Regarding Train Accident from January 2002

Introduction

· Good morning.

· I would like to thank Senator Conrad and Representative Pomeroy for inviting Chairwoman Engleman and myself to Minot to talk about what the federal government has been doing since the tragic accident over two years ago now.

· First, let me explain a little about what the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is responsible for.

· The mission of the FRA is to promote and ensure railroad safety. Safe rail infrastructure, safe rail equipment, safe rail operations, safe rail crews.

· We monitor and inspect railroads and their safety compliance programs to ensure that they are meeting all appropriate federal safety standards.

· When we find problems, we bring them to the attention of the railroad, seek a remedy, and if necessary, take enforcement actions and / or impose penalties.

· Since the 1970s, railroading in America is dramatically safer. All the safety statistics have been trending in the right direction—DOWN.

· There have been fewer highway-rail grade crossing fatalities, significantly less injuries and fatalities of railroad workers, less frequent train accidents—despite a significant increase in traffic volumes on both the railroad system and on our highways.

· Unfortunately, accidents do still occur.

· I am pleased to say that the kind of accident that happened here—catastrophic rupture of a pressurized hazardous material tank car—is a very rare occurrence.

· Since 1963, only seven such accidents have occurred in the United States. Given that there are over million movements of hazardous materials by rail each year, this is a very good record, by any measure.

· In fact, transporting hazardous materials by rail is the safest way to do so.

· This safety record is the result of several factors.

· Over the years, railroads, shippers, rail car manufacturers, and the federal government have worked together to develop better operating procedures, improved tank car design, and achieved greater compliance with overall rail safety regulations.

· And while we are pleased with our past success in this area, we continually seek ways to make it safer yet. FRA Action in Immediate Aftermath of Accident

· Which brings me to why Senator Conrad and Representative Pomeroy asked us out here today.

· The NTSB investigation report on the Minot accident provided a detailed look at what caused the derailment to occur and the subsequent rupture of the pressurized tank cars.

· The NTSB also made several recommendations on what might be done to prevent this type of accident in the future.

· Frankly, the NTSB recommendations directed toward FRA came as no particular surprise to us.

· By that I mean, we did not have to wait until the NTSB issued its report to begin addressing what was involved with this accident. We acted immediately.

· It was clear that issues associated with the track were contributing factors in this accident. The type of track involved is called Continuous Welded Rail (CWR)—sections of track extending as long as 400 feet without a joint.

· The derailment occurred primarily as a result of a crack in the joint bar that connects two sections of CWR together.

· In the immediate aftermath of the accident, FRA issued a Special Notice of Repairs on similar portions of CWR track on the Canadian Pacific (CP) system and reduced the operating speeds of its trains traveling over these sections of track.

· Soon thereafter, FRA staff inspected 334 miles of CP track in North Dakota. A number of defects were found and two additional Special Notice of Repairs were issued. We followed up with the railroad to ensure that all identified defects were repaired in a timely manner.

· We also went to the CP headquarters in St. Paul, Minnesota to conduct a records review of their Continuous Welded Rail program. We found several problems, including that many of the Maintenance of Way workers had not received appropriate training to repair this type of track.

· Continued inspections by FRA staff since the accident have found that CP has satisfactorily addressed the issues we raised and is now in compliance with its CWR program.

· While the accident happened in Minot, we realized it had national implications. As such, the FRA immediately brought this issue to the attention of the railroad industry through the Association of American Railroad (AAR) Tank Car Committee.

· This committee is comprised of railroads, shippers, and rail car manufacturers—key players who are actively involved in finding ways to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.

· So in addition to the NTSB investigation, the past two years have seen the FRA actively working to resolve some of the issues arising from this accident.

NTSB Recommendations

· I would now like to speak briefly to the several recommendations that NTSB directed toward FRA.

· But first I want to express my appreciation for the professional manner in which the NTSB handled this investigation.

