<DOC>
[110th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:35235.wais]
BUILDING AND MAINTAINING A HEALTHY
AND STRONG NASA WORKFORCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 17, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-31
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
35-235 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866)512-1800
DC area (202)512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail Stop SSOP,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California JO BONNER, Alabama
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania TOM FEENEY, Florida
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BARON P. HILL, Indiana VACANCY
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
HON. MARK UDALL, Colorado, Chairman
DAVID WU, Oregon TOM FEENEY, Florida
NICK LAMPSON, Texas DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
MIKE ROSS, Arizona JO BONNER, Alabama
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky VACANCY
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
BART GORDON, Tennessee
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICHARD OBERMANN Subcommittee Staff Director
PAM WHITNEY Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Republican Professional Staff Member
ED FEDDEMAN Republican Professional Staff Member
DEVIN BRYANT Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
May 17, 2007
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Mark Udall, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 13
Written Statement............................................ 14
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking
Member, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 15
Written Statement............................................ 16
Witnesses:
Ms. Toni Dawsey, Assistant Administrator, Human Capital
Management; Chief Human Capital Officer, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA)
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 19
Mr. John G. Stewart, National Academy of Public Administration
Fellow; Member, Panel on NASA Multi-sector Workforce
Oral Statement............................................... 24
Written Statement............................................ 26
Dr. David C. Black, President Emeritus, Universities Space
Research Association; Adjunct Professor, Physics and Astronomy
Department, Rice University; Co-Chair, Committee on Issues
Affecting the Future of the U.S. Space Science and Engineering
Workforce, National Research Council, The National Academies
Oral Statement............................................... 28
Written Statement............................................ 30
Biography.................................................... 38
Dr. Lee Stone, Legislative Representative, NASA Council of IFPTE
Locals, International Federation of Professional and Technical
Engineers
Oral Statement............................................... 38
Written Statement............................................ 40
Discussion
Opinions on NASA's Response to National Academies' and NAPA's
Reports...................................................... 53
How NASA Is Achieving Workforce Goals.......................... 55
Suggested Resources for Funding NASA........................... 56
Introduction of Mr. Feeney as Ranking Member................... 58
Suggestions for Utilizing the Current Pool of Workers and
Developing a Workforce for the Future........................ 60
Future Vision for NASA......................................... 61
Age Demographics of the NASA Workforce......................... 63
Workforce Implementation Plan.................................. 65
Importance of In-house Scientists at NASA...................... 65
Ratio of Permanent and Nonpermanent Civil Servants............. 67
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Ms. Toni Dawsey, Assistant Administrator, Human Capital
Management; Chief Human Capital Officer, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA)................................ 70
Mr. John G. Stewart, National Academy of Public Administration
Fellow; Member, Panel on NASA Multi-sector Workforce 79
Dr. David C. Black, President Emeritus, Universities Space
Research Association; Adjunct Professor, Physics and Astronomy
Department, Rice University; Co-Chair, Committee on Issues
Affecting the Future of the U.S. Space Science and Engineering
Workforce, National Research Council, The National Academies... 82
Dr. Lee Stone, Legislative Representative, NASA Council of IFPTE
Locals, International Federation of Professional and Technical
Engineers...................................................... 85
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Supplemental Information for the Record by Dr. John Stewart,
Academy Fellow and Member of the NASA Multi-sector Workforce
Panel.......................................................... 92
NASA: Balancing a Multi-sector Workforce to Achieve a Healthy
Organization, A Report by a Panel of the National Academy of
Public Administration, February 2007........................... 95
BUILDING AND MAINTAINING A HEALTHY AND STRONG NASA WORKFORCE
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 17, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Udall
[Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Building and Maintaining a Healthy
and Strong NASA Workforce
thursday, may 17, 2007
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
On Thursday, May 17, 2007 at 10:00 am, the House Committee on
Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will hold
a hearing to examine National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) workforce issues and the recommendations of independent review
panels for ensuring the health and vitality of the NASA workforce in
the 21st century. This is the first in a series of NASA workforce
hearings. Later hearings will address Shuttle transition workforce
issues and specific legislative proposals.
Witnesses:
Witnesses scheduled to testify at the hearing include the
following:
Ms. Toni Dawsey
Assistant Administrator for Human Capital Management, NASA
Mr. John G. Stewart
Fellow, National Academy of Public Administration, Member, NASA
Multi-sector Workforce Panel
Dr. David Black
Co-Chair, Committee on Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National
Vision for Space Exploration, National Research Council
Dr. Lee Stone
Legislative Representative, NASA Council of IFPTE Locals,
International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers
Background
Potential Issues
The following are some of the potential issues that might be raised
at the hearing:
<bullet> Is NASA's Workforce Strategy the Right Approach for
Building the NASA Workforce?--NASA is undertaking a sizable
shift of programmatic activities as the Agency endeavors to
carry out the President's Vision for Space Exploration.
Specifically, NASA is in the midst of the following changes:
Implementing the Vision for Space Exploration;
Retiring the Space Shuttle by 2010;
Completing the International Space Station;
Developing the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)
and the Ares Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV);
Refocusing the aeronautics program;
Dealing with a flatter funding profile than
previously assumed; and
Encountering a growing, retirement-eligible
workforce.
These changes will have a significant impact on the NASA
workforce in large part because the Agency has not developed a
human space transportation system in over 25 years. Pursuant to
the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, the Agency has developed a
Workforce Strategy to ensure that NASA possesses a workforce of
the appropriate size and skills to carry out its programs.
However, the strategy only covers the period through FY 2011.
Is NASA's Workforce Strategy the right approach for building
NASA's future workforce? How well does the strategy address the
two recent independent reports on NASA's workforce--the
National Academy of Public Administration's (NAPA) NASA:
Balancing a Multi-sector Workforce to Achieve a Healthy
Organization and the National Academies' Building a Better NASA
Workforce: Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National Vision
for Space Exploration? What, if any, gaps or shortcomings do
the reports identify in the Workforce Strategy, and what
actions does NASA plan to take in response?
<bullet> NASA's Workforce Strategy and Long-Term Planning--
NASA's Strategy states that ``The workforce strategy allows
NASA to deal effectively with the critical issues now facing
the Agency, particularly a significant amount of uncovered
capacity [workers whose time is not allocated to projects at
100 percent]. . .. NASA does recognize that some future events,
such as the termination of the Space Shuttle Program, require
long-term planning. . ..'' On the other hand, the Strategy
notes that ``Planning is a task requiring sensitivity to
ongoing changes in programs, budgets, political priorities, and
the labor market.'' What are the underlying assumptions on
which the strategy was developed? Was the strategy aimed at
responding to near-term workforce challenges, and if so, is the
existing strategy sufficient for long-term planning? NASA has
developed a strategic plan that outlines the Agency's goals and
programs for the next decade. Does NASA have a workforce
strategy and implementation plan that supports the Agency's
strategic plan? How robust is the Workforce Strategy against
potential changes in resources and priorities that Congress or
a new Administration might have for NASA?
<bullet> Workforce Strategy and NASA's Contract Workforce--
NASA's Workforce Strategy reflects an analysis of competencies
and approaches for building and strengthening the Agency's
18,000 civil servant workforce. However, the Agency also relies
on some 44,000 contractors to execute its projects. The
National Academies report states that ``in the short-term, NASA
does not possess the requisite in-house personnel with the
experience in human space flight systems needed to implement
the VSE [Vision for Space Exploration]. . .. Much of the
workforce on which NASA has historically relied, and will
continue to rely, exists outside the Agency. . .'' in industry
and at universities. Does NASA plan to include contractors and
academic researchers in its strategic workforce decisions? How
is NASA making long-term decisions about the number of
contractors it may need, at which centers, and for which
competencies, skill areas, and positions it will need those
contractors? Does NASA have the right infrastructure and in-
house skills for managing contracts and procurements?
<bullet> The Pipeline of NASA Workers--NASA, like other
government agencies, has used hiring freezes to control the
size of its workforce and avoid Reductions in Force (RIFs).
Opportunities to bring entry level civil servants into the
workforce depend, in part, on attrition, buy-outs, or
acceptances of early-retirement offers. This practice has led
to a NASA workforce that is comprised of an increasing number
of retirement-eligible workers and an insufficient number of
younger workers who can rise to leadership positions in the
future. The National Academies report notes that NASA will
suffer a long-term shortage of in-house technical expertise in
human space flight systems if the Agency does not take steps to
improve the pipeline of future leaders and managers. What steps
is NASA taking to ensure a pipeline in its workforce? The
independent reports also recommend improvements to NASA's
mentoring, internship, cooperative education, and graduate
fellow programs in the interest of attracting new talent to
NASA. In addition, the National Academies recommends that small
science space flight programs be used as opportunities to train
younger workers and build the skills in program/project
management and systems engineering the Agency has says it
needs. Does NASA plan to make any changes to its training and
recruitment programs? How effective are buy-outs and early-
retirement offers in opening positions for younger workers, and
how is NASA ensuring that those offers do not eliminate
individuals with skills that are difficult to replace?
<bullet> The Workforce Strategy and NASA's Aeronautics and
Science Programs--NASA's workforce strategy identifies a
moderate diminished need for Full-Time Equivalents [FTEs] in
space sciences, biological sciences, physical sciences, among
other competencies. The National Academies report recommends
that ``NASA should assess whether the skill levels of in-house
scientists at each field center are appropriate to fulfilling
that center's scientific leadership and service
responsibilities and should ensure that appropriate efforts are
made to maintain the scientific competency and currency of each
center's scientific workforce.'' How well does the strategy
address the need to develop and maintain healthy science and
aeronautics programs? Were NASA's assessments of needs in the
space, biological, and physical sciences based on the Agency's
understanding of the core capabilities needs and the number of
individuals that can meet those core capabilities? Or rather,
were NASA's assessments based on the projected resources
available for those disciplines in view of the Agency's other
priorities? Does NASA have mechanisms for assessing the
research and engineering capabilities needed from universities
to support current and potential NASA programs?
<bullet> Other Challenges Facing NASA's Workforce--During the
June 2006 Science Committee workforce hearing, a NASA official
testified that the Agency had reduced the problem of
``uncovered capacity'' (workers whose time is not allocated to
projects at the 100 percent level) by two-thirds, but still
carried significant uncovered capacity. Furthermore, NASA had
instituted retraining programs to enable uncovered workers to
take on new tasks. What are the causes of uncovered capacity?
What is the status of the Agency's uncovered capacity and how
effective have the retraining programs been? Are NASA's
approaches to handling uncovered capacity adequate over the
long-term? NASA has reported difficulty in tracking uncovered
capacity and the NAPA report notes that NASA does not have a
transparent process for monitoring its uncovered capacity;
there is no accounting code or tracking of when an employee is
uncovered or working on tasks outside his/her competencies.
Does NASA plan to make any changes in response to improve its
monitoring of uncovered capacity?
4<bullet> Is ``Ten Healthy Centers'' a Good Idea?--NASA's
Workforce Strategy embraces the goal of maintaining a fully
productive workforce at all of its field centers in what it
calls ``Ten Healthy Centers.'' Centers have been given new
exploration roles but face challenges as they shift from a
focus on research or aeronautics, for example, to exploration
projects. The National Academies report notes that, ``According
to NASA, the immediate problem with employees whose primary
skills are not currently needed is most significant at the
three aeronautics centers (Ames, Glenn, and Langley).'' In
addition, these centers have been identified as carrying the
highest percentages of uncovered capacity. The NAPA report
questions ``whether the pursuit of ten healthy centers will
yield a healthy NASA.'' What is NASA's definition of a healthy
center? What are the long-term implications of the ``Ten
Healthy Centers'' approach?''
<bullet> Supporting Strategic Decisions about the NASA
Workforce--NASA has assessed its requirements for the
categories of workers the Agency needs to support its programs.
The Agency has used an information system--the Competency
Management System (CMS)--devoted to workforce planning to
conduct this assessment. The independent reports assert that
NASA needs more information for its workforce planning,
question the adequacy of the CMS, and recommend that NASA
develop models for projecting future competency and skill
requirements. In particular, the National Academies recommends
that more information is needed about the current skills,
experience levels and expected attrition of the center
workforce. Competencies and experience levels need to be
translated into specific positions. What is the status of the
CMS and does NASA plan to make any changes to CMS? Will NASA
workforce decisions and future planning be based on robust,
transparent data and analyses? What information does NASA plan
to acquire to support both short-term and long-term workforce
decisions and plans?
<bullet> Looking Beyond NASA to Build the Future NASA
Workforce--The NAPA and National Academy reports seem to
suggest that NASA's workforce planning would benefit from the
same innovation and external partnerships that make the
Agency's space missions so successful. The National Academies
state that ``the solution to NASA's workforce issues is not to
be found by considering NASA in isolation from the rest of the
aerospace ecosystem [NASA, Department of Defense, industry, and
universities].'' NASA should conduct workforce planning in
cooperation with other government agencies, industry, and
universities. Both independent reports recommend that NASA use
interagency partnerships and improve internships and
cooperative programs to attract new talent. The National
Academies recommends that NASA invest in nontraditional
approaches such as the Centennial Challenges program to build
public support and train the next generation. NAPA recommends
that NASA consider detailing highly skilled technical experts
to other agencies during periods when NASA projects do not
require those employees' skills. How would such interagency
transfers work? How open is NASA to looking beyond itself to
address its workforce challenges? What plans does NASA have, if
any, for undertaking innovative approaches to strengthen and
build its workforce?
BACKGROUND
This section provides summary information on 1) NASA's current
workforce, 2) the NASA Workforce Strategy, 3) the National Academies
and National Academy of Public Administration's reports on NASA's
workforce, 4) the 109th Congress, Committee on Science's hearing on
NASA's workforce held on June 13, 2006, and 5) on the NASA Flexibility
Act of 2004.
Current NASA Workforce Demographics
As detailed in Attachment 1, NASA's workforce includes a total of
18,343 civil servants (as of April 2007) and approximately 44,023
contractors (as of April 2006). The largest numbers of civil servants
and contractor employees are retained at Johnson Space Center, Kennedy
Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Goddard Space Flight
Center, respectively.
Summary of NASA's Workforce Strategy
Pursuant to the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, NASA prepared a
Workforce Strategy. The Strategy serves to assess and build a NASA
workforce that can achieve the Agency's objectives for the Vision for
Space Exploration, scientific activities, and aeronautics research.
Specifically, the Strategy identifies the factors affecting NASA's
workforce:
<bullet> Implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration
<bullet> Retiring of the Space Shuttle by 2010 and development
of the Crew Launch Vehicle and Crew Exploration Vehicle
<bullet> A refocusing of aeronautics research program away
from technology demonstration and toward long-term basic
research
<bullet> Increasing numbers of retirement-eligible workers
<bullet> Change to full cost management and a resulting need
to balance human resources with center workload and project
life cycles
Elements of the Workforce Strategy include:
<bullet> The objective of 10 Healthy Centers that maintain a
workload to sustain a productive workforce.
<bullet> A workforce planning process that involves all levels
of management, including center management, and serves as a
central component of NASA's strategic, business, and resource
planning.
<bullet> A set of workforce planning tools including a
Competency Management System (CMS) to identify and monitor
NASA's knowledge base. According to the NASA workforce
strategy, ``Competencies are used to categorize the
capabilities of an employee, identify the knowledge
requirements of a position or those associated with projects
and programs, and forecast the Agency's workforce
requirements.'' In addition, a Workforce Integrated Management
System (WIMS) collects and manages NASA's data on the workforce
and competency planning.
<bullet> An assessment of supply and demand for specific
competencies in the workforce between 2006 and 2011, including
a projection of the number of FTEs needed at each NASA center
from FY 2005-FY 2011, based on expected requirements and
anticipated funding.
NASA identified, based on the assessment,
competencies in increasing demand: 1) program/ project
management; 2) systems engineering and integration, and
3) mission operations. Primary competencies in
decreasing demand are: 1) engineering and science
support; 2) management competencies; and 3)
paraprofessional business operations, among other
functions.
The Strategy discusses a problem with ``uncovered
capacity,'' that is, employees whose work time is not
allocated at 100 percent to project tasks.
<bullet> Identified steps for addressing the gap in required
competency areas, including approaches for recruiting new
talent and for retaining employees who possesses competencies
required to fulfill the Agency's objectives.
The Workforce Strategy emphasizes the need for flexibility to
reflect new information and changes in policies, plans, resources, and
political situations.
Building a Better NASA Workforce: Meeting the Workforce Needs for the
National Vision for Space Exploration (National
Academies, 2007)
In September 2005, NASA's Associate Administrator for Program
Analysis and Evaluation requested that the National Academies ``study
the long-range science and technology workforce needs of NASA and the
larger aerospace science and engineering community to achieve the
Vision for Space Exploration. . ..'' The report's key conclusions and
recommendations are summarized below:
No National Shortage of Skilled Employees to Support the Vision
<bullet> There is ``no looming national shortage of skilled
scientists and engineers to implement the VSE over the long-
term.''
<bullet> Low numbers of entry-level NASA workers (25-29 year
age range) who can build the experience necessary to implement
the Vision over the coming decades raise concern.
<bullet> The workforce that NASA has relied on in the past and
will continue to rely on resides outside of the Agency in
universities and industry. NASA will need to approach its
outside scientific workforce differently than its outside
engineering workforce, because while industry personnel can
move among defense, commercial aerospace, and NASA projects,
university research talent will be lost if NASA stops
supporting scientific research.
NASA Needs to Collect More Data In Order to Assess its Workforce
<bullet> NASA has conducted a top-down, headquarters-led
assessment of the Agency's needs and skills to meet its
workforce demands but needs to conduct a bottom-up, center-led
``assessment of the current skills, experience levels, and
projected attrition of the workforce for each individual
center.''
<bullet> This information should be used to develop a model
that will allow the Agency to project the skills it needs to
develop as well as the competencies and experience levels NASA
requires. NASA should translate such competencies and
experience levels into specific positions and projected
timeframes of when each center will require those positions.
<bullet> NASA should also apply the model to project the mix
of skills that could be conducted internally or externally in
industry.
Increased Need for Program/Project Managers and Systems Engineers
NASA's requirements for both internal and external scientific and
engineering workforce share the common need for ``highly skilled
program and project managers and systems engineers.'' Approaches for
increasing these capabilities include:
<bullet> Leveraging workers with systems engineering and
technical experience acquired from robotic science programs for
human spacecraft development;
<bullet> Providing opportunities for junior-level workers to
obtain hands-on flight development experience through low-cost
sounding rocket, balloon, and aircraft research projects to
develop the program/ project management and systems engineering
skills that NASA needs now and in the future.
<bullet> Retaining existing employees with much needed
program/project and systems engineering skills while also
recruiting employees from outside the Agency that possess those
capabilities.
<bullet> Using the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 and working
with Congress and the executive branch to reduce the barriers
that enable the flow of skilled employees between industry and
NASA.
NASA Should Help Train Its Future Workforce
<bullet> NASA should become involved in training its potential
workforce, because the Agency cannot rely on other government
agencies or external institutions to provide ``the skills that
are unique to the work the Agency conducts.''
<bullet> NASA training programs have languished and need
additional support and restructuring. The Graduate Student
Research Program (GSRP) establishes a strong link between NASA
and university scientists, but similar connections do not exist
for engineering and human exploration.
<bullet> NASA's Education Program could be used to fund
workforce programs including hands-on training opportunities in
suborbital programs and small mission programs such as
Explorers.
<bullet> Nontraditional means of inspiring and training the
future workforce such as the Centennial Challenge prizes should
also be considered. Many of the programs it mentions--sub-
orbital, GSRP, and Centennial Challenges--do not require large
investments and will yield training benefits many times more
than the necessary investments.
NASA Workforce Within the Broader Context
<bullet> The stability of support for and funding for the
Vision will be important to industry's ability to attract and
maintain skilled and younger workers to support exploration
projects.
<bullet> NASA's workforce is not an internal matter but must
be considered as part of a national strategy with input from
national security government agencies, industry, and
universities.
NASA: Balancing A Multi-sector Workforce to Achieve a Healthy
Organization (National Academy of Public
Administration, 2007)
In March 2006, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee and NASA
asked the National Academy of Public Administration to conduct a study
on NASA's workforce that would focus on 1) the challenges of
transitioning from the Shuttle Program to the Vision, and 2) acquiring
the right balance within its multi-sector workforce of approximately
18,000 civil servants and 44,000 contractors.
Some of the NAPA study panel's specific concerns are summarized
below:
NASA's Dedication to ``Ten Healthy Centers''
<bullet> The panel noted that ``NASA has not established a
comprehensive evaluation process to assess and monitor the
long-term health of each center.'' The report introduces a
guide for assessing the health of each center and recommends
that NASA's Program Analysis and Evaluation Office use the
guidelines to evaluate each center annually.
<bullet> The panel warns that ``. . .the potential danger of
the ten healthy centers approach is that actions intended to
help the struggling centers could harm the other centers.
Therefore, supporting all ten field installations could come at
the expense of NASA as an agency.'' The panel added that ``The
current and long-term health of the three NASA research centers
(Ames, Glenn, and Langley) is questionable and should be a core
concern of NASA headquarters.''
Multi-sector Balance
<bullet> The panel noted that interpretations of
responsibilities that are `inherently governmental,' and
therefore should be conducted by civil servants, differ across
the government. The report presents guidelines for deciding
whether a position should be filled with a civil servant or a
contractor. For decisions on civil servant hires, the report
introduces guidelines for determining what kind of appointment
should be used: tenured permanent or multi-year term.
<bullet> NASA's Workforce Strategy is limited to the civil
service workforce. It does not address the contractor personnel
that comprise two-thirds of the Agency's total workforce.
``Although the Strategy is consistent with historical
approaches to civil service workforce planning, it was a narrow
interpretation of the Congressional mandate for a human capital
strategy to ensure a workforce of the appropriate size and with
the appropriate skills.''
<bullet> NASA's Competency Management System (CMS) covers only
civil service employees, however, NAPA notes that ``other
federal organizations have developed systems to capture
aggregate contractor competencies. In June 2006, for example,
the Department of National Intelligence (DNI) began to develop
a comprehensive competency-based inventory for its civil
servants and its ``embedded'' (on-site) contractors who are
doing core work.''
Contracting Officer Technical Representatives
<bullet> The NAPA panel observes that there is ``An
inconsistent definition of the federal acquisition workforce,
which often excludes and, by implication may undervalue,
Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs). COTRs
are an agency's technical link to ensure that contractors
deliver quality products meeting agency specifications,
schedules, and costs.'' ``The Panel believes that NASA must
have more comprehensive information regarding who its COTRs
are, what training they have had, what training they need, what
parts of their contracting work they are doing effectively and
timely, and what responsibilities are perhaps not getting
adequate attention.''
<bullet> The report also calls attention to a December 2005,
NASA Inspector General (IG) report that identified a list of
``trouble areas'' relating to the contracting process,
including problems with the financial management system in
tracking contract spending; insufficient transparency in work
performed by subcontractors; sizable cost overruns in some NASA
programs, among other concerns. The IG recommended an improved
internal control framework, as well as establishing
institutional procurement officials accountable for acquisition
integrity.''
Centralization of Human Resources
<bullet> The report notes that ``Until recently, each NASA
center had its own tools and processes for workforce strategy
and planning, which made it difficult to track uncovered
capacity, skill mismatches, and other human capital issues and
take appropriate corrective actions.'' Recently NASA has moved
to centralize and make uniform its human resources activities
through its NASA Shared Service Center. ``By consolidating
these services, NASA intends to improve operational efficiency
and overall customer service and focus more on its core
competencies. NASA has projected annual savings of up to $6.6
million from NSSC, with more than 200 civil service FTE across
the four redirected functional areas.''
Human Resource Tools
<bullet> To efficiently manage the anticipated workforce
transitions, the NAPA report calls for workforce flexibilities,
including ``modified RIF rules, blanket buy-out authority with
a higher dollar value incentive, and limited statutory
authority for emergency retirement reform.''
Workplace Planning Scope
<bullet> The NAPA panel believes that, in light of the
considerable uncertainty in mission direction that NASA will
receive, NASA's workplace planning should expand from a one to
two-year to a five year horizon.
<bullet> The panel endorsed a recommendation from a 2005 GAO
report (GAO-05-230) to use scenario planning. The planning
should be focused and ``Identify the driving forces underlying
each likely scenario; Incorporate the scenarios into strategic
actions; Identify key events that would indicate a particular
scenario is unfolding; Create mechanisms to monitor the
environment; Make adjustments to agency strategies based on
environmental monitoring; and Identify and coordinate overall
agency competencies, schedules, and facilities across programs
by scenario.''
<bullet> NAPA learned in October 2006 that NASA's Office of
Human Capital Management (OHCM) is working to incorporate
scenario planning into the workforce planning process across
the five-year budget cycle.
Maintaining Core Skills
<bullet> Drawing upon workforce studies conducted by RAND, the
Panel emphasized the importance of identifying, sizing, and
maintaining core competencies. This process requires long-term
planning, and according to RAND, analysis of the demand for
labor at the skill level over time; understanding and
definition of core capabilities; and planning over the long-
term to maintain such capabilities.
Human Capital Flexibilities
<bullet> The NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 enlarged NASA's
workforce flexibilities, yet the Panel notes ``While these
flexibilities are important, they are much more modest than
those given to the DOD and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). NASA is subject to such Title 5 requirements as
staffing, position classification, compensation, and
performance management. For example, it is not authorized to
implement pay-banding or performance-based compensation
strategies.''
<bullet> The panel recommends that NASA ``Pursue additional
statutory and regulatory authorizations to obtain other
flexibilities needed to strategically manage the workforce. .
..'' For example, the Panel's 2005 Human Capital Flexibilities
report recommended that NASA be able to alter its agency's
career life cycle by modifying retirement rules ``to allow the
Agency to separate an employee eligible for optional retirement
if doing so would help it achieve workforce reshaping or
downsizing goals.''
The Competency Management System (CMS)
<bullet> Since 2003, NASA has used a Competency Management
System (CMS) to document the workforce competencies required by
NASA positions and possessed by NASA employees. As NASA has
defined it, a competency is not a role or function, but a base
level of knowledge relevant to the Agency's mission that
defines for a position what knowledge is needed and how it is
applied.
<bullet> The report notes that ``As presently constituted, CMS
is not always as helpful to centers at the personnel hiring
level because it does not track directly to positions.'' The
panel recommends that NASA ``Strengthen the CMS by integrating
it with existing budget tools. . .with a methodology for
translating competency surpluses and deficits into FTE needs.''
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on
Science, June 13, 2006. ``The NASA Workforce: Does
NASA Have the Right Strategy and Policies to Retain
and Build the Workforce It Will Need?''
During the 109th Congress, the House Science Committee's
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics examined issues related to NASA's
workforce during a hearing held in June 13, 2006.
<bullet> Ms. Toni Dawsey, NASA Assistant Administrator for
Human Capital Management testified on NASA's workforce
challenges including the Agency's uncovered capacity and
efforts to ensure that employees with critical skills are not
lost during buy-outs or early retirement offers. She also
discussed the Agency's workforce strategy and the importance of
human capital tools and flexibility such as the NASA
Flexibility Act, cooperative education programs, and intern
programs in attracting new talent into the Agency.
<bullet> Dr. Lee Stone, Legislative Representative from IFPTE
and an employee of NASA Ames Research Center testified that
NASA does not have the right strategies or policies to build
the workforce it needs and that the Agency's efforts in
workforce planning can only provide short-term solutions. The
only long-term solution to building a healthy workforce is to
reverse the trend in budget cuts to aeronautics, science and
exploration programs.
<bullet> Dr. David Black, Co-Chair of the National Academies'
report on NASA's Workforce testified that, in the view of the
Academy committee, NASA's work is incomplete and represents a
top-down approach that does not properly reflect the workforce
needs of individual centers. He also noted that the lack of
support and budget for the Vision for Space Exploration affects
the Agency's ability to find the best and brightest employees.
Dr. Black noted that if NASA elects to build its workforce
internally rather than use outside contractors, the Agency will
over the next five years face a gap in expertise that cannot be
addressed through new hires or in-house employees.
<bullet> Mr. John Douglass, President, Aerospace Industries
Association testified that aerospace workforce is aging and
that industry is in the process of rebuilding its workforce for
the future. He spoke about the use of contractors for short-
term projects and civil servants for basic research and
development efforts. Mr. Douglass testified that competition
for systems engineering skills among industry and other
government agencies is of concern. He said that the aerospace
industry can absorb more NASA work.
Uncovered Capacity
Subcommittee Members probed the issue of uncovered capacity. Ms.
Dawsey reported a total of 1000 FTEs were uncovered, which equates to
828 employees. NASA's approach to addressing the problem is to reassign
work to those centers with the most significant uncovered capacity and
to retrain workers for exploration-related tasks. The union asserted
that NASA's uncovered capacity problem had little to do with workforce
and much to do with full cost accounting. Dr. Lee Stone testified that
NASA managers were diverting labor funds to support hardware
procurements, thus creating the problem in uncovered capacity.
Competency Management System (CMS)
The IFPTE union called attention to the deficiencies in NASA's CMS
system. The system was originally intended to include several databases
but so far only includes one. The database in use only captures primary
competencies and cannot reflect an employee's secondary skills. In
addition, competencies have not been assessed and translated into
specific positions.
Balance of In-House Civil Servants and Contractors
The Subcommittee also examined the process for making decisions on
NASA's use of in-house civil servants versus contractors and the
balance between these elements of its workforce. Ms. Dawsey noted that
the Agency was seeking guidance on this issue from the National Academy
of Public Administration. Dr. Black suggested that NASA look beyond
itself and consider the question with the broader aerospace and
research community. Dr. Lee Stone referred to the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB) report and its cautioning on NASA's reliance
on contractors for technical support, use of experienced managers for
contract oversight rather than technical leadership, and use of
inexperienced engineers for management roles.
A Funding Crisis, Not a Workforce Crisis
Members and witnesses alike referred to the fact that NASA's
expanding responsibilities are not being met with appropriate
resources. As a result, the Agency will lose capabilities in science
programs, especially life and micro-gravity sciences and astrobiology,
which cannot be easily replaced. Insufficient funding to execute NASA's
multiple missions does not present a strong signal to graduate students
and young workers who might be considering NASA or NASA-related work as
a means to build and grow their careers.
The NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-201)
The NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 granted a range of increased
flexibilities for strengthening NASA's workforce. Under the Act, term
appointments could last longer, and conversion from term to permanent
appointments was made easier. Recruitment, relocation and retention
bonuses were increased, and redesignation bonuses were added. Authority
was granted for hiring distinguished scholars and for critical position
hiring. The time period for an Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA)
assignment limit was increased. Travel and transportation reimbursement
capabilities, and change of position incentives, were enlarged. Annual
leave, and Senior Executive Service (SES), eligibilities also were
enlarged. The maximum allowable rate of pay for NASA-excepted (NEX)
employees was increased. A scholarship program was established.
The NASA Transition Act of 2007
The NASA Transition Act of 2007 proposes to amend the Space Act of
1958 and the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004. The Transition Act includes
two new workforce management tools:
<bullet> Authority to offer a permanent employee an incentive
for voluntarily converting to a time-limited appointment; and
<bullet> Authority to pay the government's share of the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) premium for
employees who separate because their positions are being
eliminated or transferred out of the commuting area. This is
expected to result in a greater number of employees being
willing to separate voluntarily.
<bullet> Specific provisions of the legislation would
terminate in 2010.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Chairman Udall. The hearing will come to order.
