<DOC>
[110th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:34720.wais]
THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND
OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 27, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-58
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRITNING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California JO BONNER, Alabama
LAURA RICHARDSON, California TOM FEENEY, Florida
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BARON P. HILL, Indiana PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas Wisconsin
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director
EDITH HOLLEMAN Subcommittee Counsel
JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member
DOUG PASTERNAK Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN JACOBSON Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member
STACEY STEEP Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
September 27, 2007
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 5
Written Statement............................................ 6
Statement by Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Ranking
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 7
Written Statement............................................ 9
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 10
Panel 1:
General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Ret.), Chairman, Military
Advisory Board, The CNA Corporation
Oral Statement............................................... 11
Written Statement............................................ 12
Biography.................................................... 14
Mr. R. James Woolsey, Vice President, Booz Allen Hamilton
Oral Statement............................................... 15
Written Statement............................................ 16
Biography.................................................... 17
Discussion
Climate Change Disaster Planning............................... 18
Strategic Planning to Create Goodwill Towards the U.S.......... 20
Ocean Acidification............................................ 21
Transporting Fuel in Iraq...................................... 23
Are Humans Causing Climate Change?............................. 23
Can Human Behavior Reverse Climate Change?..................... 25
Global Warming Is an Important Issue........................... 25
More on How Humans Effect Global Warming....................... 27
Scientists Who Oppose the Idea of Man-made Global Warming...... 28
Military Prioritizing to Reduce Global Warming................. 31
Public Prioritizing to Reduce Global Warming................... 31
More on Military Prioritization................................ 33
More on Energy in Iraq......................................... 33
Dependence on the Wrong Regimes................................ 34
Domestic Energy Sources........................................ 35
Nuclear Power and Plug-in Hybrids.............................. 36
High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors........................... 37
New Materials for Armoring Vehicles............................ 38
Justifying Cost to Reduce Emissions............................ 38
Evaluating Current Methods to Reduce Emissions................. 39
Trade-offs in Decision-making.................................. 39
Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change Report.............. 40
Rallying Americans Behind Energy Problems...................... 41
Panel 2:
Dr. Alexander T.J. Lennon, Research Fellow, International
Security Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies; Editor-in-Chief, The Washington Quarterly
Oral Statement............................................... 43
Written Statement............................................ 44
Biography.................................................... 50
Dr. Andrew T. Price-Smith, Assistant Professor, Department of
Political Science, Colorado College; Director, Project on
Health, Environment, and Global Affairs, Colorado College/
University of Colorado-Colorado Springs; Senior Advisor, Center
for Homeland Security, University of Colorado
Oral Statement............................................... 51
Written Statement............................................ 53
Biography.................................................... 59
Dr. Kent Hughes Butts, Professor of Political Military Strategy;
Director, National Security Issues, Center for Strategic
Leadership, U.S. Army War College
Oral Statement............................................... 60
Written Statement............................................ 62
Biography.................................................... 72
Discussion
Are Current Multinational Structures Sufficient?............... 73
Disease Vectors................................................ 74
DOD Thinking About Climate Change.............................. 75
More on the IPCC Report........................................ 76
Policy Measures to Reduce Spread of Disease.................... 77
U.S. Assistance in Major Global Disasters and Emergencies...... 78
More on Disease Vectors........................................ 80
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. R. James Woolsey, Vice President, Booz Allen Hamilton........ 82
Dr. Alexander T.J. Lennon, Research Fellow, International
Security Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies; Editor-in-Chief, The Washington Quarterly............. 84
Dr. Andrew T. Price-Smith, Assistant Professor, Department of
Political Science, Colorado College; Director, Project on
Health, Environment, and Global Affairs, Colorado College/
University of Colorado-Colorado Springs; Senior Advisor, Center
for Homeland Security, University of Colorado.................. 86
Dr. Kent Hughes Butts, Professor of Political Military Strategy;
Director, National Security Issues, Center for Strategic
Leadership, U.S. Army War College.............................. 88
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
CNA Security and Climate Executive Summary....................... 94
THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad
Miller [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The National Security Implications
of Climate Change
thursday, september 27, 2007
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose:
The purpose of this hearing is to examine current thinking on the
nature and magnitude of the threats that global warming may present to
national security, and to explore the ways in which climate-related
security threats can be predicted, forestalled, mitigated, or remedied.
Among the many direct consequences of warming temperatures may
number: flooding, drought, soil and coastal erosion, melting of
glaciers and sea ice, and change in the range of disease vectors. Such
phenomena can lead to water shortages, diminution of food supplies from
both agriculture and the oceans, the spread of disease to new areas and
the emergence of new diseases, increased risk of fire, and decreased
production of electrical power. Through famine, epidemic, and
competition of resources, these can contribute to the breakdown of
civil order--and, where governments are already stressed,
disintegration of the state--as well as rampant human misery, mass
migration, the rise of extremist ideologies, and armed conflict. This
hearing will look at the current state of research into these
possibilities, as well as the strategic thinking that is being
developed in hopes of anticipating and coping with such threats.
In so doing, the hearing should help the Committee in identifying
new areas of research, or new emphases in existing areas, that have
begun emerging with the recently burgeoning of attention to the links
between climate change and national security.
Background:
The Committee on Science and Technology has long been a leader in
bringing the importance of climate change to the attention of the
Nation and in advocating measures to deal with this critical problem.
It played a crucial role in the creation of the U.S. Global Change
Research Program in 1990 and, just this June, reported out a measure,
H.R. 906, amending that original act. This legislation would require
the President to present to Congress a quadrennial assessment that
analyzes, among other things, ``the vulnerability of different
geographic regions of the world to global change, including analyses of
the implications of global change for international assistance,
population displacement, and national security.''
In addition, both Houses of Congress are now considering
legislation that would put Federal intelligence experts to work
studying the connection between climate change and national security.
Both H.R. 2082 and S. 1538 would direct the Director of National
Intelligence to submit to Congress, within 270 days of enactment, ``a
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the anticipated geopolitical
effects of global climate change and the implications of such effects
on the national security of the United States.'' The provision was
inserted into the Senate version of the bill via an amendment offered
by three Democrats and three Republicans.
Even with the legislation pending, the National Intelligence
Council (NIC) has begun working with the U.S. Global Change Research
Program and the Joint Global Research Institute, a collaborative effort
of Battelle Memorial Institute and the University of Maryland, on a
study of the sort the bills describe. Whether the study will be
published as an NIE or a National Intelligence Assessment is to be
determined closer to publication, which is expected in early 2008.
This legislation parallels the rise in prominence in policy circles
of the issue of global climate change's potential impacts on U.S.
national security. Early this year the Global Business Network, a
private consultant, issued a report titled Impacts of Climate Change: A
System Vulnerability Approach to Consider the Potential Impacts to 2050
of a Mid-Upper Greenhouse Gas Emissions Scenario.
A report to be considered at this hearing appeared shortly
thereafter: The CNA Corporation, which incorporates the Center for
Naval Analyses, produced National Security and the Threat of Climate
Change. The Subcommittee will receive testimony on this report
presented by a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon
Sullivan, USA (Ret.), who chaired the Military Advisory Board that CNA
formed in conjunction with this project. At about the same time, the
Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College and the Triangle
Institute for Security Studies jointly held a colloquium on ``Global
Climate Change: National Security Implications'' two of whose speakers,
Dr. Butts and Prof. Andrew Price-Jones of Colorado College, will also
be among the witnesses at this hearing.
Awaiting publication within the next year is a report, to be titled
``The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global
Climate Change,'' based on a year-long review by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Two men involved with its
production will testify at this hearing: Mr. James Woolsey, the former
Director of Central Intelligence, who wrote one of the three climate
change scenarios that make up the report; and Dr. Alexander Lennon, who
is serving as Co-Director of the report for CSIS.
Witnesses:
Panel One
General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Ret.), is the former Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Army and is serving as the Chairman of the Military Advisory
Board that The CNA Corporation formed in conjunction with its report
National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.
Mr. James Woolsey, a former Director of Central Intelligence and
currently Vice President of Booz Allen Hamilton, is the author of a
chapter of the forthcoming Center for Strategic and International
Studies report ``The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications
of Global Climate Change.''
Panel Two
Dr. Kent Hughes Butts is the Director of National Security Issues at
the U.S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership.
Dr. Alexander Lennon is a Research Fellow in the International Security
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and co-
director of the forthcoming CSIS report ``The Foreign Policy and
National Security Implications of Global Climate Change.''
Dr. Andrew Price-Smith is Assistant Professor of Political Science at
Colorado College, Director of the Project on Health and Global Affairs,
and author of the book The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease,
Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and
Development.
Chairman Miller. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order. Today's hearing is entitled The National Security
Implications of Climate Change.
The seeds of the Second World War and the Holocaust were
sown in the world-wide depression of the 1930s. European
democracies fell and were replaced with authoritarian regimes
with repugnant ideologies.
Last year the British Government issued a report that
concluded that environmental devastation from global warming
could result in a five to 20 percent decrease in the world's
economic production, which would be comparable to the Great
Depression or the World Wars.
The report concluded that global warming could result in
hunger from diminished agricultural production and fisheries,
water shortages, epidemics, and coastal flooding that could
displace as many as 200 million people. Other experts argued
that the report's conclusions were overstated and alarmist. But
what if the report was right?
Are we ready for the world we could face if the report's
conclusions prove correct? Will environmental and economic
devastation result in failed states, authoritarian regimes, the
spread of extremism and terror, and warfare over scarce
resources?
Our national security professionals don't like surprises.
They make it their business to anticipate events and plan for
different contingencies, however unlikely. In the '40s and the
'50s we were frequently surprised when governments we thought
were stable fell to coups or revolutions. Our intelligence
community developed models to predict which societies were
unstable or might become unstable. And contingency planning is
second nature to our military. Few adversaries are polite
enough to tell us in advance what their military plans are.
Have we considered which societies may become unraveled as
a result of environmental and economic devastation, whether or
not we are certain that those results will materialize? The
possibility of a world transformed by climate change is not a
science fiction myth of a post-apocalyptic society. It is not a
road warrior movie. It is happening now.
There is another Holocaust now in Darfur. The barbaric
Bashir regime certainly is responsible for the genocide in
Darfur, but the U.N. General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon recently
called the Darfur conflict an ``ecological crisis'' that had
arisen ``at least in part from climate change.''
Arab tribes and African tribes lived together more or less
in harmony for centuries, maybe millennia, but precipitation in
what was already an arid region has declined by 40 percent in
the last two decades, as the Sahara moves south into what had
been Sub-Saharan Africa. There is no longer enough water both
for Arab herders and for African farmers. The fighting in the
Sudan has resulted in 400,000 to 450,000 deaths, 2.5 million
people are living in refugee camps, and four million people in
Darfur, about half the region's population, depend on food
assistance to survive.
How many struggling governments in developing nations will
collapse from the economic consequences of global warming? Will
those ungoverned regions become, to use General Anthony Zinni's
phrase, petri dishes for extremism and terrorism?
The consequences of global warming affect the work of many
Committees of this Congress. They have certainly been the
subject of other hearings by the Science and Technology
Committee. The national security implications of global warming
certainly may guide the work of this committee. What research
should we be doing that we are not doing already? What research
should we move up in priority because of national security
concerns?
Can we be better prepared to protect our national security
interests by conducting research that will predict what
consequences can come from global warming and where? Can we be
better prepared by conducting research into how to mitigate the
consequences of global warming because the consequences are so
dire, whether or not we are certain they will happen?
To give just one example of the decisions this committee
faces, this committee fought for years the decision to
eliminate sensors designed to collect climate-related data from
the NPOESS satellite, the National Polar Orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System. The Department of Defense
decided to eliminate the sensors to save money in what was
already an embarrassingly large cost overrun. Is the
elimination of those sensors shortsighted just on the basis of
national security concerns and our national security needs?
Each of our witnesses today will have five minutes to
answer those questions. If you do not need the entire five
minutes, of course, you may waive your time.
And now I will recognize Mr. Sensenbrenner for his opening
remarks.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Brad Miller
The seeds of the Second World War and the Holocaust were sown in
the world-wide depression of the 1930s. European democracies fell and
were replaced with authoritarian regimes with repugnant ideologies.
Last year the British Government issued a report that concluded that
environmental devastation from global warming could result in a five to
20 percent decrease in the world's economic production, which would be
comparable to the Great Depression or the World Wars. The report
concluded that global warming could result in hunger from diminished
agricultural production and fisheries, water shortages, epidemics, and
coastal flooding that could displace as many as 200 million people.
Other experts argued that the report's conclusions were overstated
and alarmist. But what if the report was right? Are we ready for the
world we would face if the report's conclusions prove correct? Will
environmental and economic devastation result in failed states,
authoritarian regimes, the spread of extremism and terror, and warfare
over scarce resources? Our national security professionals don't like
surprises. They make it their business to anticipate events, however
unlikely, and to plan for different contingencies.
In the forties and the fifties, we were frequently surprised when
governments we thought were stable fell to coups or revolutions. Our
intelligence community developed models to predict which societies were
unstable, or might become unstable. And contingency planning is second
nature to our military. Few adversaries are polite enough to notify us
of their military plans.
Have we considered which societies may come unraveled as a result
of environmental and economic devastation, whether or not we are
certain that those results will materialize? The possibility of a world
transformed by climate change is not a science fiction image of a post-
apocalyptic society, it is not a road warrior movie, it is happening
now.
There is another holocaust now in Darfur. The barbaric Bashir
regime certainly is responsible for the genocide in Darfur, but U.N.
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon recently called the Darfur conflict an
``ecological crisis'' that had arisen ``at least in part from climate
change.'' Arab tribes and African tribes had lived together more or
less in harmony for centuries, perhaps millennia. But precipitation in
what was already an arid region has declined by 40 percent in the last
two decades as the Sahara moves south. There is no longer enough water
for Arab herders and for African farmers. The fighting in the Sudan has
resulted in 400 to 450 thousand deaths, 2.5 million are living in
refugee camps, and 4 million people in Darfur--roughly half the
region's population--now depend on food assistance. How many struggling
governments in developing nations will collapse from the economic
consequences of global warming? Will those ungoverned regions become,
to use General Anthony Zinni's phrase, petri dishes for extremism and
terrorism?
The consequences of global warming affect the work of many
Committees of this Congress, and have been the subject of other
hearings by the Science and Technology committee. The National Security
implications of global warming certainly may guide the work of this
Committee. What research should we be doing that we're not doing? What
research should we move up in priority? Can we better prepared to
protect our national security interests by conducting research that
will predict what consequences can come from global warming, and where?
Can we be better prepared by conducting research into how to mitigate
the consequences of global warming?
To give just one example, this committee fought for years the
decision to eliminate sensors designed to collect climate-related data
from the national polar orbiting operational environmental satellite
system. The Department of Defense decided to eliminate the sensors to
save money in a program with embarrassingly cost overruns. Is the
elimination of the sensors shortsighted on the basis of our national
security needs? Each of our witnesses today will have five minutes to
answer those questions. But won't be the last time we discuss the
topic.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The purpose of
today's hearing is to examine the current thinking on the
nature and magnitude of the threats that global warming may
present to national security. I have experience with this
issue.
This April I participated in a hearing on exactly the same
topic before the Select Committee on Energy Independence and
Global Warming. The issue was not new to me then either. As
Chair of the Science Committee I have held numerous hearings on
that topic.
I chaired related hearings as evidence that I believe it is
important, but increasingly discussions about climate change
are dominated by alarmism instead of commonsense. As global
warming has become more and more popular politically,
predictions of the Earth's future have become more and more
dire, and the images of a world a degree warmer sound almost
post-apocalyptic.
Some of the scenarios I am told we are destined to face
include increased border and immigration stress on the United
States from Mexico and the Caribbean, a widening wealth cap and
fleeing of intellectual and financial elite within developing
countries, increased poverty, floods, monsoons, melting
glaciers, tropical cyclones, hurricanes, water contamination,
ecosystem destruction, political unrest throughout Asia and
Europe, even full-scale war between China and Russia.
Education and understanding of the effects of global
warming are critical, but sermons about an environmental
apocalypse, while effective in rallying political support,
ultimately monger fear, force a poor prioritization of
resources, and threaten our ability to respond to more imminent
threats.
The national security risk posed by climate change need to
be balanced against other threats and priorities. Climate
change and its effect on national security have not exactly
been ignored. As I mentioned, the Select Committee has already
held an identical hearing. There have been a slew of books and
policy papers, several of which will be discussed today. And
most importantly, the intelligence community is already
studying the issue.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
informed me that it expects to release an NIE on the issue in
early 2008. Nonetheless, both the Senate and House are
considering legislation that would force the DNI to submit that
NIE that his office is already working on. Holding identical
hearings and mandating reports that are already being written
has more to do with politics than preparedness.
This is not the first time someone has claimed the sky is
falling. The predictions surrounding Y2K were similarly dire.
Of course, this time it is different. Every time the sky falls
it is different, and every time those who advocate commonsense
are chastised for ignoring inescapable peril. Maybe it is my
unwavering optimism that protects me from paranoia, or maybe it
is just a lifetime of experience with dire prognostications.
As unwise as it would be for us to ignore the national
security implications of climate change, it is equally unwise
to politicize our security to agree that we exaggerate certain
threats and ignore others.
Environmental consequences are not the only problems we
have to address in our response to global warming. The other
side of this challenge, the side that politicians and green
extremists are reluctant to acknowledge, is that our energy
demands are rising and will continue to rise. Running out of
conventional power plants is a real threat. We need to find
solutions like nuclear power that limit carbon emissions but
also ensure that our energy needs will be met.
We are also facing unprecedented economic challenges. Does
the challenge of competing in the globalized economy mount,
rapidly-growing countries like China and India have made it
clear again and again that they do not intend to hinder their
economic growth to curb climate change. This means that any
modest successes we enjoy at limiting our emissions will be
completely offset by China and other nations. That also means
that we cannot afford to stall our own economic development
when other nations will not be similarly handicapped. Solutions
that compromise our ability to produce energy or compete in the
global economy will be disastrous for America's future.
Fostering a more robust economy is our strongest defense
against climate change. The New York Times published an article
called ``Feel Good Versus Do Good on Climate.'' The weather
matters a lot less now than how people respond to it. According
to the article, Robert Davis, a climatologist at the University
of Virginia, concluded that the number of heat-related deaths
in New York in the 1990s was 33 percent lower than in the '60s.
That it was not, of course, cooler in the '90s than it was the
'60s, but an increase in air conditioning saved lives.
Because it is too late to prevent rising temperatures, the
best response is to insure our economy is strong enough to
adequately respond. Everyone agrees that the wealthiest
countries' individuals will be the least affected by global
warming. Putting more people in a position to afford air
conditioning will actually save lives.
It has become controversial in today's warming political
climate, but it not outrageous to trust that American ingenuity
can respond to this challenge as it has responded to challenges
in the past. Preparedness demands that we consider how changing
circumstances affect the overall picture of our national
security, but ultimately solutions to global warming and the
multitude of problems that it presents will be solved by the
scientific community and emerging technological industries.
As policy-makers our focus should be on encouraging these
industries, insuring that our energy needs are met by sources
that limit carbon emissions, then by responding to anticipating
problems engendered by climate change.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sensenbrenner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
The purpose of today's hearing is to ``examine current thinking on
the nature and magnitude of the threats that global warming may present
to national security.'' I have experience with this issue. This April,
I participated in a hearing on the same topic before the Select
Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming. The issue was not
new to me then either. As Chairman of the Science Committee, I held
numerous hearings on this topic.
That I chaired related hearings is evidence that I believe it is
important, but increasingly, discussions about climate change are
dominated by alarmism instead of common sense. As global warming has
become more and more popular politically, predictions of the Earth's
future have become more and more dire and images of the world a degree
warmer sound almost post-apocalyptic. Some of the scenarios I am told
we are destined to face include: increased border and immigration
stress on the United States from Mexico and the Caribbean, a widening
wealth gap and fleeing of intellectual and financial elite within
developing countries, increased poverty, floods, monsoons, melting
glaciers, tropical cyclones, hurricanes, water contamination, ecosystem
destruction, political unrest throughout Asia and Europe, and even a
full-scale war between China and Russia.
Education and understanding of the effects of global warming are
critical, but sermons about an environmental apocalypse, while
effective at rallying political support, ultimately monger fear, force
a poor prioritization of resources, and threaten our ability to respond
to more imminent threats. Each of the above disasters could happen, but
the risks need to be balanced against other threats and priorities.
Climate change and its affect on national security have not exactly
been ignored. As I mentioned, the Select Committee on Energy
Independence has already held an identical hearing. There have been a
slew of books and policy papers, several of which will be discussed
today. And, most importantly, the intelligence community is already
studying the issue. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
informed me that it expects to release a National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) on the issue in early 2008. Nonetheless, both the House and
Senate are considering legislation that would force the Director of
National Intelligence to submit the NIE that his office is already
working on. Holding identical hearings and mandating reports that are
already being written has more to do with politics than preparedness.
This is not the first time someone has claimed that ``the sky is
falling.'' The predictions surrounding Y2K were similarly dire. Of
course, this time is different. Every time the sky falls it is
different, and every time, those who advocate common sense are
chastised for ignoring the inescapable peril. Maybe it is my unwavering
optimism that protects me from paranoia, or maybe it is just a lifetime
of experience with dire prognostications. As unwise as it would be for
us to ignore the national security implications of climate change, it
is equally unwise to politicize our security to a degree that we
exaggerate certain threats and ignore others.
Environmental consequences are not the only problems we have to
address in our response to global warming. The other side of this
challenge, the side that politicians and green extremists are reluctant
to acknowledge, is that our energy demands are rising and will continue
to rise. Running out of conventional power plants is an actually
imminent threat. We need to find solutions, like nuclear power, that
limit or eliminate carbon emissions but also ensure that our energy
needs will be met.
We are also facing unprecedented economic challenges. As the
challenges of competing in a global economy mount, rapidly growing
countries like China and India have made clear that they do not intend
to hinder their economic growth to curb climate change. This means that
any modest successes we enjoy at limiting our emissions will be
completely offset by China and other nations. It also means that we
cannot afford to stall our own economic development when other nations
will not be similarly handicapped. Solutions that compromise our
ability to produce energy or compete in a global economy will be
disastrous for America's future.
Fostering a more robust economy is our strongest defense against
climate change. As the New York Times published in an article titled
``Feel Good vs. Do Good on Climate,'' ``the weather matters a lot less
than how people respond to it.'' Robert Davis, a climatologist at the
University of Virginia, concluded that the number of heat-related
deaths in New York in the 1990s was 33 percent lower than the number of
deaths in the 1960s. It was not, of course, cooler in the 1990s than it
was in the 1960s, but the increase in air conditioning was saving
lives. Because it is too late to prevent global warming, the best
response is to ensure that our economy is strong enough to adequately
respond. Everyone agrees that the wealthiest countries and individuals
will be the least affected by global warming.
It has become controversial in today's warming political climate,
but it is not outrageous to trust that American ingenuity can respond
to this challenge as it has responded to challenges in the past.
Preparedness demands that we consider how changing circumstances affect
the overall picture of our national security, but ultimately, solutions
to global warming and the multitude of problems that it presents will
be solved by the scientific community and the emerging technological
industries. As policy-makers, our focus should be on encouraging these
industries, ensuring that our energy needs are met by sources that
limit carbon emissions, and by responding to and anticipating problems
engendered by climate change.
As our witnesses testify today, I hope they will focus their
answers less on scare tactics and hypothetical cataclysms than on
common sense approaches to dealing with the problems we are facing.
After all, we know the sky isn't falling if only because hot air rises.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Other Members may submit
written testimony for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before
our committee to discuss The National Security Implications of Climate
Change.
Within the past year, the Nation has focused on the increasing
trends of global warming and the potential devastating results. I
believe it is vital to understand the potential national security
threats due to the effects of global warming combined with our limited
energy supply.
Congress continues to focus on energy reform and ways to curtail
our dependence on foreign oil while maintaining a sound environment and
national economy. Given the volatility of the oil and gas markets, it
makes sense to develop policies that place a greater dependence on
domestic resources. As I have said before, one way to accomplish this
goal is through the use of domestic fuels.
Towards this end, the United States enjoys an abundant amount of
coal, which currently used to produce half of our electricity. I firmly
believe coal used in conjunction with carbon capture and storage (CCS)
gasification and other clean coal technologies, is part of the solution
to achieving U.S. energy independence, continued economic prosperity
and improved environmental stewardship.
As we continue to address our energy crisis and the potential
threats it poses to the United States, it is imperative to invest in
multiple domestic energy sources in order to reduce our dependence on
foreign oil and strengthen our national security. I look forward to
working with my colleagues as we find practical solutions that lead us
down the path of energy independence.
