<DOC>
[110th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:40942.wais]
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S
R&D BUDGET PRIORITIES FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2009
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 6, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-81
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
40-942 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ÿ091800
Fax: (202) 512ÿ092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402ÿ090001
______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California JO BONNER, Alabama
LAURA RICHARDSON, California TOM FEENEY, Florida
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BARON P. HILL, Indiana PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation
HON. DAVID WU, Oregon, Chairman
JIM MATHESON, Utah PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
CHARLIE A. WILSON, Ohio JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
MIKE ROSS, Arizona PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
LAURA RICHARDSON, California
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
MIKE QUEAR Subcommittee Staff Director
RACHEL JAGODA BRUNETTE Democratic Professional Staff Member
COLIN MCCORMICK Democratic Professional Staff Member
TIND SHEPPER RYEN Republican Professional Staff Member
PIPER LARGENT Republican Professional Staff Member
MEGHAN HOUSEWRIGHT Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
March 6, 2008
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative David Wu, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 10
Written Statement............................................ 12
Statement by Representative Phil Gingrey, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 13
Written Statement............................................ 14
Prepared Statement by Representative Laura Richardson, Member,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 15
Witnesses:
Hon. Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 17
Biography.................................................... 30
Mr. Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 30
Written Statement............................................ 32
Biography.................................................... 36
Mr. George Ryan, Director, Testing & Evaluation and Standards
Division, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 36
Written Statement............................................ 17
Discussion....................................................... 37
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Hon. Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security................... 54
Mr. Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security................................ 66
Mr. George Ryan, Director, Testing & Evaluation and Standards
Division, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 70
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Letter to Ralph J. Ciccerone from Jay M. Cohen, dated September
20, 2007....................................................... 74
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S R&D BUDGET PRIORITIES FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2009
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 2008
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:14 a.m., in
Room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. David Wu
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The Department of Homeland Security's
R&D Budget Priorities for
Fiscal Year 2009
thursday, march 6, 2008
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On Thursday, March 6, 2008 the Subcommittee on Technology and
Innovation of the Committee on Science and Technology will hold a
hearing to consider the President's fiscal year 2009 (FY09) budget
request for research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) at
the Department of Homeland Security. Agency officials will discuss
budget priorities within the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and discuss how the
agency's RDT&E efforts are developing technologies to promote the DHS
mission.
2. Witnesses
The Honorable Jay M. Cohen (Rear Admiral, USN ret.) is the Under
Secretary of Science and Technology at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
Mr. Vayl Oxford is the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) at DHS.
Mr. George Ryan is the Director for the Testing, Evaluation, and
Standards Division of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (DHS
S&T).
3. Brief Overview
<bullet> The FY 2009 budget request for the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate (DHS
S&T) is $868.8M. This is a $38.5M increase over the FY 2008
enacted funding. The Explosives Division and Laboratory
Facilities accounts receive the largest increases, while the
Chemical and Biological, Infrastructure and Geophysical, and
Testing and Evaluation accounts are reduced.
<bullet> The FY 2009 budget request for the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) is $563.8M. This is a $79.4M increase
over the FY 2008 enacted funding. The bulk of the increase is
for acquisition of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal radiation
monitors, a controversial technology that Congress has blocked
DHS from acquiring for the last two fiscal years because of
problematic test results.
<bullet> The S&T Directorate was reorganized into discipline-
oriented divisions in mid-2006, but there is still a question
of whether DHS' R&D portfolio is properly balanced. The bulk of
R&D funding supports biological and nuclear detection research
even though the Department has not yet responded to
Congressional requests for a formal risk assessment justifying
this ranking of priorities.
<bullet> Components of DHS S&T and DNDO carry out testing and
evaluation of technologies prior to deployment by the
Department of Homeland Security. The Under Secretary for
Science and Technology is also responsible for overall
coordination of DHS' testing and evaluation activities. The
results of these technology evaluations are used by DHS
components, first responders and law enforcement, and other
homeland security technology stakeholders. Questions have been
raised about the validity of test design and expressed concern
about the availability of results.
4. Background
Research and development at the Department of Homeland Security is
concentrated in the Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) and
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DHS S&T has responsibility
for carrying out or coordinating nearly all federal homeland security
related research. DNDO was separated from DHS S&T in 2005 to coordinate
all research, development, and operations of technology for detecting
and reporting unauthorized transportation of nuclear and radiological
materials.
DHS S&T Organization
DHS S&T was reorganized into six divisions by Under Secretary Jay
Cohen in mid-2006. The Under Secretary appointed three research
directors to oversee and coordinate long-term basic research, shorter-
term applied research, and high-risk technology development across six
divisions. The discipline-oriented divisions are intended to reflect
specific threats to public safety and critical infrastructure. They
include:
Chemical and Biological: detection and mitigation of chemical
and biological weapons threats
Explosives: detection of and response to conventional (non-
nuclear) explosives
Human Factors: social science research to improve detection,
analysis, and understanding of threats posed by individuals as
well as how communities respond to disasters
Infrastructure and Geophysical: identifies and mitigates
threats to critical infrastructure
Border and Maritime: develops technologies for surveillance
and monitoring of land and maritime borders
Command, Control, and Inter-operability: research and
development support for inter-operable communications and cyber
security R&D
In addition to the six independent divisions, the three research
directors coordinate the DHS S&T's R&D activities with extramural
researchers and technology customers (mainly other components of DHS,
such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) or Customs and
Border Protection (CBP)) and facilitate technology transfer to DHS
components, other federal agencies, or State and local government
entities. As part of the extramural research portfolio, the DHS S&T
funds the University Centers of Excellence program, which supports
research across a broad variety of homeland security-related topics at
university-based centers across the country.
DNDO Organization
DNDO was created to coordinate federal efforts to detect and
respond to unauthorized transportation of nuclear or radiological
materials into and within the United States. DNDO, which reports
directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security, was split from DHS S&T
in 2005. DNDO is responsible for coordination of federal agency efforts
at DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy
(DOE), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the State Department to prevent the
transport of nuclear and radiological materials across U.S. borders. It
also works with international partners on detection and interdiction
activities. DNDO is responsible for research, development, testing and
evaluation of detection technologies; acquisition of detection
technologies; threat assessments; and technical support and training
for State, local, and Federal Government partners and first responders.
5. Issues and Concerns
How do DHS R&D priorities reflect the needs of customers, including
other Directorates within DHS, interagency partners, and State and
local governments? Under Secretary Cohen has said that the research
priorities of the S&T Directorate should directly serve ``customers''--
defined as users of DHS' research results and developed technologies.
To that effect, the Under Secretary established ``integrated process
teams'' (IPTs) comprised of officials from other DHS components who
advise the S&T Directorate on their technology needs, thus informing
specific research priorities. While these interdisciplinary teams are a
step in the right direction, the Department needs a much stronger focus
on integrating the opinions of interagency and outside partners. At
least 10 agencies, including the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the
Department of Transportation (DOT) and others perform homeland
security-related R&D. However, there is no formal mechanism for
leveraging the R&D work of other agencies within DHS. Both the S&T
Directorate and DNDO have been criticized for ignoring the work and
advice of other federal agencies.
How is DHS using the results of tests and evaluations to effectively
develop and deploy technology? How are they sharing these results with
end-users? The testing and evaluation division of DHS S&T is
responsible for working with all components of DHS to ensure that
technology and equipment used by DHS, law enforcement, and first
responders meets users' needs. This division and DNDO also partner with
other federal agencies, most notably the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) to conduct tests and guide the
development of standards. While DHS has been praised by homeland
security industry representatives for their support of voluntary
consensus standards, the Department's testing and evaluation protocols
and reporting have been criticized by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), Congress and the user community.
State and local officials, including first responders, have
complained that DHS is not responsive to their requests and
recommendations related to technology development and test results. DHS
S&T must ensure that tests reflect user requirements and needs and that
test results are available to full user community, especially those
outside of DHS. The reduction in funding for this account is troubling,
especially given the increased funding available for short-term
technologies that would require testing and evaluation prior to
deployment.
Is the balance between research divisions appropriate? Is there
adequate investment in long-term basic research? Though DHS S&T has
slightly rebalanced funding for its research divisions based on
customer requirements, the Department's investment is still strongly
weighted towards biological, chemical, and nuclear threat mitigation.
The Department's mission is to reduce the vulnerability of the United
States to--and mitigate the effects of--threats, both manmade and
natural, but the overall justification of the DHS R&D portfolio makes
no indication that there was any threat analysis used to inform how
research areas were prioritized.
Additionally, though longer-term R&D funding is increased for both
DHS S&T and DNDO, the Department's R&D portfolio remains strongly
weighted towards end-stage technology development. An inadequate
investment in longer-term research makes the Department significantly
less agile and responsive, locking it into a single technological
response to emerging and future threats. Additionally, reduced funding
for programs that support university research significantly hinders the
Department's ability to train and recruit the next generation of
scientists and engineers with skills relevant to the homeland security
mission.
6. FY 2009 Budget Request
DHS S&T
After a large decrease in appropriated funding because of the
transfer of various programs from the Department of Homeland Security's
Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) in FY 2007 and 2008, the
budget for DHS S&T is once again climbing. The increase in the
President's request is indicative of the high priority the
Administration places on short-term technology development in support
of counter-terrorism efforts. The overall budget for research and
development within DHS S&T increases by $38.502M above the final FY
2008 appropriations.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
The balance between research divisions remains problematic. There
is an extremely strong emphasis on biological research and counter-
measures, which account for 23 percent of the total R&D budget. Other
critical homeland security fields, including explosives research and
infrastructure protection are increasing but are still under-
represented. However, DHS S&T proposes to shift some funding from the
chemical and biological division to other divisions because of new
priorities identified by DHS components.
In FY 2008, DHS S&T developed new methods for setting research
priorities that included greater involvement by ``customer''
components; the operational components of DHS such as CBP, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and others. Representatives of these customers were brought
together in Integrated Process Teams (IPTs) which set research and
spending priorities down to the individual project level. In addition
to the IPTs, DHS S&T also reconstituted the Homeland Security Science
and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) and tasked that group with
identifying project priorities to meet the challenge of detecting and
preventing attacks with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). HSSTAC had
formerly been responsible for advising DHS S&T on research priorities.
Because these advisory groups are now focused on meeting specific
technological needs, they naturally emphasize shorter-term research
priorities.
Funding priority among the various research disciplines is
determined by the Under Secretary in consultation with the Deputy
Secretary of DHS. Management of research within DHS S&T is divided into
three overarching areas: basic research (long-term), innovation (mid-
term), and transition (short-term and technology development). The
directors of research, innovation, and transition help manage and
coordinate research within each division that falls into their
respective category. The FY 2009 budget request summary states that DHS
S&T now invests 20 percent of its research money in basic research
(defined by DHS S&T as eight years or longer until technology
development), yet the project descriptions show a strong bias towards
short-term technology development.
An analysis of selected components is below:
Innovation
In addition to coordinating various priorities within the divisions
of DHS S&T, the Director of the Innovation portfolio manages additional
technology development projects. Specifically, the Director of
Innovation oversees the Homeland Security Advanced Research Project
Agency (HSARPA) and coordinates funding for the short-term High Impact
Prototypical Solutions (HIPS) and High Impact Technology Solutions
(HITS) projects. In the FY 2009 request, the funding for the Innovation
portfolio is increased to fund additional projects identified as high
priority in the Integrated Product Team (IPT) process. The projects
include technologies for rapid liquid explosive detection, secure
container testing, IED defeat, and levee strengthening. However, as in
the FY 2008 budget the funding increase will support mainly advanced
technology development and demonstrations and does not provide funding
for the basic and applied research priorities included in HSARPA's
mandate.
Transition
The Director of Transition manages technology transfer and near-
term product development for DHS S&T. Funding for several important
programs that guide research priorities and technology transfer is flat
in the FY 2009 request for the Transition portfolio. The Homeland
Security Institute, a Federally-Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC) charged with providing analysis and advice to DHS, is held flat
at $5M in FY 2009. Additionally, the TechSolutions and
TechClearinghouse programs, which are web based platforms for
soliciting information on capability gaps and for sharing technology
information with first responders, are held flat.
Test and Evaluation, Standards
The Test and Evaluation and Standards portfolio within DHS S&T is
decreased by $3.8M to $24.67M in the budget proposal. In spite of the
decrease, there are several new programs in the proposal that will fall
into the Test and Evaluation and Standards portfolio. First, DHS S&T
proposes adding a testing and evaluation oversight process to the
Integrated Product Team process. Testing and evaluation activities at
DHS (within DHS S&T and DNDO) have come under significant criticism
because of opaque processes, potentially falsified results, and lack of
robust testing protocols. Giving oversight authority to IPT
participants is a good first step towards improving the process,
especially since they represent many of the end technology users. The
proposal also includes developing a modeling and simulation strategic
plan to support testing and evaluation, and the establishment of an
advisory council.
Border and Maritime Security
The border and maritime security division's proposed FY 2009 budget
has a strong emphasis on technology testing and evaluation. This
division carries out research in support of all border security
components of DHS, including TSA, CBP, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The overall
divisional budget is held flat in FY 2009, but there are internal
adjustments to increase support of testing and evaluation in support of
the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), border officer protection
technology, and maritime security.
Chemical and Biological (Chem/Bio)
Chemical and biological research are the largest priorities for DHS
S&T. Specifically, research into biological threats and counter-
measures receives the largest funding of any single priority. Within
Chem/Bio, DHS S&T has placed a strong emphasis on technology testing.
Research funding is focused on completing development of cheaper, next
generation biohazard detection devices (BioWatch 3).
Command, Control, and Inter-operability
The request includes a $5.4M increase for the Command, Control, and
Inter-operability Division (CID), bringing it to $62.4M. The increase
is strongly focused on testing of information infrastructure security.
Testing activities and support will take place in part in collaboration
with the National Science Foundation (NSF), and DHS will also fund a
war gaming project for cyber security training. Conversely, R&D funding
in the field of cyber security, which includes technology
demonstrations and testbed development, is reduced in the request.
Explosives
On the recommendations of DHS components participating in the IPT
process, DHS S&T increased the request for funding in the explosives
division by $18.5M to $96.1M. The additional funding will go towards
new investments in detecting and neutralizing vehicle borne IEDs and
suicide bombers. As part of the IED program, DHS S&T is also finally
requesting funding to examine new options for detecting liquid
explosives.
Human Factors
The Human Factors division (HF) was created in FY 2008 to bring a
social science perspective to DHS S&T. This division's mission is
unclear in the FY 2009 budget request. Funding is split between using
psychological research as part of the technology development process,
where scientists would look at how people interact with technology to
make devices easier to use or more socially acceptable. The other
portion of the funding is dedicated to research that attempts to apply
behavioral science theories to the DHS mission, using facial
expressions to identify potential terrorists. Behavioral scientists
have raised serious concerns about the validity of the research on
which these projects are based.
University Programs
DHS University Programs are an important resource for DHS. The
Centers of Excellence (COE) program is a source of much of the valuable
basic research in security related science. Additionally, both the COE
and Scholars and Fellows program support the development and expansion
of the homeland security workforce by attracting and training students
in critical fields. However, the FY 2009 budget proposal once again
guts this program by dividing less money among more centers. The
funding for University Programs is decreased from $49.3M to $43.8M. The
total amount for COEs is held flat, but additional grants for new COEs
will be awarded in FY 2008 and FY 2009, making the amount of funding
available to individual centers significantly lower.
DNDO
The FY 2009 budget request for the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) is increased by $79.41M above the FY 2008 enacted
appropriations to $563.8M. This amount, especially when compared to DHS
S&T's overall proposed funding of $868.8M, demonstrates the
Administration's focus on nuclear terrorism. The Administration uses a
threat calculus to determine R&D priorities that emphasizes preventing
the highest impact events, regardless of how probable those events may
be. Nuclear threats thus top the list, as DNDO accounts for nearly 40
percent of the Department's R&D portfolio. The Department has not
released any justification of this balance of priorities.
Each of the individual portfolios within DNDO receives increased
funding in the budget proposal, though there is some readjustment among
the various programs. The largest increase is for systems acquisition,
with an increased proposed budget for the controversial Advanced
Spectroscopic Portal radiation detector.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
An analysis by components is below:
Management and Administration
The increase for Management and Administration will go towards
reimbursing other federal agencies providing detailees to DNDO as well
as towards creating additional full time positions to reach a total of
144 staff. As DNDO continues to build up as an independent office, a
full time permanent staff will create continuity and expand the
office's expertise and capabilities. DNDO still depends on a
significant number of detailees, which represent approximately one-
third of the total full time staff.
Research, Development, and Operations
The budget request for FY 2009 is $334.2M, a $10M increase over the
enacted FY 2008 appropriations. The largest increase goes towards
transformational R&D, which has a strong focus on technology
development, especially short-term projects to develop radiation
detectors. There is also additional funding for systems engineering and
development for projects that emphasize non-containerized security, a
new thrust area for DNDO. These new projects will focus especially on
detecting nuclear threats posed by general aviation aircraft (i.e.,
private planes) and boats. DNDO has also acknowledged end-user needs to
a greater extent than in previous years. They emphasize their
collaboration with other components of DHS, including TSA, USCG, and
CBP.
The proposed reduction in the budget for technology assessments is
worrisome. DNDO has been carrying out tests of new detection technology
and has been criticized for running invalid tests. Cutting assessment
funding at this point would stifle DNDO's ability to fund legitimate
tests, even though DNDO requests additional money to fund production of
the technologies that lack legitimate test data.
Systems Acquisition
The Systems Acquisition budget request is increased $61M over the
FY 2008 appropriations. The increase goes almost exclusively for
funding for next generation Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP)
radiation monitors with cuts to other acquisition programs totaling
$10M. ASPs have been an Administration priority since the creation of
DNDO. The FY 2008 appropriations law blocked any expenditure for ASPs
because of irregularities in test data that indicate these monitors are
potentially ineffective. The law now requires the Secretary to certify
the performance of ASPs before any funding can be allocated to their
acquisition. This request suggests that the Secretary is confident in
being able to certify performance in FY 2009, but it is unclear whether
ASPs will be able to reach the performance levels necessary to justify
this $67M expenditure.
The request cuts $10M from the budget for the Securing the Cities
program. This is a program to deploy nuclear detection equipment at
entryways into a city, including ports, highways, and airports. The
potential effectiveness of this program is questionable. The concept of
operations calls for deployment of hand-held, vehicle based, and
stationary radiation sensors that would be stationed at various points
around New York City. However, there has been little clarity on how
currently available technologies would effectively locate radiological
material with the precision necessary to isolate any dangerous
materials, and there are also privacy and cost concerns inherent to
this type of plan that involves such a wide array of sensors.
Chairman Wu. I call the Subcommittee to order, and want to
welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on the fiscal year
2009 research and development budget for the Department of
Homeland Security. This is our second hearing on the DHS R&D
budget in the 110th Congress, and I hope that we will be able
to devote at least some of our time today to learning more
about the Department's accomplishments in the past year. So I
am glad to see that the Administration is demonstrating a
better understanding of the need for research and development
in support of homeland security goals by increasing its
requests for both the Science and Technology Directorate and
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
I am somewhat disappointed that many of the issues that
arose during last year's budget hearing remain unresolved or
only partially on their way to resolution. In spite of requests
from this committee and others, this year's budget request was
developed without the guidance of a comprehensive risk analysis
that justifies the balance between R&D areas, such as
biological counter-measures, nuclear detection, cyber security,
conventional explosive mitigation, and others. DHS S&T did
release a strategic plan last year, for which we commend it,
and we appreciate that effort, but that plan did little to
answer the questions about planning and priorities. I am
disappointed that we do not have better answers about how DHS
makes important decisions about where to invest limited
resources for R&D.
Though Under Secretary Cohen and Director Oxford have done
an admirable job at integrating the needs of the mission
components of DHS into their research and technology
development planning, this subcommittee continues to hear
complaints that outreach does not trickle down to end-users
outside of DHS. State and local officials, especially first
responders, a crucial part of our domestic security enterprise,
continue to feel that they are shut out of the process of
identifying gaps in capabilities, and setting research
priorities.
Today, I would like to hear about an action plan for how
the S&T Directorate and DNDO will ensure that stakeholders
outside of DHS are fully integrated into the research planning
process, and that their costs and operational needs are met
before any technologies are considered ready for deployment.
An additional related issue that I want to discuss during
this hearing is how the S&T Directory and DNDO conduct testing
and evaluation of technologies, and how the results of those
tests are used to guide decisions about procurement. According
to the Department's budget requests, nearly half the funding in
the S&T Directorate will go toward product transition, and one
third of the DNDO funding will go towards systems acquisition.
Such a strong emphasis on end-stage technology development and
acquisition means that high quality, trustworthy testing is
imperative to the Department's mission.
Concerns have been raised about DHS testing and evaluation
efforts, some of which have come under close scrutiny by this
committee and others, but at the end of the day, if end-users
cannot trust that technology works, they will not take
advantage of the many benefits we all know technology brings to
the day to day activities of the Homeland Security workforce.
Lest you think that this hearing will be comprised entirely
of complaining, let me conclude by commending all of you on
some successes. We discussed last year the value of basic
research to the Homeland Security mission. I see that this
year's budget request, the basic research investment for the
S&T Directorate will reach Under Secretary Cohen's goal of 20
percent. Additionally, DNDO plans to increase their investment
in transformational R&D. A strong investment in basic research
keeps DHS S&T flexible and capable of responding to emerging
threats quickly. Moreover, much of this money ends up funding
academic research that helps build a skilled science and
engineering workforce capable of meeting homeland security-
related research needs for many years to come.
Of course, the S&T Committee always likes to see more long-
term research, but this is a good, appropriate first step. I
want to reiterate that I am committed to working with the
Department of Homeland Security to ensure that R&D investments
are successful in increasing our knowledge of how to confront
catastrophes, whether from human or natural causes.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, but there are
developments that occur in real-time to which we need to
respond, and one of those developments is the news story and
response in the Washington Post this morning, a news article on
the front page delineating some of the problems that have
developed with DHS technology. It was originally focused on the
border fence, but it addresses many other issues that DHS works
on, including airport security and some of these other
technologies that we have been talking about.
