

the Ohio Hazardous Materials Exercise and Evaluation Manual

(OHM-EEM)




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OHIO HAZARDOUS MATERIALS EXERCISE AND EVALUATION MANUAL (OHM-EEM)

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose

In 1990, Ohio and its LEPCs began testing their plans. The State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) recognized the need to develop a manual that explains the program to local officials. In late 1992, the first Ohio Hazardous Materials Exercise and Evaluation Manual (OHM-EEM) was distributed. It provides LEPCs guidance for the planning, execution and evaluation of the required annual hazardous materials exercises. Changes to Ohio law in 1994 necessitated the first change to this guide. Once again, changes have occurred in Ohio law that necessitate a change. Throughout the years, the SERC's Planning and Exercise Committee has actively reviewed and updated the program with the direct support of local officials.

This manual is designed to assist the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) in understanding the unique requirements under which their Chemical Emergency Response and Preparedness Plan (the Plan) is exercised. It will outline the specific requirements under Ohio law. It will then briefly address how to design, conduct, and utilize the LEPC exercise. In doing so, it will identify some considerations that may be used to enhance the LEPC exercise. The manual then addresses how the LEPC can use an actual incident as an exercise. It will also discuss how one LEPC can complete an exercise with another LEPC or the State. Next, the manual outlines and discusses the Objectives each LEPC exercise will evaluate. For more specific information on how to develop and conduct an exercise, the LEPC should review Tab D as it identifies various sources of exercise training and guidance. These tools should permit the LEPC to develop an exercise which will adequately demonstrate their Plan.

An exercise will only have value if it leads to improvement in the Plan and the local response system. Therefore, the exercise should always look to identify and eliminate problems, and not just highlight its successes. FEMA's Exercise Design Course notes that there are two benefits to an exercise program. The first is training. Personnel get a chance to practice hands-on with equipment and learn to effectively implement their procedures. They can identify where additional training is needed or what additional resources may be required. The second benefit is the improvement to the overall planning process. The exercise lets various agencies interact and learn more about their respective roles in chemical incidents. The exercise will generate input from a variety of personnel such as how to eliminate any duplication of effort or how to improve response coordination. The exercise can validate a hazard analysis that was completed for a given incident scenario. The two benefits can only be realized if the LEPC designs and conducts an effective exercise, and uses the results to improve the local program.

This manual has been adopted to help meet those goals. Therefore, it is the state's official exercise development and evaluation guide for Ohio's LEPCs.

B. Exercise Laws, Rules, and Policies in Review

Ohio law requires local communities to annually exercise their plan. It further requires the SERC to develop exercise rules that identify unique requirements that LEPCs must address when developing and conducting a chemical exercise. Meanwhile, the SERC can also issue basic policies that clarify how the law and rules apply. This section summarizes the contents of the law, its rules, and the SERC's policies, and addresses the intent behind these requirements.

1. Ohio Revised Code (ORC). Chapter **3750**, entitled '**Emergency Planning**,' includes provisions for the annual exercising of the LEPC's plan. The following are excerpts from the ORC. These requirements were established when the original law was passed in 1988.

a. ORC 3750.04(A)(12). Section .04(A) outlines what information must be included in each LEPC Plan. In particular, Item (12) notes that the Plan shall contain 'the methods and schedules for exercising the plan.' This means that the Plan shall summarize *how* the LEPC develops and conducts its annual exercise.

LEPCs were issued planning guidance that further requires that the Plan *shall* describe the frequency or identify the schedule used to exercise during a four-year exercise cycle. This guidance also notes that the plan *should* provide a summary of the exercise types and describe how actual events may be used. Finally, it *should* also outline how the exercise will be critiqued and how those results will be used to improve the emergency management system. These planning requirements are discussed and outlined in the SERC's 'Hazardous Materials Plan Development and Evaluation Document,' June 1995.

b. ORC 3750.04(C). Section .04(C) states that the LEPC shall conduct an exercise of its Plan at least annually. The section further requires the LEPC to provide the SERC thirty (30) days notice before they conduct the exercise. This is required because the SERC must observe each LEPC exercise. The thirty-day notice gives SERC time to schedule and have a Facilitator attend the event. Finally, the section notes that the SERC will either concur or refuse to concur with the conduct of the exercise. This concurrence is based on the Evaluators' findings and the report submitted by the Facilitator.

c. ORC 3750.02(B)(2)(b). Section .02(B)(2) notes that the SERC shall adopt a variety of rules to implement and administer the SERC/LEPC programs. Specifically, Item (B)(2)(b) directs the SERC to establish criteria and procedures for exercising. This includes how the SERC will review and provide concurrence for an exercise. It allows the SERC to request the LEPC to modify their plan and exercise program based on observations made during the event. This portion of the law also notes that each exercise will include the participation of local emergency response and medical personnel. The exercise will also include either a facility subject to the Plan (an EHS Facility) or a transporter of hazardous materials (one who is subject to USDOT regulations).

SERC's rules are then published in the Ohio Administrative Code (OAC).

2. Ohio Administrative Code (OAC). As noted above, the SERC must adopt rules that outline how the LEPC will complete its annual exercise of their Plan. The SERC's Planning and Exercise Committee develops these rules for SERC to adopt. The rules are then published in the OAC, section 3750-20, items -70, and -76 through -84. As a side note, state law requires the SERC to review these rules every five years. At that time, the SERC will either modify, not change, or delete these rules as the situation dictates. These rules were revised and became law as of October 1998.

a. Rule 3750-20-70 – Exercise Definitions. This rule provides certain definitions that are used in the exercise program. It includes definitions for actual events, exercise Objectives, primary and alternate EOCs, operational capability, and Points of Review.

The exercise Objectives are the criteria used to evaluate a specific operational function. These Objectives include what are considered to be 'Core' Objectives. Core Objectives are the key parts of response plans and are fundamental in protecting the public's health and safety. Each Objective contains a specific set of Points of Review. These Points are collectively used to evaluate the demonstration of a specific function or operational capability. The Objectives and their Points of Review are defined in Tab A.

Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) are used during major disasters to coordinate and support response activities. An EOC's essential functions include: to gather and display information, coordinate and centralize decision-making, establish response and recovery priorities, identify and coordinate resource needs, support field operations, and establish and maintain communications with field and support agencies. To qualify as an EOC for this exercise rule, each site must be a fixed facility and be identified in the LEPC's plan. The EOC must be capable of accommodating essential government and private agencies who have a specific and pre-planned role in the EOC. The facility must be physically equipped to accommodate the EOC's staff and will allow them to operate effectively from the EOC. These 'tools' are more specifically outlined in Tab A's discussion of Objective #4: Emergency Operations Center.

Most plans identify one site as the County's Primary EOC. It is this site that will likely be activated first during most emergencies. However, the plans may also identify other sites that can be used as an EOC. These sites are used when the Primary EOC is unavailable or when the use of the 'Alternate'

location would be more practical to support on-scene operations. An Alternate EOC is also a fixed facility, must be able to accomplish the same essential functions as the Primary, and must have the equipment necessary for the staff to complete these functions.

b. Rule 3750-20-76 - Types of Exercises. This rule describes the exercise types that may be conducted. They are Table-Top, Functional and Full-Scale. Each exercise type has specific constraints that must be adhered to when developing the exercise. The rule also notes how an actual event may qualify as an exercise. Each type is briefly noted below, and is discussed in more detail in Section II.

A Table-Top exercise is a 'verbal' walk through or discussion of the response procedures. It is designed to evaluate plans and resolve questions of coordination and roles. It must demonstrate at least three and not more than five Objectives, one of which is a Core Objective. This will allow the exercise to focus on each Objective and should evolve into a detailed discussion of those selected procedures.

A Functional exercise is a 'hands-on' or physical demonstration of a specific function or operational capability. The function or operation is such that it can be implemented with little or no outside support. The exercise will evaluate four or more Objectives, two of which are Core Objectives. An EOC or incident command post (ICP) is activated for this exercise in order to show how the command structure manages the function or operation.

A Full-Scale exercise is again a 'hands-on' test, but this time it will evaluate the overall emergency management system. It will test most or all of the emergency response functions as outlined in the Plan. It includes the mobilization and use of personnel and equipment. Also, an EOC or ICP is used to coordinate the response functions. The exercise will evaluate eight or more Objectives, five of which are Core Objectives.

In order for an Actual event to qualify as an exercise, the LEPC must submit an Exercise Notice form within thirty days of the response. The Ohio EMA will then arrange a meeting with the principal participants of the response to determine whether or not the exercise Objectives were successfully demonstrated.

c. Rule 3750-20-78 - Execution of Exercises. This Rule outlines the basic requirements for the exercise program. It establishes an exercise cycle, defines what must be accomplished in each cycle, establishes this guide, identifies who's involved, and defines what chemicals can be part of the scenario.

The SERC defines the 'annual' exercise year to be the State Fiscal Year (SFY) which is July 1st to June 30th. This rule then notes that there is a recurring, four-year, exercise cycle. The original cycle began in SFY 94 and ended in SFY 97, and the current cycle is SFY 98 to SFY 01. During this four-year period the LEPC must accomplish a number requirements. First, the LEPC must complete at least one Full-Scale exercise in the cycle. The LEPC then has the option to complete any type of exercise in the remaining three years to include additional Full-Scale exercises if they so wish. As for actual incidents, the rule notes that no more than two (2) actual incidents may be claimed for exercise credit in the four-year period.

The next requirement of the four-year cycle is that the LEPC must fully activate and evaluate their primary EOC at least once in the four-year period. The phrase 'fully activate' means the majority of the EOC members are involved and the site's equipment is 'physically' used. Players will respond to simulated events in the field or will actively work with players in the field to manage the scenario. This evaluation will need to be accomplished during either a Functional or Full-Scale exercise. A Table-Top exercise will not fulfill this requirement since Table-Tops do not physically use equipment during the exercise. For those LEPCs who have Alternate EOCs, it is the LEPC's option on whether or not they wish to test or activate the Alternate EOCs during the four-year cycle.

Next, the SERC established this manual as the LEPC's primary reference tool to use when developing an exercise. This rule requires the manual to outline the exercise Objectives and does so in Tabs A and B. The rule requires the LEPC to ensure each of those Objectives is evaluated at least once in the four-year period. It is likely that the LEPC will evaluate some Objectives more than once during the cycle.

Finally, this rule states that the LEPC will include emergency response and medical personnel in the exercise. The exercise will also involve either a Facility subject to the Plan or a transporter of hazardous materials. The rule specifies the Facility will be an EHS Facility. These sites are specifically to be identified in the LEPC Plan and as such they will have a completed hazards analysis as part of the

Plan. The rule also notes the chemicals that will be involved at this site may be any one of those materials annually reported to the LEPC, it does not have to be an EHS. As for transportation incidents, the rule stipulates that it will utilize a transporter who must abide by USDOT's regulations on moving hazardous materials. Basically, this includes vehicles that require warning placards. It also notes that the chemicals involved must come from regulated 'cargo load.' This means a release of fuel from a saddle tank does not qualify as an exercise.

d. Rule 3750-20-80 – Review of Exercises. This Rule outlines how the LEPC exercise will be reviewed and accepted by the SERC. It establishes Ohio EMA as SERC's exercise authority, identifies what is contained in an exercise report, sets the criteria to concur with exercise, creates a corrective action program, and notes how actual events are claimed for exercise credit.

The SERC designated Ohio EMA as the state agency who will observe and conduct the reviews of the LEPC annual exercises. As such, Ohio EMA will receive exercise notices, create the exercise reports, and will be the general point of contact about exercising LEPC plans. The rule also notes that SERC will only review exercises for those LEPCs who have submitted a Plan for review. In Ohio, every LEPC currently has a Plan on file with Ohio EMA.

Next, Ohio EMA will create an exercise report following each exercise. By law, they have sixty days from the date of the exercise to complete this report. The rule meanwhile establishes what is contained in the report. It will contain a general synopsis of the exercise's results and provide specific comments and recommendations on any Point considered to be Not Met by an Evaluator. The report will then make a recommendation to SERC to either concur with the conduct of the exercise or require the LEPC to complete a Corrective Action Plan.

A Corrective Action Plan will be required when an Evaluator and the Facilitator determine that an exercise did not adequately demonstrate a majority of Points for a specific Objective. In this case, Ohio EMA will forward the exercise report to the LEPC and direct them to develop a Corrective Action Plan. This plan must identify what actions have been taken or will be taken to correct those Points considered to be Not Met for a specific Objective. The LEPC has sixty days from the receipt of the report to identify the corrections and to submit their plan to Ohio EMA. Ohio EMA will review the plan and determine if it adequately resolves the exercise issues. In turn, Ohio EMA will provide this plan, the exercise report, and the Facilitator's recommendation to Concur or not with the exercise to SERC for their consideration.

Finally, the rule notes what steps must be taken to have an actual incident qualify as an exercise. The LEPC must submit an exercise notice form to Ohio EMA within thirty days following the response. The Ohio EMA will schedule a meeting with the LEPC to interview personnel who were involved in the response. Ohio EMA will use the exercise evaluation forms to determine if the event adequately demonstrated the chosen Objectives. At this point, Ohio EMA will treat the event as if it was an exercise and follow the same procedures to report the event's findings to the SERC and the LEPC.

e. Rule 3750-20-82 - Issuance of Exercise Orders of the SERC. This rule outlines how SERC will ultimately issue an order to concur or refuse to concur with the exercise.

Ohio EMA will submit an exercise report to the SERC that will contain a recommendation on whether or not to concur with the conduct of the exercise. The SERC can concur in two ways. The first option is when the exercise report shows that a majority of Points within each Objective was adequately demonstrated. The second option exists when the exercise report identifies any one Objective as being 'Not Met.' In this case, the LEPC will have been directed to complete and submit a Corrective Action Plan (CAP). The Ohio EMA will determine that the plan adequately addresses the problems identified in the report and that the report was received within the sixty day deadline. In these cases, the SERC will concur with the conduct of the exercise.

The SERC can refuse to concur with an exercise only after the LEPC was directed to submit a Corrective Action Plan. This will occur when either the Ohio EMA determines that the submitted plan does not adequately address the problems identified in the report, or the report was not received within the sixty day deadline. If either situation occurs, the SERC will refuse to concur with the conduct of the exercise.

f. Rule 3750-20-84 - Public Review of Plan Exercises. This rule requires that each Committee shall discuss the conduct and review of each Full-Scale exercise at a meeting open to the public. The public meeting may be held at a regularly scheduled LEPC meeting or at a separately advertised meeting.

The meeting will include discussion of issues concerning the exercise and public commentary. The rule also notes that the public meeting must be advertised as per the 'sunshine law' (ORC 121.22).

3. SERC Policies/Resolutions. The SERC occasionally adopts and passes resolutions that impact how LEPCs must adhere to a particular law or rule. For exercises, the SERC's Planning and Exercise Sub-Committee will address and develop these resolutions. In fact, recent changes to the SERC's exercise rules have rescinded a number of past resolutions and opinions. The LEPC receives copies of each such resolution, and should be adding those to their LEPC Procedures Manual for quick reference. Those directly affecting the conduct or design of an exercise are discussed below.

a. Resolution 96-159. From the beginning of the exercise program, LEPCs have been responsible to select their own exercise evaluators. However, it was noted that some LEPCs were using persons who were not familiar with local procedures or the LEPC's plan. As such, the Evaluators were not able to objectively evaluate the exercise. Nor could they provide credible or useful feedback to the LEPC. This defeated the purpose of conducting an exercise, to learn from one's mistakes.

To resolve this issue, SERC passed this resolution which requires the LEPC to choose Evaluators who are knowledgeable in the areas they will evaluate. For example, the evaluator who observes response personnel safety must have training and response experience in Hazmat safety operations. The design team is encouraged to avoid using someone who has limited Hazmat training or experience to be an Evaluator.

The resolution also requires the LEPC to give each Evaluator those Plan sections or local procedures that pertain to the Objectives they are to evaluate. These materials must be provided well in advance of the exercise so the Evaluators can review and know the procedures they are to evaluate. If an Evaluator already has a copy of and uses the local procedures, there is no need to copy or re-issue the materials.

To monitor this process, the SERC's Facilitators will note when and if any Evaluator was not properly prepared or capable to evaluate their assigned Objectives. The Facilitators will include a statement to this affect in their exercise report if an Evaluator was not prepared and how it impacted the exercise evaluation. The SERC will take this into consideration as part of its decision to either Concur or Refuse to Concur with the conduct of the exercise.

This resolution was passed on August 14, 1996.

b. Resolution 98-173. Annually, the SERC provides monies to each LEPC that allow them to implement their program. The funding is based in part on whether or not the LEPC completes its annual exercise. This resolution amended how the SERC determines what amount of funding the LEPC should receive as it relates to exercises.

The resolution notes that if the LEPC completed an exercise and it was concurred with by the SERC, then the LEPC would receive \$2,500.00 as part of its annual funding. It further notes that for those LEPCs whose exercise was not concurred with, they would only receive partial funding at \$1,250.00. Please note that even though it is not specifically stated, the LEPC will not receive any exercise funding as part of their overall grant if they fail to complete their annual exercise.

This resolution was passed on August 12, 1998.

c. Resolution 99-49. The SERC's Planning and Exercise Committee routinely reviews the rules and regulations that apply to this program. As issues are addressed and changes are made to the exercise process, the Committee will revise this manual.

This resolution officially adopted this manual as it's current exercise guide. This resolution was passed on February 9, 1999.

SECTION II - LEPC EXERCISES

The Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) is responsible to conduct an annual exercise of their plan. To do that, the LEPC should use this portion of the manual to ensure that all exercise provisions under Ohio law are satisfied. The following section outlines the basic steps that should be followed to develop and conduct an LEPC's annual exercise. This is a brief overview of the exercise process. It is not the only way in which to develop an exercise. It addresses the law's unique exercise requirements and how to address them. To learn more about designing or conducting an exercise, the LEPC should consult specific guidance such as the NRT-2 exercise guidebook or by taking an exercise design course. See Tab D for a listing of available exercise guides and/or courses.

A. Exercise Considerations

1. Purpose. Exercising is the principal means of testing a county's ability to implement its response procedures. It allows people to practice their procedures and interact with other agencies in a controlled setting. And in the end, participants identify and make recommendations to improve the overall emergency management system. The fundamental purpose, therefore, is to improve how to implement procedures. In support of that goal, an exercise should be used to:

- a. Reveal planning weaknesses in the Plan or local department SOPs, or to test and validate recently changed procedures.
- b. Improve the coordination between various response organizations, elected officials, and community support organizations.
- c. Validate the training of the critical elements of emergency response, (ie., incident command, hazard recognition, evacuation, decontamination, etc.).
- d. Increase the general awareness and understanding of the hazards present in the community.
- e. Identify additional resources, equipment or personnel, needed to prepare for and respond to a chemical incident.

There is also a legal requirement to exercise (as discussed in Section I above). As noted, the LEPC must complete a minimum of one exercise per year. The exercise year is based on the State Fiscal Year (SFY), July 1st through June 30th of the following year. It is setup this way due to the State's funding system. The amount of monies received in the annual LEPC grant depends, in part, on whether or not the LEPC completed an exercise. Funds are then released based on the SFY, and thus by the end of each SFY (June 30th) the LEPC must complete an exercise. Finally, the law established a recurring, four-year exercise cycle. The current exercise cycle started in SFY 98 and finishes in SFY 01. Within this four-year period, the LEPC must complete a number of tasks. Those tasks were discussed above and will be repeated throughout this manual as a reminder.

2. Determine Exercise Need. The first step after deciding to conduct an exercise is to determine what needs to be tested. To do this, the LEPC should review the following issues in order to establish what the exercise will entail.

- a. What types of exercise were completed in the past, how effective they were, and what type should be used next.
- b. Which response functions were evaluated in the past and which ones need to be tested.
- c. Which exercise Objectives were tested previously, were they adequately demonstrated, and which are remaining to be exercised in the present four-year exercise cycle.
- d. What exercise requirements, if any, have not yet been addressed.
- e. Which departments and personnel were involved in past exercises, who would benefit from this year's test, and who is available to participate this year.
- f. Whether to involve either an EHS Facility or a transporter of hazardous materials.
- g. What date and time would be best to conduct an exercise and will allow involvement by the maximum number of organizations.

- h. What will be the expense of conducting the exercise, to include employee overtime and equipment costs.

This process should be a general review of the county's ability and readiness to conduct an exercise. This step is typically considered a 'needs' or 'capability' assessment. The assessment is used to determine how the exercise can fulfill needed training instead of just fulfilling a legal requirement. LEPCs can even use this process at the start of the four-year exercise cycle to outline what functions and exercise types will be completed over the entire four-year period. The LEPC should review FEMA's Exercise Design Course student manual for more about the benefits of 'Building an Exercise Program.'

3. Designate an Exercise Design Team. The entire LEPC should not be used to design and conduct the exercise. Instead, the LEPC should appoint an Exercise Design Team to develop and run the exercise.

The Team's membership should be comprised of one or two LEPC members. The remaining Team members should come from local organizations and have expertise in the functions and procedures to be tested. For example, if Sheltering is to be tested then an ARC representative should be on the team. Or, if Response Personnel Safety is to be tested then a Hazmat Team member or someone trained in Hazmat Operations should be on the Team. If a Facility is involved, they should be asked to provide a representative to address their needs and procedures.

There is no set size for an Exercise Design Team. The size normally depends on the exercise type, materials involved, and the number of functions to be tested. The bigger and more complex the exercise, the greater the need for a larger exercise team. The size should be small enough to meet when needed and yet still develop a complete exercise.

Once the Exercise Design Team has been selected, the group should ensure they have one person designated as the Exercise Director. This person will have the overall responsibility for developing the exercise and leading the group through the process. It is recommended that an LEPC member should be designated the Exercise Director.

The NRT-2, page 15, elaborates on how to establish an exercise design team. Also see FEMA's Exercise Design Course student manual on 'Organizing a Design Team.'

B. Exercise Development

1. Design Activities. Exercise design is the most critical part of doing an exercise. This is where the Design Team should begin to create an exercise. If the exercise is not properly planned, the exercise will likely fail to achieve the Committee's desired goals. FEMA has outlined a number of steps that can be followed when developing an exercise. These steps include but are not limited to:

a. Conduct Needs Assessment. The LEPC should complete this step before appointing a Design Team. The assessment is used to give the Team direction on what type of exercise needs to be completed. The Team should review local training needs, review existing plans and procedures, and discuss lessons learned from recent events. They should review what hazards exist and can be used in an exercise scenario. They should discuss the need to test with local facilities or identify which transportation hazards should be tested. The goal is to identify what needs to be tested.

b. Determine Exercise Scale. From the needs assessment, the Team can identify how large and detailed the exercise will be. The Team should discuss how many agencies want or need to be included. They should determine how great the impact or how complicated the release will be. The Team should identify what portions of the plan or local procedures should be evaluated, such as sections not recently tested or that are newly updated. The Team should identify if there are other emergency plans within the County that might need to be exercised in conjunction with the Hazmat Plan. The Team can now determine the type of exercise to be completed.

c. Select Exercise Type. The Team will use the discussion about the needs assessment and exercise scale to define what type of exercise is best-suited to meet those needs. Communities who have not completed a field exercise should first consider completing a Table-Top exercise before taking on field exercises. Field exercises should be used to focus response operations and evaluations on specific hands-on activities.

d. Select Exercise Objectives. Based on the Exercise Type, the Team will select which Objectives will be used to adequately test the plan and players. The selected Objectives should relate to each other in order to make exercise design a simpler task. Tab A outlines each Objective to includes tips on what issues should be considered when developing an exercise to test the given Objective.

e. Develop Exercise Scenario. The scenario should outline what the incident will include such as the time of the incident, the weather conditions, the location of the incident, and the likely impacts or problems posed by the accident. The Team will also identify if the incident will be a Facility or Transportation-related incident, or a combination of the two.

f. Outline Major Events and Expected Actions. The Team should develop a timeline of what major events will occur during the exercise as it pertains to the Objectives being tested. For each key event, the Team can identify what actions, personnel, and resources will be used to resolve the event. Using the expected actions, the Team will identify what tasks responders will physically complete versus those actions that they will merely need to simulate.

g. Identify and Develop Simulations. The Team can now determine how to setup the accident scene so that it realistically portrays the incident. This includes the need to simulate injuries, draft exercise messages/inputs, and use props to create the accident site. The scene setup should allow responders to fully implement their procedures with a minimum of simulation or exercise control.

h. Identify and Organize Participants. Finally, the Team should identify what agencies and personnel will be asked to participate as Players, Controllers, Victims, and Evaluators. The Team should look at which personnel or departments need experience, have the training, and can provide the resources. The exercise may also need to include adjoining County departments or personnel (ie. mutual aid, Hazmat teams) for a combined exercise. The Team can also identify what other personnel or groups may wish to attend as Observers.

The following sections take a closer look at these steps and what unique concerns are posed by each.

2. Select Exercise Type. SERC has approved four (4) types of exercises that will be used to test local plans and procedures. Each exercise has unique design considerations that the design team needs to understand. Overall, a minimum of one (1) Full-Scale exercise must be completed within the four-year exercise cycle. In the remaining three (3) years, any type of exercise may be completed. Also, no more than two (2) actual events may be claimed for exercise credit in the four-year cycle.

a. Table-Top Exercise. The basic purpose of this exercise is to solve problems in a group discussion. This is normally used to provide elected officials, department officials, and individual personnel an opportunity to evaluate staff coordination, review plan elements, or prepare for a larger exercise. The exercise typically involves only key personnel from a given agency and not the complete staff.

Each Table-Top shall demonstrate at least three (3) but no more than five (5) exercise Objectives. Of these three to five Objectives, at least one (1) will be a Core Objective. The limitation will allow participants to fully discuss each Objective. The Team should also be aware that some Objectives are not well-suited for a Table-Top discussion. The Objectives in question are designed to be tested in a hands-on manner such as Communications. To adequately test that Objective, it requires personnel to use the equipment. Table-Top exercises do not use equipment. They merely discuss procedures. Tab A reviews each Objective and includes a discussion on exercise design issues.

Table-Top exercises are conducted in one of two ways. The first option uses a Controller to present problems to the participants as a whole. The problems are addressed one at a time until the group is satisfied with its response. If something is overlooked, the group can return to that topic and modify their response. The controller may query players as to why or how an action is taken to further the discussion. The second option uses pre-scripted messages to generate problems. These messages are given to individual players who must then relate and discuss the problem with the group. A Controller is available to clarify a particular message, but does not lead the discussion. Players may receive a number of messages or problems at one time. Therefore, they will have to work together to prioritize and resolve the issues. In either case, participants practice problem solving to resolve questions about responsibilities, procedures, and coordination with a minimum of stress. The Controller will act as a

moderator so that one subject does not become the sole focus of the discussion versus spending little or no time talking through the topic.

In the design of the Table-Top, the Team should ensure the Controller's discussion or inputted messages need to address the chosen Objectives' Points of Review. The inputs should not be worded verbatim from the Points. Instead, the inputs should create problems in relation to the Points. The Controller should be prepared to generate inputs in case the discussion is not addressing the selected Objectives. It is important to include everyone in the discussion and to ensure no one agency dominates the exercise. In the design process, the Team and Controller need to ensure there are problems that will involve all participants. During the exercise, the Controller needs to draw personnel into the exercise to acknowledge issues and provide their insights.