Chairman Miller. At this time we will, I would like to
introduce our first panel, and it is an impressive,
distinguished panel.
General Gordon R. Sullivan is the former Chief of Staff of
the United States Army and is currently the Chairman of the
Military Advisory Board to the Report by the CNA Corporation
entitled, ``National Security and the Threat of Climate
Change.'' Mr. James Woolsey is the former Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency and is currently Vice-President at
Booz Allen Hamilton. He is the author of a chapter in a
forthcoming report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies entitled, ``Potential Foreign Policy and
National Security Implications of Global Climate Change.''
It is the spoken testimony--the oral testimony is limited
to five minutes. I think you, yes, you all have both submitted
written testimony, which is longer or may be longer. It is the
practice of the Subcommittee to take testimony under oath. We
are an investigations committee. This is not truly an
investigation. Since we are asking you to speculate about the
future, it is pretty hard to imagine you will be prosecuted
later for perjury if your forecasts prove to be incorrect, but
do either of you have any objection to being sworn in? We do
prefer that you tell us the truth, however, even if perjury
prosecutions appear unlikely.
And you have the right to be represented by counsel. Do
either of you have counsel with you today?
All right. These are men who are confident of their, of
what they will say. If you would now please stand and raise
your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn]
Chairman Miller. Thank you. General Sullivan, you may
begin.
Panel 1:
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GORDON R. SULLIVAN, USA (RET.), CHAIRMAN,
MILITARY ADVISORY BOARD, THE CNA CORPORATION
General Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I
am here as the Chairman of the Military Advisory Board to the
CNA Corporation. The Advisory Board consists of retired three-
and four-star flag officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marines.
We were charged with looking at the emerging phenomenon
known as global climate change through the prism of our own
experience and specifically looking at the national security
implications of global climate change.
Having said this, I must admit I came to the Advisory Board
as a skeptic. There are lots--and I am not sure some of the
others didn't as well--there are lots of conflicting
information on the subject of climate change, and like most
public policy issues in America, many opinions on this specific
issue.
After we listened to leaders of the scientific, business,
and Governmental communities, both I and my colleagues came to
agree that global climate change is and will be a significant
threat to our national security. The potential destabilizing
impacts of global climate change include reduced access to
fresh water, impaired food production, health issues,
especially from vector and food-borne diseases, and land loss,
flooding and so forth. And the displacement of major
populations.
And overall we view these phenomena as related to failed
states, growth of terrorism, mass migrations, and greater
regional and inter-regional instability.
The findings of the Board are first, projected climate
change poses a serious threat to America's national security.
Potential national threats to the Nation--potential threats to
the Nation's security require careful study and prudent
planning. Read the NIE.
Second, climate change acts as a threat multiplier for
instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.
Projected climate change will add to tensions even in
stable regions of the world.
Fourth, climate change, national security, and energy
dependence are a related set of global challenges.
The recommendations of the Board are that we cannot wait
for certainty in this issue, as been pointed out here in the
two statements this morning. There is a lack of certainty, but
there is certainly no lack of challenges, and in our view
failing to act because a warning isn't precise would be
imprudent.
Second, the United States should commit to a stronger
national and international role to help stabilize climate
changes at levels which will avoid significant disruption to
global stability and security.
And we should commit to global partnerships to work in that
regard, and I believe there have been a number of activities
this week which support that finding.
Fourth, the Department of Defense, which it is doing,
should enhance its operational capabilities by accelerating the
adoption of improved business processes and innovative
technologies.
And fifth, DOD should conduct an assessment of the impact
on military installations worldwide of the rise of sea level,
extreme weather events, and other possible climate change
impacts over the next 30 to 40 years.
Climate change, national security, and energy dependence
are all interrelated. Simply hoping that these relationships
will remain static is simply not acceptable given our training
and experience as military leaders. And hoping that everything
is going to be great probably won't work, at least in our view.
In closing, I would say that most of us on the Advisory
Board were in the military service of the United States of
America for over 30 years, most of it during the Cold War. Very
high levels of catastrophe would have--could have taken place
and might have taken place--if we didn't invest in military
preparedness and awareness of the threats we face. In our view
there is uncertainty here, and it would be prudent for us to
pay attention and to do our best to understand what is really
going on so that we could respond if asked.
Mr. Chairman, I request my full statement be added to the
report, and I stand ready to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Sullivan follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Ret.)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, for the opportunity to appear before you on this
important issue. Today I am here as Chairman of the Military Advisory
Board to The CNA Corporation report on ``National Security and the
Threat of Climate Change.'' The Advisory Board consists of three and
four star Flag Officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine
Corps. Our charge was to learn as much as we could in a relatively
short period about the emerging phenomenon of global climate change
using our experience as military leaders to process our learning
through a national security lens. In other words, what are the national
security implications of climate change?
When I was asked to be on the Military Advisory Board, I was both
pleased and skeptical. Pleased because of one simple and
straightforward fact--I am 70 years old, I have served my country for
over 50 years in both peace and war and now in the late stages of my
life I feel as if the sacrifices I and my soldiers, colleagues,
friends, and my family made for America are now being overtaken by a
much more powerful and significant challenge to the well-being of our
nation.
Having said this, I must admit I came to the Advisory Board as a
skeptic. There is a lot of conflicting information on the subject of
climate change and like most public policy issues in America, many
opinions, on the subject.
After listening to leaders of the scientific, business, and
governmental communities, my colleagues and I came to agree that global
climate change is and will be a significant threat to our national
security and in a larger sense to life on Earth as we know it to be.
The potential destabilizing impacts of climate change include:
reduced access to fresh water; impaired food production, health
catastrophes--especially from vector- and food-borne diseases; and land
loss, flooding and the displacement of major populations.
What are the potential security consequences of these destabilizing
effects? Overall, they increase the potential for failed states and the
growth of terrorism; mass migrations will lead to greater regional and
global tensions; and conflicts over resources are almost certain to
escalate.
The findings of the Military Advisory Board are:
<bullet> First, projected climate change poses a serious
threat to America's national security.
Potential threats to the Nation's security require careful
study and prudent planning--to counter and mitigate potential
outcomes.
<bullet> Second, climate change acts as a threat multiplier
for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the
world.
Many governments in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are
already on edge in terms of their ability to provide basic
needs: food, water, shelter, and stability. Projected climate
change will exacerbate the problems in these regions and add to
the problems of effective governance.
<bullet> Third, projected climate change will add to tensions
even in stable regions of the world.
Developed nations, including the U.S. and countries in
Europe, may experience increases in immigrants and refugees as
drought increases and food production declines in Africa and
Latin America. Pandemics and the spread of infectious diseases,
caused by extreme weather events and natural disasters, as the
U.S. experienced with Hurricane Katrina, may lead to increased
domestic missions for U.S. military personnel-lowering troop
availability.
<bullet> And, fourth, climate change, national security and
energy dependence are a related set of global challenges.
As President Bush noted in his 2007 State of the Union
address, dependence on foreign oil leaves us more vulnerable to
hostile regimes and terrorists, and clean domestic energy
alternatives help us confront the serious challenge of global
climate change. Because the issues are linked, solutions to one
affect the others.
The recommendations of the Military Advisory Board are:
<bullet> First, the national security consequences of climate
change should be fully integrated into national security and
national defense strategies.
As military leaders we know we cannot wait for certainty.
Failing to act because a warning isn't precise is unacceptable.
Numerous parts of the U.S. Government conduct analyses of
various aspects of our national security situation covering
different timeframes and at varying levels of detail. These
analyses should consider the consequences of climate change.
<bullet> Second, the U.S. should commit to a stronger national
and international role to help stabilize climate changes at
levels that will avoid significant disruption to global
security and stability.
All agencies involved with climate science, treaty
negotiations, energy research, economic policy, and national
security should participate in an interagency process to
develop a deliberate policy to reduce future risk to national
security from climate change. Actions fall into two main
categories: mitigating climate change to the extent possible by
setting targets for long-term reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions and adapting to those effects that cannot be
mitigated.
<bullet> Third, the U.S. should commit to global partnerships
that help less developed nations build the capacity and
resiliency to better manage climate impacts.
Some of the nations predicted to be most affected by climate
are those with the least capacity to adapt or cope. This is
especially true in Africa. The U.S. should focus on enhancing
the capacity of weak African governments to better cope with
social needs and to resist to overtures of well-funded
extremists to provide schools, hospitals, health care, and
food.
<bullet> Fourth, the Department of Defense (DOD) should
enhance its operational capability by accelerating the adoption
of improved business processes and innovative technologies that
result in improved U.S. combat power through energy efficiency.
DOD should require more efficient combat systems and include
the actual cost of delivering fuel when evaluating the
advantages of intervention in efficiency.
<bullet> And, fifth, DOD should conduct an assessment of the
impact on U.S. military installations worldwide of rising sea
levels, extreme weather events, and other possible climate
change impacts over the next 30 to 40 years.
As part of prudent planning DOD should assess the impact of
rising sea levels, extreme weather events, drought, and other
climate impacts on its infrastructures so its installations and
facilities can be made resilient.
Climate change, National Security and energy dependence are inter-
related. Hoping that these relationships will remain static is simply
not acceptable given our training and experience as military leaders.
The path to mitigating the worst security consequences of climate
change involves reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. There is a
relationship between carbon emissions and our national security. I
think that the evidence is there that would suggest that we have to
start paying attention.
The Federal Government and the Department of Defense can help and
lead in this area. DOD is the largest energy user in the U.S.
Government and one of the largest energy users in the Nation. One of
our key vulnerabilities on the battlefield today is transportation of
fuel for combat use. We are using a lot of fuel in Iraq, and the Army
in particular is experiencing battlefield casualties on their fuel
convoy's--they are difficult to protect--so to the extent that DOD can
develop new technologies to protect the troops by improving energy
efficiency, so too can those technologies be beneficial to our country.
In fact, a Defense Science Board study now underway and another one in
2001 said that the energy challenges of our nation and those of our
military are similar and that DOD can lead in resolving our nation's
energy challenges even as DOD meets its own challenges in this area. In
a very real sense, the buying power of the Federal Government can help
lead our nation to low carbon energy futures.
In closing I would say that most of us on the Military Advisory
Board were in the service through the Cold War. All of us served for
over 30 years. Most of us retired in the '90s. Very high levels of
catastrophe could have occurred at that time, and by investing in
military preparedness we were able to avert the dangers of that time.
In our view, there's a lot of uncertainty here, but we need to be
paying attention to what might happen and what is happening around the
world from the threats of climate change.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before
you here today. Mr. Chairman, I request my statement and the report to
be entered into the record.
Biography for General Gordon R. Sullivan
General Sullivan was the 32nd Chief of Staff--the senior general
officer in the Army and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the
Chief of Staff of the Army, he created the vision and led the team that
helped transition the Army from its Cold War posture.
During his Army career, General Sullivan also served as Vice Chief
of Staff (June 1990-June 1991); Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
and Plans (July 1989-June 1990); Commanding General, 1st Infantry
Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas (June 1988-July 1989); Deputy
Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas (March 1987-June 1988); and Assistant Commandant,
U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky (November 1983-July 1985).
His overseas assignments included four tours in Europe, two in Vietnam
and one in Korea. He served as he served as Chief of Staff to Secretary
of Defense Dick Cheney under the first Bush Administration.
General Sullivan was commissioned a second lieutenant of Armor and
awarded a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from Norwich University in
1959. He holds a Master of Arts degree in Political Science from the
University of New Hampshire. His professional military education
includes the U.S. Army Armor School Basic and Advanced Courses, the
Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.
General Sullivan is currently the President and Chief Operating
Officer of the Association of the United States Army, headquartered in
Arlington, Virginia. He assumed his current position at the Association
in February 1998 after serving as President, Coleman Federal in
Washington, D.C.
He is the co-author, with Michael V. Harper, of Hope Is Not a
Method (Random House, 1996), which chronicles the challenges of
transforming the post-Cold War Army. Gordon Sullivan is a trustee of
Norwich University and serves on the boards of several major
corporations, including Newell-Rubbermaid, Shell Oil and Getronics
Government Solutions, L.L.C. He is also a Director of the Atlantic
Council of the United States and the George C. Marshall Foundation and
the Chairman Emeritus of the Marshall Legacy Institute.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, General. It will, of course, be
added.
Mr. Woolsey.
STATEMENT OF MR. R. JAMES WOOLSEY, VICE PRESIDENT, BOOZ ALLEN
HAMILTON
Mr. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be
asked to appear before you today and to appear beside my
friend, General Sullivan.
I want to stress I am speaking only for myself and not for
any institution that I am associated with. I have attached a
24-page draft of the chapter that you referred to when you
introduced me, and I would like to use these five minutes to
point out several things in that chapter.
I deal there with two types of risks to our future. I call
them malignant and malevolent disruptions. By malignant I mean
something that, like cancer in the human body, is not
intentionally caused but is the, results from our behavior to
some extent--and this could either be overloading our
electricity grid and having it fail because of storms and tree
branches falling in Ohio, as it did four years ago, or putting
too much carbon into the atmosphere and, some decades from now,
perhaps contributing to sinking Bangladesh beneath the waves.
We are not trying to take down Canada's electricity, and we are
not trying to sink Bangladesh beneath the waves, but sometimes
our behavior can cause cascading failures in complex systems.
We also, however, face a second set of problems that I
called malevolent because terrorists are a lot smarter than
tree branches. And the vulnerabilities of our energy systems to
intentional malevolent interference from terrorism are set
forth and described rather fully in the first pages of the
report.
I think with respect to climate change, it is important to
realize that the most disastrous potential effects are, I
think, ocean, sea-level height changes. And those may come
about at unexpected times and in unexpected ways, because we
have entered a period in which there is exponential change as a
result of warming to a degree that we have not--even if we have
not accurately forecast precisely when that is going to occur.
I think certainty is very difficult in this field, but what
should not be difficult is realizing that, for both potential
malignant changes such as climate change and malevolent changes
such as terrorism, the cause may operate and act in ways that
we cannot fully understand at this point.
What I want to stress is, and I set it up in a perhaps
curious way as a dialogue between what I call a tree hugger and
a hawk: My tree hugger is the ghost of John Muir, and my hawk
is the ghost of George S. Patton. Muir in the chapter is
concerned exclusively with carbon. Patton is concerned
exclusively with terrorism. The point is that, although they
don't convince one another of the importance of their concern,
what they end up finding they need to do in order to deal with
both sets of problems rather remarkably overlaps.
Both in the chapter come to the conclusion that radical
improvement in efficiency of buildings, particularly as steps
that have positive paybacks, not costing anything but having
internal rates of return of 10 percent or more, radically
increasing the use of combined heat and power or cogeneration
as Denmark does, and substantially changing the incentives for
long-term movement toward distributed generation of electricity
and heating and cooling. Together with following California's
lead in decoupling revenues from earnings for electric
utilities, so that a utility may make money by improving its
efficiency and investing, even if that doesn't produce more
electricity. That has led California in the last 20 years to be
absolutely level in its degree of energy use per capita,
electricity use per capita, whereas the rest of the country has
gone up 60 percent.
Some of these changes, including--and I have run out of
time--moving toward also plug-in hybrid gasoline electric
vehicles, flexible fuel vehicles, biofuels, more use of
electricity for automobile propulsion as well, are all steps
that Patton and Muir find they can agree on, even though they
are solving different problems.
And I would urge on really all participants in this debate,
Mr. Chairman, that even though I think both of these problems
are serious, I consider myself in this context both a tree
hugger and a hawk. I don't think there should be any problem,
nearly as much problem in cooperating and working together on
solutions as there may be on convincing one another of the
substantive concern that each of several different groups may
have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Woolsey follows:]
Prepared Statement of R. James Woolsey
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. It is an honor to be
asked to testify before you today on this important subject. By way of
identification, I am now a Vice President of a large consulting firm,
where I work on energy issues; before I became a consultant five years
ago I practiced law for 22 years in the field of civil litigation and I
have also served in the Federal Government for a total of twelve years
on five different occasions, holding Presidential appointments in four
administrations, two Republican and two Democratic--all in the field of
national security. Most recently I served as Director of Central
Intelligence 1993-95. I am speaking today solely on my own behalf and
not that of any institution with which I am associated.
I have attached to this opening statement a 24-page draft of a
chapter I am contributing to a collection to be published in several
months on national security and climate change. As the chapter's text
indicates, of the several authors submitting contributions to this book
I was asked to concentrate on the extremely severe case of several
possible climate change scenarios.
In my view, in the interest of our nation's security, for the
foreseeable future we need to keep our attention on two potentially
disastrous types of disruptions of our society. I call these
``malignant'' and ``malevolent'' disruptions. The first, like cancer in
the human body, is not intentionally caused but the risk of disruption
or even disaster may be enhanced by some aspects of our behavior--if we
overload our electricity grid we may become more vulnerable to
blackouts, or if we put too much carbon into the atmosphere we may
enhance the risk of climate change. But terrorists are smarter than
tree branches in storms, so we also need to be concerned about
``malevolent,'' or intentional, attacks. Some of these may exploit
vulnerabilities in our energy production and distribution or other
weaknesses in our infrastructure.
If we want to be as secure as possible, we cannot ignore either
type of threat. But normally these two threats are addressed by
different groups who sometimes give short shrift to the threat that is
of central concern to the other. In the chapter I call the group that
focuses on malignant threats such as climate change the ``tree
huggers'' and that which focuses on malevolent threats such as
terrorism the ``hawks.'' The first 15 pages of the chapter address both
of these types of risk: malignant and malevolent.
I would emphasize that although there is broad scientific agreement
that future climate change is a serious problem and, in important
measure, one that is caused by human activity, there is substantial
uncertainty in predicting the point at which the increasing
concentration of global warming gases in the atmosphere would have
enough of an effect on temperature to lead to irreversible climate
change. This is because climate models tend to be linear and have great
difficulty forecasting the exponential changes which at some point
could tip us over into irreversibility--for example, the rapid melting
of the West Antarctic ice sheet, which could cause a rise of five
meters or more in sea levels. So most of the predictions of disastrous
change rely on data but use that data to construct analogies to climate
change in the past (pp. 4-6 of chapter). As NASA's James Hansen puts
it, ``I'm a modeler, too, but I rate data higher than models.''
Still, even relying on analogies, when one considers today's level
of CO<INF>2</INF> emissions and the prospect of substantial growth in
them as world population increases and economies develop (pp. 6-7), it
seems clear that there is enough degree of risk that some action must
be taken. This is in substantial part because of prospective sea level
rise and coastal flooding, which Dr. Hansen calls ``the big global
issue.'' Such flooding could have disastrous effects on populations in
this country and all over the world and seriously affect our military
capabilities, world political balance, energy and water systems, and
much else (pp. 7-11).
At the same time, many aspects of our society, including the way we
produce and use energy, make us vulnerable to terrorist attack for the
foreseeable future. These include our dependence on oil (pp. 11-13) and
the vulnerability of our electricity grid, particularly to physical
attack on its transformers and cyber attack on its Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems (pp. 13-14). An important recent
commission report also describes the vulnerability of the grid to
Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) attack, unfortunately something that could
readily be contemplated in the not-distant future by countries having
only a primitive nuclear weapon, a SCUD missile, and a fishing boat
(pp. 14-15).
The last eight pages of the chapter set out an imaginary meeting
between a ``tree hugger'' and a ``hawk'' to try to design an energy
policy for the country in light of the need to deal with both malignant
and malevolent risks. I picked two of my favorite Americans for these
roles. For the tree hugger I chose the ghost of John Muir and for the
hawk the ghost of General George S. Patton. In the meeting Muir is
focused exclusively on climate change and Patton exclusively on
terrorism, but although there are points where they disagree, they are
somewhat surprisingly able to come up with a common nine-part energy
plan that reduces both types of risks substantially--it involves energy
conservation, distributed and renewable production of both electricity
and alternative fuels, plug-in hybrids and flexible fuel vehicles.
Whatever package the United States settles on, Mr. Chairman, in my view
we should do so in the spirit of this mythical Muir-Patton discussion
and treat seriously both of these looming threats to our nation and
indeed to civilization itself.
Biography for R. James Woolsey
R. James Woolsey joined Booz Allen Hamilton in July 2002 as a Vice
President and officer. He is with the firm's Energy practice, located
in McLean, Virginia. Previously Mr. Woolsey served in the U.S.
Government on five different occasions, where he held Presidential
appointments in two Republican and two Democratic administrations. He
was also previously a partner at the law firm of Shea & Gardner in
Washington, DC, where he practiced for 22 years in the fields of civil
litigation and alternative dispute resolution.
During his 12 years of government service Mr. Woolsey was: Director
of Central Intelligence from 1993 to 1995; Ambassador to the
Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Vienna, 1989-
1991; Under Secretary of the Navy, 1977-1979; and General Counsel to
the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1970-1973. He was also
appointed by the President as Delegate at Large to the U.S.-Soviet
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Nuclear and Space Arms Talks
(NST), and served in that capacity on a part-time basis in Geneva,
Switzerland, 1983-1986. As an officer in the U.S. Army, he was an
adviser on the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT I), Helsinki and Vienna, 1969-1970.
Mr. Woolsey is currently Co-Chairman (with former Secretary of
State George Shultz) of the Committee on the Present Danger. He is also
Chairman of the Advisory Boards of the Clean Fuels Foundation and the
New Uses Council, and a Trustee of the Center for Strategic &
International Studies and the Center for Strategic & Budgetary
Assessments. He also serves on the National Commission on Energy
Policy. Previously, he was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Board of Regents of The Smithsonian Institution, and a trustee of
Stanford University, The Goldwater Scholarship Foundation, and the
Aerospace Corporation. He has also been a member of The National
Commission on Terrorism, 1999-2000; The Commission to Assess the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S. (Rumsfeld Commission), 1998; The
President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform, 1989; The
President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard
Commission), 1985-1986; and The President's Commission on Strategic
Forces (Scowcroft Commission), 1983.
Mr. Woolsey is presently a managing director of the Homeland
Security Fund of Paladin Capital Group and a member of VantagePoint
Management, Inc.'s Cleantech Advisory Council. He has served in the
past as a member of boards of directors of a number of other publicly
and privately held companies, generally in fields related to technology
and security, including Martin Marietta; British Aerospace, Inc.;
Fairchild Industries; Yurie Systems, Inc.; and USF&G. He also served as
a member of the Board of Governors of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange.
Mr. Woolsey was born in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and attended Tulsa public
schools, graduating from Tulsa Central High School. He received his
B.A. degree from Stanford University (1963, With Great Distinction, Phi
Beta Kappa), an M.A. from Oxford University (Rhodes Scholar 1963-1965),
and an LL.B from Yale Law School (1968, Managing Editor of the Yale Law
Journal).
Mr. Woolsey is a frequent contributor of articles to major
publications, and from time to time gives public speeches and media
interviews on the subjects of foreign affairs, defense, energy,
critical infrastructure protection and resilience, and intelligence. He
is married to Suzanne Haley Woolsey and they have three sons, Robert,
Daniel, and Benjamin.
Discussion
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. Woolsey. It is difficult to
wear both Birkenstocks and combat boots at the same time.
Mr. Woolsey. Well, it is one foot each maybe.
Climate Change Disaster Planning
Chairman Miller. In the draft of your report that you did
provide us, you began with a quote from a British intelligence
officer who retired in 1950 after 47 years of service and said,
``Year after year the worriers and the fretters came to me with
awful predictions of the outbreak of war. I denied it each
time. I was only wrong twice.''
Mr. Woolsey. Yes, sir.
Chairman Miller. How dire--well, how probable--do the
consequences that we have. . .? Neither of you are scientists.
Neither of you really can predict. We haven't called you for
that reason. But how probable do the dire consequences need to
be for us to feel some urgency in planning for the
possibilities?
General Sullivan.
General Sullivan. Well, my response to that is that I,
first of all, I believe there is some planning going on, and it
is interesting that this morning, when I arrived at the office,
I had the statement of General George Casey, Jr., Chief of
Staff in the Army, which was made yesterday in a hearing.
General Casey said the following: ``Population growth and its
youth bulge will increase opportunities for instability,
radicalism, and extremism. Resource demand for energy, water,
and food for growing populations will increase competition and
conflict. Climate change and natural disasters will cause
humanitarian crises, population migrations, and epidemic
diseases.'' That was in his hearing yesterday before the
Senate.
I think the leadership in the Pentagon and around the globe
in their official positions are well aware of the nature of
this phenomenon and responding appropriately. I have every
reason to believe they are. AFRICOM, the new African command,
which is being stood up, I feel quite sure will be paying a lot
of attention to some of the issues which are raised.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Woolsey, do you have any sense of what
kind of planning should be taking place and how probable the
different scenarios need to be for us to be well deep into
planning for them?
