[Federal Register: November 25, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 227)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 70535-70545]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr25no02-7]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of the Secretary
14 CFR Part 234
[Docket No. OST 2000-8164]
RIN 2139-AA09
Reporting the Causes of Airline Delays and Cancellations
AGENCY: Office of Secretary, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: As required by Federal statute, the Department of
Transportation is modifying certain reporting requirements. We are
requiring air carriers that file airline service quality performance
reports to collect and report the causes of airline
[[Page 70536]]
delays and cancellations. Currently, there is a lack of data on the
specific causes of airline delays and cancellations. The changes are
designed to fill the data gaps in reference to the causes of airline
delays and cancellations and to provide this information to the public
and other interested parties.
EFFECTIVE DATE: This rule is effective on June 1, 2003.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bernard Stankus or Clay Moritz, Office
of Airline Information, K-14, Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC
20590-0001, (202) 366-4387 or 366-4385, respectively. You can also
contact them by e-mail at bernard.stankus@bts.gov or
clay.moritz@bts.gov or by fax at (202) 366-3383.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Electronic Access
An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded by using a
computer, modem, and suitable communications software from the
Government Printing Office's Electronic Bulletin Board Services at
(202) 512-1661. Internet users may reach the Office of the Federal
Register's home page at: http://www.nara.gov/fedreg and the Government
Printing Office's database at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara. You can
also view and download this document by going to the webpage of the
Department's Docket Management System (http://dms.dot.gov/). On that
page, click on ``search.'' On the next page, type the last four digits
of the docket number shown in the heading of this document. Then click
on ``search.''
Background
Section 227 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform
Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) requires that we modify our airline
data collection system, 14 CFR Part 234--Airline Service Quality
Performance Reports, to explain more fully to the public the nature and
source of airline delays and cancellations (See Pub. L. 106-181, 114
Stat. 61). AIR-21 also directed that DOT establish a Task Force to
review airline delays and cancellations and develop recommendations for
the associated reporting criteria. Since the passage of AIR-21,
Congress has continued to express concern that DOT needs more accurate
data to better understand gate, tarmac, and airborne delays. The DOT
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) also highlighted the need to
examine airline delays and cancellations in its July 25, 2000 report on
air carrier flight delays and cancellations. Our own consumer complaint
statistics also support regulatory action to reduce airline delays.
Also, passengers have expressed frustration when not advised of the
cause and length of delays.
In August 2000, we formed the Air Carrier On-Time Reporting
Advisory Committee (the Task Force). The Task Force members were chosen
to reflect a balanced cross section of interests. In addition to
government representatives, they included representatives from consumer
airline groups, air carriers, labor unions and airport operators. On
September 25, 2000, the Task Force was chartered as a Federal advisory
committee. Its mission was to consider changes to the current on-time
reporting system so that the public would have clear information about
the nature and sources of airline delays and cancellations.
In the Fall of 2000 (i.e., October 25 and 26, November 1 and 2, and
November 13), the Task Force held several meetings to identify the
issues surrounding airline delays and cancellations and to develop
reporting criteria. The meetings were announced in the Federal Register
(65 FR 63285) and were open to the public. We opened a public docket
for the submission of comments, Docket OST-2000-8164. On November 29,
2000, the Task Force submitted its report to DOT. The Task Force made a
number of recommendations, including that we establish a reporting
framework for collecting information about the causes of airline delays
and cancellations. The Task Force also recommended that, prior to
rulemaking, we conduct a pilot program to test the proposed reporting
categories. Following up on that recommendation, we contacted a number
of air carriers; four air carriers agreed to participate in a voluntary
pilot project. The four carriers were American Airlines, Delta Air
Lines, Southwest Airlines and United Air Lines. Over several months, we
met with the four carriers and discussed what causal delay and
cancellation information should be collected and how best to report
that delay and cancellation data. After the parties agreed on a
reporting framework, the carriers began submitting delay and
cancellation data to us.
We used the recommendations from the Task Force, the results of our
pilot project and our outreach efforts to craft the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) which was published on December 27, 2001 (66 FR
66833). In response to the NPRM, we received 16 comments.
The Proposed Rule
The Department proposed requiring air carriers that file airline
service quality performance reports under Part 234 regulations to
collect and report the causes of airline delays and cancellations.
There was a lack of data on the specific causes of airline delays and
cancellations. The Department proposed four delay categories and three
cancellation categories as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delays Cancellations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Carrier............................... Air Carrier.
Weather................................... Weather.
National Aviation System.................. National Aviation System.
Late Arriving Aircraft.................... ............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed changes were designed to fill the data gaps in
reference to the causes of airline delays and cancellations and to
provide this information to the traveling public and the parties most
capable of addressing the causes of the delays and cancellations.
Public Comments
We received comments from America West Airlines, American Trans
Air, Southwest Airlines, the Air Transport Association of America
(ATA), the Regional Airline Association (RAA), the American Society of
Travel Agents (ASTA), the Airports Council International--North America
(ACI-NA), the American Automobile Association (AAA), the City of
Boston, Save the Bay Association, the San Francisco Boardsailing
Association (SFBA), the Paralyzed Veterans of America, Mr. B.E.
Wendling, Mr. George Rummell, Ms. Melissa Davis, and Mr. Paul Asmus.
The substance of these comments is discussed below under a series of
topical captions.
The Continuing Need for Causal Reporting
Southwest Airlines believes that the operating environment since
September 11, 2001, negates the need to impose new reporting
requirements in the near future.
Mr. Paul D. Asmus believes that modifying the on-time data
collection system, to explain more fully to the traveling public the
source and nature of airline delays, may create a serious safety
problem. Mr. Asmus states that, ``The NPRM as envisioned, plans to add
delays for aircraft maintenance in the data that the carriers are
required to provide.'' He believes this could lead to mechanics being
pressured ``to work faster and cut corners.'' Mr. Asmus requested an
Office of the Inspector
[[Page 70537]]
General (IG) audit and, while the IG conducts its audit, that the
Department place a hold on the rulemaking.
It is only a matter of time before traffic is back to or above the
levels of the summers of 2000 and 2001. The Department wants to be pro-
active in identifying problem areas and making the necessary
improvements to the aviation system to avoid the gridlock which reached
a peak in the summer of 2000. For the first eight months of 2001, on-
time arrivals increased to 77.4% as compared to 72.7% for the first
eight months of 2000. This was accomplished despite an increase of
17,440 flight operations. The improvement was accomplished in a large
measure because the FAA made significant progress in correcting
problems identified with respect to improving the flow of traffic
through seven major airspace choke points in our national airspace
system, American and Delta reduced operations at peak times at their
hub airports, and Continental and United increased the size of aircraft
operated at selected airports. The Department does not want to become
complacent in its initiative to reduce air carrier delays. In the
Office of the Inspector General's report titled Actions to Enhance
Capacity and Reduce Delays and Cancellations (August 17, 2001), the
number one item listed as needing attention is the creation of a
uniform system for tracking the causes of flight delays and
cancellations.
