<DOC>
[110th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:38771.wais]
NEXT GENERATION BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES:
H.R. 3916
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 15, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-73
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
38-771 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California JO BONNER, Alabama
LAURA RICHARDSON, California TOM FEENEY, Florida
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BARON P. HILL, Indiana PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation
HON. DAVID WU, Oregon, Chairman
JIM MATHESON, Utah PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
CHARLIE A. WILSON, Ohio JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
MIKE ROSS, Arizona PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
LAURA RICHARDSON, California
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
MIKE QUEAR Subcommittee Staff Director
RACHEL JAGODA BRUNETTE Democratic Professional Staff Member
COLIN MCCORMICK Democratic Professional Staff Member
TIND SHEPPER RYEN Republican Professional Staff Member
PIPER LARGENT Republican Professional Staff Member
MEGHAN HOUSEWRIGHT Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
November 15, 2007
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Chairman, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 8
Written Statement............................................ 9
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Ranking Minority
Member, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 10
Written Statement............................................ 11
Prepared Statement by Representative David Wu, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 12
Statement by Representative Phil Gingrey, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 9
Written Statement............................................ 9
Statement by Representative Harry E. Mitchell, Member,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 13
Witnesses:
Mr. Robert R. Hooks, Director of Transition, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 14
Written Statement............................................ 17
Biography.................................................... 20
Mr. Ervin Kapos, Director, Operations Analysis, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security;
Executive Director, Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee (HSSTAC)
Oral Statement............................................... 21
Written Statement............................................ 22
Biography.................................................... 22
Dr. Brian A. Jackson, Associate Director, Homeland Security
Research Program, The RAND Corporation
Oral Statement............................................... 24
Written Statement............................................ 26
Biography.................................................... 32
Chief Jeff Self, Division Chief, U.S. Border Patrol
Oral Statement............................................... 32
Written Statement............................................ 34
Discussion....................................................... 36
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Robert R. Hooks, Director of Transition, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security........ 46
Mr. Ervin Kapos, Director, Operations Analysis, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security;
Executive Director, Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee (HSSTAC).................................... 52
Dr. Brian A. Jackson, Associate Director, Homeland Security
Research Program, The RAND Corporation......................... 53
Chief Jeff Self, Division Chief, U.S. Border Patrol.............. 55
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
H.R. 3916, To provide for the next generation of border and
maritime security technologies................................. 60
NEXT GENERATION BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES: H.R. 3916
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart
Gordon (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Next Generation Border and
Maritime Security Technologies:
H.R. 3916
thursday, november 15, 2007
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On Thursday, November 15, 2007, the Committee on Science and
Technology's Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation will hold a
hearing to discuss H.R. 3916 and examine the current and future
priorities in border and maritime security research, development, and
technology for the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate (DHS S&T).
2. Witnesses
Dr. Robert Hooks is the Director of Transition for the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
Mr. Ervin Kapos is the Director of Operations Analysis for the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
He acts as the Executive Director of the Homeland Security Science and
Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC).
Dr. Brian Jackson is an Associate Physical Scientist for the Science
and Technology Policy Institute at the RAND Corporation.
Mr. Jeff Self is Division Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol.
3. Brief Overview
<bullet> The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
processes approximately 1.18 million people entering the United
States through established ports of entry every day. CBP is
also responsible for monitoring between legal entry points
along the Northern and Southern borders and intercepting
individuals attempting to cross the border. Border patrol
officers also act as first responders, rescuing individuals in
danger from extreme weather or violent situations at illegal
entry points.
<bullet> Surveillance technology acts as a ``force
multiplier,'' which allows border patrol agents to augment
their patrols with ground based and aerial observation
capabilities. Examples of currently in-use security
technologies include infrared sensors, automated cameras, and
seismic sensors to detect motion, as well as air based
observational equipment to monitor a large area.
<bullet> Many promising technologies are still not feasible
for full implementation along the border because of numerous
barriers: high cost, lack of robustness in harsh conditions,
lack of personnel trained to properly use high-tech equipment,
and technical problems. DHS S&T has primary responsibility for
bringing new technologies to full readiness, with support from
other agencies such as the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, which provides testing and validation services.
<bullet> Additionally, many capability gaps, including
situational awareness and officer safety, have been identified
by end-users that require further basic and applied research to
meet existing or anticipated challenges. DHS S&T has several
mechanisms to receive advice on R&D priorities, including
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), which bring together
stakeholders from other components of DHS, including CBP, in a
regular, formal process to determine short-term technology
needs. Advice on longer-term research priorities comes from a
number of sources, including the Homeland Security Science and
Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC), the Homeland Security
Institute (HSI), and the National Academies.
<bullet> The Border and Maritime Security Division of the DHS
S&T Directorate has ongoing research projects focusing on
advanced sensing capabilities, decision-making software tools,
non-intrusive search capabilities, and other priorities.
Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) carry out some
border and maritime security technology research. USCG research
includes officer protection, boarding, and suspect apprehension
tools such as net guns for trapping fleeing boats. NIST has
been conducting research on facial recognition technologies and
fingerprint analysis, and technical tests of the RFID
technology being incorporated into new electronic passports
being issued by the State Department to prevent document
counterfeiting.
4. Issues and Concerns
How does the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) set
overall research and development priorities? Under Secretary Jay Cohen,
who took over leadership of DHS S&T in 2006, has established six
research divisions that focus on specific technical areas. These
divisions are Explosives, Chemical/Biological, Human Factors, Border/
Maritime, Infrastructure/Geophysical, and Command, Control, and Inter-
operability. Funding for each division is determined by the Under
Secretary.
Short-term technology research priorities within each division are
established by a formal mechanism based on a program at the Naval
Research Laboratory (NRL). Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) bring
together stakeholders from the mission components of DHS, such as the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) or Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). The IPTs are organized by theme, and stakeholders
first determine outstanding capability gaps and then rank research
projects by order of urgency. Of the 11 IPTs, three deal with issues
related to H.R. 3916: Border Security, Maritime Security, and Cargo
Security.
Short-term projects determined through the IPT process account for
roughly seventy percent of the DHS S&T budget and are managed by the
Transition Portfolio Director. Longer-term basic research currently
accounts for approximately thirteen percent with an announced goal of
increasing this share to twenty percent over the next few years.
Currently, there is no strategic plan guiding longer-term research
priorities. The agency turns to a number of resources for advice on
long-term planning, including internal groups such as the Homeland
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) and the
Homeland Security Institute (HSI) as well as outside think tanks and
advisory bodies such as the National Academies. However, there is no
mechanism to coordinate the efforts of the various advisory groups. The
results of the efforts of these groups are unclear, however, as DHS S&T
has not released a strategic plan outlining specific long-term research
priorities.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
What are the current short- and long-term priorities in border and
maritime security technology R&D? Is ongoing R&D helping to overcome
some of the barriers to implementing specific border security
technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles? Border and Maritime
Security research is run through the Border and Maritime Division of
DHS S&T, currently headed by Acting Director Captain Dave Newton
(USCG). Additional border security research is carried out by other
divisions within the S&T Directorate, most notably the Command, Control
and Inter-operability (C2I) and Human Factors (HF) divisions as well as
other agencies including the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Because of the many
players in the border security technology realm, there are not
consistent priorities across the many agencies and divisions. However,
within DHS S&T, the divisions involved in border security research work
to coordinate their efforts through the IPT process.
Currently, DHS S&T efforts are focused on situational awareness
(the collection and harmonization of information about a situation from
numerous sources), officer safety, and cargo security. The associated
research projects span a variety of fields, including sensor
technologies, command and control systems and software, connectivity
tools, modeling and simulation, non-intrusive search tools, and cargo
monitoring tools.
How will H.R. 3916 affect ongoing and future R&D at DHS S&T? H.R. 3916,
introduced by Ranking Member Hall on October 22, 2007, strives to
provide guidance to DHS S&T on the process of setting research
priorities, ensuring that technology meets the needs of end-users, and
on specific border security research priorities.
5. Background
This hearing will examine H.R. 3916, a bill introduced by Ranking
Member Ralph Hall with the goal of improving long-term planning for
research and development at the Department of Homeland Security,
especially in the area of border and maritime security technology. The
bill authorizes specific border security technology programs, and
instructs DHS S&T to improve processes for setting research priorities
and serving the needs of technology end-users.
Section-by-Section Discussion
Section 1: Requires the Department of Homeland Security Science and
Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) to clearly define the operational
requirements of technologies they are developing for Customs and Border
Patrol and other end-users. These one to three-year product development
projects are part of the Transition portfolio at DHS S&T and comprise
the bulk of research and development spending (approximately 70
percent).
This section is intended to ensure that both DHS S&T and the DHS
customer component that will eventually own and operate the equipment
developed have agreed to baseline requirements for operational as well
as technical objectives. This requirement can be met through the
Technology Transition Agreements (TTAs) that S&T currently negotiates
for development work.
Section 2: Extends the S&T Advisory Committee, which was last extended
through December 31st, 2008 in the SAFE Ports Act of 2006. Currently
S&T is appointing new members and has recently begun new meetings. The
Committee briefly lapsed in November 2005. Further extends the Advisory
Committee through December 31, 2012.
The HSSTAC was created with the original Homeland Security Act, but
lapsed once and has produced little for the Department. Since coming
on-board last year, Under Secretary Cohen has reconstituted the
committee and begun seeking their advice on specific topics. However,
the committee will lapse again in December of 2008 without
congressional action. The usefulness of the HSSTAC is largely
determined by the Under Secretary's willingness to engage them in his
decision-making, but letting them lapse would remove the only
independent, S&T-focused advisory body immediately available to the
department.
Section 3: Calls for an NRC study to provide a roadmap for research
activities in the border/maritime division.
One of the primary gaps in DHS S&T's planning is the lack of a
long-term research strategy. In 2002 the National Academies completed a
90-day study titled ``Making the Nation Safer'' that gave a general
overview of how DHS S&T could support the then-fledgling Department.
However, DHS S&T has failed to set specific long-term strategic
priorities to guide research and development decisions. This section
would allow the NAS to look specifically at one division of DHS S&T.
The document produced by the NRC would give program managers at DHS a
longer-term perspective than is provided through the one to three-year
IPT process. If successful, similar reports could be commissioned for
the other major DHS S&T divisions, such as Explosives or C2I.
Section 4: Reminds DHS of their role as a potential operator of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the national airspace and directs
them to continue their work in the Joint Planning and Development
Office accordingly. Currently, operation of UAVs in national airspace
requires considerable advance planning and approval from the Federal
Aviation Administration. Requires DHS to seek the ability to routinely
and safely operate UAVs for border and maritime security missions.
Authorizes DHS to take part in pilot projects to obtain whatever data
is necessary to make an informed decision about how UAVs can be safely
included in the airspace.
Several laws enacted in the 108th and 109th Congresses instructed
DHS to work towards implementing a UAV surveillance program for border
security. Numerous challenges have prevented DHS from launching a broad
UAV program, including safety concerns. UAVs currently have an accident
rate 100 times greater than that of manned aircraft. They are also more
susceptible to adverse weather conditions than manned aircraft. These
safety issues can likely be solved through further research, but flight
tests will be an integral part of improving UAV technology. However,
under current FAA regulations, UAVs cannot fly in the U.S. without
special permission.
DHS is involved in an inter-agency planning group, the Joint
Planning and Development Office (JPDO), to design the Nation's next
generation air traffic control system, including UAV use. However,
DHS's involvement to date is principally through the TSA. Given the
high likelihood that DHS components would operate UAVs in the U.S., the
Department should take a more active role now in planning for their
introduction.
Section 5: Requires DHS to create a formal research program in the area
of tunnel detection, and to coordinate with similar DOD activities.
Calls for priority to be given to technologies that would allow real-
time detection of tunnels and would allow for immediate action by
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers.
Various advanced fencing and surveillance technologies are
currently being tested as part of the Secure Border Initiative.
However, in San Diego, where the double-layer Sandia fencing has been
constructed, smugglers have dug numerous tunnels underneath the border
fence, including one concrete-reinforced, kilometer-long tunnel. This
is just one example of the systemic challenges that face border patrol
agents. With time and resources, committed individuals can avoid most
border surveillance by simply digging right past them. Furthermore,
detecting tunnels is remarkably difficult and solutions in the one to
three-year time-frame are not likely. This has led DHS S&T and CBP to
focus on other near-term priorities. This section asserts Congressional
interest in a long-term tunnel detection program.
Section 6: Requires the Under Secretary for S&T and Director of NIST to
begin a joint R&D project of anti-counterfeit technologies and
standards. Furthermore, this designee is charged with coordinating
research activities with other federal agencies engaged in related
research. Requires a report to Congress on the research programs
undertaken under this section one year after enactment.
Counterfeit documents are a major problem at legal ports of entry,
with individuals attempting to enter the U.S. using fraudulent
passports, identification, or birth certificates. CBP intercepts over
200 fake documents daily at the Nation's borders, but technology for
creating counterfeit documents is growing increasingly sophisticated
and fraud is increasingly difficult to detect. The Federal Government
has begun to support research activities to development technology for
verifying documents, but currently activity in this area is broadly
distributed with DOD, Treasury, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement,
State, and Justice all pursuing various aspects. DHS S&T, however, has
not been actively involved despite the clear impact on agencies such at
ICE and CBP.
Chairman Gordon. Good morning, everyone, to today's hearing
on Next Generation Border and Maritime Security Technologies.
Now, the mission of U.S. Customs and Border Protection is
one of the most difficult within the Department of Homeland
Security. CBP officials are responsible for securing the
movement of people and goods by air, land, sea, across our
nation's borders. That job is part law enforcement, part first
responder, part diplomat, and part detective, and the scope of
CBP's job is enormous. Nearly 1.2 million people come through
our legal ports of entry every day. In addition, illegal
activity, including unlawful border crossing, drug smuggling,
and human trafficking is persistent.
The State Department estimates that nearly 18,000 people
are smuggled into the U.S. every year for the purpose of forced
labor. They also report that nearly 90 percent of the cocaine
and the majority of the heroin in the U.S. comes from our
southern borders. It is clear that these agents need the help
of new technology to do their jobs better, and to make our
borders more secure.
Technology acts as additional eyes and ears for Border
Patrol agents, allowing for observation of border areas 24
hours a day. The Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate supports R&D to meet technology needs of
the Department's components, including CBP. There are some
promising technologies that have been deployed, but the
enormous scope of the border security challenge requires a
long-term strategic plan that has not yet been developed.
Without a specific plan for border security technology
research, long-term basic research will be disconnected from
the real-life challenges of coming years and decades.
Additionally, short-term priorities must be more responsive
to the needs of end-users. When he appeared before the
Technology and Innovation Subcommittee in March, Under
Secretary Cohen outlined measures that DHS S&T is taking to
involve end-users in setting research priorities, including
integrated product teams and Web-based means for soliciting
end-user opinions on technical needs. But DHS must do more than
simply identify capability gaps. End-users should be able to
provide feedback on cost, robustness, and other characteristics
that determine whether a technology will be adopted or whether
it will sit on the shelf. This is especially true for border
security technologies, which are often used by agents without
significant technical training in harsh environments.
I would like to commend Ranking Member Hall on his bill,
H.R. 3916, which takes important steps toward improving the
capabilities of the Border Patrol to prevent criminal
activities at and around our nation's borders. Mr. Hall's bill
authorizes important programs to enhance Border Patrol's
ability to carry out its mission by supporting short- and long-
term research priorities. Additionally, it ensures that new
technologies will be useful to Border Patrol agents by
mandating that DHS work to meet cost and training needs of end-
users when developing these technologies. This bill is a
concrete step toward solving a complex issue now, on how to
secure our nation's borders against those who would do us harm.
I look forward to working with Ranking Member Hall on this bill
as we move forward.
I now recognize Dr. Gingrey, the Ranking Member, for his
opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bart Gordon
I'd like to thank Chairman Wu for calling today's hearing and
commend Ranking Member Hall on his bill, which takes important steps
towards improving the capabilities of the Border Patrol to prevent
criminal activity at and around our nation's borders.
Border Patrol agents are responsible for securing nearly seven
thousand miles of land borders to the North and South, as well as
ninety-five thousand miles of shoreline. While our current corps of
border patrol agents is doing a commendable job, their job is daunting.
Technology can play a vital role in extending observational
capabilities, helping border patrol agents locate suspects and monitor
the border more effectively.
Mr. Hall's bill authorizes important programs to enhance the border
patrols ability to carry out its mission by supporting short- and long-
term research priorities.
Additionally, it ensures that new technologies will be useful to
border patrol agents by mandating that DHS work to meet cost and
training needs of end-users when developing these technologies.
This bill is a concrete step towards solving a complex issue: how
to secure our nation's borders against those who would do us harm.
I look forward to working with Ranking Member Hall on this bill as
we move forward.
Mr. Gingrey. Good morning, Chairman Gordon, and I want to
thank you for, of course, holding this hearing on H.R. 3916,
the border security bill that was introduced by the
distinguished Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Hall,
of Texas.
As an original co-sponsor of H.R. 3916, I am pleased to see
that the Science Committee and specifically this subcommittee,
which I am Ranking Member of, the Subcommittee on Technology
and Innovation, is taking an active role in securing our
borders, and I believe it is one of the most important issues
facing this Congress and the country as a whole.
Mr. Chairman, I commend both you and Chairman Wu for co-
sponsoring the legislation that does improve long-term planning
for R&D at the Department of Homeland Security and border and
maritime security technology. As a Member of the Congressional
Immigration Reform Caucus, I support and I have authored
legislation that will help secure our borders and discourage
illegal immigration. I believe that H.R. 3916 will assist the
Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Agency in long-term utilization of technologies to
help us secure our border from threats that face our nation.
Mr. Chairman, I am indeed, as I say, proud to support this
legislation, and at this time, I will yield back to you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gingrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Phil Gingrey
Good Morning Chairman Wu. I want to first thank you for holding
this hearing on H.R. 3916 the border security bill introduced by the
distinguished Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Hall of Texas.
As an original co-sponsor of H.R. 3916, I am pleased to see that the
Science Committee--and specifically the Subcommittee on Technology and
Innovation--is taking an active role in securing our borders, which I
believe is one of the most important issues facing this Congress and
our country as a whole.
Mr. Chairman, I commend both you and Chairman Gordon for co-
sponsoring this legislation that improves long-term planning for R&D at
the Department of Homeland Security in border and maritime security
technology. As a Member of the Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus,
I support and have authored legislation that will secure our borders
and discourage illegal immigration. I believe that H.R. 3916 will
assist the DHS and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency in
long-term utilization of technology to help us secure our border from
threats that face our nation.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing today's testimony from our
panel on this vital issue of border security and the solutions they
have that will enable us to plan for the use of emerging technologies
in the future. With that Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Gordon. With no objections, I would like to yield
to Mr. Hall for whatever time he might consume.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I join Dr. Gingrey
in his accolades for your cooperation and assistance in holding
a hearing on border security and House Bill 3916, that I
introduced just a few weeks ago, and I think it is a crucial
issue for the Committee to discuss, and I would like to thank
you and the Full Committee, Chairman Gordon. I thank you
personally for co-sponsoring this legislation and bringing this
very capable panel before us today. I would also like to thank
Mr. McCaul for the substantial contribution he made to the
bill.
Border security is a concern of all Members of Congress,
and we have nearly 7,500 miles of border, land border with
Canada and Mexico, over which half a billion people and 2.5
million rail cars pass each year. In addition, we have over 300
ports that see over nine million cargo containers each year.
Now, we have a myriad of reasons for wanting strict control
over this traffic. For instance, according to Department of
Justice statistics, over 30,000 kilograms of cocaine, heroin,
and meth were seized within 150 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border
in 2006.
I know many Members of this committee have worked
tirelessly and hard to end the meth problems in our nation, yet
success at restricting access to meth ingredients here in the
States has led drug dealers to import more across our borders.
Stopping the flow of narcotics across our borders remains, I
think, key to our efforts to curb illegal drug use.
The threat of terrorism also compels us to re-examine our
borders. Whether we are talking about foreign groups trying to
infiltrate our country, or homegrown terrorists seeking weapons
and supplies, our borders remain a critical element of our
defenses. Our enemies, however, are adaptive and guileful. One
of our witnesses today, Dr. Jackson, has tracked a number of
terrorist groups and has sage advice about our need for a
multi-layered defense.