Mr. Woolsey. If one looks at probabilities, as the models
of the IPCC do, one comes up with sea-level rise, and I tend to
use that as a proxy for a number of climate effects. Sea-level
rise of something between six or eight inches and two feet
during the 21st century. That could be substantial for some
parts of the world, such as Bangladesh. And it could be
accompanied by a number of very difficult climate circumstances
such as glacial melting, which would make parts of South
America very difficult to live in from the point of view of
water and the like. It could be quite serious.
But the really serious problem is if we hit--and it is hard
to attach a probability to this--if we hit one of these tipping
points which causes something like a rapid melting of the West
Antarctic ice shelf. If I could just, an analogy in history:
Between 14,000 and 15,000 years ago, sea level was rising at
four or five times today's rate. And then it went from rapid to
amok and increased another factor of four or five and went up
by about 20 meters in 400 years, so about five meters a
century. Five meters a century is absolutely huge.
A lot of climatologists believe that was because the West
Antarctic ice shelf may have melted. It could have been
something else. But what we have to worry about is not
something that human beings can predict very well with their
models, which operate in a linear fashion. The key point is:
When do you hit these tipping points, the knee of the curve,
the exponential change in which from our point of view
everything begins to accelerate? From the point of view of
nature it has probably been operating exponentially all the
time, going up by factors of one to two to four to 16, et
cetera.
So I--it is a long-winded way of saying--I have a hard time
attaching a probability to it, and I think the climatologists
do, too. It is the judgment of people like Dr. Hansen and
others about these historical analogies and when things have
changed rapidly in the past and why, that I think we really
have to rely on to say it is prudent to begin to do some
things, and some important things, now.
But a lot of what we need to do serves other purposes such
as making us more resilient against terrorism, and a good deal
of it actually makes money rather than costing money. So I come
out that we should begin to move now, even if we don't have a
really good sense of the probabilities.
Chairman Miller. My time is now expired.
Mr. Sensenbrenner.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Strategic Planning to Create Goodwill Towards the U.S.
I guess I want to go from big philosophical things to
little, practical things.
I think we all know that America's standing in many parts
of the world is not what we would like to have it be. I look
back at when the earthquake and tsunami hit in Southeast Asia.
The fact that we had military assets available ended up being a
lifesaver in Indonesia, again, one of the countries where our
approval rating is in the tank.
But even people who might have been Islamic fundamentalists
who hate the values that we stand for recognize that we saved a
lot of lives, and we also saved a lot of suffering of people
whose lives were not in jeopardy.
How do you, each of you think that we ought to be looking
at an intelligence estimate in terms of not necessarily dealing
toward a catastrophic event which may or may not have been
caused by climate, but essentially building up goodwill that we
are on their side in things like providing agricultural self-
sufficiency, which we have done very well since the end of the
Second World War, encouraging reforestation, which everybody
agrees helps sop up carbon, and reversing the denuding of the
rainforests in certain parts of Africa and South America and
other parts of the world.
How does intelligence and strategic planning fit into that?
General Sullivan. I think very closely. If you look at East
Africa, there is migration from north to south out of Somalia
into Kenya and nations south. The problem is--well, not the
problem--they are seeking food, they are seeking in some cases
fish, but the Wildlife Federation has a program to assist
countries in East Africa to create coast guards. Interestingly
enough, with relatively small boats people in those countries
are able to go out to patrol their own shores, which, in fact,
limits overfishing.
I think there are many things as you point out which can be
done, and I think commands like AFRICOM under General Kip Ward
and his people, they are looking at those issues: deforestation
and economic self-sufficiency, agricultural self-sufficiency.
And there have been pretty good examples of how reforestating--
if there is such a word; reforesting, or whatever the word is--
helps.
And I think those are simple things which can be done and
will be done. I feel reasonably sure they will be done.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. How do you put an American face on that,
though?
General Sullivan. How do you put it?
Mr. Sensenbrenner. How do you put an American face on that?
General Sullivan. Well, I think, I don't know this for
sure, but I think the Special Forces and some of the military
missions which are going in parts of our effort do have an
American face.
Mr. Woolsey. Congressman, I think that in the. . . Even
short of any of these sort of catastrophic changes that I
referred to earlier, even modest amounts of climate change,
particularly warming in the Southern Hemisphere let us say
here, is likely to have enough weather changes associated with
it and crop yield changes and fresh water changes that you may
start to see rather substantial beginnings of migrations. And a
lot of refugees and so forth, particularly from places which
are very low-lying: deltas, Bangladesh, et cetera.
I think that until one gets into rather large levels of
sea-level rise, the worldwide potential deploying and
assistance that U.S. military forces can provide can be of
benefit, very substantial benefit in foreign countries, such as
they were in Indonesia, as you said--after the tsunami. But
they can also be good ambassadors for the country.
And I think that some of relatively easy things to do could
pay big dividends. For example, we have some amphibious ships,
as I understand it, that are about to get scrapped. And it
might not be too expensive, I know some groups are talking
about doing this, to turn one or more of them into hospital
ships for the purpose of rapid deployment for our own country--
in case we have to deal with another tsunami of our own, such
as the hurricane damage in New Orleans--but also for places
like Indonesia and the rest. One can do a great deal by showing
up with even a relatively small contingent of the U.S. Navy in
a hospital ship.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you.
General Sullivan. Can I come back to follow up?
Chairman Miller. General Sullivan, go ahead.
General Sullivan. Just to Sensenbrenner. I have just been
told Colonel Retired Kent Butts will be on the next panel. Next
week--I don't want to steal his thunder, I will let him explain
it--but he is hosting a conference up at Carlisle Barracks with
AFRICOM and the Army people, working on the type of issues you
just raised, and I would let him explain it to you.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, General Sullivan.
Mr. Baird.
Ocean Acidification
Mr. Baird. Just a couple of questions. Thank you, first of
all, for your service and for being here today.
We tend to focus on climate change as the, maybe, the
headline impact of CO<INF>2</INF> accumulation in the
atmosphere. But the CO<INF>2</INF> accumulation also has
another effect which in some ways may be at least as dramatic,
and that has to do with increasing the acidification of the
oceans. And at least some research studies are suggesting
rather strongly that as acidification goes up, the coral reefs
go down. In fact, my understanding is in geological history the
last time that we estimate that CO<INF>2</INF> levels were this
high and acidification was this high, there are no fossil
records of coral reefs for that period. Because--basically, and
this is not--you don't have to look at climate trends, you can
replicate this in a lab. You can make an enclosed base, pump
some CO<INF>2</INF> into the air, it gets dissolved into the
water, that changes the acidity. That acidity takes up the
calcium carbonate, and there you go: You have got no coral
reefs.
And I don't know if that has been looked at. And I am not--
it is not clear to me how the national security implications--
except, for some countries, it is their nation, the lack of
coral--so any comments on that would be more than welcome on
that issue. And also it has an effect on sea life, et cetera.
General Sullivan. I am not, as been pointed out--and truth
in lending--I am not a scientist. I am a history major. I was a
soldier for the bulk of my adult life, so let the record show
that.
But number two, I have visited Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institute and actually I have visited a couple of times, and I
do know that scientists there are very clear on the subject
which you raise. That is, acidization of the oceans is having a
detrimental effect on plankton, on the growth of krill, so
forth and so on. And coral reefs are, in fact, diminished,
which is reducing sea life, which is reducing food for
populations which get their, frankly, get their protein--much
of their protein--from the ocean.
And there is a direct link in my view connecting the dots,
not as a scientist, but as a soldier. There is a direct link
between that--those phenomenon--and unrest, and that unrest
causes the rest of the chain to be activated: that is,
extremists, opportunists who are selling food for exorbitant
amounts of money and so forth and so on. Terrorism.
Mr. Woolsey. Congressman, I would agree with General
Sullivan, but I would jump perhaps quickly to what do we do
about it. And if we look at the fact that today the carbon
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere are approaching double
what they have historically been when the world's climate has
been more or less like this, two major recent studies by
institutions cited on page 17 of my chapter indicate that if
you just take the world's buildings and just look at projects
to improve their, reduce their use of energy, that has a 10
percent or greater internal rate of return. So all of these
make money. They don't cost anything. Up front they cost
something, but they all have at least a 10 percent or greater
internal rate of return.
Just from the buildings in the world, one could hold global
warming or, say, CO<INF>2</INF> concentrations to somewhere
between 450 and 550 parts per million. That would be a stunning
achievement compared with all of what else is being discussed,
with respect to CO<INF>2</INF> concentrations. That is the
first thing that my mythical John Muir and mythical George
Patton agree on doing. And it is money-making.
So I think if one is even to a modest degree concerned
about CO<INF>2</INF> concentrations in the ocean--I think for
the reasons General Sullivan said we ought to be more than
modestly concerned--why not go ahead and make the money and do
it: make these changes anyway before we have to decide whether
it is disastrous or just difficult?
Transporting Fuel in Iraq
Mr. Baird. I appreciate it. Let me raise one other issue,
and my time will probably be expired, but if you look at the
situation we have in Iraq right now with the infrastructure--
particularly energy being a critical factor--transporting
petroleum products or energy over either long pipelines or long
transmission lines creates a system that is vulnerable to even
the most rudimentary insurgent group of RPGs. You can blow up a
pipeline, you can knock down a transmission line with a
hacksaw.
Amory Lovins, who I am sure you gentlemen probably know,
has done some very important work on national security
implications of dispersed energy versus local energy, soft
energy paths. My understanding is he has gotten scant
attention. He has tried to get attention from our planners in
Iraq, but I would certainly think we ought to spend a whole lot
more time talking to Amory, listening to Amory Lovins, and
implementing some of his recommendations in Iraq rather than
trying to secure these pipelines at the lives of our boys over
there.
Mr. Woolsey. Congressman, Amory is an old friend of mine. I
wrote the forward to his book, Brutal Power, 25 years ago. He
was on my panel for the Defense Science Board. I chaired the
policy panel of their recent study of energy issues in defense
that is about to come out.
And I think you are exactly right. The real fuel cost at
the front lines is many hundreds of dollars per barrel of fuel
if you allocate all of the logistical training that is needed
to get the fuel forward. And energy-savings capabilities for
our deployed forces are a very important part of their being
able to fight effectively, as well as all of the other issues
that we are discussing today.
Mr. Baird. Thank you.
General Sullivan. Seventy percent of the weight the Army
carries into battle is liquid. It is either fuel or water. It
is a huge number, and they are working very hard: I can assure
you the scientists and the research and development people are
working very, very diligently to reduce energy usage to move,
you know, this. I am not looking at the numbers, but it is big.
We will have to get it there.
Chairman Miller. Thank you for your testimony. Your written
testimony also makes a point that gasoline convoys are
especially difficult to protect. I believe it was, maybe it was
General Woolsey, Mr. Woolsey.
General Sullivan. Right.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Are Humans Causing Climate Change?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. I can tell from your testimony
that you both believe that there is climate change taking
place, and I think most people will agree that there is a
climate change taking place. Are you both convinced that the
climate change that is taking place is manmade as compared to
the many other climate changes that we have gone through as Mr.
Woolsey has already made reference to in his testimony?
Mr. Woolsey. I am not certain it all is. I think it is, a
substantial share of it is, as the scientists call it,
anthropogenic. That is certainly the conclusion of the Inter-
Governmental Panel on Climate Change, but I don't think it
matters in a way.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. I am going to follow up on that, but
General, do you believe that the climate change that we are
going through as compared to all these other times that there
has been a climate change that has occurred on this Earth is
now caused by human activity?
General Sullivan. No.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is very important, because in the
decisions that we are making here, we are being told we have to
do certain things and restrict human activity in a way to stop
the climate change, which both of you now seem to indicate
there is a natural occurrence.
Now, those of us who are skeptical about the climate change
theory are not skeptical that there are climate, major climate
changes that happen in the Earth, and as Mr. Woolsey has
repeatedly pointed out in his testimony, we should be prepared
for that.
And also let me note that those of us who are skeptics of
the global warming theories that were being presented, I would
agree totally with you, Mr. Woolsey, when you suggest that we
should be making our engines more efficient for energy
independence, also for health reasons, and because we are
concerned about clean air and the health of our people. And
also there are long-term economic benefits to having more
efficient engines.
But there is a difference about where you put your emphasis
if you buy into what is being told to us today that the climate
cycle that we are in is caused by human activity, by humans
producing more CO<INF>2</INF>. And then it is a whole different
thing. I certainly buy into, I think there is nothing we are
going to do that is going to prevent a cycle of climate that,
by the way, is going on on Mars and Jupiter at the same time.
General Sullivan. Well, I----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, sir. Go right ahead.
General Sullivan.--don't agree with that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
General Sullivan. I don't agree with that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you think----
General Sullivan. I think----
Mr. Rohrabacher.--you think there is some things that we
can actually do----
General Sullivan. I think there are some things we can do
to mitigate----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Oh, no, no. Not mitigate. Reverse. No, no.
Mitigate is----
General Sullivan. Well, I don't know, even reverse. We
reversed ozone.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well----
General Sullivan. We reversed the hole, the ozone hole, by
limiting hair spray and other, the use of freon in our cars.
Can Human Behavior Reverse Climate Change?
Mr. Rohrabacher. But that is another issue that I will have
to say deserves some debate, but in terms of actually reversing
the climate change that we are going through today by changing
human activity is a lot different than saying, which is what
Mr. Woolsey is saying, we need to do things to plot a strategy
so that that does not, this climate change that is coming about
like the many other cycles that have, we have gone through on
this Earth, that we need to be prepared for it because there
will be national security implications.
Mr. Woolsey. Congressman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Go ahead.
Mr. Woolsey. Even if some portion of the climate--let us
say the CO<INF>2</INF> concentrations--are from non-
anthropogenic causes, if the pace is the pace that we are
seeing now, and we do a number of things that make sense anyway
for counter-terrorism purposes, for saving money purposes----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah.
Mr. Woolsey.--et cetera, we may be able to have an effect
whether or not they are all, the changes are all anthropogenic,
or as I believe, probably substantially all anthropogenic----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, that is correct.
Mr. Woolsey.--or only a little bit anthropogenic.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is correct. However, there is a great
debate, and obviously there are, you may not be aware that
there are a large number of scientists who suggest that as the
Earth changes and has gone through this cycle, that is what is
producing more CO<INF>2</INF>. It is not the fact that human
beings are producing more CO<INF>2</INF> that is creating the
climate change.
And thus what we should be doing is, many of the
suggestions you have made, which are absolutely on target, and
I might add, this is my continual conversation with Governor
Schwarzenegger in California, is that there are areas, a large
number of areas where those of us who are skeptical that the
human beings are causing global warming, but we should be doing
the right thing. And making things more efficient and cleaner
for that reason.
But to try to do this in the name of stopping this climate
change, Mr. Woolsey, I think you are more on target that we
should be aiming our efforts, realizing that the climate is
changing, as it has so many times in the past, prepare for it
in case there are national security implications.
Mr. Woolsey. We can do smart things for Patton reasons or
for Muir reasons or for Patton and Muir reasons, and I am
perfectly happy for scientists who don't go along with the
climate change theory to take these----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Very well.
Mr. Woolsey.--taking these steps for Patton.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Global Warming Is an Important Issue
General Sullivan. Speaking for myself, and I believe the
rest of this committee, we make it very clear that we are not
scientists. We are not physicists, although some of them happen
to be scientists. One happens to be an astronaut, and the other
is intimately involved with the nuclear industry, nuclear
power, but as a group we were not into all of the data because
the data can be contradictory, and we are not qualified.
What we tried to do is look at the trends, and the fact
that you can sail a boat from the Atlantic Ocean to the Bering
Sea, and they actually have people sailing 35-foot boats, tells
us something. Something is going on, and I have no idea.
Mr. Rohrabacher. General, what it tells us is that just as
the Vikings were able to do that very same thing, the Earth is
going back to a warmer time period just as it was during the
Viking time period.
General Sullivan. Agreed. I don't have any problem with
that, but the fact----
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Thank you.
General Sullivan.--of the matter is it is worth paying
attention to.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Rohrabacher's time has expired.
We have been joined by Dr. Ehlers, not a Member of the
Subcommittee but someone for whom this is a subject near and
dear to his heart. And in the interest of having more material
for late-night special orders, Dr. Ehlers, do you have
questions?
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
recognizing me.
I just simply came here to learn something, and I have
learned something. I can't help but respond to my colleague
about the many thousands of scientists he says support his
point of view. I would say there are many, many, many more
scientists who disagree with that. So it is a preponderance of
scientific evidence and scientific belief that is on the other
side. I normally don't bother arguing this point, but I just
wanted to make that particular point.
The, I, as I say, I came here primarily to learn, but in
terms of the response we make, I was intrigued by Mr.
Sensenbrenner's comment relating to Indonesia, and it occurred
to me that perhaps the response, the military's response, since
that is what this hearing is about, the military response might
more appropriately be just send larger contingents of the Army
Corps of Engineers than to send combat troops abroad, if, in
fact, the problem is flooding of Bangladesh, which is a major
concern. Maybe the Army Corps can do much more than combat
troops could.
I have not, I don't want to get into all the pluses and
minuses, but I appreciate the comments that both of you have
made, and I appreciate the understanding you displayed. This is
a serious problem, and it does have very strong national
security factors related to it, as does our continued overuse
of energy from various other parts of the world. I think it is
one of our greatest national security problems, not just so
much the consumption of it, but the fact that we have developed
such a dependence on it that we have become very vulnerable to
military actions which reduce the amount of energy available
from other countries.
So I appreciate the insight that both of you have brought.
I have no specific questions. Just wanted to make those
comments, and thank you for being here.
I yield back.
More on How Humans Effect Global Warming
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Dr. Ehlers. I now recognize
myself for a second round of questioning.
There have been questions about the extent to which the
changes in the climate--the warming of the globe--are natural,
cyclical, and the extent to which they are caused by human
activity. And I am not sure either of you got to answer your
questions entirely, and again, neither one of you are
scientists. You are dealing with information from scientists on
that, but is it your understanding or belief that human
activity can affect the extent to which the planet may warm,
and therefore what consequences may result?
Mr. Woolsey.
Mr. Woolsey. Mr. Chairman, you have not one but two history
majors in front of you today, so I would very much stress that.
But I would, I think, basically go with what I understand is a
preponderance of scientific views here as reflected in the IPCC
report, that at least a very substantial share--possibly all,
but perhaps slightly less than all--of the concentrations of
CO<INF>2</INF> that we see today are anthropogenic. They tend
to have taken off around the beginning of the industrial era, a
couple of centuries ago. They are approaching double what they
have been for extended periods of time, although Congressman
Rohrabacher's right, of course: There have been many periods in
the history of the world in which climate has changed a lot.
But the correlation seems substantial to, I think, about 90
percent of the scientists that have looked at this, and I can't
do any better than to say I would go along with that. But there
is, I think, some uncertainty. There are some distinguished
people who have not signed onto it.
Chairman Miller. General Sullivan, your testimony is that
military planning or national security planning generally
doesn't just take into account what is certain to happen. You
plan given a certain amount of uncertainty what might happen,
how likely it is, and how to be prepared for those different
events. Is it also part of military planning or national
security planning to see how the likelihood of different events
may be changed by what we do?
General Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, you are right on both
counts. We normally look at any number of threats and the
likelihood of something happening, and try to figure out how we
could stop it from happening or do something that might stop it
from happening, if it is in our area of responsibility. And I
think that is what is going on in this case.
In all cases, though, it is not within the military's
purview or the Department of Defense purview to be the only
action agent. Other agencies of the government are involved,
and we recognize that.
So you are right on both counts, and that is really what
the basis of our study is. Look, the trends are not good, and
what can we do in our planning and our analyses? And I think
what is going on at Carlisle next week up at the Army War
College is a pretty good indicator of how people are starting
to think about it.
Mr. Woolsey. Mr. Chairman, if I could just have one----
Chairman Miller. Mr. Woolsey.
Mr. Woolsey. When I was Director of Central Intelligence,
the head of the National Intelligence Council for me was Joseph
Nye of the Kennedy School, Harvard. And Joe and I came up with
an effort to try to put probabilities on things that really
depend on human judgment--what an enemy or a potential enemy
may do--that it is very, very hard actually to put odds on. We
would try to use vague formulations of gamblers' odds--you
know, one change in ten, something like that--in order to give
a feel for probabilities.
But the reality is that in dealing with a conscious enemy,
a malevolent enemy, it depends on whether he is shrewd or not.
If you are fighting Stonewall Jackson, you are probably going
to lose unless you have an equally--and there were very few--
brilliant general on your side. And if you are trying to deal
with something like climate change here, it depends on in a
sense at what point--and we don't know--the methane begins to
be released from the tundra. And since it is 20 times worse
than carbon dioxide as a global-warming gas, it begins to speed
up the warming and the release, and speed it up further and
further and further. Where is that tipping point? Nobody really
knows.
So it is very tough, if you are dealing with really serious
matters like a conscious enemy or something like these tipping
points, to put probabilities on it. We try, but it is really
something that is probably doomed to failure. Qualitative
judgment is about the best you can do, I think.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Mr. Sensenbrenner is not here,
so we will turn to Mr. Rohrabacher.
Scientists Who Oppose the Idea of Man-made Global Warming
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
I take it that when you were doing your studies that you
did not have any in-depth discussions with any of the major
scientists who oppose this concept of manmade global warming.
Is that correct?
General Sullivan. No. In our case we did.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Which scientist----
General Sullivan. Am I on or off?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, do you have a name of one or two of
the scientists who you talked to?
General Sullivan. Dr. Hansen was the first one.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Dr. Hansen is a major proponent of the----
General Sullivan. Yeah. I mean----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Let me just note for, I will put in
the record at this point the statements by several prominent
and respected, world class scientists who not only doubt global
warming but lament the fact that many of their fellow
scientists are being lured away from their integrity by grants
over the last 10 and 20 years, which have been readily
available to those people who support the manmade global
warming theory but not available to those people who were
opposed to the manmade global warming theory. And I will put
those quotes into the record from several very renowned,
respected scientists.
[The information follows:]
INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD
The following are examples of scientists who are skeptical of
global warming and have had their careers significantly affected by
their positions.
Summary
1. Dr. William Gray was cut off from funding during the
Clinton/Gore Administration for his position on climate change.
2. Dr. Fred Singer was pressured by Gore and his staff to
remove Dr. Roger Revelle's name from a paper criticizing Gore.
Revelle was a mentor to Gore on climate change.
3. Dr. William Happer was asked to resign his position as
Director of Energy Research at the Department of Energy for his
views on climate change.
4. Dr. Christopher Landsea resigned from the IPCC for the
politicalization of his work.
5. Dr. Hendrik (Henk) Tennekes was dismissed from the Royal
Dutch Meteorological institute for questioning the scientific
basis for climate change assertions.
Dr. William Gray
William M. Gray is a world famous hurricane expert and emeritus
Professor of Atmospheric Science, Colorado State University.
From an interview with Dr. William M. Gray in Discover Magazine,
September 2005 Title: ``Weather Seer: `We're Lucky.' ''
``Are your funding problems due in part to your views?
``G: I can't be sure, but I think that's a lot of the reason. I
have been around 50 years, so my views on this are well known. I had
NOAA money for 30 some years, and then when the Clinton administration
came in and Gore started directing some of the environmental stuff, I
was cut off. I couldn't get any NOAA money. They turned down 13
straight proposals from me.''
Dr. Roger Revelle/Dr. Fred Singer
Roger Revelle was a leader in the field of oceanography. Revelle
trained as a geologist at Pomona College and at U.C. Berkeley. Then, in
1936, he received his Ph.D. in oceanography from the Scripp Institution
of Oceanography. Revelle was a member of the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) and served as a member of the Ocean Studies Board, the
Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, and many committees. Dr.
Revelle passed away in 1991. See http://dels.nas.edu/osb/
about<INF>-</INF>revelie.shtml
S. Fred Singer, an atmospheric physicist, is professor emeritus of
environmental sciences at the University of Virginia, adjunct scholar
at the National Center for Policy Analysis, and former director of the
U.S. Weather Satellite Service. He is also a research fellow at the
Independent Institute and author of Hot Talk. Cold Science: Global
Warming's Unfinished Debate (The Independent Institute, 1997).
Al Gore refers to Dr. Revelle in his film An Inconvenient Truth and
his book Earth in the Balance. He cites Dr. Revelle as a person who
influenced his views regarding the dangers of global warming.
But an article, co-authored by Revelle in the April 1991 issue of
Cosmos magazine, and later reprinted in the New Republic, states: ``The
scientific base for a greenhouse warming is too uncertain to justify
drastic action at this time,'' and ``[t]he bright light of political
environmentalism [Gore], seems increasingly to believe that the only
correct stance is to press the panic button on every issue.''
