and business--provide
the thematic approach to help keep us focused on the priority areas for
the S&T Directorate.
I have realigned the S&T Directorate to help it fulfill its
potential of becoming the customer-focused, output-oriented, science
and technology management organization that Congress intended it to be
and the Nation deserves. I thank Congress for its support of the new
organizational structure that, in turn, is supportive of a broad and
balanced range of activities that are aimed at identifying, enabling
and transitioning new capabilities to our customers to better protect
the Nation. We have organized our program management into six technical
divisions that are led by veteran S&T Directorate staff members and
linked to three research and development investment portfolio directors
in a ``matrix management'' structure. The technical divisions are
focused on enduring homeland security disciplines of Explosives;
Chemical and Biological; Command, Control & Inter-operability; Borders
and Maritime Security; Human Factors; and Infrastructure Protection and
Geophysical Sciences. The effort to combat the threat posed by nuclear
or radiological weapons is primarily led by the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office. The portfolio directors--Director of Research,
Director of Transition, and Director of Innovation/Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)--provide cross-cutting
coordination of their respective aspects of the investment strategy
within the technical divisions.
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I am pleased to report that today the S&T Directorate has a strong
leadership team in place with all key positions filled. Since August,
we have also welcomed 20 new highly qualified subject matter experts
and professionals to the S&T Directorate, including three former DHS
S&T employees who had previously left the Directorate and who have
returned. Overall, we are 66 percent staffed and plan to have 100
percent of staff in place by the end of 2007.
I have made significant strides in ``getting the books right'' by
holding the S&T Directorate to a high standard of fiscal
responsibility. Toward this end, I have established an Office of
Strategy, Policy & Budget Division led by the S&T Chief Financial
Officer that has put in place the systems and protocols that will
enable the S&T Directorate to be fully responsive and transparent in
the budget development process and in the sound fiscal management of
S&T appropriations. This new office is enhancing the efficiency of S&T
operations by integrating related functions of policy, planning,
programming, budgeting and execution. Centralizing financial oversight
has enabled the S&T Directorate to implement corrective actions to
address financial management deficiencies and accelerate the
distribution of funds to DHS Laboratories, Department of Energy (DOE)
National Laboratories, private industry and academia. As a result, the
S&T Directorate has committed approximately 50 percent of its FY 2007
budget compared to six percent at the same time last year,
significantly accelerating the distribution of funds to DHS Labs, DOE
Labs, industry and academia, which will result in accelerated
technology development and delivery to keep our nation safer.
In other developments, I have added a director of Special Programs
to work in select, mission-critical areas. And a new director of Test &
Evaluation and Standards is building upon the S&T Directorate's
previous work in homeland security standards and adding test and
evaluation capabilities to advance this effort and draw greater
industry participation in developing new technologies for homeland
security applications throughout DHS. We have also established a
Corporate Communications Office to inform and engage our customers and
their customers in the S&T Directorate's broad investment portfolios.
I also know that we must look beyond our Department, indeed beyond
our nation's borders, for solutions in combating domestic terrorism.
Therefore, consistent with DHS enabling legislation, I have established
Interagency and International Program Offices responsible for,
respectively, coordinating with other Executive Branch agencies to
reduce duplication and identify unmet needs, and coordinating our
international outreach efforts to help us tap into science and
technology communities across the globe for solutions to counter
domestic terrorism. Embedded S&T Directorate liaisons in Europe, the
Americas and Pacific/Asia are casting a wide global net to identify the
most viable homeland security solutions and their providers. This
office will allow S&T to benefit from and leverage off of the efforts
of our allies in the War on Terror.
I have developed mechanisms in three areas to better coordinate the
scientific research and technical development activities of the S&T
Directorate with those of other federal Agencies.
First, our overarching policy is to leverage research and
development efforts across the Federal Government to benefit our DHS
customers as well as first responders. Our preference is to avoid
replicating efforts underway by other federal agencies in favor of
coordinating and collaborating with our federal counterparts in
research areas of mutual interest and benefit. The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 provides me with specific authorities in this regard.
The second coordinating mechanism is aimed at better positioning
the Directorate to increase our awareness of, and the opportunities to
participate in or otherwise benefit from, other federal research,
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts that are relevant to
our mission. The new directors for Interagency Coordination and Special
Programs report directly to me regarding their progress in this area.
The third mechanism for coordinating research and development (R&D)
is through specific agreements and relationships. For example, in
December of 2006, the Department of Defense (Homeland Defense), the
Department of Justice, and DHS S&T signed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) to promote closer coordination and collaboration of our R&D and
technology transfer efforts. The S&T Directorate is also actively
engaged in various committees, subcommittees, and working groups of the
National Science and Technology Council. In recent months, we have
developed a closer working relationship with U.S. Northern Command,
U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Technology Support Working Group, the
National Guard Bureau, and the Joint IED Defeat Organization regarding
research and development initiatives, defining their inter-operability
requirements through established Defense Department, Joint, and
military service-based processes as appropriate. In addition, S&T has
established a pilot program and assigned a liaison official to the
California Governor's Office of Homeland Security in Sacramento in an
effort to recognize and address coordination and inter-operability
issues early on.
Last December, we saw the ``physical manifestation'' of our
restructuring plan spring to life with the relocation of 340 of our
staff members within the Directorate. Staff are now physically co-
located within their new organizational alignments. At the same time, I
issued the first S&T Organization and Requirements Manual (STORM) that
defines functions, duties and responsibilities for the administration
and management of the Directorate. The STORM tells our customers who we
are and how we function so they may better understand the capabilities
we can bring to bear in support of their protective missions.
Throughout this process, it was very important to me personally
that S&T staff be kept informed of our plans for the realignment and
that they have a forum for asking questions and expressing their views
and concerns. Since last August, I have held four ``All Hands''
meetings at regular intervals to brief all S&T staff, including
teleconference links with staff in other locations such as the
Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, Plum Island Animal
Disease Center, and the Environmental Measurements Laboratory in New
York City. These meetings also allow me to recognize the achievements
of staff members, to answer questions and solicit input, and, most
importantly, express my gratitude for their excellent work and for all
the cooperation, support and patience they have exhibited during this
transitional period.
During the first six months of my tenure as Under Secretary for
Science and Technology, I have focused on building the organization,
team and processes that are necessary for any science and technology
management organization to succeed. While our effort to completely
institutionalize these changes continue, we now have a foundation in
place that allows us to focus on delivering products to our customers
as we execute our FY 2007 appropriation. The S&T Directorate is
striving to be effective, cost-efficient, responsive, agile and
flexible, and with your support of the President's FY 2008 Budget
Request we will build on our current momentum.
CUSTOMER/OUTPUT FOCUSED
The S&T Directorate functions as the science and technology manager
within the Department. We invest in science and technology that
supports DHS components in their efforts to protect our homeland
against catastrophic events--technology that makes the Nation safer. In
the last six months, we have established meaningful working
relationships with our DHS operational component customers. As they
appear before you this year, I encourage you to ask them about the ways
that S&T is addressing their operational needs. Thanks to the support
of the Congress and the leadership of the Department, we are gaining
significant momentum, and I humbly ask for your continued trust and
support so that we can build on those efforts.
The S&T Directorate develops and manages an integrated program of
science and technology, from basic research through technology
transition to customers that are the operating components of DHS,
State, local and tribal governments, first responders and private
sector entities. The managers of this program are predominantly active
scientists and engineers in the many disciplines relevant to Homeland
Security. They are guided by a multi-tiered investment strategy and
review process based on higher guidance, the stated needs of our
customers, and technology opportunities.
S&T's three R&D portfolios support a broad range of program
activities across the Directorate. The President's FY 2008 Budget
Request includes $86 million for the basic research portfolio which
addresses the long-term R&D needs for the Department in sciences of
enduring relevance to Homeland Security. The transition portfolio,
designed to provide mission-capability relevant technology in support
of the Department's acquisition programs, is driven by customer needs
through a DHS customer-led IPT process. The President has requested
$343 million in FY 2008 for this effort. The Director of HSARPA
administers the $73 million innovation portfolio (including the Small
Business Innovation Research program) to promote revolutionary changes
in technologies with a focus on prototyping and deploying technologies
critical to homeland security. This portfolio, balanced around risk,
cost, impact and time to delivery, produces capabilities of high
technical quality responsive to homeland security requirements.
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Basic Research (> 8 years)
The S&T Directorate's basic research portfolio addresses long-term
research and development needs in support of DHS mission areas that
will provide the Nation with an enduring capability in homeland
security. This type of focused, protracted research investment has the
potential to lead to paradigm shifts in the Nation's homeland security
capabilities.
The S&T Directorate's basic research program enables fundamental
research at our universities, government laboratories and in the
private sector. Approximately $95 million is allocated for basic
research in FY 2007 and $86 million or 13 percent of S&T's RDT&E
budget, is allocated in FY 2008. Eventually, I would like up to 20
percent of the S&T Directorate budget allocated for basic research. It
is critical that basic research be funded at consistent levels from
year to year to ensure a continuity of effort from the research
community in critical areas that will seed homeland security science
and technology for the next generation of Americans and prevent
technological surprise.
Product Transition (0 to 3 years)
The centerpiece of the S&T Directorate's product transition
portfolio are Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPT) that function in
mission-critical areas to identify our customers' needs and enable and
transition near-term capabilities for addressing them. These Capstone
IPTs engage DHS customers, acquisition partners, S&T technical division
heads, and end-users as appropriate in our product research,
development, transition and acquisition activities.
The IPT process enables our customers to identify and prioritize
their operational capability gaps and requirements and make informed
decisions about technology investments. The S&T Directorate, in turn,
gathers the information it needs to respond with applicable technology
solutions for closing these capability gaps. The science and technology
solutions that are the outcome of this process, referred to as Enabling
Homeland Capabilities, draw upon technologies that can be developed,
matured, and delivered to our customer acquisition programs within
three years.
Capstone IPTs have been established in 10 major areas: Information
Sharing/Management; Cyber Security; People Screening; Border Security;
Chemical/Biological Defense; Maritime Security; Explosive Prevention;
Cargo Security; Infrastructure Protection; and Incident Management
(includes first responder inter-operability).
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The S&T Directorate's product transition/IPT process ensures that
appropriate technologies are engineered and integrated into the DHS
acquisition system for our customers. The $343 million allocated for
product transition for FY 2008 represents nearly half of my RDT&E
budget.
The IPT process has created an excellent forum for the S&T
Directorate to gain a better understanding of the most important issues
of our customer agencies. Another tangible benefit of this Capstone IPT
process has been improved coordination in addressing common functional
challenges across the Department. This is due in large measure to the
enthusiastic participation of DHS agency heads such as TSA
Administrator Kip Hawley, Secret Service Director Mark Sullivan, and
Border Patrol Chief David Aguilar and many other DHS leaders who have
all personally chaired the IPTs relevant to their interests.
In FY 2008, the S&T Directorate plans to transition or transfer
four programs that pre-date the IPT process. These programs have
reached technical maturity and will be transferred to other DHS
agencies who will be responsible for their continued operation. The
budget request reflects the transfer to the Office of Health Affairs of
the operations portions of BioWatch 1 & 2, the Biological Warning and
Incident Characterization (BWIC) system, and the Rapidly Deployable
Chemical Detection System, totaling $84.1 million. Moving the
operations portions of BioWatch out of S&T allows us to focus on
completing the development of BioWatch 3. BioWatch is a bio-aerosol
monitoring system designed to provide cities the earliest possible
detection of a biological attack. BWIC interprets warning signals from
BioWatch and public health surveillance data using incident
characterization tools (e.g., plume and epidemiological models) to
quickly determine the potential impacts a release may have. Together,
these two systems provide emergency personnel with the information they
need to respond effectively and initiate life-saving medical
countermeasures. In addition, the FY 2008 budget request reflects the
transfer of the non-R&D component of the SAFECOM program to the
National Protection and Programs Directorate, totaling $5.0 million.
It is important that the S&T Directorate also engage the emergency
responder community and address operational issues to help them do
their jobs more quickly, effectively and safely. S&T's Technology
Clearinghouse and TechSolutions initiatives provide direct support to
emergency responders' technology needs. The Technology Clearinghouse,
created in accordance with a provision of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, is designed to be a ``one-stop shop'' for access to technology
information for federal, State, and local public safety and first
responder communities. TechSolutions provides a Web-based mechanism for
responders to register their input regarding capability gaps that need
to be addressed to help them in their jobs. S&T responds by identifying
existing technology that may meet the need, or if nothing is available,
proceeding with the rapid prototyping of an appropriate solution to be
fielded in less than 18 months. S&T also houses the Office for Inter-
operability and Compatibility, which includes some components of the
legacy SAFECOM program and aims to increase levels of emergency
responder inter-operability by developing tools and methodologies, as
well as advancing standards that emergency response agencies can put
into effect.
Innovative Capabilities (2 to 5 years)
S&T's Innovation/HSARPA portfolio supports a key goal of mine for
the Directorate in its efforts to put advanced capabilities into the
hands of our customers as soon as possible. It has made important
inroads in research areas aligned with our DHS customers. Toward this
end, S&T has introduced two important new initiatives. One of these,
Homeland Innovative Prototypical Solutions (HIPS) is designed to
deliver prototype-level demonstrations of game-changing technologies
within two to five years.
The second initiative, High Impact Technology Solutions (HITS), is
designed to provide proof-of-concept solutions within one to three
years that could result in high-payoff technology breakthroughs. While
these projects are very high-risk, they offer the potential for ``leap-
ahead'' gains in capability should they succeed. While projects are
separately budgeted in ``Innovation/HSARPA'' (based on moderate to high
risk with a high payoff, if successful), ALL are executed within the
six technical divisions.
The S&T Directorate also continues to manage an active Small
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program on behalf of DHS that
currently issues two solicitations each year and generates multiple
awards for the small business community. The first solicitation for FY
2007 opens in mid-February and the second solicitation is planned for
release in May. The solicitations will address topics in areas that are
aligned with the six technical divisions.
The Innovation/HSARPA portfolio is receiving $60 million in FY 2008
funding for the innovative/leap-ahead HIPS and HITS projects. Because
of the short timeline for HIPS and HITS, we anticipate that these
projects will respond to the urgent needs of the DHS components for
solutions to fill capability gaps.
ENABLING U.S. LEADERSHIP IN SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
University-Based Centers of Excellence
The S&T Directorate is developing a robust, results-oriented
network of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence (COEs) to leverage
the independent thinking and ground-breaking capabilities of the
Nation's colleges and universities. The COEs are conducting multi-
disciplinary research and education, each focused on an area critical
to homeland security. The Office of University Programs is providing
the communications and infrastructure to produce, share, and transition
the Centers' research results, data, and technology to customers and
end-users.
Currently, seven pre-existing COEs connect experts and researchers
at more than 80 colleges and universities, including several Minority
Serving Institutions (MSI). More than 20 partners representing
industry, laboratories, think tanks, nonprofit organizations, and other
agencies also participate. University Programs is coordinating COE
efforts with other S&T Directorate-sponsored, university-based
initiatives. Under the new S&T organizational construct, existing COEs
are being strategically aligned with at least one S&T division, or to
Directorate-wide activities such as Operations Analysis and the
Homeland Security Institute, in a structure that will best support the
Divisions' fundamental research and development activities and other
requirements.
We are proceeding with plans to establish four additional COEs over
the next two fiscal years to help round-out the Directorate's need for
university-based fundamental research. The new COEs will combine the
research missions of some existing COEs and add new research areas
under the division-aligned construct to meet DHS needs. S&T has
released Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) regarding plans to establish
new COEs in the areas of explosives detection, mitigation, and
response; border security and immigration; maritime, island, and
extreme/remote environment security; and natural disasters, coastal
infrastructure and emergency management. The competitive selection
process is designed to ensure that institutions of high quality and
academic merit participate from as many areas of the United States as
practicable.
DHS Scholars and Fellows Program
DHS education programs are helping to attract and nurture future
scientific leaders for the homeland security workforce and to
strengthen the expertise of our existing labor pool. University
Programs is engaging high-performing students through the DHS Scholars
and Fellows program. Increasingly, S&T's scholarships and fellowships
will become aligned to the Centers of Excellence and to the DHS
mission. During this period of transition, we will honor our
commitments to all currently participating Scholars and Fellows.
The FY 2008 budget requests $38.7 million for S&T's University
Programs, which includes the Homeland Security Centers of Excellence
and the Scholars and Fellows Program.
Office of National Laboratories
In carrying out its mission, the S&T Directorate works to develop,
sustain, and renew a coordinated network of DOE National Laboratories,
federal laboratories and University Centers, the infrastructure needed
by multi-disciplinary teams of scientists, engineers and academics to
discover, develop and transition homeland security capabilities to
operational end-users.
The FY 2008 budget request includes $88.8 million for the Office
for National Laboratories (ONL), through which the S&T Directorate's
laboratory facilities programs are executed. ONL provides the Nation
with a coordinated, enduring core of productive science, technology and
engineering laboratories, organizations and institutions, which can
supply knowledge and technology required to secure our homeland. In
addition to oversight of laboratory operations in direct support of the
Department and its missions, ONL also has the specific responsibility
for coordinating homeland security-related activities and laboratory-
directed research conducted within the DOE National Laboratories.
Industry Participation in DHS Science & Technology
Industry is a valued partner of DHS S&T and its continued
participation in developing solutions for homeland security
applications is vital to our effort to safeguard the Nation. Consistent
with S&T's new structure, our Innovation/HSARPA portfolio and six
technical divisions will be releasing BAAs that seek industry
participation to address specific challenges in their respective areas.
For example, Innovation/HSARPA has already posted BAAs seeking
expertise in tunnel detection technologies, container security (SAFECON
program), and a mobile screening laboratory to support human screening
R&D in the field.
Innovation/HSARPA plans to release six additional BAAs shortly to
address areas that include critical infrastructure protection, hostile
intent detection and other key areas. By spring 2007, we intend to
issue a BAA for longer-term efforts that cover our complete innovation
topic area portfolio.
No one knows where good ideas come from and for that reason I have
been personally proactive in both seeking out and receiving technology
briefs and opportunities. This is a culture I am working to instill
throughout the DHS S&T Directorate.
The Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies
(SAFETY) Act of 2002, administered in the S&T Directorate, is proving
to be a valuable tool in expanding the creation, proliferation and use
of cutting edge anti-terrorism technologies throughout the United
States. Over the past year we have made significant improvements in
implementing the Act, including a new Rule; a revised, streamlined
Application Kit; new coverage for emerging technologies that are
undergoing test and evaluation; increased use of pre-application
teleconferences between SAFETY Act technology evaluators and applicants
to review requirements and answer questions prior to submitting a full
application; and formal procedures to expedite applications for
technologies involved with pending government procurements. The Office
of SAFETY Act Implementation (OSAI) has made significant strides in
reducing application processing time and providing more Qualified Anti-
Terrorism Technologies (QATTs) that could save lives. Through increased
efficiencies and process improvements, the average time to process
SAFETY Act applications has been reduced from 233 days in the early
days of the program to less than 140 days in FY 2007. As of February
2007, OASI has received 223 full applications and 376 pre-applications.
A total of 137 SAFETY Act awards have been granted--87 applications
have qualified for both Designation and Certification and 50 have
received Designation only. I am mindful of the interest in this program
in the Congress and across the Nation.
As part of our outreach efforts to encourage greater industry
participation, the Directorate is hosting the first Homeland Security
Science & Technology Stakeholders Conference, May 21-24. The conference
will inform government, industry and academia of the direction,
emphasis, and scope of the research investments by the S&T Directorate,
and provide information about business opportunities. The conference
will present the Directorate's new organization, explain how to do
business with the DHS S&T research enterprise, and provide visibility
into new and emerging technologies through an Innovation Gateway
Marketplace. I hope you will join us for this event at the Ronald
Reagan Building and International Trade Center.
FY 2008 BUDGET OVERVIEW
Science and Technology Directorate's budget request of $799.1
million includes $142.6 million for Management and Administration (M&A)
and $656.5 million for research, development, testing and evaluation.
M&A funds federal employees' salaries, benefits, travel, and other
expenses at Headquarters and the S&T laboratories. This staff maintains
oversight of S&T's extensive day-to-day technical and administrative
operations. M&A also funds business operations, including working
capital fund, and management support. Research, Development,
Acquisition and Operations supports the needs of the operational
components of the Department and is categorized to match the new S&T
organization. The basic research, product transition and innovation R&D
activities undertaken by S&T cut across the Directorate and its
divisions and are incorporated into the following projects and programs
that are included in the President's budget for FY 2008.
<bullet> The $25.9 million requested for Borders and Maritime
Security will support technology development for the Secure
Border Initiative (SBI), a comprehensive multi-year plan to
secure America's borders. This Division is providing the tools,
processes, and manpower to ensure SBI implementation is
effective and affordable. We are working directly with the SBI
program executive office to provide a transformation strategy
for SBI; develop the next generation of modeling and analysis
tools for strategic planning; and provide systems engineering
support. The Division will also develop and transition
technologies to industry to reduce risk and support border
security programs like SBInet, a technology acquisition program
under the Customs and Border Protection SBInet Program
Management Office.
We are also developing technologies to ensure the integrity
of cargo shipments with known origins, and to better target
suspicious shipments, and to enhance the end-to-end security of
the supply chain--from the manufacturer of goods to final
delivery. One of the most significant potential terrorist
threats to the Nation is the vast numbers of shipping
containers that flow through our borders each year, most of
which enter without physical inspection. Technologies and
processes developed within this area will assure government
customs and shippers of the integrity of shipping containers
and its cargo and communicate the container's status as well as
security information. By employing a system-of-systems
approach, this will deliver technological capabilities to DHS
customers and end-users that address supply chain
vulnerabilities. These capabilities are directed toward
enhanced physical security and information management, and
bound by a security architecture which encompasses the world's
supply chain.
<bullet> The $228.9 million requested for Chemical and
Biological will provide the basic knowledge, technologies and
systems needed to protect against possible chemical and
biological attacks on the Nation's population, agriculture or
infrastructure. The greatest emphasis is on those biological
attacks that have the greatest potential for widespread
catastrophic damage to the population. These include--but are
not limited to--aerosolized anthrax, and smallpox.
The Division conducts material threat and risk assessments
on both naturally occurring and engineered agents; conducts
experiments to close major scientific knowledge gaps that could
have a large impact on how the Nation responds to a biological
attack; and provides scientific support to the intelligence
community. As such, the primary output is an intelligence-
informed, scientific characterization and prioritization of the
bio-terrorist risks to be used by the Homeland Security Council
and partnering agencies (e.g., Department of Health and Human
Services, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of
Agriculture, and the Intelligence Community).
Based on this knowledge, we are developing effective
measures for deterrence, detection, and mitigation of
biological terrorism acts against the U.S. population,
infrastructure, and agricultural system. This includes
developing tools to meet federal, State, and, local emergency
responder needs such as operational models to support
Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC).
The Division is developing next-generation, biological-
threat-agent detectors that recognize the signatures or
fingerprints of biological agents. These detectors will be
incorporated into the BioWatch system to substantially increase
the system's capabilities and significantly reduce the response
time. Other significant program activities include developing
biological aerosol detection and sensor systems for monitoring
the Nation's critical infrastructure such as government
buildings, airports, subways, office buildings, shopping malls,
sports arenas, hotels and hospitals. These ``detect-to-
protect'' systems detect biological agents within minutes
(acting as reliable `smoke alarms') to protect high value
facilities and their occupants. Many of the technologies being
developed in this program will be manufactured and used by the
private sector.
Chemical countermeasures work enhances the Nation's
capability to anticipate, prevent, protect from, respond to and
recover from chemical terrorist attacks. The chemical threat
spectrum comprises a broad array of chemicals, to include
chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, and non-
traditional agents (NTAs). Existing and emerging chemical
warfare agents can potentially be used against virtually any
civilian target resulting in significant loss of life and
impedance in the use of key infrastructure. Chemical
countermeasures addresses these threats by: enabling
comprehensive understanding and analyses of chemical threats;
developing pre-event assessment, discovery, and interdiction
for chemical threats; developing warning, notification, and
timely analysis of chemical attacks; optimizing technology and
process for recovery from chemical attacks; and enhancing the
capability to identify a chemical attack's source.
<bullet> The $63.6 million requested for Command, Control and
Inter-operability will fund programs focused on cyber security;
communications, compatibility and inter-operability; and
knowledge management.
Cyber security research, development, testing and evaluation
is focused on improving the security of the existing cyber
infrastructure and providing a foundation for a more secure
infrastructure through coordinated efforts with other
government agencies and private industry. Cyber attacks on U.S.
information networks can have serious consequences such as
disrupting critical operations, causing loss of revenue and
intellectual property, or loss of life. The Division also
addresses cyber security requirements from internal Department
customers in support of the DHS's operational missions in
critical infrastructure protection. It also addresses related
aspects of national security and emergency preparedness
telecommunications.
Communications, inter-operability and compatibility programs
within Command, Control and Inter-operability strengthen inter-
operable wireless communications, improve effective information
sharing, and develop tools to enhance overall coordination and
planning at all levels of government. Currently, the Nation's
capacity for inter-operable communications is hindered by sub-
optimized planning and coordination, and the Office for Inter-
operability and Compatibility is working to strengthen and
integrate inter-operability and compatibility.
We are also developing knowledge management tools to reduce
the risk of terrorist attacks and to prepare for and respond to
natural and man-made disasters. This will provide new
capabilities for the DHS Intelligence & Analysis Directorate
and the DHS information enterprise for the integration,
management, analysis, and dissemination of actionable
information. This knowledge management research provides tools
and methods to handle massive amounts of information that is
widely dispersed in a great variety of forms. Being able to
find such information, understand its meaning, and then use it
to assess an actual threat and determine the level of risk
before an attack or incident occurs is the best way to save
lives and preserve our way of life.
<bullet> The $63.7 million requested for Explosives will fund
programs focused on the detection, mitigation, and response to
explosives threats such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
and suicide bombers. The Division employs a broad range of
existing and emerging approaches to detect and lessen the
impact of explosive materials. These include baggage-screening
devices as well as the capability to identify explosives
residue. Terrorist events like the Madrid rail bombing, the
London Underground attack, and the recent disclosure of planned
attacks on U.S.-bound flights from the United Kingdom, all
involved explosive threats. Those events underscore the
operational need for a unified approach to the detection of,
response to, and mitigation of explosive threats across all
modes of transportation.
In explosives detection, we are improving existing explosive
detection methods, developing new technologies, and integrating
improvements and technological developments into both deployed
and new systems. Detection is a key defense against successful
attacks. For example, the Check Point Program applies to
multiple venues where real or virtual portals exist.
Historically, airports have received the most attention, but
similar portal situations can be found at rail stations and
cruise ship terminals. Check point programs address suicide
bombers, carry-ons, leave-behind IEDs, and vehicle-borne IEDs.
The two other principal programs in this area are checked
baggage and cargo. Like aviation, rail and ship modes share
checked baggage and cargo screening challenges.
The check point program addresses the risk of catastrophic
loss of mass transit resulting from small IEDs detonated in
passenger cabins and the catastrophic loss or hostile takeover
of mass transit resulting from the presence of certain weapons
in passenger cabins. The principal objective of the program is
developing advanced technology for integration with future
check point systems to detect explosives and concealed weapons,
while meeting requirements for automation, efficiency, and cost
reduction. Longer-term objectives include applying systems
integration and a seamless flow of information with reduced
impact to the checkpoint operations environment. The program
also strives to upgrade currently deployed technologies to
address emerging threats and concealment methods.
The checked baggage program identifies and develops the next
generation of checked baggage screening systems, and supports
continuous improvements toward the Congressionally directed
goal of 100 percent screening of aviation checked baggage by
electronic or other approved means with minimum or no impact to
the flow of people or commerce. Checked baggage will focus on
continuing work with Manhattan II by conducting system
development and integration of the Manhattan II checked baggage
program, complete the preliminary system architecture test and
evaluation, and conduct detection-technology test and
evaluation.
The cargo program is developing the next generation of air
cargo screening systems, with transition targeted for FY 2011.
<bullet> The $12.6 million requested for Human Factors will
apply the social and behavioral sciences to improve detection,
analysis, and the understanding of threats posed by
individuals, groups, and radical movements. This knowledge will
support the preparedness, response and recovery of communities
impacted by catastrophic events and to advance national
security by integrating human factors into homeland security
technologies. Further this will enhance the capability to
control movement of individuals into and out of the United
States and its critical assets through accurate, timely, and
easy-to-use biometric identification and credentialing
validation tools.
<bullet> The $24.0 million requested for Infrastructure and
Geophysical will develop technical solutions and reach-back
capabilities to improve State, local, tribal, and private
sector preparedness for and response to all hazardous events
impacting the population and critical infrastructure.
The Division's focus is on identifying and mitigating the
vulnerabilities of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors and
key assets that keep our society and economy functional. The
Division models and simulates the Nation's critical
infrastructures to determine how various scenarios will affect
each sector, provides decision support tools to guide decision-
makers in identifying gaps and vulnerabilities, and develops
predictive tools and methods to aid in preparing for and
responding to various catastrophes. Additionally, the Division
focuses on responder preparedness and response capabilities
that improve the ability of the Nation to prepare for, respond
to, and recover from all-hazards emergencies. Applying the best
available science and technology for the safety and security
our emergency responders and homeland security professionals
ensures they may effectively perform their jobs--saving lives
and restoring critical services.
The Division is also developing a capability that will
enable owners and operators of the most vital critical
infrastructure sites to implement affordable and reliable blast
and projectile mitigation measures improving capabilities to
withstand these threats. The program is developing suites of
advanced materials, design procedures, and innovative
construction methods that can be used to protect critical
infrastructure and key resources.
In addition, the Division is developing decision-making and
information-sharing tools to aid responders. This will
dramatically enhance the information management and information
sharing capabilities of incident commanders and emergency
responders as emergencies increasingly demand more highly
coordinated responses.
<bullet> The $59.9 million requested for Innovation/HSARPA
will focus on homeland security research and development that
poses a risk of failure, but if successful would lead to
significant technology breakthroughs that would greatly enhance
DHS operations. HSARPA carries out its activities in two areas:
(1) Homeland Innovative Prototypical Solutions, which are
designed to deliver prototype-level demonstrations of game-
changing technologies in two to five years. These programs are
moderate risk, but offer high pay-off and (2) High Impact
Technology Solutions, which are designed to provide proof-of-
concept answers that could result in high-payoff technology
breakthroughs. Though there is a considerable risk of failure,
these projects offer the potential for significant gains
resulting from success.
<bullet> The $88.8 million requested for Laboratory Facilities
will fund operation of the S&T laboratory facilities, including
Plum Island, the Transportation Security Lab, Environmental
Measurements Laboratory, the Chemical Security Analysis Center,
and the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center. Laboratory Facilities also funds design work on the
National Bio and Agrodefense Facility and upgrade of the Plum
Island facility.
<bullet> The $25.5 million requested for Test & Evaluation and
Standards funds two areas Test and Evaluation (T&E) and
Standards. T&E works across DHS and ensures that systems meet
the capability needs of users, validates performance and
provides measurable improvement to operational capabilities.
Effective testing and evaluation programs provide crucial
information to decision-makers for acquisition and deployment
of technology. Standards are consensus based measures--from
basic specifications to performance criteria--that give DHS and
its customers confidence that technology and systems will
perform as required. The S&T Directorate works across DHS and
with numerous external partners to build consensus and support
development of needed standards.
<bullet> The $24.7 million requested for Transition programs
will expedite technology transition to deliver near-term
products and technologies to meet DHS component requirements.
This area also funds the Office of the SAFETY Act
Implementation, transition support programs such as the
Technology Clearinghouse, and the S&T Directorate's
international and interagency programs.
<bullet> The $38.7 million requested for University Programs
will allow the S&T Directorate to engage the academic community
to support current DHS priorities and enhance homeland security
capabilities by providing ground-breaking research, analyses
and educational approaches. The program is designed to bring
together the best scientific talent and resources from U.S.
academic institutions to help solve complex and technologically
challenging homeland security problems facing our nation.
Program activities simultaneously focus on building homeland
security expertise in the academic community, creating
strategic partnerships, and fostering a new generation of
homeland security experts.
The program works to:
<bullet> Strengthen U.S. scientific leadership in
homeland security research;
<bullet> Generate and disseminate knowledge and
technical advances to aid homeland security frontline
professionals;
<bullet> Foster a homeland security culture within the
academic community through research and education
programs; and
<bullet> Build a highly-trained science and
engineering workforce dedicated to homeland security
that will sustain progress over time.
This program invests in two areas: the university-based
Centers of Excellence, and student Scholarships and Fellowships
intended to build and develop the next generation of academic
researchers in disciplines that are relevant and essential to
homeland security.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I am pleased to report that the S&T Directorate is
well positioned today to mobilize the Nation's vast technical and
scientific capabilities to enable solutions to detect, protect against
and recover from catastrophic events.