· Our two agencies have worked together for many years and they always do a thorough job in finding out why accidents occurred. Their recommendations are often insightful as well.

· The recommendations from the NTSB to FRA basically fall into two categories: track inspection and tank car design.

· In the track inspection area, there are several items to consider.

· First, is a recommendation suggesting the FRA should require railroads with CWR to perform on-the-ground visible track inspections to identify cracks in rail joint bars.

· We agree that detection of cracks in rail joints deserves additional attention.

· The FRA Office of Research and Development is working on a means to inspect joint bars in a cost effective ways by using an automated vehicle-mounted photo imaging inspection system.

· We will ask the joint FRA / Railroad industry Rail Integrity Task Force to explore the conditions under which more effective and accurate detection of joint bar cracks can be accomplished.

· As part of this, we will review if it is appropriate for on-the-ground visual inspections to be integrated into CWR inspection programs.

· Second, is a recommendation to establish a program to periodically review CWR inspection data and require railroads to increase inspection frequency as necessary.

· The FRA currently reviews track inspection data provided by the railroads as well as our own data. In addition, we can—and do—require railroads to improve their inspection methods.

· When the data indicates a need, we increase the track inspection activity. This is part of the core mission of FRA.

· And third, is a recommendation that FRA inspectors use a copy of each railroad’s CWR program and to use it when we conduct inspections.

· FRA inspectors are being furnished copies of these programs and have been instructed to use them as they perform their jobs.

· To reinforce this requirement, a Technical Bulletin is being prepared for distribution to FRA inspectors to provide additional guidance.

· The tank car recommendations have appropriately garnered much interest both here in North Dakota and across the country.

· It was, after all, the rupture of the tank cars, not simply the train derailment, which caused the major problems here in Minot.

· The first recommendation calls for the FRA to conduct a comprehensive analysis to determine the impact resistance of the steel in the shells of pressurized tank cars built before 1989.

· With the active involvement of FRA, the AAR Tank Car Committee met in early April, assigned a special task force to develop a plan to address this recommendation, and has already put the plan into operation.

· In addition to obtaining steel samples for analysis, the task force will evaluate the types of testing suggested by the NTSB.

· Second is a recommendation for the creation of a program to rank all of the 34,000 pre-1989 pressurized tank cars still in service according to their risk of catastrophic failure and separation from their rail car. And, we are to implement measures to eliminate or mitigate this risk.

· For many years, the FRA has been working with the rail industry in pursuing improvements to tank car structural integrity and we will continue to do so.

· It will be necessary to complete the comprehensive analysis before we can begin to assess and evaluate risk or to develop any necessary operating restrictions.

· Third, NTSB recommends we develop a model to predict the maximum forces acting on tank cars under accident conditions.

· Current research FRA is involved in includes evaluation of in-train forces associated with derailments. These programs are underway and on-going at the Volpe Center and at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

· We hope to be able to better predict such forces and to use information to design tank cars with higher survivability rates.

· The final recommendation involves developing fracture toughness standards for tank cars transporting certain type of hazardous materials and should take into account the entire range of operating temperatures for the tank car.

· Before we can fully implement this recommendation, the previous analyses will need to be completed. Furthermore, the most effective testing methods will need to be identified.

· Overall, the NTSB recommendations are appropriate responses to the accident that happened here.

· Some of them are things the FRA has, is, and will continue to do—and we will try to do better still.

· Others will take some time to develop and implement.

· All are things we will work towards in the coming years.

Closing

· I am interested in hearing what the leaders and residents of Minot have to tell us so I will conclude my remarks here.

· But before I take my seat, I want to further express what I have tried to communicate today.

· We at the FRA take rail safety seriously.

· It is what we do and we don’t ever want another community to have to experience what happened to you.

· As a result of the accident, we have taken positive action to make sure that this doesn’t happen again.

· The NTSB recommendations will help direct us toward that goal.

· Thank you and I look forward to hearing your comments and concerns.