Interview With Pan-Arab Print Reporters

(10:15 a.m. EST)

QUESTION: My name is Hanan.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yes.

QUESTION: Actually, my first will be regarding the Arab Human Development Report. What's your side of the story, and suppressing academic freedom part of the push for democracy?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: What is -- what particular aspect of it are you questioning, and I'll give you my response.

QUESTION: I'm asking about the Human, the Arab Human Development Report. We heard that, I mean, Washington really doesn't like what it --

MR. ERELI: This is the Tom Friedman -- it's the Tom Friedman op-ed that said we're trying to suppress the new --

QUESTION: The third report.

MR. ERE.I: The third report that's coming out, the Arab Human Development Report.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Is it true?

MR. ERELI: No. No, it's not true.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I don't think it's true. Yeah, it's not even gotten to my level so I don't think we are opposed to it at all. Why would we be? If that's your question. Do we oppose it?

QUESTION: Yeah.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, we don't.

QUESTION: You don't?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No.

QUESTION: And you are not planning to do so?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No. Not to my knowledge. Is there some aspect of it that really bothers you? I mean, I'm -- I don't see any reason to.

QUESTION: And Washington's still supporting such an --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Is this out of Tom's article?

MR. ERELI: Right, yeah.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: You could write your own article and then it would be more accurate.

QUESTION: Tom claimed, just to follow up on the finance thing --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yeah.

QUESTION: That the United States does not like what is written about Iraq. It doesn't like what is written about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: We may not --

QUESTION: And he says that (inaudible) represents about 2 percent and the rest is really good.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: We may not like it. That's different from suppressing it.

MR. ERELI: And we haven't seen it, actually.

QUESTION: Yet, it is published --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I mean, whether we like it or not -- by the way there are very few things written about the United States I like. But that doesn't mean we don't accept it. And sometimes criticism is helpful.

QUESTION: Yeah.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Do you want to go ahead --

QUESTION: Yeah, I was -- last week Prime Minister Sharon said he reached an understanding with the President Bush not to return to the '67 border to keep all the Jerusalem and most of the settlement. Is this true and aren't you undermining the new Palestinian leadership with your silence?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, my -- well, my understanding is, first of all, regarding the emerging leadership of the Palestinians, we're going to be careful not to do what we did last time, which is embrace too much, and maybe by embracing too much, to smother.

On the question of the -- whatever Prime Minister Sharon has said, our position has been clear. The agreements reached on the returns of territories have to be ones that are reached between the two parties and not ones that we are going to agree upon. We can be helpful to try to get the parties together sooner, but the two parties themselves have to come to an agreement. And you know the rest based on 242 and 338, et cetera.

Again, on the -- if you think that we're undermining the Palestinian leadership in any way, I think our actions show quite the opposite. A couple of weeks ago, a week-and-a-half or so ago, we announced $20 million of budget support for the PA. We've taken part, I think, usefully, in the various meetings and conferences.

We -- I, myself, went to the Gulf along with Assistant Secretary Bill Burns and made very straightforward presentations on the need for our friends in the Gulf to support the Palestinians and we surely saw Abu Mazen and Minister Fayad's trip through the Gulf, which, apparently, was quite successful. So I think quite the opposite. We're trying to support the emerging Palestinian leadership so they have a chance to lead the Palestinian people out of the wilderness that they've been in for so long.

QUESTION: To follow up on the point that Hanan raised on the $20 million. Secretary Armitage, that seems to be the same $20 million that was promised back in 2002. And not only that, it went to Israeli utility companies.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: That were owed money. Minister Fayad was very -- when he came in to see me, he was very appreciative of this gesture. I don't think it's up to us or even, for that matter, to you to be more critical than the people who have the actual responsibilities, where they were quite appreciative.

It is a matter of fact steadily has provided $75 million annually to the Palestinians. I believe that is -- if it's not the most generous, it's among the most generous.

QUESTION: The most?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: The most. So I don't think we have much to be apologetic for. And we're not.