Unfortunately, there was a response in the back pages of
the Washington Post. Mr. Ignatius quoted extensively from
Secretary Chertoff, and apparently, it is the Secretary's
approach to point to sources external to the Department as the
cause of many of the Department's problems.
I would like to remind everyone in the room that we had a
set of nudge-like hearings a year ago, kindly nudge-like
hearings, which were an attempt to be helpful to the research
efforts at DNDO and at the S&T Directorate. These were not
classic Washington, D.C. ``got you'' type hearings, and they
were not intended as such, and they were not executed as such.
But we expressed serious concerns about whether user groups
were being properly consulted, whether gaps in technology were
being properly addressed, whether there was a proper allocation
between basic research and applied research, whether there was
too much of a tendency to fight the fire of the day rather than
to have a comprehensive approach to addressing risks, and
whether, indeed, risk assessment was being properly used to
deploy limited research results.
There has not been enough progress made in the twelve
months between last year's hearing and today. Twelve months
from now, there will be a change in administration, and no
matter who is in charge at the top, the crucial mission of the
DHS will remain. I, for one, am somewhat frustrated at the pace
of progress, and would like to consider what mechanisms are
necessary to ensure that in the coming months, in the last
months of this Administration, that we continue to press
forward with sufficient aggressiveness to address the issues
which were identified a year ago, and which we will focus on
today.
And with that, I would like to recognize my colleague and
the Ranking Member from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey, for his opening
remarks.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Wu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman David Wu
I would like to call the Subcommittee to order.
I want to welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on the FY09
research and development budget for the Department of Homeland
Security. This our second hearing on the DHS R&D budget in the 110th
Congress, and I hope that we are able to devote at least some of our
time today to learning more about the Department's accomplishments in
the past year.
Though I am glad to see that Administration is demonstrating a
better understanding of the need for research and development in
support of homeland security goals by increasing its requests for both
the Science and Technology Directorate and Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, I am disappointed that many of the issues that arose during
last year's budget hearing remain unresolved. In spite of requests from
this committee and others, this year's budget request was developed
without the guidance of a comprehensive risk analysis that justifies
the balance between R&D areas such as biological counter-measures,
nuclear detection, cyber security, conventional explosive mitigation,
and others.
DHS S&T did release a strategic plan last year, and we appreciate
that effort, but that plan did little to answer questions about
planning and priorities.
I am disappointed that we do not have better answers about how DHS
makes important decisions about where to invest limited resources for
R&D. Though Under Secretary Cohen and Director Oxford have done an
admirable job at integrating the needs of the mission components of DHS
into their research and technology development planning, this committee
continues to hear complaints that outreach does not trickle down to
end-users outside of DHS. State and local officials, especially first
responders--a crucial part of our domestic security enterprise--
continue to feel that they are shut out of the process of identifying
gaps in capabilities and setting research priorities.
Today I would like to hear about an action plan for how the S&T
Directorate and DNDO will ensure that stakeholders outside of DHS are
fully integrated into the research planning process, and that their
cost and operational needs are met before any technologies are
considered ready for deployment.
An additional related issue that I want to address during this
hearing is how the S&T Directorate and DNDO conduct testing and
evaluation of technologies, and how the results of those tests are used
to guide decisions about procurement. According to the Department's
budget request, nearly half the funding in the S&T Directorate will go
towards product transition and one-third of the DNDO funding will go
towards systems acquisition.
Such a strong emphasis on end-stage technology development and
acquisition means that high quality, trustworthy testing is imperative
to the Department's mission. Concerns have been raised about DHS
testing and evaluation efforts, some of which have come under close
scrutiny by this committee and others. But at the end of the day, if
end-users cannot trust that technology works, they will not take
advantage of the many benefits we all know technology brings to the
day-to-day activities of the homeland security workforce.
Lest you all think that this hearing will be comprised entirely of
complaining, let me conclude by commending all of you on some
successes. We discussed last year the value of basic research to the
homeland security mission.
I see that in this year's budget request, the basic research
investment for the S&T Directorate will reach Under Secretary Cohen's
goal of twenty percent. Additionally, DNDO plans to increase their
investment in transformational R&D. A strong investment in basic
research keeps DHS S&T flexible and capable of responding to emerging
threats quickly. Moreover, much of this money ends up funding academic
research that helps build a skilled science and engineering workforce
capable of meeting homeland security-related research needs for many
years to come. Of course, the S&T Committee always likes to see more
long-term research, but this is a very good and appropriate first step.
I want to reiterate that I am committed to working with the
Department of Homeland Security to ensure that R&D investments are
successful in increasing our knowledge of how to confront catastrophes,
whether from human or natural causes. I look forward to hearing all of
the witnesses' thoughts on the FY09 budget request and how that budget
supports science and technology to make our nation safer.
I now want to recognize my colleague and the Ranking Member from
Georgia, Dr. Gingrey, for his opening remarks.
Mr. Gingrey. Good morning, Chairman Wu. I want to thank you
for holding this hearing this morning to get an in-depth look
at the fiscal year 2009 budget request for the Department of
Homeland Security's ongoing efforts in research and
development.
Our nation's scientific enterprise remains, and will
continue to be, a critical component of our homeland security.
The efforts of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the
Science and Technology Directorate contribute to the
preparedness of our nation against potential terrorist attacks
and, of course, natural disasters as well.
These organizations tap into the limitless creativity of
our nation's scientists and engineers, leading to direct
benefits for our first responders, our guardsmen, our Border
Patrol agents, our police, our firefighters, just to name a
few. These offices within DHS are vital components to our
homeland security strategy, and I certainly want to thank the
panel for being here this morning.
I also want to thank all the men and women who work with
you to bring the skill of our nation's scientists and engineers
to bear to protect us from threats we currently face. You are
performing a great service to this country, and you should be
recognized for those efforts.
Mr. Chairman, last week, the full Science and Technology
Committee unanimously reported the Border Security Technology
Innovation Act of 2008, which is sponsored by the distinguished
Ranking Member of the full Committee, Mr. Ralph Hall of Texas.
This bill acknowledges the crucial role that science and
technology play in protecting our nation's borders. Today, I
expect we will hear from our witnesses that our science and
technology research and development efforts are strong, and
they are yielding immediate benefits for our nation. However, I
do know that we can continue to improve on these efforts.
For the fiscal year 2009 budget, President Bush has
requested over $1.4 billion for the research and development
efforts at DHS. In addition to prioritizing among the various
types of threats that we face, we must also consider the
character of research performed. How much spending should be
geared towards long-term basic research? How much towards
incremental improvements to our current capabilities?
Now, Mr. Chairman, we also have to consider how best to
defend against an adaptive and intelligent enemy who will
attempt to overcome or bypass any defense we create. Therefore,
it is crucial that we seek defenses that can be implemented as
broadly as possible, and minimize the chance that they can be
easily sidestepped. I think that is what we are talking about
in regard to the need to reauthorize and extend and improve the
FISA law, the Protect America Act. Reaching this goal will
require sustained attention to the operational needs of the
Department of Homeland Security, and continual re-examinations
of the many threats that we do face.
Finally, we must ensure that our substantial investments in
new security technology work as advertised. Both of your
agencies have been criticized in the past for incomplete or
inaccurate testing and evaluation procedures. A rigorous
testing and evaluation process will help your agencies in the
long-term by ensuring that your work meets the needs of our
first responders. I applaud your efforts to immediately address
these concerns, and suggest that this committee is well
situated to help you in those efforts. The fundamental
challenge before us is how best to distribute limited funding,
always, in the face of highly uncertain, varied, and changing
threats.
In the past year, your organizations have steadily improved
our nation's defenses. These are areas, there are areas, I
should say, where I think more must be done in the coming year.
I look forward to discussing these issues with you today,
seeking ways to help you implement your effective, efficient,
and evolving defense of our homeland.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the panel. I look
forward to their testimony, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gingrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Phil Gingrey
Good morning, Chairman Wu. I want to thank you for holding this
hearing this morning to get an in-depth look at the Fiscal Year 2009
budget request for the Department of Homeland Security's ongoing
efforts in research and development. Our nation's scientific enterprise
remains--and will continue to be--a critical component of our homeland
security.
The efforts of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the
Science and Technology Directorate contribute to the preparedness of
our nation against potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters.
These organizations tap into the limitless creativity of our nation's
scientists and engineers, leading to direct benefits for our first
responders: our guardsmen, our border patrol agents, our police, and
our firefighters, just to name a few.
These offices within DHS are vital components to our homeland
security strategy and I want to thank the panel for being here this
morning. I also want to thank all the men and women who work with you
to bring the skills of our nation's scientists and engineers to bear to
protect us from threats we currently face. You are performing a great
service to this country, and you should be recognized for your efforts.
Mr. Chairman, last week, the full Science & Technology Committee
unanimously reported the Border Security Technology Innovation Act of
2008, which is sponsored by the Distinguished Ranking Member of the
Full Committee, Mr. Ralph Hall of Texas. This bill acknowledges the
crucial role that science and technology play in protecting our
nation's borders. Today, I expect we'll hear from our witnesses that
our science and technology research and development efforts are strong
and yielding immediate benefits for our nation. However, I know we can
continue to improve on these efforts.
For the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, President Bush has requested over
$1.4 billion dollars for the research and development efforts at DHS.
In addition to prioritizing among the various types of threats that we
face, we must also consider the character of research performed. How
much spending should be geared towards long-term, basic research? How
much towards incremental improvements to our current capabilities?
Mr. Chairman, we also have to consider how best to defend against
an adaptive and intelligent enemy who will attempt to overcome or
bypass the defenses we create. Therefore, it is crucial that we seek
defenses that can be implemented as broadly as possible and minimize
the chance that they can be easily side-stepped. Reaching this goal
will require sustained attention to the operational needs of the
Department and continual reexamination of the threats we face.
Finally, we must ensure that our substantial investments in new
security technology work as advertised. Both of your agencies have been
criticized in the past year for incomplete or inaccurate testing and
evaluation procedures. A rigorous testing and evaluation process will
help your agencies in the long-term by ensuring that your work meets
the needs of our first responders. I applaud your efforts to
immediately address these concerns and suggest that this committee is
well-situated to help you in your efforts.
The fundamental challenge before us is how best to distribute
limited funding in the face of highly uncertain, varied, and changing
threats. In the past year, your organizations have steadily improved
our nation's defenses. There are areas, however, where I think more
must be done in the coming year. I look forward to discussing these
issues today and seeking ways to help you implement an effective,
efficient, and evolving defense of our homeland.
With that Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Wu. I thank the gentleman, and if there are
Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, your
statements will be added to the record.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Laura Richardson
Thank you Chairman Wu for holding this very important hearing
today. I would also like to thank our witnesses for their testimony.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the Administration's FY
'09 budget request for the research, development, testing, and
evaluation performed at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The
Science and Technology Directorate at DHS and the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) are this nation's leading federal agencies
tasked with the responsibility of developing the next wave of
technology that will protect the American people. Fortunately the work
that this committee performs allows us to approach the issue of
national security in a relatively bipartisan manner. Equipping our
border agents, service men and women, and other agencies/customers of
DHS with proven technology is a necessity, and a step in the right
direction towards securing our borders, and fighting the war on terror.
Looking at the proposed budget it is obvious the Administration's
priorities are, chemical and biological research. While the threat of a
large scale biological or chemical attack is always possible; I, like
many of my colleagues are interested to hear whether or not the
Department has done a threat assessment to justify this commitment.
Likewise this Administration is also committed to the work that is
performed at the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; again a threat
assessment to justify this level of spending is not only reasonable,
but fiscally responsible.
Another issue that this committee has is the concerns that DHS is
not responsive to the concerns of its varying agencies as they pertain
to test results and user requirements. I must say that it is short
sighted not to heed the concerns of the individuals who need to use
this technology in the field every day. Therefore, what we need to know
is what the Department is doing to address this issue.
Also, as a Member whose district is adjacent to the port of Long
Beach and close to the port of Los Angeles, I am particularly
interested in the R&D work that is being performed in the Border &
Maritime Security division. As I mentioned at last week's markup of the
USFA reauthorization, an incident at one of these ports that results in
an eventual shutdown can cost the national economy billions of dollars.
Therefore I am interested to know what technology has already been
implemented, and what technology has the promise of full implementation
in the near future.
In closing I want to reiterate my strong support for the work that
all of our witnesses do at their respective agencies. The general
public may not be aware what you do, but the Members of this committee
appreciate all of your work. Likewise the Members of this committee
just want to ensure that the work you do in the field can continue at
the highest levels.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I yield back my
time.
Chairman Wu. I would now like to introduce our
distinguished panel of witnesses. Rear Admiral Jay Cohen is the
Under Secretary for Science and Technology at the Department of
Homeland Security. Mr. Vayl Oxford is the Director of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO, at DHS. And
finally, Mr. George Ryan is the Director of Testing,
Evaluation, and Standards for the DHS S&T Directorate.
I will now turn things over to our witnesses, and as our
witnesses know, your longer written statement will be submitted
into the record, and your oral testimony is limited to five
minutes each, after which the Committee will have five minutes
each to ask questions.
And we will start with Under Secretary Cohen. Please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAY M. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cohen. Well, good morning, Chairman Wu and Congressman
Gingrey, and the other distinguished Members of the Committee.
It is a great personal honor for me to appear before you today,
along with Vayl Oxford and George Ryan. It is a great privilege
for me to be entrusted with the taxpayers' resources to oversee
the Science and Technology component of the Department of
Homeland Security, and also, to lead a fantastic group of men
and women who are absolutely dedicated to using science and
technology to make our nation safer.
I will limit my words to just a very few thoughts, because
I think your questions will be much more important than
anything I might say at the start, but I appreciated your
words, Chairman, and your words, Congressman Gingrey, on the
progress that we have made, and the progress that we have to
make, as we go forward. Your Committee and the other
committees, including the other body, have been very supportive
throughout the year and a half I have been on-board. We rapidly
reorganized into a more enduring S&T construct, of enduring
disciplines, where projects come and go, and a balanced
portfolio of basic research, as you indicated, near-term
product transition, and then, a higher risk innovation
portfolio, which only S&T has the ability to facilitate.
And so, I shared with you the threats as I saw them a year
and a half ago. This is my third time testifying before this
committee in this position, and those are the four Bs, bombs,
borders, bugs, and business. Everyone understands bombs,
borders, and bugs. The business is the cyber-backbone that
enables everything that we do in our society, and I know there
is great interest in that.
And then, I told you from my organization, I had the four
gets, and we had to get those right. We had to get the
organization right, and you were very helpful with that. We had
to get the people right. When I came on-board, as you may
remember, the Office of Personnel Management had evaluated my
organization the spring before I got there, and we were ranked
222 out of 222 government organizations, so if at the end of my
tenure, I achieve 221, I believe I will be a hero, because at
least, we won't be last, but I think we are doing a lot better
than that, because we had 60 percent federal employees when I
came on-board, and today, we have over 93 percent federal
employees. I have no shortage of volunteers, and about ten
federal employees who had left my Directorate in the spring of
'06 have come back on-board to be full members and program
managers. So, it is an exciting time.
We had to get the books right, and this was written about
in the legislation, and I am joined today by Dick Williams, my
Chief Financial Officer. We came on-board the same day, 10
August 2006. You may remember that was the day of the liquid
explosives plot in London, and welcome aboard, and it has been
a heck of a ride ever since.
And then, finally, if you get the people right, you get the
organization right, and you get the books right, then you can
get the content right. And that has been the focus of my last
year, and I guarantee you, Chairman and Members, it is
absolutely my focus in the transition year.
And so, the four Bs, the four gets, we have testified to
that before. I think it brings us to a place where I am now
focused on the four Ps. I want to assure you that I have only
23 initiatives left, because then I run out of letters in the
alphabet.
Well, what are the four Ps? The first is people, and they
enable everything we do, especially in science and technology.
The next is process, and we have invited your Members, and they
have been very kind, and your staff, to come to all of our
processes, whether it is the Integrated Product Team, or it is
basic research reviews or field trips, or our outreach
stakeholder conferences, and they have been very, very
supportive, as has the IG. I believe in open processes, and it
is the processes and the five year budget and the priorities
that will outlive me and this Administration, as it did when I
left the Office of Naval Research after six years.
The third is partnerships, and I know, Chairman, how
strongly you and the committee feel in the enabling
legislation, about leveraging the other components of
government, international, United States, industry, and of
course, our heroes, my customers, the first responders, and you
have already addressed that so well.
And so, if we get the people right, then we get the
processes in place, which I believe we have, and we have
vibrant partnerships to save the taxpayers money and not
duplicate effort, in the end, you add those all up, we get
product. And the product is what we are trying to get out, not
only to the 22 components and directorates, my immediate
customers at DHS, but also, the customer of my customer, the
first responders.
And I know there will be many questions on that. And so, as
always, I welcome your oversight. I welcome your questions. I
appreciate very much the bipartisan support that Science and
Technology has and continues to receive, and I am committed to
you, sir, and to the American taxpayer, and to the
Administration, to do my very best to charge to the goal, and
turn over the best science and technology in support of making
the Nation safer, that I can do.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Cohen and Mr. Ryan
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jay M. Cohen and George Ryan
INTRODUCTION
Good Morning Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and distinguished
Members of the Committee. It is an honor for me to appear before you
today to update you on the progress of the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T Directorate)
and discuss how the President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2009
will position us to develop and transition technology to protect the
Nation from catastrophic events.
The S&T Directorate is committed to serving our customers--the many
components that comprise the Department--and their customers--the
hardworking men and women on the front lines of homeland security,
especially the first responders, who need ready access to technology
and information to perform their jobs more efficiently and safely. I am
honored and privileged to serve with the talented scientists, engineers
and other professionals who support these dedicated Americans in our
shared mission to secure our homeland and defend our freedoms.
First and foremost, I continue to be very appreciative of the
leadership of the Congress in its support of the S&T Directorate, and
of me personally, as Under Secretary for Science and Technology. I am
grateful for the engaged and nonpartisan relationship we enjoy, which
is vitally important for the S&T Directorate. The informed counsel of
Committee Members with homeland security oversight, and that of their
staffs, has been invaluable to the Department's efforts to position the
S&T Directorate for accountability, tangible results and success, both
for today and in the future.
Last year, I told you that to achieve long-term success, the S&T
Directorate must get four `gets' right--its organization, its people,
its books, and its program content. I also told you that we would
concentrate our activities on the four `Bs'--bombs, borders, bugs and
business--to stay focused on priority threat areas for the S&T
Directorate.
I'm pleased to report that since last year, we have made
significant progress in the four `gets' and the four `Bs.'
Highlights of this progress include:
Publishing a strategic plan that provides a framework to guide
the Directorate's activities over the next five years;
Strengthening our workforce by increasing federal staff,
implementing training initiatives, and building morale through
directorate-wide communications and events;
Realigning our organizational structure and research,
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) activities to better
serve the Department's components and their end-users; and
Establishing a customer-led, Capstone Integrated Product Team
(IPT) Process to identify our customers' needs and develop and
transition near-term capabilities for addressing them.
This year, I am going to focus on the four `Ps': People, Process,
Partnerships, and Product. Fine tuning and sustaining the four `Ps'
will ensure that the S&T Directorate achieves enduring success.
The first `P' is for People. That is because once you get the
people right, you have to keep the people right. The S&T Directorate
will keep the right mix of people by having a solid staffing plan and
by being a great place to work. Our employee communications, training
opportunities and directorate-wide activities have helped make the S&T
Directorate a place where highly skilled professionals want to be. We
must sustain this effort.
The second `P' is for Process, because you need a stable and
efficient operational foundation to keep an organization, its program
content, and its books right. The S&T Directorate will refine and
integrate its internal management processes--financial and
administrative--to ensure operational excellence and fiscal
responsibility. We must also mature those processes that drive the
delivery of products to our customers, such as our customer-led
Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT) Process--and continue to support
a balanced portfolio for RDT&E activities.
The third `P' is for Partnerships, which are essential for long-
term success. The S&T Directorate will build on the international and
interagency partnerships it put in place this past year by establishing
more formal working agreements and commitments to the development of
homeland security science and technology.
The fourth `P' is for Product, because we exist to deliver to our
customers' science and technology breakthroughs that will strengthen
the security of our homeland.
PEOPLE
The S&T Directorate functions as the Department's science and
technology manager. We invest in science and technology that supports
DHS component efforts to protect out homeland. To achieve this, the S&T
Directorate develops and manages an integrated program of science from
basic research and technology innovation through technology transition.
The managers of this program are predominantly active scientists and
engineers in the many disciplines relevant to Homeland Security.
Program investment is guided by a multi-tiered strategy and review
process based on higher guidance, customer needs, and technology
opportunities.
Our staffing is currently at 93 percent of Full Time Equivalents
(FTE). Hiring has been slowed due to the continuing resolution and a
reduction in the M&A funding, but we expect to reach our full
complement of 381 FTEs by the end of FY 2008. This year we are putting
in place a career Senior Executive Service Deputy Under Secretary for
Science and Technology to help ensure a seamless transition into the
next Administration. I'm also pleased to inform you that in the past
several months we have received a number of unsolicited employment
applications from very qualified individuals. The word is out that the
S&T Directorate is making a difference.
It continues to be very important to me personally that S&T
Directorate staff be kept informed of our plans and priorities and that
they have a forum for asking questions and expressing their views and
concerns. I hold monthly ``All Hands'' meetings to brief all staff
members, including teleconference links with staff in other locations
such as the Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New
Jersey, the Animal Disease Center on Plum Island, New York, the
Environmental Measurements Laboratory in New York City, and the
National Biodefense Analysis Counter-measures Center in Fort Detrick,
Maryland. These meetings also allow me to recognize the achievements of
staff members, to answer questions and solicit input, and, most
importantly, express my gratitude for their superb work.
PROCESS
I thank Congress for its support of the new organizational
structure, which we put in place in September 2006.