Finally, in Fiscal Year 2005, U.S. Border Patrol agents
apprehended 1.19 million people attempting to enter the country
illegally. While I understand the concerns many Members have
regarding comprehensive immigration reform, we should not allow
that issue to stymie progress deterring terrorists, drug
smugglers, and human traffickers.
I believe this committee is ideally positioned to
strengthen control of our nation's borders through bipartisan
legislation supporting effective, efficient, and evolving
defenses. H.R. 3916 begins this effort. The sections in this
bill reflect a single underlying theme. The Science and
Technology Directorate at DHS needs to establish long-term
goals and objectives for border security and broaden science
and technology community involvement. The bill highlights three
long-term research areas: unmanned aerial vehicles, tunnel
detection, and anti-counterfeit technologies that promise to
significantly improve border security across all the threats
and against all the threats that we currently face.
I have a longer statement for the record that includes
additional background on H.R. 3916, but in the interests of
time, I will yield following one parting thought, and that is
that border security is one of the most difficult problems
faced by scientists and engineers. It is a complex system of--
it is just a system of systems, that will require concerted
interdisciplinary attention over many years, and I urge this
committee to take the lead in Congress to push a long-term,
adaptable, science-enabled border security policy.
And I yield back my time, and I thank the Chair.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall
Chairman Wu, thank you for holding this hearing on border security
and the bill H.R. 3916 that I introduced just a few weeks ago. I
believe this is a crucial issue for this committee to discuss. And I
would like to thank you and Full Committee Chairman Gordon for co-
sponsoring this legislation and bringing this capable panel before us
today. I'd also like to thank Mr. McCaul for the substantial
contribution he made to the bill.
Border security is a concern of all Members of Congress. We have
nearly 7,500 miles of land border with Canada and Mexico, over which
half a billion people and 2.5 million rail cars pass per year. In
addition we have over 300 ports that see over nine million cargo
containers each year. Meanwhile, the Government Accountability Office
estimates that one in ten serious drug and weapon violators and illegal
immigrants pass through airports and land borders undetected.
We have a myriad of reasons for wanting strict control over this
traffic. For instance, according to Department of Justice statistics,
over 26,000 kilograms of marijuana were seized in northern border
states in 2005 while over 30,000 kilograms of cocaine, heroine, and
methamphetamine were seized within 150 miles of the U.S./Mexico border
in 2006. Stopping the flow of narcotics across our border remains key
to our efforts to curb illegal drug use. I know many Members of this
committee have worked tirelessly to end the scourge of methamphetamine
in our nation. Yet, success at restricting access to meth ingredients
here in the States has led drug dealers to import more across our
borders.
The threat of terrorism also compels us to re-examine our borders.
Whether we're talking about foreign groups trying to infiltrate our
country or home-grown terrorists seeking weapons and supplies, our
borders remain a critical element of our defenses. Major efforts in
this area are well underway. With the help of the Science and
Technology Directorate, Customs and Border Protection has created a
massive screening program to detect nuclear material that might be
smuggled in via cargo containers. Our enemies, however, are adaptive
and guileful. One of our witnesses today, Dr. Jackson, has tracked a
number of terrorist groups and has sage advice about our need for a
multi-layered defense.
Finally, in fiscal year 2005, U.S. Border Patrol agents apprehended
1.19 million people attempting to enter the country illegally. While I
understand the concerns many Members have regarding comprehensive
immigration reform, we should not allow that issue to stymie progress
deterring terrorists, drug smugglers, and human traffickers.
I believe this committee is ideally positioned to strengthen
control of our nation's borders through bipartisan legislation
supporting effective, efficient, and evolving defenses. H.R. 3916
begins this effort. The sections in this bill reflect a single
underlying theme: the Science and Technology Directorate at DHS needs
to establish long-term goals and objectives for border security and
broaden science and technology community involvement. The bill
highlights three long-term research areas, unmanned aerial vehicles,
tunnel detection, and anti-counterfeit technologies, that promise to
significantly improve border security across all the threats we
currently face.
Section 1 requires S&T to include cost and operational objectives
in any near-term application development. This section is meant to
ensure that both S&T and the DHS component that will eventually own and
operate the equipment developed have agreed to baseline requirements
for operational as well as technical objectives. This requirement can
easily be met through the Technology Transfer Agreements (TTAs) that
S&T currently negotiates for development work.
Section 2 extends the S&T Directorate's advisory committee through
2012. The HSSTAC was created with the original Homeland Security Act,
but lapsed once in that time. Under Secretary Cohen has reconstituted
the committee and begun seeking their advice on specific topics.
However, the committee will lapse again in December of 2008 without
Congressional action.
Section 3 specifically addresses long-term planning in the border
security realm by tasking the National Research Council with a needs
assessment and road-mapping request. In 2002 the National Academies
completed a 90-day study titled ``Making the Nation Safer'' that gave a
general overview of how S&T could support the fledgling DHS. This
section would allow the NAS to look specifically at one sector of DHS
S&T. The document produced by the NRC would give program managers at
DHS a longer-term perspective than is provided through the one to
three-year IPT planning process. If successful, similar reports could
be commissioned for the other major DHS S&T divisions, such as
Explosives, Chem/Bio, or Cyber Security.
Section 4 directs the Secretary of DHS to take an active role in
safely incorporating unmanned aerial vehicles into the national
airspace. UAV's cannot currently fly in the U.S. without special
permission from the FAA. DHS is involved in an interagency planning
group, the JPDO, to design the Nation's next generation air traffic
control system, including UAV use. Given the high likelihood that DHS
components would operate UAVs in the U.S., the Department should take a
more active role now in planning for their introduction.
The tunnel detection program described in Section 5 aims at solving
a persistent smuggling problem. Organized crime has the time and
resources to avoid most border surveillance by simply digging right
past them. However, detecting tunnels is remarkably difficult and
solutions in the one to three-year timeframe are not likely.
Similarly Section 6 asserts Congressional interest in a sustained
program to defeat counterfeiting. Activity in this area is broadly
distributed in the Federal Government with DOD, Treasury, Immigrations
and Customs Enforcement, State, and Justice all pursuing various
aspects. DHS S&T, however, does not have a devoted office or program in
this area despite the clear impact on agencies such at ICE and CBP.
Border security is one of the most difficult problems faced by
scientists and engineers. It is a complex system of systems that will
require concerted, interdisciplinary attention over many years. I urge
this committee to take the lead in Congress to push a long-term,
adaptable, science-enabled border security policy.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Hall. Your full remarks
will be made a part of the record. As a Texan, you have first-
hand knowledge of this, and I can assure you that the Majority
looks very forward to working with you and Dr. Gingrey and your
staff and other Members of this committee on this important
issue. It will be fast tracked, and we will, again, be as
accommodating as you would like.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Wu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman David Wu
I want to thank everyone for attending today's hearing on Next
Generation Border and Maritime Security Technologies.
The mission of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection is one of the
most difficult within the Department of Homeland Security. CBP
officials are responsible for securing the movement of people and goods
by air, land, and sea across our nation's borders. That job is part law
enforcement, part first responder, part diplomat, and part detective.
And the scope of its job is enormous. Nearly 1.2 million people come
through legal ports of entry every day. In addition, illegal activity--
including unlawful border crossings, drug smuggling, and human
trafficking--is persistent. The State Department estimates that nearly
18 thousand people are smuggled into the U.S. every year for the
purpose of forced labor. They also report that nearly 90 percent of
cocaine and a majority of the heroin in the U.S. comes across our
Southern border.
The House has voted to increase the number of Border Patrol
officers by 3000, and it is clear that these agents need the help of
new technology to do their jobs better and to make our borders more
secure. Technology acts as additional eyes and ears for Border Patrol
agents, allowing for observation of broad areas 24 hours a day.
Innovative technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles, infrared
sensors, and motion detectors help border agents identify where illegal
activity might be taking place, multiplying the effectiveness of
existing and added CBP staff.
The Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
Directorate supports R&D to meet the technology needs of the
Department's components, including CBP. There are some promising
technologies that have been deployed, but the enormous scope of the
border security challenge requires a long-term strategic plan that has
not yet been developed. Without a specific plan for border security
technology research, long-term basic research will be disconnected from
the real life challenges of coming years and decades.
Additionally, short-term priorities must be more responsive to the
needs of end-users. When he appeared before this subcommittee in March,
Under Secretary Cohen outlined measures that DHS S&T is taking to
involve end-users in setting research priorities, including Integrated
Product Teams and web-based means of soliciting opinions.
But DHS must do more than simply identify capability gaps that need
to be filled with technology. End-users should be able to provide
feedback on cost, robustness and other characteristics that determine
whether a technology will be adopted or whether it will sit on the
shelf. This is especially true for border security technologies, which
are often used by agents without significant technical training in
harsh environments.
I want to thank the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Hall,
for introducing H.R. 3916, which we will be discussing today. That
legislation addresses these crucial issues and brings up some important
questions. Do we have the technology we need to help CBP do its job? Do
the new technologies developed by DHS meet the needs of end-users in
terms of cost and ease of use, and other important parameters? And,
more generally, how is the DHS Science and Technology Directorate
determining priorities for R&D?
I'm eager to hear our witnesses' thoughts on the answers to these
questions. I am especially interested to hear our DHS witnesses'
comments on how they will work to meet the technology needs of the
border patrol in the short- and long-term. We need to do a better job
of aligning research to the needs of end-users, and I'm looking forward
to working with my colleagues to promote innovative technology to
support our nation's hardworking border patrol.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Harry E. Mitchell
Border security is an issue that truly hits home. Illegal
immigration affects Arizona more than any other state-more than half of
illegal crossings over the U.S.-Mexico border happen in Arizona.
When the Federal Government fails to live up to its responsibility,
Arizona pays a hefty price. Illegal immigration fosters violent drug
and human smuggling crimes, and burdens our local law enforcement and
emergency rooms.
These illegal crossings threaten our national security. We must do
better.
We can start by ensuring that these border agents have all the
tools necessary to protect our borders. Stopping people from crossing
the border is not as simple as building a fence. These people sneak
across the border daily by going to under-patrolled areas, jumping over
fences, and building underground tunnels.
I am proud to co-sponsor Chairman Hall's legislation, H.R. 3916,
which will help provide our border guards with technologically advanced
equipment to monitor the borders. Significantly, this bill will improve
border security by advancing technology for tunnel detection as well as
aerial monitoring of the border.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how this
legislation will help secure our borders.
I yield back.
Chairman Gordon. Let me also say, this is a very
distinguished panel. I want to thank you for taking your time
to be here. We have Members that are in both parties, who have
conferences and meetings this morning getting started, so we
are going to have some folks coming in. This hearing is
televised. Staff are watching it both from the anteroom and
back in the offices, and Members are watching it there, too, so
your testimony falls on a large audience, and we want to have
that input from all.
So now let me introduce our distinguished panel. First, Mr.
Robert Hooks is the Director of Transition at the Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, also
known as DHS S&T. Mr. Ervin Kapos is the Director of Operations
Analysis at the DHS S&T and coordinates the Homeland Security
Science and Technology Advisory Committee, called HSSTAC. And
Dr. Brian Jackson is the Associate Director of the Homeland
Security Research Program at the RAND Corporation. And Mr. Jeff
Self is the Division Chief for the U.S. Border Patrol, for some
real-world information here today. Thank you, Chief, for being
here.
And as our witnesses should know, the spoken testimony is,
we try to limit it to five, but we don't want you to feel
uncomfortable. If you--we really want your information, if you
take what you need, and the remainder of your testimony will
certainly be in the record.
And we will now start with Mr. Hooks.
STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT R. HOOKS, DIRECTOR OF TRANSITION,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Hooks. Good morning, Chairman Gordon, Ranking Members
Hall and Gingrey, and distinguished Members of this
subcommittee. I am Robert Hooks, and I should clarify, I am not
a doctor. I wish I was, but I am not.
I am the Director of Transition Portfolio for the Science
and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland
Security, and I am pleased to appear before you today to
discuss the successes that the Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology Directorate have achieved
with respect to technology solutions on our borders, both land
and sea. Under Secretary Cohen asked me to express his
appreciation and thanks to this committee, your staffs, and the
entire Congress for the strong bipartisan leadership and
support you have given him and the men and women of the Science
and Technology Directorate as we work to make the Nation safer.
Nearly 14 months ago, with Congress' support, Under
Secretary Cohen implemented a new organizational structure for
the Science and Technology Directorate, to make it customer
focused and output oriented. Our customers are the operating
components and directorates of DHS, and their stakeholders are
the State, local, tribal governments, first responders, and the
private-sector entities. Our Science and Technology effort to
deliver technology is primarily organized into three
portfolios: transition, innovation, and basic research.
The Product Transition Portfolio, for which I am the
Director, is centered on 11 functional DHS customer-led,
Capstone Integrated Product Teams, three of which are Maritime
Security, Cargo Security, and Border Security. In the Capstone
IPTs, DHS operational components, and directorates are the
chairs or co-chairs. They define and prioritize the capability
gaps, then S&T offers technical solutions, where the customer
is then the final approval on if the offered technical solution
is appropriate for them.
While we have identified the principal customers within the
Capstone IPTs, as the chairs or co-chairs, they are not the
only representatives at these IPTs. All of the DHS operational
components and directorates are invited as customers to any
Capstone IPT relevant to their mission. As an example, because
of the interrelationship within their respective geographic
areas of responsibility, Coast Guard has representation at the
Borders IPT, and CBP is represented at the Border Security IPT.
Directed by the priorities of the Border, Cargo, and
Maritime Security Capstone IPTs, S&T is developing technologies
that can be delivered to components in the near-term, usually
less than three years, to assist in securing our maritime land
borders and protecting CBP and Coast Guard law enforcement
officers, and you see some of those displayed on the placards
and also at the table.
We are pursuing efforts to deliver advanced detection,
identification, apprehension, and enforcement capabilities
along land and maritime borders, and provide advanced
technology, spiral development injections into DHS component
program areas, such as SBInet, Command 21, the Secure Freight
Initiative, Container Security Initiative, and Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism, CTPAT.
Specifically in the border security area, a number of our
near-term product transition programs focus on developing
detection, classification, and localization sensor technology
to monitor illegal border activity with a wider range and
greater accuracy than present-day technologies and command-and-
control systems that deliver a much broader amount of
information about current events to different levels of law
enforcement, communication systems that provide connectivity
for law enforcement officers working in remote locations, as
well as modeling and simulation tools to help border
enforcement agencies make informed improvements in immigration
and border security policy and operations, and appropriate
investments in technology, complex systems, and infrastructure.
These technologies and systems will help to ensure that
maritime and border security assets are used effectively and
efficiently, and enable law enforcement to have access to
robust and reliable intelligence when they need it.
S&T is also developing and delivering technologies that
will enable border security and Coast Guard members to perform
their current tasks more efficiently, effectively, and with a
higher level of safety. Development of these tools, in many
cases, is leveraged from the initial investment of other
government agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the
National Institutes of Justice, and then adapt it to fit the
operational environment and functions of the several DHS
security components.
We are also developing near-term technologies to improve
supply chain security and thus decrease screening frequency and
simultaneously increasing our probability of detection against
dangerous contraband. Using a system-of-systems approach, we
are developing advanced sensor and communication technologies
within a security architecture that encompasses the world's
supply chain. Some of the technologies developed in this
program will enable CBP officers to identify tampering events,
their location, track the shipping containers, and ensure that
alarm data is communicated reliably and securely.
Consistent with H.R. 3916, we recognize that our technology
effort needs to account for the affordability, life cycle
costs, and the training costs. This way, if the procurement
based on our new technology would be too expensive for the
component or the operating costs too prohibitive, the decision
to look for a new technology solution can be made early, before
large acquisition buy programs are initiated, and before the
federal, State, local, and tribal entities expend their
precious resources.
The basic research portfolio addresses long-term research
and development needs in support of the DHS mission areas that
will provide the Nation with an enduring capability in homeland
security. The basic research program is focused on research
projects that clearly contribute to the goals of S&T's DHS
customers and is informed by the customer capability gaps
identified in the Capstone IPTs.
This type of focused, long-term research investment has the
potential to lead to paradigm shifts in the Nation's homeland
security capabilities. An example is in tunnel detection. This
is a type of long-term, focused research effort that would be
tackled in the basic research area. As you are probably aware,
the threats posed by clandestine, underground tunneling along
the border in order to smuggle persons and goods into the
United States is a serious and growing concern. Tunnel
detection was a priority capability gap identified in our
Border Security IPT as well, and needing a technical solution.
However, there are currently no promising near-term
technologies to detect underground tunnels efficiently that
supports the Border Patrol's operations. The detection of
smuggling in these tunnels requires a combination of both
direct and indirect methods to determine the shape, size,
position of the tunnel, geophysical characteristics, and
understanding of the various detection methods.
The basic research area intends to study and characterize
the geophysical characteristics of key border regions, examine
the limitations of current detection methods, assist in
advancing those detection methods, and examine the potential
for new, complementary detection methods. This research and
other new discovery is necessary so that future technology
development of an effective tunnel detector will be possible.
So, you can see how the basic research tunnel investment will
directly support and be complementary to our transition and
innovation R&D efforts.
Our innovation portfolio supports a key goal to put
advanced capabilities into the hands of our customers as soon
as possible as well. This is a high-risk research area, as
compared to the low-risk product transition area, but if
successful can be a game changer and provide new and improved
operational capability to our component customers. An example
is another tunnel detection effort. We are exploring
additional, novel approaches to tunnel detection, including
experimenting with UAV-mounted digital, electromagnetic, and
gravity gradiometers, to determine their effectiveness and
reliability. If successful, this will provide a wide-area
search capability for rapid tunnel detection, potentially
suitable to the Border Patrol. This demonstration may fail, but
if successful will be a great game changer in our ability to
protect the border.
Another innovative program includes DHS partnering with DOD
and the ongoing global observer Joint Concept Technology
Demonstrator, JCTD, which offers the potential for DHS to
provide persistent, airborne, wide-area surveillance along our
borders and coasts. In cooperation with CBP and the Coast
Guard, S&T is planning a demonstration for employing maritime
radar on an unmanned aircraft to detect and help prosecute
drug-running boats off the Florida coast, for example--
Mr. Mitchell. Could you wrap it up, Mr. Hooks?
Mr. Hooks. Yes, sir. Sorry.
In summary, DHS is dedicated to being a customer-focused,
output-oriented organization. Thank you.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. Mr. Kapos.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hooks follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert R. Hooks
Good morning, Chairman Wu, Congressman Gingrey and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee. I am Robert Hooks, and I am the Director
of the Transition Portfolio for the Science and Technology Directorate
of the Department of Homeland Security, and I am pleased to appear
before you today to discuss successes that the Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology Directorate has achieved with respect
to technology solutions on our borders.
As you are aware, Under Secretary Cohen is on travel and I am
honored to appear before you in his place. Under Secretary Cohen asked
me to express his appreciation and thanks to this committee, your
staff, and the entire Congress, for the strong, bipartisan leadership
and support you have given him and the men and women of the Science and
Technology Directorate as we work to make the Nation safer.
Introduction to the DHS S&T Organization
Nearly 14 months ago, with Congress' support, Under Secretary Cohen
implemented a new organizational structure for the Science and
Technology Directorate to make it customer focused and output oriented.
Our customers are the operating components and directorates of DHS, and
their stakeholders are the State, local and tribal governments, first
responders and private sector entities. Our Science and Technology
effort to deliver technology is primarily organized into three
portfolios: Basic Research, Innovation, and Product Transition.
Introduction to the Basic Research Portfolio
The Basic Research portfolio addresses long-term research and
development needs in support of DHS mission areas that will provide the
Nation with an enduring capability in homeland security. This type of
focused, long-term research investment has the potential to lead to
paradigm shifts in the Nation's homeland security capabilities.