A dispute ensued regarding whether Dr. Revelle's name should be
shown as co-author of the Cosmos article which was being subsequently
being placed in an anthology on climate change by Dr. Richard Geyer.
According to Dr. Fred Singer, on July 20 1992, in a telephone
conversation between Singer (a co-author of the article) and Dr. Julian
Lancaster (a former associate of Revelle) Lancaster requested that
Revelle's name be removed.
``When I refused his request, Dr. Lancaster stepped up the pressure
on me. ...he suggested that Dr. Revelle had not really been a co-author
and made the ludicrous claim that I had put his name on the paper as a
co-author `over his objections.' ''
See http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi<INF>-</INF>m1282/
is<INF>-</INF>n12<INF>-</INF>v46/ai<INF>-</INF>15544248; http://
media.hoover.org/documents/0817939326<INF>-</INF>283.pdf
``Subsequently, Dr. Anthony D. Socci, a member of Senator Gore's
staff, made similar outrageous accusations in a lengthy letter to the
publishers of the Geyer volume, requesting that the Cosmos article be
dropped.''
Jonathan Adler in the Washington Times on July 27, 1994:
``Concurrent with Mr. Lancaster's attack on Mr. Singer, Mr.
Gore himself led a similar effort to discredit the respected
scientist. Mr. Gore reportedly contacted 60 Minutes and
Nightline to do stories on Mr. Singer and other opponents of
Mr. Gore's environmental policies. The stories were designed to
undermine the opposition by suggesting that only raving
ideologues and corporate mouthpieces could challenge Mr. Gore's
green gospel. The strategy backfired. When Nightline did the
story, it exposed the vice president's machinations and
compared his activities to Lysenkoism: The Stalinist
politicization of science in the former Soviet Union.''
Nightline 2/24/94 Ted Koppel:
``There is some irony in the fact that Vice President Gore,
one of the most scientifically literate men to sit in the White
House in this century, that he is resorting to political means
to achieve what should ultimately be resolved on a purely
scientific basis.''
Dr. William Rapper Jr.
In 1991 William Happer was appointed by President George Bush to be
Director of Energy Research in the Department of Energy and served
until 1993. On his return to Princeton, he was named Eugene Higgins
Professor of Physics and Chair of the University Research Board. Dr.
Happer is a Fellow of the American Physical Society, the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, and a member of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences
and the American Philosophical Society.
Happer, Director of Energy Research at the U.S. Department of
Energy for two years, was asked to leave. ``I was told that science was
not going to intrude on policy he says.''
``With regard to global climate issues, we are experiencing
politically correct science,'' Happer says. ``Many atmospheric
scientists are afraid for their funding, which is why they don't
challenge Al Gore and his colleagues. They have a pretty clear idea of
what the answer they're supposed to get is. The attitude in the
administration is, 'If you get a wrong result, we don't want to hear
about it.''
See http://www.sepp.org/Archive/controv/controversies/happer.html
. . .Bush appointee William Happer, the highly regarded Director of
Research at the Department of Energy, was slated to stay on-board after
the 1992 election. But Happer, in internal discussions and
congressional testimony, continued to discount global-warming alarmism
and push for additional research before taking draconian action. One
former Energy employee remembers a meeting where a high-ranking civil
servant told Happer, ``I agree with you, Will, but I'd like to keep my
job.'' Happer got the axe.
From an article in National Review October 14, 1996.
See http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi<INF>-</INF>m1282/
is<INF>-</INF>n19<INF>-</INF>v48/ai<INF>-</INF>18763610/pg<INF>-</INF>3
Dr. Christopher Landsea
Christopher Landsea, formerly a research meteorologist with
Hurricane Research Division of Atlantic Oceanographic & Meteorological
Laboratory at NOAA, is now the Science and Operations Officer at the
National Hurricane Center. He is a member of the American Geophysical
Union and the American Meteorological Society. He earned his doctoral
degree in Atmospheric Science at Colorado State University.
Dr. Landsea wrote an open letter withdrawing from the IPCC because
of politicalization of his work on the committee. The first and last
paragraphs of that letter are below. For the complete letter see http:/
/www.lavoisier.com.au/papers/articles/landsea.html
``Dear colleagues,
After some prolonged deliberation, I have decided to withdraw from
participating in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). I am withdrawing because I have come to
view the part of the IPCC to which my expertise is relevant as having
become politicized. In addition, when I have raised my concerns to the
IPCC leadership, their response was simply to dismiss my concerns.''
. . . . . . . . . . . .
I personally cannot in good faith continue to contribute to a
process that I view as both being motivated by pre-conceived agendas
and being scientifically unsound. As the IPCC leadership has seen no
wrong in Dr. Trenberth's actions and have retained him as a Lead Author
for the AR4, I have decided to no longer participate in the IPCC AR4.
Sincerely,
Chris Landsea
17 January 2005
Dr. Hendrik (Henk) Tennekes
Hendrik (Henk) Tennekes is formerly Director of Research at the
Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute and a professor of aeronautical
engineering at Penn State. Tennekes pioneered methods of multi-modal
forecasting.
Richard Lindzen is an atmospheric physicist, the Alfred P. Sloan
Professor of Meteorology at MIT and a member of the National Academy of
Science Lindzen is known for his research in dynamic meteorology--
especially atmospheric waves.
In an article posted on the Science & Environmental Policy Project
web site (Jan 2006) he said:
``I protest against overwhelming pressure to adhere to the
climate change dogma promoted by the adherents of IPCC. . ..
The advantages of accepting a dogma or paradigm are only too
clear. . .. One no longer has to query the foundations of one's
convictions, one enjoys the many advantages of belonging to a
group that enjoys political power, one can participate in the
benefits that the group provides, and one can delegate
questions of responsibility and accountability to the
leadership. In brief, the moment one accepts a dogma, one stops
being an independent scientist.''
See http://www.sepp.org/
According to Richard Lindzen: ``In Europe, Henk Tennekes was
dismissed as research director of the Royal Dutch Meteorological
Society after questioning the scientific underpinnings of global
warming.''
From a Wall Street Journal op ed, April 12, 2006; Page A14
See http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110008220
Military Prioritizing to Reduce Global Warming
Let me ask both of you in your professional, you both come
from a national security background. If it was being proposed
by Congress, if there was a motion in Congress that would
require the military in the name of doing our part to stop this
global warming and the military's part, but would insist, for
example, on lighter armor on tanks or that the tanks wouldn't
produce as much pollution out the other end, even though that
lighter armor put our men in jeopardy, or lighter body armor
because the process in developing the body armor was something
that caused more pollution, CO<INF>2</INF> going into the air.
Would you support that move by Congress?
General Sullivan. No.
Mr. Woolsey. Congress is the wrong institution to design
armored vehicles, I think.
Public Prioritizing to Reduce Global Warming
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. But they prioritize. I agree with
that, but they--if we end up with global warming, we say, okay.
That is going to be our greatest worry now, not terrorism, not
military, possible military, so the military has to step in
line. You guys would both oppose this.
Let me ask you this. When they say to us, we have to then
make our automobiles less armored, meaning you can't have a
heavy car. I have three kids at home. I want them safe, I want
them in a heavier car. Now, the people who are global warming
advocates would like to outlaw me.
Now, is it any less reasonable for me to say that I am
going to make the decision as to the weight of my car than it
is for you to say that you would oppose the efforts of Congress
to oppose the weight of armored vehicles of men going into
action?
Mr. Woolsey. For several years of my life I had three
little boys who were in Boy Scouts and soccer teams and
baseball teams, and I drove a Chevy Suburban because I was
driving baseball teams----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. Woolsey.--around. But what I would say today is that if
you want a large SUV and you need one for any reasonable
purpose, as long as we have it be a plug-in hybrid--that is
also a flexible fuel vehicle and is running on 85 percent
ethanol--it will be getting something on the order of 200 miles
per gallon of gasoline. And that isn't bad.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Sure.
Mr. Woolsey. I think----
Mr. Rohrabacher. And the market will take care of that
because people will want to pay less for their gasoline. But
what if someone wanted to mandate it, which is basically like I
said, it is going to be mandated whether or not that hybrid
technology is already available and thus Dana or whoever else
who has kids cannot make the choice of buying a heavier car.
Mr. Woolsey. And Congress's role and the Executive Branch's
role ought to be to get the incentives right and to do away
with barriers to competition, such as having vehicles that can
only drive on gasoline and can't also drive on alternative
liquid fuels.
But when the Executive Branch or Congress or together has
tried to pick a solution, they picked the Synfuels Corporation
in the late '70s and early '80s, which went bankrupt in '86,
when the oil price went down. And it picked the hydrogen
highway at the beginning of this decade, which has not worked
out well at all for family cars and the rest.
So I don't think the record, frankly, of either Congress or
the Executive Branch in picking a single solution is very good,
but in terms of getting the incentives right for all of us in
removing barriers, I think that is----
Mr. Rohrabacher. The greatest incentive, Mr. Woolsey,
probably is the high price of oil, which will make the American
people choose more efficiency.
Mr. Woolsey. I agree
Mr. Rohrabacher. And by the way, thank you, General and Mr.
Woolsey, and Mr. General, I will make you, give you that last
say here. But I do appreciate the fact that it was very clear
to you that military is going to do their primary mission, and
even though you do obviously hold it important that we be
involved with global trends, but your job is to make sure those
men going into action are safe. And you are not advocating----
Chairman Miller. General Sullivan, do you have an answer
that you wanted to----
General Sullivan. Yeah. I want to make it very clear that
the Department of Defense, certainly the Department of the Army
is trying to make tanks lighter. That gives the same protection
and make vehicles lighter and giving the same protection.
Chairman Miller. Right.
More on Military Prioritization
General Sullivan. Research and development efforts are
moving in that direction. Now, whether they are going to be
able to solve the problem or not remains to be seen. That is
out there, and it may be ceramics or something, but the point
is we cannot afford to have 70 percent of the weight which the
Army carries be liquid, and that relates to how we power these
pieces of equipment. And we have to get them there, to the
fight, quickly.
By the way, our job is to win. Okay. It is to win for the
American people, and we will do our best, and I am speaking for
myself. I believe the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines will
do their best to do that with these tradeoffs.
Chairman Miller. All right. Mr. Rohrabacher's time has
expired. Mr. Baird, in your last round of questioning I think
you established that the Maldives have a good deal more to
worry about than we do. Mr. Baird.
More on Energy in Iraq
Mr. Baird. Yeah, I think the Maldives do. But I also hope I
established that a decentralized energy approach, as that
advocated by Amory Lovins, is much more likely, I think, to
provide a sustainable power source. Not only ultimately for our
troops; and I was really referring to how you get lights on in
Baghdad, and air conditioning working. Because we----
But I will tell you when I was over there, and I met the
energy minister of Iraq, the electrical energy minister, his
main concern was that the Iraqis face a difficult challenge. If
they use oil to produce energy, then they don't have oil to
sell on the foreign reserve market or, sorry, on the
international market and then thereby bring capital in. When I
asked him if they had talked to Amory Lovins, and I asked the
U.S. consultants who were accompanying them, they did not know
who Amory Lovins was.
So I would encourage you, Admiral, if you have a chance to
try to talk to General Lute or any of our lead strategists over
there to give another look at that, because I spoke personally
after that visit to Iraq, I called Amory Lovins and spoke to
him on the phone, and he said he had tried three times to get
folks to really pay attention, and basically they don't get the
concept. And I hate to think our guys are going to try to
defend a couple hundred or a thousand-mile pipeline when we
could have some alternatives.
I welcome any thoughts you have about how you can convince
our military.
And then the second question, if I may, is if you look at
some of the areas where we have conflicts, they are clearly
related to oil, and if you look at some of the international
impressions of our country, it is that we go to war for oil
regardless of human rights sometimes. And certainly I have
heard that from constituents back home. And you look at Nigeria
and elsewhere in the world where our policies have not
necessarily backed progressive regimes.
A second question after the Amory Lovins one if you have
time to get to both would be how does our dependence on oil
cause us to back regimes that may lower our international
standing or actually lead ultimately to conflict that we might
otherwise avoid.
General Sullivan. One of our panel members--this is to the
Lovins question--one of our panel members was Admiral Truly,
and he and Dr. Lovins have collaborated on a number of issues.
And Dr. Lovins, certainly his name and some of his feelings,
came up during the study group. In a previous study that our
executive director, this man behind me, participated in, he was
a part of that. So I think his feelings were well known by the
group.
Mr. Baird. The Pentagon is not paying much attention, I
will tell you. In Iraq they didn't even know the guy's name.
General Sullivan. I don't know.
Mr. Baird. This was the electrical minister for Iraq. So
the concepts are alien to them.
Mr. Woolsey. Congressman, I think the notion of
distributed-generation electricity that is dealt with on pages
18 and 19 of the text of my chapter that I submitted is very
important for the military, and sometimes it takes awhile for
things to filter through. But the Science Board report that is
about to come out moves us both domestically and, I think, in
terms of operations overseas toward fuel conservation in many
ways and distributed generation in many ways. I think you will
find it a useful thing.
Dependence on the Wrong Regimes
As far as dependence on the wrong regimes, I surely could
not agree more. There is a professor at Oxford named Paul
Collier who was an economist for the World Bank, I believe, for
some years, and he has written extensively about the degree to
which oil--or, indeed, it is true of anything that has a lot of
economic rent associated with it, that is, a lot of economic
return that is not based on either investment or labor. A lot
of economic rent tends to concentrate power in the central
government of the country that is producing it. It is not
accidental that of the top 12 oil reserve countries in the
world, about ten of them are either dictatorships or autocratic
kingdoms.
And as Bernard Lewis puts it, there should be no taxation
without representation, but it is also true that there is no
representation without taxation. If you don't need taxes, you
don't need a legislature, and a number of these countries that
are very rich in oil don't have real legislatures. The
executive branches of those countries don't have to sit in
front of hearings and be asked questions by independent,
elected representatives of the people.
And so in a way, by helping move away from oil I think, for
powering our transportation system almost exclusively, by
introducing competitive fuels--electricity, ethanol, butanol,
whatever--I think one is, over the long run, taking some very
positive directions for the governments of some of these other
countries and societies. But I think you are exactly right on
that.
Mr. Baird. Very grateful for your comments. I wish our
Administration would call upon the American people to make some
of these changes as a patriotic duty in the interest of our
national security. I think it would put a much different light
on our energy policy, and it is certainly merited. And I am
grateful for your service and insights today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this good hearing.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Mr. Sensenbrenner. Mr. Broun.
Domestic Energy Sources
Mr. Broun. Mr. Woolsey, in your report you point to the
Nation's dependence on foreign oil as a major point of concern,
and I certainly agree with that and concur fully. Yet, there
are significant supplies of domestic oil and natural gas in
areas such as out on the continental shelf and in Alaska, not
only in ANWR but in other areas up there. Nuclear power has
proven to be one of the cleanest energy sources on Earth, and
the last nuclear power plant that we built in this nation I
believe was in 1973.
Now, I know that there are no permanent solutions, but it
seems to me that the most expedient solution might be looking
for domestic sources of oil as well as other energy sources.
Certainly in my area of Georgia we don't have the amount of
wind that they do out west to develop energy through wind
technology or other things, some of these other alternative
sources of fuel.
And I am for one very eager to search for alternative
energy sources, not only to power automobiles but also
electricity and certainly we seem to use a lot of that around
here, too. So don't you think that maybe searching for domestic
sources of energy is maybe a best type of policy that we should
have as a government?
Mr. Woolsey. It is certainly part of what we need to do,
Congressman. Nuclear is not going to substitute for oil,
imported oil or any other oil, however, because only about two
percent of our electricity is produced by oil. Back in the '70s
it was different. Twenty [percent] or so was produced. So if
you built a nuclear power plant in the '70s, you could well be
replacing oil consumption, but today our use of oil for
electricity is almost negligible.
I think nuclear power has some advantages. Lack of global
warming gas emissions is certainly one, and if Congress and the
Executive Branch can agree on the degree of essentially public
insurance that is to be provided for nuclear power, it may well
take up some of the slack that may be needed for new power-
plant construction.
But I don't think we ought to look at it as a long-term
solution globally because I believe today over 60 percent of
the new nuclear power plants that are being built are being
built in developing countries. And because the International
Treaty Regime for proliferation does not really deter countries
that have nuclear power plants from getting into the fuel cycle
with uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing; once you
have a nuclear power plant, you are unfortunately likely to be
off into the business of producing fissionable material. It is
not really a problem here, although we have to store our
nuclear waste and agree on how to do it, but it is a problem in
lots of parts of the world unless we want to see proliferation
grow substantially.
As far as domestic oil is concerned, I have been generally
in favor of offshore drilling. I think that is now ecologically
and in engineering terms quite sound. I have opposed drilling
in the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge in substantial measure
because of the insecurity of the Alaska Pipeline, which Amory
Lovins and I have written together about and call a very large
piece of Chapstick just about to happen. It is extremely
vulnerable even to rifle fire, much less anything else.
I think that what has to take place is that we need to do
to oil and its monopoly on transportation, its 97 percent
monopoly of transportation, what electricity and refrigeration
did to salt at the end of the 19th century. In the late 19th
century salt was a strategic commodity. It mattered whether
your country had salt mines, countries fought wars over salt
mines. It is hard to imagine now. Today we don't care, because
salt's unique role in preserving meat was effectively destroyed
by electricity and refrigeration.
What we need to do is not destroy oil and not stop using
oil, but we need to break oil's monopoly on transportation. And
I think that if we do that, things will sort themselves out--
given the amount of carbon used, given its accessibility and so
forth--in a reasonable way. But I think the first priority to
me is things like plug-in hybrids and alternative liquid fuels
so that we can break oil's monopoly on transportation, and then
I think some domestic oil production, particularly off shore,
sure.
Mr. Broun. Well, I think with the current technology with
the hybrids, if, it depends on how far you drive every day
whether they make sense economically or not, and it looks to me
in the short run maybe expediting building safe nuclear power
plants as well as looking for domestic sources of petroleum
products and maybe new coal technology, et cetera, make more
sense if we can ever figure out how to create hydrogen. That
may be even another source, but that is just my point.
And looking domestically makes more sense to me than trying
to further things that may be not economically feasible now.
So----
Chairman Miller. Thank you.
Mr. Broun.--would you comment about that?
Chairman Miller. Well, actually the gentleman's time has
expired.
Mr. Broun. Excuse me.
Chairman Miller. That is all right. Dr. Ehlers, do you have
any questions? You don't have to if you don't want to but----
Dr. Ehlers, your mike apparently is not on.
Mr. Ehlers. I am sorry.
Chairman Miller. Or not working. Okay.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you.
Nuclear Power and Plug-in Hybrids
I have been an advocate of nuclear energy for some time,
even though I am Mr. Muir. I have been a Sierra Club member for
many years and have argued with them on this point simply
because the issue is not displacing oil. It is displacing
carbon dioxide producing materials, which is largely coal and
natural gas and the power plants at this point.
And if we are going to impinge, and I agree with you Mr.
Woolsey, that the real problem is transportation, and if we do,
in fact, go the route of plug-in hybrids, we are going to need
considerable amounts of electricity, and I would prefer that
that be produced by nuclear plants rather than coal burning or
natural gas burning plants, particularly since natural gas in
my opinion is too good to burn. It is an incredible feedstock
for the petro-chemical industry, and it is ideal for serving,
for providing heat for residences. Burning it in an electric
power plant I think is not an optimum use.
Mr. Woolsey. Congressman, I certainly agree that
electricity needs to be produced cleanly, and nuclear may be
one way to do that, with the qualifications I mentioned
earlier. I would only add that the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratories has done a very thorough study of plug-in hybrids,
and they say that 85 percent of the cars on the road could be
plug-in hybrids before you need a single new power plant,
because you are using off-peak, overnight power.
Mr. Ehlers. Yeah.
Mr. Woolsey. And that is one of the reasons why shifting
from an internal combustion engine to a plug-in hybrid, even in
coal-heavy states where the grid is largely run by coal, still
saves something on global warming gas emissions. And in a state
like California with very clean grid it saves a great deal with
respect to global warming gas emissions.
Mr. Ehlers. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Would the colleague yield for a question?
High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors
Mr. Ehlers. Yes. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. This is where we agree.
I appreciate your comments on nuclear energy, and I would
draw your attention and ask, this is in the form of a question,
but drawing our attention of the panel as well to the high
temperature gas-cooled reactor that has now been designed and
prototypes have been built by General Atomics in San Diego. Are
you aware of the high temperature, gas-cooled reactor?
Mr. Ehlers. I am aware of a number of different reactors,
and I think the great lack is we have not done adequate
research on the many types of reactors. For example, the
hydrogen project which is, no one seems to say much about
today, depends entirely on being able to produce and transport
hydrogen at fairly low cost. Clearly the traditional ways of
doing it are not good. Perhaps I----
Mr. Rohrabacher. The reason I bring up that, Mr. Ehlers, is
that Mr. Woolsey brought up the problems of nuclear waste and
also the proliferation issue, and those two issues do not need
to prevent us from moving forward with nuclear energy, and I
would suggest that maybe our panel would like to look at this
alternative, because it is a nuclear power plant that cannot,
that does not produce waste at the same level and it will not
produce material that can be turned into bombs. And so it takes
care of a lot of problems, and I would hope that you, Mr.
Ehlers, as someone I deeply respect and pay attention to, as
well as our panel, would look at this alternative when looking
at the issue we are discussing today.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Ehlers. I yield back.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. I accept your time. Mr.
Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. I have no questions.
Chairman Miller. All right. That was convenient. We have
time, I think, for another round of questions if everyone does
their length of time, and then we do have a set of votes. We
probably will need to carry over into the first couple of
minutes of votes, but if we could have a quick last round of
questions for this distinguished panel, and the next panel is
also distinguished, and we will hear their testimony after the
votes.
New Materials for Armoring Vehicles
General Sullivan, in the earlier questions whether you
would favor reducing the armor if it made armored vehicles less
sturdy in battle, you said ``No,'' but you also said that you
thought that the need for lighter vehicles because of fuel
needs certainly justified research and developing lighter but
still strong materials. Is that correct?
General Sullivan. That is correct. I am not in favor of . .
. Protection, validity, and mobility are the three variables
which are considered in armored vehicles, and you can see in
the MRAP--this new vehicle which the troops will receive--the
vehicle is very heavy because that is what you need to protect
the troops, . . .
Chairman Miller. Uh-huh.
General Sullivan. . . .our most precious asset. But that
doesn't mean that the scientists and the people in the labs
aren't working to reduce the weight of the armor which goes on
vehicles, and it may be that it is ceramics or some substance
which--I am sorry the doctor left--plastics and so forth and so
on.
So you have got a tradeoff, and I am sure they will work
their way through that.
Justifying Cost to Reduce Emissions
Chairman Miller. The British report that I referred to in
my opening remarks estimated that the world's response to
carbon dioxide emissions, greenhouse gas emissions, would cost
perhaps one percent of the world's GDP. In view of the threat,
does that expense seem justified by the threat we face? General
Sullivan.
General Sullivan. One percent. I don't know. I am not
qualified to----
Chairman Miller. Okay.
General Sullivan.--I am really not qualified to draw that
kind of conclusion.
Chairman Miller. Okay. Mr. Woolsey.
Mr. Woolsey. I think it does, yes--in part, however,
because taking the steps that one needs to take also makes the
whole system much more resilient against terrorism. And also a
number of those steps that the Stern, I guess it is the Stern
report, in the numbers, I think, don't take into account some
of the things we were talking about before: some of the ideas
that Amory Lovins's Rocky Mountain Institute has been
instrumental in pushing, of what they call ``negawatts''--that
is, of efficiency improvements that make money. I don't think
those types of considerations played a major role in the Stern
report: for example, these building improvements that my Patton
and Muir start off with.
So, yes, I mean, if it takes one percent--because these are
both important issues, both terrorism and climate change--in my
personal judgment it is worth it. But I think we ought to make
sure that we aren't taking expensive and unnecessary steps
rather than profit-making ones in order to get where we want to
go.
Chairman Miller. You think one percent may have been
overstated?
Mr. Woolsey. It is possible. I think so. I think if you
turn the Stern report over to the Rocky Mountain Institute and
ask them to critique it, I will bet you would find that they
would say there are cheaper ways to take the steps that we are
taking.
Evaluating Current Methods to Reduce Emissions
Chairman Miller. And I think both of you have either
explicitly or implicitly already addressed this. Whether the
steps are--or what the Stern report suggested--are there other
cheaper, smarter things to do? Do you think what we have done
to this point or [are] doing now are aggressive enough in view
of the threats we face?
General Sullivan.