The Table-Top exercise should only require the use of one or two Evaluators. A critique is held immediately following the exercise. It will likely be brief as the participants have already discussed and identified procedural needs. It should be used to recap and document which key issues require change.

b. Functional Exercise. The functional exercise is a 'hands-on' activity and is designed to evaluate one or two specific functions (ie. Incident Command, Decontamination, Victim Rescue and Treatment, etc.). The Functional exercise requires the use and deployment of equipment for those functional areas being evaluated. The exercise is meant to test not just the response capabilities of personnel but also to test the coordination used to manage the agencies, personnel, and equipment on-site. Actions take place in real time and the exercise does not stop to re-train personnel or redo a task. An ICP or EOC is activated to physically demonstrate the command and control structure.

Each functional exercise shall demonstrate at least four (4) exercise Objectives. Two (2) of the selected Objectives will be Core Objectives. The Team should choose to evaluate Objectives that closely support each other in order to make the exercise more realistic and less complicated.

This exercise takes more pre-planning and design. The Team should use a Timeline and a list of Major Events with Expected Actions to design the exercise. They will need to setup a realistic incident environment that closely resembles a real emergency. They will use props and simulated events to create the realism. The day of the exercise, members of the Design Team become the Controllers who ensure players understand the scenario. The key to a successful Functional exercise is having a realistic scenario and scene, and to ensure there are sufficient players and resources available to 'physically' demonstrate each Objective. Simulation is kept to a minimum. Players may be given a pre-briefing on the Objectives to be evaluated, the manner in which simulations will be carried out, and a review of ground rules and safety issues. The exact details of the hazards and problems to be resolved are not provided. The exercise can start at any point in the response timeframe and will end when designed activities have completed the demonstration of the Objectives. Equipment and personnel are staged near to the scene to avoid running 'lights and sirens' to the scene.

The Functional exercise can require as few as two and up to twelve Evaluators. This depends on how many Objectives are being completed and where the field play will occur. For example, if Initial Notification and Communications are being evaluated there should be an Evaluator with each Dispatch office as well as on-scene. A critique is held immediately following the exercise. The Controllers should lead the discussion and have the participants speak first and actively review their actions. Evaluators should then summarize their findings for the group. Throughout, the Controllers should document which issues require change or further discussion at a later date.

c. Full-Scale Exercise. The Full-Scale exercise involves 'physically' testing a major portion of the emergency plan. This exercise includes the actual movement of emergency personnel and resources to a variety of sites over a number of hours. It involves the coordination of numerous emergency response organizations and resources to demonstrate a coordinated response capability. The emphasis on completing multiple functions will evaluate the community's ability to manage a major emergency or disaster. An ICP or EOC is activated to demonstrate the command structure. A minimum of one (1) Full-Scale exercise must be completed within the four-year exercise cycle.

The Full-Scale exercise shall demonstrate eight (8) or more Objectives with at least five (5) being core objectives. The number of Objectives chosen may be limited to how many agencies and resources will be available to participate in the exercise.

This exercise requires the commitment of large number of agencies and officials. The Team must ensure that there is enough lead time given to likely participants in order for them to schedule and

participate in the exercise. The LEPC should ensure the respective response groups and elected officials understand and support the need to complete a Full-Scale exercise. The Team will then design and complete the exercise in the same manner as they would for a Functional exercise. During the exercise, there may need to be more Controllers than in a Functional to facilitate exercise flow. Most problems will arise from logistical issues such as arranging adequate resources to participate in the exercise. Scene setup is also critical so that the disaster site is realistic.

The Full-Scale exercise will involve a number of Evaluators, anywhere from eight to twenty. The Team needs to define how many sites will require an Evaluator in order to observe the Objectives. It may also require multiple Evaluators to review one Objective. The critique will therefore be more complicated. Due to large number of participants, the critique does not need to include every player. A brief review of the actions taken can be conducted for the players immediately following the exercise. However, the Evaluators will need time (up to one hour) to meet and organize their findings. This is especially true when multiple Evaluators review the same Objective. They may not be ready to debrief personnel immediately following the exercise. The Team can elect to have key personnel, the Evaluators, and the Facilitator meet at another time to discuss the evaluation.

Finally, Full-Scale exercises must be 'publicly' debriefed. The LEPC is required to meet and discuss the review of the exercise at a meeting open to the public. This must be advertised, as would any public meeting in keeping with Ohio law. The meeting will include a discussion of exercise issues, make available the exercise report, and allow for public commentary. This meeting is separate from the responders' critique since the exercise report, based on the Evaluators' findings, will not be complete at that time. This meeting should therefore be either a separately advertised meeting, or should be held during a regularly scheduled LEPC meeting. The last option is usually the easiest to coordinate and should allow the Facilitator enough time to draft the exercise report.

d. Actual Events. The most realistic test of the plan is an actual response to a release. As such, an actual event can qualify as an exercise. An actual event is defined as an incident that is reported in accordance with ORC 3750.06.

The LEPC can use up to two (2) actual events in lieu of conducting an exercise in any two years within the four-year cycle. Also, the LEPC can only claim credit for either a Functional or Full-Scale exercise. Table-Top exercises do not qualify as they are not 'hands-on' events. The intent of the Table-top is to 'discuss' and 'question' procedures, and this is not completed during the response to an actual event. As a side benefit, the actual event can save the LEPC the cost of conducting an exercise.

Section G of this guide discusses in greater detail how to use an actual event in lieu of conducting an exercise.

3. Exercise Objectives. The SERC has established fourteen (14) pre-scripted Objectives that will be tested by each LEPC. Of those fourteen, the SERC has defined nine (9) of these as being a Core Objective. A Core Objective is defined as being fundamental to the plans and response situations. When performed successfully, they will directly contribute to the significant reduction of the public and environmental threat.

LEPCs must evaluate each Objective at least once within a four-year period. If an Objective is considered to be 'Not Met', it is highly recommended to re-test and evaluate those Objectives in future exercises to determine if past problems have been resolved or not. It should be noted that some Objectives may, by design or choice, be evaluated more than once in the four-year period (ie. Incident Command).

In selecting exercise Objectives, the Team should review the description of the Objectives and the respective Points of Review. These are defined in Tab A. Tab A provides a review of the intent and focus of the Objective. It identifies what each Point of Review is meant to evaluate. There are concerns and tips identified to assist the Team when designing the exercise for the given Objective. Finally, the Tab provides insight on how/where to evaluate the given Objective. The Team should review that section to ensure that the Objectives selected can be fully demonstrated by the exercise type chosen. This will then help the Team to develop its exercise scenario, messages, and simulations.

Each County should be able to exercise every Objective regardless of the capabilities and limitations within the county. However, it is recognized that some Counties do not have the capability to conduct some procedures without the direct assistance of outside agencies. For example, not every County has a Hospital or Hazmat Team who will be needed to complete some tasks such as victim treatment and/or

decontamination. Therefore in this example, the County may not be able to test Objectives such as #7 or 13 without the outside help. To resolve this possible conflict, the Team needs to solicit and receive the support of those groups to participate in a local exercise. Since the County already relies on their assistance for actual emergencies and may have mutual aid with those groups, the LEPC should have no trouble getting their support once within a four-year period. Without this assistance, the County is relying on procedures that may or may not work. An exercise is the best way to identify and resolve response conflicts.

If the County cannot arrange the required cooperation, they will need to discuss this issue with their respective Ohio EMA Hazmat Planner. The issue will be presented to the SERC's Planning and Exercise Committee who may intervene to assist in gathering the support or may waive the requirement to evaluate a given Objective. This will be done on a case-by-case basis only. Again, every County should ensure they will test each Objective at least once within a four-year period.

4. Develop an Exercise Scenario. After the Team has determined which objectives it wants to exercise, the next step is to develop a realistic scenario based on a probable accident. Exercises must involve either a Facility that is subject to the plan or a transporter of hazardous materials.

a. The SERC recognizes that a 'Facility that is subject to the plan' is in fact an EHS Facility. By law, the LEPC plan shall contain an identification of each EHS Facility within the District and therefore those sites are 'subject to the plan.' If a Facility is used, the Team can create a scenario that involves any hazardous material found on-site, it does not have to necessarily be an EHS. However, the materials chosen must be those that are specifically reported to the LEPC and local Fire Department. This reporting requirement occurs each March and is defined in ORC 3750.08. LEPCs are encouraged to use a scenario based on their completed hazard analysis or the local fire pre-plan for the Facility. And since this is a test of the plan, LEPCs are also encouraged to test a release of an EHS.

b. The SERC recognizes that a 'transporter of hazardous materials' is one who is regulated by USDOT's Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, as amended. Basically, this includes transporters who must placard their hazardous loads under the regulation. This includes rail, road, vessel, or air carriers. If a transporter is used, the scenario must involve a release of the regulated load. This means the LEPC can not use a fuel release from a saddle/fuel tank on the vehicle. Instead, the fuel release must occur from the tanker, trailer, boxcar, cargo hold, etc.

The scenario will be submitted to Ohio EMA as part of the LEPC's thirty (30) day exercise notice. As indicated on the form, the scenario should be a narrative that describes the incident to include meteorological conditions. This is a general overview of what is to happen, when, where, and how. It also needs to outline the likely sequence of events that will occur. This identifies what should happen first, second, third, or simultaneously. This should include any unique problems that will be inputted by the Team at specific times. Next, the scenario should identify what hazardous material(s) will be involved and a description on how it is being released. Finally, the scenario needs to identify what geographical areas and populations will be affected by the release, and how. For example, it would discuss how a gaseous cloud will drift into a nearby trailer park and make 100 people physically sick. If the exercise is not going to test an off-site response and will only focus on the on-site tasks, this issue can be omitted.

Scenarios should be both realistic as well as challenging. This will increase the training gained from the drill and generate support for future exercises. The NRT-2, page 16, provides a discussion on exercise scenario development. Also, FEMA's Exercise Design Course student manual addresses the various tasks and steps needed to fully develop a scenario depending on the exercise type chosen.

5. Outline Major Events and Expected Actions. Overall, the scenario should be developed to focus the exercise play on the selected Objectives. To better visualize, FEMA uses a technique to organize the Team's thoughts. FEMA first recommends that a design team should walk through the scenario and identify the key events. Key events are situations that occur during the emergency. For example, the tank explodes, victims are discovered, and the release is stopped. Each event should cause one or more expected actions for one or more agencies. The Team can now list what actions those personnel will likely take. These actions sometimes happen in unison or follow specific steps, and may involve more than one agency.

This process will outline how the exercise should proceed. It will identify what props and events are needed by the Team to create a realistic emergency. It will then identify what personnel and resources are needed to implement procedures. It will also identify which actions must be taken to fully demonstrate the selected Objectives and which actions need not be accomplished, as they do not pertain to the evaluation.

FEMA's Exercise Design Course student manual, pages 9-16 thru 9-24, and FEMA's Guide to Emergency Management Exercises, pages 56-66, discuss the importance of this process.

6. Identify and Develop Simulations. As noted previously, a well-scripted scenario will allow the Team to identify what exercise enhancements are needed to setup the scene and run the exercise. The types of simulations will vary for each exercise type.

a. For a Table-Top Exercise, the Team can use one Controller to lead the discussion and thus would only need a well-scripted scenario and the list of major events/actions. The Controller will be responsible to see that the problems are clearly understood. If the exercise will use messages to create exercise play, the Team will need to use the list of major events and expected actions to develop messages. These messages are worded to create problems and see if personnel respond as expected. If actions get off-track or do not get accomplished, the Team will have to create and input messages during the exercise to get the discussions back on-track.

b. For a Functional Exercise, this will depend if this is an EOC-only test or a field test. An EOC-only test will only activate an EOC and there may be no field play. In this case, the Team will simulate the emergency and will role-play the functions being completed in the field. They will input the field response needs that will be typically relayed to an EOC. EOC members will then address the issues and reply back to the 'simulators' as needed. This is run much like a Table-Top exercise where messages run the exercise, but EOC members physically use all of the EOC's assets including communications. This type of exercise can be used to satisfy the need to physically activate and evaluate the Primary EOC once in a four-year period.

In a field test, the Team will need to 'setup' an accident site that simulates a real emergency scene. Props are used to represent the hazards. For example, water is dyed green to simulate a corrosive liquid. Or, a smoke generator is used to create a toxic cloud. The more realistic the scene, the less the players have to guess as to what is going on. Controllers are then used to clarify the players concerns and to input additional problems.

c. For a Full-Scale Exercise, the simulation is handled like a Functional exercise. However, there may be more props needed depending on the size and complexity of this drill. Controllers may be needed in more than one location to ensure expected events or problems are input in a logical order. If an EOC is activated for this exercise, actual field play will initiate EOC activities and should not require simulated messages unless to create a problem.

FEMA's Exercise Design Course student manual discusses these issues and offers examples of exercise enhancements that will make an exercise appear as realistic as possible.

7. Identify and Organize Participants. When deciding which agencies, departments, or organizations should be in the exercise as players, the Team should consider those that would normally be expected to be involved if the planned scenario were a real incident. In order to meet certain objectives of the exercise, the Team may need to exercise a particular organization or agency, or to conduct the exercise in a certain area of the district, or combine the exercise with exercises of other entities responsible for maintaining and testing emergency plans.

Therefore before committing significant time in developing the exercise, the Team should first identify what agencies are needed to complete the test. The Team can use the major events and expected actions list to identify who is needed to adequately demonstrate the chosen Objectives. The Team should then ask for and get a commitment by those groups to participate. The Team should clearly brief the departments or groups on what roles or functions they will be asked to fulfill. The participants should be told which Objectives will be evaluated and provide a general synopsis of what the exercise will encompass. The Team should not provide a full description of the drill. This would take away from the training and evaluation aspect of the event. Instead, they only need to explain what actions they are likely to take, how many resources they may need to provide, and when/how long the event will occur. This

should be done well in advance in order to allow those groups time to arrange schedules and fully participate in the exercise.

It is also recommended that the Team informs and solicits the support of the local elected officials. Otherwise, an official could pull their department's support if they find out later an exercise involves their assets and they were not consulted.

Also, the Team should only invite those departments and personnel that are reasonably needed to conduct the exercise. If too many are invited, there may not be enough activity to warrant their use. They will feel as if they have wasted their time and will not likely participate in future exercises. Some agencies want to invite themselves to participate even though there will be no functions for them to complete. The Team should politely discourage this and should not expand the scope of the exercise. A simple exercise can quickly get out of control as people add themselves into the drill. Instead, invite these groups to participate in the next exercise.

Finally, the LEPC is encouraged to include or invite state agencies to participate in a local exercise. Agencies such as the OSP and ODOT typically have field offices and often like to be included. It provides them additional training and helps them to learn more about the local community's response abilities and needs. The LEPC should also consider including outside response or technical support people from OEPA, SFM, PUCO, or ODNR. These personnel often are involved in real emergencies and thus can be part of local exercises. By including the state agencies, the interaction should improve the county's understanding of what functions those agencies can or cannot provide during a response. The LEPC should not wait for a state-directed exercise to invite or include state agencies in a local exercise.

C. Exercise Control Issues

1. Controllers. On the day of the exercise, the Exercise Design Team members assume a new title: Controllers. The Team members are excellent to utilize as the exercise controllers since they designed the exercise and are completely familiar with how it should be completed.

Controllers are non-exercise players. A lead controller is responsible to start and conclude the exercise. For field drills, controllers should have a communication's capability so they can coordinate when to input messages or the need to create an unplanned message. They are responsible to let responders know when they can and cannot simulate a response activity. For example, players demonstrating decontamination may be permitted to not use soap and water with the concurrence of the controller. Controllers ensure players complete those tasks needed to demonstrate an Objective. They should not permit players to simulate tasks if the work can be realistically accomplished.

The controller's main purpose is to help keep the exercise on-track as envisioned and planned. They interject either pre-planned or spontaneous control messages to create new problems or to force players to address an issue. They can clarify player questions, but they do not resolve the issues for the players. For example, they note that the green liquid is actually a dark oily substance but will not tell them what the material is. They also let players know whether or not a response function was successful. For example, players may insert a plug or patch a leak, but controllers can remove the fix to further challenge responders.

Controllers must also monitor all the safety aspects of the exercise. For example, a player not wearing SCBA or the appropriate PPE may approach a toxic material. The controller should give the player clues they are becoming sick or the chemical smell is increasing. The controller can ultimately inform the player that they are now a victim and must act as one. The controller should debrief the player on their mistake and how to avoid the same mistake next time. More importantly, the controllers should watch for and immediately stop an action that would create a real emergency. Safety is paramount.

Overall, one controller is used in a Table-Top exercise to moderate a discussion, while three or four controllers may be needed to interject messages if used. Field exercises require using enough controllers to monitor exercise play in each location.

2. Simulation. Two issues are addressed here. First, the ability to create a realistic incident scene requires some simulation and make-believe. This is created by the design team and carried out by the Simulators. Second, it is recognized that an exercise will test only those functions or tasks which are to be evaluated. However, those actions may require responders to complete a function that is not being evaluated. To expedite exercise play, responders can be permitted to simulate those tasks and thus allow them to focus efforts on the evaluated functions. Below is a brief review of these considerations.

a. Simulators. Like Controllers, Simulators are non-exercise players. They are used to portray or input pre-scripted or spontaneous scenario problems. These inputs are designed to provide the realism needed to have the players respond as planned. Inputs include the release of smoke around the scene, the use of victims, the role playing by grieving families, phone alerts to 911 operators, or the arrival of the media. As the design team outlines its major events and expected actions, they need to identify what events are needed to be generated to simulate the emergency and make the scene as realistic as possible. They can then identify what tools or techniques will be used to create this environment.

During the exercise, Controllers will ensure Simulators understand their roles and oversee when/how the events are to be initiated. Also, the Controllers themselves may act as Simulators. They can generate problems to force personnel to respond to a situation that is being overlooked or misunderstood.

b. Simulated Exercise Play. This simulation applies to the Functional and Full-Scale exercises where players are supposed to physically demonstrate their functions. As responders react to the scenario and implement their procedures, there are times at which their actions can be simulated. The players' activities should only be simulated in three situations.

First when actions are not going to be evaluated and would not negatively impact other actions, the controller can acknowledge that the action would have been completed. For example, the Incident Assessment Objective requires the IC to determine what public protective action must be initiated. If the Population Protective Actions Objective is not being evaluated, the IC only needs to announce what measure would be completed and the action is not accomplished. This will save time in completing the exercise and will allow players to focus their attention on those actions that are being evaluated. In this case, responders must carry out their actions to the fullest extent possible. If they are going to evaluate Population Protective Actions, then players must physically complete the evacuation or in-place sheltering. Players cannot simply explain how they would manage the task, they must physically complete the task.

The second situation occurs when response actions require the use of a limited or costly resource. Responders may need specialized equipment (ie. Class A suit) to control a release, but can not afford to waste the use of that resource in an exercise. For example, responders can simulate the use of a Class A suit by wearing a Tyvex suit. This allows personnel to still demonstrate the function (donning suits and making entry) without wasting an expensive piece of equipment. In this case, the design team should pre-identify what resources are too costly to use and then identify how they will have responders simulate the use of that equipment. This simulation should be pre-briefed to the Facilitator and Evaluators.

The third situation is reserved for those actions that would create a safety hazard. There may be times when the exercise play could result in an unwanted injury. For example, personnel operating in Class A and B protective equipment are susceptible to heat exhaustion. To prevent this, personnel first demonstrate the proper steps to use the equipment and initiate response operations. After they have adequately shown they can carry out the task, personnel may be permitted to doff the equipment and simulate its use. This should prevent unwanted injury and will help expedite exercise play. The Controller in coordination with the Facilitator and Evaluators will approve the simulation. However, personnel must first adequately demonstrate the procedures before they are allowed to simulate a task.

CAUTION: Before permitting the simulation of response activities, the Design Team/Controllers must ensure response personnel have successfully demonstrated the various Points of Review. If the majority of Points are only simulated and not physically demonstrated, the Objective is not realistically tested. The Evaluators will likely not be able to say the Points were Met. The Objective in this case will likely be identified as Not Met and the exercise will have failed to achieve its purpose.

The Facilitator may intervene in this situation and remove the Objective from the list of those Objectives being evaluated. If this is done, the LEPC will have to test that Objective in a future exercise and must do so during the current exercise cycle. The Facilitator will coordinate with the LEPC before taking this action.

The goal of the Design Team must be to ensure the exercise will permit the players to fully implement their procedures. There should be enough players committed to participating so that the Objective is fully tested. For example if the LEPC is to test Traffic and Access Control, the scenario must create the need to re-route traffic, deny access, and close roads. There must also be sufficient numbers of law, fire, and/or highway personnel participating so that the actions taken are fully demonstrated. The bottom line is that simulated exercise play must be kept to a minimum.

3. Safety Issues. The design team, the participants, and the Evaluators throughout the exercise process must consider safety. Personnel must be alert for unsafe acts during the exercise and be prepared to take immediate actions to stop and correct the situation. The following two concerns should be specifically part of the exercise design process.

a. Call-Off Procedures. The design team should have a procedure in-place that will be used to stop the exercise if a greater need arises. There may be a need to stop the exercise should an actual incident (ie. four-alarm fire) elsewhere require personnel to leave the exercise. Or, there may be an emergency or unsafe situation that develops on-scene (ie. a responder collapses from heat exhaustion). A Controller, Evaluator, or Player can then use the ‘call-off’ procedure to suspend play. Play should be resumed when the situation permits.

In some instances, the Controllers, in coordination with the Facilitator, may need to declare that the exercise is completely over. This is created when a real emergency requires the commitment of the majority of assets involved in the exercise. However, the exercise should not be stopped for a ‘routine’ emergency runs (ie. a minor traffic accident) where only one or two assets are needed. Instead, the design team should ensure that the participating agencies have pre-arranged mutual aid from non-participating departments who can take those routine calls. Since most emergencies do not occur in isolation from other events, the exercise should be prepared to run even though minor events may be occurring elsewhere. The exercise should only be stopped when players must leave because there is no other mutual aid available.

When an exercise is prematurely declared over, the Controllers and Facilitator will need to decide whether to re-do the exercise at a later date. They may determine that enough activity occurred so that the Objectives could be fully evaluated and the exercise can be called complete. In the case where the required numbers of Objectives were not fully demonstrated, the LEPC must complete the exercise at a later date. Therefore, the design team should have a back-up date pre-selected so that they may re-conduct and complete the exercise. And along this line, the design team should not schedule an exercise in the last week of the exercise year. If the exercise is inadvertently stopped and is not complete, there may be no time left in the year to complete the exercise. In this case, the LEPC will not have met the requirements under the law. Also, this will negatively affect the LEPC’s annual award and fiscal grant.

b. Communications. All simulated message and communication traffic must begin with the following statement ‘THIS IS AN EXERCISE’. The person initiating the communication should preface their call with this statement. The person receiving the call should also repeat this statement to ensure they understand this was an exercise-related communication. This statement is used to ensure all persons listening understand this is part of the exercise. This should prevent personnel from thinking the simulated message or traffic is a real incident or need. It should prevent the general public mistakenly thinking an exercise is a real emergency for those who listen to response scanners.

The design team may also wish to use special radio channels or communications during the exercise. This is done to alleviate the load placed on normal channels and again lessens the chance that an exercise message is misinterpreted as a real emergency call. In this case, players will need to be briefed when normal channels or communications techniques are not to be used. As a side note, this technique should not be done when specifically testing the Communications Objective. It is meant to test the existing communications network. Instead, the above technique to announce “This is an Exercise” must be stressed and used.

4. Observers. Some LEPCs invite spectators to view the exercise. This is often used to educate those groups about the LEPC process and the abilities of local responders. The observers might be elected officials, persons from non-playing agencies or organizations, persons from other Districts, State Agencies or the media. Or, some response or support groups may wish to simply observe the exercise before they participate in an exercise.

The design team will need to decide if Observers will be permitted to attend a given drill. Some exercise locations are not large enough to accommodate Observers. Their presence can also have a negative impact on the players’ ability to carry out their functions. The Team should also consider whether or not to provide meals to Observers who are invited to attend. If Observers are permitted to attend, procedures should be in place to keep the Observers in a designated area. If permitted to roam amongst the scene and players, they may interfere with exercise play and disrupt the training being provided.

D. Exercise Evaluation

1. Evaluators. Evaluators are persons assigned to observe and evaluate certain selected objectives during the exercise. Their primary role is to observe actions taken by the players and to document how/if those actions conformed to planned procedures.

The LEPC is responsible for selecting individuals to serve as evaluators for their exercise. The Evaluators can be emergency response, medical, industry representatives, emergency management, or community service personnel. The personnel can be from organizations within the District or from another District. The only requirement is that the individuals selected must be knowledgeable in the area(s) they are asked to evaluate. It would be unfair to the players and to the evaluation of the exercise if the evaluator was not experienced in the area being evaluated. For example, the evaluator who observes response personnel safety must have training and response experience in Hazmat safety operations.

A SERC resolution also requires the LEPC to ensure each Evaluator has a copy of those procedures that pertain to the Objective they will evaluate. The procedures may be outlined in the LEPC's Plan or they may be part of a local SOP. In either case, these materials must be provided in advance of the exercise so the Evaluators have time to review and understand the procedures they are to evaluate. This should ensure the Evaluators provide objective feedback on those procedures. Please note that if an Evaluator already has a copy of and uses the procedures to be evaluated, there is no need to copy or re-issue the materials. The SERC's Facilitator will note in their exercise report when and if any Evaluator was not properly prepared. The Facilitator will note why an Evaluator was not prepared and how it impacted the exercise evaluation. The SERC will take this into consideration as part of its decision to either Concur or Refuse to Concur with the conduct of the exercise.

By having the procedures in advance, the Evaluators are now partially prepared to evaluate the exercise. The LEPC should also ensure those persons are provided the respective Evaluation Forms they will use to conduct their evaluation. They should also be given copies of the scenario, exercise timeline, major events, and/or expected actions. The LEPC should also brief the Evaluators on how the scenario will be presented, what simulations will be used, and what actions the responders will not be required to conduct. This will ensure the Evaluators understand the scope and purpose of the exercise. This should be completed one or two weeks prior to the exercise. Trying to complete this the day of the exercise may not give Evaluators enough time to prepare for the exercise. The LEPC should include the SERC Facilitator in any such pre-briefing. The Facilitator can help explain the evaluation process, the use of the forms, the post-exercise critiques, and how the Evaluator comments will be used to write the exercise report.

When selecting the Evaluators, the LEPC should also ensure they have an appropriate number of Evaluators available. The Objectives chosen, the extent of play and the exercise type will dictate how many Evaluators are needed. One Evaluator should typically be used to observe each Objective, but they should not review more than two Objectives. More than this will cause the Evaluator to miss various events and will not be able to effectively observe each function. This defeats the purpose of the Evaluation. Tab A identifies which Objectives are best suited to evaluate together.