In support of this objective for long-term research and
development, we are in the process of establishing additional
university-based Centers of Excellence in critical homeland security
mission areas, including a Center for Excellence for Border Security
and Immigration and a Center of Excellence for Maritime, Island, and
Extreme/Remote Environment Security. These centers will provide
fundamental research to support the DHS goals of strengthening border
security, maritime security, and interior immigration enforcement.
These centers will also establish education programs in homeland
security relevant to their specific mission areas. This will provide
learning opportunities to support the development of the next
generation of homeland security leaders. We are currently in the
selection phase and expect to announce the institutions for the new
Centers of Excellence this month.
Tunnel Detection is an example of the type of focused, long-term
research effort that we would tackle in the basic research area. As you
are probably aware, the threats posed by clandestine underground
tunneling along the border in order to smuggle persons and goods into
the United States are a serious and growing concern. Detection of these
smuggling tunnels requires a combination of both direct and indirect
methods to determine the shape, size, and position of the tunnel,
geophysical characteristics, and understanding of the various detection
methods. If funded in fiscal year 2009, we intend to study and
characterize the geophysical characteristics of key border regions,
examine the limitations of current detection methods, assist in
advancing those detection methods, and examine the potential for new
complementary detection methods. The basic research tunnel investment
will directly support and be complementary to our Transition and
Innovation efforts.
Introduction to the Innovation Portfolio
The Innovation portfolio--Homeland Security Advanced Research
Project Agency (HSARPA)--supports a key goal of Under Secretary Cohen's
to put advanced capabilities into the hands of our customers as soon as
possible. Within the Innovation Portfolio, we have two overarching
programs: High Impact Technology Solutions or HITS, and Homeland
Innovative Prototypical Solutions or HIPS.
HITS are designed to provide proof-of-concept solutions within one
to three years that could result in high-payoff technology
breakthroughs. An example of a HITS is the tunnel detection effort.
While we are in the process of awarding a contract as a result of a
Broad Agency Announcement soliciting additional novel approaches to
tunnel detection, we are also experimenting with UAV mounted digital
electromagnetic gradiometers to determine effectiveness and
reliability. If successful, this would provide a wide area search
capability for rapid tunnel detection. This is high risk research, but
if successful, can be a game-changer of new operational capability to
our component customers and will complement our Transition and
Innovation efforts.
HIPS are designed to deliver prototype-level demonstrations of
game-changing technologies within two to five years. An example within
the HIPS portfolio is the SAFECON project which is focused on
developing an advanced screening capability at ports of entry. Sensors
mounted on a crane interrogate shipping containers as the crane engages
and lifts the container off of the ship. The sensors detect and
identify dangerous cargo without impact to the normal flow of commerce.
Our goal is to detect and identify dangerous cargo within 45 seconds or
less.
Introduction to the Product Transition Portfolio
The Product Transition Portfolio, for which I am the Director, is
centered on 11, functional, customer led, Capstone Integrated Product
Teams (IPTs), three of which are Maritime Security, Cargo Security, and
Border Security. In the Capstone IPTs, DHS operational components and
directorates are the chairs or co-chairs and they define and prioritize
capability gaps, then S&T offers technical solutions, and the customers
are the final approval on if the offered technical solution is
appropriate.
Specific to border security, our Border Security Capstone IPT is
co-chaired by David Aguilar, Chief of the Border Patrol, and Luke
McCormack, Chief Information Officer of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). For Cargo Security, Jayson Ahern, Former Assistant
Commissioner for CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO), was the
original chair. His successor is Tom Winkowski, CBP's New Assistant
Commissioner for Office of Field Operations. For Maritime Security,
Rear Admiral Ron Hewitt, USCG, was the original chair. His successor is
Rear Admiral Robert Parker, USCG, Assistant Commandant for Capability
(CG-7).
While we have identified the principal stakeholders within the
Capstone IPTs as chairs or co-chairs, they are not the only customer
representatives to the IPTs. All DHS operational components and
directorates are invited as customers to any Capstone IPT relevant to
their mission. As an example, because of the inter-relationship within
their respective geographic areas of responsibility, Coast Guard has
representation on the Borders IPT, TSA, and DHS Policy office have
representation on the Cargo IPT, and, CBP and ICE have representation
on the Maritime Security IPT. Directed by the priorities of the Border,
Cargo, and Maritime Security Capstone IPTs, we are developing
technologies that can be delivered to the components in three years or
less to assist in securing our maritime and land borders, and protect
our Customs and Border Protection and Coast Guard law enforcement
officers.
Introduction to the Borders and Maritime Security Division
The Borders and Maritime Security Division oversees the delivery of
technologies to provide advanced detection, identification,
apprehension and enforcement capabilities along land and maritime
borders, and provide advanced technology spiral-development
``injections'' into the following program areas: Secure Border
Initiative Network (SBI Net), Command 21, Secure Freight Initiative,
Container Security Initiative, and Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT).
Borders and Maritime Technologies Programs
A number of our programs focus on developing Detection,
Classification, and Localization (DCL) sensor technologies to monitor
illegal border activity with a wider range and greater accuracy than
present-day technologies; command and control systems that deliver a
much broader amount of information about current events to different
levels of law enforcement; communications systems that provide
connectivity to law enforcement officers working in remote locations;
and modeling and simulation tools to help border enforcement agencies
make informed improvements in immigration and border security policy
and operations, as well as investments in technology, complex systems
and infrastructure. These technologies and systems will help to ensure
that maritime and border security assets are used efficiently and
effectively and enable law enforcement to have access to robust and
reliable intelligence when they need it.
Unmanned Aircraft for Border and Maritime Security Missions
We are continuing to actively develop technologies that will permit
routine operation of UAVs for border and maritime security missions
within the National Airspace System. In conjunction with the FAA and
the DOD, we are developing an FAA-validated simulation that will be
used, starting in FY09, to evaluate automated sense and avoid systems,
the key enabler for safe and routine unmanned aircraft flight. DHS S&T
is also partnering with DOD in the ongoing Global Observer Joint
Concept and Technology Demonstration (JCTD), which offers the potential
for DHS to provide persistent, airborne, wide area surveillance along
our borders and coasts.
In cooperation with Customs and Border Protection and the Coast
Guard, S&T is planning a demonstration for employing maritime radar on
an unmanned aircraft to detect and help prosecute drug running boats
off the Florida coast. We are actively pursuing, both outside DHS with
the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Transportation and inside DHS
with CBP and the Coast Guard, the increased use of unmanned aircraft to
secure our nation's borders and provide airborne capabilities for
requirements that require extended station times.
Border Officer Tools Program
The officer tools and safety effort is developing and delivering
technologies that will enable border security and Coast Guard members
to perform their current tasks more efficiency, effectively, and with a
higher level of safety. Development of these tools in many cases is
leveraged from the initial investments of other government agencies,
and then adapted to fit the operational environment and functions of
several DHS security components. Where possible, technology is
leveraged to support multiple DHS components. For example, the program
will provide Coast Guard boarding officers with tools they carry onto
vessels to perform inspections, which could be applied to CBP searches
of over-the-road transportation. We are also developing tools that can
be used by multiple DHS components to rapidly search vessels or
vehicles, locate any hidden compartments, discriminate legitimate cargo
from contraband, and remotely attain a positive identification of a
person. We have recently developed and are not testing a pre-
acquisition prototype of a repeater-based communications system that
permits communication among boarding team members, no matter where they
are in a ship. Repeaters are small transmission devices that are
deployed like breadcrumbs as boarding officers enter and search a ship.
The repeaters provide 100 percent connectivity between boarding team
members in areas that previously allowed less than 50 percent
connectivity without repeaters. In the future, we plan to make
available a deployable communications repeater for boarding teams.
Cargo Security Efforts and Programs
Through our SAFECON (safe container) HIPS project, we are
researching ways to quickly screen cargo at ports of entry. As a
complement, we are also looking to improve supply chain security and
thus decrease screening frequency and simultaneously increasing our
probability of detection of dangerous contraband. Using a system-of-
systems approach, we are developing advanced sensor and communication
technologies within a security architecture that encompasses the
world's supply chain. Some technologies developed in this program will
enable CBP officers to identify tampering events and their location,
track shipping containers, and ensure that alarm data is communicated
reliably and securely. Most of these technologies will be
commercialized, purchased by industry and adopted as an international
standard that will meet DHS's core security requirements. Current
project activities include the Advanced Container Security Device
(ACSD), an in-container sensor to detect and warn of intrusion on any
six sides, door openings or the presence of human cargo; Container
Security Device (CSD), a small, low-cost sensor mounted within a
container to detect and warn of the opening or removal of a container
door; Marine Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS), a remote and adaptive
multi-modal global communications and tracking tag for transmitting
security alert information from ISO shipping containers; Hybrid
Composite Container, a potential next-generation, ISO approved,
shipping container with embedded security sensors to detect intrusions
that is more than 15 percent lighter than existing ISO steel containers
and more durable; Advanced Screening and Targeting, a project that
develops computer algorithms and software that will automatically
collect, combine, analyze and find suspicious patterns in the shipping
information of containers; and Supply Chain Security Architecture
(SCSA), a framework for how near-term and future container-security
technologies that will be incorporated by industry into supply chain
security operations and how information can be communicated securely to
CBP officer.
Technology Transition Process: Customer Focused and Output Oriented
As we develop these technologies, we recognize we need a
disciplined process to ensure the technology is turned into widely
distributed and utilized products and capabilities. Once the Capstone
IPTs approve technical solutions, project level IPTs--S&T program
managers working with component-customer program managers--are
established to turn the proposed technical solutions into deliverable
technology that is affordable and meets the customer's schedule and
performance requirements. Through signed Technology Transition
Agreements, S&T and our customers define and agree on schedule,
performance requirements, transition paths, organizational
responsibilities, integration strategy, technology transition readiness
level, and estimated procurement, operating and support cost up front.
This way, if initial procurement is too expensive, or operating costs
are prohibitive, the decision to look for a new technology solution can
be made early--before large buy acquisition programs are initiated and
before federal, State, local, and tribal entities expend their precious
resources.
Conclusion
In summary, DHS S&T is dedicated to being a customer focused,
output oriented organization. Through the Capstone IPT process, our
customers prioritize and decide on the incremental technology
improvements most important to them. Informed by the Capstone IPTs, our
basic research and innovation efforts provide the focused, protracted
research and high impact advanced research for longer-term game
changing technology solutions. We are dedicated to providing our
customers--the DHS components and directorates, State, local and tribal
governments, first responders and private sector entities--the
technology necessary to succeed at their mission and protect our
nation. That concludes my statement for the record. On behalf of Under
Secretary Cohen, thank you for your support of the Science and
Technology Directorate, and I welcome your questions. Thank you.
Biography for Robert R. Hooks
Robert Hooks serves as the Director of Transition, in the Science
and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security. In
this role, Mr. Hooks is responsible for delivering near-term advanced
technologies to the operational components of the Department to address
their priority mission capability gap areas. Mr. Hooks communicates
regularly with the component agencies of the Department to understand
capability gaps and propose appropriate technology solutions that can
transition into future component acquisition programs. Mr. Hooks then
shares these desired technology solutions with other U.S. Government
agencies, the private sector and International partners to identify the
most appropriate providers. In addition, Mr. Hooks oversees the
Department's SAFETY Act program which provides important legal
liability protection to qualified Anti-Terrorism technologies, whether
they are products or services.
Previously, Mr. Hooks served as the Chief of Staff for the Science
and Technology Directorate and was responsible for the day-to-day
management of the Directorate. He has also served as the Deputy
Director in the Office of Research and Development where he oversaw the
research, development, test and evaluation programs that were executed
at the DHS federal laboratories, including the National Biological
Analysis and Countermeasures Center, the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center, the Transportation Security Lab, as well as within the Homeland
Security elements of the DOE national laboratories. He oversaw the
Homeland Security Stewardship Initiative, which included facilities
construction and recapitalization, strategic partnerships with other
government agencies, and Homeland Security focused workforce
development and education programs that included a Scholars/Fellows
Program and an integrated network of Homeland Security University
Centers of Excellence.
Prior to joining the Department of Homeland Security in July 2003,
Mr. Hooks served 20 years in the U.S. Navy in a variety of positions as
a submarine officer, financial analyst, intelligence analyst, and
personnel specialist. Mr. Hooks was the Contingency Budget Analyst in
the Navy Budget Office where he was responsible for the Department of
Navy's funding of military readiness and operations following the
September 11th attacks and the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. His
sea tours were on both fast attack and ballistic missile submarines and
included overseas deployments, special missions, and six Trident
strategic deterrent patrols during the Cold War. He also served as an
intelligence analyst for special programs at the National Security
Agency where he authored several strategic intelligence assessments.
Mr. Hooks graduated from Cornell University with a Bachelor's of
Science degree in Agricultural Engineering. He also holds a Master's of
Administrative Science in Financial Management from The Johns Hopkins
University. He was selected to the Senior Executive Service in
September 2005.
STATEMENT OF MR. ERVIN KAPOS, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS ANALYSIS,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (HSSTAC)
Mr. Kapos. Good morning, Chairman Mitchell, Congressmen
Gingrey and Hall, and other Members of the Committee. I am
Ervin Kapos, Director of Operations Analysis for the Science
and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland
Security, and I am pleased to appear before you today to
discuss my responsibilities concerning the oversight of the
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Advisory Committee.
And I must express my gratitude for somebody having introduced
into the record its informal name, the HSSTAC, so I don't have
to trip over its full name.
The HSSTAC was originally authorized in Section 311 of the
Homeland Security Act for a period of three years, expiring on
November 25, 2005. In October 2006, Section 302 of the Safe
Port Act, and under Section 311 of the Homeland Security Act,
reauthorizing the HSSTAC until December 31, 2008. The HSSTAC is
chartered to be a source of independent scientific and
technical planning advice for the Under Secretary for Science
and Technology, with several objectives.
First, the committee advises the Under Secretary for S&T on
organization of the Nation's scientific and technological
resources, to prevent or mitigate the effects of catastrophic
terrorism against the United States, and of catastrophic
natural events. Second, it identifies research areas of
potential importance to the security of the Nation, including
matters relating to science, technology, research, engineering,
new product development, including demonstration and
deployment, business processes, emergency response, cargo
security, technology, and other matters of special interest to
the Department of Homeland Security.
Third, the HSSTAC assists the Under Secretary in
establishing mission goals for the future. It advises on
whether the policies, actions, management processes, and
organizational constructs of the Science and Technology
Directorate are focused on mission objectives. It advises on
whether the research, development, test evaluation, and systems
engineering activities are properly resourced to accomplish the
objectives. It also identifies outreach activities and reviews
the technical quality and relevance of the Directorate's
programs.
Finally, upon request, the HSSTAC provides scientifically-
and technically-based advice to the Homeland Security Advisory
Council. Conversely, the committee draws, when needed, on the
expertise of outside advisory groups for independent advice on
specific technical and policy matters.
The HSSTAC has changed its modus operandi in the past year.
It is now focused predominantly on certain high-priority issues
that the Under Secretary has identified for it. At present, the
HSSTAC is tasked with reviewing the threat that is expected
from improvised explosive devices, IEDs, in the United States
in the next five and more years, and recommending Science and
Technology investments to counter this threat in the future.
I believe, as does Mr. Cohen, that the HSSTAC provides the
S&T Directorate valuable, independent, scientific and technical
planning advice. We appreciate and support your efforts to
extend the HSSTAC authority to 2012. Under Secretary Cohen
appreciates your support of the S&T Directorate.
I shall welcome your questions. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. Dr. Jackson.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kapos follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ervin Kapos
Good morning, Chairman Wu, Congressman Gingrey and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee. I am Ervin Kapos, Director of the
Operations and Analysis Division for the Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security, and I am pleased to
appear before you today to discuss my responsibilities concerning the
oversight of the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory
Committee (HSSTAC).
The HSSTAC was originally authorized in Section 311 of the Homeland
Security Act (P.L. 107-296) for a period of three years, expiring on
November 25, 2005. In October 2006, Section 302 of the SAFE Port Act
(P.L. 109-347) amended section 311 of the Homeland Security Act
reauthorizing the HSSTAC until December 31, 2008.
The HSSTAC is chartered to be a source of independent scientific
and technical planning advice for the Under Secretary for S&T with
several objectives. First, the Committee advises the Under Secretary
for S&T on organizing the Nation's scientific and technological
resources to prevent or mitigate the effects of catastrophic terrorism
against the United States, and of catastrophic natural events.
Second, it identifies research areas of potential importance to the
security of the Nation, including matters relating to science,
technology, research, engineering, new product development (including
demonstration and deployment), business processes, emergency response,
cargo security technology, and other matters of special interest to the
Department of Homeland Security.
Third, the HSSTAC assists the Under Secretary in establishing
mission goals for the future. It advises on whether the policies,
actions, management processes, and organization constructs of the
Science and Technology Directorate are focused on mission objectives.
It advises on whether the research, development, test, evaluation, and
systems engineering activities are properly resourced to accomplish the
objectives. It also identifies outreach activities and reviews the
technical quality and relevance of the Directorate's programs.
Finally, upon request the HSSTAC provides scientifically- and
technically-based advice to the Homeland Security Advisory Council.
Conversely, the Committee draws, when needed, on the expertise of
outside advisory groups for independent advice on specific technical
and policy matters.
At present, the HSSTAC is tasked with reviewing the threat that is
expected from Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in the United States
in the next five and more years, and recommending Science and
Technology investments to counter this threat in the future. I believe,
as does Mr. Cohen, that the HSSTAC provides the S&T Directorate
valuable, independent scientific and technical planning advice. We
appreciate and support your efforts to extend the HSSTAC Authority to
2012. Under Secretary Cohen appreciates your support of the S&T
Directorate, and I welcome your questions. Thank you.
Biography for Ervin Kapos
Introduction
Mr. Kapos was born in Transylvania (Romania) in 1931, and lived in
Cyprus from 1938 to 1950. He then came to the United States and
attended Indiana University, studying mathematics at both the
undergraduate and graduate levels for eight years, before moving to the
Washington, D.C. area. He now lives in McLean, Virginia, with his wife
June, a professional potter; their daughter Valerie, a tropical
botanist, lives in Cambridge, England, with her husband and two
daughters. Mr. Kapos was a Founding Director of MORS in 1966, Vice
President and a member of the Council on Military Operations Research
Symposia, and was a Chartering Officer for MAS, the Military
Applications Section (now a Society).
Education
Mr. Kapos completed a B.A. in Mathematics at Indiana University in
1954 and completed Ph.D. course work in Mathematics, also at Indiana
University. At Indiana University, Mr. Kapos was a Teaching Associate
in the Department of Mathematics and a Research Associate in the
Institute of Educational Research.
Experience
Mr. Kapos joined the Navy's Operations Evaluation Group (OEG)
(later an element of the Center for Naval Analysis) in 1958,
immediately after leaving graduate school and remained there for almost
15 years. He served several tours as an analyst in the fleet, mainly
with Pacific Fleet Commands, including OPTEVFORPAC, First Fleet, and
CINCPACFLT. He also established and directed first-of-their-kind
operations analysis programs in Command and Control and in Operational
Intelligence. During the period from 1967 to 1972, he was successively
Director of CNA's Southeast Asia Combat Analysis Division, Marine Corps
Operations Analysis Group, and Operations Evaluation Group.
Mr. Kapos was senior OEG Representative on the staff of the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commander, First Fleet, and the
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force. He conducted
extensive analyses of combat operations in Southeast Asia,
concentrating on the effectiveness of air and surface interdiction and
on techniques of defense suppression. Other efforts involved test and
exercise design, reconstruction and analysis in a variety of naval
warfare and support areas, but with particularly heavy emphasis on
communications, command and control. Mr. Kapos also developed a unique
concept of intelligence analysis that culminated in a major Navy-
supported study program know as ``Red Side Operations Analysis.''
Mr. Kapos was Director of the Marine Corps Operations Analysis
Group, CNA. He managed the principal operational and systems analysis
organization supporting the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps and the Fleet
Marine Forces. Earlier, Mr. Kapos was Director of the Southeast Asia
Combat Analysis Division and directed analyses of the operations and
effectiveness of Naval forces in Southeast Asia. Before that he was
Leader of the Communications, Command and Control Team, where he
pioneered the application of operations analysis in those areas.