I want to welcome all our witnesses here today, and before
I make my opening remarks, I did want to tell everybody who is
gathered that we have got a tight schedule this morning. I
apologize in advance. We may be disrupted 45 or 50 minutes into
the hearing, because we have a series of votes, but we will
move with some dispatch, because we really do want to hear from
this distinguished panel.
I look forward to getting your views on this important
issue of how best to ensure that NASA will have the workforce
that it needs to accomplish its various challenging missions.
It is obvious that NASA's workforce is critical to the success
of its missions, and yet, it should be equally obvious that the
continued health and strength of NASA's workforce cannot be
taken for granted. It needs to be nurtured, supported, and
given the tools and resources it will need to carry out the
complex and challenging mission that it has been asked to
undertake in science, aeronautics, and human space flight.
That is why I am keenly interested in hearing the findings
and recommendations of the two recent independent assessments
of NASA's workforce needs, as well as NASA's response to them.
However, I envision today's hearing as only the first step in a
continuing examination of the health of NASA's workforce by our
subcommittee.
In particular, I hope to have a follow-on hearing later
this year to examine some of the particular civil service and
contractor workforce challenges that are associated with the
upcoming retirement of the Space Shuttle, and in addition, I
would like the Subcommittee to review the proposed legislative
provisions that have been provided to Congress by NASA to
address some of these workforce challenges.
Thus, I hope that this hearing will be one in a series of
hearings on this topic. We owe it to both the highly talented
NASA employees, as well as to the broader aerospace community,
to make sure NASA and Congress get it right in attempting to
shape NASA's future workforce.
As I have said, and many others have acknowledged it,
NASA's civil service workforce consists of some of this
nation's ``best and brightest.'' In most cases, they have made
a long-term commitment to public service. I respect them for
that commitment, and I think that whatever workforce strategy
NASA develops should build on the strengths that these
individuals bring to the Agency, because if those skills are
discarded, whether for short-term budgetary reasons, or for
some other reason, we would find out at a later date that it is
difficult, if not impossible to recapture skills that the
Nation discovers it needs. And at the same time, NASA must work
to attract and properly utilize the young men and women who
will provide the scientific, engineering, and project
management expertise required for NASA's future missions
decades into the future.
Doing all of that would be a tall order under the best of
circumstances, and it will be doubly difficult if NASA is not
provided resources that are equal to the missions that it has
been asked to undertake.
Now, I am sure Judge Hall would agree with me that money
alone will not ensure that NASA will have the strong and vital
workforce that it needs, but insufficient funding will undercut
whatever workforce initiatives are put in place.
We have got a lot to talk about today, and I want to again
welcome our witnesses, and I am at this time honored to yield
whatever time he deems necessary to my good friend, Congressman
Hall, the Ranking Member of the entire Committee.
Judge Hall.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Udall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Mark Udall
Good morning.
I'd like to welcome all of our witnesses to today's hearing.
We have a distinguished panel, and I look forward to getting your
views on the important issue of how best to ensure that NASA will have
the workforce it needs to accomplish its various challenging missions.
Before I say more, however, I'd like to take a moment to
congratulate Mr. Feeney on his selection as the new Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee, replacing my good friend and colleague Ken Calvert,
who has moved over the Appropriations Committee.
Welcome Mr. Feeney, I look forward to working with you in your new
capacity in the days and weeks ahead.
Now it's obvious that NASA's workforce is critical to the success
of NASA's missions.
Yet it should be equally obvious that the continued health and
strength of NASA's workforce cannot be taken for granted.
It needs to be nurtured, supported, and given the tools and
resources it will need to carry out the complex and challenging
missions it has been asked to undertake in science, aeronautics, and
human space flight and exploration.
That is why I am keenly interested in hearing the findings and
recommendations of the two recent independent assessments of NASA's
workforce needs, as well as NASA's response to them.
However, I envision today's hearing as only the first step in a
continuing examination of the health of NASA's workforce by this
subcommittee.
In particular, I hope to have a follow-on hearing later this year
to examine some of the particular civil service and contractor
workforce challenges that are associated with the upcoming retirement
of the Space Shuttle.
In addition, I would like the Subcommittee to review the proposed
legislative provisions that have been provided to Congress by NASA to
address some of those workforce challenges.
Thus, I hope that this hearing will just be one in a series of
hearings on this topic--we owe it both to the highly talented NASA
employees as well as to the broader aerospace community to make sure
NASA and Congress ``get it right'' in attempting to shape NASA's future
workforce.
As I have said in the past, NASA's civil service workforce consists
of some of this nation's ``best and brightest.''
In most cases, they have made a long-term commitment to public
service.
I respect them for that commitment, and I think that whatever
workforce strategy NASA develops should build on the strengths that
those individuals bring to the Agency. . .
. . .Because if those skills are discarded, whether for short-term
budgetary reasons or for some other reason, we could find out at a
later date that it is difficult if not impossible to recapture skills
that the Nation discovers it needs.
At the same time, NASA must work to attract and properly utilize
the young men and women who will provide the scientific, engineering,
and project management expertise required for NASA's future missions.
Doing all that would be a tall order under the best of
circumstances.
It will be doubly difficult if NASA is not provided resources that
are equal to the missions that it has been asked to undertake.
Money alone will not ensure that NASA will have the strong and
vital workforce that it needs, but insufficient funding will undercut
whatever workforce initiatives are put in place.
Well, we have a lot to talk about today.
I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Mr. Hall. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think I would be
remiss if I didn't say I was honored to be sitting by a member
of really a great American family, and one that has lived a
life of public service, and the guy is so dang handsome, I ask
unanimous consent if I could sit down there, I didn't have to
sit by him.
Chairman Udall. Judge Hall, you are out of order, and----
Mr. Hall. All right, here I go. And I do thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for holding this meeting, because I always like to
welcome the witnesses, and thank them for coming today, because
they are giving up their time. It takes time to get here. I
think that I saw Mr. Stewart coming in this morning, and I
thought he was Norm Augustine. I almost said hello, Norm, how
are you doing. And Ms. Dawsey, good to see you again, and
welcome, and thank you.
NASA has a unique and interesting set of missions, and all
of us on this committee want you to successfully accomplish the
missions that we have laid out, and I don't think we ought to
give any on the program that is laid out, we ought to hold what
is laid out. We shouldn't have to take any suggestion that we
are not in a good economy, because that wouldn't be true, and
we don't need to start surrendering any of the gains that we
have laid out, and that the President's vision has set out, and
that we have accepted. We need just to carry it out and to
follow it.
And the workforce is so important in that. Everything that
NASA does depends on its ability to maintain a really highly
qualified and competent workforce, and developing the right mix
of skills, and keeping people engaged in the challenging work,
as budgets and program priorities change, I think, requires
just a very continuing commitment, a commitment that I have
noticed in NASA from the time I have been here.
You face a number of workforce challenges over the next few
years, including retiring the Space Shuttle in 2010, while
simultaneously completing the International Space Station, and
developing the new Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and Ares
Launch System. NASA's aeronautics program has been refocused,
shifting away from technology demonstrations and toward long-
term basic research.
NASA's vital science programs have faced difficult changes
as well. Furthermore, in addition to technical, scientific, and
engineering challenges, the Agency also faces daunting
financial management challenges that it has been largely unable
to address, in part because of a lack of qualified financial
auditors and administrators, I am told.
These pressures are unlikely to go away. In fact, they will
almost certainly continue in the future. Things are always
changing, that's the nature of science and technology, but the
workforce has to adapt to these changes, and the Agency bears
responsibility to employees and to its stakeholders including
Congress to develop a strategy to effectively address these
changes.
In April of 2006, NASA released its Workforce Strategy
document, as required by the NASA Authorization Act of 2005.
The National Research Council and the National Academy of
Public Administration have each reviewed NASA's strategy, and
offered very thoughtful perspectives on it. I look forward to
hearing from them today, and I also look forward to hearing
from the International Federation of Professional and Technical
Engineers.
Workforce is so vital to NASA's mission, NASA has to
constantly evaluate its future needs, and be ready to take
preemptive action when necessary to ensure the right people are
there to do exciting and challenging missions, and continue to
accomplish extraordinary scientific discoveries.
I look forward to hearing from you today, from the
witnesses, and with that, I thank the Chairman, and yield back
my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall
I want to thank Chairman Udall for holding today's important
hearing. I'd also like to welcome the witnesses, and thank them for
coming before us today to help us better understand NASA's workforce
challenges and the strategy to address them.
NASA has a unique and interesting set of missions, and all of us on
this committee want NASA to successfully accomplish the missions that
have been laid out. Everything that NASA does depends on its ability to
maintain a highly-qualified and competent workforce. Developing the
right mix of skills, and keeping people engaged in challenging work as
budgets and program priorities change, requires a continuing
commitment.
NASA faces a number of workforce challenges over the next few years
including retiring the Space Shuttle in 2010 while simultaneously
completing the International Space Station, and developing the new
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and Ares launch system. NASA's
Aeronautics programs have been refocused, shifting away from technology
demonstrations and toward long-term basic research. NASA's vital
Science programs have faced difficult changes as well. Furthermore, in
addition to technical, scientific, and engineering challenges, the
Agency also faces daunting financial management challenges that it has
been largely unable to address in part because of a lack of qualified
financial auditors and administrators.
These pressures are unlikely to go away. In fact they will almost
certainly continue in the future. Things are always changing--that's
the nature of science and technology--but the workforce must adapt to
the changes, and the Agency bears a responsibility to employees and its
stakeholders, including Congress, to develop a strategy to effectively
address the changes.
In April 2006, NASA released its Workforce Strategy document as
required by the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. The National Research
Council and the National Academy of Public Administration have each
reviewed NASA's strategy and offered thoughtful perspectives. I look
forward to hearing from them today. I also look forward to hearing from
the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers.
The workforce is so vital to NASA's mission. NASA must constantly
evaluate its future needs, and be ready and able to take preemptive
actions when necessary to ensure the right people are there to do the
exciting and challenging missions, and continue to accomplish
extraordinary scientific discoveries.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses. And with that, I
yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Judge Hall.
At this point, if there are Members who wish to submit
additional opening statements, your statements will be added to
the record, and without objection, so ordered.
And at this time, I wanted to introduce the panel of
witnesses, and I will introduce all of you, and then we will
start on my left with Ms. Dawsey and her testimony, but let me
welcome all of you again, and say a little bit about each one
of you.
Ms. Toni Dawsey is the NASA Assistant Administrator for
Human Capital Management. Mr. John Stewart, next in line, is a
Fellow at the National Academy of Public Administration, and
was a member of its NASA Multi-sector Workforce Panel.
Dr. David Black recently co-chaired the National Research
Council's Committee on Meeting the Workforce Needs for the
National Vision for Space Exploration, and we have to his left
Dr. Lee Stone, the Legislative Representative from the
International Federation of Professional and Technical
Engineers, who serves on the NASA Council of IFPTE Locals.
Welcome. I think most of you, if not all of you, are
professionals at this. You have been in front of the Committee
and the Subcommittee before, and you know you have five
minutes, and then, we will turn to questions, so that we can
further drill down into the expertise you have in your
perspective.
So, Ms. Dawsey, the floor is yours for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF MS. TONI DAWSEY, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, HUMAN
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT; CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICER, NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)
Ms. Dawsey. Thank you Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to
discuss NASA's workforce.
Implementing the Vision for Space Exploration clearly
represents a great management challenge, now and for many years
to come. In particular, the retirement of the Shuttle, the
completion of the International Space Station, and the
development of the multiple elements of the Constellation
Program involve a daunting series of transitions both
programmatic and institutional.
The NASA Workforce Strategy submitted to Congress in April
2006 laid the foundation for the actions the Agency must take
to maintain the knowledgebase of the current workforce, and to
acquire the skills necessary to accomplish NASA's mission.
The document articulates three principles underlying our
workforce strategy: building and sustaining ten healthy
centers, maximizing the use of NASA's people, and evolving to a
more flexible, scalable workforce.
We have developed a comprehensive plan based on these
principles, with three primary goals to implement them. The
first goal is to understand mission requirements, both near and
long-term. The second goal is to align the skills of the
workforce with mission needs, and the third goal is to enable
more effective and efficient human resources operations,
through the delivery of comprehensive and authoritative
workforce information.
The first goal, understanding mission requirements,
requires an especially strong workforce planning capability.
Recognizing that it is critical that all levels of management
be involved in workforce planning. In January, the Agency
established a workforce planning governance structure,
comprised of key agency managers, to identify workforce risks,
and to develop joint solutions to issues as they emerge. We
have also integrated workforce planning with the development of
program and project budgets. With an enhanced workforce
planning capability, NASA will be better able to determine the
demand for and supply of individual workforce skills.
The second goal, to align the workforce with the mission,
requires strengthening the technical and leadership excellence
of our employees, and reshaping the workforce to better serve
future mission requirements. In addition, as more of our
experienced employees reach retirement eligibility, it is
imperative that we attract and develop new talent.
To strengthen technical excellence, the Agency is providing
workforce retraining and skill development through a number of
programs designed to develop program and project managers and
engineers to transfer knowledge across NASA, academia,
industry, and international partners, and to ensure that
lessons learned are captured for the next generation. In order
to build leadership ``bench strength,'' NASA has created a
corporate leadership framework that provides succession
planning and executive development.
Another challenge is to reshape the existing workforce to
better serve current and future requirements. The use of buy-
out/early out authority to encourage voluntary attrition has
been critical to NASA workforce reshaping. Since the start of
Fiscal Year '04, over 1,300 employees in targeted areas of
surplus took buy-outs or early outs. This is over one third of
the total attrition of 3,500 during this period.
We continue to monitor this program to ensure that
experienced employees with needed and critical skills are not
leaving the Agency, and that safety of the Space Shuttle or the
International Space Station is not compromised. To replace
normal attrition, since 2004, we have hired nearly 2,500
employees. Of this number, 700 are recent college graduates.
The tools provided by the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004
continue to be vitally important to us as we reshape our
workforce. They provide over a dozen tools that include
enhanced recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses,
expanded use of term appointments, and benefits for new hires.
In March, NASA submitted legislative proposals to provide
the Agency with additional flexibilities that it needs to
better implement the transition from Shuttle to Constellation.
To effectively manage change, NASA must leverage information
technology also to provide more responsive, reliable
information to support decision-making. This is our third goal.
NASA is working toward full integration of human resources
information across the Agency. NASA also is converging business
systems, expanding access throughout the Agency, and increasing
tools and applications. These efforts will form a human capital
information environment that will provide a foundation for
total business systems integration and provide near real-time
comprehensive information to enable an informed decision-making
at all levels.
The initial operating capability for this environment is
planned for the summer of 2007, with final implementation
during the fall of 2008. In summary, in implementing the NASA
Workforce Strategy, NASA is positioning itself to deal
effectively with the critical issues now facing the Agency on
an integrated, agency-wide basis. NASA is putting in place
approaches that not only will alleviate the Agency's current
imbalances, but also will provide a structure that allows such
issues to be resolved in the future, as part of a deliberate,
systematic process.
The foundation that NASA is building is a big picture view
that will facilitate and institutionalize long-term planning
and agency-level coordination.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dawsey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Toni Dawsey
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss NASA's workforce.
Implementing the President's Vision for Space Exploration clearly
represents a great management challenge, now and for many years to
come. In particular, the retirement of the Space Shuttle, the
completion of the International Space Station, and the development of
the multiple elements of the Constellation Program involve a daunting
series of transitions both programmatic and institutional in nature.
The issues associated with these transitions are complex and our
planning, already well underway, will be an iterative, evolutionary
process featuring tight integration between these efforts and NASA's
ongoing Science and Aeronautics Programs.
The NASA Workforce Strategy, submitted to the Congress in April
2006, laid the foundation for the actions the Agency must take to
maintain the knowledge base of the current workforce, as well as
broaden, reinvigorate, and acquire new skills necessary to accomplish
NASA's Exploration, Science and Aeronautics missions. The document
articulates three principles underlying our workforce strategy:
building and sustaining ten healthy Centers; maximizing the use of
NASA's current human capital capabilities; and evolving to a more
flexible, scalable workforce. We remain committed to these principles
and view them as essential to mission success. Our comprehensive plan
for managing NASA's current and future workforce is based on these
principles, and we have developed three primary goals to implement
them.
<bullet> The first goal is to understand mission requirements,
both near- and long-term, to enable the identification and
matching of needed skills to program tasks through a robust,
comprehensive workforce planning process.
<bullet> The second goal is to align the skills in the
workforce with mission needs by strengthening technical and
leadership excellence and by reshaping the existing workforce.
<bullet> The third goal is to enable more effective and
efficient human resources operations through the delivery of
comprehensive and authoritative workforce information for
decision-making through integrated human resources, financial
and other business support systems.
Recently, both the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
and the National Research Council (NRC) released reports of
recommendations for addressing our overall workforce challenges, as
well as for addressing more specific issues relating to the
aforementioned transitions. To a large degree, these reports confirm
our assessments of the challenges facing us in the workforce arena and
validate the actions that we have initiated to address the most
critical and encompassing issues. All of the information, findings and
recommendations contained in the reports will continue to inform
implementation of our basic workforce strategy, and will help ensure
that we remain focused on the key issues.
Below, I have highlighted some of the key initiatives we've
undertaken over the past year in support of implementing the Workforce
Strategy through the stated goals.
Understand the Mission Requirements
Workforce Planning
Implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration requires an
especially strong workforce planning capability--a capability that will
allow Centers and the Agency to identify and assess areas of workforce
risk so that viable solutions to mitigate those risks can be developed
and implemented.
Recognizing that it is critical that all levels of management be
involved in workforce planning, the Agency's first Workforce Planning
Governance Structure was established in January 2007. The Governance
Structure comprises key management officials from across the Agency
who, in collaboration with the human resources community, work together
to identify Agency workforce risks and develop solutions to workforce
issues as soon as they emerge.
We have also integrated and synchronized workforce planning with
the development of program and project budgets. This new approach--
planning and integration among all levels of management--helps NASA
determine the best application of workforce to projects as they proceed
from formulation through development and mission operations. With an
enhanced workforce planning capability, NASA will be better able to
determine the demand for, and supply of, workforce skills based on
current and projected work requirements and to identify areas of
potential risk in matching workforce to work. This will allow more time
to develop strategies to mitigate these risks. In addition, we've
enhanced our ability to analyze workforce data necessary to support
effective workforce planning. We have begun to develop measures to
monitor multiple dimensions of workforce capability at the Centers and
to identify areas of strengths and weaknesses.
Shuttle Workforce Transition
With the retirement of the Shuttle in 2010, NASA will shift from
the current primary focus on operations to one in which we develop new
systems, with the capability for human space exploration missions to
the Moon, on to Mars and beyond.
These changes have significant workforce implications--for both
civil servants and contractors. The nature of the work will change as
we transition from Shuttle operations to research and development-
focused activities like planning, design, development, testing and
verification for Constellation systems. This presents unique challenges
to the Agency. NASA must retain the skills necessary to safely execute
the remaining Shuttle missions, manage the transition of skilled
Shuttle employees into Constellation development, and retain skills
between FY 2010 and FY 2015 necessary to safely execute Constellation
flight operations.
The National Research Council noted that ``NASA has undertaken a
commendable top-down analysis of current agency needs and the skill
levels of its current workforce that the committee believes is an
excellent first step'' (Finding 1). We acknowledge that more work is
needed, though. As the Constellation Systems Requirements Reviews are
completed this year, NASA will gain a much clearer understanding of the
demand for future workforce skills, which will form the foundation for
making any future decisions.
We are engaged in many initiatives to manage this transition. We
are striving to give our employees opportunities to build on their
existing skills by moving appropriate work packages across the Centers
to match resident workforce skills, by building ``virtual'' project
teams within and across Centers, and by offering temporary details.
Through such initiatives, many employees will be prepared to easily
transition into new positions when the exploration systems development
work comes on-line. We are developing a mapping of current available
skills among the Shuttle workforce with the skills we will need for
future work so that we can better plan and implement workforce
reassignments. We are supporting retraining to ensure that employees
have the skills to be successful in the new work. We are making good
use of temporary and term appointments to get the flexibility to better
align to the time-phased workload.
As we work through this transition, NASA remains committed to
working with our industry, supplier, and research partners to minimize
disruption, upheaval, and economic impact, while maximizing support
vital for Shuttle missions and program requirements. A Shuttle Human
Capital Council convened recently to bring together the civil service
and contractor Human Resources Directors to surface and address common
workforce issues, share best practices in resolving issues, and
strengthen the human capital network.
Workforce Flexibilities
In March 2007, NASA submitted legislative proposals to the
Subcommittee to provide the Agency with additional workforce
flexibilities to better implement the transition from the Space Shuttle
era to the new era of exploration.
Several years ago, NASA gained important new workforce
flexibilities through the enactment of the NASA Flexibility Act of
2004. Those flexibilities have made a difference already, and will be
vitally important to the Agency over the coming years in competing for
top talent and maintaining the knowledge base of the workforce.
However, the authorities in the NASA Flexibility Act represent, for the
most part, tools for attracting and retaining high-quality employees.
They do not address a different--but equally critical--human capital
challenge: managing attrition in a strategic, effective, and
compassionate manner. The need for attrition management tools is
particularly important to NASA as we face the challenges associated
with retaining Shuttle skills through completion of the Program, and
then effectively transitioning that workforce.
In many cases, skill misalignments can be addressed by retraining
or reassigning the employees whose skills cannot be utilized
effectively in their current assignments. NASA has been aggressive in
this regard over the past several years with hundreds of people now
productively and enthusiastically engaged in the Constellation Program.
But not all skill misalignments can be resolved by retraining and
redeployment. Furthermore, NASA historically has had an exceptionally
low attrition rate, rendering reshaping of the workforce difficult and
slow.
As such, NASA needs to manage attrition in a targeted manner to
achieve better alignment of the workforce with the mission without
creating unwanted losses, skill imbalances, and disruption in the
general workforce. But that is not the only objective. The method by
which attrition is achieved is just as important. NASA must manage
attrition in a way that does not demoralize the workforce, create an
environment of uncertainty, generate a lack of trust in management, or
stimulate the departure of the workforce the Agency needs to retain. If
attrition is not managed in the right way, NASA's outstanding image as
a leading employer of choice will be eroded, resulting in a long-term
negative impact on the Agency's ability to attract and retain the
workforce it needs.
NASA has submitted proposals for two new workforce authorities in
its legislative package--a conversion incentive and temporary
continuation of coverage of health benefits--in order to manage
attrition more effectively and strategically. The conversion incentive
would allow the Administrator to pay a permanent employee a monetary
incentive for voluntarily converting to a time-limited appointment. The
purpose of this financial incentive is to offset the risk the employee
assumes by giving up the right to continued permanent employment. The
incentive may not exceed $25,000 or 25 percent of the employee's annual
salary, whichever is less, for each 12-month period of service for
which the incentive is paid. Unlike a buy-out, an employee who converts
to a term appointment and receives the conversion incentive is not
precluded from securing full time federal employment and retaining the
incentive.
This authority is particularly tailored to managing the Shuttle
workforce. A conversion incentive serves as both an incentive for the
employee to remain with the program to the date needed by management
(similar to the concept of a retention incentive) while allowing
management to plan for an orderly release of employees on a defined
date without the need to resort to involuntary actions such as a
reduction-in-force.
The other workforce provision in the legislative proposals, the
temporary continuation of coverage of health benefits, would permit
NASA to pay the government's share of the Federal Employees Health
Benefits premiums for certain NASA employees who elect temporary
continuation of health benefits coverage upon separation from NASA.
Eligible employees would be those who are separating because their
positions are being eliminated. This provides a ``soft landing''
benefit to employees who desire continued health coverage while they
seek other employment and are not otherwise eligible for the Federal
health benefits without paying the full cost of the premiums. We
believe that this benefit will expand the pool of employees who would
be willing to resign voluntarily from the Agency.
Align the Workforce with the Mission
NASA is filled with highly educated, dedicated employees at all
levels who love what they do and are inspired by the challenging and
exciting environment. Our current diverse workforce represents a wealth
of skills and valuable experience. In order for the Agency to
accomplish its aggressive mission, it is critical that this workforce
be aligned with the mission by strengthening the technical and
leadership excellence of our employees and by reshaping the workforce
to better serve future mission requirements. In addition, as more of
our experienced employees reach retirement eligibility, it is
imperative that we attract and develop the new talent that is needed to
implement the Agency's Exploration, Science and Aeronautics missions.
To do so, we must create, sharpen, and use all the tools that are
needed to enable current and future employees to support the work of
this agency.
Technical and Leadership Excellence
One of our challenges is to strengthen the technical and leadership
excellence of the NASA workforce. In so doing, we have a number of
tools at our disposal to ensure that our workforce continues to excel
technically and that we are building ``bench strength'' in both our
technical disciplines as well as in our leadership roles.
To strengthen technical excellence, the Office of the Chief
Engineer supports NASA's field centers in workforce retraining and in
current and future workforce skill development through its Academy of
Program/Project and Engineering Leadership (APPEL), the NASA
Engineering Network (NEN), and the NASA Engineering Safety Center
(NESC) Academy. These programs are designed to both develop and enhance
the professional knowledge of NASA program/project managers and
engineers at all career levels; to capture and transfer knowledge from
seasoned program/project managers and engineers across NASA as well as
from industry, academia, and international partners; and to ensure that
lessons learned are captured for the next generation.
In order to build leadership ``bench strength,'' we have developed
a corporate, integrated approach to leadership development. NASA has
created a leadership strategy which is used both agency-wide and at the
Centers as a framework for designing and implementing leadership
programs. This framework provides continuity through succession
planning and executive development--creating a skilled pipeline for
leadership within NASA. It includes a variety of components: workforce
planning and analysis, career paths, formal agency-wide leadership
development programs, formal and informal coaching and mentoring
programs, and leadership training. Many of these Programs are
supplemented by Center-level development activities. Our formal Agency-
wide programs reflect a life cycle approach to leadership development
with programs targeting entry, mid and senior level employees as they
prepare for leadership responsibilities.
Reshaping of the Workforce
Another challenge is to reshape the existing workforce to better
serve current and future requirements. This involves not only some
reductions in aggregate workforce size, but also a build up in areas of
greater need and reduction in areas that are surplus to evolving
mission requirements.
The use of buy-out/early out authority to encourage voluntary
attrition has been critical to NASA workforce reshaping. Since the
start of FY 2004, over 1,300 employees in targeted areas of surplus
took buy-outs or early outs. This is over one-third of the total
attrition of 3,500 during this period. We continue to monitor this
program to ensure that experienced employees with needed and critical
skills are not leaving the Agency and that the safety of the Space
Shuttle or the International Space Station is not compromised.
To replace normal attrition and strengthen areas with increased
requirements, we have hired nearly 2,500 employees with a range of
experiences and skills. Of this number, 700 are workers hired either
directly out of colleges and universities, or shortly thereafter. NASA
Centers make good use of programs such as the student employment
program and the Federal Career Intern Program to recruit new talent
into the Agency. NASA Centers have cooperative education program (co-
op) agreements in place with multiple universities. Across the Centers,
we have maintained a constant average of 450 students participating in
the co-op Program. These students have an opportunity to get ``hands-
on'' experience in their technical field, and to demonstrate their
abilities on the job. The best of them are converted to entry level
engineers, scientists and business professionals upon graduation. The
Federal Career Intern Program also has allowed us to hire recent
college graduates. The fact that these interns are brought in as term
appointments, with the ability to convert them to permanent positions,
provides additional flexibility in managing our workforce. Of the 700
entry level hires, 400 have been outside hires and the other 300 are
conversions from either our co-op pool or from temporary or term
appointments.
We are also refining our recruitment strategy by conducting more
targeted recruitment on mission critical occupations and with under-
represented groups; working with NASA's Office of Education to enhance
and expand student programs that can serve as a pipeline into our
workforce; and developing partnerships and relationships that can be
beneficial in future recruitment efforts.
The tools provided by the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 continue to
be vitally important as we reshape our workforce. They provide targeted
solutions to multiple challenges--the need to recruit new talent and
the need to leverage the talent of the current workforce. Along with
the government wide flexibilities, they provide over a dozen tools that
include enhanced recruitment, relocation and retention bonuses,
expanded use of term appointments, pay authority for critical
positions, and enhanced travel and annual leave benefits for new hires.
We make use of the full range of these flexibilities and find that
combining them to create incentive packages tailored to the needs of
specific candidates has been a particularly successful strategy.
Enable Effective and Efficient Human Resources Operations
To effectively manage change while attending to our critical
resource, our people, NASA must leverage information technology to
provide more responsive, reliable information to support decision-
making.
Workforce Information Systems
Our current human resources information systems (HRIS) environment
is quite robust, providing automated solutions for the majority of our
human capital programs, and providing a wealth of information to
managers and workforce planners. NASA is working toward full
integration of the HRIS environment and improvement of capabilities
that will provide the full range of information required to most
effectively manage our changing environment.
Over the years, NASA has invested in a number of Agency-wide
systems such as our Staffing and Recruitment System and our Competency
Management System (CMS). CMS enables NASA to assess the demand for, and
supply of, workforce skills based on current and projected work
requirements. CMS captures the competencies for every civil service
position and multiple personal competencies for each individual NASA
employee. Management of personal competencies enables the
identification of expertise across the Agency and provides the
capability to integrate this information for use in planning the
workforce.
Competencies are the common thread that tie the elements of
workforce management together. CMS is a relatively new system that we
are continually working to improve. By integrating CMS with other
workforce planning tools, we are able to not only identify the critical
current and future competency gaps and surpluses, but we can weave that
competency information throughout the workforce management process.
Recognizing the almost limitless possibilities of information
technology (IT), NASA is converging business systems, expanding access
to managers, supervisors, and employees, and increasing the
capabilities of tools and applications. These efforts will form a Human
Capital Information Environment (HCIE) that will provide a foundation
for total business systems integration, foster Agency-wide
collaboration, provide tools and information to assist our management
team in their strategic planning efforts, and provide near real-time
comprehensive information to enable and inform decision-making at all
levels.
Developing an HCIE is the first step in instituting a fully
integrated, strategically focused, business environment for online,
near real-time access to reliable, comprehensive information that
managers need for rapid and accurate decision-making. The HCIE will
inter-operate seamlessly with NASA's financial management authoritative
data repository (ADR), and provide dependable integrated workforce and
financial information to all organizational elements. A common, robust
data repository will remove the need for redundant systems because the
ADR will furnish the wealth of information needed to meet the demands
of this mission-driven, project-oriented Agency.
Information will be presented through a secure, web-based workforce
services portal accessible from the user's desktop computer, enabling
managers to formulate workforce plans and manage employees; manage and
plan based on workforce indicators, including competency, demographic
and trending information; and conduct analyses and run reports using
common and timely information. The initial operating capability for
HCIE is planned for the summer of 2007 with final implementation during
the Fall of 2008. The capabilities of HCIE are enormous, limited only
by our ingenuity in identifying the boundless ways in which information
can be woven together to drive decisions and enable success.
Summary
In implementing the NASA Workforce Strategy and associated
workforce management goals, NASA is positioning itself to deal
effectively with the critical issues now facing the Agency on an
integrated, Agency-wide basis. NASA is putting in place approaches that
not only will alleviate the Agency's current imbalances, but also
provide a structure that allows such issues to be resolved in the
future as part of a deliberate, systematic process. To quote the NASA
Administrator, ``. . .it is clear that an understanding of the broad
issues, the big picture, is so much more influential in determining the
ultimate success or failure of an enterprise than is the mastery of any
given technical detail. The understanding of the organizational and
technical interactions in our systems, emphatically including the human
beings who are a part of them, is the present-day frontier of both
engineering education and practice.'' The foundation that NASA is
building is a big picture view that will facilitate and
institutionalize long-term planning and Agency-level coordination. As
stated in the NRC report, though, some of the issues NASA faces are
``not unique to NASA'' and require ``a national approach'' to solve
them. NASA plans to be in the forefront in developing such approaches.