General Sullivan. I will only speak to what I know. I think
that General Casey's point yesterday was indicative of an
awareness by the senior leaders--one of the chiefs, a member of
the Joint Chiefs, a senior Army officer--that these issues are
important. And I have reason to believe AFRICOM is another case
in point that the senior military leaders of our country are
addressing the issue of global climate change. And the NIE, I
think, is another example: Admiral McConnell, who is doing the
NIE, who is responsible for it, has said that it is important.
And so I think everybody is getting the word, and it is moving.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized for just
five minutes.
Trade-offs in Decision-making
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you, and I do think it is
important for us to note that the general said exactly the
right thing, and that is his job is making sure that our
country is protected and those people can do their job in
defending our country. And while no one disagrees with the fact
that we should try and be trying to develop better, more
efficient technologies, the question is when we have to make
decisions right now versus climate change that we are going to
have some effect on climate change that will in some way
prevent the military from doing their job, the General is going
to have the military do their job.
General Sullivan. Well, I think that is exactly what
happened with the MRAP and body armor and everything else that
is protecting the troops. They are giving the troops what they
need. We can't wait for 10 or 20 years----
Mr. Rohrabacher. There you go.
General Sullivan.--to make it happen.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And General, the same principle is true,
unfortunately, we are being told by the alarmists here about
climate change that we have to have another criteria for how we
make our decisions based on, and certainly I agree with Mr.
Woolsey, yes. We should have SUVs that can protect our people,
our kids, and our families, but we should not necessarily
mandate it now if the technology isn't ready and say that SUVs
have to be lighter or whatever, if that is not ready right now.
And the alarmists would have us put people in jeopardy. It
is as simple as that. And I, first of all, I appreciate both
your testimony today, and I respect both of you tremendously.
Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change Report
This question. When you look over this report, when you
examined the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change report,
what it did say that if we implemented all of their
recommendations at, with the tremendous cost to the world that
we are talking about, what percentage of the climate, of the
increase in the temperature of the planet would we achieve?
Mr. Woolsey. I don't----
Mr. Rohrabacher. What are we going to get out of--if we
went along with all the Inter-Governmental Panel Climate Change
(IPCC) recommendations and the things that they said we need to
do, which many of them are very draconian, what type of change
would we expect to achieve and did they say they would achieve
in terms of the, preventing the increase in the temperature of
the plant?
Mr. Woolsey. Congressman, I tend to use the sea-level rise
as the proxy. And I realize that is not a perfect way to go at
it, but the IPCC's predicted range, I think, for the 21st
century is somewhere between around eight inches and two feet.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And how, if all the recommendations were
followed with all of the costs associated with that, what would
be the change in the ocean?
Mr. Woolsey. I don't know. I don't think of the IPCC as
being the institution that is likely to be providing the best
recommendations for action. I think----
Mr. Rohrabacher. No, no. I am not talking about action. If
they, if all of their actions, the IPCC had recommendations for
us and with the Kyoto treaty, et cetera, through the Kyoto
treaty, if all of those recommendations were put in place, let
me just note for the record the actual achievement would be
minuscule. Minuscule. And I don't have it with me right here
the exact amount, and but just let us note that you have to,
one of the reasons some of us were skeptical about what is
going on not only is the fact that leading scientists have said
that their colleagues have been lured away from their integrity
by the promise of grants, but that what the General suggested,
his reasonable decision-making process was not being used in
meeting the other demands on the civilian economy in terms of
what we would get out of those decisions. So, out of
implementing those recommendations.
Mr. Woolsey. There are a number of things that the IPCC
doesn't touch on that could be far cheaper and far more
effective than other points that are being made. I will just
refer you to Patton's and Muir's nine points in this chapter I
wrote. And these are not original with me. They have been
picked up from all----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Sure.
Mr. Woolsey.--sorts of different sources, but some of them
are rather dramatic. For example, Denmark today gets 50 percent
of its electricity from combined heat and power. It means they
just take the waste heat from factories, turn generators,
supply power to themselves. It is heat that is wasted today.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I appreciate----
Mr. Woolsey. We are way under 10 percent of that in the
United States.
Mr. Rohrabacher. My time is----
Mr. Woolsey. Simply by being smart----
Mr. Rohrabacher.--up, and let me just note I appreciate
your testimony. I agree with everything you have said today,
and the bottom line is is that we should be more efficient and
more save consumption of oil and et cetera, become more
independent for a lot of the reasons----
Chairman Miller. The gentleman's time----
Mr. Rohrabacher.--other than climate change. Thank you.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Baird.
Mr. Baird. You recognize me for just five minutes?
Chairman Miller. If you use less, you would be viewed by
the Chair as a great American.
Rallying Americans Behind Energy Problems
Mr. Baird. Thank you. I would like to thank these two great
Americans for what I think is one of the--actually we have a
tremendous number of hearings in this body as you know, and I
think this hearing is one that all Americans should have a copy
of. And I commend you for your insights and the perspective you
bring to this.
As historians I would ask you this question. One of my
concerns about this conflict we currently face in Iraq--and
about how we deal with potential for climate change,
acidification of the oceans, and all the other impacts--is that
there seems to be a reluctance on the part of our political
leaders to truly call on the American people to dig deep in the
spirit of patriotism and national and international interest to
change their behaviors.
Post-World War II. . .when World War II broke out, the
Nation was in the fight. When September 11 happened, we were
told to go shopping. As historians, what insights can you give
us in terms of ways that we might rally the American people to
change their behavior in relation to how we use energy and
where energy comes from--as a national security as well as
environmental--and other interests?
General Sullivan. Well, first of all, I am, you know, a
soldier, I am a retired general officer. I am somewhat
reluctant to get into an area that is not my own. But certainly
as you allude to, I think, this is an important conflict we are
in. However you may feel about it politically; and I understand
there are varying views on that, certainly up here as well as
elsewhere throughout America. But we do have young men and
women serving in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and they could use
more of their fellow citizens. And asking the American people
to support the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines with
qualified people is, in my view, an important indication of how
Americans feel about their own security. And service to the
Nation in uniform is a noble calling.
Now, to your point about sacrificing: If somebody somewhere
can draw a link, and I am not sure I can, but if they could
draw a link--as I say, I don't see how I could. If I were in
the position of trying to mobilize public opinion to this issue
that we are discussing here and this conflict, I think, I
suppose you could if you went into the discussion that Mr.
Woolsey was involved in and where oil comes from and the
politics of all of that. Okay. Reduce the consumption of oil, I
think in the long run that is very important. But other than as
a catalyst for that discussion, I think it would be tough to
sell it on what is going on in Iraq, and Iraq mainly.
It could be done, but other people more expert than me in
that: the mobilization of the American people, a la World War
II and Ken Burns and all of that which is apparent to everyone
who watches it. I think you have a good point but----
Mr. Woolsey. Congressman, I would say that a clear call for
a national commitment to move toward alternative fuels for
transportation and distributed generation of energy: both fuels
and electricity, with an eye towards renewables, but if you
move toward distributed generation, it tends to be renewables.
It is hard to put a coal-fired power plant on your roof. And I
think the technologies are moving that way. Photovoltaics is
taking off in part because of the progress that was already
made with silicon chips for computers, and much of the
technology is similar. Genetically modified biocatalysts to
make transportation fuel out of waste and so forth is taking
off because of genetic modification work done for
pharmaceuticals, and battery capabilities are taking off
because nobody wants to recharge their cell phones more than
once a day.
And because, unrelated to energy, these three things are
all happening, and they give us an opportunity to exploit these
technologies, and, I think, have the kind of call for national
action that you were suggesting.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. This panel is now concluded. I
think we all need to run to the Floor to vote, but thank you
very much, both Mr. Woolsey and General Sullivan.
We will be in votes for a while, it looks like. There are
five votes, so we could be gone for 45 minutes. But we will
take the testimony of the next panel when we return. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the Subcommittee recessed, to
reconvene at 1:05 p.m., the same day.]
Ms. Hooley. [Presiding] Dr. Alexander Lennon is a Research
Fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies and Co-Director of the
forthcoming CSIS report, ``The Potential Foreign Policy and
National Security Implications of Global Climate Change.'' Dr.
Andrew Price-Smith is an Assistant Professor of Political
Science at Colorado College, Director of the project on Health
and Global Affairs, and author of the book, ``The Health of
Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their
Effects on National Security and Development.'' Dr. Kent Hughes
Butts is Professor of Political Military Strategy and the
Director of the National Security Issues Group at the U.S. Army
War College's Center for Strategic Leadership.
Welcome to all of you. As our witnesses should know, spoken
testimony is limited to five minutes each, after which the
Members of the Committee will have five minutes each to ask
questions.
It is also the practice of the Subcommittee to take
testimony under oath. Do you have objections to being sworn in?
You also have the right to be represented by counsel. Is
anyone represented by counsel at today's hearing?
Okay. Please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn]
Ms. Hooley. Dr. Lennon, you may begin, and you can be
seated.
Panel 2:
STATEMENT OF DR. ALEXANDER T.J. LENNON, RESEARCH FELLOW,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, THE WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY
Dr. Lennon. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is an honor to be
invited here before the Subcommittee to share my experiences
with you today.
Coming from the national security community, I think most
Members traditionally approach climate change thinking about
how Russia might be affected and how our competition with other
major powers could come into play.
With Members from the environmental community, climate
change connotes images of glaciers melting, sea levels rising,
polar bears losing their homes.
My experience with this issue has turned both of these
premises on their head. Over the next generation the foreign
policy and national security implications for the United States
are strongest because of the weakness that simply things like
more frequent storms, more severe storms, and changes in
rainfall patterns might be able to cause over a generation.
Over the past year I have learned a tremendous amount from
being the Co-Director of a project at CSIS, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, that has sought to combine
the best insight of two traditionally separate communities:
both the scientists in policy and climate change with analysts
of foreign policy and national security.
The project intentionally did not delve into questions
about whether climate change is occurring, who is responsible
for it, or what to do about it. It focused exclusively on how
to understand the better potential foreign policy and national
security implications, if climate change were to occur.
The key to our focus was to change the timeframe of both
communities' traditional analysis. That timeframe was to bring
the national security community to look at a problem over the
course of a generation, or about 30 years, or the time it takes
for the purchases of major military platforms.
Over the climate change what we found is that while the
greatest temperature changes will be observed toward the Poles,
the fragility of societies and governments that are closest to
the equator means that the national security implications for
the United States are greatest in those regions of the world.
Four risks in particular struck me through our work. First
is that climate change would exacerbate water, food, and energy
shortages and increase the risk of at least political stress,
particularly because of water shortages in the Middle East.
Second, while many countries face stress from climate
change, the geopolitical significance of China and the water
shortages, desertification, migration, and public unrest that
it may face over the next 30 years could undermine any fragile
progress in economic and political modernization in that
country or Beijing's ability to act as a responsible
stakeholder in the international system.
Third, migration within and from both South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly to Europe, threatens to cause
instability in the developing world and increase the risk of
radicalization in Europe of Muslim communities, which then must
deal with politically-sensitive migration issues.
Finally, and potentially of greatest concern to me, the
effects of global climate change such as famine, disease, and
storms can strain the poor regions of the world, undermine
brittle confidence in governments, and increase the risk of
state weakness and failure, a contributing cause to terrorism
over the course of the next generation.
The single greatest lesson from the project that I learned
is that well before we get to the stage of rising sea levels or
islands disappearing, there are sincere national security
consequences to at least consider from simply storms and
changing patterns of rainfall.
I have a longer testimony that I prepared that I would
request would be submitted for the record, but in the interest
of time and to keep the statements short and engage in
questions, I thank you for your attention, and I am happy to
answer any questions I might be able to.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lennon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alexander T.J. Lennon
THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in
collaboration with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), has
been conducting a project over the past year to identify and analyze a
wide range of potential foreign policy and national security effects of
major disruptions in the world's climate patterns. I have co-directed
this project with Julianne Smith, Deputy Director of the International
Security Program when the project started and now Director of the
Europe program at CSIS, with the guidance of Executive Director, Kurt
Campbell, who was Senior Vice President and Director of the
International Security Program at CSIS when the project started and is
now the co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of CNAS.
The project has not collectively delved into questions about
whether climate change is occurring or who might be responsible. Nor
has the group sought to make recommendations about what to do about the
issue. That is not our area of expertise. It has exclusively sought to
better understand the potential foreign policy and national security
implications if climate change occurs.
Within this national security framework, the project has proceeded
from two premises. First, the national security community is not
traditionally accustomed to planning for contingencies more than thirty
years into the future, or about the time frame for developing new
military capabilities. Therefore, most of the work in this project
focused on national security implications over the next three decades.
Project members have concluded that it is not necessary for doomsday
predictions of glaciers melting, ice sheets breaking off, or
catastrophic sea level rise to come to fruition for U.S. foreign policy
and national security interests to be harmed. Instead, the analysis
focuses on consequences associated with effects such as more severe and
frequent storms as well as changes in rainfall patterns over the next
thirty years. Second, national security planning is based on being
aware of, and contingency planning for, the worst consequences that may
be encountered in the foreseeable future.
Through a series of working groups, this effort has sought to
combine the best insight of two traditionally separate expert
communities--specialists in the science and policy of climate change
with analysts of foreign policy and national security. In consultation
with scientific experts through these working groups, Jay Gulledge of
the Pew Center for Global Climate Change took the lead in outlining
scenarios for three posited worlds, two over the next thirty years
(expected and more dramatic climatic changes, respectively), as well as
more cataclysmic global climate change over the next 100 years.
Based on these scenarios, foreign policy and national security
experts John Podesta, former Chief of Staff for President Bill Clinton;
Leon Fuerth, former Vice President Gore's National Security Adviser;
and R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence, then
respectively assessed a wide range of possible foreign policy and
national security consequences--political, economic, social, military,
and religious--of each world. The highlights are expected to be
published as a monograph later this fall and in greater detail as a
book in 2008.
Unless otherwise noted, the testimony presented today is
principally based on the mildest of these three scenarios, or the
expected climate change over the next thirty years, based primarily on
a scenario presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) and analyzed by John Podesta and Peter Ogden with feedback from
the working group. The frame for presenting these issues in this
testimony is my own, highlighting what most struck me as Co-Director of
the project, but my role here is to convey the findings as a co-
director and group member, not to present my original analysis. The
credit for the analysis goes principally to the authors as well as
working group members.
Overall, project authors have emphasized that two general remarks
about climate change should be highlighted. First, while rising average
global temperatures tend to be discussed when analyzing climate change,
the reality is that such changing temperatures usually vary widely both
in different parts of the globe and across time, with impacts not
evolving linearly but often suddenly. Changes in ocean currents,
atmospheric conditions, and cumulative rainfall will vary dramatically
across different regions and geographies. It is unfortunately also true
that current modeling capacity focuses on continent-sized areas. We
currently lack the models for smaller regions, countries, or areas.
Second, at least as important as the way that the climate reacts to
rising temperatures is the way that societies around the world react to
temperate and climate changes. While the greatest changes in
temperature will be seen toward the poles, the greatest vulnerabilities
lie near the equator where fragile societies in Africa, south Asia, and
central and South America will experience the greatest impact from
climate change.
While authors raise a variety of concerns throughout the three
scenarios, four consequences stand out to me as the greatest concerns
to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests.
<bullet> First, climate change would exacerbate water, food,
and energy shortages and increase the risk of at least
political stress if not resource conflicts, possibly over water
in the Middle East and even sources of protein, such as fish,
in East Asia.
<bullet> Second, while many countries will face stress from
climate change, potential consequences in China present unique
challenges because of its geopolitical significance.
<bullet> Third, migration within and from south Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, including to Europe, threatens our foreign
policy and national security interests.
<bullet> Finally, and potentially of greatest concern to me,
the effects of global climate change will increase the risk of
state weakness and failure, exacerbating the threat of global
terrorism over the next generation.
These crises are all the more dangerous because they are
interconnected: water shortages can lead to food shortages, which can
lead to resource conflicts, which can drive migration, which can create
new food shortages in new regions, all of which can strain a state's
ability to govern, particularly when it is already weak or failing.
Collectively, the greatest risks of global climate change in the next
thirty years come from its impacts in the developing world--not just
the demands for disaster relief, development assistance, and conflict
prevention that will be placed on the developed world, particularly the
United States, but also to U.S. security itself from state failure and
terrorism.
Water and other resource shortages
An August 20 Washington Post article raised concerns that warming
will exacerbate global water shortages. To put it simply, hotter
temperatures mean that more water will evaporate into the air,
increasing droughts, while at the same time potentially causing floods
when it descends back to Earth as more severe rain storms, only to
evaporate again in an increasingly violent hydrological cycle.
Increasing water scarcity due to climate change will contribute to
instability throughout the world.
Although references to this threat may evoke images of armies
amassing in deserts to go to war over water, Podesta and Ogden
emphasize that the likelihood of such open conflict over the next 30
years is low. Nevertheless, while we are not likely to see ``water
wars,'' water scarcity can shape geopolitical order when states
directly compete with neighbors over shrinking water supplies.
This is likely to be the case in the Middle East, where water
shortages will coincide with a projected population boom. According to
current projections, the Middle Eastern and North African population
could double in the next 50 years. Meanwhile, seventy-five percent of
all the water in the Middle East is located in Iran, Iraq, Syria and
Turkey. Situated at the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates, Turkey
is the only country in the Middle East that does not depend on water
supplies that originate outside of its borders. Yet climate change will
leave all of the other countries dependent on water from the Tigris and
Euphrates Rivers more vulnerable to deliberate supply disruption.
Israel, for example, is extremely water poor and will only become
more so. By 2025, Israel will have less than half the minimum amount of
water per capita considered necessary for an industrialized nation.
Moreover, Israel's water is in politically unstable territory with one-
third in the Golan Heights, a source of strain in its relations with
Syria, and another third in the mountain aquifer that underlies the
West Bank.
Strains over water are not limited to the Middle East, particularly
in more severe scenarios of climate change according to Leon Fuerth.
The Indus River system is the largest contiguous irrigation system on
Earth with the headwater of its basin in India, making it the most
powerful player in political disputes over water. Pakistan, Bangladesh,
and Nepal are already engaged in water disputes with India and severe
climate change would exacerbate those tensions.
The ongoing genocide in Darfur may have begun as a consequence of
water scarcity. Water shortages have led to the desertification of
large tracts of farmland and grassland. Arab nomads in North Darfur
subsequently moved south for livestock to graze, thereby coming into
conflict with southern sedentary farmers and mixing with simmering
ethnic and religious tensions. Government refusal to address the
grievances of southern farmers led in stages to rebellion, counter-
insurgency, and eventually ethnic cleansing.
Other resources may be affected as well, according to Fuerth,
particular under more severe predictions for climate change. For
example, China could find itself in direct confrontation with Japan and
even the United States over access to fish. Rising standards of living
are already leading to increased demands for higher quality food and
sources of protein, such as fish, in China. This increasing demand
combined with severe climate change at a time when all major fisheries
may have crashed as the result of unsustainable fishing practices,
along with the ongoing, worldwide decimation of wetlands, would create
at least political strains over sources of protein.
China's challenges
Depleted fisheries are not the only challenges that climate change
will present to China or that China will present to the world. China's
current energy production and consumption patterns alone threaten the
long-term global environment. Unless its pattern of energy consumption
is altered, China's carbon emissions will reinforce or accelerate
several existing domestic environmental challenges--ranging from water
and food shortages to desertification to unrest within China--and
become the primary driver of global climate change itself.
Water shortages will pose a major challenge to China. Two-thirds of
China's cities are currently experiencing water shortages, and will be
exacerbated by shifts in precipitation patterns and increased water
pollution. In 2004, the UN reported that most of China's major rivers
had shrunk, and in December 2006 it found that the Yangtze River's
water level dropped to an all-time low because of climate change.
Northern China faces the greatest threat in this respect, as it will be
subject to heat waves and droughts that will worsen existing water
shortages.
According to the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report in 2007, these
regional water shortages will also lead to food shortages as ``crops in
the plains of north and northeast China could face water-related
challenges in coming decades, due to increases in water demands and
soil-moisture deficit associated with projected decline in
precipitation.'' China's first national report on climate change,
released in late 2006, estimates that national wheat, corn, and rice
yields could decrease by as much as an astounding 37 percent in the
next few decades.
China, moreover, is severely affected by desertification. More than
a quarter of China is already desert, and the Gobi is steadily
expanding, threatening roughly 400 million people according to the UN
Convention to Combat Desertification. The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Changes (UNFCCC) notes that desertification-prone
countries are ``particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of
climate change.''
In spite of the colossal development projects that China has
initiated, domestic social and political turmoil are expected to
increase. One source of unrest will be increased human migration within
China due to environmental factors. Much of this migration will
reinforce current urbanization trends, putting added pressure on
already overpopulated and dangerously polluted Chinese cities. Those
regions of China that do benefit from some additional rainfall will
also need to cope with an influx of migrants from water-scarce areas.
In China's northwestern provinces, where rainfall may increase, the
acceleration of the movement of Han Chinese into Muslim Uighur areas
will aggravate tensions that have led to low-level conflict for many
years.
In the last few years, concerns over environmental issues have
provoked thousands of Chinese to demonstrate across the country. In
April 2005, as many as 60,000 people rioted in Huaxi village in
Zhejiang Province over the pollution from a chemical plant. Just three
months later, 15,000 people rioted for three days in the eastern
factory town of Xinchang, 180 miles south of Shanghai, over the
pollution from a pharmaceutical factory.
More broadly, the findings of a poll conducted in China last year
by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org
indicate that much of the Chinese public believes that climate change
is a uniquely serious environmental problem. Some 80 percent of
respondents concurred that within ten years, global warming could pose
an important threat to their country's ``vital interest.''
On one hand, this may lead to internal political reform designed to
address public concern. It is also possible, however, that the Chinese
leadership will not make necessary adjustments, potentially leading to
larger protests and violent clashes with police, as well as more
restrictions on the press and public use of the internet. Relations
with the West would rapidly deteriorate as a result. Whatever the
political response, many experts including SAIS China Director David
Lampton, former Assistant Secretary of State Jim Kelly, and Secretary
Rice have all argued that it is not in the U.S. interest to have a
massive country like China be weak and unstable.
Migration
Challenges from migration are not limited to China. The United
States itself, like most wealthy and technologically advanced
countries, will not experience destabilizing levels of internal
migration due to climate change, but will still be affected. According
to the IPCC, tropical cyclones will become increasingly intense in the
coming decades, and will force the resettlement of people from coastal
areas in the United States.
The United States will also experience border stress due to the
severe effects of climate change in parts of Mexico and the Caribbean.
Northern Mexico will be subject to severe water shortages, which will
drive immigration into the United States in spite of the increasingly
treacherous border terrain. Likewise, the damage caused by storms and
rising sea levels in the coastal areas of the Caribbean Islands--where
60 percent of the Caribbean population lives--will increase the flow of
immigrants from the region and generate political tension.
In the developing world, however, the impact of climate-induced
migration will be most pronounced. Migration will widen the wealth gap
between and within many of these countries. It will deprive developing
countries of sorely need economic and intellectual capital as the
business and educated elite who have the means to emigrate abroad do so
in greater numbers than ever before. Podesta and Ogden focus on the
effects on three regions in which climate-induced migration will
present the greatest geopolitical challenges are South Asia, Africa,
and Europe.
South Asia
No region is more directly threatened by human migration than South
Asia. The IPCC warns that ``coastal areas, especially heavily populated
mega-delta regions in South, East and Southeast Asia, will be at
greatest risk due to increased flooding from the sea and, in some mega-
deltas, flooding from the rivers.'' Bangladesh, in particular, will be
threatened by devastating floods and other damage from monsoons,
melting glaciers, and tropical cyclones that originate in the Bay of
Bengal, as well as water contamination and ecosystem destruction caused
by rising sea levels.
The population of Bangladesh, which stands at 142 million today, is
anticipated to increase by approximately 100 million people during the
next few decades, even as the impact of climate change and other
environmental factors steadily render the low-lying regions of the
country uninhabitable. Many of the displaced will move inland, which
will foment instability as the resettled population competes for
already scarce resources with the established residents. Others will
seek to migrate abroad, creating heightened political tension not only
in South Asia, but in Europe and Southeast Asia as well.
Bangladeshi migrants will generate political tension as they
traverse the region's many contested borders and territories, including
between India, Pakistan, and China. The India-Bangladesh border is
already a site of significant political friction, exemplified by the
2,100 mile, two-and-a-half meter high, iron border fence that India is
in the process of building.
In Nepal, climate change is contributing to a phenomenon known as
glacial lake outburst, in which violent flood waves reaching as high as
15 meters destroy downstream settlements, dams, bridges, and other
infrastructure. Ultimately, this puts further stress on the already
beleaguered country as it struggles to preserve a fragile peace and
reintegrate tens of thousands of Maoist insurgents. Neighboring the
entrenched conflict zone of Kashmir and the contested borders of China
and India, an eruption of severe social or political turmoil in Nepal
could have ramifications for the entire South Asian region.