Mr. Kapos was Director of the OEG for three years. He managed
almost 100 civilians and military analysts. Programs included a field
organization of 40 professionals at about 30 Navy operating commands,
and a headquarters analysis effort totaling about 60 professionals that
covered the range of Navy warfare and support disciplines.
Joining Ketron, Inc. in late 1972 as Vice President and Director of
Washington Operations, Mr. Kapos became Executive Vice President in
1976 and President in 1980. He was personally involved in many of the
naval warfare and support studies carried out in Ketron. He was most
heavily engaged in analytical support to planning studies affecting
naval surface warfare and command support, evolving concepts and
objectives for tactical development and evaluation in the Navy, new
concepts for readiness evaluation, the application of operations
analysis to problems in operational intelligence, and the development
of new approaches to the use of gaming and simulation for command and
management training.
He was the founding principal and President of Kapos Associates
Inc. (KAI) from 1984 to 2000. In KAI, Mr. Kapos evolved a complex,
integrated program structure of policy studies, operational analysis
and executive level gaming that, while initially focused on naval
issues, also served clients up to Cabinet level, including various
interagency bodies, executive departments, military services, and
regional commands, as well as the private sector. In substantive
content, the projects he pioneered and directed ran the gamut of
interagency coordination, crisis response and consequence management;
both counter- and anti-terrorism; modeling and simulation; maritime,
land and aerospace warfare mission areas; special operations, weapons
of mass destruction, military operations other than war; readiness
assessment and reporting, command and control, operational logistics,
manpower requirements, and war-gaming.
Mr. Kapos has been Director of the Operations Analysis Program in
the Office of Naval Research (ONR) since 2001. The program is intended
both to establish OA as a tool for management decision-making in ONR
and thus an internal service function, and to provide solutions to
problems in analytical methodology that obstruct the application of OA
in such key areas as readiness assessment, command and control, force
protection, and experimentation.
Other Professional Experience, Honors
He received the Secretary of the Navy's Meritorious Public Service
Citation as well as numerous letters of commendation from the Naval
Fleet and Force Commanders. Mr. Kapos has been an Associate Member of
the Defense Science Board, serving on the Naval Surface Warfare Panel
in 1974-76, and the Summer Study on Training and Training Technology in
1982. In 1987-1988, he was a member of the DSB Task Force on Computer
Applications to Training and War-gaming. He has been a member of the
National Academy of Science/National Research Council Panel on Response
to Casualties involving Ship-Borne Cargoes. Mr. Kapos also served on
the National Security Agency Advisory Board in 1979-1982. He served on
the Panel on Science and Technology and Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), and was a member of the Panel on Crisis
Management at CSIS.
STATEMENT OF DR. BRIAN A. JACKSON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE RAND CORPORATION
Dr. Jackson. Thanks very much. Chairman and distinguished
Members, I thank you for inviting me to participate in today's
hearing.
I was asked to testify specifically about a recently-
completed RAND research project that was supported by the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
Directorate that looked at how adversaries, terrorist groups in
particular, can undermine the effectiveness of security
technologies by altering their behavior. The way such groups
have responded to defensive measures is similar to how others
who seek to cross the border illegally can and have responded
to security efforts, making the lessons that the terrorist
groups can teach us very relevant to today's discussion about
future border security technologies.
The core message of my testimony today is that we must
explicitly consider the risks that adversaries' adaptive
behavior poses to the performance of our border security
technologies when we craft our research and development plans.
If we don't do so, we risk spending resources on defenses that
ultimately will not deliver the protection that we expect them
to.
Looking across a variety of terrorist groups, we found that
when challenged by security efforts, they responded with a set
of four counterstrategies that limited the effects that the
defenses had on the groups' operations. Specifically, they
changed their operational practices in ways that made the
defenses less effective. They used new technologies of their
own to counter them. They moved to alter or to avoid the
defensive measures, and they attacked the security technologies
directly.
My written testimony and the research underlying it
document numerous examples of counter technology strategies
that these groups put in place, but what we found overall is
that, for most defensive measures, the groups could find ways
to degrade their protective value. In some cases, the groups
paid a significant price to get around defensive measures. For
example, to evade border controls and the security fence being
put around the Israeli border, Palestinian groups had to
develop specialized ladders that could let them get over
without triggering the detection technologies on top, or had to
build elaborate tunnel systems to get under it, as we have
heard is a challenge at our border. In other cases, the price
to evade defensive measures was relatively small. For example,
the Irish Republican Army determined that under some
circumstances at least an expensive surveillance and facial
recognition system could be defeated by having their operatives
wear inexpensive baseball caps.
Given what we found, we identified three principles that
should be considered as next-generation measures are designed
and implemented. The first is that there needs to be extensive
testing of the robustness of new security measures before they
are introduced. Focused red-teaming efforts, challenging the
technologies with teams of capable individuals to see if we can
discover new ways to penetrate them, is one way to do that
assessment. Such red-teaming is accepted practice in many
technology development efforts, but our study further
emphasized how important it is. The need to assess new
technologies' weaknesses also suggests that small-scale
demonstration projects may be particularly valuable steps to
include in technology programs whenever possible before
expanding to large-scale demonstrations or technology
deployment, particularly given the extensive border security
protection challenge that we face in this country.
A second principle is that we should preserve as much
flexibility as we can in the technologies that we deploy.
Systems that aren't locked into specific modes of operation
preserve the ability of border security organizations to
respond when adversaries change their behavior. Explicitly
considering the value of this flexibility as we assess new
technologies is important, since flexible technologies may cost
more than systems that are locked into only one operational
mode. If we don't consider the value of that flexibility, it
may be inadvertently sacrificed to cut costs.
The final principle is that the Nation should maintain a
diverse and flexible border security research, development,
tests, and evaluation portfolio. If we devote all our resources
to optimizing a single line of defense, there may be no backup
available if that line is breached. Even if multiple defensive
options are not all deployed, a portfolio approach to
developing measures can provide fallback options if an initial
defense becomes obsolete.
Depending on the level of the adaptive threat we face, the
Nation might actually be better off having multiple defensive
options of average effectiveness than concentrating on raising
the performance of a single technology to the highest
effectiveness possible, in terms of thinking about this as an
overall system.
When faced with an adaptive challenge, the bottom line from
our work is that we need to be prepared to adapt in return. The
potential that adversaries might break through a defense soon
after its introduction must be carefully assessed and included
in our decision-making. Not doing so risks making large
investments whose eventual benefits may not justify their
costs. In designing protective measures, it shouldn't be
immediately assumed that the newest and most advanced
technologies give us the best protection. Sort of going to our
title of our report, drawing on the common metaphor for defense
efforts of building a fortress, relying on formidable but
static defensive measures is a rather fragile and tenuous
strategy, because once a wall is breached, there may not be
anything left to protect you.
Depending on the adaptive capabilities of the adversary, a
defensive model built on variety, where we have a number of
security measures that can be adjusted and redeployed as their
vulnerable points are discovered, is a superior approach.
I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to
address the committee, and look forward to your questions.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. Chief Self.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jackson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian A. Jackson\1\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. The series records testimony
presented by RAND associates to federal, State, or local legislative
committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private
review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit
research organization providing objective analysis and effective
solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private
sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Developing Robust Border Security Technologies to Protect Against
Diverse and Adaptive Threats\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/294/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman and distinguished Members: Thank you for inviting me to
speak on the issue of border security technology as the House Science
and Technology Committee begins the process of considering legislation
focused on developing the next generation of border and maritime
security technologies. I was asked to provide testimony about a
recently completed RAND research effort for the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Office of
Comparative Studies, focusing on the role of technology in homeland
security activities.\3\ As part of homeland security efforts,
technology systems play a key role within a larger, integrated strategy
to counter the efforts of violent and criminal organizations and to
protect the public. Information and detection technologies gather data
on individuals, vehicles, and behaviors; are used to monitor sites and
areas of concern (including border information systems aimed at
identifying individuals who should be not allowed to enter the
country); help detect concealed weapons or contraband; and manage
collected information so such information can be drawn on later to
guide security decisions. Technologies such as barriers and setbacks
harden targets or deny individuals access to the areas they want to
enter or attack. Technologies such as communication systems coordinate
response activities to increase the chances that terrorist or other
illegal activities can be interdicted and stopped.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The results of this research effort have been published in a
series of RAND reports focusing on the use of technology by terrorist
groups and security organizations combating terrorism: Breaching the
Fortress Wall: Understanding Efforts to Overcome Defensive
Technologies, Brian A. Jackson et al., RAND MG-481-DHS, 2007, available
at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG481/; Sharing the Dragon's
Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies, Kim
Cragin et al., RAND MG-485-DHS, 2007, available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/monographs/MG485/; Stealing the Sword: Limiting Terrorist Use of
Advanced Conventional Weapons, James Bonomo et al., RAND MG-510-DHS,
2007, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG510/; Network
Technologies for Networked Terrorists: Assessing the Value of
Information and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist
Organizations, Bruce W. Don et al., RAND TR-454-DHS, 2007, available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical--reports/TR454/; Freedom and
Information: Assessing Publicly Available Data Regarding U.S.
Transportation Infrastructure Security, Eric Landree, et al., RAND TR-
360-DHS, 2007, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
technical<INF>-</INF>reports/TR360/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our work has examined security technologies in the context of long-
term conflicts between law enforcement and security organizations and
terrorist groups. Much of this research focused on how the
effectiveness of security technologies can degrade as our adversaries
adapt and alter their behavior in response to the introduction of
defensive measures.\4\ That adaptive behavior can pose a significant
risk to the security benefits new defensive technologies are intended
to provide and, therefore, must be considered in technology planning.
The testimony provided today is drawn from this research and focuses on
the parts of the study that specifically address technologies relevant
to border security.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Efforts to
Overcome Defensive Technologies, Brian A. Jackson, et al., RAND MG-481-
DHS, 2007, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG481/
\5\ While these remarks draw both on my work and that of my co-
authors and colleagues, the specific content of my testimony is my
responsibility alone. Additional information on RAND's research
relevant to border security challenges is included in Michael A.
Wermuth and K. Jack Riley, ``The Strategic Challenge of Border
Security,'' Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, U.S.
House of Representatives, March 8, 2007, available at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT275/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although preventing a terrorist attack is one reason for the
security measures at our nation's borders, it is not the only goal
those measures are intended to achieve.\6\ It is estimated that several
hundred thousand individuals enter the United States illegally each
year.\7\ Most people seeking to cross the U.S. border illegally are not
doing so to conduct terrorist activities. Rather, they are seeking to
enter the country themselves, smuggle drugs, move other illicit goods,
or engage in human trafficking. The shipping of illicit cargo through
legitimate means--e.g., through the container shipping system--is also
a concern. Although such individuals and groups are not motivated by
the same factors as terrorist groups, they are nonetheless similarly
determined to succeed and will respond to defensive measures placed in
their path to hinder them. As a result, the broader lessons we
identified about designing technologies that are robust to terrorist
group adaptation are similarly relevant to the other challenges and
threats that border protections are designed to address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Border Patrol,
``National Border Patrol Strategy,'' undated.
\7\ See, for example, estimates in Government Accountability
Office, ``Illegal Immigration: Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled
Since 1995; Border Patrol's Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been
Fully Evaluated,'' GAO-06-770, August 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The core message of my testimony today is that in our technology
planning and development we must explicitly consider the risk to the
performance of our border security technologies that is posed by the
competitive, action-reaction dynamic that exists between our security
efforts and the adversaries they target; if we do not do so, we risk
spending resources on defenses that ultimately will not deliver the
protection we expect. To do so we must
<bullet> include testing, red-teaming, and experimentation in
technology development efforts to ensure new security measures
are robust to adversary adaptation
<bullet> maintain flexibility in our security technologies to
the extent possible so we can respond to changes in the
behavior of our adversaries that degrade or eliminate the
protection the systems provide
<bullet> ensure defense in depth by developing portfolios of
defensive measures that provide ``fall back'' options if
adversaries learn how to avoid our primary defensive systems
Finally, although the focus of today's hearing is on developing
technology, we must also remember that security is ensured not by
technical systems alone but also by the organizations and people who
use them and the concepts of operation that guide how they are used.\8\
How we use technologies is a key determiner of how vulnerable or robust
technologies are to our adversaries' adaptive efforts and helps to
determine the net security effect of adversaries' efforts to break
through our defenses. As a result, how technologies will be used in
border security efforts should be considered during technology planning
and research roadmapping to make sure we capture the full set of
factors that will define their future security performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See, for example, David Aguilar, Office of Border Patrol,
``Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology and the Human Element,''
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global
Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, February 13, 2007; RADM David P. Pekoske, U.S. Coast
Guard, ``Border Security: Infrastructure, Technology and the Human
Element,'' Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and
Global Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, February 13, 2007; and Jay Cohen and Gregory Giddens,
Department of Homeland Security, ``How Can Technologies Help Secure Our
Borders?'' Testimony Before the Committee on Science, U.S. House of
Representatives, September 13, 2006.
How Can The Responses of Terrorist Groups or Other Adversaries Affect
the Protective Value of Security Technologies?
New security technologies are frequently costly, making it
imperative that we ensure, to the extent possible, that they will
produce enough benefits in improved security to justify the investments
required to develop and deploy them. If there is a substantial risk
that the security benefits of a particular technology will not be
realized, that risk could make an otherwise promising technology a poor
choice.
In our research, we examined one such risk: How changes in behavior
by terrorist groups could reduce or even eliminate the protective value
of technological security measures. To identify how technologies were
vulnerable to terrorist group adaptation, we looked at how a number of
such organizations responded when they were challenged by new defensive
measures. Because we were interested in lessons relevant to today's
homeland security context, we examined four comparatively sophisticated
terrorist groups that were in conflict with sophisticated states:
<bullet> Palestinian terrorist groups in Israel
<bullet> Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and affiliated groups in
Southeast Asia
<bullet> Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka
<bullet> Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in the
United Kingdom
We found that the groups responded to security measures put in
place by states or across regions with a set of four counter-technology
strategies to limit the effect of the defenses on their operations.
Specifically, they changed their operational practices in ways that
made the defenses less effective, used new technologies of their own to
counter them, moved to avoid the defensive measures, and attacked the
security technologies directly. U.S. experience with individuals and
organizations seeking to cross our border illegally shows these same
broad strategies are relevant to help design current efforts to secure
the country and to develop the technological tools needed to do so.
To illustrate the effect that groups changing their behavior has on
the effectiveness of defensive measures, I discuss here a few of the
ways the terrorist groups we studied reduced the effectiveness of
protective technologies, circumvented the technologies entirely, and
even attacked or corrupted the defensive measures that were getting in
their way.
In many cases, terrorist groups found ways to change their behavior
to render protective measures less effective. For example, the majority
of the four terrorist groups responded to weapons-detection
technologies by breaking down their weapons materials into small
quantities (such as smuggling explosives in toothpaste tubes or cookie
tins) or otherwise shielding them from detection technologies to enable
smuggling or attack operations. The various ways they did this included
shipping explosives obscured by strong-smelling spices or hiding them
in noxious cargoes like rotting fish to conceal their odor from dogs or
confuse other detectors.
PIRA spent considerable time conducting ``challenge-response''
studies to determine the limitations of surveillance systems in an
effort to learn what the systems could and could not detect and to
assess the areas they covered. The group then used that knowledge to
operate in ways and at times that were less likely to be detected. For
example, armed with the knowledge that specific weather and lighting
conditions made some sensors less effective, PIRA planned its movements
and operations accordingly.
The strategies we discovered in our case studies are similarly
relevant to the Nation's border security challenges. For example, in
2004 testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Lawrence Wein of Stanford University raised questions about whether
terrorist groups could render the fingerprint biometric scanning done
by the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT) program less effective by selecting operatives whose
fingerprints either will not scan well or have been deliberately
altered to defeat the scanning.\9\ It is also well known that smugglers
seeking to bring illegal narcotics and other materiel into the country
frequently alter their operational practices to conceal their cargoes
from search-and-detection approaches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Lawrence M. Wein, ``Disrupting Terrorist Travel: Safeguarding
America's Borders Through Information Sharing,'' Testimony before the
U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Homeland Security,
September 30, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When they could do so, terrorist groups avoided defensive measures
entirely, neutralizing their protective benefits. To avoid
identification requirements and databases used to flag known or
suspected operatives, most groups relied on false documents and
identification credentials to hide the true history and identity of
both people and vehicles. Some groups even took this strategy to the
extreme, coercing innocent people with no connection to terrorism--by
threatening their lives or the lives of their loved ones--to transport
people or weapons through checkpoints with identity checks.
Avoidance can work for surveillance systems as well: As part of
Israeli security measures, overhead surveillance with unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) or helicopters were used to monitor areas near the
border where attacks were staged. In rural areas, Palestinian groups
used spotters on rooftops in the West Bank or Gaza Strip to watch for
the vehicles and warn militants to stay out of sight when the
surveillance systems were in the area.
To avoid some defenses, groups had to make more drastic changes. In
response to significantly strengthened border security at ports of
entry in the nations where it operated, JI shifted its operations from
seeking to move people and material through defended areas like
airports to less monitored and defended maritime or land borders. In
response to the security barrier erected around Israel, Palestinian
groups reportedly deployed specially crafted ladders that enabled them
to climb over the security fences without triggering the sensors at the
top. In addition, the groups have also engaged in extensive tunneling
to circumvent the barrier around Israel and border security between
Egypt and Gaza, enabling weapons smuggling and infiltration. The
Israeli Defense Force (IDF) notes that Palestinians have taken a number
of measures to avoid having their tunneling operations detected,
including building tunnels in residential areas (entrances are often
through private homes and property), digging at night, transporting
displaced dirt and sand out of the vicinity of the tunnels, and staging
diversionary strikes against IDF outposts to conceal the sound of
explosives.
At our own border, individuals seeking to enter the United States
illegally have responded to the deployment of border fencing in similar
ways, for example by altering their routes and seeking to enter the
country at more remote, unfenced locations. Drug smugglers have
similarly shifted their routes and transport modes to avoid
interdiction efforts.\10\ Tunneling under the barriers has also been
observed.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See, for example, discussion in Office of National Drug
Control Policy, ``Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement
Operations on Drug Smuggling, 1991-1999,'' August 2001.
\11\ See, for example, discussion in Blas Nunez-Neto and Stephen
Vina, ``Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International
Border,'' Congressional Research Service, RL33659, September 21, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, in some limited cases, terrorist groups simply attacked
the defensive measures hindering their activities. In response to the
extensive use of information systems in the counterterrorism effort
against PIRA, the group sought to attack information systems directly
to corrupt or steal information (at one point breaking into a police
facility to steal files). The group also used information-gathering
technologies such as the security organizations' own public tip line to
inject false information into the system. The group also used hoax
operations and triggered detection technologies to cause false alarms
as ways to stress the capabilities of the security and response forces.
In some cases, the groups we studied directly broke down barriers and
defenses that got in their way, either by using larger bombs or by
staging more complex operations to neutralize the defense before a
larger attack took place. In response to the construction of fencing on
the U.S. land border, similar efforts to damage or breach the barrier
have been observed.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See, for example, discussion in Nunez-Neto and Vina, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How important were terrorist efforts to ``learn their way around''
defensive measures? For most defensive measures, the groups could find
ways to reduce their effectiveness and degrade their protective value.
However, in some cases, terrorist groups paid a substantial price to
neutralize a defense; for example, although a tunnel might make it
possible to get under a security barrier, the effort the group had to
spend to construct it was effort that could not be devoted to violent
activities. When this was the case, even if the technology did not
necessarily deliver the full protection it was expected to--or deliver
it in the way that was expected when it was designed--its value could
still be considerable.
Then again, in other cases, the cost to the group to evade a
defensive measure was relatively small; in one particularly dramatic
case cited by a counterterrorism professional we interviewed, PIRA
learned that a sophisticated surveillance system incorporating facial
recognition technology could, under the right circumstances, be
countered by simply wearing a baseball cap. In this case, it took the
group very little effort to counter the technology.