Last year NASA presented its Workforce Strategy which outlined the
steps to manage the transitions associated with implementing the
Agency's Exploration, Science and Aeronautics missions. Since then, we
have made significant progress, with specific human capital initiatives
aimed at three key goals: understanding mission requirements, aligning
workforce to mission, and enabling effective and efficient human
resources operations. The NRC and NAPA reports confirm the actions
we've initiated, and will continue to inform further implementation of
the Strategy.
I would be please to respond to any questions the Subcommittee may
have.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Ms. Dawsey. Mr. Stewart, five
minutes.
Mr. Stewart. I would be personally remiss, Mr. Chairman, if
I didn't say how much I admired your father, and had a chance
to work with him on occasion back in the old days, but a truly
great, great public servant, and I am not just----
Chairman Udall. On that note, I would put Judge Hall in
that same category, as a great public servant, and somebody who
has roots in that area, and Judge Hall has helped to, in his
own way, keep that spirit alive, so----
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?
Chairman Udall. I would be happy to yield to my good friend
from Texas.
Mr. Hall. I knew Mo Udall, and I'm no Mo Udall. I would say
this, that I learned more from Mo, my first office was directly
across from him back 27 years ago, and I learned more from him
the first 30 days than I had learned in the last ten years in
the Texas Senate.
Chairman Udall. You are out of order again twice in one
day.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN G. STEWART, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION FELLOW; MEMBER, PANEL ON NASA MULTI-SECTOR
WORKFORCE
Mr. Stewart. Well, anyway, I had better get going here.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, Sally Anne
Harper, our panel chair, very much wanted to present this
testimony. She is the Chief Administrative Officer at the
Government Accountability Office, and her duties there this
morning made her appearance not possible, and so they have to
go to the bench, and I am here to stand in for Sally Anne
Harper.
Our panel had six major conclusions and recommendations.
First, we said that NASA should make greater use of strategic
planning mechanisms to position itself for programmatic and
scheduled changes. The agency needs to adopt a longer range,
risk-based planning strategy to anticipate and respond
effectively to future program needs, budget shortfalls, and
schedule revisions for its total multi-sector workforce.
Despite declining overall budgets for aeronautics, as well
as reductions in some scientific programs, NASA has retained
most of its aeronautic and scientific workforce. Although many
of these individuals can continue working on existing
aeronautics and scientific programs, or transition to new
programs, it is unrealistic to expect that all will be able to
do so. Essentially, NASA needs to determine the number and type
of employees that would constitute a critical mass for its
aeronautics and scientific responsibilities, as well as a
critical mass to develop the various systems needed to achieve
the Vision for Space Exploration.
Second, NASA must broaden its workforce planning to
encompass its multi-sector workforce. The process should
inventory the key components and skills available for both
civil servants and contractor organizations, including the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. In the initial version of the NASA
Workforce Plan, it dealt solely with civil servants, and we
felt that this was an omission that needs to be acted on.
Third, NASA must integrate its acquisition and human
capital planning processes. This is really important. Contracts
provide surge and long-term support capacity, as well as the
ability to shift people and competencies as the mission
dictates. So, NASA has made a good start at establishing a new
acquisition process that begins with a strategic discussion of
whether and how to contract for major programs and projects,
but this should be further developed. Such integration will
help NASA better understand the workforce implications of
contracting decisions. To help facilitate this process, the
Panel designed two rules to help managers focus on the critical
common factors to consider in making civil service versus
contractor decisions.
Fourth, NASA should strengthen its human capital function,
and use a formal process to decide when to hire a permanent
civil servant or a term employee. As one of NASA's most
critical internal support capabilities, human capital needs to
be a full participant in all agency decisions, with important
workforce implications, including high level planning for the
total workforce. And NASA is moving in that direction, let me
just interject, which is good. And to be effective, human
capital professionals must have the ability to identify skill
mismatches, promote the effective use of existing
flexibilities, and collaborate with others to craft other
needed flexibilities. In addition, NASA needs to be more
strategic in how to make civil service hiring and conversion
decisions, and we have developed a tool to assist NASA
decision-making in these areas.
Fifth, the Panel has concerns about the long-term health of
NASA's research centers, and believes that the Agency should
use a more comprehensive framework to evaluate them. The panel
found NASA's approach to healthy centers to be people-focused,
which to some degree is fine, but with an emphasis on fully
funding civil servants to assist NASA in this area, the Panel
developed a detailed 12 factor framework covering such areas as
center's mission, program performance, civil service,
contractor workforce, and organizational structure. This
framework should help NASA balance changing mission
requirements and budget constraints.
Sixth, NASA must make maximum use of existing human capital
flexibilities, while seeking new authorizations for necessary
reform, and of course, the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 gave
NASA some flexibilities. They are being used, but not as fully
as they could be, and we think there are some more that are
needed.
And more controversially, and we know this is
controversial, the Panel believes that Congress should provide
NASA with limited emergency authority to invoke a fully
eligible individual's retirement to meet work restructuring
needs, if some or all of the following criteria are met, and we
list those criteria, and we can talk about them in the question
period. And I want to emphasize that these statutory
recommendations that we are making cannot be implemented by
NASA alone. They require action by Congress and OPM in the face
of likely political resistance. They are controversial. And let
me just say for the record, we understand that NASA understands
the nature of this problem. It has taken some initial steps,
and we have made some suggestions to help them move further
down the right road.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement, and I
will answer questions when that time comes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stewart follows:]
Prepared Statement of John G. Stewart
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify today. I represent a Panel of the National
Academy of Public Administration that recently completed, a
comprehensive study of the workforce challenges facing the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). That study was done at the
request of the Senate Appropriations Committee. As the former Staff
Director of the Senate Science, Technology, and Space Subcommittee, I
recognize the importance this committee attaches to addressing critical
aeronautics and space issues.
Also, as a former member of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel, I strongly believe NASA's mission to advance space exploration,
scientific discoveries, and aeronautics research is critical to our
nation. Thirty-eight years after the Apollo 11 mission, NASA remains
the only organization in the world to have landed a person on the Moon.
Now, with the Congressionally-authorized Vision for Space Exploration,
NASA is tasked with expanding our presence in the solar system and
establishing a permanent human outpost on the Moon.
Our Panel was asked to examine several critical questions:
<bullet> How should NASA decide whether to obtain the services
and products from a contractor or hire a civil servant?
<bullet> If NASA decides to hire a civil servant, what kind of
appointment should it use (tenured permanent or multi-year
term)?
<bullet> What is a healthy center? How should NASA measure it?
In responding, we primarily focused on issues facing NASA as it
transitions from the Shuttle program to the Vision. The Panel had six
major conclusions and recommendations.
First, NASA should make greater use of strategic planning mechanisms to
position itself for programmatic and schedule changes.
The Agency needs to adopt a longer-range, risk-based planning
strategy to anticipate and respond effectively to future program needs,
budget shortfalls, and schedule revisions for its total multi-sector
workforce. Despite declining overall budgets for aeronautics, as well
as reductions in some scientific programs, NASA has retained most of
its aeronautics and scientific workforce. Although many of these
individuals can continue working on existing aeronautics and scientific
programs or the transition to new programs, it is unrealistic to expect
that all will be able to do so. Essentially, NASA needs to determine
the number and type of employees that would constitute a critical mass
for its aeronautics and scientific responsibilities.
Second, NASA must broaden its workforce planning to encompass its
multi-sector workforce.
This process should inventory the key competencies and skills
available for both civil servants and contractor organizations.
Although contractors constitute approximately two-thirds of NASA's
total workforce of 58,000 employees, the Agency's April 2006 Workforce
Strategy focused solely on its 18,000 civil servants. Many of the
contractors--and particularly the up to 26,000 on-site contractors--
have competencies that mirror those of NASA civil servants. A broader
workforce planning process would allow NASA to maximize organizational
flexibility and fully leverage its workforce to meet changing demands.
Third, NASA must integrate its acquisition and human capital planning
processes.
Contracts provide surge and long-term support capacity as well as
the ability to shift people and competencies as the mission dictates.
NASA has made a good start at establishing a new acquisition process
that begins with a strategic discussion of whether and how to contract
for major programs and projects. But, this should be further developed.
NASA needs to factor in how cost, safety, facility availability,
existing expertise, and scheduling will impact agency work. Such
integration will help NASA better understand the workforce implications
of contracting decisions. To help facilitate this process, the Panel
designed tools to help managers focus on critical common factors to
consider in making civil service vs. contractor decisions.
Fourth, NASA should strengthen its human capital function and use a
formal process to decide when to hire a permanent civil servant or a
term employee.
As one of NASA's most critical internal support capabilities, human
capital needs to be a full participant in all agency decisions with
important workforce implications, including high-level planning for the
total workforce. And, to be effective, human capital professionals must
have the ability to identify skill mismatches, promote the effective
use of existing flexibilities, and collaborate with others to craft
other needed flexibilities.
In addition, NASA needs to be more strategic in how it makes civil
service hiring and conversion decisions. While the Agency uses many
short-tenure employees, each center currently has discretion to make
its own decisions about which type of civil servant to hire, and
conversion to permanent employment is the predominant practice for most
NASA term hires. The Panel developed a tool to assist NASA's decision-
making in these areas.
Fifth, the Panel has concerns about the long-term health of NASA's
research centers and believes that the Agency should use a more
comprehensive framework to evaluate them.
The Panel found NASA's approach to healthy centers to be people
focused with an emphasis on fully funding civil servants. To assist
NASA in this area, the Panel developed a detailed twelve-factor
framework covering such areas as the center's mission, program
performance, civil service and contractor workforce, and organizational
structure. This framework should help NASA balance changing mission
requirements and budget constraints. The Panel believes the ultimate
test of the ten healthy centers approach is whether it leads to a
healthy NASA.
Sixth, NASA must make maximum use of existing human capital
flexibilities while seeking new authorizations for other necessary
reforms.
NASA has acknowledged that the significant programmatic changes
over the past few years have created a major imbalance between the work
the Agency plans to do and the existing workforce. In the Panel's view,
this imbalance is NASA's most serious workforce challenge. While the
Agency's mission and allocation of resources have been changing
substantially, the civil service workforce has not. The Panel found
that NASA could be more proactive in using currently available
flexibilities by establishing a more innovative recruitment program and
encouraging the out-placement of blocks of employees with competencies
no longer needed.
Also, the Panel believes that NASA should be provided a package of
additional flexibilities. Clearly, Administrator Griffin's recent
request for legislative authority to pay an allowance to civil servants
who voluntarily convert to a time-limited appointment recognizes the
significant challenges facing NASA. Among other things, the Panel
believes that Congress should increase the monetary cap on buy-outs and
establish a new Reduction-in-Force (RIF) framework for NASA modeled on
the National Institute of Science and Technology's Alternative
Personnel Management System. This new framework would allow the Agency
to retain its highest-performing employees in critical occupations by
enhancing the weight given to performance, narrowing the definition of
``competitive area,'' and preventing employees from ``bumping'' or
``retreating'' into positions for which they are poorly suited. The
Panel also believes that OPM should grant blanket authority to NASA to
conduct buy-outs over the next five years and to waive salary offsets
when recruiting reemployed federal annuitants for critical areas.
More controversially, the Panel believes that Congress should
provide NASA with limited emergency authority to invoke a fully
eligible individual's retirement to meet work restructuring needs if
some or all of the following criteria are met:
<bullet> The employee's skills are no longer required for
mission accomplishment.
<bullet> The employee's skills are outdated or unnecessary,
and management determines that retraining would not be
practical, or the employee is unwilling to update skills.
<bullet> Funding for the employee's existing work is not
available.
<bullet> The employee's skills are not easily transferred to
other work.
Retiring employees should be compensated fairly by being given
severance pay in addition to earned annuities. While NASA would not
likely use this emergency statutory authority on a broad basis, its
availability would provide the means to secure the expertise required
for its highly complex mission, protecting the safety and integrity of
the space program.
I want to emphasize that these statutory and regulatory
recommendations cannot be implemented by NASA alone. They require
action by Congress and OPM in the face of likely political resistance.
However, by providing NASA with the tools to reshape its workforce,
Congress could more easily hold NASA accountable for meeting program
milestones in a cost-effective, timely way.
Mr. Chairman, underlying the Panel's recommendations is the belief
that NASA's institutional health depends on a knowledge-based, data-
driven approach to workforce utilization and management. For NASA to
develop an optimally-sized, appropriately skilled workforce that is
flexible and scalable, it will need to make human capital decisions
based on the rigorous collection and analysis of data widely shared
with stakeholders. From our work, we believe that NASA understands the
nature of this problem. It has taken some initial steps, but more
significant changes are needed. We believe NASA could adopt most of our
recommendations without significant additional resources. And, the
Panel's recommended approach would not only provide a stronger basis
for internal agency decisions, but would also ensure that you, as
Members of Congress, have better information decisions about annual
appropriations and the human capital flexibilities needed to accomplish
NASA's mission.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement, and I would be
pleased to answer any questions you or the Subcommittee Members may
have.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Mr. Stewart, and Dr. Black, the
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID C. BLACK, PRESIDENT EMERITUS,
UNIVERSITIES SPACE RESEARCH ASSOCIATION; ADJUNCT PROFESSOR,
PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY DEPARTMENT, RICE UNIVERSITY; CO-CHAIR,
COMMITTEE ON ISSUES AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. SPACE
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING WORKFORCE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
Dr. Black. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Hall, and
Committee Members, I appreciate the opportunity to testify
before you today. I appear in my capacity as Co-Chair of the
National Research Council's Committee on Issues Affecting the
Future of the U.S. Space Science and Engineering Workforce. My
Co-Chair of the NRC study, Professor Daniel Hastings, joins me
today, and you can tell which one of us drew the short straw.
Our committee found it useful to consider two distinct
timeframes when evaluating the NASA workforce as it relates to
NASA's implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration.
Specifically, we looked at the next five years, and then, the
timeframe beyond 2012. I want to highlight three aspects of our
committee's conclusions.
First, in the view of our committee, NASA does not
currently have the expertise needed in-house, particularly in
the areas of systems engineering and project management, to
implement the Vision, nor do we feel that any amount of
training or retraining during this timeframe will address fully
the shortage of expertise.
Second, we are confident that a well thought out and
implemented training and hiring program will allow NASA to be
well positioned in the post-2012 timeframe to implement the
Vision. Third, the Committee feels strongly that the issues
NASA faces are not unique to NASA. They are at the heart of any
assessment of the Nation's aerospace technical workforce
generally, and as such, deserve consideration on a national
scale.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to share a story with the
Committee. At the end of April, after our committee presented
its report to NASA, the Agency announced the winner of its
Astronautic Glove Challenge. The winner was Mr. Peter Homer.
NASA used this new and nontraditional approach to acquire a
hardware design that will eventually improve the ability of our
astronauts to work in space, but this is not simply a story
about new equipment or an innovative approach to finding new
ideas, one that our committee, in fact, endorses. It turns out
that Mr. Homer is unemployed, and actually left the field of
aerospace engineering many years ago to work as a sales manager
in the computer industry.
Indeed, this is a frequent aspect of the aerospace
workforce, if I could have the first figure, please. This is
some data that we got from NSF, and pertains to the year 2003.
As you can see, of the roughly 200,000 people, that blue
circle, currently working in the aerospace and space science
arenas, only 40 percent of them have degrees in those areas.
Oh, you can't see it. I can see it. I am sorry you can't see
it.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Black, why don't you continue, and we
will----
Dr. Black. I will just continue.
Chairman Udall. And this will be included in the record,
and we will do our best--here we go.
Dr. Black. Very good. Thank you. The blue area, as I say,
has roughly 200,000 people, and those are the ones currently
working. Only 40 percent of them actually have degrees in that
area. Another point to make here is that the NASA civil service
workforce comprises only 10 percent of that area.
Moreover, fully 75 percent of the people with degrees in
aerospace and space science are not currently working in this
area, people like Mr. Homer. The point here is that one needs
to take care in interpreting the many numbers floating around,
in terms of how many skilled workers truly are available for
these kinds of activities.
One of the main themes of our report is the need for hands-
on training for NASA's workforce, particularly in the areas
that are key to achieving its programs on schedule and on
budget. The Committee recognized that two skill areas are
important not only to NASA, but to the national security space
programs. These are systems engineering and program project
management. Those skills cannot simply be produced in a
classroom. They must be acquired over time. Just as a baseball
player cannot become proficient by seeing the game explained on
a blackboard, a systems engineer cannot become proficient at
his job without building and integrating a spacecraft.
But also, just as baseball players do not immediately head
to the major leagues without first graduating from Little
Leagues, through the farm systems, up to the majors, a systems
engineer or program manager must also start small and gain
experience. Unfortunately, the opportunities for gaining this
kind of experience are missing. If you look at the following
figure, that shows the kind of opportunities for hands-on
experience by graduate students in earth and space sciences
over the years, and as you can see, they have been diminishing.
That shows both sounding rockets, airborne opportunities,
balloons, and spacecraft, and in the aggregate, as well as each
of the individual elements of that graph, have all been
decreasing drastically over the years.
In closing, I would like to return to the third aspect of
our conclusions. My experience as a former NASA employee and as
the president of a not-for-profit association of a hundred
universities working with NASA is that the Agency has a
tendency, has tended to deal with problems in relative
isolation of other entities, a reflection of the can-do
attitude of the Apollo era, as well as a bit of the not
invented here syndrome. The Committee feels that NASA workforce
issues are a microcosm of a broader set of national concerns,
and that solutions are best sought in the context of what the
Committee refers to as the aerospace ecosystem, shown here.
NASA is a relatively small player in this ecosystem. As I
said earlier, the civil service makes up only 10 percent of the
total workforce, and it therefore seems that it would do better
to work with other elements in defining and understanding the
key issues, and then arriving at a solution that is in
everyone's best interest. In this way, NASA would be able to
leverage its concerns off of those of the larger inhabitants of
the ecosystem.
That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you
for your interest in this important topic, and would be happy
to answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Black follows:]
Prepared Statement of David C. Black
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority Member, and Committee Members: I
appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. My name is
David Black. I am President Emeritus of the Universities Space Research
Association. I am also an Adjunct Professor in the Physics and
Astronomy Department at Rice University. I appear today largely in my
capacity as Co-Chair of the National Research Council (NRC)'s Committee
on Issues Affecting the Future of the U.S. Space Science and
Engineering Workforce. The NRC is the operating arm of the National
Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute
of Medicine of the National Academies, chartered by Congress in 1863 to
advise the government on matters of science and technology. The views
expressed in my testimony today are primarily those expressed by the
NRC Committee in its Final Report, as well as my own.\1\ I shall do my
best to make clear which views are mine and which are those of the
Committee. The latter views are fully supported by my co-chair of the
NRC study, Dr. Daniel Hastings, Dean for Undergraduate Education and
Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems at
MIT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Issues Affecting the Future of the U.S. Space Science and
Engineering Workforce--Interim Report, The National Academies Press,
Washington, D.C., 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Allow me to address the specific questions that you posed prior to
this hearing. Your questions are indicated in bold type followed by my
responses.
What was the scope of your recently released report on NASA's
Workforce, and what are its major findings and recommendations?
The NRC Committee's charge from NASA is to explore long-range
science and technology workforce needs to achieve the Nation's long-
term space exploration vision, identify obstacles to filling those
needs, and explore solutions for consideration by government, academia,
and industry. The specific tasks that we have been requested to
undertake are the following:
1. Assess current and projected demographics of the U.S.
aerospace engineering and space science workforce needed to
accomplish the exploration vision;
2. Identify factors that impact the demographics of the
affected workforces;
3. Assess NASA's list of the workforce skills that will be
needed to implement the Vision for Space Exploration, both
within the government and in industry;
4. Identify the skills needed to implement NASA's Vision for
Space Exploration within the academic community;
5. Assess the current workforce against projected needs;
6. Identify workforce gaps and analyze obstacles to responding
to the workforce needs, and in particular, analyze the proper
role of academia and the obstacles to achieving this proper
role; and
7. Develop recommendations for specific actions by the Federal
Government, industry, and academia to address those needs,
including considerations such as organizational changes,
recruiting and hiring practices, student programs, and existing
workforce training and improvement.
The NRC Committee has drawn upon input from a workshop and
meetings, documents provided by NASA, and our own experiences to arrive
at the following findings and associated recommendations:
Finding 1: NASA has undertaken a commendable top-down (i.e.,
headquarters-directed) analysis of current agency needs and the skill
levels of its current workforce that the committee believes is an
excellent first step. But although NASA has considered workforce needs
for the Agency as a whole, it has not yet projected its requirements
for future hiring in terms of (1) the numbers and specific skill sets
of workers expected to be needed by each NASA center over time and (2)
the timeframes for hiring based on anticipated retirements of the
present workforce. The committee believes that understanding future
hiring requirements will depend on an accurate, detailed assessment of
the skills, Vision for Space Exploration-related development
capabilities, and expected attrition of the workforce for each center.
Recommendation 1: Collect detailed data on NASA workforce requirements.
The committee recommends that NASA collect detailed data on and
develop accurate assessments of the capabilities possessed by the
current workforce and required for the future S&T workforce. The issue
here is not simply ``more data,'' but data that are more to the point
in terms of understanding the workforce issue. Examples of the type of
data are cited below.
<bullet> Because each NASA center has unique mission
requirements and the mobility of personnel between centers is
limited, NASA should complete a center-developed, bottom-up
assessment of the current skills, experience levels, and
projected attrition of the workforce for each individual NASA
center.
<bullet> NASA should use the data obtained from such
assessments to develop a model for projecting future NASA
priorities for Vision for Space Exploration skill development
and hiring by competencies, experience levels, and centers, as
well as a model for the best mix of skill development conducted
within NASA versus within industry.
<bullet> NASA should translate identified workforce needs from
competencies and experience levels into specific positions to
be implemented at individual centers at specific points in
time.
<bullet> NASA should assess whether the skill levels of in-
house scientists at each field center are appropriate to
fulfilling that center's scientific leadership and service
responsibilities and should ensure that appropriate efforts are
made to maintain the scientific competency and currency of each
center's scientific workforce.
<bullet> NASA should ensure that hiring constraints such as
pay levels, personnel ceilings, and ability to recruit suitable
candidates guide make-or-buy decisions about how staffing needs
will be met.
<bullet> NASA should ensure that appropriate workforce
strategies?including providing training for staff (e.g.,
through the NASA Academy of Program/Project and Engineering
Leadership program), contracting out work to industry and
academia, facilitating exchange programs, and hiring temporary
contract and term employees are applied at each center.
The committee believes that it is premature to recommend a
particular mix of strategies for obtaining the desired worker skill mix
until NASA fully defines its staffing needs. NASA is moving to collect
the data necessary to help them make these capability assessments.
Since NASA is in the Vision for Space Exploration for the long-term,
NASA will need to establish a systematic process for monitoring and
updating its workforce needs.
Finding 2: In the short-term, NASA has too few program and project
managers and systems engineers with the requisite experience in human
space flight systems development to successfully oversee Vision for
Space Exploration projects. Given the lack of detailed data on NASA's
near-term workforce skills and needs as well as uncertainties over
NASA's budget, the committee did not attempt to assess the likely
success of NASA's planned steps to address near-term workforce
problems.
Recommendation 2: Hire and retain younger workers within NASA.
The committee recommends that NASA implement a long-term strategy
for hiring a steady supply of younger workers and subsequently
retaining those workers as they rise to senior management positions so
that a balanced distribution of age and skill is maintained throughout
the Agency's entire workforce.
<bullet> NASA should take full advantage of the NASA
Flexibility Act of 2004, which was passed to facilitate the
Agency's recruitment of employees from industry. NASA has
already utilized the act to a considerable extent, and the
committee encourages the Agency to continue to do so, as well
as to inform Congress of any additional hiring flexibility that
is required.
<bullet> NASA, working with Congress and the executive branch,
should develop solutions to legal problems that limit the flow
of senior and highly skilled employees from industry to NASA
even when such employees are willing to accept lower salaries.
Issues regarding share holding, pensions, and perceived or
actual conflicts of interest severely hamper personnel
exchanges between industry and NASA. These problems stem from
policy issues that cannot be resolved by NASA alone but instead
require action by Congress and the executive branch working in
concert with NASA.
Finding 3: NASA's workforce requirements and challenges cannot be
considered in isolation from those of other government and industry
organizations. NASA is part of an aerospace workforce ecosystem in
which the health and needs of one organization or sector can affect
another. Thus, NASA's workforce issues require the intervention and
assistance of higher-level government organizations such as the Office
of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the
President.
Recommendation 3: Ensure a coordinated national strategy for aerospace
workforce development among relevant institutions.
The committee recommends that representatives from relevant
government agencies, the aerospace industry, including the emerging
private sector, and the academic community work together to develop a
coordinated national strategy to ensure an effective aerospace
workforce ecosystem. When NASA is using only approximately 10 percent
of the workers in the aerospace workforce, it must think about its
needs in the context of agencies and actors who have much larger needs.
Finding 4: There is a longstanding, widely recognized requirement for
more highly skilled program and project managers and systems engineers
who have acquired substantial experience in space systems development.
Although the need exists across all of NASA and the aerospace industry,
it seems particularly acute for human space flight systems because of
the long periods between initiation of new programs (i.e., the Space
Shuttle program in the 1970s and the Constellation program 30 years
later). NASA training programs are addressing some of the Agency's
requirements in this experience base, but the current requirement for a
strong base of highly skilled program and project management and
systems engineering personnel, and limited opportunities for junior
specialists to gain hands-on space project experience, remain
impediments to NASA's ability to successfully carry out Vision for
Space Exploration programs and projects.
Recommendation 4: Provide hands-on training opportunities for NASA
workers.
The committee recommends that NASA place a high priority on
recruiting, training, and retaining skilled program and project
managers and systems engineers and that it provide the hands-on
training and development opportunities for younger and junior personnel
required to establish and maintain the necessary capabilities in these
disciplines. Specific and immediate actions to be taken by NASA and
other parts of the Federal Government include the following:
<bullet> In establishing its strategy for meeting Vision for
Space Exploration systems engineering needs, NASA should
determine the right balance between in-house and out-of-house
work and contractor roles and responsibilities, including the
use of support service contractors.
<bullet> NASA should continue and also expand its current
employee training programs such as those being conducted by the
Academy of Program/Project and Engineering Leadership (APPEL).
To facilitate the development of key systems engineering and
project management skills, NASA should increase the number of
opportunities for entry-level employees to be involved in
hands-on flight and end-to-end development programs. A variety
of programs--including those involving balloons, sounding
rockets, aircraft-based research, small satellites, and so on--
can be used to give these employees critical experience
relatively early in their careers and allow them to contribute
as systems engineers and program managers more quickly.
System Engineering is a discipline and skill that can be partially
taught and also has an important component of learning from
experiences. It is much easier to learn on small projects where
mistakes can be made and recovery is possible than from large projects
where recovery might not be possible.
Finding 5: NASA relies on a highly trained technical workforce to
achieve its goals and has long accepted a responsibility for supporting
the training of those who are potential employees. In recent years,
however, training for students has been less well supported by NASA. A
robust and stable commitment to creating opportunities at the
university level for experience in hands-on flight mission development,
graduate research fellowships for science and engineering students, and
research is essential for recruiting and developing the long-term
supply of competent workers necessary to implement NASA's future
programs.
<bullet> Faculty research not only is fundamental to student
training but also leads to the development of new technology
and tools for future applications in space. Programs supporting
critical scientific and technological expertise are highly
desirable.
<bullet> Hands-on experience for students is provided by sub-
orbital programs, Explorer and other small spacecraft missions,
and design competitions, all of which rely on continuing NASA
support.
<bullet> The Graduate Student Researchers Program supports the
education and training of prospective NASA employees and
deserves augmented support.
<bullet> Undergraduate and graduate co-op student programs are
particularly effective in giving students early hands-on
experience and in exposing students and NASA to each other to
help enable sound career choices and hiring decisions.
Recommendation 5: Support university programs and provide hands-on
opportunities at the college level.
The committee recommends that NASA make workforce-related programs
such as the Graduate Student Researchers Program and co-op programs a
high priority within its education budget. NASA should also invest in
the future workforce by partnering with universities to provide hands-
on experiences for students and opportunities for fundamental
scientific and engineering research specific to NASA's needs. These
experiences should include significant numbers of opportunities to
participate in all aspects of sub-orbital and Explorer-class flight
programs and in research fellowships and co-op student assignments.
Finding 6: Although NASA's primary role is not education or outreach,
improved support of the higher education community and of young
professionals is critical to maintaining a sufficiently talented
workforce. Involvement in providing development and educational
opportunities, especially hands-on flight and vehicle development
opportunities, will pay future dividends not only by encouraging larger
numbers of talented students to enter the field, but also by improving
the abilities of incoming employees. Indeed, a failure to invest in
today's students and young professionals will ultimately lead to a
crisis when that generation is expected to assume the mantle of
leadership within the U.S. aerospace community.
Recommendation 6: Support involvement in suborbital programs and
nontraditional approaches to developing skills.
The committee recommends that NASA increase its investment in
proven programs such as sounding rocket launches, aircraft-based
research, and high-altitude balloon campaigns, which provide ample
opportunities for hands-on flight development experience at a
relatively low cost of failure. Rather than viewing sounding rockets,
aircraft-based research, and balloon programs simply as low-cost,
competed, scientific missions, NASA should also recognize as an equal
factor in the criteria for their selection their ability to provide
valuable hands-on experience for its younger workers and should
investigate the possibility of funding such programs through its
education budget. In addition, NASA should take advantage of
nontraditional institutions and approaches both to inspire and to train
potential future employees. Investment in programs such as Centennial
Challenge prizes and other innovative methods has the potential to pay
benefits many times greater than their cost, by simultaneously
increasing NASA's public visibility, training a new generation of
workers, and pushing the technology envelope.
Strategic planning for workforce issues is difficult because budget
and program decisions often have major impacts on the workforce that
make strategic planning irrelevant. The committee heard from industry
representatives who stated that NASA's ability to attract junior-level
personnel and retain senior personnel would be heavily influenced by
perceptions about how compelling and stably funded the Vision for Space
Exploration is. The committee thus believes that NASA must adopt
policies that, while relatively inexpensive, can have a longer-term
impact on its ability to obtain the highest-quality personnel. The
development of the right people is as important as the development of
the right hardware. NASA policies must recognize and reflect this
attention.
Which issues, according to the report, present the most serious
challenges to building and maintaining a healthy and strong NASA
workforce?
The major challenges identified by the Committee are a) conducting
programs on time scales that are better matched to those of the
emerging labor market and for the near future, up to roughly five years
from the present, and b) finding ways to tap the broad and deep
experience base in key job areas that currently exist outside of the
Agency. Allow me to expand on both of these points.
The Committee received input from university professors who
observed that people in today's young to middle-age labor market are
more focused on short-term success and are more mobile than were their
counterparts of the Apollo era. They are attracted to careers where
measurable progress of both a personal and professional nature takes
place over five to ten years, as contrasted with decades. The vast
majority of current and recent large scale and therefore highly visible
NASA programs, be they robotic or human space flight, are of the latter
variety. For example, it took nearly three decades of planning,
replanning and redesigning before the remarkably successful Spitzer
telescope was launched. It has been over 23 years since President
Reagan charged NASA with building and operating a space station, and
the end of that journey remains far in the future. These examples are
typical of current NASA programs. Perhaps just as telling is that this
trend appears to be true also for the Vision. The projected
availability of the two key hardware components of the Vision is
slipping for a number of reasons.