Our plans for restructuring the organization have been implemented
and it is indeed gratifying to see that they appear to be working as we
advance to the critical phase of product transition. Increasingly, our
DHS customers are recognizing the substantial value that S&T's
technical expertise brings to their operations. We have engaged them,
eliciting participation at the highest levels, to join us at the table
to work constructively on solutions for countering the formidable
threats this nation faces.
We appreciate the many demands on the taxpayers' precious dollars
and you have my commitment that the S&T Directorate will be wise
stewards of the public monies you have entrusted to us. We are
steadfast in our resolve to serve the best interests of the Nation by
investing in the talent and technology that will provide America with a
sustainable capability to protect against acts of terror and other
high-consequence events for generations to come.
Members of the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to meet
with you today to discuss a newly realigned Science & Technology
Directorate that is meeting homeland security challenges with a renewed
sense of purpose and mission. I look forward to working with you
throughout the 110th Congress.
Biography for Jay M. Cohen
Department of Homeland Security, Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Jay M. Cohen is a native of New York. He was commissioned
in 1968 as an Ensign upon graduation from the United States Naval
Academy. He holds a joint Ocean Engineering degree from Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and
Master of Science in Marine Engineering and Naval Architecture from
MIT.
His early Navy assignments included service on conventional and
nuclear submarines. From 1985 to 1988 Cohen commanded USS HYMAN G.
RICKOVER (SSN 709).
Following command, he served on the U.S. Atlantic Fleet as a senior
member of the Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board, responsible for
certifying the safe operation of nuclear powered ships and crews.
From 1991 to 1993, he commanded USS L.Y. SPEAR (AS 36) including a
deployment to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation DESERT STORM.
After Spear, he reported to the Secretary of the Navy as Deputy
Chief of Navy Legislative Affairs. During this assignment, Cohen was
responsible for supervising all Navy-Congressional liaison.
Cohen was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in October 1997 and
reported to the Joint Staff as Deputy Director for Operations
responsible to the President and DOD leaders for strategic weapons
release authority.
In June 1999, he assumed duties as Director Navy Y2K Project Office
responsible for transitioning all Navy computer systems into the new
century.
In June 2000, Cohen was promoted in rank and became the 20th Chief
of Naval Research. He served during war as the Department of the Navy
Chief Technology Officer (a direct report to the Secretary of the Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps).
Responsible for the Navy and Marine Corps Science and Technology (S&T)
Program (involving basic research to applied technology portfolios and
contracting), Cohen coordinated investments with other U.S. and
international S&T providers to rapidly meet war fighter combat needs.
After an unprecedented five and a half year assignment as Chief of
Naval Research, Rear Admiral Cohen retired on February 1, 2006.
Under Secretary Cohen was sworn in to his current position at the
Department of Homeland Security on August 10, 2006.
Chairman Wu. Thank you, Mr. Under Secretary. Director
Oxford.
STATEMENT OF MR. VAYL S. OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Oxford. Good morning, Chairman Wu, Ranking Member
Gingrey, and other Members of the panel. I would like to thank
the Committee for the opportunity to present DNDO's research
and development priorities for fiscal year 2008. I am pleased
to be here with my colleague, Under Secretary Cohen, and other
colleagues from past lives that are with me also here on the
panel.
DNDO is chartered to develop a global nuclear detection
architecture that would form a robust defensive layer to
prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism. We are also asked
to direct all radiation detection development programs on
behalf of DHS and to work as the U.S. Government collaborator
with other Departments regarding research and development for
the radiological and nuclear area.
We invest in the enhancement of existing technologies
through both a near-term spiral development program, as well as
a transformational research and development program to deliver
revolutionary improvements in the performance of nuclear
detection systems. Today I will highlight the near-term and
transformational plans for 2008, and touch upon how DNDO
coordinates its R&D activities with other federal agencies.
Regarding near-term R&D priorities, we feel we must finish
the work of securing our nation's ports of entries. However, we
cannot ignore the possibility that a terrorist might attempt to
illicitly transport a nuclear or radioactive material between
the ports of entry.
DNDO's near-term focus is on making further improvements to
radiation detection capabilities for the national ports of
entry, while also developing solutions for non-ports of entry
threats. We are testing the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal at
the Nevada Test Site and the New York Container Terminal.
Results of these tests will be used to support the Secretary's
certification decision as required by the 2007 Appropriations
Bill. And in 2008, we will also complete development and begin
production for ASP variants to include mobile truck mounted
systems, as well as shuttle carrier systems that address
specific challenges presented at some of our sea ports that
load cargo directly from ships to rail. The Cargo Advanced
Automated Radiography System will automatically detect high
density shielding within cargo that could escape the detection
by our passive systems. The automated imaging processing
capabilities and vision for CAARS will substantially improve
throughput rates over current generation radiography systems.
Development of these technologies will continue in 2008,
with prototypes being delivered in mid 2009. DNDO's Human
Portable Radiation Detection System Program will improve
current and backpack radiation detection systems by improving
identification capabilities, standardizing displays and
controls, reducing weight, and improving system connectivity so
that data can be rapidly communicated and analyzed.
Within our long-term transformational research program we
include an exploratory research program, a dedicated Academic
Research Initiative, and several upcoming advanced technology
demonstrations. In exploratory research we have initiated 44
projects with our national laboratories. We have recently
awarded seven cooperative agreements with academia, and next
week we will announce 10 awards with private industry. These
efforts have already begun to pay off.
An automated process established at Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratories allows us to evaluate over 100 new
detector materials per month or over 1,000 per year, a tenfold
increase over previous capabilities within this country. Proof
of concept efforts on several standoff technologies have
demonstrated that very small amounts of material can be
detected at 20 miles per hour from a distance of over 65
meters. Again, a tremendous improvement over previous and
current capabilities.
In 2008, our Advanced Technology Demonstration Programs
will include an Intelligent Personal Radiation Locator that
responds to a user requirement to improve upon capabilities in
personal radiation devices for discrimination as well as
localization of threat materials. Our Standoff Detection
Advanced Technology Demonstration will develop and evaluate
technologies to significantly increase detection ranges out to
100 meters. The verification of Shielded Special Nuclear
Material Advanced Technology Demonstration will develop and
test advanced technologies to verify the presence of special
nuclear material in cluttered environments and may lead to a
human portable capability to automatically verify the presence
of shielded special nuclear material.
Finally, a survey by the National Science Foundation and
the Department of Energy showed a downward trend in this
nation's nuclear science expertise. In 1980, there were 65
nuclear engineering departments in our U.S. universities. Today
there are 29. Currently it is estimated that one-third to
three-quarters of the current nuclear workforce will reach
retirement age in the next 10 years. DNDO's Academic Research
Initiative will spur the academic community to provide the
nuclear detection experts of the future by funding universities
to conduct R&D in the areas relevant to nuclear detection. Last
month DNDO and the National Science Foundation solicited grant
applications from our colleges and universities to help begin
this new academic initiative.
Regarding coordination with other organizations, we
recognize that several federal agencies already engage in
research in this area, so we have coordinated our activities
with the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, and the Director for National
Intelligence. Several mechanisms are currently in place to
insure active coordination of these efforts. These include
joint participation in the Domestic Nuclear Research and
Development Working Group, chaired by the President's science
advisor, an interagency working group that is intended to
create an R&D roadmap for the future.
DNDO also supports Department of Energy activities by
jointly reviewing proposals that come into both organizations
to make sure that we are collaborating and reducing the
conflict of funding. We do that also with the Department of
Defense.
Finally, in conclusion, let me say the challenges that lie
ahead require coordinated effort on behalf of the best
scientific minds in this country, from fostering the
development of revolutionary detection technologies that fill
gaps in our evolving architecture, to providing next-generation
technologies that improve performance, cost, and operational
value. DNDO is working to provide the Nation with a
continuously improving capability to protect against a
terrorist nuclear attack.
And I would at this time yield the rest of my time and be
glad to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vayl S. Oxford
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee. As Director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO), I would like to thank the Committee for the
opportunity to discuss our research and development (R&D) priorities
for Fiscal Year 2008 and how these activities will directly enhance the
probability of mission success. I am pleased to be here with other
distinguished witnesses, Under Secretary Cohen, Mr. Czerwinski, Dr.
Epstein, and Ms. Ward.
Key to the success of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
improving the Department's ability to mitigate risks across the entire
threat spectrum. In recognition of the catastrophic risk posed by the
use of a nuclear weapon within the United States, all nuclear detection
research, development, test, evaluation, and operational support within
the Department was consolidated into the DNDO in April of 2005. Since
then DNDO has developed, and continues to evolve, the global nuclear
detection architecture, while improving the domestic means to detect
and report attempts to import or transport a nuclear device or fissile
or radiological material intended for illicit use.
DNDO maintains a preeminent research and development program and
capitalizes on the benefits of integrating this program with larger
acquisition efforts. Over half of DNDO's Fiscal Year 2008 budget
request is intended for R&D activities. We categorize our R&D work into
two areas: enhancement of existing technologies through near-term,
spiral development; and long-term transformational R&D that will
deliver revolutionary improvements in the cost, performance and
associated operational burdens of nuclear detection systems.
Today, I will be discussing both our near-term and transformational
R&D plans for FY 2008. As I describe these efforts, I will share with
you how DNDO uses architectural analysis and end-user requirements to
help guide not only acquisition efforts, but also our research agenda.
I will also touch upon how DNDO coordinates its scientific research and
technical development activities with other federal agencies.
Near-Term R&D Priorities
Our analysis of the detection architecture concluded that we must
finish the work of securing our nation's ports of entry (POEs).
However, we cannot ignore the possibility that a terrorist might
attempt to illicitly transport a nuclear device or radioactive material
between the POEs. DNDO's near-term focus is on making further
improvements to radiation detection capabilities for the Nation's POEs
as well as developing solutions for non-POE applications. These include
general aviation, small maritime craft, non-POE land border crossings,
and State and local operations.
DNDO will continue our Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program,
which improves upon existing polyvinyl toluene (PVT)-based radiation
portal monitors that are currently deployed at the Nation's POEs, and
select foreign POEs through the DOE Megaports Initiative. ASP systems
not only detect the presence of radiation, but also identify the
radiation source, enabling the system to discriminate real threat
alarms from alarms due to normally occurring radioactive material
(NORM). Alarms due to NORM are also known as nuisance alarms. The use
of spectroscopic identification dramatically reduces nuisance alarms,
and will allow for considerably improved throughput at high-volume
ports, while simultaneously improving security. DNDO awarded contracts
to Raytheon Company, Thermo Electron Corporation, and Canberra
Industries, Inc. for the development and production of ASP last July.
Approximately $44.5 million was immediately provided to the three
vendors. Based on results of system performance tests now underway and
upon certification by the Secretary, DNDO plans to award up to $1.1
billion over a five-year period to complete ASP development and
acquisition.
In FY 2008, we will complete development and test phases and begin
production for: truck-mounted ASP systems that provide mobility for
several applications, including relocatable chokepoint applications in
State and local operations, or at low-volume POEs where fixed systems
may not be cost effective; and shuttle carrier-mounted ASP systems that
address the challenge presented by several seaports that load cargo
directly from ships to rail cars, therefore bypassing typical exit gate
screening operations. By developing additional passive detection design
variants that meet unique port requirements, DNDO will be well on its
way to achieving technical solutions that enable us to screen 100
percent of cargo containers entering the United States. To support all
of our passive systems, we will be upgrading the standard ASP cargo
portals with software improvements and better controls and displays
based on feedback that we receive from operational deployments.
The Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) will
automatically detect high-density material shielded within cargo that
could escape detection by passive radiation systems, like ASP. The
automated image processing techniques envisioned for CAARS will also
substantially improve throughput rates over current-generation
radiography systems. DNDO awarded contracts to L-3 Communications,
American Science and Engineering, Incorporated, and SAIC for the
development of CAARS last September.
Development of these technologies will continue in FY 2008, with a
projected delivery of prototype units in mid-2009. Once ready, these
systems will be subjected to a rigorous test program to evaluate the
technology and to enter into engineering development. Test results will
serve as a major factor in evaluating the performance of the three
contractors and continuing with the next phase of the program, in which
low-rate initial production will begin. DNDO will also begin
preparations for pilot deployments to evaluate operational factors and
conduct other deployment planning efforts such as site surveys and
environmental impact assessments.
Nevertheless, ASP and CAARS deployed at our official POEs are not
the only technologies needed to fulfill our nuclear detection
architecture. The DNDO is also working on Human Portable Radiation
Detection Systems, or HPRDS, that aim to improve on current hand-held
and backpack radiation detection systems similar to those currently
used by Customs Border and Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard. These
systems currently weigh ten to 25 pounds, and are generally operated as
a secondary screening tool. When an alarm is detected, hand-held
systems can then be used to isolate and identify the source of the
radiation. The HPRDS program seeks to reduce the weight of systems to
approximately five pounds, while simultaneously improving detection
probabilities to as high as 90 percent when used in tertiary or
confirmatory inspection applications; and also improve connectivity for
alarm reporting and technical support. In October, five companies
received awards--Smiths Detection, SAIC, Ortec, Sanmina-SCI, and Target
Instruments.
In FY 2008, development efforts for the next generation of hand-
helds and backpacks will focus on: improving the identification
capabilities of human portable systems so they can distinguish between
threat and non-threat material quicker and with greater accuracy;
standardizing the displays and control functions to improve system
operability for field operators; reducing the weight of units so they
are less burdensome to use; and improving systems connectivity so that
data can be rapidly communicated and analyzed to determine if it
represents a potential threat.
Long-Term Transformational R&D Priorities
Despite the progression of our near-term R&D efforts, there are
still key, long-term challenges and vulnerabilities in our detection
architecture that require long-range, higher-risk research programs to
deliver the highest payoff improvements in detection capabilities. One
of the primary motives for the establishment of the DNDO was to create
a mechanism for significant and sustained funding into radiation
detection technologies through innovative approaches. Our
transformational R&D program works with all sectors--National
Laboratories, academia, and private industry--to seek dramatic
technical improvements.
This is not research for the sake of research. This is a
deliberate, focused effort to address significant capability gaps in
our present detection architecture--gaps that cannot be filled with
current technologies because of performance issues, cost, or lack of
capability. Revolutionary advances in radiation detection technology
could potentially impact all capability gaps in our present detection
architecture, from a distributed network of inexpensive radiation
detectors to highly sensitive, standoff detection systems for sensing
mobile threats at speed. Many of these technical breakthroughs would
directly address some of the opportunities and challenges I mentioned
before, such as general aviation, small maritime craft, non-POE land
border crossings, and State and local operations.
Our transformational research includes a robust Exploratory
Research Program, a dedicated Academic Research Initiative, and several
upcoming Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs). Exploratory
Research focuses on technical solutions that are at the feasibility
phase and show significant promise, but require further concept
development and demonstration. As solutions and concepts mature,
technologies will transition either into enabling components for
existing ATDs or will generate new ATD initiatives. The purpose of an
ATD is to develop and test a device and generate the data needed to
perform a preliminary cost-benefit analysis for a technology.
Successful research originating from our Academic Research Initiative
will also transition to exploratory research or an ATD initiative.
In December 2005, DNDO published a Call for Proposals to the
National Laboratories soliciting novel detection approaches, materials,
and advanced technologies as part of our Exploratory Research program.
DNDO received more than 150 proposals, and ultimately selected 44 for
award, resulting in nearly $40 million in research programs. Similarly,
DNDO released a solicitation for private industry and academia
proposals in the same research topics. More than 200 white papers were
submitted, and last month we announced the award of seven cooperative
agreements with academia totaling approximately $3.1 million. The
research topics of these universities include advances in materials,
associated electronics, detection techniques, and enabling technologies
to investigate and understand important and related phenomenology.
In FY 2008, exploratory research topics will include: new materials
that have high energy resolution, high efficiency, and low cost;
shielded special nuclear material (SNM) verification efforts that would
enable highly penetrating, efficient, low-dose interrogation systems to
address screening of general aviation, small boats, and occupied
vehicles; new solutions for passive detection of SNM in general
aviation, commercial air cargo, and boats and small ships near the U.S.
coastline; and technology and concepts that offer significantly
enhanced threat sensitivity with remote and distributed emplaced sensor
networks. In addition, we will be working with the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate to examine techniques for integrating explosives
detection with radiological and nuclear detection, achieving single-
device solutions.
Our ATD program takes leading edge technological concepts (in many
cases technology demonstrated conceptually under Exploratory Research)
and develops a performance test unit to conduct a realistic
demonstration of capabilities. The results of the tests form the basis
for a preliminary cost benefit analysis that is used to objectively
determine whether the technology should transition to our Systems
Development and Acquisition program.
In FY 2008, the Intelligence Personal Radiation Locator (IPRL) ATD
that started in 2006 will result in a performance test unit that will
be ready for testing. The IPRL emerged from an end-user requirement for
a next-generation personal radiation detection system similar to the
radiation pagers often used by CBP, first responders, and law
enforcement officials. IPRL will have sufficient energy resolution and
sensitivity to reliably discriminate between NORM, background, and
potential threats, and will be used by law enforcement, first
responder, counterterrorism, the intelligence community and others in
routine activities and surveillance. DNDO awarded contracts worth up to
$22M for the IPRL program last September. This enabled us to conduct
the design and development work required to take IPRL from the
conceptual phase and become ready for testing of IPRL performance test
units in early FY 2009.
In addition, our Standoff Detection ATD will be ready for final
system design review, with a mid-FY 2009 target for testing of the
performance test units. This ATD will allow DNDO to develop and
evaluate key existing technologies such as coded aperture and Compton
imaging that may dramatically improve sensitivity and directional
accuracy. Our goal is to extend nuclear detection ranges to as much as
100 meters, potentially providing the capability to locate and identify
nuclear threat materials at greater distances for use in ground-based,
airborne, and maritime platforms. Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) also have strong
requirements for long standoff capability for detection of nuclear
materials. To de-conflict our programs, DTRA cites the need for very
long standoff detection of one kilometer (1000 meters) or more. Since
in most cases the goal of 100 meters is unattainable with current
technologies, DTRA's current efforts are closely related to those of
DNDO. Achieving our shared goal to improve capability for longer
standoff detection will require the resources of both DHS and DOD.
Our Verification of Shielded SNM ATD is scheduled for preliminary
design reviews in early FY 2009, with final system design review
expected in late FY 2009. This ATD will develop and test advanced
technology to resolve alarms and definitively verify the presence of
SNM despite cluttered environments or intentional countermeasures like
shielding. Furthermore, another embodiment of this technology may lead
to a whole new capability for portable interrogation systems that will
enable relocatable or human portable detection systems that can
automatically verify the presence of shielded SNM.
The final component of our transformational R&D program provides a
much needed emphasis in nuclear detection sciences, a field that has
been in decline at American universities for years. A survey by the
National Science Foundation showed a downward trend since the mid-1990s
of nuclear scientists and engineers of approximately 60 per year. In
1980, there were 65 nuclear engineering departments actively operating
in the U.S. universities; now there are only 29. Currently, it is
estimated that one-third to three-quarters of the current nuclear
workforce will reach retirement in the next 10 years. The future
security of our nation requires such a rejuvenation effort at our
universities. The current projections forecast a need for approximately
100 new Ph.D.s per year.
DNDO's Academic Research Initiative will spur the academic
community to provide the nuclear detection experts of the future by
funding universities to conduct R&D in areas relevant to the detection
of nuclear and radiological material. In addition, the program will
foster potentially high-risk but high-payoff ideas that could lead to
solutions that have not yet been considered. Last month, DNDO and the
National Science Foundation announced grant opportunities worth up to
$58 million over the next five years for colleges and universities.
Once this program matures, our estimate is that this initiative will
produce 20 to 30 new Ph.D.s per year, while also addressing critical
research needs. This will not address the need completely. But our
efforts, combined with the academic support efforts of other federal
agencies like the Department of Energy, will help provide the nuclear
scientists and engineers of the future.
Coordination of Effort
The identification of gaps in nuclear detection capabilities
justifies the need for a well-supported DNDO research and development
program. At the same time, we recognize that several federal agencies
already engage in research and development in this area. Therefore, the
planning process for the DNDO transformational research agenda was
coordinated with partners, including the DOE National Nuclear Security
Administration's Nonproliferation and Verification Research and
Development Program (NA-22), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
I would like to take a moment to describe several mechanisms currently
in place to ensure active coordination between DNDO and other agencies
funding related research and development.
From its founding, DNDO supported the Domestic Nuclear Defense
Research and Development (DND R&D) Roadmap Working Group to develop a
coordinated, interagency R&D roadmap that would enhance the breadth of
domestic nuclear defense efforts to ensure a secure nation. The DND R&D
Working Group was chartered by the Homeland Security Council/National
Security Council Domestic Nuclear Defense (DND) Policy Coordinating
Committee. The DND R&D Roadmap Working Group developed a long-term
vision for domestic nuclear defense R&D. The scope of this working
group covered the interagency coordination of: R&D strategies for
domestic nuclear defense; the identification and filling of critical
technology gaps; enhancing efforts to develop and sustain critical
capabilities through appropriate investments in the foundational
science and research; interagency funding for necessary science and
technology; and collaboration and exchange of vital R&D information.
DNDO co-chairs the working group on interdiction research and
development.
DNDO has also supported the National Nuclear Security
Administration in reviewing foundational science proposals for advanced
detectors and materials. Staff from both NA-22 and DNDO served on each
others' proposal review panels, in part to ensure that duplication of
funding is minimized. This interaction helped ensure that DNDO
transformational R&D programs are well coordinated with those of NA-22
(which focused on foundational science for advanced detectors and
materials), enabling the U.S. Government to best utilize the expertise
of the National Labs. DNDO conducted similar proposal reviews with
DTRA.
DNDO, as an interagency office, has full-time detailees from
agencies such as DOE and DOD. These individuals have provided
invaluable expertise in all aspects of the DNDO mission. Our detailees
enable us to maintain an open and productive dialogue with our
interagency partners so that we can avoid duplication of effort and
make strides toward the complete implementation of the proposed
architecture.
Conclusion
The challenges that lie ahead require a coordinated effort on the
behalf of the best scientific minds within our government, academia and
the private sector. The DNDO has taken an end-to-end approach to
research and development, systems development, and product improvement.
From fostering the development of revolutionary detection technologies
that fill gaps in our evolving architecture to providing next-
generation technologies that improve performance, cost, and operational
value, DNDO is working to provide the Nation with a continuously
improving capability to protect against a terrorist nuclear attack.
This concludes my prepared statement. With the Committee's
permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the record.
Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and Members of the Subcommittee, I
thank you for your attention and will be happy to answer any questions
that you may have.
Biography for Vayl S. Oxford
Mr. Vayl Oxford was appointed Director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) in September 2005, reporting to the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security with responsibility for the
establishment of the new, jointly staffed office and for directing all
activities associated with the organization.
Prior to his appointment to DHS, Mr. Oxford served as the Director
for Counter-proliferation (CP) at the National Security Council.
Before his assignment to the White House, Mr. Oxford was the Deputy
Director for Technology Development at the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA).
From 1993 to 1998, Mr. Oxford served at the Defense Nuclear Agency,
and, then, the Defense Special Weapons Agency as the Director for
Counter-proliferation.
During his Air force tenure, Mr. Oxford held several positions
associated with aircraft and weapons development, and war plans
analysis in Europe and the Pacific. He also served as an Assistant
Professor of Aeronautics at the United States Air Force Academy from
1982 to 1986.
Mr. Oxford is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and
the Air Force Institute of Technology and the recipient of numerous
military awards. He received the DOD ACTD Technical Manager of the Year
Award in 1997. He was appointed to the Senior Executive Service in 1997
and received the Meritorious Executive Presidential Rank Award in 2002.
Chairman Wu. Thank you, Director Oxford. Dr. Epstein.
STATEMENT OF DR. GERALD L. EPSTEIN, SENIOR FELLOW FOR SCIENCE
AND SECURITY, HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Dr. Epstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Gingrey, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you this morning.
Before I start, I can't help but point out that I first
started studying the issues I am going to be talking with you
about this morning working for this institution in an agency
that unfortunately no longer exists. I used to be with the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and wrote a
report on the same things we have been talking about. And as
much as I welcome the opportunity to speak with you today,
frankly, you deserve better than that. You deserve better than
one hearing with individual witnesses. You need your own folks,
a dedicated office working on precisely the interface of
technology and policy, not just for this committee but for
practically every other committee on the Hill. So let me just
command that I think that is a capability that could be used
here on the Hill.
Let me get back to what you asked me to talk about. I would
like to start off by highlighting just one or two factors I
think we need to keep in mind when we address Homeland Security
Science and Technology, make a few observations along with way
about the fiscal year 2008 request from the Department, and
then end up with one specific point on what has turned out to
be a popular issue, that of Science and Technology education.
Let me start with I think the greatest challenge we face in
managing an R&D portfolio for the Department of Homeland
Security, which is looking over the entire menu of risks that
are in front of us and deciding what it is we actually need to
spend our money on. This forces us to compare some very
different threats; nuclear threats, biological threats,
infrastructure, explosives, borders, cyber attacks, and all
this fortunately in the absence of much of the data you would
really want to do a quantitative risk assessment. These attacks
have not happened much to date. We would like to keep it that
way. But I think we need better tools, better analytical
procedures, better processes to figure out how we actually make
some of these high-level tradeoffs.
Before we say, before I spend a lot of money on this
capability, which I might know how to do, what else might I be
able to spend it on, and what more security could we get for
that? I don't think there is going to be a magic spreadsheet
that is going to come up with the right allocation among
different priorities, but I do think we can have systems that
are going to help make our decisions a little more transparent
and highlight where it is that our gut hunches, our subjective
probabilities really are making a big difference.
I would also like to talk about the time horizon of S&T
research in the Department of Homeland Security. When the
Department was first formed, the government had just realized
it had this mission. There was not a long-standing base of work
precisely on homeland security type issues. There were a lot of
immediate needs, a lot of immediate capabilities that could
fill those needs, and the decision made at the time to go for
what I think has been called the low-hanging fruit, near-term
research, but to defer the more basic and the longer-term
investigations. That is an understandable decision at the time,
but it is not sustainable. And I am pleased to see looking
through this year's budget request that we have a more balanced
portfolio of research and development, not just near-term
programs but also longer-term programs, and I am particularly
pleased to see that we are willing to take some risks. And that
is essential.
A serious pathology that a technology development
organization can run into, especially one that has to look at
emerging technological threats, is to aim too low. Under
Secretary Cohen is going to need your help in making sure he is
not running into this problem, making sure his vision is far
enough. The way you will know he is doing his job is if he can
come back to you and report that he has failed. If he hasn't
started some programs that just don't pan out, he is not being
aggressive enough, and I think he can use your help in holding
him to that.
And I would just now like to conclude on a note about the
Homeland Security Science and Technology Fellows Program. This
is an important program. I am pleased that the Department
recognizes the importance of a strong national Science and
Technology base, not just for the many other objectives that we
draw on S&T for but particularly for the Department of Homeland
Security mission. And the Department recognizes this
responsibility to replenishing the supply of human resources in
this arena. But I think the program actually could probably be
modified so that the fellows not only contribute in general to
the U.S. science and technology base but contribute
specifically to Homeland Security missions. And this is not by
making more requirements on the program but actually getting
them more excited about homeland security and the technology
applications that they can work on that are solving our own
needs. I think a deeper engagement with these fellows, they now
have an orientation at the beginning of the process and they
work on an internship, I think a continuing involvement, high-
level mentorships, briefing them on threats facing the Nation
and the different ways in which the whole Homeland Security
architecture can address it will get them excited, not only
about their own science and technology investigations, but
about applying that to the homeland security mission.
And, again, we need S&T workforce in this country, but the
homeland security agencies have a harder job. They have got to
work with the U.S. citizens. We are fortunate to have foreign
nationals contribute to the technical workforce in this
country, but they can't get security clearances, and they can't
work for the gentleman on my right. So the programs they are
supporting are very important, and I think they can have a
higher payoff in having them work directly for the Homeland
Security sector.
So I would be glad to entertain your questions at the end
of the panel.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Epstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gerald L. Epstein
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Budget for
Fiscal Year 2008. I am currently serving as Senior Fellow in Science
and Security in the Homeland Security Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), here in Washington. I am
also an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service, where I teach a course on science,
technology and homeland security. I have been working in the area of
science, technology, and security policy for more than twenty years and
have been studying nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological
weapons issues and responses for over 15 years.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ None of the institutions I am affiliated with take policy
positions on the topics I will discuss, and the views expressed are
strictly my own.
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At CSIS, my colleagues and I are involved in a major international
effort, supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, to take a comprehensive,
international, and interdisciplinary approach to dissuading,
interdicting, mitigating, and responding to biological weapons threats.
This project aims to improve the ability to counter these weapons at
all stages, from influencing the intent to produce weapons, to denying
access to materials and expertise, to detecting illicit programs, to
managing the consequences of an attack. The Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology program, and particularly its
biological defense programs, are an important part of the United
States'--and the world's--response to these threats.\2\
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\2\ See the CSIS Biological Threat Reduction Program website at
www.csis.org/hs/btr
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Other Sources of Advice to Congress
Before I start, however, I cannot help pointing out to this
committee that I first started working on the issues I will be
discussing today at an agency that no longer exists--the Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment. At OTA I was the Project Director for
a major series of reports produced for the Congress on the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including biological
weapons. As much as I welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues
with Members of this committee this morning, frankly you and your
colleagues deserve more attention than I or any other outside witnesses
can devote to you in one hearing. You need a dedicated, credible, and
authoritative body of substantive experts, working for you within a
carefully structured and fully bipartisan process, that can relate the
best available technical understanding directly to the policy choices
you face. I have long believed that you and your colleagues--who must
act on policy issues that are inextricably dependent on science and
technology in practically every Committee of Congress--would find such
a capability to be very helpful.
Homeland Security Science and Technology Challenges
What we now call ``homeland security'' has only been recognized as
a mission of the Federal Government since the late 1990s, and only
since 9/11 has it acquired the resources and organization it has today.
Previously, national security policy dealt primarily with overseas
threats, and domestic policy did not have a major security component.
The U.S. National Academy of Sciences' landmark 2002 study Making the
Nation Safer\3\ recognized the vital role that science and technology
could play in bolstering our homeland security, and this report played
a significant role in the establishment of a Directorate of Science and
Technology within the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
2003. Given both the importance of applying science and technology to
this new mission and the paucity of previous government efforts to do
so, the DHS S&T Directorate was one of the few parts of the new
Department to receive a substantial infusion of new funding; most of
the rest of the Department consisted of agencies whose staffs, budgets,
and missions were transferred (either whole or in part) from elsewhere
in government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism,
National Research Council; Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science
and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, DC: National
Academy Press, 2002). Available online at http://www.nap.edu/html/stct/
index.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2008 budget
request marks only the fourth one that has been prepared by the
Department itself, as opposed to its various predecessor agencies, and
applying science and technology to the homeland security mission
continues to pose challenges:
1. Military technology is not directly applicable to homeland
security. Although the military has considerable experience in
developing and fielding technologies that are relevant to
homeland security needs (such as detecting chemical and
biological agents), few military systems can be directly
adopted in a homeland security context. Military and civil
users differ in their threat scenarios; levels of user skill,
experience, and training; systems for maintenance, logistics,
and self-protection; sources of funding; willingness to
tolerate disruption; ability to issue orders; and respective
legal and policy contexts in ways that make it very difficult
to use military systems for homeland security purposes. The
independent existence of a DHS Science and Technology program
is an acknowledgment of this fact.
2. Users of homeland security technologies may not be federal
employees. Many individuals responsible for mitigating,
defending against, or dealing with terrorist attacks in the
United States--e.g., police officers, emergency medical
technicians, subway train operators, operators of critical
infrastructures--are not federal employees at all. They work
for State, local, and tribal governments or for the private
sector, often in organizations that buy equipment ``off the
shelf'' and that have little experience in developing their own
systems. They may even be members of the public attempting to
protect themselves. These users tend to be highly
disaggregated, and they may not have their own funding to
purchase and field new technologies.
3. Users may not even exist yet. Some key missions of interest
to the DHS S&T directorate--including detection of pathogenic
biological organisms in the atmosphere, decontamination of wide
areas after a major biological attack, or detection of smuggled
nuclear weapons in commercial shipping--were nobody's
responsibility prior to the creation of DHS. Moreover,
technological breakthroughs can provide capabilities that had
never been anticipated, and that no institution or entity may
currently be in a position to utilize. Although developing
technology without a clear sense of what is needed risks
wasting time and money, tying R&D programs exclusively to the
identified needs of established users can impede our ability to
utilize ``game-changing'' breakthroughs. Sufficiently powerful
tools should motivate us to figure out how to use them.
4. Technologies don't protect us--systems do. Throwing
technology at a problem does not necessarily make us safer.
Careful studies are needed to identify systems and concepts of
operations that will mitigate, dissuade, expose, or respond to
threats; model how effectively these systems will work in
different situations; ask how the deployment of such systems
might change the nature of the threat; and evaluate how much
better off such a system, on balance, will make us. Moreover,
the political leaders who will oversee the use of these systems
need to become familiar with their capabilities and their
limitations.