Principles for Designing Defensive Technology Efforts
Given the costs of designing and implementing novel border security
technologies, it is important to consider the threat that adversary
adaptation poses to their eventual effectiveness and value during
research, development, test, and evaluation planning, and
implementation.\13\ Looking across the terrorist groups we studied, we
identified a number of principles that should be considered as next-
generation measures are designed and implemented. In some cases, what
our review of historical terrorist group behavior had to teach us was
``not news'': Some of the lessons merely reinforced the importance of
principles already considered good practice in technology design and
testing. However, in other cases, what they had to teach was less
obvious. In all cases, the potential result of not learning the lessons
is high: losing the opportunity to prevent terrorist attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Michael A. Wermuth and K. Jack Riley, ``The Strategic
Challenge of Border Security,'' Testimony Before the Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global
Counterterrorism, U.S. House of Representatives, March 8, 2007,
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT275/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Importance of Testing and ``Red Teaming'' Technologies
Terrorist groups' counter-technology efforts underscore the
importance of extensively testing new security measures before they are
introduced. To make sure new technologies will perform over time,
designers need to assess what information adversaries would need to
circumvent the technologies and identify how they might get access to
that information. Can groups ``test'' a defense's capabilities by
challenging it in different ways? If a measure's performance relies on
keeping some details of its capabilities secret, how long can those
secrets be kept? Furthermore, dedicated ``red teaming'' of new
technologies--challenging them with teams of capable individuals to see
if they can discover new ways to penetrate the security measures--is
also critical. Such testing is established practice for many security
technologies and measures. For example, when it comes to cyber
security, companies routinely use ``hackers'' to challenge security
measures the companies have put in place. The need to test new
technologies and explore their possible weaknesses also suggests that
small-scale technology demonstration projects and evaluation studies of
promising technologies may be particularly valuable intermediate steps
to include in technology programs whenever possible before they are
expanded to larger-scale demonstration or technology-deployment
efforts.
Maintaining Flexibility in Technology Design
Given that adversaries will almost certainly find ways to degrade
the performance of even the best security technologies, we should
preserve as much flexibility as possible in the technologies we design
and deploy. If the design of a defensive measure locks it in to a
single configuration or operating mode, its benefits are vulnerable to
changes in adversary behavior. If the security measure is static\14\,
it will not be able to adjust to a dynamic threat. In contrast, if
flexibility is built into the defense from the start--e.g., if, when a
terrorist group ``breaks the code'' on how the defense functions, we
can change the code and reconstitute performance--then the benefits
provided by the defensive measure can be preserved. Just as the
terrorists we studied were able to change their operational practices
to get around defensive technologies--e.g., obscuring the signatures
they were designed to detect, using deception, adjusting the speed or
character of their operations--changes in operational practices could
similarly provide a variety of strategies for altering the character of
defensive systems. For example, maintaining the ability to redeploy
surveillance systems or change how security forces respond to alarms
from detection systems are ways that technological performance could be
altered to respond to changes by adversaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Depending on the security measure, the technological
characteristics--e.g., the nature of a detection technology--could make
it difficult or impossible to change in response to adaptation by an
adversary. In other situations, the combination of technology and the
way it is used-- e.g., including the concept of operations, etc.--could
make it possible to respond to countermeasures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Systems that are flexible--that are not locked into specific modes
of operation--preserve the opportunity for border security
organizations to adapt their performance to respond to changes made by
individuals and organizations seeking to enter the country illegally.
Considering the value of this flexibility in the evaluation of
potentially new technologies is important, since providing such
flexibility may require additional expenditures up front when the
defense is designed and implemented. If it is not considered, options
that could provide robustness may be inadvertently sacrificed in an
effort to reduce costs.
Developing Portfolios of Defensive Options for Defense in Depth
The risk that adversaries will identify strategies to defeat or
evade individual security measures also suggests that the United States
should maintain a diverse and flexible border security research,
development, test, and evaluation portfolio. If we devote all our
resources to optimizing a single line of defense, there will be no
backup available if that line is breached. This is one reason behind
the idea of defense in depth--maintaining multiple lines of protection
against high-risk threats.
Security planners should consider a variety of defensive technology
options, maintaining possibilities for alternative approaches if
currently effective technologies are neutralized. Even if multiple
defensive lines are not all deployed at the same time, a portfolio
approach to developing defensive measures could provide ``fall back''
options if an initial defense becomes obsolete. Depending on the level
of adaptive threat, the Nation could be better off having multiple
defensive options of average effectiveness than a single highly
effective option without a viable back-up. If decisions are made to
pursue a specific path, the costs of maintaining other technologies in
reserve--perhaps not fully developed, but at a stage at which they
might be called on if needed--should be considered as well. Such an
approach is analogous to maintaining a diversified portfolio of
investments, containing a variety of options, where comparatively small
investments provide various hedges against different shifts in
circumstances. Small-scale technology demonstration projects and
evaluation programs can also help to pursue this strategy, since they
can provide a cost-effective way to explore multiple security options
and assess their relative performance and robustness.
Conclusions
When adversaries are successful in countering all or part of a
defensive technology, the utility of the system may be significantly
reduced or lost entirely. Such losses devalue the costs society pays to
design, produce, field, use, and maintain the technology--where costs
include not just financial and materiel costs but also less tangible
costs such as reductions in privacy or the inconveniencing of
individuals legitimately crossing U.S. borders, when such security
measures are implemented. Given the scale of U.S. borders and the
volume of individuals and goods that cross them everyday, those costs
can be considerable.
As a result, ``adaptive destruction'' is one more risk that must be
managed by the science and technology programs charged with developing
novel border security capabilities. The potential that adversaries
might break through a defense soon after its introduction must be
assessed and included in the cost-benefit analyses that provide the
basis for going forward with large-scale technology testing and
procurement. Not doing so may lead to major investments whose eventual
benefits may not justify their costs. The robustness of new defensive
technologies against adversary adaptation must be explicitly considered
in crafting a technology roadmap for next-generation border security
technologies and in efforts to deploy current technologies on the
borders.
Furthermore, although the focus of the discussion here is on
technology, we must recognize how the technology choices we make affect
the rest of the border security system and the how the interactions
among the parts of that system shape the value of new technologies and
defenses. Although an adversary's efforts to break through our defenses
may be aimed at the technologies we use to protect ourselves, the
impact of those efforts will be shaped by the concepts of operation
around those technologies and the people charged with implementing
them.
For example, if a new detection technology produces many false
alarms (magnified perhaps by individuals or smuggling organizations
intentionally triggering the sensors to undermine the value of the
system) can such false alarms be dealt with quickly or will responding
to them consume human resources that could be put to better use in
other ways? If migrants and smugglers respond to border fencing and
surveillance by regularly damaging the fence and its associated
systems, how will a constant stream of repair efforts affect DHS's
security efforts? If the defenses we deploy simply result in
displacement (e.g., individuals shift from crossing the border at one
location to another) are we better off, worse off, or the same from a
security perspective?\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ For example, diversion of illegal entry traffic from urban to
rural areas has been characterized as beneficial from a security
perspective, because individuals crossing the border in an urban area
can vanish quickly into traffic, thus considerably reducing the time
for apprehension. (David Aguilar, ``Border Security: Infrastructure,
Technology and the Human Element,'' Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland
Security, U.S. House of Representatives, February 13, 2007.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The answers to these questions depend not just on technology but on
how all the elements of the border system work together, and their
answers will partly determine how much of a threat adversaries'
counter-technology efforts pose to the country.
Although technologies can provide an edge in protecting our
borders, that edge can be dulled by adversaries' counter-technology
efforts. An understanding of the way adversaries have responded to
counter defensive technologies in the past underscores the complexity
of designing new systems to protect society from the threat such
adversaries pose. Our research suggests that, in designing protective
measures, we should not immediately assume that the newest and most
advanced technologies--the highest wall, the most sensitive
surveillance--will provide the best protection. Drawing on common
metaphors for defensive efforts, a fortress--relying on formidable but
static defensive measures--is a limiting strategy. Once a wall is
breached, the Nation is open to attack. Depending on the adaptive
capabilities of the adversary, a defensive model built from a variety
of security measures that can be adjusted and redeployed as their
vulnerable points are discovered provides a superior approach. However,
whatever combination of models and measures is chosen, it is only by
exploring adversaries' potential counter-technology behaviors that
vulnerabilities in current and potential future defensive measures can
be discovered and addressed.
I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to address the
committee today on this important topic, and I look forward to
answering any questions you might have.
Biography for Brian A. Jackson
Brian A. Jackson is Associate Director of the Homeland Security
research program at the RAND Corporation. His terrorism research has
focused on tactical and operational learning by terrorist groups and
terrorist groups' use of technology. Individual projects have developed
approaches to assess the threat posed by potential terrorist use of
specific weapons, examined of the strategies to respond to terrorist
targeting of national economies, constructed terrorist attack scenarios
to support policy analysis efforts, and examined emergency response
strategies and incident management for responses to major disasters and
terrorist attacks. Key publications in these areas include articles in
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Military Review on technology
adoption by terrorist organizations, terrorist organizational
structures and behavior, and intelligence gathering for targeting
terrorist and insurgent groups, as well as the RAND reports Aptitude
for Destruction, Volumes 1 & 2, examining organizational learning in
terrorist groups, Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist
Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies, and Volumes 1 and 3 of the
RAND Protecting Emergency Responders series of publications. Brian
holds a Ph.D. in bio-inorganic chemistry from the California Institute
of Technology and a Master's degree from George Washington University
in Science, Technology, and Public Policy.
STATEMENT OF CHIEF JEFF SELF, DIVISION CHIEF, U.S. BORDER
PATROL
Mr. Self. Thank you, Chairman Gordon, for your opening
remarks, Congressman Mitchell, Ranking Members Hall and
Gingrey, and other distinguished Subcommittee Members.
It is my honor to appear before you today to discuss the
Office of Border Patrol's use of technology in securing the
border. My name is Jeff Self. I am the Division Chief
responsible for Southwest border operations for Customs and
Border Protection's Office of Border Patrol.
The United State's Border Patrol is a component of the
Department of Homeland Security, DHS, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. I would like to begin by giving you a brief
overview of agency and mission. Since 1924, the Border Patrol
has grown from a handful of mounted agents patrolling desolate
areas along the U.S. border to today's highly trained, dynamic
workforce of almost 15,000 men and women supported by
sophisticated technologies, vehicles, aircraft, and other
equipment.
Contributing to all this is the Border Patrol's time-
honored duty of interdicting those who illegally enter the
United States or smuggle narcotics and contraband between ports
of entry. The Border Patrol's national strategy is an all
threat strategy with anti-terrorism as our main priority. We
cannot protect against the entry of terrorists and the
instruments of terror without also reducing the clutter that is
caused by illegal migration across our borders. This strategy
has increased the effectiveness of our agents by using a risk
management approach to deploy our resources. This strategy
recognizes that we cannot go it alone. Border awareness and
cooperation with our law enforcement partners are critical to
securing America's borders.
We cannot control our borders by merely enforcing law at
the line. Our strategy incorporates defense-in-depth
components, including transportation checks away from the
physical border. To carry out its mission, the Border Patrol
has a clear strategic goal to establish and maintain effective
control of the borders of the United States. Effective control
is defined in the Border Patrol strategy as ability to detect,
respond, and interdict border penetrations in the areas deemed
a high priority for threat potential or other national security
objectives.
In order to establish effective control in a given
geographical area, we must be able to consistently detect an
illegal entry, identify and classify the entry, and determine
the level of threat involved, respond to the entry, and bring
the event to a satisfactory law enforcement resolution.
Gaining, maintaining, and expanding a strong enforcement
posture with sufficient flexibility to address potential
exigent enforcement challenges is critical in bringing
effective control to the borders. Guidance at the national
level for planning and implementation ensures resources are
initially targeted to gain and maintain effective control in
the most vulnerable, high risk border areas, and then to expand
this level of border control to all Border Patrol sectors.
While the key is the right combination of personnel,
infrastructure, and technology, it must be coupled with
improved rapid response capability and organizational mobility.
Each of these components is interdependent, and is critical to
the success of the Border Patrol strategy. There is no stretch
of the border in the United States that can be considered
completely inaccessible or lacking in the potential to provide
an entry point for a terrorist or terrorist weapon.
Therefore, securing every mile of diverse terrain is an
important and complex task that cannot be resolved by a single
solution. To secure each unique mile of the border requires a
balance of technology, infrastructure, and personnel that
maximizes the government's return on investment, and is
tailored to each specific environment.
The Border Patrol operates in three basic geographical
environments: urban, rural, and remote. Each of these
environments requires a different mix of resources. In an urban
environment, enforcement personnel generally have only minutes
or sometimes seconds to identify an illegal entry and bring the
situation to a successful law enforcement resolution. In rural
and remote areas, where enforcement personnel have minutes to
hours, or hours to days to detect, identify, classify, respond,
and resolve, we expect to incorporate a comprehensive
technological solution.
Continued testing, acquisition, and deployment of sensing
and monitoring platforms will be crucial in addressing these
vast areas along America's borders. Nationally, the Border
Patrol is tasked with a very complex, sensitive, and difficult
job, which historically has presented immense challenges. We
face those challenges every day with vigilance, dedication to
service, and integrity, as we work to strengthen the national
security and protect America and its citizens.
I would like to thank both Chairman Wu and the subcommittee
for the opportunity to present this testimony today, and for
your support of CBP and DHS.
I look forward to answering any questions that you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Chief Self follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeff Self
Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Gingrey, and distinguished Subcommittee
Members, it is my honor to appear before you today to discuss the
Office of Border Patrol's use of technology in securing the border. My
name is Jeff Self, and I am the Division Chief over Southwest Border
for Customs and Border Protection's Office of Border Patrol. The United
States Border Patrol is a component of the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). I would like
to begin by giving you a brief overview of our agency and mission. As
the guardian of the Nation's borders, CBP safeguards the homeland--
foremost, by protecting the American public against terrorists and the
instruments of terror, while at the same time enforcing the laws of the
United States and fostering the Nation's economic security through
lawful travel and trade. Since 1924, the Border Patrol has grown from a
handful of mounted agents patrolling desolate areas along U.S. borders
to today's highly-trained, dynamic work force of almost 15,000 men and
women supported by sophisticated technology, vehicles, aircraft, and
other equipment. Contributing to all this is the Border Patrol's time-
honored duty of interdicting illegal aliens and narcotics and those who
attempt to smuggle them across our borders. We cannot protect against
the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terror without also
reducing the clutter that is caused by illegal migration across our
borders. For example, today we have to account for all who enter or
attempt to enter the United States illegally. Last year we arrested
over 870, 000 people who entered the United States illegally. Of those,
we had over 18,000 major crime hits through biometric technology. These
crime hits canvassed a litany of crimes to include murder, rape, sexual
assaults, and kidnapping. It is imperative that we reduce the number of
persons or clutter attempting to illegally enter the United States so
that we can concentrate on terrorist or weapons of terror from entering
the United States.
The Border Patrol's national strategy is an ``all threats''
strategy with anti-terrorism as our main priority. This strategy has
made the centralized chain of command a priority and has increased the
effectiveness of our agents by using a risk-management approach to
deploy our resources. The strategy recognizes that border awareness and
cooperation with our law enforcement partners are critical.
Partnerships with the Department of the Interior; Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of
Investigation; State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies; and
State Homeland Security offices plays a vital role in sharing and
disseminating information and tactical intelligence that assists our
ability to rapidly respond to an identified threat or intrusion, which
is essential to mission success.
Recognizing that we cannot control our borders by merely enforcing
the law at the ``line,'' our strategy incorporates a ``defense in
depth'' component, to include transportation checks away from the
physical border. Traffic checkpoints are critical to our enforcement
efforts because they deny major routes of egress from the borders to
smugglers who are intent on delivering people, drugs, and other
contraband into the interior of the United States. Permanent traffic
checkpoints allow the Border Patrol to establish an important second
layer of defense and help deter illegal entries through comprehensive
enforcement. Border Patrol Agents often encounter fraudulent documents
while conducting transportation check duties. Agents receive training
at the Border Patrol Academy that enables the agent to identify key
features and characteristics of valid immigration documents. This
training, coupled with on the job training, allows agents to identify
common tactics used by the criminal element in creating fraudulent
documents. Our most valuable asset at the checkpoint in examining the
validity of any document (birth certificate, driver's licenses, and
immigration documents) is the agent's experience.
To carry out its mission, the Border Patrol has a clear strategic
goal: Establish and maintain effective control of the border of the
United States. Effective control is defined in the Border Patrol's
strategy as the ability to detect, respond, and interdict border
penetrations in areas deemed a high priority for threat potential or
other national security objectives. In order to establish effective
control in a given geographical area, we must be able to consistently:
<bullet> Detect an illegal entry;
<bullet> Identify/Classify the entry and determine the level
of threat involved;
<bullet> Respond to the entry; and
<bullet> Bring the event to a satisfactory law enforcement
resolution.
Gaining, maintaining, and expanding a strong enforcement posture
with sufficient flexibility to address potential exigent enforcement
challenges is critical in bringing effective control to the borders.
Guidance at the national level for planning and implementation ensures
resources are initially targeted to gain and maintain effective control
in the most vulnerable, highest-risk border areas, and then to expand
this level of border control to all Border Patrol Sectors.
While the key to mission success is the right combination of
personnel, infrastructure, and technology, it must be coupled with
improved rapid response capability and organizational mobility. Each of
these components is inter-dependent and critical to the success of the
Border Patrol's strategy. We are fully engaged with the DHS Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate in our efforts to identify, develop, and
acquire technology to help us gain enhanced awareness and control of
our borders. Our participation in S&T's Integrated Process Team on
Border Security, for example, will help us use S&T resources to develop
technology that will better secure our borders. Systems with the
technological ability to predict, detect, and identify illegal entries
and other criminal activity, but lacking the capacity for a rapid
response or reaction, cannot complete the enforcement mission.
Conversely, enforcement personnel with inadequate intelligence or poor
technological support to provide situational awareness, access, and
adequate transportation or equipment necessary to conduct enforcement
activity are much less likely to be effective in today's dynamic border
environment.
There is no stretch of border in the United States that can be
considered completely inaccessible or lacking in the potential to
provide an entry point for a terrorist or terrorist weapon. Therefore,
securing every mile of diverse terrain is an important and complex task
that cannot be resolved by a single solution, such as installing fence.
Securing each unique mile of the border requires a balance of
technology, infrastructure, and personnel that maximizes the
government's return on investment and is tailored to each specific
environment. Some of the components utilized in evaluating tactical
infrastructure needs are border access (the existence of all-weather
roads), border barriers (vehicle and pedestrian), and the lack of non-
intrusive inspections equipment at checkpoint facilities.
The proper mix of personnel, technology, and infrastructure will
vary with differing border environments and enforcement challenges. The
Border Patrol operates in three basic geographical environments: urban,
rural, and remote. Each of these environments requires a different mix
of resources. In an urban environment, enforcement personnel generally
have only minutes, or sometimes seconds, to identify an illegal entry
and bring the situation to resolution. This dynamic is a result of the
fact that significant infrastructure exists to facilitate an illegal
entrant's approach to the border and entry and to permit the violator
to escape within moments of effecting the entry by blending in with the
legitimate traffic in the community. New tactics are constantly
developed by those attempting to avoid detection in such situations in
order to combat increased border security. One of those new methods
that we have seen is the discovery of tunnels. There have been over 70
tunnels detected on the border. These tunnels were detected by various
methods including sinking vehicles, collapsing roads, and by agents in
the performance of their duties.
On the Northern border, the vastness and remoteness of the area and
the unique socioeconomic ties between the U.S. and Canada are
significant factors in implementing the Border Patrol's national
strategy. Severe weather conditions on the Northern border during
winter intensify the need to expand ``force-multiplying'' technology to
meet our enforcement needs. The number of actual illegal border
penetrations along the U.S.-Canada border is small in comparison to the
daily arrests along the U.S.-Mexico border. The threat along the
Northern border results from the fact that over ninety percent of
Canada's population of 30 million lives within one hundred miles of the
U.S.-Canada border. It is most likely that potential threats to U.S.
security posed by individuals or organizations present in Canada would
also be located near the border. While manpower on the U.S.-Canada
border has significantly increased since 9/11, the Border Patrol's
ability to detect, respond to, and interdict illegal cross-border
penetrations there remains limited. Continued testing, acquisition, and
deployment of sensing and monitoring platforms will be crucial in
addressing the Northern border threat situation.