QUESTION: Sir, on Syria and the U.S., yesterday the President said that we have a, you know, a whole range of options --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Options, right.

QUESTION: -- to do with Syria from the diplomatic to economic and even into the military action. I mean, are you on a collision course with Syria because of differences with Iraq and because of differences with 1559, Resolution 1559 on Lebanon? I mean, you gave them at least a list of demands and --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, let's separate them out.

First, on UN Security Council Resolution 1559, this is the will of the entire Security Council, and so not a collision course with the United States. We're simply asking that Lebanon be left to Lebanese and that Lebanese themselves are able to determine their future free of foreign influence now. So that's not a collision course with the United States, it's a collision course with the international community.

The question of Iraq, we have made certain presentations to the Government of Syria, and they have done some of the things that they've asked. We trust that they'll do a lot more. Syria has to come to the conclusion that their neighbor will be a free and democratic Iraq. And I think it will be much more -- much better for Syria's future if that neighbor, the one had fond remembrances of a friendly relationship Syria than someone who has a grudging relationship because Syria has not done what is necessary to do to support the people of Iraq.

To the extent there's a collision course, it's with Iraq.

QUESTION: Just to follow up.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Sure.

QUESTION: The Syrians say that they have cooperated little bit with the United States, especially on the issue of --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I just said they have.

QUESTION: Yeah, on financial accounts --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: And borders.

QUESTION: And borders. Right. And also, but I remember I was told that when Secretary Burns and Mr. (inaudible) were there in September, I think, the Syrians were given certain names --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: That's correct.

QUESTION: Including the name of a former Baathi leader, who is, according to the American side, is in charge of financing the insurgency in Iraq. When you give them information like that that is specific, what do they say and did they promise you, I mean, this has been a few months ago, right?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: There were no promises. They took the information and said they'd look into it. It's not one individual, there were several former Baathists who, apparently, are allowed to range fairly freely in Syria, and we believe are responsible for some of the funding -- not all of the funding, but some of the funding that funds insurgent activities in Iraq. And we expect them to close those spigots down.

QUESTION: Sir, on --

QUESTION: Let me follow up on this.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: We've got plenty of time.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: On this issue --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yeah.

QUESTION: Now, I have it from a solid Syrian source that you actually submitted six names. You wanted six names, two of whom are wanted by the Syrians for bombings and so on in Damascus, you know, some years back. I mean, I, as you know, the Syrian regime and the Iraq regime were not good friends. And the other four are apparently -- there are no solid evidence against them. Could you --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, I won't speak specifically to how many names. You've got your own source and you generally have good sources.

The fact of the matter is, we have to be convinced, and I think more importantly, that the Government of Iraq, the people of Iraq have to be convinced, that Syria is doing all she can to stop the activities which harm Iraq.

It's hard for me to believe, knowing the nature of the Syrian regime that they can't come up with some information on people.

QUESTION: Right.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Who are involved in anti-Iraqi people activities. So we look for even greater efforts from the Syrians.

QUESTION: And do you --

QUESTION: And just -- okay.

QUESTION: Sorry.

QUESTION: Follow up.

QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Sure.

QUESTION: Do you expect that Syrian-American relations will continue to sort of be chilly for, you know, the --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I would hope not. But the answer to that is in Damascus as far as I'm concerned.

I would hope for a much better day with Syria, but it's all up to Mr. Assad and his colleagues.

QUESTION: May I just follow up on that.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Sure.

QUESTION: Why always, I mean, some people saying that also, why your position on Syria vis-à-vis Lebanon and Iraq seems identical and following the, I mean, in the footstep of Israel? Regarding Syria or towards Syria.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Make sure I understand the question: That our activities vis-à-vis Syria are the first steps on --

QUESTION: No, no.

QUESTION: No, no.

QUESTION: Mirror that. It's like the Israeli position.

QUESTION: Of Israel. Take the Israeli position most of the time.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, to the extent -- it reflects the Israeli position to the extent that, for instance, Hezbollah forces are funded through Damascus, and Hezbollah is a threat to the citizens of Israel. To that extent, it would reflect Israel's position.