The extent of play may, in some cases, require there to be more than one Evaluator to evaluate an Objective. This is usually caused because the exercise play occurs over a large area or in multiple areas and so one Evaluator cannot observe all the activities. For example, the Communications Objective may begin with the 911 center, but will be supported by the Fire Dept. dispatcher, and all communications are generated on-scene, but may require Amateur Radio groups to support the shelter and EOC. To effectively monitor this amount of activity means the LEPC needs more than one Evaluator in each area to observe communications. Some Evaluators may evaluate Communications along with another Objective (ie. Incident Command) or will only Evaluate the one Objective (at the 911 center).

With this in mind, the Design Team should ensure they have enough Evaluators to watch each Objective in each area where exercise play will occur. This generally means a Table-Top exercise should have two Evaluators. A Functional exercise may have three to six Evaluators while a Full-Scale exercise may need eight or more Evaluators. This will depend on the extent of play. FEMA's exercise design course discusses how many Evaluators are appropriate for each exercise type.

2. Facilitators. Facilitators are the SERC's representatives to observe and report on the conduct of the exercise. The SERC has appointed the Ohio EMA as SERC point of contact for exercises and will

supply a Facilitator for each LEPC exercise. Typically, the Facilitator will be the Ohio EMA Hazmat Planner who is assigned to support LEPC operations. Ohio EMA also routinely use their Field Coordinators to fulfill the Facilitator role when the Hazmat Planners are unavailable.

Initially, the Facilitator will receive and review the LEPC's Exercise Notice. This notice allows the Facilitator to ensure the planned exercise meets SERC's exercise criteria. The Facilitator will identify how the exercise is not meeting SERC's requirements, and will provide options on how the exercise can be modified to adhere to the exercise rules. The Facilitator has the ultimate right to refuse to observe an exercise if it does not meet SERC's requirements. As a technique, the LEPC should invite the Facilitator to participate in the design process or attend one/two exercise meetings. This should ensure the exercise meets the SERC's requirements. The Facilitator can also provide insight as to what has and has not worked in other exercise. It should also prevent the Facilitator from requiring last minute changes or denying to attend an exercise if the thirty-day notice shows the exercise is not being conducted as per the exercise requirements.

The Facilitator is also responsible to contact each Evaluator prior to the exercise. The Facilitator will ensure each Evaluator understands the exercise scenario and the Objectives they will evaluate. They will clarify how the exercise process will occur and how the forms are to be used to document exercise observations. On the day of the exercise, the Facilitator will oversee the exercise evaluation. They will ensure Evaluators have addressed each Point of Review and have made comments on how well the procedures did or did not work. The Facilitator will need some time following the exercise to meet with each Evaluator and ensure they complete their review. The Facilitator can be asked to share their observations and recommendations with players during the critique.

It should be noted that the Facilitator might not always be able to immediately identify if the exercise successfully demonstrated each Objective. They may need additional time to review each Evaluator's comments to make this determination. These comments will be used to write the formal report of the exercise, with appropriate recommendations to the LEPC. This report will be submitted to the LEPC as soon as practical, but not later than sixty days following the exercise (this time limit is defined in the law). Finally, the Facilitator will also attend the public meeting following a full-scale exercise to review and discuss the exercise report. This meeting should be scheduled so that it allows the Facilitator time to complete the report. The Facilitator will then submit the report to the SERC for their Concurrence or to direct the LEPC to complete a Corrective Action Plan. This is discussed later in the post-exercise section.

E. Exercise Preparations

1. Exercise Preparations. After the design team has developed the exercise scenario, there may be a need to brief the elected officials, the various agencies, departments and organizations that will participate. This pre-briefing should review what objectives are to be evaluated and what type of exercise will be completed. The team should identify what expected resources should be brought or made available. The team may decide to review the scenario, but specific details such as the chemicals involved and the expected actions should not be discussed. The release of too much information will result in an exercise that is choreographed and will not generate an objective evaluation. Completely rehearsed or choreographed exercises should be avoided.

Instead, participating agencies and personnel should be encouraged to prepare and train for the exercise. Personnel should use the Objectives to review the Plan and their own SOPs prior to the exercise. Individual departments may decide to conduct refresher training on specific procedures (ie. decontamination, EOC activation, etc.). These tasks are used to develop individual and team skills, test procedures, train on equipment and to brush up on areas which may need attention.

Training may also be conducted for exercise controllers and simulators. The team may hold a pre-exercise session to review roles, provide information on last minute changes, identifying times to report, and how to input exercise messages. The team may wish to review and explain procedures with Evaluators who are not familiar with the local program.

Another technique to prepare is to conduct an informal Table-Top exercise. This is an excellent training tool to prepare for the larger Functional or Full-Scale exercises. This discussion should not review the exact scenario or timeline of events. Instead, it should simply discuss the procedures that will likely be evaluated for each of the selected Objectives. This is not considered a rehearsal since personnel will not be given or know the exact scenario. The Table-Top will allow personnel to review response activities and ensure they understand how to handle the simulated emergency.

2. Public Announcements. Although it is not a requirement, there are benefits and reasons why the LEPC should inform the public about the annual exercise. The first is safety. When conducting a field exercise, the general public may mistake the exercise as a real emergency. This reaction could result in 911 lines being tied up with concerned calls. The LEPC should inform those living near to the proposed exercise site that a drill will be conducted on a given day and time. This is especially important if roads will be closed or access to an area will be denied. The public should be asked to remain clear of the area and to excuse the unnecessary delays. Remind them that this is necessary and valuable training, and provide a clear timeframe that identifies how long the delays will last.

The second use of public announcements is to generate public support. The LEPC may want to test evacuation procedures. The LEPC could ask a local subdivision to participate in the exercise and act as the evacuees. This will let the public know uniformed response personnel will be in their area and conducting an evacuation. In all cases, players will preface their conversations with “This is an Exercise” to ensure there are no misunderstandings. The LEPC may also use public announcements just as a means to promote its efforts and to generate support for local responders. This will show the public that their local responders are trained and capable of managing an emergency.

Announcements should be made in advance of the drill through radio interviews, newspaper articles, and/or door-to-door flyers. The use of announcements should also be coordinated with local officials to ensure they support the process. Announcements should also occur the morning of and after the exercise. The morning notice will remind those who have forgotten or missed the original broadcasts. The day after notice should thank the public for any inconvenience and to note the successes learned during the drill.

Finally, public involvement is required following a Full-Scale exercise. The LEPC must hold a public meeting to discuss the results of the Full-Scale exercise. The meeting will allow the public to comment on or question what occurred and what was learned.

3. Final Arrangements. As the exercise date nears, the design team may want to conduct a final coordination briefing or pre-exercise meeting with the players, Evaluators, or Simulators. A final meeting provides the opportunity to provide last minute changes, remind personnel of report times and locations, or other last minute adjustments.

A critical time for each exercise is the hour or so just prior to the start of the exercise. The design team should consider what could go wrong. For example, what if a response department is called out to a real emergency, or no one is available to unlock the proposed shelter site. The team should discuss these ‘what if’ situations and have a game plan on what to do just in case. There are a number of circumstances that may arise and cancel an exercise. The goal is to minimize those chances.

Getting the exercise started will then require some coordination and pre-planning. The team should have plenty of time allotted to complete the last minute tasks. Time is needed to moulage victims, and setup props on-scene (wrecked vehicles, displaced drums). The Facilitator will meet with the Evaluators and Controllers to review their tasks and to pre-position themselves for the exercise. If exercise participants are being pre-staged, a Controller should meet them and provide an initial exercise briefing if required. Players should also be reminded of where and when the player critique will be conducted.

4. Start the Exercise. There are many techniques used to start an exercise. Table-Top exercises are usually started with a brief reminder of the Objectives and how the exercise will be conducted. The players should be reminded that this an open discussion and requires their active input. The Controller then simply introduces the scenario and inputs the first of many problems. Field exercises will use some form of exercise-initiating narrative or action. It may start with an exercise message into the normal emergency communication channels (ie. 911, fire dept.) and lets the exercise develop much like an actual emergency. If the initial dispatch process is not being tested, players will be pre-staged and briefed on what call was just received. A Controller will then let the players move to the incident scene and begin the exercise.

The team must take responsibility for the exercise and ensure it starts off and continues according to the exercise scenario and timeline. See Exercise Conduct, page 19, NRT-2 for further information. The student manual for FEMA’s Exercise Design Course also addresses these techniques in general and for each exercise type.

F. Post Exercise Activities

The exercise process does not end after the exercise play is complete. Following the exercise, a number of important activities remain to be completed. There will be a critique of the exercise play. Based on that critique, the Facilitator will complete and submit an exercise report. The report will highlight the strengths of the local program as well as make recommendations to improve local operations. The SERC will either Concur with the conduct of the exercise or direct the LEPC to make modifications to the local program. Finally, the LEPC will need to modify local operations or make changes to their plan based on the findings of the exercise. These steps are addressed briefly below.

1. Exercise Critiques. Three techniques are used to review the exercise and discuss its strengths and weaknesses. This includes an Evaluator Meeting, Player Critique, and Public Debriefing.

a. Evaluator Meeting. Immediately following the exercise, the Facilitator will hold a brief and necessary meeting with all the Evaluators. This meeting allows Evaluators to gather their thoughts and compile their observations concerning the exercise. This meeting should last no longer than 30-45 minutes. It will usually be completed as responders return equipment to service just prior to the player critique. The Facilitator uses this time to ensure each Evaluator has completed all entries on their respective evaluation forms. Together, the Evaluators can also discuss their observations and clarify what were the strengths and weaknesses of the drill. The Evaluators will also use this time to prepare a brief overview of their evaluation for the player critique. The Evaluators will ultimately turnover their evaluation forms to the Facilitator before leaving the exercise. These comments will be used to develop the official exercise report and to make recommendations for the LEPC.

b. Player Critique. The player critique gives the participants an open forum to identify what lessons were learned as a result of the exercise. This critique should be conducted shortly following the conclusion of exercise play. Time should be given to players so they can recover equipment and gather at a central meeting place.

The design team leader or lead controller will conduct the critique. This person should 'walk-thru' the scenario with the players and have them discuss what actions were taken and why. The critique should generate information regarding the effectiveness of the exercise to test planned procedures and the overall emergency response system. Participants should provide suggestions for improvements to plans and procedures, and for future exercises. Once the players have had a chance to share their findings, the Evaluators should briefly recap their observations and share their recommendations with the group. The players should feel free to respond to those observations if they so desire.

Throughout the critique, the Controller or Design Team should document the comments. This will be used to determine what changes are needed for local procedures, training, resources, personnel, and/or future exercises. The controller will also need to ensure the focus of the critique is on identifying ways to improve operations. The critique should not be used to point fingers, make demeaning comments, or verbally attack any person or group. The controller should begin the critique with a reminder to this affect and re-emphasize the critique's purpose is to gather constructive recommendations.

The type of exercise completed will determine the length of the critique. Table-Top exercises may take 30-60 minutes while Functional and Full-Scale Exercises may take 60-90 minutes. The Controller will need to ensure discussions stay focussed to identify lessons learned. The discussion should not try to completely resolve every issue. Lengthy discussions will distract personnel and ruin the intent of the critique. These issues should be noted and then used to meet at another time to resolve those concerns.

c. Public Debriefing. By law, the LEPC is required to hold a public meeting to discuss the conduct and review of a Full-Scale exercise. The purpose of the meeting is to review the findings generated by the Evaluators and Facilitator. This meeting should be used by the LEPC to outline what follow-up actions may be needed to act on the recommendations made and to decide how modifications to plans or procedures will be accomplished. The meeting is also designed to allow the general public to provide general commentary to the LEPC about the exercise.

The meeting and this discussion can occur at either a regularly scheduled LEPC meeting or at a specifically scheduled meeting. Either way, the LEPC must advertise this public meeting in accordance

with the State's public meeting requirements (ORC 121.22). The date/time selected should not be more than thirty days following the exercise. The Facilitator will attend this meeting in order to address the exercise's recommendations and findings. At this time, the Facilitator should be able to determine which, if any, Objectives were not adequately demonstrated and why. The LEPC will need to coordinate the date/time and location with the Facilitator in advance so there is time to organize these comments. Finally, the Evaluators are not required to attend, but they may be asked to come and answer questions about their observations.

2. Exercise Report. The exercise report is written based on the evaluations of each Objective. The Facilitator completes this report. The Evaluators' comments and the Facilitator's observations are used to determine which Points were considered met and to provide recommendations as needed.

The report will first review the exercise scenario and identify the Evaluators. The report then goes Objective by Objective and identifies the strengths and weaknesses observed. Each Point of Review will be identified as being either Met (successfully demonstrated), Not Met (not adequately demonstrated), or Not Applicable (not pertinent to the test). For each Point identified as Met, the report will collectively highlight the strengths found in that Objective. For each Point identified as Not Met, the report will identify why it was not met and then provide recommendations on how to correct the situation. Recommendations typically include the need to modify local procedures or conduct additional training. The evaluation may even indicate that the exercise design/control caused the Point to be Not Met by responders. For the Not Applicable or for the exercise as a whole, additional comments may be made for those Points considered as Not Applicable. Ultimately, the Facilitator will identify whether the exercise successfully demonstrated each Objective.

This report will be submitted to the LEPC Information Coordinator and the SERC, not later than sixty days from the date of the exercise. The report will recommend that the SERC either Concur or Refuse to Concur with the conduct of the exercise. The SERC will then take action based on this report.

3. Exercise Concurrence. The SERC, by law, will either Concur or Refuse to Concur with the conduct of the exercise. Concurrence means that the SERC believes the LEPC has satisfactorily addressed the exercise requirements under the law. A Refusal means that some portion of the exercise did not adhere to the law or the SERC's exercise rules.

For Concurrence, the majority of Points within each Objective must be identified as 'Met.' In case one or more Objectives are identified as 'Not Met,' the LEPC will be given sixty days to identify how to resolve the concerns identified in the exercise report. As long as the LEPC adequately addresses those issues, the SERC will also Concur with the exercise.

For a Refusal to Concur, the SERC will issue such an order in one of two situations. The first condition occurs when the LEPC is directed to complete a Corrective Action Plan and they do not complete and submit such a plan. The second condition occurs when the LEPC is directed to complete a Corrective Action Plan and the plan does not adequately address the issues presented in the report. In either case, the SERC has no choice but to issue a Refusal to Concur. The corrective action program is designed to give LEPCs an opportunity to address and correct the Points found to be Not Met.

NOTE: The concurrence process has a direct impact on the monies received annually by the LEPC from the SERC. As long as the exercise receives a Concurrence, the LEPC's funding will not be impacted. If the LEPC should receive a Refusal to Concur, the LEPC will lose a portion of its funding in its next grant.

4. Corrective Action Program. As noted above, if the Facilitator has determined that any one Objective was not successfully demonstrated, the Facilitator will direct the LEPC to complete a Corrective Action Plan (CAP). The purpose of this plan is to recognize that certain Points were not adequately demonstrated. It then gives the LEPC a chance to identify how they can/should correct the situation.

After receiving a notice that the LEPC is directed to complete a CAP, the exercise team and/or LEPC should review the exercise report to determine what Objectives were not successfully demonstrated. They should identify which Points were considered Not Met and review why this occurred. They should also review what recommendations the Evaluators and Facilitator made. The LEPC is encouraged to involve the Facilitator in this review so they fully understand what went wrong and how to possibly correct future situations.

Points are typically identified as Not Met when a procedure is overlooked or improperly implemented. It may identify that planned procedures do not reflect actual operations. It may recognize that existing equipment was not adequate to support operations or that personnel are not properly trained to use the equipment. The Point may simply reflect a need to emphasize training on planned procedures or with equipment. The evaluation may even show that the exercise was not properly designed to adequately test a given Objective, or that too many functions were simulated instead of actually being completed. In many cases, there may be a combination of factors that caused a problem. Also, one mistake may have lead to a series of mistakes. In any case, the LEPC should clearly understand what was not accomplished and now outline how they can resolve the issues.

Once the LEPC identifies and understands the shortcomings, they should take steps to correct the situation. If training is required, the LEPC should identify what courses will be offered, at what times, and who should attend. If the procedures need updated, the LEPC should show which procedures will be revised, by whom, and when a future exercise will re-test those procedures. If equipment is required, the LEPC should identify what resources are needed and how responders plan to obtain them. If the exercise design was at fault, the LEPC will outline how similar situations can be avoided. The LEPC may also indicate that one correction can/will actually resolve a number of issues. The LEPC must outline how these corrections are being achieved in a letter to the SERC. It must clearly identify how the issues will be resolved over the next year. At a minimum, the LEPC must address those Points considered Not Met for those Objectives that were not adequately demonstrated.

The LEPC is given sixty days to review the exercise report and submit its CAP. This will be submitted to the Facilitator who generated the original exercise report. The Facilitator will then review the recommendations made and determine if they will adequately resolve the Points considered to be Not Met. If the Facilitator believes the LEPC has identified ways to improve the local program and will implement those recommendations, the Facilitator will recommend that the SERC Concur with the exercise. If the Facilitator believes the LEPC has not taken the proper steps to address the issues or that the LEPC simply did not respond within sixty days, the Facilitator will recommend a Refusal to Concur.

The goal of this process is to identify and initiate ways to improve emergency operations. By doing so, it shows that the exercise has achieved its primary function, which is to improve the local emergency response system. If steps are not taken to correct the procedures, then the exercise was a waste of time.

G. Actual Events

1. Purpose. Actual events are true tests of local plans and procedures. As such, LEPCs are permitted to use an actual event instead of completing an annual exercise. However, the LEPC is only permitted to use two actual events in place of an exercise within the four-year exercise cycle. The LEPC must then complete an exercise in the other two years.

Credit for an actual event is given as either a Functional or Full-Scale exercise. These are hands-on events as is the actual event, and thus will be evaluated in that manner. The Table-Top is a discussion of events and the actual event is not the time to discuss how a response should be conducted.

2. Qualification and Application. The LEPC has thirty (30) days after the conclusion of response activities to decide to use the event as an exercise. This means that once the emergency threat is contained and cleanup/recovery operations begin, the LEPC has thirty days to review the event and submit the LEPC Exercise Notice Form (Tab C).

To make the decision to use the event, the incident must satisfy the same requirements as established for a planned exercise, either Functional or Full-Scale credit. The LEPC should first ensure the actual event was at an EHS Facility subject to the plan, or it involved a transporter of hazardous materials. For facility incidents, the materials involved must be one of the site's annually reported materials. If the response was to a transportation incident, the released materials must be those that were actually in transport as cargo. Fuel spills from "gas tanks" (ie. a truck's saddle tanks or a locomotive's fuel tanks) should not be used as these spills occur on a routine basis and most responders can easily manage the majority of those spills. However, the SERC P&E Committee recognizes that some gas tank spills may pose extraordinary or significant risks. In this case, the LEPC may use a gas tank spill under the following conditions. The incident must involve 100 gallons or more of fuel, create an immediate impact to local drinking waters, necessitate the shutdown of public facilities, force the evacuation and sheltering of the nearby public, require extensive cleanup operations, and involve numerous response

agencies from beyond the local jurisdiction. In this case, Ohio EMA's Hazmat personnel will review the request and determine if the incident response was extraordinary or posed significant risks to the public and responders. In turn, they will determine if the event can be used in lieu of an exercise. If there is some doubt by Ohio EMA, the request will be forwarded to and reviewed by the SERC's P&E Committee. They will then determine whether or not to allow the use of the incident as an exercise.

The LEPC should next discuss which exercise Objectives were thoroughly tested by the response and choose which Objectives are to be evaluated. Before they choose, the LEPC should review the Points of Review for each likely Objective and identify that response functions *did* physically demonstrate each of the Points. If the response only briefly addressed an Objective or spent little time/effort in completing its Points, the LEPC should not choose to evaluate that Objective. Therefore, the LEPC should only choose to evaluate those Objectives that were *completely tested*. Also along this line, the LEPC should review what Objectives they have not yet evaluated or were poorly tested in previous exercises. The event should be used when it helps the LEPC to complete the requirement to test each Objective once in the four-year cycle or to demonstrate that past problems have been addressed and are corrected. Again, the purpose of using an actual event is to ensure the most is gained by using the event instead of conducting an exercise.

Should the LEPC wish to use an actual event to evaluate Objective #14, Containment and Recovery Operations, it is recognized that it may take more than thirty-days to complete some of its Points of Review. In this case, the LEPC should not wait until all of the recovery actions are complete to submit their request. Instead, the LEPC needs to submit the exercise request within thirty-days of when the event occurred even though some of the recovery actions may still be on going. In this case, the Facilitator will be able to review Objective #14 while it is still in progress and this should yield a more complete review of those Points and the local procedures.

Finally to request the use of any actual event, the LEPC must complete and submit the 'Exercise Notice Form.' Again, this form must be submitted to Ohio EMA within thirty-days after the conclusion of *response* activities. The form will first identify the location, date, and time of the actual event. For the Exercise Coordinator space, the form should identify who will be the primary point of contact to discuss the response and to help coordinate the completion of the evaluation. The LEPC will next identify which Objectives the LEPC has chosen to evaluate. The next section requires the LEPC to attach and provide a synopsis of the event. This synopsis should outline the major events and what resources were involved. It should describe the extent of the hazards posed to the public and the environment. To support this, the LEPC should submit response logs that identified response actions taken. If a critique was already completed, the LEPC should include the notes from that meeting. The LEPC can also submit relevant news articles that discussed the event. The goal is to provide the Facilitator enough information to understand what occurred, who responded, what actions were taken, and how the event was resolved. The second page should first check-off what agencies were involved. Next, the Evaluator section should identify the principal players that coordinated the response actions. For example, this should identify the IC, Safety Officer, lead Law Enforcement representative, etc. The Facilitator will interview these personnel in order to complete the evaluation of the event.

3. Evaluation and Concurrence. The Facilitator will complete the evaluation. To do this, the Facilitator will meet with and/or interview the key response personnel. During this review, the Facilitator will question personnel how the event tested the respective Objectives. The Facilitator may choose to use phone interviews to complete this process, or may decide to meet face-to-face with personnel. If a meeting is conducted, the Facilitator may meet individually with personnel or conduct a group meeting. The Facilitator will work with the exercise coordinator identified on the exercise notice to coordinate these meetings. The meetings will be informal and are meant to identify what lessons are to be learned by the response.

Following the interviews, the Facilitator will complete an exercise report based on the observations gathered during the interviews. The report will be completed and submitted to SERC and the LEPC as would be done for any exercise. SERC will then Concur or Refuse to Concur as it would for any exercise.

H. Joint LEPC Exercises

1. Purpose. Joint exercises test the coordinated response to an incident by personnel from two or more LEPC Districts. Some of the following scenarios identify why LEPCs may need to complete a joint

exercise. An EHS Facility may lie on or near the border of two Districts, and a release would require both counties to respond to the emergency. Similarly, a transportation corridor (ie. railroad, highway) may pose a threat that would involve multiple counties. A fire department or Hazmat Team from one District may be the principle responder in the neighboring District, and thus a response would use the resources from both jurisdictions. The joint exercise is then used to show how each LEPC plans to coordinate such a response and to ensure the various response procedures are compatible.

2. Pre-Exercise Considerations. To complete a joint exercise, the exercise design team will need to include members from each District involved in the exercise. The design process is then the same as for any other exercise. The joint team will develop the scenario, outline the major events/expected actions, arrange the participants, and develop the simulation. There are a few situations that the joint team must understand and the following discusses those issues. The joint team should consult with the Ohio EMA Hazmat Planners if they have any question about how to address these concerns.

The first unique concern will be the selection of the exercise type. The joint team should first review what exercise requirements each District needs to complete. The scenario should be developed to support those needs. This joint 'needs assessment' should identify what type of exercise will adequately test those needs. The joint exercise will either be a Table-Top event or a field event. The LEPCs should not use this process when one LEPC wishes to complete a Table-Top exercise when the others will complete a Functional or Full-Scale exercise. The purpose of the joint exercise to exercise together, and this cannot be effectively completed when one group is only talking about their roles while the others are physically accomplishing the tasks. When it comes to completing field exercises, the LEPCs can choose to participate at either a Full-Scale or Functional level. This simply notes one group will have a limited involvement while the others will have more tasks to complete. This will typically occurs when the LEPC responds into a neighboring district as mutual aid. They may only need to evaluate their support in a Functional setting while the others wish to evaluate their roles in a Full-Scale setting.

The next concern is to identify which Objectives will be evaluated by each involved LEPC. Each LEPC can only choose to evaluate an Objective where their personnel have an active role in completing the tasks for that Objective. For example when choosing the 'Response Personnel Safety' Objective, the LEPC's response personnel must be physically participating in the decontamination process, making entry, and/or managing the safety operations. When both LEPCs have response personnel actively involved in the Objective, both LEPCs may use that Objective for exercise credit. When the task is completed using only personnel from one LEPC, then only that LEPC may claim that Objective for credit.

Next, the joint team will need to determine how many Evaluators will be needed to evaluate the various Objectives. For those LEPCs evaluating the same Objective in the same response area, the joint team may elect to use one Evaluator to observe that Objective. That Evaluator's comments and observations will apply to both LEPCs and will be reflected in the exercise reports made to each LEPC. If the functions are completed in various areas, the team will obviously need an adequate number of Evaluators to observe those actions. In the cases when only one LEPC chooses to evaluate a particular Objective, one Evaluator is used and their findings will only apply to that LEPC. Their comments will only be reflected in that LEPC's exercise report. Therefore, the joint team must clearly identify which LEPC is actively involved in completing which task and seeks to evaluate which Objective. This will determine how many Evaluators are needed.

Another concern the joint team must address is the requirement to ensure the Evaluators understand or have copies of the procedures/plans for each LEPC. If a given Evaluator observes the actions of multiple LEPCs, the Evaluator must be provided copies of the procedures and plans for each District. If the Evaluator is only observing one District, then the Evaluator only requires that District's procedures.

Finally, the joint team must complete and submit a separate Exercise Notice (Tab C) for each LEPC. The purpose of this is to identify which Objectives each LEPC will actively complete and should not identify those Objectives being completed by another LEPC. The form will also show which Evaluators are observing Objectives for multiple LEPCs versus only watching an activity for one LEPC.

3. Exercise Conduct and Evaluation. The conduct of the exercise and its evaluation proceeds as it would for any other exercise. The joint team will act as the exercise controllers and will carry out the drill as planned. The Evaluators will complete their tasks as they would in any other exercise.

4. Post-Exercise Considerations. The joint team will conduct a joint critique of the exercise. The critique is run as it would be managed for any other exercise. All players are involved in the process. The Evaluators will share their respective insights with the entire group. The Facilitator will then gather and use those comments to complete an exercise report for each LEPC.

The LEPCs respective reports will highlight those accomplishments and recommendations as they apply to their chosen Objectives. The report will reflect which actions were completed as joint effort or were accomplished solely by that LEPC's personnel. For example when one county chooses Objectives #4-8 and another chooses #5-10, the first report will only reflect #4-8 and the second will reflect #5-10. However, both reports will note that Objectives #5-8 were completed as a joint effort.

Next, the SERC will issue a separate Concurrence or Refusal to Concur order for each LEPC. If an Objective was jointly evaluated for each LEPC and it was determined that the Objective was not adequately demonstrated, each LEPC will be directed to develop a Corrective Action Plan because of that Objective. The LEPCs should work together to address how and why the Objective was not properly addressed and to determine how to resolve the issues. Ultimately, each LEPC will submit their own Corrective Action Plan. The Facilitator will consider those plans independently and make a recommendation to SERC on whether or not the LEPC's corrective actions will adequately address the issues raised. Again, each LEPC will receive their own Concurrence or Refusal to Concur.