One tool that CBP uses to assist with border security is the
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). The UAS provides CBP with a remotely
piloted asset that allows for persistent, broad area surveillance. UAS
operations are proactive responses to un-cued, cued, and intelligence
based missions. The UAS Program focuses its capabilities on the CBP
priority mission and enhances surveillance and reconnaissance
requirements along the border. The UAS has the flexibility and
endurance to fly long leg surveillance missions while conducting both
scheduled and unscheduled searches. As a law enforcement force
multiplier for CBP, the UAS allows CBP Air and Marine (A&M) to support
other DHS entities, including the United States Coast Guard, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.
Since 2004, CBP UASs have flown more than 2,000 hours, directly
contributing to more than 4,000 arrests and the seizure of thousands of
pounds of marijuana. In July 2007, CBP A&M added another UAS to the
southwest border for a total of two. In FY 2008, one UAS will migrate
to the northern border to support expanded northern border operations.
Once additional personnel are trained to support UAS operations in the
southwest, CBP A&M will be available to provide surveillance at the
southwest border 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
Nationally, the Border Patrol is tasked with a very complex,
sensitive, and difficult job, which historically has presented immense
challenges. We face those challenges every day with vigilance,
dedication to service, and integrity as we work to strengthen national
security and protect America and its citizens. I would like to thank
both Chairman Wu, and the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to present
this testimony today and for your support of CBP and DHS.
Discussion
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. At this point, we will open up for
our first round of questions, and I will recognize myself for
five minutes.
Dr. Jackson, you specifically mentioned how adversaries
have been able to detect the technologies identified as
priorities in the bill: unmanned surveillance vehicles, tunnel
detectors, anti-counterfeit technologies, and so on. How should
these identified vulnerabilities affect how DHS proceeds in
these research areas?
Dr. Jackson. Well, any technology is vulnerable. It is a
question of how easy or how hard it is for those
vulnerabilities to be discovered by our adversaries, and how
quickly they can exploit them.
In thinking about--sort of dealing with that in research
and development planning, one of the elements is to pursue
different strategies simultaneously, so if they determine a way
around a first line anti-counterfeiting technology, for
example, there are ways that it can be modified to address that
vulnerability.
But the other piece of this, too, it is something that I
included in my written testimony, but not my oral, is that the
other piece of this is the technology's function within the
overall system of our border defense, and so, there is also the
human resources and the concepts of operation better used to
reinforce the effectiveness of those technologies.
And those can actually provide a way, by preserving
flexibility in the way that we use the technologies, to
preserve our ability to adapt in response as well. So it is
sort of the two-pronged strategy of making sure that we have
preserved variety in our technologies, but also, thought
through how the way that we use those technologies can also
counteract the adaptability of the folks who are trying to
break through the border.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. Chief Self, one of the things I
would like to ask you--. First, how would you characterize DHS
S&T's interaction with the CBP, and has DHS S&T been responsive
to the CBP's short and long-term technology needs?
Mr. Self. I would characterize it, sir, as a very close
relationship. Within the Office of Border Patrol, we have an
Enforcement and Information Technologies Division with the
Division Chief responsible for the personnel. They work closely
with CBP Office of Information Technology, and together,
coordinate with S&T.
There has been coordination on many efforts in research and
development for operational technologies over the last couple
of years.
Mr. Mitchell. In your testimony, you say that our most
valuable asset at the checkpoint in examining the validity of
any document is the agent's experience. Does CBP currently
employ anti-counterfeiting technology to help agents catch
fraudulent documents? And if not, why, and in your opinion,
what value does technology add to anti-counterfeit efforts?
Mr. Self. As it now stands, sir, agents in the field
basically rely on their training that they receive at the
Academy. They receive 21 hours of training in fraudulent
document identification. In addition, they are trained in how
to look at the security features that are within the document,
and after leaving the Academy, they have post-Academy, in which
they receive additional training on fraudulent documents.
Other than that, there--at the present time, there is no
technology for them to utilize in running cards through to
identify that they have been altered or they are a false card.
Mr. Mitchell. You rely strictly on the agent's experience,
and what they learned?
Mr. Self. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. All right. You mentioned that the Border
Patrol operates in three distinct environments: urban, rural,
and remote. Yet, research priorities are weighed towards
technologies intended to operate in remote environments. What
type of technology gaps exist for CBP operations in urban and
rural environments, and why have these technologies not been a
priority?
Mr. Self. In the urban and rural environments, sir, it is,
in all three environments, it comes down to the proper mix, and
the proper mix is, of course, personnel, it is infrastructure
and technology. In urban and rural, we have minutes to seconds
to respond, especially in the urban environment. The smuggling
infrastructure in the urban environment is normally directly
adjacent to the international fence or the international line.
If we don't have the infrastructure, the fences, the
individuals penetrating the border can come in and be within
the smuggling infrastructure and heading into the interior of
the United States within minutes to seconds. Therefore, we need
the infrastructure.
In addition to that, typically, in our urban environments,
we do have technologies. We have RBSS cameras that survey the
fence. In some areas, we have attended ground sensors that will
pick up somebody walking into the United States. There is a mix
of tactical infrastructure and technologies in our urban areas.
For the most part, however, it is not clear across the border
at this time.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Hall for five
minutes.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Self, I probably
owe you an apology. I called you a general when I was out there
earlier. I saw those two stars there. You have a lot heavier
duty and more territory to cover than an average general does.
You are the division guy out of a great area.
Mr. Self. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall. Very valuable to us.
Mr. Self. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Hall. And I would like for you to hurry up with your
testimony and get on back to doing what you are doing, because
we need you.
Mr. Self. I would rather be out there than here, sir.
Mr. Hall. Yeah, I know you would. And I will correct
something on you, Dr. Hooks. By golly, you are a doctor,
because I looked in the dictionary, and it says a doctor is a
learned person, and you taught me all about these exhibits
here, that I know more now than most citizens do, and I can
answer a lot of questions that I get asked.
Mr. Hooks. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Hall. I don't know how I am going to fully describe all
that, but I am just going to tell them we have it, and they
will have to take my word for it.
I mentioned in my opening statement, Dr. Jackson, about the
fact that you tracked a number of terrorist groups, and that
you had some good advice about our need for a multi-layered
defense. Do you want to enlarge on that a little?
Dr. Jackson. Sure. I mean, in the work that we did, we
looked across the whole world. So, we picked terrorist groups
from--everyone from the LTTE in Sri Lanka, which is a very
structured and well researched terrorist group, to Jemaah
Islamiyah in Indonesia, and we did that because we wanted to
cover the variety of the threat that technologies face from
groups responding.
And in looking across that, what struck us was the
commonality in the ways that a lot of these groups sort of came
at the defenses that were put in their way, because
technologies can be--provide a very potent security role, they
are something that are threatening to the interests that the
terrorist groups are trying to advance, so they respond to
them.
And so, in thinking about a multi-layered defense, and one
element of that is sort of the multi-layers that we have heard
here, you know, talking about reinforcing the fence with
sensing equipment, so you have, you know, multiple layers at
the same time. But the other element of this multi-layer idea
that came out in our research is this idea of making sure that
we have a portfolio of technologies available, not that we are
all using at the same time, to provide multi-layers right now,
but also we have things on the bench, if you will, to roll out
if the first layers are broken through. And so, it is a multi-
layered defense not just at the same time, but providing our
ability to reconstitute the layers of our defense over time,
because of course, as I am sure anyone who does this on a day
to day basis knows, this is an ongoing, long-term contest
between the people who are trying to break through the border,
and the security organizations that are trying to keep that
line.
And so, as a result, we have to be prepared to think about
what we are doing, and the benefits of what we do over the
long-term.
Mr. Hall. Getting back to you, Mr. Hooks--Dr. Hooks. In
your testimony, you state that tunnel detection is an example
of research the Directorate likes to tackle through the basic
research portfolio for Fiscal Year 2009. What specific programs
are you seeking funding for, for Fiscal Year 2009, and where
would these be carried out?
Mr. Hooks. Specifically related to tunnel research?
Mr. Hall. Yes. Yes, and that's in this bill.
Mr. Hooks. We are looking to pursue specific efforts in
fiber optic technology and enhancements, so that they could
detect when tunnels are being built, the vibrations of the
tunnels being constructed, and/or the people passing through
them.
Mr. Hall. Just give us an idea about what kind of problem
tunneling is.
Mr. Hooks. Problem----
Mr. Hall. Yeah.
Mr. Hooks. Problem from a detection standpoint?
Mr. Hall. Detection, prevention. The length of the tunnels.
What is the longest tunnel you have ever seen?
Mr. Hooks. I can't specifically comment on----
Mr. Hall. But can you come close to it?
Mr. Hooks.--on the details.
Mr. Hall. I have heard that they have been, tunnels as far
as a block.
Mr. Hooks. Oh, at least a block. In different locations,
and Chief Self can probably provide some specific details.
Mr. Hall. I will ask the Chief about that.
Mr. Self. That is correct, sir. We have had tunnels as far
as several hundred yards, starting in Mexico, and tunneling
into the United States.
Mr. Hall. And how do you detect--how can you detect that?
How far underground is the tunnel?
Mr. Hooks. Tunnels aren't that deep, 20 yards or so. I am
sure there are cases they have been deeper.
Mr. Self. One problem they have in tunneling, sir, is they
have to deal with the water level in certain areas of the
Southwest border. Therefore, in some areas, you can have them
as deep as 12, 15, 20 feet. In other areas, they are only
anywhere from six to say, eight, 10 feet below the surface.
Mr. Hall. Go ahead and answer the question I asked you a
moment ago.
Mr. Hooks. Yes, sir. And so, the challenge in tunnel
detection is being able to detect it in near real time.
Ideally, to support their operations in a nonobtrusive manner
and quickly, using some kind of different detection scheme,
whether that be looking at the vertical deflections, gravity
deflections, electromagnetic deflections or whatnot, and right
now, the equipment is just not sensitive enough, so that you
could fairly rapidly, maybe using a truck at the border going
10 miles an hour along the border, be able to detect a tunnel
successfully, not receive a lot of false positives, so that the
Border Patrol could then take, excuse me, corrective action
accordingly.
Mr. Hall. I think my time is up. Mr. Chairman, are we going
to be allowed to send questions to them?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, we will.
Mr. Hall. Okay. I thank you for my time, and I am sorry I
went over the time.
Mr. Mitchell. I thank you. At this time, I recognize Ms.
Richardson for five minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell.
First of all, I would like to take a moment to commend
Congressman Hall for bringing forward this legislation, H.R.
3916. I think nothing is more important when we talk about
setting appropriate priorities, particularly having to do with
research and funding, taxpayer funding that is going towards
this, that it is done in the right way.
So, congratulations, Congressman Hall, on your efforts
today. I simply have one question for Mr. Hooks, and that is,
when technology is developed by the Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology group, how is it that a
technology's performance is validated?
And let me preface what I am saying to give you an example.
I represent Southern California, and we recently had a spill in
Northern California, where you know, a bridge was hit, and oil
was dumped, and the Coast Guard was supposed to have been
there, and you know, first of all, they shouldn't even have run
into the bridge to begin with, then oil was dispersed into the
water. No communication was made to the public for eight years.
It was just a comedy of errors, and when I say comedy, I don't
mean it in a humorous way. It was a disgraceful way, in my
opinion.
So, I am concerned with the tremendous amount of funding
that we use to, you know, utilize these technologies to protect
our borders, but sometimes actually validating the performance
of all this work is where we have a shortfall.
So, if you could tell us a little bit about what your
department is doing in that aspect, and how you work with other
groups or independent agencies to assist us in this effort?
Mr. Hooks. Yes, ma'am. It is important, we totally agree,
to effectively test the technologies before they are placed in
an operational environment with the different components. To do
that, we use several different means. Underneath each of the
Capstone IPTs, we have created project IPTs, where program
managers from the components, such as the Border Patrol, and
program managers in S&T, are coming together with appropriate
end-users, and defining the specifics of that equipment, the
requirements that it needs to meet.
Commensurate with that, they also need to define what are
the appropriate test and evaluation procedures that should be
followed, testing of that equipment both in the laboratory
setting and out in an operational setting, so that by the time
that equipment is transferred to the Border Patrol for
procurement, they can be confident that it works correctly.
So, we would encourage them, and surely, they would
participate in that evaluation of the testing of the equipment
as we go forward, so that they can feel confident at the point
that they receive it that it works properly. One example is we
have a test bed down at the Southwest Border at Douglas, where
we take new technologies down there, we give them to the Border
Patrol agents. Our Science and Technology people will be there,
but they are using them in the background of their normal day-
to-day operations, giving us feedback on it, and helping us to
evaluate the equipment, to make sure that it is operating
effectively.
Ms. Richardson. And when you say they give you feedback,
are these the actual ground patrol officers who are providing
you with the results?
Mr. Hooks. Yes. Yes, down in the Tucson sector, either the
Sector Chief, his specific agents, he has a component down at
the Douglas Test Site that specifically engages with us. These
are Border Patrol agents in that sector that are using the
technology, and we get direct feedback from them.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Hooks. I yield back my time,
Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. I now recognize Dr. Gingrey for
five minutes.
Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman Mitchell, thank you very much,
and I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here this
morning, and this is a hugely important issue. We all know
that, and not only our ground borders, but maritime security,
we haven't talked too much about maritime, but I have certainly
had the opportunity to go to the Southwestern border. We are
talking about 2,000 miles, aren't we, Chief Self?
Of course, the Canadian border, it is a longer border, but
I think our main focus, at least, on the Southern border, is
paying great benefits. Chief, I commend you for your long
service there. I actually went to Nogales, and we saw some of
the work of your people on the ground in the heat of the day,
and the dark of night, 24/7, doing their work, and I want to
commend you and, of course, everybody else on the panel, for
being here, and helping us understand a little bit better. I'm
proud to be a co-sponsor of Mr. Hall's legislation.
And I wanted an answer to a couple of specific questions,
and actually, the first one, Mr. Kapos, is in regard to HSSTAC.
I understand there was a lapse of authorization for HSSTAC back
in 2006, and I want to know, did that adversely affect the S&T
Directorate's ability, their organizational and planning
capability, when that authorization was not forthcoming in
2006?
Could you comment on that for us?
Mr. Kapos. Sure. I was not there, but all the same, I got
to pick up the pieces. By the time the HSSTAC was reauthorized,
we had only six members of the original 20.
Mr. Gingrey. Of the original 20, did you say?
Mr. Kapos. Yeah. Yeah.
Mr. Gingrey. Describe these 20 people.
Mr. Kapos. Well, they are representatives of scientific
disciplines, and of the first responder community, who had an
interest in--obviously, first responders have an interest in,
but the scientists are specifically picked to be people who are
eminent in their fields, and to have an interest in homeland
security problems.
As I said, by the time the HSSTAC was reauthorized, there
were only six of them left, whose terms had not either lapsed--
--
Mr. Gingrey. Six out of 20?
Mr. Kapos. Yeah. Whose terms had not either lapsed or who
had not resigned in order to accommodate other commitments. And
actually, it turned out to be fairly straightforward to recruit
14 people, because by and large, the people that I contacted
came from lists that had been prepared previously of people who
were interested. And by and large, they were very willing, but
we have to face up to the fact that the HSSTAC didn't meet for
the best part of a year, and it took us about two or three
months to get the people recruited and screened and so on.
We had our first meeting in late August in Newport, and we
meet again in December in Arlington, and in between these two
meetings, we have had a number of fact-finding meetings. We
have been working pretty hard. As a result, while you would
like not to lose any momentum, it turns out to be less
problematic than it might be to regain it.
Mr. Gingrey. Well, we appreciate your strong effort in
restoring to that 20 number, and trying to replace those 14 who
were so valuable. My five minutes went mighty quick, I guess,
this slow, Southern way of talking. But let me just follow up.
I have got a few seconds left and may as well stick with Mr.
Kapos, in regard, how was the current task of IED threat
assessment chosen, if you could discuss that with us in the
brief time we have left?
Mr. Kapos. Yes, indeed. The Under Secretary has been very
concerned about the need to prepare for this threat. Now, IEDs,
coming to a theater near you. And he was, in particular,
concerned, that there was not a properly rounded program to
address this. Running across the kill chain, from indication
and warning, from prediction, from detection, all the way
through to response. So, he simply asked the HSSTAC to look at
it from that viewpoint, and I must say, since I get to sit
through every endless meeting with the HSSTAC, that they are
doing a very, very good job of considering the entire spectrum.
Mr. Gingrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Kapos. Hopefully, we
will have a second round, and I can address some questions to
the other witnesses.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and I thank you.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. My understanding is we are going
to be called to votes in about 10 minutes, so at this time, I
would like to call on Mr. Wu, and then, we will call on Mr.
Smith.
Mr. Wu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am going to ask a
question. I am going to ask two questions, and I will take the
answers in writing. If we have time, we will take them here in
the Committee, and then, I would like to focus on a third
question.
And the first piggybacks on Mr. Hall's question about
tunneling, and also, gets at the issue of long-term versus
short-term research. And with respect to tunnel detection
research, it was pointed out that there are some basic research
investments which are needed as a first step, and yet, the S&T
Directorate is awarding a contract for shorter-term tunnel
detection technology, and I am a little bit troubled that while
the foundation might not have been laid, that we are charging
ahead with short-term technology, and I am concerned that that
would lead us to wasted research.
And I would like the Department to justify awarding the
short-term contracts, while the basic research hasn't been done
yet. And maybe there is a good explanation for that, and maybe
there isn't.
Now, we will jump from underground to overhead, and I would
like to know what the biggest technological challenges are in
the UAV R&D area. Who is responsible for performance testing
the UAVs? What criteria does the Department use to develop UAVs
and define successful operation of UAVs, and I will take
answers to both those questions in writing unless we can get
back to it. This five minutes goes really fast.
Now, Mr. Kapos, about HSSTAC, I am very concerned about
long-term research versus short-term research, and laying the
foundation in long-term research, so that, you know, we are not
firefighting all the time, and you know, we do have to do a
certain amount of firefighting in response to immediate
threats. But you know, the challenge, and I think the challenge
for the S&T Directorate, has always been that there is concern
that you all are shortsighted. There has been too much focus on
short-term stuff, and not enough foundational work, so that we
have the flexibility to flex with the changing threat
environment.
And the concern is that the one tool, or a very important
tool for setting long-term priorities is HSSTAC, and yet, that
is a tool that has now been very strongly focused on IEDs,
which is the threat of the day, and so, the problem is we have
a problem with shortsightedness, and now, you have just taken
the glasses off. We have gotten every more shortsighted,
because HSSTAC has been focused on a near-term threat rather
than looking out there, and appropriately setting priorities
for the S&T Directorate's long-term research.
Can you respond to what the S&T Directorate is doing about
the long-term, while appropriately addressing the short-term,
and whether HSSTAC has been hijacked to, you know--into short-
term projects?
Mr. Kapos. Sure. First, let us address the IEDs, because
the HSSTAC is looking explicitly at IEDs in the farther future,
five and more years into the future, and----
Mr. Wu. Now, what about non-IED threats? Shouldn't we be
concerned about those also?
Mr. Kapos. Most certainly, we should.
Mr. Wu. I mean, you know, there are broad categories, you
know, things like biosecurity, cyber security, et cetera. I
mean, you know, folks don't just focus on one thing.
Mr. Kapos. No, no. I agree. When we finish our
consideration of IEDs in the five- to 10-year future, which
will be about the 1st of February, then will be the time to
pick another problem. And certainly, cyber security is begging
for a look. Certainly, biosecurity is, too. But it is
important, I think----
Mr. Wu. HSSTAC is configured to just handle one thing at a
time?
Mr. Kapos. It is, pretty much. There is nothing that says
that we cannot subdivide the HSSTAC and consider two problems
or three problems, but remember, please, that the law allows
for only 20 members, and so we have to worry about having a
sufficient concentration of the various disciplines in order to
provide a well-rounded consideration.
Mr. Wu. Well, how many JASONs are there in the JASON
program at DOD? I mean, aren't they supposed to look at a
universe of defense threats, and that is sort of their task?