I would also say it reflects the position of the Iraqi Government. Because on another border, our activities with Syria and our interests in Syria has been closing down that border, so I don't think that our activities vis-à-vis Syria are necessarily a function of any one government. We have different interests with Syria. We've got Iraqi interests. We've peace process interests. We've got Lebanon's interest.

I would long for the day where Syria would be a hopeful and participating member of the community, and the regional community. But as I say, that's not a decision that'll be reached here in Washington. It'll be reached in Damascus.

QUESTION: This included your action, the recent action against Al Manar TV channel?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Lebanese TV Al Manar?

QUESTION: Yeah.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: We've designated it a Foreign Terrorist Organization -- as a Hezbollah Foreign Terrorist Organization --

MR. ERELI: A terrorist organization.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: A terrorist organization.

QUESTION: Okay.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Because of their activities spewing Hezbollah incitement, inciting to violence, and it reflects the fact that our view is that Al Manar is not being a good citizen.

QUESTION: I'm done with this issue. You want to continue on different?

QUESTION: Just a final one on Lebanon, on 1559.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Sure.

QUESTION: The Lebanese were not very happy with 1559 as a government.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Some Lebanese were not very happy. Some are thrilled.

QUESTION: Yeah, the government. No --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Some are thrilled.

QUESTION: Probably most of them are thrilled. (Laughter.)

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Thank you. (Laughter.) Put that on the record.

QUESTION: Well, I'm Lebanese although I'm asking my question as a professional. But the government was not thrilled by it, honestly. What's the state of play between the United States and the Lebanese Government on this issue because there is -- I've heard that when the issue of UNIFEL, the UN presence in south Lebanon is reviewed at the end of January, that the United States is going to raise the issue of 1559, too.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: We may very well raise it, 1559. Syrian noncompliance with it is flaunting the will of the international community. The government -- I've spoken before, the Government of Lebanon seems to have a distinctly "made in Damascus" flavor. And I don't know how that is particularly pleasing to the great majority of Lebanese citizens.

But as I say, and as 1559 points out, it should have the right to be free of foreign interference.

QUESTION: Secretary Armitage, going to the peace process, today, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Silvan Shalom, was very critical of Mahmoud Abbas, Abu Mazen, because of Mazen spoke of the same constant that Arafat spoke, which was, you know, Jerusalem's right to return and all these things. He is saying that this is really a non-starter. What is your comment on that?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, I won't gainsay anything the Israeli Foreign Ministers says. That is, in my view of what's going on with Abu Mazen and others who are participating in the political process is their inner campaign -- there in a political campaign to try gain the favor of the Palestinian people.

We will await the outcome of that campaign and the judgment of the Palestinian people. Our view is, it looks, for the first time in quite a while that there may be reason for some small amount of optimism. I don't want to oversell that, but a small amount of optimism. And I think it's very noteworthy that Mr. Sharon is dead set on carrying out his extraction from Gaza, his disengagement from Gaza. And I was reading some article today that made a very, what I think is a key point that this is important beyond the actual fact of turning over territory to Palestinians. It's important psychologically for Israelis to make this step to give up occupied territory.

So psychologically, I actually agree with that and I think that's a very good and key point. So that's why we're so supportive of the Egyptian efforts with regard to the Israelis on this question and that we keep urging Mr. Sharon's Gaza disengagement plan and the four areas in the West Bank be turned over, four villages be turned over as soon as practicable.

QUESTION: Why is the Department was against Marwan Barghouti's bid for president?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: It was a matter -- what we'd say about Mr. Barghouti is that his candidacy was problematic. It was problematic because it's very difficult to lead a people out of the wilderness when you're in jail.

QUESTION: But you --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I mean, it's just a practical implication. So we're not for or against anybody. It's a practical situation.

QUESTION: Okay. Can I change just the matter? I would like to ask --

QUESTION: Can we stay on this just for --

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: There's only one Nelson Mandela, who was in jail. But that's --

QUESTION: It's only one Nelson Mandela, yeah.