Next, if the exercise was a Full-Scale exercise then there must still be a public critique. If only one LEPC requests Full-Scale exercise credit, then only that LEPC needs to complete the public meeting. If multiple LEPCs request Full-Scale credit, then they can complete a joint public meeting or conduct their own respective public debriefing. Each LEPC must ensure the Facilitator attends their public debriefing if separate meetings are conducted.

The key to joint exercises is to ensure the exercise is developed, completed, and evaluated together. Also, the joint team should ensure the established exercise requirements are adhered to. If there are any questions during the process, the joint team should bring this to the Facilitator's attention as soon as practical.

SECTION III – STATE EXERCISES

A. General Overview

At least annually, the SERC shall jointly exercise its Hazardous Materials Plan in conjunction with a LEPC exercise. They will abide by the same rules established for LEPCs to develop and conduct an exercise. After the exercise, the SERC will review and revise the State Plan as needed.

LEPCs are encouraged to participate in this joint exercise. It will allow the local community to identify how and when they will utilize state agencies to manage a local chemical emergency. Local and state personnel can practice how they interface during a response. They will each gain a better appreciation for who is responsible to do what. They will learn each other's abilities and limitations to control and resolve a release. This will ultimately lead to improved plans and support during actual incidents.

B. Exercise Design

The SERC's Planning and Exercise Committee will take the lead for SERC to organize the annual exercise. They will first work to solicit and identify one or more LEPCs to participate in a joint exercise. Together, the SERC and each participating LEPC will organize a joint exercise design team. This joint team will then design and develop the joint exercise.

The joint team will follow the same procedures as addressed Section II's discussion on Joint Exercises. The team will work to identify what Objectives the State and LEPCs wish to evaluate. Together they will identify the type of exercise to complete and the level of involvement by each group. The scenario will then be developed that most realistically tests those needs. As the joint develops the drill, the team will need to closely coordinate who is to participate. The team will need to control the size and scope of the event so that it does not become too large and unrealistic.

The team will also need to focus some attention on how they present the scenario to the players. They need to clearly identify where exercise play will commence and thus determine how many exercise Controllers are needed. When it comes to choosing Evaluators, the joint team must ensure the Evaluators understand the procedures for the LEPC they will evaluate. The same is required for those who will evaluate the state functions. They will need copies of the State Plan and the unique SOPs for the participating state agencies.

C. Exercise Conduct

The conduct of the exercise should proceed as it would for any other exercise. The joint team will act as the exercise Controllers and will see that the exercise is carried out as planned.

D. Exercise Evaluation, Critique, and Report

Ultimately, each participating LEPC will need to submit a completed Exercise Notice to Ohio EMA. That Facilitator will observe the activities for the respective LEPC and submit an exercise report as they would for any other LEPC exercise. The team will also need to identify who will act as the Facilitator to review the conduct of the State agencies.

Following the exercise, the participating will complete a joint player critique. The Controllers will need to ensure both State and local personnel are involved. Together, they can review what steps are needed to improve coordination during a response. Evaluators for the State and LEPC should share their observations at the end of the critique.

The respective Facilitators will then gather those Objective forms needed to develop an exercise report. This State's Facilitator will complete an exercise report specifically for the State agencies. This will be submitted to the SERC for their concurrence. The LEPC's Facilitator will complete and submit that exercise report as they would for any exercise. If an Evaluator is observing both State and LEPC play, copies of those Objective forms must be provided to the respective State and LEPC Facilitators.

TAB A: EXERCISE OBJECTIVES IN REVIEW

Overview of the Exercise Objectives

The SERC's Planning and Exercise Committee has developed fourteen (14) Exercise Objectives. Of these, nine (9) are considered to be 'Core' Objectives. Each LEPC will use these standard Objectives to evaluate their annual exercise. The LEPC must evaluate each Objective at least once within the four-year exercise cycle. The Objectives were developed based on the planning criteria that the LEPC plans must address. They are designed to evaluate the knowledge and ability of those with planned responsibilities to operate within the framework of the plan and their SOPs.

The following are the fourteen (14) Objectives. (● Indicates a Core Objective)

- #1: Initial Notification of Response Agencies
- #2: Incident Assessment
- #3: Incident Command
- #4: Emergency Operation Centers
- #5: Resource Management
- #6: Communications
- #7: Response Personnel Safety
- #8: Population Protective Actions
- #9: Emergency Public Information
- #10: Traffic and Access Control
- #11: Shelter Management
- #12: Emergency Medical Services
- #13: Hospital Services
- #14: Containment and Recovery Operations

Review of the Individual Exercise Objectives

To better understand each Objective, this Tab will give the reader an individual review of the intent and focus of each Objective. The discussion of each Objective is broken down into four parts: **Basic Intent**, **Discussing the 'Points of Review'**, **Exercise Design and Control**, and **Evaluation Needs and Issues**.

The **Basic Intent** section will provide the Objective's established definition. The section may further clarify the purpose and scope of the Objective. The section may identify unique laws, training, or specific procedures that apply to the Objective.

The next section, **Discussing the 'Points of Review'**, tries to clarify what the Points are asking. The Points are provided and then the section discusses how the exercise participants may demonstrate the Point. It may also provide examples of what tools or techniques are used to implement a given Point. The Exercise Design Team may use these when developing the exercise scenario to ensure exercise play will address each Point. As preparedness tool, response personnel are encouraged to review these

Points beforehand to ensure their procedures do address the Points. This review will also help them prepare for an exercise. Next, the Evaluators should also review these in case they are not sure what to look for when evaluating each Point. Overall, the evaluation must show that a majority of Points were adequately demonstrated for each chosen Objective.

It is important to note that *the comments provided are not the only techniques* in which a Point can be addressed. These are suggestions only! Other options may be used and are encouraged if they accomplish the Point.

Next, the **Exercise Design and Control** section addresses various concerns the Exercise Design Team may need to consider when developing the exercise so that the Objective is completely tested. It may provide techniques on how the team can control the exercise flow. Examples may be provided from past exercise that help explain why a certain technique should or should not be used to test the Objective or one of its Points.

Finally, the **Evaluator Needs and Issues** provides guidance on who would be best suited to be an Evaluator for the particular Objective. The section also provides guidance on how to evaluate the Objective. And finally, the section identifies other Objectives that could be evaluated along with the given Objective.

Conclusion

In preparing for an exercise, these pages need to be reviewed by the Exercise Design Team so that the exercise fully tests the Objectives chosen by the LEPC. Exercise participants are encouraged to review this section so that they understand the criteria being used to evaluate how they implement their local procedures. And of course, Evaluators need to review these pages in advance so they have a better perspective on what to evaluate while observing the Objective.

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| <p>Objective #1: Initial Notification of Response Agencies Demonstrate the ability to notify response and support agencies, and to mobilize emergency personnel.</p> |
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Basic Intent This Objective addresses the ability of dispatch and/or response personnel to receive notice of an incident and in turn promptly mobilize response and support personnel.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. *Were procedures followed to document the initial incident call and to determine if hazardous materials were involved?*

Spillers (facility or transportation) are required by law to notify the local fire department and the LEPC's Emergency Coordinator. This notification will also provide specific information about the release and its hazards. This information should be documented and passed along to the initial responders. Some plans/SOPs utilize a special form to record this information. Also, personnel receiving the call must be alert to recognize or question if the accident also involves a hazardous material. For example, it may be a fire at a regulated facility or a vehicle accident involving a tractor trailer/tanker.

2. *Were appropriate personnel (response and/or support) initially notified of the emergency?*

Communities have usually pre-determined what assets will be dispatched to a chemical incident. In addition, some plans outline a tiered-notification system (levels I, II, and III) in which agencies can be quickly dispatched based on the size and scope of the incident. This system alerts responders as well as support agencies such as the American Red Cross (ARC), local Hospitals, and/or state agencies. Or, local procedures may require a specific response or support group (ie. Chemtrec, Hazmat Team, toxicologist) be notified if chemicals are involved.

3. *Did this notification occur in a timely manner?*

The question of whether or not notifications are made in a timely manner may be somewhat subjective. Evaluators will need to distinguish if the call was delayed because other activities took precedence or if the notification was simply overlooked. Also, the initial notification does not stop after the first units are dispatched. As the initial size-up of the scene is completed, responders will determine the need to alert additional resources. The notification process continues to be evaluated as dispatchers alert those additional assets. Also, some support agencies (ie. Hospitals, ARC shelter operators, EOC staff) may require an advance alert in order to prepare their personnel to support operations. Responders should ensure they have been given an advance call if the situation warrants.

Were call lists/run cards/points of contacts current, including alternates?

Local contact numbers, call lists, run cards should be current. The contact names and numbers that are most likely not current or available are for specialty resources or those coming from outside the area. For example, Hazmat Teams, Cleanup Contractors, and State Agency numbers may randomly change. If this information is not current, personnel will need to show how they can obtain the correct numbers and make the notification. For any contact, there should be more than one number or manner to contact the person or agency.

5. Were procedures followed to verify that notifications were completed?

If the initial call is not successful in reaching someone, personnel should routinely try to contact the person or attempt to contact another person. There should be some limit as to how many tries will be attempted before going to the next contact. As calls are received, dispatch personnel should have a log, form, or some technique to document when the call was received and any significant reply.

6. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

Procedures to document the initial call and make subsequent notifications are required to be part of the LEPC plan. Or, local procedures in the 911 center or individual dispatch locations should address this process. Local procedures should not have multiple agencies making the same contact (ie. the same initial call to Ohio EPA by 911, on-scene IC, and law enforcement dispatcher).

Exercise Design and Control Issues

Since this Objective is fairly straightforward, there are only a few issues to address when it comes to the exercise design and control. The design simply requires a scenario. In fact, the scenario can be as detailed or vague as the Design Team wishes. The initial call will generate a response sufficient to evaluate activities.

For Table-Top exercises, the design team will simply need to have a dispatcher participate and address how procedures are implemented. If more than one site dispatches, the design team should invite personnel from each location to participate. And in this case, the exercise may be able to identify and clarify differences in dispatch procedures.

For Functional and Full-Scale exercises, there will need to be sufficient dispatch personnel available to manage the exercise and still handle the normal/real emergency calls. Also, the controllers and dispatchers should be briefed as to how/when to call-off the exercise or put it on hold should a real emergency require the dispatchers' full attention. Next, dispatchers and responders will need to be briefed on what assets can/will be called versus which agencies will only require a simulated notification. This is equally important for agencies that are called for technical information such as Ohio EPA or Chemtrec. And if this type of asset is not playing and responders require the

technical information, controllers will need to be ready to answer and provide the requested information.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

To evaluate this Objective, the Evaluator needs to be someone who understands the local dispatching process. The person can be either a local responder or someone from within the dispatching service.

This Objective is typically evaluated at the central dispatch facility. This is the easiest location from which to observe the various Points of Review. If more than one dispatch facility is likely to be used, there should be an Evaluator in each dispatch location. If the design team chooses to evaluate this Objective from the scene, the team will need to provide the Evaluator(s) with a means to monitor the notifications. This can be complicated if resources are alerted on multiple channels or via methods other than radio. In either case, the Evaluator(s) will need to be briefed on which assets will be participating, in what order they are likely to be alerted, and by what method they are notified. This will allow the Evaluator(s) to objectively evaluate if planned procedures were followed or not.

This Objective can be evaluated along with Objective #6.

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| <p>Objective #2: Incident Assessment Demonstrate the ability to identify the hazardous material(s) involved in the incident and to assess the associated health and physical hazards.</p> |
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Basic Intent The ability to recognize that chemicals are present and then determine how they will harm personnel is the focus of this Objective. Responders should have received the 'Awareness' level of training which teaches them how to recognize the presence of chemicals. This will require personnel with 'Operations' training to determine what are the physical and health hazards associated with the released materials. Responders will show how they use this information to develop an action plan and safely implement protective actions.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. *Did response personnel safely approach the incident scene?*

When initially notified of a chemical release, personnel must make their approach safely and avoid pulling up next to the incident. Typically, this is uphill and upwind. If the initial call does not include the mention of hazardous materials, personnel need to recognize the hazards *and* move to a safe location.

2. *Were proper steps taken to safely obtain information about the material(s) involved before committing resources and beginning response operations?*

Once on-scene, first responders need to identify what is the scope and nature of the hazards involved. This should include the following information:

- Type of container or package involved,
- Extent of damage to the container,
- Use placards or labels to identify materials,
- Physical state of materials (gas, liquid, solid/powder),
- Quantity of materials being released or likely to be released,
- Materials involved or exposed to other hazards (fire, other chemicals).

3. *Did personnel consult proper technical guidance/resources to obtain relevant information about the hazards involved?*

Response personnel are initially trained and should show their ability to use USDOT's North American Emergency Response Guidebook. However, this provides only initial guidance and should be supplemented by more technical guidance. This technical assistance can come from any number of sources such as computer programs (ie. Cameo, Toxnet), shipping papers, MSDSs, pre-planned hazard analyses, chemical handbooks/dictionaries, or chemical specialists (ie. Chemtrec). Assistance can also come directly from the spiller or company that uses the material.

4. Did personnel identify the potential movement and impact posed by the released materials on-site and to adjacent areas?

Movement of the material and its physical/health hazards will dictate what impact is posed. If the material is a gas or gives off a gas as it evaporates, the gas may be toxic or may displace oxygen. It might be flammable or explosive. Responders should note how far a gas may move downwind and determine what locations may be at risk. Solids or liquids may not travel far but can pose an adsorption and ingestion hazard if they come in direct contact with personnel. Responders should also consider the impact to the environment such as how it may contaminate nearby water sources or threaten animal and vegetation life.

5. Did personnel use the assessment to identify proper response actions to be taken by personnel?

Before committing any resource or taking a response action, responders must determine what action they can safely implement. The assessment should identify the most prudent means of containing the release. This might include actions to dike, neutralize, absorb, or dilute the material. Caution should also be taken that the response action does not cause a greater hazard, such as putting water on a water-reactive material. Or the IC may decide that no action is the safest course of action to take, and let the material simply dissipate or burn off. Finally, responders must identify what resources such as PPE, absorbents, and neutralizing materials are readily available to implement the response action. They should also determine what will be done until those resource arrive on-scene if not already there.

6. Did personnel use the assessment to properly develop protective actions for the public and the environment?

The likely protective actions include evacuation, sheltering-in-place, or a combination of the two. Responders need to consider the benefits and limitations of each method in order to identify which technique will best minimize the hazard's affect. A toxic cloud may disperse before an evacuation can be organized, or it may linger and thus expose each person as they evacuate. Sheltering-in-place may have people trapped in their homes with no heat or air conditioning thus creating other medical emergencies.

7. Was the incident assessment transmitted in a timely manner to other response personnel and support groups?

Personnel on-site and off-site need to know what hazards are present. On-site, the IC or Safety Officer must brief personnel on the signs of exposure, the wearing of protective equipment, and the short and long-term health effects. Off-site, hospitals will need this information so they can protect their personnel and equipment. The Red Cross will also need this information if needed to open shelters and care for evacuees.

8. Were proper strategies/tactics used to continuously assess and monitor the hazards?

The hazards posed will change as the incident progresses. As such, the IC or Safety Officer must show how they will identify when/if significant changes occur in the hazards posed. Physical techniques may include air monitoring, water testing, or litmus swipes. It may require responders to consult technical experts from the spiller, OEPA, or local health department. It may occur when the material is returned to its proper storage conditions.

9. *Were changes in the incident assessment transmitted in a timely manner to other response personnel and support groups?*

As changes are identified, groups on and off-site supporting the response must be briefed. The changes may be either an escalation or de-escalation of the hazard, or may be a change in the protective actions. Most often, off-site groups (hospitals, traffic controllers, shelters) are not kept informed of the changes.

10. *Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?*

By law, LEPC plans shall contain the methods and procedures to implement this process. Also, some response agencies may have outlined this process in their own SOPs. As a side note, personnel trained only to the Awareness level should recognize they are not trained to implement this process and must alert/rely on other agencies to complete this task.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

To effectively test this Objective, the scenario and its hazards must be clearly presented to the players. The scene must resemble an actual incident as close as possible, otherwise they may respond to the incident differently than intended. The scenario and exercise controllers should provide sufficient clues (smoke, flowing liquids, bodies, placards, etc.) for players to determine what materials are involved. Controllers should be prepared to verbally 'illustrate' the scene for the players and ensure they 'see' what the incident is supposed to be (the green dye is actually an oily sheen, the white smoke is actually a gas leak not a fire, the fumes smell like ammonia). Controllers will also need to provide responders feedback on whether or not their actions have changed the release (the valve did not close, the leak is from is a jagged gash not the valve).

Also during the initial assessment, players may ask for technical assistance from an agency or person who is not playing (CHEMTREC, neighboring county Hazmat Team, OEPA). The design team should ask these resources to participate in the exercise. If they cannot play, the exercise controllers will have to act as that resource and address the responder's questions/needs. Or, the controllers may decide to tell the players that the resource is not available and that they will have to make due without them.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

Evaluators for this Objective need to have a good Hazmat response background. They should be trained to at least the Operations level and preferably to the Technician level. These Evaluators should typically come from the Fire service, or a member of a Hazmat Team. A Facility representative may also qualify if they have experience in Hazmat safety and response.

During the response, the Evaluator should observe how the first responders arrive on-scene. The Evaluator should join those responders and 'listen-in' to their evaluation of the scene. Throughout, the Evaluator should float between the command post, Hazmat team, and/or operations area to effectively see how the assessment is made and coordinated. To make Evaluators more 'mobile,' the design team may wish to furnish these Evaluators with communications that can monitor the coordination process.

Also, this Objective should not be evaluated from within an EOC. The EOC may support the assessment process, but this Objective is to be accomplished at the scene.

This Objective can be evaluated along with Objectives #3, 7, or 8.

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| <p>Objective #3: Incident Command Demonstrate the ability to implement and Incident Command System and effectively direct, coordinate, and manage emergency response activities.</p> |
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Basic Intent OSHA's Hazwoper standard (1910.120(q)(3)(I)) notes that the 'senior official' on-scene will control the emergency with a site-specific Incident Command System (ICS). Ohio law (ORC 3737.80) notes the chief of the fire department is responsible for primary coordination of the on-scene activities. Therefore, this Objective will look at how fire personnel implement a command system. It will also note how well other agencies work within and understand that command system.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. Was an Incident Command System (ICS) clearly identified?

Incident command begins as the first piece of equipment arrives on-scene and it expands to meet the needs of the incident response. ICS positions should be assigned as the situation requires (ie. Operations, Decon, Staging, Logistics, Medical). It should be noted that OSHA requires a Safety officer be designated for every Hazmat incident. Liaisons from outside agencies (ie. law enforcement, EMA) should be included in the command system as required.

2. Was the Incident Commander (IC) clearly identified and effectively in charge?

The senior fire official who is first on-scene will become the IC. The IC will need to clearly establish the response priorities and then delegate the functional responsibilities to responders. Once the functions are delegated, the IC's job is to coordinate activities and not to get involved with the individual 'hands-on' assignments. The IC should remain within the command post and be easily accessible to the command positions.

3. Was a command post (CP) established and clearly identified?

The size and actual location of the command post will depend on the incident. Small incidents may be controlled from the front seat of a vehicle while larger incidents may utilize a formal command vehicle. Its location should also allow easy access for key personnel working in the cold zone but remain isolated from outside distractions (media, the public). Some departments use techniques such as posting green lights/flags to identify the CP. The CP must be able to communicate with agencies that are both on- and off-site. Liaisons coordinating off-site activities should also be located within the CP environment.

4. Was the command post adequately staffed and equipped to support emergency operations?

Staffing the command post depends on the incident size and complexity. For most incidents, the IC will need a liaison from the external agencies who are coordinating actions off-site. These liaisons typically include law enforcement for traffic control, public information officers for media/public relations, and possibly an EMA official for

logistical support. The CP staff may include the spiller so they can provide input on how to control or cleanup the release. In larger incidents, the IC should have administrative support to document actions taken, manage communications, and account for resources on-site.

5. Did the command staff identify the need to activate an Emergency Operations Center?

The goal of the ICS is to manage the on- and off-site activities. If the IC believes the *off-site* events are distracting from his/her ability to effectively manage the *on-site* events, the IC should request the activation of an EOC. An EOC should be tasked to coordinate off-site activities and to support the IC's logistical needs. Typically, county plans rely on the local EMA Director to coordinate with the IC and decide where/when to activate an EOC. It should be noted that some EMA offices are proactive and may open an EOC before the IC formally requests one. In this case, the EOC must ensure the IC knows this has occurred and then take its direction from the IC.

6. Was decision-making and resource allocation coordinated with on-site personnel?

The IC needs to ensure personnel are in the information loop. The IC should be in regular contact with command positions who in turn keep individual personnel informed. The command positions will provide feedback back to the IC as to what actions are completed and what additional actions or resources are needed.

7. Was decision-making and resource allocation coordinated with off-site agencies?

Off-site agencies need to be routinely updated on actions taking place on-scene in order to effectively manage their own tasks. For example, hospitals will need to know what hazards are present, how many victims are involved, and to what extent personnel are contaminated. This may alter the actions they take to effectively carry out their duties. They may also determine they cannot support the scene or that other hospitals are needed. The IC for small incidents may accomplish this coordination or it will be delegated to specific liaisons or command positions.

8. Were arriving mutual aid resources adequately briefed on the emergency conditions before they were assigned functions?

The IC is required by law to ensure arriving personnel are briefed on the hazards, what duties are to be performed, and what level of PPE should be worn. This in-briefing may occur when the aid arrives at the staging location, as personnel report to their functional area, or it may be done directly by the IC. In either case, command personnel must ensure personnel are fully briefed on their tasks and to whom they coordinate their activities. Conversely, the arriving mutual aid should inform commanders as to what tasks they are not equipped or trained to accomplish.

9. Was an accountability system implemented to track personnel and resources on-site?

The IC shall limit the number of personnel at the site, especially in those areas of potential or actual chemical exposure. In order to accomplish this, the IC should have a system in-place that identifies who has been assigned to work in which areas. Also, the IC should use this system to identify when to obtain additional or replace personnel (EMS squads, traffic controllers) and equipment (absorbents, SCBAs). The system should also show when a given asset was released from service on-site.

10. Was incident information updated and shared between command staff and on-site personnel?

The IC should be in regular contact with command positions who in turn provide feedback as to what actions are completed and what additional actions or resources are needed. Significant changes in events (spill worsens, all victims rescued) should be immediately shared with the IC. This will allow the IC to set new response priorities or modify protective actions off-site.

11. Was incident information routinely updated and shared with off-site agencies?

Significant changes in events on-scene will likely alter the actions taken off-site. The IC should immediately share this information with those sites (hospitals, ARC shelters, EOC, traffic controllers). This will allow those groups to re-prioritize their actions (open a new shelter, establish new traffic detours) or to begin recovery operations. Conversely if off-site groups modify their priorities, they will need to inform the IC so that a response action is not overlooked, duplicated, or thought to be still in progress.

12. Were records kept documenting response actions taken?

A running record of key actions taken and decisions made should be maintained. This task may be accomplished in the command post or by each functional commander (Safety, Operations, etc.). These notes can be used to see that tasks are completed and not overlooked, or to re-define response needs. They can be used to see that required calls were made or that needed assets were mobilized. As the incident comes to a close, the command personnel can use the notes to address issues such as cost recovery, equipment accountability or replacement, and accident investigation.

13. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

The LEPC plan is required to address these concerns. Further, NFPA's 1500 and 1600 standards recommend that fire protocols include an incident command system as the basis for incident management to include specific roles, titles, and responsibilities. If there is not a common system used in the county, individual departments should have these points addressed in their SOPs. As a side note, OSHA requires those who will assume command of the incident must have Incident Command training.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

This Objective typically does not require any special design considerations. It is noted that OSHA requires anyone likely to take charge of a Hazmat response must have had

IC training. Therefore, the senior fire officials should have had this training and should be able to adequately manage the exercise. In fact, many exercises like to use the junior officers to manage the exercise and give them a chance to implement an ICS. The design team should include a fire department official trained in IC as part of the design team to ensure the scenario addresses these points. This official can then act as the Controller on-scene to see that the IC and the command positions lead the exercise in the right direction.

As a side note, counties should refrain from using the same fire department in each exercise. This means other departments are not given a chance to evaluate how their personnel manage a response. Counties need to ensure each local fire department has a chance to be evaluated under this Objective.

As for exercise control, controller input is usually needed only to make sure responders understand the scenario. A controller should be available to the IC and the various commanders to clarify what the incident scenario is and what hazards are being simulated. For example, the green smoke is not a fire, or the closer you get to the incident the more suffocating the odor becomes. The controllers will also need to let the IC, or the other officers, know if a response action worked or not. However, the controller will not guide the IC through the exercise.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

The Evaluator for this Objective needs to be trained in Hazmat Operations and the ICS. One technique is to use a senior fire official from a neighboring department as the evaluator. This person will be familiar with the local fire procedures and should give an objective evaluation. Another option is to use a fire official from a nearby county. Their feedback should be unbiased toward local opinions and may provide responders insights on techniques not used or considered locally.

For field exercises, the Evaluator will initially need to be located in a position to observe as the first pieces of equipment arrive and establish command. The Evaluator can observe how junior or non-fire personnel first manage the scene, and then observe how they transfer command to senior fire officials. The Evaluator can then shadow the IC throughout the exercise, but should also observe those who were assigned various command positions. As this activity may be accomplished away from the IC and CP, the Evaluator will need to stay alert as to who is doing what and ensure they can observe each Point. The exercise design team should consider providing the Evaluator with communications equipment so they can listen in to the coordination going on between command positions.

This Objective can be evaluated along with Objectives #2, 7, and 9.

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| <p>Objective #4: Emergency Operations Center Demonstrate the ability to utilize an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to coordinate and support emergency response activities.</p> |
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Basic Intent An EOC is a fixed facility where agencies gather to support the response needs of one or more incident sites and to help coordinate the actions of various off-site organizations. An EOC is commonly activated during a large-scale emergency or a widespread disaster. Each county typically has one location that is designated as the main or primary EOC, and they may have designated a number of sites as possible alternates. This Objective looks at the activation and functional use of such a site and its ability to support field operations.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. Were planned procedures followed for activating the EOC?

The decision to activate an EOC is made in coordination with the IC(s) and with the concurrence of the Chief Elected Official(s) for the affected area(s). Each county's Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) should identify who staffs the EOC, what equipment is available and setup, and how the site is to be operated. Some plans require the full-activation of an EOC regardless of the incident. Some plans establish varying levels of activation and staffing based on the type and size of the incident. In any case, the EOC should be staffed with those agencies who can coordinate actions for the IC(s) and off-site agencies. This includes but is not limited to response agencies, human service groups, utility services, voluntary organizations, and elected officials.

2. Was the activated EOC either the Primary or Alternate EOC as identified in the plan?

EOC locations need to be pre-planned. Typically, counties have one primary EOC and may have one or more alternate sites. The use of a different site is not wise, as no planning has been done to determine if the site is truly suitable for EOC operations.