5. Prioritization is, and will remain, difficult. Perhaps the
hardest job in developing homeland security technologies is
determining which threats to address, deciding how much to
spend on countering each, and measuring our progress. Major
terrorist attacks are fortunately rare, and we do not have an
exhaustive database of prior attacks that will let us predict
what the next attacks will look like. Moreover, tracking
terrorist plans and capabilities is much more difficult, say,
than counting Soviet armored divisions or intercontinental
ballistic missiles was. Modeling and systems studies can
provide some guidance in allocating our defensive dollars, but
they can be very sensitive to assumptions that will be
impossible to justify empirically. Improving our methodologies
for such decision-making should itself be a high priority, even
if in the end, decision-makers will have to rely on subjective
judgment.
6. No magic organizational solution can eliminate inherent
overlap among agency missions, such as those of the Department
of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). DHS deals with deliberate attacks, including
those involving biological agents and disease. HHS deals with
health and disease threats, including those involving
deliberate attack. Biological attacks are both health incidents
and security incidents, and both DHS and HHS must be involved
in countering them. The potential for conflict can never be
eliminated, but it can be managed--particularly through open
lines of communication, clear delineation of roles and
missions, and an awareness of the different contexts in which
each agency views this issue.
Biodefense in the FY 2008 DHS Science and Technology Budget
The largest component of the DHS S&T Directorate's budget is the
Chemical and Biological Division, which I was asked to address in my
testimony. Overall federal responsibilities for biodefense and
biosecurity have been specified in policy documents such as Homeland
Security Presidential Directives HSPD-9 (``Defense of United States
Agriculture and Food,''), HSPD-10 (``Biodefense for the Twenty-First
Century''), and HSPD-18 (``Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of
Mass Destruction''), which in turn have generated taskings for the
Department of Homeland Security. A few aspects of the Department's
biological research and technology development program merit particular
attention.
Prioritization. As indicated above, one of the key management
challenges facing those responsible for developing and deploying
homeland security technologies is establishing priorities. At the
operational level, this process would consist of identifying
performance or readiness goals that characterize the capabilities we
need to achieve; measuring how far we are from those goals; and
deriving a set of programs (including acquisition, technology
development, training and doctrine, etc.) that will close those gaps.
This process would also require some way of evaluating which gaps were
most important to close, and which programs would be most effective in
closing them. Such a process would involve all agencies that had
homeland security responsibilities, and it would be updated regularly.
The National Academies' study Making the Nation Safer stated that
the government did not have the analytic capabilities it needed to
inform decision-making,\4\ and it called for such capabilities to be
created. That work is incomplete. Even with better tools, however, I
believe that assessing risk, setting priorities, and measuring progress
will be a very difficult job--one that is harder than the equivalent
planning process in the Department of Defense, since homeland security
vulnerabilities are more diverse and the threats against them harder to
evaluate. In the end, however, dollars have to be spent on some things
and not on others, and those choices should be informed by analysis to
the greatest extent possible.
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\4\ Ibid, p. 21.
Biowatch and the Office of Health Affairs. The transfer of
operational responsibility for the Biowatch system into the new Office
of Health Affairs for FY 2008 budget is a promising development.
The Biowatch system, which samples air in a number of metropolitan
areas for the presence of specific biological threat agents, is an
example of a system that was deployed before it had true users. We had
never had the ability to respond to a bioterrorist attack on a U.S.
city in ``near real time''--as or shortly after the agents were
released--and it was therefore nobody's job to look for attacks on that
timescale. Nevertheless, the motivation for the Biowatch system is
compelling--to provide sufficient warning to initiate the distribution
of medical countermeasures before illnesses start to manifest, when
those countermeasures can be far more effective.
The combination of a compelling technical rationale with the lack
of an obvious user meant that the early deployment of this system
outpaced the development of response protocols that involved all the
local, State, federal, and non-governmental entities that would have
some role in responding to a true attack. In subsequent years, as we
have gained experience operating this system, additional work has been
done to incorporate Biowatch information more effectively into response
planning and decision-making. Even so, it remains an open question
whether or not Biowatch will be able to provide early confirmation of a
biological attack with a level of confidence that is high enough for
public officials to take highly consequential actions such as
community-wide distribution of medication.
Exploration of these essential systems issues will be advanced by
the transfer of operational responsibility for running the Biowatch
system from the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to the new DHS
Office of Health Affairs. The S&T Directorate would retain
responsibility for technical improvement and next-generation systems.
This transfer for the first time identifies a principal federal
``user'' for the Biowatch system, albeit a surrogate one. The Office of
Health Affairs does not itself mount the full response to a biological
attack, but it does have the responsibility to work with actual
responding agencies at many different levels of government to ensure
that the Biowatch capability is effectively utilized. Clarifying
operational and research responsibilities for the Biowatch system is a
positive step that will improve both the technical prospects and the
operational confidence of the system.
Technically, Biowatch has been highly successful. I would never
have predicted that over two million Biowatch assays would have been
processed by now without any false alarms. This is a very impressive
record that helps to build confidence in the system. At the same time,
we have seen a number of ``true positives''--the detection of actual
threat agents in city air samples. In each case, these detections have
been attributed to organisms that occurred naturally in the
environment, and none of these detections resulted in mobilizing a full
response to a fictitious attack. These detections therefore served to
validate the system hardware and analysis protocols, and they also
proved that our response protocols did not incorrectly assume a
detection always meant an attack.
On the other hand, the fact that Biowatch alarms had to be
confirmed by actual cases of disease before a full response would have
been mounted does raise the question of what the added value of the
Biowatch system is. (Note that the response to an alarm might have been
different for an agent such as smallpox, which is not found in nature,
for which confirmed laboratory detection would be impossible to
attribute to natural causes.) As we continue to gain operational
experience with Biowatch, it will be essential for the Office of Health
Affairs to evaluate the ways in which Biowatch warning information can
prove useful, even if it is not sufficient to trigger a full response.
Possible uses of such information include heightening our sensitivity
to look for individual cases of disease, triggering some initial stages
of pharmaceutical distribution, or informing subsequent determination
of the scale and scope of a biological attack.
Relationships Between DHS and Other Governmental Agencies. As
described above, there is no organizational solution that will
eliminate the potential for interagency conflict or confusion over
biodefense. As we are exploring at CSIS in our Biological Threat
Reduction project, interactions between different professional
communities--embodied in the U.S. Government by different government
agencies--are an essential aspect of any response to biological
threats. Although these interactions will always present challenges, I
believe that the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human
Services are developing appropriate mechanisms for working together.
In the current fiscal year--pending appropriations--and certainly
in the coming year, a new agency in the Department of Health and Human
Services will appear on the scene with a vitally important role in
biodefense: the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority,
or BARDA. With the mission of bridging the gap between basic biomedical
research and countermeasure procurement, BARDA will play an essential
role in building the Nation's capacity to respond to biological attack.
But in addition to facilitating the development of specific
countermeasures, BARDA will have an additional mission that may prove
even more important in the long run--that of promoting innovative
technologies that can reduce the time and cost of countermeasure
development in general. With biotechnology becoming ever more powerful
and more widely available, we will be less and less able to restrict
our attention in the future to a short list of threat agents, each with
its own lengthy and expensive countermeasure program.
Instead, we have to move towards a flexible, adaptive, and
responsive biodefense system capable of dealing with threats in near-
real-time. Creating such a system will blur the distinctions between
environmental detection, medical diagnosis, prophylaxis, and treatment,
making it even more important for the Departments of Homeland Security
and Health and Human Services--whose mission delineations currently
depend on some of these functional boundaries--to work together
effectively. These departments will also need to work with the
Department of Defense, whose Transformational Medical Technologies
Initiative, funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, also works
to shorten and simplify medical countermeasure development.
Time and Risk Horizon of DHS Research. When the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate was first
formed, there were so many immediate demands for science and technology
that longer-term research was considered an unaffordable luxury. This
may have been a necessary decision at the time, but it was not a
sustainable one. Failure to invest in longer-term research limits the
prospects for future breakthroughs that could dramatically improve
DHS's ability to fulfill its mission.
As the S&T Directorate matures, so must its S&T portfolio--which
means investing in a portfolio of both near-term and long-term
research. I understand that the S&T Directorate's leadership now shares
this view. I particularly welcome Admiral Cohen's plans to fund some
high-risk but potentially very high payoff projects. A serious
pathology that can overtake a technology development program is to
become failure intolerant, forcing it to settle on safe bets that are
less ambitious than its mission requires. Admiral Cohen will need your
support if he hopes to avoid this--you will have to make sure he fails
often enough, and to hold him accountable if he doesn't.
Classified Biological Research and Treaty Compliance. Classified
research constitutes a much smaller portion of the U.S. biodefense
program than many might suspect. The vast majority of U.S. biodefense
consists of unclassified research at the National Institutes of Health,
which dwarfs all Department of Homeland Security biodefense activities,
let alone any classified ones. Nevertheless, classified DHS biodefense
research will constitute one of the most controversial parts of the
U.S. biodefense program. Research that cannot be shared with diverse
technical reviewers, independent non-governmental observers, or foreign
colleagues will raise questions with respect to technical merit, policy
appropriateness, and treaty compliance.
Even more so than in other areas of science, the biological
sciences have enjoyed a tradition of openness and international
collaboration--and this heavy presumption of openness should continue.
Since disease continues to kill millions of people around the world
each year, any restrictions on relevant scientific knowledge could have
serious consequences. Yet the existence of hostile, witting adversaries
that are determined to wreak devastation and that are known to be
interested in biological weapons mandates that this openness not be
absolute. The U.S. biodefense program would like to avoid serving as
the R&D program or the targeting staff for Al Qaeda or any other
terrorist group, even while it works to advance science, cure disease,
and assure the world that it is abiding by treaty commitments.\5\
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\5\ See Center for Strategic and International Studies, Commission
on Scientific Communication and National Security, Security Controls on
Scientific Information and the Conduct of Scientific Research (June
2005) for discussion of some of the tensions between security and
openness. This paper is available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/
pubs/0506<INF>-</INF>cscans.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without attempting to do justice to the complexity of this issue,
let me make a few observations about both classification and treaty
compliance:
<bullet> Actions that violate the 1975 Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) also violate similarly worded provisions of
U.S. law.\6\ Any government employees or contractors who
violated the BWC in the course of their job would be subject to
criminal prosecution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, now at Title 18,
Section 175 of the United States Code.
<bullet> DHS should engage in public outreach to instill
confidence that it is appropriately reviewing its biological
research activities, including classified activities, for
treaty compliance, legal compliance, and consistency with
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
policy.
<bullet> No matter how rigorous its internal review policies
are, and notwithstanding the involvement of officials who have
no connection to the projects being reviewed, an internal DHS
compliance process will not be viewed by outside observers as
being truly independent. The more widely that DHS activities,
including classified ones, can be reviewed by appropriately
cleared individuals outside of DHS and even outside the U.S.
Government, the greater the confidence will be that the
Department's activities are technically sound and treaty
compliant.
<bullet> Even if it cannot all be shared with the public, the
United States has an interest in sharing information on its
biodefense activities with other countries to assure them that
it is complying with the Biological Weapons Convention. The
fact that the United States has no offensive biological weapons
program should allow it to share this information more widely
than if it were seeking to protect a military advantage.
<bullet> Classified biodefense activities have been accused of
triggering a ``security dilemma''--of appearing to others as
offensive, and therefore stimulating other countries to respond
with offensive programs of their own.\7\ Independent of the
level of empirical support for this proposition--there are
certainly examples of state biological weapons programs that
proceeded in, or were even prompted by, the absence of any
perceived bioweapons activities by their adversaries\8\--this
argument retains at least theoretical salience as an incentive
for openness. However, it is incomplete at best. It is not
clear that a country suspecting others of having offensive
biological weapons programs would choose to respond with an
offensive program of its own; a much more rational response
would be for it to improve its defenses. Even more
significantly, the argument fails utterly with respect to non-
state programs. Al Qaeda's motivation for pursuing biological
weapons, for example, has absolutely nothing to do with any
suspicion that the United States may have an offensive program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Jonathan Tucker, ``Avoiding the Biological Security Dilemma: A
Response to Petro and Carus,'' Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense
Strategy, Practice, and Science, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006), pp. 196-197
\8\ W. Seth Carus and James B. Petro, ``Avoiding the Biological
Security Dilemma at Our Own Peril: A Response to Tucker,'' Biosecurity
and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Vol. 4,
No. 2 (2006), p. 202.
<bullet> The Biological Weapons Convention bans the
development of biological agents ``of types and in quantities
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or
other peaceful purposes.'' \9\ The treaty has no meaning if any
conceivable offensive activity is justified as ``protective''
on the grounds that it is important for defensive purposes to
``see what is possible.'' Although some may worry that
classified U.S. biodefense efforts may be doing just that, I
believe that the U.S. biodefense program has too much to do to
waste resources on such unconstrained speculation, even without
treaty restrictions. However, I also believe that a requirement
to be protective can be made operational in a treaty compliance
review. To justify an activity as ``protective,'' I would argue
that it should be shown to specifically increase our ability to
protect ourselves--e.g., that its results should directly and
materially inform particular decisions, or contribute to
particular capabilities, that improve our ability to protect
against biological weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Article I(1).
Human Resources for Homeland Security Related Science and
Technology. One farsighted program run by the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate is its Graduate Fellowship program. This program
is intended to support outstanding graduate students in technical
disciplines that are important to the DHS mission, with the ultimate
objective of strengthening the Nation's science and technology
community. However, more can be done to attract these Fellows into
careers in the homeland security sector.
Fellows are required to attend an orientation program, to
participate in a 10-week internship, and to express willingness to
accept homeland security-related employment after graduation (although
this is not a binding obligation). U.S. citizenship is required, and
security clearances are required for many of the internships.
A strengthened S&T community constitutes ``a critical advantage in
the development and implementation of counter-terrorist measures and
other DHS objectives,'' as the Fellowship's promotional materials
explain,\10\ but having these Fellows enter the technical community at
large upon graduation does not serve the homeland security mission as
effectively as if they were to work directly in the homeland security
sector. The United States scientific and technical workforce is
strongly dependent on foreign nationals, who constitute a significant
fraction of each year's graduates in technical disciplines. Many of
these highly skilled foreign nationals remain in the United States
after graduation, to this country's great benefit.\11\ However, foreign
nationals are not eligible to work in many homeland security-related
institutions. DHS Graduate Fellows can, and policies that maximize the
fraction of these technically trained U.S. citizens who enter the
homeland security sector would be very valuable.
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\10\ ``DHS Scholarship and Fellowship Program 2007 Competition
Guidelines,'' http://www.orau.gov/dhsed/
\11\ See Center for Strategic and International Studies, Commission
on Scientific Communication and National Security, Security Controls on
the Access of Foreign Scientists and Engineers to the United States
(October 2005) for discussion of the importance of foreign interchange
to the U.S. science and technology base. This paper is available at
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/051005<INF>-</INF>whitepaper.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current program exposes Fellows to DHS problems and processes
to some degree, but I think that a deeper level of engagement with
these Fellows, with a more thorough exposure to the U.S. Government's
homeland security operations, will stimulate greater interest in
pursuing homeland security careers after graduation. More should be
done to secure security clearances for the Fellows and brief them on
homeland security threats at a classified level; to have senior
representatives from homeland security and related agencies (i.e.,
homeland security, intelligence, defense, public health, critical
infrastructure) meet with them to describe their jobs, their agencies'
responsibilities, and different ways in which science and technology
build homeland security capabilities; and to establish mentorships
between Fellows and senior employees in the homeland security sector.
The Fellows should be convened periodically, perhaps by holding
regional meetings or seminars that would be convenient for them to
attend. Ongoing engagement with the Fellows is much more likely to
elicit an interest in a career in homeland security than a single
orientation.
A model for such a program of continuous engagement and involvement
of technical professionals in security problems, albeit one pitched at
a smaller number of individuals at a more senior level in their career,
would be the Defense Science Study Group that is organized by the
Institute for Defense Analyses for DARPA. I would recommend that DHS
officials involved in the Graduate Fellowship Program familiarize
themselves with that activity.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for your
interest, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have
at this time.
Biography for Gerald L. Epstein
Gerald Epstein is Senior Fellow for Science and Security in the
CSIS Homeland Security Program, where he works on issues including
reducing biological weapons threats, improving national preparedness to
respond to biological attack, and ameliorating tensions between the
scientific research and national security communities. He is also an
Adjunct Professor with the Security Studies Program at Georgetown
University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, where he
teaches a course on ``Science, Technology, and Homeland Security.''
Epstein came to CSIS in 2003 from the Institute for Defense Analyses,
where he had been assigned to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. From
1996 to 2001, he worked at the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP), serving for the last year in a joint
appointment as Assistant Director for National Security at OSTP and
Senior Director for Science and Technology on the National Security
Council staff. His responsibilities at OSTP included technologies to
counter terrorism and to protect the Nation's critical infrastructures;
chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation and arms control;
missile defense; strategic arms control; the nuclear weapon stockpile
stewardship program; export controls; and national security/emergency
preparedness telecommunications.
From 1983 to 1989 and again from 1991 until its demise in 1995, Dr.
Epstein worked at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment,
where he directed a study on the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and worked on other international security topics. From
1989 to 1991, he directed a project at Harvard University's Kennedy
School of Government on the relationship between civil and military
technologies, and he is a co-author of Beyond Spinoff Military and
Commercial Technologies in a Changing World (Boston, MA: Harvard
Business School Press, 1992). He has also served as visiting lecturer
in public and international affairs at Princeton University's Woodrow
Wilson School.
Dr. Epstein is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and in
2007 chairs that society's Committee on International Scientific
Affairs. He is also a member of the editorial board for the journal
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism and of the Biological Threats Panel of the
National Academy of Sciences' Committee on International Security and
Arms Control. He received S.B. degrees in physics and electrical
engineering from MIT and a Ph.D. in physics from the University of
California at Berkeley.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Chairman Wu. Thank you, Dr. Epstein. Mr. Czerwinski.
STATEMENT OF MR. JONAH J. CZERWINSKI, MANAGING CONSULTANT, IBM
GLOBAL BUSINESS SERVICES; SENIOR FELLOW, HOMELAND SECURITY, IBM
GLOBAL LEADERSHIP INITIATIVE
Mr. Czerwinski. Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey,
Congressman Mitchell, my name is Jonah Czerwinski. I am a
senior fellow with IBM's Global Leadership Initiative and a
managing consultant at IBM's Global Business Services. I thank
you for the opportunity this morning to appear before you to
highlight three things.
First, IBM's dedication to supporting basic research and
services science. Second, the investment priorities of the DHS
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and the importance of
placing these efforts in a broader framework that protects the
golden flow of trade and travel. And third, matching R&D
investments of the DNDO to the risks posed by covert nuclear
weapons and materials.
IBM spends approximately $6 billion per year on research
and development. Much of it on basic research. However,
increasingly IBM and others are also investing in research in
emerging areas such as services, which comprise approximately
80 percent of the U.S. economy and account for more than 75
percent of IBM's corporate revenues. We believe that the
national investment in basic research remains critical to
foster innovation and to support our country's economic
competitiveness. And we advocate that the Federal Government
also should support research and curriculum development in the
area of services science.
By way of background from 2004, through the early part of
this year I was director of Homeland Security projects at the
Center for the Study of the Presidency and worked with Center
President David Abshire and Norm Augustine to organize the
Nuclear Defense Working Group. That group provided the
groundwork and rationale for the Government reorganization that
led to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
The challenge of nuclear material is its subtle
radiological signature, which usually requires a detector to be
both close to the suspected source and within its vicinity for
enough time to gather telltale radiation. For this reason most
of the investments made in detecting smuggled nuclear weapons
should support two key success factors; increasing distance
between the detector and the radioactive material and
decreasing dwell time near the material itself.
The DNDO budget includes funding for certain longer-term
R&D commitments that show progress in these areas. For example,
the development of the Advanced Standoff Detection Program that
Mr. Oxford described could become a game-changing capability.
This research may deliver faster detection at a greater
distance.
In the end, investments like these must not only protect
the public and the Nation's critical assets but do so without
harming the flow of trade and travel. Congress must view the
effort to combat the smuggled nuclear weapons threat as one of
several interlocking objectives, many of which should benefit
from our R&D investments. Doing so requires a framework that
connects the search for global, excuse me, the search for
nuclear materials to the broader goal of protecting the flows
of cargo, people, and conveyances in the global trade and
travel system. The DNDO should figure prominently in this
mission.
Ultimately, homeland security R&D investments should
support the broader objective of bringing efficiency, security,
and resilience to one of the most attractive targets of WMD
terrorism; the flow of global trade and travel. IBM has
developed a means by which today's homeland security
imperatives can reinforce both efficiency and security in the
global movement of cargo, people, information, and finance. We
call this framework Global Movement Management. It adds
resilience to this critical system of movement without imposing
inefficiencies that risk outweighing the security benefits to
the numerous stakeholders that use these systems of trade and
travel. The country needs a strategic framework like you
mentioned to overarch our R&D investments for maximum benefit
to both our Homeland Security interests and our economic
competitiveness.
The strategic framework is lacking today. Nevertheless,
DNDO has chosen successfully several important pilots,
including those I mentioned in my written statement.
This leads me to my final point. Mr. Chairman, you asked
specifically about the role of risk assessments and identifying
the best use of our R&D investments in this area. When the DNDO
first was created, it was understood by its authors that as the
threat of nuclear terrorism and proliferation would evolve,
America's relevant technological base would evolve and would
other significant international factors such as the war in Iraq
and Afghanistan. It was, therefore, critical that as a help for
national efforts to combat the smuggling of nuclear material,
the DNDO began with a net assessment of the Nation's
capabilities, matched against a current snapshot of the threat.
The DNDO's Global Nuclear Detection architecture is based on
that assessment. It includes guidance on how best to operate
the nuclear detection assets and authorities, as well as a
clear list of gaps in America's nuclear detection efforts.
Those gaps lead to DNDO's list of investment priorities.
I would recommend giving special attention to the
methodology and makeup of the Global Nuclear Detection
architecture to better illustrate the connection between risk
and the DNDO's budget. Ultimately, these individual investments
can serve a greater goal of resilience, security, and
efficiency. The DNDO and the Executive Branch as a whole should
be measured by the ability of their R&D investments to do just
that.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Czerwinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jonah J. Czerwinski
Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, Members of the Subcommittee, I
am pleased to appear before you today to comment on the role of the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) in securing the homeland against the smuggled nuclear
threat, the DNDO's budget priorities, and the extent to which this
relatively new office works across the interagency and with relevant
partners and stakeholders outside of the federal government.
I am a Senior Fellow with IBM's Global Leadership Initiative\1\ and
a Managing Consultant for IBM's Global Business Services. I am here to
address three items. First, I will discuss select high-leverage and
innovative components of the DNDO's budget that I believe strike the
right balance between immediate deployment and the vital long-term
commitment to basic research. Second, I will address the need for
investing in a reorganization that is currently underway at DNDO that
reflects its crosscutting mission. And third, I will place this mission
in the broader context of a framework that connects the defense against
smuggled nuclear materials to the imperative of protecting the stream
of cargo, people, conveyances, information, and money flows in the
global trade system.
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\1\ The Global Leadership Initiative is a strategy team designed to
cut across all IBM business lines to identify new ideas that place IBM
at the forefront of companies with the ability to anticipate and serve
customer needs in the public sector on a global basis.
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IBM has invested in the development of new thought leadership in
this field because we, like the Members of this committee, value
innovation. Innovation is the key to our competitiveness--both IBM's
and the Nation's. IBM spends approximately $6 billion per year on
research and development (R&D)--much of it on basic research. However,
increasingly, IBM and others also are investing in research in emerging
areas such as services, which, as you may be aware, make up
approximately 80 percent of U.S. economy, while employing approximately
the same percentage of the U.S. labor force. As a country, we need to
invest in the skills needed for 21st century jobs that will almost
certainly be dominated by the services market. This means funding
investment in the emerging academic discipline of services science,
including R&D and curriculum development.
My own work at IBM focuses on developing a comprehensive framework
for security, resilience, and efficiency in the global movement of
goods, people, and information. From 2004 through the early part of
this year, I was Director of Homeland Security Projects at the Center
for the Study of the Presidency.\2\ Beginning in April 2004, I worked
with Center President David Abshire to organize the Nuclear Defense
Working Group. That group provided the groundwork and rationale for a
government reorganization that led to the creation of the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office.
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\2\ The Center for the Study of the Presidency is a non-partisan,
non-profit organization founded in 1965 to examine past successes and
failures of the Presidency as they apply to present challenges and
opportunities.
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Origins and Initiatives of the DNDO
The single most devastating threat to America remains a nuclear
weapon covertly detonated in a major city. Presidents have considered
this risk ever since Einstein wrote Franklin Roosevelt in 1939 to warn
him that a ``bomb of this type, carried by a boat and exploded in a
port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the
surrounding territory.'' \3\ While that risk is much greater today than
it was then, some progress in the field of detection has been made.
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\3\ Albert Einstein, Leo Szilard correspondence to President
Franklin D. Roosevelt. August 2, 1939.
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In April 2004, a talented group of experts gathered at the Center
for the Study of the Presidency to consider an intimidating question:
Is the Nation doing all that it can to reduce the risk of covert
nuclear attack at an acceptable cost? Norman Augustine co-chaired the
session with then-Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, Admiral James
Loy. Representatives from the Departments of Defense, Energy, and
Homeland Security, along with participants from the White House,
national laboratories, and think tanks attended.
Two perspectives emerged during that meeting. One held that highly
enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium used in a nuclear weapon is simply
too difficult to detect because of the low radiation levels they emit
prior to detonation. The other argued that today's technology simply
lacks the strength to detect an element as subtle as HEU, but
improvements are not impossible. Both groups agreed that, among other
things, a better organization within government was necessary to
improve detection because existing national efforts simply were too
disunified.\4\ Solving the political science problem would help solve
the physical science problem.
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\4\ See ``Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack.'' http://
www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/attack.pdf.
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The result was the creation of the DNDO in April 2005 through
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14.\5\ The DNDO was born out
of the acknowledgement that no single agency had the assets,
authorities, or responsibilities needed to address the risk of covert
nuclear attack. Since then, this office, under the leadership of Vayl
Oxford, and the reorganization of DHS's Science and Technology
Directorate, led by Under Secretary Cohen, have led to significant
progress in combating the threat of terrorism.
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\5\ The text of HSPD 14 can be viewed at http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/nspd/nspd-43.html.
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Over the past two years, the DNDO has stood apart as a work in
progress and as a place for addressing one of the Nation's most urgent
security concerns. While the DNDO is still nascent, it is no longer
``too early to tell'' if it is achieving its goal of integrating and
accelerating national efforts to combat the smuggled nuclear weapons
threat.
Mr. Chairman, your invitation to testify before this committee
included the important indicators to gauge the success of this
experiment: Does the new budget request--the third for this office--
advance the highest priorities for combating smuggled nuclear weapons?
Do those priorities reflect an adequate read of the risk? Are current
research efforts producing results that support the DHS mandate? Is
DNDO collaborating effectively with other federal agencies?
When the DNDO first was created, it was understood by its authors
that as the threat of nuclear terrorism and proliferation would evolve,
America's relevant technological base would evolve, as would other
significant international factors--such as the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and Nunn-Lugar programs. It was therefore critical that, as
a hub for national efforts to combat the smuggling of nuclear material,
the DNDO begin with a net assessment of the Nation's capabilities
matched against a current snapshot of the threat.
The DNDO's ``Global Nuclear Detection Architecture'' is based on
that assessment. It includes guidance on how best to operate the
nuclear detection assets, authorities, and responsibilities. What
emerges is a clear list of gaps in America's covert nuclear detection
capabilities. Those gaps lead to the DNDO's list of priorities.
The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is an interagency product
designed to provide a plan for improving the status quo through a
deliberate systems engineering approach to a gradual--and perhaps
someday rapid--reduction of the risk of covert nuclear attack. Its
success depends upon a multilayered system of systems that must knit
together initiatives contributing to a reduction of the risk in the
U.S., across the maritime and air domain, and in foreign territories.
DNDO priorities reflect a shared perception of the threat as it
evolves over time. The real challenge is setting a budget that balances
the imperative of deploying available detection capabilities now with
conducting basic and applied research that push the limits of today's
technology and help create new capabilities for tomorrow. Interwoven
with that strategy is a more strategic asset: an integrated forensics
mission that reaches across the U.S. Government.
To adequately combat the risk of smuggled nuclear material, the
DNDO invests in exploratory research that challenges assumptions about
the limits of technology. It takes the gaps in the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture and makes longer-term R&D commitments to
promising solutions. These efforts can lead to major game-changing
improvements in our ability to combat nuclear terrorism. Some promising
examples include the following:
1) First, the FY08 budget request includes about $12 million
for a technology demonstration called the Verification of
Shielded Special Nuclear Material (SNM). This initiative
addresses the risk caused by a proliferator or perpetrator who
seeks to foil many currently deployed detectors by moving
critical bomb-making material while hiding it behind lead or
other shielding.
2) Second, the budget includes about $11 million for the
Intelligent Personal Radiation Locator, or IPRL. The technology
represents a move from search to surveillance, and it amounts
to a transformation of the current version of the ``pager''
devices now used, which are little more than personal Geiger
counters. The IPRL investment addresses, albeit in a limited
way, the gap that was identified in the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture showing the need for increased numbers
of smaller, more mobile detectors to help locate stolen nuclear
material or weapons at a late stage of deployment. The new
locators--presently at a very early demonstration stage--are
worn on a belt and can provide the wearer with indications of
where the source is located and the type of isotope within
range. They also have the ability to communicate wirelessly
with other locaters so as to rapidly close in on a suspicious
source. All of this is done with increasing range and with
greater reliability.
3) Third, the DNDO is developing the advanced Stand-off
Detection capability, which focuses on increasing the distance
from dangerous nuclear material while decreasing dwell time
near that material. Both are critical. However, the challenge
of nuclear material is its subtle radiological signature, which
usually requires a detector to be both close to the suspected
source and in its vicinity for enough time to gather telltale
radiation. By soliciting competing teams of partners among
private industry, national laboratories, and academia, this
research may deliver more detailed imaging capabilities at a
range that is increased by a factor of 10 or more. This same
effort could produce detectors capable of working effectively,
while moving at a rate of 20 miles per hour. The result of
faster detection at a greater distance from the source
material--combined with intelligence tools for better
targeting--will not only protect the public and the Nation's
critical assets, but it also will facilitate the movement of
cargo through ports without sacrificing security.
4) Fourth, the FY2008 budget request includes $16.9 million
for the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC),
which supports DNDO's technical forensics responsibility. This
money would support not only an R&D investment, but also a
much-needed reorganization. Nuclear forensics cuts across the
entire mission space from deterrence and dissuasion, to
detection through consequence management, to attribution and
response. It is a core part of the mission of combating
smuggled nuclear weapons.
The NTNFC should be considered a priority given the significant
return on investment that progress in this area can deliver. While the
Department of Homeland Security is not responsible for the entire
spectrum of forensics, the NTNFC represents a step forward in two
clearly needed capabilities:
1. Across the government, unify various competencies and
programs that are focused on aspects of the forensics mission.
2. Develop, enhance, and maintain technical forensics
capabilities for pre-event needs.
DNDO Collaboration
This committee asked specifically whether the DNDO is collaborating
effectively with other federal agencies. I believe that combating the
smuggled nuclear weapons threat is, by nature, a collaborative mission.
This mission was at the center of the interagency debates in 2004, and
the DNDO of today reflects this imperative. This is an area in which
the DNDO has made progress.
Since the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center is in many
ways a microcosm of the DNDO, I would like to highlight a few examples
here that represent a broader collaborative effort now underway. At the
NTNFC, the FBI provides an expert as Deputy Assistant Director, and it
also provides a senior liaison from the FBI lab. The Department of
Defense provides a detailee, and the Department of Energy is assigning
an expert of its own.
The Forensics Center has a Working Group, made up of members from
each relevant federal agency and members of the intelligence community,
which meets regularly to address high priority issues. There is an
``Interagency NTNF Program & Budget Crosscut'' that is under
development to help align relevant programs and harmonize budget
requests. Lastly, the NTNFC--and the DNDO in general--work with
interagency partners in planning and executing exercises that support
the research, development, and deployment of technologies, as well as
shared concepts of operations, or CONOPS.
DNDO works mostly with the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of
Nonproliferation Research and Development, known as NA-22, and DOD's
Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The interactions include serving as
proposal evaluators on each other's programs, deconflicting projects by
comparing portfolios, and jointly participating in project reviews and
technical reports.
The Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs), such as Standoff
Detection and Verification of Shielded Nuclear Material, include teams
that have developed technology with funding from DNDO, DOE, DOD, and
other sources. The purpose of an ATD is to develop and test a
technology that addresses a critical need and which has reached a
proof-of-concept stage, usually with payoff for more than one agency.
In this way, DNDO takes advantage of work that is funded by others, but
it also supports R&D that can be useful to other agencies.