Nigeria and East Africa
The impact of climate change-induced migration will be felt
throughout Africa, but its effects on Nigeria and East Africa pose
particularly acute geopolitical challenges. Migration will be both
internal and international. The first domestic wave will likely be from
agricultural regions to urban centers where more social services are
available, and the risk of state failure will increase as central
governments lose control over stretches of their territory and their
borders.
Nigeria will suffer from climate-induced drought, desertification,
and sea-level rise. Already, approximately 1,350 square miles of
Nigerian land turns to desert each year, forcing both farmers and
herdsmen to abandon their homes. Lagos, the capital, is one of the West
African coastal megacities that the IPCC identifies as at risk from sea
level rise by 2015. This, coupled with high population growth (Nigeria
is the most populous nation in Africa, and three-fourths of the
population is under the age of 30), will force significant migration
and contribute to political and economic turmoil. It will, for
instance, exacerbate the existing internal conflict over oil production
in the Niger Delta. Nigeria is the world's eighth-largest oil exporter,
Africa's single-largest, and the fifth-largest oil exporter to the
United States, larger than any Middle Eastern country other than Saudi
Arabia. This instability has an impact on the price of oil, and will
have global strategic implications in the coming decades.
Europe
Some migration from South Asia and Africa will likely increase the
number of Muslim immigrants to the European Union (EU), potentially
exacerbating existing tensions and increasing the likelihood of
radicalization among members of Europe's growing and often poorly
assimilated Islamic communities. The majority of immigrants to most
Western European countries are already Muslim. Muslims constitute
approximately five percent of the European population, with the largest
communities located in France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark.
Europe's Muslim population is already expected to double by 2025, and
it will be much larger if climate change spurs additional migration
from South Asia and Africa.
The degree of instability generated will depend on how successfully
these immigrant populations are integrated into European society.
Unfortunately, this process has not always gone well as articles by
State Department analyst Timothy Savage in The Washington Quarterly and
Robert Leiken in Foreign Affairs have discussed. Although the influx of
immigrants from Africa--Muslim and otherwise--will continue to be
viewed by some as a potential catalyst for economic growth at a time
when the EU has a very low fertility rate, the viability of the EU's
loose border controls will be called into question, and the lack of a
common immigration policy will invariably lead to internal political
tension.
State failure
In addition to potentially exacerbating radicalization in Europe,
climate change could contribute to terrorism by increasing weak and
failing states. In poor economic and social conditions, a country's
political direction can change quickly. For instance, the inability or
perceived unwillingness of political leaders to stop the spread of
disease or to provide adequate care for the afflicted would undermine
support for the government. In countries with functioning democracies,
this could lead to the election of new leaders with political agendas
radically different from their predecessors. It could also breed
greater support for populist candidates whose politics resonate in a
society that believes that its economic and social hardships are due to
neglect or mismanagement by the government. In countries with weak or
non-democratic political foundations, there is a heightened risk that
this will lead to civil war or a toppling of the government altogether.
Water-borne and vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue
fever will be particularly prevalent in countries that experience
significant additional rainfall due to climate change. Conversely, some
air-borne diseases will thrive in precisely those areas which become
more arid due to drought and higher temperatures, such as in parts of
Brazil. Shortages of food or fresh drinking water will also render
human populations more susceptible to illness and less capable of
rapidly recovering.
Restrictions on the movement of goods in response could become a
source of economic and political turmoil. Countries that depend on
tourism could be economically devastated by even relatively small
outbreaks. For example, the fear of Severe Accurate Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) sharply curtailed international travel to Thailand in
2003. Even without trade restrictions, the economic burden that disease
will place on developing countries will be severe from factors such as
added health care costs combined with a loss of worker productivity
from worker absences.
The outbreak of disease can also lead a government to adopt
policies that may be seen as discriminatory or politically motivated by
segments of its own population. Treatment may be provided first, or
exclusively, to a particular ethnic group, religious faction, or
political party. This can provide anti-governmental groups with the
opportunity to increase their popularity and legitimacy by providing
those health services that the government does not.
The threat of state failure and a base for global terrorism may be
highest in East Africa because of the potential number of weak or
failing states, the numerous unresolved political disputes, and the
severe impacts of climate change. Climate change will likely create
large fluctuations in the amount of rainfall in East Africa during the
next 30 years--a five to 20 percent increase in rainfall during the
winter months will cause flooding and soil erosion, while a five to 10
percent decrease in the summer months will cause severe droughts. This
will jeopardize the livelihood of millions of people in a region where
80 percent of the population earns a living from agriculture and it
constitutes about 40 percent of GDP. Meanwhile, the entire Horn of
Africa continues to be threatened by a failed Somalia and other weak
states. Al Qaeda cells are active in the region, and there is a danger
that this area could become a central breeding ground and safe haven
for jihadists as climate change pushes more states toward the brink of
collapse.
The risk is also high in South Asia, particularly Bangladesh, where
hundreds of Taliban and jihadists already found safe haven in the wake
of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. In his May/June 2007 Foreign
Affairs article, ``Al Qaeda Strikes Back,'' former National Security
Council staffer and CIA analyst Bruce Riedel warns that Bangladesh is
among the places most likely to become a new base of operations for al
Qaeda. The combination of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions,
radical Islamic political groups, and dire environmental insecurity
brought on by climate change could prove a volatile mix with severe
regional and potentially global consequences.
The U.S. response and the risk of desensitization
Although some of the emergencies created or exacerbated by climate
change may ultimately be managed by the United Nations, the United
States will often be sought as a global ``first responder'' in the
immediate aftermath of a major natural disaster or humanitarian
emergency. The larger and more logistically difficult the operation,
the more urgent the appeal will be.
The U.S. military has already played a vital role in international
relief efforts undertaken after the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.
Podesta and Ogden emphasize that there was simply no substitute for the
more than 15,000 U.S. troops, two dozen U.S. ships, and one hundred
U.S. aircraft that were dedicated to the operation. The performance of
the U.S. military was resoundingly applauded by the international
community. In Indonesia itself, the U.S. public image improved
dramatically. A Pew Research Center poll conducted in the spring of
2005 found that 79 percent of Indonesians had a more favorable
impression of the United States because of its disaster relief efforts.
As a result, the overall U.S. favorability rating in Indonesia rose to
38 percent after having bottomed out at 15 percent in May 2003. U.S.
Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was
right to describe the military's response to the tsunami and the
subsequent improvement of the U.S. image in the region as ``one of the
most defining moments of this new century.'' The question now is
whether the tsunami response will be remembered in 30 years time as a
defining case or an exception to the rule.
If and how to respond will be a recurring question for the United
States, each time raising a difficult set of issues with important
national security and foreign policy implications. How much financial
assistance should the United States pledge and how quickly? With which
other countries should the United States seek to coordinate its
response, either operationally or diplomatically? Should the U.S.
military participate directly, and, if so, in what capacity and on what
scale?
Over time, it is possible that the United States will become
reluctant to expend ever greater resources on overseas disaster relief,
not to mention longer-term humanitarian and stabilization operations,
as the impacts of climate change begin to be seen more frequently and
felt more acutely at home. Natural disasters already cost the United
States billions of dollars annually, and the IPCC projects that climate
change will create an ``extended period of high fire risk and large
increases in area burned'' in North America and particularly in the
western United States. The United States will also have to meet rising
health costs associated with more frequent heat waves, a deterioration
of air quality, and an increase in water-borne disease.
We might have glimpsed a model of this future in the response to
the 2005 Pakistani earthquake, which occurred within a year of the
Indian Ocean tsunami and just two months after Hurricane Katrina. With
time and resources devoted to the Gulf Coast, the United States may not
have responded as quickly and effectively at it otherwise would have,
and as a result, missed a rare opportunity to recast its image in a
strategically critical country.
Over the next three decades, the spread and advancement of
information and communication technologies will enable the public to
follow these crises more closely, making it difficult to ignore the
widening chasm between how the world's ``haves'' and ``have-nots'' are
affected by climate change. Ironically, as noted in a recent report by
the UK Ministry of Defense's Development, Concepts, and Doctrine
Center, the very words and images that at first will catalyze action
might eventually lose their impact: ``Societies in the developed and
developing worlds may become increasingly inured to stories of
conflict, famine, and death in these areas and, to an extent,
desensitized.''
Ultimately, the threat of desensitization could prove one of the
gravest threats of all, for it is clear that the national security and
foreign policy challenges posed by climate change are tightly
interwoven with the global leadership challenge of helping those least
responsible to cope with its effects.
Climate change will present challenges to U.S. foreign policy and
national security interests all over the globe over the next
generation. While the greatest temperature changes will be observed
toward the poles, the greatest threats are likely to be seen closer to
the equator, where societies and governments are more fragile and less
able to cope with the strains of climate change. These threats include
water shortages in the Middle East, environmental damage and domestic
instability in China, migration within South Asia and Africa as well as
from those regions to Europe, and state weakness and failure
particularly in Africa and South Asia. Ultimately, these threats are
not simply environmental but would exacerbate the threat to U.S.
national security from terrorism itself, both by exacerbating
radicalization of Muslim communities in Europe, which may then seek
harm to Western societies, and by providing a home for terrorist
operational planning and training in increasingly strained countries in
the generation ahead.
Biography for Alexander T.J. Lennon
Alexander T. J. Lennon is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington
Quarterly, the Center for Strategic and International Studies's (CSIS)
policy journal on global strategic issues. Dr. Lennon is also a fellow
in the international security program covering the grand strategy,
foreign and defense policy of the great powers--particularly the United
States, China, and India, but also Europe, Japan, and Russia--and on
nuclear proliferation prevention strategy. He is also an adjunct
professor in security studies at Georgetown University. His current
research projects are on the national security implications of global
climate change and the regional risks of proliferation, especially on
Iran and North Korea.
Before assuming his current positions, Lennon was the Deputy
Director of studies at CSIS. Before that, he received a Presidential
Management Internship (PMI) and served at the U.S. Department of State
as the political-military officer principally responsible for bilateral
security relations with Israel. While at the State Department, Lennon
was awarded both the Benjamin Franklin award and a State Department
Certificate of Appreciation for his performance as the lead U.S. action
officer for the semiannual Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) with
Israel. Prior to that, he worked in the political-military studies
program at CSIS where he specialized in Northeast Asian security issues
as well as nuclear doctrine and nonproliferation.
Alex has published articles in The Washington Quarterly (before he
was Editor), Internationale Politik: Global Edition, Strategic Review,
The China Business Review, The Christian Science Monitor, The Boston
Globe, Defense News, and Newsday, among other publications. He has
edited or co-edited five books: Reshaping Rogue States (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2004); The Battle for Hearts and Minds (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2003); What Does the World Want from America? (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2002) Contemporary Nuclear Debates (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2002); and (with Michael J. Mazarr) Toward a Nuclear Peace: the
Future of Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1994).
Lennon has been interviewed on dozens of radio programs and
television news broadcasts, including BBC, Fox-News TV, CBC (the
Canadian Broadcasting Company), and Feature News Service throughout
Asia. He is a life member of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS), the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and the Council
for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).
Alex earned his Ph.D. in Policy Studies, part-time, at the
University of Maryland where he wrote his dissertation on the role of
transnational (track-2) security policy networks with other great
powers in U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. He also holds a
Master's degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown and an
A.B. cum laude from Harvard, where he was the national intercollegiate
policy debate (NDT) champion.
Ms. Hooley. Thank you. Certainly from a different
perspective I think than we have----
Next we have Dr. Price-Smith.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW T. PRICE-SMITH, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLORADO COLLEGE; DIRECTOR,
PROJECT ON HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT, AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS, COLORADO
COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO-COLORADO SPRINGS; SENIOR
ADVISOR, CENTER FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
Dr. Price-Smith. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will be
discussing the impact of global climate change on infectious
disease, its implications for economic and political
instability, and for U.S. national security.
As you will see from the slides now presented to you, I
will be discussing first the precipitation trends. This is IPCC
data from, as you can see, 1900 to 2000. In my opinion it is
the best global data set available. Period.
The effects of precipitation on infectious disease are
going to be expressed through precipitation's effects on
vectors, namely mosquitoes, flies, snails, and so forth. And,
specifically, increased precipitation will lead to increasing
prevalence of malaria, schistosomiasis, and perhaps other
diseases as well.
Next slide, please. These are the annual temperature trends
from 1976 to 2000. What we are likely to see here is an
expansion of the ranges of disease-bearing vectors in terms of
both latitude and altitude, which means that diseases like
malaria are expected to move from the tropics towards the
Poles--so, from the tropical to the sub-tropical and temperate
regions.
Furthermore, malaria and other vector-borne diseases may
expand in terms of altitudinal range--in other words, moving up
where it is up hills and mountainsides to affect cities like
Nairobi in Kenya, which historically was free of malaria but is
no longer so as a result of the warming trend in that region.
I must confess I came to this topic as a bit of a skeptic.
It was at Kent's invitation to a conference for the TISS down
in North Carolina. However, I have changed my views a bit on
some of these issues.
Another thing that is interesting, if we could go back to
the precipitation slide for a second, is the changes in
aridity. All right. Arid environments are, in fact, inimical to
certain pathogens, such as schistosomiasis, which is borne by
snail vectors, specifically oncomelania. So you will see that
in portions of Central Africa, right there indicated by the
orange dots, those increasingly arid environments will actually
see a decline in certain pathogens such as malaria and
schistosomiasis because of their declining moisture.
So what I would like to state is that climate change
generates winners and losers. It is contextual, and it depends
upon both the pathogen in question and the vector.
Into the realm of economics--well, before we get there
actually, let us discuss non-linearities. As Woolsey
indicated--he brought this up this morning, I think--it is
important to think in non-linear terms. All right. Diseases
don't gradually increase. They expand geometrically once they
attain a rate of expansion of over one within any given
population.
So thinking that climate change is just going to generate
linear, slow, incremental change in terms of disease prevalence
may be the wrong way to go. All right. We may see exceptional
explosions of diseases in certain areas and also rapid declines
of disease in other regions. Again, it is contextual.
In the realm of economics now, health is the central driver
of economic productivity. It has been rather established, I
think. Conversely, disease erodes productivity, savings, and
aggregate wealth in affected societies. Jeffrey Sachs has
estimated that malaria alone generates 1.3 percent drag on GDP
per capita growth in affected nations.
Furthermore, disease exhibits differential impacts on
class. The burden of disease falls primarily on the poor and
middle class and historically has exacerbated inequities
between classes.
Politically, I think that, just in conclusion here--and I
would be happy to answer more questions--pathogens should be
thought of as stressors upon the state and upon societies and
upon economies. It can exacerbate pre-existing conflicts
between classes, ethnicities, religious factions, and between
state and society. The destabilization is likely pathogen
specific. And areas at risk in my opinion include South Asia,
Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan African, and portions of Latin
America.
The effects on U.S. national security in my opinion will be
primarily indirect, but disease can act as a stressor to: 1)
weaken states; 2) radicalize populations; and 3) thus
facilitate radical and or terrorist activities, in my opinion.
So in sum, much more research is actually required in this
domain. It is a very new domain of exploration, climate to
disease to economic and political outcomes, and hopefully we
can provide more information to you.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Price-Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew T. Price-Smith
On Climate Change and Infectious Disease: Implications for Political
Destabilization and Conflict
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Science and Technology Committee,
thank you for inviting me here today to share with you my views
regarding the impact of Global Climate Change on Infectious Disease,
its implications for economic and political instability, and for U.S.
national security. I am the Director of the Project on Health,
Environment, and Global Affairs, which is an inter-university research
initiative between Colorado College and the University of Colorado,
Colorado Springs, and Senior Advisor to the Center for Homeland
Security at the University of Colorado. I serve as Assistant Professor
of Political Science at Colorado College, and have held previous
appointments at Columbia University and the University of South
Florida. Over the years I have served as consultant or advisor to the
U.S. Department of Energy, and Department of Defense, the World Bank,
the United Nations Development Program, and the Council on Foreign
Relations.
On Etiology and Emergence
In the twenty first century, novel pathogens are currently
`emerging' at the rate of approximately one new agent per annum.
Emerging diseases often are the result of `emergent properties' wherein
antecedent variables (e.g., population density, speed of transport)
combine in unusual and unforeseen ways that facilitate the emergence of
a given pathogen which then becomes endogenized within the human
ecology. The classic modern example of such emergent properties leading
to viral proliferation is the SARS coronavirus which appeared in
Guangzhou, China in late 2002, and subsequently spread throughout the
Pacific Rim nations. In that particular case, this virulent coronavirus
spread from its natural reservoir in east Asian bat populations, into
palm civets. The variant of the virus that infected civets was
transmissible among humans, amplified by elements of the human ecology
such as the `wet markets' of East Asia, the closed environments of
modern hospitals which amplified degrees of infection, and modern jet
airplane technology that facilitated the rapid spread of the virus
throughout the Pacific theater. Individually these disparate variables
would not predict the emergence of epidemic disease, however, when
combined together the SARS contagion of 02-03 resulted.
The dynamics of contagion frequently exhibit such emergent
properties,\1\ and the relations between pathogen, human host, and
vectors of transmission (e.g., mosquitoes) are central to both the
transmissibility and lethality of any given manifestation of contagion.
Furthermore, epidemics and pandemics exhibit non-linearities and
threshold dynamics. For example, pathogens may simmer in a given
population for some time, but once the rate of transmission passes from
<1 to >1, the proliferation of the pathogen may then increase on an
exponential scale. Diseases also exhibit high levels of interactivity,
and the capacity for co-infection. The classic example is HIV which
destroys the host's immune system, and thereby facilitates colonization
by other pathogens (e.g., tuberculosis) that ultimately kill the host.
What then is the relationship between climate change, infectious
disease, prosperity, and political stability and security? The
complexity of such interactions is enormous, and so we begin with the
relations between climate and disease, focusing on malaria in
particular.
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\1\ For an in-depth discussion see Andrew Price-Smith, Contagion
and Chaos, MIT Press, forthcoming 2008.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Data provided by the IPCC regarding changes in precipitation from
1900-2000 indicate enormous variance on a global scale. Certain
regions, such as the arctic and sub-arctic regions of the northern
hemisphere, the northeastern sector of south Asia, and Eastern
Australia are clearly enjoying increased levels of precipitation.
Certain vectors of disease, (such as mosquitoes and snails) thrive in
wet environments. Consequently, increases in precipitation will induce
the proliferation of vectors, and thereby increase the transmission
rates of certain pathogens such as malaria and schistosomiasis.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Pathogens and their vectors of transmission are often highly
sensitive to changes in temperature as well. IPCC data from 1976-2000
clearly indicate increasing temperatures for much of the surface of the
planet, with the greatest increases evident in the temperate to polar
regions. As isotherms shift toward the polar regions, this will expand
the latitudinal range of the vectors in question (i.e., anopheles
mosquitoes) and thereby permit the expansion of malaria in previously
non-malarious zones. Similarly, increasing surface temperatures permit
the movement of malaria in higher altitudes than before. For example,
Nairobi has historically been non-malarial due to its altitude, but in
recent years increases in temperature have seen the pathogen moving
into the region. The temperature-induced expansion of malaria is
problematic because it exposes novel populations, who often lack any
genetic or acquired immunity to the pathogen. Thus, the mortality and
morbidity in such regions may be much higher than in zones where
malaria is endemic.
Increasing temperatures also affect the biting rate of vectors. As
temperatures rise, the vectors (mosquitoes) feed with greater
frequency, and therefore increase the transmission rate of the
plasmodium (the parasite) into human populations. Furthermore,
increasing temperatures also affect the extrinsic incubation rate of
the pathogen, such that it replicates within the gut of the vector at a
greatly augmented rate. Thus, under conditions of higher temperatures,
there are greater numbers of plasmodium within the vector, and the
vector bites with much greater frequency.\2\ On a macro level, all of
this means that as temperatures increase, the burden of disease (e.g.,
malaria) is likely to increase to a significant degree. Precipitation
and Sea Surface Temperatures (SST's) are strong predictors of malarial
incidence.\3\
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\2\ See Reiter 2001, Kovats et al., 2001; Hunter, 2003; van
Lieshout, 2004; Patz et al., 2005; McMichael, 2006.
\3\ M.C. Thompson et al., 2005.
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In the case of cholera, increasing SST's are highly correlated with
the growth of algal blooms. The blooms move across oceans courtesy of
dominant currents and winds, and function as vectors of transmission of
the vibrio. Thus, we see a long-term empirical association between SST
and the incidence of cholera. In the case of cholera we have also seen
that incidence is responsive to the modulation of the El Nino Southern
Oscillation (ENSO), with preliminary evidence from case studies carried
out in Bangladesh (Rodo, 2002). There is also considerable evidence of
thresholds and non-linearities, such that warming temperatures may
produce minor and linear increases in vibrio incidence until a
threshold point is reached, after which the numbers of the pathogen
increase at an exponential scale.\4\
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\4\ See Xavier Rodo et al., 2002; J. Patz, 2002.
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Schistosomiasis is a frequently lethal disease induced by parasitic
blood flukes, and it is prevalent in tropical and temperate zones. The
vector of the parasite is the snail (oncomelania) which thrives under
conditions of increased precipitation, and within the temperature range
of 15.3 degrees C to an optimal temperature of 30 degrees C. The
balance of available evidence suggests that global climate change (GCC)
will shift the distribution of the vectors into new regions, and
thereby afflict previously uninfected populations. A caveat however,
the IPCC data clearly indicate that certain regions (e.g., West Africa)
are becoming increasingly arid, which is inimical to the vector.
Consequently, those zones that witness declining precipitation levels
will see a decline in the incidence of schistosomiasis in their
respective populations. In those regions that exhibit both increasing
precipitation, coupled with increasing temperature, we are likely to
witness augmented geographic zones of transmission, and increased
frequency of transmission within those regions. Thus, GCC will result
in winners and losers, dependent upon the particular pathogen in
question, and its sensitivity to aridity and temperature.\5\
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\5\ See Nagasaki, 1960; Zhou et al., 2002; Yang et al., 2005;
Steinmann et al., 2006; Guo-Jing Yang et al., 2007.
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Economic Outcomes
The economic historian Robert Fogel won the Nobel Prize in
economics in 1994 for his analysis of the hypothesis that population
health was the central driver of economic productivity (NBER, 1994). If
health promotes prosperity, then disease erodes productivity and
wealth. At the micro-economic level disease erodes productivity through
mechanisms such as the debilitation of workers, increased absenteeism,
increased medical costs, reduced savings and investment, and the
premature death of breadwinners. At the sectoral level, disease imposes
a particular burden upon those sectors of the economy that are labor-
intensive, such as agriculture, and resource-extraction, and thereby
imposes a relatively greater effect upon the economies of the
developing world.
The impact of malaria is illustrative at the macro-economic level.
Sachs and Malaney estimate that for those countries where malaria is
endemic, the pathogen generates a 1.3 percent drag on their GDP growth
rate, per capita/per annum. Further, Gallup and Sachs estimated that a
10 percent decline in malaria incidence resulted in a 0.3 percent
increase in the growth rate of GDP per capita/per annum. McCarthy
estimated that malaria imposed a drag on the GDP growth rate of
affected nations, at the level of 0.25 to 0.55 percent per annum.\6\ In
case studies of individual nations, malaria control has resulted in
greater prosperity for the polity in question. For example, malaria
control measures in Zambia resulted in a $7.1 billion increase to that
nation's economy.\7\
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\6\ D. McCarthy et al., NBER paper 7541, 2000.
\7\ Utzinger et al., 2002.
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The burden of infectious disease falls primarily upon the poor and
middle classes, and therefore as the burden of disease increases in
certain regions it will likely exacerbate both the perceived and real
level of economic inequities between socioeconomic strata.
Historically, such perceptions of inequity have led to periods of
social and political destabilization.\8\ On a global scale, GCC-induced
increases in the burden of disease will exert a drag on the global
economy, and the perpetuation of poverty within the LDCs.
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\8\ Price-Smith, Contagion and Chaos, MIT Press, 2008, forthcoming.
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Assessments of the economic burden of a given illness (e.g.,
malaria) are complicated by the lack of adequate surveillance
infrastructure throughout much of the developing world where the
disease is endemic.\9\ Moreover, the complexity of measuring the
economic impact of GCC-induced infectious diseases is augmented by the
interactivity of various pathogens in a given population. For example,
the population of country X may be increasingly beset by increased
incidence of malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis, and certain
individuals may exhibit co-infection with one or more pathogens.
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\9\ Worral et al., 2004, 2005.