The Committee's discussions with members of the academic community
revealed that most are unwilling to urge their best students to pursue
a career with NASA or NASA-related programs. Moreover, given the
propensity of younger members of the aerospace workforce to seek
shorter-term gratification, they are looking to other professions such
as bio-related fields, or economics, as their first choice rather than
the Nation's space program. This represents rational choices given the
potential returns and the perceptions of involvement in programs that
might take a long time to come to fruition.
The Committee found that pay scales for entry to mid-range
professionals at NASA are generally comparable, or even better, than in
competing job sectors. This is generally not the case for the more
senior members of the aerospace workforce. The drawn out nature of
NASA's current programs, coupled with the pay discrepancy, is a major
cause for the drain of experienced workers from the Agency. Additional
barriers in bringing experienced people back to NASA are found in
conflict of interest issues and the need for these individuals to
divest themselves of the financial returns that took them to industry
in the first place. This tends to make these opportunities most
attractive to people who are retiring from industry.
How well does NASA's Workforce Strategy address the findings and
recommendations contained in your report?
The Committee applauds NASA's early efforts at developing a
strategy for workforce development, but feels that it needs substantial
work on several fronts. This strategy is based fundamentally on the
notion of maintaining ten healthy centers. While such an approach is
understandable from a purely political perspective, I am concerned that
it runs great risk that it becomes essentially a jobs program with work
being sent to centers that are not necessarily staffed to do the jobs.
If there were complete mobility in the civil service workforce, NASA
might be able to make this approach viable, but that mobility does not
exist.
The NASA Workforce Strategy does recognize many of the key
challenges that NASA faces, but the Committee is concerned that the
NASA strategy views its workforce issues in isolation of what the
Committee has dubbed the ``aerospace workforce ecosystem.'' The
workforce problems that NASA faces are a microcosm of a broader
national problem, one that faces academia, industry and other
government entities, and it is the view of the Committee that all
parties would be best served by seeking a national solution to these
problems. This approach would yield a more stable long-term solution
for NASA and the Nation's aerospace workforce as a whole. This may take
a cultural shift on the part of NASA and its centers. Data provided to
the Committee by NSF from 2003 reveals that fully 75 percent of the
workforce with a degree in aeronautics and space science-related fields
does not currently work in those fields (Figure 1). The workforce is
potentially available, but needs revectoring.
Given that NASA is a multi-mission agency, how de we ensure that core
competencies are maintained in each of NASA's core missions?
The fundamental issue facing NASA in its efforts to maintain core
competency in the short-term is its shortage of qualified experienced
personnel in key areas such as systems engineers and project managers.
The Committee feels that training or retraining of existing staff
cannot meet this shortage in the near-term. There are too few
opportunities to gain the needed experience, particularly in the human
space flight regime to provide the number of needed experienced staff.
Viewed from a longer-term perspective, say the time frame from 2012 and
beyond, a well conceived and implemented set of training programs and
opportunities could provide the necessary core of skilled workforce.
This may mean looking to the full aerospace workforce ecosystem as a
means to provide adequate hands-on training opportunities, not just
NASA missions.
NASA is a relatively small player in the aerospace workforce
ecosystem from a pure numbers perspective. For this reason, and others,
the Committee encourages NASA to look for opportunities to leverage its
efforts with those of the DOD, industry, and the academic community to
identify existing programs that could provide opportunities, as well as
work in a coordinated manner to develop new programs to accomplish this
vital training.
Which of the recommendations do you believe NASA could readily adopt
(i.e., that do not require significant resources or disruption in
business processes), and which do you think will be the most difficult
to implement?
A strong finding from the Committee's work is that meaningful
opportunities for hands-on training, an end-to-end involvement in doing
space projects, has been a declining element of NASA's portfolio for
several years (see Figure 2). The programs that are most effective in
providing the experience that is needed are the low cost suborbital
programs, such as sounding rockets and balloon programs. Relatively low
cost space missions such as the small end of the Explorer line are also
of value here, but they do not provide the opportunity to reach as many
students as do the sub-orbital programs. Reaching students and workers
when they are younger, and potentially more open to career paths is
important.
Increasing efforts in the suborbital programs, particularly if
paired with other entities with a vested interest in seeing skilled
workers developed, would cost relatively little and could begin to show
dividends on a time scale that is short compared to other similar
training opportunities. The Committee feels that use of NASA
educational funding, along with joint funding from other entities,
could be brought to bear in this area. Emphasizing workforce
development as a major factor in proposal competition for such
programs, as distinct from a focus purely on the scientific return is
also encouraged by the Committee. This would bring an explicitly
strategic view to the funding of these opportunities.
Which issues related to NASA's workforce are least well understood and
what recommendations does your report offer for addressing those
uncertainties?
An oft-used exemplar for NASA's workforce is a plot of the age
distribution. Two aspects of this distribution are usually mentioned;
that the age of the peak has been steadily increasing over the past
several years, and that those members at the upper end of the
distribution will soon be retirement eligible. While it is the case
that there has been an aging of the workforce distribution, a
comparison with the other aerospace workforce sectors shows that NASA's
workforce is not significantly different than the aerospace workforce
generally (Figure 3).
The Committee would emphasize several points regarding this
characterization of the NASA workforce. It does not capture a key
aspect of the workforce, viz., the experience associated with the
bodies that are represented in the data, and as the Committee has
emphasized it is the lack of experienced personnel that lies at the
heart of NASA's workforce issues. Moreover, the Committee was unable to
find evidence that NASA, or anyone else for that matter, was able to
say what the ``right'' distribution should be for an employer with
NASA's needs and challenges. A key element here is how one can model
this distribution so as to understand the ``sources and sinks'' that
alter the distribution, understand the time scales over which those
sources and sinks operate and hence alter the distribution. The
Committee feels that any strategic plan that NASA develops for
workforce development must include an effort to model and ultimately
understand the dynamics of its workforce age distribution. The
Committee was not able to conduct an extensive search for people or
organizations that do, or could do, this type of analysis, but it seems
clear that it lies outside of NASA, most probably in the academic
community. We would strongly encourage studies in this area. We would
also encourage NASA to periodically reevaluate its model and update its
data both for the results and as a way of keeping focus on these
critical workforce concerns.
In closing my prepared remarks Mr. Chairman, I would reiterate that
the NRC Committee feels strongly that NASA needs to look outside of
itself in assessing the nature, scope, and possible solutions for its
skill mix. NASA has historically been a ``can-do'' agency, but also one
afflicted to some extent with the ``not invented here'' syndrome. The
issues NASA faces in terms of workforce are national in character; they
reverberate through other government agencies involved in space-related
work, as well as the private sector including universities. NASA should
not, in our Committee's view, try to structure a solution in isolation
from consultation with the broader set of communities noted above. I
believe I can speak for many people in saying that the Nation's space
programs would benefit if the issue of workforce is addressed by
involving the representatives of the workforce ecosystem in both the
assessment of the problem and the range of possible solutions.
Thank you again for the opportunity to share with your committee
the perspectives on this important issue that the NRC Committee has
developed over the past year.
I would be happy to expand on my remarks or address additional
questions should you wish.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Biography for David C. Black
DAVID C. BLACK, is President Emeritus of the Universities Space
Research Association (USRA), a consortium of 97 different colleges and
universities having graduate programs in space science or engineering.
He is also adjunct professor of space physics and astronomy at Rice
University. Between 1970 and 1975 Dr. Black served in various
capacities at NASA's Ames Research Center, including chief of the
Theoretical Studies Branch and deputy chief of the Space Science
Division, and he was the first chair of the Ames Basic Research
Council. Dr. Black was selected as the first chief scientist for the
space station program at NASA Headquarters in 1985. He returned to NASA
Ames in 1987 as the chief scientist for space research. He spent an
academic year as a visiting professor at the University of London
(1974-1975). Dr. Black is an internationally recognized researcher in
theoretical astrophysics and planetary science, specializing in studies
of star and planetary system formation. He has also done pioneering
experimental research involving the isotopic composition of noble gases
in meteorites, was the first to discover and correctly identify
evidence for non-solar material in solar system matter, and was the
first to show that the isotopic composition of solar flare noble gases
differs from that of solar wind noble gases. He is a leader in the
current effort to search for and study other planetary systems. He is
past chair of the Solar System Exploration Subcommittee and the Origins
Subcommittee of NASA's Space Science Advisory Committee. Dr. Black also
served as a member of the NRC Planetary and Lunar Exploration Task
Group (1984-1988) and the Working Group on Search for Extraterrestrial
Intelligence (1979-1983).
Dr. Black served as Co-Chair with Dr. Daniel Hastings of the
National Research Council (NRC)'s Committee on Issues Affecting the
Future of the U.S. Space Science and Engineering Workforce. Dr.
Hastings is a Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering
Systems and Dean for Undergraduate Education at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT). The other committee members were:
BURT S. BARNOW, Johns Hopkins University
JOHN W. DOUGLASS, Aerospace Industries Association of America,
Inc.
RAY M. HAYNES, Northrop Grumman Space Technology
MARGARET G. KIVELSON, University of California, Los Angeles
WILLIAM POMERANTZ, X PRIZE Foundation
JOSEPH H. ROTHENBERG, Universal Space Network
KATHRYN C. THORNTON, University of Virginia
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Dr. Black, and we worked through
the audiovisual glitch, and that is important data. We will put
that in the record.
Dr. Stone, five minutes is yours, and welcome.
STATEMENT OF DR. LEE STONE, LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, NASA
COUNCIL OF IFPTE LOCALS, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF
PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL ENGINEERS
Dr. Stone. Thank you, Chairman Udall and Ranking Member
Hall for providing the International Federation of Professional
and Technical Engineers, NASA's largest federal employee union,
the opportunity to present our perspective on the workforce
challenges facing NASA today.
IFPTE's primary interest in testifying is to provide
advocacy for maintaining the technical excellence and
independence of NASA's civil service workforce. However, our
interests extend more broadly to a deep commitment to NASA's
success, not only in the near-term, but more important, in the
long-term, consistent with the true spirit of the Vision for
Space Exploration.
NASA is not facing a workforce crisis. It is facing a
fiscal crisis. The President's Vision outlines a bold and
ambitious set of milestones, yet NASA is not being given a bold
and ambitious budget needed for success. As long as the Vision
remains largely an unfunded mandate, all of NASA's missions and
its workforce will remain at risk, and that is the primary
issue.
The last time a President asked NASA to send humans to the
Moon, NASA had nearly 36,000 civil servants onboard, and an
annual budget of more than $30 billion, adjusted for inflation,
and they were not being asked to fix design problems with the
Shuttle or to build a Space Station at the same time. Yet
today, NASA's civil service workforce has been halved, and its
budget reduced by more than 40 percent. Until the fundamental
discrepancy between mission and budget is corrected, NASA's
problems cannot be properly solved.
First slide, please, or the only slide, please. A workforce
demographic problem is readily apparent in Figure 2-2 of the
NRC report. The real problem is the five-fold reduction in the
30- to 34-year-old range between 1993 and 2005, indicated by
the vertical blue arrows on the left, a fivefold reduction.
Management, however, remains obsessed with the faux problem of
the right hand tail of the distribution to the right of the
vertical red line, which represents only about five percent of
the workforce, and has been stable for more than a decade, yet
there is where they keep pounding to reduce it.
IFPTE applauds the National Research Council for its
thoughtful analysis and recommendations on NASA's Workforce
Plan. The report recognizes the immediate need to engage
aggressively in the education, the hands-on training, and
recruitment of the next generation of NASA employees. IFPTE,
however, is disappointed with the National Academy of Public
Administration's report, as it fails to question management's
assertions. It accepts as fact uncertain and mistaken premises
that NASA's budget will not grow, that its current employee
skills are seriously mismatched with NASA's new mission, and
thus, that NASA must reduce it science, aeronautics, and
technology development activities and workforce. We
fundamentally disagree.
IFPTE, however, continues to support the ten healthy
centers philosophy initiated by Dr. Griffin, and we reject the
criticism of that plan in the NAPA report. We encourage Dr.
Griffin to persevere in his efforts to decentralize the
Constellation Program. Unfortunately, current policies continue
to severely stress NASA's research centers. The solutions
should not be, and cannot be to convert them into mini-
operational centers, or to subject them to some BRAC-like
process. Rather, the revitalization of cutting edge R&D at the
field centers is crucial for the safe and meaningful return to
the Moon, as well as for delivering on our promises in science
and aeronautics.
To reinvigorate NASA's workforce in support of all of its
missions, and to maintain America's prestige and leadership in
science and aerospace R&D, IFPTE offers the following seven
recommendations.
First, Congress should fund NASA at close to the authorized
level as possible, and prohibit transfer authority across major
accounts. IFPTE proposes at least an additional $300 million
for science, $420 million for exploration systems, $200 million
for aeronautics, $30 million for education, and $50 million for
critical facilities over the President's Fiscal Year 2008
proposal.
Second, Congress should preserve the technical excellence
and independence of NASA's civil service workforce. NASA should
fund civil servant salaries directly to the centers,
independent of programs, to allow for the effective use of
matrix management, and to end the scapegoating of civil service
employees.
Third, NASA should provide stability for its current
workforce, to reassure its future workforce. The Administrator
should publicly reject any use of RIFs, so that the best and
the brightest young engineers and science graduates can once
again see NASA as a great career move.
Fourth, IFPTE supports the NRC recommendations. NASA must
begin an aggressive campaign to recruit young employees while
the current staff is still on board to transfer its critical
knowledge.
Fifth, IFPTE strongly opposes three of NAPA's
recommendations. IFPTE opposes any authorization to use a BRAC-
like process to close centers, any streamlining of the RIF
procedures, and any authority to unilaterally terminate
retirement eligible employees.
Sixth, IFPTE supports enhancing voluntary buy-out
authority. We support the post-employment extension of medical
coverage, and an increase in the buy-out incentive up to an
individual's severance pay, capped at one year's salary.
Seven, IFPTE strongly opposes any new authority to
facilitate the conversion of permanent positions to term
positions, and therefore, we oppose the Administration's
proposed term conversion legislation.
In closing, IFPTE is very grateful for the bipartisan
Congressional rescue that has thus far protected NASA's
workforce from a misguided RIF. Let us now turn from the era of
workforce damage control to a more positive era of rebuilding
NASA's future workforce.
Once again, Chairman Udall and Ranking Member Hall, IFPTE
thanks you for inviting us to bring these important issues to
the attention of the Subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Stone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lee Stone
Thank you, Chairman Udall and Ranking Member Calvert, for providing
the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers,
NASA's largest Union, this opportunity to present our perspective on
the workforce challenges facing NASA today. It is a privilege and honor
for me to speak for IFPTE and for the thousands of NASA employees we
represent.
IFPTE's primary interest in testifying today is to provide advocacy
for maintaining the technical excellence and independence of NASA's
civil service workforce that has served the Agency so well for decades.
However, our interest extends more broadly to a deep commitment to
NASA's success not only in the near term but, more importantly, in the
long term, consistent with the true spirit of the Vision for Space
Exploration (VSE). NASA's rank-and-file employees are not only the
heart and soul of the Agency, but also provide much of its brain power.
They are hard working and dedicated to mission success, but see this
success as including all of NASA's critical missions. Indeed, many of
our nation's best and brightest came to NASA primarily to be part of
endeavors greater and nobler than more lucrative pursuits available to
them in the private sector. They came to discover and to explore so
that America can lead mankind in aerospace science, engineering, and
exploration. That dream is in jeopardy today, not because of a failure
of technical competence or innovation, but because of a failure of
political will.
NASA is not facing a workforce crisis; it is facing a fiscal
crisis. The President's Vision outlines a bold and ambitious set of
milestones for NASA, ultimately leading to permanent human presence on
the Moon and a safe manned mission to Mars. Yet unfortunately, the
White House has thus far been unwilling to propose a bold and ambitious
NASA budget to match. The misguided policy decision to make the VSE an
unfunded mandate is the driving force behind all of NASA's current
woes. IFPTE calls on Congress to redirect this policy and to fund NASA
at the levels Authorized less than two years ago with overwhelming
bipartisan support. This course of action is essential for enabling
NASA's success, for maintaining America's prestige and leadership in
aerospace R&D, and ultimately for safeguarding our national security.
<bullet> Unless NASA's budget is increased significantly,
commensurate with its full set of responsibilities, mission
failure is a real possibility. Something has to give. Either
the Constellation schedule will need to be significantly
slipped, or Shuttle and Space Station activities will need to
be curtailed even further, or, as the Administration would now
have it, critical Aeronautics, Science and Technology
activities will be severely cut, leaving Orion and Ares
vehicles with ill-defined missions and NASA's Science and
Aeronautics responsibilities unfulfilled. This is not a
partisan concern; for example, Representative Calvert, the
former Chairman (and now Ranking Member) of this subcommittee,
recently expressed concern about how cuts in NASA Aeronautics
R&D impact the Nation's effort, coordinated by the newly
established inter-agency Joint Program Development Office
(JPDO), to develop the next generation airspace system:
``. . .Congress anticipated that the Federal Aviation
Administration, as the operator of our nation's ATM system, and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as our
nation's leading aeronautics R&D organization, would continue
to work collaboratively as they have for more than forty years:
NASA researching and developing long-lead, high risk
technologies; FAA adapting their research products to
incorporate them into the national airspace system. . .. The
JPDO recognized NASA's expertise early on by selecting them to
lead the `Agile Airspace' integrated product team. . .. In the
last eighteen months, however, and subsequent to the creation
of the JPDO, NASA's aeronautics R&D program has undergone a
major reorganization. . . I remain concerned that so early in
this grand endeavor now known as NextGen, one of the two key
partners is changing the rules of the game, and it's happening
at a time when R&D roadmaps are being finalized, and spending
for developing and integrating new technologies is about to
ramp up. I would strongly prefer that NASA's Airspace
Management program continue to advance promising technologies
to a high level. . . It is my sincere hope that NASA's actions
don't hinder JPDO's efforts to develop technologies upon which
NextGen is reliant.''
IFPTE shares this concern and urges Congress to properly
fund NASA's Aeronautics R&D mission, which will not only
address this and other critical national needs, but will also
greatly reduce the workforce instability at the Agency.
<bullet> The Administration's fiscal policy is driving the
indefinite postponement of the recruitment of NASA's next
generation of scientists and engineers thereby seriously
compromising the long-term health of the Agency. At an All-
Hands meeting at Ames Research Center on February 22nd 2007,
Administrator Griffin responded to a query about what NASA is
doing to recruit young scientists and engineers by saying:
``I cannot grow the Agency by bringing in even all-stars
right now that I want to bring in, unless and until folks like
us who, as you said, are getting older, until and unless these
folks retire.''
While we sympathize with the Administrator, given the
untenable position he is in of trying to meet NASA's many
awesome responsibilities without an honest budget, we must
stand in opposition to any further stalling. This defeatist
statement, coming directly from the Administrator, reveals that
the current workforce plan is simply to punt, effectively
sacrificing NASA's future to meet its immediate milestones,
leaving his successor to deal with an even more serious problem
down the road.
IFPTE applauds the National Research Council (NRC) for its
thoughtful report and recommendations on NASA's workforce planning. The
report properly recognizes the symbiotic relationship between NASA's
in-house scientists and their academic colleagues, as well as the
immediate need to engage aggressively in the education, hands-on
training, and recruitment of the next generation of NASA employees. We
fully endorse their key recommendations.
<bullet> Although the NRC primary interest is in maintaining
NASA's support of academic research and IFPTE does not agree
with all of the statements made in the report, nonetheless,
IFPTE believes that NASA's entire multi-sector workforce would
be well served by following their recommendations.
<bullet> One concern however is the references made about
government conflict-of-interest rules hindering the recruitment
of senior program/project managers from industry. IFPTE
strongly believes that these ethics rules are absolutely
essential for protecting the government and the taxpayer from
the corrupting influence of private profit motives. The
influence of the aerospace industry on NASA policies is
powerful enough already, any weakening of government ethics
rules would be unwise.
IFPTE is disappointed with the National Association of Public
Administration (NAPA) report and strongly objects to the fact that it
blindly accepts the Administration's assertions about NASA's fiscal and
programmatic constraints and uses them to bolster their argument that
some dramatic workforce realignment with a significant reduction of
civil service component is somehow required for the success of the VSE.
This simply is not the case and indeed, we believe the converse is
true. We also strongly object to their recommendations that NASA
management be given new authority for streamlined Reductions-In-Force
(RIFs) and for termination based on retirement eligibility.
<bullet> For example, the NAPA report (p. 164) makes the
astounding statement that:
``Most employees who have been ``uncovered'' in the past are
concentrated in various legacy programs and related
occupations, such as engineering and science support
(technicians); . . .program/project management; computer
science and information technology; space sciences; . .
.various systems engineering competencies; electrical and
electronics systems; . . .The April 2006 NASA Workforce
Strategy recognized this reality.''
The above statement that NASA does not now need and is not
going to need these ``legacy'' competencies to meet its future
missions in Science, Aeronautics, and Human Space Flight is
absurd. Yet, assertions like this are used throughout the
report to justify a persistent call to target CS employees for
layoffs. Indeed, the NRC report correctly points that NASA
desperately needs to recruit more talent in the areas of
program/project management and in systems engineering (and
talented Aeronautics program/project managers and systems
engineers can clearly be quickly cross-trained to support space
flight programs). Furthermore, the NAPA report's lack of
objectivity is revealed as it repeatedly uses the term
``reality'' to describe unchallenged assertions by NASA
management, while they refer to Union statements as ``views.''
<bullet> The fatal flaw in the NAPA report is that most of its
recommendations are based on mistaken or uncertain premises
presented as facts. The budgetary and the programmatic
assertions made are not the clear cut ``reality'' that NAPA
would have one believe; for example, the drastic and unwise
cuts to Science, Aeronautics, and Technology Development in the
President's proposed FY 2008 budget will not become reality
unless Congress agrees to them. Over the last few years, a
bipartisan coalition in Congress has repeatedly shown its
willingness to restore NASA funding in these areas.
IFPTE continues to support the ``ten healthy Centers'' philosophy
put forward by Dr. Griffin; we reject criticism of his plan within the
NAPA report. Unfortunately, the implementation has been spotty. In
particular, as noted in the NAPA report (p. 57), current policies have
severely stressed NASA's research centers. The solution to this problem
cannot be to convert them into mini-operational centers or to subject
them to a BRAC-like process. Rather, the Administration must recognize
that revitalized R&D at NASA's research centers is crucial for the
success of the VSE and NASA's Science and Aeronautics missions. NASA's
research centers and their academic partners must be provided with the
resources needed for them to continue to make their contributions to
NASA's longer-term missions.
<bullet> Specifically, healthy Aeronautics and Exploration
research budgets should be fully sequestered from the manned
space flight operational and exploration development budgets
and should be managed by the research centers. This is
necessary to prevent continued pilfering of longer-term
research projects in support of shorter-term Constellation
milestones, and to make sure that the technologies needed to
support productive and safe long-duration lunar missions are
available when the rockets are ready to get us there. In
particular, the Advanced Capabilities programs should be
managed by research centers with their R&D activities primarily
at the research centers. This will protect these vital efforts
from being usurped by Constellation and will foster innovation,
unfettered by the constraints of current operational thinking.
Constellation must be kept healthy by direct funding, not by
co-opting R&D funds.
<bullet> As recommended in the NRC report (recommendation 6),
small scale flight projects (e.g., small sats, free flyers,
balloon launches) should be revitalized thereby enhancing
synergistic links between academia, the smaller emerging
``new'' space industry, and the research centers. This not only
has the potential to produce good space, Earth, life and
microgravity science for less money, but will also provide the
key hands-on experience needed to develop strong in-house
program/project managers/scientists and to educate/recruit the
next generation of employees.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
The key problem and the misguided nature of the current management
approach are readily apparent in Fig. 2-2 of the NRC report (see
above).
<bullet> The real problem is the nearly five-fold reduction in
the number in the 30-34 year old range between 1993 and 2005
(see vertical blue arrow). The last two Administrations share
the blame for dereliction of their duty to renew and replenish
this critical national capability.
<bullet> NASA management (and the NAPA report) is obsessed
with the faux problem of the right-hand tail of the
distribution (to the right of the vertical red line), which
represents only about five percent of the workforce and has
demonstrated itself to be stable for more than the last decade.
Furthermore, this tail represents the older, experienced and
dedicated, scientific and engineering workforce, whose
retention is often critical for mission success because of the
priceless corporate memory they possess.
Matrix management and full-cost recovery of civil-service salaries:
NASA's peculiar version of matrix management, in which programs
wield all budgetary power and line management is effectively impotent,
is harming morale and productivity at most centers among both the rank-
and-file and line managers.
<bullet> When NASA claimed to convert over to ``full-cost
accounting'' in FY04, it actually converted over to a full-cost
recovery system. This system unwisely empowered distant program
managers to siphon salary and facilities money away from field
centers. By giving so much power to senior program managers
(for Constellation, program management is often
indistinguishable or closely aligned with line management at
Johnson Space Center), a low priority has been placed on
preserving long-term institutional assets and capabilities at
the less-powerful centers. Labor costs at these centers can
thus be low-balled by pitting competing centers against each
other and they have ended up being forced to provide technical
support to programs at below actual cost simply because a half
FTE for full time work is better than nothing. This has created
the artificially inflated ``uncovered capacity'' that is being
exaggerated by anti-CS proponents to justify layoffs.
<bullet> The Administration has only recently begun to pay
adequate attention to the agency-wide consequences of full-cost
recovery on core technical competencies and facilities. There
is little incentive within program management (which controls
nearly all of NASA funds and is under terrible pressure to meet
current fiscal-year milestones) to be interested in any long-
term agency-wide workforce planning.
<bullet> Matrix management coupled with full-cost recovery is
seriously undermining line/center management authority and
morale. For matrix management to work properly, line and
program management must have equal, complementary authorities.
Line managers should control CS labor and travel costs
(provided directly to each center); while program managers
should control procurement and contractor labor costs. This
more equitable balance would then force greater cooperation
between line and program management to the benefit of the
Agency, its programs, and all of its employees.
Abuse of term hiring:
NASA management has been systematically abusing its authority to
create term civil-servant positions with strict quotas on hiring
permanent positions, thus forcing centers to make improper term hires
to fill long-term technical needs more properly served by a permanent
hire.
<bullet> The percentage of NASA's civil service workforce that
is employed under a term contract has increased more than 7-
fold since the beginning of FY2003. Of the current term
positions, 80 percent are scientists or engineers and many of
them will leave the Agency in two to six years, despite NASA's
considerable investment in training them.
<bullet> The number of outside hires into permanent science
and engineering positions decreased more than 9-fold between FY
2000 and FY 2006.
<bullet> The ratio of permanent to non-permanent outside hires
shifted from 1.3 in FY 2000 to 0.4 in FY 2006.
<bullet> As noted in the NAPA report (p. 160), ``NASA has used
term employment as a vehicle to extend the typical one-year
probationary period.'' Even if this is meant to be benevolent,
this common rationale for using a term hire instead of a
permanent hire improperly circumvents the intent of Title 5 and
the Flexibility Act.
<bullet> IFPTE agrees with the NAPA recommendation that the
decision to offer term or permanent status should be based on a
careful analysis of the job requirements and of the long-term
need for the relevant skills. NASA must develop transparent,
consistent, and compelling criteria for denying full civil-
service rights to any new hire. However, IFPTE is troubled by
the conclusion of Chapter VI of the NAPA report that asserts
that
``Term employment may be preferable to permanent employment
options given the great deal of budget and programmatic
uncertainty.''
This statement openly advocates for the improper use of term
positions to compensate for political instability at the
Agency. Every year, NASA's budget and programs are uncertain,
so this cannot be used as a criterion for determining whether a
position is best filled by a permanent or term hire. That
decision should be based on the position's skill requirements
and the long- vs. short-term need for the specific competency
being hired.
<bullet> The exploding use of term positions is threatening
the quality and independence of our technical staff. The best
and brightest new scientist and engineering graduates are being
wooed by MIT, Johns Hopkins, Carnegie Mellon, Stanford, Cal
Tech, UC-Berkeley and many other high-caliber academic
institutions. Premier academic institutions offer tenure. In
the past, NASA has been able to get its fair share of these
candidates because it offered tenure, better benefits, and a
similarly excellent intellectual environment. The NRC report
(p. 41) notes that the reduction in federal pension benefits
made under the Reagan Administration is hindering NASA's
ability to recruit senior staff away from more lucrative
private-sector positions with better benefits than the
government. Any diminution of tenure rights will only make
recruitment even more difficult as it will make cold cash the
only usable currency to compete for top talent and the
government is not in a good position to win based on that
criterion. More critically, tenure provides technical employees
with the security they need to speak truth to power.
<bullet> A more extensive analysis of the crucial value of
civil-service tenure can be found in IFPTE's testimony to this
Subcommittee on June 13th, 2006.
Balancing the public and private workforce components:
IFPTE reiterates its prior testimony stating that NASA benefits
greatly from the synergy generated by its combined federal and private-
sector workforce. However, we also believe that NASA has achieved the
minimum healthy balance between its current 18,020 civil servants on
duty (16,299 full-time permanent) and its dedicated contractor
workforce of around 40,000. The latest CS number represents a nearly a
two-fold change from the 35,860 civil servants on board in FY1967, the
last time NASA was working to send Americans to the moon and back
safely. Any further decrease in the civil-service component would
appear unwarranted and would put mission success at increased risk.
IFPTE is concerned that neither the NRC nor the NAPA report
emphasized the many important reasons for maintaining a strong civil-
service component to NASA's workforce especially when facing budgetary
and schedule pressures. A few of these reasons are:
<bullet> Civil servants serve as smart buyers so the taxpayer
buys good products at a fair price.
<bullet> Civil servants are needed to provide proper technical
monitoring and financial oversight of NASA's contractor and
academic efforts.
<bullet> Civil servants are needed to balance out private-
sector profit motives in order to maintain safety. The Columbia
Accident Investigations Board (p. 198) indeed pointed out that
increases in the industry workforce together with reductions in
the CS workforce contributed to the disaster and that, over
time, NASA management tends to forget this.
Prior to Challenger, Shuttle Program structure had hindered
information flows, leading the Rogers Commission to conclude
that critical information about technical problems was not
conveyed effectively through the hierarchy. The Space Shuttle
Program had altered its structure by outsourcing to
contractors, which added to communication problems. The
Commission recommended many changes to remedy these problems,
and NASA made many of them. However, the Board found that those
post-Challenger changes were undone over time by management
actions. NASA administrators, reacting to government pressures,
transferred more functions and responsibilities to the private
sector. The change was cost-efficient, but personnel cuts
reduced oversight of contractors at the same time that the
Agency's dependence upon contractor engineering judgment
increased.
The Agency also needs to engage more scientists, engineers, and
technicians, and fewer managers, deputy managers, associate managers,
and assistant managers. NASA's dedicated technical workforce at all of
its centers, both civil servant and contractor, stands ready, willing,
and able to support all of NASA's missions and there is more than
enough technical work to go around. NASA headquarters needs to reduce
the load of self-generated program-reporting busy work that it dumps on
its front-line managers, which then reduces real productivity and
drives the ``need'' for excess management.