This enabled us to re-engineer our management and administrative
processes over the last two years to reduce the costs of our business
operations by more than 50 percent. We accomplished this by
implementing several efficiency initiatives to make better use of our
resources including converting positions filled by contractors to be
civil servants, consolidating office space, and limiting our overhead,
which I will continue to cap at nine percent in FY 2009.
It has also supported a broad and balanced range of activities that
are aimed at identifying, enabling and transitioning new capabilities
to our customers to better protect the Nation. This is reflected in the
President's FY 2009 Budget request, which includes $145.1 million for
the basic research portfolio; $361.4 million for the transition
portfolio; and $58.6 million (including SBIR) for the innovation
portfolio.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Basic Research (> 8 years)
The S&T Directorate's basic research portfolio addresses long-term
research and development needs in support of DHS mission areas that
will provide the Nation with an enduring capability in homeland
security. This type of focused, protracted research investment has the
potential to lead to paradigm shifts in the Nation's homeland security
capabilities.
The S&T Directorate's basic research program enables fundamental
research at our universities, government laboratories and in the
private sector. I have previously stated a goal to grow this account to
approximately 20 percent of the budget; and I am pleased today to be
able to say that we have met this goal. Approximately 20 percent of the
S&T Directorate's investment portfolio, or $136.2 million, is allocated
for basic research in the current fiscal year with 20 percent or $145.1
million planned for FY 2009. It is essential that basic research be
funded at consistent levels from year to year to ensure a continuity of
effort from the research community in critical areas that will seed
homeland security science and technology for the next generation of
Americans.
This year, we will focus internally on refining our basic research
``thrust areas'' and developing better means to measure the
effectiveness of the basic research portfolio. I have asked the
National Academies to help in this effort.
Product Transition (0 to 3 years)
Development of the product transition portfolio is driven by our
customer-led, Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) that function in
mission-critical areas to identify our customers' needs and enable and
transition near-term capabilities for addressing them. These Capstone
IPTs engage DHS customers, acquisition partners, S&T Division Heads,
and end-users as appropriate in our product research, development,
transition and acquisition activities.
The Capstone IPT process enables our customers to identify and
prioritize their operational capability gaps and requirements and make
informed decisions about technology investments. The S&T Directorate,
in turn, gathers the information it needs to respond with applicable
technology solutions for closing these capability gaps. The science and
technology solutions that are the outcome of this process, referred to
as Enabling Homeland Capabilities, draw upon technologies that can be
developed, matured, and delivered to our customer acquisition programs
within three years.
Our experience over the last year has led us to align our Capstone
IPTs structure to 12 major areas: Information Sharing/Management;
Border Security; Chemical Defense; Biological/Agricultural Defense;
Maritime Security; Cyber Security; Transportation Security; Counter
IED; Cargo Security; People Screening; Infrastructure Protection; and
Incident Management (includes first responder inter-operability).
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
S&T's product transition/IPT process ensures that appropriate
technologies are engineered and integrated into the DHS acquisition
system for our customers. Approximately 53 percent of S&T's investment
portfolio or $376.0 million is allocated for product transition in the
current fiscal year with 49 percent or $361.4 million planned for FY
2009.
Innovative Capabilities (2 to 5 years)
The Innovation/HSARPA portfolio supports three important efforts to
put advanced capabilities into the hands of our customers as soon as
possible: Homeland Innovative Prototypical Solutions (HIPS), High
Impact Technology Solutions (HITS) and the Small Business Innovative
Research (SBIR) program.
HIPS are designed to deliver prototype-level demonstrations of
game-changing technologies within two to five years. Projects present
moderate- to high-risk, with a high-payoff if successful.
HITS are designed to provide proof-of-concept solutions within one
to three years that could result in high-payoff technology
breakthroughs. While these projects are high-risk, they offer the
potential for ``leap-ahead'' gains in capability should they succeed.
The Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program, which the
S&T Directorate manages on behalf of DHS, issues two solicitations each
year and generates multiple awards for the small business community.
The first solicitation for FY 2008 opened in mid-February and the
second solicitation is planned for release in May. The solicitations
will address topics in areas that are aligned with the S&T
Directorate's six technical divisions.
The Innovation/HSARPA funding request for FY 2008 was $60 million
and $33 million was approved in the final Appropriations Act. I do not
believe this reduction reflected any lack of confidence in the
portfolio on the part of the Congress, but was rather an outcome of the
extreme pressure in the Appropriations ``end game.'' Therefore, we are
requesting $45 million in FY 2009 for Innovation's HITS and HIPS
activities.
Test & Evaluation and Standards
In 2006, I established the Test and Evaluation and Standards
Division (TSD). TSD is working closely with DHS Under Secretary for
Management as well as all DHS components to develop and implement a
robust Test and Evaluation (T&E) policy for all of DHS that will be
fully integrated into the Department's Acquisition Policy. The goal of
the T&E policy will be to establish processes to support the evaluation
of system efficacy, suitability and safety. TSD has established a T&E
Council to allow participation by all components of DHS in promoting
T&E best practices and lessons learned in establishing consistent T&E
policy and processes for use in acquisition programs throughout DHS.
Developmental Testing and Evaluation (DT&E) and Operational Testing and
Evaluation (OT&E) are conducted at levels commensurate with validating
performance and Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of the system
throughout the development process. TRL assessments are initiated early
on S&T projects and are performed throughout development to ensure
technology is maturing as required and that projects are ready to
transition to the DHS components at the appropriate time. DT&E is
performed during the developmental phase of a product or system and is
concerned chiefly with validating the contractual and technical
requirements and the attainment of engineering design goals and
manufacturing processes. OT&E focuses on determining operational
effectiveness, suitability, and supportability and is performed with
production representative equipment, with trained operators in an
operational environment by an independent third party.
DHS Acquisition and T&E Policy under development will provide the
appropriate review chain both within DHS as well as the approval
process for test results and for adequacy of testing. The draft T&E
policy that is being developed will require user components to
participate in creating, reviewing and signing the Test and Evaluation
Master Plan (TEMP). Its primary purpose is to describe the necessary
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E) that needs to be conducted in order to determine
system technical performance, operational capabilities and limitations.
The TEMP is an integrated and agreed upon plan to ensure that the right
tests are conducted and the products are meeting the user requirements.
Having the customers involved in the test planning, execution, and
reporting for the technology or system under development will ensure
that the components are able to use the results and maintain a current
knowledge during the product development. The TEMP also addresses the
testing laboratories, capabilities, facilities and ranges required for
the test program; testing laboratories are accredited/recognized; and
independent oversight of the tests are performed. Additionally, when
possible DHS ensures independent operational test teams are involved
early in the project development to ensure operational shortcomings are
identified and corrected as early as possible during development. The
test results will be critical in ensuring that DHS products meet the
necessary milestones to continue development.
While the T&E Policy is being finalized, DHS development programs
are moving forward with the assistance and guidance of TSD in designing
T&E protocols to assess whether systems meet standards, technical
specifications and some operational requirements. It is the
Department's objective to prepare standard T&E master plans, test plans
and test reports to document the planning, execution and reporting
phases of the testing. Test plans are required whether the research
project is being conducted internally or externally to S&T. Red Teaming
will be included in the test plans as required and be employed post
deployment when appropriate.
The DHS components working within the DHS Capstone IPT process
ensure that the user needs are addressed in the research as well as the
testing and evaluation. End-user needs are incorporated in the planning
and design of the tests. All tests will be performed to component
requirements or DHS adopted standards. Reports of efficacy, safety, and
suitability are assessed against test criteria which are developed with
Component input.
TSD is also developing an accredited/recognized test capability,
with the goal of testing all products in accredited/recognized
facilities. The accreditation/recognition process is under development
and facilities are currently being identified that are capable of
conducting different aspects of the testing process. Accomplishing
independent testing in realistic operational environments will better
assess product effectiveness and suitability. Test results from the
above process will allow decision-makers to formulate better judgments
concerning readiness for transition to the next phase of development or
deployment.
TSD has an effort under way to ensure that once testing is
completed both components and first responders have access to product
performance evaluations. T&E results will be placed on the Responders
Knowledge Base (RKB) that is funded and managed by FEMA. In addition to
posting the results on the RKB, the DHS T&E policy will provide
standard report formats to ensure that the results are useful including
system limitations and capabilities.
In the area of standards, I would to like mention our efforts to
implement the DHS Standards Policy through the development of a
standards infrastructure and the issuance of guidance. Just as with
T&E, we have established a Standards Council. TSD and the Standards
Council have developed and distributed guidance on the participation in
the development and use of non-government standards. We continue to
evaluate and adopt voluntary consensus standards in support of the
Homeland Security Grant Program as well as key initiatives such as
National Preparedness. Our standards development program continues its
successful support for research on standards to support national needs
in homeland security. In August of 2007 the Office of Standards
published its first Annual Report which documents the work and
accomplishments of the previous year. In the years ahead we will be
focusing on refining our investments to reflect the evolving challenges
facing the Department, utilizing S&T's new operating model and the
outputs from the Capstone IPTs. The range of projects includes trace
and bulk explosives detection, biometrics, credentialing, chemical and
biological counter-measures, responder protective equipment and many
more. The standards office engages experts from the DHS components and
a variety of federal partners, and leverages the outstanding work of
private sector standards development organizations.
PARTNERSHIPS
Over the past year, we have built partnerships that have helped us
align our efforts within the S&T Directorate, across the Department,
and with our public and private partners around the world. Within the
Directorate, we have developed and published the S&T Strategic Plan
that provides the strategy and planning framework to guide the
Directorate's activities over the next five years. Through the Capstone
IPT process, we have aligned our transition portfolio to our customers'
needs. In basic research, we have aligned our university-based Centers
of Excellence and, as a result of a meeting I held with the Directors
of the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories in May 2007,
the National Laboratories to our six technical divisions to focus this
enormous capability more closely on the fundamental knowledge gaps that
limit our customer oriented applied research programs. We announced
five new COEs on February 26, 2008, which will further satisfy the
Directorate's need for university-based fundamental research.
Over the past year my Office of Interagency Programs (and First
Responder Liaison) has worked very closely with DOD to develop and
enhance information sharing opportunities. Among the accomplishments
were the development of an implementing agreement among the partners
and a senior level DHS-DOD working group. These accomplishments will
help ensure the best use of resources while avoiding duplication of
effort and will promote further cooperation among our partners. The
first S&T liaison position within the California Governor's Office of
Homeland Security was also established to enhance interagency efforts
with our customers. Many of the experiences of this successful pilot
were used as a working model for engaging with our federal, State,
local and tribal customers We will continue to conduct national
interagency outreach through site visits, meetings, conferences and
symposia to promote federal, State, local, and tribal inter-
operability, collaboration, and coordination in the area of Science and
Technology.
We also developed the Coordination of Homeland Security Science and
Technology document that establishes the baseline for the efforts of
the entire Federal Government homeland security research and
development community. This document lays out the roles and
responsibilities of federal agencies as well as initiatives already
under way to counter threats to the homeland. It identifies strategic
goals through 2015 and intermediate steps to achieve those goals, and
is the first step in developing a more prescriptive plan that will
guide the efforts of all participants in the Homeland Security Science
and Technology enterprise. For the next steps in the development of
that plan, I intend to work with the Office of Science and Technology
Policy's National Science and Technology Council to utilize standing
processes and committees, specifically the Committee on National and
Homeland Security, which I co-chair. Continued development of the plan
concurrent with the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review beginning this
year will play an important role in helping align strategies and
missions to adapt to a fast-changing world and an ever evolving enemy.
Industry is a valued partner of DHS S&T and its continued
participation in developing solutions for homeland security
applications is vital to our effort to safeguard the Nation. Consistent
with S&T's new structure, our Innovation/HSARPA portfolio and six
technical divisions will be releasing BAAs that seek industry
participation to address specific challenges in their respective areas.
For example, Innovation/HSARPA has already posted BAAs for projects
that cross all six divisions, seeking prototype or proof of concept
demonstrations within 1-5 years. Innovation/HSARPA plans to release
additional BAAs as new technology developments permit and as new gaps
in capabilities for homeland security are identified. We have issued a
Long Range BAA (08-01) that will remain open throughout the fiscal
year. This BAA allows both national and international public and
private sector providers to offer solutions to a very broad range of
gaps and requirements. As I have often said, no one knows where good
ideas come from and for that reason I have been personally proactive in
both seeking out and receiving technology briefs and opportunities from
all sources. This is a culture I am working to instill throughout the
DHS S&T Directorate.
Additionally, DHS S&T has held several Stakeholder Conferences to
foster business partnerships with key customers and partners, including
industry, Federal, State, and local government leaders, and academia.
The Command, Control, and Inter-operability Division also held their
annual Industry Roundtable to engage industry leaders on the future of
communications inter-operability issues.
The Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies
(SAFETY) Act of 2002, administered in the S&T Directorate, continues to
be a valuable tool in expanding the creation, proliferation and use of
cutting edge anti-terrorism technologies throughout the United States.
During FY 2007, the Office of SAFETY Act Implementation achieved an
increase of 81 awards, an 83 percent increase over the total cumulative
number of approvals attained over the previous three years of the
program. Approximately 86 percent of the approved awards during FY 2007
have relevance for the classes of capabilities and needs identified by
the Science and Technology Capstone IPTs. The number of applications
was up 63 percent, while processing time has been reduced 31 percent.
The career federal staffing level of the SAFETY Act office was
increased to three, thus providing more continuity of leadership, and
permitting more attention and a quicker response to individual
applicants. I am mindful of the interest in this program in the
Congress and across the Nation.
As part of our outreach efforts to encourage greater industry
participation, the Directorate held the first Homeland Security Science
& Technology Stakeholders Conference in May 2007 here in Washington. We
were partners in a conference in London last December that focused on
international outreach. And we held a conference in Los Angeles in
January 2008, focused on ``Putting First Responders First.'' On March
19 and 20, we will sponsor the second University Programs Summit here
in Washington, an event at which participants will show off the results
of their fantastic research at the colleges and universities that are
part of the Homeland Security University Centers of Excellence. We will
have another industry stakeholders' conference in Washington, June 2-5,
2008. I invite you and all elected Members and staffs to attend these
events so you might see for yourself the power of innovation and
technology in making our nation safer.
I also know that we must look beyond our nation's borders for
solutions to combating domestic terrorism. Therefore, consistent with
DHS enabling legislation and the recent Implementing the
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, the International Programs
Division is responsible for coordinating international outreach efforts
to help us tap into science and technology communities across the
globe. We have proactively pursued bilateral technology and
programmatic cooperation with my counterparts in the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, Sweden, Singapore, the European Union, Germany,
Mexico, France, Japan, and Israel. Formal agreements currently exist
with Canada, the UK, Australia, Sweden and Singapore. With our current
partners, we have twenty concrete projects in a number of high priority
research areas including air cargo explosive detection, chemical and
biological counter-measures, visualization and analytics, critical
infrastructure protection, and incident management. In addition to
these projects, active information sharing with our foreign partners
has reduced duplication of research efforts, streamlined project
development, and synergized the expertise of the broader international
community to produce mutually beneficial results. The International
Programs Division maximizes these relationships across the U.S.
Government through active coordination with DHS Components and other
agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense. Embedded S&T
liaisons in Europe, the Americas and Pacific/Asia cast a wide global
net to seek out new science and technology solutions with current and
prospective partners. Annual academic grant competitions are open to
the global community and provide world-wide access to cutting-edge S&T
research in support of our homeland security mission. S&T is actively
engaging with partners across the globe to develop coordinated efforts
and joint solutions to our shared security challenges.
PRODUCT
I am committed to best apply across the S&T Directorate the
resources you have wisely provided in ways that best serve the American
people and better secure our homeland. Your support over the last year
has allowed us to ``hit our stride,'' and I humbly ask for your
continued trust and support of the President's FY 2009 Budget Request
to allow us to build upon that momentum. The following are a few
examples of products we have developed and in some cases transitioned
to our customers.
Border and Maritime Security
<bullet> Developed a lightweight shipping container with
embedded security features within its walls, doors and floor to
detect intrusions. Shippers benefit from weight savings by
allowing them to load more goods per container, encouraging the
use of these more secure containers.
<bullet> Conducted a joint test of the Marine Asset Tag
Tracking System (MATTS) with Japan. When fielded, MATTS will
provide the ability to track shipping containers in near-real
time from their origin to final destination using a remote
global communications and tracking device interfaced with
sensors that detect container breaching.
Chemical and Biological
<bullet> Completed the Project BioShield material threat
determinations for all traditional biothreat agents of
significant public health concern. Such determinations are
required before the authorized use of the BioShield Special
Reserve Fund to procure new medical counter-measures.
<bullet> Transitioned BioWatch Generation 1 and Generation 2
operations to the Office of Health Affairs (OHA).
Command, Control and Inter-operability
<bullet> Combined several government-funded testbeds to
increase cyber security capabilities to create a realistic
model of the Internet on which to test cyber security
technologies.
<bullet> Assisted states in identifying and implementing
effective statewide technical inter-operability solutions;
conducted piloted programs to assess and demonstrate data and
video technologies in real-world environment.
Explosives
<bullet> Evaluated and tested commercial off-the-shelf systems
capable of detecting homemade explosives to find the most
effective existing technologies.
<bullet> Completed a system false alarm analysis of deployed
check baggage technology and provided results to the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
Human Factors
<bullet> Developed a database of public needs that were unmet
during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and made recommendations to
address those needs during future emergencies.
Infrastructure and Geophysical
<bullet> Developed a risk-informed decision support system.
The system provides information for making critical
infrastructure protection (CIP) decisions by considering all 17
critical infrastructure sectors and their primary
interdependencies, and computing human health and safety,
economic, public confidence, national security, and
environmental impacts. Built out CIP-Decision Support System
(DSS) to include cyber-disruptions, nuclear event, and
physical/natural disaster disruption scenarios.
<bullet> Developed the system requirements and designs for a
first responder 3D location system for tracking personnel that
provide incident commanders situational awareness through
accurate location and monitoring inside threatened buildings,
collapsed buildings, and subterranean areas.
Innovation
<bullet> Initiated Homeland Innovative Prototypical Solutions
(HIPS) to deliver prototype-level demonstrations of game
changing technologies in two to five years. These projects are
moderate-to-high risk with high payoff potential.
<bullet> Started High Impact Technology Solutions (HITS) to
provide proof-of-concept answers that could result in high
technology breakthroughs. These projects have the potential to
make significant gains in capability; however, there is a
considerable risk of failure.
<bullet> Built upon the efforts in Explosives and demonstrated
the ability of sensors based on a high altitude platform to
detect the launch of and track MANPADS.
<bullet> Investigated various technologies including probe
systems to be installed on the cranes that on-load and off-load
ship carried containers, sensors and container materials to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the screening of
cargo containers.
Laboratory Facilities
<bullet> Managed the operations and maintenance of specialized
DHS laboratories and infrastructure including the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center (PIADC), portions of the National
Biodefense Analysis and Counter-measures Center (NBACC),
Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC), Transportation
Security Laboratory (TSL), and the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory (EML).
<bullet> Began operation of the NBACC facility as a Federally
Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC).
<bullet> Started construction of the Chemical Security
Analysis Center (CSAC).
<bullet> Conducted the conceptual design of the National Bio
Agro Defense Facility (NBAF), which will be an integrated
animal, foreign animal, and zoonotic disease research,
development, and testing facility that will support the
complementary missions of DHS and U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA). Down-selected potential sites for the NBAF.
Test & Evaluation (T&E) and Standards
<bullet> Continued to develop standards for an integrated
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
(CBRNE) sensor.
<bullet> Completed multi-modal biometrics standards, including
standards for latent fingerprint analysis, rapid biometric
evaluation, and biometric image and image feature quality.
<bullet> Developed performance standards for emergency
responder locator communications in collapsed structures. These
standards will apply to new signal processing technologies that
allow amplification of weak signals through rubble from
collapsed structures.
Transition
<bullet> Aligned and coordinated the Directorate's transition
effort with the Departmental component's requirements through
the use of Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPT) and provided
support and analysis to the customer-led IPTs in developing
prioritized science and technology capability gaps based on
their experience and projected requirements.
<bullet> Conducted a Marine Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS)
test and workshop/conference on results with Japan and
conducted a bi-national S&T exercise with Sweden to identify
and describe transformational approaches to mitigating the
effects of improvised explosive devices in mass transit
systems.
University Programs
<bullet> Established five new DHS Centers of Excellence (COE)
and developed a number of efforts to improve the capabilities
of Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs) to conduct research in
areas critical to homeland security and to develop a new
generation of scientists capable of advancing homeland security
goals.
<bullet> Provided scholarships for undergraduate and
fellowships for graduate students pursuing degrees in fields
relevant to homeland security.
FY 2009 BUDGET OVERVIEW
The S&T Directorate's FY 2009 Budget Request reflects the
refinement of our four ``Ps'' and a commitment to the S&T investment
portfolio. The request of $868.8 million is approximately five percent
over the FY 2008 appropriation and nine percent over the FY 2008
request.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
The Management and Administration request reflects several
efficiency initiatives to make better use of its resources and better
accounts for program activity costs at the laboratories. The Research,
Development, Acquisition and Operations request is primarily based on
the increased support for the development of additional technologies
for specific high-priority, customer-identified needs identified during
the S&T Capstone IPT process.
Administration (M&A)
The S&T Directorate requests $132.1 million for M&A in FY 2009.
This is a decrease of $6.5 million from the FY 2008 budget request.
This reflects a shift of $14 million and 124 positions to the
Laboratory Facilities PPA combined with a $7.5 million increase to
fully fund our planned FTEs.