For example, some efforts at DNDO could contribute to Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA) \6\, a major program developed by the Coast
Guard to identify threats and intercept them before they arrive
onshore. In MDA, the Coast Guard and Department of Defense require
better intelligence, as well as detection and interdiction capabilities
to accomplish their goals. In the context of nuclear terrorism, a
successful mission depends upon the ability to detect threatening
material or people at the greatest possible distance. The ability of
DNDO to contribute to that mission should be a measure of its return on
investment.
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\6\ MDA is the principle strategy articulated in ``The National
Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness,'' which was released by the
Department of Homeland Security in October 2005. As directed by
National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-13, it is one of eight plans developed to
support the National Strategy for Maritime Security.
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Placing Detection R&D Within a Broader Framework
Congress must view the effort to combat the smuggled nuclear
weapons threat as one of several interlocking objectives, many of which
should benefit from R&D investments. Doing so requires a framework that
connects the search for nuclear materials to the broader flows of
cargo, people, conveyances, information, and money in the global trade
and travel system. And that framework should reach across DHS, DOD,
DOE, State, and other departments to improve the resilience and
security of the global trade and travel system, while ensuring its
security.
The DNDO--and DHS S&T--should figure prominently in this mission.
Ultimately, the federal R&D management process must more effectively
link the strategic planning process at DHS with the broader mission of
bringing transparency, efficiency, security, and resilience to one of
the most attractive targets of WMD terrorism: the global flow of trade
and travel.
IBM has developed a framework like this that also acknowledges an
existing incentive for the private sector, which is to satisfy the
economic imperative to improve the efficient and reliable flow of
people, cargo, conveyances, money and information.
At IBM, we call this framework ``Global Movement Management.'' \7\
It is a means by which the technology requirements of today's homeland
security measures can provide for both efficiency and security in the
global movement of cargo, people, information, and finance. This new
framework adds resilience to this critical system of movement without
imposing inefficiencies that risk outweighing the security benefits to
the numerous stakeholders that use these systems of trade and travel.
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\7\ Global Movement Management (GMM) is a comprehensive governance
structure and system architecture for monitoring and securing the key
flows of global commerce--people, goods, conveyances, money, and
information. It provides the framework to safeguard the global economy
against disruptive threats by fostering new levels of visibility,
accountability, and resiliency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the DNDO, finding a smuggled nuclear weapon on a ship in the
Port of Portland is too late. That threat must be identified, verified,
and interdicted before it ever approaches. The DNDO investments that I
highlighted go a long way in generating the transparency needed to
identify a threat, but the broader strategy should consider, in this
example, that the shipping system itself must be able to withstand a
disruption, terrorist or otherwise. This is because, as global movement
becomes ever more interdependent, a disruption--let alone an actual
attack--would be catastrophic.
Conclusion
The country needs a strategic framework to overarch our R&D
investments for maximum benefit to both our homeland security interests
and our economic competitiveness. DNDO and DHS lack this strategic
framework today. Nevertheless, DNDO has chosen successfully several
important pilots, including those I mentioned. Indeed, Congress should
view DNDO's work as being on track after three years.
But Congress also should consider how the individual investments
can serve a greater goal of resilience, security, and efficiency. The
DNDO, and the Executive Branch as a whole, should be measured by the
ability of their R&D investments to do just that.
Thank you. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you
may have.
Biography for Jonah J. Czerwinski
Jonah Czerwinski is Managing Consultant, Global Business Services
at IBM, working on homeland security policy issues, and he is a Senior
Fellow in IBM's Global Leadership Initiative. Jonah is also a Senior
Advisor for the Center for the Study of the Presidency and a 2007
Senior Fellow at the Homeland Security Policy Institute of George
Washington University.
From 2003 to 2006, Jonah was Senior Research Associate and Director
of Homeland Security Projects at the Center for the Study of the
Presidency (CSP). He led the Center project on combating the smuggled
nuclear threat, which worked across the Executive Branch in an effort
that led to establishment of the Department of Homeland Security's
National Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). He also served on
the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on Strategies for Defense
Against Nuclear Terrorism. From 2001-2004, he directed the Center's
Homeland Security Roundtable, which regularly convened senior Homeland
Security leadership of the Executive Branch and Congress with leaders
of the think tank community, academia, and private sector to discuss
critical Homeland Security issues.
Jonah led a Center project on strengthening the transatlantic
relationship through NATO, which published Maximizing NATO in the War
on Terror in May 2005. He also directed the Center's working group on
The U.S.-Canada Strategic Partnership in the War on Terrorism in 2002.
He served as a member of the ``Taskforce for Examining the Roles,
Mission, and Organization of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security,'' which published its recommendations as DHS 2.0 (December
2004). In 2005, he was Senior Fellow at the Homeland Security Policy
Institute of George Washington University, and in 2004, he was named a
Manfred Worner Fellow.
Jonah was a contributing writer to and research coordinator of the
Center's 2001 report on Comprehensive Strategic Reform. He was project
coordinator and principal writer of Forward Strategic Empowerment:
Synergies Between CINCs, the State Department, and Other Agencies, and
assistant editor and contributor to In Harm's Way: Intervention and
Prevention.
Professional media appearances include interviews on CNN and CNN-
International, in addition to interviews for The New York Times, Wall
Street Journal, The National Journal, Los Angeles Times, Congressional
Quarterly, National Defense, and other major news outlets. In addition
to authoring, editing, or co-authoring a number of publications, Mr.
Czerwinski has spoken at the Elliott School of International Affairs at
The George Washington University, the Center for International Security
Studies at the University of Maryland, and the graduate school at Salve
Regina University.
Prior to joining the Center in late 1999, Mr. Czerwinski was an
analyst with the program in International Finance and Economic Policy
and a research assistant to the CEO at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS). He has worked with the George Washington
University Center for International Health on the intersection of
international security and health, as a consultant to CSIS, and as
coordinator for the Trinity National Leadership Roundtable. He serves
on the Advisory Council of the Salvation Army of Washington, DC, as
Chairman of the Nominating Committee. Mr. Czerwinski earned his
undergraduate degree (A.B., Philosophy) from Salve Regina University.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Czerwinski. Ms. Ward.
STATEMENT OF MS. MARILYN WARD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
PUBLIC SAFETY TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL (NPSTC)
Ms. Ward. Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and the
Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the National Public
Safety Telecommunications Council, referred to as NPSTC, it is
a privilege to appear before the Subcommittee and its
examination of the Department of Homeland Security's research
and development activities. We commend the Subcommittee's work
in this area.
NPSTC's mission is devoted to improving the communications
capabilities of local and State public safety agencies. NPSTC
was created in 1997, as a volunteer federation of 13 national
public safety associations. Our efforts are focused on the
technological capability and the capacity of radio
communications and the coordination of these resources
throughout all agencies.
The following are just a few examples of what NPSTC does.
We provide the DHS SAFECOM Program local and State public
safety input to its Science and Technology research and
development and standard efforts. NPSTC critically examines
technical and regulatory implications regarding radio spectrum
utilization and management.
NPSTC provides comments to the FCC on critical public
safety issues representing over 250,000 public safety
responders. NPSTC provides an open forum for discussion and
dispute resolution on public safety communications issues.
My testimony today focuses on the DHS Science and
Technology role in furthering public safety communications.
Through its Executive Committee, Emergency Response Committee,
and organizations like NPSTC, SAFECOM is developing a national
plan to enhance inter-operability.
We believe the focus on new and innovative technology today
is found in broadband. The challenge is that public safety
spectrum is currently not available for a nationwide broadband
network that is controlled by and built to public safety
standards and requirements. The recent testimony of Chief
Harlan McEwen from IACP, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, and Chief Charles Werner of the International
Association of Fire Chiefs, to the Senate Commerce Committee is
supported by all of the major public safety associations,
including NPSTC, and it is attached to my written testimony.
The public safety community is concerned that there was
considerable reduction in the 2007 budget and that the newly
created Office of Emergency Communications was left unfunded.
Agencies transferring portions of their budgets to fund DHS OEC
is time-consuming, it creates tension among agencies, and
causes confusion and uncertainty for the State and local
community.
DHS SAFECOM has pursued development of regional radio
systems by soliciting participation using a bottom-up strategy.
Although this takes time, it is a critical element and must be
completed. In addition to the tools and critical studies
SAFECOM develops, they also test, evaluate technologies,
conduct pilot programs, and are funding a compliance lab. None
of these have adequate resources.
Although not directly involved with the Department's
planning and priority mechanisms, we do not see projects and
programs based on long-term solutions to the problems that we
face in communications. The budgets at the federal level
fluctuate and are not sustained in a manner that is conducive
to long-term solutions.
DHS SAFECOM, along with their partners at the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Office of Law
Enforcement Standards, and the National Telecommunications and
Information Agency Institute for Telecommunication Sciences are
currently testing the current public safety standard commonly
referred to as P25. This is an especially important requirement
because many of the State and local agencies, as well as the
Department of Defense and other federal agencies, are using P25
equipment. Through the SAFECOM Program, NPSTC has been involved
with the NIST/OLES for many years such as in the development
and review of the SAFECOM Statement of Requirement for public
safety communications technology.
Another example of our collaboration occurred last month
when NPSTC worked with NTIA ITS in Bolder to develop
requirements for broadband technologies. Through this
collaboration the original input of 57 practitioners was
expanded to 627 who provided input to the project.
I would also like to ask that this subcommittee review our
comments on the progress made regarding the recommendations of
the September 2004, GAO report on inter-operability, which is
provided in my written testimony.
In closing, there are two issues the Subcommittee and
Congress should consider. First, fluctuations in funding for
communications inter-operability deters progress. Three to
five-year funding estimates would provide stability for long-
term programs and strategies and would result in considerably
more improvements.
The second issue we would like you to consider is the
proposal to permit the creation of a Public Safety Broadband
Trust in the 700 MHz and reallocating 30 MHz of spectrum to
public safety that is scheduled to be auctioned. We urge
Members to examine this issue very closely. It would make a
positive and important contribution to public safety
communications.
Thank you, again, for the invitation to appear before this
committee.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ward follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marilyn Ward
Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and Members of the Subcommittee:
On behalf of the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council
(NPSTC), it is a privilege to appear before the Subcommittee in its
examination of the Department of Homeland Security's Research and
Development Activities. NPSTC's mission is devoted to improving the
communications capabilities of local and State public safety agencies.
With heightened domestic defense and emergency response demands, the
work of the Department of Homeland Security in this area is vital.
NPSTC was created in 1997 as a volunteer federation of associations
representing State and local public safety telecommunications to
advance communications capabilities, including inter-operability, of
first responders, through one collective voice for public safety
communications. NPSTC serves both as a resource and advocate for public
safety organizations in the United States on matters relating to public
safety telecommunications. The technical capability and capacity of
radio communications and the coordination of these resources across all
agencies are fundamental to our core mission, that of speeding response
to the citizen facing an emergency.
NPSTC is dedicated to encouraging and facilitating, through its
collective voice, the implementation of the Public Safety Wireless
Advisory Committee (PSWAC), and the 700 MHz Public Safety National
Coordination Committee (NCC) recommendations. NPSTC explores
technologies and public policy involving public safety agencies,
analyzes the ramifications of particular issues, and submits comments
to governmental bodies with the objective of furthering public safety
communications worldwide. NPSTC serves as a standing forum for the
exchange of ideas and information for effective public safety
telecommunications. The following 14 organizations participate in
NPSTC:
American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials
American Radio Relay League
American Red Cross
Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies
Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials-
International
Forestry Conservation Communications Association
International Association of Chiefs of Police
International Association of Emergency Managers
International Association of Fire Chiefs
International Municipal Signal Association
National Association of State Chief Information Officers
National Association of State Emergency Medical Services
Officials
National Association of State Foresters
National Association of State Telecommunications Directors
Several federal agencies are liaison members to NPSTC. These
include the Department of Agriculture, Department of Homeland Security
(SAFECOM Program, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency),
Department of Commerce (National Telecommunications and Information
Administration), Department of the Interior, the Department of Justice
(National Institute of Justice, CommTech Program), and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).
Below is an illustration of the NPSTC organization, its four
operational committees and multiple working groups. It is clear that
there are many topics to be resolved that impact public safety
communications and NPSTC is active in developing positions and
advocating for State and local first responders.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
NPSTC IS AN ADVOCATE FOR PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS IN THE
FOLLOWING WAYS:
NPSTC is the only national consensus forum for major public safety
associations that facilitates an open dialog and exchange of
information on critical public safety telecommunication issues.
NPSTC provides the SAFECOM Program local and State public safety
communications input to science and technology research and development
projects and related standards efforts.
NPSTC critically examines technical and regulatory implications
regarding radio spectrum utilization and management.
NPSTC provides comments to the FCC on critical public safety issues
upon receiving consensus from its 14 member associations, representing
over 250,000 public safety responders.
NPSTC's members include the four FCC certified public safety
frequency coordinators.
NPSTC includes liaisons from the Federal Government that ensure
feedback to and from practitioners and policy-makers.
NPSTC provides an open forum for our members, guests and the
community for discussion and dispute resolution, including the ability
for people who cannot travel to attend the meetings by calling into a
teleconference bridge.
NPSTC actively engages in securing and protecting spectrum for
states and localities: 700 MHz for Wide Area Voice and Data, 800 MHz
Rebanding, continued VHF & UHF availability and 4.9 GHz for on-site
broadband.
NPSTC actively monitors key technology-related issues having long-
term implications on public safety inter-operability by actively
participating in Software Defined Radio forums (SDR), International
Association of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) meetings,
and international public safety standards efforts, such as Project
MESA.
NPSTC addresses public safety spectrum issues along the U.S. border
by participating in related State Department efforts.
NPSTC provides the SAFECOM Program a forum to monitor the pulse of
the public safety community and determine needs to improve inter-
operability.
NPSTC recently developed a common radio channel naming plan to
standardize the radio channels to read the same display no matter where
the responder is located in the U.S.
NPSTC is currently developing a dispute resolution procedure for
700 MHz Regional Planning Committees when conflicts occur among
adjacent regions.
NPSTC monitors 4.9 GHz and 5.9 GHz testbeds and communicates the
information to the State and local public safety community.
NPSTC communicates the impact and solutions of nationwide reviews
of in-building radio coverage to the public safety community.
NPSTC promotes a national forum where Amateur Radio and public
safety work together on nationwide public safety wireless communication
issues.
As the founding Chair and current Executive Director of NPSTC, I
would like to convey to the Subcommittee how important its work is and
relate our appreciation for inviting us to speak on the issues that
impact our members and their constituents in the first responder
community. As you requested, the focus of my testimony is on the impact
of the Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology
Directorate (DHS S&T Directorate) on our nation's public safety
communications. The issues that I have been asked to address are listed
below. I want to emphasize that in addressing these issues I will be
largely focusing on the communications and inter-operability issues,
although I will also address the larger context of DHS support for the
first responder community and localities.
<bullet> The role DHS should play in helping localities
prepare for security threats and disasters.
<bullet> How well the FY 08 budget request for DHS S&T
supports the development of technology for first-responders.
<bullet> DHS collaboration with State and local governments
and the first responder community on standards development and
how the first-responder community uses the results of DHS
technology testing and evaluation and standards.
<bullet> The principal technological needs of the first-
responder community.
<bullet> DHS' planning and priority-setting mechanisms and the
communications needs of first responders.
<bullet> A reflection on the General Accounting Office Report
of 2004 and the progress made to assist the first responders
with inter-operability.
Protecting the public is a key responsibility of all levels of
government. From federal agencies down to local fire protection
districts the public depends on us. DHS plays a key role in this effort
by supporting the 55,000 local public safety agencies in their daily
challenges and during major disasters where it and other federal
agencies provide direct response and service. DHS funding is a critical
element that helps State and local public safety meet daily and
catastrophic challenges. Communication is critical to meeting those
challenges and DHS funding encourages all levels of responders to work
together to promote better communications systems, including solving
inter-operability and other public safety communications issues.
The National Incident Management System (NIMS)
DHS programs such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS)
started out as a guide for major events, but local agencies now find
that the NIMS structure is also effective during everyday events from
fires to hostage situations. DHS supported the implementation of NIMS
through the grant process and has been successful at encouraging local
public safety to embrace and use NIMS during joint responses to
emergencies. It is important to note that one of the reasons that NIMS
works is because it was developed with input from the State and local
practitioner community. As a result, DHS was able to both draw upon
best practices from the people that do this work daily as well as
obtain ``buy-in''' for the final product.
DHS guidelines are now requiring local agencies to develop joint
plans for multi-agency responses. Part of this challenge is that local
agencies have long delayed sitting down and working together. With DHS
funding directed at regional or cross jurisdictional responses, there
is significant incentive to finally come together to share resources
and manage incidents effectively.
Inter-operability
The heart of any coordination of an incident, large or small is
communications. In this regard, the next round of federal grant dollars
requires that states must develop statewide communications plans that
also include counties, cities, and local districts. The guidelines for
these statewide plans were developed by the SAFECOM Program located
within the DHS Office of Inter-operability and Compatibility' (OIC),
with the participation of local responders and public safety
communications officials.
The significance of the national guidelines is they require prior
planning and, at the same time, ensure that grant funds are spent on
specific solutions in accordance with those plans. When the major
issues are addressed at the local level, it also means they are
addressed at the national level. The challenge is to ensure that the
overall objectives meld into the State and local operational
environment to enhance effective response.
Interagency communication problems have been identified in every
major incident over the last 10 or more years. Solving this issue is
not as easy as it might seem. State and local jurisdictions have
invested billions of dollars in non-compatible communication systems
that are operating in different bands of spectrum. The solution most
often involves building new infrastructure which is very expensive.
While the development of regional systems make sense, building them is
also very expensive and requires a heightened level of cooperation
among agencies. It also involves knowledge of best practices that is
not always available at the local level. What has emerged is not only
an emphasis on infrastructure and equipment, but the planning and
cooperation needed to make use of these resources effectively across
all agencies.
The DHS Office of Inter-operability and Compatibility's SAFECOM
Program has been one of the true successes in providing assistance to
State and local agencies to meet these challenges. SAFECOM provides
research, development, testing and evaluation, guidance, tools, and
templates on communications-related issues that improve emergency
response through more effective and efficient inter-operable wireless
communications.
The key to the success of SAFECOM is that it is a practitioner-
driven program and has developed a process to facilitate the input of
local and State emergency response practitioners. SAFECOM, working with
its Executive Committee, the Emergency Response Council, and
organizations in the practitioner community, like NPSTC, developed a
national plan to enhance inter-operability, a Statement of Requirements
for communications equipment, systems, and tools to assist
jurisdictions to develop governance structures and planning; and,
consequently, helped facilitate the quicker adoption of standards and
grant guidance for communications-related grant programs, among other
things.
Most recently SAFECOM completed a national Baseline Study of Inter-
operability to learn what the problems were at the local level. DHS
also developed a Scorecard of Inter-operability in designated Urban
Areas (UAs) using public safety practitioners in the process. A key
next step will be to develop a scorecard on standards compliance
testing at the local level, something sorely needed to assist State and
local jurisdictions in making the right procurements.
The ``scorecard'' reviews of the UAs focused on three main areas:
Governance (leadership and strategic planning); Standard Operating
Procedures (plans and procedures); and Usage (use of equipment). The
evaluation criteria was derived directly from the SAFECOM Inter-
operability Continuum and Inter-operability Maturity Assessment Model
that depicts the key components of inter-operability--governance,
standard operating procedures, usage, technology, and training and
exercises.
The findings identify gaps and areas for improvement. Key findings
included:
<bullet> Plans for inter-operable communications are now in
place in all 75 urban and metropolitan areas, but
implementation is now needed.
<bullet> Regular testing and exercises are needed to
effectively link disparate systems and facilitate
communications between multi-jurisdictional responders,
including State and federal agencies.
<bullet> Cooperation among first responders in the field is
strong, but formalized governance (leadership and strategic
planning) across regions is not as advanced.
In my opinion, these are important findings and should apply to all
areas of public safety nationwide, not just the Urban Areas.
There also needs to be an examination to determine the level of
inter-operability in the non-urban areas of our nation. This will
provide a better idea of where we stand and the basis for determining
future costs. Since 2003, DHS has awarded $2.9 billion in funding to
enhance State and local inter-operable communications efforts; this is
a small amount, given that experts estimate an $18 billion
infrastructure nationwide that is not inter-operable and the equipment
is outdated. We will continue to see an inter-operability improvements
only if there is adequate funding and grant guidance to promote
regional and statewide planning and systems.
Compliance Testing
Compliance testing of radio equipment is one item best done at the
national level. Local agencies do not have the facilities, experience,
or the type of equipment to do in-depth compliance testing. For
example, at the present time there is only one national standard for
radio equipment, commonly referred to as P25 and relating to inter-
operability. While several manufacturers make claims that their
products are P25 compliant; testing is necessary to validate their
claims.
There is a need for a federal agency to perform these compliance
tests and DHS SAFECOM, along with their partners at the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National
Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) Institute for
Telecommunication Sciences (ITS) fill this role. This is especially
true in that the Department of Defense (DOD), other federal departments
and State and local agencies are now all using P25 radio equipment.
There is no real magic in which agency does the testing; it just needs
to be done.
The NIST Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES) technical staff
has been involved with NPSTC for many years, and they have included our
volunteers in the development and review of the SAFECOM Statement of
Requirements (SOR) for public safety technology. They have worked
closely with NPSTC as it develops consensus positions on the best
technology use for first responders and provides a welcome check and
balance to their work.
Broadband
An example of our collaboration occurred last month when NIST/OLES
in Boulder, Colorado worked with NPSTC to develop user's needs in
broadband. The effort expanded the input of 57 practitioners who had
provided input into the needs study. With NPSTC support, 627
practitioners agreed to provide input to the project. Such
collaboration is mutually beneficial to both the local and federal
communities. The SAFECOM Program provides an important mechanism for
this collaboration.
The focus on new and innovative technology today is in broadband
for public safety. Ten years ago the public safety community could not
have imagined that broadband technology would have advanced as it has
today and have the potential to provide so much. The concern today is
that broadband was not planned for nationwide use, and yet to ensure
inter-operability that is what we need, a nationwide broadband network
that is controlled by and built to public safety standards. The
testimony to the Senate on February 8, 2007, of Chief Harlin McEwen
representing the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP),
the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials-International
(APCO), the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC), the National
Sheriff's Association (NSA), and the Major County Sheriff's Association
and NPSTC along with the testimony of Chief Charles Warner representing
the International Association Of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) regarding broadband
for public safety is attached to this document. This testimony is
supported by all of the major public safety associations and NPSTC.
The SAFECOM Inter-operability Baseline survey was sent to 22,400
randomly selected law enforcement, fire response and emergency medical
services (EMS) agencies. Findings indicate that roughly two-thirds of
emergency response agencies across the Nation use inter-operable
communications in varying degrees. Agencies tend to be more developed
in technology than they are in standard operating procedures and
exercises. Cross-discipline and cross-jurisdiction inter-operability at
the local level tends to be more advanced than between State and local
agencies. In addition, law enforcement, fire response, and EMS agencies
reported similar levels of development in most areas of inter-
operability.
To date, no national survey has addressed broadband systems owned
by public safety since there is currently little or no available (700
MHz or 4.9 GHz) spectrum for this use. The 700 MHz block of spectrum
that will become available with the digital television transition will
be the first opportunity for local public safety to use these new
technologies. Many local agencies have developed and filed their plans
with the FCC for local and regional use of the broadband spectrum. The
transition and release of this spectrum to public safety remains
critical.
SAFECOM, in conjunction with NIST/OLES, recently brought together
key stakeholders from both industry and the public safety community to
discuss and clarify the varying perceptions of Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP's) role in public safety communications. This technology
has the potential for significant impact on public safety
communications. Yet there must be the ability to test its use for
mission-critical activities and ensure its robust nature before
marching into nationwide acceptance on local networks.
Funding Levels and Priorities
Of great concern to the public safety community is that despite the
critical work being done by OIC's SAFECOM program, it has never been
adequately funded. In Fiscal Year 2007 OIC's entire budget was $27.2
Million to fund SAFECOM and other programs of importance to the first
responder community. The Inter-operable Communications Technical
Assistance Program (ICTAP) run by the Grants and Training Office (G&T)
only received $10 Million. The newly created Office of Emergency
Communications (OEC) has received no funding to date. Given the
critical nature and magnitude of the challenge, this is woefully
inadequate. The expectation of other agencies transferring portions of
their budgets to fund the DHS OEC is time consuming and creates concern
among the other federal agencies. It has also caused confusion and
uncertainty amongst the State and local community.
DHS needs to continue to more broadly encourage the development of
regional systems that are multi-jurisdictional, multi-disciplined, and
inter-operable for all responders. With over 55,000 public safety
entities in this nation, each supporting their own systems and
political jurisdiction, as I noted earlier, the estimate to upgrade
and/or replace communications equipment is over $18 billion dollars.
For example, I come from Orange County (Orlando) Florida. Our
county radio system cost $21 million in 1992 when it was built, and new
sites continue to be added to accommodate growth, at a cost ranging
from a quarter of a million to a million dollars per radio site. This
is one system in one of Florida's 67 counties. Within Orange County,
there are several small cities and the City of Orlando which maintain
individual systems. I was with the City of Orlando where I retired
after 27 years with the Police Department. During that time we built a
$10 million dollar system while the county was building their $21
million dollar system. We pursued joining the County and building one
system but were unable to cross the barriers to make that happen. This
is common around the U.S. Incentives are needed to eliminate
duplication and waste of taxpayer money.
NPSTC was formed for the sole purpose of bringing the multitude of
public safety disciplines together to address communication issues. In
this area we have found that DHS, primarily through SAFECOM, not only
consults with our community on issues, but solicits our participation
in helping them develop planning and priorities. It embraces the
objective of making improvements in public safety communications with
the important recognition that local and State participation is
crucial. A cooperative working relationship has been established over
the years and our community values the input and assistance that we
receive not only from DHS, but from the several federal agencies that
interrelate with us on a regular basis.
The success of homeland security depends in large part on the
success of local public safety. Local public safety relies on the
support and guidance it receives from its federal partners. The
Department of Homeland Security should continue to facilitate a robust
and substantive intersection between the Federal Government and the
response community.
In addition to the Office of Inter-operability and Compatibility,
we are currently working with the NIMS Integration Center and other
offices to update the National Incident Management System and the
National Response Plan. We also work with the Office of Grants and
Training. The success of working together is critical to ensure that
policies and procedures are operationally driven and able to be
realistically implemented on the ground.
Areas that need continued enhancement of the federal-public safety
relationship include critical infrastructure protection and
information/intelligence sharing offices. There is evidence of movement
in information and intelligence sharing, but the emergency services'
role in critical infrastructure protection continues to be
challenging--due, in part, to emergency services unique role as both
protector of sectors and a sector to be protected.
A final note, and on a larger scale, intersections between local,
State and federal entities cannot be identified nor trusting
relationships built if the landscape and personnel are constantly
changing. DHS's impending re-organization will prove another test--but
also an opportunity--to form relationships between the Federal
Government and first responders.
The 2004 General Accountability Office Report
In September 2004, the GAO released a report on inter-operability
and testified before the Subcommittees on technology, Information
Policy, Intergovernmental relations, and Census, House of
Representatives titled Federal Leadership Needed to Facilitate Inter-
operable Communications Among First Responders
Set forth below is what the GAO determined and our view of the
progress three years later:
GAO: (1) In a recent report on inter-operable communications, we
recommended that the Secretary of DHS (1) continue to develop a
nationwide database and common terminology for public safety inter-
operability communications channels.
Progress to date: With the support of the SAFECOM Program, NPSTC
recently completed a forum and methodology for responders to work
toward common nomenclature. NPSTC has made progress and has a consensus
on several key issues. A report has been distributed for review and
comment, and we will be making a final recommendation to our Governing
Board in June 2007. Federal support and adoption by the FCC is now
needed to formalize the use of common channel naming across the Nation.
GAO: (2) help states assess inter-operability in specific locations
against defined requirements.
Progress to date: Through DHS Grants and Training grant awards, 75
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) locations began developing plans
and were accessed by a standardized scorecard developed by SAFECOM and
member associations. This is important progress and must be extended
statewide beginning in 2007.
GAO: (3) through federal grant awards, encourage State action to
establish, and support a statewide body to develop and implement
detailed improvement plans.
Progress to date: The SAFECOM Program created grant criteria, which
were placed in the DHS Grants; however it has taken until March 2007
for the first national meeting hosted by the National Governors
Association (NGA), SAFECOM, and NPSTC to begin statewide planning. This
process will request states to voluntarily provide an ``inter-
operability coordinator'' statewide and provide guidance for states to
begin developing statewide plans.
GAO: (4) require that grant applications be in compliance with
statewide inter-operability plans, once they are developed.
Progress to date: Several states have made good progress to
complete their plans, however many are just beginning. The Grant
guidance prepared by SAFECOM, supports this recommendation.
GAO: GAO also recommended that the Director of OMB work with DHS to
review SAFECOM's functions and establish a long-term program with
appropriate authority and funding to coordinate inter-operability
efforts across the Federal Government.
Progress to date: In the opinion of the public safety community
which I represent, the SAFECOM Program has never been funded at an
appropriate level. The fluctuation in budgeted funds belies any attempt
for long-term programs to be successful. Short quick fixes become the
norm and the possibility for a long-term strategic plan that stays the
course until it is completed is threatened when funding fluctuates in
these extremes. In addition to the tools and critical studies (Baseline
Study, etc.), SAFECOM also tests and evaluates technologies, conducts
pilot programs, and funds the standards compliance testing. None of
these efforts have adequate resources.
GAO: The current wireless inter-operable communications
capabilities of first responders nationwide have not been determined.
To assess these capabilities, a set of requirements is needed that can
be used to assess ``what is'' compared to ``what should be.'' The
Office of Management Budget (OMB) has established the Wireless Public
Safety Inter-operable Communications Program, SAFECOM, within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the focal point for
coordinating federal efforts to improve inter-operable communication.
In April 2004, SAFECOM issued a document designed to serve as a set
of baseline requirements and is working to develop a baseline of
current capabilities by July 2005.
Progress to date: The baseline was published in 2006 and UASI
scorecards were published in 2007.
GAO: The Federal Government can take a leadership role and provide
support for developing:
(1) a national database of inter-operable communication frequencies,
Progress to date: This remains a challenge, the closest version is
the 700 MHz ``notebook of frequencies'' developed by NPSTC and funded
and maintained by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ).
GAO: (2) a common nomenclature for those frequencies,
Progress to date: NPSTC continues to commit significant work on
this issue. SAFECOM has included a grant guidance principle to
encourage common channel naming.
GAO: (3) a national architecture that identifies communications
requirements and technical standards,
Progress to date: This is an in-progress task undertaken by the
SAFECOM Program. This is a very technical and expensive process that
does not have adequate resources at this time.
GAO: (4) statewide inter-operable communications plans.
Progress to date: This process began in 2007.
GAO: State and local governments can play a large role in developing
and implementing plans to improve public safety agencies' inter-
operable communications. State and local governments own most of the
physical infrastructure of public safety communications systems, and
states play a central role in managing emergency communications.
States, with broad input from local governments, are a logical choice
to serve as a foundation for inter-operability planning because
incidents of any level of severity originate at the local level with
states as the primary source of support.
However, states are not required to develop inter-operability
plans,
Progress to date: States are not required to develop inter-
operability plans; however States must have a plan to qualify for
federal communications grant funds.
GAO: there is no clear guidance on what should be included in such
plans.
Progress to date: SAFECOM is proving planning guidance to the
states at the March 2007 meeting and funding is being made available to
support the development of statewide planning assistance.
It is NPSTC's view that the DHS SAFECOM Program has worked
diligently to meet the goals identified in the GAO report and has
provided support to the local communities, recognizing that it must be
a practitioner-driven program. SAFECOM has achieved inter-operable
communications at the command level, defined as communications within
one hour of a major event, in the 10 highest threat urban areas, as
part of its Rapid COM 1 initiative. It has published a step-by-step
planning guide for developing a locally driven statewide strategic plan
for inter-operable communications and facilitated regional
communications inter-operability pilots that assist local officials in
the implementation of their statewide plans.
In addition to the practitioner input SAFECOM seeks from NPSTC and
the practitioner community, SAFECOM seeks advice from the first
responder community through its Executive Committee (EC) and the
Emergency Response Council (ERC). The SAFECOM EC is comprised of
representatives from local and State emergency response agencies and
professional associations, as well as contributing federal agencies.
Working through the associations is critically important to ensure
State and local collaboration with the Federal Government. The EC
serves as the primary steering group for the SAFECOM Program.
Montgomery County, Maryland, Council chairwoman Marilyn Praisner,
National Association of Counties (NACo), serves as EC Chair, and Mr.
Glen Nash, Past-President, Association of Public-Safety Communications
Officials, International (APCO), serves as Vice Chair.