QUESTION: It's the exception in this.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yeah. Indeed so.

QUESTION: You are right.

QUESTION: Sir, on the -- last weekend, I'll ask you the same question I asked Mr. Boucher yesterday. Last weekend, the Israeli army went into the Rafa refugee camp. They bulldozed many homes. They made 600 families homeless and so on. My question to you, sir, is, why can't the United States at least pressure the Israelis to allow people a couple of hours so they can collect their belongings instead of having to leave right away and come back to find nothing? They can't even recognize their neighborhood. They can't even collect their clothing.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: As you know, we're against any sort of collective punishment. We have deep, long and sometimes arduous discussions with the Israelis. They are doing what they think they need to do to protect their citizens. And we just ask that they carefully gauge their actions to see whether, in the longer run, this is something that's going to increase their own security, or does it, in the longer run, cause people to react against them. This was something that we asked the Israelis to think about very carefully.

QUESTION: Sir, on the issue of --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Is anybody going to talk about Iraq --

QUESTION: I'd like to --

QUESTION: No, no. To keep beating a dead horse, on the issue of reform --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Palestinian reform or --

QUESTION: No, no, the --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: -- Middle East reform?

QUESTION: The -- after the meeting in Morocco, Forum for the Future, there were some commentators in this -- in the United States, as well as in the Arab world, who were somewhat disappointed because the objectives were scaled down, including the American objectives initially, because of Arab -- the resistance from the Arab regimes.

Now, we're coming up on two elections that are very critical for both the United States and the Arabs, Iraq and Palestine. Why this continuing reluctance on the part of the United States to really push harder on the issue of reform?

Because, you know, as someone who believes that we need it badly, reform is important in and of itself, regardless of Palestine and Iraq, although it should reflect positively on Iraq and Palestine.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: The United States --

QUESTION: This is a loaded question I know, but I'll admit it.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, no, but it's fair. First of all, the press commentary coming out of Forum for the Future in Rabat was actually better in the Arab world than it was here.

QUESTION: Yeah, it's true. Well --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, because I think friends in the Arab world realized that something is going on in every state whether it's Bahrain, or whether it's Egypt, or any other. There are changes. There are changes in attitude. There are changes in aspirations. There are moves toward empowerment of women, of minorities. There's a lot going on. Now it's going on at different paces in different countries, and that's appropriate because there are different cultures, and I think that the pace reflects sort of some traditional values and cultures.

The United States realized that -- and the G-8, as a matter of fact, has realized that this is going on and that it should be supported. It should be supported in a way that's comfortable to the various states and the various cultures that are represented by those states.

So we think we're on -- there's a path, and it's sort of inexorable. We believe that free countries, open countries, countries which have vibrant economies, do not have major unemployment problems; hence, don't have angry young people, generally young people, milling around, we think unemployment in the Arab world is very much an Achilles heel and we have -- we, that is all those who care about the Middle East, have to do all we can to move forward. And that's why we're keen on this. And if the United States doesn't try to organize these things, very often, they don't happen.

When you try to organize things that are sometimes a little scary, a little frightening to some governments or to some people, then naturally, you come under some criticism. It is a criticism we're willing to absorb because we feel, ultimately, so many hundreds of millions of people are going to be better off, and hence, be able to be better neighbors with each other, as well as to us. So in the long run, this is not just altruism, this is good common sense.

QUESTION: I would like just to change the subject to ask regarding Iraq why you is -- United States delays -- some say refuse to carry out census in Iraq before the election?

MR. ERELI: The census?

QUESTION: The census.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Why have we done what about the census?

QUESTION: Yeah. Do you refuse to do so, or do you delay it?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, it wasn't that. It was a practical situation, and I can remember it myself having to discussions with the UN Electoral folks. And to run a proper census is not something that can be done in a timely enough fashion to have an election. There is a rough measure, the -- what do they call them -- PSDs?

MR. ERELI: The vouchers? The Oil-for-Food vouchers?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, the PSD, the food vouchers. What do they call them?