Research, Development, Acquisitions, and Operations (RDA&O)
The S&T Directorate requests $736.7 for RDA&O in FY 2009. This is
an increase of $80.2 above the FY 2008 budget request and $45.0 above
the FY 2008 appropriation. The following is a summary of the FY 2008 to
FY 2009 changes--many are due to the increased support for the
development of additional technologies for specific high-priority,
customer needs identified during the S&T Capstone IPT process,
specifically:
Borders and Maritime Security
The FY 2009 program increase of $9.4 million above the FY 2008
request allows the development of additional technologies for specific
high-priority, customer-identified needs identified during the S&T
Directorate's Capstone IPT process. The increase will allow for the
development of technologies for advanced detection, identification,
apprehension and enforcement capabilities along the maritime borders
that support a framework that includes Coast Guard partners for rapid,
coordinated responses to anomalies and threats. A science and
technology investment in these areas will provide significant risk
mitigation complementary to proposed major acquisition efforts such as
the Coast Guard's Command 21 program. This increase will also provide
tools and technologies to border security and law enforcement officers
allowing for efficient, effective and safe vehicle and vessel
inspections. These tools will improve Coast Guard boarding teams' and
Border Agents' effectiveness and enhance officer/agent safety while
searching vessels/vehicles.
Chemical and Biological
The FY 2009 program decrease of $7.6 million from the FY 2008
appropriation is in large part due to the BioWatch Gen 3 Detection
Systems and Detect-to-Protect Triggers and Confirmers projects within
the Surveillance and Detection R&D Program of the Biological Thrust
area coming to an end in FY 2009. Also, the Autonomous Rapid Facility
Chemical Agent Monitor (ARFCAM) and Low Vapor Pressure Chemicals
Detection System (LVPCDS) projects in the Detection program of the
Chemical Thrust area are ramping down to end in FY 2010.
Command, Control, and Inter-operability
The FY 2009 program increase of $5.4 million over the FY 2008
appropriation funds the development of additional technologies for
specific high priority customer-identified needs identified during the
S&T Directorate's Capstone IPT process. The increase in Cyber Security
R&D will allow the division to address Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) and Process Control Systems (PCS) security
increasing the protection and improving the resiliency of the electric
distribution grid. These systems will proactively manage threats by
identifying and responding to vulnerabilities and threats before they
are maliciously exploited to significantly impact critical
infrastructure. They will also provide autonomy of operations that can
quickly respond to natural disasters and security events and address
new vulnerabilities.
Explosives
The increase in the FY 2009 request of $32.4 million over the FY
2008 request supports Counter-IED Research, which includes Vehicle
Borne Improvised Explosive Device/Suicide Bomber Improvised Explosive
Device (VBIED/SBIED) Program, the Render Safe Program, and the
Detection and Neutralization Tools Program. The increase in funding in
the Counter-IED Research will allow the Explosives division to improve
large threat mass detection in such areas as the transit environment,
special events and other large areas.
The implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19
(HSPD-19), Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States,
requires new science and technology solutions to address critical
capability gaps in the areas of deterring, predicting, detecting,
defeating, and mitigating the use of IEDs in the United States. The
Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) is currently assessing the Nation's
ability to address this threat and is developing a prioritized set of
technology gaps. The S&T Directorate is working with OBP to support
basic science and develop technologies for the following kill chain:
<bullet> Deter: Actionable Social and Behavioral Indicators of
IED Attacks; Intent-based Counter-measures;
<bullet> Predict: IED Target Projections; IED Staging Area
Projections; Anomalous Behavior Prediction; Suicide Bombing
Prediction; Deceptive Behavior Screening; Multi-Modal
Behavioral & Biometric Screening;
<bullet> Detect: Suicide Bomb Detection; Technology
Demonstration & System Integration; VBIED Detection; Canine
R&D; Tagging R&D; Standards;
<bullet> Defeat: Electronic Counter-measures; Robotics; Render
Safe & Diagnostics; Directed Energy; Post Blast Forensics;
Forensic Marking; Bomb Components; Outreach; and
<bullet> Mitigate: Blast Mitigation; Body Armor; Inerting.
We are performing valuable work to improve methods of detecting
explosives threats on people, in personal items and in cargo. As part
of the Checkpoint Program, S&T's Explosives Division is working with
TSA to complete test and evaluation efforts on the Whole Body Imaging
system that could help operators of check points better identify
potential threats. We are also conducting tests to enhance the
screening of carried baggage and personal items. We are conducting
Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) of the Fido II Explosives
Detection System and currently have units deployed at multiple airports
in the United States. The portable detection system has been enhanced
to detect liquid explosive components and will be used by TSA to
counter the growing threat liquid explosives pose to transit security.
This effort is complemented by our significant work to characterize the
homemade and liquid explosives threat, which has included live fire
tests to assess potential damage and the efficacy of hardening
materials.
In addition to addressing the risk of catastrophic loss resulting
from IEDs in carry-on baggage or at public events, our Explosives
Screening Program is identifying and developing the next generation of
screening systems which will support continuous improvements toward the
Congressionally directed goal of 100 percent screening of aviation
checked baggage by electronic or other approved means with minimum or
no impact to the flow of people or commerce. We have continued our work
on the Manhattan II and began test and evaluation efforts of the
system's ability to identify real explosive devices, both homemade and
conventional. We have also worked with industry to develop a common
performance standard for coupling algorithms and hardware. Another part
of our effort is the Air Cargo Explosives Detection pilot program. We
began operations at San Francisco International Airport and at
Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky International Airport, and launched and
completed operations at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. At all
locations we are capturing vital information for TSA, including data on
the costs of running a system capable of screening amounts of cargo
above current levels, including equipment needs, staff requirements,
and system upkeep, in addition to the impacts of these upgrades to
overall airport operations. This data can be extrapolated to airports
nationally, based on, among other things, the amount of cargo they
handle and airport size. It will also allow TSA to develop operational
plans that incorporate proven ways to screen air cargo while
maintaining an effective and efficient air transport system.
Human Factors
The budget request for FY 2009 is $12.5 million, which is $1.7
million less than the amount enacted for FY 2008. In FY 2008, the Human
Factors Division received funds for the Institute for Homeland Security
Solutions (IHSS) to conduct applied technological and social science
research. In FY 2009, the Human Factors Division is not requesting any
funds for IHSS. The Division still intends to support efforts that
address high-priority capability gaps in biometrics and credentialing,
suspicious behavior detection, hostile intent determination, group
violent intent modeling, and radicalization deterrence as identified by
customers through the Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT) for People
Screening and the Technology Oversight Group (TOG), chaired by the
Deputy Secretary. Two other Capstone IPTs, Border Security and
Explosives Prevention, also identified Suspicious Behavior Detection as
critical to meeting their respective high-priority capability gaps.
Infrastructure and Geophysical
The FY 2009 request of $37.8 million is an increase of $13.8
million over the FY 2008 request to fund several new program areas
specifically identified by our customers, with efforts focused on high
priority technology gaps in the areas of Infrastructure Protection and
Emergency Incident Management. Specifically, funded efforts will
improve the protection of our critical infrastructure by providing
technologies for hardening these vital critical infrastructure assets
and for rapid response and recovery for critical infrastructure assets
to limit damage and consequences and allow for normal operations to be
resumed more quickly than would otherwise be possible.
Innovation
The FY 2009 program increase of $12 million reflects an increase in
scope of existing programs as they mature and might allow for
additional projects that would address gaps identified by the S&T
Capstone IPT process. These projects are high risk in nature but would
dramatically increase capabilities in responding to threats posed by
terrorism and natural disasters. The high risk factor means that the
Office of the Director of Innovation requires flexibility in the
projects it funds. These projects will reach critical decision points
to continue or stop. New projects are always under consideration, and
the FY 2009 request will potentially fund new projects or current ones
that justify further development based on results.
Laboratory Facilities
The FY 2009 request of $146.9 million is an increase of $43.1
million over the FY 2008 appropriations. The S&T Directorate intends to
cover the FY 2009 operations and maintenance (O&M) start-up costs of
the new NBACC facility. These costs include the installation and
outfitting of portable laboratory equipment and furnishings and funding
interim space lease. Also in FY 2009, the S&T Directorate intends to
move the remaining functions of EML into much smaller office space in
the same building or another General Services Administration (GSA)
facility in the New York area and pay for a one-time cost for final
cleanup of EML space (e.g., final disposal of contaminated material,
removal of fume hoods, large exhaust ducting, furnaces, and shielded
spaces). Also, the Directorate will begin a detailed design of the
National Bio and Agrodefense Facility (NBAF) which will support the
initiation of construction in FY 2010.
The increase also reflects a transfer of funds from Management and
Administration to the Laboratory Facilities PPA to pay for salaries and
benefits of FTEs located at the laboratories. All Homeland Security
laboratory employees work on RDA&O products. The shift of laboratory
FTEs into the RDA&O account better reflects the actual Science and
Technology RDA&O program costs.
University Programs
In FY 2009, the S&T Directorate is requesting $5.5 million less for
its University Programs. This decrease reflects no funding request for
the Naval Post Graduate School and a reduction to the educational
programs within the S&T Directorate that fund scholars and fellows in
homeland security related fields.
Transition
The FY 2009 program increase of $1.5 million will support a DHS
competition for a new Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC). The FFRDC will provide discreet, independent, and objective
analysis to inform homeland security policies and programs and ensure
continuity of FFRDC support.
Test Evaluation and Standards
The S&T Directorate requests $3.8 million less for FY 2008 than
enacted for FY 2008. This decrease is the result of having initiated
the independent peer review program in FY 2008 and the program will
therefore not need additional funding in FY 2009. The S&T Directorate
is also implementing a reallocation of funds by the TOG during the
Capstone IPT process.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I am pleased to report that the S&T Directorate is
well positioned today to mobilize the Nation's vast technical and
scientific capabilities to enable solutions to detect, protect against
and recover from catastrophic events.
We appreciate the many demands on the taxpayers' precious dollars
and you have my continued commitment that the S&T Directorate will be
wise stewards of the public monies you have entrusted to us. We are
steadfast in our resolve to serve the best interests of the Nation by
investing in the talent and technology that will provide America with a
sustainable capability to protect against acts of terror and other
high-consequence events for generations to come.
Members of the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to meet
with you today. I truly believe that through Science and Technology can
come Security and Trust, and I look forward to working with you to meet
our homeland security challenges with a renewed sense of purpose,
mission and urgency in the last year of the Administration.
Biography for Jay M. Cohen
Department of Homeland Security, Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Jay M. Cohen is a native of New York. He was commissioned
in 1968 as an Ensign upon graduation from the United States Naval
Academy. He holds a joint Ocean Engineering degree from Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and
Master of Science in Marine Engineering and Naval Architecture from
MIT.
His early Navy assignments included service on conventional and
nuclear submarines. From 1985 to 1988 Cohen commanded USS HYMAN G.
RICKOVER (SSN 709).
Following command, he served on the U.S. Atlantic Fleet as a senior
member of the Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board, responsible for
certifying the safe operation of nuclear powered ships and crews.
From 1991 to 1993, he commanded USS L.Y. SPEAR (AS 36) including a
deployment to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation DESERT STORM.
After Spear, he reported to the Secretary of the Navy as Deputy
Chief of Navy Legislature Affairs. During this assignment, Cohen was
responsible for supervising all Navy-Congressional liaison.
Cohen was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in October 1997 and
reported to the Joint Staff as Deputy Director for Operations
responsible to the President and DOD leaders for strategic weapons
release authority.
In June 1999 he assumed duties as Director Navy Y2K Project Office
responsible for transitioning all Navy computer systems into the new
century.
In June 2000, Cohen was promoted in rank and became the 20th Chief
of Naval Research. He served during the Iraq war as the Department of
the Navy Chief Technology Officer (a direct report to the Secretary of
the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine
Corps). Responsible for the Navy and Marine Corps Science and
Technology (S&T) Program (involving basic research to applied
technology portfolios and contracting), Cohen coordinated investments
with other U.S. and international S&T providers to rapidly meet war
fighter combat needs. After an unprecedented five and a half year
assignment as Chief of Naval Research, Rear Admiral Cohen retired on
February 1, 2006.
Under Secretary Cohen was sworn in to his current position at the
Department of Homeland Security on August 10, 2006.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Under Secretary. Mr.
Oxford.
STATEMEHT OF MR. VAYL S. OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Oxford. Good morning, Chairman Wu, Ranking Member
Gingrey, and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I
would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to
discuss our research and development priorities for Fiscal Year
2009.
As always, we look forward to the engagement with this
committee on an annual basis and throughout the year. Before I
go into detail on our priorities for 2009, I would like to
share some key accomplishments that we have had since we last
appeared before you.
In December, we met the congressionally mandated goal of
scanning 98 percent of all incoming cargo at U.S. seaports.
Three years ago, when DNDO was established, we were only
scanning 22 percent of cargo entering through our major
seaports. And when we now couple that with the fact that we are
scanning 100 percent of all cargo coming across the southern
border, we are now scanning 96 percent of all cargo coming into
the United States for radiation. We have also equipped the U.S.
Coast Guard, all their boarding teams, with radiation detection
equipment, so they can have a multi-mission capability.
To address other threats, DNDO supplied Customs and Border
Protection with additional hand-held detectors, and as of
December 2007, CBP is now scanning all international general
aviation airplanes arriving in the United States. We are also
implementing a program to enhance physical security of high
risk radioactive sources in U.S. medical facilities. Our
programs that support long-term research have also been very
successful.
We have seen tremendous involvement on behalf of the
National Laboratories, private industry, and academia, in DNDO
research efforts. I am proud to say that these programs are
already yielding some very promising results. As an example,
our Advanced Technology Demonstration with the Intelligent
Personal Radiation Locator, or IPRL, is expected to be complete
in 2009, and transition to systems development in 2010. This
program is based on user needs for a next generation personal
radiation detection system, and will be used by first
responders, law enforcement, and counter-terrorism communities.
Our Academic Research Initiative awarded 22 grants this
last year, and currently supports over 70 graduate students in
nuclear and radiological research areas. This year, we are
hosting the first annual Grantee Conference in April to
showcase research and foster academic collaboration. In fiscal
year 2008 and 2009, we will apply an additional $26 million in
follow-on grants and new awards to the academic environment.
This will help develop the nuclear scientists and engineers of
the future.
Our DNDO research philosophy is very broad. Our work spans
both near-term and long-term transformational concepts, as
mentioned by the Chairman and the Ranking Member. In our case,
it is driven by DNDO's architectural analysis, and by user
needs. We translate gaps in the detection architecture and
associated user needs into specific technical areas to define
our research agenda. We use pilots to integrate existing or
developmental systems into operational concepts, to refine
capabilities for the radiological and nuclear detection
missions.
DNDO does provide a wide variety of products to our State
and local partners. These include handbooks on how to use
equipment and how to operate the radiation detection mission.
We provide training for those that are equipped with radiation
detection devices, and we also provide them with preferred
equipment recommendations for use in the grant process. And
finally, we provide a 24/7 technical reach-back capability for
all State and local users.
For technical needs that exist beyond current capabilities,
we have a robust transformational research program that aims to
do several things. First of all, fulfill new mission needs, to
reduce system cost, to increase technical performance against
the full spectrum of radiological and nuclear threats, and
demonstrate and evaluate technology to transition to systems
development. Our transformational research program has three
key benefits. It yields new, promising detector materials and
concepts; it focuses the U.S. technical community and industry,
National Laboratories and academia, on the highest threat
nuclear detection priorities, and finally, it is beginning to
reverse the trend in the nuclear expertise pipeline through our
Academic Research Initiative and forensics work.
DNDO's research efforts are underpinned by sound system
engineering processes and an extensive test capability that we
will talk about today, and allows us to evaluate systems
against realistic threats in operationally relevant
environments. Our tests not only evaluate the technical
performance of systems, but also involve our customers.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, DNDO's 2009 budget reflects a
concerted effort to address vulnerabilities and needs. The
challenges that lie ahead require a coordinated effort on
behalf of the best scientific minds in government, academia,
and the private sector.
We have made good progress, but much work remains to be
done. We are anxious to work with the Committee as we go
forward, and with that, Mr. Chairman, this concludes my
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vayl S. Oxford
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee. As Director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO), I would like to thank the Committee for the
opportunity to discuss our research and development (R&D) priorities
for Fiscal Year 2009. I am pleased to be here with my counterparts from
the Science and Technology Directorate, Under Secretary Cohen and Mr.
Ryan.
DNDO has made significant progress over the past three years
towards mission success, from both a scientific and operational support
standpoint. In sharing our Fiscal Year 2009 research and development
agenda, it is my hope that the progress we have made is evident, and
that future efforts to create better means to stop radiological and
nuclear terrorism are well justified.
Consistent with previous years, over half of DNDO's Fiscal Year
2009 budget request is intended for R&D activities. We categorize our
R&D work into two areas: enhancement of existing technologies through
near-term, spiral development; and long-term transformational R&D that
will deliver revolutionary improvements in the cost, performance, and
associated operational burdens of nuclear detection systems. Of
particular focus for Fiscal Year 2009 is developing breakthrough
technologies to meet new mission requirements. We have made great
progress in deploying detection systems to our Ports of Entry (POEs).
At the end of 2007, 100 percent of Southern border container traffic
and 98 percent of all seaport container traffic was being screened for
radiological and nuclear threats. While work remains at our ports of
entry, our research and development efforts must look beyond simply
countering threats that may come through the supply chain. Therefore,
we are focusing on developing solutions that can effectively counter a
determined and mobile adversary who will seek routes to bypass existing
security measures.
The architectural analysis conducted by DNDO is the driving force
behind this shift in our research agenda. We know that unconventional
pathways sought by the enemy--be it through our waterways or general
aviation--present technical and operational challenges that cannot be
easily resolved by existing technologies. DNDO is working with our
interagency partners, Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Coast
Guard, State and local authorities, and others to gather user
requirements and develop viable concepts of operation. We are then
translating this information about gaps in the existing detection
architecture and associated user requirements into specific technical
areas that define our long-term research agenda. In my testimony today,
I will talk about these technical areas and provide a sampling of our
projects that are already yielding promising results. I will also touch
upon how DNDO conducts test and evaluation activities, and coordinates
its research and development efforts with other DHS components, federal
agencies and private industry.
Near-Term Research Priorities
DNDO's near-term focus is on making further improvements to
radiation detection capabilities for the Nation's POEs as well as
developing solutions for non-POE applications. DNDO is continuing our
Advanced Spectroscopic Portal, or ASP, program, which improves upon
existing polyvinyl toluene (PVT)-based radiation portal monitors that
are currently deployed throughout the global architecture. In Fiscal
Year 2009, we will be conducting research to develop advanced systems
for use in maritime, general aviation, and rail environments. We will
specifically be developing systems for use in on-dock rail
configurations to provide scanning solutions for seaports that load
cargo directly from ships to rail cars, therefore bypassing typical
exit gate screening operations. In addition, it is our expectation that
Fiscal Year 2009 will bring about full-rate production and deployment
of ASP systems at the Nation's POEs.
DNDO is also working on Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems,
or HPRDS, to improve current hand-held and backpack radiation detection
systems. In previous years, our efforts have been focused on acquiring
systems to meet the imminent operational needs of our users--Customs
and Border Protection and the Coast Guard. DNDO and the Coast Guard
implemented a Joint Acquisition Strategy, ensuring that every Coast
Guard boarding team was equipped with radiation detection equipment by
the end of 2007. In Fiscal Year 2009, DNDO will be improving detector
sensitivity and identification capabilities, reducing false alarm
rates, and ensuring that next-generation systems are more user-friendly
for system operators. In addition, DNDO will be gathering data for
software improvements and conducting testing to ensure that HPRDS under
development are able to meet performance specifications. Hand-held and
backpack systems will also be used in a variety of DNDO pilot programs,
including maritime and aviation efforts, to determine how best to
utilize this type of technology to meet emerging mission requirements.
Long-Term Research Priorities
New solutions are required to create a multi-layered detection
system that is responsive to the changing threat environment. Not all
of these solutions are on the immediate horizon. DNDO's long-term
research agenda fills gaps in the present detection architecture that
exist because of performance issues, cost, or lack of capabilities. We
have several programs underway that support long-term research--
Exploratory Research, Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs), and a
dedicated Academic Research Initiative. There is tremendous involvement
with the National Labs, private industry, and academia for these
efforts. I am proud to say that these programs have already yielded
some very promising results that we hope will make a tangible impact on
this nation's nuclear detection capabilities.
Our Exploratory Research program focuses on technical solutions
that are feasible and show significant promise, but require further
concept development and demonstration. Successes to date include the
development of a new scintillating material that has very high light
output, good energy resolution, and is potentially inexpensive to scale
up for use as a large detector. We also have developed a new
semiconductor material, which is proving to be as good as the best
current room temperature materials, but should be easier to grow to a
large size. We have also seen breakthroughs in passive detection of
shielded special nuclear material. Finally, our project that integrates
video with directional gamma imaging has made good progress towards
making it feasible for us to ``tag'' vehicles that might be
transporting a nuclear threat.
In Fiscal Year 2009, we will focus on continuing research into new
detector materials, passive and active detection concepts, and systems
integration. Over $16 million is dedicated in Fiscal Year 2009 to begin
new projects. Mature projects become candidates for future ATD program.
For our ATD program, leading edge technological concepts (in many
cases technology demonstrated conceptually under Exploratory Research)
are further developed, tested, and evaluated. Specifically, the basic
technological components are integrated into an experimental device
with reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology
can be tested in a simulated environment. The results of the tests form
the basis for a preliminary cost benefit analysis that is used to
objectively determine whether the technology should transition to a
systems development and acquisition program.
In Fiscal Year 2009, we will be completing our Intelligent Personal
Radiation Locator, or IPRL, ATD with an expected transition to the
HPRDS program in Fiscal Year 2010. The IPRL emerged from an end-user
requirement for a next-generation personal radiation detection system
similar to the radiation pagers often used by CBP, the Coast Guard,
first responders, and law enforcement officials. IPRL will have
sufficient energy resolution and sensitivity to reliably discriminate
between naturally occurring radioactive material (or NORM), background,
and potential threats, and will be used by law enforcement, first
responder, counter-terrorism, the intelligence community, and others in
routine activities and surveillance.