And why is HSSTAC different from that?
Mr. Kapos. I cannot answer why HSSTAC is different from
that. I don't know how many JASONs there are, but I do know
that the JASONs lay out a study program for themselves a year
ahead, and they go from problem to problem to problem. And that
is pretty much what we are trying to do with the HSSTAC.
Mr. Wu. Except in this instance, HSSTAC didn't pick IEDs
themselves, they were told to do so.
Mr. Kapos. Well, there was considerable consultation
between the Under Secretary and the Chairman of the HSSTAC
before they settled on IEDs. And as I say, the IEDs are crying
out for an integrated, broader spectrum program than they have
had in the past. So, I guess I am saying that I don't quite
agree that it has been hijacked by the immediacy of the
problem.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. I would like to now recognize Mr.
Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hooks, if you wouldn't mind answering this question. A
2008 budget request for the Border and Maritime Division is
only about three percent of the total S&T budget. Can you
elaborate on why that would seem, at least on its face, to be
such a small amount? As a percentage of the entire budget? Or
of the Directorate's activities, at least?
Mr. Hooks. Excuse me. I can say that within our S&T budget,
in my particular area, in the transition area, we look at the
11 different functional areas that we have broken down the DHS
mission space to, and with the leads of the different
components, they have identified what their highest priority
gaps area that require technology solutions. We propose
different technology programs and cost estimate them to provide
those solutions.
And then we have created a Technology Oversight Council
that is led by the Deputy Secretary of the Department, where he
looks, in an integrated fashion, across those 11 IPTs and the
requirements of each of those 11 IPTs, and based on risk in
those functional areas and his considerations, he is charged
with the balancing of that effort to make sure that it is
meeting across the spectrum of effort the highest-priority
needs of the Department. And that is how that budget is formed.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. Before we bring the hearing to a
close, I want to thank our witnesses for testifying before us
today.
The record will remain open for additional statements from
the Members, and for answers to any follow-up questions the
Committee may ask of the witnesses.
The witnesses are excused, and the hearing is now
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
<SKIP PAGES = 000>
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Robert R. Hooks, Director of Transition, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1a. What are the biggest technological challenges in the area of
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) R&D? Who is responsible for performance
testing for UAVs? What criteria does DHS use to define successful
operations for UAVs?
A1a. The biggest technological challenges DHS faces today in Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) R&D involves: Fulfilling FAA requirements to
operate within the National Airspace System (NAS), expanding sensor
capabilities allowing DHS to discriminate criminal activities at
medium- to high-altitude operating regimes, and maximizing the
operational benefits of an unending stream of data information obtained
by sophisticated UAV platforms.
<bullet> In order to have the FAA allow DHS unmanned aerial
systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS), they
currently require a lengthy approval process to fly in a very
controlled and confined environment. The FAA will become much
more flexible once they can be assured of collision avoidance
between UAS' and manned/other unmanned aircraft. To accommodate
this requirement, automated sense-and-avoid systems, capable of
detecting and sidestepping oncoming aircraft without a pilot's
intervention are required to assure collision avoidance. The
challenge to accommodate this provision lies in the fact that
the avoidance system must be fully automated without human
intervention as one would find in manned aircraft.
<bullet> In order to take full advantage of increased
surveillance opportunities found with advanced UAS
capabilities--altitudes from 18,000 to 65,000 feet and longer
station times of up to seven days--UAS payloads and sensors
need greater sensitivity and resolution to meet DHS
requirements. Requests for such complex UAS platforms have
pushed the envelope for producers of sensor equipment because
the demand for such high-resolution/high-sensitivity sensors
(i.e., sensors that can optically discriminate features of
illegal cargo and people engaged in illegal activities) is
relatively new. DHS' ultimate goal is a UAV platform that
yields a fully functional operating picture that highlights
areas of potential criminal activity.
Q1b. Who is responsible for performance testing for UAVs?
A1b. DHS is exploring options for performance testing providers. Until
a final determination can be made, DHS is working through cross-
organizational and cross-agency venues to conduct performance testing.
For example, DHS partnered with DOD for one DOD UAS-related Joint
Concept Technology Demonstration. DHS also has planned the UAS Gulf
Coast Demonstration (GCD) to determine acceptable platform and sensor
performance. This particular demonstration will combine the operational
efforts of multiple DHS Agencies while using the test and evaluation
capabilities of the Science and Technology Directorate.
Q1c. What criteria does DHS use to define successful operations for
UAVs?
A1c. The criteria that DHS uses to define successful unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS) operations are availability, mean time between failure,
mishap rate, etc. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the operator
of UASs within the Department and establishes these criteria. CBP
tracks statistics for law enforcement operations such as the number of
apprehensions made or pounds of illegal drugs confiscated. UAV
performance is measured against metrics based on these statistics.
Q2a. With regards to tunnel detection research, you point out that
basic research investments are needed as a first step towards
developing effective tunnel detection technology. Yet you also say that
DHS S&T is awarding a contract for a shorter-term tunnel detection
technology effort. What is the goal for developing prototype detection
technology, given that much of the important foundation research has
not yet been conducted? How much is DHS S&T spending on this High
Impact Technology Solution (HITS) project?
How will DHS S&T test and validate any technology developed
through this HITS project? If the technology is successful, what steps
will DHS take to make this technology available to CBP? What criteria,
outside of technological capabilities, will DHS use to measure success?
Cost? Training requirements?
A2a. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 calls for the Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) to ``promote revolutionary
changes in technologies. . .'' In the execution of that direction, the
S&T Directorate's Innovation/HSARPA work pursues technologies that have
potential to achieve results far sooner than the normal development
process. The Tunnel Detection effort is one of the S&T Directorate's
High Impact Technology Solutions (HITS) projects, where we invest a
relatively small amount of money, accepting considerable risk of
failure, in order to pursue a potential proof-of-concept answer within
one to three years. This approach challenges industry to think outside-
of-the-box and to develop leap-ahead technologies. However, because of
the potential risk of failure of this approach, it is important that
this work takes place in parallel with more conservative approaches,
including longer-term, basic research.
Q2b. How much is DHS S&T spending on this High Impact Technology
Solution (HITS) project?
A2b. The S&T Directorate FY 2007 budget for the tunnel detection HITS
project is $2 million. The S&T Directorate's planned FY 2008 budget for
the tunnel detection HITS project is $1 million.
Q3. In your testimony, you discuss the S&T Directorate's plans for
tunnel detection research. Specifically, you say you ``intend to study
and characterize the geophysical characteristics of key border
regions,'' beginning in FY 2009. Why do you believe DHS should carry
out this research, as opposed to the U.S. Geological Survey? More
generally, how do you determine whether DHS should carry out certain
research as opposed to agencies with greater expertise in specific
fields?
A3. The Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agencies are partnered with the S&T Directorate to
develop and demonstrate robust and reliable tunnel detection
technologies. In support of this effort, we will review U.S. Geological
Survey data to determine the existing geophysical characteristics of a
region-of-interest. Such data is important to enabling the technology
to detect anomalies or changes that would indicate the existence of a
tunnel.
Q4. In your testimony, you discuss current cargo security research
efforts. How has DHS engaged with end-users of these technologies, such
as shipping industry representatives, to develop performance
requirements and standards for tracking and cargo identification
technologies?
A4. The S&T Directorate's Borders and Maritime Security Division uses a
variety of methods to engage industry on the development of performance
requirements and standards for emerging tracking and cargo-
identification technologies. These include industry forums, requests
for information, and one-on-one discussions with container and maritime
industry representatives.
For example, the S&T Directorate meets regularly with members of
the shipping industry. Through dialogue with several ocean carriers, we
found that two of the systems developed by our office, the Marine Asset
Tag Tracking System (MATTS) and the Hybrid Composite Container, could
provide broader commercial benefits in addition to our intended
security objectives. MATTS can provide efficiencies from improved asset
visibility, while the Hybrid Composite Container offers more durability
and weight savings over existing containers. Industry could benefit
commercially from the potential promulgation of cargo security
standards such as these. Additionally, the S&T Directorate continues to
seek and has received the cooperation of the shipping industry to test
these technologies.
The S&T Directorate also uses industry forums and invitational
speaking engagements to ensure a broader outreach across carriers and
shipping industry end-users. Recently, in November 2007, we addressed
the annual world-wide Terminal Operators Conference (TOC) in Panama on
the S&T Directorate's Cargo Security Program. During this review, we
received positive feedback on our approach to solving complex security
issues involving container shipping.
The S&T Directorate has met with the World Shipping Council and
members of the Department of Transportation (DOT) Supply Chain Security
Working Group to discuss the role of standards in both industry and
government related to cargo and shipping containers. The S&T
Directorate is supporting the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Working Group focused on cargo and container security standards. CBP is
the United States' representative to the World Customs Organization
(WCO). International standards would need to be promulgated through the
WCO, as the end-user regulatory body, through their SAFE Framework of
Standards.
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Q1a. During the hearing you described the process by which the Deputy
Secretary looks across the 11 IPTs to determent funding priorities for
the Directorate. What information does the Deputy Secretary use to
determine the relative investment among the IPTs? Similarly, what
metric does S&T use to determine what projects are funded in the high-
risk, Innovation portfolio?
A1a. The Deputy Secretary has established a Technology Oversight Group
(TOG) to provide oversight of the S&T Directorate's Capstone IPT
investments. The TOG is chaired by the Deputy Secretary and consists of
the DHS Under Secretary for Management and the DHS Under Secretary for
National Protection and Programs. The DHS CFO attends, and the DHS
Under Secretary for Science and Technology is the Executive Secretary.
Through the TOG, the Deputy Secretary provides oversight of the S&T
Capstone IPT investment and ensures investment balance across the
Capstone IPTs. In implementation, the DHS Under Secretary for Science
and Technology provides the Capstone IPT-approved, -prioritized and -
recommended S&T Enabling Homeland Capabilities (EHC) to the TOG. The
TOG validates the customer focus and ensures that proposed S&T
Directorate programs support Department-wide strategies and concerns.
The TOG prioritizes funding across S&T Directorate Divisions using
specific criteria such as:
<bullet> Magnitude of Vulnerability/Risk--projects that would
significantly reduce the known vulnerability/risk to a known
threat;
<bullet> Projects that address one or more of the DHS
priorities identified;
<bullet> Cross-cutting Department priority--projects that
address high-priority capability gaps identified by multiple
IPTs;
<bullet> Ability to fill a major capability gap--projects that
have a high potential to fill a capability gap identified by
IPTs;
<bullet> Transition timing--projects that match transition
with a scheduled DHS acquisition program upgrade; and
<bullet> Expected delivery time.
Q1b. Similarly, what metric does S&T use to determine what projects
are funded in the high-risk, Innovation portfolio?
A1b. The initial (current) set of Homeland Innovative Prototype
Solutions (HIPS) and High Impact Technical Solutions (HITS) projects
were selected in early FY 2007, prior to the initial meeting of the S&T
Directorate's Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). They were
selected as a result of the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology's participation in a two-day off-site with all Department
leadership. The Under Secretary was able to identify the priority gaps
in capability as described by leadership and those gaps became the
initial HIPS and HITS. The list of HIPS and HITS projects has been
extremely well received by our customers and has generated tremendous
interest among industry. New HIPS and HITS will be selected from
various inputs including the IPT process, unsolicited input from
industry and laboratories, and from teaming opportunities with other
agencies. The S&T Directorate's Corporate Board will review all
potential candidates for HIPS and HITS categories and make final
program decisions.
Q2. In your testimony you describe a UAV simulation S&T is currently
developing with the FAA. How will this simulation help ease the
barriers to regular operations of UAVs in the National Airspace System?
Will S&T also pursue flight tests of relevant safety hardware?
A2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) simulation between the S&T
Directorate and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will directly
affect the relationship during regular operations of UAVs in the
National Airspace System (NAS). By coordinating during the simulations,
the process of putting more UAVs in the NAS will be much safer.
Simulations will address issues such as the airspace during take-offs
and landings as well as in-flight collision avoidance. Since many UAVs
fly at the same altitude as manned aircraft, this is where most of the
coordination is needed. By doing simulations that will practice take-
offs and landings and flying in the vicinity of manned aircraft, DHS
organizations and the FAA will help ease the barriers during regular
operations as well as last-minute disaster relief operations such as
the recent wildfires in California. By preparing emergencies during
simulations, DHS organizations as well as the FAA will be able to
coordinate and manage the NAS much more efficiently.
The S&T Directorate is working with the FAA and DOD to pursue
flight tests of relevant safety hardware including collision avoidance
systems. The fact that UAVs are unmanned makes safety in the NAS the
highest concern to the S&T Directorate, and we intend on ensuring all
relevant safety hardware has been properly tested and standardized.
Q3a. Dr. Jackson's testimony highlighted the need for regular red-
teaming to ensure technological defenses cannot be immediately
overcome. What role does red-teaming play in current testing and R&D
activities of the Directorate? Dr. Jackson also spoke about the
potential need for organizational changes to utilize new technology or
adapt to opponents. Does the S&T Directorate have the expertise to
advise DHS components on organizational or operational improvements or
provide research in this area?
A3a. The S&T Directorate agrees with the importance of red teaming and
is evolving an external red team capability. Within the S&T
Directorate, we look to various laboratories to provide red teaming
capability on selected technologies.
Q3b. Dr. Jackson also spoke about the potential need for
organizational changes to utilize new technology or adapt to opponents.
Does the S&T Directorate have the expertise to advise DHS components on
organizational or operational improvements or provide research in this
area?
A3b. The DHS operational components are the experts in their operations
and organizational structure. The S&T Directorate will closely
coordinate with the operational components on the development of
incremental and innovative technologies. Through this close
coordination, the operational components will be better able to
evaluate these technologies, evolve new concepts of operations if
necessary, and determine the degree of operational improvement each
technology provides. This close coordination manifests itself through
the Capstone IPT process where the S&T Directorate develops a better
understanding of operational requirements. Demonstrations and pilots of
technologies allow operational components and end-users to better
understand and evaluate the technology as it matures, and
experimentation provides an environment for the operational components
to test the edges of the technology and the underlying operational
concepts. The S&T Directorate is a component of this important chain,
but our operational customers are the experts and end-users.
The S&T Directorate has developed various test beds to evaluate
technology in actual operational environments. The test beds allow us
to evaluate technology for survivability, operational efficacy, and
susceptibility to counter-measures. Relevant to Border Security, our
border test beds provide integrated system level test platforms for
evaluating border security sensor and processing technologies and
demonstrating their performance in an operational environment.
Furthermore, the test beds mature those technologies for transition,
reduce associated technology risk, and establish lessons learned for
our operational components. For example, in FY 2006, the S&T
Directorate installed a southern border test bed in the Tucson sector
of Arizona, which tested Border Patrol officer's abilities to remotely
access databases, sensor alerts, and geo-spatial information via
vehicle-mounted computers and hand-held devices. In FY 2007, the S&T
Directorate expanded the southern border test bed by extending access
to multiple law enforcement databases; deploying an in-field, 10-
fingerprint reading system; improving radio direction finding of
individuals conducting counter surveillance in support of illegal
activity; and adding a law enforcement asset location tracking
capability (blue force tracking). In FY 2008, the S&T Directorate will
install a northern border test bed demonstration in the Swanton sector
of Vermont, which will include a multi-sensor fusion function, field
level scene awareness capability, and law enforcement data base query.
This puts new technology in real-world environments against real-world
adversaries and provides a measure against current operational
technologies and capabilities.
Q4a. In your testimony you describe the university-based Centers of
Excellence (CoE) as an integral part of the Directorate's long-term
research agenda. How much of the Directorate's basic research is
performed through CoE's versus individual grants or national
laboratories? Does the Directorate have a planning mechanism for long-
term research across all of the divisions?
A4a. About 50 percent of the S&T Directorate's basic research budget
goes toward Centers of Excellence (CoE) research.
Q4b. Does the Directorate have a planning mechanism for long-term
research across all of the divisions?
A4b. Yes, the S&T Directorate develops long-term research programs with
the divisions. Long-term research develops the fundamental or
scientific technical basis or understanding that future systems and
devices will be based on. Long-term research needs are derived mainly
from three sources; basic or fundamental research issues that are
identified in the IPT program planning process, priorities unique to
Homeland Security solutions, and leveraging opportunities with our
research partners that have strong Homeland Security applicability. The
S&T Directorate coordinates basic research workshops between the
divisions and DHS in-house labs, the National Laboratory networks, and
the CoEs.
Q5a. To the credit of Under Secretary Cohen and yourself, the
Integrated Product Team (IPT) process has significantly improved S&T's
responsiveness to the other components of DHS. Does the focus on
technologies that can be delivered in three years or less, however,
bias the Directorate towards modest changes of existing systems? Is the
IPT review system capable of assessing long-term research goals?
A5a. No. The Capstone IPT process is only one pillar of the S&T
Directorate's investment effort. We also recognize the need to invest
in basic research and in higher risk innovative technologies. The three
S&T Directorate investment pillars compliment each other by allowing
S&T to address near-term capability gaps while investing in longer-term
solutions. The focus of the Capstone IPT process is to connect with the
customer, understand their operations and capability gaps, and deliver
near-term improvements to protect the Nation. Our innovation effort is
informed by the Capstone IPT process but is focused on longer-term,
higher risk, game-changing technologies. Basic research invests in
areas where there are capability gaps but no near-term or innovative
solutions. Basic research invests in these areas so that in the long
run, we develop the understanding of the relevant basic science that
will eventually provide the technical solutions our customers' need.
Presently, about 15 percent of the S&T Directorate's budget goes toward
long-term research. Our goal is to direct 20 percent of the S&T
Directorate's budget toward long-term research.
Q5b. Is the IPT review system capable of assessing long-term research
goals?
A5b. Yes, the S&T Directorate's IPT process provides the information
that feeds long-term research planning. As our technical subject matter
experts work with other DHS components, they identify many R&D needs.
If a capability gap identified by the customer cannot be solved by a
near-term technology solution, or an immature high-risk technology
solution that is not evident, then basic research is necessary to
advance the science and find breakthroughs that could result in future
technology solutions. The S&T Directorate's subject matter experts
(SMEs) work directly with DHS component representatives to determine
which needs fit into the scope of the three-year target and through our
innovation effort. Other long-term, high-priority needs identified
during the process are handled through the office of the S&T
Directorate's Director of Research.
Questions submitted by Representative Phil Gingrey
Q1. What were some of the capability gaps identified in the planning
process CBP and S&T undertook? Were there projects that fell ``below
the line'' and could not be immediately funded by the Directorate? If
so, what were these items?
A1. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), along with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), co-chair the Border Security Capstone
Integrated Product Team (IPT). The Capstone IPTs are arranged along
departmental function lines, and thus, address overall border security
and interior enforcement issues and not just a single component's
priorities. As the co-chairs of the Border Security Capstone IPT, CBP
and ICE followed a structured process that identified and assessed
capability gaps. The Capstone IPT quickly realized that the high
priority gaps identified by CBP were also common to ICE and the U.S.
Coast Guard. The Capstone IPT identified several major acquisition
programs that would benefit from the S&T Directorate conducting risk
mitigation including CBP's SBINet and the U.S. Coast Guard's Command 21
programs. Additionally, capability gaps were identified in the
following areas:
<bullet> Improved ballistic protection via personal protective
equipment;
<bullet> Improved detection, tracking, and identification of
all threats along the terrestrial and maritime border;
<bullet> Ability to access ICE databases in which voice
information is entered; provide analytical, reporting, and
automated case de-confliction; classify, and identify voice
samples;
<bullet> Non-lethal compliance measures for vehicles, vessels,
or aircraft allowing for safe interdiction by law enforcement
personnel;
<bullet> Non-destructive tools to inspect hidden or closed
compartments to find contraband or security threats;
<bullet> Improved analysis and decision-making tools that will
ensure the development/implementation of border security
initiatives;
<bullet> Ability to non-intrusively determine the intent of
subjects during questioning;
<bullet> Ability for law enforcement personnel to quickly
identify the origin of gunfire and classify the type of weapon
fired; and
<bullet> Ability for law enforcement officers to assure
compliance of lawful orders using non-lethal means.