MR. ERELI: Food distribution center.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yeah, but it's some -- they've got --

QUESTION: Maybe a technical name, yeah.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: It's a technical name, which is a pretty good starting list that gives you an idea.

QUESTION: The ration cards?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: The ration card list. In addition, then, we made arrangements for people who were, for some reason, not on the list -- and most people were -- that they could come in and sign up and get on the list, so they could be on the voting rolls, so a census ideal.

QUESTION: Yeah.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: We didn't have a census in Afghanistan either, by the way, and that came off pretty well. You do the best you can with what you've got, and as --

QUESTION: Some went two times to get the food cards.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Pardon me? Say what?

QUESTION: Some of the Afghani went to register for two times to get the food --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I'm sure it wasn't perfect and no one of the observers said it was. But it was, under the circumstances, pretty remarkable. This election on the 30th of January is not going to be perfect. There's no question. But it will take place. And hopefully, it will take place with the widest possible participation.

QUESTION: I have here number reported by the news -- some newspapers, or according to the news, and even the King of Jordan today, that there are from 1 to 3 million Iranian entered Iraq and registered for to vote.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I don't know how anyone knows that.

QUESTION: Does that make any --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Let me make a different point. There are 1.5 million Iraqis living in Iran who will vote. There are 14 countries, including the United States, in which voting for Iraqi (inaudible) will be allowed.

QUESTION: And how that far will -- if the election itself, I mean, some people think it's a fraud election since there are one, two, three --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Look; I can't judge an election is free and fair before it happens. I recognize the practical difficulties. Some were opposed to the, what's called, out-of-country voting. But the Iraqi Electoral Commission made this decision themselves, so it seems to me, if we have a sovereign government of Iraq, we ought to respect the decision made by the Iraqi Electoral Commission. And we're doing that. But I don't know how anybody could say how many Iranians are in Iraq. But I do know there are 1.5 Iraqis -- 1.5 million Iraqis in Iran.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: Sir, it's very unlikely that there will be many people in the so-called Sunni Triangle who are going to vote. And there is fear that this is going to tarnish the legitimacy of the elections. And I'm sure you're aware of that. I'm sure you're concerned about that. Is there any kind of thinking as to what can be done afterwards just to deal with this issue of legitimacy and to deal, politically, with the anger and resentment within the Sunni community?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, first of all, you shouldn't play with me. The majority of the Sunni population lives in Baghdad and Mosul. So if we are making a suggestion that the majority of the Sunnis won't have access to voting and won't vote, I think you're barking up the wrong tree, because those two cities have the majority of the Sunnis.

QUESTION: But they're going to vote for political reasons or intimidation.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, they'll vote, they'll vote. I think we can take heart from the fact that even bodies representing Sunnis in the area, Al Anbar, area of Ramadi, et cetera, who said they were going to boycott, now decided to participate in the election.

Look, who better than an Iraqi would know the history of Iraq? Who better than Iraqis and who better than Sunnis would know that when the Shia opted out of the vote in the 1920's --

QUESTION: Lost for 80 years.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: They were lost for 80 years. Exactly. And so I think you'll find the majority of the Sunni participating. That is not to say that you are in any way wrong, that -- it will be difficult in those areas, and we'll have to do the best we can, and then we'll make a judgment in the international community. It won't be the United States. The international community will make a judgment of what is important: Two things: It's what the Iraqi people think that's most important, and second of all, you realize that this election on 30 January is not the end of the process; it's simply the beginning of the process.

QUESTION: What do you expect to happen after the 30th of January, especially if, as the President said yesterday, he says, 15 in out of 18 districts are voting, you know, and --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, I think some of the other three will also vote.

QUESTION: Okay, some will vote.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: At what level, I don't know.

QUESTION: But, you know, if there is a tremendous boycott and there is a majority of Sunnis in the Arab world, what do you expect to happen on, let's say, the 1st of February? What will the situation be like?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, first of all, I expect that a majority of Sunnis will vote, and I was gratified to see that at the GCC Summit just completed in Bahrain, that one of the comments out of the summit was to the effect that urging Sunnis to participate as fully as possible, which I think was a very -- very wise statement from the GCC Summit.