3. Was an individual clearly identified and effectively in charge of the EOC?

Once activated, the county EMA office is typically responsible to operate and coordinate the actions within the EOC. This is done in conjunction with the EOC's 'executive group' or the chief elected officials for the affected area.

4. Were communications established between the EOC and the incident site(s) in an effective and timely manner?

This is one of the EOC's essential functions. In order to coordinate decision-making, the EOC must establish and maintain communications with the field and support agencies. For example, EOC members may have direct radio or cellular phone communications with their respective agencies in the field. The EOC's location should also be a good reception site to receive radio/cellular traffic or have its radio tower.

Also, the EOC may have dedicated telephones and radios in place. Some EOCs may rely on dispatch centers or amateur radio groups to act as the communications link.

5. Was decision-making and resource allocation effectively coordinated between the key staff within the EOC?

These are essential functions of an EOC. The EOC's representatives may individually track actions and needs for their particular service, but they must also work together to coordinate the overall issues and resource needs of the field. Therefore, EOC representatives should be situated so they can readily gather and share information, set response and recovery priorities, and coordinate actions.

6. Was decision-making and resource allocation effectively coordinated between the EOC and the incident site(s)?

This too is an essential function of the EOC. The incident site will establish its response priorities and notify the EOC for support as needed. EOC members should address and organize that support in a prompt manner. If no input is received from the field, EOC members may need to query the IC or one of the field liaisons to identify what support is needed. EOC members should also try to anticipate what resource needs or response problems may arise. They should discuss these concerns with the CP to see if those issues have been or should be considered.

7. Was incident information routinely updated and shared between the EOC and the incident site(s)?

As the incident changes, the IC will need to update the EOC as to how it changes their support of on-scene operations. Conversely, the EOC should update the scene as off-site tasks are completed or when situations off-site would require changes to on-scene actions.

8. Were the necessary authorities not represented in the EOC readily available and effectively coordinated with in order to implement emergency actions?

The EOC should be staffed so that it insures all response and support needs are being addressed. The EOC should also be large enough to accommodate the pre-planned staffing needs. But when key personnel are not at the EOC, the EOC staff must show they can compensate for those missing personnel or physically coordinate with those personnel at their alternate location. For example, if the Health Dept. cannot send a representative, then either another EOC member must show they can effectively resolve Health Dept. concerns or the EOC will have to coordinate issues directly with/to the Health Dept. office. The County plan will identify who staffs an activated EOC.

9. *Were copies of the Plan and/or SOPs readily available at this location and reviewed (when needed) in support of EOC operations?*

The EOC should have copies of local plans and procedures readily available, or the individual agencies may bring their own. Some plans contain forms used only in a disaster such as emergency proclamations, sample emergency alert messages, or damage assessment forms. Also, EOC members may use these plans to review procedures and thus anticipate response needs. These are essential tools of an EOC.

10. *Was adequate technical guidance (manuals, computer programs) readily available and reviewed (when needed) to support EOC operations?*

The EOC should have access to various technical guides. These guides may include computerized chemical-plume programs, chemical handbooks (USDOT's response guidebook, MSDSs), facility reports/plans, resource databases, county/city/utility service maps, etc. These tools help determine how to best implement or resolve a response issue and are essential tools of an EOC. For example, the CP notes a chemical plume is airborne but they have no on-scene air modeling tools. The EOC can use its Aloha program to estimate the plume for the CP.

11. *Was the facility, and its equipment and displays, adequate to support EOC operations?*

To support operations, the EOC must be equipped to carry out its essential functions. The EOC must have sufficient tables, chairs, and workspace available so as to establish an organized work environment. It must have administrative tools such as paper tablets, pens and pencils, staplers, etc. Dry-erase, chalk, or corkboards need to be available along the walls to allow personnel to display critical information. EOC staff should have pre-scripted forms to document and track essential information. Ideally, the EOC can be equipped with a computer network that allows members to electronically document, print, send, and receive incident related information. A must is to have copiers and fax machines readily available. Televisions and am/fm radios need to be available to monitor local media reports in order to identify and dispel rumors/misinformation. Alternate power and lighting should also be available at the site. These are essential tools for an EOC.

12. *Were records kept to document actions taken?*

Each EOC member should maintain a log of action taken, communications made, and issues resolved. This working ledger will help ensure response issues are being addressed or will act as a reminder as to what actions still must be accomplished. Also, the EOC controller should have a way to show what key events have occurred. This can be shown on one main status board or by sharing the individual event logs. After the incident, this documentation can be used to critique EOC operations and in turn improve its operational procedures.

13. *Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?*

As noted, each County EOP has procedures to open, staff, equip, and operate an EOC. The LEPC's plan is required to address these concerns if it is a stand-alone plan or they should refer to the EOP. The LEPC plan shall clarify how and when an EOC is utilized for chemical incident. It is recognized that the majority of chemical incidents will not require an EOC activation. But when the event is widespread or occurs along with another emergency (flood, tornado, terrorist act), an EOC will be useful.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

SERC rules note that the county's 'primary' EOC will be 'fully activated' and evaluated once in the four-year cycle. The exercise must allow the EOC members to 'physically' use its resources and support operations. Either a Functional or Full-Scale exercise can be used to accomplish this task. Note that a Table-Top exercise will only review procedures but will not test the 'functional' capabilities of the EOC. Therefore, Table-Top exercises can not be used to meet the EOC activation requirement.

This Objective requires that the scenario be severe enough to warrant the activation of an EOC. For a Hazmat only incident, the scenario should be one that makes managing the event solely from the scene near impossible. For example, this may be a release that forces the evacuation of an entire city. The size and impact of this Hazmat only incident will vary from county to county. The other option is to have more than one emergency in progress and involving multiple jurisdictions working with limited assets. For example, a multiple-hazard scenario might involve a flood in the major city that creates a chlorine release at the water treatment plant. This creates an evacuation of an area not impacted by the flood.

For this Objective, the design team can conduct a Functional exercise that only involves the physical activation, use, and evaluation of an EOC. In this case, the design team would create and then simulate a major disaster for EOC members. To do this, a group of exercise controllers would gather in separate room to input the simulated concerns, needs, and problems into the EOC. The controllers will act as the ICs and outside agencies, and will follow a scripted scenario/timeline to create the emergency. The controllers would input messages to the EOC either through real phone and radio communications, or via hand-written messages (simulating the communications). EOC members would then address the inputted messages and respond back to the controllers as needed.

Actual field play should drive the use of the EOC during Full-Scale exercises. This allows the county to identify if responders understand how to use an EOC and to determine whether or not the scenario justifies an EOC. However, the exercise may require some simulated message input if the field play will not fully address response

actions. For example, the scenario may require the EOC to coordinate the activation of two or more shelters but no actual shelters are being opened. The controllers will input messages as if they were the shelters and create shelter problems for the EOC to resolve.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

The Evaluator for this Objective should be knowledgeable in how and why EOC's are used to support emergency operations. Typically, this is an EMA official from a neighboring county or a senior response official familiar with EOCs.

The Evaluator should be looking to see that EOC members are actively pursuing information and anticipating response needs. If there is a lack of activity it typically indicates EOC members are either not receiving/obtaining information from the field, that the scenario does not warrant the use of the EOC, or that EOC members are familiar with the intent of an EOC. The Evaluator will also note how/if the facility is adequately equipped to support EOC operations.

This Objective can be evaluated along with other Objectives #1, 5, 8 and 9. If Objective #1 is to be evaluated in the EOC, EOC members and equipment cannot be pre-staged or setup. The goal for that event is to evaluate how much time and effort is spent physically establishing an EOC.

tab a - exercise objective #4 in review

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Objective #5: Resource Management Demonstrate the ability to identify, mobilize, and manage resources required for emergency operations.

Basic Intent Each incident involves a unique hazard, therefore, responders must carefully identify what resources are needed to contain and control a release. Responders will need to show they can arrange for and obtain the resources specifically required to manage the given scenario.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. Was the ICS/EOC staff knowledgeable of available resources and existing mutual aid agreements?

Communities should have pre-identified what specific types of resources are likely to be needed during a chemical release and should have identified whether these resources are available locally or must be brought from outside sources. Those in charge should be familiar with what assistance is in-place locally and can be quickly mobilized.

2. Were resource lists readily available and did they provide accurate information on resource availability?

Each person cannot remember where every asset is or what is available. Personnel should consult the county's or their department's own resource lists to identify how to obtain needed assets. If these lists are not on-scene, they should be readily available (ie. with dispatchers or in the county EMA office).

3. Were resource needs identified and requested in a timely manner?

As personnel complete the initial scene assessment and develop an action plan, they will identify what assets will be needed. If they are uncertain of what assets are needed, personnel should consult with the spiller. Personnel may also contact state agencies (OEPA, SFM), federal agencies (NRC), or private contacts (CHEMTREC, CHLORNET) to identify what assets may be needed.

4. Were arriving resources effectively integrated into the response effort?

The IC is required by law to ensure arriving personnel are briefed on the hazards, what duties are to be performed, and what level of PPE should be worn. This in-briefing may occur when the aid arrives at the staging location, as personnel report to their functional area, or it may be done directly by the IC. In either case, command personnel must ensure personnel are fully briefed on their tasks and to whom they coordinate their activities. Conversely, the arriving mutual aid should inform commanders as to what tasks they are not equipped or trained to accomplish. This Point should also identify if equipment was integrated such as medical supplies, SCBAs, absorbent pads, etc.

5. *Were procedures taken to identify and secure 'replacement' resources?*

Certain resources are typically used quickly and must be replaced, such as absorbents and diking materials. This also includes response tools such as backboards, medical supplies, and SCBAs. This may even include the need for additional personnel. Command personnel must be alert to identify the need to replace an asset before they run out of a needed resource.

6. *Did the ICS/EOC staff effectively account for and track resources in use?*

Command personnel should have a system in-place that identifies what asset has been assigned to work in which areas. This will help to indicate at what point will local assets be exhausted and create the need to go outside of the community to secure additional resources. The system should also show when a given asset was released from service.

7. *Were records kept to document resources utilized in support of the cost recovery effort?*

The cost of response will typically be the responsibility of the spiller, but it can also be the community's own responsibility. Therefore, command personnel must ensure they have accurate records to show what resources were utilized. Documentation after-the-fact may miss certain assets and thus not recover the cost as anticipated. Also, challenges to the cost will be futile if no records were maintained.

8. *Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?*

The LEPC plan is required to contain a composite statement of specialized equipment that is available within the County for chemical incidents. Departments often maintain their own resource lists. Also, each County EOP typically has a chapter dedicated to Resource Management as well as Tabs that identify available resources.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

First, the exercise should challenge responders to acquire a variety of resources and not just those used for routine emergency calls. The scenario should also vary from year-to-year. This will prevent personnel from becoming complacent in only having to deal with one hazard. This Objective is well suited for the Table-Top setting as it allows personnel to fully discuss what resources are needed and how to obtain them.

Second, the design team should determine what resources would likely be needed to manage the exercise scenario. This will identify what assets must be available to participate in the exercise. Responders with limited supplies may not wish to expend an asset because of the cost to replace the items (booms, class A suits, patch kits). In this case, the design team should consider another scenario, solicit for donated resources, or ensure 'training only' resources are used. Also, the scenario may require responders to utilize assets from outside the community (Hazmat Teams, Chemtrec). The design team should ensure these assets are prepared and able to participate. For example, Chemtrec can support exercises if this is arranged in advance. Hazmat

Teams may wish to use the exercise as training for themselves or to work with personnel they would not normally train with. Finally, the design team needs to determine how many local assets will actually participate. If adequate assets are not available, the design team will need to choose another time to conduct the exercise.

The exercise play of this Objective is greatly influenced by what assets are and are not available. If specific resources are not participating, players will still need to demonstrate how to contact the needed resource. Responders must then determine how to function without that resource. Or in cases where only information is requested (ie. a call to Chemtrec or OEPA for information), controllers can provide that technical assistance. And depending on what other Objectives are being accomplished, controllers can acknowledge that the resource was requested through the proper channels and allow players to respond as if they had the resource (ie. additional booms, absorbents). This simulation should be kept to a minimum, otherwise there is a loss of training and the Objective will be not be completely evaluated.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

Someone who understands the resource needs and availability of assets locally should evaluate this Objective. This can include EMA personnel, Hazmat Team members, or senior first response personnel. The Evaluator should be able to recognize and anticipate what resource requests will be needed for the given scenario.

The Evaluator should observe this Objective by watching the various command positions and how they determine their resource needs. This review should note how personnel work together and coordinate resource needs through the CP or EOC. The key is to see that resource requests are not being duplicated. The exercise design team should brief the Evaluator on those assets that will not be available but will be simulated by the controllers. This will ensure the Evaluator can note that the action was accomplished.

The Objective can be evaluated along with most any Objective, but it is specifically well suited when testing Objectives #3 and 4.

Objective #6: Communications Demonstrate the ability to effectively establish and maintain communications amongst all appropriate response locations, organizations, and personnel.

Basic Intent The ability to communicate during an emergency is commonly noted as the single most challenging aspect of the response. The challenge is not necessarily with the equipment, instead the challenge is in how the people use that equipment. Thus, the ability to effectively communicate with each other depends on how the people use the available equipment. Pre-planning, training, and actual incidents should have identified what radio frequencies, phone lines, and non-verbal signals will be used to manage operations. This applies to on-site personnel as well as between off-site personnel.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. Were response and support organizations able to effectively communicate with each other?

This should determine if each group was properly included into the response system via communications. It should identify if the on-scene communications allowed each group (fire, EMS, law, mutual aid) to communicate with each other or not. This should include outside groups such as state agencies, private contractors, and/or the spiller. It should note that off-site agencies (hospitals, traffic controllers, shelters) were alerted and that a line of communications was promptly established or not. This should see if the IC and the EOC could communicate with each other in an effective manner.

2. Were communications effectively utilized to gather and disseminate information about the incident?

This should identify if personnel properly used the equipment they had to share information. Initially, this looks at how dispatch centers facilitate the communications process and provide first response information. On-scene, the IC is the focal point and thus must establish a communications protocol. This means that individuals know who to contact and that side or long conversations are avoided. Personnel understand who is responsible to coordinate with off-site groups so those two groups are not making the same call. Also, off-site groups should know whom to call on-site for questions, and should not be questioning every action. This should identify if messages are relayed verbatim or were they modified or interpreted by the receiver. Finally, updates of the incident should be made in a timely manner and should go to all involved groups.

3. Were the existing communication links able to handle all necessary traffic?

This should identify if the existing equipment supported or hindered operations. The CP must determine what frequencies should be used, whether it is a tactical frequency, a common channel, or a combination of channels. An EOC should have an adequate number of phone lines and ensure response groups bring their own radio support. Personnel should identify what technique (phone, radio, or relay through dispatch) will be used to contact and inform off-site agencies.

4. Did personnel identify shortfalls in the communications being used and take appropriate steps to alleviate the problems?

This should note how personnel overcame communications problems. Personnel should be able to identify where an equipment incompatibility exists (ie. hi- v. lo-band). They should have a plan to provide or share compatible equipment. They may have to mobilize alternate or back-up communications (ie. amateur radio, mutual aid with a cellular phone provider). Sometimes face-to-face communications or hand signals can overcome an equipment/personnel incompatibility. Other problems that may include poor radio/phone coverage due to location, failing phone batteries, or overloaded dispatch centers. Whoever discovers the problem (ie. dispatch, off-site, CP, EOC) should work to create a solution to the problem.

5. Were backup communication systems effectively integrated into response operations?

Backup or alternate systems can include the use of amateur groups such as RACES, ARES, or CAP. They can as a radio go-between or relay for field personnel and off-site groups. However, responders should ensure these persons are familiar with response procedures or technical language. Personnel may acquire additional cellular phones to supplement existing lines or radios. The incident may require the activation of additional phone lines for an EOC.

6. Were records kept to document the key communication activities?

To assist in managing communications, the command staff should be monitoring transmissions and documenting these conversations. Not every radio or phone conversation needs to be recorded, staff should only note key events. This documentation will show when certain calls were made (ie. to the spiller, OEPA, media). It should be noted that some groups rely on local dispatch centers to track messages. But, these sites may not be able to record every message and they cannot be easily replayed or reviewed by on-scene personnel.

7. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

The LEPC's plan must contain procedures for a reliable and effective communications system between emergency response groups and to the public. Also, many response agencies have their own communications protocols. These procedures and the lessons learned from past incidents should ensure groups effectively communicate amongst one another.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

The exercise design team will need to consider a few issues when exercising this Objective. First, this Objective is meant to evaluate the physical use of equipment. The Table-Top exercise only discusses procedures and does not physically test the equipment's capabilities or limits. This does not adequately 'test' the Objective as intended and thus the use of a Table-Top exercise for this Objective should be avoided.

The next concern deals with how this Objective is physically tested. One school of thought is that the exercise should not congest radio frequencies with exercise

activities. They should carry out the exercise on one frequency and leave the rest available for real emergencies. This also does not permit a complete evaluation of the system. Others say that no emergency ever happens alone and so they should use all available equipment as they normally would. This may lead to confusion over which situation is the real incident and which is the exercise, and who is playing in which situation. The design team must determine which, if any, communication systems will not be utilized and brief players on why it is not to be used. In any case, players should be briefed to initiate each radio/phone call with "This is an Exercise" to avoid any confusion.

Finally if this Objective is to be evaluated solely at an EOC, the design team will need to ensure all of the site's communications capabilities are for use. This includes the activation and use of dormant phone lines, which may need to be specifically activated. Also if there is no field play and this is an EOC Functional exercise, the design team will also need to setup communications to simulate the emergency. For example, controllers with radios will act as the IC, Hazmat Team, Law Enforcement, or other groups who are working in the field. Meanwhile, other controllers with phones act as the Hospital, Shelter, Media, or other applicable agencies. These controllers then act as players to simulate the emergency.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

The Evaluator for this Objective should be familiar with the local response system and know how communications are typically managed for emergencies. Typically, this person should have a fire, law enforcement, dispatch, or EMS background.

If using a single Evaluator, the design team needs to provide them access to radio equipment that can monitor the local frequencies during the exercise. The Evaluator should also move about the various command positions to observe how they manage communications on and off-site. The Evaluator may also need to query players as to who they are routinely talking with if they are using communications other than radios.

Also, the exercise design team may use more than one Evaluator to observe this Objective. Evaluators can be assigned on-scene as well as in the various off-site locations (dispatch centers, EOC). Multiple Evaluators can watch their location more closely and this should generate a more complete review of the communications process.

This Objective can be evaluated along with Objectives #1 and 9. Or, the team may elect to have this Objective evaluated as a second Objective by each Evaluator.

Objective #7: Response Personnel Safety Demonstrate the ability to protect emergency personnel health and safety.

Basic Intent The intent is to ensure response personnel are not placed in a hazardous situation without proper equipment, training, and procedures to safely work on-scene. To implement this, the command structure will need to address certain issues. They must ensure access to the immediate hazard is controlled. They need to identify the hazards and provide the proper protective clothing for personnel. Finally, they need to ensure a decontamination process is in-place to protect those who were exposed to the hazards. The importance of this Objective is reflected in OSHA's emergency response standard (29 CFR 1910.120) and the NFPA's recommended practices for hazardous materials events (NFPA 471, 472, 473, and 1600).

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. Were proper procedures followed so the arrival at the scene did not expose or contaminate personnel to the on-scene hazards?

As the first piece of equipment arrives on-scene, responders should recognize that chemicals are involved. If the initial notification includes information about the hazards, dispatchers should provide this information as they mobilize responders. Vehicles should cautiously approach a known Hazmat scene and stop at a safe distance. No response actions should be taken until the hazards are assessed.

2. Was a Safety Officer clearly identified and effectively in control of site safety?

OSHA requires a Safety Officer be designated for each Hazmat incident. OSHA notes that the Safety Officer is responsible to recognize when personnel are in imminent danger and must take action to alter, suspend, or terminate those activities. The IC may elect to act as the Safety Officer for small incidents, but should delegate this function for large or complex scenarios. The IC needs to ensure personnel on-scene know who the Safety Officer is. This person will need to work closely with the Operations Officer and those who will work within the hazard area.

3. Were hazard zones clearly defined and established in a timely manner?

OSHA notes that the ICS shall limit the number of responders working at the site, particularly in those areas of potential or actual exposure to the hazards. To facilitate this process, the use of control zones is recommended to limit access. This typically involves three zones and they go by a number of names. They are the Hot or Contamination, the Warm or Contamination Reduction, and the Cold or Clean zones. To be effective, responders must establish and define these zones at the beginning of the response. Responders may use flags, cones, or barrier tape to define each zone.

4. *Was access between each hazard zone effectively controlled to ensure no one entered a restricted zone without the proper personal protective equipment (PPE)?*

A formal process must be in-place to ensure personnel do not move between the zones without the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). The Safety, Decon, Operations, or Hazmat Team officers control access. Personnel should be directed to proceed through clearly defined checkpoints. This will ensure personnel do not enter the zones without the proper equipment and they are properly decontaminated as they re-enter the cold zone.

5. *Did personnel identify and provide the appropriate level of PPE based on the hazards?*

OSHA requires that personnel have the appropriate PPE, which includes SCBA if an inhalation hazard is present. The Safety and Operations officers need to consult with the spiller, the shipping papers, MSDSs, or a technical expert to determine what PPE is appropriate. PPE is divided into four categories (A, B, C, D), and the appropriate level depends on the hazard and the work location. The equipment is meant to protect personnel from a vapor and/or physical contact hazard. It should be noted that a firefighter's turnout gear with SCBA provides limited or no protection. The gear can actually absorb the chemical and is difficult to properly decontaminate. The NFPA 471 standard addresses how to determine what type of PPE should be used.

6. *Was the issued PPE utilized only by personnel trained to properly use the equipment?*

Personnel working in the hot and warm zones must be trained to the Operations or Technician level. At a minimum, NFPA's 472 standard notes that personnel with Operations training are qualified to don, work in a defensive function, and doff PPE. Technician training permits a higher level of PPE use and to work in an offensive function. The IC should know his responders' level of training and ability to work in the hazard zones. If not, personnel should be queried so that someone is not assigned a decontamination or entry function if they are not properly trained.

7. *Were personnel entering the warm and hot zones adequately briefed on the hazards, PPE requirements, and expected response actions?*

Personnel must be briefed on the physical and health hazards before beginning a response action. They should understand their expected work function (rescue, containment, decontamination, etc.). The briefing should stress to make minimal contact with the materials and to use the 'buddy-system' while in the zones. The Safety Officer should complete this entry briefing in conjunction with the Operations Officer or Hazmat Team.

8. *Was adequate medical monitoring provided for hot and warm zone personnel?*

Typically, an EMS unit will be assigned to support entry and decontamination personnel. EMS assets should complete baselines on entry members. They should look for signs of heat exhaustion/stress. They should manage the rehabilitation

function for operations personnel. They should also check responders for signs of exposure and any reaction to the materials after they leave the hazard zones. NFPA's 471 standard stresses the need for medical monitoring, while their 473 standard outlines the training EMS personnel should have for working at a Hazmat scene.

9. Was a back-up team identified, suited, and readily available?

The ICS must ensure personnel are available and properly suited as 'back-ups'. These personnel should not be accomplishing other duties, and should be in a position to immediately dress and enter the hazard area. They may be needed to rescue a responder in a hazard zone or be used to replace workers.

10. Were procedures followed to safely account for and track all response personnel on-scene?

This system should have the ability to identify what personnel are engaged in which response functions. It should note what members are in the hazard zones and how long they have been in those areas. Finally, the system should have the ability to immediately notify and evacuate personnel from where an imminent hazard exists.

11. Was an effective means of communications available between the IC, Safety Officer, decontamination personnel, and entry personnel to safely conduct operations?

There should be a clearly established means of communications between those in the hazard zones and back to the cold zone. This can be accomplished through specialized communication sets or the use of department radios on a dedicated/tactical channel. As a backup, personnel should have an understood set of visual and verbal signals. An emergency evacuation signal should also be briefed or understood.

12. Was there an effective process used to determine whether personnel and equipment were contaminated?

The type and extent of contamination depends on the physical characteristics of the chemicals and how they cause a contamination. The amount of contamination also depends on how/if responders come into contact with the materials and for how long. Personnel and equipment may be exposed to the materials but are not necessarily contaminated. Contamination means the material remains on the person or equipment. Visual observations, monitoring devices, or wipe sampling are techniques to determine the extent of contamination.

13. Were proper decontamination techniques chosen and implemented in a timely fashion?

A decontamination system must be in-place before responders enter the hazard area. The ICS must identify the most effective means to remove and contain the contaminant. The process can be the physical removal of the chemical (washing, vacuuming, or absorption). It can also be the chemical reduction of the hazard (degrade, neutralize, disinfect, solidify). An emergency or gross decontamination can be used to support an immediate rescue. NFPA's 471 standard discusses this topic in detail.

14. Were all personnel and their equipment properly decontaminated?

Decontamination methods vary in their effectiveness. Personnel should have a defined method to see that contaminants have been removed. Personnel should also understand how or if a secondary contamination hazard exists.

15. Was anything that could not be decontaminated properly identified and isolated?

Personnel must identify what items could not be decontaminated. Some equipment may be simply disposed, however, equipment such as shovels, SCBAs, or boots may be needed for future operations. Personnel should have pre-identified how to properly clean those items or determined that the items will be disposed. Mechanical and electrical equipment will require a thorough inspection to determine its ability to return to service.

16. Were contaminated wastes controlled and properly held for later disposal?

Those materials used to decontaminate must be collected and contained for proper disposal. Overpack drums may be used to contain the materials. If in doubt, responders should consult the spiller, a cleanup contractor, or OEPA on how to properly handle these materials.

17. Were provisions made for personnel to receive rest and rehabilitation?

The ICS needs to provide entry and decontamination members a suitable rest and rehab system. NFPA's 471 notes this should include medical evaluation and treatment, food and fluid replacement, and relief from climatic conditions. Fatigue or heat exhaustion will likely be the greatest hazard.

18. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

NFPA's 471 standard notes that an emergency plan should outline these safety procedures in accordance with OSHA's requirements. OSHA allows departments to use the LEPC's plan if it addresses these issues. The LEPC plan must contain this information or it will rely on the individual departments' procedures.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

The design team needs to ensure that the hazard scenario and scene present a realistic incident. There should be sufficient clues and /or visual aids present to allow responders to identify the hazards. For field exercises, the use of a smoke generator can simulate a toxic gas cloud or a colored-water can simulate a corrosive liquid. Exercise controllers should also be available to provide verbal descriptions of the scene to responders so they clearly understand what the scenario is. These aids should ensure responders react properly to the scenario.

Next, the design team needs to discuss what actions will be taken should a player disregard a safety issue or their action results in an unsafe situation. First if the action would cause an **actual** injury (two people carrying a backboard when four are required),

the controllers must obviously stop and correct the event. Evaluators should also be briefed to watch for and prevent unsafe actions. The issue should be quickly corrected, debriefed, and the exercise should be continued. Second if the action poses a **simulated** hazard (a player approaches a simulated airborne hazard without SCBA or puts finger into simulated corrosive liquid), the controllers may wish to make that player a new victim. The player would be debriefed on why the action was unsafe and then would be made be a victim needing rescue/treatment. Or, the controllers can simply make a mental note of the event and then debrief the action with the Evaluators and players after the fact as a 'lesson to be learned.'