Decentralizing the Constellation program:
Administrator Griffin deserves considerable praise for realizing
that all of NASA Centers should share in the work opportunities (and
responsibilities) provided by the Constellation program, according to
their capabilities and facilities. This idea, however, has been
difficult to implement fully and is not a long-term solution.
<bullet> Constellation program management is too closely
allied with Johnson Space Center management and has therefore
been very reluctant to comply fully with the decentralization
process. As stated in the minutes of the NASA Strategic
Management Council's February 21st 2007 meeting:
``. . .flight centers seem reluctant to place development
work at research centers. . .''
Indeed, when Constellation work-packages have been
transferred to other centers, JSC has only minimally complied
by transferring the CS Full Time Equivalent (FTE) portion of
the funds, while retaining the procurement dollars and
contractor work-year equivalent (WYE) funds, thereby making it
impossible for other centers to match JSC's apparent
productivity. JSC continues to prefer hiring within their local
JSC contractor teams and to resist transferring the full budget
associated with Constellation work-packages to CS-contractor-
academic teams at other centers.
<bullet> IFPTE concurs with the NRC report finding that
rigorous requirement management is a critical factor in mission
success (Box 4.1). It would therefore appear troubling that
Constellation and JSC management have chosen to use employees
of the Orion prime contractor to help define the development,
validation, and verification of Orion's requirements; this
creates an obvious conflict of interest as these requirements
impact the profitability of the prime contract. To protect the
taxpayer, civil-service ethics rules would disqualify any
civil-servant employee from working on a NASA project in which
they had a direct financial interest. Furthermore, this
questionable out-sourcing is particularly harmful when the
expertise contracted out already exists in-house at another
NASA center.
<bullet> The Constellation work is largely short-term
technical oversight tasks of hardware-software development
programs, with the lion's share of the real work ultimately
performed by the Orion prime and sub-contractors. These work
assignments are generally not full-time and do not generally
cover NASA's world-class scientists and technology developers,
whose innovative research is critical for the long-term health
of the Agency and the ultimate success of the VSE. The only
sustainable long-term solution is to revitalize NASA's
Aeronautics, Exploration Research and Technology, and Science
programs.
The Administration's proposed new flexibilities:
IFPTE supports NASA's efforts to obtain enhanced voluntary buy-out
authority. However, we strongly opposed the effort to obtain
legislation to enhance their authority to convert permanent positions
to term positions as this would only exacerbate the current abuse of
term hiring.
Recommendations:
In order for NASA to move forward towards reinvigorating its
workforce to better support all of its missions, IFPTE offers the
following recommendations:
1. Congress should fund NASA as close to the authorized level
as possible and prohibit executive transfer authority.
<bullet> In its endorsement of the VSE, Congress
authorized $18.7 billion for FY08, yet the President
has proposed only $17.3 billion. This $1.4 billion
shortfall is at the core of all of NASA's problems.
<bullet> None of the National Research Council
recommendations on NASA workforce revitalization can
come to fruition without adequate Appropriation.
<bullet> Congress' direction will not have the
intended impact unless all major Appropriations
accounts are unambiguously specified, with executive
transfer authority limited to moving funds within these
major accounts (e.g., Education funds should be
specifically appropriated with transfer to other
activities prohibited).
<bullet> IFPTE proposes an additional $300 million for
Science above that in the President's budget (including
increased funding for the Research & Analysis
activities called for by the NRC to support both in-
house and academic research), an additional $120
million for Exploration Advanced Capabilities (to
support the longer-term R&D needed to maintain healthy
and strong technology development both in-house and
externally), an additional $30 million for Education
(to encourage our youth to devote themselves to a
technical education leading to a career in aerospace),
and an additional $200 million for Aeronautics (to
support NASA's traditional forte in Aeronautics R&D as
well as its traditional relationship with the aviation
industry and its new commitments to the JPDO). In
addition to fully supporting NASA's key missions, these
specific Appropriations proposals also form the basis
of an implementation plan for workforce renewal,
consistent with the NRC report.
2. Congress should preserve and protect the technical
integrity and independence of NASA's civil-service workforce.
<bullet> All talk of downsizing should cease
immediately and be replaced by talk of sustained
recruitment of NASA's new generation of employees.
<bullet> Congress should prohibit the disruptive and
misguided policy of full-cost recovery of civil-service
salaries, thereby re-empowering rank-and-file employees
and their line management with the flexibility to
assign and perform work as needed within a balanced
partnership with program management.
<bullet> Congress should require NASA to fund CS
salaries and travel directly to the centers,
independent of programs, to allow for more balanced and
effective matrix management. This would put an end to
the scapegoating of the CS workforce for NASA's overall
budgetary shortfall.
<bullet> Congress should ask the Government
Accountability Office to audit NASA's use of term
positions.
<bullet> Although Congress has temporarily prohibited
layoffs, as seen in the recent NAPA report, some within
NASA management continue to promulgate anti-civil
service rhetoric. Without adequate factual
justification, NAPA has endorsed a plan to consider
downsizing NASA's CS workforce (i.e., they want to put
RIFs back on the table with weaker safeguards, with
management's latest target being 2,000 Shuttle
employees primarily at JSC and KSC as we near 2010).
Clearly, most of these employees can be retrained to
work on Constellation or they will simply retire, yet
NASA is asking for legislation to go after them.
3. NASA management should provide visible and sustained
stability for its current workforce to support the inspiration
then recruitment of its future workforce.
<bullet> The best and brightest young engineering and
science graduates need once again to see aerospace as a
stable career option in general and NASA as a great
career move in particular, comparable to accepting a
job at a premier academic or private-sector research
institution (e.g., MIT or Google or Lockheed Martin).
They need to feel confident of stable job opportunities
at NASA early in their education to inspire them to
embark on the demanding educational paths of science,
engineering, and math.
<bullet> NASA should re-embrace its Aeronautics,
Science, and Technology missions as these activities
are a major component of the attraction to NASA for the
best and brightest young minds.
4. IFPTE supports the NRC recommendations, especially #2, #4,
and #6.
<bullet> NASA must begin an aggressive campaign to
recruit young employees while the current senior staff
is still on board to transfer its knowledge.
<bullet> NASA must aggressively establish hands-on
training programs and research opportunities for both
current employees and students (aka future employees)
to help forge a strong future workforce.
<bullet> NASA must maintain a portfolio of smaller
flight programs to both provide valuable, yet less
expensive, scientific return (especially given that the
Shuttle is no longer available to support Life or
Microgravity Science) and to train young project
managers/scientists within more modest projects.
5. IFPTE strongly opposes three NAPA recommendations.
<bullet> The NAPA report is deeply flawed as it
accepts, unchallenged, erroneous premises associated
with the Administration's policies. In particular, the
argument that NASA's mission is changing dramatically
thereby requiring a smaller CS workforce is fallacious.
NASA's mission has been and will continue to be to
perform aerospace-related scientific research &
engineering development. The current transient emphasis
on spacecraft design and development will pass and
should not be the pretext for a massive downsizing of
NASA's civil service workforce. The crisis is
artificial; without adequate funds for Constellation,
the Administrator has resorted to cannibalizing the
Science and Aeronautics budgets and their associated
employees. Rather than advocating for a fictitious
realignment, the NAPA report should have performed a
more neutral and vigorous examination of the budgetary
and programmatic premises provided to them by the
Administration.
<bullet> The recommendation that NASA should
contemplate a BRAC-like process to consider the closure
of one or more of its research centers completely
misses the mark. BRAC was a unique response to America
winning the cold war. The US therefore needed to
dramatically transition its military posture to be more
appropriate for the completely different post-cold-war
world. NASA, on the other hand, is preparing to re-
invigorate its human space flight mission in response
to the VSE. It is moving back to the future to re-
invent Apollo, while also maintaining its traditional
portfolio of Aeronautics and Science. The VSE does not
represent a dramatic change in NASA's mission but
rather only a transient re-emphasis on spacecraft
design and development. Furthermore, NASA's research
centers function as a lifeline to academia and are
absolutely essential if NASA is going to solve the very
real technology development obstacles on the critical
path to lunar outpost and Mars. NASA's highly-respected
research centers need to be rescued from the
Administration's current misguided policies, not
sacrificed to meet short-term budgetary shortfalls.
<bullet> The recommendation that NASA management be
allowed to streamline its RIF procedures fails
completely to acknowledge the fundamental principles
behind the creation of the civil service. Hiring and
firing employees nearly at will, as is sometimes done
in the private sector, may provide management with the
flexibility it craves, but it does not work well when
management is playing with the taxpayers' money. The
usual market-force feedback is not present and thus
very stringent regulations are absolutely necessary to
prevent patronage, cronyism, and other forms of
corruption. Furthermore, given that Chapter IV of the
NAPA report laments that NASA management currently is
not properly following existing federal law related to
contractor employees, it would seem imprudent to reward
NASA management with greater authority to fire CS
employees. Again, NASA's primary workforce challenge,
as repeatedly highlighted in the NRC report, is to
recruit and build its future workforce. The obsession
with layoffs is misplaced, is wasting taxpayer dollars,
and harming morale and productivity.
<bullet> The recommendation that NASA management be
allowed to declare an emergency and terminate its older
annuity-eligible employees is not only wrong-headed, it
is overtly discriminatory. Retirement eligibility
(which correlates strongly with age) should never be
used as a criterion for termination or any other
adverse employment action. When all other criteria are
the same, using retirement eligibility to decide who
stays and who is fired is unconscionable. IFPTE is
simply shocked that the NAPA would openly advocate for
age discrimination. NASA employees generally become
annuity eligible at 50 years young; IFPTE believes that
rather than considering employees over 50 as
liabilities, NASA management should acknowledge that
the maturity, wisdom, and hands-on experience that our
older scientists and engineers provide are critical for
mission success.
6. IFPTE supports enhancing NASA's voluntary buy-out
authority.
<bullet> Congress should consider legislation to allow
enhanced buy-out authority for NASA. We therefore
support the temporary continuation of medical coverage
in Section 102 of the Administration's proposed
flexibility legislation.
<bullet> Many non-critical employees would like to
retire immediately, but need to stay on a few
additional years for financial reasons. A more
reasonable compensation package would greatly help NASA
persuade these employees to retire without impacting
morale and would ultimately save the taxpayer a lot of
money.
<bullet> The NAPA recommendation that NASA management
be allowed to increase its voluntary buy-out cap from
$25,000 to $35,000 is simply inadequate to effectively
enhance this incentive. The high-tech industry standard
is generally one year's pay, which is much more than
NASA's current $25,000 or the proposed $35,000.
<bullet> IFPTE proposes a more realistic incentive, in
line with those available to many untenured private-
sector employees, with the buy-out calculation equal to
the individual's severance pay (regardless of annuity
eligibility) capped at one-year's salary.
7. IFPTE strongly opposes any new authority to facilitate the
conversion of permanent positions to term positions.
<bullet> NASA management is already abusing its
current expanded term authority and should not be given
additional authority to undermine civil-service
independence. We therefore oppose Section 101 of the
Administration's proposed flexibility legislation.
In conclusion, IFPTE is encouraged by the recent effort to
distribute Constellation work more fairly and intelligently across the
centers, and is very grateful for the bipartisan Congressional rescue
that protected NASA's workforce from the Administration's reckless RIF
plan. We must now turn from the era of workforce damage control to the
more positive task of re-building NASA's future multi-sector workforce.
We hope that the Subcommittee will seriously consider our
recommendations above, as well as those of the NRC panel.
Once again, Chairman Udall and Ranking Member Calvert, IFPTE thanks
you very much for the opportunity to bring these important issues to
the attention of the Subcommittee.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Discussion
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Dr. Stone. At this point, let us
open up our first round of questions, and the chair will
recognize himself for five minutes.
I am going to direct my first round of questions to Dr.
Black and Mr. Stewart. Ms. Dawsey's testimony notes that to a
large degree, these reports, and that is the National
Academies' and the NAPA reports, confirm our assessments of the
challenges facing us in the workforce arena, and validate the
actions that we have initiated to address the most critical and
encompassing issues.
Do you agree with NASA's response to the findings and
recommendations of these reports, and if not, which of your
recommendations do you think need the most attention by NASA?
Dr. Stone, let us start with you, and then, we will move to
Mr. Stewart, and then, if Ms. Dawsey has--if there is time
left, we will give you a chance to share your point of view.
So, Dr. Stone.
Dr. Stone. So, your question is what do I think of NASA's
response to these reports?
Opinions on NASA's Response to National Academies' and NAPA's
Reports
Chairman Udall. Yes, yeah, and if you don't agree with all
of them or most of them, or some of them, which of your
recommendations do you think need most attention by NASA?
Dr. Stone. Okay. I would say that NASA has, indeed,
basically, except for the most extreme proposals at the end of
the NAPA report, that I would like to address separately. The
NAPA report basically is just a rubber stamping of the approach
that NASA has been taking, of trying to realign its workforce
through a process that largely involves the flexibility to
enhance attrition, and to reduce the civil service complement,
and I think there is a strange mixture in the goals of NASA's
management, between trying to adjust to the real goal of the
Vision, and trying to implement a civil service reshaping that
involves a reduction of several thousand employees.
And I think the latter is a political decision that isn't
linked to any reality to the Vision, and so, there is some
schizophrenia to their response, in that some of it is
addressing real issues, and some of it is really just
addressing that, what seems to be a predetermined goal to
reduce the civil service complement.
As far as the NRC report, I don't see much of a response at
all to what they have suggested, and indeed, they seem to be
continuing to shrink their education budget, continuing to
reduce efforts to bring in young people, and in my longer
testimony, there is a quote from the Administrator on this that
I think is really telling. And there was a question asked at an
all hands meeting at Ames a few months ago by a very prominent
scientist, and the scientist asked: ``What is NASA doing to
recruit young people?'' which is the largest effort in the NRC
recommendations, and the Administrator's response was: ``I
cannot grow the Agency by bringing in even all stars right now,
that I want to bring in, unless and until folks like us, who as
you said, are getting older, until and unless these folks
retire.'' And indeed, I don't think this is official policy,
but I think there is a quota of three to one, where centers are
not allowed, the research centers are not allowed to hire
someone until three people retire.
And so, I think that there is a fundamental resistance from
management to actually seriously take on the question of
solving that fivefold reduction in the younger employees, and
on one side, I find that reprehensible, and on the other side,
it is understandable. It comes back to the point that I said at
the beginning. There isn't enough money for Dr. Griffin to meet
all the challenging needs of Constellation, and also, rebuild
the workforce. And he is choosing to meet the short-term
milestones of Constellation, and leave the workforce rebuilding
problem to his successor, and he is doing so, I believe, not
because he wants to, but because he is not being given adequate
budget to do it right.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Dr. Stone. I am going to try and
give Dr. Black a minute or so here to respond, and then, we
will, in the next round, I will give Mr. Stewart and Ms. Dawsey
a chance as well.
Dr. Black. Thank you, Chairman.
The problem of the workforce is a daunting one, and I think
NASA has made at least good initial strides in trying to deal
with this. As has been pointed out by Dr. Stone, our
committee's concerns as regards young people and fresh hires, I
think that they have not yet done all that well there.
One of the things to understand is this is a very, very
difficult problem. If you look at the kind of curve that Dr.
Stone showed, one of the things that I think NASA has not done
is to characterize its people both by the true level of their
experience, their expertise, they count belly buttons in bins
by job categorization, but not whether they really have the
skills necessary.
And the other thing that is really crucial in the strategic
sense is to understand the dynamics of that curve. What are the
sources and sinks? How do you adjust? Over what time scales?
Different things have different timescales. Graduate students
have certain timescales, industry has timescales. So, I think
they really need somebody, and I don't believe this expertise
exists in the Agency. We did a modest search. We were unable to
find things, but I am sure somebody in the university community
knows how to do this, to really understand what are the forces
that shape and evolve that curve that Dr. Stone showed. And I
think essentially, you are going to have to have that, if you
are going to truly have a strategic plan to deal with workforce
issues.
Thank you, Dr. Black, and at this time, I will recognize
the Ranking Member, Mr. Hall, for five minutes.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Dawsey, it seems to
me that we all agree that NASA's workforce is likely to face
some changes--we expect that--that is given--in order to meet
new goals that we have in exploration, science, and
aeronautics, and NASA sent us a Workforce Strategy over a year
ago, and I presume that you have been busy over the past year
trying to implement some of this strategy. I think that is a
good presumption.
Would you please give me some specifics about what NASA is
doing to bring its workforce into appropriate alignment to meet
our exploration, science, and aero goals, and specifically, to
answer the in-house problems, as set out by Dr. Black?
How NASA Is Achieving Workforce Goals
Ms. Dawsey. Yes, sir. We have been working very hard over
the past year to implement the Workforce Strategy. The
Workforce Strategy is still current. What we have done is we
have developed a comprehensive implementation plan, and that
implementation plan, as I said, is worked around three goals,
and one of them is workforce planning.
Over the past year, we have set up a governance structure
which includes human capital as, I believe, Mr. Stewart
recommended, in all of the workforce planning decisions,
aligned with other key officials in the Agency. We have also
set up in that governance structure a standing workforce
planning team, technical team, that includes human capital and
workforce planning, workforce transition, staff from around the
Agency, and we have specific sub-teams that will address
specific issues, for example, for any skill mix issues, or the
Shuttle transition. We have a team set up to do the mapping of
Shuttle employees from Shuttle to Constellation.
In terms of alignment, we have redesigned our leadership
development programs. Basically, what we are working on is
while our entry level pipeline is getting some criticism here
this morning, we do have that pipeline. We have students, co-op
students at NASA. We have about 400 of them at any given time.
We also have over 400 graduate students working on NASA
projects.
The other part of the alignment, though, is to make sure,
as also was suggested this morning, that we have program
managers, project managers, senior technical, and senior
executive service pipelines, and so, we are building career
paths and training programs that start fairly early in our
employees' career, and give them experience as needed, not only
to build within their own career, but to understand NASA as a
whole, both the program side of the house and the institution
side of the house.
And finally, we have taken our systems that have been
operating pretty much independently of one another, the systems
that would inform our leadership, and we are integrating them,
so that they have all the workforce data they need, all the
demographic data they need, to make decisions for the
workforce.
Mr. Hall. I thank you for that. So, the NASA Workforce
Strategy, the ten healthy centers, I think the Administrator
pretty well put that to bed.
Ms. Dawsey. Yes.
Mr. Hall. That there was talk of closing them at one time,
and maybe some others on here think that might be the thing to
do, but I think he has taken a pretty firm position on that,
and I think a lot of us up here recognize how very capable he
is.
The second one is to maximize the existing workforce, as
you have pointed out, and I think we have to do that, and
third, then, you said three goals, and is the third one to
evolve to a more flexible civil service, by--in your workforce,
you pointed out the temporary people that you were using, and
how many different universities they were from. Does that kind
of summarize what--the three that you have said, or have I left
out something?
Ms. Dawsey. No, those are the three.
Mr. Hall. All right. I think my time is almost up, and I
yield back, and I do thank all four of you. Thank you, Dr.
Black.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Judge Hall, and at this point,
yield five minutes, to recognize for five minutes the gentleman
from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, and well, first of
all, let me ask Dr. Stone. You made suggestions about spending
large amounts of money. Could you suggest to us where that
money will be coming from?
Suggested Resources for Funding NASA
Dr. Stone. First of all, I don't think they are large
amounts of money that we are talking about, asking for----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Anytime you talk about over $100 million,
it is a lot of money.
Dr. Stone. Okay. But----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Where is it supposed to come from? You
want to take it from the military? You want to take it from
health research? To be taken seriously, when someone testifies
here nowadays, you can't just come up and say you want hundreds
of millions of more dollars here, hundreds of millions of
dollars more there, and just expect we are going to come up
with it like the Tooth Fairy is going to deliver it. If you
want to be taken seriously, it is like any engineer, you have
to know that you can't build something out of nothing. So,
where do you want to get that money?
Dr. Stone. With all due respect----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am asking a specific question. You can--
--
Dr. Stone. The numbers that we quoted there were right out
of the Authorization Bill. The Authorization Bill was passed
almost unanimously by both sides of Congress.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, fine.
Dr. Stone. And so I didn't invent----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Fine.
Dr. Stone. But secondly----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, I will have to tell you that I
disagree with--quite often, when this Congress irresponsibly
authorizes money, and doesn't say where it is coming from. You
are an engineer, where do you want us to take it from?
Dr. Stone. Well, you mentioned the military. The military
has well over $22 billion----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Dr. Stone.--for its space research program. A lot of the
Constellation efforts----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Dr. Stone.--are efforts that could be leveraged by the
military. Indeed, when the Shuttle is gone, satellites are
going to need to be repaired in different ways, and I would
think that a lot of the technology that would be developed
under the Constellation program would be dual use, and so, it
would not be unfair to leverage some of those funds.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. That is a good answer. That is
what I was looking for. So, you think that we can actually find
more funds by finding, by looking into what is now in the DOD
budget, and either rechanneling them, or leveraging them, and
making sure that they pick up some of the costs for what you
want to do on the NASA side. Is that what you are talking
about?
Dr. Stone. That was one suggestion. The bottom line
question is, though, if you ask NASA to do something, then you
have to pay for it, so if you are not going to give us the
billion dollars, then you have to decide what we are not going
to do.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And I agree with that as well, but let us
just note that when people are advocating that we are going to
end up spending so much more money, it has got to come from
somewhere, and almost, you know, in my 18 years here, at least
the Democrats now are suggesting that we have pay go, you have
got to know where the money is coming from in order to advocate
something, and I think to be taken seriously, and the
suggestion you just gave, I think, is a good suggestion.
Dr. Stone. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Let me note that when we are
talking about the workforce and future workforce, which you
also stressed, we should be, I think NASA should be focusing
more, although we just heard the testimony that there are 400,
was it interns?
Ms. Dawsey. There are 400 cooperative program interns at
NASA.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. It would seem to me that there
should be more than that. That is a very cost-effective
program. We have passed scholarship concepts here, which I have
pushed for over the years, to try to target those people who
are getting their education, and may not be able to afford it,
unless we help them. The scholarships and the internships and
apprentice programs, these are all things that I think are very
cost-effective that should address some of the concerns of Dr.
Stone and others that have testified today.
Let me note that for a long time, I have been on this
committee now for 19 years, and for at least 15 of those years,
we were begging for a space strategy, and no President gave it
to us except this President, and I have my differences with
this President on a number of issues, but I will suggest that
he did give us a space strategy. He wants us to focus on the
Moon, he puts that forward, back to the Moon is the primary
mission, and if we now know that that is the space strategy,
and we all were begging for one, shouldn't NASA be restructured
so that it meets that strategy as its primary goal?
And you are not going to do it by keeping NASA exactly the
same number of, you know, of employees, exactly the same number
of centers. There has to be a prioritization in order to meet a
goal. We finally have somebody set a goal, and I would suggest
that we are going to have, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that
we are going to have to do some serious reform if we are to
suggest to the people that we are serious. Now, I just asked
Dr. Stone to be serious about it, give us an example, we have
got to prioritize as well, and we have accepted the space
strategy, let us get to work on it, and I am very, very pleased
that Mr. Feeney is going to be the Ranking Member, and working
with you, Chairman Udall, and you can count on my active
support to try to make sure we reach that goal of back to the
Moon, set that strategy, as the President has, and do the
things that are necessary to responsibly reach those goals.
Other goals have to be secondary, and it might mean closing
some of the centers and letting some of the people go, mainly
because you can't, as you say, you have got to spend money. The
money hasn't been allocated, so let us spend the money that we
have got wisely, to achieve the specific goals that have been
set by the President. And I might say, approved by Congress.
With that said, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Congressman Rohrabacher, for
your spirited interchange with the Panel. I would acknowledge
and point out that all of us on the Committee know that we have
to find some additional resources, and we are working in a
bipartisan way to do so. At this point, I want to yield to----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, could--just one note.
Chairman Udall. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It is finding additional resources or
making the system more efficient.
Chairman Udall. My opinion would be we need to both. Thank
you for that question, Congressman Rohrabacher. At this point,
I want to yield to Judge Hall, we want to start the clock for a
special announcement and acknowledgment. Judge Hall.
Introduction of Mr. Feeney as Ranking Member
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman and Members on both sides of the
docket, I am honored to say that when Ken Calvert was moved to
Appropriations, it meant that we selected from among our group
one to be ranking with you, Mr. Chairman, here, and the
selection has been made. It is Mr. Feeney. He represents the
Kennedy area, and is a very great supporter and very
knowledgeable about space and aeronautics, and I think to
demonstrate that I recognize him, that I will abandon this
area, and let him come on and take my place, and I will go
about looking for another job or something. Yield back.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Congressman Hall, and as
Congressman Feeney moves over here, I will filibuster for a
minute or so before I recognize Congressman Feeney. I would
tell you that, as Judge Hall mentioned, Congressman Calvert has
taken an important position on the Appropriations Committee. He
has, I am sure, committed to all of us that we will take this
particular committee's interests to heart on the Appropriations
Committee, but I feel like we have actually generated a dual
benefit, because as Congressman Calvert moves to the
Appropriations Committee, we now have a new Ranking Member, Mr.
Feeney from Florida, who represents the Kennedy Space Center,
and I know will be a strong advocate for all things NASA.
I had a chance to get to know Congressman Feeney a little
bit better when we traveled together last summer to see the new
series of Shuttle launches. We, as we often do, as Members of
Congress, jinxed the launch for that particular day, but those
of you remember the narrative, the Shuttle was launched on the
4th of July, which was very appropriate, and I know Mr. Feeney
was one of the proud observers that day.
So, Congressman Feeney, I am looking forward to working
with you. Welcome, as the new Ranking Member of the Committee,
and the floor is yours to provide questions to the Panel, and
to make any comments you would like to make.
Mr. Feeney. Well, thank you, chairman. I am really honored.
I am especially honored that my friend, Ralph Hall, would ask
me to take this position. In the interest of full disclosure,
you know, I am a real estate lawyer by background. I don't know
much about science or space. I have got a lot of people in my
district that do, including my wife, who spent about two
decades as an engineer for a major contractor at Kennedy Space
Center, and I like to point out that my political adversaries
regularly say I am no rocket scientist, and that is true, but I
am married to one, or she is pretty close, anyway, and that is
about the best I can do, but having said that, I appreciate the
chairman's leadership, and I agree with him that we are going
to need both more resources and more efficient use of our
resources, and I think that is an attitude that the both of us
share, and I am very excited about pursuing ways to do that.
I am particularly interested in some of the criticism of
the strategy that Ms. Dawsey has laid out today, and I think
there is a lot of good things in it, but some of the criticism
focuses, and I think Congressman Rohrabacher mentioned it, on a
lack of an aggressive enough plan for young people. And I
should share with you that along with Mark Kirk and Rick
Larsen, I was the first American allowed to see the Chinese
civil space launch facility in Jiuquan, and that was a year and
a half ago, and one of the remarkable things about what the
Chinese are doing is that they are having young people develop
a next generation rocket. What they admitted to us, and of
course, all of their program is in their military budget, and
they intentionally obfuscate what they are doing, but they
admitted that they have over 100 university centers working on
things involved in future space issues, whether it is creating
robots to explore the Moon. Whether it is different types of
technology. And one of my concerns is, and I think Dr. Black
had a great analogy, no matter how talented you are, you can't
walk onto a baseball field. I mean, try explaining the rules of
baseball to a foreigner. It is almost impossible, and it takes
time to understand the rules, let alone develop the specific
skills. And I am concerned, Dr. Stone, I think, pointed out
with the retirement that we are facing, I am very concerned
that we do not have the long-term plan in place to attract the
young people that we are going to need to maintain space
predominance, and failure to maintain space predominance is
simply not an option. We don't know what the Chinese long-term
intentions are, for example, but we cannot permit space
predominance, anybody other that even potentially could be
hostile to peaceful interests, and I think it is very
important.
Dr. Black, would you elaborate, because you talk about the
fact that we ought to visualize the workforce as more than just
the 80,000 people that are working directly in aerospace and
also trained in aerospace, but we have got a much larger pool,
DOD, aerospace industries, can you give us some idea how we can
better use the available pool today, but also, develop a larger
pool for tomorrow, of young people?
Suggestions for Utilizing the Current Pool of Workers and
Developing a Workforce for the Future
Dr. Black. Well, there actually is, as you are well aware,
I am sure, there is an Interagency Aerospace Workforce
Revitalization Taskforce Act, which you have been involved
with, and that is, I believe, a term thing that is involved,
focuses strictly on government entities. One thing I would
encourage you to do is try and broaden that. The ecosystem that
we talk about includes not only the government, but also, the
university community, as well, and the private sector of the
contractors, and it is in that context that I think the
solution must be sought, in terms of how to balance, move, have
flexibility for the overall aerospace workforce.
I would say that if you take your point on China, I think
China now is much like it was when I was a kid, at the
beginning of the Apollo, I am giving my age away here. It is--
--
Mr. Feeney. You mean, much like we were.
Much like--right. And as, I think that it is one thing to
maintain existing space capabilities. It is another thing to
have young people actually develop new----
Dr. Black. Well, that is right. And I think the enthusiasm,
what the Chinese youth are probably seeing now is much what the
youth of America saw in the late '50s and early '60s.
Mr. Feeney. I can tell you, their taikonauts are heroes
over there. We are----
Dr. Black. Oh, you bet. You bet. And so, and I think that
is one of the things we have lost, if you--as we listen to
various witnesses that came before us and our committee, one of
the things that emerged is that NASA is no longer the place,
necessarily, where the people in universities are recommending
their best students go, and in fact, many of the best students
no longer do go there. And one of the reasons for that is
programs take so much longer. If you look at what has happened
with--I was the first chief scientist for the Space Station
Program. I came here in 1985 for that function, and left in
'87. I don't have to tell you where we are on that right now.
So, that is the kind of thing that if you are today's
youth, and by the way, today's youth, I think, as a professor
at Rice University, are--my experience and my colleagues'
experiences are that they are much more oriented toward quick
return. They are not as career-oriented as many of us were, so
I think the ability to attract young people is a much more
difficult challenge, and to keep them in the workforce, than it
was when we were growing up.
But I think it is important to do that, and Ms. Dawsey
points out the 400 kids working. The problem is, many of those
are associated with what is truly the sort of crown jewel of
NASA, the science programs. They are very excited, and they
come over, and that is great, and I don't think that should be
discouraged, but the shortage that the Committee noticed was
more in the systems engineering, project and program
management, and there are very few programs that NASA has to
bring youth in those areas. They are very strong in the science
areas, but not so strong in those areas, so I think if they are
going to truly address the shortages that they have, they need
to pay more attention to that aspect, as well.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Congressman Feeney. Thank you,
Dr. Black. I wanted to acknowledge that a contributing and a
very engaged Member of the Committee has joined us, Mr.
Melancon from Louisiana. I know at this time, he doesn't have
any questions and wants to learn from the panel, so at this
time, I will recognize the Member from Alabama, Mr. Bonner, and
we all envy Alabama's delegation, and its commitment to
aerospace and aeronautics, and the tremendous set of facilities
and operations they have down there. So, Congressman Bonner.
Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to each of
the panel members.
I am going to give you an unscripted question, because a
lot of times, we get questions given to us that we think we
need to put on the record. As a nation, we have often looked to
our President or to the head of NASA, or other leaders in the
field to set out a vision, and I think it is safe to say that
each of the four of you have a passion for NASA, and have a
passion for the mission of NASA. But as President Kennedy in
the 1960s, and as other Presidents in more recent years have
done, in describing their vision of where they would like NASA
to be in the 10, 15, 20 years in front of us, where would you
like to see NASA be? If you differ from what Congressman
Rohrabacher indicated President Bush's mission of taking us
back to the Moon, and possibly on to Mars, where would you
like, and this is not a loaded question.
