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For many tribes, the decision to assume responsibility for the TANF program is a critical one. On the one hand, the prospect of tribal control of TANF represents the opportunity to improve services to tribal program participants, extend tribal self-determination, expand program coordination, and can enhance the reputation and image of the tribe. On the other hand, the cost of implementing and operating TANF, the risk that vulnerable tribal members may be harmed if services are inadequate, potential staffing problems, and problems with the state can deter tribes from taking over operation of the program. Weighing the advantages and disadvantages involves careful assessment and consultation among many stakeholders. This chapter examines the key incentives and disincentives that affect tribal decisions on operating TANF, and describes tribal experiences in obtaining the input needed to reach a decision.
Operating a TANF program presents important opportunities. The program affects many tribal members. It can potentially increase employment on the reservation and the employability of program participants. It also can bring a large infusion of federal and state dollars under tribal control, enhance program coordination, and improve the tribe's reputation and image.
Improvement of services for tribal members is the most often cited justification for tribal operation of the TANF program. According to one tribal TANF program director, a tribe that did not believe that it could provide better TANF services than the state, and that had decided to operate TANF for other reasons, was unlikely to have a successful TANF program. Officials at every tribe/consortium in the study sample believed they understood their tribal members' barriers to employment and needs better than did state TANF staff. Tribal officials generally felt that state TANF programs had good intentions but did not fully understand the culture, circumstances, and conditions of tribal TANF recipients.
At each study site, tribal officials said that lack of access to TANF services and benefits that state programs provided was a problem for tribal members. Often, county or state TANF offices are more than 20 miles from a reservation. Of the 10 states in which the 10 study sites are located, only Arizona had established a TANF office on tribal land. Most reservations do not have public transportation systems, and most tribal members who are eligible for TANF do not have access to reliable transportation, so many tribal members have difficulty applying for and obtaining TANF services from states or counties.
Tribal officials described a lack of sensitivity at some state programs. Some tribal members felt unwelcome because few state or county staff spoke their tribal language, or because staff sometimes behaved disrespectfully and failed to fully appreciate the reservation's special circumstances, such as lack of job opportunities, child care, and support services. Other tribal officials said that, because of high unemployment rates on the reservation, state TANF programs sometimes denied tribal members services through "benign neglect"--by making little effort to enforce program work requirements, engage tribal members in work activities, or place them in jobs.
Although tribal programs focus on employment and on issuing TANF benefits, they also take a longer view beyond the immediate circumstances their members face. Even when employment opportunities are scarce, the tribal TANF programs work to increase the employability of participants by improving their work experience, educational attainment, job preparation, and job-seeking skills. In conjunction with other programs, such as Native Employment Works (NEW) and Welfare to Work (WtW), tribal TANF programs seek to decrease employment barriers, such as the lack of available child care, transportation, and untreated substance abuse.
Maintaining and enhancing tribal sovereignty and self-determination is a key goal in Indian country. One way to strengthen self-determination is to control assets and resources that affect tribal members and tribal lands. Because of its importance and dollar value, assuming control over the TANF program can expand tribal sovereignty and self-determination. Bringing TANF under tribal control marries two major goals--tribal self-determination and moving tribal members from welfare to work.
One way in which operating TANF increases tribal control of resources is to expand the range of employment opportunities that are filled through tribal action. Because of the high unemployment rates in much of Indian country, tribes find the salaried staff positions required to run TANF programs especially attractive. Consistent with the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (PL 93-638), as amended, most tribes include Indian preference in their hiring practices, and most tribal TANF programs try to hire industrious, successful participants in the program. Former TANF participants can bring valuable perspectives and experience to their work, and they can be models for current program participants.
Coordination among human service agencies and programs can help overcome the many employment barriers that American Indians and Alaska Natives face. When a state operates the program, the TANF office often is far from the reservation, and it is difficult to coordinate services and activities with tribally operated programs, such as WtW, NEW, and vocational and adult education. When a tribe operates TANF, the offices are on the reservation, often in the same building as, or near, other tribal programs. This proximity, common administrative structure (all are tribal programs), and overlapping service populations facilitate program coordination.