Representatives from the following organizations also serve on the
EC:
<bullet> Association of Public Safety Communications
Officials--International, Inc. (APCO)
<bullet> Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Chief
Information Officer (CIO)
<bullet> Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief Information Officer
(CIO)
<bullet> International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
<bullet> International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC)
<bullet> Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC)
<bullet> Major County Sheriffs' Association (MCSA)
<bullet> National Association of Counties (NACo)
<bullet> National Association of State EMS Directors (NASEMSD)
<bullet> National Governors Association (NGA)
<bullet> National Institute of Justice Communications
Technologies (NIJ CommTech)
<bullet> National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
<bullet> National League of Cities (NLC)
<bullet> National Public Safety Telecommunications Council
(NPSTC)
<bullet> National Sheriffs' Association (NSA)
<bullet> Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
<bullet> U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM)
The SAFECOM ERC provides a mechanism for individuals with
specialized skills and common interests to share best practices and
lessons learned so that interested parties at all levels of government
can learn from one another's experience, perspective, and expertise.
Its membership, which comprises representatives from the local, tribal,
State, and federal emergency response and policy-maker communities, is
a key resource for the improvement of emergency response communications
inter-operability.
Representatives from the following organizations serve on the ERC:
<bullet> American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
<bullet> American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
<bullet> Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS)
<bullet> Capital Wireless Integrated Network (CapWIN)
<bullet> Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)
<bullet> Council of State Governments (CSG)
<bullet> Department of Agriculture (DOA)
<bullet> Department of Commerce (DOC)
<bullet> Department of Defense (DOD)
<bullet> Department of Energy (DOE)
<bullet> Department of Interior (DOI)
<bullet> Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
<bullet> Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
<bullet> Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
<bullet> Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
<bullet> Federal Partnership for Inter-operable Communications
(FPIC)
<bullet> InterAgency Board (IAB)
<bullet> International Association of Emergency Managers
(IAEM)
<bullet> International City/County Management Association
(ICMA)
<bullet> International Municipal Signal Association (IMSA)
<bullet> Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
<bullet> National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
<bullet> National Association of Regional Councils (NARC)
<bullet> National Association of State Chief Information
Officers (NASCIO)
<bullet> National Association of State Telecommunications
Directors (NASTD)
<bullet> National Association of State EMS Directors (NASEMSD)
<bullet> National Association of Telecommunications Officers
and Advisors (NATOA)
<bullet> National Criminal Justice Association (NCJA)
<bullet> National Emergency Management Association (NEMA)
<bullet> National Emergency Number Association (NENA)
<bullet> National Guard Bureau (NGB)
<bullet> National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
<bullet> National Native American Law Enforcement Association
(NNALEA)
<bullet> National Public Safety Telecommunications Council
(NPSTC)
<bullet> National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA)
<bullet> Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP)
<bullet> Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
<bullet> SEARCH
<bullet> Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA)
<bullet> USDA Forest Service
Summary
The work of the Department of Homeland Security in public safety
communications is vital if we are to meet the expanded demands of
domestic security and emergency response. We believe that DHS, its
SAFECOM program and other component agencies diligently pursue this
responsibility and recognize the critical importance of meaningful
local participation.
In closing, I think there are two issues the Subcommittee should
consider as part of the overall effort to improve public safety
communications. First, the fluctuation in funding of the budget as it
pertains to communications inter-operability deters progress. A more
stable environment with a better estimate of funding levels for a
three- to five-year period would allow the planning and funding
participation to be pursued. The result would be more participation and
system improvements.
The second issue is a proposal to permit the creation of a Public
Safety Broadband Trust in 700 MHz and reallocating 30 MHz of spectrum
scheduled to be auctioned. This broadband trust would be a first for
public safety. With a Congressional embrace, a nationwide broadband
inter-operable radio system could be built that would permit first
responders to have everything from blackberry type messages to full
motion video of incidents. It would be paid for by private funds as the
system would sell excess capacity to non-public safety users. It is
also a way to bring the advantages of broadband to rural areas that now
have none. It would expand access to new technologies without burdening
taxpayers. We urge members to examine this issue very closely; it would
make a positive and important contribution to public safety
communications.
Thank you again for the invitation to appear before the
Subcommittee. I would be pleased to respond to any questions.
WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF
Harlin R. McEwen
Chairman, Communications & Technology Committee
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
Communications Advisor
Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC)
National Sheriffs' Association (NSA)
Major County Sheriffs' Association (MCSA)
Before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
February 8, 2007
CURRENT AND FUTURE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished Members of the Committee
for the opportunity to appear before you today.
My name is Harlin McEwen and I have been actively involved in
public safety for almost 50 years. My career has been in law
enforcement and I also have been a volunteer firefighter. I am the
retired Police Chief of the City of Ithaca, New York, and am also
retired as a Deputy Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in Washington, DC. I serve as Chairman of the
Communications and Technology Committee of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), a position I have held for more
than 28 years. I also serve as the Communications Advisor for the Major
Cities Chiefs Association (MCC), the National Sheriffs' Association
(NSA), and the Major County Sheriffs' Association. I am the Vice
Chairman of the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council
(NPSTC) and am a Life Member of the Association of Public-Safety
Communications Officials-International (APCO). Today I speak on behalf
of all of these organizations.
When I first became a law enforcement officer in 1957 police
vehicles had tube type six volt analog mobile radios that dimmed the
headlights when we pushed the microphone button. In those days there
were no hand held radios. In my career I have witnessed many changes
and advances in law enforcement and public safety communications.
However, the advances for public safety have consistently lagged behind
the advances of commercial services, primarily because of lack of
funding and spectrum.
As you are aware, citizens rely upon their local and State police
agencies, sheriffs' offices, fire departments, emergency medical
services, and other emergency services like highway and public works
and utilities to come to their assistance wherever and whenever needed.
They respond whether it is a crime in progress, a civil disturbance, a
building fire, a forest fire, an automobile accident, a health
emergency, a natural disaster, or, as we learned on 9/11, a terrorist
attack. Today, citizens assume that those first responders will get the
call and will have the communications tools they need to address
emergencies quickly and efficiently. Unfortunately that is not always
true.
I want to applaud the efforts of this committee and the Congress in
voting to clear the television broadcasters from the long promised 700
MHz spectrum. This will help us improve public safety radio
communications, both operability and inter-operability. The major
cities and metropolitan areas of this country are still in desperate
need of additional land mobile voice channels and are anxiously waiting
for this spectrum to become available. Your efforts to designate $1
billion derived from the auction of radio spectrum for public safety
communications are also very much appreciated by the public safety
community and will be very helpful. The introduction of S.385 by
Senators Inouye, Stevens, Kerry, Smith, and Snowe is also helpful in
giving direction to NTIA with respect to the $1 billion grant program
and we appreciate these efforts to have this funding program
implemented in a timely fashion.
I am pleased to have the chance to discuss with this committee an
exciting new opportunity for Congress to take steps that will pave the
way to reducing the dependence on local and federal tax revenues to
maintain modern public safety communications systems. That is a
proposal for a 700 MHz nationwide public safety broadband network. This
proposed network can become a reality only if Congress authorizes
creation of a public/private partnership, controlled by the public
safety community, to hold a nationwide license for 30 MHz of spectrum
in the upper 700 MHz band and further authorize us to deploy this
network pursuant to a public sector-private sector partnership model.
I have studied the issue of public safety telecommunications for
decades. I have been actively engaged in the efforts of the Federal
Communications Commission, other federal agencies, State and local
government entities and individual departments to identify law
enforcement communications requirements and provide our first
responders with the necessary tools to meet those needs. Substantial
time and significant taxpayer dollars have been devoted to those
efforts, yet in 2007 the public safety community still is far behind
commercial users in terms of wireless functionality. Our public safety
users who should have the best, most advanced, and most robust
capabilities too often must rely on systems that are inadequate for
their needs today, much less the expanded responsibilities with which
they will continue to be charged in the future. Without a fundamental
change in the way we approach emergency responder communications,
specifically without allocation of the additional 30 MHz of spectrum
and adoption of the approach embodied in the Public Safety Broadband
Trust (PSBT) proposal, I see no reason to ever expect substantial
improvement.
The wireless voice systems public safety personnel use today are
among the most important tools they have to do their job in a safe and
efficient manner. However, these systems have in many cases been under
funded, poorly maintained and generally not refreshed. As we look to
the long-term future, we need to look at new and better ways to improve
public safety communications.
The need for more efficient public safety data systems is growing
and this has become the focus of much of our attention as we look to
ways for public safety to take advantage of Third Generation (3G) and
Fourth Generation (4G) technologies.
The implementation of a nationwide public safety broadband network
can also be the beginning of the end to the problem of public safety
inter-operability. We have been asking for funding support for years to
help us upgrade and replace mission critical land mobile voice systems
that are built by different manufacturers, are of different vintages,
and are generally incompatible and in many cases not compatible with
the P25 standards, the only recognized national digital standards for
land mobile public safety communications inter-operability.
It is critical to understand that this is a one time only
opportunity to solve many of the public safety communications
requirements of today and the future. We recognize this is not an easy
decision for the Congress. You must choose between solving the public
safety communications problem and making sure our citizens have good
public services, or allowing the spectrum required by public safety to
be auctioned to commercial companies who want to expand their services
and increase their profits. It seems simple to us that by your approval
of this important step for public safety you will be doing the right
thing for America. It will begin to take the burden off the taxpayers
who must build and maintain increasingly expensive public safety
communications systems.
The benefits from a nationwide public safety broadband network as
set forth in the Public Safety Broadband Trust proposal are as follows:
1. Broadband data services (such as text messaging, photos,
diagrams, and streaming video) not currently available in
existing public safety land mobile systems.
2. A hardened public safety network with infrastructure built
to withstand local natural hazards (tornadoes, hurricanes,
earthquakes, floods, etc) that would include strengthened
towers and back up power with fuel supplies to withstand long-
term outages of public power sources.
3. Nationwide roaming and inter-operability for local, State,
and federal public safety agencies (police, fire and EMS) and
other emergency services such as transportation, health care,
and utilities.
4. Access to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
similar to current commercial cellular services.
5. Push to talk, one to one and one to many radio capability
that would provide a backup to (but not replace) traditional
public safety land mobile mission critical voice systems.
6. Access to satellite services to provide reliable nationwide
communications where terrestrial services either do not exist
or are temporarily out of service.
For those who argue that public safety already has enough radio
spectrum to meet current and projected mobile requirements, I can only
say that they purposely ignore the facts concerning public safety
spectrum allocations and first responder communications requirements.
As an example, the cellular industry, represented by CTIA, has grossly
misrepresented the spectrum issue as recently exhibited in their press
release critical of Senator McCain's announcement that he would be
introducing legislation to establish a new nationwide, state-of-the-art
public safety broadband network. The CTIA statement said ``the basic
facts of the matter should compel this important debate to be about
providing first responders with funding, access to equipment and
coordination, not more spectrum.'' CTIA further stated ``Right now, the
public service community utilizes 47 MHz of spectrum to serve its
public safety users. At the same time, there are wireless carriers that
use roughly the same amount of spectrum to deliver voice, data and
advanced information services to many times that number of subscribers.
More spectrum is clearly not the answer.''
Contrary to what the CTIA says, the REAL facts on spectrum
allocations are as follows:
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
But even these numbers do not tell the real story or explain why
existing public safety allocations cannot be used for broadband
operations. Historically, the FCC has allocated individual channels,
not contiguous channel blocks, for public safety use. These channels
are immediately adjacent to channels allocated for taxicab companies,
truck operators and other businesses. The channels typically are no
larger than 25 kHz bandwidth and more frequently 12.5 kHz, or a tiny
fraction of each 25 MHz cellular system authorization. This allocation
approach has permitted numerous governmental entities to secure
licenses for localized, individual purposes, but precludes the public
safety community as a whole from consolidating enough contiguous
channels to deploy 21st century broadband technology networks. There
simply is not sufficient contiguous bandwidth to support the text
messaging, building diagrams, photos, streaming video and other
transmissions that will be as essential to law enforcement officers
during these perilous times as the weapons they carry.
While the 24 MHz public safety allocation in the upper 700 MHz band
is contiguous, even that spectrum is subdivided in various categories
designed for mission critical voice communications on both localized
and State levels, as well as for wideband data applications. And that
spectrum allocation, first promised to the public safety community in
1997, was intended to address the unmet needs and identified
deficiencies in the spectrum resources available to public safety more
than a decade ago. New technologies and new services have since been
developed to respond to the ever escalating commercial appetite for
more useful and sophisticated mobile communications tools and
solutions--and appropriate new commercial spectrum allocations have
been made available to commercial network operators to bring those
improvements to their customers. Likewise, over the past decade, public
safety's needs for access to these advanced technologies, services,
tools and solutions has not stood still--although, unfortunately, the
amount of appropriate spectrum allocated to meet them has.
Allow me to emphasize these points by example, as the contrast
between the spectrum resources available to commercial wireless network
operators and to the public safety community could not be more
striking. To begin with, commercial cellular and PCS licensees have
access to large blocks of contiguous spectrum. Their allocations were
specifically designed to support system architectures and technologies
that would accommodate vast numbers of customers. To compare the number
of subscribers that can be served on a 25 MHz cellular network with the
number of police officers that can share a 12.5 kHz bandwidth channel,
or even multiple channels, is as meaningful as comparing the size of
watermelons to grapes. Compounding the imbalance is the absolute amount
of spectrum that has been made available for commercial use in
comparison to that which has been made available for public safety uses
as detailed above. Just last year, the Commission made another 90 MHz
of spectrum of Advanced Wireless Spectrum available for commercial
operations, again in large spectrum blocks and expressly authorized for
commercial mobile broadband uses.
In fact, it is the success of the cellular/PCS model that has
convinced us that public safety must have a 30 MHz spectrum block on
which to deploy an advanced technology broadband network. That model
has persuaded us that the public safety community must join together in
the Public Safety Broadband Trust, rather than seeking individual
licenses for individually designed and deployed systems, if we are to
achieve our objective: seamless nationwide roaming capability on a 21st
century broadband 700 MHz network that is built and operated to satisfy
increasing and demanding public safety requirements.
I stated previously that a nationwide broadband network solution
needed to address both spectrum and funding, and to address them both
at the same time and in the same context. The latter is just as
critical as the former and requires an innovative approach given the
extraordinary costs associated with building and operating a truly
nationwide broadband network. Unlike purely commercial systems that
have the luxury of limiting coverage to areas of denser population and
transportation corridors, public safety users must have communications
capability wherever there are people or property to protect. This
mandate has the important consumer benefit of ensuring that a broadband
network designed to meet public safety needs will be available in
suburban and rural communities that remain outside the areas of
commercial broadband deployment. However, I have substantial experience
in the traditional funding sources for public safety communications and
see no realistic possibility that the necessary monies will be made
available even to build, much less maintain, operate and routinely
upgrade a network of this scope if dedicated to purely public safety
requirements.
The only solution that we consider viable is a public sector-
private sector partnership as proposed in the Public Safety Broadband
Trust. Under this approach, the PSBT would acquire a 30 MHz license at
700 MHz and would enter into leases of spectrum usage rights with
commercial operators who would build a nationwide public safety network
that (1) would be paid for by commercial operators using excess
capacity, not by the public safety community or the taxpayer; (2) would
be licensed and controlled by public safety representatives to ensure
public safety priority access; and (3) would be refreshed with the
latest technical improvements, funded by the commercial participants.
We do not support what some would call a ``hosted'' public safety
network. While the term may have somewhat different meanings to
different people, at its core it puts mission critical, emergency
response communications in a position of dependence with respect to the
host commercial provider. Moreover, it undermines or even negates the
essential nationwide character of the network. With all due respect to
commercial operators that might now express support for hosted systems,
there is nothing in the over 20-year history of commercial wireless
systems that would validate their reliability or availability for
mission critical public safety needs. That is not an arrangement that
the public safety community could endorse.
In regard to the 9th Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) recently
issued by the Federal Communications Commission, we have many concerns
about the concepts set forth in that proposal. The 9th NPRM suggests
that a nationwide broadband network could be built using the 12 MHz of
spectrum currently allocated for local licensing of public safety
wideband systems. This would take away from local licensing control the
spectrum long promised for use by local agencies. In addition we
believe the proposal is seriously flawed by failing to acknowledge the
need for enough spectrum to attract investors to participate in a
public/private partnership where private funds would be invested to
build a nationwide network.
By contrast, the partnership outlined in the Public Safety
Broadband Trust creates a symbiotic and balanced relationship, but one
in which public safety always remains in control. It represents a win-
win opportunity if sufficient spectrum is allocated to accommodate both
public safety and commercial usage. Public safety cannot fund this
network on its own, but also must be confident that the network is
built to hardened public safety requirements with priority access that
is adequate to respond to emergencies. Commercial operators will lease
the spectrum and build the network to public safety specifications, but
only if there is sufficient excess capacity to permit meaningful
commercial service on a regular basis. The technical data supports the
conclusion that a minimum of 30 MHz is needed to serve these
complementary requirements.
The many public safety organizations and agencies that have
supported the PSBT approach recognize that it will require removing
some of the 700 MHz spectrum that currently is scheduled to be
auctioned. The PSBT proposal includes a plan to make the federal budget
whole. The PSBT would raise $5 billion to pay the U.S. Treasury for the
spectrum, using the revenues from the commercial users and the
assistance of federal loan guarantees similar to those that have been
made available to industries such as airlines, pipelines and automobile
manufacturers. This financing arrangement would ensure that other
federal public safety spending priorities, including the $1 billion for
other public safety inter-operable communications needs, would not be
affected.
Let me add that I and other supporters of the PSBT also endorse the
commendable work being done by local and regional organizations such as
the Capitol Area Region Broadband Project with respect to broadband. To
the extent their efforts bring about public safety communications
improvements, it is important work that deserves support. But we must
remain mindful that the results will be, at best, a patchwork of
improved, but incompatible, non-inter-operable networks at a daunting
per unit cost. They are doing what they can in light of the regulatory
and financial environment in which they must operate, but this nation
can and must do better.
I have dedicated most of my professional career to the advancement
of public safety communications. From that perspective, I believe this
Congress has an extraordinary time sensitive opportunity. Approval of
the PSBT and the public sector-private sector partnership will catapult
public safety to its rightful place in the forefront of communications
capability while at the same time delivering broadband service to
communities that continue to be bypassed by the commercial
telecommunications revolution. I hope you will share my belief that
this is an opportunity that must be seized for the benefit of the
entire American public.
Public Safety Broadband Trust
Statement by Fire Chief Charles L. Werner
International Association of Fire Chiefs
before the
Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation
United States Senate
February 8, 2007
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am
Charles Werner, Fire Chief of the Charlottesville Fire Department in
Virginia and a member of the Communications Committee of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs IAFC). I am appearing today as
the representative of the International Association of Fire Chiefs
whose 12,000 members represent the leadership of America's fire and
rescue service from small, rural, volunteer fire departments to the
large, urban, metropolitan fire departments. Last year America's fire
service responded to over 23 million fire and emergency calls covering
incidents of structure fires, wildland/urban interface fires, emergency
medical situations, hazardous materials incidents, technical rescues,
and natural disasters. We are prepared, as well, to respond to the
aftermath of terrorist attacks. I appear today to address a specific
and growing communications need for America's fire service--broadband
technology. Our testimony also reflects the views of the Association of
Public-Safety Officials International, Inc.
PUBLIC SAFETY SPECTRUM NEEDS
At the request of Congress, the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) and the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) established the Public Safety Wireless Advisory
Committee (PSWAC) to define and document the critical need for
communications resources and the spectrum to support public safety
through the year 2010. The final report was released on September 11,
1996. Three key problem areas were identified in the report:
First, radio frequencies allocated to public safety had become
highly congested in many, especially urban, areas. Usable
spectrum for mobile operations is limited making it difficult
to meet existing requirements much less to plan for future,
more advanced communications needs.
Second, the ability of agencies within and between
jurisdictions to communicate with one another is limited. Yet
inter-operability is desirable for success in day-to-day
operations as well as larger scale operations in dealing with
both man-made and natural disasters.
Third, public safety agencies lack the spectrum to implement
advanced communications features. A wide variety of
technologies--both existing and under development--hold
substantial promise to reduce danger to public safety and
achieve greater efficiencies in the performance of their
duties. Specifically mentioned in the 1996 report were
broadband data systems, video systems for better capabilities
including use of robotics in toxic and hazardous environments,
and better monitoring and tracking of both personnel and
equipment.
To implement the requirements identified, the advisory committee
determined that more spectrum was required, as follows:
Immediately, 2.5 MHz of spectrum for inter-operability from
new or existing allocations.
Within five years approximately 25 MHz of new public safety
allocations are needed. The report suggested using spectrum
from television broadcast channels 60-69 as soon as possible.
Over the next 15 years (e.g., through 2011) as much as an
additional 70 MHz will be required to satisfy the mobile
communications needs of public safety.
These were the needs and recommendations addressed in the PSWAC
report of 1996. Then, in December 2005 the FCC sent a Report to
Congress On the Study to Assess Short-Term and Long-Term Needs for
Allocations of Additional Portions of the Electromagnetic Spectrum for
Federal, State and Local Emergency Response Providers. This report was
submitted pursuant to P.L. 108-458, the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. In its conclusion, the FCC stated:
``First, as to the operation and administration of a potential
nationwide inter-operable broadband mobile communications network based
upon input from federal, State, local and regional emergency response
providers, emergency response providers would benefit from the
development of an integrated, inter-operable nationwide network capable
of delivering broadband services throughout the country. Second, as to
the use of commercial wireless technologies, while commercial wireless
technologies and services are not appropriate for every type of public
safety communication, there may now be a place for commercial providers
to assist public safety in securing and protecting the homeland.''
For the above stated reasons, the National Public Safety
Telecommunications Council [a resource and advocate for public safety
organizations in the United States on matters relating to public safety
telecommunications] has filed comments with the FCC in support of
reallocating 30 MHz of spectrum in the upper 700 MHz band, currently
slated for auction, to create a public/private nationwide broadband
network to be managed by public safety for the benefit of public
safety. The filing states: ``In an era where government preparedness is
crucial, there is no nationwide public safety network to manage and
coordinate response. There is no wide scale broadband technology
capability to expedite analysis and information sharing critical to
emergency assistance, investigation and apprehension. Not only is the
current public safety spectrum so congested as to constrain voice--much
less permit broadband use for video and data, limited funding hinders
the incremental improvements that can be made and which are only
pursued on a system by system basis. That which is possible in
communications today and what public safety agencies have available
reflects an enormous divide. The result is tangible: slowed and
hindered response across all services which puts lives at risk and
property in danger.
``Although legacy systems will continue to play an important role
in public safety communications, the opportunity presented by the yet
to be auctioned 700 MHz channels is emphatic. Without this additional
spectrum, there can be no national public safety network connecting all
agencies. Using broadband technologies to transmit information across
agencies and miles immediately will be the exception. Public safety
communications will come up short in meeting its challenges.''
The IAFC is a member of the governing board of NPSTC and an active
participant in all of its proceedings. The IAFC fully concurs with the
statements of support by NPSTC for the establishment of a nation-wide,
public/private, broadband network that will harness the innovative
power of the private sector but be managed by public safety for the
benefit of public safety.
PUBLIC SAFETY BROADBAND REQUIREMENTS
In 1997, Congress addressed part of the issue of additional
spectrum by directing the FCC to allocate 24 MHz in the upper 700 MHz
band for use by public safety. As a result of the Deficit Reduction Act
(P.L. 109-171), which passed last year at this time, this spectrum will
finally become available for our use in February 2009. As was
originally intended, it is to provide, for individual licensees, 12 MHz
of voice channels and 12 MHz of wideband data channels. Fire and police
departments are now in the planning process of building communications
systems utilizing this new spectrum. Broadband capability for public
safety, identified in the 1996 PSWAC report, is a vital and growing
need for fire and police agencies. It is the next step following the
allocation and implementation of the 24 MHz designed to alleviate
current spectrum congestion and provide inter-operability. To meet the
broadband need for public safety, the following requirements are
established:
A nationwide, broadband network covering 99 percent of the
population, 65 percent of the land mass, most of the critical
infrastructure, and a network that supports urban, suburban and
rural communities.
A network large enough to draw commercial support which is
requisite for a nationwide network to be affordable for public
safety.
A network built using next generation technology.
A network built to public safety ruggedness specifications to
ensure reliability under severely adverse conditions.
A network governed by public safety.
A network which ensures priority access for public safety.
PUBLIC SAFETY USES OF NATIONWIDE BROADBAND NETWORK
The Public Safety Broadband Trust proposal provides public safety
with enormous potential that does not currently exist.
A hardened public safety network would make possible nationwide
roaming and inter-operability for public safety agencies at the federal
(e.g., U.S. Coast Guard), State (e.g., highway patrol), and local
(e.g., police, fire/EMS) levels. It would give public safety access to
satellite services where terrestrial services either do not exist or
are temporarily out of service. The network build-out would give rural
areas--for the first time--broadband coverage and provided public
safety there a communications tool that would be virtually impossible
because of cost under any other scenario. In addition, this new network
will protect nuclear power plants, dams, railroads and pipelines and
other parts of the Nation's critical infrastructure in rural areas.
There are a number of technologies that are available today that
fire departments would use--more will be developed, especially if an
affordable broadband network is available. Some examples are:
Transmitting video, photographs, blueprints and other
information both to and from an incident command post.
Advanced paging systems particularly useful for summoning
volunteer firefighters/medics.
Mesh enabled architecture (MEA) for non-GPS broadband location
system.
Fireground accountability systems--biometrics as well as
location.
Smart building downloads enroute to an alarm.
Enhanced GIS mapping capability for building locations,
critical infrastructure, target hazards, water systems,
transportation systems, etc.
Personal Area Networks linking a portable radio carried by a
firefighter to many useful and lifesaving accessories including
a helmet video camera, video viewing device, health monitor,
wireless self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) microphone
and speaker, or a handheld computer.
Vehicular Area Networks that could link a vehicle's radio to
laptop computers, printers, remote headsets, bar code readers,
and cameras.
Medical video and high-resolution image transmissions from the
scene of an incident to the emergency department of a hospital
where physicians can assess patient status and give on-scene
and enroute treatment instructions.
PDAs for fire department leaders or for all firefighters.
A ONE-TIME OPPORTUNITY TO DO THE RIGHT THING
Senator McCain has announced his intension to introduced
legislation to establish a Public Safety Broadband Trust. The trust
will be composed of public safety organizations to hold a single
license for 30 MHz of broadband spectrum to create a nationwide,
public/private broadband network. The trust also will be the management
group to oversee the policies, procedures and practices of the network.
In other words, the public safety trust will run the network for the
benefit of public safety.
The 30 MHz of spectrum that is being considered is immediately
adjacent to the 24 MHz of spectrum allocated to public safety in 1997
and which will be available in 2009. This has considerable advantage
over any other spectrum since radio communication devices can be dual
purpose with the spectrum so close. This spectrum in the upper 700 MHz
is also near existing public safety which is being relocated in the
lower 800 MHz band.
This 30 MHz of spectrum is currently slated for auction. The
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 requires the FCC to auction this spectrum
by January 2008. Without legislation taking this out of the auction and
allocating it for the public safety trust, this one-time opportunity
will be lost forever.
CALL FOR ACTION
The Congress of the United States has a one-time opportunity, in
the near-term, to provide public safety with a nationwide, broadband
network. In order to be affordable for public safety, the network would
have to have viable commercial capacity of about 30 MHz of spectrum.
The network would be built to public safety ruggedness specifications.
A Public Safety Broadband Trust would be created to hold the single
license from the FCC for the 30 MHz of spectrum and would oversee
management of the network. While the network volume would be largely
commercial, public safety agencies would use what it needed with a
built-in priority status. Commercial use also ensures that sufficient
capital will be available for maintaining the system and upgrading and
refreshing newer technologies when they come along.
We urge the members of this committee to take the first action to
create this Public Safety Broadband Trust by promptly reporting
legislation to take 30 MHz from the pending auction and direct the FCC
to reallocate it to public safety. We cannot suggest too strongly the
urgent and identified need for broadband capability that public safety
can use with assurance that it will work when needed, be available when
needed, and is affordable. With a global war on terrorism being fought
daily and homeland security interest at an all-time high, public
safety, in defense of the homeland, should be operating on 21st Century
technology. Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee. We
appreciate your consideration of this most important public safety
issue.
Biography for Marilyn Ward
Ms. Ward brings 35 years of experience as both an advocate for
public safety telecommunications issues and as an administrator in
public safety telecommunications, from her position as Manager of
Communications at the City of Orlando and part-time police officer in
her early days in public safety, to her role as Orange County Public
Safety Communications Manager, from which she retired in 2005.
Ms. Ward has been involved with communications issues on every
level-local, State and federal. A former president of the Association
of Public Safety Communications Officials--International (APCO) and
founding NPSTC Chair, Ms. Ward has served in many leadership roles such
as:
APCO Task Force Leader on the Public Safety Wireless Advisory
Committee (PSWAC)
Steering Committee Member of the National Coordination
Committee (NCC)
Statewide Coordinator of the Regional Domestic Security Task
Force Communications Committee Chairs in Florida
Florida Statewide Executive Inter-operability and Technology
Committee
Ms. Ward holds a degree in Business and Management and has received
many public safety-related awards in her career.
Discussion
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Ms. Ward. We open the
first round of questions, and the Chair recognizes himself for
five minutes.
Under Secretary Cohen, I understand that you all in the S&T
Directorate are working on a strategic plan, and I would like
to ask you about the status of the development of this
strategic plan and the extent to which a formal risk assessment
will play a role in your strategic planning.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. As I have previously
testified this year to the Homeland Security Committee, I owe
the Congress two strategic plans. One is for the directorate
itself, and that will be risk informed and customer focused.
And some of the other panel members here have already discussed
the importance of that. I have committed to the Congress that
you will have that by June of this year.
The second that I owe was mandated by the enabling
legislation. This is a much broader strategic plan, and it
recognizes the wisdom of the enabling legislation where you did
not want me to recreate the National Institute of Health, did
not want me to recreate the DOE or DOE labs, you did not want
me to recreate the National Science Foundation. But you did
give me a preeminent position to go ahead and leverage those
tens of billions of dollars of research where those other
agencies and departments of government must share with me the
results of that critical research so that I can take my
precious investment and focus those results on Homeland
Security requirements and needs.
That government-wide strategic plan was in preparation
apparently for about two years. Because the approach it took,
and I have reviewed it myself in draft form, was more perceived
by the other departments and agencies as mandated what they
would do for Homeland Security, as to how they, through their
efforts could contribute to Homeland Security, I think it had a
very difficult time coming to fruition. I commit by the end of
this fiscal year I will have to the Administration that
strategic plan that is a partnership across government for them
then to provide to the Congress.
Chairman Wu. Mr. Under Secretary, what I heard you to say
is that the first strategic plan that you are going to be
working out is going to be informed by shall we say less formal
risk analysis. Do you have some plan at this point or some
point in the future to do a more systematic formal risk
analysis to inform the research priorities of DHS?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. And, in fact, that is in place right
now. The reorganization that I put in place where the majority
of my budget goes in an integrated product team, to the
customer, whether that is border patrol, Coast Guard, cyber
security, or infrastructure protection with the National
Infrastructure Plan, each of those customers does a risk-based
analysis to determine what capabilities they need to fulfill
their homeland security mission. Now, you wisely gave us the
Homeland Security Institute. In the short time I have been on
board I have reoriented them to bring operations research,
operations analysis, and make the Homeland Security Institute
the risk-based analysis determiner for all of my 22 customers.
So when I sit down and integrate a project team and my division
director, along with the customer and the acquisition provider,
we have 11 capstone IPTs. You see the capabilities they are
trying to provide. The customer working with us then
prioritizes what they need to do their job based on the risks
as they see it. We then commit through technology agreement in
writing where they hold me to cost, schedule, and capability
metrics to provide the enablers for their people, process, and
product. Because that is how they do their job.
Chairman Wu. Mr. Under Secretary.
Mr. Cohen. On a bigger scale----
Chairman Wu. Mr. Under Secretary, because my time is
expiring----
Mr. Cohen. On a bigger scale, I will answer your question
directly. I have sat down with the National Academies of
Science because, and the other Members may feel differently
here, the science of risk is not well known, and I have asked
the National Academies to work with me so I can fund how we can
better determine risks for the issues that have been raised
here.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much for focusing on that part
of the question. With the forbearance of the Ranking Member, a
few seconds after my time has expired, since you have brought
up this chart, I wanted to ask you about the IPT. You know, I
think it is terrific that the different federal agencies have
been pulled together in this. I have to say that there have
been concerns expressed, perhaps some complaints, that some of
the end users, and you refer to them in your testimony, and the
first responders, that some of their needs in terms of
usability, in terms of maintenance, you know, the ability to
withstand challenges in the field and prioritization of devices
and threats, that that has not been paid sufficiently close
attention to, shall we say. And that a specific example would
be the, what many of us would consider, you know, shoulder-
fired anti-air missiles in this town, MANPADS, man portable air
defense systems, that the system that was developed is roughly
a million dollars a copy. The folks who would be responsible
for purchasing them and maintaining them are reluctant to make
that investment. Do we have a problem here with a lack of
linkage with the ultimate user?