As to the inclusion of flights that are delayed or cancelled for
maintenance, the Department has included statistics for such flights
beginning in January 1995. While the Department tracked whether the
flights experienced delays, the reasons for delays were not identified.
The inclusion of all carrier operations in the airline service quality
performance data base provides consumers with a more accurate picture
of a carrier's overall on-time record. Moreover, we have seen no
evidence whatsoever that inclusion of cancellations and delays related
to maintenance has in any way diminished safety. To the contrary, there
is an incentive for carriers to keep their equipment in top working
condition. While the present proposal recommends collection of the
causes of delays and cancellations, the proposed cause categories are
broad and do not specifically identify maintenance delays or
cancellations. As proposed, maintenance delays and cancellations would
be reported as ``Air Carrier'' caused delays.
The safety of passengers and crew has always been the most
important responsibility of air carriers and the number one priority of
the Department. The Department does not believe a delay in the
rulemaking is appropriate; however, the Department will investigate any
specific allegation that air safety is being compromised and take
appropriate action, including enforcement action, where necessary.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
large certificated air carriers decreased commercial operations by
about 20 percent, as many airlines grounded large numbers of older less
efficient aircraft and deferred delivery of new aircraft. As a result
of a less congested air transportation system, on-time performance has
improved. In March 2002, the FAA held its Annual Commercial Aviation
Forecast Conference. During the conference the FAA released The FAA
Aerospace Forecasts, Fiscal Years 2002-2013, which estimates that
domestic capacity will gradually return to pre-September 11 capacity
levels over a 3-year period. At the same time, U.S. regional/commuter
air operations continue to grow, albeit at a slower rate than the pre-
September 11 growth rate. Thus, although recent on-time performance
would not in and of itself indicate need for regulatory action, the
Department's statutory mandate, the growing post September 11 airline
operations, and our long-range forecasts require regulatory action in
this area.
Extending the Reporting Requirements to Other Carrier Groups
We proposed that the requirement to report causes of delays at the
present time apply only to the air carriers that are already required
to report on-time data under Part 234. These air carriers not only
account for the vast majority of domestic operations and enplanements,
but they are in a position to quickly adopt the new reporting system,
thus minimizing the regulatory burden on the industry and, at the same
time, providing valuable information to the public, and to the parties
best able to rectify delay problems.
Comments from the ATA, ACI-NA, Save the Bay, SFBA, the City of
Boston, and Mr. George Rummell were in favor of extending the reporting
requirements to code-share partners of the major carriers, to national
air carriers and to large regional air carriers. The RAA is opposed to
extending the requirements beyond the current major carriers and
believes that American Eagle should be relieved of its current
reporting obligation.
SFBA stated that code-share partners of major airlines should begin
reporting as soon as practicable. It pointed out that many airports
have extensive operations by such code-share carriers and the data from
these flights ``would be valuable in assessing the delay problems.''
SFBA stated that although the large certificated air carriers account
for 87% of domestic enplanements, they account for a lower percentage
of domestic operations. As an example, SFBA pointed to statistics for
United Air Lines and its code-share partners at San Francisco-Oakland
(SFO) airport for March 4, 1999, stating that while United accounted
for 84% of the available seats at SFO, it accounted for only 69% of the
operations there. SFBA claims that smaller aircraft ``contribute to
delay more than larger aircraft'' because smaller aircraft are slower,
require more space to avoid wake turbulence, and serve less passengers.
According to SFBA, as a way to minimize reporting burden on code-share
partners, reporting could be limited to reportable airports where the
code-share operations account for 10% or more of the operations. A
reportable airport is an airport that accounts for at least one percent
of domestic scheduled enplanements.
The City of Boston believes that excluding from the proposed new
causal reporting requirement 17% of passenger enplanements limits the
usefulness of the proposed new data. It stated that ``it will be
impossible for the DOT to implement well-informed market-based
approaches to minimize delays,'' without delay information from the
carriers not required to report.
ACI-NA believes that DOT must design a system for tracking the
causes of delays that is accurate and complete. The omission of code-
share partners and other scheduled air carriers which account for 17%
of passengers distorts and undermines the utility of delay data.
According to ACI-NA, ``More accurate data will enable smaller and
regional carriers to understand their flight delay problems and
ultimately help solve those problems. Currently, there is no mechanism
that serves this function.''
ATA stated that ``all major, national and code-sharing partners
should be included in the Part 234 reporting system,'' and each carrier
must be responsible for its own reporting. ATA believes that ``The 17%
of enplanements exempt from reporting contribute a disproportionate,
higher number of airplanes to the congestion mix since these airplanes
generally have fewer seats.'' According to ATA, ``By leaving out this
17%, we may inadvertently deny ourselves the ability to find out the
triggering causes of delays, which increase exponentially at congested
airports with each added flight, no
[[Page 70538]]
matter how small the aircraft.'' ATA cited La Guardia as a good example
of an increase in small aircraft operations overwhelming the system.
AAA supports extending the reporting requirements to all air
carriers.
Mr. George Rummell believes that the airline industry should report
all delays.
The RAA strongly opposes the expansion of the reporting
requirements to all medium and large code-sharing regional airlines. It
states that regional airlines generally operate routes in the 250 to
500 mile range, which subjects the regional carriers to a high level of
ground delays not experienced by major carriers. Regional carriers do
not have the technology to easily capture delay data. RAA cites a cost
estimate, provided by one of its members, concerning the additional
personnel needed to collect and report the data. The estimate places
the additional costs at $75,000 per year. RAA further claims that,
given the current environment of increased insurance costs and new
security fees, the smaller communities served by regional airline may
not be capable of absorbing higher air fares which the carriers would
need to charge to recover the reporting costs.
The Department realizes that it is a difficult decision to
determine the cutoff for which carriers should report on-time data.