Our Standoff Detection ATD will be completing critical design
reviews and undergoing laboratory tests that will determine the
technology's readiness to undergo performance tests. This ATD will
allow DNDO to develop and evaluate key existing technologies such as
coded aperture and Compton imaging that may dramatically improve
sensitivity and directional accuracy. Our goal is to extend detection
ranges against relevant nuclear and radiological sources to as much as
100 meters, potentially providing the capability to locate and identify
nuclear threat materials at greater distances for use in ground-based,
airborne, and maritime platforms.
Our Shielded Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) ATD is scheduled for
preliminary design reviews in early FY 2009, with final system design
review expected in late FY 2009. This ATD will develop and test
advanced technology to definitively verify the presence of SNM despite
cluttered environments or intentional countermeasures like shielding.
As I mentioned previously, proof-of-concept results from Exploratory
Research projects have been very promising. Furthermore, another
embodiment of this technology may lead to a whole new capability for
portable interrogation systems that will enable relocatable or human
portable detection systems to automatically verify the presence of
shielded SNM.
Finally, in Fiscal Year 2009, we are beginning a new ATD on Remote
Emplaced Sensors. This ATD will assess the performance capabilities of
small, low-power, inexpensive detectors to detect and track the
movement of SNM. The potential applications of this technology are
significant, allowing us to increase the probability of detection in
non-POE environments such as unattended borders, urban areas, and
airports.
The final component of our long-term research program provides a
much needed emphasis in nuclear detection sciences. DNDO's Academic
Research Initiative, or ARI, spurs the academic community to provide
the nuclear detection experts of the future by funding universities to
conduct R&D in areas relevant to the detection of nuclear and
radiological material, as well as nuclear forensics. In addition, the
program fosters potentially high-risk but high-payoff ideas that could
lead to solutions that have not yet been considered. We initiated ARI
in Fiscal Year 2007 and received 132 applications from universities
around the United States. We awarded 22 projects, totaling $58 million
in funding over the next five years. The program currently supports
over 70 graduate students in nuclear and radiological research areas.
However, ARI is considered a multi-disciplinary program with students
working on ARI projects pursuing degrees in various related university
departments, including physics, chemistry, chemical engineering,
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, materials science, and
operations research. This year we are hosting our first annual grantee
conference to showcase research and foster academic collaboration. In
Fiscal Year 2008, follow-on grants will be made for the ARI projects
begun in Fiscal Year 2007. In addition, we are soliciting for new
proposals and anticipate adding 7-10 multi-year projects to the current
22. In Fiscal Year 2009, follow-on grants will be made for previous ARI
projects in addition to another separate round of new awards for ARI
grants. It is our hope that DNDO efforts through ARI as well as our
nuclear forensics programs, combined with the academic support efforts
of other federal agencies like the Department of Energy, will help
provide the nuclear scientists and engineers of the future.
Comprehensive Test and Evaluation
With a strong research and development portfolio, DNDO also
maintains a comprehensive test and evaluation program. All
technologies, tactics, and processes developed and acquired in support
of the DNDO mission are evaluated and demonstrated prior to full-scale
deployment. In addition, technologies are independently assessed once
deployed. Finally, DNDO adheres to strict systems engineering
principles that ensure that integrated and balanced solutions are
developed for the global nuclear detection architecture. This means
that our tests not only evaluate the technical performance of systems,
but also reflect and involve our customers and their needs. For
example, Customs and Border Protection works hand-in-hand with DNDO as
it evaluates ASP systems. Similarly, the Coast Guard as well as State
and local users have been critical players in evaluating hand-held and
backpack systems.
In Fiscal Year 2009, test and evaluation activities will support
ASP spiral development, acquisition decisions for the HPRDS program,
selection of detection systems in support of maritime and international
general aviation pilot programs, and a variety of ATD transitions. DNDO
is orchestrating a new test program that will enable vendors to submit
performance data on radiation detectors collected independently at
laboratories accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory
Accreditation Program. We will evaluate this detector performance
information to support the Authorized Equipment List from the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Grant Programs Directorate as well
as to support other federal acquisition programs. I am pleased to
report that 2009 will be the beginning of nuclear operations at the
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex,
or RNCTEC, in Nevada. This is a permanent DNDO facility that allows us
to evaluate detection systems against SNM in realistic configurations.
As you can see, our test and evaluation schedule is quite full and
we are dedicating significant resources to these efforts. While it
appears that our budget for test and evaluation declines slightly from
Fiscal Year 2008, this is a reflection of concluding instrumentation
activities for our Rail Test Center that will help DNDO develop
solutions for on-dock rail screening. Overall, we are still dedicating
significant financial resources, as well as personnel, to technology
evaluation, with all test campaigns being supported by associated
program funds.
In addition to traditional test and evaluation activities, DNDO
will continue to conduct red teaming and net assessment activities in
Fiscal Year 2009.
Coordination of Effort
Several federal agencies already engage in research and development
related to radiological and nuclear detection. Therefore, the planning
process for the DNDO research agenda is coordinated with partners,
including the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration's
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program (NA-
22), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI). In addition, DNDO is home to
the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center that has a mission of
being the U.S. Government ``system integrator'' for technical nuclear
forensics. This office provides national-level planning, integration,
assessment, and stewardship across the forensics spectrum and with all
the relevant partners in the Departments of Defense, State, Energy,
Justice, and the DNI.
From its founding, DNDO supported the Office of Science and
Technology Policy Domestic Nuclear Defense Research and Development
(DND R&D) Roadmap Working Group's efforts to develop a coordinated,
interagency R&D roadmap that would enhance the breadth of domestic
nuclear defense efforts to ensure a secure nation. In addition, DNDO
supports the National Nuclear Security Administration in reviewing
foundational science proposals for advanced detectors and materials.
Staff from both NA-22 and DNDO served on each others' proposal review
panels, in part to ensure that duplication of funding is minimized.
This interaction helped ensure that DNDO transformational R&D programs
are well coordinated with those of NA-22 (which focused on foundational
science for advanced detectors and materials), enabling the U.S.
Government to best utilize the expertise of the National Labs. DNDO
conducted similar proposal reviews with DTRA.
As a key part of the interagency execution strategy, the DOD, DOE,
DNI and DHS have jointly signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on
the Coordination of National Nuclear Detection Research and Development
Programs. This MOU specifically cites that all Parties will integrate
their programs via the following mechanisms: (1) include representation
of all Parties during R&D program reviews, (2) provide full and open
access among all Parties to all aspects of ongoing R&D programs, (3)
provide equal and open access to the findings from all R&D programs and
maximize leverage were possible, (4) establish a standing body of
qualified R&D representatives from each agency for program
coordination, and (5) where possible, joint programs are encouraged.
DNDO, as an interagency office, has full-time detailees from
agencies such as DOE and DOD. These individuals have provided
invaluable expertise in all aspects of the DNDO mission. Our detailees
enable us to maintain an open and productive dialogue with our
interagency partners so that we can avoid duplication of effort and
make strides toward the complete implementation of the proposed
architecture.
Within the Department, DNDO works with the Science and Technology
Directorate, coordinating efforts on a variety of levels--from the
shared use of radiological and nuclear detection expertise at the
Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML), through developing an
integrated Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Risk
Assessment required by HSPD-18, Medical Countermeasures against Weapons
of Mass Destruction.
In fulfillment of a legislative requirement within the Security and
Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347, Sec. 121 (e)
), S&T and DNDO collaborated to write the Report on the feasibility of,
and a strategy for, the development of equipment to detect shielded
nuclear and radiological threat material and chemical and biological
weapons of mass destruction, submitted in April 2007. This report
outlines the DHS R&D strategies for robust capabilities to detect
chemical, biological, and shielded radiological and nuclear threats.
These strategies have been implemented and are being continually
refined to meet the evolving challenges of homeland security.
Conclusion
DNDO's Fiscal Year 2009 budget reflects a concerted effort to
address the remaining vulnerabilities in our evolving detection
architecture. The challenges that lie ahead require a coordinated
effort on the behalf of the best scientific minds within the
government, academia, and the private sector. We have made good
progress, but much work remains to provide the Nation with a
continuously improving capability to protect against a terrorist
nuclear attack.
This concludes my prepared statement. With the Committee's
permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the record.
Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and Members of the Subcommittee, I
thank you for your attention and will be happy to answer any questions
that you may have.
Biography for Vayl S. Oxford
Reporting directly to Secretary Chertoff, Mr. Vayl Oxford was
appointed Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) by
the President in December 2006. Mr. Oxford is responsible for DNDO's
jointly staffed office, which serves as the primary entity in the
United States Government to improve the Nation's capability to detect
and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or
transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation,
and to further enhance this capability over time.
Prior to his appointment to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), Mr. Oxford served as Director for Counter-proliferation (CP) on
the White House National Security Council (NSC). His responsibilities
included establishing national policy and priorities for CP, which have
been codified into the National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Before assignment to the White House, Mr. Oxford was
Deputy Director for Technology Development at the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, where he was principally involved in the Research and
Development vision for future-year programs.
From 1993 to 1998, Mr. Oxford worked for the Defense Nuclear Agency
and was then Director for Counter-proliferation at the Defense Special
Weapons Agency. He also served in the United States Air Force in
aircraft and weapons development positions; and as Assistant Professor
of Aeronautics at the United States Air Force Academy. Mr. Oxford is a
graduate of the United States Military Academy and the Air Force
Institute of Technology, and the recipient of numerous military awards.
He received the Department of Defense Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration Technical Manager of the Year Award in 1997. He received
the Meritorious Executive Presidential Rank Award in 2002.
Chairman Wu. Thank you, Director Oxford. Next, Mr. Ryan.
STATEMENT OF MR. GEORGE RYAN, DIRECTOR, TESTING & EVALUATION
AND STANDARDS DIVISION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Ryan. Good morning, Chairman Wu and Ranking Member
Gingrey, and other distinguished Members of the Committee. I am
George Ryan. I am the Director of Testing, Evaluation, and
Standards under Under Secretary Cohen, and I am honored to
appear before you today to discuss DHS tests and evaluation.
The DHS S&T Testing, Evaluation, and Standards Division is
working closely with the DHS Under Secretary for Management, as
well as all DHS components, to develop and implement a robust
test and evaluation policy for all of DHS, that will be fully
integrated into the Department's acquisition policy.
The T&E policy that is being developed will require user
components to participate in creating, reviewing, and signing
the test and evaluation master plan. The primary purpose of the
Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) is to describe the
necessary developmental test and evaluation and operational
test and evaluation that needs to be conducted in order to
determine the system, technical performance, operational
capabilities and limitations.
The TEMP is an integrated and agreed-upon plan to ensure
that the right tests are conducted, and that products are
meeting the user requirements. DHS ensures independent
operational test teams are involved early in the project
development to ensure that operational shortcomings are
identified and corrected as early as possible during
development. The test results will be critical in ensuring that
DHS products meet the necessary milestones to continue
development or deployment.
The DHS components, working within the DHS capstone IPT
process, ensure that the user needs are addressed in research,
as well as the test and evaluation. End user needs are
incorporated in the planning and design of the tests. All tests
will be performed to components' requirements or DHS adopted
standards. Reports of efficacy, safety, and suitability are
assessed against the criteria, which are developed with
component input.
The Testing, Evaluation, and Standards Division is also
developing an accredited and recognized test capability, with
the goal of testing all products in an accredited and
recognized facility. The accreditation and recognition process
is under development, and facilities are currently being
identified that are capable of conducting different aspects of
the testing process.
The Testing, Evaluation, and Standards Division has an
effort underway to ensure that once testing is completed, both
components and first responders have access to product
performance evaluations, as well as their limitations and
capabilities. The T&E results will be placed on the Responder
Knowledge Base, which is an online system that is funded and
managed by FEMA.
And I wait for any questions you may have. That is the
conclusion of my remarks.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much. We have just been called
for two votes, and it is my view that perhaps taking a break at
this point, and coming back to the questions, may be the better
course of action for the Committee.
Then, we will temporarily suspend the hearing, and we will
reconvene after these two Floor votes. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 10:41 a.m., the Subcommittee recessed, to
reconvene at 11:20 a.m., the same day.]
[Recess.]
Discussion
Chairman Wu. I want to thank everyone for dealing with
these Floor votes. That just kind of--they are like ducks. They
fly when they want to, and they just kind of come and go.
We are in our period of questions now, and Members will
have five minutes to ask questions, and the Chair recognizes
himself for the opening five-minute period.
Under Secretary Cohen and Director Oxford, at our hearing a
year ago, one of the concerns that I expressed, and I was
hoping that you all would make some substantial progress on
this, was having a defensible way of developing priorities for
your research.
And I want to return to that subject, to inquire about how
you currently determine which research areas become funding
priorities, because in this Fiscal Year, or the proposed fiscal
year 2009, biological and nuclear research receive a lot of
funding, have high priority, over other important areas, such
as explosives, which have been a commonly used device in
terrorism, over cyber security, and there are uncorroborated
reports of penetrations of both government and private sector
computers, and other infrastructure issues.
What we discussed a year ago was whether there should be a
system of formal risk analysis, informal risk analysis, or
other methodologies, to determine research priorities. And I
would like to know whether you have undergone those processes
to set your budget priorities, because there are other
uncorroborated reports that the Vice President cares about some
of these things, and not about others.
So, I would like to know if you are performing risk
analyses over our society, at economic damage, human threats,
or whether it is a bolt out of the blue coming from the White
House or the Vice President's office, that is setting these
research priorities.
Mr. Cohen. Well, Chairman, first of all, I think it is a
very wise concern on your part and the Committee's part, and I
did hear you, and I did take action. It is not a bolt out of
the blue. As I came on-board, as you know, in the summer of
2006, I reviewed what had been done since the standup of the
Department of Homeland Security.
It appeared to me that in the research area, about one
third of the budget, about $500 million, was going to nuclear/
radiological, about one third was going to chem/bio, and about
one third was going to everything else. And I don't know what
the basis for that was, but clearly, the Administration, the
Congress, and the appropriators had, at some point, over a
couple of years, agreed to that.
Secretary Chertoff feels very strongly, and he has
testified to this, about risk informed decision-making, that
should generate grants, which are not S&T, but also, everything
else we do, because I think it was Goethe who said, ``If you
defend against everything, you defend against nothing.'' And
so, your question is absolutely on the mark.
Where we are today, and Vayl will talk about his area,
radiological and nuclear, and his funding, as you know, I have
been bringing down the chem/bio area, as we have been
delivering product, the BioWatch II, and now, we are getting
ready to prototype BioWatch III, et cetera, and we have had a
chance to analyze the other threats, cyber and explosives, and
a wide variety of others.
Our Infrastructure Protection Directorate has 17 critical
infrastructure protection areas, and they have done the
detailed analysis, the societal, and the economic impact of low
probability of occurrence but high consequence effects, many of
which, regrettably, are on the West Coast. And so, it is a work
in progress.
Following our discussions last year, and in keeping with
the Congress's desires and Secretary Chertoff's focus on risk
informed decision-making, and I would like to enter this for
the record if I may, I sent a letter to Dr. Cicerone, and asked
for his help in four areas. This letter addresses two. One is
to help us determine the science of risk informed decision-
making. Just like after World War II, the Battle of the
Atlantic, with strategic bombing, we developed the science of
operations research, operations analysis, and it is quite
mature today, and we are able to use it in a very good way. We
have actuarial tables today for just about everything. It sets
our insurance publicly and privately, but it is really history
and probabilistically based.
What we don't have is a good understanding of when bad
people want to intentionally do bad things to perfectly good
societies, bridges, railroads, border systems, et cetera. Now,
in my area, and I salute Dr. John Vitko in our chem/bio group,
they took this on with looking at 30 major threats, and I am
not going to give all of them, but you know, it is anthrax and
botulism, et cetera, and they took the probability of
occurrence, this predates this letter, 0 to 1, very small
number, and they took the consequence of occurrence of a
pandemic, millions dead, billions lost, you multiply them
together, you get a number. That is the beauty of math. But
when we stretched that number across all 30 of these pathogens,
we found that the variability was plus or minus an order of
magnitude. What does that mean? It means the answer that we
got, if it was 10, if the number was 10, the real answer was 1
to 100. That is a span that is very difficult for us to decide
how to invest.
But the surprise to me, and that is why I went to Dr.
Cicerone, is while each one of the 30 answers had that
variability, we saw clusters. We actually saw a high risk
cluster, a medium risk, and a low risk cluster. So, this is a
work in progress. It is not going to be solved this year. It
may not be solved this decade, but I think working together,
these are not bolts out of the blue. These are not bolts out of
the blue, and I probably could make a joke about the Vice
President, but I am a member of the Administration, so I won't.
But I did want to share this with you. This is Jay Cohen's
view of life, and then, I will end. It is the likelihood of
occurrence versus the consequence of occurrence, lower, higher,
lower, higher. You will notice I have nuclear off the page on
the right. The consequence of occurrence would be devastating,
but today, you have to either steal or buy a bomb today, don't
know how long that will last, to make that happen.
But you will notice cyber, the probability of occurrence
and the consequence is the highest, because it is happening to
you and I right now. Someone is trying to steal our identity,
as well as all the other issues that are going on
internationally. Now, you can agree or disagree about the
position. It is PowerPoint, you can move them around, but this
is where, with the help of the National Academies, we are
trying to do that.
And finally, as I look at my six divisions, and I look at
my twelve capstone Integrated Product Teams, and where we
should invest for the customer, I don't generate requirements.
My customer does, and the Congress does, and the Administration
does. I provide solution opportunities, and when I think that
we are investing too much in chem/bio and not enough in cyber,
I go to what we call the Technology Oversight Group. In the
Department, that is the Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary
for Management, and the Under Secretary for National
Preparedness, NPPD. They get to vote. I make proposals on how
we should move money in the budget generation process, and the
components then get to make their reclama, no, don't take from
me, take from someone else. So, we have a formal process that
now is a year old. We just went through the TOG, Technology
Oversight Group review, we made adjustments for the financial
year 2010 budget that I think are consistent with your
concerns, and with that, I will end, and fail. I apologize if--
--
Chairman Wu. My five minutes have expired, but Director
Oxford, I would like to give you an opportunity to answer that
question also.
Under Secretary Cohen, perhaps off-line, between our
staffs, we can drill down into the mechanisms that are actually
used to connect the assessments with the budget priorities,
because it is important for us to understand what it is that
you are doing, and have some confidence in that, and I would
very much like to have confidence in that.
Director Oxford.
Mr. Oxford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, using your term bolt out of the blue, this was not,
it was, DNDO was actually created after almost two years of
discussions within the executive branch. It started in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, when people started looking at
other potential vulnerabilities and risks to the country. We
tried to do this across the executive branch, in kind of
uncoordinated ways, for a couple of years, to find out we were
not making the progress necessary to help make this nation more
secure against a nuclear or terrorist attack.
So, the Interagency came together and decided we needed to
put together the business model, the office model that we have
with DNDO, to put together a concerted effort against nuclear
attack. We were asked to put together what we call the Global
Nuclear Detection and Reporting Architecture as part of that.
That effort takes stock of all of the efforts across the
U.S. Government dealing with the nuclear threat. It takes into
account what Department of Energy, Department of State,
Department of Defense are doing overseas, whether that adds to
our overall layered security or not, and then looks at the
domestic dimension to figure out what we need to do
domestically to enhance our overall security.
So, from that, we do not spend a lot of time on actually
specifying details of the threat. We assume somebody, in time,
will want to do something harmful to this country from a
radiological or nuclear perspective, and we can't wait for the
precision of the intelligence community to say it is there
before we take preventative action. What we also reflected upon
is most of the efforts in the country were based on response
versus prevention, and as Under Secretary Cohen said, if you
put your stock in responding to a catastrophic event, as
opposed to preventing it, we thought we had the math wrong. Not
that we shouldn't be doing emergency response actions, but we
need to be putting our stock, in this case because of the
catastrophic nature, in the prevention piece.
So, as we looked at prevention, we started to look at the
critical aspects and vulnerabilities, and as we worked this,
along with the Congress, there was immediate priority put into
border security, in terms of trying to keep things from
transiting across our borders, into our land borders, our
seaports. And in my opening statement, I mentioned we have made
tremendous progress now, and we are scanning 96 percent of the
cargo coming into this country.
The rest of our architectural analysis is starting to
identify other potential vulnerabilities that need to be
addressed. I also mentioned that we are now scanning
international general aviation airplanes coming into this
country, because that is a very quick way, fast way, using
Under Secretary Cohen's term, if somebody can get their hands
on an existing nuclear weapon, within hours, you can get it
into this country.
So, what we are doing is addressing those other critical
vulnerabilities beyond our port security, beyond our land
borders, to address those. That, then, helps drive the research
agenda that we have put together, to make sure that we can have
the capabilities in place to enhance our ability to detect and
interdict along those various threat pathways.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much. The gentleman from
Georgia.
Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Before I ask my
question, I want to request that the letter that Admiral Cohen
referenced, that he wrote to the National Academies, be put in
the record as part of the permanent record.
Chairman Wu. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information appears in Appendix 2: Additional Material
for the Record.]
Mr. Gingrey. Director Oxford, your testimony today
described the need to address gaps in the current architecture,
and develop ``solutions that can effectively counter a
determined and mobile adversary who will seek routes to bypass
existing security measures.'' That was your quote. Yet, in the
fiscal year 2009 request, that includes a $60 million increase
for acquisition of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal, which is,
as I understand, a fixed location system, meant to upgrade our
current capabilities at our ports of entry.
But meanwhile, research and development funding is kept
relatively flat from the prior years, $334 million in 2009,
compared to $324 million in 2008, so a meager $10 million
increase, a very small percentage, although $10 million is a
lot of money.
So, the question is why is the upgrade of current
generation portal monitors more important than the development
of new technologies to close the current gaps in our detection
system? Are we, in effect, putting locks on the front door, but
leaving all of the windows wide open?
Mr. Oxford. Thank you for that question. It is interesting,
that is exactly the same kind of perspective that the Secretary
has on this, is that we need to make sure that we are looking
not only at all the other windows, but we look at the back door
and everything. We think we have got the balance right. And I
can't go into all the classified details of why the upgrades
are necessary, but I will tell you that we know some of the
current systems are vulnerable to critical aspects of the
threat, and we will be glad to share with you that off-line, in
terms of what those threats are.
