

**Compliance**

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

**Interim Action**

(f) These actions are interim actions due to the on-going investigation, and we may take further rulemaking actions in the future based on the results of the investigation and field experience.

**Engine ECU Software Removal**

(g) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, remove software version 8.4.E or older versions, from the engine ECUs, part numbers 1797M63P01, 1797M63P02, 1797M63P03, 1797M63P04, 1797M63P05, 1820M99P01, 1820M99P02, 1820M99P03, 1820M99P04, and 1820M99P05.

**Previous Software Versions of ECU Software**

(h) You may use an ECU installed on an engine with a software version of 8.4.E or older for no longer than 24 months after the effective date of this AD.

(i) Once software version 8.4.E or older has been removed and new FAA-approved software version is installed in an ECU, reverting to version 8.4.E or older of ECU software in that ECU is prohibited.

(j) After 24 months from the effective date of this AD, use of an ECU with a software version of 8.4.E or older is prohibited.

**Alternative Methods of Compliance**

(k) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

**Special Flight Permits**

(l) Special flight permits are not authorized.

**Related Information**

(m) Information on removing ECU software and installing new software, which provides increased margin to flameout, can be found in GE Service Bulletin No. CF6-80C2 S/B 73-0352 dated February 7, 2007.

(n) Contact John Golinski, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; email: [john.golinski@faa.gov](mailto:john.golinski@faa.gov); telephone: (781) 238-7135, fax: (781) 238-7199, for more information about this AD.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 22, 2007.

**Francis A. Favara,**

Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.  
[FR Doc. E7-12490 Filed 6-27-07; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION****Federal Aviation Administration****14 CFR Part 39**

[Docket No. FAA-2007-28379; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-077-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

**Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A300 Series Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

[T]he FAA has published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88). \* \* \* Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates for passenger transport aircraft \* \* \* are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks. This Airworthiness Directive (AD), which renders mandatory the modification of the fuel pump wiring against short circuit, is a consequence of this design review.

The unsafe condition is chafing of the fuel pump cables, which could result in short circuits leading to fuel pump failure, intermittent operation, arcing, and possible fuel tank explosion. The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by July 30, 2007.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *DOT Docket Web Site:* Go to <http://dms.dot.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.
- *Mail:* Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
- *Hand Delivery:* Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

**Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://dms.dot.gov>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone (800) 647-5227) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Tom Stafford, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1622; fax (425) 227-1149.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:****Streamlined Issuance of AD**

The FAA is implementing a new process for streamlining the issuance of ADs related to MCAI. This streamlined process will allow us to adopt MCAI safety requirements in a more efficient manner and will reduce safety risks to the public. This process continues to follow all FAA AD issuance processes to meet legal, economic, Administrative Procedure Act, and **Federal Register** requirements. We also continue to meet our technical decision-making responsibilities to identify and correct unsafe conditions on U.S.-certificated products.

This proposed AD references the MCAI and related service information that we considered in forming the engineering basis to correct the unsafe condition. The proposed AD contains text copied from the MCAI and for this reason might not follow our plain language principles.

**Comments Invited**

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2007-28379; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-077-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://dms.dot.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each

substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

### Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2007–0066, dated March 13, 2007 (referred to after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

[T]he FAA has published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88). In their letters referenced 04/00/02/07/01–L296, dated March 4th, 2002 and 04/00/02/07/03–L024, dated February 3rd, 2003, the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) recommended the application of a similar regulation to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA).

Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates for passenger transport aircraft with either a passenger capacity of 30 or more, or a payload capacity of 7,500 pounds (3402 kg) or more, which have received their certification since January 1st, 1958, are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.

This Airworthiness Directive (AD), which renders mandatory the modification of the fuel pump wiring against short circuit, is a consequence of this design review.

**Note:** For A310 and A300–600 aircraft, refer to [EASA] AD 2006–0284R1. [On March 7, 2007, the FAA issued a corresponding NPRM for Model A310 and A300–600 airplanes, which was published in the *Federal Register* (72 FR 11302, March 13, 2007).]

The unsafe condition is chafing of the fuel pump cables, which could result in short circuits leading to fuel pump failure, intermittent operation, arcing, and possible fuel tank explosion. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled “Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements” (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (“SFAR 88,” Amendment 21–78, and subsequent Amendments 21–82 and 21–83).

Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type

certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.

In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.

The JAA has issued a regulation that is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed to cooperate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.

We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

### Relevant Service Information

Airbus has issued Service Bulletin A300–24–0103, Revision 01, dated January 11, 2007. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

### FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

### Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.

### Costs of Compliance

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect about 29 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 72 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is \$80 per work-hour. Required parts would cost about \$5,050 per product. Where the service information lists required parts costs that are covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these costs. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be \$313,490, or \$10,810 per product.

### Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

### Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

### The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

### PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

**Airbus:** Docket No. FAA-2007-28379; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-077-AD.

#### Comments Due Date

(a) We must receive comments by July 30, 2007.

### Affected ADs

(b) None.

### Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A300 series airplanes, all certified models, all serial numbers, certificated in any category; except Model A300-600 series airplanes; and except those modified by Airbus Service Bulletin A300-24-0103, Revision 01, dated January 11, 2007.

### Subject

(d) Electrical Power.

### Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

[T]he FAA has published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88). In their letters referenced 04/00/02/07/01-L296, dated March 4th, 2002 and 04/00/02/07/03-L024, dated February 3rd, 2003, the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) recommended the application of a similar regulation to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA).

Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates for passenger transport aircraft with either a passenger capacity of 30 or more, or a payload capacity of 7,500 pounds (3402 kg) or more, which have received their certification since January 1st, 1958, are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.

This Airworthiness Directive (AD), which renders mandatory the modification of the fuel pump wiring against short circuit, is a consequence of this design review.

**Note:** For A310 and A300-600 aircraft, refer to [EASA] AD 2006-0284R1. [On March 7, 2007, the FAA issued a corresponding NPRM for Model A310 and A300-600 airplanes, which was published in the **Federal Register** (72 FR 11302, March 13, 2007.)]

The unsafe condition is chafing of the fuel pump cables, which could result in short circuits leading to fuel pump failure, intermittent operation, arcing, and possible fuel tank explosion.

### Actions and Compliance

(f) Within 31 months after the effective date of this AD, unless already done, modify the inner and outer fuel pumps wiring, route 1P and 2P harnesses in the LH (left-hand) wing and in the RH (right-hand) wing, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A300-24-0103, Revision 01, dated January 11, 2007. Actions done before the effective date of this AD in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A300-24-0103, dated March 15, 2006, for airplanes under configuration 1 as defined in the service bulletin, are acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

### FAA AD Differences

**Note:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences.

### Other FAA AD Provisions

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom Stafford, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1622; fax (425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

### Related Information

(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Airworthiness Directive 2007-0066, dated March 13, 2007, and Airbus Service Bulletin A300-24-0103, Revision 01, dated January 11, 2007, for related information.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 21, 2007.

#### Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E7-12495 Filed 6-27-07; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**