There were numerous comments that point out the difficulty of making
accurate and informed decisions about correcting delay problems when
17% of enplanements and a higher share of operations are omitted. This
is compounded by the fact that many of the missing operations are flown
by slower moving aircraft. On the other hand, the Department is
concerned about adding to the operating cost of small carriers. The
Department is attempting to strike a balance between the competing
interests. The public interest is best served at this time by applying
the new reporting requirements to those airlines that already report
on-time data to the Department. Therefore we disagree with RAA's
request to relieve American Eagle from the reporting system. American
Eagle operated almost 493,000 scheduled domestic passenger flights with
almost 12 million domestic enplanements. Relieving American Eagle of
its reporting obligation would create a data gap at a time when the
Department is looking for economical ways to fill its data needs.
American Eagle's data are especially important because American Eagle
is the only carrier reporting regional jet operations.
The Department intends to revisit, at a later date, the issue of
whether to expand the air carrier universe for on-time reporting. The
Department will continue to analyze delay data to see if the reporting
burden is too costly for smaller carriers to participate in the data
collection. Also, the Department will look at alternative reporting
means for less burdensome and costly reporting.
Causal Categories and Methodology
The City of Boston stated that it was unclear from the proposed
rule as to which delay category deicing activities should be assigned.
It also stated that ``bird strikes'' are associated with individual
airports and should be assigned to the National Aviation System
(``NAS''). The City of Boston took issue with the following statement
in the NPRM:
Consistent high volume delays are an indication to airport
operators and to state and local governments that there is a need
for infrastructure investments and improvements.
It believes volume delays can be addressed by actions such as peak-
period pricing, auctioning of landing and takeoff rights, or increased
use of secondary airports.
American Trans Air believes that ``bird strikes'' are acts of God
and should be reported under ``NAS'' delays. The carrier also stated
that:
* * * the National Aviation System category for reporting delays is
not adequately defined. There are codes and situations that fall
under this category, which are now classified elsewhere or are not
specific enough to be meaningful. For example, should not airport
delays due to infrastructure, terminal and runway limitations and
local and regional curfews fall under NAS? The current allocation of
codes, we believe, needs to be less subjective, and include more
government-controlled conditions to be labeled as NAS.
ATA believes that ``bird strikes'' should be attributed to NAS. FAR
Part 139 requires airports to have a wildlife management program and
there are specific air traffic control (ATC) procedures to alerting
pilots to bird hazards. ATA also believes that data on late arriving
aircraft is not useful. ``Root delay causes for down-line late arriving
aircraft cannot be consistently determined when multiple delay causes
are involved.''
America West asked, ``What is the difference between extreme and
non-extreme weather delays?'' It believes that ``bird strikes'' should
be coded as an external delay/cancellation (e.g. extreme weather), not
as ``Air Carrier'' or ``NAS.'' America West questions the logic of
allowing carriers to choose whether or not to report the initial cause
of delay for late arriving aircraft delays.
Weather
The Department realizes that reporting the causes of airline delays
and cancellations adds subjectivity to the reporting system. There is a
fine line between some delays coded as ``Weather'' (extreme weather)
and others coded as ``NAS'' (non-extreme weather). The purpose of the
assignment of codes is to identify the party or organization which is
in the best position to take corrective action. Delays or cancellations
coded ``Air Carrier'' are best corrected by the air carriers; delays or
cancellations coded ``NAS'' are best corrected by the FAA, airport
operators, or State or local governments; and delays or cancellations
coded ``Weather'' (extreme weather) cannot be reduced by corrective
action. Delays or cancellations coded ``NAS'' are the type of weather
delays that could be reduced with corrective action by the airports or
the FAA. Therefore, delays attributed to deicing are coded as
``Weather'' delays.
Extreme weather delays or cancellations are caused by weather
conditions (e.g., significant meteorological conditions), actual or
forecasted at the point of departure, en route, or point of arrival
that, in accordance with applicable regulatory standards and/or in the
judgment of the air carrier, prevents operation of that flight and/or
prevents operations of subsequent flights due to the intended aircraft
being out of position as a result of a prior delay or cancellation
attributable to weather.
Security Delays
Ms. Melissa Davis believes that, in light of the terrorists attacks
of September 11, 2001, airport disruption or security delays should be
added to the list of delay or cancellation causes. Ms. Davis cites the
evacuation of Hartsfield International Airport on November 16, 2001, as
a prime example of the need for security delay reporting.
ATA recommends that a separate delay category be established to
report security delays. ATA asserts that security delays are easily
identified and these delays should be distinguished from ``NAS'' or
``Air Carrier'' caused delays.
The Department agrees with the commenters that requested a separate
category for delays and cancellations that relate to security. We will
adopt a new category known as ``Security.'' Congress has assigned
responsibility for aviation and other transportation security to the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). One of TSA's primary
functions is to provide security screening of passengers and their
[[Page 70539]]
accessible property transiting from an airport's common areas to its
sterile areas where passengers board their flights. Delays in flight
departures are not properly attributable to ``Security'' if they are
caused by routine passenger screening. Carriers may or may not elect to
delay a flight's departure for such passengers. Flight delays occurring
because an air carrier holds a flight for screening are ``Air Carrier''
delays not ``Security'' delays. Not all screening and other security-
related delays are attributable to ``Security.'' Some security delays
may result from actions of air carriers or airport employees who fail
to follow security requirements. Air carriers should take care to
ensure that delays and cancellations assigned to the ``Security''
category are not attributable to their own actions or caused by their
own employees.
National Aviation System (NAS)
Delays and cancellations attributable to ``NAS'' refer to a broad
set of conditions: weather-non extreme, airport operations, heavy
traffic volume, air traffic control, etc.
Delays or cancellations resulting from ``bird strikes'' should be
coded ``NAS.'' While bird strikes could be viewed as an Act of God,
improved wildlife management at airports could reduce the frequency of
bird strikes.
While air traffic volume delays and cancellations in the short term
are generally the result of over-scheduling by the airline industry,
these types of delays and cancellations are coded ``NAS.'' Volume
delays occur when there are more flights scheduled than the airport can
handle for a given period of time. An individual air carrier's schedule
by itself does not create volume delays. Rather, it is the accumulation
of all the commercial, general aviation, and military operations at the
airport that contribute to the problem. Air carriers schedule flights
to meet consumer demand. Volume delays can be reduced in the short term
through changes in the air carriers' scheduling practices, which
includes using larger equipment, or as the City of Boston suggests, by
creating incentives to change consumer preference. Such delays may in
the long term be reduced by improving the airport's infrastructure
(e.g. building runways, improving FAA tower facilities, etc.). The
airline industry must work together reduce volume delays.
Air carriers only track delays up to ``push back from the gate.''