Our test programs have shown the vulnerabilities in the
current deployment, the systems that are deployed out there,
and it is a critical aspect of our vulnerability that we need
to address. And the new systems will allow us to do that.
Secondly, it allows our Customs and Border Protection agents to
be a lot more effective.
Just to give you some information from LA/Long Beach, the
biggest port in the country, right now, with the current
systems, they are getting 400 to 500 nuclear alarms per day.
They have assigned almost 200 customs officers to deal with
that phenomenon at LA/Long Beach alone. These new systems have
the promise to bring those down to 20 to 25 serious alarms per
day, therefore, allowing CBP to address a wider variety of the
mission space that they have been assigned.
Mr. Gingrey. Yes, sir, and what percentage of those alarms
are false alarms?
Mr. Oxford. Right now, all of them, and so, what we need to
be able to do is distinguish that, reduce the operational
workload, but also, enhance our overall ability to identify the
threat, so that they can pay attention to the serious----
Mr. Gingrey. Would you repeat that, the number per day that
are all false alarms?
Mr. Oxford. Yes, right now, 400 to 500 nuclear alarms per
day at LA/Long Beach.
Mr. Gingrey. Wow.
Mr. Oxford. And we get roughly 200,000, at our seaports
alone, on an annual basis, 200,000 alarms that then have to go
through the full adjudication process to make sure that there
is not a threat contained in that primary alarm. We get another
40,000 on our land borders, and that is based on 2006
deployment numbers, and our deployment of systems have gone up
since then.
Mr. Gingrey. Describe the full adjudication process.
Mr. Oxford. Sure. Let me use the seaport as an example. As
the ships are unloaded, and the cargo containers are put on
trucks, they go through primary screening, where we have a
radiation portal monitor that has the capability to detect, but
not identify what is in the cargo. So, if it alarms, it merely
says we have the presence of radiation. That vehicle, then, is
pulled over into what we call secondary screening. It goes
through another radiation portal monitor, to make sure that
that alarm was valid in primary. At that time, if it alarms,
the customs officers go through a second hand-held screening
process, where they take a radioisotope identification system,
a hand-held detector, they screen the vehicle again. This
device has some capability, although we understand its
limitations, to be able to take a spectra and identify what the
nature of that radiation is, and whether it is something of
consequence, or something that is totally benign that is
normally in the environment.
There is a list of critical isotopes that then have to go
into another process, where that spectra sent to Laboratories &
Scientific Services within CBP to do further analysis of that
spectra. This can take upwards of hours. So, now, when you have
got a situation like LA/Long Beach, with 400 or 500 of these a
day that may go through that process, you see there is a
possibility, not only to, based on the limitations of these
systems, to miss the threat, but also, then, to slow down the
conveyances through the ports.
So, there is a combination of purposes, as to why we need
to do the upgrades that you asked for. Meanwhile, a lot of our
R&D and our transformational work is addressing the other basis
of the vulnerabilities that I talked about that are in the
architecture right now.
Mr. Gingrey. My time has expired, and I yield back.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much. Ms. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all
of you for being with us today.
Let me start off my comments by saying that although there
has been much frustration by Members of this committee and the
public, I think, as to the things we have not been able to
accomplish, we would be neglect, though, in not acknowledging
the fact that, since 2001, there has not been an attack, you
know, on our soil, and so, the work that you have been able to
do to provide homeland security for us is obviously there, and
so, for that, we should all say thank you. So, I wanted to
preface my comments by acknowledging that fact.
A few quick comments, and if you could answer them quickly,
because the rules here is a red light comes on, and we are only
given five minutes, and since I am a freshman, they hold me to
it, so we will, if you could help me with it, I would
appreciate it.
Number one, Mr. Cohen, Under Secretary Cohen, in your
testimony, it mentioned the database of unmet human needs after
Hurricane Katrina, and when I asked staff here, did we have a
copy of what that database was, no one had it. Could you
provide it to this committee in the future?
Mr. Cohen. Absolutely.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. My--that was great, we are doing good
so far.
Second question, Under Secretary, you also mentioned in
your testimony that, with the University Scholars and Fellows
Program, you now have instituted a policy to require one year
of service in a homeland security-related field. I would
respectfully request that you reconsider that, and let me tell
you the reasons why.
I represent an area just adjacent to the ports, so 45
percent of the entire Nation's cargo does go through my
district. However, I would tell you, though, unfortunately, in
my community, we are not always abreast of some of these
programs and job opportunities and internships, et cetera, and
I will give you an example. I recently participated in two
Congressional delegations, and I didn't see anyone who looked
like me, who was there working on behalf of the Foreign
Services and the folks who were supporting us.
And so, to leave out young people who clearly, I think this
is going to be one of the key areas where we can have gainful
employment for our young people, I really see this as a, really
as a deterrent, and something that could hinder other youth an
opportunity to participate.
So, I would respectfully request that you reconsider this
requirement and take it away.
Mr. Cohen. Well, Congresswoman, first of all, thank you for
your service as a teacher. I don't know if it was harder with
the A.D.D. students in the school, or in the halls of Congress,
but I will leave that up to you.
Let me tell you that you and I are in absolute full
agreement on the face of America, and where we need to go, and
as you are aware, last week, after a year's process, we went
ahead, and we announced the five new University Centers of
Excellence with co-leads for research and education, and I am
pleased to tell you, of the 11 schools announced, five were
minority serving institutions, three HCBUs, one Hispanic-
serving institution, and one Native Hawaiian.
At the end of the day, I want, and it is not now, but it
will be, our University Fellowship and Scholarship Program to
reflect the face of America. That is what I did at the Office
of Naval Research. You do that by putting out a very broad net.
Having said that, as a taxpayer, and I will end, because I
respect your time, at the end of the day, the Fellowship and
Scholarship Program I inherited was not aligned to our Centers
of Excellence, and was not meeting the requirements of the
enabling legislation, which has me develop the workforce for
Homeland Security, and oh, by the way, STEM, science,
technology, engineering, and math, so important to our
economies, including Long Beach and California.
And so, the payback and the internships, et cetera, are a
work in progress. I have taken no hard decision there, but I am
not a giveaway organization, as I read the enabling
legislation, and if you would like me to do for the country
with the precious taxpayer dollars. But I am committed to equal
opportunity and to the diversity that is critical for the
future of this nation, and I believe I have a track record
there.
Ms. Richardson. So, are you saying you will remove this
requirement?
Mr. Cohen. I will consider it, and I am glad to discuss
with you or your staff how I achieve the goals mandated in the
enabling legislation, for the Centers of Excellence and for
STEM and Homeland Security workforce development through
student programs.
Ms. Richardson. I didn't want to use my time to go to this
extent, but maybe, it appears that I need to do so.
I am a student who was an athlete, and I had a chance to
get into UC Santa Barbara based upon an EEOP program, and for
those of you who don't know what that means, that is an equal
opportunity program. And I would put my record against anybody
in this room. And so, it is critical, I cannot stress to you
enough how important this issue is to me and to other Members
in this Congress. We do not have, all children do not have the
same opportunities. All children do not have the same access to
AP classes. All children do not have the same access to various
languages. All children do not have the same access to the
precursors, the prerequisites that might be required as they
look for this other employment.
So, I would say to you, Mr. Under Secretary, until we can
have that equalizing force to discriminate, and I would use the
term, to discriminate against giving young people an
opportunity to appropriately qualify, is a very serious issue
for me.
So, I would like to continue this discussion, if it is
going to be needed, but my request, and if necessary, I will
bring it before the TriCaucus, my request would be that this
requirement would be removed.
Mr. Cohen. And if the Chairman would just indulge me, I am
a product of the New York City school system. I did not come
from rich folks. I went to the Naval Academy, and I was
required to pay back five years in service, which I did with
great honor. It dragged on to be 42 years.
There are many programs in the Federal Government where we
require, post-graduation, a payback for the taxpayers'
investment. I may be misunderstanding you, and I don't want to
take valuable time; I am glad to meet with you, and if I am
misunderstanding you, there is no prequalification. What we are
asking kids to do is to be involved with our DOE and National
Labs, as rising juniors and rising seniors, so we can expose
them to what we are doing, encourage them to come into that
workforce, which desperately needs revitalization.
Ms. Richardson. So, this is a post-requirement, not a pre-
requirement.
Mr. Cohen. Oh, I wouldn't have taken all this time.
Absolutely. There are no prerequisites. The prerequisite is
merit, just as you indicated, but I am not hard over yet on one
year, maybe the right answer is two years. Maybe the right
answer is 0 years, so long as we have a robust rising junior,
rising senior summer intern program that I pay for.
But what I inherited was a system that I couldn't look you
in the eye and justify the expenditure for payback. So, I
apologize, Congresswoman. I think there is no light between the
two of us. There is no pre-criteria. I apologize. I am----
Ms. Richardson. And I appreciate that clarification, and
that is perfect with me. Mr. Chair, could I just close with one
last comment?
Chairman Wu. Please.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you. You are very kind. I appreciate
it. Mr. Under Secretary, it is my understanding that in terms
of staffing, we have this whole idea of the one face at the
border, and that is becoming quite an issue, because the one
face does not necessarily have the expertise, in particular,
with the agricultural requirements.
And so, if not at this meeting, because I have extended my
time, and as a freshman, my red light is on, so I have got to
stop. So, I would just ask that you could prepare, for this
committee, a better understanding of where we are. Because I am
hearing that there are concerns in the field with that issue,
that the expertise is not there, particularly on the
agricultural end, and given the fact that I do represent the
largest area in the Nation, it is a great concern of us.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Wu. I thank the gentlewoman. If you were a 20 year
veteran, the red light would still be on, but I really
appreciate the gentlewoman's passionate pursuit of the issues,
and I thank her for her background of service, and the Admiral,
Vice Admiral, we are all a product of our backgrounds, and it
is a strength of this nation that we bring these different
perspectives, to make sure that our society can capture all the
human talent which we can bring to bear for these very
challenging times.
And the Chairman, recognizing himself, just for a moment
touching upon an old issue. Director Oxford, your eloquent
answer was, perhaps, a lengthier way of saying we have a very
deep risk, and we haven't done the risk analysis, but because
it is such a great risk, we are allocating the resources that
we feel we need to, to address that risk.
And perhaps we, at a staff level, we need to circle back
around to see whether that is the right thing to do, because as
serious as that risk is, resources that are allocated there are
not allocated, say, to Nunn-Lugar, which is a different
solution to the problems that you are trying to address, or
resources addressed there are not able to be redeployed to
other, perhaps equally significant hazards to our society, and
to human life.
I would like to shift to a different ground, which is the
Integrated Product Teams, or IPTs, that the Under Secretary has
implemented with some success, and this is a question directed,
really, at all three of our witnesses here.
My understanding is that there has been success in bringing
the IPTs together, and addressing some of the concerns that
different parts of DHS has about the technologies that we are
working on, but you know, I am concerned about whether the IPT
process reaches out far enough into the testing process, into
the end-user community, so that their concerns about validation
first, next, using these products, in an operational
environment, and maintaining them in an operational
environment, is reflected in the IPT process, when we are
setting research and development goals.
Mr. Cohen. I will give you a very succinct answer. I do
science and technology, and that is the principle of what I do.
In law, I am also, it is not an S&T responsibility, it is a
separate responsibility, the Test and Evaluation Executive for
the Department of Homeland Security, a job I am very
comfortable with, and George Ryan and I had that same job for
six years in the Department of the Navy, much larger budget,
and I characterized test evaluation as we are not going to buy
no junk, and it must be independent, and you understand that.
In S&T, I get to take risk. In order to keep--with
millions--hopefully intelligent risk--to keep from putting
billions in acquisition at risk, because acquisition is, and
should be, risk-averse, whether it is in industry or it is in
government. And so, the Integrated Product Team has been a very
good step forward to bring together the customer, Coast Guard,
Border Protection, et cetera, with their capability gaps. They
don't tell me what technology to invest in. They tell me what
their high priority mission needs are. I offer them solutions,
universities, laboratories, United States, international, or if
they have a preferred solution from a provider, just give it to
me. We do a technology readiness assessment, because I am not
going to buy no junk, and if it measures up, I am glad to
resource it.
Chairman Wu. Well, Mr. Under Secretary, the groups that you
listed are part of DHS.
Mr. Cohen. Right.
Chairman Wu. And the question is whether you are reaching
out sufficiently, say, to the Fire Department of Peoria.
Mr. Cohen. Sure. And the short answer is, I need to do a
better job, because the enabling legislation said the 22
components of my customers, but also, the first responders.
State, tribal, local, et cetera. In the Integrated Product
Team, you will see on the bottom of each of the diamonds is the
user. The user may be an agent. The user may be a first
responder. I just asked Rob to pass to you. The challenge that
I have, unlike DOD, where I just had Marines and sailors. I now
have the customer and the customer of the customer, and so, we
have different transition paths. They go to first responders,
go to agents, et cetera.
It was my intent, in August of '06, as I put in place the
organization which you all, very kindly, rapidly approved, to
have in my interagency and international liaison, so I didn't
duplicate what any other component of government was doing, and
brought international partners, to also have first responder
liaison. And because I have to deal with the Sheriff of
Mayberry, and I have to deal with the New York City Police
Department, I can't handle that scale, but I can deal with the
Fraternal Order of Police Chiefs, and the Fire Chiefs. They
understand the scale issues.
And so, I wanted to have that capability. I was advised
that because the Department had State and local, because the
Department had an outreach, and because the first responders
had indicated they felt there were too many entry points for
DHS, and it was confusing, that I needed to deal internally to
get those inputs. I think I may have taken that too far, and
that is why, and it was adjacent to Congresswoman Richardson's
district in January, at the invitation of California, we had a
first responder outreach conference. Several hundred first
responders were there, the Mayor of Los Angeles participated,
et cetera, to do exactly what you said. But I have got to
formalize how I bring them to the table, not just in the
requirements generation and satisfaction, but also with George,
as we do in the Navy, we don't allow contractors to load the
missiles onto the plane. We bring in fleet sailors, because at
the end of the day, they are going to be loading the plane, and
we will figure out how to do that better, and we will do that
this year, sir.
Chairman Wu. I have gone past my five minutes. But Mr.
Ryan, if you could address some of the testing components of
this, and Mr. Oxford, if you have anything to add. Have you
pressed the microphone button?
Mr. Ryan. I am sorry. Excuse me. Let me address--I am only
using you for foresight. You know, the wisdom of Congress, when
they created enabling legislation that put T&E in S&T, and
then, the foresight of Under Secretary Cohen, to put standards
and T&E together, I think is very good, because the T&E now,
and I was with the operational test leaders from the government
and industry last week, and that was an issue in DOD, is
because of the interest in accelerating the cycle time of
getting things deployed, they feel that they need to be more
involved in the laboratory end of it, which they are currently
not in DOD.
And here we are, we are right where they want to be, so to
speak, because we can see what the requirements are early on,
we can determine that the requirements are testable. And then,
with the IPT, and with standards, we can support the standards.
And I will give you a good example that I think touches on many
things that you had in your questions. It is, I was in eastern
Kentucky, I went to both Somerset to see the NIMH Center, and
then, I was in eastern Kentucky, and they were doing UAVs, and
I got into a discussion about standards of UAVs, and I came
back and said, the mini micro UAVs that first responders want
to have, and there were actually some policemen at eastern
Kentucky when they were flying these, they, if you looked at
it, there were no standards. So, what we did is, a combination
of the Standards Group, and Bert Coursey is here as the
Department's Standards Executive, we got with the, in this
case, we got with the Navy, the work on test protocols, to
support the standards once they get development.
And we also have NIJ involved, and actually, at the NIJ
meeting we had the other day, there were people from the Texas
Association of Sheriffs. So, they are all working together to
develop these standards, and then, in test protocols, to
support that. From the IPT process, we are involved in the IPT
process, so early on, we are meeting with, even though it may
be internal, we are meeting with the users and the developers
again, to understand the technology, to get a better feel for
what instruments and test capability are needed, actually prior
to the testing, so we can budget for it, and make sure it is
there, when you get to the point of doing the testing.
So, I think we are making a lot of progress in the right
direction. If that helps.
Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. I will try
to cover the two facets of your question.
First of all, our customer base is federal, State, and
local. We have a little bit different model than the Under
Secretary does. We have embedded in DNDO representatives from
TSA, CBP, Coast Guard, so we have, within the cross-section of
our DHS customer base, direct liaisons working with us every
day, so we have a pretty good conduit of getting capability to
our federal partners.
From the outset of DNDO, I established a State and Local
Affairs Office, with the entire intent of broadening the
awareness of the radiological and nuclear threat at the State
and local level. We have conducted now seven workshops; we will
have our eighth workshop in April, where we bring in State and
local representatives from across the country. In some cases,
we have had 30 states represented as part of that interchange.
We are enhancing their awareness. We are talking to them about
how they can enhance their own security within their
metropolitan areas and their State environments. Then we work
with them on the grant process, as appropriate, so they can get
capabilities, and then, provide the requisite training that
goes with that capability.
On the test side--do you have a question? On the test side,
when I inherited this responsibility, there was almost no test
capability in the radiological nuclear detection area, so we
have kind of grown that from whole cloth. Some of the
criticisms that you have seen in the press and elsewhere
suggests there needs to be more independence in the tail end of
our process, where we are dealing with the operational side.
What the Under Secretary and I have agreed to do, along with
the Deputy Secretary, is Mr. Ryan will now become part of our
independent operational test entity, where he will review test
plans; he will look at the adequacy of those test plans, and
ultimately, on the operational tests and evaluation piece, he
will be signing off on the test reports. So, we are negotiating
an MOU right now that should be done next week that will put
that into perspective.
Chairman Wu. Well, Mr. Oxford, even more briefly, is that
process working around New York City, and what you are trying
to do there?
Mr. Oxford. We have seen tremendous capability grow from
our engagement in New York City. What we have seen is the
secondary benefits of 22 different jurisdictions working
together just in the radiological and nuclear defense area.
That is starting to expand, for example, New Year's Eve, when--
--
Chairman Wu. Let us continue to follow and track that
process.
Mr. Oxford. Absolutely.
Chairman Wu. Let me recognize the gentleman from Georgia.
Mr. Cohen. And Chairman, if I may, as you remember, the
Environmental Measurements Laboratory of New York was a big
concern last year, and Vayl and I went up there, and we have
leveraged that incredible intellectual capital, who have
expertise in nuclear radiological, to work with DNDO. In fact,
Vayl is paying for eight to ten of those people in direct
support in the tri-state area, for what he is doing in test and
evaluation.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much. And the gentleman from
Georgia.
Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have one last
question, and Mr. Oxford, you don't have to take the full five
minutes. I am already two minutes late for my next meeting.
In your testimony, you described your support in
developing, well, actually, it was the Under Secretary's
testimony, but developing a coordinated, interagency, R&D
roadmap that would enhance the breadth of domestic nuclear
defense efforts through the Office of Science and Technology
Policy's Domestic Nuclear Defense R&D Group. What is your
expectation for the completion of this roadmap?
Mr. Oxford. As far as I know, Dr. Marburger has now
approved that roadmap. I don't know if OMB has endorsed it for
follow-on budget deliberations, but the roadmapping activity is
complete.
Mr. Gingrey. Admiral Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. As you know, we were required in the
enabling legislation to come up with a coordination document.
At that time, DNDO and S&T were one unit. I delivered to the
Congress, at the end of last calendar year, something that had
been in progress for a long time. It is that coordination,
absent the nuclear roadmap, and Dr. Marburger now, he is doing
the integration to put it into one roadmap. My challenge there
was the enabling legislation wanted me to have a little bit
more leverage over the other departments of the government, and
they were not as enthusiastic about letting me do that.
So, it is truly a coordination document, but at least we
have laid out what their capabilities are, and what the
Nation's needs are, and now, we will use leadership by
embarrassment to get the desired result.
Mr. Gingrey. Right. Thank you, and I will yield back my
time. Thank you both.
Chairman Wu. Dr. Gingrey has expressed that he has no
objection to me asking one more tranche of questions, even with
no Republican supervision in the room.
And first, I just want to touch upon the issue that each of
you all, whether it is in the testing arena, or research in
certain specific areas, whether it is building safety or other
topics, or nuclear detection, there is a lot of expertise over
at NIST, the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
and I think that I will ask the staff off-line to inquire as to
each of your operations, how much interaction, how much
cooperation, there is between your efforts and the expertise
that is available over at NIST.
The last question that I want to focus on in this hearing
is that Mr. Under Secretary, you have done a commendable job of
raising the amount of basic research, to invest about 20
percent of research funding in basic research. I just want to
make sure that for budgetary purposes, that the definition of
what is basic research has not been shifted in order to reach
that 20 percent mark. Is this the same definition that has been
used in prior fiscal years, and if there has been a shift in
definition, what are the differences between the current
definition and the past definition?
Mr. Cohen. One of the things I have learned in this town,
Mr. Chairman, is to always tell the truth. I do it for two
reasons. One, it tends to work, and at my age, I don't have to
remember what I said. So, there is no bait and switch. I have
not redefined, and I am not using----
Chairman Wu. That is a problem, that others tend to have
long memories, too.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. And paybacks are heck. But the facts
of life are, and I say this as a citizen, today, we don't have
Bell Labs, as we knew them. We don't have Xerox PARC. It is
only the Federal Government, and its deep pockets and tenacity,
that can make the sustained investment in basic research that
has given us the technology, and this incredible economy that
we enjoy, whether it is the Bayh-Dole Act, or so many other
things the Federal Government has done.
And so, in the Navy, when I was asked to make sacrifices in
the budget, I said take whatever you want in transition, but
don't take a penny of the basic research. We did not have a
robust basic research portfolio when I got here. We have
established that. It is focused on universities. It is focused
on laboratories. I define it as eight years or more. We have a
chart right here, because I believed you were going to ask
this, Mr. Chairman, which shows by division, the purple, by
division, shows the percent of their research dollars that go
into basic research.
