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2	DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
3	PRESS CONFERENCE
4	With Attorney General Janet Reno and
5	Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman
6	Regarding the Microsoft Settlement
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8	Saturday, July 16, 1994
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13	(Transcribed from a provided audiotape.)
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: Good afternoon.
3	The Justice Department has charged Microsoft, the
4	world's largest software company, with using unfair
5	marketing and contracting practices to choke off competition
6	to preserve its monopoly position. Microsoft has agreed,
7	yesterday, to settle the charges with a consent decree that
8	will prohibit the company from continuing to engage in
9	monopolistic practices in the future.
10	While the company fairly and lawfully climbed to
11	the top of the industry ladder, it used unfair and illegal
12	practices to maintain its dominant position, and kept honest
13	competition from other U.S. companies.
14	The Justice Department has taken an action that
15	is critical to the personal computer industry and the
16	efforts to make it competitive. This settlement will save
17	consumers money, enable them to have a choice when selecting
18	PC operating systems, and it will stimulate innovation in
19	this critical market.
20	Today's settlement is the result of close
21	coordination between the Department of Justice and the
22	Competition Enforcement Authorities of the European
23	Commission, which, today, also has indicated an undertaking
24	containing essentially the same terms.
25	This complaint and settlement marks the first

1	coordinated effort of the two enforcement bodies in
2	initiating and settling an antitrust enforcement action.
3	I want to thank and to recognize Anne Bingaman and
4	the fine staff of the Antitrust Division, who have worked
5	through long hours of negotiations to resolve quickly this
6	significant case, and achieve the best results for the
7	consumers of America.
8	And now I would like to ask Anne --
9	MS. BINGAMAN: Thank you.
10	We are proud of the achievement that the
11	settlement filed in Federal District Court in Washington,
12	the District of Columbia, at 9:30 last night represents.
13	It is a significant -- in fact, historic -- breakthrough for
14	the software industry, for innovation, for the
15	competitiveness of the American economy.
16	Let me describe for you briefly what the case we
17	filed is about and what the settlement achieves, because
18	they are significant.
19	Number one, the settlement will open the playing
20	field; it will level the playing field for Microsoft's
21	competitors in the operating system software market, to
22	enter this important market, to bring down prices to
23	consumers, to innovate, to produce better products.
24	Microsoft, for years, and has today, monopoly
25	power in the software -- operating system software market.

1	As this chart shows, Microsoft has 79-plus percent of that
2	market. Its competitors are other American companies who
3	have been struggling for years to enter this market to
4	provide better, cheaper products to American consumers, and
5	Microsoft's contracting practices, which are challenged in
6	this lawsuit and which are ended by the settlement we
7	achieved, have prevented those competitors from entering the
8	market. They have deprived consumers of choice. And they
9	have stopped innovation -- slowed innovation in this
10	important market.
11	Let me describe to you the four major things that
12	Microsoft did and which this settlement ends.
13	Number one, the per-processor license, I'll
14	describe in a moment.
15	Number two, contracts of extraordinarily long
16	duration which blocks the market.
17	Number three, huge, 100 percent minimum
18	commitments for years, which amounted to take-or-pay
19	contracts, which blocked the market.
20	And, four, restrictive non-disclosure agreements
21	for software writers which prevented them from writing for
22	other software companies in some cases.
23	Let me turn first to the per-processor license,
24	what that is and what this settlement does to stop it.
25	Number one, the settlement bans it outright. That

1	is first. What the per-processor license has done until
2	last night at 9:30 was to lock up 60 percent of this market
3	in the United States in per-processor contracts which
4	Microsoft began using in 1988. Per-processor contracts are
5	contracts which Microsoft imposed by virtue of its dominant
6	monopoly position on computer manufacturers, such as Dell,
7	Compaq, Gateway, you name it, the OEM's they are called in
8	the business, the computer makers, who have to license from
9	Microsoft because it has had this monopoly position and the
10	products are demanded in the marketplace.
11	Nothing wrong with that, but rather than simply
12	sell those products fair and square on the merits and on
13	price, in 1988, Microsoft invented a form of contracting
14	called the per-processor license, under which it required
15	the computer manufacturers -- induced them with extremely
16	low prices to pay for every processor they shipped of a
17	certain type not just to Microsoft, but to the competitors.
18	So it worked this way: Under a per-processor
19	license, which 60 percent of the industry has had until last
20	night, Microsoft got paid for every processor shipped by a
21	computer maker, whether or not that processor had a
22	Microsoft operating system loaded on it.
23	Now, if you are a competitor of Microsoft and you
24	wanted to sell your competing product to a consumer, you do
25	that through these computer manufacturers. But they had to