These delays are departure delays. After push back, the aircraft is
under air traffic control. Delays occurring after departure are
assigned by air carriers to the NAS. Therefore, whenever the arrival
delay is greater than the departure delay, the air carriers apportion
NAS minutes to make up the difference between the departure delay and
the arrival delay (Departure delay + NAS delay = Arrival delay).
Whenever the departure delay is more than the arrival delay, the en
route time savings would be prorated back to the departure delay
categories. For example, if a 50 minute departure delay consists of a
15 minute ``Air Carrier'' delay, a 10 minute ``NAS'' delay, and a 25
minute ``Late Arriving Aircraft,'' then the departure delay would be
30% ``Air Carrier,'' 20% ``NAS'' and 50% ``Late Arriving Aircraft''. If
the flight arrived 40 minutes late, this would be reported in minutes
as 12 minutes ``Air Carrier,'' 8 minutes ``NAS'' and 20 minutes ``Late
Arriving Aircraft.''
Using the available internal data, the FAA will review the delays
reported by the air carriers in the ``NAS'' category to identify the
actual causes of the delays. Air carriers track delays up to the time
the aircraft pushes away from the departure gate. Delays that occur
after ``push-back'' are generally assigned to the ``NAS'' category. The
FAA has various data sets that can be used to identify delays after
``push-back.'' One of these is FAA's Air Traffic Operations Network
(OPSNET) information. This data set provides information on delays
incurred by aircraft while under the control of the air traffic system.
In addition, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
provides the FAA with weather information. Airport operators provide
the FAA with information on runway closures and other airport
incidents. With these data sets, the FAA has the capability to refine
the NAS delays into weather-non extreme, volume, equipment outages,
runway closures, other, or ``no match.''
Carrier Delays
The Paralyzed Veterans of America requested that the Department
remove the specific reference to ``handling disabled passengers'' from
the guidance list of ``Air Carrier'' delays.
The Department concurs with the request of The Paralyzed Veterans
of America to remove the specific reference to ``handling disabled
passengers'' from the guidance list of ``Air Carrier'' delays. Slow
boarding or seating covers all passengers and there is no intent to
focus on an individual group. Delays attributed to slow boarding are
coded as ``Air Carrier.''
The Department disagrees with the proposal to attribute to ``NAS''
a delay caused by an air carrier observing an airport curfew. Curfews
are in place at many airports and air carriers must plan their
schedules taking into account these curfews. If a delay or cancellation
is the result of an airport curfew, the delay is an ``Air Carrier''
delay.
Delays caused by positive passenger/baggage matches are coded ``Air
Carrier'' when the air carrier is responsible for conducting the match.
Air carriers are responsible for advising passengers of the time needed
for pre-boarding clearances and security screening. If delays are
caused by inoperative security equipment or if the government
institutes a security action which delays flights, then the delays will
be coded as ``Security.''
Delays Attributed to Late Arriving Aircraft
Consumers have an interest in knowing if particular flights are
consistently late due to late arriving aircraft. Delays reported under
the ``Late Arriving Aircraft'' category demonstrate the ripple effects
of an earlier flight delay problem. The cause of the initial delay must
be addressed to cure the delays associated with late-arriving aircraft.
Some carriers track the initial causes and use an internal code to
identify the initial cause for downline late arriving aircraft. Other
carriers do not track the downline effects of earlier delays and only
record that the flight was late because of the previous flight's late
``turn around.'' While data that identify the initial causes of
downline delays are useful data, they are not critical. Originally, we
proposed in the NPRM to create a two-tier system where carriers had the
option to report the root cause of late arriving aircraft delays. We
agree with ATA that this two-tier reporting system could be confusing
to data users and not produce the desired results. Therefore, in such
cases we have decided to require that carriers report only that the
delay was the result of a ``late arriving aircraft'' and not report the
initial delay cause. The Department will have the ability to track the
ripple effects of downline delays since carriers report the aircraft
tail number, which will enable the Department to follow an aircraft
through its daily flight schedule.
Thus, based on our review of the public comments, we are adopting
the following reporting codes:
Cancellation Codes
(A) Air Carrier;
(B) Extreme Weather;
(C) National Aviation System (NAS); and
(D) Security.
Delay Causes
Air Carrier;
[[Page 70540]]
Extreme Weather;
National Aviation System (NAS);
Security; and
Late Arriving Aircraft.
Delay and Cancellations Causes
Below is a list of examples of causes for delays and cancellations.
This list should be used as a guide for relating the types of
occurrences and the associated delay or cancellation code. This list
should not be considered a complete list. Carriers report delay
categories when the arrival delay is 15 minutes or more. The rule does
not require carriers to report causal data for flights that are
considered ``on-time.''
Air Carrier
Aircraft cleaning
Aircraft damage (except bird strikes, lightning/hail damage)
Airport curfew
Awaiting the arrival of connecting passengers or crew
Awaiting alcohol test
Awaiting gate space
Baggage loading
Cabin servicing
Cargo loading
Catering
Computer outage--carrier equipment
Crew legality (pilot or attendant rest)
Damage by hazardous goods
Engineering Inspection
Flight paperwork
Fueling
Gate congestion
Government forms not properly completed--INS, FAA, Agriculture, Public
Health, etc.
Ground equipment out of service
Hot brakes restriction
Last minute passenger
Late mail from Post Office
Late crew
Lavatory servicing
Maintenance
Medical emergency
Out of service aircraft
Oversales
Positive passenger baggage match
Passenger services
Potable water servicing
Pre-flight check
Ramp congestion--blocked by another aircraft under carrier's control
Ramp service
Removal of unruly passenger
Revised weight sheet
Shortage of ramp equipment
Slow boarding or seating
Snow removal (when it is a carrier ramp service function)
Stowing carry-on baggage
Weight and balance delays
Weather
Below minimum conditions
Clear ice inspection
Deicing aircraft
Earthquake
Extreme high or low temperatures
Hail Damage
Holding at gate for enroute weather
Hurricane
Lightning damage
Pre-planned cancellations that result from predicted weather
Snow Storm
Thunder Storm
Tornado
National Aviation System (NAS)
Airport conditions
Airport construction
Air Traffic Control (ATC)
Awaiting ATC clearance while still at gate
Air Traffic Quota Flow Program--ATC
Closed Runways
Computer failure--air carrier equipment
Equipment Outage--ATC
Gate hold--ATC
Ground delay program--ATC
Flow control program--FAA
Other disabled aircraft blocking runway
Ramp congestion--blocked by aircraft not under carrier's control
Ramp Traffic--Air Traffic Control
Restricted aircraft movement on runways
Volume Delays
Security
Bomb threat
Inoperative screening equipment
Evacuation of terminal or concourse or re-boarding aircraft resulting
from security breech
Weapon confiscation
Late Arriving Aircraft
Means a previous flight with same aircraft arrived late which caused
the present flight to depart late.