Mr. Cohen. I will give a concise answer. Yes. This is an
area that I am very much focused on. The enabling legislation
not only made the head of the S&T Directorate, but you made me
the test and evaluation executive for the entire Department,
and you put standards, not just inter-operability, but all
standards under me for the entire Department. In the IPT
process you can see the bottom of each diamond has the
customer, the guardsmen, fill in the blank.
Chairman Wu. Above the line, those are solid lines, that is
a dotted line down below, and I don't know who to interpret
that.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. Because S&T is like the BASF
commercial you see every Sunday morning. I don't make the
widget. I make the widget better. My other panel members
already noted, S&T for S&T's sake does not satisfy the customer
nor does it reduce the risk to this country. And so what I have
done in some cases because they are internal to DHS, I have
mandated, because it is my process, the customer, the customer
be there. But I am not going to tell the Commandant of the
Coast Guard, and I am not going to tell the cyber czar, et
cetera. I have provided for the customer to customer to be at
the table.
We have also established, and it is operating and running,
tech solutions, a website, something I did in Navy, where first
responders themselves can come to my website with
recommendations or gaps that they believe exist, because they
live it every day, and they are smart people. In Navy I had a
sailor who came in to from the Persian Gulf on a carrier who
asked for a degreasing Zamboni for four and a half acres. It
wasn't quite S&T but we provided it, using our laboratories,
and that sailor I don't think ever bought another beer in his
life. We are going to do the same, and I am committed to our
first responders. But this is a work in progress, and I look
forward to improving it as we go forward. But you are right,
and we have got to do a better job, and I believe we are
organized to do that now, sir.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Under Secretary. Dr.
Gingrey.
Mr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Under Secretary,
Admiral Cohen, I had mentioned in my opening statement a very
difficult task to assess and characterize the various threats
that our nation faces. In that vein I am interested in hearing
more about this BioWatch Program, I guess it is called.
BioWatch. Can you give us the history of the program, its
various successes, and some of the struggles and what you see
as the future of BioWatch? It is my understanding it is a
program that can play an effective and efficient role in
securing our country, but there has been some problems. So if
you would talk to us about BioWatch.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir, Congressman. I am a big fan of
BioWatch. In fact, Rita Colwell, Dr. Colwell, when she was
Director of the National Science Foundation, in the summer of
2001, came to me as Chief of the Naval Research and proposed a
cooperative program--Army DOD with her for something very
similar to this, so that in our main cities we would put in
place sensors that would monitor for various pathogens. Because
we didn't have a database how that varied diurnally with
season, what the false alarms were, weather conditions, et
cetera. It didn't gain traction, and then we had 911, and then
the standup of the Department of Homeland Security.
On the broader issue in terms of the priorities and risks,
what I basically inherited was Mr. Oxford has about one-third
of the S&T budget for nuclear and radiological. Chem bio has
about one-third of the budget. Those are the two obvious,
clearly defined, major threats, and all the other threats share
about one-third of the budget. Is that right or wrong? I don't
know. That is follow the money.
The BioWatch Program was established about four years ago.
It was intended to do what Rita proposed. I don't know that
they knew she proposed it, but it was to go in about 30 of our
major cities, using current technologies with fixed stations to
monitor pathogens that we have the technology to do. And it is
analog in nature. You know from your background we draw the air
through pads, then we collect it weekly. We then go to the lab
and do a detailed analysis.
It has been highly successful. It works. We have taken over
three million samples of which we have gotten 15 positive
results, all of them verified but all due to natural, not
terrorist causes. In fact, two months ago when the stink bomb
engulfed Manhattan, and we didn't know what it was, smelled
like hydrogen sulfide, Mayor Bloomberg, I understand was able
in the first hour to go before the good people of New York City
and say they didn't know what caused it, but it was not a
threat. That statement was in part enabled by the BioWatch
sensors in New York.
We have now in the Department of Homeland Security, working
in conjunction with the Congress through the last year,
established the Office of Health Affairs. That is headed by our
Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Runge. Dr. Runge filled in for me
over the last six months before I came on board at S&T, and we
work very closely together. This is an area where S&T didn't
have a customer in DHS. Now I have a customer, and so my budget
this year reflects a one-time transfer of approximately $80
million to Dr. Runge and the Office of Health Affairs, because
that is what it costs to operate BioWatch II, which is in
operation.
Now, we will continue to do S&T to improve that system, but
with Dr. Vitko and the rest of my chem bio division, we are
leaping ahead. We are leaping ahead to BioWatch III. This
brings the current digital technologies, the microchips that
will allow us, we believe, when fielded, and we hope to have it
fielded within the next three to four years, the ability to
have real time monitoring coupled with wireless and hopefully
because it is one quarter the cost to operate, four times the
sensors in many more cities----
Mr. Gingrey. Yeah.
Mr. Cohen.--so that----
Mr. Gingrey. I know my time is running out, Admiral.
Mr. Cohen. Sure.
Mr. Gingrey. But in the remaining few seconds, tell us some
of the particular things that you would be monitoring for that
the general public would be aware of, things like sarin gas as
an example, or anthrax or something that we read about.
Fortunately, on not a common occasion, but it scares the
bejesus out of everybody. Tell us some of the things that you
are watching for in these 30 cities.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. I will leave it very limited in this
form because you are aware that we did put out earlier or late
last year a major threat determination on 30 different
pathogens, using a very detailed risk determination,
probability of occurrence times consequence of occurrence. But
it is safe to say that anthrax, botulism, some of the more
common diseases that could be pandemic are monitored for.
Mr. Gingrey. They are part of that watch?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gingrey. Thank you, Mr. Under Secretary, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the second round.
Chairman Wu. Thank you, Dr. Gingrey. Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, Chairman Wu. Mr. Under Secretary,
much of the Secure Borders Initiatives Systems development has
been completed by S&T. How have you insured that the Secure
Borders Initiative has responded to the needs of customs and
border patrol agents along the Southwest border?
Mr. Cohen. Well, Congressman, the borders are clearly very
important to us, and it has been a major S&T initiative.
Secretary Chertoff has testified numerous times that the
current contract for the SBI went with proven technology so
that it could be fielded in a timely manner. I know you are
well aware of this because of the towers and the other aspects
that are being deployed in Arizona and other Southwest borders.
In our integrated product team which you see border security,
both the customs and border protection and ICE are my chairmen,
and it is Chief Aguilar himself who sits at that table with my
border and maritime Merv Leavitt, Director. And it is Chief
Aguilar and ICE who tell us what they need to make the borders
better. We slave it to that.
Now, these, Congressmen, are incremental improvements.
These are spiral development. Maybe we can move the towers from
five-mile spacing to seven and a half mile spacing but with the
same fidelity to insure the safety of the border. And we are
doing that. I am investing into that, but in my high-risk
portfolio where Dr. Epstein talked about the need to take risks
and fail, we have several programs. Tunnel vision, tunnel
detection. No one has been able to do this in a timely manner.
We are going to risk, we may fail, but in fact, and I think you
know him from Tucson, Tony Mulligan, in Advanced Ceramics, is
proposing using Silver Fox, a small 24-pound unmanned aerial
vehicle, and using, I am not going to give the technology, but
fly that along the border to see if we can detect tunnels down
to several hundred feet. Will it work? I don't know. Stay
tuned. But I get to do that. We are also using persistent
surveillance. These are 24-hour, high-end UAVs, unmanned aerial
vehicles. We are using them for several reasons. One, as
counter MANPADS. As the Chairman said, the airlines are not
high on the cost or the maintenance of the impact of counter
MANPADS on their aircraft. So we are looking to use a 65,000
foot decoy to take the MANPADS away from the aircraft. But this
same decoy can be used with state-of-the-art day, night video
to give us persistent surveillance as we have overseas in war
on our borders for our border patrol. And it can also be used
as a bounce link to have secure communications, reliable
communications in that last mile for a distant franchise, first
responders. I know your time is short. What I am telling you is
we are taking the low risk and the high risk at the same time
to make the borders more secure.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. Just one follow up. Has the border
patrol expressed the need for any research and development that
has not been completed yet?
Mr. Cohen. Absolutely. In fact, one of the things that I
liked, please put that up, about this Integrated Product Team
Process, and I learned this in Navy, this is not new, is when
you have the customer at the table, they always have, I know
this is hard for Congress to believe, always have more
requirements than we have money or technology to fill. And so
we ask the customer to prioritize. Now, here you are seeing my
human factors. My people screening. In the upper left that is
what I am funding. These are all prioritized. In the lower
right I am funding for those in the out years. It goes to the
issue that was raised by Ms. Ward. I am doing six-year funding,
and I am showing OMB, and I am showing the Hill how we are
sequentially going to invest. And as more money becomes
available, those items below the cut line put there by Chief
Aguilar, get raised, because I can do them. But the ones that
we are doing in zero to three years, when they are delivered, I
reinvest that money in the items below the line, and they
naturally move up over the six-year budget period.
Mr. Mitchell. One last quick follow up. How has, there is a
proposed cut in the border and maritime division of about seven
and a half percent. How will this cut affect the research that
is being done there?
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, in going to the new organizational
construct, I have basic research, which I am growing. It was at
five percent. My goal in my tenure is to get it to 20 percent
for the reasons you heard Dr. Epstein address. Fifty percent of
my budget goes to the Integrated Product Team, the immediate
improvement for my 22 customers, but 10 percent goes to
innovation. It is the high-risk portfolio. So what I have done
with Merv Levitt and with the Commandant, is we have taken some
of the monies that were in what we call on and on research, no
defined customer, and we now have Merv Levitt in borders and
maritime with a defined customer requirement and the high risk.
And so what I have done is it has been an internal transfer of
money from that division to my innovation portfolio. But the
monies are fundamentally the same, sir. Just differences in
risks and time of delivery.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. I yield my time.
Chairman Wu. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. Now my good friend
from Texas, Mr. Hall, the Ranking Member of the Full Committee.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think that I
probably want to start off, Admiral, by thanking you and
thanking you for all the wonderful work you have done, not just
for this committee and for this thrust but for this country. I
know your background. You are a graduate of the Naval Academy.
I never could have got in there, much less getting out. You
were MIT, you were Navy Congressional liaison. You have done it
all, and I don't know of anybody more qualified for what you
are doing and doing it right than anybody under the Capitol
Dome, and I want to thank you for that. We are lucky to have
you.
I have a question for you and for Mr. Oxford, and I guess
maybe it is general, but just what tools and what procedures
are available through your offices to help State and local
governments, the people at the bottom, to help them assess and
address their own vulnerabilities to natural and to manmade
disasters? And how can interested communities interface with
expertise as housed in DHS, and how do you get it from your
mind down to their mind and to help us defend that that they
are obligated to defend just like you are at the top? Would you
give me something like that in the last three minutes I have?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. First of all, I want to thank you for
your very kind words, but I also want to thank you for your
long and dedicated service and especially your focus on science
and education. I would like to remind you that our greatest
Admiral, Admiral Nimitz, was a Texan from Fredericksburg, and
my only regret in life is that I am not a long horn.
Mr. Hall. I was a JG when I served under him. I didn't get
any closer than 100 yards of him, but I sure did admire him.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. I am going to give you a fairly
succinct answer. The first responders and the communities are
not at the bottom in my book. They are at the top, and I exist
to fulfill and serve their requirements. We have many, many
ways to do that. I briefed the Tech Solutions website, which I
put online, where they can come in directly. I have established
in my organization, very lean agency, because my
responsibilities run throughout all Federal Government and also
international. I was going to have an association, because I
have to deal with the sheriff in Mayberry, and I have to deal
with the New York City Police Department. And I have to deal
with the Tribal firemen, and I have to deal with the Chicago
Fire Department. That scale is very difficult for me, but as
Ms. Ward has indicated, this is the role of the associations.
We in Homeland Security have, in the Department, not in my
directorate, and I think that is appropriate, groups that reach
out to private industry, groups that reach out to associations,
sit down with them. They then pass those needs to me. But as I
said in my confirmation, my door is always open. At the end of
the day the 22 components and agencies, border patrol, Coast
Guard, who deal, who live in those communities, they bring to
me their requirements tailored for those communities. This is a
very difficult issue. We have got 35,000 fire departments of
which 80 percent are volunteer. This is how America works. This
is the beauty but also the challenge of America. It is a new
department. It is a work in progress. I do think we are getting
wind under our wings, though, sir.
Mr. Hall. Are you actually in touch with these folks? Do
they know a number that they can call? Do they know how to call
for help if they see something that concerns them?
Mr. Cohen. I would say that some do. I would say the
majority don't. I would tell you that I am not proud of the
Homeland Security Department website.
Mr. Hall. But if I know you, you are working on it.
Mr. Cohen. I am. You bet. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall. And thank you for that. I thank every one of you
for not just being here today but for how you got here today,
and I have made this statement before. I would have known all
of you and would have admired you, but I wouldn't have liked
any of you because you are the very people that run the curves
for guys like me in college. But I thank you for your
participation, and I thank you for what you are doing for this
country. All of you. I yield back, Chairman Wu.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall. And the Chair
now recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky.
Mr. Chandler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I also
appreciate your service. Unlike our, my friend, the Ranking
Member from Texas who has obviously Texas has somewhat of a
tradition with the Navy, with Admiral Nimitz, I am afraid
Kentucky's historic association with the Navy is not that
great, despite our enormous coastline.
Mr. Cohen. With Ohio.
Mr. Chandler. Yes, sir. That is right. The Ohio Ocean. Mr.
Under Secretary, I am interested in a cut, a proposed cut in
the budget request having to do with University Centers of
Excellence. I noticed that the number, the FY 2006, number was
$62 million; in FY 2007, enacted $48 million. Now, the
suggestion is down to 38 million, and in addition to what is a
fairly substantial cut, there, as I understand it there is also
a proposal to spread that money over more universities. Could
you give me some indication as to the thinking there, and will
the money when it is watered down in that way or, you know,
less to each place, will that yield as strong a result as you
have been getting from those programs?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. And you will never heard me say less
is more. This is something I testified to two weeks ago with
the Homeland Security Committee. You may remember when I came
on board last August there was some less than complimentary
language in the pending Congressional legislation about my
directorate and more specifically about the Centers of
Excellence. Working with both sides of the aisle and both
Houses, authorizers and appropriators, we were able to find a
solution. But for the Centers of Excellence, draconian measures
were about to be taken because of the perceived under-
performance as they were organized prior to my arrival. The
legislation that came out I am very thankful for. It required
me to come back to the appropriators, both House and Senate,
within 60 days of enactment, which I did on the 58th day.
Chairman, I can meet some schedules. And explain how we were
going forward. With my new organizational construct it has six
division and three investment areas of basic research, product
transition, and high-risk innovation. Everything is aligned to
explosives, chem bio, command, control, inter-operability, to
borders maritime, to human factors, and infrastructure and
geophysical sciences. That is how I do business overlaid by
matrix portfolio directors so we don't have stovepipes. In
September of last year I sat down with all the directors of the
existing seven COEs and asked them to align with one or more
division so I could justify their existence in the basic
research. They immediately did that, and I am very proud of
that. But at that same time the Congress advised me, and I
looked at my own six divisions, have we got the vertical? Yeah.
Would you turn that for the Congressman, please, just so we can
see it better? I had two divisions that were lacking any
Centers of Excellence, and they were critically important.
Explosives. And so today I have four broad agency
announcements, competitive in nature, to fill those areas that
I knew the Congress wanted me to do. And we have consolidated.
On the Administration side, the Administration and the
Department and OMB, looking at that pending legislation, which
would have decimated the COEs, went ahead and removed as part
of the budget development a majority of that funding. That was
unacceptable to me, and so I was working, as I said in
testimony, a two-front battle. On one hand I had the Congress
telling the Administration they are going to do away with it,
and on the other hand I had the Administration saying, not even
the Congress values them. I was able to buy back, as you can
see, 80 percent of what I had the previous year. With this new
alignment I guarantee you, and I use that word rarely, that
with the product you will see coming out of basic research, the
universities and the associated laboratories including Silicone
Hollow, which we are very pleased to be involved with, I
believe you will see, the administration will understand the
value of this, its dual use, and we will grow that budget.
Mr. Chandler. Thank you, Admiral. It sounds like you have
put a lot of thought into this, and so you got, what you are
saying is you got what you could get by what appears to be a
lot of hard work.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chandler. I have got one other question, if I may, Mr.
Chairman. And this is I think better answered by Dr. Epstein
possibly. The S&T Directorate seems to have a strong focus on
biological threats that are human caused, things like anthrax,
smallpox, that sort of thing. Do you think that this, and I
understand how important those are, is this in your view the
main priority, or should the priority, or should we be, are we
doing enough, let me ask it that way, are we doing enough to
prepare for natural threats, naturally occurring threats? For
instance, the avian flu.
Dr. Epstein. I think I will echo Under Secretary Cohen's
reply that we are never doing enough. There is a lot of threats
out there. One challenge with this particular question is that
natural threats, well, let me back up. There is two different
Cabinet departments involved, and so part of the challenge is
not just determining how much money needs to go to it, but what
is the relative role of the two departments. And the point I
make here is that there is no correct way to make that
boundary. These are both, at least on the bio-terrorism side, a
bio-terrorist attack is an intentional attack, and it is a
disease. You have got one Cabinet department to worry about
disease. You have got another one that worries about
intentional attacks, and they will both have to be involved. I
think it is appropriate that the bio-terror focus that the
Department of Homeland Security has is there. I think it is
appropriate that is their largest program. When one looks out
into the future and says, all the ways that technology can be
abused by folks who have ill-intent, what are the capabilities
that might put the most power in the hands of the smallest
groups in the most places. Biological weapons are certainly one
that is a serious problem. No matter how serious one thinks it
is today, it is not getting any better in the future.
The pandemic natural disease problem, again, it is
something that we have to expect we will see. Parts of the
government are mobilized to do it, and I, it is hard to give a
short answer as to whether we have the right balance. I mean, I
think they are both important, and I think they both are
getting attention, and we just need to keep our eyes open to
them.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much. The gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, thank you. When I asked the Admiral
a question that I asked a few moments ago, I noticed Ms. Ward
gave me an eyebrow there, and I want to follow up with her and
leave little enough time for Mr. Oxford maybe to tag onto it,
too, because I asked those two the question, but I think you
probably have more real experience at the level that I am
talking about, because I note in your background that you have
been in the trenches at the local level, and you were in the
city management business for the city of Orlando. Probably, I
was stationed there in 1943, at Daytona Beach, and drive over
to Orlando. The magnificent growth at that time, you were part
of that. And city managers are kind of like tail gunners. They
are usually removed after each mission, and if you survived
that, you had a lot of good experience there.
I want to ask you----
Ms. Ward. It has changed a lot.
Mr. Hall.--to help us with that. I note that you were a
task force leader. You were a coordinator of a regional area,
and you have been early days in public safety. Now, for a
little community like Blackland or Munson in my home, I live in
the smallest county in Texas of 254 counties, and we would be a
great one to test to see how far really what the Admiral's
working 23 hours a day on, reaches us. Give me some ideas as to
how we can, I can tell folks there that I see day in and day
out, that I go to church with and see on the streets, how they
could benefit from what all five of you are doing?
Ms. Ward. I was very happy to hear the Admiral acknowledge
the fact that some of the local people probably don't know what
is going on, because that is a very true statement. That is one
of the benefits of the group that I belong to, and I had not
seen the tech solutions website and will be happy to provide
outreach to the membership and their members so that they will
know that that is available. That is one of the hardest things
that we deal with is getting back down to the trenches.
Mr. Hall. It is the figures, the numbers alone just are
stultifying.
Ms. Ward. That is correct. And that is actually the value
of our group, the NPSTC group.
Mr. Hall. Yes.
Ms. Ward. Our associations represent all of these people,
so what we end up working with SAFECOM on, goes back into our
associations, and then is funneled down to the lowest level,
including the volunteer fire departments that were referenced
earlier. That is why we are hoping that this esteemed group
will see the value of what we do with the SAFECOM group, take
into consideration the 9/11 Commission's recommendation,
Secretary Chertoff has also said that inter-operability is
going to be one of the major issues to get resolved and kind of
not dilute the message that we, and our mission by changing the
personality of SAFECOM. Because those people that work in your
community, the public safety people, the only way they are
going to be able to get reached is through some mechanism where
the State and local people have input into what is going on
here in Washington. And I will tell you, you know, I come from
local government. I would never have any funding to be sitting
in this chair from Orange County where I worked or the City of
Orlando if it was not for the associations that were supporting
me to be here. So that is a major issue that this committee and
Congress in general I hope will take into consideration that
you have to find a means to be able to get local and State
participation, and the means is through the associations and
through supporting groups like ours that bring associations
together.
Mr. Hall. And the means are green, aren't they?
Ms. Ward. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall. And that is what, where we are supposed to come
in.
Ms. Ward. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Oxford, if I have a minute or so left, do you
want to add to that?
Mr. Oxford. Yes, sir. First of all, I want to point out
that when we stood up in my office, we acknowledged the need to
have an aggressive dialogue at the State and local level. I
have an office director for State and local affairs that
reports directly to me. Since that first day we have had an
aggressive outreach through a series of workshops at the State
and local level. Just a month ago we had a series of telephone
conferences that engaged 34 separate states, about 150 people,
starting with homeland security advisors on down, to talk to
them about the threat, about their problem, the things they
could bring to this table. In concert with that we have done
specific commercial off-the-shelf testing for State and local
people that are interested in acquiring radiation detection
equipment. We then post those results on the first responder
knowledge base, so they all have access to the test results so
they can make these acquisitions in an informed way.
As they acquire this equipment we also have established a
training program where we write the curricula for how to use
these devices. Using grants and training funding then, we are
allowing delivery at the State and local level to the people
using the equipment so they know how to do that. In a like
manner we have set up a series of pilot programs in the
Southeast, and in the Northeast we have established regional
technical support laboratories so if they have an alarm, they
have someone they can call to get the alarm resolved. They can
also call my joint analysis center directly to understand what
to do with the alarm information that they have.
So we have had an aggressive program. I have a director for
operations who is a senior FBI agent. He is working now with
all the JTTFs as well as all the fusion centers that are
evolving across the country to bring out relevance to each of
those states. So we can talk a lot more in detail later, but we
have had an aggressive State and local outreach.
Mr. Hall. Well, I thank you for that information. It is a
wonderful thing, and I have noticed so many times at the local
level that, for example, a lot of times you don't even fix a
bad bridge until a teenager gets killed there, and then that
brings it to your attention and why haven't you done it before,
and when did you know the bridge was bad? We are going through
that with the hospital out here about 100 miles from here,
right today, at the federal level. Information is really great,
and you all have a major job of making that information,
sifting it down to the local levels where they can use it and
have it available if it is there, and I thank you for it. I
yield back, sir.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall. Pardon me. I
want to apologize first to the three other witnesses. I intend
to bring you in right now, well, in a moment, to address the
risk assessment issues, which the Under Secretary talked about
during my first round of questions. But before I do that, Mr.
Oxford, I heard the Under Secretary refer to you as Dr. Oxford.
And if we, if this subcommittee has deprived you of a Ph.D., I
deeply apologize, and let me just refer to you as Director
Oxford.
And the question I have for you is that in your testimony
you have referred to a research agenda that is at least in part
driven by end user requirements. However, specifically with
respect to the Securing the Cities Initiative, there have been
publicized reports, The New York Times, among others, that DNDO
is not addressing the cost and maintenance and other
requirements of local governments who ultimately will be
responsible for paying for the equipment, its operations, and
maintenance. Is there a formal structure for the ultimate end
users to have their say in the technologies that you are not
only developing but apparently deploying in the Securing the
Cities Initiative?
Mr. Oxford. Well, thank you for both those questions, and
with the absence of the Ranking Member I will say that I am Mr.
or Director, and I work for a living so I never went on to the
other academic pursuits. But I take those as accolades.
We have a very aggressive program with the New York City
officials. This is a developer, user combination. My
counterpart in New York is the deputy commissioner for counter
terrorism as designated by the actual police commissioner in
New York. Mayor Bloomberg has delegated the radiation detection
issue to Ray Kelly, the police commissioner. He, in turn, has
delegated this to his counter terrorism deputy commissioner. He
has formulated a structure within the New York region of
bringing together all the major entities that exist within New
York City as well as New York State, New Jersey, and
Connecticut at this point in time. They have veto authority on
any potential deployments that we have to that region. This is
an active dialogue where we are building a deployment
architecture that will be predicated on system capability as
well as their ability to actually operationally respond to any
alarms. We can't just have detectors in place that have alarms
that they do not have the operational capacity to respond to.
So it is a strong, mutual dialogue. Them having veto
authority over any potential deployments that we might make, as
well as they will observe any testing that we do on the systems
to make sure they work in the capacity of how they want them to
work within the city before we deploy.
Chairman Wu. Well, Director Oxford, the veto authority is
great, but one hopes develop the technology that everyone can
use rather than having a veto so that it is not deployed.
As we turn to the other three witnesses, you know, I am
going to cite a few numbers here, and we did this quickly, and
this is, I only gave the staff a few hours to pull this
together, and this is down and dirty. As the speaker said in
the meeting last night, in her time on the Intel Committee, the
plural of anecdote is not data, but this is slightly better
than anecdote and not as thorough as a real risk assessment.
According to the numbers that we pulled together, computer
consulting firms estimated that total economic loss of all
forms from cyber attack in 2003, was $226 billion. That, I will
skip a number of these other related statistics. That the
insurance industry estimates that financial losses due to a
tsunami could be up to $100 billion, that weather-related
losses between 1980, and 2005, in the United States alone
according to NOAA, is over $500 billion, and I will skip the
numbers pertaining to deaths from explosives as opposed to
other causes in human-caused incidents.
But I am deeply concerned about the proper integration of
formal risk analysis and we understand that there are some
challenges there with good solid risk analysis. But I would
like our, if you will, outside witnesses to talk with me a
little bit about this and how we could better integrate the
risks that we face with the research that we are doing so that
we properly face the threats of the future.
Dr. Epstein. Any of us just jump in?
Chairman Wu. Why don't we start with you, Dr. Epstein.
Dr. Epstein. You have got your finger on a terribly
important problem, and it is a terribly hard one. Let me back
up a little bit. Much of the methodology we have to make this
kind of calculation today comes from looking at engineered
systems. We have a whole science of nuclear reactor accidents,
probability of risk assessment. What is the probability this
valve will fail, this pipe will burst? Another branch that we
are drawing from is sort of looking at infectious disease,
natural-occurring incidents, weather, things were we have a
database, things where we have statistics, things where nature
isn't going to change what it does because we do something.
We have got a very different problem here looking at the
intentional threat. We have got adversaries that are looking
not only at what we are doing in and where we are weak. They
may look at the output of our risk assessment, which says we
think risk A is high, we think risk B is low, and they may hit
us on risk B. So in principle this is a much more difficult job
than anything that has looked like risk assessment or
probabilistic analysis before. And my comments on the field are
not so much that I think there is a lot of things we need to do
to figure out how to handle the problem. It may be cautionary
that it is a terribly important question, and there may be
fundamental limits on what analysis will tell us.
So the type of approach I like to see is structures that
help guide our thinking. We will never know what the right
number is for the probability of a terrorist attack, let us
say, but we have to have a system where if I think it is high,
I jack it up. If I think it is low, I jack it down, and I get
to see what happens on other parts of my portfolio. I do think
we have the right institutions involved. If the National
Academy of Sciences is gearing up to look at what is the state
of science in this field, they have the ability to tap those
people in the academic community. The Homeland Security
Institute that Under Secretary Cohen mentioned was created by,
suggested by act of Congress, created by DHS, with these
specific types of questions in mind. If that power can be
devoted to looking at these questions, then we have got the
right analytic skills and the ability to draw on the people,
who, if there is an answer there, one would hope they are able
to come to it.
But my basic point is this is a very different question
than what we have been trying to do in the past when we have
been doing things that sound similar.
Chairman Wu. Thank you, Dr. Epstein. For the next two
witnesses, my apologizes to the panel in general. Those bells
and whistles that you all have been hearing, I mean, it could
be worse. The ship could be sinking, but we have just been
called to a vote. That was a few minutes ago. We have about
five minutes left for the vote. So if you all could try to make
your comments in about a minute or so that would be deeply
appreciated. Mr. Czerwinski.
Mr. Czerwinski. I will be brief. Let me just try and
reframe the issue in this way. Risk is different in homeland
security than it is in anywhere else. The reason for that is
that what is at risk is just about everything. If you think
about what the DOD has or what the Defense Department has to
worry about in terms of pursuing its objectives, it worries
about its own combatants, it worries about non-combatants, and
it worries about the enemy. Well, in homeland security we are
worried about everything else. The global economy is a part of
the equation, so we have to look at this in such a way where we
can't just say, well, the risk is this. We have got
vulnerabilities, and we have got threats against those, so now
we have risks. Instead, we have to take a look at much, much
broader picture, at the impact of the certain A, B, or C level
types of vulnerabilities that Dr. Epstein was talking about and
say what would the consequences on these. That is really where
risk comes out.
The impact of certain attacks is one thing but also the
impact of the measures we use against those attacks. An
overreaction in homeland security by the U.S. Government could
be even worse than the actual attack itself, and we have seen
this in the past.
What IBM has been doing now for a few years is actually
modeling and simulation exercises that show what these sort of
impacts might be, actions and the impact of those as well in
certain cases of pandemics, but now we are looking at one in
terms of global trade and travel flows as well.
So we can go into this at another time, but I would just
suggest broadening the picture in that way. Thank you.
Chairman Wu. Thank you.
Ms. Ward. This is an interesting question for someone who
represents first responders. We respond as things happen,
immediately. Risk assessment comes through different groups
like in Florida. I was on the Regional Domestic Security Task
Force, where we brought in different entities and different
agencies to talk with us about how our ports, I found this
discussion today quite interesting because those are some of
the same things that we were dealing with on the local level.
Our first responders are reactionary. We have to wait until
the phone rings basically telling us to go to a 911 call. We
have to look at our crime stats or our fire stats to do fire
prevention. So we are not in the same role as some of my co-
panelists. But I will tell you that in our work with these
other entities, one of the number one priorities for us is that
we can talk to them.
So I will come back to the inter-operability discussion and
just kind of wind up by hoping that this committee will look at
the value of the first responders. They are the first ones on
the scene, long before any assistance comes from the State or
federal level, and these are the people that we need to take
care of. And our interest in inter-operability is taking care
of them so that they will be able to talk to each other and ask
for help when they need it.
So we would ask that you look at our groups, look at our
associations, and look to supporting our programs that allow us
to have input into the federal level.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Ms. Ward. Thank you for
your work. Thank you all for your fine work. We look, this
committee looks forward to working together with all of you
over time to improve the processes at which we can best
identify threats to our nation and to ameliorate them as best
as possible. Perhaps there were those, Mr. Czerwinski, you hit
on the point that our national defense is focused on one set of
issues, whereas homeland defense is focused on so many more.
Perhaps there were those who predicted or at least said it was
possible for a Japanese military strike at Pearl Harbor in
1941. Maybe yes, maybe no. I haven't looked at the history
closely enough to know that. I know that through all the time
that I was growing up this nation was preparing for another
bolt out of the blue, and we were probably looking the wrong
direction, except for perhaps just a few people when the bolt
out of the blue finally came. It is our job to try to do our
best, do our level best to have the technology and the people
in place to prevent that from happening, to do what we need to
do.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today, and
I now need to bring this hearing to a close. I want to thank
all the witnesses for testifying. It has been highly
educational. I look forward to working with the agencies and
working with our outside information sources.
If there is no objection, the record will remain open for
additional statements. Hearing none, so ordered. Members,
questions will be submitted and answers may be given for the
record. Without objection, so ordered. This hearing is now
closed.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
<SKIP PAGES = 000>
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary of Science and Technology,
Department of Homeland Security
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Staff
Q1. In your written testimony, you stated that you have hired 66
percent of your full staff.
Q1a. In which divisions or offices do you lack staff? Do you have
adequate mid-level employees to support your Directorate's day-to-day
activities? What impact does this have on operations and how will
things change when you are fully staffed? What percentage of your
current staff are detailed from other federal agencies? Of those
detailees, how many are in senior level positions?
Q1b. In which divisions or offices do you lack staff?
A1a,b. Program manager and program execution functions across the S&T
Directorate are not fully staffed by federal employees; however, they
are better staffed now than prior to the ramping up of S&T Directorate
hiring efforts at my direction. The bulk of our hiring actions are
focused on bringing on program management expertise and building the
next generation of senior program managers.
Q1c. Do you have adequate mid-level employees to support your
Directorate's day-to-day activities?
A1c. The S&T Directorate supports its day-to-day activities by
supplementing its federal staff with contractual support and some
detailees from other federal agencies and other entities, e.g.,
national laboratories and State and local governments. The S&T
Directorate's goal is to further solidify this staff by increasing the
ratio of federal employees to contractual staff.
Q1d. What impact does this have on operations and how will things
change when you are fully staffed?
A1d. As the S&T Directorate builds its federal staff, it will create
more permanency and build morale, leading to retention of valuable
employees and institutional memory, which helps to maintain consistency
and improve efficiency.