There were capability gaps which fell below the line for the Border
Security Capstone IPT based on resource limitations. The S&T
Directorate's Capstone IPT process is customer-focused with the goal to
deliver incremental technology improvements within three years. The
three-year turnover establishes an automatic refresh capability. Once
the Capstone IPT Process matures, we expect that each year 30 percent
of our technology efforts will complete and transition, which would
make funds available for the next below-the-line priority or the next,
new, Capstone IPT-identified threat. The first priority Border Security
Capstone IPT ``below the line'' capability gaps would be addressed by
accelerating the following technology efforts: Tunnel Detection,
Advanced Ground Surveillance Radar, Pattern Discovery and Prediction as
a Decision Support System, Sense and Avoid Systems for Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UASs), Counter Surveillance, and Less-Lethal compliance
measures for personnel to provide solutions sooner to our DHS component
customers.
Question submitted by Representative Adrian Smith
Q1. You mentioned in your testimony the Border Officer Tools program
and explained how this program will enable border security and Coast
Guard members to perform their current tasks more effectively and
safely. Could you please explain in greater detail how these
technologies are assisting border patrol officers on the U.S.-Mexico
border?
A1. There are two main projects under the Border Officer Tools and
Safety program in the Borders and Maritime Security Division: Border
Officer Tools and Border Officer Safety. Border Officer Tools will
improve law enforcement effectiveness and enhance officer/agent safety
while searching vessels/vehicles. Many of these tools will leverage
technology currently under development by either DHS or Department of
Defense (DOD) for their purposes. One effort is developing tools that
support secure communications (i.e., voice and data) between field
operators as well as between field operators and their command centers.
Another example is an effort to deliver intrusive (requiring contact)
as well as non-intrusive, non-destructive technologies to aid in the
identification of contraband. In FY 2009, the project will conduct a
technology survey to identify documentation resolution versus bandwidth
solutions to provide 24-hour, Real-Time Image Transmission of high-
definition images and documents. The Border Officer Safety project will
integrate technologies to enable border security law enforcement agents
to perform their mission with greater safety. These technologies
include, but are not limited to: Enhanced Ballistic Protection,
Automatic Facial Recognition, Hidden Compartment Inspection Devices,
and less-lethal Pursuit Termination-Vehicle/Vessel Stopping. In FY
2009, the project will develop and document ballistic vest performance
requirements for border application, evaluate equipment/technologies
and develop gun-fire location requirements for law enforcement agents.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Ervin Kapos, Director, Operations Analysis, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security;
Executive Director, Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee (HSSTAC)
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
HSSTAC Format
Q1. The format of the HSSTAC was changed for the most recent iteration
of the Committee. Previously, HSSTAC had a broad focus and provided
recommendations for research priorities across the many fields covered
by DHS S&T. Now, HSSTAC zeros in on specific project recommendations in
a particular field, currently focusing on improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). Why did the format of HSSTAC change? Given that the Committee
is composed of experts from a variety of fields, are you taking
advantage of the members' expertise when you focus on fields that fall
outside their backgrounds? How does this format affect HSSTAC's ability
to establish mission goals for the long-term?
A1. There have been changes to HSSTAC, however the Committee still
adheres to its established responsibilities of reviewing and providing
recommendations for research priorities across the fields that are, or
possibly might be, covered in the programs of the S&T Directorate. In
fact, that will be one of the topics to be covered in the next cycle of
HSSTAC studies. At the same time, the Directorate asked the Committee
to take intensive looks at problems that are pervasive in their impact
on the S&T Directorate. For example, the HSSTAC will review what
science and technology projects need to be undertaken in the next
several years to provide an adequate basis for a capability to respond
to the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the U.S.
domestic environment. Members of the HSSTAC have worked on the various
portions of this problem as their backgrounds and expertise have
particularly qualified them to do. The Committee also meets as a whole
to critique and integrate the partial answers to the problem which
becomes broad ranging advice to the Under Secretary for S&T. Finally,
members representing the various academic disciplines have integrated
well with the members representing the various first-responder and
related fields, and we have found that this mode of operation supports
HSSTAC's capability to establish mission goals for the S&T Directorate.
HSSTAC Expertise
Q2. Does the membership of the HSSTAC include operational expertise
that would allow the Committee to inform the Directorate on tactical
concerns such as concepts of operation or organizational issues within
the Directorate or other DHS components?
A2. Yes, the membership of the HSSTAC includes the operational
expertise required to allow it to advise the S&T Directorate on
concepts of operation and organizational issues that arise. Nearly all
of the members have broad ranging and deep experience in Homeland
Security activities and in what has been found to work and not to work
in these areas in the past. Also, the membership includes
representatives of the first-responder communities, such as law
enforcement, fire safety, emergency management, and health affairs. The
interaction between these first responders and the representatives of
the various scientific disciplines on the HSSTAC has been consistently
productive of valuable insights in areas such as concepts of operation
and organizational issues.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Brian A. Jackson\1\, Associate Director, Homeland Security
Research Program, The RAND Corporation
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research. This
product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. The series
records testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or
local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and
panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation
is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. In your testimony, you said, ``the effectiveness of security
technologies can degrade as our adversaries adapt and alter their
behavior in response to the introduction of defensive measures. That
adaptive behavior can pose a significant risk to the security benefits
new defensive technologies are intended to provide and, therefore, must
be considered in technology planning.'' In your opinion, does DHS S&T
recognize the need for adaptive, flexible technology planning? How do
the contributions of various advisory groups, such as Integrated
Product Teams and the HSSTAC affect DHS S&T's ability to adapt to new
challenges?
A1. Our research on the effects of terrorist adaptive behaviors on the
efficacy of defensive measures was sponsored by DHS S&T's Office of
Comparative Studies to identify the implications for S&T planning for
combating terrorism. Because RAND has not had the opportunity to
examine DHS S&T's technology planning processes or the activities of
groups like the Integrated Product Teams and the HSSTAC, I
unfortunately cannot provide an informed answer on the extent the ideas
developed in our or others' work on this topic are reflected in DHS
planning efforts.
Q2. You specifically mention how adversaries have been able to defeat
the technologies identified as priorities in the bill: unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), tunnel detectors, and anti-counterfeit technology. How
should these identified vulnerabilities affect how DHS proceeds in
these research areas?
A2. Terrorist groups' past efforts to degrade the effectiveness of
priority technologies like UAVs, tunnel detectors, and anti-
counterfeiting technologies can inform research planning in two ways.
First, the ways that terrorist groups have found to do so provide
lessons for improving future technologies that can be directly applied
in current research activities. If approaches can be devised that
render terrorists' past counter-technology strategies ineffective, our
future defenses will be stronger as a result. Our research has shown
that responding to terrorist adaptive behavior can involve
modifications to the technical systems themselves, which would need to
be an integral part of R&D programs, but frequently require changing
the concepts of operation for how technologies are used as well. This
emphasizes that in developing new defensive measures it is important to
consider the ways those technologies will be used as part of the
development process, since those concepts of operation may be critical
to maintaining the technologies' effectiveness. It also underscores the
importance of the transition efforts to move new technologies to end-
users and help shape their application.
Second, in designing research programs for these priority
technologies, the principles identified in our research and summarized
in my testimony are important to ensure that the defensive measures we
develop in these areas are robust to adversary adaptive efforts.
Including testing, red teaming, and small scale technology pilot
efforts in R&D programs is needed to identify and address
vulnerabilities to their effectiveness. Furthermore, given that
adversary groups have shown remarkable flexibility to respond to even
sophisticated technologies, it is also critical to maintain reasonable
flexibility in the technologies being developed and to build R&D
portfolios in each of these areas (i.e., rather than focusing on only a
single technology choice) to preserve ``fall back'' defensive options
if the effectiveness of deployed technologies is compromised.
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Q1. What assessment technique would you suggest for determining the
funding priorities among threats such as border security or
radiological detection?
A1. In RAND's past research and testimony on homeland security, we have
advocated that funding priorities should be informed by risk analysis--
an assessment of the threat of specific attacks, the vulnerability of
targets of concern to those attack modes, and the consequences that
would occur if an attack was successful. Use of risk analysis in policy
planning ensures that priorities are defined not just by one these
three factors in isolation but by all three together, providing a way
of considering high probably, lower consequence events--such as
``everyday'' illegal border crossings by individuals--with lower
probability but potentially higher consequence events--such as
radiological material being smuggled into the country.
A risk-informed priority setting process for R&D would consider the
seriousness of individual risks and select technology priorities and
options based on their ability to reduce those risks. The results of
our research on terrorist responses to defensive measures could
contribute to such a process since those responses degrade the
effectiveness of defensive technologies, thereby cutting their ability
to reduce risk.
Q2. What implications does your research have for the appropriate
balance between short-term and long-term research projects? Are
incremental changes to technological defenses enough to stay ahead of
opponents' counter-efforts?
A2. It is difficult to provide a general answer to whether incremental,
short-term technological changes are enough to stay ahead of adversary
adaptive efforts. For some technologies, incremental efforts may make
it possible to maintain a defense's efficacy for some time, though it
is unlikely to do so forever. In other cases, depending in large part
on the specific way the opponent has found to defeat the technology,
incremental changes may provide little benefit. For example, if an
adversary has found a way to avoid the functioning of the technology
entirely (one of the four strategies our work identified that were
highlighted in my testimony), incremental change is unlikely to be
enough. The importance of both short-term and long-term research
projects is therefore a part of the ``portfolio approach'' to
developing defenses our work suggested, where it is longer-term work
that may be the source of the ``fall back'' defensive options if
today's technologies are breached. Focusing disproportionately on
shorter-term efforts risks creating a defense that cannot respond to
future changes in the threat.
While it is easy to say that both short- and long-term focused work
are needed, the resources available for supporting research and
development are not infinite and resource constraints must limit the
number and scale of activities that can be pursued simultaneously. As a
result, in thinking about portfolios of defenses we are not suggesting
that multiple ``full scale'' technology programs be pursued at once.
Instead, what is needed is portfolios of smaller scale research, pilot,
and technology evaluation efforts that maintain a group of options at
differing levels of maturity that be then called on--and scaled up--if
and when they are needed.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Jeff Self, Division Chief, U.S. Border Patrol
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
All Threats
Q1. You say in your testimony that Border Patrol has an `` `all
threats' strategy with anti-terrorism as our main priority.'' In a
conversation with a CBP officer at a major port, our staff learned that
on-the-ground officers estimate that drug interdictions have decreased
by approximately 90 percent since CBP's focus shifted to terrorism. In
your opinion, is that estimate accurate? If so, how is CBP working with
DHS S&T to identify promising technologies to improve the rate of drug
interdictions?
A1. The Border Patrol, along with CBP, was an active partner with ONDCP
and DOJ in the development of the National Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy, which was publicly released in October 2007.
The Border Patrol is working diligently to implement the numerous
strategy objectives that relate to combating all border threats,
including narcotics. In FY 2007, the Border Patrol increased agent
staffing along with complementary tactical infrastructure and
surveillance technology to make gains in the number of miles under
operational control between the ports of entry. These increases have
contributed to the decrease in the number of arrests of aliens entering
the United States illegally and the increase in the amount of marijuana
and cocaine seizures nationwide. Border Patrol marijuana seizures
(1,859,299 pounds) increased 36 percent; over 99 percent of that amount
was seized on the southern border with Mexico. Border Patrol cocaine
seizures (14,242 pounds) increased 11 percent; over 89 percent was
seized on the southern border with Mexico, just over nine percent in
the coastal border sectors and less than two percent along the northern
border with Canada.
CBP Border Patrol's area of responsibility (AOR) is focused between
the official ports of entry, while CBP Office of Field Operations
concentrates at the port of entry. The Border Patrol is unfamiliar with
the CBP officer assertion regarding the reduction of drug interdiction.
That being said, the U.S. Border Patrol is the Department's first line
of defense in interdicting terrorists, terrorist weapons, including
potential weapons of mass destruction--from entering the United States
between the ports of entry. This complements the Border Patrol's
traditional missions of interdicting illegal aliens and drugs and those
who attempt to smuggle them across our borders between the ports of
entry.
To carry out its mission, Border Patrol has a clear strategic goal:
to establish and maintain operational control of the border of the
United States. All of our efforts are focused on this goal. The Border
Patrol's strategy consists of five main objectives:
<bullet> Establish substantial probability of apprehending
terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to enter illegally
between the ports of entry;
<bullet> Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement;
<bullet> Detect, apprehend, and deter smugglers of humans,
drugs, and other contraband;
<bullet> Leverage ``Smart Border'' technology to multiply the
effect of enforcement personnel; and
<bullet> Reduce crime in border communities and consequently
improve quality of life and economic vitality of targeted
areas.
Reports/Recommendations
Q2. Has the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory
Committee or Homeland Security Institute prepared any reports or
recommendations for U.S. Customs and Border Protection directly? If so,
how did CBP use these recommendations?
A2. CBP has utilized the Homeland Security Institute (HSI) to conduct
several studies. The first study was an analysis of CBP's apprehensions
at the border, and the second was an operational assessment. Both of
these studies, the outcomes and recommendations that followed, were
intended to help CBP assess whether progress is being made in our
border security mission. In short, HSI substantiated in their report
that there has been a cumulative deterrent impact resulting from our
regular operations and special initiatives such as Jump Start,
Streamline, end of catch and release, and interior repatriation. CBP
also utilized HSI to help determine the initial staffing requirements
for the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) Program Executive Office (PEO),
including the resources required to manage the SBInet procurement.
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Tunnels
Q1. What risk do tunnels pose to our border security?
A1. As the Border Patrol increases and expands its efforts along the
border, there will always be methods that smugglers employ to try to
penetrate and thwart our efforts. Cross-border tunnels have become one
way of countering our success above ground. The success of the Border
Patrol's mission above ground coincides with an increase in the amount
of cross-border tunnel activity that has been found. It is more
difficult and time consuming for smugglers to dig tunnels underground
then to cross the border illegally above ground.
Cross-border tunnels pose a threat to the Nation's border security.
While those tunnels discovered thus far have primarily served as a way
to smuggle drugs, clandestine tunnels could be used for illegal alien
entry or to smuggle of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or potential
terrorists into the United States.
The Border Patrol conducts below-ground sonar inspections in an
attempt to find tunneling activity along the border, participates in
multi-agency Tunnel Task Forces, and shares intelligence with partner
agencies regarding this threat. The DHS Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate has an ongoing program which is looking for breakthrough
technologies to improve our ability to detect cross-border tunnels/
tunneling activity. The goal is to develop a technology, or a
combination of technologies that Border Patrol officers and other
enforcement agencies can use to monitor the border for tunnel
construction.
As we gain effective control of the border, we expect to see
smuggling organizations try other tactics, and we will adapt our
efforts in order to shut those tactics down as well.
Red Tape
Q2. What red tape must Customs and Border Protection or S&T overcome
in order to use UAVs routinely? How has the Unmanned Aircraft System
(UAS) program stacked up against helicopters and airplanes in
effectiveness and cost as a tool for the Border Patrol?
A2. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) continues to work closely
with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Department of
Defense on issues affecting the use of unmanned aircraft in the
national air space. To date, the FAA has been very cooperative in
meeting CBP's air space access requirements. Through the Office of CBP
Air and Marine (A&M), the Agency's plans for expanded use of unmanned
aircraft across all of the Nation's borders are being addressed with
the FAA. In FY 2008, CBP A&M intends to conduct a maritime
demonstration of UAS capabilities in conjunction with the U.S. Coast
Guard, and to introduce a UAS to the northern border area of
responsibility.
The Predator B UAS provides CBP with a remotely piloted asset that
allows for persistent, broad area surveillance with proactive responses
that is driven by un-cued, cued, and intelligence based missions. With
a maximum range of 3,000 miles and the potential for 30 hours of on-
station time, no other system in the CBP Air and Marine fleet provides
the same capabilities as the Predator B. Instead of duplicating or
replacing the capabilities of existing CBP assets, CBP A&M exploits the
unique capabilities of the UAS to greatly enhance CBP's border security
operations. The UAS will allow CBP A&M to support other DHS entities,
including the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The FY 2008
Appropriation requires CBP to submit a cost effectiveness report to
Congress. Once that report is submitted to the committees on
appropriations, CBP will share that cost effectiveness information with
the Committee.
FAA Restrictions
Q3. Currently the FAA requires that licensed pilots operate all
aircraft in the National Airspace. The FAA does not allow fully
autonomous aircraft to fly without special authorization. Would you
expect a large increase in use of UAVs by the Border Patrol if these
restrictions were lifted? Finally, has the Border Patrol gained benefit
from early trials of remotely-piloted UAVs and would you consider
participating in similar trials for autonomous drones?
A3. CBP A&M does not expect a large increase in the use of unmanned
aircraft systems for homeland security if the FAA lifted their
restrictions on pilot qualifications and system capabilities. The use
of instrument-rated pilots for operations in the national air space is
a safety of flight issue and CBP would retain the requirement even if
the FAA lifted their restrictions. UAS operations across the southwest
border have proven highly effective. In just over 1,500 hours of flight
operations, CBP UASs have been credited with over 4,000 apprehensions
and the seizure of about 15,000 lbs of illegal drugs. The Predator B
UAS has the capabilities to meet all current CBP mission requirements.
Should new requirements emerge that the Predator B could not
accommodate, CBP A&M would investigate the use of other aviation assets
to meet the new mission need.
Questions submitted by Representative Adrian Smith
Fences
Q1. In your experience, where there are fences or physical barriers,
are they singularly effective at preventing aliens from crossing the
border illegally?
A1. Border infrastructure, in this case fences and physical barriers,
is effective in certain areas. However, as experience and common sense
suggests, fencing by itself cannot prevent all aliens from crossing the
border illegally. There are stretches of fencing or barriers that are
complemented by a presence of agents and technology to support the
infrastructure, making the fencing and barriers operationally
successful by preventing aliens from the crossing the border illegally.
Technology allows the Border Patrol to identify and track illegal
activity. Fencing helps deter illegal crossings and gives Border Patrol
agents time they need to respond to illegal cross border activity.
Fencing and barriers work hand in hand with manpower and technology to
establish deterrence and increase the certainty of apprehension.
UAS
Q2. As you stated in your testimony, the Unmanned Aircraft System
(UAS) has assisted immensely in arrests and seizure of illegal drugs.
In your opinion, are these types on technologies more capable and
effective at preventing illegal entry into our country than physical
barriers?
A2. CBP is building a border security system comprised of many
components, and each component complements one or more of the others.
UASs provide intelligence-gathering and surveillance capabilities as
well as direct support to ground and maritime interdiction operations.
But the UAS cannot meet all Agency border security requirements. In
addition to Border Patrol agents on the ground, physical barriers and
sensors are required to cover the vast areas threatened by illegal
activities. Threat information must be processed and returned to the
field as actionable intelligence. Only though an integrated network of
ground systems, air and marine systems, sensors, communications,
intelligence, and people can CBP accomplish its homeland security
mission.
Documents
Q3. How often do Border Patrol Agents come across fraudulent
documents? What types of documents are most often tampered with? And
how many documents must Border Patrol agents become familiar with?
A3. There have been fewer than 100 reported fraudulent documents
encountered throughout the Border Patrol annually in the last five
years.
For encounters with tampered documents, agents generally come
across the older plastic covered I-551, Lawfully Admitted Permanent
Resident (LAPR) card and I-94, Arrival/Departure Record. The older I-
551 LAPR card was manipulated by photo substitutions and modifying the
type within the card. The older I-551 LAPR card has been replaced with
an updated holographic magnetic striped machine readable card with
additional security features. The I-94 is a paper document that has
computer type, ink stamping, an embossed seal and an attached photo.
The I-94 is sometimes manipulated by photo substitutions and modifying
the type and stamps.
Agents must become familiar with immigration documents and other
local governmental issued documents. Examples of immigration documents
are the I-551 LAPR card, I-586 Border Crosser Card (BCC), I-94 and
other foreign issued travel documents such as passports and visas.
Other non immigration issued documents that Border Patrol Agents need
to be familiar with are birth and marriage certificates, Social
Security Cards and driver's licenses.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record
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