Passenger Notification
Several commenters stated that they support the rule to collect
causal data, but more should be done to require passenger notification
and to relieve passenger inconvenience at the time of the delay or
cancellation. Mr. Rummell states that a passenger should receive
compensation, similar to denied boarding compensation, when an air
carrier's delayed flight causes a passenger to miss a connecting
flight.
The Department agrees that air carriers should make their best
efforts to alert passengers as early as possible of delays, the reason
for the delay, and the actions the carrier is taking to deal with the
problem. The instant rulemaking is focused on collecting data that can
be used by consumers in making future travel plans and by the operators
and managers of the air transportation system for strategic planning to
decrease the frequency and severity of flight irregularities. Thus,
these proposals suggesting notification requirements in the event of
delays or cancellations as well as the proposal for compensation are
outside the scope of this rulemaking.
Standardizing Flight Times
ACI-NA states that the current system does not take into account
the common practice by air carriers of increasing flight times in their
schedules to avoid the appearance of frequent delays. According to ACI-
NA system inefficiencies are masked when carriers' flights are counted
as ``on-time'' only because the air carriers padded their schedules.
ACI-NA believes that, ``DOT's establishment of a more uniform delay
reporting system would go a long way towards rectifying these problems,
but will only do so if most or all air carriers are required to
comply.''
We agree that the current reporting system has the capacity to
conceal inefficiencies in the aviation system. However, we also believe
that airlines are acting responsibly and in the best interests of the
public in adjusting their schedules to reflect actual departure and
arrival times. It is more important for the public to be able to rely
on the stated time that their flight actually will arrive at its
destination, than it is for them to know the time the flight would
arrive if there were no inefficiencies in the system. Generally,
carriers schedule their flight times based on the unimpeded taxi-out
time, the unimpeded air time, the unimpeded taxi-in time, and the time
of all anticipated delays. For example, if each morning an air
carrier's flight experiences a 20 minute wait in a queue for take-off
clearance, the air carrier will incorporate those 20 minutes into its
flight schedule. Flights are late when the carrier experiences an
unanticipated delay. If events causing delays occur regularly, these
events are built into a carrier's schedule, which precludes the public
from otherwise being deceived and permits the public to rely on the
carrier's stated schedule.
The Department's Inspector General audited some flights at certain
heavily used airports and found that scheduled flight times have
increased in duration over time. The increase in scheduled flight time
is related to the rise in operations in the aviation system. Generally,
an increase in the volume of operations at an airport means an increase
in taxi-out times. This is especially true during peak operating
periods. Rather than creating a more ``uniform'' system for carriers to
report
[[Page 70541]]
their scheduled times, the Department has plans to develop an
efficiency index for routes and airports. The route index would be
based on the sum of the unimpeded taxi-out time, the unimpeded air
time, the unimpeded taxi-in time divided into the scheduled times. The
airport index would be an average of all route indices originating at
the airport. High indices would represent an inefficiency on the route
or at the airport. Accordingly, we do not find it in the public
interest to adopt ACI-NA's suggestion to alter the way on-time flights
are calculated.
Airline Service Quality Performance Data vs. Operations Network Data
ACI-NA states that, ``The current system for reporting flight
delays and cancellations is deeply flawed because of inconsistencies
between the Airline Service Quality Performance (ASQP) data reported by
the airlines to the BTS and the delay data collected by FAA personnel
from manually recording aircraft via the FAA's Operations Network
(``OPSNET'' data). The OPSNET data are intended to measure system-wide
ATC performance and to identify areas for ATC operational
improvement.''
The Department does not believe the reporting systems are flawed
because ASQP and OPSNET reports have different delay results. As ACI-NA
correctly points out, OPSNET measures how well the ATC system is
performing. If a flight cannot lift-off within 15 minutes after
departing the boarding gate, OPSNET records a departure delay because
the ATC system did not service that aircraft in a timely manner.
Conversely, ASQP measures how well the air carriers are meeting their
published schedules. The most important delay statistic of ASQP is the
percentage of scheduled on-time arrivals. As stated earlier, if an air
carrier's flight routinely experiences a 20 minute wait in a departure
queue, the carrier will add those 20 minutes into its flight schedule.
That flight will probably have a consistent OPSNET delay and an on-time
ASQP arrival. The largest discrepancies between OPSNET and ASQP occur
when there are long ATC delays in the early morning. In these cases,
both systems record delays for the initial morning flights. ASQP will
continue to record delayed flights until the air carriers are able to
meet their published schedules. OPSNET, on the other hand, would not
record another delay unless there was another ATC problem.
The Department does not view different statistics from OPSNET and
ASQP as flawed data. However, the public can be confused when the media
uses OPSNET and ASQP data interchangeably without explaining the
differences in the two systems. We believe that the proper source to
advise the public of air carrier on-time performance is the ASQP data.
OPSNET data are the proper data source for analyzing ATC delays.
However, once causal data are included in the ASQP system, it should
become the primary source for all delay studies.
Publication of Causal Data
The ATA believes air carrier causal data are proprietary and
confidential and should only be released to the public in an aggregate
form and that no individual carrier causal data should be publicly
released. ATA also believes that the Department should not release the
``refined'' NAS data until the Department and airlines have had ample
time to evaluate its utility for this purpose. In the NPRM, the
Department stated that it would use OPSNET data and information from
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to identify the
actual causes of delays reported in the ``NAS'' category.
Given the existing reporting requirements in this area, ATA has
failed to demonstrate why causal data should be viewed as proprietary
data. Indeed, Congress and the Department have made the determination
that overriding public interest calls for release of the data.
Moreover, the causal category ``Air Carrier'' is inclusive of all types
of delays under the control of the carrier. This level of summarization
does not allow a competitor air carrier to gain a competitive advantage
by studying another carrier's reported ``Air Carrier'' delays. For
example, you could not gain insight as to a carrier's policy of holding
a flight for delayed connecting passengers from delays coded ``Air
Carrier.''