Finally, controllers may choose to suspend some portion of the exercise play in the interest of time or safety. For example, limited class B training suits may be available for the exercise. In this case, controllers may allow a few players to initially suit up and demonstrate they know how to properly don and work in the PPE. After this is shown, controllers can allow players to remove the gear and continue the exercise with simulated PPE.

Overall, allowing too much simulation often hampers this Objective. Simulation does not demonstrate that personnel can safely implement these procedures. Nor does it allow personnel to receive valuable hands-on training. The design team should ensure there is ample time, equipment, and personnel to fully demonstrate this Objective.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

The Evaluator for this Objective needs to have a working knowledge in response safety. The person may be a Hazmat Team member, a Facility safety supervisor, or a trained first responder. The person should be trained at least to the Operations level and preferably to the Technician level. They should also understand OSHA's and NFPA's requirements in regards to site safety.

In conducting the evaluation, the Evaluator should shadow the Safety and Operations officers. The Evaluator should also observe how a Hazmat Team interacts with the local response system. Also, the Evaluator should follow entry and decontamination personnel as they move in and out of the hazard zones. The goal is to see that personnel are thinking about the hazards before committing themselves to a response action. The best action may just be to do nothing. The Evaluator may need to query various players to see if they have received information about the health hazards, what are the contamination hazards, what PPE is required, and what actions should be taken to prevent unwanted exposures to the materials.

This Objective can be evaluated along with Objectives #2 or 14.

Objective #8: Population Protective Actions Demonstrate the ability to identify and implement appropriate protective actions based upon projected risks posed to the public.

Basic Intent To develop protective actions, responders must promptly assess the severity of the hazard and the impact it poses the general public. The Objective focuses on the decision-making process, the implementation of the actions, and the support needed by special populations.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. Did personnel determine how geographical areas could be at risk?

Responders need to clearly identify the physical and health hazards of the materials. This will determine how these hazards could impact the surrounding area. They should identify the risks posed to the public and environment. It may be an airborne toxic, or it could be poisonous liquid flowing into a nearby storm sewer. The toxicity may be a factor, but the explosive nature may pose a greater risk. Personnel should know if it may poison crops, kill wildlife, or contaminate well water. Also, responders should determine how long this impact would last. It may last for days, it may disperse quickly, or it may exist until it has been physically removed. Liquids may evaporate slowly or may drift for some distance before the toxins dissipate.

2. Did personnel determine which geographical areas could be at risk?

Is the release in a congested urban or residential area, or is the area unpopulated or a farmer's field? Personnel should identify how widespread and how far the hazard may spread. They should determine how the topography (rolling hills, open fields) affects the movement or impact of the released materials. They should identify if the material will collect in low-lying areas (heavy gases such as propane).

3. Was an appropriate protective action decision made in a timely manner, based on the risks posed and the area to be impacted?

Based on hazards and the surrounding area, responders must then decide what actions will best protect the public and environment. Responders can evacuate the area, have people shelter in-place, or use a combination of these actions. Responders should also consider the impact that the time of day and season has on the protective action. There may not be enough time to evacuate. To shelter in-place during the cold of winter or heat of summer may create a greater hazard. They should also determine if this is going to be a short-term incident or if it requires a long-term isolation and restoration of the area.

4. Was the protective action decision implemented in a timely manner?

Which action is chosen will be influenced by whether or not responders can safely

implement the action. If evacuating, responders may be exposed to a hazard and thus may need to wear PPE. There may not be enough trained personnel to accomplish this task. The IC will need to clearly define what action is to be taken and what specific areas this will apply to.

5. Were protective actions effectively coordinated amongst involved organizations?

Numerous agencies may be mobilized to implement the protective action. If a shelter is needed, the ARC will require advance notification so they have time to mobilize personnel. In the meantime, local responders will need to care for the evacuated public or advise them where to go for assistance. The IC may even delegate the oversight of these actions to an activated EOC, and thus allow the IC to stay focused on containing the release.

6. Were sufficient resources readily available and utilized effectively to implement protective actions?

Command should identify how many agencies and personnel will be involved when implementing this action. Local law enforcement personnel may be enough to go door-to-door, but they may need support from ODOT to establish roadblocks. They may need to find and mobilize school buses to evacuate the neighborhood. They may need public information officers to generate new releases. Additional EMS personnel may be needed to support the evacuation of the nursing home.

7. Were public alert/notifications implemented in a timely manner?

Part of any protective action is the need to promptly alert the public. Plans typically rely on door-to-door notifications to alert a small, nearby community. In larger areas, the process includes using local media assets to broadcast warnings. Other techniques include the use of cable television alerts, live radio/TV broadcasts, or the activation of the EAS.

8. Was the content of instructions appropriate to the protective action made?

Regardless of the tool used, responders will need to insure the message provided is clear, concise, and understandable to the common person. Some typical points that should be made include, but are not limited to, what routes are and are not to be used. Or, it may include instructions on caring for pets, assisting elderly or handicapped, or having proper medications on-hand. Responders also need to remember that the general public may not understand why or how to implement the action. Therefore, the information provided must clearly instruct the public on how to take action.

9. Did response personnel identify which and how special needs groups could be impacted?

A 'special population' is a group that needs special assistance to receive and implement the protective action. This may include populated areas such as schools, shopping centers, prisons, or hospitals. It may include people with disadvantages such as elderly, or handicapped. It may include vacation areas such as campgrounds, or

special events such as county fairs and high school football games. Finally, this may include those with cultural differences such as migrant workers who speak a foreign language or groups like the Amish/Mennonites.

10. Were proper arrangements made to alert and care for the impacted special needs groups?

For each case, responders must identify what procedures and resources they will need to have in order to alert and protect those groups. It may require special equipment to move persons, such as evacuating a hospital or advanced care nursing home. It may require transportation assets such as school buses to evacuate a prison.

11. Were protective actions updated in a timely manner as required by changes in the incident status and weather conditions?

As the incident progresses, responders must continuously assess how the public and environment are impacted by changes in the incident status. Responders should relax or expand the protective actions as required. Changes in wind direction will move an airborne toxic. Rains may spread a contaminant or create a new danger if the material is water-reactive. As the materials are absorbed or the leak is plugged, the actual threat is diminished. These changes should be shared with those implementing the protective action.

12. Was the process to return evacuees to their homes effectively coordinated between traffic controllers, shelter managers, and the command system?

Responders ultimately need to show how they determine the surrounding area is safe and can be returned to its normal use. This may be through the use of air monitors to show an airborne toxic or flammable gas has dispersed, or that the liquid has been diked and/or absorbed. Responders then need to show what procedures, personnel, and resources are used to return people home in an organized manner. This includes developing public information messages, going back door-to-door, closing shelters, briefing the media, etc.

13. Were records kept of protective action decisions made, instructions issued, and actions implemented?

Command staff should have noted what protective action was implemented and how it was concluded. They should note any unique concerns or actions that occurred in regards to the protective action. For example, noting that some people along a given street did not want to evacuate. Documentation is used to ensure actions have been implemented or to identify what additional actions may still be needed. After the event, the documentation will be used to improve procedures or to resolve a liability issue.

14. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

The LEPC plan must contain evacuation procedures to include measures taken to establish alternate traffic routes. The plan must also include procedures to communicate with the public in a timely and effective manner. Plus, the hazard analysis section should identify what geographic areas will likely be impacted by a release (at EHS Facilities).

Exercise Design and Control Issues

The common problem associated with this Objective is that the players do not 'physically' complete the tasks during the field exercises. The Points are often only simulated. This simulation does not demonstrate how the procedures are implemented or if they are effective. Field exercises must physically demonstrate the actions. Therefore, the exercise design team needs to ensure the scenario and the exercise setup allows personnel to physically complete each task.

Another problem is that the scenario does not truly impact anyone. When it does create an impact, it only affects a few homes. For example, transportation incidents along isolated highways give players hands-on training, but no population was impacted. Instead, the design team needs to setup a scenario so that the incident impacts a densely populated area and not just the environment. Facility scenarios, such as the plan's hazard analyses, are often best suited for this Objective. As for transportation scenarios, they should occur in a public location such as adjacent to a school. Scenarios should also include an impact to some special population or event such as fairs, high school sporting events, or nursing homes. If not, those Points of Review are not tested. Overall, if only one or two people are impacted then this Objective is not being honestly tested.

To help test this Objective, the team should make arrangements to have the general public participate in the exercise. The public can be informed that an exercise will test a given protective action and their support is needed. They can be asked to actually evacuate and report to an opened shelter. One technique is to enlist the support of a small subdivision or trailer park to act as the impacted public. The site may not be the actual population impacted by the scenario, but will play as if they are affected. Responders can respond to that site and still implement the protective action. If the public is not going to participate, they should be advised that responders will be conducting an exercise in their area and please excuse any inconvenience. If properly setup, this is an excellent public relations event and can promote disaster safety.

As a safety issue, responders must be briefed as to how much of the procedure they will actually be required to carryout. For example, they should write-out each press release and not just say they have notified the public. Or, they should go door-to-door and not just say the area is evacuated. The same is true for establishing roadblocks, moving people, or opening shelters. In either case, the design team will need to establish how far each Point must be demonstrated. Exercise controllers will then acknowledge when the Point has been adequately demonstrated.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

The Evaluator for this Objective should be knowledgeable in response procedures as it applies to implementing protective actions. Typically, this will be someone with a fire or law enforcement background.

This Objective may need to have more than one Evaluator should there be exercise play outside the immediate incident site. For example, Evaluators can shadow responders as they go door-to-door, setup roadblocks, and interact with the general public. Meanwhile, one Evaluator stays at the command structure to observe the decision-making process and how actions are coordinated among the response agencies. Evaluators may have to query players to see if they know how or why the particular protective action was chosen or to understand how they overcame problems while implementing the action.

This Objective can be evaluated along with Objectives #2, 3, 4, 8, and 10.

Objective #9: Emergency Public Information Demonstrate the ability to coordinate and disseminate accurate information about the incident to the public and the media in a timely manner.

Basic Intent Chemical incidents have the potential to cause significant harm to the surrounding area. As such, these incidents draw a great deal of media attention. Therefore, response personnel must be prepared to respond to media inquiries and convey that the public is being protected. This Objective looks at the abilities of responders to gather and disseminate accurate information to the public. Responders will need to identify and activate warning systems that can inform the public in a timely manner. And, they must demonstrate their ability to coordinate information with the various media outlets.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. Was an individual clearly identified who authorized the release of information to the public and media?

One spokesperson should release information to the public otherwise conflicting and misleading information could be created. The average responder should refer all media and public questions to the IC. The IC will be responsible to manage this task or delegate it to a specific person. It also may require having to coordinate with a local elected official if the incident is a 'very public' or of a sensitive nature. In any case, a public information officer (PIO) is usually assigned this function in the ICS or at an EOC.

2. Was a Public Information Officer (PIO) clearly identified to draft and issue information to the public and media?

The IC may act as the PIO in small incidents and accomplish the task from on-scene. In larger incidents, the IC should delegate this function. The PIO may be a first responder, a chief elected official, or other recognized government agent. County EOPs typically identify one or more persons who are trained to fulfill the PIO role.

3. Were media notifications made in a timely manner?

The IC should have one person or group clearly designated to interact with the media and release information to the public. On-scene, law enforcement personnel should establish a location near to the scene that permits interviews and film coverage but does not hamper response efforts or endanger personnel. The PIO should make contacts with designated media outlets. The EOC may work to see that media outlets outside of the area can obtain information about the incident.

4. Were pre-planned alert and notification methods effective?

Responders need to identify what method can best be used to alert the public. Techniques include the use of sirens, public address systems on vehicles, phone calls

to special groups/locations, or door-to-door notifications. Responders may rely on the electronic media television, cable, or radio broadcasts (ie. EAS) to inform the public. Some communities use pre-scripted messages to speed the release of media alerts. Live broadcasts are used as well, but this process is used more to provide updated information instead of the initial alert. All of these options should be pre-planned and thus allow responders to quickly alert the public.

5. Was the public notification process effectively coordinated among involved organizations?

The public information process must be conducted in a controlled manner. This requires each response agency to relay media inquiries to the IC or PIO. Responders should not speculate on the progress of response actions or the scene's hazards. The IC and PIO will address those issues and ensure the public receives accurate information on the hazards and the protective actions in-place.

6. Was the content of press releases and briefings appropriate to the emergency, response actions taken, and protective actions implemented?

The public and media generally do not understand what problems arise during a chemical incident or how the problems are managed. The messages should avoid the use of technical jargon or response lingo. It should reassure the public that the situation while hazardous is being managed by response forces.

7. Were appropriate follow-up messages prepared and disseminated in a timely manner?

As the situation changes, the IC and PIO should evaluate the need to update the information provided to the media and general public. These updates should reassure the public that the situation is being managed, dispel rumors, and provide additional information. This may include information about shelter status, health concerns, or protective actions. The process requires the PIO to be actively involved within the command structure to exchange and confirm information about the release.

8. Did the PIO stay aware of changes in the emergency situation's status and the protective decisions implemented?

The PIO should be immediately available to the IC but should also meet routinely with media personnel on-scene. This will allow the PIO to stay informed about response actions, the effectiveness of protective actions, and to look down the road as to what information should be released next. Also, response and support groups off-site should provide the CP/PIO feedback on what concerns they hear from the public.

9. Were the locations used to release information to the public and conduct media briefings effective to support response operations?

On-site, law enforcement should designate an area for media groups to ask questions and receive information about the release. The location should provide photo opportunities and permit routine access to key response personnel. The time allotted to this media access should not interfere with critical response operations. In larger

incidents, the County may establish a Joint Information Center where information can be provided continuously and would not hamper response efforts.

10. Were media questions promptly and accurately answered?

It is media's business to cover the story. If responders are not cooperative, media may circumvent normal procedures to gain access to the scene. This could put them in harms way. Responders and media outlets should establish a system by which their questions can be addressed. This cooperation should also ensure the released information is brief, accurate, and avoids speculation.

11. Were procedures in-place and effective to control rumors caused by the emergency?

Messages may be misinterpreted or altered and thus change the intent of the information. The PIO should occasionally watch/listen to the media releases to catch and correct misinformation. The PIO may need to have an off-site group (who have access to TVs and radios) monitor the local media stations. This may be an EOC or response agency's home office.

12. Were records kept to document messages issued, briefings made, and actions taken?

Throughout the incident, the command system should document the actions taken to initially alert the public, generate follow-up information, and to work with those media assets on- and off-site. The designated PIO should record when and how information was released to the public. For larger incidents, procedures could be in-place for an off-site location to videotape or record news alerts. This process will assist in rumor control, supports the critique, and identifies future preparedness needs.

13. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

As noted before, this process should be pre-planned. The LEPC plan must contain procedures for the timely and effective use of communications with the general public. The all-hazard EOP typically has an Annex dedicated to this topic. Plus, most ICS training teaches how to use the PIO function as a support tool within the command post. Therefore, this process should be well documented locally.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

This Objective can be accomplished either in a command post atmosphere, as part of an EOC-only exercise, or in a combined effort. The design team will need to anticipate how this function will be managed for the chosen scenario. This will determine what inputs or simulations should be provided to fully test the Objective.

First, the exercise should include the participation of local media assets. The design team should ask for television, radio, and print media groups to participate in the exercise. They can be used in one of two ways. Media can be asked to respond as if this was a real incident. This free-play technique will permit players and media groups to interact naturally and should generate a more complete evaluation. To make this work, media assets must commit to playing as would any response agency otherwise

the Objective will not be fully demonstrated. Media can also be used in a scripted approach. The design team will establish what questions should be asked or what challenges media groups should pose to responders. Here, media is an exercise simulator rather than a player.

If media will not participate at all, the design team could use volunteers to act as media personnel. Again, the design team will establish what questions should be asked or what challenges the volunteers should pose to responders. The design team must use personnel that understand the media process otherwise the exercise of this Objective will be ineffective.

As for responders, they will need to physically complete each Point of Review to its fullest extent in field exercises. They should actually write press releases and follow-up messages. They should fill-in the blanks to pre-scripted messages. They should actually contact media outlets if required to initiate the public alert process. They should give media interviews. They should go door-to-door with sample messages. It is too easy to 'simulate' these actions or just to say it's done. This exercise play could stop short of actually broadcasting a message over the air. Door-to-door messages will simply note that this is an exercise task, and thanks for listening. As players physically demonstrate the Points, the exercise becomes more useful and the evaluation will be more useful. As a caution, remember that media and the public may not always hear that this is an exercise. Stating that this is an exercise should be stressed when releasing information.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

This Objective will focus on how the public is informed and thus rests with the person(s) implementing the PIO function. The Evaluator needs to understand response techniques as well as media procedures. Local media members or county personnel who have fulfilled the PIO role make good Evaluators.

The exercise design team will need to designate where this Objective will be evaluated. On-scene, the Evaluator can observe the command post and their interaction with local media assets. Off-scene, an Evaluator can watch how this function is managed at a JPIC or EOC. Or, the team may wish both sites to be evaluated. In either case, there needs to be sufficient play to physically demonstrate the Points. Otherwise, the Evaluator may have to query responders as to what actions have been taken. Evaluators should note when too much simulation was used to demonstrate the Objective.

This Objective can also be evaluated along with Objective #8.

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| <p>Objective #10: Traffic and Access Control Demonstrate the ability to implement site security, designate evacuation routes, control traffic flow, and manage evacuation area site access.</p> |
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Basic Intent Because of the risks associated with hazardous materials, access to and around the incident must be strictly controlled. Responders will need ample space at the scene to work and keep the general public away from the area. Meanwhile, public protective actions will require the surrounding area to be evacuated. Evacuation routes and alternate traffic routes will be established. Security must be provided for those areas not evacuated. This will require the coordination of multiple law enforcement groups and will involve state and local transportation department assets.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. Was an individual clearly identified and effectively in charge of coordinating traffic and access control issues?

To manage the incident, the IC may coordinate traffic control for a small incident. In larger events, the IC should delegate this task to a law enforcement official that has jurisdiction over the area. Mutual aid departments must be briefed on who is managing this task. Also, this liaison may manage the task away from the command post and therefore needs to routinely coordinate actions with the IC. If an EOC is tasked to coordinate off-site support, the liaison needs to regularly coordinate actions with them.

2. Was site security effectively implemented at and around the immediate scene?

Response measures should permit clear access to and from the scene for response vehicles. The area should also be large enough to setup a command post and allow movement within the cold zone. Roadblocks, traffic cones, and barrier tape are tools often used to secure the scene. Access from open fields and back alleys may need to be monitored. Also, some vehicles or the general public already in the area may need to be removed.

3. Were only authorized personnel allowed access to the scene?

The traffic liaison and staging officials will need to work together so they let traffic controllers know what resources are enroute and allowed access to the scene. This especially applies to those assets which are not first responders such as private cleanup contractors, state officials, or personnel arriving in private vehicles. It will also require establishing access and control procedures for media assets who may respond to the incident. The liaison will need to work with the PIO to establish a media area that permits media coverage of the incident without interfering with response operations.

4. *Were traffic control points and evacuation routes clearly designated in a timely manner?*

Responders may initially consult USDOT's emergency response guidebook, but the IC may need to revise those estimates based on the incident assessment. The IC and traffic liaison will need to identify traffic control points that will secure the area around the warm zone. The steps and resources needed to re-route traffic, especially along state or US highways, will need to be clearly defined. This will likely require the support and input of local transportation offices such as City Highway Departments, ODOT, or the County Engineer's office.

5. *Were traffic and access control decisions disseminated to the general public in a timely manner?*

This information should come from the IC and traffic liaison through the PIO. Traffic controllers should relay any public concerns promptly to the liaison who can then have the PIO address the concerns. Public information messages should clearly outline traffic closings, evacuation area boundaries, and alternate traffic routings. This should also include a note on the expected length of any delay. As the situation changes, the liaison must ensure the traffic controllers and public are kept informed.

6. *Were traffic controllers fully briefed on the emergency, on what actions would be taken to manage traffic flow, and were deployed in a timely manner?*

Those working in the field should clearly understand what response and protective actions are in-place. They should understand the nature of the hazard and what precautions are needed to prevent unnecessary exposure to the hazards. Personnel should also understand with whom and how they are to coordinate response and support needs.

7. *Were the chosen traffic control measures effective and appropriate for the response?*

These actions should be based on the incident assessment and not simply rely on the DOT guidebook. The traffic control measures should ensure the public is kept clear of the warm zone to include any downwind locations. The alternate traffic routes and control points should be clearly defined and every attempt should be made to permit the smooth flow of traffic. If problems arise, personnel should demonstrate how they resolve the issues such as defining new traffic detours and/or control points.

8. *Was security effectively managed at and around the evacuated areas?*

The liaison will need to identify and mobilize sufficient assets to manage the traffic flow. Additional law enforcement will be needed to patrol and control access around evacuated areas.

9. *Were traffic control decisions updated and shared in a timely manner based on changes in either the incident status and/or protective action needs?*

The IC and traffic liaison should work with Operations personnel to identify when and how traffic control measures are relaxed or expanded. Weather changes may create the need to expand the evacuation area and thus close additional routes. The incident may worsen and force more road closures. Conversely, conditions will eventually improve and permit a gradual return to previously closed routes. Any such changes should be shared with personnel as the need arises.

10. *Were actions implemented appropriate to control all types of access (road, rail, air, water, land)?*

Responders should consider each avenue of access. Commonly, ground traffic will be the immediate concern for responders. Control of that movement will involve posting roadblocks and establishing detours for the area. Railines may transit the impacted area and require responders to identify how to stop movement along the line. As for air traffic, ground personnel can restrict the airspace above an incident. Therefore, they need adequate communications to manage arriving aircraft, such as life-flight or stray aircraft (media). Finally, access via water may be difficult to manage. Access control may range from canoeists on a small stream to large barges on a major lake or river.

11. *Were communications between traffic controllers and the command system effective to coordinate actions?*

The liaison will need to establish a clear line of communications with the various assets implementing traffic control. This may require some agencies (highway dept, ODOT, OSHP) to provide a liaison to the command post who can help identify needs, mobilize assets, and facilitate the communications between the various groups. An EOC may be tasked to coordinate these off-site actions in larger emergencies.

12. *Were records kept to document resources expended and actions taken?*

The traffic liaison should maintain a log of what traffic control actions were implemented to include any concerns that occurred and how they were resolved. The logs should note what routes are closed and which are the designated alternate routes. The logs should identify or account for what assets are currently in-place to manage the traffic flow. As with other documentation, these logs can be used to identify response needs, prioritize the use of assets, and confirm actions were taken as planned. Afterwards, the logs will help to critique response operations and should identify the costs incurred.

13. *Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?*

The LEPC plan is required to address transportation issues as it pertains to evacuation control, to include establishing alternate traffic routes. Also, some hazard analyses identify likely traffic control points for fixed facility incidents. The County EOP also

addresses basic traffic control issues in various Annexes, such as Law Enforcement, Evacuation, and Engineering & Public Works.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

The basic need of this objective in any exercise is that the scenario must impede local transportation routes. It can simply affect road traffic, but can also impact multiple transportation corridors. The scenario should not be so small that it only requires traffic control at the scene itself. In this case, traffic controllers are not implementing a protective action or accomplishing this Objective. In field exercises, the goal is to have a scenario that allows players to 'physically' address each Point.

The exercise location(s) should also permit players to physically close routes and establish alternate routes. It is recommended that the exercise should not close main transportation corridors (interstates, major state routes, railines, etc.). In these cases, players must identify to the evaluators what actions and what resources would be expended to close each impacted route. The exercise should be conducted where actual traffic closures will produce a minimal impact to the local public and commerce. The exercise should not force the closure of local businesses unless they agree to participate in this manner. As for actually closing routes, advance coordination must be completed so that all involved groups understand the closure. The public should be informed in advance that routes might be closed for a specified time due to a training exercise. If roads are not to be closed, one technique can simulate road closings but still require responders to physically address the situation. Responders would be required to go to each traffic control point and post a flag or traffic cone at the location. That action will simulate the road as being closed.

This is an excellent Table-Top Objective. It allows players to fully discuss the logistic challenges and time constraints posed by the scenario. Field exercises are often limited by time and personnel restrictions, which means the Objective is not fully demonstrated. The team should ensure sufficient assets are available to participate and implement the needed traffic and access control measures. This includes law enforcement personnel as well as ODOT or local transportation resources.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

The Evaluator for this Objective should understand what challenges are created when implementing traffic and access control issues. This will typically be someone with a law enforcement background.

The Evaluator will need to be mobile to observe how personnel in the field are managing traffic flow and security issues. If there is extensive field play, this Objective may require multiple Evaluators. The Evaluator(s) should also be provided a communications capability that can monitor the coordination between the command post and field personnel. The Evaluator should also observe the actions taken within the command post to determine which routes will be controlled and how.

This Objective may be evaluated along with Objective #8 depending on the amount of field play.

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| <p>Objective #11: Shelter Management Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and services to provide for the anticipated protective action and sheltering needs of evacuees.</p> |
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Basic Intent Hazardous material incidents often force the evacuation of the surrounding area. When this occurs, responders need to offer assistance to those who were forced from their homes. Nationally, the American Red Cross (ARC) is tasked to coordinate this support. Locally, support also comes from a variety of human service groups. This Objective should demonstrate how those agencies are mobilized and work together to care for those impacted by a chemical release.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. *Were an adequate number of shelters/reception sites activated in a timely manner in order to care for the number of evacuees involved?*

When it is decided to evacuate, the IC needs to mobilize the ARC who will shelter the evacuees. The IC will need to inform ARC officials on how many persons may be impacted by the evacuation order. The IC should also identify if this scenario will require long-term or over night housing. The shelters must be located well clear of the hazard area especially if the situation on-scene were to worsen. Each of these concerns will allow the ARC to determine which shelter(s) should be opened.

2. *Were procedures in place in case the shelter's capacity was exceeded or it's location had to be changed?*

The ARC typically has a number of sites available to open as necessary. They should be anticipating when and why the current shelter will no longer support this operation. For example, the shelter may have been too close to the evacuated area. A wind shift may force the evacuation of the shelter itself. Also, the evacuation may go from a daytime event to an overnight situation. This may have more people seeking beds than were originally registered.

3. *Were there sufficient staff and support agencies at the shelter to support operations?*

Initially, the ARC should let the IC know how long it will take before a shelter can be opened. This may require responders to setup a temporary reception center where evacuees can go for initial information and instructions until the shelter opens. Once open, the shelter should have sufficient personnel available to meet and register evacuees. There should also be support staff to feed and care for evacuee needs such as human services, local health department, EMS, or mental health personnel.

4. *Did the shelter have adequate communications with on- and off-site support agencies?*

Shelter operators should have communications with on-scene personnel and any off-site agencies (EOC, hospitals, human service groups) who would support shelter operations. The communications used may include phones at the site or via radio

communications. If these communications are not adequate, the shelter manager should know and demonstrate how to overcome each problem.

5. Was security effectively managed at and around the shelter?

The shelter security should not only prevent disruptions inside the shelter but it also needs to control access from the outside. Evacuees should be directed to a controlled entrance for registration and screening. Shelter managers may decide to use a separate exit to limit possible exposures should someone be contaminated.