1	pay Microsoft.
2	Now, if Microsoft -- take this hypothetical --
3	operating system was $15, and you came in with a better
4	operating system or cheaper, it worked just as well,
5	hypothetically $10 -- these numbers are lower than average,
6	but for ease -- under the per-processor license, the
7	computer manufacturer pays Microsoft 15 and the competitor
8	10 for a total of $25 on what really is a $10 item.
9	The result, computer manufacturer were reluctant
10	-- extremely reluctant -- to buy from competitors. And that
11	was the purpose and the effect of the per-processor license.
12	It's obvious what it does. It drives prices up to
13	consumers. It raises prices. It locks out competitors.
14	And it slows innovation.
15	So, this settlement stops the per-processor
16	license.
17	Two, Microsoft used contracts of three to five
18	years in an industry that was rapidly turning over. These
19	extraordinarily long contracts made it very difficult for
20	competitors to get in. The settlement we achieved today
21	reduces contract lengths to one year, with one, one-year
22	extension on the same terms and conditions which the
23	computer manufacturer, in its sole option, can elect.
24	So, we have gone to one-year contracts, banning
25	of per-processor.

1	The third important feature of this settlement is
2	abolishing minimum commitments. Microsoft's third way to
3	lock up this market was to say to the computer makers who
4	had to deal with it, We will give you a lower price if you
5	estimate a large volume.
6	Nothing inherently wrong with that volume
7	discounting. The problem is Microsoft quoted these low
8	prices in conjunction with 100 percent minimum commitments
9	-- i.e., you get that price only if you sign on the dotted
10	line to pay us every cent regardless of whether you actually
11	ship our product or not -- a take-or-pay contract. You pay
12	no matter what.
13	Well, what does that mean?
14	Over a long-term contract, what that means is if
15	the computer manufacturer's business has not gone quite as
16	well as it thought, it is locked into Microsoft no matter
17	what because it owes them this minimum commitment, even if
18	it has not sold any machines. So, minimum commitments was
19	a third way that Microsoft locked up this market, locked out
20	competitors, and minimum commitments are abolished. They
21	are zero in the settlement we achieved yesterday.
22	Finally, NDA's, non-disclosure agreements, were
23	restrictive agreements which Microsoft, this winter, imposed
24	in a manner that had never been done before in the software
25	industry on certain applications writers. It would have --

1	the NDA's challenged in this lawsuit and which Microsoft in
2	the consent decree agrees to stop would have prevented
3	applications writers from discussing Microsoft's operating
4	systems for as long as three years after public disclosure
5	of the operating system.
6	The effect could take those application writers,
7	the software writers, forever out of business, in effect,
8	except for Microsoft. It is another way to, in effect, lock
9	up the market -- this time by locking up the important
10	software applications writers.
11	Microsoft itself has said these NDA's were a
12	mistake. It has agreed in this consent decree to never
13	engage in such practices while this consent decree is in
14	effect. And that also is a significant achievement of this
15	settlement.
16	The last thing the settlement does is prohibit the
17	use of lump-sum contracts, which would have been another way
18	that Microsoft could have locked up this market. They had
19	not needed to use them in the past because they had these
20	other methods, but looking forward, our concern was that
21	they might. And so the settlement also bans lump-sum
22	contracts.
23	This settlement is everything we could have hoped
24	for in a fully litigated case and possibly more. It is an
25	historic achievement. I tell you, the charts we have