The Department also disagrees with the suggestion that the FAA
should not identify the delays coded ``NAS.'' It is important for
management purposes for the FAA to identify the specific cause of
``NAS'' delays. The FAA has had ample experience using OPSNET data to
identify ATC, airport, and weather related delays. The Department
realizes that there will be some ``NAS'' delays which it will not be
able to match with its internal data. For example, there probably will
not be internal FAA data to identify delays or cancellations caused by
bird strikes. From the information gathered by the Air Carrier On-Time
Reporting Advisory Committee and our experience with the follow-on
pilot program on causal reporting, it appears air carriers presently
lack the necessary information to code those flight delays which occur
after the aircraft pushes back from the departure gate. Because of
this, air carriers code all delays after push back as ``NAS'' delays.
Since air carriers lack the causal knowledge of delays after push back,
we believe the FAA is the proper party to identify ``NAS'' delays.
Moreover, if ``NAS'' delays were not identified, the public may be left
with the perception that all ``NAS'' delays are solely ATC delays,
which is not accurate.
Diverted Flights
We have concluded that air carriers should not report causal codes
for diverted flights. Air carriers track and code delays only up to the
time the aircraft pushes back from the gate at the origin airport.
Carriers are instructed to code delays after push back as ``NAS''
delays because, after push back, the aircraft is generally under the
command of the air traffic control system. Most diversions are caused
by extreme weather conditions or mechanical malfunctions. There are
only a minimal number of diverted flights and most diversions would be
mis-coded if carriers followed the reporting instructions to code in-
flight delays as ``NAS'' delays.
The Five Minute Rule
In the interest of keeping the reporting burden to a minimum,
carriers will be required only to track delay causes of five minutes or
more, however carriers may elect to track delays by the minute.
Regardless of the method chosen, a carrier must ensure that, in all
cases, the total minutes of the reported causal delays equal the actual
minutes of arrival delays. For instructions, see examples 2, 3, 8, and
11 under the caption ``Examples of delayed flight coding.''
Reporting of Delayed Flights
Carriers use a fixed-length file format to report on-time data. We
have added four-position numeric fields for each of the five possible
causes of delays. Instead of reporting delay codes, carriers will
report the number of minutes attributed to the cause of delay into the
assigned fields for the appropriate cause of delay. There often are
multiple reasons for delayed flights, and we are requiring air carriers
to report each category of flight delay, as applicable. The Department
has adopted the fixed-length file format as follows:
[[Page 70542]]
Field Specifications for Form 234, On-Time Performance Reports
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Field and description Type Location Length Comments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A--Carrier code....................... Alpha 1-2 2
B--Flight number...................... Num 3-6 4
C--Origin airport code................ Alpha 7-9 3
D--Destination airport code........... Alpha 10-12 3
E--Date of flight operation........... Num 13-20 8 Format yyyymmdd.
F--Day of the week of flight operation Num 21 1 Mon = 1, Sun = 7.
G--Scheduled departure time per OAG... Num 22-25 4 Local time 24 hour
clock.
H--Scheduled departure time per CRS... Num 26-29 4 Local time 24 hour
clock.
I--Gate departure time (actual)....... Num 30-33 4 Local time 24 hour
clock.
J--Scheduled arrival time per OAG..... Num 34-37 4 Local time 24 hour
clock.
K--Scheduled arrival time per CRS..... Num 38-41 4 Local time 24 hour
clock.
L--Gate arrival time (actual)......... Num 42-45 4 Local time 24 hour
clock.
M--Difference between OAG and CRS Num 46-49 4 In minutes (2 hrs = 0120
scheduled departure times. min).
N--Difference between OAG and CRS Num 50-53 4 In minutes.
scheduled arrival times.
O--Scheduled elapsed time per CRS..... Num 54-57 4 In minutes.
P--Actual gate-to-gate time........... Num 58-61 4 In minutes.
Q--Departure delay time (actual Num 62-65 4 In minutes.
minutes CRS).
R--Arrival delay time (actual minutes Num 66-69 4 In minutes.
CRS).
S--Elapsed time difference (actual Num 70-73 4 In minutes.
minutes CRS).
T--Wheels-off time (actual)........... Num 74-77 4 Local time 24 hour
clock.
U--Wheels-on time (actual)............ Num 78-81 4 Local time 24 hour
clock.
V--Aircraft tail number............... Alpha/Num 82-87 6 Left justified, trailing
blanks.
W--Cancellation code.................. Num 88 1 (A, B, C, or D).
X--Minutes late for delay............. Num 89-92 4 Carrier Caused Delays--
In minutes.
Y--Minutes late for delay............. Num 93-96 4 Extreme Weather Delays--
In minutes.
Z--Minutes late for delay............. Num 97-100 4 NAS Delays--In minutes.
AA--Minutes late for delay............ Num 101-104 4 Security--In minutes.
AB--Minutes late for delay............ Num 105-108 4 Late Arriving Aircraft--
In Minutes.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cancellation codes Delay causes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A--Carrier Caused......................... Carrier Caused.
B--Extreme Weather........................ Extreme Weather.
C--National Aviation System............... National Aviation System.
D--Security............................... Security.
Late Arriving Aircraft.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All numeric fields for which data are unavailable will be zero-
filled.
All alpha fields for which data are unavailable will be left
blank.
The data fields in this document are Y2K compliant.
Examples of delayed flight coding: 1. A flight received a 20 minute
ground hold because of congestion at the destination airport, and the
flight was 18 minutes late arriving at the destination airport gate.
The delayed flight would be coded 18 minutes for NAS.
2. A flight was 4 minutes late pushing back from the gate and
arrived 21 minutes late. The delayed flight would be coded 21 minutes
for NAS. Please note in this example that the air carrier delay was
less than 5 minutes, and thus unless the carrier tracks delays by the
minute, the 4 minute push-back delay would not be attributed to the air
carrier.
3. A flight was delayed 4 minutes due to slow boarding of
passengers and another 3 minutes to load late-arriving baggage. The
flight arrived 15 minutes late. The delayed flight would be coded 7
minutes for air carrier and 8 minutes for NAS. Please note in this
example that while no single air carrier caused delay was 5 minutes or
more, the sum of the carrier delay was more than 5 minutes and the
total delay was 15 minutes, and thus, reportable.
4. A flight was delayed 20 minutes waiting for connecting
passengers from another flight and arrived 28 minutes late. The delayed
flight would be coded 20 minutes for air carrier and 8 minutes for NAS.
5. A flight had a 16 minute ground hold and arrived 14 minutes
late. There is no delay coding as the flight arrived within 15 minutes
of scheduled arrival time, and thus, is considered on-time.
