While section 3(f) speaks of practices performed ``in conjunction
with'' as well as ``incident to'' farming operations, it would be an
unreasonable construction of the Act to hold that all practices were to
be regarded as agricultural if the person performing the practice did
any farming, no matter how little, or resorted to tilling a small
acreage for the purpose of qualifying for exemption (Ridgeway v. Warren,
60 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Tenn.); in re Combs, 5 WH Cases 595, 10 Labor
Cases 62,802 (M.D. Ga.)). To illustrate, where an employer owns several
thousand acres of timberland on which he carries on lumbering operations
and cultivates about 100 acres of farm land which are contiguous to such
timberland, he would not be engaged in agriculture so far as his
forestry or lumbering operations are concerned. In such case, the
forestry or lumbering operations would clearly not be subordinate to the
farming operations but rather the principal or a separate business of
the ``farmer.''