I would just like to know from your experience, where would
you like to see NASA go in the next 20, 30 years? And it is
open to all four of you.
Future Vision for NASA
Mr. Stewart. Well, I think in fact, I think that the Vision
that President Bush set out is a pretty good one, and it is a
very challenging one. I mean, we have been talking this morning
as though this is going to be a piece of cake. Well, I mean,
given the realities of the budget situation that the Congress
faces, and given the realities of the existing NASA workforce,
and given the fact that one of the first things that
Administrator Griffin mentioned when he took responsibility for
that position was that he wanted to bring the core
responsibilities back into NASA. He wanted NASA to have the
expertise and the experience to take charge of developing the
various elements that are going to be needed to achieve the
Vision.
And that was exactly the right thing to say. I mean, that
was precisely on target, but it laid out a very daunting
agenda, because the fact is, and I think both our reports
indicate that, the expertise and the technical expertise that
is needed to do that does not currently exist in NASA to the
degree that it needs to if they are going to accomplish it. So,
that is why this workforce thing is so important.
And so, it is a challenging Vision that the President has
set out, and it is one that I think has it, I mean, you know,
the Shuttle has been, in many ways, a real triumph, in many
ways, a great tragedy, but because it never really went
anywhere, you know, it just went around in circles, so to
speak, it didn't have quite the same excitement associated with
the Apollo Program.
Well, that is going to change now. And I think when we are
actually another couple of years down the road, and the young
people of this country see, in fact, that we are going to go
back to the Moon, I think there is going to be a lot of them
who are going to get very excited about that, as they did
before, and I certainly hope that that is what happens. I think
it will, and that is--if we could achieve that, I would think
we would be--and don't forget, the Vision includes not stopping
at the Moon. And so, if you really take that seriously, you
have really got yourself an agenda.
Ms. Dawsey. Congressman, I agree with Mr. Stewart. I think
that the Vision set before us is an exciting Vision, and it is
where NASA should go.
I would like to say that our Administrator, Mike Griffin,
is doing his best to carry out that Vision. He has reorganized
NASA back to the, almost to look like the organization under,
during the Apollo era, and we are all tasked, Mike Griffin has
spoken very directly, as many of you may know, he is a very
open, direct person, and he has told us what he expects of us.
And yes, it is a daunting challenge, but I really feel
convinced that NASA is doing everything it can, given what
people are calling challenges in terms of budget and FTEs, but
what we have done in the past year is remarkable.
In terms of workforce planning, for example, I have talked
about a governance structure, but we took 75 separate systems
just in HR that didn't talk to one another, and we pulled them
together, to give the leadership an idea of who is working on
what, and when and where. We have a competency management
system that now is loaded with personal competencies, as well
as position competencies, and they are validated by supervisors
or expert panels. That system is married now with the Workforce
Information Management System, to show, the CMS shows supply,
the Workforce Information Management System shows demand, and
together, they are showing us where our gaps and surpluses are,
so that we can start building recruitment programs around
those.
The other thing that we are doing, in terms of setting,
making sure we are moving quickly enough and in the right
direction, is we have mapping plans of Shuttle to
Constellation, so again, we are watching that workforce, and
where we don't have, we have ceiling restrictions, when I
mentioned that we had 400 cooperative education students in
NASA, they are across all centers. They are in science and
engineering, and where most of the science funds are going are
to the graduate students, and yes, most of the money for the
graduate student program is science.
The other part of the problem is we do have a workforce
that has been at NASA a long time. People love NASA. It is an
exciting place to work. They come to work there, and it is
their career. They are not looking to move on. The newer
generation might be, but our experience so far is they want to
be there. So, we are putting in place really serious retraining
programs. We are developing program project management training
programs. We have engineering programs going. We are sending
people to colleges and universities, as well as doing internal
training. We have realized that we used to be ten centers, and
we realized that we need to be one NASA, and Mike Griffin is
really pushing that. So, when we look at the exploration
program, if work can be done at other centers, the work goes
there. And NASA has educated, intelligent engineers and
scientists in all ten of those centers, and so, we have been
really, really successful.
Two years ago, we had over 2,000 unfunded FTEs, we have
that down to 200 now, because we have moved work judiciously,
and we have reassigned people. We have offered buy-outs and
early outs to allow us to recruit, and over 1,300 people have
left, because we have that flexibility. It is very difficult to
explain how all of this is coming together. We are working very
hard on the institution side of the house to support the
program side of the house, and there are a lot of exciting
activities going on. And we also have updated----
Chairman Udall. Ms. Dawsey, if I might, the gentleman's
time has expired, and I appreciate your passion for the
subject, and if the other witnesses would like to comment for
the record on the question that Mr. Bonner directed, we would
be happy to accept those comments.
I want to make a comment and make an acknowledgment before
we recognize Dr. Wu. Congressman Bonner talked about unscripted
remarks. He is now in a very exclusive group, because
Congressman Rohrabacher never makes scripted remarks, to his
great credit.
I did want to acknowledge we were talking about heroes in
the Chinese society, and we have just been joined by a true
American hero, and that is Buzz Aldrin is here, sitting on the
front row, and we want to acknowledge the great Buzz Aldrin.
Thank you. Thank you for your service and your example, and we
are honored to have you here, sir.
I would be honored to yield five minutes to Congressman Wu.
Age Demographics of the NASA Workforce
Mr. Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
making me a doctor. I have really disappointed my parents by
not going down, further down that road. But I am making up for
it today.
Ms. Dawsey, perhaps I will give you an opportunity to
follow up on the answer that you were making, and I am asking
this question just based on anecdotal evidence, personal
experience of visiting three or four NASA centers, and
attending several lectures of folks who were with the Mercury,
Gemini, and Apollo Programs, and these were active
participants. If you did the arithmetic, you sort of thought oh
my gosh, you know, these are folks who were in their early to
mid 30s when they were in charge of major parts of the program.
That is one information set, if you will, and then, during
my walkthroughs, and this could be anecdotal and not accurate,
it could be because of the people I was with, and what I was
looking at, but it sure seemed to me like, and I hate to use
the term old, because these were folks about my age, maybe
slightly older, maybe slightly younger, but there were a whole
bunch of folks who were sort of longer in the tooth, like me,
than coming to the younger age groups, there seem to be
precipitous dive-downs statistically, and then, as you get to
the youngest of the professional groups, or out in the assembly
areas, there might be a little blip of younger people. But
there seem to be a real collection of people at the older end
of the spectrum, and then, at least as a significant valley of
people in the in between range, and a shortage of younger
people.
And I just, when I observe that, and this was, you know,
over a period of a few years, and I have not been back in the
last 12 months or so, at least, I have a concern in the back of
my head about whether we have the right, whether we will have
the right personnel mix to accomplish the missions that have
been set out for us, and it is not that you don't learn a lot,
get better at things, as one hopes, also, as one gets older,
but I am just wondering about the age distribution of the
workforce that we have today, as compared to the early
exploration phases that NASA engaged in, whether that has
something to do with NASA budgets, whether that has something
to do with the competitive arena that you all are engaged in,
with the private sector or others, and I would like to just
turn it over to you and the rest of the panel to address that
as best you can.
Ms. Dawsey. I will try to keep my response shorter. One of
the reasons that what you observed is true is NASA has always
worked hard not to conduct reductions in force, and in the
'90s, when there was major downsizing across government, NASA,
attrited through natural attrition, and did not conduct
reductions in force when most other government agencies did.
So, that is why you see that gap in the middle.
As I said, when we are able to hire, we are trying to hire
to fill that, to do the succession management kind of hiring,
so that we have people who are filling in the middle group, and
bringing in younger students. We recognize we do have an issue,
and we are working to address it.
One of the ways we are addressing it is we are having
different--Constellation is relatively new, and we are just
finishing the systems requirements, and the systems
requirements reviews this month, and we are going to do a
program baseline synchronization following that, and that will
show, give us a better idea of what the new requirements are
for Constellation and where we need to direct our recruiting,
and so, that is another effort to know what kinds of skills and
when we can start hiring to fill those skills, those skill
needs.
Mr. Wu. Thank you. Would any of the other panelists like to
make a comment?
Mr. Stewart. You are right about the age distribution and
so on. It is very striking, and a good part of this is due to
the fact that in the '90s, there was a job freeze in most areas
of NASA, and it was very difficult to deal with that, and there
weren't any fresh outs coming in in several of those years. And
I was on the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel in those years,
and we wrote specific reports on the safety implications of not
having adequate workforce dealing with the Space Shuttle, and
it got to be 2000, 2001, those restrictions were relaxed, and
we could begin to hire young people and so on.
But there are going on in NASA today, and we talk about it
in our report, various experiments, which are very
encouraging--let me see if I can get the right title on it--the
Contracting Intern Program--which has been done in the Office
of Procurement, to go out and find young people, bring them in,
circulate them around through the centers, so they don't get a
headquarters mentality, has been very successful.
There are a number of examples in other federal agencies,
which we talk about in our report, that I think NASA could
usefully adopt, and not at any great additional funding, none
of these are going to cost more money, but there are examples,
and I think the panel agrees, I don't agree with much of what
Dr. Stone said, let me say, but I do agree that we have got to
get more young people in.
Chairman Udall. Mr. Stewart, thank you. The gentleman's
time has expired. We have just had a series of votes called,
but I think we will try and get another round from the Chairman
and from the Ranking Member, if you all would be willing to
stay, and then, we will have to adjourn the hearing.
Workforce Implementation Plan
Ms. Dawsey, you stated that NASA has a Workforce
Implementation Plan to accompany the Workforce Strategy. Does
that plan have specific objective, steps to achieve those
objectives, specific milestones and resources requirements, and
if not, why not, and would you please either way, provide the
Implementation Plan to the Subcommittee?
Ms. Dawsey. Yes, I think it is on, the Implementation Plan
is on its way to the Subcommittee, if you don't already have
it. It was requested on Monday, so you may have it by now.
The Workforce Implementation Plan is very comprehensive. I
mentioned the three goals that we had, and each of those goals
has three objectives, but the total is 150 tasks to implement
the strategy.
Chairman Udall. Does it have timetables and milestones?
Ms. Dawsey. Yes, it has timetables and milestones, and we
have an automatic tracking system, and the automatic tracking
system shows the milestones, the metrics, timetables, and the
leads. And it is agency-wide, we have--some of our centers are
some of the leads on the projects, on the tasks.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, and we look forward to reviewing
that plan when you send it over to us. Thank you.
Dr. Black, the National Academies report notes that it is
critical to maintain in-house scientific competence to provide
leadership and to maintain expertise in specialty areas that
are not broadly practiced in universities and industry. Would
you elaborate on that point?
Importance of In-house Scientists at NASA
Dr. Black. You know, the in-house scientists at NASA play a
very special role. They provide the linkage with the project
and the science objectives of the missions. They help translate
the requirements. They are, in a sense, the guardians of the
sciences, as the trades need to be made, and as the mission
goes forward.
And these are the kinds of activities that typically
university people do not have the time or the inclination to
stay involved with. So, it is very important that NASA maintain
a core scientific expertise with people who have the ability to
work with the projects, work with the engineers, to make sure
that the projects are being done in a way that really realizes
the scientific objectives that are set out. And so, these are
the kinds of skills, if I understand your question, that we
think that it is important to maintain inside the Agency.
We did remark in our report that it would probably be
worthwhile at least doing a head count, and see whether, in
fact, all of the scientists associated with NASA need to still
be involved that way, but that is a separate issue.
Chairman Udall. In the couple of minutes I have remaining,
anybody else on the panel want to comment on that particular
question? Mr. Stewart.
Mr. Stewart. Well, somewhere before the hearing is over, I
want to just say clearly for the record, that I think Dr. Stone
has seriously mischaracterized the NAPA report, and I take real
exception to some of the things that he said. I just want to
get that on the record. For example, nowhere in our report do
we talk about BRAC commission. It just isn't there. I mean, we
talk about the fact that there ought to be a systematic
methodology for looking at the centers, for matching the
responsibilities of the centers to the workforce that they
have, and providing the flexibility and tools that are
necessary to get the right people to the right place at the
right time.
The Senate Appropriations Committee, when they asked us to
do this report, I don't think anticipated that we were going to
come back to them and say well, you know what, folks, what you
need to do is appropriate more money. I don't think that was
what they had in mind when they gave us that assignment. We
didn't get into the issue of what the NASA budget ought to be.
That was not our assignment. Our assignment was how do you make
a flexible, scalable workforce a reality in NASA, given the
tasks that they have to accomplish, and the budget restraints
that are part of their world, and we have attempted to do that.
And if one reads the report carefully, you will see we are
saying you need data, you need data at the right places, you
need data that is integrated. You need mechanisms, and we have
provided several, that will help you make sense out of that
data, and then, you need the tools that you can then act on
that data. That is essentially what the report is all about.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Mr. Stewart, and you can
certainly submit additional testimony on that line of thinking.
Mr. Stewart. I think we will.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Stone, you want the last 38 seconds?
Dr. Stone. Just check the PDF file and do a search for
BRAC. You will find it.
Chairman Udall. Let me turn, at this time, to the gentleman
from Florida for the final round of questioning. Mr. Feeney.
Mr. Feeney. Well, thank you. Again, I want to thank
Chairman Udall, and we have to run off, and we have got a
series of about eight votes, so this will probably be the end,
so that you guys can go to lunch, and we can get about our
business.
Ratio of Permanent and Nonpermanent Civil Servants
I focused earlier on the need to recruit youth, whether
directly in NASA, or DOD, or the aerospace community, that are
excited about this, and now, I want to address a question that
Dr. Stone has raised and Mr. Stewart has raised, and that is
the question of what the proper balance is, being the strategy
that Ms. Dawsey described, talks about a more appropriate blend
of permanent and nonpermanent civil servants.
And I guess I would like very briefly, because we only have
a few minutes, I think I know Dr. Stone's answer here, but I
would like to have the, maybe he can address this very quickly,
but then the others. What is the proper ratio? How do we
determine that, and for Ms. Dawsey, who I guess we will let
finish up, how is NASA going to make these judgments and
decisions about who ought to be permanent, as opposed--who
ought to be nonpermanent civil servants.
Dr. Stone, you want to start?
Dr. Stone. Just briefly. As I said in the beginning of my
opening statement, there were 36,000 NASA civil servant
employees the last time we went to the Moon, and we went there
successfully. And now, we have only 16,300 permanent, full-time
civil servants left.
And rather than give a long answer right now, I would just
encourage the Subcommittee Members to take a look at the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board and their advice on this
topic, because I think there is a detailed analysis done by an
objective panel about the role of over-outsourcing technical
responsibilities to the private sector, and undermining the
internal technical abilities of the agencies, and that
contribution to the Columbia disaster, and I think that
analysis is thorough, and that would give you an idea of what
our concerns are. I can't give you a magic number, but I think
when you look at the situation today, and you look at the graph
that I showed you up there, the biggest problem facing NASA
today is not to reduce its civil service workforce, and so, the
obsession with this is a little bit troubling, considering that
is not what the big problem is.
And secondly, in one of the responses made earlier by Mr.
Stewart, he said that the problem of recruiting young people
was only in the '90s, but if you take a look at the graph, half
of that fivefold reduction in the employees between 30 and 35
was between 1993 and 2000, and the other half of it was between
2000 and 2005. So, all I am saying is we are not hiring young
civil servants, and the few young civil servants that we are
hiring, we are hiring into term positions, which are much less
attractive than the positions that were open to young people
when I was looking at the Agency.
Mr. Feeney. We are running out of time very quickly. Dr.
Black and Mr. Stewart.
Dr. Black. I just want to know if I get hazardous duty pay
for sitting between these two.
No, I don't really have that much to add. I think it is,
the only thing I would say here is that, do not fall into the
trap of just looking at a simple curve or two, and listening to
numbers about how many are in this bin or in that bin. This is
a far more complex issue than that, and to look at the dynamics
of how you get people in, as I said earlier, to look at the
differing timescales for the sources and sinks of these people,
understanding the evolution of this workforce is a very, very
daunting problem, and I don't think we have our arms anywhere
near yet around how to do that.
Mr. Feeney. Mr. Stewart.
Mr. Stewart. You can't give a precise ratio off the top of
your head. It is a position by position decision that the
hiring authority has to make, and it is the nature of the
position, the nature of the responsibilities that person would
hold, along with a number of other factors, and we have a very
precise decision guide in our report that will help managers
make that decision in a coherent, rational way.
In some cases, a term employee fits the position very well.
In other cases, the term employee would not be a good decision,
but you have to make that in a kind of rational way, and not
just sort of grab something out of the air, and what we have
tried to do here is to provide a mechanism for doing that in a
rational and coherent way, and if that is done, we think that
the actual ratio will take care of itself.
Mr. Feeney. Ms. Dawsey, you have got about 10, 20 seconds.
Ms. Dawsey. Okay, first of all, using term appointments is
not for the purpose of attriting civil servants. The purpose of
the term appointment is to look at work that is changing over
the next 20 years, and making sure, as Mr. Stewart said, that
the position dictates the type of appointment. Term
appointments are for two years initially, but can be extended
up to six years, and with our new term flexibility, we can
convert without further competition to permanent if we, in
fact, still need the skills. Right now, we have a skills mix
issue that using term appointments will help us prevent in the
future.
Chairman Udall. Thank you. We are in a bit of a hurry, so
you will understand as we depart quickly, but I want to thank
the panel particularly, and for the very forthright and
impassioned conversation we have had. And Dr. Black, you can
apply for hazard pay at the site office. But I think that as a
service we all care deeply about NASA. We have a passion for
its future, and we also have great pride in what it has
accomplished, and that is the point of the hearing, and the
point of your all's appearance.
If there is no objection, the record will remain open for
additional statements from the Members, and for answers to any
follow-up questions the Subcommittee may ask of you all, the
witnesses. Without objection, so ordered.
The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
<SKIP PAGES = 000>
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Toni Dawsey, Assistant Administrator, Human Capital
Management; Chief Human Capital Officer, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. What are the critical milestones for NASA's workforce planning
over the next few years, and do you anticipate any difficulties in
reaching those milestones?
A1. The single most critical milestone for NASA's workforce planning
over the next few years is the end of the Shuttle Program in 2010. As
the new Constellation Program begins, NASA is shifting from a primary
mode of operating and sustaining two major legacy systems, to a period
of concurrent development of several new systems, and then to a period
of transitioning from exploration back to operations. Operations
personnel will be critical elements of developmental design, testing,
and verification activities for Orion and Ares I initially. Once
operational, the next developmental iteration of Ares V, the Earth
Departure Stage, and the Lunar Surface Access Module will begin,
thereby concurrently driving the need for a substantial developmental
workforce. Thus, the NASA paradigm must shift more than once over the
next few years. First, toward our new focus on development, and then to
operations cycles that allow the Vision laid out in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005 to be fully executed on the schedule and
funding profile outlined by the President and Congress. NASA's
overarching goal is to preserve its critical skill base, ensure the
viability of its core competencies, and execute the bold missions
assigned to the Agency--this will be challenging, dynamic, and
evolutionary. The major milestones for workforce planning related to
transition are tied to the design milestones for the Constellation
program (including initial operational capability for the Orion/Crew
Exploration Vehicle currently planned for March 2015) as well as the
retirement of the Shuttle program in 2010. NASA will evaluate these
milestones, and revise them as appropriate, as part of the annual
Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution process.
Workforce and critical skills must be retained for safe execution
of the remaining Shuttle missions, managed appropriately during the
transition to ensure that the new developmental program workforce
requirements are met, and engaged during the period following Shuttle
retirement in 2010 prior to initial operational capability of the
Orion/Crew Exploration Vehicle. For those elements of our new
spacecraft systems that are based upon heritage Shuttle hardware or
existing designs, the skill set requirements will be directly
transferable to the new programs. In other cases, some of our workforce
will have to shift roles, jobs, and possibly duty locations as the
needs of the new programs require. The inherently more efficient design
of the new systems will result in a need for fewer direct operations,
support, and processing skills. Thus, some of the operations-focused
workforce will be leveraged and shifted to more development-focused
activities such as planning, design, testing and verification, and
integration in order to build a workforce capacity that enables future
developmental cycles spanning the transition from initial Ares I/Crew
Launch Vehicle and Orion capability, to development and fielding of
Ares V, Earth Departure Stage, Lunar Surface Access Module, Lunar
Outpost, and then to systems that will take America to Mars.
NASA plans to maintain this vital workforce and experience through
final fly out of the Shuttle through: applying some of the new
processes required for the new Ares and Orion vehicles to Space Shuttle
processing in order to give workers the skills and hands-on experience
they need to qualify for future work; non-monetary award based
strategies; financial incentives when necessary; conversion to
temporary and term appointments; and solid leadership. In addition,
NASA is developing integrated workforce requirements across the
Shuttle, International Space Station and Constellation programs. This
will help with scenario planning, identification of gaps and overlaps
in skills availability, and further refinement of the workforce
profile. All of these steps will ensure we maintain the proper
workforce for continued safe operations.
Q2. Your testimony notes that ``with an enhanced workforce planning
capability, NASA will be able to determine the demand for, and supply
of workforce skills based on current and projected work requirements.''
What is the timetable for having the enhanced workforce planning
capability, and how are decisions on workforce being made in the
meantime?
A2. NASA's workforce planning capability is being enhanced in two key
areas: (1) the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution (PPBE)
process; and, (2) the improvement of the quality of planning data used
to determine gaps between workforce supply and demand.
As explained more fully in the response to Question for the Record
number nine below, workforce planning at NASA is programmatically
driven through the PPBE process. Formulation of the FY 2009 budget is
the first time that NASA is fully integrating workforce planning into
the PPBE process. FY 2009 budget formulation is currently in process,
and the impact of enhanced workforce planning integration is already
being seen as workforce analysis drives Agency mission and work
distribution planning. In addition to the normal PPBE data collection,
the Agency is using the NASA Workforce Integrated Management System to
improve its ability to track and manage the Available for New Work pool
(uncovered capacity; i.e., civil service employees at NASA that are not
currently assigned or supporting Agency programs) through new data
collection formats.
NASA plans to complete several efforts to improve the quality of
workforce planning data for use outside of the budget process by the
end of the calendar year. One important initiative is the development
of a Strategic Workforce Management Model which will be an Agency-wide
``FTE demand'' (i.e., the anticipated long-term need for workforce FTE,
to accomplish funded programs and projects) model to be used in
workforce planning activities. In addition, NASA is holding Agency-wide
capability assessment forums to further refine the Agency's workforce
planning picture. Finally, the Agency is now evaluating several
modeling, simulation and analytical tools in an effort to better
capture system dynamics and requirements-driven workforce and skill-mix
forecasting.
Q3. The National Academies report recommends that NASA increase
opportunities for younger workers to obtain hands-on flight development
experience through NASA's sub-orbital programs. The report also
suggests that NASA fund these hands-on training opportunities through
the Education Office. Does NASA have any plans for adopting this
recommendation and has it been discussed with NASA's Education Office?
A3. Experience has shown that exciting and compelling NASA missions
truly can inspire the next generation of explorers, innovators, and
leaders. NASA's unique program content, people, and facilities can be
leveraged to spark interest, capture imaginations, and guide students
toward careers in STEM fields while increasing their scientific and
technologic literacy to the benefit of the Nation.
A top priority for the new management of NASA's Science Mission
Directorate (SMD) is to provide greater hands-on development and flight
opportunities as a way to prepare undergraduate and graduate students
in science and engineering to lead larger missions in the future.
Through NASA's suborbital sounding rocket, balloon, and aircraft
research programs, as well as flight projects, SMD is currently
conducting a comprehensive study of student hands-on opportunities to
better prepare new scientists and engineers in the scientific
exploration of space through a Student Collaboration Definition Team.
This team was established to: 1) explore best practices in project-
based learning exemplifying the nature of NASA's scientific exploration
in space; 2) explore additional learning opportunities of a similar
character that is not part of a flight missions; and, 3) provide
opportunities for input from the community engaged with SMD. This team
held its first meeting in early May 2007. A white paper is under
development and a community workshop will be held at the end of 2007 or
early 2008. The sub-orbital research programs continue their
involvement of students in relevant authentic research opportunities.
In addition, four new sounding rocket payloads were recently selected
for flight, with research launches planned between 2008 and 2010.
NASA's Office of Education in collaboration with the Agency's four
Mission Directorates provides additional opportunities for students to
engage in NASA mission related experiences. For example, within SMD, a
broad spectrum of education activities are sponsored ranging from
kindergarten to postgraduate levels. All of NASA's science missions and
programs are required to have an education and public outreach
component. Through a competitive, peer-review selection process, NASA
provides funding dedicated to education and public outreach to
researchers. NASA also sponsors graduate and post-doctoral fellowship
opportunities. In addition, the Agency is looking for new ways to
provide increased opportunities for students to gain greater experience
developing and launching their own science instruments, either in
conjunction with science missions or through its sub-orbital rocket and
balloon programs.
Examples of successful collaborations include:
<bullet> Launched in January 2006 as part of the New Horizons
Mission, the Student Dust Counter is the first student-built
instrument selected by NASA to fly on a planetary mission.
Built by students at the University of Colorado at Boulder, the
counter will monitor the density of dust grains in space. This
data is of particular interest to researchers. Given the nine-
year travel time, discoveries from this mission will engage
today's elementary school student until college when this
spacecraft encounters Pluto.
<bullet> Aeronomy of Ice in the Mesosphere (AIM) began its
two-year mission on April 25, 2007, after a flawless ride to
Earth orbit aboard an Orbital Sciences Pegasus XL rocket. AIM
is the first mission dedicated to exploring mysterious ice
clouds that dot the edge of space in Earth's Polar Regions.
With AIM, Hampton University in Virginia has become the first
Historically Black College and University to lead a NASA
satellite mission. Undergraduate and graduate students from
various STEM disciplines will have an opportunity to join
faculty researchers in the analysis of collected data.
<bullet> On February 17, 2007, NASA launched five Time History
of Events and Macroscale Interactions during Substorms (THEMIS)
micro-satellites to study the Earth's magnetosphere. THEMIS
will help scientists understand how and why space storms create
havoc on satellites, power grids, and communication systems.
Students will work with scientists to unravel a variety of
scientific mysteries.
<bullet> Between the International Space Station, the Space
Shuttle, sounding rockets and high altitude balloons, NASA's
Education Flight Projects provide hands-on experiences to
inspire and motivate students to pursue studies and careers in
STEM through participation in NASA research applications. NASA
is using its unique assets like the C-9 better known as ``The
Vomit Comet'' to allow students to study microgravity. The
Agency is launching student experiments more than 25 miles
above the Earth on sounding rockets. And NASA astronauts make
phone calls from 240 miles above Earth's atmosphere to students
to involve them in current research aboard the International
Space Station. All these opportunities take advantage of NASA's
flight hardware projects provide real, hands-on experiences to
inspire the minds, imaginations, and career ambitions of
America's young people.
<bullet> NASA's support of higher education students is
embodied by the National Space Grant College and Fellowship
Program, which continues to provide fellowships and
scholarships to students across the country. Recent statistics
show that, of the pool of students who completed their degrees,
31 percent were employed in STEM careers and 48 percent
continued their education to the Master's, Ph.D., or
postdoctoral levels. Many consortia have implemented hands-on,
university student-led projects in aeronautics, rocketry,
scientific ballooning, rocketry, and nano- and micro-satellite
development. These types of projects provide the professional
training that enable students to be fully prepared to enter the
STEM workforce.
<bullet> NASA, in collaborations with the International Space
Education Board (ISEB), is increasing science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics literacy and enhancing future
workforce needs with the development of Global Education Ground
Station Network. The network will serve the interest of all
universities wishing to launch small satellites, by providing
near continuous ground station coverage for all educational
satellites. NASA is funding California Polytechnic University
(Cal Poly) to collaboratively develop software in support of
the Global Educational Ground Station Network. The software
will schedule passes autonomously, monitor for errors, perform
error correction, prioritize utilization, etc. The network is
to be developed by students for students.
<bullet> The Office of Education is sponsoring one Science,
Engineering, Mathematics and Aerospace Academy (SEMAA) team to
participate in ARLISS (A Rocket Launch for International
Student Satellites). ARLISS is designed to provide an
educational experience to students in the design, flight, and
data analysis of a space experiment (an experiment housed in a
coke can). This program is to prepare students for an exciting,
technical challenge that may lead to launching space
experiments into low-Earth orbits and beyond. University
aeronautics/astronautics students, high school students,
robotic clubs, and hobbyists get together each year to fly
their satellite projects in rockets supplied by Aero-pac.
Stanford University and others around the world sponsor this
project.
Q4. According to the list of NASA workforce competencies provided in
the National Academies report, there are 106 NASA workers with
competency in astronomy and astrophysics, eight with competency in
hydrological science, 36 in air traffic systems, and so on. How is NASA
making decisions about how many individuals are needed to maintain core
competencies in science and aeronautics areas?
A4. The NASA centers use the Agency's Workforce Integrated Management
System (WIMS) to plan the individuals and competencies required for
future work elements. WIMS aggregates the numerical data expressing
workforce requirements for each center. Center management reviews this
planning data and makes adjustments as necessary, including adjustments
to the size of specific workforce components. Each center is the focus
for specific key capabilities required for the overall NASA mission,
including space flight, aeronautics and science capabilities. Through
the annual budget process, centers work with Headquarters in making
decisions that affect the workforce strength available in the future to
provide key capabilities.
Q5a. With respect to the ``Ten Healthy Centers'' component of NASA's
Workforce strategy, Dr. Black questions whether the Centers will have
the appropriate staff to handle work that is sent to the Centers. Mr.
Stewart raises concerns about how NASA plans to measure the health of
its Centers. What are NASA's current plans for implementing the ``Ten
Healthy Centers'' approach?
A5a. NASA has implemented and intends to maintain the ``Ten Healthy
Centers'' approach.
Q5b. What criteria is NASA using to evaluate the health of its
Centers?
A5b. An essential attribute of a healthy center is a skilled and
flexible blended workforce with sufficient depth and breadth to meet
the Agency's challenges. Recognizing that NASA must be able to assess
the capability (or ``health'') of its workforce to meet mission goals,
the Agency recently developed six measures of workforce capability that
are being used to monitor multiple dimensions of workforce health at
the centers and identify areas of misalignment. These measures are:
scalability, skill availability and access, performance and
proficiency, sufficiency, sustainability, and utilization. They are
defined below.
<bullet> Scalability: Extent to which a center is able to
adjust the number of FTE (civil service employees) and WYE
(contractor employees) of different types quickly enough to
meet changes in workforce demand within an anticipated range of
future work.
<bullet> Skill Availability and Access: Extent to which a
center has access to needed competencies at an acceptable
quality level for range of anticipated work.
<bullet> Performance and Proficiency: Extent to which civil
service and contractor performance is (or is anticipated to be)
reliable for range of work--particularly with work that is new,
high risk or inflexible in terms of schedule or cost.
<bullet> Sufficiency: Degree to which a center has sufficient
capacity, appropriate skill mix, and competence within the
civil service workforce to fulfill management and oversight
responsibilities.
<bullet> Sustainability: Extent to which a center has
sufficient ``bench strength'' over time to sustain appropriate
level of internal capacity in key business, technical, and
managerial positions to grow in-house skills and replace
workforce as they move up or out.