The "477 program," which is available only to Indian tribes, can further enhance program coordination. It allows tribes to coordinate and integrate employment, workforce development, training, and related programs, combining funds received under formula grants from different federal departments and agencies, including DHHS, the Department of Labor, and the Department of the Interior. (1)
In addition, "477 tribes" may use a portion of their total plan resources (including TANF, if it is part of the 477 plan) for economic development activities. (2) The tribe develops a single plan, with a single budget, developed in accordance with tribally-determined goals and priorities. Informants at the four tribal grantees that operate 477 programs (Mille Lacs, Port Gamble, Tlingit and Haida, and Winnebago) said that, because of its size and its emphasis on moving participants from welfare to work, the TANF program was an attractive candidate for incorporation into a tribe's 477 program.
Comments from tribal staff made it clear that successfully implementing and operating TANF can enhance the way that state and local agencies, employers, and surrounding communities perceive their tribe. Some tribes, despite impressive achievements and successes in overcoming difficult obstacles, have an image problem. Nontribal members may not know the tribe exists, or they may be aware only of negative characteristics generally associated with poverty, such as high levels of unemployment, low levels of educational attainment, and poor health status. Negative stereotypes, stemming from conflict between the tribe and postcolonial immigrants to the tribal lands, can exacerbate the image problem. Tribal TANF offers an opportunity to address this problem. If the tribe successfully implements and operates the TANF program, tribal members, state and federal officials, and others may realize that the tribe shares their values of personal responsibility and the goal of moving people from welfare to work. Recognition of tribal management abilities and the program's ability to improve work skills can have long-lasting, positive effects on the tribe's image and on tribal-state relationships.
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As with any program, operating the TANF program poses risks and opportunity costs for tribes and tribal consortia. Implementing and operating a TANF program consumes resources that other tribal programs need. If a tribe fails to operate the program successfully, the most vulnerable tribal members might be harmed. Operational problems could set back other tribal self-determination initiatives, raise difficult and divisive personnel issues, and create or exacerbate problems with the state.
Relative to tribal resources, the costs of planning, implementing, and operating a TANF program are substantial. Unlike states, tribes lack the experience of having operated the AFDC program and have not developed the infrastructure and systems to support TANF. (3)The process of deciding whether to operate the TANF program may involve stakeholder meetings, data collection, and tribal council actions and requires investment of scarce tribal resources. After the decision is made, tribal resources must be used to develop the TANF plan required by DHHS as a condition of grant award. Actual implementation and operation of a TANF program may further strain the tribe's resources and capacities; the invested resources represent opportunity costs that cannot be used to plan, implement, or operate other tribal programs and initiatives. The Act does not provide funding for making the decision to operate TANF or for developing a TANF plan.
A tribe must overcome many challenges to develop a successful TANF program. Developing its TANF plan and revising it, if requested by DHHS, are major efforts. Once the plan is accepted, the tribe may have difficulty implementing the program. Inadequate facilities, poor telecommunications and information systems, or lack of trained staff may create access barriers, result in incorrect eligibility determinations, or prevent the tribal TANF office from issuing checks accurately and promptly. Even a successfully implemented basic program may be weak in critical services, such as skills training and job placement, and thus have difficulty moving TANF participants from welfare to work. These are risks that can dissuade tribes from operating their own TANF programs. On the other hand, tribal TANF grantees have the options to amend their plans or any part of them, and to adjust their programs as needed, and tribal TANF grantees can retrocede their programs to the states if they determine that they are unable to meet their obligations. In more than five years of administering TANF programs, no tribal grantee has retroceded its program, or failed to achieve its program goals and the expectations it set for itself when it assumed responsibility for TANF.
The biggest threat to the success of tribal TANF programs is the lack of unsubsidized employment on reservations. Unless employment opportunities grow in an unprecedented fashion in Indian country, many participants are likely to reach the 60-month lifetime TANF limit without finding and keeping a job, regardless of how efficiently the program prepares participants for work and removes employment barriers.