You can see in explosives, because I can't detect at range
a suicide bomber or a suicide car today, we have got plenty on
the output side, that is being used in Afghanistan and Iraq,
but I have got to get the phenomenology, photon packets. I
don't know what the methodology is; I need a discovery, half
you see, in explosives. Whereas in borders maritime, it is
small. Command and control, I can leverage everyone else in
government, so I don't want to double spend those moneys. I am
using the definition from OMB to a lot of definitions at the
end of the day, but it is university, laboratory focused,
unfettered, and long-term.
And I am glad to work with the Committee. The Committee
staff has been involved in all of this process, and if I don't
have it quite right, we will certainly make adjustments, but I
think I have spoken honestly, sir.
Chairman Wu. I want to thank all of the witnesses for their
participation today. And I want to assure everyone that at a
Member level, at a staff level, we want to continue to work
with your agencies to assure that we are properly focused,
spending the taxpayers' money wisely, and taking care of their
long-term interests.
I thank you for your participation, and the record will
remain open for additional statements and questions for five
days, and we will be sending additional written inquiries to
each of you.
Thank you very much, and with that, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
was recently reconvened to advise DHS S&T on research priorities.
However, the format of the HSSTAC was changed for the most recent
iteration of the Committee. Previously, HSSTAC had a broad focus and
provided recommendations for research priorities across the many fields
covered by DHS S&T, such as biosecurity, cyber security, and others.
Now, HSSTAC zeros in on specific project recommendations in a
particular field, currently focusing on improvised explosive devices
(IEDs).
Q1a. Why did the format of HSSTAC change?
A1a. The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
(HSSTAC) mission remains in line with its intended purpose as stated in
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, in that it makes recommendations
with respect to the activities of the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, including identifying research areas of potential
importance to the security of the Nation. Counter-IEDs is a priority
for the Administration, DHS and the S&T Directorate. The Under
Secretary for Science and Technology recognized the need to focus the
breadth of experience of the HSSTAC to help ensure that the S&T
Directorate focuses its work in the right areas. With the IED study
completed (in February 2008), the HSSTAC is now conducting a
comprehensive assessment of all S&T Directorate programs and options
for technologies to support DHS's operational responsibilities in the
cyber area.
Q1b. Given that the Committee is composed of experts from a variety of
fields, are you taking advantage of the members' expertise when you
focus on fields that fall outside their backgrounds?
A1b. The membership of the HSSTAC includes experts in scientific as
well as emergency response fields such as law enforcement, fire safety,
emergency management, and health affairs. Nearly all of these experts
have broad ranging and deep experience in Homeland Security activities,
and the interaction between them consistently provides valuable
insights in areas such as concepts of operation and organizational
issues.
Q1c. How does this format affect HSSTAC's ability to establish mission
goals for the long-term?
A1c. Members representing the various academic disciplines have
integrated well with the members representing the various emergency-
responses and related fields, and we have found that this mode of
operation supports HSSTAC's capability to establish mission goals for
the S&T Directorate.
Q1d. How have you taken advantage of HSSTAC, the Homeland Security
Institute, and other resources when planning long-term research
strategies?
A1d. The S&T Directorate works through HSSTAC and the Homeland Security
Institute (HSI) to gather outside expertise and inputs on current and
planned activities. The HSSTAC will continue to play an important role
in advising the S&T Directorate on long-term goals, institutional
relationships, and research programs.
Q2a. How many projects will be funded in FY 2008 under the
TechSolutions program?
A2a. To date, the TechSolutions program has funded nine projects in FY
2008. Funded projects include: (1) Safe Against Fires and Embers
(SAFE)--identification of technologies that will mitigate damage caused
by California wildfires; (2) Next Generation Breathing Apparatus--
reduce the weight and profile of the compressed air cylinder for a
First Responders self-contained breathing apparatus by more than half
and increase its flexibility; (3) 3-D location--improve 3-D location
accuracy from three meters to one meter for a device that tracks
incident responders in situations such as inside of threatened
buildings, collapsed buildings, and subterranean facilities; (4) Inter-
operable Communications--develop a communications device capable of
operating on all public safety radio bands (e.g., 700 and 800 MHz
bands); (5) Vehicle Mounted Chem Bio Sensor--develop a vehicle mounted
sensor capable of identifying toxic industrial chemicals and detecting
biological agents when an emergency vehicle arrives on the scene; (6)
Fire Ground Compass--develop an orientation device that enables
firefighters, their exterior sector officers and the fire-ground
commander to maintain their reference point to the fire building or
area as they battle interior structural fires; (7) Standoff Patient
Triage Device--develop a hand-held device capable of obtaining a
victims pulse, respiration, temperature and body movement readings from
a distance of five feet to 40 feet in 30 seconds or less; (8) Dazzler--
reduce the size of the current ``Dazzler'' incapacitation LED prototype
to that of a MAG flashlight and perform operational field testing; and
(9) Readiness Optimization (Brain Music)--improve performance of
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) agents and Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) screeners by mapping music scores to
electroencephalogram (EEG) brain wave patterns that, when played back,
create a relaxed or alert state of mind.
Q2b. How many projects do you anticipate funding in FY 2009?
A2b. The TechSolutions program plans to fund 8 to 12 projects in FY
2009.
Q2c. Of those already-funded projects, how many were requested by
stakeholders outside of the Department of Homeland Security?
A2c. Seven of the nine projects funded by TechSolutions in FY 2008 were
requested by stakeholders outside the Department of Homeland Security.
The remaining two (3-D location and Dazzler) are ongoing S&T
Directorate projects that TechSolutions invested in to improve
functionality and accelerate transition and commercialization
activities.
Q2d. What efforts is DHS S&T making to promote TechSolutions as a
resource for users outside of DHS?
A2d. The Department is promoting TechSolutions to audiences outside of
DHS through press releases, attendance at major emergency responder
conferences and events, publication and distribution of program related
materials, including a newsletter found on the Firstresponder.gov web
site and a TechSolutions web site that provides emergency responders
with a means to submit their capability gaps. The web site is currently
accessible from www.Firstreponder.gov or www.dhs.gov/techsolutions. In
addition to these activities, TechSolutions is looking at ways to
distribute informative program materials to emergency responder
training facilities, put information about TechSolutions in frequently
read emergency responder publications, work with emergency response
departments to place a shortcut to the TechSolutions web site on their
department computers' home page and provide a new and improved
TechSolutions web-based system for inputting capability gaps and
obtaining information about existing and recently awarded TechSolutions
projects.
Q2e. Also, the original plan for TechSolutions was to follow a quick
timeline from the submission of suggestions to acceptance of a project.
How successful has TechSolutions been at meeting their timeline goals?
A2e. TechSolutions has been relatively successful in achieving its
goals for reviewing, vetting, selecting and awarding contracts to
develop prototype technology for capability gaps submitted by First
Responders. TechSolutions recently performed an audit on its current
process that identified areas where improvements could be made. The
improvements are being addressed in a new TechSolutions web-based
system that is scheduled for release in the third quarter of this year.
Q3a. You mentioned that you were not able to meet your staffing goals
from your strategic plan in 2007 because of inadequate management and
administration funding, but your FY 2009 request for management and
administration is decreased by $6 million from the enacted FY 2008
funding. How will you increase your staffing level to 100 percent or
381 full-time employees while cutting funding for management and
administration?
A3a. The S&T Directorate plans to transfer 124 full-time employees
(FTE) from management and administration (M&A) to its Laboratory
Facilities program. This move results in a decrease from the FY 2008
enacted budget to the FY 2009 President's Budget request for S&T
Directorate M&A.
The S&T Directorate expects to fill all positions prior to the end
of 2008. We have committed 96 percent of our positions and have only 11
remaining positions under development. Currently, due to heavy
workload, the DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Office (CHCO) has
advised us that many of our hiring actions would not appear until July.
The S&T Directorate's goal is to provide all the needed support to hire
new employees.
The following table shows the S&T Directorate's FY 2008 hiring plan
which fills those positions vacant at the beginning of the fiscal year.
Maintaining this plan is dependent on whether we have adequate
remaining M&A funds as the fiscal year progresses.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Q3b. Also, in your strategic plan, you state that you will ``not fill
a career-reserved Senior Executive Service (SES) position using an
[Intergovernmental Personnel Act] assignee.'' How many IPAs are
currently assigned to DHS S&T, and what positions do they fill?
A3b. There are 14 IPA's currently on-board in the Science and
Technology Directorate in the following positions:
<bullet> Director of Research
<bullet> Assistant to Deputy Director of Research
<bullet> Director, Plum Island Animal Disease Center
<bullet> Director, Test, Evaluation & Standards Division
<bullet> Science & Technology Liaison, International Programs
Division
<bullet> Program Manager, Operational Experimentation,
Operations Analysis Division
<bullet> Director, Small Business Innovative Research,
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
<bullet> Agriculture Security Program Manager, Chemical/
Biological Division
<bullet> Program Specialist for State & Local Interaction,
Infrastructure & Geophysical Division
<bullet> Transition Program Executive for Explosives and
Program Manager for Counter-Man-Portable Air Defense Systems,
Explosives Division
<bullet> Program Manager, Manhattan II Transition Programs,
Explosives Division
<bullet> Deputy for Knowledge Management & Tools/Threat
Assessment and Program Manager, Command, Control & Inter-
operability Division
<bullet> Research Director/Program Manager, Command, Control &
Inter-operability Division
<bullet> Program Manager, Cyber Security, Command, Control &
Inter-operability Division
Q3c. Are any of them in Senior Executive Service positions?
A3c. The approved Career-Reserved Senior Executive Service (SES)
position of Director, Test & Evaluation and Standards Division is
currently filled by an IPA; however, recruitment is currently under way
to fill the position with a permanent federal employee.
Q4a. What role do the University Centers of Excellence (COEs) play in
the Directorate's activities?
A4a. The S&T Directorate's Centers of Excellence (COEs) form an
integral part of S&T's basic research strategy, along with the National
Labs. The COEs conduct multi-disciplinary research in priority DHS
mission areas and are aligned to the S&T Directorate's divisions and
their customers. COEs improve understanding of the causes, elements,
and consequences of a range of threats from terrorists and natural
disasters. The COEs also support countermeasures, mitigation and
prevention approaches to identified threats (including biological,
agricultural and explosives threats) based on both technologies and on
human behavior. To accomplish this, the centers have assembled a
powerful group of academic experts, researchers and educators in fields
relevant to homeland security.
Q4b. How is university research oriented and integrated to meet the
research needs of DHS?
A4b. The S&T Directorate's Office of University Programs, which manages
DHS Centers of Excellence (COEs), works closely with the S&T
Directorate's six Divisions to align the basic research program of the
COEs with the gaps identified by the Divisions' research program
managers. The Divisions are largely responsible for negotiating the
research agenda of the COEs. They are substantially involved with
reviewing and evaluating the COEs' results and in communicating
successful outcomes to the DHS and other federal, State, local, tribal
and industry customers that can use these results to reduce threats to
the Nation.
Q4c. How will the proposed reduction in funding for the COE program
affect the research currently being performed at those COEs?
A4c. Under the S&T Directorate alignment adopted in FY 2007, an
increasing portion of the DHS Centers of Excellence (COEs) funding will
come from the S&T Directorate's six divisions to conduct research
relevant to DHS' mission. These funds will supplement the base level
funding provided by the University Programs' COE budget, which is
intended to adequately sustain administration, education, travel,
outreach and coordination with DHS, National Labs and other COEs, and
other program support functions.
Q4d. What is the added benefit of funding additional COEs while at the
same time significantly cutting overall funding?
A4d. The DHS Centers of Excellence (COEs) added in FY 2008 addressed
critical gaps in DHS' research program and are now aligned with the S&T
Directorate's six Divisions. Two Divisions had no aligned COEs--gaps
that will be addressed by the new COEs for Explosives, Border Security
and Immigration, and Maritime Security. Additionally, Hurricane Katrina
demonstrated the need for serious university-based research on
hurricanes, flooding and other natural disasters, which the new Natural
Disasters COE will address. Additional research funding will come from
the S&T Directorate's six Divisions, which should enable both the old
and new COEs to thrive on a combination of base level funding from
University Programs and supplemental research funds from the Divisions.
Q4e. Should the COEs be allowed to accept funding from outside
sources, and how would that affect their relevance to the DHS mission?
A4e. We fully anticipate funding for the DHS Centers of Excellence
(COEs) to come from a variety of sources, and in fact, encourage it
within limits. The DHS COE grants or cooperative agreements are
intended to be open vehicles to facilitate research that meets three
conditions: first, it must be actual research for a public purpose that
addresses fundamental scientific questions, second, it must fall within
the scope of the grant or cooperative agreement, and third, it must be
subject to an approved merit review process to ensure it is good
science. Research projects that meet these criteria will be sound, will
remain relevant to the DHS mission and will conform to federal
assistance agreement (grants and cooperative agreements) guidelines. If
their objectives do not meet these criteria, outside sources, whether
public or private, can always engage the COE investigators as
individuals through other mechanisms.
Q5a. In your testimony, you noted that DHS S&T has evaluated and
tested commercial off-the-shelf technology for detecting homemade
explosives. Why did these tests not take place until the most recent
fiscal year, since liquid explosives were identified as a threat in
August 2006?
A5a. The S&T Directorate has worked toward detecting homemade
explosives (HME) for several years, including testing systems that
could potentially be used at airports to detect HME threats. A rapid
response team involving national laboratories, the Transportation
Security Laboratory (TSL), and others, was established immediately
after the London bombing incidents in August 2006. A consortium of
national laboratories undertook physical and chemical characterization
of the liquid homemade explosives threats of most urgent concern. Our
characterization effort also took into account similar characterization
work being undertaken under the auspices of the FBI laboratory.
The characterization data informed the explosives detection
activities to test HME against at least six different systems at a
secure facility created at Tyndall Air Force Base. This work began in
late-2006. Raw data and images were collected and analyzed to determine
how to improve system performance against the novel threats being
faced. Data was collected and analyzed using a large number of
different types of bags which contained a variety of clutter and
different orientations of explosives. Data is being shared across
vendors to assist in improving the detection performance of Commercial
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) explosives detection equipment.
In recent months, additional testing has focused on addressing
threats that use laptop computers. We are also extending earlier
characterization work to categories of HME not yet examined.
Q5b. How far away are we from having working homemade and liquid
explosives detectors deployed in airports?
A5b. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) handles the
acquisition and deployment of detection systems in airports. The S&T
Directorate and its Transportation Security Laboratory support
acquisition and deployments through research, development, test and
evaluation of detection equipment.
For example, one explosives detection system recently evaluated by
the S&T Directorate is planned for deployment by TSA to 70 airports. To
support this deployment, the S&T Directorate undertook evaluations at
Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) to test a new hand-held, portable
liquid screening system based upon the chemical luminescence principle
for detection. This system exploits the high vapor pressure of
peroxides and detects such explosives threats in the vapor stage. The
system was deployed to about six airports for testing in real airport
settings. Based upon the success of the system, TSA made a decision to
deploy the system in 70 airports. In addition, SNL is evaluating a
portable trace explosive detector which might be useful as a complement
to the hand-held, portable liquid screening system.
Q6a. Please clarify the purpose and goals of the Human Factors
division. As part of your list of 2008 accomplishments, you discuss the
development of a database of ``unmet human needs after Hurricane
Katrina'' as a major Human Factors achievement. Yet in the budget
request and research and development plans that were submitted to the
Committee, DHS S&T indicates that the Human Factors division will focus
on human-technology interaction research, and behavioral science
research, which are far different research fields than cataloging
``unmet human needs.'' What is the primary mission of the Human Factors
division?
A6a. The Human Factors Division (HFD) applies the social and behavioral
sciences to improve detection, analysis, and understanding of the
threats posed by individuals, groups, and radical movements; it
supports the preparedness, response, and recovery of communities
impacted by catastrophic events; and it advances homeland security by
integrating human factors into homeland security technologies. This
work includes numerous aspects of social and behavioral sciences,
encompassing the Hurricane Katrina Database as well as R&D on human-
technology interaction.
Q6b. How will the Human Factors division serve the overall homeland
security mission, and how do you intend to integrate Human Factors'
research into the research and technology development activities within
the other divisions?
A6b. The Human Factors Division (HFD) funds research and development
(R&D) designed to meet the following goals to improve homeland
security: enhance the analytical capability of the Department to
understand terrorist motivation, intent and behavior; improve screening
by providing a science-based capability to identify deceptive and
suspicious behavior; enhance the capability to control movement of
individuals into and out of the United States and its critical assets
through accurate, timely, and easy-to-use biometric identification and
credentialing validation tools; enhance safety, effectiveness, and
usability of technology by systematically incorporating user and public
input; and mitigate impacts of catastrophic events by delivering
capabilities that incorporate social, psychological and economic
aspects of community preparedness, response and recovery.
HFD supports R&D efforts that address high-priority capability gaps
in biometrics and credentialing, suspicious behavior detection, hostile
intent determination, violent intent modeling and simulation, and
radicalization deterrence as identified by customers through the S&T
Directorate's Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT) for People
Screening and the Technology Oversight Group (TOG), chaired by the
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security. Two other Capstone IPTs, Border
Security and Explosives Prevention, also identified Suspicious Behavior
Detection as critical to meeting their respective high-priority
capability gaps.
With respect to ``unmet human needs after Hurricane Katrina,'' HFD
is funding a project entitled ``Enhancing Public Response and Community
Resilience,'' which is aimed at an improved understanding of public
needs during a catastrophic event in order to enable emergency managers
to better plan for actual emergencies. This project includes a database
of the 900,000-plus public requests received over the Texas 211 Call
System during the evacuation from and response to Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. In FY 2008, the project will develop a report detailing
temporal analysis of requests for shelter, food, disaster relief,
evacuation information, and other requests received into the Texas 2-1-
1 System. The project will also develop a standardized template to
improve efficiency of 211 Call Systems nation-wide. In FY 2009, the
project will conduct a geo-spatial analysis of this information to
assist Texas emergency responders in better planning of evacuation
routes, and will identify vulnerable areas where requests were more
frequent or of a more urgent nature. This project represents the first
analysis of real-time public communications during a widespread natural
disaster. The analytic process used in this study will be of value in
emergency planning and public communications during disasters.
The following recent accomplishments highlight how HFD serves the
overall homeland security mission.
Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT) Refinement is
supporting the Transportation Security Agency's (TSA) SPOT program.
Interim analytical results suggest the potential for future optimizing
of the internal weights associated with the behavioral indicators used
by Behavior Detection Officers. Additional analyses are in progress and
a final report is projected in FY 2010.
Project Hostile Intent (PHI) developed a baseline set of behavioral
indicators yielding an accuracy rate of 87 percent for the detection of
future hostile intentions in a laboratory environment. These results
are currently being transitioned to DHS' operational customers through
an S&T developed training course.
Mobile Biometrics conducted a Coast Guard pilot of maritime mobile
biometrics in the waters of the Mona Pass between Puerto Rico and the
Dominican Republic. S&T's support will inform future mobile biometric
projects.
Credentialing developed and transitioned a laboratory test plan for the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) card reader
supporting the future deployment of TWIC readers in the ports.
Co-sponsored and guided the creation of the Multiple Biometrics Grand
Challenge (MBGC), which encourages competition among vendors leading to
accelerated algorithm development that includes DHS-specific
operational requirements.
The Motivation and Intent Program funded the release of the first web
interface for the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD will enable
users to identify and analyze trends in terrorist activities, and
enhance our strategic capabilities to protect the homeland from future
attacks.
Violent Intent Modeling and Simulation (VIMS) delivered a framework
demonstration to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and Social
Science Experts. VIMS allows analysts to strategically identify
influences and the probability that groups will adopt violence to
achieve their goals. The framework improves the analysts' ability to
direct collection requirements and to engage in mitigation strategies
to prevent terrorist attacks.
The Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership Project in coordination
with S&T's University Programs organized three meetings on
radicalization research for the DHS Radicalization and Engagement
Working Group. The meetings allowed policy-makers to define areas of
interest related to radicalization, the differences between
radicalization processes in the United States and Europe, and the role
of community engagement in fostering integration.
HFD convened the Community Perceptions of Technology Panel to enable
DHS to gain insights into community acceptance and perceptions of
technology. This will allow the agency to better recognize and
integrate viewpoints and issues into the development and deployment of
technology.
Through work at the Transportation Security Laboratory, HFD delivered
research reports on the effects of sleep deprivation, night-shift work,
and time-on-task for X-ray screeners. This research identified various
factors that lead to good or poor X-ray search performance, and will be
used to inform operational and training improvements with TSA.
Q6c. How do you intend to integrate Human Factors' research into the
research and technology development activities within the other
divisions?
A6c. The Human Factors Division (HFD) uses three main mechanisms for
integrating its research with other divisions--its program managers, a
management directive, and the Human Systems Integration Community of
Practice.
On a day-to-day basis, Human-Systems R&D Program Managers are
responsible for incorporating human systems integration into the R&D
process in order to maximize human performance, overall system
effectiveness, safety, and acceptance, as well as to facilitate data-
driven design decisions by ensuring S&T Directorate decision-makers are
aware of the human performance risks associated with those design
alternatives and trade-offs being considered. Accordingly, HFD staff
assess S&T Directorate programs for human performance risks and provide
advice and counsel to DHS program managers, engineers, and scientists
on human systems integration. Support also includes assistance in the
development of the various programs' contractual documentation
including Broad Area Announcements, Request for Proposals, Requirements
Documents, Statements of Work, etc. This will ensure the appropriate
language is included to help performers systematically address human
performance issues throughout the life cycle and make them aware of the
advantages of a comprehensive plan for human systems integration that
optimizes total system performance, minimizes total ownership costs,
and ensures that the system is built to accommodate the characteristics
of the user population that will operate, maintain and support the
system.
