It is clear that Congress intended the Fair Labor Standards Act to
be broad in its scope. ``Breadth of coverage is vital to its mission''
(Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497). An employer who claims an
exemption under the Act has the burden of showing that it
applies (Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U.S. 545; Mitchell v.
Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290: Tobin v. Blue Channel Corp., 198 F.
2d 245, approved in Mitchell v. Myrtle Grove Packing Co., 350 U.S. 891;
Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d 52). Conditions specified
in the language of the Act are ``explicit prerequisites to exemption''
(Arnold v. Kanowsky, 361 U.S. 388). In their application, the purpose of
the exemption as shown in its legislative history as well as its
language should be given effect. However, ``the details with which the
exemptions in this Act have been made preclude their enlargement by
implication'' and ``no matter how broad the exemption, it is meant to
apply only to'' the specified activities (Addison v. Holly Hill, 322
U.S. 607; Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254). Exemptions provided in the
Act ``are to be narrowly construed against the employer seeking to
assert them'' and their application limited to those who come ``plainly
and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.'' This construction of
the exemptions is necessary to carry out the broad objectives for which
the Act was passed (Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490; Mitchell v.
Kentucky Finance Co., supra; Arnold v. Kanowsky, supra; Calaf v.
Gonzales, 127 F. 2d 934; Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11; Mitchell v.
Stinson, 217 F. 2d 210; Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d
52).