Addressing the significant staffing needs of the TANF program can create difficult personnel issues for tribes and tribal consortia. A tribe must use staff resources just to decide whether to operate the program. Staff is also needed to develop the TANF plan, and far more staff is required to implement and operate the program. Often, staff is borrowed from other tribal programs, which can add to the burden on other tribal social services. When staff temporarily assigned to the planning process return to their original program, the transition may be difficult for both programs.
Qualified staff to operate tribal TANF programs is sometimes scarce. Staff from state TANF programs could offer their knowledge and experience to fill positions in tribal TANF programs, but tribal members rarely have this employment experience. Hiring nontribal members to staff tribal programs, moreover, may be inconsistent with the letter and spirit of tribal Indian preference employment regulations. Such hiring is likely to be controversial (especially if a tribe has a high rate of unemployment) and may produce social and political dissension.
Relationships between tribes and states may be difficult because of historical differences and competing interests, but tribal-state relationships do evolve over time. Most of the grantees in the study indicated that, while they encountered some problems with state officials and had some disputes over specific issues, tribal-state relations with respect to TANF generally were positive. Arizona, California, Minnesota, and Wisconsin supported tribal TANF programs from the outset, whereas Nebraska and New Mexico became increasingly supportive of (or less resistant to) the programs after intense negotiations with or lobbying by tribes (Winnebago Tribe and Navajo Nation, respectively). States and tribes may have conflicts of interest or competing interests (for example, sovereignty, taxation, ownership and use of lands, and tribal rights specified in treaties with the United States). Conflicts of interest in one area can create discord and harm tribal-state relations in other areas, and concern that such conflicts may arise can deter tribes from taking over the TANF program.
Divergence of views between state executive and legislative branches, or among counties that operate a state's TANF program, have contributed, in some states, to tribal reluctance to take over the program. For example, in one state where a tribal grantee was included in the study--Alaska--the legislature has resisted appropriating funds for tribes and tribal consortia, but the executive branch has provided discretionary funding from agency budgets to support tribal TANF programs. Tribal leaders who believe that some state officials oppose tribal operation of the TANF program may be reluctant to pursue the plan, fearing increased conflict with the state.
The experience of some tribal grantees suggests that potential difficulties with county-level administrators could also be a factor to be considered. In California, the Torres Martinez consortium had difficult negotiations with Los Angeles County on issues such as the location of tribal TANF offices in the County. Los Angeles County administrators wanted the tribal consortium to locate a TANF office in each of the County's supervisory districts; the consortium wanted to locate the offices in areas with many American Indian and Alaska Native residents, regardless of the supervisory district. The tribal grantee reported that county officials opposed involvement of state representatives in negotiations anticipating that the state would support the positions of the tribal grantees. The Mille Lacs tribe had problems with one adjacent county (but not others) when it took over the TANF program. These problems were resolved through negotiation, with some assistance from the state of Minnesota.
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Tribal respondents interviewed for this study noted that each tribe and tribal consortium faces different circumstances and must reach its own conclusion about the operation of tribal TANF. There is no single right answer or approach. The decision process requires consensus building among tribal members, and information must be gathered and disseminated so that stakeholders can educate themselves about their options and make informed choices. Consultation with tribal members who participate in the state TANF program and with those who participated in the AFDC program can provide valuable information for decision makers. Most tribal consortia face an additional challenge in the consultation process¾in addition to consulting with tribal members, each member of the consortium must assess the advantages and disadvantages of operating TANF for itself and for the consortium as a whole.
One site visit respondent said that, even with careful data analysis and consensus building, the decision process is ultimately a "leap of faith." Since funding levels are set based on 1994 AFDC caseloads, a tribe can never be sure that it will be able to serve all eligible participants if unexpected events or circumstances arise, such as a natural disaster that reduces tribal members' income or employment.
The process of deciding whether to operate the TANF program was complex, requiring 6 to 24 months of internal consensus building by the 10 study grantees. Many people were involved, including members of the tribal council, the tribal chairman, and staff of other tribal programs (for example, social services, employment and training, and adult education). Participants in the process met repeatedly and exchanged information, ideas, and opinions in different venues that depended on the tribe's size, organization, and political structure. For example, the Navajo Nation, a large tribe, worked through its Chapter Houses, which are local political entities. Smaller tribes, such as Port Gamble and Winnebago, held general meetings and assemblies.