6. A flight is 20 minutes late because of weather and is coded 20
minutes for weather. The next flight with that aircraft is 15 minutes
late leaving the gate and arrives 20 minutes late. The delayed flight
would be coded 15 minutes for late arriving aircraft and 5 minutes NAS.
Please note in this example that the air carrier made up 5 minutes of
the initial late arriving aircraft delay, but then experienced a 5
minute en-route delay.
7. A flight was 30 minutes late pushing back from the gate. The 30
minute delay consisted of 10 minutes for a late arriving aircraft and
20 minutes for slow boarding process because of an oversales problem.
The flight arrived 24 minutes late. The delayed flight would be coded 8
minutes for late arriving flight and 16 minutes for air carrier. Please
note in this example that the 6 minutes gained after push back was
prorated back to the two recorded delays. In this example, late
arriving aircraft was 33.3% of the original delay and the air carrier
delay was 66.6% of the delay. Therefore, late arriving aircraft was
computed as 33.3% of 24 which equals 8; and air carrier was computed as
66.6% of 24 which equals 16.
8. A flight was 20 minutes late because of a thunderstorm and 6
minutes late because of a crew problem. The flight arrived 18 minutes
late. The delayed flight would be coded 14 minutes for weather and 4
minutes for air carrier. In this example, the air carrier must round
the prorated minutes to whole numbers. Carriers should not report
fractions or decimals. Also, the
[[Page 70543]]
carrier would report an air carrier delay of less than 5 minutes
because the carrier was required to track the crew delay because it was
5 minutes or more.
9. Flight number 234 was 20 minutes late departing the gate because
the air carrier substituted a spare aircraft to reduce a known upcoming
delay. The flight was scheduled to be operated with an aircraft that,
at the time, was experiencing a 3 hour extreme weather delay. Flight
number 234 arrived 16 minutes late, and was reported as a 16 minute
late arriving aircraft--extreme weather.
10. A flight was 2 hours late because the carrier's concourse was
evacuated and passengers re-screened because of a breech of security.
The flight would be coded 120 minutes--Security.
11. A flight was 3 minutes late because of late crew and 4 minutes
late because of severe weather. The flight arrived 19 minutes late.
Since the flight was 7 minutes late departing the gate, the carrier
could report the delay as 7 minutes ``Weather'' (the predominant cause
of the gate delay of over five minutes) and a ``NAS'' delay of 12
minutes. Also, acceptable would be 3 minutes ``Air Carrier,'' 4 minutes
``Weather'' and 12 minutes ``NAS.''
Examples of cancelled flight coding: 1. A flight cancelled because
of mechanical problems is coded ``A'' for air carrier.
2. Flight 123, BOS-DCA was cancelled because, overnight, the
airport had two feet of snow. The cancellation would be coded ``B'' for
weather.
3. The next segment of Flight 123, DCA-MIA was cancelled because
the aircraft that was to be used for this flight is stuck in two feet
of snow in Boston. The weather in Washington and Miami is clear. The
cancellation would be coded ``B'' for weather, because the intended
aircraft was out of position as a result of a prior cancellation
attributed to weather.
4. It's a clear day at O'Hare, but there is a ground hold for
flights to DFW because of a severe thunderstorm around the DFW airport.
After a 3 hour wait, the weather at DFW has not changed, and the
carrier cancels the flight. The cancellation would be coded ``B'' for
weather.
5. It's a rainy, misty day at O'Hare. Operations have been slow all
morning. The air carrier receives a call from air traffic control
asking that it cancel one of its next five flights to allow the airport
to return to normal operations. Other carriers receive similar calls.
These cancellations would be coded ``C'' for NAS.
6. The airport is closed for two hours because of a breech in
security. The carrier cancelled three flights because the number of
scheduled departures exceeded airport capacity; and the FAA advised all
air carriers that they must reduce the remainder of their daily
schedule. The cancellation would be coded AD'' for Security.
Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This rule is ``significant'' under Executive Order 12866 and the
regulatory policies and procedures of the Department of Transportation
(44 FR 11034), and was reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.
As discussed above, the purpose of the rule is to disclose more fully
to the public and aviation managers the nature and source of the delays
and cancellations experienced by air travelers. This objective is
achieved by amending 14 CFR 234 to require reporting air carriers to
identify and report causes of airline delays and cancellations. Based
on information collected during the pilot project, we estimate that the
new reporting requirements would require each reporting carrier to
expend 10-20 hours to reconfigure its data system. Once these initial
resources are expended, we estimate that there will be no additional
costs or burdens for delay and cancellation reporting. We estimated
reprogramming costs of $100.00/hour. Thus, we estimate that for the 10
reporting air carriers in total, there would be an initial
reprogramming cost of $10,000--$20,000.
Prior to the issuance of the NPRM, the Air Carrier Association of
America stated that the start-up costs for air carriers not presently
reporting under Part 234 would be approximately $25,000, with annual
costs as high as $100,000. The Air Carrier Association of America did
not submit a comment in response to the NPRM. American Trans Air
estimated its initial programming costs at $136,000 and an annual cost
of $100,000 ``to report on-time performance as well as causal data.''
The ATA stated that it would be ``inappropriate'' for it to estimate
the costs to its members because ``on-time flight performance reporting
is the responsibility of each certificated carrier.''
This final rule applies only to carriers reporting under Part 234
and, while American Trans Air submitted cost estimates, it has not
reached the Part 234 reporting threshold at this time and thus, is not
covered by the requirements of this rule. Thus, none of the air
carriers covered by this final rule face development costs since they
are already reporting under Part 234. None of the carriers, presently
reporting under Part 234, indicated that the annual costs for reporting
the causes of delays and cancellations would be $100,000 or more. A
carrier whose business expands to such a point that it meets the Part
234 reporting requirements, must develop a computer system to file its
quality performance reports of which the casual delay information would
be a minor part of the overall development costs.
Finally, even using slightly higher cost estimates ($25,000-
$50,000), we believe that the benefits to the traveling public and the
availability of more accurate information for the allocation of
transportation resources outweigh the modest costs that would be
incurred by the reporting air carriers.
Executive Order 12612
This rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 (``Federalism'') and we
have determined the rule does not have sufficient federalism
implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires an
agency to review its regulations to assess their impact on small
entities unless the agency determines that a rule is not expected to
have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Unless alternative definitions have been established by the agency in
consultation with the Small Business Administration (SBA), the
definition of ``small business'' has the same meaning as under the
Small Business Act (15 CFR parts 631-657c). For those companies
providing scheduled passenger air transportation, the SBA defines a
small business as an air carrier that has 1,500 employees or fewer (See
NAICS Number 48111).