<bullet> Utilization: Degree to which civil service workforce
is used efficiently to perform the work of the center, in terms
of ``coverage'' of workforce by budgeted FTE dollars as well as
efficient and effective use of staff to funded work.
Associated with each measure are qualitative and/or quantitative
indicators (including demographic patterns, refresh rates, attrition
patterns, career development paths) that each center uses to assess its
workforce relative to that measure. The measures can be used
individually to describe specific areas of misalignment, but are
intended to operate as a set to demonstrate the overall ``health'' (or
capability) of a center's workforce and indicate potential tradeoffs
that may be necessary to meet particular workforce objectives.
It is important for the Agency to identify potential misalignments
sufficiently early that there is adequate lead time to develop and
implement effective strategies to correct the misalignments. For that
reason, we have integrated this assessment process with the annual
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. The objective
is to have centers provide information to the Agency regarding the
capability of their workforce over the budget planning horizon using a
consistent and systematic approach.
Q6. How are decisions currently being made on whether NASA projects
should be conducted by in-house civil servants or by contractors?
A6. NASA has a policy directive in place to address distinguishing
between contractor and civil service functions. NASA also has
identified specific activities that it has determined to be vital to
keep in house. These include: strategic guidance, oversight,
fundamental decision-making, sustaining program momentum, retention of
institutional memory, decisions about cost trade-offs, and
architectural understanding. Decisions regarding whether projects
should be conducted by in-house civil servants or by contractors are
made within the framework of the NASA Strategic Acquisition Approach.
During acquisition strategy planning, leadership considers issues such
as alignment with the Agency Strategic Plan and the NASA Ten Healthy
Centers policy. Prior to acquisition or to partnership commitments,
Acquisition Strategy Meetings are held to validate make-buy rationales
and to make final make-buy decisions.
Q6a. How does NASA determine whether it has the right level of in-
house expertise to make ``smart-buyer'' decisions?
A6a. Assuring ``smart-buyer'' capability is inherent in Agency and
center leadership's responsibility to manage NASA's multi-sector
workforce. It is inextricably linked with responsible institutional and
technical management practiced at NASA. Several major Agency-level
processes come together to ensure that NASA has the right level of in-
house expertise to make ``smart-buyer'' decisions. Within the
acquisition process, NASA leadership at both the Agency and center
level work together in the Strategic Acquisition Approach to make sure
that all pertinent considerations (such as key activities and Agency
strategy and policy described above) are taken into account in
determining which work to contract out and which to perform in-house.
Within the budget process, the Agency makes decisions about the
assignment of work to centers such that risk to the long term viability
of centers and their ``smartbuyer'' capability is minimized and center
health assured. Within the human capital process, recruitment, staffing
and development actions are undertaken continually to improve NASA's
``smart-buyer'' capability.
Q6b. Does NASA plan to use the tools for decisions about the mix of
contractors and civil servants in NASA projects provided in the NAPA
report?
A6b. It is important to note that NAPA's eight major categories of
critical importance in deciding whether to hire a civil servant or use
a contractor are not conceptually new to NASA. Considerations of
Function, Resources, Workload, Labor Market, Accountability, Risk,
Quality/Service Level, and Employment/Flexibility are already part of
NASA's decision-making. What is new about NAPA's NASA Civil Servant-
Contractor Decision-Making Guide is its quantitative approach to using
the scoring and rating of multiple criteria within each category to
drive Agency make-buy decisions. NASA is currently in the process of
coordinating analysis and evaluation of NAPA's Guide to determine how
it may be incorporated into Agency practice.
Q7. Your testimony refers to the creation of a Workforce Planning
Governance Structure. How often does this group meet and could you
please provide some examples of the types of decisions that they are
making?
A7. The Workforce Planning Governance Structure, established to
strengthen NASA's human capital strategic planning capability, has
representation from the Agency's human resources community, mission
directorates, other mission support offices, and the NASA centers. The
governance process will be used to align the Agency's resources in a
manner that ensures the effective utilization of the workforce and the
skills needed to accomplish the Agency's mission. The focus will be on
increasing the level of integration and collaboration across workforce
planning functions, improving the quality of information used to make
decisions, and balancing short- and long-term planning needs.
There are three main components of the Governance Structure: the
Agency Governance Group, a Workforce Planning Technical Team, and other
issue-specific ad hoc technical teams that are formed as needed.
The Agency Governance Group is responsible for surfacing high-risk
issues and recommendations to senior management, evaluating the results
of planning activities, monitoring the progress of the operational
groups, and developing workforce planning capabilities.
The Workforce Planning Technical Team is a standing, on-going group
that implements workforce planning guidance and policies; helps develop
and implement center workforce planning capabilities; and assists in
collecting data in support of workforce activities undertaken by the
team. It is the hub of workforce planning information collection,
distribution, analysis, and reporting across NASA.
The ad hoc technical teams are formed to deal with specific issues.
Their purpose is limited to the issue they are tasked with solving,
with a defined scope and timeline.
The Workforce Planning Technical Team is the element that meets
regularly to address important workforce issues facing the Agency and
to develop strategies to address the issues. It is not the group that
makes the key decisions for the Agency; instead, it functions as a
working, representative team that studies significant workforce issues
and provides information, data, and recommendations to Agency senior
management to consider. This team held its first meeting in mid-
February and meets (via telecon) every two weeks. This group has
focused on a number of significant workforce planning initiatives over
the past four months, including:
<bullet> establishing a greatly improved process for
identifying the Available for New Work (uncovered capacity)
segment of the workforce to facilitate finding solutions to
mitigate the problem; and,
<bullet> ensuring that centers understand the new ``Measures
of Workforce Capability'' adopted by the Agency to assess
workforce health at the centers so that the information centers
provide will generate valuable insights into the workforce
challenges they face, enabling Agency leadership to identify
the actions needed to strengthen and sustain workforce health.
Q8a. At the June 13, 2006, Subcommittee hearing, you testified that
NASA had reduced its uncovered capacity through retraining, job fairs,
and buy-outs, among other measures. What is the current status of
NASA's uncovered capacity and how does NASA track who is uncovered and
by how much?
A8a. As stated in the NASA response to Questions for the Record number
two above and number nine below the Agency plans individuals to
programs and projects at one tenth of an FTE level by program and
project at the work breakdown (WBS) level by name in the current year
and next two years in the Agency Workforce Integrated Management System
(WIMS). WIMS identifies which of the workforce is not fully assigned to
a WBS and by how much.
NASA's level of Available for New Work has been reduced to less
than 100 FTE in FY 2008, an amount that is historically manageable as
it is owed primarily to normal starting and stopping of tasks or
projects. The success in reducing the level of uncovered capacity is
due primarily to assigning Constellation Program work to every NASA
center so that all centers are vested in the space exploration mission.
While NASA still has skill mix imbalances at the centers the Agency
continues to address those through early out/buy-out measures.
Q8b. At last year's hearing, you noted that NASA had established
retraining programs lasting several months at research Centers to allow
staff to develop the skills needed to handle new work sent to the
Centers. What is the result of those training programs and how are you
assessing the effectiveness of those programs?
A8b. Many NASA centers have initiatives in place to ensure they have
employees in place with the skills necessary to take on Constellation
work. The retraining efforts predominantly focus on program and project
management and systems engineering. Many of these initiatives are in
their infancy, with identified employees still working on competency
and skills development. NASA's Academy for Program Project and
Engineering Leadership, which provides the bulk of this type of
training within the Agency, conducted over 1,600 instances of related
training in FY 2006. Training instances in FY 2007 will exceed last
year's number.
NASA's Langley Research Center (LaRC) in Virginia has begun a
program of retraining that includes technicians. LaRC has also offered
open enrollment courses on program management. In addition, LaRC has
begun a series on program management and exploration which consists of
courses, mentoring, projects, and details to other centers. To date,
the participants have completed all the course work and are scheduling
other aspects of the curriculum. NASA's Glenn Research Center in Ohio
has recently begun its second class of systems engineering. They are
conducting a mid-point evaluation of the first class and will make
needed adjustments. Program effectiveness will eventually be assessed
by engineering and project management feedback.
In addition, other centers have transition teams in place to manage
retraining efforts. NASA's Johnson Space Center in Texas has
established an Engineering Academy designed to provide a comprehensive
training program for the next generation of engineers. This effort will
prove especially useful to those engineers currently supporting the
Space Shuttle Program, as they gain knowledge & training in design and
development competencies. NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida
centralized all day-to-day engineering functions into a new Engineering
Directorate in October 2006. The realignment effort will enable them to
more efficiently and effectively utilize current engineering skills and
resources as well as position themselves to be prepared for meeting
Constellation workforce and skills requirements. NASA's Marshall Space
Flight Center in Alabama has created a Shuttle Transition Team that is
heavily engaged with human resources staff to define skill gaps,
recruitment and retraining strategies.
Not all of the research centers have been conducting retraining.
NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center in California, for example, was
able to hire within the past year. Individuals were selected with the
needed skill set to support the Center's Constellation work.
The centers are working to ensure that they have the necessary
competencies and skill sets to support the Vision for Exploration. They
have positioned themselves well as the workforce plan more sharply
focuses on the competencies needed for the Agency's future.
Q9a. Your testimony states that NASA has ``integrated and synchronized
workforce planning with the development of program and project
budgets.'' Could you please describe in concrete terms how workforce
planning is integrated with programs and with project budgets?
A9a. NASA utilizes the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution
(PPBE) process as an Agency-wide methodology for aligning resources in
a comprehensive, top-down approach that supports the Agency's vision
and mission. It focuses on translating Agency strategy, priorities and
planned outcomes into actionable programs. Workforce planning at NASA
is programmatically driven through this budget process. The preparation
of the FY 2009 budget is the first year that we have fully integrated
workforce planning into the PPBE process through all phases.
Several of the annual PPBE process milestones incorporate workforce
planning: (1) Both the Strategic Program Guidance and the Program and
Resource Guidance incorporate workforce planning policy guidance; (2)
Interim snapshots of workforce distribution data inform all of the
milestones within the programming phase of PPBE; (3) The Institutional
Infrastructure Analysis includes the evaluation of qualitative
Workforce Measures of Capability (e.g., sustainability, scalability,
etc.) and quantitative workforce planning data focused on areas of
concern collected from the NASA centers; (4) Workforce data and
analysis informs make-buy decisions made under NASA's new Strategic
Acquisition Approach, as well as final Programming decisions; and, (5)
Outputs of the PPBE Programming phase include a comprehensive plan for
work and workforce distribution for the current and next five fiscal
years.
Data collection, tracking and reporting for PPBE workforce planning
is managed through the NASA Workforce Integrated Management System
(WIMS). Within WIMS, the supply of current and planned civil servants
is aligned with planned program-based work demand and funding sources.
WIMS outputs include a workforce plan that ties each employee (to the
1/10 of an FTE level) to a specific project work breakdown structure
(WBS) element for the current and next two years. For the following
three years, FTE-competencies are planned by WBS. Because of these
plans, each NASA center understands how many FTEs and what type of FTE
is funded for the various projects assigned to it, and it can plan its
human capital programs accordingly.
Q9b. Prior to this integration, how were workforce decisions made with
respect to program developments and project budgets?
A9b. Prior to the implementation of the Planning, Programming, Budget
and Execution (PPBE) process, there was a greater separation between
budget planning and workforce planning. The processes were more
sequential, with workforce planning being secondary. Budget decisions
were made first, and these drove workforce planning. In recent years,
key aspects of budget planning and workforce planning take place
concurrently. NASA's implementation of full cost accounting has shed
light on the workforce impacts of what previously might have been
understood as primarily budget decisions. Currently, analysis of the
workforce frequently influences and even drives budget and mission
planning decisions; for example, in determining at what NASA center
work packages will be directed.
Q10a. Your testimony notes that ``Competencies are the common thread
that tie the elements of workforce management together. CMS is a
relatively new system that we are continually working to improve. By
integrating CMS with other workforce planning tools, we are able to not
only identify, the critical current and future competency gaps and
surpluses, but we can weave that competency information throughout the
workforce management process.'' Could you please describe the history
of the CMS development along with milestones for improvements that are
being made or are planned to be made.
A10a. The Competency Management System (CMS) is managed and operated by
the Office of Human Capital Management at NASA Headquarters, working
with mission directorates, mission support offices and the NASA
centers. The primary objectives of CMS are to maintain a listing of
workforce competencies across the Agency, align the expertise of the
workforce to the mission via the budget planning process, and enable
the Agency to build the level of expertise in targeted knowledge areas.
The CMS was deployed in multiple phases as it grew in scope and
operations. The goal was to try and minimize the impact and work at the
centers, so early deployment was limited to a small audience at each of
the centers. This also allowed greater flexibility with the design by
allowing the team to incorporate lessons learned from one phase into
the next.
Since the start of the program, the Agency has undergone several
major strategic and operational changes. Therefore, the CMS must, and
does continue, to adjust and adapt to the changing business environment
in order to maintain its relevancy and usefulness to the Agency's
mission.
The history of CMS development along with milestones for improvements:
Development/Center Implementation Pilot Phase (2000-2001)
<bullet> Developed the competency model (concepts, data
structure and business process)
<bullet> Developed a Competency Dictionary at one center
(content from subject matter experts)
<bullet> Collected competency data from all 1,800 employees at
the center over a three month period
<bullet> Supervisors and peer reviewers conducted validation
of employee competencies over a five month period
Agency Implementation Pilot Phase (2001-2003)
<bullet> Developed the Competency Dictionary for the entire
Agency (consensus by subject matter experts from the centers)
<bullet> Generated an initial Position Level Competency
Inventory (based on NASA Classification Codes)
<bullet> Centers refined the position inventory
<bullet> Performed FY 2005 interim budget assessment of
workforce FTE needs in terms of competencies
<bullet> Performed first GAP analysis and identification of
critical competencies
Agency Implementation Deployment Phase (2004-2006)
<bullet> Performed FY 2006 budget assessment of workforce FTE
needs
<bullet> Conducted revision 5 of the Competency Dictionary
(increased review audience to include functional offices at the
corporate level)
<bullet> Requested competency data from all employees in the
Agency
<bullet> Supervisors performed validation of employee
competencies
<bullet> Planned deployment of additional functionality (2007-
2008)
<bullet> Integrated with the employee development process and
the Agency's new Learning Management System
<bullet> Modified the Agency workforce gap analysis process to
adapt to changes of the Agency budget planning process
Operational & Maintenance Phase (2008-)
<bullet> Perform annual review and revision of the workforce
competency dictionary
<bullet> Perform annual Agency workforce gap analysis in
conjunction with the Agency budget submittal
<bullet> Supervisors and human resource specialists maintain
accurate and updated competency requirements for job positions
<bullet> Employees and supervisors develop and implement
individual learning plans to build and maintain employee's
expertise
Q10b. What are the other workforce planning tools being integrated
with CMS and what is the plan for that integration process?
A10b. Competency Management System (CMS) data, plus a comprehensive set
of other workforce data currently available, are already providing good
definition of the current workforce. The Workforce Information
Management System, in conjunction CMS, provides the Agency with good
information about current workforce gaps and surpluses. Additionally,
the Agency has a business intelligence tool populated with current and
historical workforce data. This business intelligence tool enables
multidimensional analysis of workforce trends and forecasts future
retirements in specific organizational, occupational and skills areas.
Forecasting of retirements enables the Agency to do one aspect of
advanced planning for the workforce, determining if there are workforce
components which are at increased risk due to future losses.
Q10c. When will NASA be in a position to identify current and future
competency gaps and surpluses using workforce-planning tools such as
CMS?
A10c. Currently, NASA is planning to utilize CMS in the fall of 2007 to
perform workforce competency gap analysis based on the proposed FY 2009
budget. This information will show trends in planned competency needs
over the next five years and the forecasted ability of the workforce to
meet those needs. From this analysis, areas of potential competency
shortages and surpluses should be identified.
The second aspect of workforce planning requires effective
processes for getting good definition of future work requirements. This
is directly related to program planning and budget formulation, and,
for the first time, NASA is integrating workforce planning with the
budget process for the FY 2009 budget. NASA anticipates successful
identification of potential workforce gaps and surpluses. The Agency
also anticipates it will have learned important lessons to apply to the
FY 2010 budget and workforce planning processes.
Q11a. Your testimony states that ``The capabilities of HCIE (Human
Capital Information Environment) are enormous, limited only by our
ingenuity in identifying the boundless ways in which information can be
woven together to drive decisions and enable success.'' Could you
please describe the requirements for the development of the HCIE?
A11a. Developing the Human Capital Information Environment (HCIE) is
the first step in creating a fully integrated, strategically focused,
business management environment for online, near-real-time access to
comprehensive information needed for rapid and accurate decision-
making. The basic requirement for HCIE development is inter-operability
and close integration with NASA's financial management system through a
shared database to provide dependable human capital information,
integrated with information from other business areas, such as finance,
for all organizational elements. This common, robust data source will
eliminate the need for stand alone, non-integrated systems, which often
offer redundant capabilities. The authoritative data repository, HCIE,
will furnish a wealth of information in support of the demands of this
mission-driven, project-oriented Agency. HCIE supports the President's
Management Agenda (PMA), implementation of the Vision for Space
Exploration, and our NASA Workforce Transformation; and aligns with our
Information Resource Management Strategy and the HR Lines, Business,
and EGov requirements. Finally, HCIE has been developed using a
service-oriented architecture which provides point integration and
inter-operability with our non-human capital applications such as
identify management, safety, security, legal, facilities, and financial
management.
Q11b. What is the relationship of the CMS and other workforce planning
tools to the HCIE?
A11b. The HCIE is the vehicle to enable integration of all human
capital tools, including CMS and the other workforce planning tools.
NASA has already integrated information from CMS, WIMS (workforce
planning tool), the Agency's Labor Distribution System and the Agency's
budget system with the HCIE data warehouse. By integrating
authoritative data from each of NASA's workforce planning and financial
systems within a single data warehouse, the Agency enables the
generation of complex queries, analysis and reporting of information
most useful to project managers, program managers and workforce
planners.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by John G. Stewart, National Academy of Public Administration
Fellow; Member, Panel on NASA Multi-sector Workforce
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. Both the NAPA and the National Academies reports call for more
detailed information on the workforce at NASA's Centers. Could you
please discuss in specific terms what information the Agency needs in
order to support long-term workforce planning?
A1. The Panel believes that NASA's workforce planning processes and
data collection should address the total workforce, including the work
for which it will hire staff as well as for the work it will buy. While
the Panel acknowledges the key differences in NASA's relationship with
its contractors and noted that NASA is not responsible for managing
contractor personnel on a daily basis, the Agency should nonetheless do
a competency analysis for this group that comprises two-thirds of the
Agency's multi-sector workforce. The contractor competency assessment
should be done on an aggregate basis, focusing on cost effectiveness,
timeliness of deliverables, and return on investment. In addition to
detailed information about needed competencies across programs, NASA
needs information on its required skills, certifications, and
programmatic/project assignments.
For the contracting organizations, NASA needs such information as:
<bullet> Appropriate roles of contractors--for example, the
Agency should specifically identify work that is not inherently
governmental, is located off-site, is not a NASA core
competency, is not needed long-term, requires a unique
expertise, or results in a distinct product appropriately
delivered by a contractor.
<bullet> Contract duration and flexibilities for surge
capacity.
<bullet> Penalties associated with early termination.
<bullet> Cost-effectiveness.
<bullet> Return-on-investment.
In terms of its current workforce, NASA will need to identify
competing demands across programs and projects. It will need to fully
understand the current workforce's availability and competencies and
project future workforce requirements across the organization in the
short-term, intermediate-term, and longer-term time horizons.
While gathering information on the current civil service workforce,
NASA should consider the extent to which current recruiting sources and
programs, as well as current training and development programs, are
meeting its needs. In addition to the standard information typically
collected in workforce planning processes, NASA particularly needs
information that allows it to track skill mismatches by individual
employees and field centers. It particularly needs information such as:
<bullet> Existing competencies, especially for key occupations
<bullet> Potential desirability of retraining or redirecting
competencies and the cost of retraining, if needed and feasible
<bullet> Occupational mix
This information should be collected by center and aggregated for
the Agency as a whole.
In order to project future work requirements, NASA needs to collect
data in such areas as:
<bullet> Specific program demand changes over the short-term,
intermediate-term, and longer-term
<bullet> Competencies needed during these time frames based on
business projections
<bullet> Nature of the work to be done, including volume,
location, duration, and appropriate component of the multi-
sector workforce (tenured or limited duration civil servant,
contractor, grantee, university, military, etc.)
As part of this analysis, NASA should consider several key
questions:
<bullet> How will the structure of the work and its
organization, as well as the underlying job functions, need to
change to meet these demands?
<bullet> How will technology continue to impact the way work
is accomplished?
<bullet> How can the Agency respond to unexpected requirements
or contingencies?
NASA also needs to determine the core workforce required to
maintain competencies that may be required over the longer-term, but
for which the Agency has a declining current need. By quantifying core
workforce requirements, the Agency could ensure a critical mass is
available in the future in case of a resurging need. To this end, the
Panel urged NASA to use a methodology, such as RAND's, to quantify the
``core'' workforce required to maintain its critical aeronautics and
scientific competencies. Consistent with the Panel's emphasis on the
total NASA workforce, the analysis should include both civil service
and contractor components. The Panel further recommended that this same
methodology be applied to the Shuttle transition process to assist with
long-term scheduling projections, quantification of core competencies
and proficiencies, and analysis of overlapping mission needs.
Q2. The NAPA and National Academies reports emphasize that NASA should
make full use of the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004. Did your committee
conclude that NASA was under-utilizing the Flexibility Act, and if so,
why?
A2. The Panel believes that NASA could make greater use of certain key
provisions of the Flexibility Act. One provision that NASA has made
extensive use of is the term appointment authority. In this area,
however, the dominant practice or intention at most centers has been to
convert successfully performing terms, without regard to whether the
work they are performing is permanent. The major exception has been
Kennedy Space Center, which has no plans to routinely convert terms
given the planned retirement of the Space Shuttle.
In addition to the term appointment authority, the NASA Flexibility
Act of 2004 provides the Agency with additional authorities in the
following areas:
<bullet> Pay a ``re-designation'' bonus to a current federal
employee, who accepts a position with NASA designated as a
critical need.
<bullet> Pay a retention bonus of up to 50 percent of basic
pay if the position meets a critical need.
<bullet> Pay a salary of up to the Vice President's for a
position when the Administrator finds it necessary to recruit
or retain an exceptionally highly qualified individual for a
critical position (limit to 10 employees).
<bullet> Direct hiring authority for GS-7 through GS-12
scientific and professional positions with qualifying GPA
(Distinguished Scholar program).
<bullet> Ability to extend Intergovernmental Personnel Act
assignments beyond the initial two-year period for up to four
additional years.
<bullet> Travel and transportation expenses for certain new
appointees.
<bullet> Annual leave enhancements for certain non-federal
experiences.
<bullet> Limited term appointment to ``career reserved'' SES
positions to fill a temporary need.
<bullet> Qualifications pay to encourage employees to accept a
new set of duties or new position.
<bullet> Increased maximum rate of pay for NASA-excepted (NEX)
employees.
The Panel recommended that NASA use formal decision metrics to
ensure that decisions about hiring or converting terms are grounded in
work-based criteria. This will ensure that NASA acts strategically, not
tactically, in filling its term and permanent positions. Regarding
conversions, the Panel believes that they should occur not simply
because of a satisfactory performance by an individual, but based on an
evaluation of the nature of the work--for example, a core competency
inadequately represented in the current workforce or a required
proficiency level best achieved through a permanent civil service hire.
NASA has made virtually no use of the Distinguished Scholar
program, relying heavily on its long-established co-op program. The
Panel believes that NASA would be more effective over the long-term by
expanding its recruitment strategy to hire Distinguished Scholars as a
way to recruit the next generation of agency scientists, engineers, and
administrators. Despite some differences on how best to respond to
NASA's workforce challenges, our Panel, the National Academy of
Sciences Committee, and the International Federation of Professional
and Technical Engineers all agree that rebuilding NASA's early and mid-
career workforce is critical.
Likewise, the Panel noted that NASA has made limited use of its IPA
authority for external placements, with no more than seven each in FY
2004 and FY 2005. For an agency with changing program needs and
priorities and identified underutilized competencies, the IPA program
offers an excellent opportunity to leverage scarce salary dollars and
FTE through negotiated cost-sharing arrangements with universities,
non-profits, State/local governments, and others that might need NASA
expertise. Such a mechanism would allow NASA employees with unfunded
work, for example, to contribute meaningfully to another institution
and further enhance their skill base.
Q3. The NAPA report mentions strategic partnerships with other federal
agencies that demand technical skills as a potential opportunity for
managing NASA employees whose skills do not align with current NASA
projects. Could you please elaborate on this aspect of the NAPA report?
A3. Given NASA's workforce misalignments, the Panel believes that the
Agency could make greater efforts to partner with other federal
agencies. Near the beginning of this study, the Academy offered to
broker a partnership between NASA and the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) to help alleviate NASA's uncovered capacity problem.
Officials at the highest level of PTO were interested in a block of
NASA's scientific and technical personnel becoming patent examiners, on
a temporary or preferably permanent basis, to reduce patent processing
backlogs. It was also interested in accessing NASA expertise to train
its patent examiners in state-of-the art aeronautics, nanotechnology,
and other scientific disciplines for which the Agency typically
receives patent applications. PTO was open to reimbursing NASA,
relocating NASA employees, and considering the use of NASA employees at
their home centers. In response to this offer, NASA offered no official
or strategic agency encouragement for employees to participate, but
chose to refer the offer only to Ames Research Center, which posted the
information as an opportunity for individual center employees to
voluntarily explore on their own.
Despite its stated commitment to a ``flexible, scalable
workforce,'' NASA has not vigorously pursued other out-placement
options in the belief that future work assignments will require the
skills of current NASA employees, and it would therefore be imprudent
to put significant effort into out-placement. In interviews, some NASA
officials expressed reluctance to directly communicate with employees,
both individually and collectively, about the need to manage their
careers and take advantage of all available opportunities--both inside
and outside of NASA. Some NASA officials even said they were concerned
that being too forthright with individual employees about their options
would be construed as harassment.
In addition to PTO, the Panel identified other possible federal
agencies that could make use of NASA's excess competencies:
<bullet> The Environmental Protection Agency, with whom NASA
shares an interest in climate change and wind tunnels
<bullet> The National Institutes of Health, with whom NASA
shares an interest in space implications for medical technology
improvements and the lessons to be learned about microgravity's
impact on health
<bullet> The Department of Energy, with whom NASA shares an
interest in basic research as well in various elaborate
batteries used in space missions
<bullet> The Department of Defense, which has similar need for
project and program managers within varied engineering
disciplines
This is a challenge across the Federal Government. Some agencies
have excess competencies in areas that are critical needs for other
federal agencies. It may be useful for the Federal Government to have
an informed broker, such as OPM or OMB, to identify opportunities for
competency sharing and trading among federal agencies. The broker would
be responsible for making matches between federal agencies with skill
deficiencies, whether temporary or long-term, with agencies with excess
capacity, undergoing low attrition, or mission changes. In today's
environment, with such rapidly changing technology, the government's
role as financial and human capital steward is likely to require
additional adaptive mechanisms to facilitate the government's effective
use and development of its human capital resources.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by David C. Black, President Emeritus, Universities Space
Research Association; Adjunct Professor, Physics and Astronomy
Department, Rice University; Co-Chair, Committee on Issues
Affecting the Future of the U.S. Space Science and Engineering
Workforce, National Research Council, The National Academies
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. During your oral testimony, you showed a figure that indicates
that the number of opportunities for students to gain hands-on training
has been declining. Could you please elaborate on this point and
describe which opportunities have been declining and why?
A1. The figure shown during my testimony is included below for your
reference. There are two major messages in this figure. One is that the
vast majority of opportunities for students to gain space experience
via involvement in payloads is found in the suborbital programs--
typically sounding rockets, balloons, and aircraft-based research
(primarily high-altitude aircraft such as NASA's WB-57 and ER-2
airplanes). While the Explorer and other deep space missions do have
student involvement, it is typically at the instrument level rather
than the full spacecraft level. Moreover, owing to the cost of Explorer
missions, relative to that of suborbital missions, and the associated
longer timescale for project development, the deep space missions do
not lend themselves as readily to substantial student involvement.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
The second message is that all opportunities for student
involvement have been in steady decline over the past few decades. This
is most notable in the sub-orbital program that includes sounding
rockets, balloons, and aircraft (where the involvement is primarily at
the instrument level). The reasons for this decline are varied. One of
the contributors to the decline is the heavy emphasis on science return
as the justification for these missions. This emphasis, while valid,
places the lower cost sub-orbital missions at a disadvantage when
compared with an Explorer mission, for example. In general, NASA's
science leadership argues that the ``quality'' of science, measured in
terms of papers published or influence on other researchers, is less
for a sub-orbital mission. Also, the quantity of science is less, as
judged by the amount of data returned. This emphasis on science for the
lower cost, more student-oriented missions ignores one of the key
aspects of these missions, workforce development. These missions give a
cradle-to-grave training experience in project management and systems
engineering, both key skills that are currently in short supply at
NASA. Our committee would like to see proposals for suborbital programs
be judged much higher (some committee members believe at least 50
percent) on the merits of the workforce development aspect of the
proposal, with the rest of the weighting in the review process being
the science that would be accomplished by the proposed mission.
Another factor in reduction of these opportunities is a combination
of funding reductions as NASA managers look everywhere for funds to
cover the increasing costs of their higher profile missions, as well as
a past lack of support for sub-orbital missions by senior management at
NASA. One further point to note here is that launch opportunities in
this country have diminished over time making it harder to find
suitable, that is low cost and relatively frequent, rides into low-
Earth orbit for student satellites.
Q2. Your testimony referred to the value of sub-orbital programs in
providing systems engineering and project management skills. Could you
please explain in detail how the sub-orbital programs help develop
these skills?
A2. Sub-orbital programs typically can be conducted from beginning to
end in a year or two, while more complex Earth orbital projects may
take at least two to four years. Both of these timescales are
consistent with meaningful involvement of students. The shorter
timescale is well matched to design and build classes for
undergraduates, or even high school students, while the longer
timescale matches well with graduate student experiences. In addition
to the time match to student activity, there is an opportunity in these
projects for students to see and experience all facets of a major
project. They see what happens if inadequate attention is paid to
interface issues, for example. They learn to manage a project on a
schedule and a budget. Also, they can learn from a failure as much as a
success. NASA's main missions now cost so much and have so much
visibility that many more procedures and additional backup systems are
added to reduce risk. This drives cost up and keeps students out of
meaningful career development experiences.
Q3. How much do sub-orbital programs typically cost and what is the
end-to-end duration of such programs? What, if any recommendations did
your committee make on how these programs should be funded?
A3. Since our report was issued there has been some change in NASA's
sub-orbital programs, particularly the sounding rocket program. The
sounding rocket program appeared to be in continuing and serious
decline even as late as the issuance of our report. However, a new NASA
Associate Administrator for Science has indicated his intention to
revive the sounding rocket program by increasing its funding and
returning to a launch rate of 24 flights a year by FY10. However, I
would note that his goal for this is to solidify the sub-orbital
program's role in developing science and also producing experienced
principal investigators for science missions. Our committee emphasized
that sub-orbital programs are a value to the entire agency--not simply
science--because they can provide experience in program/project
management and systems engineering that can eventually be used in other
programs, including human space flight.