1	prepared today were prepared for the lawsuit we planned to
2	file yesterday. The lawsuit was not filed because of the
3	settlement. We filed instead a complaint with a settlement.
4	We are extremely proud of this result.
5	And the last point that the Attorney General
6	noted, I think, deserves mention. This is the first time
7	in history that the Competition Authorities of the European
8	Commission and the Department of Justice have cooperated
9	closely in investigating a major worldwide company, whose
10	anti-competitive practices affected important markets both
11	in Europe and the United States.
12	We took this under a letter -- the EC and I and
13	the Department of Justice asked Microsoft last October to
14	waive any confidentiality restrictions under our respective
15	statutes so that we could work together and think about the
16	case we were jointly -- not jointly to them -- but that we
17	had each initiated. Microsoft agreed to that in writing.
18	We worked with the EC throughout the winter. We
19	shared documents. We worked closely with them. We settled
20	this together on terms that are substantially identical.
21	We negotiated in Brussels the week of July 4th with
22	Microsoft. We negotiated this week at the Department of
23	Justice with EC officials here. And this also is a truly
24	historic aspect of this settlement.
25	So, we are extremely proud of this. We are

1	gratified that it concluded with a consent decree which
2	achieves the really 100 percent results that any lawsuit
3	could have achieved, and possibly more. And I want to
4	especially note that this was the ultimate team effort. We
5	had a group of lawyers, led by Sam Miller, who is here
6	today, and Don Russell, who is on his way back from Brussels
7	-- he has been in Brussels all week coordinating this hour
8	by hour with the EC over there -- we have had extraordinary
9	people on this case. We had a team of lawyers I would put
10	against anybody, and I would feel for the other side.
11	And I want to simply state the names on the
12	complaint we filed last night, because I am so proud to have
13	been part of this group. The complaint was signed by Sam
14	Miller, Don Russell, Joyce Bartu, Bob Zastrow, Dick Irvin,
15	Peter Gray, Justin Dempsey, Gil O'Hana, and Larry Frankel.
16	And there were more, and we had a paralegals. And this was
17	an effort of a remarkable, extraordinary, incredible group
18	of lawyers that I am so proud to have been part of. And I
19	am proud of our partnership with the EC.
20	So, with that, what can I tell you about any
21	questions you have?
22	QUESTION: What kind of room does this give
23	Microsoft's competitors -- (inaudible) -- civil actions?
24	MS. BINGAMAN: That is up to the competitors. I
25	do not actually believe this case changes the legal status

1	of any competitor's suit, because, by settling, Microsoft
2	has admitted to no facts. It has consented to entry of the
3	decree that was filed with our complaint. But facts are not
4	established of record by a settlement, the way they are by
5	a litigated case to conclusion, with a jury trial.
6	So, my own horseback impression is that the
7	action, as such, does not change the legal status. But, as
8	far as private suits by competitors, it has enormous impact
9	for competitors in opening the market. This is exactly what
10	has been needed for years and years in the software
11	industry. And I think, in the market-opening respects and
12	for innovation, prices to consumers, it will have tremendous
13	impact.
14	QUESTION: Why has this taken so long, and why is
15	there no monetary penalty? And I notice it says that -- you
16	say in the press release that it bans these practices in the
17	future, but then says it only lasts six-and-a-half years.
18	MS. BINGAMAN: Okay. You have got several
19	questions there. Number one, we have had this case for a
20	little less than one year. The FTC had it for, I think,
21	two-and-a-half or three years before that. As everyone
22	knows, or a lot of people, the FTC deadlocked two to two.
23	We took the case acting as a fifth commissioner. We have
24	looked carefully at this case because it is an important
25	case, and we wanted to understand it fully ourselves.

1	So, I have no concerns whatsoever about a one-year
2	action by the Justice Department that ends these practices.
3	There are no monetary penalties because they are
4	not provided by any law and never have been. When the
5	Justice Department settles a civil case, the Antitrust
6	Division -- the antitrust laws do not provide for civil
7	penalties, period.
8	We obtain adjunctive reliefs to open the market.
9	Under the American legal system, private actions obtain any
10	monetary damages, and that is just the way it is in all of
11	our cases. They are no different.
12	You had a third aspect.
13	QUESTION: The length of time, you say --
14	MS. BINGAMAN: Oh, the six-and-a-half years. Our
15	decrees normally last 10 years. We negotiated long and hard
16	with Microsoft over the length of the decree. The EC's
17	decrees last four-and-a-half years. We obtained immediate
18	effect of this decree. That was a crucial aspect of the
19	decree. And we believe we added, in effect, three to
20	three-and-a-half years on the front end of the decree
21	because the contract duration stops right now. The
22	per-processor stops as of last night.
23	The illegal practices that had locked up the
24	market are ended. And they do not have to wait for
25	contracts now in effect to run out. And it was our belief