The rule applies only to those air carriers that meet the Part 234
reporting criteria (i.e., carriers that hold a certificate under 49
U.S.C. 41102 and account for at least 1 percent of the domestic
scheduled-passenger revenues in the past 12 months). We have reviewed
our data base and find that none of the air carriers that report under
Part 234 have 1,500 employees or fewer. In fact, our information
indicates that all of these carriers employ more than 10,000 employees.
Therefore, we believe that this rule does not apply to any ``small
business'' as defined by the SBA. Thus, based on the above discussion,
I certify this rule will not have a
[[Page 70544]]
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
This rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of $100
million or more to either State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or to the private sector.
Environmental Assessment
We believe that the changes to the Part 234 reporting system have
no significant impact on the environment. The changes proposed in this
final rule should increase the quality of data collected on the causes
of airline delays and cancellations, thus increasing our ability to
evaluate potential air traffic problems and allocate the appropriate
resources toward mitigating these problems. These revisions should
produce a small net benefit to the environment by improving the data
sources used in regulatory development. Therefore, we find that there
are no significant environmental impacts associated with this rule.
Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
The reporting and record keeping requirements associated with this
final rule are being sent to the Office of Management and Budget in
accordance with 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35 under OMB NO: 2138-0040.
Administration: Bureau of Transportation Statistics; Title: Airline
Service Quality Performance Reports; Need for Information: Statistical
information on the causes of airline delays and cancellations; Proposed
Use of Information: To disclose more fully to the public the nature and
source of the delays and cancellations experienced by air travelers;
Frequency: Monthly; Burden Estimate: 150 hours; Average Annual Burden
Hours per Respondent After Final Rule is Issued--No burden. Based on
information collected during the pilot project, we estimate that these
reporting requirements will require each affected carrier to expend 10-
20 hours to reconfigure its data system. We estimate reprogramming
costs of $100.00/hour. Thus, we estimate that for the 10 reporting air
carriers in total, there would be an initial reprogramming cost of
$10,000-$20,000. Once these initial resources are expended, we estimate
that there would be no additional annual burden. We invite comments on
our burden estimates. For further information or to comment on the
burden hour estimate contact: The Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Room 10235, New Executive
Office Building, Washington, DC 20503, Attention Desk Office for the
Department of Transportation or Bernie Stankus at the address listed
under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
Regulation Identifier Number
A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in
April and October of each year. The RIN number 2139-AA09 contained in
the heading of this document can be used to cross reference this action
with the Unified Agenda.
Regulatory Text
Accordingly, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, under
delegated authority pursuant to 49 CFR part 1, amends Chapter II of 14
CFR, as follows:
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 234
Advertising, Air carriers, Consumer protection, Reporting
requirements, Travel agents.
PART 234--[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for Part 234 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 329 and chapters 401, 413, 417.
2. Section 234.4 is amended by adding paragraphs (a)(16) through
(a)(21), revising paragraph (b), and adding paragraph (g), (h) and (i)
as follows:
Sec. 234.4 Reporting of on-time performance.
(a) * * *
(16) Causal code for cancellation, if any.
(17) Minutes of delay attributed to the air carrier, if any.
(18) Minutes of delay attributed to extreme weather, if any.
(19) Minutes of delay attributed to the national aviation system,
if any.
(20) Minutes of delay attributed to security, if any.
(21) Minutes of delay attributed to a previous late arriving
aircraft, if any.
(b) When reporting the information specified in paragraph (a) of
this section for a diverted flight, a reporting carrier shall use the
original scheduled flight number and the original scheduled origin and
destination airport codes. Carriers are not required to report causal
information for diverted flights.
* * * * *
(g) Reporting carriers should use the following codes to identify
causes for cancelled flights:
Code
A--Air Carrier
B--Extreme Weather
C--National Aviation System (NAS).
D-Security
(1) Air Carrier cancellations are due to circumstances that were
within the control of the air carrier (e.g., lack of flight crew,
maintenance, etc.).
(2) Extreme weather cancellations are caused by weather conditions
(e.g., significant meteorological conditions), actual or forecasted at
the point of departure, en route, or point of arrival that, in
accordance with applicable regulatory standards and/or in the judgment
of the air carrier, prevents operation of that flight and/or prevents
operations of subsequent flights due to the intended aircraft being out
of position as a result of a prior cancellation or delay attributable
to weather.
(3) NAS cancellations are caused by circumstances within the
National Aviation System. This term is used to refer to a broad set of
conditions: weather-non-extreme, airport operations, heavy traffic
volume, air traffic control, etc.
(4) Security cancellations may be the result of malfunctioning
screening or other security equipment or a breech of security that
causes the evacuation of the airport or individual concourses, or the
need to re-screen passengers.
(h) Reporting carriers should use the following causes to identify
the reasons for delayed flights:
CAUSE
Air Carrier
Extreme weather
NAS
Security
Late arriving aircraft
(1) Air carrier delays are due to circumstances within the control
of the air carrier.
(2) Extreme weather delays are caused by weather conditions (e.g.,
significant meteorological conditions, actual or forecasted at the
point of departure, en route, or point of arrival that, in accordance
with applicable regulatory standards and/or in the judgment of the air
carrier, prevents operation of that flight and/or prevents operations
of subsequent flights due to the intended aircraft being out of
position as a result of a prior cancellation or delay attributable to
weather.
(3) NAS delays are caused by circumstances within the National
Aviation System. This term is used to refer to a broad set of
conditions: weather-non-extreme, airport operations, heavy traffic
volume, air traffic control, etc.
[[Page 70545]]
(4) Security delays may be the result of malfunctioning screening
or other security equipment or a breech of security that causes the
evacuation of the airport or individual concourses or the need to re-
screen passengers.
(5) Late arriving aircraft delays are the result of a late incoming
aircraft from the previous flight.
(i) When reporting causal codes in paragraph (a) of this section,
reporting carriers are required to code delays only when the arrival
delay is 15 minutes or greater; and reporting carriers must report each
causal component of the reportable delay when the causal component is 5
minutes or greater.
3. Section 234.5 is revised as follows:
Sec. 234.5 Form of reports.
Except where otherwise noted, all reports required by this part
shall be filed within 15 days of the end of the month for which data
are reported. The reports must be submitted to the Office of Airline
Information in a format specified in accounting and reporting
directives issued by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics' Assistant
Director for Airline Information.
Issued in Washington, DC on November 15, 2002.
Rick Kowalewski,
Acting Director, Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
[FR Doc. 02-29910 Filed 11-22-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-P