After that period of time, after 1 February, I expect to see a Government of Iraq, which is one, democratic, and two, might actually have a slightly Islamic cast to it. But it will not be a theocracy like Iran at all; that it will have a very high percentage of secular participation; that after -- no matter the list going into the election, the entity, so-called entities list, that after the election, we see who among the 275 members who are elected, you'll see a lot of trading back and forth for positions in government. And I think you're going to -- and I think the world's going to witness a really vibrant, vibrant exchange in Iraq, and I mean, a positive exchange. But I do not expect the violence.

QUESTION: You do not -- you do not expect that, say, what King Abdullah was pointing, that there is a -- some sort a Shiite crescent that will stretch from Tehran to Lebanon?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, I do not.

QUESTION: Is the United States in contact with some Muslim countries like Egypt and Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco, to send troops to Iraq after the election? This is what we heard that you asked Egypt and Morocco.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, no, we -- no, you know, the Iraqis themselves, first of all, they're in charge and they've got views about who should participate in their country. So it wouldn't be the United States urging Egypt and others. I'm unaware of it, and I generally sign out the cables.

QUESTION: One of the Iraqi high officials told me last week, he said that it's okay if we need it since the United States has to move or resend some of their troops back to the States.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, my suggestion is that the Iraqi high official should make sure --

QUESTION: It's the Minister, Treasury Minister, Adel Al-Mahdi, I think?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Al-Mahdi?

QUESTION: Yeah.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I'm going to see him this afternoon. He's the Finance Minister.

QUESTION: Yeah, he told me that --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: He's the Finance Minister.

QUESTION: -- he welcomed --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: The -- Ghazi al-Yawar, the President, was here a couple of weeks ago; I hosted him. Ayad Allawi, the Defense Minister, the Interior Minister, I think they have slightly different views on this matter.

QUESTION: And Chalan too. I had the chance to ask him, too. Is opposite.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, al-Mahdi is a very excellent guy. I enjoy him very much.

QUESTION: Yeah.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: And he's a very excellent representative, who I think will be -- play a prominent role in the next Government of Iraq.

QUESTION: But the Egyptians at one time, we were saying we will do training out of country.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yeah, they have done that. I think they're doing that.

QUESTION: And they would like to increase that, but definitely they are not interested in going back to Iraq because they said remember what happened to them once upon a time -- you know the story.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: This is what I'm talking about.

QUESTION: but yeah, there are all sort of stories about that, you know that.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, the Jordanians are even a different story. Though I will notice the monarchist party did register as an entity -- Sharif Ali and his friends; they did register as an entity for the vote.

QUESTION: When you think the United States will leave Iraq? I know it's an ideological question -- realistic?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I don't know. The President spoke to it yesterday. I don't know.

We'll leave, first of all, when asked -- you know, or if asked by the legitimate government, we would leave. We've made that clear in public testimony. I have and my colleagues have. Second of all, when the people want us to leave, and when the job is done. We won't try to stay on and hang on just for the sake of hanging on. When we can train up Iraqis security forces officially so they can take over the job and have confidence and the government has confidence that they will be able to prevail; we're out.

QUESTION: Sir, yesterday, the President --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: But he won't -- he won't -- the President won't predict a date --

QUESTION: But after you leave --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: -- and cannot predict a date.

QUESTION: On the issue of training, the President addressed that issue yesterday, and for the first time, he did not paint a rosy picture of what's going on. And in that sense, he was pointing to some failures.

There is also a very a very thorough report issued by Cordesman from CSIS, the Center for Strategic Studies, where he says, you know, the whole training program is plagued by failures, and so on, and he is suggesting certain points. Could you tell us what is happening and can you evaluate it?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yeah, I can speak to this a bit. The President indicated there are some -- some good and some bad units. There are some elements who were fought very well and some who fought not at all, who ran away. There are also some problems of infiltration by insurgents in the units. We find where units are fighting alongside our Marines, et cetera, they fight quite well.