Concurrently, HFD is developing a Department-wide Directive to
establish policy on human systems integration to ensure that it is
incorporated early and iteratively in all DHS R&D efforts. Successful
implementation and incorporation of human systems integration into
research, development and acquisition programs will enable DHS to
generate more complete and operationally accurate technology
requirements, limit integration difficulties throughout the life cycle,
reduce cost and schedule risks, and most importantly, provide the
customer with a solution that maximizes technology capability and human
performance.
HFD is also coordinating a DHS-wide Human Systems Integration
Community of Practice. This Community of Practice connects all DHS
human systems integration practitioners, facilitates collaboration and
knowledge sharing across all DHS components, and serves as a forum for
the rapid exchange of lessons learned, best practices, ideas,
information, and data. As a result of this corporate knowledge sharing
and collaboration, DHS can reduce cost, schedule and risk across all
DHS programs/efforts by leveraging the experience of all DHS human
systems integration practitioners as well as leveraging existing and
ongoing analyses, designs, prototypes and tests completed on similar
programs across all DHS components. The Community of Practice will
serve as a vehicle to build a bridge between DHS Research and
Acquisitions.
Q7a. The DHS S&T budget request for cyber security will fund ``secure
facilities and methods for testing cyber security technologies under
real-life conditions.'' Who will develop these testbeds, and who will
comprise the user community?
A7a. The S&T Directorate is developing the Cyber Defense Technology
Experimental Research (DETER) cyber security testbed in partnership
with the University of California (UC) Berkeley; University of Southern
California's Information Sciences Institute; and SPARTA Inc. The
National Science Foundation (NSF) contributed funding to the effort in
2003-2005.
DETER users are cyber security researchers in academia, government
and industry. Interested users are welcome to request an account via
the DETER web site at www.isi.deterlab.net.
The following list is a current snapshot of projects and users
using DETER.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Q7b. How will you coordinate with other agencies conducting both cyber
security research and testbed development, such as the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Science
Foundation (NSF)?
A7b. As part of its cyber security research and development (R&D)
efforts, S&T Directorate program managers regularly coordinate their
activities, including development of the Cyber Defense Technology
Experimental Research (DETER) cyber security testbed, with other DHS
components and federal agencies. They include the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Science Foundation
(NSF). Coordination involves active participation in formal cross-
agency coordination committees, such as the Cyber Security and
Information Assurance Interagency Working Group (CSIA IWG), as well as
other, more informal, activities including conferences, symposiums and
other events.
In addition, NSF previously contributed funding to DETER and
continues to be involved in its development and use. NSF encourages its
cyber security researchers to use DETER in their efforts by including
information about DETER in NSF's annual CyberTrust program
solicitation.
Q7c. How will the facilities and methods DHS S&T develops differ from
those funded by other agencies?
A7c. Existing testing facilities cannot handle experiments on a large
enough scale to represent today's operational networks or the portion
of the Internet that might be involved in a security attack. Industry
has only been able to test and validate new security technologies in
small- to medium-scale private research laboratories that do not
adequately simulate a real networking environment. The Cyber Defense
Technology Experimental Research (DETER) cyber security testbed will
address these gaps. Additionally, the DETER testbed is currently the
only government-funded testbed that provides experiment tools (e.g.,
topology generators, malware) to help the researcher produce more
realistic results. In FY 2007, the project combined several other
government-funded testbeds to increase capabilities to create a
realistic model of the Internet to test cyber security technologies. In
FY 2008, the project will increase the testbed's capacity to allow
larger-scale malicious-code experiments. The project will also increase
the number of testbed users and large-scale data set applications. In
FY 2009, the project plans to test five new technologies that may
include: worm defense, routing security, distributed denial of service
defense, malware detection and domain name system security.
Questions submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Q1a. In 2010, the S&T Directorate will begin construction of the
National Bio- and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF) at a cost of nearly $500
million over five years. Do you expect the cost for construction to be
appropriated in addition to your current activities or will some
programs see cuts to fund this construction?
A1a. The S&T Directorate and the Department's five-year budget builds
in funding for National Bio- and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF)
construction, and there are no plans to cut other program funding to
pay for construction. Anticipated start-up costs associated with the
operation of NBAF have also been built into the five-year plan. The S&T
Directorate anticipates requesting appropriations to support NBAF
construction over the next several years.
Q2b. Additionally, in your FY 2009 budget request you have asked for
$16.2 million for equipment purchases for the newly completed National
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC). Are similar
start-up costs expected for the NBAF? Do you have an estimate for the
costs of equipment for NBAF?
A2b. The NBAF construction cost estimate is for fixed equipment that is
part of the new facility. Since NBAF would serve as a replacement
facility for Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), to the extent
possible, movable equipment will be transferred from PIADC to NBAF as
part of the overall transition to the new facility. In addition, new
portable equipment is likely to be required for the expanded NBAF
mission. The current estimate for new portable equipment during initial
years of operation, beginning in FY 2014, is $38 million to be jointly
funded by DHS and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, Department of Homeland Security
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. You noted in your testimony that DNDO has deployed detection
systems such that 100 percent of Southern border container traffic and
98 percent of seaport traffic is being screened for nuclear and
radiological threats. How many Ports of Entry and other border crossing
points have screening equipment, and how many do not? What are the
plans for deploying screening equipment to those entry points? What is
the current error rate for the technologies in use?
A1.
<bullet> How many Ports of Entry (POEs) and other border
crossing points have screening equipment and how many do not?
As of March 21, 2008, 190 of the total 551 POEs and border
crossing sites have been completely equipped with scanning
equipment and 21 of the 551 sites are in process. As of March
21, 2008, 361 POEs and border crossing points do not yet have
scanning equipment.
<bullet> What are the plans for deploying screening equipment
to those entry points? The Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM)
Program plans to equip all air cargo POEs in the current
program scope with radiation detection equipment by September
2011. We will complete deployments to the remaining southern
border land crossings by June 2009, northern border land
crossings by December 2009, seaports by September 2011, and
rail crossings by July 2013.
<bullet> What is the current error rate for the technologies
in use? The average nuisance alarm rate for currently deployed
systems is on the order of 1/100 (one percent) for cargo
scanning. These numbers are not error rates or false alarm
rates, since for the most part there is real radiation being
detected (and PVT systems don't perform isotope
identification). False alarm rates (when the system alarms on
statistical fluctuations) is about 1/10,000 or 0.01 percent for
cargo screening.
Another metric that can be measured is the systems availability.
This is the percent of time that the detection system was functioning
in a manner that met the acceptable detection/interdiction criteria.
The average, first year systems availability for the time period of
October 2007 through March of 2008 was 99.58 percent.
For the time period of October 2007 through March 2008, the average
number of trouble calls was three per RPM system; this includes all
calls, even such minor issues as a stuck lock or crashed computer,
which would not be considered `true' RPM system errors.
Where RPMs are deployed, CBP Officers utilize these systems to the
fullest extent. The mandate given to CBP is to scan 100 percent of all
mail, cargo, and conveyances entering the United States. CBP will
continue to perform this mission with current technology and assist in
the development of next-generation detection systems whenever possible.
The goal of reducing the logistics burden on operators is one of the
main reasons why DNDO is dedicating significant resources to pursuing
next-generation systems that have improved detection and identification
capabilities. Next-generation RPMs like ASP are designed to drive down
the number of containers that need to go through resource intensive
alarm resolution processes.
Q2. You discussed interagency coordination in your testimony, and in
the area of testing and evaluation, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) is a primary partner. In FY 2008, how much
funding did NIST receive from DNDO for contract work? How much do you
estimate DNDO will spend on NIST contract work in FY09? How will you
ensure that NIST staff remain independent so as to provide unbiased
results in future contract work?
A2. In FY 2008, DNDO will provide approximately $2.5 million in funding
to NIST. In FY 2009, DNDO is planning to provide NIST approximately
$2.6 million in funding for test and evaluation work.
NIST has a long and carefully cultivated reputation for unbiased
and objective science. NIST has specifically defined roles and
functions in conjunction with its work for DNDO. While NIST provides
expertise in support of standards and evaluation for preventive
radiological and nuclear detection equipment, NIST employees are not
involved with DNDO program management and contract execution. DNDO
fully expects NIST to continue giving independent, unbiased, and
scientifically sound analysis as in the past.
Q3. You have previously discussed the serious problem with decreasing
student interest in the field of nuclear science, and the Committee is
pleased to see that you are continuing to work with the National
Science Foundation (NSF) to provide funding for students interested in
this field. How do you plan to make sure students who take advantage of
this funding opportunity choose to go into homeland security-related
positions, especially at DNDO? How many students will this program
support in FY 2009, and which science and engineering fields do they
represent?
A3. Students supported by Academic Research Initiative (ARI) funds are
required to be U.S. citizens or permanent residents. While this does
not guarantee that the students will work in homeland security related
positions, it does increase the likelihood of the student base
remaining in the U.S. It also increases the likelihood that the
students will indirectly support homeland security applications through
employment within industry, academia, and national labs.
More notably, DNDO hosts an annual conference for ARI awardees
where students are encouraged to participate and build working
relationships with DNDO and government personnel working in homeland
security applications. A major goal of the conference is to draw
students to future career paths in homeland security related fields.
The first ARI conference will be held on April 21 and 22, 2008 and will
occur on an annual basis thereafter.
It is estimated that by FY 2009 the ARI program will provide
funding for over 100 students at colleges and universities throughout
the country. ARI is a multi-disciplinary program and students working
on ARI projects are pursuing degrees in various university departments
including nuclear engineering, physics, chemistry, chemical
engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, materials
science, and operations research.
Q4. You said in your testimony that ``DNDO is orchestrating a new test
program that will enable vendors to submit performance data on
radiation detectors collected independently at laboratories accredited
by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program.''
Currently, how many laboratories certified under NVLAP have the
capability to collect data on radiation detectors? How many vendors do
you anticipate will be able to take part in this new test program, and
how do you intend to work with NIST to increase lab capacity? Who will
be responsible for developing and validating test protocols?
A4. There are nine laboratories accredited under the Calibration
Laboratories Accreditation Program. It is expected that some of these
laboratories have the capability to collect data on radiation
detectors. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is the only
laboratory at this time that has submitted an application for
accreditation to support the new test program. Since this is a
voluntary program, there is no way to predict how many vendors will
take part in this new test program. However, if we look at past trends
to inform our estimates, we can see that in FY 2005 more than 25
companies provided technologies to be tested under the S&T radiation
detector testing program. At the request of DNDO, NIST has provided
training through workshops and conferences for laboratories interested
in obtaining accreditation status for testing radiation detection
instruments for this new program. NIST has developed and validated the
test protocols for this new program in prior years.
Q5. How is testing and evaluation integrated into your Advanced
Technology Demonstration (ATD) program? You mention lab testing for
some of your technology projects. Is field testing completed before
these technologies are determined to be ready for end users? What about
cost analyses?
A5. The ATD programs are structured to include a vendor-assisted
testing phase that utilizes device characterization in a laboratory or
field environment so that we are able to fully understand and document
the state of the technology in question. This testing/characterization
phase may also include data collection in a field environment that does
not qualify as operational test and evaluation, but rather testing in a
relevant environment. For example, an outdoor range provides the
opportunity to investigate certain aspects of a technology that would
not otherwise be quantified in a laboratory. More specific examples
could involve measuring the effects of large structures (i.e.,
buildings with concrete in them) on small detectors, or standoff
detection ranges in varying backgrounds, or detection at varying speeds
in the case of mobile detectors.
ATD testing and evaluation activities will not determine readiness
for end users, but will make a recommendation on the state of
technology and its suitability for moving into the development phase.
That recommendation will be based upon analyses from the
characterization studies. The analysis of the ATD collected data will
produce the following reports which will form the basis for
recommendation and decisions for follow on activities:
a. Full device characterization against requirements and goals
b. Device performance against test scenarios as a function of
individual and multiple units, as appropriate
c. Assessment of success of technology as a function of
component
d. Recommendations on maturity of technology (what technology
needs to inform the exploratory and subsequent ATD programs)
e. Assessment of technology potential--suitable to support
specification development for follow on activity
f. Any specific analysis required to support analysis of
alternatives and cost-benefit analysis for any subsequent
development
Questions submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Q1. In your testimony you say DNDO has three programs for long-term
research activities: the Academic Research Initiative, the Exploratory
Research Program, and the Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD). Yet
your description of the Exploratory Research and ATD programs suggest
these projects are technologically ``feasible'' but require further
development, testing, and evaluation. The S&T Directorate under Adm.
Cohen has made it a goal to spend roughly 20 percent of the budget on
long-term, basic research which he defines as having a timeframe of
more than eight years. How much of DNDO's budget is similarly directed
towards research with a timeframe of more than eight years? Who are the
major performers of this research?
A1.
<bullet> ``Yet your description of the Exploratory Research
and ATD programs suggest these projects are technologically
``feasible'' but require further development, testing, and
evaluation.'' DNDO would like to clarify how the term
``feasible'' relates to both Exploratory Research (ER) and the
ATD programs. The ER and ATD programs include projects at a
variety of Technology Readiness Levels, or TRLs, all the way
from TRL1 to TRL6 (using the same scale as DOD or NASA where
TRL 1 is feasibility and TRL 4 is Proof of Concept).
Exploratory Research is designed to cover TRLs from 1 through
4, and ATDs are designed to cover TRLs 5-6. DNDO currently has
programs in all these TRL levels. Hence, a good portion of the
ER programs are focused on showing feasibility, so that the
technology becomes ``feasible.'' That is, not all of the ER
programs are ``feasible'' yet, but are tasked with
demonstrating feasibility. This is normally a key milestone of
the first phase of ER projects.
<bullet> ``The S&T Directorate under Adm. Cohen has made it a
goal to spend roughly 20 percent of the budget on long-term,
basic research which he defines as having a timeframe of more
than eight years.'' DNDO's Transformational and Applied
Research (TAR) Directorate does not pre-define a fixed
percentage of the R&D budget that will be committed to ``long-
term, basic'' research. Instead, TAR funds research that is
consistent with its own clearly stated mission statements and
goals; namely: ``Conduct, support, coordinate, & encourage an
aggressive, expedited transformational, high-impact Program of
R&D to dramatically improve national capabilities to detect and
report illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological
materials.'' As such, programs are chosen primarily based on
being consistent with that mission.
<bullet> ``How much of DNDO's budget is similarly directed
towards research with a timeframe of more than eight years?''
Most, if not all, of the Academic Research Initiative (ARI)
efforts have an expected timeframe of over eight years. This
would cover about 10 percent, growing to more than 15 percent,
of DNDO TAR R&D funding in the next few years.
DNDO's mission is also focused with a high level of urgency,
and ER and ATD program efforts must define a path forward for
improvements in radiation detection performance. A standard
``new'' project would take 3-4 years in ER and 2-3 years in an
ATD before transitioning to a development and acquisition
program. There are, of course, projects which move more quickly
or slowly, depending on the underlying technologies. The goal
is to move these projects through the R&D process in the 5-7-
year timeline, and an estimated five percent of the budget
would support the longer-term projects that would have a
significant impact if successful.
DNDO does not define a funding percentage goal as stated by
S&T, but about 15-20 percent of the TAR budget supports longer-
term research.
<bullet> ``Who are the major performers of this research?''
The long-term research within DNDO is performed mainly by
academia, national laboratories, government laboratories, and
to a smaller degree, industry.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by George Ryan, Director, Testing & Evaluation and Standards
Division, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1a. You mention in your testimony that you are developing a new
testing and evaluation policy for the Department. What is the timeline
for implementation of this policy?
A1a. The DHS Test and Evaluation (T&E) Policy is scheduled for formal
review at the end of April with approval anticipated in the summer.
Once the policy is signed, the T&E Office will begin approving the T&E
documentation and overseeing testing for all DHS Acquisition programs
in collaboration with the DHS Office of Management.
Q1b. Will you retroactively evaluate tests carried out by DHS
components for compliance with this T&E policy?
A1b. The DHS Test and Evaluation (T&E) Office will not retroactively
evaluate tests carried out by the DHS components, but will review the
categorization of the test reports currently provided in the
Responder's Knowledge Base (RKB) to ensure that the tests categorized
as operational were truly conducted operationally, and that they are
reported appropriately in the RKB. The T&E Office will also review
planned tests to ensure they are appropriately conducted and reported.
Q1c. How will the requirements within the policy be enforced,
especially when work is carried out through contracts with other
federal agencies?
A1c. The DHS Test and Evaluation (T&E) Policy will be implemented
through an acquisition framework that has multiple decision points for
each acquisition program. The DHS T&E Office will provide inputs at
each decision point to inform DHS components and the acquisition
decision authority, DHS Under Secretary for Management Chief
Procurement Officer, of a program's T&E status. Inputs from the T&E
Office will be the primary method of enforcing the policy.
Q2a. In your testimony, you stated that ``developmental testing and
evaluation (DT&E) and operational testing and evaluation (OT&E) are
conducted at levels commensurate with validating performance. . .'' Who
currently carries out these tests, and how are the results reported?
A2a. Developmental testing is conducted at contractor facilities,
National laboratories, and other Government Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation (RDT&E) facilities. Operational testing of production
representative systems or technologies is conducted by the system/
technology operators in actual environments.
For both DHS acquisition programs and Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate projects, DHS program managers manage and oversee these
test and evaluation (T&E) activities and the results are reported
directly to them and/or the appropriate DHS program decision authority.
Q2b. Is developmental and operational testing a requirement for
transitioning technologies to customers?
A2b. For DHS research and development projects that will transition
technologies to customers, the level and adequacy of testing is
commensurate with the maturity of the system being transferred. A
designation of Technology Readiness Level 6 (TRL 6) requires the
technology to be tested in a simulated environment (lab) whereas a TRL
8 designation requires the technology to be successfully demonstrated
in the actual operational environment.
Q2c. What role do your customers play in setting testing requirements
currently?
A2c. Currently, customers provide input to test requirements through
the S&T Directorate's customer-led, Capstone Integrated Product Team
(IPT) process.
Q2d. Will any test results be retroactively classified if the results
are unfavorable?
A2d. No. The Test and Evaluation (T&E) Office will determine the
classification of test results prior to actual testing, and they will
not be reclassified as a result of testing outcomes.
Q2e. You also said in your testimony, ``when possible, DHS ensures
independent operational test teams are involved early in project
development.'' Can you give some examples of when you used these
independent test teams, and how results from their tests were used to
improve the technologies?
A2e. The DHS Test and Evaluation (T&E) Office facilitates the
integration and use of independent test teams into T&E plans and
activities whenever possible. For example, the DHS T&E Office has
worked closely with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and DHS Office of the Chief Information
Officer (CIO) on the use of independent test teams in T&E plans and
activities, as follows:
<bullet> The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Test
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) for the Transportation
Workers Identification Card (TWIC) calls for operational T&E
results to be reported by an independent party, the Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR).
<bullet> The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) uses the Navy Commander
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COTF) to support the
Deepwater program. COTF performed an early operational
assessment on the National Security Cutter in September 2007
and plans to conduct an observation of operational capability
on the HH-60J avionics upgrade.
<bullet> The DHS Test and Evaluation (T&E) Office and the DHS
Chief Information Officer (CIO) have brought in the DOD Joint
Inter-operability Test Command as an independent party to
oversee the independent verification and validation testing on
the on the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-
12) Card.
The results of these independent tests have or will be reported to
program managers and/or decision authorities who will use the results
to identify operational shortcomings and correct them as early as
possible in development.
Q3a. You mentioned in your testimony that test results will be placed
on the Responders Knowledge Base, which is run by FEMA. Yet the DHS S&T
budget request includes funding for the Tech Clearinghouse web site,
which, according to the request, will include a tool to disseminate
test results and technology information to State, local, and tribal
agencies. Who has access to the Responders Knowledge Base, and is this
database standardized so as to make finding and understanding test
results straightforward and easy to use?
A3a. The Responder Knowledge Base (RKB) is a publicly accessible web
site that contains some material, such as test reports, that have a
limited distribution. In order to access limited distribution
documents, users must register with the RKB as a first responder,
state/local/tribal official or federal employee. Responders and state/
local/tribal officials are vetted by contacting their home agency and
other responders/officials who are already vetted with the RKB. Federal
employees are vetted primarily through their e-mail addresses such as
.mil, .gov, etc. When requesting the documents, the registered user
must agree to the distribution statement on the document.
The RKB has a consistent, organized, easy to use layout, and the
DHS Test and Evaluation (T&E) Office plans to standardize definitions
for classifying operational T&E data.
Q3b. And if test results are being loaded directly into the Responders
Knowledge Base, what is the function of the Tech Clearinghouse site and
how much money do you plan to spend on it in FY 2009?
A3b. The Tech Clearinghouse focus is on the dissemination of homeland
security science and technology information to federal, State, local
and tribal agencies. The system and associated efforts encourage and
support innovative solutions to enhance homeland security and also
fulfill Section 313 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
The S&T Directorate's FY 2009 budget request includes $4 million
for the web development, operation, and maintenance associated with the
Tech Clearinghouse Portal, which includes a Communities of Practices
collaborative environment. The S&T Directorate is also investing in the
TechSolutions and www.FirstResponder.gov, an Internet portal that links
relevant DHS content including the Tech Clearinghouse and the Responder
Knowledge Base (RKB). Launched in January 2008, www.FirstResponder.gov
provides one-stop-shop access to the already registered 60,000-plus RKB
users. In addition to links to Technology Clearinghouse, the portal
provides links to the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), the
National Integration Center Incident Management System (NIMS), SAFETY
Act, and SAFECOM, as well as web-based resources from other government
agencies and the private-sector.
Q3c. Also, what is your plan for disseminating test results with
relevance outside the first responder community?
A3c. The DHS Test and Evaluation (T&E) Office, in collaboration with
FEMA, is expanding the Responder Knowledge Base (RKB) to include items
that have relevance beyond the first responder community. Since the RKB
is a well-designed and functioning site, the plan is to use its
database capabilities to disseminate additional DHS test results to a
broader audience. For example, work is underway to include test results
for Transportation Security Administration certified explosive
detection devices in the RKB.
Appendix 2:
----------
Additional Material for the Record
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>