Most of the grantees in the study established a TANF study team of 2 to 12 people who gathered and presented information to tribal officials, often after consulting with state officials and other tribal TANF grantees, if available. For example, a team of about 10 members of the Hopi tribe planned the tribe's TANF program. The team included representatives of tribal programs, including Human Services (responsible for behavioral health), Education (high school, guidance center, and scholarship program), BIA social services, tribal courts, and the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) program, as well as the chairman's representative. The Navajo Nation implemented a large task force consisting of representatives of all Nation agencies that would be involved in providing TANF services to clients. Additional meetings were held with state and local TANF officials from Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. The Tlingit and Haida tribal TANF team assembled, and distributed to each member of the consortium, information describing how the program would operate and how tribal members would be most affected by tribal operation of the program.
Many tribes conducted activities to obtain the input of tribal members who participated in the state TANF program. In addition to Chapter House meetings, the Navajo Nation held five public hearings at different locations on the reservation to solicit input from TANF clients. The Port Gamble tribe held focus groups of current TANF and former AFDC recipients. They were asked why they applied for AFDC, why they left the program, how they survived while on welfare, whether they would like the tribe to run the TANF program (all did), and what changes they would like to see.
While consultation with tribes and consortia that have experience operating TANF may have helped tribes make their decision about whether to run the TANF program, the grantees in this study were among the first to develop and submit tribal TANF plans and, consequently, did not have such an opportunity. (4)Most of the grantees now work with and support the efforts of other tribes and consortia to develop and implement tribal TANF programs. For example, tribal grantees share information, strategies for negotiating with states and DHHS, and Memoranda of Understanding. The Hopi, Pascua Yaqui, Navajo, Salt River Pima-Maricopa, San Carlos Apache, White Mountain Apache, and Zuni tribes have formed the Southwest Regional TANF Coalition. The Torres Martinez Consortium has developed a best practices manual, which it distributes to interested tribes and consortia. The Port Gamble tribe promotes tribal TANF programs by providing consulting to other tribes in the Pacific Northwest. In addition to helping potential grantees in deciding to operate TANF, these tribal grantees and groups of grantees help each other and other grantees to improve their programs.
Because a group of sovereign tribes make up a tribal consortium, the decision to operate TANF can be especially difficult. Generally, each tribe has to decide whether its members would be better served by the state, the consortium, or its own TANF program. There were two tribal consortia in the study--Tlingit and Haida and Torres Martinez. Tlingit and Haida, while a federally recognized tribe, is one of the 12 Alaska Native regional entities that are eligible to operate TANF under section 419(4)(B) of the Social Security Act. Since the Act does not extend eligibility to operate TANF to Alaska Native villages, the communities that comprise Tlingit and Haida are ineligible to operate TANF independently--the choice for these communities (and for other Alaska Native villages) is whether to receive TANF from the consortium or from the State of Alaska. Tlingit and Haida asked representatives from all communities to discuss whether the consortium should take over the TANF program. They also gave presentations at the villages and brought representatives from the villages to Juneau. Although communicating and coordinating planning efforts were challenging, the consortium approach has enabled tribes and Alaska Native villages with few members to work collectively to provide TANF services. According to program staff, it would have been impractical (even if allowed) for the member tribes to implement and operate a tribal TANF program without working as a consortium.
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1. While any tribe can coordinate its programs regardless of the funding source, study informants at grantees that participated in the 477 program said that the program made a dramatic difference in their coordination efforts, activities, and achievements
2. Section 9(b) of PL 102-477 provides that 477 tribes may use a percentage of 477 project funds for creation of employment opportunities, including private sector training placement. The maximum percentage of 477 program funds that may be used is the greater of the unemployment rate in the tribe's service area, up to 25%, or 10%.
3. The Lac du Flambeau and Red Cliff tribes, through special arrangements with the state of Wisconsin, participated in the operation of the AFDC program.
4. Most of the grantees selected for this study were early program implementers and thus had some degree of experience in operating the TANF program. Grantees with little TANF experience were unlikely to have developed innovative approaches and therefore were unlikely to be selected in the sample.
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