In our system, to train one company of men to be competent in battle, it takes about a year. To train a division in our system, a whole division, to be competent in battle takes about 18 months. And that's with officers and soldiers who have gone through basic courses on leadership and military skills, et cetera. So this is not something that happens overnight.

The longest pole in the tent, if you will, the one that we need most, is leadership. And where units had good officers in Fallujah, they fought like crazy. And when they had officers who were lacking in leadership skills, they didn't fight as well. But everything the President said was right, and everything I'm telling you is right. And that is that when we last engaged with these forces in the April timeframe, the result was not good. In Fallujah, the result, according to our officers, was much, much better.

So we're on the right track. The question I think you can legitimately ask is whether we're going fast enough.

QUESTION: Sir, a quick follow up on this.

MR. ERELI: One more round.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Oh, yeah. Right.

QUESTION: Very quickly. In this country, we train people, you know, through ROTC, the West Point, and the other academies. Now, Iraq had excellent, also, Air Force Academy, Army Academy, and so on. Why can't you put it back together as it was?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: It's not -- first of all, they didn't just break apart, they disintegrated apart; and they've gone back to a much more traditional structure, which is tribal -- village and tribal structure with all that that culture entails.

So it's not as easy as blowing a whistle and getting everybody to come back. You can argue about whether the decision to disband in the beginning was a right one or wrong one. The Iraqis themselves argue about it. But we're much more back to a situation of, as I say, the tribal and the village connections, if you will, to be able to draw units back, as a whole.

Second, the units that existed prior -- previous to the invasion are not ones that were trained in the type of skills that we necessarily prize, to include a respect for the lives of civilians and civilian property.

QUESTION: Okay. You partially answered that question because I was going to ask how come -- what are the difficulties facing the attempt to bring back some of the old officers from -- at least the professional ones, those who have no blood on their hands?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: First of all though, anyone that doesn't have blood on their hands is welcome to come back. They have to be retrained and they have to rejoin, be reequipped and then join their units. It's happening.

The Iraqis are doing an awful lot of the vetting, as you know. They're vetting their own people. And like any other situation in which there have been intense rivalries, fears and -- from the past, when our Iraqi friends sit around and vet somebody and they say, yeah, he's a pretty good guy. And then you say no, he's not a good guy, I remember him from before. So the vetting process takes some time. But Iraqis are doing it and then they provide to us the candidates and then we, we train them.

QUESTION: Just one quick one. The history of counterinsurgency is not very promising. I mean, you've fought in wars in your life from Indo-China to Algeria. What can the United States do in Iraq that you haven't done in Vietnam or the French didn't do in Algeria? Because --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: If you look at -- I'll tell you the difference, I think. The one -- and I've thought about this; in Algeria, the so-called insurgents, or in Vietnam, the so-called insurgents, they had a positive view.

QUESTION: They had a program.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: A program and a positive view. That's what I'm talking about.

QUESTION: A vision. A vision. Sure, sure. Yeah, you're right.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: In Iraq that's lacking. The insurgents have only fear and they're not gaining.

QUESTION: Actually, that's an excellent point.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: They have only fear to offer. They have only terror to offer. This is why they're so brutal in their intimidation. That, however, is not something that apparently finds favor with a great majority of Iraqi people; and I think that's a keen difference between the insurgency, as you correctly point out, and the one now.

Do you want to do one more? And then I have to leave.

QUESTION: Yeah. I just want to --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yes. Please.

QUESTION: This is the last question?

QUESTION: Yes, yes.

QUESTION: Oh, okay.

QUESTION: What time -- more than half an hour. Yeah, it's enough.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: What time?

A PARTICIPANT: Eleven o'clock is fine.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Oh, we can go to 11, so we'll go two more. Ask quick questions.

QUESTION: Okay. I have many questions --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Okay, well, go ahead.