6. Were shelter operators aware of the health and physical hazards evacuees could be exposed to by the released materials?

In the process of opening the shelter, the IC will need to provide the shelter operators some basic information about the incident. Shelter operators should be briefed on what chemicals are involved and what physical/health hazards they pose to the evacuees. The IC should provide information on the likelihood that evacuees were exposed or contaminated by those chemicals.

7. Were evacuees screened for possible exposure/contamination before admittance to a shelter?

The shelter operators should understand how to screen or determine if the evacuees are showing signs of being impacted by the materials. They should have received or requested this information from the IC when opening the shelter. Shelter operators should understand if PPE is required to greet evacuees. Evacuees can be queried as they register or this should be done before they enter the site, if able.

8. Was information about the health and physical hazards posed by the released materials shared with evacuees?

Evacuees may have concerns about what hazards are involved. They may not have completely understood or received this information when evacuated. The shelter should work with the PIO to have information that dispels rumors or reassures evacuees about their safety. This should also include the safety of their belongings, such as pets, cars and homes.

9. Were contaminated evacuees safely handled, decontaminated, and given medical assistance?

Shelter personnel should be instructed on how to safely handle those who are contaminated, to include whether or not PPE should be worn. The IC and ARC need to coordinate on how evacuees will be provided decontamination and medical support. A decontamination station may be setup right at the shelter. Victims may also be transported to either the scene or a medical facility for decontamination and medical treatment. Evacuees should not be simply turned away, they should be told how/where to receive assistance if none is available at the shelter.

10. Was a process in-place to screen and safely handle vehicles that may be contaminated?

The initial screening of evacuees should also try to identify whether or not their vehicles were exposed, and thus potentially contaminated. If so, a system should be established to decontaminate or properly dispose of those vehicles. The shelter should coordinate with the IC/EOC in regards to this concern. Measures should also be taken to isolate those vehicles from possible contact by the general public.

11. Was information about the incident status updated and shared with shelter operators?

The IC/EOC should routinely update the shelter on the status of the response. However, the shelter can also query personnel if they are unsure about the current status. Shelter operators may wish to establish a routine time interval to receive or request updates from the scene/EOC.

12. Was information about the incident status updated and shared with evacuees?

The shelter's staff should routinely update evacuees on the status of the release. This may include information on how long the evacuation will continue, what precautions are needed when they return, or whether food/water supplies are safe to use.

13. Were the shelters screened for signs of contamination before they were closed and returned to normal operations?

Before closing the shelter, personnel should have a process to determine if the shelter requires any type of decontamination. This will depend on whether evacuees were actually contaminated and if there is chance of secondary contamination. The shelter should coordinate with the IC to address this issue.

14. Were records kept to document resources expended and actions taken?

This documentation is not just about the registration information. The shelter manager should also note hazard-specific information such as the initial precautions and hazards information relayed by the IC. They should note which evacuees, if any, were exposed and/or contaminated. They should note what actions were taken to care for those individuals and staff personnel. Finally, they should note what actions were taken to ensure the facility was not contaminated before it returns to normal use/operations.

15. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

These procedures should be addressed in local ARC plans and procedures. The LEPC's plan may also address these procedures or may refer to an ARC plan. Meanwhile, the county's EOP typically has a chapter that addresses Sheltering operations. Finally, the LEPC's hazard analysis may be used to identify what shelters would be used if there were a release from a fixed facility.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

The exercise scenario must require responders to evacuate the surrounding area. Also, the chemicals involved should pose an airborne hazard. Remember that EHSs are materials that pose an airborne hazard. The scenario should include a random number of evacuees who were just exposed (but not contaminated) or who are contaminated with signs of illness from their exposure. The exercise design team will need to determine just how many exposures there will be. This will determine how much of a challenge the exercise will pose to responders and shelter operators.

For Table-Top exercises, the exercise controller will have to either role play or input the clues as to how the evacuees were exposed. For field exercises, the exercise design team will need to secure volunteers to act as evacuees who have been exposed or contaminated. The signs and symptoms can be obvious or players can wait until they are specifically asked. Symptoms can also be delayed. This function is different from the role general public can provide under Objective #8 (Population Protective Actions). Those evacuees are not required to be exposed or contaminated, they simply need to evacuate. For this Objective, the evacuees must be exposed to varying degrees.

Also, shelters are not activated on a routine basis. Therefore, the exercise design team should solicit the support of each agency that would provide a service at the shelter. The exercises will then act as refresher training and allow these groups to provide their service in a disaster setting. To make the training useful, there should be sufficient volunteers available to act as evacuees.

The evacuees should be staged together with an exercise controller. The exercise controller should then randomly release groups and individuals to report to the shelter. Evacuees should arrive at staggered times and not all at once.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

The Evaluator for this Objective must understand shelter operations and the needs of evacuees. This person can come from groups like the ARC, Salvation Army, or government human service agencies. This person will locate at the activated shelter. If more than one shelter will be activated and evacuees arrive with chemical-related problems at both sites, there should be an Evaluator at both sites.

The Evaluator's focus of the review will be at the shelter, but should also address the coordination between the shelter and the command system. This coordination may occur between the shelter and either the command post or the activated EOC. It should also look at how well the various agencies work together to care for evacuees.

Objective #12: Emergency Medical Services Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, and equipment to handle, treat, and transport victims involved in a hazardous materials incident.

Basic Intent It is crucial for responders to identify to what extent have the released materials contaminated the victims. Medical personnel will then need to outline what steps will be taken to safely rescue and treat the contaminated victims versus those not contaminated. Throughout, medical personnel will need to minimize the possibility of exposure to themselves or their equipment.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. Were proper procedures demonstrated by EMS personnel to safely approach the scene?

Medical personnel may in fact be the first on-scene. As such, they should demonstrate that they recognize the presence of hazardous materials. Personnel should not commit resources until it is determined where it is safe to operate, which victims require decontamination, and what protective equipment is required.

2. Was an individual clearly identified and effectively in charge of EMS operations?

The IC should designate an EMS officer to take charge of EMS operations. The EMS liaison should clearly identify or be briefed on what hazards are involved. The EMS officer should ensure all EMS personnel understand the hazards, where it is safe to work, and what precautions should be taken while handling victims.

3. Were EMS operations effectively coordinated with on-site personnel and command staff?

The EMS liaison will establish the medical priorities to include where to receive victims, how to separate contaminated from non-contaminated, where to stage equipment for use, and how to account for medical safety on-site. This requires close coordination with the Operations and Safety officers. EMS personnel should also designate a squad to directly support the Hazmat Team and/or entry/decon personnel.

4. Were the health hazards and the secondary contamination risks posed to patients identified by responders?

Exposed victims may or may not be contaminated. EMS will need to coordinate with Operations to identify the extent of contamination for each victim. EMS personnel should also understand what type of decontamination was provided. Finally, EMS personnel need to understand the likelihood of a secondary exposure or contamination. EMS personnel will need to research these issues using tools beyond the DOT guidebook. Tools can include chemical textbooks or MSDS, computer programs such as CAMEO or TOXNET, or contact with specialists such as Poison Control, Toxicologists, or Hazmat Team members.

5. *Were adequate medical equipment and supplies identified and/or obtained to support EMS operations?*

As EMS personnel establish their medical priorities, they should determine what medical assets are needed on-scene. For example, personnel may need additional backboards to move contaminated victims. Contamination controls may require lining the interior of squads with plastic, donning tyvek suits, or using body bags to wrap victims for transport. This requires EMS personnel to understand the hazard, what precautions to take, and thus what resources are needed to minimize the hazards.

6. *Were triage procedures properly implemented based on the contamination present?*

Victims may or may not be recovered by EMS personnel. If not, rescuers/entry personnel need to be briefed on how to conduct triage. They should know the likely routes of entry, the signs and symptoms of exposure, and whether injuries or chemical exposure takes precedence in recovery. EMS may complete the triage for the walking wounded who have received a gross decontamination.

7. *Were patients adequately decontaminated before being treated?*

Decontamination will be required for those exposed or contaminated. The amount and type vary on the materials involved and the type/length of exposure. EMS personnel should know which victims required decontamination, and what type they received before treating them.

8. *Were appropriate steps taken to prevent exposure/secondary contamination to emergency medical personnel while treating/handling patients?*

EMS personnel shall determine what PPE are appropriate to receive, handle, treat, and transport victims. They should recognize the limitations work uniforms and structural fire gear provide in preventing contamination.

9. *Were the appropriate steps taken to prevent exposure/secondary contamination to squads prior to transporting patients?*

In preparation to transport victims, EMS personnel should note whether or not the squads require protection from possible secondary contamination. Techniques include using plastic sheeting to line the inside of the squad or to fully wrap the victim. Personnel may only use one or two squads to shuttle the decontaminated victims to the hospital. This will leave other vehicles clean and able to transport those who were not contaminated.

As a side note, EMS personnel may decide to transport victims via air ambulance. In this case, EMS personnel should be aware that some carriers will not transport victims who have been contaminated with either a flammable or poison. And it does not matter how extensive the decontamination was. EMS personnel should be familiar with their local carrier's restrictions when determining who will be airlifted.

10. Were personnel aware of which medical facilities were able and ready to receive contaminated patients?

EMS personnel should understand which facilities locally can/cannot handle victims involved in a chemical incident. These facilities may exist outside of the County. EMS personnel should make contact with each facility to ensure they can accept the victims or determine they should go to an alternate site.

11. Was patient status/information shared with the receiving medical facilities in a timely manner?

EMS personnel should brief the medical facility(ies) on what chemicals were involved, what contamination occurred, what decontamination occurred, along with basic patient information. This information should be provided before the patient leaves the scene. This will give medical facilities time to prepare their people and equipment.

12. Were appropriate actions taken to coordinate patient arrival with the receiving medical facility?

EMS personnel should confirm which entrance they should use to deliver the patients to the medical facility. Some sites may require contaminated victims to arrive at a specific entrance. This should be pre-planned, but should be confirmed while on-scene.

13. Were emergency medical personnel and equipment screened for contamination and treated appropriately before returning them to service?

Upon arrival, the medical facility should be alert to look for whether or not EMS personnel are exhibiting signs of exposure. If in doubt, EMS personnel should request the hospital to quickly screen them for symptoms of exposure. If symptoms are present, EMS personnel should be held for treatment and observation. This will prevent personnel from returning to service and becoming ill later due to the exposure.

14. Were records kept to document resources expended and response actions taken?

To assist in coordinating EMS operations, the EMS liaison should document various information. NFPA's 473 standard notes that this information should include product information, extent and duration of exposures, actions taken to limit contamination, treatment rendered, and patient disposition. Personnel should also note what resources were contaminated and expended. This documentation should help to prioritize medical needs, manage safety concerns, recover costs afterwards, critique operations, and identify training needs.

15. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

Overall, these actions are required to be contained in the LEPC plan. These procedures may also be outlined in department SOPs. In either case, Awareness training tells personnel not take action until they are briefed on the hazards and what precautions should be taken to support operations.

As a side note, this Objective is addressed specifically by NFPA's 473 standard. It outlines the training and procedures medical personnel should adhere to while operating in either the cold or warm zones. This standard should be reflected in the LEPC plan, local SOPs, and local training.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

This Objective requires exercise controllers to provide sufficient numbers of victims with varying degrees of exposure, contamination, and injury. One or two victims do not permit a complete test of EMS procedures and personnel. For Table-Top exercises, the exercise controller will need to outline the injuries of each victims so the players can respond accordingly. For field exercises, victims should be moulaged or wear tags that identify the subtle signs of chemical exposure.

This Objective is typically tested along with Objective #7, Response Personnel Safety. This allows fire personnel to setup a decontamination line and extract the victims for EMS personnel. However, this Objective can be completed without using the other Objective. In that case, victims are prepared as if they have just completed decontamination or have come directly out of the hazard area. Controllers directly control the flow of victims to the EMS sector. The controllers will have to address any questions EMS personnel have and would expect the decontamination or safety personnel to answer.

Also, this Objective is usually tested along with Objective #13, Hospital services. However, if a hospital is not playing, then EMS personnel should carry out all normal procedures to include driving victims away from the scene to a staging site. Meanwhile, controllers will act as the Hospital. They will respond to verbal questions and radio messages by EMS personnel, and thus test the coordination process.

Victims should be prepared to actually be decontaminated by first responders. This means they should wear clothing that can be removed or cut from the body. A bathing suit is usually worn under the clothing to permit washing during the decontamination, but only if temperatures permit. Do not risk hypothermia if conditions do not permit. Dry clothing should be pre-staged on-scene or at the receiving medical facility to allow victims to change after their role is complete. The exercise team should also make arrangements to pick-up and/or return victims who went to a medical facility from the scene via EMS squad.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

The Evaluator for this Objective should be an EMT and preferably trained to the Operations level. This individual should also be familiar with the ICS. The Evaluator will evaluate actions from where EMS personnel establish triage operations. The Evaluator should observe how EMS personnel identify the hazards and how they determine what actions should be taken to safely work in the area. The Evaluator should also pay attention to how EMS personnel interact within the command system.

This Objective can be evaluated along with Objective #13. To do this, the Evaluator will observe enough EMS actions to adequately address its Points of Review. Then, the Evaluator should accompany a squad to the Hospital. This will allow the Evaluator to watch how EMS is received at the Hospital and then to observe the Hospital actions for

the remainder of the exercise. Arrangements will have to be made to return the Evaluator to the scene or critique as needed.

This Objective can be evaluated along with Objectives #2, 7, and 13.

Objective #13: Hospital Services Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, and equipment to receive and treat victims involved in a hazardous materials incident.

Basic Intent Medical facilities within the County and in surrounding areas differ in their ability to support chemical incidents. This Objective is best suited to evaluate those medical facilities that have trained staff and established procedures to receive and treat victims of a chemical incident. The facility should have procedures to establish appropriate contamination controls, have the capability to research the chemical hazards, and be able to provide their personnel with suitable protective clothing.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. *Was the Hospital notified in a timely manner that a hazardous material incident had occurred?*

The Evaluator should note who, how, and when this notification occurred. The notification may be made by the responders on-scene, through dispatch personnel, or only when EMS squads arrive at the facility. It should also be noted if the facility monitored response radios to learn of the emergency. In this case, the facility could be proactive and directly contact responders instead of waiting for an 'official' notification.

2. *Was the material's health hazard information provided or identified in a timely fashion?*

The notification should include the identity of the chemical involved and an estimate of the injuries to include chemical exposures. This information should be provided before the first patient arrives at the facility. If the hospital does not have this information, they should request it from the IC. Information should include specifics on routes of entry, length of exposure, health symptoms, decontamination needs, etc. Internally the facility should also have a means to research the hazards. This research may come from chemical textbooks, on-staff toxicologists, or computer databases. Also, the medical facility should have MSDSs on file for those EHS Facilities within the area. The facility can also contact the EHS site or the shipper (if it was a transportation incident) for technical assistance.

3. *Were appropriate actions taken to coordinate patient arrival with the arriving emergency medical squads?*

The medical facility should have a pre-designated area where victims would be delivered. This is done to limit the chances that a critical area of the facility will be closed due to contamination. Some sites use alternate entrances rather than going straight into the emergency room. This access should be confirmed with EMS personnel on-site before the first patient arrives. This coordination can be done over response radios, by cellular phone, or via dispatch to include the confirmation of ETAs. EMS should update the facility on changes about victim status or on-scene actions. The medical facility should inform EMS when no more victims can be accepted and they must go to another facility.

4. Were hospital personnel equipped to safely receive and handle arriving patients?

Victims may arrive after being decontaminated on-scene or they may arrive on their own without going through a decontamination process. Facility personnel should be equipped to protect themselves from possible exposure to any chemicals remaining on the arriving victims. The facility should also have proper equipment to handle the victims and should limit the amount of equipment exposed to existing contaminants. To prepare, the facility should have consulted on-site technical guidance or with the IC to determine what personal protective equipment (PPE) is needed. Internal procedures may dictate that a specific level of PPE will be worn regardless of the situation. Personnel should be trained on the proper manner to don and wear the PPE chosen.

5. Were arriving patients safely received, handled, and treated based on injuries and contamination levels?

Pre-coordination with arriving EMS personnel should have allowed the facility to pre-identify what medical actions were required. They should understand the type and severity of the injuries as well as how/if the victims are contaminated. The facility should note whether or not there is a need to decontaminate each patient. They should have procedures in-place to remove and isolate contaminated clothing if needed. They should determine whether to treat the injuries while wearing PPE or move the patient to other medical personnel after the patient is decontaminated. Those not contaminated should be moved directly to a clean area for immediate treatment.

6. Were arriving EMTs checked for signs of exposure and treated accordingly?

EMTs and on-scene actions should have prevented the likelihood that arriving squad members are exposed to secondary contamination risks. As a crosscheck, the medical facility should quickly screen EMTs for signs and symptoms of exposure. The facility should note what are the signs of an acute exposure and if there will be any delayed medical symptoms. Squad members should be questioned as to how they feel and what precautions were taken when handling this victim. They should review the EMTs' PPE for rips, tears, or other signs that a chemical may breach the PPE. This will prevent returning personnel to service that may be spreading contaminants or are becoming ill due to their exposure. If affected, the facility should admit those personnel for treatment and advise the IC of this action.

7. Were security measures in-place to control access to the receiving, treatment, or other potentially contaminated areas?

As victims arrive, the receiving area should have a controlled access that limits the possibility of contamination outside of the area. Procedures should be in-place to transfer a patient from a contaminated area into a clean area. Medical personnel should not freely move between each area. Control measures may include closing off access, removing or covering non-essential equipment, and isolating ventilation systems. Outside of the receiving and treatment areas, access should be limited to only essential personnel. Security may even be needed outside of the medical facility to manage the arriving squads, the general public, and possibly media groups.

8. Were the Hospitals able to adequately communicate with all necessary agencies/personnel?

This process requires adequate communications not just with the scene but internally as well. The medical facility should have direct communications to the scene's EMS command. This may be through cellular phone, dedicated radios, or via dispatchers. The facility should be proactive to request information rather than waiting for the scene to provide information. Internally, the receiving area is often isolated from other operations. Communications should permit the exchange of equipment and information from the receiving area and the rest of the facility.

9. Were procedures followed to safely contain and dispose of contaminated materials?

A process should be used to decontaminate those personnel who treated and thus may have been exposed to the victims. Runoff from the process should be properly contained for disposal. This process should also address how to handle a patient's personal items or equipment used by EMS personnel that may be contaminated. Finally, the process should confirm the area is clean before it returns to normal operations.

10. Were records kept to document resources expended and actions taken?

Personnel within the medical facility should take note of various actions relating to this event. This may include notes on what materials were involved, which patients received decontamination on-site, what types of PPE was issued, who wore the PPE and for how long, and how the decontaminated wastes were managed.

11. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

The LEPC plan is required to contain the procedures used by medical facilities to support on-scene operations. These concerns may already be addressed in the medical facility's SOPs. It is also noted that OSHA requires Operations training for those facilities whose personnel will conduct decontamination operations at the medical facility.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

Obviously, this Objective requires the medical facility to receive and treat victims of a chemical incident. The victims should have varying types of injuries and chemical exposures. The number of arriving victims should be enough to fully test the facilities ability to handle the patient load. If multiple facilities are to participate, each should receive a variety of patients. The exercise design team could also arrange for some victims to arrive as walk-in patients. The walk-ins can simulate the evacuated public who believes they were exposed to an airborne chemical.

Victims should be prepared to be decontaminated by the medical facility. This means they should wear clothing that can be removed or cut from the body. A bathing suit should be worn under the clothing to permit washing during the decontamination. Dry clothing should be pre-staged at the facility to allow victims to change after their role is complete. The exercise team should also make arrangements to pick-up and/or return victims who arrived to the facility from off-site via EMS squad. The exercise team may decide not to physically drive victims from the scene to a medical facility. In this case, victims are pre-staged just outside of the facility and one squad is used to move the victim to the facility's receiving area.

Finally, a real emergency may arise for the medical facility and so there should be a procedure to terminate operations if needed. Some facilities may wish to continue playing the exercise along with managing the real emergency. Some will need to temporarily terminate exercise play and continue after the real emergency is terminated. The exercise design team will need to clearly pre-establish how the decision to halt the exercise will be made.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

The Evaluator should be familiar with medical facility operations. This can be an emergency room doctor or nurse from the facility or from a neighboring medical facility. This could also be an EMT with Operations training. The Evaluator will be located within the medical facility where victims will be received and initial treatment will proceed.

This Objective can be evaluated along with Objective #12. In this case, the Evaluator will first observe the EMS function on-scene and then go with an EMS squad to the medical facility to observe those procedures. In this case, the exercise design team will need to make arrangements to pick-up/return the Evaluator as needed.

Objective #14: Containment and Recovery Operations Demonstrate the ability to contain a release, terminate response actions, and commence with recovery procedures.

Basic Intent This Objective looks at those operations needed to bring the incident to a successful conclusion. Responders will need to demonstrate the proper spill control and containment procedures. They will need to take steps to see that the site is properly cleaned and wastes are disposed. Decontamination of equipment and supplies should be completed to ensure response resources can be returned to service.

Discussing the 'Points of Review'

1. Were proper techniques followed to safely contain and stabilize the released materials?

Was the product identified? Note what techniques were used, i.e. booming, diking, neutralizing agents, over packing, etc. Note if personnel were in proper PPE if responders were in direct contact with the product. Note whether personnel were in direct contact with product or taking preventive measures away from the product. Note if actions were defensive or offensive. If possible, identify the training levels of responders.

2. Were the responsible parties and the cause of the release identified?

Was the spiller identified? What actions or interactions did the spiller have with responders? What steps did/would responders take to investigate the incident? What agencies were involved? Was the cause identified, i.e. improper mixture of products, load shift, traffic accident, faulty equipment, etc.?

3. Were appropriate resources identified and coordinated with to cleanup and dispose of the released materials and to remediate the impacted area?

If spiller is known, did they coordinate with IC on actions that were going to be taken? Did IC coordinate with local and state responders/agencies as applicable? Did responders readily know who to contact for needed resources to remediate impact? Note interactions between clean-up contractor and IC (if applicable). If spiller is unknown, the IC should coordinate this action with OEPA and possibly local health officials.

4. Were the proper methods followed to assess/monitor the health/physical hazards posed by the released materials to the responders, public, and environment?

Identify what tools (ie. reference books, CAMEO, technical assistance) were used to identify concerns. Identify agencies involved, if applicable, in assessing release impact. Did responders note immediate health hazards (inhalation, physical exposure)? Did responders note long term health hazards & impact? Note actions taken by responders to monitor release. If monitoring capabilities limited, how and with whom did responders coordinate activity? Did responders concern themselves with health hazards on and off scene? Did they identify what areas were or could be impacted?

5. *Were the response personnel adequately debriefed on the health/physical hazards posed by the released material?*

The safety officer should debrief personnel, but it could also involve the cleanup contractor, spiller, Hazmat Team or OEPA. Personnel should understand how they were exposed or contaminated by the product and how effective was the decontamination. Responders should also understand what, if any, possible health affects are posed by the materials.

6. *Was a system in-place to ensure plans, procedures, training, and resources are updated as a result of an incident critique?*

Responders should conduct a critique or at least identify why/when would one be held. The IC should be responsible to hold a critique or arrange to collect constructive observations about the response. Personnel should identify ways to improve procedures, identify needed resources, or determine additional training needs. This process may generate a report that outlines these needs and defines how personnel will accomplish them.

7. *Were records kept to document resources expended and actions taken?*

Personnel need to identify who kept records on the response actions taken. Logs should identify who was involved and for how long as well as what equipment was expended. The process should identify what costs are recoverable versus those costs that will be absorbed by the local officials. If logs were not maintained during the response, it may be difficult to properly document the costs. Federal law notes that the spiller is financially liable. However, Ohio law notes that only 'extraordinary' costs can be recovered. The County prosecutor or local legal counsel can support this process. Also, some federal dollars may be available, but only if specific steps were followed. These should be identified in the plan.

8. *Were the above actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?*

Either the responder's own SOPs or the LEPC's plan should address how to bring a response under control and terminate response operations. They should describe what steps are taken to return equipment to service, recover costs, prosecute spillers, and improve procedures.

Exercise Design and Control Issues

This Objective begins once the release is stopped and victims are rescued. However, this is when most exercises stop. This Objective is best suited to be evaluated in a Table-Top setting. It gives players a forum to specifically discuss each Point. In field exercises, controllers will need to make sure the exercise is not 'terminated' until each Point has been discussed.

For field exercises, the first four or five points should be easy to complete while still on-scene. Personnel should either perform containment and recovery procedures. Or, they should contact those who can manage the task and outline what steps will be implemented. Outside agencies such as OEPA, Hazmat Team, or contractor should be invited to participate if local responders would normally rely on them to assist in

managing these tasks. If these groups cannot attend, the exercise controller will need to role-play their role and address the responder's questions or needs. Points 6-8 will require the IC to gather the players and conduct an open discussion on how to manage these tasks. This discussion should occur as a lead into the Evaluator's normal review of the exercise. The IC should conduct the discussion as an actual critique. Controllers will have to brief players on why this step is required.

Evaluation Needs and Issues

The Evaluator should be familiar with containment strategies and recovery issues. They should be trained to the Operations level or beyond. The Evaluator may be a member of a Hazmat Team, Fire or Facility personnel, or from a government agency.

As for the evaluation, this Objective will be coordinated between the IC, Spiller, OEPA, and Hazmat Team officials. The Evaluator may have to question each of these key players as to what decisions are being made. Some actions (in reality) may take more than one day to complete. Therefore, the players will need to clearly explain to the Evaluator how these actions will be completed, who will be involved, and what unique considerations will be made.

This Objective can be evaluated along with Objective #7.

TAB B: EXERCISE EVALUATION FORMS

General

The SERC has developed standardized evaluation Objectives. This section contains the forms that will be utilized to evaluate and make comments regarding the conduct of the exercise. The following section describes the form layout and intent. The Tab then provides the actual exercise evaluation forms for each Objective. See Tab A for a discussion about each Objective and its corresponding Points of Review.

Evaluation Form Layout

Each form consists of a **Header**, **Objective Definition**, **Points of Review**, **Checkspaces**, and **Comment lines**. Below is a brief discussion of each section.

The **Header** section provides a space to identify the Evaluator for this Objective. They should neatly print their name, title, and telephone number. Their name and title is required for the Facilitator's report. Their phone number is provided should the LEPC or SERC Facilitator have further questions of the Evaluator. The Exercise Design Team may complete this portion of the form before it is provided to the Evaluator; or the Evaluator will complete this prior to the exercise.

The **Objective Description** section provides the established definition for the Objective.

Each Objective is evaluated against a certain number of **Points of Review**. Each Objective varies in the number of Points to be reviewed. These Points are straightforward 'yes/no' questions. The questions are arranged in a logical order to make it easier to address them as the exercise progresses.

The overall goal is to evaluate the Objectives based on how well players implemented planned procedures. The Exercise Design Team is required to give each Evaluator, in advance, a copy of their assigned Objective(s) and copies of the planned procedures that correspond to the Objective(s). The Facilitator will review their assigned Objectives with the Evaluator at some time before the exercise to clarify questions about the forms.