According to a presentation made by NASA's sounding rocket program
office to the Space Studies Board in June 2007, after our report was
completed, NASA's sounding rocket program has seen a dramatic drop in
flights over the past decade. The program currently supports about 10
principal investigators per year and an annual flight rate of 10 to 20
flights per year. In contrast to promised increased funding following
the announcement of the Vision for Space Exploration in January 2004,
NASA made severe cuts to the sounding rocket program budget: $4.2M in
FY05, $10.9M in FY06, $9.4M in FY07, and $11.7M in FY08--a $36M cut
over a four-year period. Our committee found that implementing the
Vision will require precisely the kinds of skills that the sounding
rocket programs provide.
Each launch costs between $2.5M-$3M including operating costs, and
a typical project lasts from one to three years (the actual flight
times, however, are measured in minutes). NASA's sounding rocket
program has a success rate of about 98 percent. These factors make
sounding rocket programs ideal for educational uses and allows for
students to see a project through from the beginning to the end. The
committee recommended NASA increase its investment in sounding rockets
to provide ample-opportunities from hands-on flight development
experience at a relatively low cost of failure.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Q4. Both the NAPA and the National Academies reports call for more
detailed information on the workforce at NASA's Centers. Could you
please discuss in specific terms what information the Agency needs in
order to support long-term workforce planning?
A4. NASA is slowly coming to grips with understanding its workforce
issues. In my view and that of the NRC committee, NASA does not yet
understand how to model its workforce and its evolution. They need far
better insight into the skills that reside at the Agency, a better
understanding of the flow of programs and how that affects the civil
service workforce, and they need to look outside of NASA to understand
better the sources and movements of experienced as well as entry-level
professional talent that is available. This is a skill that does not
reside at NASA. They will need to look to outside expertise to help
them in both identifying the type of information that is needed to do
good workforce modeling, and in constructing the models to use the
data. NASA, in my opinion, has lost track to some extent that it is an
enabler of the Nation's civil space program. It has evolved to a point
where it sees itself as an independent entity and makes policy and
other decisions, particularly workforce matters, based on survival of
the Agency and its centers rather than doing the job for the country.
Q5. The NAPA and National Academies reports emphasize that NASA should
make full use of the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004.
Q5a. Did your committee conclude that NASA was underutilizing the
Flexibility Act, and if so, why?
A5a. The committee heard anecdotal information from a number of
speakers that although the NASA Flexibility Act had helped the Agency,
it was still relatively recent and therefore the Agency had not yet
been able to adopt it to the fullest extent (for instance, not all of
the relevant offices were aware of the Act's provisions). The committee
did not conclude that there was resistance to the Act at NASA, but did
hear some comments from NASA officials that indicated that even if the
Agency was able to make full use of it, some fine-tuning may still be
necessary. This is probably a subject that is best left to discussions
directly between Congress and NASA.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Lee Stone, Legislative Representative, NASA Council of
IFPTE Locals, International Federation of Professional and
Technical Engineers
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Centralized HQ Versus Decentralized Center-based Decision-making
Q1. NASA's workforce strategy involves a transition from a more
decentralized Center-led decision-making process to an agency-wide,
integrated approach. What are the Centers' and the IFPTE's perspectives
on how smoothly this transition is occurring?
A1. The value of centralized versus de-centralized governance depends
on the mission. NASA is designing and preparing to build one Orion crew
exploration vehicle and two Aries launch vehicles using essentially
existing technologies. It is absolutely critical for everyone to be on
the same page; the value of a single centralized focal point for
Constellation program planning and decision making is self-evident.
However, for NASA's multifaceted Science, Aeronautics, and Technology
Development missions, the value of centralized governance at
Headquarters (HQ) is far from obvious. Rigid centralization schemes are
known to stymie innovation and creativity, which are generally the
fruits of smaller, more agile, and independent teams that can tolerate
failure within a less rigid schedule and budget structure. Indeed, the
Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) plan is anything but
innovative, born of the necessity of meeting an urgent schedule to
replace the Shuttle with a budget half that the last time NASA was
asked to design a manned lunar spacecraft. So up front, it should be
noted that NASA's new management governance model embraced to support
the Constellation program may not be appropriate for NASA's other
equally important endeavors.
The wisdom of NASA's management plan aside, its centralized, matrix
management model has been unevenly applied. At its essence, matrix
management is designed to split management into two equal branches: 1)
centralized programmatic management authority is retained at HQ, and 2)
de-centralized line management authority is delegated to the Centers.
There are however two problems with NASA's current implementation of
matrix management. First, HQ has delegated line management
responsibilities, yet has not provided the necessary resources and
authority to the Centers to perform this task. NASA's current
governance model has therefore seriously weakened line management,
which is not the co-equal partner it needs to be for mission success.
This has resulted in program management controlling all of the
financial resources and micromanaging program implementation, and has
prevented line management from being able to function properly to the
detriment of the Agency, its Centers, and its missions. Second, as a
result of this first point, in order to salvage power for its line
management, center management at Johnson Space Center (and to some
extent at the other manned space flight Centers) has simply hijacked
key program management authority and uses that power to protect its
Center from the adverse consequences of NASA's implementation of
lopsided matrix management and full-cost recovery of salary and
facilities costs. While JSC's success at collapsing matrix management
by combining key line and program management nodes is an
understandable, and indeed predictable, reaction to NASA's flawed
matrix management implementation, the sustained centralization of
program and fiscal authority for manned space programs at JSC continues
to be an obstacle to any bone fide matrix management system centralized
at HQ and is a major obstacle to the 10 healthy centers plan.
The governance model and Exploration:
NASA's manned spacecraft development and manned space flight
implementation are endeavors so massive and ambitious that they benefit
from a more centralized authoritarian leadership strategy. The
transition to centralized authority at HQ continues to be slow and
remains incomplete. Indeed, the initial artificial uncovered capacity
crisis of the last few years was generated by the programmatic transfer
of a large chunk of NASA's personnel funds to Constellation by the
Administration, followed by the refusal by Constellation program
management (largely overlapping with JSC line management) to share
these resources appropriately across all NASA Centers. The
Administration's initial plan was to retain funding and personnel at
JSC and eliminate across the rest of the Agency, nearly 3,000 highly
skilled and experienced federal employees, predominately at the
Research Centers, who were improperly deemed unworthy of Constellation
dollars because of a fictitious ``skills-mix'' problem. If the House
and Senate Science committees had not intervened with a Reduction-In-
Force (RIF) moratorium (subsequently extended by the Commerce-Justice-
Science Appropriators), that plan would have been fully implemented
last year. Indeed, the phase-one harassment and buy-out portion of the
plan was implemented resulting in the loss of more than a thousand
largely technical employees and a significant decrease in morale across
the Research Centers, but phase-two of the employee elimination plan
was luckily averted by direct Congressional intervention. IFPTE and
NASA's civil service workforce remain extremely grateful for the strong
bipartisan leadership shown by Chairman Gordon and former Chairman
Boehlert in their timely opposition to the Administration's ill-devised
plan.
In the summer of 2006, IFPTE testified that NASA's uncovered
capacity crisis was a fiction created by a deeply flawed accounting
process and a program management unwilling to accept that the technical
staff at Research Centers should play a major role in Constellation.
Squeezed by the RIF moratorium, last fall, Administrator Griffin
finally simply directed JSC to transfer meaningful work packages to the
Research Centers and the ``crisis'' dissipated. Indeed, Centers that
last year reported hundreds of employees with skills/competencies
deemed surplus have now received funding to assign Constellation work
to nearly all of them. The magical disappearance of the uncovered
capacity confirms that the initial crisis was a fiction created by
management failures, and not by any skills problem with the technical
staff across the Agency. We now have empirical proof that employees at
Ames, Glenn, JPL, Langley, and Goddard can work well together with
employees at JSC, Marshall, and KSC to the benefit of the Exploration
mission, the Agency, and the Nation. NASA's employees, distributed
across all Centers, stand ready to make Constellation a success and
look forward to that opportunity and challenge.
So why isn't this the happy ending of this scary fairy tale? There
are two lingering clouds that loom ominously. First, sustained
underfunding of the Agency is still squeezing NASA's scientists and
researchers who do not fully benefit from Constellation work packages
that only cover Constellation development activities. This problem
requires the re-balancing and/or additional appropriation of funds to
Science, Aeronautics, and Technology research activities that have
taken a disproportionate and unwise share of the fiscal hit imposed by
NASA's inadequate budget. Congress should act to force a modest yet
essential rebalancing, which would only involve about five percent of
NASA's budget. Second, the distribution of work packages from JSC are
still being made begrudgingly so that inadequate numbers of civil
servant Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) are being transferred to cover the
required work and few procurement funds are being transferred to cover
associated local expenses. Furthermore, JSC management continues to co-
opt Advanced Capabilities funds that should be used to cover scientists
and researchers engaged in longer term, non-Constellation, Research and
Development (R&D) activities. Advanced Capabilities funding is being
diverted to meet unfunded Constellation requirements and to cover
disproportionately JSC personnel and contract support staff. Congress
should act to prevent the diversion of the few remaining R&D funds
within the Exploration Systems Mission to non-R&D activities and away
from the Research Centers.
The governance model and Science & Aeronautics:
NASA's broad research missions in Science and Aeronautics are less
well served by a centralized, distant, and bureaucratic leadership at
HQ, detached from the nitty gritty R&D process and overly influenced by
transient political interests. Succinctly stated, NASA's long-term R&D
should be managed by those most qualified to manage NASA's R&D
activities, NASA's Research Centers, with greater independence from the
vicissitudes of the personalities and political winds at HQ. Indeed,
the director of National Institutes of Health understands that he is
merely the custodian of a distributed brain trust that needs nurturing,
oversight, and advocacy, not intrusive technical direction. The
Institutes are largely autonomous, the Lab Chiefs are largely
autonomous, and even the individual PIs are largely autonomous. That
more decentralized structure not only gets the job done, it fosters
creativity and innovation. The Associate Administrators for the Science
and Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates should follow that
example and embrace more muted and humble roles. In the ideal matrix
governance model, program management sets budgets, goals, and
milestones, while line management assigns the technical work to the
appropriate personnel, decides on the needed procurement and
procurement mechanisms, implements the program plan, and is accountable
for meeting the milestones. Unfortunately, program management has
abused its near absolute fiscal authority to co-opt line management's
authority to assign work, to direct local procurements, to manage day-
to-day activities at the performing centers, and thus to undermine
collective bargaining rights (because all Union contracts are with
center line management, which is becoming somewhat irrelevant). Any
transition to a bone fide matrix management model will require
equalizing the balance of authority between program and line
management.
Specific recommendations:
IFPTE asks that Congress:
<bullet> Increase NASA's Science, Aeronautics, and Advanced
Capabilities budgets and protect them from being reprogrammed
overtly or covertly to Constellation.
<bullet> Direct NASA to provide civil-servant salaries and
non-programmatic travel along with CM&O directly to the
centers, independent of programs, to allow for effective matrix
management and to maintain Center capabilities.
<bullet> Line management would then be empowered
(i.e., funded) to perform its critical immediate roles
of assigning and supervising work as well as its longer
term role of keeping local intellectual capabilities
and facilities healthy. Re-empowering center management
to perform the latter role is essential because the
currently unchecked Program management funding
structure benefits from exploiting current resources
for near-term milestone at the expense of long-term
milestones and institutional infrastructure. Program
management should, however, continue to control
procurement funding levels and programmatic travel
funds to perform its critical role of setting budgets,
goals, and milestones. With this more equitable
division of resources and authorities, the short-term
programmatic and longer term institutional interests
can be properly balanced through cooperation between
the two branches of management. Program management
would have to negotiate with Center management for
civil service labor, yet Center management would still
need to align its workforce to meet program needs in
order to acquire procurement and most travel funds.
<bullet> Direct NASA to move program management of the
research activities of the Advanced Capabilities programs to
the Research Centers to prevent their subjugation by
Constellation or JSC management, and to allow them to maintain
crucial independent research and technology development
capabilities across NASA's research Centers.
<bullet> Inter-center competition and cooperation
across multiple research programs assigned evenly
across co-equal research centers will prevent parochial
interests from dominating programmatic interests.
Abuse of Term Hiring Authority
Q2. Your testimony notes that NASA's increasing use of ``term'' hires
[hiring for work that is expected to last between 1-6 years] rather
than tenured civil service hires is, in part jeopardizing NASA's
ability to attract the best and brightest science and engineering
staff.
Q2a. Why do you believe that the use of term hires jeopardizes NASA's
ability to attract the best and brightest?
A2a. When young scientists receive their Ph.D. from a world-class
institution (thereby completing 20+ years of formal education), most
begin to plot a future for themselves whereby they can expect a stable
and productive research career in their field of choice. In some
instances, a one-to-three-year postdoctoral fellowship is sought in
order to obtain additional training to broaden their skills and
experience under the mentorship of a well-respected researcher at
another elite institution. However, within a year or two of receiving
their Ph.D., the best and brightest young scientists begin to seek a
tenure track (hard money) research professorships at a prestigious
university and eschew non-tenure track (soft money) adjunct
professorships that are contingent on external funding sources. Young
biotech scientists and aerospace engineers have highly lucrative
private-sector opportunities in addition to this traditional academic
option. In the past, NASA has competed successfully for its fair share
of these individuals by offering a package of advantages that academia
cannot match: accelerated tenure, no teaching requirements, and access
to numerous sources of competed and even directed Research and Analysis
funding for mission-related research projects that nonetheless are
largely self-generated. NASA has been successful in the past in
recruiting even the most competitive candidates by offering better job
security, more comprehensive benefits, cutting-edge research
opportunities, and a very high quality of life. In particular, one of
the most rewarding aspects of a career at NASA has been the ability to
remain engaged with an exciting long-term project throughout its
lifetime so that one is still around to see one's technical
contribution finally comes to fruition, as opposed to being terminated
after a few years of performing piece work.
In the early 1980's, the Federal Government lost some of its
recruiting leverage in the arena of benefits when they converted to a
less competitive 401k-style dominated and less desirable retirement
system (i.e., private sector and academia now often offer better
benefits). Over the last few years, NASA's recruiting problems have
been exacerbated by three critical factors: the policy of improperly
using term offers to circumvent the federal employee tenure process and
to assert greater daily control over its technical staff, the dramatic
reduction of NASA research opportunities available to in-house
scientists and engineers to perform self-generated mission-related R&D,
and the full-cost recovery of employee salaries. The latter has created
a hostile and demeaning time-clock punching environment that 1)
prevents our best scientists and engineers from devoting an appropriate
portion of their time to difficult longer-term technical problems (and
thus improving/sustaining their technical skills) and 2) forces them
into a full-time preoccupation with short-term milestones within an
autocratic program management system. NASA's best and brightest
scientists and engineers have no problem saluting the flag and working
diligently towards NASA's mission goals, but they do not thrive when
bossed around on a daily basis by non-technical administrative task
masters obsessed with weekly performance metrics, and when deprived of
nearly all independent research funding opportunities.
As a result of these factors, the current senior technical
workforce can no longer aggressively recruit the graduating students of
their academic colleagues because they cannot say, in good conscience,
that coming to NASA is the best career move for that young student
compared to tenure track options at prestigious academic institutions
or lucrative stock options at cutting-edge private high-tech ventures.
Word of mouth recruiting by NASA's technical staff (not by HR) is how
NASA has traditionally gained access to the best and brightest
technical employees before they are even on the market, so that NASA
could bring them on board as pre- and post-doctoral fellows to focus on
NASA relevant training and then hire many of them as permanent civil
servants. That proven recruiting process is now breaking down to NASA's
peril; as NASA's pre- and post-doctoral fellowships and permanent S&E
positions dry up, so does its future.
In brief, the best and brightest will not consider term positions
at a fiscally unstable and programmatically chaotic NASA a promising
career move when they can take prestigious positions at UC-Berkeley,
MIT, Google, or other elite academic or private-sector institutions
that will offer them greater intellectual latitude and genuine respect
often with more lucrative compensation packages. The bottom line is
that the key to successful recruiting of NASA's future workforce is to
be able to promise candidates exciting and stable careers within an
intellectually open and respectful work environment that values and
features independent research opportunities. Note also that with term
positions, recruitment becomes a recurring task as the Agency must bid
again and again for skills as terms expire, or risk losing increasingly
experienced talent in which it has already invested considerable
resources.
Over the last four years, NASA's management has been so overly
disrespectful to its technical staff (term hiring being only one facet
of this disrespect) that serious harm has already taken place. This
disrespect has been part of a well-orchestrated and ill-conceived
campaign to accelerate the attrition of NASA's senior technical staff,
a strategy that remains ongoing, albeit tempered in recent months. The
other side of respect is loyalty. NASA employees have traditionally
shown tremendous loyalty that drives them to work nights and weekends,
and to forfeit annual leave without financial compensation. But loyalty
is a two-way street and permanent status is at the core of the Agency's
loyalty to its staff. NASA employees were rudely awakened in February
2004 to discover that Administrator O'Keefe had commissioned a secret
plan for the mass lay off of nearly 3,000 employees to cover the
unfunded mandate of the Vision for Space Exploration. That betrayal and
the attendant scapegoating of NASA's technical staff will not soon be
forgotten. Although the situation has improved recently, unless the
Administration fully and openly re-embraces a policy of respect for and
loyalty to NASA's civil service workforce, NASA will no longer enjoy
the recruiting power it has relied on for decades and unwisely takes
for granted.
Q2b. To what extent are term hires being used for the science and
engineering staff at present?
A2b. In addition to affecting recruitment, the use of term positions
also has adverse ramifications for mission success because a transient
Science and Engineering (S&E) workforce threatens safety (as esoteric
yet crucial knowledge/experience leaves the Agency when experienced
staff leave at the end of their term) and squanders precious training
resources (as trained personnel leave the Agency setting up a
requirement to train new arrivals). Even more importantly, one of the
primary reasons for according civil servants tenure is so that they can
speak truth to power; tenured employees can speak up and say something
is unsafe without the fear of losing their jobs, but term employees
know full well that the future renewal or conversion of their position
will be jeopardized if they challenge their management chain. The CAIB
report warned us clearly that NASA's schedule and budget driven
management culture was a primary cause of the Columbia disaster; that
management culture is dangerously reinforced by the use of term hires
who are dis-empowered, relative to permanent hires, to speak up when
schedule or budget is undermining safety and/or mission success.
In fiscal year 1994 (FY 1994), NASA made 181 outside hires for
Full-Time Permanent (FTP) Science & Engineering (S&E) staff and only
four-term S&E hires. The S&E term percentage (2.2 percent) was less
than that found across all employees: NASA hired a total of 337 FTP
employees that year and only 19 term hires (5.6 percent).
Over the last three years, NASA's hiring actions have shown a
dramatically different trend. FTP S&E hires numbered only 64, 53, and
36 in FY 2005, in FY 2006, and so far in FY 2007, respectively, while
term S&E hires numbered 174, 227, and 161. So we have gone from a tiny
fraction of S&E employees being hired as term employees in the early
90's to more than three quarters now.
Even more troubling is that the above term hiring trend appears to
be more highly focused on S&E staff. In the same three periods, FTP
Professional Administrative hires numbered 77, 100, and 63,
respectively, while term PA hires numbered 154, 215, and 121 yielding a
ratio closer to about two-thirds term hiring.
In sum, over the last three years, NASA has been hiring about
three-quarters of its new S&E full-time outside hires under term
contracts (as opposed to less than three percent in 1994) and has been
hiring more than twice as many managers as scientists and engineers (as
opposed to less than half as many in 1994).
NASA management has created the alarming trends above by imposing
strict quotas on the hiring of new permanent employees, thus forcing
Centers to make improper term hires to fill long-term technical needs
more properly served by a permanent hire. In other words, one of the
premises of the question ``that term hiring is for work expected to
last between 1-6 years'' is simply false within NASA's current
implementation. Term hiring is performed because it is generally the
only hiring permitted by HQ, not because of the specifics of the
position. Furthermore, center-based quotas of permanent hires are
linked to the number of permanent employees who leave each center. By
arbitrarily linking the departure of 3 permanent employees to each
permanent new hire each Center can have, HQ is also increasing its
pressure on center management to harass older employees to retire.
The data above are as of 6/23/07 and were acquired from http://
hqpowerplay.hq.nasa.gov/workforce/moredata.html
Specific Recommendations:
IFPTE asks Congress to:
<bullet> Commission the GAO to audit NASA's use of term
positions over the last three years and determine to what
extent that authority has been abused.
<bullet> It appears that NASA is not the only federal
agency that has been using non-permanent S&E hiring
strategies that weaken the independence of government
technical experts, so perhaps this investigation should
be extended to all government agencies across the
executive branch that perform scientific or engineering
R&D.
<bullet> Direct NASA to convert all current terms positions to
permanent status unless they can explicitly demonstrate that,
for each term position, the Agency's need for the position's
skill/competency has an unambiguous programmatically defined
endpoint by the end of the term.
<bullet> Merely stating that future funding is unsure
is not an adequate rationale as all future federal
funding is by definition uncertain.
<bullet> Require NASA to return to a hiring policy whereby all
new hires default to permanent unless an explicit, written
justification is provided explaining why NASA's programmatic
need for that skill/competency clearly ends within a specified
term of less than six years.
<bullet> This exercise should be performed as proper
Human Resource protocol in the first place so this
proposal should not be considered burdensome.
<bullet> Cap NASA's use of term hires at 10 percent of outside
hires annually.
In closing, IFPTE is very encouraged by recent changes in NASA's
workforce posture that appear to indicate a renewed respect for in-
house talent and skills. Nonetheless, there are a number of remaining
obstacles in the road ahead; those discussed above are only a few of
them. The bottom line is that the National Research Council (NRC)
report indicates that NASA will face a workforce crisis in the not-to-
distant future unless it immediately starts to educate, recruit, and
train the next generation of technical employees, who should apprentice
under the current NASA senior technical staff before they retire
(indeed, this was the rationale for the rarely used retention bonuses
in the Flexibility Act). The Administration is not heeding that advice
because, as the Administrator has publicly stated, NASA has not been
given adequate funds to do so. Over the last decade and a half, NASA
has steadily lost 80 percent of its 35-year-old workforce and nothing
is being done to stop that alarming trend. IFPTE adds its voice to the
urgent call by the NRC and others for NASA to renew its intellectual
infrastructure before the chain of knowledge and experience is broken.
Congress should act to remedy this increasingly serious situation by
appropriating and sequestering adequate funds for this endeavor and by
directing the Administrator to begin an aggressive workforce renewal.
Once again, IFPTE thanks Chairman Udall and Ranking Member Feeney
for their keen interest in and dedication to NASA's success, and for
the opportunity to bring the concerns of the NASA federal employees we
represent to the attention of your subcommittee.
Appendix 2:
----------
Additional Material for the Record
<SKIP PAGES = 000>
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD
Statement of Dr. John Stewart,
Academy Fellow and Member of the
NASA Multi-sector Workforce Panel
Mr. Chairman, I appreciated the opportunity to testify before the
U.S. House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics on May 17, 2007 on
behalf of the National Academy of Public Administration's NASA Multi-
sector Workforce Panel. The Panel's goal is the same as the
Subcommittee's: to ensure the health and vitality of NASA's greatest
asset, its civil service and contractor workforce. At the outset, it is
important to understand that the Panel's recommendation for additional
human capital flexibilities was designed to provide NASA with authority
to restructure its workforce to meet new competency requirements while
maintaining essential employees regardless of age. The Panel's
recommendation does not authorize NASA to arbitrarily reduce staff or
to discriminate based on age. Unlike the mandatory retirement of civil
servants required by federal law until 1979, the proposal would protect
NASA's ability to maintain essential employees of all ages.
I am taking this opportunity to submit additional information for
the record in four major areas:
<bullet> Scope of the Academy's project
<bullet> NASA's budgetary context
<bullet> NASA's need for proactive workforce management
<bullet> Proposals to overcome NASA's existing civil service
constraints
Scope of the Project
This nearly year-long study was not conducted in a vacuum. The
Panel and study team reached out to a wide range of stakeholders,
traveled to eight of NASA's field centers, and conducted more than one
hundred interviews, including meetings with labor representatives and
contractor organizations. I was pleased to serve along-side five other
Panel members who believe strongly in NASA. I am a longstanding former
member of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and for two years served
as staff director of the U.S. Senate's Subcommittee on Science,
Technology, and Space (1977-1979). Three of the other Panel members
were long-time NASA executives at headquarters and at Goddard Space
Flight Center. All of us care about NASA and want to be responsible
stewards of its future.
As explained in my testimony, the Panel was asked to answer some
very specific questions about NASA's current workforce and field
structure. Neither the Senate Appropriation Subcommittee nor NASA asked
the Panel to evaluate the sufficiency of NASA's current or projected
level of funding. Similarly, we were not asked to conduct a detailed
assessment of the planned timeline for phasing-out the Space Shuttle,
completing the International Space Station, developing the next-
generation launch vehicles, or establishing a permanent lunar outpost.
The Administrator did not expect the Panel to make recommendations for
dramatic changes to existing program plans, timetables, or budgets. The
Panel believed its responsibility was to determine what kind of
workforce would be required by NASA and to provide guidance on the
work-based criteria and policies needed for the Agency to achieve this
desired state. Recognizing that aeronautics and scientific competencies
will be critical components of NASA's future workforce, for example,
the Panel did recommend that NASA quantify the core workforce required
to maintain and nurture these competencies over the long-term. The
Panel cautioned, however, that NASA needs to avoid looking at
disciplines and programs in isolation. Instead, it should evaluate
competency needs and excesses across all programs and avoid a stove-
piped approach to competency management.
Budgetary Context
In order to resolve NASA's workforce challenges, others have
strongly advocated for increased funding, a dramatic reduction in
contractor support, and a return to the civil service levels of the
1960s as the panacea for NASA's workforce challenges. The Panel
believes this approach is inconsistent with the notion of managerial
and taxpayer accountability. It also ignores the fact that, with a
proposed 3.1 percent increase in the President's FY 08 request, NASA's
budget is already slated for a larger increase than the one percent
average rate of growth for other domestic discretionary agencies.
Although Congress certainly may appropriate additional funds for NASA,
I personally believe this is unlikely given the ``pay-go'' system,
which would require any increases to NASA to be paid for with cuts to
other important federal programs.
Unless Congress does decide to make significant, long-term
increases to NASA's appropriation, NASA will have to deal with its 21st
century challenges by developing a more balanced, optimally-sized, and
skilled workforce tailored to current and projected mission needs. NASA
could facilitate this transition by adopting a more proactive workforce
strategy based on the use of innovative strategic planning mechanisms,
objective data reliance, focused organizational health assessments, and
work-based human capital reforms. This would enhance NASA's health and
ensure its ability to safely meet its program milestones in a cost
effective manner.
Given the long-term fiscal challenges facing this country, I
believe it would have been irresponsible, unrealistic, and inaccurate
for the Panel to tell the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee that
NASA's workforce problems could or should simply be solved with more
money. Within the confines of the projected budget, the Panel provided
an objective assessment of the alignment of the current NASA workforce
with the new programs, the Agency's management strategies, and the
tools required by NASA.
The Panel believes that NASA management must be accountable for
implementing the Vision, approved by the President and Congress, and
setting priorities consistent with that Vision and within the budget
appropriated.
Proactive Workforce Management
The Panel applauds the work of NASA's civil servants and
contractors, acknowledging them as the Agency's greatest asset. In
examining the civil service portion of NASA's workforce, however, the
Panel believed that NASA should be more proactive in making use of all
available flexibilities--both those available to all federal agencies
and those specifically authorized in the NASA Flexibilities Act of
2004--to develop the workforce of the future. Specifically, we
recommended that NASA expand its existing recruiting practices by
establishing a nationally recognized, prestigious program to:
4<bullet> Attract exemplary applicants with technical and
administrative strengths.
<bullet> Focus on long-term core competency needs of the
Agency.
<bullet> Replenish the workforce after decades of hiring
freezes.
We believed that the existing Distinguished Scholar Authority,
authorized by the NASA Flexibilities Act, could be used as the lynchpin
for establishing such a program and help NASA to recruit its next
generation of leaders.
In addition, we urged NASA to be much more proactive in
establishing strategic partnerships with Federal, State, and local
governments, as well as universities and non-profits. In many cases,
NASA has an excess of certain competencies that may be useful to other
organizations. By formally establishing a program to temporarily or
permanently out-place blocks of employees with competencies no longer
needed by the Agency, NASA would be able to widely share its talent
with the Nation. We recommended that NASA:
<bullet> Use inter-agency details for assignments with other
federal partners.
<bullet> Partner with non-federal entities through the IPA
program.
We also encouraged NASA to explore the possibility of strategically
out-placing some existing research programs that NASA will not need in
the future, but are important to the Nation as a whole. To this end, we
recommended that NASA headquarters identify potential opportunities
across the Agency and provide initial seed-money to the university,
non-profit, or foundation assuming responsibility for the function.
Affected field centers would then be expected to identify potential
candidate institutions within their area and negotiate with them.
Overcoming Constraints
At the same time, we were struck by the significance of existing
civil service constraints. Even if NASA took all available
discretionary actions, we believed it would not have sufficient
flexibility to develop the required workforce. Accordingly, we
recommended a package of additional statutory flexibilities. Several of
these seem relatively uncontroversial:
<bullet> Congress should increase the monetary cap on buy-outs
to $35,000 and adjust for inflation in following years.
<bullet> OPM should grant NASA blanket authority to conduct
buy-outs over the next five years.
<bullet> Congress should authorize NASA to temporarily pay the
government's share of health care premiums for non-retiring
employees who agree to resign and are not otherwise eligible to
carry their benefits with them.
<bullet> OPM should grant NASA blanket authority to waive
salary offsets when recruiting reemployed federal annuitants
for critical areas.
The Panel had two other recommendations that were more
controversial and would require greater change within the existing
civil service system. First, we believe that NASA deserves the same
Reduction-in-Force (RIF) framework as the National Institutes of
Standards and Technology (NIST). The existing RIF system is widely
acknowledged to be counterproductive and expensive, as well as harmful
to federal employees and organizational health. Accordingly, we urged
Congress to exempt NASA from the Title 5 RIF rules by establishing a
new RIF framework modeled on NIST's Alternative Personnel Management
System. This system would:
<bullet> Define competitive areas in a more targeted manner,
such as career path.
<bullet> Limit both ``bumping'' and ``retreating'' to within
the same occupational series or specialty.
<bullet> Give enhanced weight to performance.
Second, the Panel believes that Congress should provide NASA with
limited emergency authority to invoke a fully eligible individual's
retirement if he or she can no longer reasonably be utilized by the
Agency. Some or all of the following criteria would have to be met:
<bullet> The employee's skills are no longer required for
mission accomplishment.
<bullet> The employee's skills are outdated or unnecessary,
and management determines that retraining would not be
practical, or the employee is unwilling to update skills.
<bullet> Funding for the employee's existing work is not
available.
<bullet> The employee's skills are not easily transferred to
other work.
We believe retiring employees should be compensated fairly by being
given severance pay in addition to earned annuities. This emergency
statutory authority would provide NASA with one means to secure the
expertise required for its highly complex mission, while protecting the
safety and integrity of the space program.
In conclusion, the Panel took very seriously its charge to think
creatively about ways in which NASA might most effectively plan for its
workforce of the future. The Panel did not make these recommendations
without considerable study and forethought. Each recommendation is
consistent with the goal articulated in NASA's Workforce Strategy: to
develop a flexible, scalable workforce. While providing certain
additional flexibilities to NASA to help it address critical competency
shortfalls and excesses, the Panel's proposed package of flexibilities
would preserve the best of the civil service system for the 21st
century.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>