1	that based on all of those facts, plus the EC's practice of
2	four-and-a-half year decrees, that this was a fair balance
3	under the circumstances.
4	Let me mention something. I neglected to thank
5	-- and it was a major oversight on my part and I want to
6	correct it -- Henry Kawati is sitting here, who worked long
7	and hard on this case, he is an economist with our Economic
8	Section; Rich Gilbert, who is head of that section, was in
9	Brussels with me; and Mark Schecter, who killed himself on
10	the case, along with Bob Lighten, but I want to thank Henry
11	Kawati and Ken Hire and Rich Gilbert, because the economics
12	aspect of this case, as you can imagine, was critical. We
13	had outstanding outside economists who Henry worked with
14	tirelessly for many, many months. And he was a critical
15	part of it, as was Rich Gilbert and Ken. So, I wanted to
16	say that.
17	QUESTION: Can you estimate how much these
18	practices may have cost consumers over the years?
19	MS. BINGAMAN: We have not. Because we do not
20	bring damage actions, we do not put efforts into trying to
21	figure out monetary total impact. But I can, to illustrate,
22	tell you this. If you were a consumer and wanted to buy a
23	competing operating system, and despite Microsoft's
24	practices, there have been, in fact, four major competitors
25	in this market to Microsoft, who have clawed and grabbed and

1	have managed to obtain some market share, if you bought one
2	of those competing companies, and 20 percent of the American
3	public does, and you were under a per-processor license, and
4	many of these licenses, as we saw, are per-processor, you
5	paid not just Microsoft anywhere from $15 to $50 for its
6	operating system, you paid the competing price on top of
7	that.
8	And so Microsoft, in effect, taxed every consumer
9	who bought a competing operating system and bought it from
10	a maker who had one of these per-processor contracts, or a
11	similar one. And so it's not insignificant. We have not,
12	as I said, made any effort to quantify it, but it is --
13	there are millions and tens of millions of PC's shipped
14	every year, and it is a major amount of money.
15	We can try to come up with some numbers after the
16	press conference. But with all the other things we have
17	done, that has not -- our focus has been opening the market,
18	truly, and obtaining the relief we needed.
19	QUESTION: To follow that up, do you have any
20	estimate of how many computers were shipped under these
21	agreements that would have been effected?
22	MS. BINGAMAN: I can come up with numbers on that.
23	We have not tried to. It is in the tens of millions. There
24	are 120 million total computers with Microsoft operating
25	systems on them. Many, many were shipped with this -- under

1	these kinds of practices. And it has been a major market
2	problem for competitors, and has restricted choice for
3	consumers.
4	Let me tell you why else this is so important to
5	the American economy. We are about innovation and
6	competition in this economy. That is what we are for. And
7	Microsoft has its shot at the market. No problem. All we
8	are saying is others should have their shot at the market,
9	fair and square, a level playing field. That is the
10	American way.
11	And they may have a better mousetrap. They may
12	not. But what we are saying is people should get a chance
13	to judge it fairly on quality and price and the other
14	factors. And that is what this case is about. It levels
15	the playing field, opens the door.
16	And if a competitor has a better product that can
17	run computers faster, run them better, support better
18	applications, build a base, cut into Microsoft's market
19	share so that applications writers will write for it, that
20	could have profound consequences for the American economy.
21	What we are about is precisely that -- promoting
22	competition, innovation, better products at cheaper prices,
23	and letting the market take care of whatever happens.
24	We are not about driving the market; we are about
25	letting the market operate freely.

1	QUESTION: Had this settlement not been reached,
2	what broader or further action could Microsoft have been
3	subjected to? And, a second question is, had there been any
4	serious consideration about splitting Microsoft into two?
5	MS. BINGAMAN: I cannot discuss our internal
6	considerations as such. I can tell you that we looked at
7	every possible legal theory and at all the facts throughout
8	the course of a long, tough winter, that the legal team I
9	mentioned went through. And it was our conclusion at the
10	end of that that the case to be filed was the case we did
11	file. We did not bargain off any case in exchange for a
12	settlement. This was the case that was there after
13	thousands of hours of work. And it needed to be brought,
14	and it was brought.
15	And that is really as much as I think
16	confidentiality permits me to talk about specifics.
17	QUESTION: Potentially, had this gone into
18	litigation, what could we have seen perhaps in terms of time
19	and cost?
20	MS. BINGAMAN: Had this been litigated, we hoped
21	to conclude it within a year. We planned to file it in a
22	district in which the dockets are not crowded and we could
23	have obtained a quick resolution, because the markets need
24	to be open. This needed to get done. But it would have
25	been a minimum of a year at the very best. It undoubtedly