Ultimately, the Evaluator's comments for each Point will determine if the Objective was successfully demonstrated. For an Objective to be considered 'Met,' the Evaluator must identify that a majority of the Points were adequately demonstrated, marked as a 'Yes.'

Three **Checkspaces** are provided to the right of each Point: **Yes, No, N/A**. These spaces will indicate whether or not the individual Points were adequately demonstrated. The Evaluator **will mark one of the three spaces** for each Point.

YES – This indicates participants did adequately demonstrate the Point.

NO – This indicates the participants did not adequately demonstrate the Point.

N/A – This indicates the question did not apply to this particular exercise and thus the Point could not be objectively demonstrated. This may be pre-determined by the Exercise Design Team or may simply result from the exercise play itself.

The form provides two **Comment Lines** after each Point or Review. This space is used to record the Evaluator’s comments, observations, and recommendations regarding the Point. Some comment lines first ask who or where. This is required so that the evaluation of the Point is accurately understood.

The Evaluator needs to provide comments, or feedback, for **each** Point regardless of whether the Point was checked ‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ or ‘N/A.’ If the Point was marked ‘Yes,’ the Evaluator should note why or how the Point was successfully demonstrated. These comments can be used to confirm that the existing procedures and training are successful. If the Point was not adequately demonstrated, the Evaluator must provide reasons why it was not completed, and offer suggestions on how to correct the situation. The comments should not ‘point fingers’ at any one person. Instead, the comments should identify how procedures, training, or resources need to be adjusted so that the same mistakes are not made during actual incidents. For those Points considered to be not applicable for review, N/A, the Evaluator should briefly identify why the Point could not be objectively reviewed. The exercise design will usually cause this, however, participants may take actions that also negate the need to address a specific question.

If additional space is needed to comment on a given Point, the reverse side of the form or separate page should be used to make the comments. Ultimately, the Facilitator will use the Evaluators’ comments to draft and submit an exercise report to the LEPC and the SERC.

The following pages are the actual forms to be used when evaluating LEPC and SERC exercises.

| | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: (____) _____ - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 1 - INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF RESPONSE AGENCIES: Demonstrate the ability to notify response and support agencies, and to mobilize emergency personnel.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

1. Were procedures followed to document the initial incident call and to determine if hazardous materials were involved?

___ ___ ___

Describe: _____

2. Were appropriate personnel (response and/or support) initially notified of the emergency?

___ ___ ___

Describe: _____

3. Did this notification occur in a timely manner?

___ ___ ___

Describe: _____

4. Were call lists/run cards/points of contact current, including alternates?

___ ___ ___

Describe: _____

5. Were procedures followed to verify that notifications were completed?

___ ___ ___

Describe: _____

6. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

___ ___ ___

Describe: _____

| | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: (____) _____ - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 2 - INCIDENT ASSESSMENT: Demonstrate the ability to identify the hazardous material(s) involved in the incident and to assess the associated health and physical hazards.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

1. Did response personnel safely approach the incident scene? ___ ___ ___
 Describe How: _____

2. Were proper steps taken to safely obtain information about the material(s) involved before committing resources and beginning response operations? ___ ___ ___
 Describe: _____

3. Did personnel consult proper technical guidance/resources to obtain relevant information about the hazards involved? ___ ___ ___
 Describe: _____

4. Did personnel identify the potential movement and impact posed by the released materials on-site and to adjacent areas? ___ ___ ___
 Describe: _____

5. Did personnel use the assessment to identify proper actions to be taken by response personnel? ___ ___ ___
 Describe: _____

6. Did personnel use the assessment to properly develop protective actions for the public and the environment? ___ ___ ___
 Describe: _____

7. Was the incident assessment transmitted in a timely manner to other response personnel and support groups? ___ ___ ___
 Describe: _____

OBJECTIVE 2 - INCIDENT ASSESSMENT CONTINUED:

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

8. Were proper strategies/tactics used to continuously assess and monitor the hazards?

___ ___ ___

Describe: _____

9. Were changes in the incident assessment transmitted in a timely manner to other response personnel and support groups?

___ ___ ___

Describe: _____

10. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

___ ___ ___

Describe: _____

OBJECTIVE 3 - INCIDENT COMMAND CONTINUED:

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

8. Were arriving mutual aid resources adequately briefed on the emergency conditions before they were assigned functions?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

9. Was an accountability system implemented to track personnel and resources on-site?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

10. Was incident information updated and shared between command staff and on-site personnel?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

11. Was incident information routinely updated and shared with off-site agencies?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

12. Were records kept documenting response actions taken?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

13. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: (____) ____ - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 4 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER: Demonstrate the ability to utilize an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to coordinate and support emergency response activities.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

1. Were planned procedures followed for activating the EOC? ___ ___ ___
 Time Established: _____ Explain: _____

2. Was the activated EOC either the Primary or Alternate EOC as identified in the plan? ___ ___ ___
 Primary or Alternate: _____ Identify by Name: _____
 Explain: _____

3. Was an individual clearly identified and effectively in charge of the EOC? ___ ___ ___
 Identify Who: _____ Explain: _____

4. Were communications established between the EOC and the incident site(s) in an effective and timely manner? ___ ___ ___
 Time Established: _____ Explain: _____

5. Was decision-making and resource allocation effectively coordinated between the key staff within the EOC? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

6. Was decision-making and resource allocation effectively coordinated between the EOC and the incident site(s)? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

7. Was incident information routinely updated and shared between the EOC and the incident site(s)? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

OBJECTIVE 4 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER CONTINUED:

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

8. Were the necessary authorities (not represented in the EOC) readily available and effectively coordinated with in order to implement emergency actions?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

9. Were copies of the Plan and/or SOPs readily available at this location and reviewed (when needed) in support of EOC operations?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

10. Was adequate technical guidance (manuals, computer programs) readily available and reviewed (when needed) to support EOC operations?

___ ___ ___

List/Explain: _____

11. Was the facility, and its equipment and displays, adequate to support EOC operations?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

24Hr/Backup Power ___ Maps/Charts ___ Tables/Chairs ___ Wall/Dry Erase Boards ___ Access Control ___

12. Were records kept to document actions taken?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

13. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

| | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: (____) _____ - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 5 - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: Demonstrate the ability to identify, mobilize, and manage resources required for emergency operations.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

1. Were the ICS/EOC staff knowledgeable of available resources and existing mutual aid agreements? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

2. Were resource lists readily available and did they provide accurate information on resource availability? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

3. Were resource needs identified and requested in a timely manner? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

4. Were arriving resources effectively integrated into the response effort? ___ ___ ___

Explain How: _____

5. Were procedures taken to identify and secure 'replacement' resources? ___ ___ ___

Which Ones: _____

Explain How: _____

6. Did the ICS/EOC staff effectively account for and track resources in use? ___ ___ ___

Explain How: _____

7. Were records kept to track resources utilized in support of the cost recovery effort? ___ ___ ___

By Whom: _____ Explain How: _____

8. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: (____) ____ - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 6 - COMMUNICATIONS: Demonstrate the ability to effectively establish and maintain communications amongst all appropriate response locations, organizations, and personnel.

| POINTS OF REVIEW | <u>Yes</u> | <u>No</u> | <u>n/a</u> |
|--|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Were response and support organizations able to effectively communicate with each other? Explain/Identify: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 2. Were communications effectively utilized to gather and disseminate information about the incident? Identify/Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 3. Were the existing communication links able to handle all necessary traffic? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 4. Did personnel identify shortfalls in the communications being used and take appropriate steps to alleviate the problems? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 5. Were backup communication systems effectively integrated into response operations? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 6. Were records kept to document the key communication activities? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 7. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |

| | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: () - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 7 - RESPONSE PERSONNEL SAFETY: Demonstrate the ability to protect emergency responder health and safety.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

1. Were proper procedures followed so the arrival at the scene did not expose or contaminate personnel to the on-scene hazards? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

2. Was a Safety Officer clearly identified and effectively in control of site safety? ___ ___ ___

Identify Who: _____ Explain: _____

3. Were hazard zones clearly defined and established in a timely manner? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

4. Was access between each hazard zone effectively controlled to ensure no one entered a restricted zone without the proper personal protective equipment (PPE)? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

5. Did personnel identify and provide the appropriate level of PPE based on the hazards? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

6. Was the issued PPE utilized only by personnel trained to properly use the equipment? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

7. Were personnel entering the warm and hot zones adequately briefed on the hazards, PPE requirements, and expected response actions? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

8. Was adequate medical monitoring provided for hot and warm zone personnel? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

OBJECTIVE 7 - RESPONSE PERSONNEL SAFETY CONTINUED:

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

9. Was a back-up team identified, suited, and readily available?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

10. Were procedures followed to safely account for and track all response personnel on-scene?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

11. Was an effective means of communications available between the IC, Safety Officer, _____
 decontamination personnel, and entry personnel to safely conduct operations?

___ ___

Explain: _____

12. Was there an effective process used to determine whether personnel
 and equipment were contaminated?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

13. Were proper decontamination techniques chosen and implemented in a timely fashion?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

14. Were all personnel and their equipment properly decontaminated?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

15. Was anything that could not be decontaminated properly identified and isolated?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

16. Were contaminated wastes controlled and properly held for later disposal?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

17. Were provisions made for personnel to receive rest and rehabilitation?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

18. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: (____) ____ - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 8 - POPULATION PROTECTIVE ACTIONS: Demonstrate the ability to identify and implement appropriate protective actions based upon projected risks posed to the public.

POINTS OF REVIEW

| | <u>Yes</u> | <u>No</u> | <u>n/a</u> |
|---|------------|-----------|------------|
| 1. Did personnel determine <u>how</u> geographical areas could be at risk? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 2. Did personnel determine <u>which</u> geographical areas could be at risk? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 3. Was an appropriate protective action decision made in a timely manner based on the risks posed and the area to be impacted? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 4. Was the protective action decision implemented in a timely manner? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 5. Were protective actions effectively coordinated amongst involved organizations? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 6. Were sufficient resources readily available and utilized effectively to implement protective actions? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 7. Were public alert/notifications implemented in a timely manner? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 8. Was the content of instructions appropriate to the protective action made? Explain: _____ _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |

OBJECTIVE 8 - POPULATION PROTECTIVE ACTIONS CONTINUED:

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

9. Did response personnel identify which and how special needs groups could be impacted? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

10. Were proper arrangements made to alert and care for the impacted special needs groups? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

11. Were protective actions updated in a timely manner as required by changes in the incident status and weather conditions? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

12. Was the process to return evacuees to their homes effectively coordinated between traffic controllers, shelter managers, and the command system? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

13. Were records kept of protective action decisions made, instructions issued, and actions implemented? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

14. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: (____) ____ - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 9 - EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION: Demonstrate the ability to coordinate and disseminate accurate information about the incident to the public and the media in a timely manner.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

1. Was an individual clearly identified who authorized the release of information to the public and media?

___ ___ ___

Identify Who: _____ Explain: _____

2. Was a Public Information Officer (PIO) clearly identified to draft and issue information to the public and media?

___ ___ ___

Identify Who: _____ Explain: _____

3. Were media notifications made in a timely manner?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

4. Were pre-planned alert and notification methods effective?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

5. Was the public notification process effectively coordinated among involved organizations?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

6. Was the content of press releases and briefings appropriate to the emergency, response actions taken, and protective actions implemented?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

7. Were appropriate follow-up messages prepared and disseminated in a timely manner?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

8. Did the PIO stay aware of changes in the emergency situation's status and the protective decisions implemented?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

OBJECTIVE 9 - EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION CONTINUED:

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

9. Were the locations used to release information to the public and conduct media briefings effective to support response operations?

___ ___ ___

Identify: _____

Explain: _____

10. Were media questions promptly and accurately answered?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

11. Were procedures in-place and effective to control rumors caused by the emergency?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

12. Were records kept to document messages issued, briefings made, and actions taken?

___ ___ ___

By Whom: _____ Explain: _____

13. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

County: _____ Date: _____

Evaluator Name: _____ Eval. Location: _____

Title: _____ Phone Number: (____) ____ - _____

OBJECTIVE 10 - TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL: Demonstrate the ability to implement site security, designate evacuation routes, control traffic flow, and manage evacuation area site access.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

1. Was an individual clearly identified and effectively in charge of coordinating traffic and access control issues?

___ ___ ___

Identify Who: _____ Explain: _____

2. Was site security effectively implemented at and around the immediate scene?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

3. Were only authorized personnel allowed access to the scene?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

4. Were traffic control points and evacuation routes clearly designated in a timely manner?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

5. Were traffic and access control decisions disseminated to the general public in a timely manner?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

6. Were traffic controllers fully briefed on the emergency, on what actions would be taken to manage traffic flow, and were deployed in a timely manner?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

7. Were the chosen traffic control measures effective and appropriate for the response?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

8. Was security effectively managed at and around the evacuated areas?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

OBJECTIVE 10 - TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL CONTINUED:

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

9. Were traffic control decisions updated and shared in a timely manner based on changes in either the incident status and/or protective action needs?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

10. Were actions implemented appropriate to control all types of access (road, rail, air, water, land)?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

11. Were communications between traffic controllers and the command system effective to coordinate actions?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

12. Were records kept to document resources expended and actions taken?

___ ___ ___

By Whom: _____ Explain: _____

13. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: (____) ____ - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 11 - SHELTER MANAGEMENT: Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and services to provide for the anticipated protective action and sheltering needs of evacuees.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

1. Were an adequate number of shelters/reception sites activated in a timely manner in order to care for the number of evacuees involved?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

2. Were procedures in place in case the shelter's capacity was exceeded or it's location had to be changed?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

3. Were there sufficient staff and support agencies at the shelter to support operations?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

4. Did the shelter have adequate communications with on- and off-site support agencies?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

5. Was security effectively managed at and around the shelter?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

6. Were shelter operators aware of the health and physical hazards evacuees could be exposed to by the released materials?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

7. Were evacuees screened for possible exposure/contamination before admittance to a shelter?

___ ___ ___

By Whom: _____ Explain: _____

8. Was information about the health and physical hazards posed by the released materials shared with evacuees?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

OBJECTIVE 11 - SHELTER MANAGEMENT CONTINUED:

| POINTS OF REVIEW | <u>Yes</u> | <u>No</u> | <u>n/a</u> |
|--|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 9. Were contaminated evacuees safely handled, decontaminated, and given medical assistance? By Whom: _____ Explain: _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 10. Was a process in-place to screen and safely handle vehicles that may be contaminated? Explain: _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 11. Was information about the incident status updated and shared with shelter operators? Explain: _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 12. Was information about the incident status updated and shared with evacuees? Explain: _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 13. Were the shelters screened for signs of contamination before they were closed and returned to normal operations? Explain: _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 14. Were records kept to document resources expended and actions taken? By Whom: _____ Explain: _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| 15. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures? Explain: _____ | ___ | ___ | ___ |

| | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: () - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 12 - EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES: Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, and equipment to handle, treat, and transport victims involved in a hazardous materials incident.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

1. Were proper procedures demonstrated by EMS personnel to safely approach the scene? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

2. Was an individual clearly identified and effectively in charge of EMS operations? ___ ___ ___
 Identify Who: _____ Explain: _____

3. Were EMS operations effectively coordinated with on-site personnel and command staff? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

4. Were the health hazards and the secondary contamination risks posed to patients identified by responders? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

5. Were adequate medical equipment and supplies identified and/or obtained to support EMS operations? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

6. Were triage procedures properly implemented based on the contamination present? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

7. Were patients adequately decontaminated before being treated? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

8. Were appropriate steps taken to prevent exposure/secondary contamination to emergency medical personnel while treating/handling patients? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

OBJECTIVE 12 - EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES CONTINUED:

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

9. Were the appropriate steps taken to prevent exposure/secondary contamination to squads prior to transporting patients?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

10. Were personnel aware of which medical facilities were able and ready to receive contaminated patients?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

11. Was patient status/information shared with the receiving medical facilities in a timely manner?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

12. Were appropriate actions taken to coordinate patient arrival with the receiving medical facility?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

13. Were emergency medical personnel and equipment screened for contamination and treated appropriately before returning them to service?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

14. Were records kept to document resources expended and response actions taken?

___ ___ ___

By Whom: _____ Explain: _____

15. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: (____) ____ - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 13 - HOSPITAL SERVICES: Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, and equipment to receive and treat victims involved in a hazardous materials incident.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

1. Was the Hospital notified in a timely manner that a hazardous material incident had occurred? ___ ___ ___
 At What Time: _____ By Whom: _____ Explain: _____

2. Was information on the material's respective health hazards provided/identified in a timely fashion? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

3. Were appropriate actions taken to coordinate patient arrival with the arriving emergency medical squads? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

4. Were hospital personnel equipped to safely receive and handle arriving patients? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

5. Were arriving patients safely received, handled, and treated based on injuries and contamination levels? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

6. Were arriving EMTs checked for signs of exposure and treated accordingly? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

7. Were security measures in-place to control access to the receiving, treatment, or other potentially contaminated areas? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

8. Were the Hospitals able to adequately communicate with all necessary agencies/personnel? ___ ___ ___
 Explain: _____

OBJECTIVE 13 - HOSPITAL SERVICES CONTINUED:

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

9. Were procedures followed to safely contain and dispose of contaminated materials?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

10. Were records kept to document resources expended and actions taken?

___ ___ ___

By Whom: _____ Explain: _____

11. Were the actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures?

___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

| | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| County: _____ | Date: _____ |
| Evaluator Name: _____ | Eval. Location: _____ |
| Title: _____ | Phone Number: (____) _____ - _____ |

OBJECTIVE 14 - CONTAINMENT AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS: Demonstrate the ability to contain a release, terminate response actions, and commence with recovery procedures.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Yes No n/a

1. Were proper techniques followed to safely contain and stabilize the released materials? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

2. Were the responsible parties and the cause of the release identified? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

3. Were appropriate resources identified and coordinated with to cleanup and dispose of the released materials and to remediate the impacted areas? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

4. Were the proper methods followed to assess/monitor the health/physical hazards posed by the released materials to the responders, public, and environment? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

5. Were the response personnel adequately debriefed on the health/physical hazards posed by the released materials? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

6. Was a system in-place to ensure plans, procedures, training, and resources are updated as a result of an incident critique? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

7. Were records kept to document resources expended and actions taken? ___ ___ ___

By Whom: _____ Explain: _____

8. Were the above actions taken based on existing plans and/or operating procedures? ___ ___ ___

Explain: _____

TAB C: LEPC EXERCISE NOTICE

General

The SERC is required to review the LEPC's annual exercise of their plan. The SERC utilizes the Ohio EMA to observe these exercises. To facilitate the process, the LEPC must submit to Ohio EMA the attached notice 'at least thirty days before' the date of the exercise. This will permit Ohio EMA time to schedule and provide a representative to observe the exercise.

This same form will also be used to request exercise credit when the LEPC wishes to use an actual event in lieu of conducting an exercise. In this case, this form must be submitted within thirty days after emergency response actions were terminated.

Exercise Notice Form Layout

The form is in eight basic sections. The following explains what information the LEPC must provide within each section.

Section A: Date, Time, & Location of Exercise Activities. The first lines (County name, date and time) are self-explanatory. Next, identify the location(s) where the exercise play will be conducted. For a Table-Top exercise, this may be the city council's meeting room, or a local fire department. For a field exercise, this should identify the specific sites where field play will occur such as the XYZ Facility and local hospital. The location should be descriptive enough so the Facilitator and the Evaluators know where the exercise will be conducted. Finally, the exercise may involve an EOC. If using an EOC, the next line should identify the name/location of the EOC to be used. Next, circle the appropriate choice to identify if this was the County's Primary EOC or if this is a 'planned' alternate location. **Note:** If the LEPC is wishing to use an actual event in lieu of conducting an exercise, this section should identify the relevant information about the incident.

Section B: Exercise Type. Place a checkmark next to the appropriate exercise type. **Note:** If this was an actual event, place a checkmark next to 'Actual.' Also, include a checkmark next to either 'Functional' or 'Full-Scale' to indicate which type of exercise credit is being requested.

Section C: Exercise Coordinator. Identify who is the local contact from the exercise design team who can be reached if there are questions about the exercise. **Note:** If this is submitted for an actual event, this section should identify who was the Incident Commander for the actual incident. This person will be the primary contact to address questions about the incident.

Section D: Objectives to be Demonstrated. Identify which Objectives will be evaluated for this exercise. Those Objectives with an asterisk indicate the Core Objectives. Each exercise type must test a minimum number of Core Objectives. **Note:** For actual events, Facilitator will review the chosen Objectives with the various agencies and personnel who were part of the response.

Section E: **Hazard Scenario/Narrative.** Attach copies of specific information about the exercise along with this form. This should:

- a. Contain a description of the scenario to include information about what weather conditions will be used for the exercise.
- b. Summarize the major events and the expected response actions. This is sometimes referred to as a timeline. It shows when exercise begins, what primary actions will be completed, and when the exercise will conclude.
- c. Identify what hazardous materials will be involved in the incident. As a reminder, if this is an exercise at an EHS Facility, the materials can be any of the chemicals that are annually reported to the LEPC. For transportation incidents, the materials must be the transported cargo that is regulated by USDOT rules.
- d. The scenario should next identify what geographic areas and general populations are to be affected by the release. It should outline what is the nature of the impact (airborne toxic, explosion/fire, water contaminant) and the extent of the impact (1/2 mile downwind/stream, 1250 foot radius, city block).

Note: If this is submitted for an actual event, submit a description of the incident and its impact. LEPCs are also encouraged to submit newspaper accounts, responder's incident logs, or other materials that explain what occurred.

Section F: **Response Participants.** Identify what agencies or departments will act as the 'players' during the exercise. For lines such as Fire and EMS, please provide the actual department names if able. For the 'Victims' line, also provide the number (#) of victims that are being used. **Note:** If this is being submitted for an actual event, the LEPC should identify each agency that was involved in the response.

Section G: **Exercise Evaluators.** Identify who has been chosen to serve as an Evaluator. Provide their name, title, and a phone number. Then identify which Objectives each Evaluator will be responsible to observe. The Facilitator will contact each of them before the exercise to ensure they understand the scenario and their evaluation role. If there is not enough space to list all Evaluators, please use a separate page to provide this information. **Note:** For actual events, the LEPC should identify the primary or key personnel that were part of the response and can be contacted to discuss the event. The Facilitator will contact them and together evaluate the response versus the chosen Objectives.

Section H: **Submission of Forms.** This section provides the address at Ohio EMA where the form is to be submitted. Again, *this form must be submitted at least thirty days prior to the exercise.* If not, the SERC cannot guarantee a Facilitator will be available to observe the exercise and the exercise will not be recognized by the SERC.

The following pages contain the actual Exercise Notice Form.

LEPC EXERCISE NOTICE

A. Date, Time, & Location of Exercise Activities:

County: _____ Date of Event: _____ Time: _____

Field Play Locations: _____

EOC: _____ primary / alternate (circle appropriate type)

B. Exercise Type: Table-Top _____ Functional _____ Full-Scale _____
Actual _____ (also choose the exercise type above for which credit is being requested)

C. Exercise Coordinator: _____ (Name) _____ (Title) (____)____-____ (Telephone)

D. Objectives to be Demonstrated: * Indicates Core Objective

- | | |
|--|---|
| _____ * 1. Initial Notification of Response Agencies | _____ * 8. Population Protective Actions |
| _____ * 2. Incident Assessment | _____ 9. Emergency Public Information |
| _____ * 3. Incident Command | _____ 10. Traffic and Access Control |
| _____ * 4. Emergency Operations Center | _____ 11. Shelter Management |
| _____ * 5. Resource Management | _____ * 12. Emergency Medical Services |
| _____ * 6. Communications | _____ 13. Hospital Services |
| _____ * 7. Response Personnel Safety | _____ 14. Containment and Recovery Operations |

E. Hazard Scenario/Narrative: (Attach copies of the following to this form)

1. Copy of the Scenario (to include meteorological conditions)
2. Copy of the Sequence of Events (also known as exercise timeline)
3. Type and Physical State of Hazardous Material(s) Involved (can be defined in the scenario)
4. Geographical Area(s) and Population Affected (can be defined in the scenario)

F. Response Participants: (Check each category to be represented in the exercise. Write in names of agencies if able.)

| | | |
|--|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Elected Officials | <input type="checkbox"/> Law Enforcement | <input type="checkbox"/> Hospital(s) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Commissioners | <input type="checkbox"/> Sheriff | _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> City/Village | <input type="checkbox"/> State Patrol | _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> County Offices | <input type="checkbox"/> Local Police | _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Engineer | <input type="checkbox"/> Fire Department | <input type="checkbox"/> EMS Units |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Health Dept | _____ | _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Human Services | _____ | _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coroner | _____ | _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> EMA Office | _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Mental Health |
| <input type="checkbox"/> State Agencies | <input type="checkbox"/> Search & Rescue | <input type="checkbox"/> Civil Air Patrol |
| <input type="checkbox"/> OEPA | _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Red Cross |
| <input type="checkbox"/> OH EMA | _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Salvation Army |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ODOT | <input type="checkbox"/> Hazmat/Decon | <input type="checkbox"/> School Personnel |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ODOH | _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Transportation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ODNR | _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Media |
| <input type="checkbox"/> OH NG | <input type="checkbox"/> Amateur Radio | <input type="checkbox"/> Victims # _____ |

Others:

G. Exercise Evaluators: (List the Evaluators chosen by the Committee.)

| Evaluator Name & Title | Phone # | Objective(s) |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| _____ | () - _____ | _____ |
| _____ | () - _____ | _____ |
| _____ | () - _____ | _____ |
| _____ | () - _____ | _____ |
| _____ | () - _____ | _____ |
| _____ | () - _____ | _____ |
| _____ | () - _____ | _____ |
| _____ | () - _____ | _____ |

H. Submission of Forms: This form must be completed and submitted to Ohio EMA at the following address **at least 30 days prior to** the date of the exercise.

Ohio Emergency Management Agency
 Attn: (Hazmat Planner)
 2855 W. Dublin Granville Road
 Columbus, Ohio 43235-2206

TAB D: REFERENCES

General

This Tab lists those materials used to develop this guide. These materials can be consulted to learn more about hazardous materials preparedness as well as conducting exercises. A number of these guides were directly cited in this manual.

Manuals

Federal Emergency Management Agency, "An Orientation to Community Disaster Exercises," Student Manual 120, July 1995.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Exercise Design Course," Student Manual 120.01, August 1995.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Guide to Emergency Management Exercises," Student Manual 120.2, October 1997.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Exercise Program Manager / Management Course," Student Manual 137, October 1997.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Controller / Simulator Workshop," Student Manual 250.8, July 1997.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Exercising Emergency Plans Under Title III," Student Manual 305.4, February 1991.

National Response Team, "Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide," NRT-1, March 1987.

National Response Team, "Developing a Hazardous Materials Exercise Program," NRT-2, September 1990.

Professional Standards

National Fire Protection Association, "Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents," NFPA 471, 1997 edition.

National Fire Protection Association, "Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents," NFPA 472, 1997 edition.

National Fire Protection Association, "Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents," NFPA 473, 1997 edition.

National Fire Protection Association, "Disaster Management," NFPA 1600, 1995 edition.