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Pathogens may also erode the functionality and efficacy of the
state as well. For example, disease-induced economic stagnation (or
contraction) of the macro economy will consequently reduce tax-based
revenues available to the state. Diminished revenues will in turn
impede the state's capacity to provide public goods and services (e.g.,
education, law enforcement) to its population. This may in turn reduce
the populace's perceptions of the legitimacy of the state. In the
domain of human capital, disease may further erode state capacity by
debilitating and/or killing trained and skilled personnel, thereby
reducing institutional resilience and efficacy.\10\
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\10\ An expanded analysis of the pernicious effects of disease on
the state can be found in Andrew Price-Smith, The Health of Nations,
MIT Press, 2002.
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On Poverty, Instability and Conflict
The association between poverty, political destabilization, and
outright conflict is complex. In particular, there is an endogeneity
issue regarding the direction of causality. However, we can make some
preliminary observations at this point. First, various iterations of
the State Failure Task Force conducted empirical investigations and
determined that infant mortality (as a measure) is a strong empirical
predictor of state failure.\11\ Ted Gurr argued that increasing levels
of poverty induced a psychological state of deprivation (perceived
injustice) that often led to intra-state conflict.\12\ This hypothesis
that conditions of deprivation (both real and perceived) led to civil
strife was supported by Deininger (2003), and low levels of the Human
Development Index are associated with conflict in Indonesia (Malapit et
al., 2003). Other political scientists have found that poverty combines
with ethnic fragmentation to produce intra-state conflict (Easterly and
Levine, 1997; Wilkinson, 2004; Korf, 2005). Charles Tilly has argued
that inequities are directly associated with intrastate conflict
(Tilly, 1998).\13\ Further, there is empirical evidence that social
polarization leads to conflict (Esteban and Ray, 1994, 1999; Boix,
2004), and that conflict may function as a `coping strategy' for those
populations confronted with extreme levels of economic deprivation
(Humphreys and Wienstein, 2004; Verwimp, 2005). Convincing arguments
take the form of the state weakness hypothesis wherein deprivation
combines with a weakened state to offer both the motive and the
opportunity for political violence, with evidence from numerous case
studies (see Kahl, 2006; and Homer-Dixon, 1999). Political scientists
(Singer, 2002) have also hypothesized that increased levels of
infectious disease may lead to conflict between sovereign states.
Although there is evidence that contagion leads to political acrimony
and trade disputes between nations, there is no evidence that
infectious disease results in war between nations (Price-Smith, 2008).
Despite the proliferation of literature to support the hypothesis that
economic deprivation generates political violence at the intra-state
level, additional cross-national empirical analysis, using time-series
data, is required. That said, the balance of existing evidence supports
the hypothesis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ D. Esty et al., State Failure Task Force I and II.
\12\ Gurr, 1970.
\13\ Also see Stewart, 2000; Langer, 2004; Mancini, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusions
Pathogens function as stressors that impose burdens on both
populations (i.e., society), and upon the structures of the state
itself. Historical analysis of the stresses generated by epidemic
disease demonstrate that pathogens have exacerbated preexisting
conflicts between socioeconomic classes, between ethnicities, between
those of different religious affiliations, and frequently induced
conflicts between state and society.\14\ Thus, the GCC-induced
proliferation of disease may facilitate socio-political
destabilization, particularly in the weak states and impoverished
populations of the developing world. However, such destabilization is
contingent upon several factors, it is pathogen-specific, and it
depends upon existing socioeconomic and political cleavages within the
polity in question. Areas at risk of such disease-induced
destabilization include the sub-tropical to temperate zones, as
tropical pathogens and their attendant vectors expand into these
contiguous zones to affect immunologically naive populations. Thus, we
should be concerned about nations in South Asia, Central and East Asia,
Southern Africa, and South America. Typically the effects of disease-
induced destabilization upon the security of the United States will be
indirect, however, in the post 9-11 era we now recognize that weak and
failed states in the developing world may generate externalities (such
as terrorism and political radicalization) that threaten the material
interests of the dominant powers of the international system, including
the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See Friedrich Prinzing, 1916; David Baldwin, 2004; Richard
Evans, 2005; Alfred Crosby, 1986; William McNeill, 1976; Charles
Rosenberg, 1987; Sheldon Watts, 1999; Terence Ranger and Paul Slack,
1996; and J.N. Hays, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In conclusion, further research is required to flesh out the
complex chain of possible causation that I have detailed above. This
will require the formation of interdisciplinary teams of both social
and natural scientists who will then model the impacts of climate
change upon disease, and the consequent effects upon the economic and
political domains. This might involve the compilation of a time-series
data set across a representative sample of countries. One obvious
problem involves modeling the long-term processes of climate change,
however we might use the ENSO effect to model how short-term changes in
climate induce variance in disease incidence, and then observe the
resulting economic and political impacts over the very short-term.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for providing me this opportunity to
appear before you. I'm happy to respond to Members' questions.
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Schistosomiasis japonicum within Oncomelania hupensis, and
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Yang, G.J. et al., ``A potential impact of climate change and water
resource development on the transmission of schistosoma
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Biography for Andrew T. Price-Smith
Andrew T. Price-Smith is Director of the Project on Health,
Environment, and Global Affairs, which is an inter-university research
initiative between Colorado College and the University of Colorado,
Colorado Springs, and Senior Advisor to the Center for Homeland
Security at the University of Colorado. He is also Assistant Professor
of Political Science at Colorado College, and Adjunct Professor of
Environmental Science. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from
the University of Toronto in 1999, where he also served as founding
Director of the Project on Health and Global Affairs at the Munk Center
for International Studies. From 1999-2000 he served as a post-doctoral
Fellow in the Earth Institute and taught at the School of International
and Public Affairs of Columbia University. Following that he taught at
the University of South Florida in both the Department of Government,
and the Environmental Science and Policy Program. He is author of The
Health of Nations (MIT Press, 2002), which was short-listed for the
Grawemeyer Award; co-author with John L. Daly of Downward Spiral: HIV/
AIDS, State Capacity and Political Conflict in Zimbabwe (USIP Press,
2004), and editor of Plagues and Politics: Infectious Disease and
International Relations (Palgrave, 2001) as well as various chapters,
articles, papers and book reviews. Andrew is the Chair of the Section
on Health and Population Studies for the International Studies
Association-West, and serves as a member of the governing board of ISA-
West as well. Dr. Price-Smith is a specialist in international health
and economic development, and biosecurity issues.
Ms. Hooley. Thank you so much. Again, another interesting
perspective, and I am glad that you told me about snails
because I understood mosquitoes and flies but I thought, what
do snails have to do with this? So thank you.
Next we have Dr. Butts. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF DR. KENT HUGHES BUTTS, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
MILITARY STRATEGY; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Dr. Butts. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for allowing me to
contribute to the work of the Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight.
The relationship between climate change and security is
important and will play a major role in defining the future
vitality of the United States. Today I will focus on the role
of the Department of Defense in addressing climate change and
security issues, and in particular highlight the value of
involving the regional combatant commands in building sovereign
nation capacity for mitigating and destabilizing climate change
threats.
Before I begin, please allow me to note that I am appearing
today on my own behalf, and my views do not represent the views
of the U.S. Army War College or the United States Army or the
Department of Defense or any other establishments with which I
am associated.
While debate continues on the causes of climate change,
significant consensus for addressing its security dimensions
already exists, and it creates many opportunities for alliance
and partner cooperation, building on issues of major
significance to regional security. The security community is
still coming to grips with soft security issues in general and
climate change in particular. For years security studies
focused on force-on-force issues and reflected the Cold War
milieu. New definitions take time to build constituencies.
Terms such as environmental security, economic security, human
security have different stakeholders and require different
approaches from the security community.
Climate change is an environmental security issue and
should be considered in that context. Environmental security
refers to a ``process whereby solutions to environmental
problems contribute to national security objections.'' While
the relationship of environmental issues to security was
recognized previously, the end of the Cold War brought a new
examination of the dimensions of security and the recognition
that environmental issues could inflame existing tensions into
conflict but could also serve as confidence-building measures
to reduce tensions.
NATO's post-Cold War strategic concept made this clear.
Risks to security are less likely to result from calculated
aggression but rather from the adverse consequences of
instabilities faced by many countries. Security and stability
have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as
well as the indispensable defense dimension. Climate change
affects the management of these elements and is a threat
multiplier for instability in most of the volatile nations of
the world. In the post-Cold War era, then, instability is the
chief threat to U.S. national security interests.
Soft security issues left untended have the potential to
destabilize regions and become hard security issues which
require the introduction of combat forces and threaten U.S.
security interests.
The security dimensions of climate change could be
characterized as having three levels: global, geopolitical, and
regional. If you looked at the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
of the Department of Defense, it states that the transformed
DOD seeks to take preventative action so problems do not become
crises. This should be the U.S. approach to climate change and
security and involve all elements of national power.
Department of Defense as the military element of national
power should support that effort. DOD can contribute to
security dimensions at each level. DOD can reduce its energy
consumption and carbon emissions. It can encourage
technological research, development, and energy conservation,
clean fuels, and alternative energy. It can prepare for
military responses to new geopolitical realities such as
competition for arctic resources. It can proactively build
regional capabilities and alliances to create climate change
resilience and preserve regional stability.
These missions make sense and will result in major source
savings for energy, waste disposal, and combat arms
deployments. However, DOD should not assume the climate change
responsibilities of other agencies. These agencies should be
properly resourced and directed to assume their climate change
missions.
While the ongoing National Intelligence Estimate and
Military Advisory Board summaries of the threat to security are
pressing, we need to do more. The questions should be asked:
Where is DOD possibly involved in solving environmental
security issues? Where are U.S. national security threats
evidence? What resources should be brought to bear? And how
should the Department of Defense be working with other agencies
to do that?
If we put those questions in our national security
strategy, if we suggest answers to those questions and
delineate which agencies will be involved, then DOD's strategic
documents will address climate change, and we will have the
best minds nationwide addressing the security dimension, and we
will preserve the vitality of the United States.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Butts follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kent Hughes Butts
Climate Change and Security
I am pleased to be able to contribute to the work of the
(Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversights) House Committee on
Science & Technology on ``The National Security Implications of Climate
Change.'' The relationship between climate change and security is
important and will play a major role in defining the future vitality of
the United States (U.S.). Today, I will focus on the role of the
Department of Defense (DOD) in addressing climate change security
issues and, in particular, highlight the value of the regional
combatant commands in building sovereign nation capacity for mitigating
destabilizing climate change threats. Before I begin, please note that
I am appearing today on my own behalf and my views do not represent the
views of the United States Army, Department of Defense, or any other
establishment with which I am associated.
CHANGE BRINGS OPPORTUNITY
Today we have an opportunity for addressing the security dimensions
of climate change that did not previously exist. President Bush's
recent leadership role on climate change issues and his decision to
support the 33rd G8 Summit's effort to at least halve the global carbon
dioxide emissions by 2050 was a watershed for the United States climate
change policy.\1\ It reflects a growing recognition in the United
States of the importance of proactively addressing the issue of climate
change and encourages research on its security dimensions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Mr. James Gertenzang and Mr. Richard Simon, ``Bush Offers to
Take Climate Lead,'' Los Angeles Times, June 1, 2007 available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-
bush1june01,1,27206787.story?track=crosspromo&col; Fact Sheet: ``A New
International Climate Change Framework,'' The White House, President
George W. Bush, Office of the Press Secretary, May 31, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to understand the way that the United States is
approaching climate change one must consider many domestic variables.
There is substantial movement on climate change in the United States
that are now being recognized and changing the milieu in which the
security dimensions of climate change are being considered.
The election of the 110th Congress is having a significant impact
on how the United States approaches climate change. Congress is drawing
governmental attention to environmental issues across many agencies
often in a bipartisan way. The Amendment to the Defense Appropriations
Act requiring the Department of Defense to consider climate change in
its planning and operations was submitted by Senator Clinton but
supported by some Republicans.\2\ Senators Domenici and Bingaman
recently co-authored a major paper on climate change regulating
greenhouse gasses.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Press Release, United States Senate, Carl Levin, Michigan,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, SR-228 Russell Senate Office
Building, Washington, DC 20510, May 25th 2007.
\3\ Senators Pete V. Domenici and Jeff Bingaman, Issue Paper
``Design Elements of a Mandatory Market Based Greenhouse Gas''
Regulatory System, February 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The faith based community is a powerful force in U.S. politics from
the local to the national level. President Bush has made clear the
importance of his faith and this community. Recently leaders of the
evangelical Christian community have entered the debate on
environmental degradation and climate change. The National Association
of Evangelicals has taken a pro environmental stance that reflects the
concept of humankind being held accountable for what they do with the
world God created.\4\ Thus, within the religious conservative
community, there is a re-examination of environmental issues and
growing support for national efforts to mitigate activities that may
contribute to climate change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Ms. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, ``Global Warming: Evangelical
Leaders Urge Action on Climate Change,'' available at http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5194527; Mr. James Sherk,
``Christians and Climate Change: Should Followers of Christ concern
themselves with the threat of Global Warming?'' Available at http://
www.evangelicalsociety.org/sherk/wwjdpf.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are other political realities at play. Polls have noted a
trend toward taking action on climate change variables among both
political parties. In the last national presidential election, polls
showed that a majority of Republican voters favored doing more to curb
tailpipe admissions. Being against taking action to address climate
change is no longer of value to candidates running for office in many
states. This is an important trend.
The private sector is becoming a powerful force for climate change
regulation. The private sector is increasingly lining up behind taking
action on greenhouse gas emissions. Faced with growing State and local
legislation aimed at controlling emissions, the private sector is
seeking a place at the table where this legislation is being crafted,
particularly at the national level. The private sector would prefer one
federal standard to which it could adapt production technology rather
than varying standards across states and regions.
It is particularly important to remember that much environmental
policy in the United States originates at the State and local level.
The U.S. air and water quality standards were first developed at the
State level. Because of its sizable economy, air quality standards in
California drove the auto industry to drop opposition to emissions
control and produce vehicles to meet that state's and federal
requirements. However, it often takes years for State standards to
become federal standards. It may appear that the United States is not
moving forward on climate change mitigation, but in fact, the recent
environmental policies implemented in California are already changing
the national debate as other states consider similar legislation.\5\
The impact of State climate change policies and recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions are being felt at the national level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Press Release,
``Governor Schwarzenegger Applauds California Climate Action Registry
for Joining First Multi-State Greenhouse Gas Tracking,'' May 8, 2007,
available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/6165/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are other key variables in the shift of public opinion on
climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
report presented a strong case for mitigating climate change, providing
previously lacking consensus among the scientific community on critical
aspects of the debate.\6\ Media coverage of obvious phenomena of
climate warming, such as the melting of glaciers and polar ice caps,
was highly influential, even among those unfamiliar with the technical
dimensions of the climate change debate. Former Vice President Gore's
movie, personal appearances, and their publicity reinforced the IPCC
report and gave an abstract (to some) concept a clear image.
Complementing these activities has been the growing understanding of
the importance of climate change to the traditional national security
objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Report, June 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY
Climate change is an Environmental Security issue and should be
considered in that context. Environmental security refers to ``a
process whereby solutions to environmental problems contribute to
national security objectives.'' \7\ While the relationship of
environmental issues to security was recognized previously, the end of
the Cold War brought a new examination of the dimensions of security,
and the recognition that environmental issues could inflame existing
tensions into conflict, but could also serve as confidence building
measures to reduce tensions. NATO's post Cold War Strategic Concept
made this clear, ``Risks to Allied security are less likely to result
from calculated aggression. . .but rather from the adverse consequences
of instabilities. . .faced by many countries. . .security and stability
have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as
the indispensable defense dimension.'' \8\ Climate change affects the
management of these elements and is a ``threat multiplier for
instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.'' \9\ In
the Post Cold War era, instability is the chief threat to traditional
U.S. national security interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Environmental Security, Strengthening National Security Through
Environmental Protection, Washington DC, Environmental Protection
Agency, September 1999, p. 1.
\8\ ``The Alliance New Strategic Concept,'' NATO Press Service,
1991, p. 3.
\9\ The Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat
of Climate Change, Alexandria, VA, CNA Corporation, 2007, p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The intelligence community has focused on environmental hot spots
as potential sources of instability, but environmental issues also
provide a valuable element of outreach and engagement, which may serve
as confidence building measures between countries or regions of
existing enmities. NATO used Environmental Security successfully to
promote dialogue and cooperation with former East Bloc countries in the
early 1990s. India, Pakistan, and China have cooperated on seismic
disaster preparedness.\10\ The Madrid Peace Process for the Middle East
used water, migration, and other environmental issues as vehicles of
multilateral engagement between Israel and regional states. Climate
change creates new opportunities for environmental engagement,
cooperation and tension reduction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Professor B.F. Griffard, COL (Ret.) Art Bradshaw, and
Professor Kent Hughes Butts, Disaster Preparedness: Anticipating the
Worst Case Scenario, U.S. Pacific Command South Asia Seismic Disaster
Preparedness Conference, 22-24 February 2005, Center for Strategic
Leadership, U.S. Army War College.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the last 15 years, the United States has used an interagency
approach in applying Environmental Security to promote national
security and diplomatic objectives, encourage stability and
multilateral cooperation, and prevent conflicts. The Department of
State (DOS) has established Environmental Hubs in U.S. embassies around
the world that use environmental diplomacy to create cooperation among
regional states.\11\ The Department of Defense and its regional
Combatant Commanders use Environmental Security as an engagement
vehicle and have worked closely with these Hubs to build cooperative
relationships among regional states and Military Support for Civil
Authority and democracy. DOD cooperation with partner countries has
been regularly supported by agencies such as the: U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID); U.S. Geological Society;
Environmental Protection Agency; and Department of the Interior. These
build partner capacity and capabilities to address Environmental
Security issues and promote stability. It is important to understand
that this international interagency cooperation is ongoing and already
addressing the security dimensions of many climate change issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ DOS Environmental Diplomacy, The Environment and U.S. Foreign
Policy, April 1997, p. 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 9/11 terrorist attacks have drawn the attention of the security
policy-making community to the underlying conditions of terrorism. As
the 9/11 Report states, ``When people lose hope, when societies break
down, when countries fragment, the breeding grounds for terrorism are
created.'' \12\ The United States has found that attacking terrorists
and their organizations is not sufficient to win the war on terror. New
analysis of terrorism suggests that it should be treated as an
insurgency with the people as the center of gravity, and highlights the
importance of regional stability, good governance, and governmental
legitimacy. Capable, stable regimes can address water and food
security, health and disease management, sustainable development,
energy requirements, and other needs of the people that constitute
demands upon the political system. Doing so prevents social unrest and
migration, humanitarian crisis, failed states, the spread of ungoverned
territory, and the encroachment of terrorist ideology. As the two
recent U.S. National Security Strategies make clear, terrorism has been
the top, stated national security priority. The significant role of
environmental issues in creating the underlying conditions terrorists
seek to exploit has caused the security community to take notice;
climate change can weaken political systems and exacerbate
environmental threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The 9/11 Commission Report; Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official
Government Edition, WW Norton & Company, July, 2004 and Mr. Byron York,
``Al Qaeda, Iran, North Korea-and Global Warming,'' National Review
Online 10 May 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the ongoing intelligence community National
Intelligence Estimate, the well regarded Center for Naval Analysis
Corporation (CNA) Report, ``National Security and the Threat of Climate
Change,'' pointed out the major role climate change is playing in
security. As the report states, climate change is a ``threat multiplier
for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.''
\13\ While many of these regions are part of the terrorist equation,
all are important to U.S. national security interests, such as: energy
access; terrorism; strong market economies, and nonproliferation. Thus,
variables that exacerbate a threat should be addressed by the security
community and the elements of national power, including the military,
but not necessarily in a lead role.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Military Advisory Board, 2007, p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The President has authorized the establishment of the African
Command (USAFRICOM) and its framing documents state that the deputy
commander should be from the DOS and its focus is not war fighting but
helping to build partner capacity and promote regional stability.
Environmental Security issues determine stability in much of Africa and
the effects of climate change will greatly affect this relationship and
very likely the engagement strategies of other regional commands.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, Executive Director, ``U.S. Africa
Command,'' June 7, 2007, available at http://www.eucom.mil/africom/
index/asp
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While debate continues on the causes of climate change, significant
consensus for addressing its security dimensions already exists in the
United States and creates many opportunities for alliance and partner
nation cooperation on issues of major significance to regional
stability.
THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Climate change may be characterized as affecting U.S. national
security at three levels. At a global level, climate change affects
moisture patterns and energy retention and will have a direct impact on
the Earth, the U.S. and its possessions and reduce the resources upon
which humankind depends. More powerful storms, extended dry periods and
droughts, periods of more intense flooding and increased migration may
challenge the U.S. directly. At a geopolitical level, the melting
icecaps, rising sea levels and loss of habitable space are creating new
geopolitical areas of concern and complicate the ability of defense
planners to project power, influence regional events and secure forward
basing. At the regional level, changes in climate will threaten the
survival of fragile states, create opportunities for extremist ideology
and insurgencies, put at risk access to strategic fuel and non-fuel
resources, and create instability that threatens U.S. national security
interests.
The DOD has no overarching directive or policy guidance that
directs DOD organizations to address the security threats of climate
change or act to mitigate its effects. However, the nature of the
military is such that once the Commander's intent is given, individual
units may use their own initiative in accomplishing the mission. This
is particularly valuable because of the ``fog of war'' which often
prevents direct communication with the Commander and rewards units that
may operate independently to accomplish the mission. This independent
culture is evident in the approach of organizations within DOD that
have recognized the need to address the economic and security of supply
dimensions of energy, the environment and stability and have already
undertaken significant activities in response to threats to U.S.
national security interests relating to climatic disruption. The DOD
Office of Net Assessment sponsored a study by Peter Schwartz and Doug
Randall in 2003 that used scenarios to frame the potential national
security implications of climate change. Although certainly not its
first effort to come to grips with its security dimensions, this well
publicized study generated much discussion, demonstrated the interest
of the Department of Defense in Environmental Security issues and
encouraged further climate change related activities at all three
levels.
GLOBAL LEVEL
At the global level organizations within DOD have begun to address
its carbon footprint through a variety of efforts to conserve energy
and reduce environmental pollution. Perhaps the best example of these
efforts is provided by the office of Mr. Tad Davis, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army Environment, Safety and Occupational
Health. His office has undertaken a sustainability program that is
saving the Department of Defense millions of dollars and is mitigating
such climate change issues as clean water generation, energy
efficiency, and emissions, and waste reduction.
The Army is using the concept of sustainability to ensure the wise
use of scarce resources and the ability to accomplish its mission now
and in future years. Sustainability refers to, ``. . .the ability of a
system to continue functioning into the indefinite future without being
forced into decline through the exhaustion or overloading of the key
resources on which that system depends.'' \15\ It is a functional
approach that is being successfully used internationally by the
Environmental Protection Agency, USAID and the DOS. Sustainable
development seeks to ensure that resources are consumed at a rate that
provides for future generations by addressing the social, economic and
environmental dimensions of development. The Army has created its own
triple bottom line of sustainability that includes mission,
environment, and community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Mr. Robert Gilman, ``Background Paper on Sustainability for
City Council Work Session,'' Context Institute, 8 September, 1999,
available at http://www.propertyrightsresearch.org/articles6/
background<INF>-</INF>paper<INF>-</INF>on<INF>-</INF>sustainabili.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recognizing that the planet's life supporting resources are
declining and rising population and economic growth are increasing the
pattern of resource consumption, the Army is seeking to meet this
threat and public concerns over this equation by changing its pattern
of resource management to minimize resource consumption while ensuring
mission accomplishment, or, ``sustain the mission, secure the future.''
Given the vast land holdings of Army bases, the energy and water
resources that Army forces consume and the environmental impacts of
operating and maintaining Army weapon systems, the application of
sustainability to the Army mission is doing much to reduce Army
contributions to greenhouse gases and address the security dimensions
of climate change at the global level. The Army's motivation is
captured in the Army Environmental Strategy; A sustainable Army is, ``.
. .simultaneously meeting current as well as future mission
requirements worldwide, safeguarding human health, improving quality of
life, and enhancing the natural environment.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Army Environmental Strategy for the Environment, Army
Environmental Policy Institute, 2004.
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The Army began the application of sustainability at the base level
using such important Army bases as Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Fort
Lewis, Washington to apply the business transformation techniques of
changed management, risk management, performance management, and
professional development to challenge leaders in addressing triple
bottom line elements. This holistic, bottom up approach was succeeded
by an Army wide implementation of lessons learned about the benefits of
sustainability and is now being applied at the international level to
support the Combatant Command's work on stability. The focus has gone
beyond leadership and management to address alternative energy, energy
efficiency, clean water generation, and waste reduction technologies
for both installations and theater operations. As a result, the Army
has: made 48 percent of its non-tactical vehicles alternative fuel
capable; reduced its energy consumption by over 25 percent from 1985
levels; committed to reduce base carbon dioxide emissions by 30 percent
and energy use by 35 percent by 2010; and created a partnership with
the private sector that funded $543 million in energy efficiency
projects through Energy Savings Performance Contracts.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States
Army, ``Sustaining the Mission, Preserving the Environment, Securing
the Future,'' Torchbearer, National Security Report, Washington DC,
February 2007, p. 16.
