It is clear that Congress intended the Fair Labor Standards Act to
be broad in its scope. ``Breadth of coverage is vital to its mission.''
(Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497.) An employer who claims an
exemption under the Act has the burden of showing that it applies.
(Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U.S. 545; Mitchell v. Kentucky
Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290; Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F.
2d 52.) Conditions specified in the language of the Act are ``explicit
prerequisites to exemption.'' (Arnold v. Kanowsky, 361 U.S. 388.) ``The
details with which the exemptions in this Act have been made preclude
their enlargement by implication.'' (Addison v. Holly Hill, 322 U.S. 60;
Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254.) Exemptions provided in the Act ``are
to be narrowly construed against the employer seeking to assert them''
and their application limited to those who come plainly and unmistakably
within their terms and spirit; this restricted or narrow construction of
the exemptions is necessary to carry out the broad objectives for which
the Act was passed. (Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490; Mitchell v.
Kentucky Finance Co., supra; Arnold v. Kanowsky, supra; Calaf v.
Gonzalez, 127 F. 2d 934; Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11; Mitchell v.
Stinson, 217 F. 2d 210; Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d
52.)