1	would have been appealed. And the key point is, after all
2	that, two to two-and-a-half years at best through appeal,
3	we could not have achieved one thing more than we got in
4	this settlement.
5	And, frankly, I am not sure we would have gotten
6	as much. I do not know, because I do not know what a judge
7	would have done. But this settlement is 100 percent of what
8	we would have gotten with a lawsuit.
9	QUESTION: Can you tell us more about the EC
10	cooperation, how and when was that initiated? And wasn't
11	there a British investigation as well?
12	MS. BINGAMAN: No, there was no British
13	investigation. It was the European Commission. It was a
14	result, actually -- last September, I went to Europe for
15	consultations, which are annual consultations with the EC
16	that we have done for years, the Antitrust Division -- it's
17	a mutual cooperative thing -- and Klaus Ailerman, the head
18	of the Competition Directorate said to me, What are you
19	doing about Microsoft, because we have a Microsoft case,
20	too, you know, and I am very interested to talk to you about
21	it?
22	And I looked at him and I said, Klaus, I do not
23	think I can say a word to you about Microsoft. Everything
24	I know is under confidential documents. I am forbidden from
25	talking about it. I can't speak to you.

1	And he said, Well, what a great pity, because
2	we've got, as far as I can tell from press reports, the same
3	case.
4	And I said, Well, it is a great pity.
5	And I came back to the United States -- that was
6	the end of September -- and 10 days or two weeks later, it
7	just hit me out of the blue one day, we should ask Microsoft
8	to waive confidentiality so that we could cooperate and
9	decide whether in fact there is a case and coordinate
10	remedies.
11	And the coordination of remedies is really crucial
12	for a company in Microsoft's position, which operates
13	worldwide, literally, in -- I do not know -- tens of
14	countries in the world. They need, for their own business
15	reasons, to have the same contracting practices. It would
16	be terribly disruptive -- and I called the EC. We asked
17	Microsoft. Microsoft, for its own reasons, said that would
18	actually -- they didn't have a problem. They waived
19	confidentiality. And that is how it began last October, and
20	it has continued since then.
21	QUESTION: How is the Justice Department going to
22	monitor the new agreements, the new contracts that Microsoft
23	will sign with its OEM's? And what guarantees are there
24	that Microsoft isn't going to turn around and say, you know,
25	if we cannot do the kinds of volume deals that we have done

1	in the past, we are going to charge 5, 10, 15 percent for
2	the operating system than we have in the past?
3	MS. BINGAMAN: If they charge more for their
4	operating system, the competitors are there, without
5	question, with comparable products. And the market should
6	take care of that. That is the whole idea of this
7	settlement. The market should take care of it.
8	We are allowed, in the monitoring provisions of
9	this decree, which you should have, to request documents
10	from Microsoft, to inspect their contracts, to talk to their
11	people. We are further -- the decree specifically provides
12	we can cooperate with the EC in this monitoring, so we will
13	continue our cooperation and close work with them.
14	And we are watching. We are very much on the
15	case.
16	QUESTION: A question about the per-processor
17	issue. From your presentation it wasn't entirely clear to
18	me, but it sounds as though Microsoft main pressure on
19	computer companies was that they got -- they would offer
20	huge, huge discounts to the companies that would accept a
21	per-processor kind of agreement. That being the case, it
22	seems to me that, on one level, the sin is that Microsoft
23	is simply charging too little for the operating system.
24	And, to follow up on that, to follow up on that,
25	it seems to me that the marketplace situation may not be a