Q1e. What percentage of your current staff are detailed from other
federal agencies?
A1e. As of pay period three, the S&T Directorate had 262 FTE. The
detailed staff equates to six percent (a total of 17 employees).
Q1f. Of those detailees, how many are in senior level positions?
A1f. One detail employee is in a senior position.
MANPADS
Q2. The request for the explosives account is reduced significantly in
the FY 2008 budget, due to the end of funding for the counter-MANPADS
program. However, there have been a number of news reports about
airlines being uninterested in purchasing counter-MANPADS technology
because of its purchase price and high maintenance costs.
Why is R&D for counter-MANPADs technology being discontinued
before it can be manufactured and maintained for an acceptable cost to
end users? What are the lessons learned from this program and has the
S&T Directorate changed its technology development programs as a
result?
A2. As directed by Congress, the objectives of the program's final
phase, Phase III, include establishing a better basis for estimating
the sustainability costs for systems derived from military technology.
To go further and achieve manufacturing, maintainability, and
sustainability costs acceptable to end users would require substantial
investment across multiple years, which is beyond the scope of the S&T
Directorate program as defined by the Congress.
Congress directed DHS to develop and demonstrate military Counter-
MANPADS technology for protecting commercial aircraft, which the
program has accomplished. Counter-MANPADS has been a very successful
program resulting in two systems that could protect commercial airlines
if deployed. This program employed a rigorous systems engineering
approach using knowledge-based acquisition principles. Among the
important lessons learned are: a comprehensive test and evaluation
program must fully account for the operational environment; that life-
cycle costs must be addressed early and completely; that modeling and
simulation produce substantial dividends; and engaging all stakeholders
early and often is crucial to success. This has proven to be an
excellent model for major systems development programs, which the S&T
Directorate would follow for similar programs that are meant to be
carried all the way to a deployment decision. Many S&T Directorate
programs feed into broad pilot programs managed by the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), which would carry the technology to
deployment for use by TSA agents and first responders. In such cases,
the S&T Directorate would develop the technology to a level appropriate
for use in pilot deployment projects.
The developmental phases of the Counter-MANPADS program will end in
early 2009, with Phase III in-service operational suitability
evaluations in cargo and passenger airline environments.
MSIs
Q3. You mentioned in your testimony that some funding for the
University Centers of Excellence and scholarship and fellowship
programs will go towards increasing the participation of under-
represented minorities and minority-serving institutions (MSIs) in
these programs.
Q3a. What is the current level of participation by under-represented
students (including women and minorities) and MSIs? What are your
specific plans for outreach to and retention of these groups in the S&T
Directorate's education programs?
A3a. Currently there are 255 students participating in the Scholarship
and Fellowship Program at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Of
that number 44 percent or 115 are women and 39 students identified
themselves as under-represented minorities. Please note that providing
information on race and ethnicity is voluntary, therefore not all
minority students may have been identified. Since the inception of the
Program in 2003, scholarships and fellowships have been awarded to 17
students from 13 Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs): 11 students from
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and six students
from Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs).
Q3b. What are your specific plans for outreach to and retention of
these groups in the S&T Directorate's education programs?
A3b. In FY 2007, the S&T Directorate established the Minority Serving
Institutions (MSI) program to enhance outreach, recruiting and
retention. The MSI initiatives are designed to improve the capabilities
of MSIs to conduct research in areas critical to homeland security,
develop a new generation of scientists capable of advancing homeland
security goals and aid in faculty retention in the broad area of
homeland security science, technology, engineering and mathematics (HS-
STEM). Competitive incentives will be used to integrate the MSIs with
the DHS University Centers of Excellence, to develop homeland security
research and training capabilities at the MSIs, and to develop career
pathways for MSI HS-STEM students at DHS, State and local agencies,
national laboratories and Centers of Excellence. Finally, the program
will develop internship and career opportunities at a variety of DHS
venues.
Program activities include:
<bullet> Conducting a Summer Research Team (SRT) Program for
MSI that provides a 10-12 week summer research experience for
teams, consisting of a faculty member and up to two students,
to perform research at a DHS University Center or Excellence
(COE) that aligns with the DHS mission. The program began in
2005 and to date there have been 16 teams and 43 faculty and
students from 15 MSIs who have participated in the program.
Several of these SRT projects have evolved into longer-term and
more extensive partnerships between MSIs and existing COEs Team
selections for 2007 are in progress.
<bullet> Sponsoring a Summer Workshop on Teaching Terrorism
for faculty and graduate students at Minority Serving
Institutions (MSIs). The workshop will: 1) offer an intensive
short-course on the fundamentals of terrorism; 2) introduce
academics to new and innovative techniques utilized to teach
terrorism; and 3) provide access to high-level officials
working in the intelligence and counter-terrorism fields. It
will also feature expert specialists from the Centers of
Excellence and integrate curriculum content from the DHS
Centers of Excellence including material on the social-
behavioral causes and consequences of terrorism, terrorism risk
analysis, food security, zoonotic disease defense, and
catastrophic event preparedness and response.
<bullet> Establishing DHS HS-STEM Leadership and Career
Development Grants to MSIs to support programs in critical HS-
STEM areas. These programs provide MSIs with funds to support
early career faculty to establish or expand education, research
and training activities in HS-STEM areas. The faculty awards
are closely linked to scholarship and fellowship awards to
qualified undergraduate and graduate students in related
homeland security STEM disciplines who intend to pursue
homeland security professional and scientific careers.
The S&T Directorate conducted further outreach efforts in 2007.
University Programs hosted three regional MSI workshops, which took
place on February 4 in Baltimore targeting Historically Black Colleges
and Universities (HBCUs), on February 21 at Broward Community College
(Florida) targeting Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs), HBCUs and MSI
community colleges, and on February 28 at USC (California) targeting
HSIs and Tribal Colleges. At these workshops, DHS:
<bullet> Introduced the MSIs to four new solicitations for
Centers of Excellence (COE), explained the opportunities those
represent and encouraged the MSIs to submit proposals as lead
institutions and as partners;
<bullet> Explained the ideas and expectations for the new MSI
program that U/S Cohen initiated, and solicit the MSIs input.
Note: UP revamped the MSI Leadership and Career Development
Grant program significantly in response to comments received
from MSIs at these workshops;
<bullet> Described the 2007 Summer Research Team program and
opportunities for partnerships with COEs;
<bullet> Described DHS Scholarship and Fellowship Programs and
the DHS Postdoctoral Research Associateship Program; and
<bullet> Invited the MSIs to a ten-day summer workshop on
teaching terrorism (SWOTT) specifically developed for MSIs.
Note: DHS is supporting the attendance of interested MSI
faculty to this workshop until capacity is reached.
Other UP MSI Activities have included:
<bullet> Participation in the White House Initiative on
Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs) conference planning
committee in Fall 2006;
<bullet> Meeting with Hispanic Association of Colleges and
Universities and HBCUs at their annual meetings and, at UP's
requests, met on ways to disseminate information, engage HSIs
and HBCUs, and present at their major conferences;
<bullet> Participation in a workshop for Native Americans on
the risk of terrorism for Casinos;
<bullet> Meeting with a number of other federal agencies on
ways to collaborate and leverage MSI resources;
<bullet> Collaboration with the White House Initiatives on
HBCUs and TCUs on ways to disseminate information and provide
speaking opportunities at their key venues; and
<bullet> Reaching out to MSIs to encourage MSI students to
apply for DHS Scholarships and Fellowships.
In addition, the Department wants to enhance the role of MSIs
within the COEs by increasing both the number and extent of
institutional partnerships between MSIs and the COEs; either through
new COEs, for which MSIs could be lead institutions, or by expanding
the network at existing COEs. The current COEs have a total of 15 MSI
partners.
Human-Technology Interface
Q4. The newly created Human Factors division within the S&T
Directorate could potentially save DHS millions of dollars by providing
``Human-Technology Interface'' testing services that could help
determine whether technology was easy to use and socially acceptable.
What are your plans for leveraging this capability?
A4. The creation of the Human Factors Division within the S&T
Directorate reflects the leadership's recognition that integrating
human factors elements early in the Research and Development (R&D)
process can increase the effectiveness of technologies and decrease
long-term costs. Utilizing the capital available in the Human Factors
Division, the S&T Directorate is working to embed human systems
elements into all phases of the R&D process, from the basic and applied
research stages to the formulation of acquisition guidance. We are also
working to leverage the resources of our partners at the Department of
Defense, NASA, the FAA, and the national labs--including the work being
done at the Transportation Security Lab--to inform and enhance this
work.
The S&T Directorate also includes human-technology interface as a
key component in the qualification and certification of security
screening and detection technologies. For example, extensive human-
technology interface assessment of hand-held metal detectors was
conducted prior to their qualification and procurement by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Further, recognizing that
incorporating human factors elements into each system it deploys is
critical, the S&T Directorate is formalizing, through the establishment
of a Community Acceptance of Technologies Panel, the already routine
interface DHS programs have with first responders and the American
public.
Transportation Security Lab
Q5. I understand that the Transportation Security Lab (TSL) would like
to offer its testing and evaluation services to private entities for a
fee.
What is your opinion of this idea? Why should the Federal
Government offer these types of testing and evaluation services instead
of the private sector?
A5. The S&T Directorate is open to the concept where DHS Laboratories,
such as the Transportation Security Lab (TSL), would perform testing
and evaluation services for a fee and on a confidential basis. It is
important that our unique facilities and testing expertise be made
available to commercial industry and others for the impartial testing
of technologies being deployed at the Nation's airports to screen
baggage. Currently, TSL and other DHS labs bear the entire costs of
performing services that benefit baggage inspection equipment
manufacturers. By adopting user fees, we are not seeking to compete
with private industry in any way. Rather, we are seeking to offer
industry the use of the unique DHS facilities and skilled personnel on
a not-to-interfere basis.
Questions submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Projects
Q1. The S&T Directorate actively pursues high-risk, high-yield
research and development activities through the Office of Innovation,
with the explicit expectation that many of these projects will fail.
How will the Directorate choose projects to pursue in this office?
What processes are in place to ensure that projects that are not coming
to fruition are in fact terminated?
A1. The Director of Innovation/HSARPA works closely with the Under
Secretary for Science and Technology, the Division Directors, other
Portfolio Directors, industry, academia, other government
organizations, and other sources to determine topic areas for projects.
The Director utilizes many sources for guidance including:
<bullet> DHS Goals and Priorities as described by the
Secretary of Homeland Security;
<bullet> Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) Research and Development
Budget Priority Guidance;
<bullet> Goals set by the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology;
<bullet> Congressional Direction; and
<bullet> Our Customers, the agencies and agents that are on
the front lines of DHS law enforcement and protection services.
Through the IPT process they are already providing us with
their list of needs. If we believe there is a potential
solution that may be high risk but would revolutionize the way
the need is met, either by greatly increasing performance and
capability or by reducing the procurement and maintenance
costs, we may decide to select that project for accelerated
prototyping.
<bullet> Our Vendors, we have received some very innovative
ideas from industry, from DHS labs and national labs in the war
on terrorism. If these ideas are such that they would provide
leap ahead capabilities if successful, we consider them for
Office of Innovation execution.
All the projects that are executed under the Office of Innovation
will have program plans and schedules developed that include milestone
events, and exit ramps if the technologies do not appear to be
progressing. The S&T Directorate will hold periodic reviews for all
programs, including innovation, and the decision to continue a program
or terminate will come from the senior staff involved in those reviews.
Coordination Activities
Q2. Your testimony identified ways in which the S&T Directorate
coordinates with other agencies and groups throughout the Federal
Government. Similarly, Mr. Oxford identified coordination activities
undertaken at DNDO in his testimony. However, neither of your
statements mentions coordination activities between DNDO and the S&T
Directorate.
Do you consult with DNDO for strategic planning and budgeting
purposes? What mechanisms exist within the Department of Homeland
Security to coordinate and balance the activities of the S&T
Directorate and DNDO?
A2. S&T and DNDO continue to have a close relationship within the
Department and do coordinate efforts at all levels from the shared use
of the radiological and nuclear expertise at the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory (EML) to the integration of requirements and
system development of technologies for use in Departmental initiatives
such as Secure Freight. The overarching missions of the two agencies
are clearly delineated and therefore do not require a formal
collaboration during strategic planning and budgeting activities there
are multiple working level interactions that incorporate requirements
and de-conflict overlapping and collocated sensor and architecture
development programs. DNDO was also invited to participate in the S&T
IPT process to provide them out-year program insight and a sense of
Departmental priorities in the R&D arena.
Improving Methodologies
Q3. Dr. Epstein suggests that improving methodologies for determining
which threats to address and how much to spend on each should be a high
priority for the government.
What activities do you have in your organization to address the
need for decision-support and long-term strategic planning? What
interagency efforts are underway to plan across disciplines and
threats?
A3. The foundation for the S&T Directorate's overall decision-support
approach is the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
process, which initiates and monitors S&T Directorate programs and
ensures that these programs result in a focused effort to improve
homeland security through science and technology. The S&T Directorate's
PPBE process uses risk-informed assessment tools to inform the
development of program priorities, and to focus efforts on addressing
high-consequence threats. The Homeland Security Institute (HSI) has
developed an independent model to assess the potential for S&T
Directorate programs to reduce homeland security risk and this model
has been used to evaluate programs based on an adjustable set of
criteria which can inform the S&T Directorate's PPBE process. This
model estimates S&T Directorate program contributions to existing
homeland security capability gaps while weighing the homeland security
risk reduction value of the programs.
The S&T Directorate is committed to delivering capabilities that
DHS components can rely on to meet their operational needs. To
accomplish this, the S&T Directorate facilitated Customer-led
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to identify homeland security
capability requirements across the Department. Approximately half of
the S&T budget was dedicated to developing products identified by DHS
customer-led IPTs that established capability gaps and requirements to
drive and inform the research and development (R&D) efforts of the S&T
Directorate. These gaps will enable the S&T Directorate to identify key
customer-oriented programs. In meeting these customer capability
requirements, the S&T Directorate draws on the best technologies and
technology researchers and developers from across the homeland security
research enterprise ranging from the private sector to other government
agencies, to universities, to international allies. The S&T Directorate
has already put in place numerous interagency Memoranda of
Understanding to ensure efficient coordination between the S&T
Directorate and other federal, State and local agencies; and the S&T
Directorate has Divisions dedicated to Interagency and International
collaboration. In executing its balanced portfolio of investments (from
basic research to technology transition), the S&T Directorate is
determined to be the model customer-focused, output-oriented, full-
service science and technology organization that delivers significant
value and supports and enhances DHS mission success.
Questions submitted by Representative Judy Biggert
Protective Measures
Q1a. How is DHS implementing its responsibility to analyze critical
national infrastructure vulnerabilities and to implement protective
measures?
A1a. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate provides analysis of
critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and supports the implementation
of protective measures through its Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CIP) Modeling, Simulation and Analysis (MSA) program. Activities
carried out through this program include risk-informed prioritization
of strategies and resource allocations in support of the National
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key
Assets. For example, one project within the program, the Critical
Infrastructure Decision Support System (CIPDSS), provides risk informed
insights for making critical infrastructure protection decisions by
considering all 17 critical Infrastructures and their primary
interdependencies. Once fully developed, the CIPDSS will assist
decision-makers in making informed choices by computing human health
and safety, economic, public confidence, national security, and
environmental impacts. The CIPDSS will transition to the DHS's National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) for operational
use in FY 2008.
Q1b. Why has DHS chosen to fund certain of its infrastructure risk
assessment and analysis research at the national laboratories on a
year-to-year basis rather than a ``line-item'' budget basis?
A1b. We have recently realigned the S&T Directorate's budget to match
the S&T Directorate organization and to map S&T Directorate programs
more directly with the components and missions within DHS. This
provides our customers and congress with more transparency to our
budget and activities. The incorporation of risk assessments and the
analysis of critical infrastructure sectors into S&T Directorate
programs require a holistic program approach, which relies on
understanding existing, emerging and perceived threats. A line item for
risk assessments would not align those activities with the programs
they support.
Q1c. What is the division of labor among the various laboratory
programs in this effort?
A1c. Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) all participate in
CIPDSS's development. Tasks related to program coordination,
development of system architecture and tools, and prototyping and
deployment will be performed by all of the laboratories. Tasks related
to consequence model development will be emphasized at LANL and SNL.
Decision model development will be emphasized at ANL.
Q1d. How do you distinguish one lab's function and capabilities from
another's?
A1d. The S&T Directorate, through collaborative interactions, works
with the national laboratories to identify which laboratories have the
functions and capabilities that are most suitable for specific
programs/projects carried out by the S&T Directorate.
Q1e. What provisions has DHS made for communications connectivity and
shared access to common databases among the laboratories?
A1e. The S&T Directorate arranges communications connectivity and
shared access to common databases among the laboratories based on
program/project needs. One example is the CIPDSS program, in which
participants communicate regularly and share data, models, and results
through multiple mechanisms. This includes weekly conference calls that
include all three participating national labs and quarterly face-to-
face meetings that include most technical members. Tri-lab team members
share data through the Knowledge Management (KM) portal hosted at SNL.
Papers, technical communications, and working papers are shared through
the KM portal. System models are shared through web-based Concurrent
Version Systems repositories. Lastly, data resulting from computer
simulation runs are automatically shared across the tri-lab team using
automatic database synchronization mechanisms.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, Department of Homeland Security
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Detailees
Q1. You mentioned in your written testimony that you have detailees on
staff from other federal agencies, including the Departments of Energy
and Defense.
What percentage of your staff is detailed from another agency? How
do you ensure that interagency personnel are not improperly involved in
making grant money available to their home agencies? For example, what
conflict-of-interest rules and guidance are in place at DNDO?
A1. Currently 40 percent of DNDO staff members are detailees. Of this,
29 percent are interagency detailees from the Departments of Energy
(DOE), Defense (DOD) and Justice (DOJ/FBI), as well as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). Detailees from the Department of Defense
include officers and civilians from the Army, Air Force, Navy, Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. In addition, DNDO has detailees
from other DHS Components such as the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and
Border Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration,
which make up the remaining 11 percent of the detailee staff.
Interagency personnel are subject to Department of Homeland
Security Management Directive 0480.1, Ethics/Standards of Conduct;
Executive Order 12674, Principles of Ethical Conduct for Government
Officers and Employees; and 5 C.F.R. Part 2635, Standards of Ethical
Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch. The DHS Ethics Office
provides mandatory initial ethics orientation to all new employees,
including detailees, as well as mandatory ethics training on an annual
basis. In addition, detailees are not allowed to make funding decisions
that affect their sending organizations. DNDO's budget and contracting
offices are independent from the program offices in which detailees
reside. Furthermore, grants would not be provided to other federal
agencies (the source of DNDO detailees).
Student Interest
Q2. You pointed out in your testimony the serious problem with
decreasing student interest in the field of nuclear science, and I am
pleased to see that you are working with the National Science
Foundation to provide funding for students interested in this field.
How do you plan to make sure students who take advantage of this
funding opportunity choose to go into go into homeland security-related
positions, especially at DNDO? Also, what is the actual job market for
people with these degrees? What studies or analyses indicate strong
demand for nuclear scientists? How many graduates in nuclear science do
we need each year, and at what level (Bachelor's, Master's, or Ph.D.)?
A2. As stated in the testimony, the nuclear science community is
forecasting a need for approximately 100 additional new Ph.D.s per year
in order to fill the overall demand, which includes homeland security.
Historically eight to ten percent of nuclear scientists go into
homeland security-related positions and we expect this percentage to
remain the same or increase. Research and development for homeland
security is performed at national laboratories, companies, and
universities by nuclear scientists who have broad interests, not just
security. Through its Transformational R&D Directorate, DNDO is
reaching out to this research community with a combination of Broad
Agency Announcements, Calls for Proposals, and National Science
Foundation (NSF) solicitations. We do not require nuclear scientists
who receive awards under the Academic Research Initiative (ARI) to join
DNDO, but we do expect them to join the nuclear science community,
whose work contributes to DNDO's programs and activities.
The job market in nuclear science is improving with opportunities
in homeland security, medical applications, basic research, defense,
etc. An increasing number of nuclear scientists are being sought by
DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), DHS, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the intelligence agencies. In addition,
many universities' nuclear engineering departments are seeking new
faculty members and department heads. The American Nuclear Society's
Special Committee on Federal Investment in Nuclear Education found
``nearly uniform anecdotal evidence that the current production rate
for NSE (nuclear science and engineering) graduates is not sufficient
to meet demand.''
In November 2004, the DOE/NSF Nuclear Science Advisory Committee
recommended that the number of new Ph.D.s in nuclear science be
increased by 20 percent over the next five to 10 years. The need for
additional graduates with Bachelor's and Master's Degrees is assumed to
be in a similar, 20 percent range.
The shortage in graduates is documented in the following five
publications:
-- Education in Nuclear Science: A Status Report and
Recommendations for the Beginning of the 21st Century, DOE/NSF
Nuclear Science Advisory Committee, Subcommittee on Education,
November 2004.
-- Report to the Nuclear Science Advisory Committee: Guidance
for Implementing the 2002 Long Range Plan, 23 June 2005, pgs.
69-73.
-- The Future of the Nuclear Workforce: The Government's Role,
Laura Beth Bienhoff, Washington Internships for Students of
Engineering, American Nuclear Society, 2003, 50 pgs.
-- Nuclear's Human Element: Defining the Federal Government's
Role in Sustaining a Vibrant U.S. University-Based Nuclear
Science and Engineering Education System for the 21st Century,
American Nuclear Society, Special Committee on Federal
Investment in Nuclear Education, December 2006, 28 pgs.
-- Opportunities in Nuclear Science: A Long-Range Plan for the
Next Decade, DOE/NSF Nuclear Science Advisory Committee, April
2002, 148 pgs.
Risk Assessment
Q3. What sort of risk assessment does DNDO use when determining where
to deploy their detection technology?
We heard in the hearing from you and Mr. Czerwinski that DNDO has
global responsibilities; however it seems that deployment of detection
technologies is limited to highly-visible, highly-trafficked ports of
entry with relatively little attention given to intercepting smuggled
materials in foreign countries or detecting materials smuggled across
more remote borders. How do you decide where to direct your efforts?
A3. In assessing risks, DNDO relies on its gap analysis to guide the
deployment of detection technology as well as the development of new
detection technologies and new detection concepts of operation. In this
analysis, DNDO has determined the existing baseline architecture of USG
capabilities and organized it into a set of detection layers that are
grouped into three main categories (international, border, and
interior).
From this baseline architecture, DNDO looks at all possible paths
from the original source of the radiological or nuclear material or
weapon to a target within the U.S. Typically, DNDO will look at
authorized pathways, e.g., Ports of Entry (POEs); other land, air, and
maritime pathways; and unauthorized pathways (e.g., illegal crossing of
land borders in remote areas). From this examination of pathways, DNDO
identifies gaps, i.e., areas where detection is not currently
sufficient. For each gap, DNDO identifies options to fill the gaps,
evaluates the likely effectiveness of the options, and makes
recommendations for programs (either deployment, new concepts of
operations, or new research and development) to address the
architecture gaps.
In formulating recommendations, DNDO is guided by the language in
NSPD-43/HSPD-14, which states that ``DNDO will be responsible for the
implementation of the domestic portion of the global architecture,''
while ``the Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy will maintain
their respective responsibilities for policy guidance and
implementation of the portion of the global architecture outside the
United States.'' Those international responsibilities include State's
EXBS programs, Energy's Second Line of Defense and Megaports programs,
and Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction activities. This process has
led DNDO to focus additional efforts to develop detection strategies
for general aviation pathways, small maritime pathways, and remote
border crossings, as well as interior layer detection (e.g., Securing
the Cities).
DNDO is constantly updating its gap analysis and, to the greatest
extent possible, incorporating risk as it relates to the current threat
as a factor in its deployment decisions throughout all (land, air, and
maritime) pathways.
Questions submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Funding
Q1. Your testimony submitted to the Committee describes a remarkable
difference in funding awards between National Laboratories and private
industry and academia. For instance, you cite a call for proposals to
National Labs in December 2005 that awarded nearly $40 million to 44
proposals from a pool of 150, a success rate of nearly 30 percent.
Whereas, a similar announcement to the private sector and academia
awarded only $3.1 million to seven institutions, out of a pool of 200
submissions: a 3.5 percent success rate.
What accounts for this stark difference in funding amounts and
success?
A1. DNDO would like to clarify that the 200 submissions referred to
above pertain to the informal white paper phase. The actual number of
proposals received by private industry and universities was 75.
Therefore, the number that should be compared to the 150 proposals for
the National Labs is 75 rather than 200.
It should be further noted that DNDO made the awards in two parts.
DNDO awarded the first set of grants to seven academic institutions,
and the second set to 10 private industry participants. Thus, a total
of 17 awards worth approximately $12 million have been made, putting
the success rate at nearly 23 percent so far for this announcement.
The differences in award timing were due to differences in the
grants and contracting processes. Regardless, these research projects
were started as soon as the awards could be made. For FY 2007, awards
to industry and academia will utilize approximately one-third of
exploratory research funding under DNDO's Transformational Research and
Development Directorate. Also, it should be noted that in addition to
these projects, industry and academia have other projects and
opportunities which are not included in the awards above. These include
opportunities with DNDO's Small Business Innovative Research program
and the newly initiated Academic Research Initiative.
Coordination Activities
Q2. At the hearing, you identified ways in which DNDO coordinates
radiological detection research with other agencies and groups.
Similarly, Under Secretary Cohen identified coordination activities
undertaken by the S&T Directorate in his testimony. However, neither of
your statements mentions coordination activities between DNDO and the
S&T Directorate.
Do you consult with the S&T Directorate for strategic planning and
budgeting purposes? What mechanisms exist within the Department of
Homeland Security to coordinate and balance the activities of the S&T
Directorate and DNDO? What interagency efforts are underway to plan
across disciplines and threats?
A2. Yes. S&T and DNDO continue to have a close relationship within the
Department, coordinating efforts at all levels--from the shared use of
the radiological and nuclear expertise at the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory (EML) to the integration of requirements and
system development of technologies being developed for use in
Departmental initiatives such as Secure Freight. In addition, there are
multiple working level interactions that incorporate requirements and
de-conflict overlapping and collocated sensor and architecture
development programs. DNDO was also invited to participate in the S&T
Integrated Product Team (IPT) process to provide them with out-year
program insight and a sense of Departmental priorities in the R&D
arena. Section 502 (d) of the SAFE Port Act of 2006 also requires that
S&T and DNDO develop an annual report that speaks to the coordination
between the two Components.
Threats
Q3. Dr. Epstein suggests that improving methodologies for determining
which threats to address and how much to spend on each should be a high
priority for the government.
What activities do you have in your organization to address the
need for decision-support and long-term strategic planning? What
interagency efforts are underway to plan across disciplines and
threats?
A3. DNDO recognizes the need for formal systems engineering processes
to support and document mission, requirements, concepts of operation,
and program performance. These processes include risk analysis to
prioritize threats and cost-benefit analysis to evaluate particular
programs.
Currently, DNDO is developing an end-to-end technology development
plan that starts from a detection architecture gap analysis and
documents the process from the identification of options, through
prototype development, operational testing, deployment, and continuous
evaluation. This documentation will provide decision support to the
strategic planning process and will ensure the government pursues
effective programs at every stage.
DNDO Red Teaming and Net Assessments (RTNA) are also developing an
end-to-end probabilistic methodology for analysis of detection
architecture effectiveness that is grounded in both adversary
capability and detection node operational performance. Collaboration is
occurring with Defense Threat Reduction Agency, elements of the
intelligence community, Department of Energy, and United States Coast
Guard on this project. This methodology will enhance global situational
awareness and support interagency collaborative planning, course-of-
action evaluations, tabletop exercises, including red team and blue
team assessments, and analyses of battle management, exercise support,
crisis action planning, and interagency collaborative planning. This
will also be an effective tool to support technology investments and
related decision making. The methodology defines and measures adversary
capabilities through intelligent overlay of interagency threat
databases, individual expert analyses, and adversary emulation
operations. It also defines and measures detection node performance
through network models for systems and CONOPS at individual detection
layers and is based on a process developed for DNDO architecture
studies and risk analyses.
In addition to DNDO internal risk assessment, DNDO is actively
participating in DHS-wide programs such as the Risk Informed Planning
Program which seeks to perform risk analysis across disciplines and
threats to provide a comparable risk assessment between DHS components.
DNDO is beginning to work directly with DHS Science and Technology to
perform a WMD risk assessment common to chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons.
DNDO plays a key role in interdisciplinary planning. One of DNDO's
founding principles was the allocation of responsibilities called,
``centralized planning with decentralized execution.'' This means that
DNDO is responsible for developing the global detection architecture,
conducting test and evaluation of available systems that may be
deployed, and assessing the effectiveness of the deployed architecture
through red teaming and other means. However, it remains the
responsibility of interagency partners to execute their respective
portions of the global architecture.
Through centralized planning, DNDO seeks to fully utilize expertise
from implementing agencies, and leverage, not duplicate, existing
initiatives related to nuclear detection. Several mechanisms facilitate
collaboration between interagency partners. For example, DNDO uses the
Interagency Coordination Council (ICC) as a forum for effective
coordination and, when required, as a mechanism for conflict resolution
across all appropriate departments and agencies. ICC members will
resolve policy issues that arise across organizational boundaries. In
addition, members will serve as liaisons between their respective
organizations and the DNDO to ensure that the interagency community is
fully aware of each other's activities as they relate to the mission of
the DNDO. Another example would be the use of interagency detailees as
full-time DNDO staff members. These detailees play a critical role in
helping DNDO interface with its implementing partners across the global
nuclear detection architecture. Frequent dialogue facilitated by DNDO
detailees with their home organizations results in a thorough
understanding of implementing agency operations, technological
requirements, reporting and information analysis needs--all of which
drive DNDO operations.
Overview
Q4. Please provide to the Committee an overview of the activities DNDO
has taken to include first-responders in the planning and operations of
your research and development activities.
A4. To periodically engage the State and local (S&L) community, DNDO
formed an S&L Stakeholder Working Group and has held five Working Group
meetings each lasting three days. Working group meetings are designed
specifically to bring the Nation's preventive rad/nuc detection
community together, inform participants on activities within DNDO and
the community, and obtain feedback on DNDO's programs and initiatives.
Since its inception, DNDO has made it a fundamental priority to
work together with, and receive feedback from, its S&L first responders
in developing programs and products. This continual loop of information
exchange has been mutually beneficial to DNDO and S&L jurisdictions and
has helped refine various programs/products/services throughout the
entire life cycle of the development process:
-- Securing The Cities Initiative (STC): Under STC, DNDO has
led a consortium of S&L stakeholders in the New York City
region to establish a region-wide coordinated radiation
detection and interdiction capability. This effort includes
agencies from the States of NY, NJ, and CT. An overarching STC
Working Group was established in January 2007, with several
specialized committees including the Equipment Working Group.
Through interactive discussions and live technology
demonstrations, this group has addressed responder operational
equipment requirements in an effort to focus DNDO acquisition
and research efforts, and has agreed upon an initial set of
equipment to be procured and distributed to responders
throughout the region. This group has also brought developers
of DNDO's SUV-based mobile Advanced Spectroscopic Portal System
face to face with the operators in the region to facilitate the
design process. Additionally, the group is addressing long-term
sustainability issues such as equipment maintenance and
calibration on a regional basis.
-- Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot (SETCP): Under
SETCP, DNDO has reached out to nine Southeast States, plus the
District of Columbia, and identified first responders with
preventive rad/nuc detection responsibilities in their
respective jurisdictions. For the last year, DNDO has met with
these individuals at least quarterly and has solicited their
functional requirements through directed surveys, interactive
discussions, and live technology demonstrations. This group was
instrumental in developing the Commercial Vehicle Inspection
annex to the Preventive Rad/Nuc Detection Program Management
Handbook. S&L participants also had input on the development of
the functional requirements for the SUV-based mobile Advanced
Spectroscopic Portal System. The SETCP live technology
demonstration (November 2006) was operated entirely by S&L
responders.
-- Radiation Detection Device Testing: DNDO works closely with
a group of S&L first responders to produce test results that
would be helpful for S&L jurisdictions as they make decisions
about which detection equipment to purchase. For the Anole test
series, S&L first responders reviewed the draft report to
ensure its readability and usefulness. For the Bobcat test
series, CONOPS from S&L first responders were utilized to
generate real-world test scenarios. Additionally, S&L first
responders participated in hands-on testing of equipment.
-- Display and Algorithm Integrated Product Teams (IPT): The
Human Portable Radiation Detection System program staff, and
the Human Factors Team that supported the Display and Algorithm
IPTs, worked with S&L public safety representatives to help
design equipment that would meet the needs of the first
responders. Some of the entities who participated included:
fire departments, law enforcement, and emergency management
from Montgomery County, MD, Virginia Department of Emergency
Management, and the Government of the District of Columbia.
Additionally, the Human Factors Team coordinated its activities
with other S&L public safety officials as well as with the U.S.
Coast Guard, and Customs and Border Protection.