QUESTION: But let me ask, I have two questions, one regarding Egypt, one regarding Iraq. You know there are an idea to extend the International Security Council. Some -- Egypt were a kind of candidate to be with South Africa, but it seems that other parts at the United Nations wants Nigeria to replace Egypt. How can you look to that?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, there have been no decisions on these matters. This is a result of the high-level panel's report on UN Security Council Reform -- or UN Reform.

QUESTION: Yeah.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: And it had a whole host of items, to include, expansion of the Security Council. And then there were all sorts of subsets under it -- whether veto, having a veto or not, and all of these different things. And these are the type of things that we're discussing with colleagues in the building first, and laterally, we'll discuss this more broadly. In fact, we've talked -- I've talked in recent days, for instance, with the Japanese about this.

So I've heard exactly what you heard from the African continent that Egypt might be a good candidate, South Africa's a good candidate, others --

QUESTION: So most of them are Arab and African?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Right. So all I'm saying is I have heard that. We haven't engaged in these discussions in any meaningful way yet.

QUESTION: And that's a follow-up on Egypt, too.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yeah, sure. Go ahead.

QUESTION: This is regarding the QIZ Egypt just signed between Egypt and Israel.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Oh, the Q-I-Z?

QUESTION: Yeah.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yeah.

QUESTION: How can you look at that? That will be helpful to give an Egypt more role in the Middle East, or with them, the Greater Middle East initiative?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I think it's helpful in a whole host of reasons. First of all, it allows goods that are produced there with Israeli-Egyptian joint cooperation, if you will, to be sold tariff free here in the United States. I think it will rather dramatically increase employment prospects and help both Israel and Egypt. But beyond that --

QUESTION: Yeah.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Beyond that, I think here in the United States the Q-I-Z is very helpful for the image of Egypt. As many -- everyone knows, we've had some in the U.S. Congress who have not been as supportive of Egypt as, perhaps, the Administration has. And I think the Q-I-Z was an excellent political move, beyond being a very good economic move.

QUESTION: And that would make Egypt be able to be more cooperation with you, even in Sudan. Especially we didn't hear about any signing for the Sudan, the southern Sudan Agreement. I mean --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, we've got nine more days until we hope we get a signature. Both sides, Mr. Taha and Mr. Garang, have agreed that they would have an agreement by the 30th. We'll see. And Egypt has been very helpful. I, myself, have had the opportunity to speak to both the president, on a previous trip, and to General Omar Suleiman about Egypt's activities supporting a solution of Sudan.

QUESTION: Thank you on that, sir.

QUESTION: When do you expect a Palestinian state to be created, and will it be viable and contiguous?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Someone asked me -- it has to be viable. The word "viable" has to always be in the Palestinian state.

QUESTION: And contiguous?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: It is not able to be separated out.

QUESTION: And contiguous?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: And contiguous?

QUESTION: Yes, sir.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: You mean?

QUESTION: Geographically contiguous.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, these are going to be worked out.

QUESTION: To be viable.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yeah, well, it's got to be viable. If it's viable --- well, not necessarily, but there have to be arrangements. The point I think to take away is that that's something that will be decided by the two parties themselves. But the key point I want to leave with you is, you're not going to hear, you shouldn't hear U.S. officials talk about a Palestinian state without saying "viable" Palestinian state.

QUESTION: When do you expect that to happen? Your feeling? Before the President's time ends?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Before the end of this presidency? I certainly hope. Do you remember when the President put out his vision in June of 2002; he had hoped it would be by 2005.

QUESTION: 2005, 2005.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: So if you extend it three years from now, it would be well within the Bush Administration. But I think the important fact of the matter -- the important fact of the matter is --

QUESTION: President Mubarak just mentioned yesterday the date of 2008.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Okay. The important point is if there were good will and meaningful negotiations on both sides, it could go as fast as the negotiators could take it.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: So I wouldn't want to give you an artificial timeframe that was too long.

So thank you all very much.

QUESTION: Thank you, sir.

QUESTION: Thank you very kindly. We appreciate. We hope to see you again.

2004/1393