1	whole lot different, because Microsoft can continue, it
2	seems to me, to charge that same low, low price.
3	MS. BINGAMAN: Ed, you been talking to Microsoft?
4	That is their line. They are not telling you right. If
5	that was so easy, why did they have per-processor licenses?
6	They are the only company in the industry that did. Why did
7	they have three- to five-year contracts? They are the only
8	company that in the industry that did. Why did they have
9	100 percent minimum commitments? They are the only company
10	in the industry that enforced that.
11	If this was so simple, why were they locking up
12	the market with practices which every computer manufacturer
13	despised and which the competitors despised and which
14	Microsoft hung tough through four years of Government
15	investigation to hang on to? Do you think that is because
16	it did not matter to them? That is the story they are
17	putting out.
18	You are darned right they are trying to spin it
19	their way. That is not right. And let me tell you. Volume
20	discounts, of course they can volume discount. No question.
21	There is nothing wrong with volume discounting. It is done
22	in all kinds of industries, in all kinds of situations. And
23	the decree does not address volume discounts as such.
24	The problem with Microsoft's practices is that
25	they were using volume discounts to lock up the market with

1	per-processor contracts and 100 percent minimum commitments,
2	which then were like iron. You could not get out of. You
3	could not escape.
4	To get those low prices, you had to sell your soul
5	and never leave Microsoft. And that is what this decree
6	changes.
7	Microsoft can compete on the basis of low price.
8	We have no problem with that. That is good. We want that.
9	What we do not want is competing on the basis of low price
10	and then using that to impose contract terms which exclude
11	every other competitor.
12	And, Ed, the reason they were able to do that is
13	because of their monopoly position in this market. I mean,
14	this is an important question you are asking, because they
15	are going to try to claim that this decree changes nothing.
16	That is wrong. That is a lie. And people need to
17	understand that.
18	Because volume discounting, in and of itself, is
19	not a problem. There are ways volume discounting can be
20	abused. I have discussed those ways with Microsoft and Bill
21	Gates. We are watching. We are watching closely what they
22	do with volume discounts. They know it. I know it. And
23	we are going to see what happens here.
24	But volume discounting, in and of itself, is not
25	a problem. There can be problems in how you structure them,

1	whether you force -- it's a technical discussion. But, in
2	any event, believe me, they did not hang tough on this for
3	so long, right to the brink of a joint lawsuit by the U.S.
4	and the EC yesterday because these practices were so
5	harmless and meaningless and so forth. But I can see why
6	they say it.
7	(Laughter.)
8	QUESTION: Is there going to be an immediate
9	effect that we will notice for consumers?
10	MS. BINGAMAN: I hope consumers, within a short
11	period of time, will have more choice of operating systems,
12	genuine choice, more innovation in computers. Certainly,
13	the prices will lower for consumers who already buy
14	competing operating systems. Any of these companies in the
15	market right now can now sell just for their price, not for
16	this double tax that Microsoft has gotten.
17	So, I think prices will immediately lower, and I
18	think, over the medium to long range, this will, I hope and
19	believe, have profound market opening impacts. It will help
20	innovation, help the competition give us better products.
21	You may be using a different operating system three years
22	from now because of this -- maybe. And if you are, great.
23	If you still want whatever, great.
24	But the point is you should have a choice.
25	Everyone should have a choice. And the companies that

1	compete with Microsoft should be able to offer you that
2	choice fairly and evenly.
3	VOICE: Thank you.
4	QUESTION: Microsoft's competitors in applications
5	have complained about the access that they have had to all
6	kinds of information about the operating system code. Did
7	the Justice Department not find that Microsoft had unfairly
8	restricted applications developers to various aspects of the
9	software?
10	MS. BINGAMAN: The nondisclosure agreement, the
11	so-called NDA part of the case, focused on nondisclosure
12	agreements required -- are you talking about something else?
13	QUESTION: I mean, certainly the NDA has been part
14	of it, but other companies --
15	MS. BINGAMAN: The so-called interoperability?
16	QUESTION: Yes, yes, hidden calls and all of the
17	charges that have been raised over the past few --
18	MS. BINGAMAN: I can tell you we have looked
19	closely at all aspects of this case. We have examined it
20	closely. And I think all that I can say, because of the
21	strictures of confidentiality and the law, is that we have
22	looked at it and this is the case we chose to bring because
23	this is the case that is there and needed to be brought.
24	And I think that is all I should say.
25	VOICE: Okay. Thank you.

1	VOICE: Thank you.
2	MS. BINGAMAN: Okay. Thank you.
3	VOICE: Thank you very much.
4	(End of proceedings.)
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