-- Training Curriculum: DNDO worked with the S&L Stakeholder
Working Group to review and gather training requirements, as
well as develop curriculum for various levels and types of
preventive rad/nuc detection training courses.
-- Alarm Resolution Response Protocols: DNDO incorporated S&L
public safety agencies into the development of detailed
protocols for resolving detection alarms.
-- Preventive Rad/Nuc Detection Program Management Handbook
and Commercial Vehicle Inspection (CVI) Rad/Nuc Module: DNDO
developed both of these products during numerous working
sessions with a multi-jurisdictional, multi-disciplinary
audience of S&L public safety officials. The program management
handbook provides consistent guidance for building or enhancing
State and local preventive rad/nuc detection programs. The CVI
Rad/Nuc Module provides guidance to S&L jurisdictions that may
choose to incorporate preventive rad/nuc detection into their
CVI program in a variety of ways, including within mobile weigh
station operations, within CVI roadside inspection operations,
or by using relocatable portal monitors on by-pass routes.
-- Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-8): DNDO
worked with the DHS Office of Grants and Training to ensure
consistency between HSPD-8 guidance and DNDO programs, as well
as coordinate the involvement of S&L public safety
representatives.
-- Maritime Pilot and a Maritime Test Bed: S&L public safety
representatives are currently working with DNDO to define the
pilot and testbed.
Questions submitted by Representative Judy Biggert
RDD
Q1a. How is DHS implementing plans to protect against radiological
weapons and radiological dispersal devices?
How does DHS evaluate the Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
threat? What studies have been done to analyze the potential damage and
consequences of an RDD attack? How does DHS distinguish its mission and
R&D program on RDDs from that of DOE, DTRA, the military services and
the FBI? What plans and programs does DHS have to analyze, mitigate,
and respond to the RDD threat? How would DHS determine the source of an
RDD attack? What data bases exist to support this effort? Since such an
attack would be different from an actual nuclear explosion, how do
these data bases differ from data bases maintained to determine the
characteristics of foreign nuclear weapons? (The specific answer would
probably be classified but the general question is: Are the data bases
the same or different?)
A1a. DHS/DNDO has a three tiered approach, closely coordinated with
other agencies, to protect the Nation from RDD devices. This approach
includes: 1) identifying the potential radiological materials that
could be used as an effective RDD; 2) securing and/or eliminating these
sources and; 3) pursuing ways to make the commercial devices that
employ radioactive sources more tamper proof. Examples of DNDO
initiatives are documented below:
-- DNDO is working with federal partners (NRC, DOE), industry,
and licensees in the United States to investigate
vulnerabilities and identify solutions to reduce the risk of
unauthorized access to the Cesium-137 sources found in
irradiators used in medical and research facilities.
-- DNDO is participating with the NRC, other federal agencies,
and the Agreement States in setting the data requirements for
the national source tracking system to improve the usefulness
of the database for source security.
-- DNDO is participating in an effort to promote the design
and production of non-nuclear alternatives for industrial
devices that currently use radioactive sources.
-- DNDO serves as the DHS representative on the NRC-chaired,
Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force, also known
as the Energy Policy Act Task Force. The Task Force is
responsible for a continuing comprehensive review of the status
of radioactive source security and for reporting periodically
to Congress on that status.
-- DNDO is participating with the NRC, other federal agencies,
and the Agreement States in the Alternative Technologies
subgroup, as part of the Energy Policy Act Task Force. This
subgroup is investigating the feasibility of alternatives to
the commercial use of certain higher risk radioactive sources.
-- DNDO is participating with the NRC, other federal agencies,
and the Agreement States Cesium Chloride subgroup, as part of
the Energy Policy Act Task Force. This subgroup is
investigating methods to reduce the RDD risk from this
particular radioactive source.
Furthermore, DNDO is beginning engagements with six UASI Tier I
Urban Areas, followed by the additional 39 UASI Tier II Urban Areas by
the end of FY 2009, as part of an operational implementation and
outreach strategy that aims to improve State and local capabilities to
detect and interdict radiological and nuclear threats. Coordinated
implementation support includes: initial engagements with senior
leaders from the Department of Energy, CBP, and the FBI; enlistment of
the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces; formulation of initial
preventive rad/nuc detection program plans; threat briefings; response
and protocol development; and training and exercise options.
Q1b. How does DHS evaluate the Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
threat? What studies have been done to analyze the potential damage and
consequences of an RDD attack?
A1b. DHS and DNDO use a combination of intelligence community and
official government sources, as well as our own assessments, to
evaluate a range of radiological and nuclear threats, including those
posed by RDDs. The RDD threat is evaluated from both a threat and
vulnerability standpoint--how susceptible are we to this type of
attack, and what can be done to detect and prevent the attack. Numerous
studies, both classified and unclassified have been conducted
(including several under DHS sponsorship at the National Labs) that
have characterized in detail the significant potential damage and
consequences that could result from an RDD attack.
Q1c. How does DHS distinguish its mission and R&D program on RDDs from
that of DOE, DTRA, the military services and the FBI?
A1c. From an R&D perspective, there are three key agencies doing R&D
for nuclear detection: DOE/NA-22 focuses on R&D to support non-
proliferation, proliferation detection, and counter-terrorism; DOD/DTRA
focuses on R&D to support international interdiction and response, and
counter-proliferation; and DHS/DNDO focuses on R&D to support
prevention of a domestic event. Specifically, DOE and DTRA assist in
the securing and detection of illicit trafficking of sources from or
within other nations, which reduce the risk of RDDs domestically. The
FBI brings to bear the investigative and law enforcement databases and
professional relationships that DNDO relies on to make asset deployment
decisions for potential domestic RDD threats.
We routinely coordinate with all of these agencies for ongoing
projects and new announcements. This allows each agency to leverage
technology advancements gained from other investments and transition
needed technologies to users more rapidly. In addition, close
coordination prevents redundancy in these R&D programs.
With respect to R&D for DNDO's nuclear forensics mission, DNDO's
National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center leads a centralized,
formalized interagency coordination process that ensures agencies' R&D
programs and initiatives are jointly planned and executed in a manner
consistent with roles and missions defined in national policy guidance.
Q1d. What plans and programs does DHS have to analyze, mitigate, and
respond to the RDD threat?
A1d. DHS plans and programs related to RDDs may be divided into
prevention and detection, which DNDO concentrates on, and mitigation
and response, which are addressed by other DHS components such as the
Directorate for National Protection and Programs, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and the Office of Health Affairs; these programs
have recently been re-organized and realigned. A significant DHS-wide
and interagency effort has gone into preparing for RDD events,
including contingency planning for the National Planning Scenarios, one
of which is an RDD. DHS analysis of the RDD threat is ongoing. The
generic effects of different types of RDDs employed in urban areas have
been modeled, with some U.S. city-specific data generated to develop
possible RDD scenarios. The predominant part of DNDO's mission involves
the detection and prevention of radiological and nuclear terrorist
events prior to the event happening.
DHS recognizes that an RDD threat could emanate from within our
borders, so we are also working to improve detection and interdiction
capabilities within our domestic interior as part of a broader layered
defense. While detection at POEs, including systems that screen
containers at seaports, is an important part of the solution, we must
also develop solutions for non-POE applications for maritime, aviation,
and land modes, including next-generation human portable detection
equipment and mobile standoff assets. For example, DNDO is making
progress to replace personal radiation detectors (pagers) now held by
first responders with equally compact and more accurate devices that
can detect both gamma and neutron radiation and identify isotopes of
RDDs.
To improve source security and decrease the availability of
radioactive sources to our adversaries, DNDO is working with other USG
agencies and with industry to further protect and account for
radioactive sources. DNDO is working to eliminate the sources within
the United States that could be used for RDDs and also working to track
radioactive sources of concern (industrial and medical) for security
and situational awareness purposes. As a part of an interagency effort,
DNDO also works with international counterparts to help other countries
prevent and detect radiological or nuclear threats closer to the
source.
Finally, we must remain vigilant and build greater public awareness
of ``what to look for,'' pre-detonation signs of radiological or
nuclear threat anomalies in neighborhoods, workplaces, and
transportation corridors that could launch a coordinated response to
stop the attack.
The modeling work that is part of our initial analysis of the RDD
threat can also help in post-event mitigation. DNDO has worked to
computer model the effects of an RDD detonated in an urban area,
allowing us to understand the size and scope of the impact on the
population. In the event of an actual RDD event, DNDO will be a source
of radiological/nuclear technical expertise and will support FEMA, HHS
and other federal agencies to mitigate the effects.
Q1e. How would DHS determine the source of an RDD attack? What data
bases exist to support this effort? Since such an attack would be
different from an actual nuclear explosion, how do these data bases
differ from data bases maintained to determine the characteristics of
foreign nuclear weapons? (The specific answer would probably be
classified but the general question is--are the data bases the same or
different?)
A1e. In formulating the response to these questions, it is understood
that the ``source of an RDD attack'' refers to ``who is responsible''
and this includes as one input the ``source of material.'' It is
further understood that the nuclear forensics process is necessarily
interagency, with respective roles and responsibilities defined by
statutes and policy directives. As part of the interagency effort DNDO
is responsible for developing a ``pre-detonation materials forensic
analysis capability in support of the lead federal agency. In most
instances the FBI will be the LFA and will be responsible for leading
the interagency attribution effort. The following response addresses
each question in turn:
Q1f. How would DHS determine the source of an RDD attack?
A1f. As indicated DHS is not responsible for determining the source of
an RDD attack. DHS is improving/developing a pre-detonation materials
forensic analysis capability that will be used principally by the FBI
in support of its overarching attribution efforts. In general however,
the key forensic processes supporting attribution of an RDD attack are
described below:
-- Material evidence would be collected from the scene that
would contain nuclear forensic signatures indicative of the
material source and RDD design. Conventional law enforcement
forensic samples related to the conventional (non-nuclear)
explosion would also be collected.
-- The evidence would be analyzed at laboratories that have
been equipped to conduct both radiochemical analyses and
traditional forensic examinations of contaminated evidence.
-- Many databases housed in various federal agencies exist to
support conventional law enforcement forensics. Regarding the
radioactive material source, databases are developed for this
type of application.
-- Data from analyses of the radiological material will be
interpreted by the appropriate laboratory and, as required,
peer reviewed by a group of experts to help identify the source
of the material. The material's source is one input that will
be used to address the question of ``who is responsible?''
Other traditional forensics will be utilized, and all the
technical information will be combined with law enforcement and
intelligence information to help develop the case for
attribution (i.e., all source information fusion).
Q1g. What data bases exist to support this effort?
A1g. The President directed the development of an integrated system of
information from all sources concerning worldwide nuclear material
holdings and their security status, the Nuclear Materials Information
Program.
Q1h. Since such an attack would be different from an actual nuclear
explosion, how do these data bases differ from data bases maintained to
determine the characteristics of foreign nuclear weapons? (The specific
answer would probably be classified but the general question is--are
the data bases the same or different?)
A1h. Due to fundamental differences in device design and materials
used, there are inherent differences between the data captured in
databases of RDD and nuclear weapon characteristics. In general, an RDD
is very different from a nuclear device that produces yield.
Essentially, the RDD databases cover two types of materials: 1)
radiological sources and 2) nuclear fuels. Radiological source
information includes information concerning commercial, industrial, and
government produced or owned radiological sources, and the nuclear
fuels information captures reactor fuels information from commercial
power, research, and government reactors. For both types of materials,
much of the data are derived from manufacturing information and
includes isotopic and elemental information, material information on
the cladding and other structures (as applicable), date of manufacture,
intended use, etc. Foreign nuclear weapons characteristics databases do
not address radiological sources or reactor fuels (and are highly
classified). Therefore, the databases are inherently quite different.
Outreach and Support
Q2. How is DHS implementing its outreach and support of regional
assets? How are priorities set for funding regional assets? How are
regional programs coordinated across all of DHS? What is the schedule
for providing support to all regions of the country?
A2. DNDO, through its Operations Support Directorate and Office of
State & Local Affairs, reaches out to State and local authorities and
helps them prioritize their demand for federal support capabilities as
well as identify their requirements for the design, requirements, and
deployment of detection systems within the United States. DNDO is
beginning engagements with the six (6) UASI Tier I Urban Areas,
followed by the additional 39 UASI Tier II Urban Areas into the
domestic layer of the GNDA by the end of FY 2009.
Working closely with the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
DNDO ensures that national level expertise is in place to support
prompt alarm adjudication. Reachback capability gives the responder
community access to National Laboratory expertise to analyze spectral
data and determine if a threat is present. We have established
procedures and connectivity to three regional reachback laboratories as
well as the National Operations Center. We routinely drill and exercise
reachback capabilities, and have the capability to adjudicate all
domestically referred primary-level radiation detection alarms. DNDO
also works to ensure that regional preventative rad/nuc detection
programs are coordinated across all of DHS. Coordinated support
includes: initial engagements with senior leaders from the Department
of Energy, CBP, and the FBI; enlistment of the FBI's Joint Terrorism
Task Forces; formulation of initial preventative rad/nuc detection
program plans; threat briefings; response and protocol development; and
training and exercise options.
Through the Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot (SETCP), DNDO
is laying the groundwork for how DHS can encourage individual states to
look at preventive rad/nuc detection as a necessary mission, as well as
how states can coordinate with each other to regionally address rad/nuc
threats. SETCP works through Regional Task Teams, comprising of state
representatives from the law enforcement, radiological health, and
emergency planning/operations communities. Dialogue with these
representatives was coordinated through the State Homeland Security
Advisors, both individually within each state and collectively across
the region. As a result, the participating states have shared goals,
technical approaches, concepts of operation (CONOPS) and lessons
learned. In addition, DNDO has solidified support through the
administration of two sets of Cooperative Agreements that have placed
new radiation detection systems into the hands of individual states,
but with an overlay of regional CONOPS to improve the use of these
devices and to establish connectivity to the DNDO Joint Analysis Center
and to Regional Reachback centers (also established by DNDO).
The following Cooperative Agreement awards have been made to States
participating in the DNDO Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot
(SETCP). A portion of these awards (GA, KY, SC, TN, and VA) were
awarded 26 Sept 2006. The remainder (AL, DC, FL, MS, NC) are scheduled
for award on or about 1 June 2007. NOTE: Virginia is scheduled to
receive an additional equipment allocation in FY2007 (an ASP Variant L
unit) under their original Cooperative Agreement.
These Cooperative Agreements comprise a combination of cash grants,
equipment grants, and services (such as site design and installation of
fixed portal hardware). Cash grants supported local purchase of
detector hardware, plus travel and allowable personnel costs for
participation in SETCP-sponsored training and exercises.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Under the SETCP, the States are also being supported by the
development of Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) to guide the use of the
issued equipment. Each State is also receiving assistance in
establishing a data exchange capability for preventive rad/nuc
detection data, both within the state and between the state and the
DNDO Joint Analysis Center (JAC).
Under Securing the Cities Initiative (STC), DNDO has led a
consortium of S&L stakeholders in the New York City region to establish
a region-wide coordinated radiation detection and interdiction
capability. This effort includes agencies from the states of NY, NJ,
and CT. An overarching STC Working Group was established in January
2007, with several specialized committees including the Equipment
Working Group. Through interactive discussions and live technology
demonstrations, this group has addressed responder operational
equipment requirements in an effort to focus DNDO acquisition and
research efforts, and has agreed upon an initial set of equipment to be
procured and distributed to responders throughout the region. This
group has also brought developers of DNDO's SUV-based mobile Advanced
Spectroscopic Portal System face-to-face with the operators in the
region to facilitate the design process. Additionally, the group is
addressing long-term sustainability issues such as equipment
maintenance and calibration on a regional basis.
DNDO also has a strong working relationship with the DHS Office of
Grants and Training (G&T), particularly regarding the development and
delivery of preventative rad/nuc detection training courses. DNDO, in
coordination with G&T, develops and executes training courses, table
tops, and other exercises and operational drills to provide federal,
State and local agencies with structure processes to refine and
standardize their procedures for the management of issues related to
detection, alarm adjudication, incident reporting, and control and
security of radioactive materials. This year's plans include training
for 1,200 law enforcement personnel and first responders. In FY 2008,
DNDO has a goal of training 2,400 individuals. DNDO also worked with
G&T to ensure consistency between HSPD-8 guidance and DNDO programs.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Gerald L. Epstein, Senior Fellow for Science and Security,
Homeland Security Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. You pointed out in your written testimony that classified
biological research can result in suspicion of the S&T Directorate's
intent, and suggest that allowing outside observers to help oversee
classified biological research can help alleviate some of the
suspicion. Is the biology community currently involved in helping
oversee S&T's biological research? If so, has S&T been providing
outside observers with adequate information and access? If not, what do
you recommend should be done?
A1. At present I am not aware of a mechanism by which members of the
non-governmental biology community have the opportunity to review the
entire biological research program, or the entire set of classified
biological research activities, within the Department of Homeland
Security. However, there are a number of mechanisms through which
member of the non-governmental biology community with appropriate
security clearances have or could have the opportunity to review
specific biological research activities, including classified ones,
that are conducted or sponsored by DHS. Without claiming that this list
is necessarily complete, these mechanisms include:
<bullet> Review by panels of the National Academies (the
National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of
Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and/or the National
Research Council)
Federal agencies including DHS often make use of the
National Academies to review research or address technical
issues involving their research programs. Academy panels have
the ability to obtain security clearances for panel members to
enable them to address classified research. One particularly
relevant panel is the Standing Committee on Biodefense Analysis
and Countermeasures, the principal function of which is ``to
coordinate studies requested by the National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasures Center related to biodefense
analysis in support of the Department of Homeland Security''
\1\ According to National Academies' staff supporting this
panel, all members of this panel, which includes distinguished
academic biological scientists, have been granted or have
applied for security clearances at the SECRET level, and they
have received classified briefings in the past on the subject
of risk assessment. This panel is in a position to receive
unclassified or classified briefings (at the SECRET level or
lower) on specific research activities associated with the
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
(NBACC), although I do not believe that it has yet been asked
to do so.\2\ (Disclosure: Although I am not a member of this
panel, I have participated in several of its meetings as an
invited guest speaker, including briefings and discussions on
assuring compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The National Academies, web page on Committee on Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasures (http://www7.nationalacademies.org/BAST/
BAST<INF>-</INF>Biodefense<INF>-</INF>Analysis<INF>-</INF>Committee.html
)
\2\ Among other things, NBACC will perform studies and laboratory
experiments--including classified ones--to ``fill in information gaps
to better understand current and future biological threats, assess
vulnerabilities, conduct risk assessments, and determine potential
impacts in order to guide the development of countermeasures. . .''
(Fact Sheet: National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center,''
February 24, 2005, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/
press<INF>-</INF>release<INF>-</INF>0627.shtm). Given its role in
understanding potential threats, NBACC activities--and in particular
classified NBACC activities--are likely to be controversial with
respect to treaty compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> NBACC Scientific Advisory Committee
Late in 2006, DHS awarded a contract to the Battelle
National Biodefense Institute to operate NBACC, and this
contractor is still in the process of establishing some of its
management structures. According to staff within the Department
of Homeland Security S&T Directorate, to which NBACC reports,
Battelle intends to create an outside scientific advisory
panel, including academic and other non-governmental
scientists, that will presumably will have some standing
responsibility to review and oversee the NBACC scientific
program, including its classified aspects.
<bullet> External Reviews by Entities such as the JASONs.
Should the Department of Homeland Security so wish, it could
ask for reviews of its activities, including classified
activities, by independent entities such as the JASONs, a group
of non-governmental, largely academic scientists with high
security clearances who do analyses and studies for a wide
range of government agencies, including agencies in the
national security sector. Members of this group can review
highly classified programs.
Although originally comprised almost exclusively of
physicists and other physical scientists, the JASONs have been
expanding their domain of expertise and now include three
nationally known biologists. To take on any significant role in
reviewing life science research, this complement of life
sciences would have to be expanded considerably, but at least
there is an initial life sciences capability today. I am not
aware that the JASONs have been asked to review any of DHS'
classified biological activities, and they would typically not
serve in a standing oversight role, but (subject to available
personnel) they could be enlisted for specific studies.
I believe that DHS is providing adequate information and access to
external reviews it has asked for, but I do not believe that outside
reviews are currently being done on a systematic or comprehensive
basis. (The DHS S&T program does undergo regular program reviews by
scientists and others who are within government but outside DHS,
including some from agencies such as NIH that are outside the
traditional national security community.) Recognizing that it may be
quite difficult and time-consuming for an outside group to be briefed
on, and to probe in depth, an entire research portfolio--a task that
clearly depends on the size and scope of that research portfolio--I
would recommend that DHS implement a process in which non-governmental
scientists with appropriate security clearances have more regular and
more systematic opportunity to review the suite of classified DHS
biological research activities. I note that DHS is currently
implementing a process by which its entire research portfolio--both
unclassified and classified--is reviewed by senior Departmental
officials to ensure compliance with laws, treaties, and policy. This is
a tiered review in which activities that warrant higher scrutiny get
it--and a similar ``tiering'' philosophy could be applied to external
technical review to DHS as well.
Since government agencies other than the Department of Homeland
Security might also conduct classified biological research activities,
it is also important that government-wide activities are reviewed with
respect to technical merit and treaty compliance, and such reviews gain
credibility to the extent that they involve members of the non-
governmental biology community (and other outside observers). My
conversations with senior government officials in several different
agencies assure me that they are aware of the importance of such
reviews and are working to develop processes to facilitate them. I
would like to highlight two relevant efforts here.
<bullet> The Biological Sciences Experts Group (BSEG) of the
National Counterproliferation Center
In response to the recommendation of the Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction that the Intelligence Community
engage more effectively with life scientists outside of the
U.S. government, the National Counterproliferation Center
within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has
created a Biological Sciences Experts Group (BSEG). This group,
on which I serve, consists of non-governmental members with
expertise in a range of disciplines associated with the
biological sciences. Its members serve strictly in an advisory
capacity. and they have no standing responsibility to review or
assess classified biological research. However, members are
available to provide advice on specific scientific and
technical activities relevant to the Intelligence Community's
missions, and they do constitute a mechanism to provide
selected IC activities (which could include biological
research) with independent, external, technical review.
Speaking for myself, I believe it would be appropriate for BSEG
members to address the credibility, legitimacy, and technical
merit of IC biological research activities. Moreover, I
believe--and have no reason to think my colleagues disagree--
that the IC staffers working with this group are genuinely
interested in obtaining independent and non-governmental views,
and that they take seriously the requests and conclusions of
BSEG members.
<bullet> Wider technical and programmatic engagement and peer
review by security-cleared non-governmental experts
Allowing more U.S. classified biological research activities
to undergo external technical reviews would require increasing
the availability of external reviewers who have security
clearances. In the spirit of the WMD Commission's charge to the
Intelligence Community to increase its engagement with the U.S.
biological research community, efforts are underway to identify
precisely these people--technical experts outside of government
who currently hold security clearances--to ask them if they
would be willing, on occasion, to perform technical reviews of
classified projects.
Question submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Q1. How does the difference in structure between the end-to-end,
research to operations, responsibilities of DNDO and the research-only
management activities of the S&T Directorate affect their ability to
provide technologies that reflect mature operational concepts and
systems design?
A1. The difference in structure would likely complicate future efforts
to merge DNDO with the S&T Directorate, but I don't see that it
necessarily makes either of these organizations better in general at
reflecting mature operational concepts and systems designs than the
other.
Even though DNDO's role extends further ``downstream'' than S&T's
does in terms of developing the architecture in which its products will
be used, neither DNDO nor S&T is likely to be the employer of the
individual who will be using that piece of equipment at the field. Both
of these agencies, therefore, must overcome the difficulty of designing
equipment for someone who is ultimately not under the agencies' direct
control, and to which that agency might not have direct access.
DNDO has the explicit charge of developing an architecture for
nuclear detection in addition to developing and procuring nuclear
detectors themselves, whereas other DHS S&T activities seek to develop
and deploy technology to support concepts, architectures, or
requirements that are either in place already or are being developed by
other DHS offices. (Biowatch had been an exception to this when its
system architecture as well as its individual detectors were developed
by DHS S&T, but responsibility for the overall architecture and
operation of that program has since been moved out of DHS S&T.) In this
sense, DNDO may have greater freedom to design systems and sensors that
complement each other than DHS S&T, since it would presumably have
fewer external constituencies or agencies to deal with. However, this
does not necessarily mean that a DNDO system will better reflect
``mature operational concepts,'' and could in fact imply the opposite:
if DNDO does not have to meet requirements as established by another
agency, it may be more tempted to set its own aggressive technical
milestones that draw on less mature operational concepts. However, I am
not aware of any specific evidence to that effect, and I am not sure
this effect is very strong in any event.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Jonah J. Czerwinski, Managing Consultant, IBM Global
Business Services; Senior Fellow, Homeland Security, IBM Global
Leadership Initiative
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. In your opinion, what are the benefits of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office's Securing the Cities Initiative? Is this type of
project likely to be successful in preventing the unlawful transport
and detonation of nuclear or radiological devices in the U.S.? Do you
believe that the requested funding level of $30 million for FY 2008 is
appropriate?
A1. The DNDO's Securing the Cities Initiative (SCI) reflects an
investment in an important part of a layered defense. While efforts to
secure sources of nuclear material in troubled areas remain critical,
in addition to interdiction operations like the Proliferation Security
Initiative, efforts like SCI help close an important gap in today's
detection mission.
Because even the most effective global effort to stop illicit
movement of dangerous nuclear material will be less than 100 percent
successful, it is wise to consider domestic detection efforts in major
cities. A perpetrator may be able to obtain nuclear material and evade
detection overseas, en route, and across the U.S. border which is known
to be porous in parts. If this occurs, it is likely that intelligence
communities will have some warning and be able to provide law
enforcement and other authorities with valuable information to aid in
an apprehension. An SCI effort would greatly help augment intelligence
and law enforcement officials by providing added warning and more
accurate information about the location of nuclear material.
The scenario of nuclear material smuggled across U.S. borders,
while dangerously possible, is perhaps as likely as nuclear material
obtained from within the United States for use against a major U.S.
city. Dangerous source material for a dirty bomb can be found in
unsecured commercial locations or universities where nuclear material
is located for legitimate uses. If a perpetrator steals this material,
SCI capabilities provide a better ability to locate and isolate the
material.
Whether or not SCI will be successful is difficult to say at this
stage, but some precedence already exists that indicates such an effort
could indeed be effective. The Department of Defense (DOD) already
deploys their own version of SCI focused exclusively on protecting
bases within the U.S. Detectors are in place surrounding the bases to
detect a potential nuclear threat in vicinity of the base. Ongoing R&D
for these programs is focused on increasing the ability to detect
source material moving at greater speeds along public roads that lead
to these bases. The potential for cooperation between DNDO and DOD
should be pursued for mutual benefit.
Lastly, DNDO's budget request for SCI deserves attention. The
Nation's investment in SCI should reflect a commitment to thinking
creatively and responsibly about the threat of nuclear terrorism in
America's cities. The nearly $11 billion to be spent on missile defense
next fiscal year places the SCI budget in perspective. With an overall
DNDO budget of approximately $550 million, dedicating $30 million to
Securing the Cities seems appropriate. At this early stage, a healthier
investment like this would help identify more promising routes to
success while weeding out potential dead-ends. SCI is equal parts R&D
and strategy.
Q2. From the FY 2008 budget request and information I've received from
DNDO, it seems that deployment of detection technologies is limited to
highly-visible, highly-trafficked ports of entry with relatively little
attention given to intercepting smuggled materials in foreign countries
or detecting materials smuggled across more remote borders. Is this an
appropriate way to deploy detection technologies? If not, what factors
should DNDO consider when determining where to deploy their detectors?
A2. The deployment strategy of detectors and other countermeasures in
combating smuggling nuclear weapons may be one of the most important
considerations in assessing the DNDO strategy. However, that the
strategy and budget seem to indicate a focus on domestic choke points
(i.e., highly trafficked points of entry) is appropriate at this stage
for two reasons. First, efforts to detect or otherwise counter the
threat of smuggled nuclear material overseas are mainly conducted by
other agencies, but there is an important role for the DNDO. Second,
the DNDO was wise to begin their deployment strategy at major points of
entry first given the priority of closing obvious gaps soonest, but
they must move forward with a plan to deploy along less populated, and
therefore less guarded, sections of the U.S. border, among other
improvements.
The effort to combat smuggled nuclear material is a global one.
Indeed the DNDO was originally named the National Nuclear Defense
Office to reflect a broader mission than the one it is perceived to
have today. After working its way through the interagency process, this
title lost the word ``national,'' which was replaced with Domestic, and
the word ``defense'' became detection, in an apparent effort to winnow
the mission of this new office. In practice, this makes some sense
since both the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense also
play a role in this area. The DHS office was given the detection
mission only, but that has since evolved for good reason. Today, the
DNDO works very closely with other agencies to develop not only new
capabilities, but also the global deployment strategy that reflects and
informs the use of detection efforts by all federal agencies including
DOE, DOD, and others.
When the DNDO was created in April 2004, the White House placed
significant emphasis on deploying detection capabilities quickly and in
the most needed places. This had both positive and negative effects.
The priority on deploying detectors quickly naturally sacrificed
quality in the short run. The ``pagers'' and first-generation portal
monitors (RPMs) suffered from poor selectivity that forced them to
signal an alarm when encountering non-threatening materials that
naturally contain radiation. This led to news reports and internal
assessments that showed RPMs signaling a ``hit'' when only ceramic tile
or other commercial material was found in an a container or truck hold.
The other major trade-off that resulted from an accelerated deployment
schedule was the low sensitivity of the earlier detectors (many of
which are still in use). Low sensitivity leads many detectors to be
unable to sense the presence of source material because, ironically,
HEU and other elements actually give off very low levels of radiation
prior to detonation. Current research and development underway at DNDO
already shows major progress in both selectivity and sensitivity in a
variety of settings.
The priority of placing detection capabilities at highly trafficked
points of entry reflects a judgment call the DNDO and DHS leadership
had to make at the time DNDO stood up and began using its first budget
in FY 2005. Given limited resources, the constraints of a new
organization, and an evolving threat, the choice was made to start with
the most likely choke points based on traffic patterns (both licit and
illicit) and the risk these areas posed to surrounding infrastructure
and populations. Over time, the DNDO plan reflects an intention to
contribute to anti-terrorism programs overseas by supporting the DHS-
DOE-State Department Secure Freight Initiative and NATO's Operation
Active Endeavor. This is a positive development that also indicates the
aggressive progress DNDO is making in the field of nuclear detection.
Future development in DNDO's deployment strategy certainly includes
efforts like Securing the Cities, but also networked detection
capabilities in less traveled sections of the border to close those
serious gaps you cited. An important improvement in strategy would
include the use of decoys, hidden detectors, and mobile sensors to
offset the adversary and increase the deterrent value of our anti-
terrorism capabilities.
Question submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Q1. How does the difference in structure between the end-to-end,
research to operations, responsibilities of DNDO and the research-only
management activities of the S&T Directorate affect their ability to
provide technologies that reflect mature operational concepts and
systems design?
A1. Improving technology, including better sensors and more effective
forensics capabilities, is a vital--perhaps the most vital--step toward
defending against a covert nuclear attack. To obtain this objective
requires long-term, sustained research commitments across the Executive
Branch and better use of the national labs, among other measures. While
the lethality of a nuclear attack on the homeland is known among
experts and decision-makers, a strategic approach to developing
advanced sensing and detecting capabilities had become stove-piped and
stultified in the Executive Branch prior to establishing the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office.
Acknowledging that the nuclear threat is different from most other
threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, and that the expensive
and complicated basic research needed to make progress is spread across
several concerned agencies, including DHS, DOD, DOE, and others, this
information served as the foundation for creating a single organization
to draw upon existing capabilities and support development and
acquisition of needed capabilities. To accomplish this critical
mission, that new organization required an end-to-end process that
spans the effort from research to deployment.
Operations, however, were never presumed to be a part of the DNDO.
To this day, the DNDO remains focused on research, development, and
acquisition to support the originally stated mission of integrating and
accelerating a better defense against smuggled nuclear weapons. Its
charter stops short of an operational role, which should continue to be
the responsibility of relevant authorities such as Customs and Border
Protection and parts of the Defense and Energy Departments.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Marilyn Ward, Executive Director, National Public Safety
Telecommunications Council (NPSTC)
Question submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. During the hearing, both Under Secretary Cohen and Director Oxford
noted that the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorate and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office have efforts underway
to respond to the needs of first responders. From the perspective of
NPSTC and its members, how responsive has DNDO been to criticism of the
high cost and difficulty of use of its technologies?
A1. The National Public Safety Telecommunications Council is focused on
the issues of public safety wireless communications and inter-
operability and does not closely follow or monitor the efforts of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. As such, I cannot comment on the
responsiveness of the DNDO or its technologies.
Question submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Q1. What is the awareness of the TechSolutions website within the
first-responder community? Will this site allow first-responders an
appropriate level of access to DHS research and development planning?
A1. To the best of my knowledge, I am unaware that the National Public
Safety Telecommunications Council community is aware of the
TechSolutions website.