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Of particular value in reducing Army environmental expenditures is
the application of sustainability and environmental variables to the
Future Combat Systems (FCS) design and development. This approach
minimizes life cycle costs by reducing energy consumption and hazardous
materials generation while increasing efficiency and combat
effectiveness. At Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, the Army is testing
alternative fuels for tactical vehicles, such as the light High
Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle, and at the motor pool where two
thirds of vehicles now use alternative fuels. Given that in Iraq the
U.S. is consuming approximately 56 million gallons of fuel per month,
the benefits of these programs are significant and save lives.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Ibid, p. 12. In a combat environment, reducing the energy
consumption of military vehicles and weapons systems means less, highly
vulnerable, energy convoys, fewer lucrative targets and reduced
casualties.
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The Army's energy and water conservation program has developed five
initiatives to reduce energy consumption, water pollution and costs.
The drivers of this program are to eliminate energy waste, reduce
dependence on fossil fuels, increase energy efficient buildings,
conserve water resources, and improve energy security and resulted in
solar energy based communities and the adoption of U.S. Green Building
Council's Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) silver
standards for new military building construction. The Army
sustainability program has been successful at the global level because
it demonstrated its value to military commanders. Reduced energy costs
at bases release more funding for operations, maintenance and training.
Maintaining or restoring oxygen producing forests and wetlands ensures
realistic training ranges and garners public support for base
expansion. While many DOD energy projects are underpinned by rising
energy costs and insecure sources of supply, the Army sustainability
program adds another dimension, global resource conservation.
The Air Force has taken a similar direction in its efforts to deal
with energy, security and the environment. In an address to the recent
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Environmental Security Conference in
Miami, Kevin Billings, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Energy, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health, spoke at length
about the way the Air Force is addressing environmental and ecological
issues and seeking to reduce the $7.0 billion that the Air Force spends
on energy resources each year. Like the Army, the Air Force is focused
on building energy efficient LEED infrastructure and finding synthetic
fuels to power its aircraft and ground equipment. In 2006, the Air
Force consumption of renewable energy totaled approximately one million
kilowatt hours. It is partnering with the Department of Energy's
National Energy Technology Laboratory to improve carbon capture,
sequestration and reuse technology, which will be necessary for coal
conversion to synfuel, and to use biomass to power its synthetic fueled
fleet. These programs and the base ``greenway'' concept which preserves
forests and natural terrain, speak directly to reducing overall energy
consumption, improving energy efficiency and mitigating the effects of
greenhouse gases.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Mr. Kevin Billings, Address Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Energy, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health to
the USSOUTHCOM Environmental Security Conference, September 17, 2007,
Miami, FL.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are two major DOD energy task forces nearing the completion
of their work. The Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Energy
Strategy is examining DOD energy usage practices to determine
technological opportunities for reducing energy consumption while still
achieving mission, force structure, and global posture objectives.\20\
The DOD Energy Security Task Force, headed by the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering, is defining an investment strategy to
increase energy efficiency, reduce fossil fuel dependence, identify
alternate energy sources and increase operational readiness.\21\
Whether these reports will recommend a formalized DOD program for
energy security remains to be seen but they have the potential to make
significant contributions to reducing DOD's carbon footprint and
providing economic incentives to the private sector to undertake
climate change related science and technology research and development
(RED). DOD is the Nation's largest single consumer of oil, with daily
consumption of 340,000 barrels per day, or approximately 1.8 percent of
U.S. total.\22\
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\20\ Mr. Kenneth Krieg, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
``Memorandum for Chairman Defense Science Board, Subject Terms of
Reference--Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy,'' Pentagon, Washington
DC, May 2, 2006; Mr. Chris DiPetto, Power Point Presentation, ``Defense
Science Board,'' Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy, 27 June 2007.
\21\ Mr. John J. Young, Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, ``Memorandum Subject: Power and Energy Alternatives and
Efficiency,'' Pentagon, Washington, DC, 12 April 2006.
\22\ Mrs. Mindy Montgomery, Deputy Director for Investment, Office
of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Address to the
USSOUTHCOM Environmental Security Conference, 18 September 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GEOPOLITICAL LEVEL
At a geopolitical level, the Department of the Navy has partnered
with other agencies to begin an analysis of the climate change related,
security implications of greatly reduced ice sheets in the Arctic. The
rapidly warming Arctic is an area of intense geopolitical interest to
the U.S. and other world powers. Historically locked under a sheet of
ice that denied resource access and economic development, and the
passage of commercial or military surface ships, the warming of the
climate has led to significant increases in the year round temperature
of the region. The current rate of ice melt exceeds those predicted by
the IPCC report published in June 2007 and portends an era of intense
State activity to establish territorial control, resource access, and
to come to grips with the geopolitical implications of significant
environmental change.\23\ The U.S. Navy has been encouraging this
analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ NSIDC Staff, ``Models Underestimate Loss of Arctic Sea Ice,''
Security Innovator, University of Colorado, Boulder, May 1, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2001, the Navy co-sponsored with the Arctic Research Commission
the Naval Operations in an Ice Free Arctic Symposium. The symposium
identified the operational implications of an ice free Arctic for naval
operations, reviewing possible naval missions and future operational
requirements. This salient event drew the attention of many naval
stakeholders to such critical strategic issues as, the Seas of Oktotsk
and Japan remaining ice free year round and the Canadian Archipelago,
and the Russian coast being open to navigation by non-ice strengthened
ships during the summer months. It also recognized the economic
importance of greater Russian access to its substantial Arctic
resources (energy, mineral, timber) and speculated on climate change
affects on the Arctic hydrological processes and resultant sociological
changes.\24\ Of particular note, it pointed out such vulnerabilities as
the U.S. having only three polar ice breakers, and the strategic
importance of bilateral and multinational alliances in defining
territorial boundaries, and interpreting the United Nations Convention
on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).\25\
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\24\ Naval Operations in an Ice Free Arctic Symposium, April 17-18,
2001, Office of Naval Research, Washington, D.C.
\25\ ``Two Polar Icebreakers Needed to Project U.S. Presence and
Protect Interests in Arctic and Antarctica,'' The National Academies
Report News Release, September 26, 2006. Particularly striking is the
fact that a Russian icebreaker had to be hired to resupply the U.S.
McMurdo Sound research stations in Antarctica.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Navy conducted a second event in July 2007, Symposium: On
the Impact of and Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and Maritime
Operations. This symposium extended the focus of the 2001 meeting and
emphasized oil and gas exploration in response to heightened demand in
Asia, the importance of collecting marine geology and geophysical data
to support U.S. territorial claims and the strategic implications of
commercial shipping. The persistence of elevated year round, Arctic
temperature measurements, warmer water moving north through the Bering
Strait over the last decade, and the unexpected retreat of Arctic ice
at a rate exceeding most computer models added a sense of urgency to
the deliberations.\26\
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\26\ Symposium: Impact of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and
Maritime Operations, July 10-12, 2007, U.S. Navy Memorial & Naval
Heritage Center, Washington, D.C.; available at http://
www.orbit.nedis.noaa.gov
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The importance of these naval sponsored exchanges to U.S.
geopolitical interests was underscored in August when the Russian
Antarctic Research Fleet flagship followed its nuclear powered ice
breaker to the North Pole, where two Russian parliamentarians descended
in a Russian mini-sub to the Arctic Sea floor. After leaving a titanium
Russian flag staking Russia's claim to the Arctic, one of the Russians,
Artur Chilingarov said, ``we must prove the North Pole is an extension
of the Russian Continental Shelf,'' and subsequently, ``the Arctic has
always been Russian.'' \27\ Canada has been expeditious in registering
its concern over Russian territorial ambitions, and for good reason.
Some estimates by geologists posit that 25 percent of global oil and
gas resources as well as significant non-fuel mineral resources may
soon be accessible in the Arctic via the northern sea route.\28\
Canadian Foreign Minister, Peter McKay, dismissed the Russian claim,
but Canada is planning on building eight additional patrol ships. This
climate change phenomenon may also intensify existing territorial
arctic disagreements between Canada, Denmark, the U.S., Norway and
Russia.\29\
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\27\ Mr. Barry Zellen, ``The New Cold War: Global warming reveals
hidden riches beneath the polar sea, causing Arctic resource conflicts
to heat up,'' Security Innovator, August 17, 2007.
\28\ Ibid.
\29\ Mr. Paul Reynolds, ``Russia ahead in Arctic `gold rush' '' BBC
News, August 1, 2007. See also ``McKay mocks Russia's ``15th century''
Arctic claim,'' Reuters, Yahoo News Canada, August 2, 2007.
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Russia's geopolitical initiative is more worrisome when set in the
context of its strategic plan to reestablish itself as a world power.
Russia is realizing significant wealth from its sales of oil and
natural gas and is bartering access to these resources for power and
influence in both Europe and Asia. Moreover, Russia has initiated a
geopolitical strategy for engagement in Asia based upon weapons sales
to salient states and the reconstitution of its regional military
forces and bases.
Russia was the leading arms exporter to Asia from 1998 to 2005,
with $29 billion in sales. Key recipients include China, India, Iran,
which agreed to acquire a $700 million air defense system in 2005, and
Indonesia. Indonesia, which is a littoral state to the oil choke points
of the Sunda and Malacca Straits, with a Muslim population of 200
million, signed a $1 billion arms agreement that includes quiet and
efficient Kilo-class submarines. Revenues from resource and arms sales
will contribute to Russia's stated plans of reconstituting its Far East
forces and Pacific fleet. These plans include building six new aircraft
carriers, three of which would be stationed in Asia, and refurbishing
its submarine base on the Kamchatka Peninsula, which fronts the Bering
Sea.\30\<SUP>,</SUP>\31\
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\30\ Mr. Donald Greenlees, ``Russia arms old and new friends in
Asia,'' International Herald Tribune, September 6, 2007, p. 1 and p. 8.
\31\ Mr. Tim Johnston, ``Russia to get Australian Uranium,''
International Herald Tribune, September 8, 2007, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Climate change has the potential to alter the geopolitical arena in
which the quest for State power in the contested Arctic. The currently
affected areas range from the Arctic to resource rich Africa, where
China is aiding drought stricken states as a quid pro quo for resource
supply, and to South Asia, where access to glacial melt waters is of
vital importance. If IPCC predictions prove accurate, to project U.S.
power overseas will require extensive reexamination.
REGIONAL LEVEL
At the regional level, the Department of Defense has taken action
that addresses the destabilizing issues climate change can multiply.
Department of Defense documents now stress the importance of
proactively addressing destabilizing issues. The 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) states that the transformed DOD seeks to undertake
``preventive actions so problems do not become crises.'' \32\ DOD
Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, stated that the
immediate goal of stability operations, ``is to provide the local
populace with security, restore essential services, and meet
humanitarian needs.'' Significantly, DOD Directive 3000.05 says,
``stability operations are a core U.S. military mission. . .they shall
be given priority comparable to combat operations.'' \33\ These
strategic level documents are important because they provide guidance
to the Combatant Commands whose responsibility it is to translate
policy into operations and planning at the regional level. Climate
change makes a proactive regional security strategy essential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense
Review, February 6, 2006.
\33\ United States Department of Defense, Directive 3000.05,
Military Support for Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations, November, 2006.
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The Combatant Commands should be thought of as the tip of the DOD
spear, serving as they do as the military elements that execute DOD
policy. They have two primary missions, war fighting and engagement.
The operational plans that allow them to prepare for regional
contingencies and be prepared to address operational threats to U.S.
security interests are classified in nature. The engagement functions
are generally unclassified and delineated in Theater Security
Cooperation Plans (TSCP). The TSCP are designed to build good will and
access with regional states, develop influence and partner military
capabilities. The benefits of the TSCP programs are striking. General
Tony Zinni, when serving as the Commander of the Central Command
(USCENTCOM), often stated that if he did engagement right, he would not
have to do war fighting. General Zinni proved that point when he
interceded in the military conflict between India and Pakistan over
Kashmir and encouraged a de-escalation of that conflict between the two
nuclear powers.
A major function of the TSCP is to work with host nation militaries
to build their capacity for and interest in supporting civilian
authority. Because many developing countries have thinly staffed
civilian agencies, the effectiveness of these agencies in protecting
the vital resources of their countries and dealing with non-military
threats is often limited. All too often, civilian agencies dealing with
environmental security, resource conservation and climate change
related threats are provided the least amount of governmental
resources. However, the well-resourced, host nation militaries can
provide substantial support to civil authority: good communication,
presence on distant frontiers and in border areas, good transportation
assets, technical expertise, security missions, and preparation for
crises and disasters. They are usually the best funded of all
government agencies. Dedicating a portion of military capabilities to
supporting these civilian agencies as they seek to confront
environmental security and climate change issues, may be the difference
between their failure and success; it may also mean the difference
between increased desertification and the loss of arable land,
deforestation, the spread of water borne diseases and large scale
destabilizing migration. Because the effects of climate change can
enflame preexisting tensions and trigger conflict, it is an excellent
preventive defense strategy to use the TSCP proactively to address
these destabilizing environmental security issues. The Combatant
Commands have active programs to build the necessary military
supporting capabilities and encourage regional military capacities and
capabilities to combat the effects of climate change.
The Combatant Commands have existing environmental security and
disaster preparedness programs. New leadership at several of the
Commands is renewing the priority of their environmental security
programs at this opportune time of enhanced awareness of the link
between climate change and security. At USSOUTHCOM, Admiral James
Stavridis has directed his Command to reenergize its focus on
environmental security. On September 17th and 18th, 2007 he opened
USSOUTHCOM's the fifth major environmental security conference, which
brought in critical regional allies and the U.S. interagency community
to explore new ways to create effective partnerships in addressing
climate change and other environmental security issues. The USSOUTHCOM
program has been particularly successful. These major regional
environmental security conferences have been attended by state
presidents, vice presidents and ministers of defense and environment.
In close cooperation with DOS Environmental Hubs in Brazilia and San
Jose, the Command has built regional multilateral and interagency
cooperation by conducting train the trainer workshops that brought
together the police, civilian environmental managers and military
forces for common training in addressing such climate change issues as
fire fighting, deforestation and disaster preparedness. In a region
where governments struggle with narco-terrorists, limited resource's
category four or five hurricanes and maintaining governmental
legitimacy of democratic states, the development of this capacity is a
welcome contribution to regional stability.
The USCENTCOM, which began its environmental security program under
General Tony Zinni, built environmental security programs for its three
sub regional areas: the Central Asian States; the Arabian Gulf; and the
Horn of Africa. These programs have been particularly valuable and
credited by the USCENTOM Deputy Combatant Commander with improving
U.S.-regional State relations in regions of critical importance to U.S.
national security and the war on terrorism. During the ongoing Iraq
War, the Command has focused on water, medical issues and disaster
preparedness in conferences, workshops and exercises with the Arabian
Gulf countries supporting U.S. war efforts. In the arid Central Asia
States, the Command addressed such issues as scarce water resources,
salt resistant agriculture and disaster preparedness. In the Horn of
Africa where droughts, migration, flooding and failed states are
regular issues, the Command was instrumental in creating a
multinational Center of Excellence for Disaster Management training in
Nairobi, Kenya. Praised by Kenya's Vice President at its opening for
addressing regional humanitarian issues, the Center continues to train
regional military and civilian crises managers able to direct regional
resources against multiple climate change related threats. The arrival
of former USPACOM Commander, Admiral William Fallon to USCENTCOM has
resulted in reexamination of Command programs in light of the
restructuring of Combatant Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) and the
loss of the Horn of Africa to the new Africa Command (USAFRICOM). The
plans and policy directorate is actively exploring the use of
environmental security and climate change to address the Command's
evolving priorities.
In the Pacific Command environmental security has long been part of
regional engagement efforts. Transnational issues, such as terrorism,
and illegal logging and other trafficking activities play a major role
in threatening U.S. interests in the region. USPACOM has used these
issues to build multilateral cooperation, and overcome misperceptions
of U.S. foreign policy. Responding to partner nation military requests,
USPACOM has stressed non-kinetic approaches to addressing the terrorist
threat. The Command has treated terrorism as an insurgency, in which
the center of gravity is the population. Underlying conditions such as
inadequate fresh water, poor disaster management, and the illegal
exploitation of resources, threaten governmental legitimacy and invite
the introduction of extremist ideology. In Southeast Asia, the Command
cosponsored a series of conferences and workshops examining the role of
these underlying environmental conditions in the growth of terrorism.
These activities resulted in best practices workshops hosted by
regional states in which the host countries educated other nations in
the use of the military element of power to mitigate developmental
issues such as poor soil fertility, reforestation, flood control and
drought management to build governmental legitimacy and good will. On
the Philippine Archipelago, Cholo and Basilan, the Pacific Special
Operations Command (SOPAC) worked closely with the Philippine Armed
Forces and local civilian authorities to successfully apply these
lessons and defeat the terrorist threat.
In the vast USPACOM area of responsibility, changing climate
patterns have affected monsoon intensity, giving rise to increased
flooding and droughts. Other natural disasters, such as tsunamis,
earthquakes and erupting volcanoes further challenge regional
government efforts to address human security problems. Using its
Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT), USPACOM facilitated
the creation of a multilateral disaster response program and common
standard operating procedures that have the capacity to deal with
climate change effects and other disasters. The ability of USPACOM and
its regional allies to successfully respond to these crises has paid
large dividends. In Indonesia the effective response of the Indonesian
and U.S. Armed Forces to the Aceh tsunami enhanced the legitimacy of
the newly elected democratic government and resulted in a decrease of
20 percent in the popularity of the Al Qaeda franchise, Jamaah
Islamiah, and a 30 percent increase in the popularity of the United
States.\34\ Recognizing the power of meeting these soft security
threats, the new USPACOM Commander, Admiral Timothy Keating is
including environmental security as a major topic in his October 2007
Chiefs of Defense Force Conference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Interview, Dr. Ermaya Suradinata, Governor, National
Resilience Institute, Jakarta, Indonesia, June 21, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Newly created, USAFRICOM's mission is predominantly humanitarian
assistance driven, encouraging stability in the fragile petroleum and
minerals rich, but drought and flood plagued continent. The Command
identifies the threats to stability in its region and works with host
nation military, regional organizations, the U.S. interagency, and
other non-governmental organizations to build the local capacity to
mitigate those threats. It is currently holding a series of
sustainability workshops in which all of these organizations provide
their insights into theater security cooperation planning. Most of the
threats to stability in the region are environmental in nature. For
example, in the Sudan and Nigeria, tensions between different religious
and cultural groups are erupting into violent conflict because of the
persistent drought and competition between herders and farmers for
increasingly scarce arable land and water. Other climate change related
issues threatening stability include disease, decreasing marine
resources, drought, flooding and soil erosion. While the Command will
be responsible for military operations against the evolving terrorist
threat in weak or failed states, its primary mission is to address the
underlying humanitarian conditions and poverty that encourage the
spread of terrorist ideology and threaten regional stability. The
chronic weakness of many African states makes them particularly
vulnerable to predicted climate change.
It may be useful to conceptualize the role of the Combatant
Commands in addressing this destabilizing issue as creating climate
change resilient communities. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) was tasked by Congress in 1994 to assess tsunami
awareness and preparedness for parts of the United States. As a result
of their analysis and research, NOAA developed a concept for mitigating
the damage of tsunamis: it is called Tsunami Resilient Communities and
was created ``to provide direction and coordination for tsunami
mitigation activities in the absence of a disaster.'' \35\ Recognizing
that no mitigation effort would be successful without the support of
local communities, NOAA designed a plan to leverage planning, education
and awareness to minimize losses and reduce fatalities and property
damage. The seven (7) variables of resilient communities are designed
to enhance national, State and local capabilities by: determining the
threat; preparedness; timely and effective warnings; mitigation; public
outreach and communication; research; and international coordination.
This concept can easily be adapted to climate change and security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ ``Tsunamis Tsunami Information": NOAA Watch: NOAA's All Hazard
Monitor available at http://noaawatch.gov/themes/tsunami.php
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Department of Defense is already doing much to address the
security implications of climate change. However, much remains to be
done.
Climate change is increasingly recognized as a multiplier effect
for existing tensions and regional instabilities. It places additional
stress on the state political system, complicating the ability of
governments to meet the demands placed on the system by a suffering
population, and reducing system resilience. This can lead to a loss of
legitimacy, internal conflict, state failure and the growth of
extremist ideology. Addressing the factors of sustainable development
in a way designed to ``sustain regional stability,'' by building the
capacity of states and local communities to mitigate the effects of
climate change, would enhance the resilience of the political system
and reduce the likelihood of state failure. The military, through its
Combatant Command TSCPs, in close cooperation with U.S. interagency and
international organizations, could play a significant role in creating
climate change resilient communities. By enhancing the capabilities of
regional militaries to support civil authority in applying the seven
variables of resilience to the unique climate change effects on their
countries, threats to regional stability and security can be reduced.
This concept, however, needs to be led by the regional and
international organizations and other U.S. agencies in a synchronized
and coordinated process.
While it may be a popular perception that DOD has been reluctant to
support climate change mitigation strategies because of political
issues, I contend that to be largely incorrect. It is only recently
that the security dimensions of climate disruption have attained
national prominence and overcome the focus of climate change debate on
the causes of climate change. A more important barrier to establishing
a DOD wide emphasis on addressing climate change, greenhouse gases and
their security dimensions is the well reasoned argument that climate
change and environmental security issues are soft security issues that
should be addressed by civilian organizations with that primary
function; the DOD is the only organization capable of fighting and
winning the nations wars and dealing with hard security issues and
conflict. The problem with this reasoning is that it is reactive in
nature and dooms the U.S. to the expensive military solution of
destabilizing regional conflicts that might have been prevented through
proactive military intervention in its underlying causes.
Soft security issues left untended have the potential to
destabilize regions and become hard security issues which require the
introduction of combat forces and threaten U.S. security interests. The
costly humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti are a
case in point. As the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
demonstrate, until the U.S. adequately resources foreign assistance and
agencies such as DOS and USAID, DOD will have no choice but to assume
these stability missions. Concern over such ``mission creep'' is a
barrier to enhanced DOD leadership in the climate change and security
area. The active involvement of the regional Combatant Commanders in
building partner military capacity to address destabilizing soft
security issues such as the effects of climate change is a cost
effective and proactive concept that should be reinforced by DOD
priority and direct language in such influential documents such as the
Global Employment of Forces (GEF) document.
As the security dimensions of climate change become recognized and
debated, DOD should become more directly involved. At the global level,
DOD can save millions of dollars and reduce its significant
contribution to U.S. greenhouse emissions through such concepts as
sustainability and incentivized energy efficiency programs. At the
geopolitical level, DOD will realize new geopolitical vulnerabilities,
revise its operational plans, determine possible new force structure
adjustments, and order new weapons systems and capabilities such as ice
strengthened naval vessels. At the regional level, climate change will
exacerbate human security demands on fragile State political systems
and present opportunities for Combatant Command regional capacity
building to prevent failed states. Thus, for DOD, climate change brings
opportunity and will become a driver for environmentally efficient and
operationally less costly weapons systems, research and development and
sustainable base management as well as heightened regional state
interest in increased security cooperation. Certain events need to
transpire in order to make this possible.
<bullet> It is time to move beyond debating the causes of
climate change and recognize climate change as the threat to
U.S. national security that it is.
<bullet> Appoint a DOD task force to define its roles and
mission in addressing the climate change related threats to
U.S. national security at the global, geopolitical and regional
levels.
<bullet> While the ongoing National Intelligence Estimate and
Military Advisory Board report are excellent first steps in
coming to grips with the security dimension of climate change,
more research needs to be done. Climatic Disruption has the
potential to create multiple major disasters beyond the
management capabilities of the national security community.
Where are U.S. security interests threatened; how should these
threats be addressed and by which organizations; and what
resources will be required?
<bullet> DOD should direct the Combatant Commands (through its
Global Employment of Forces (GEF) document) to consider climate
change as a primary engagement issue. Good governance is the
best defense against the destabilizing effects of climate
change. Sustain stability by building climate change
resilience.
<bullet> Appoint a senior DOD official to prioritize and
synchronize DOD climate change activities.
<bullet> Because of its size, resources and capabilities,
there is a danger that DOD may be seen as the ``Mr. Fixit'' of
the U.S. climate change issue. This should not be DOD's role.
DOD can reduce its energy consumption and carbon emissions; it
can encourage technological research development in energy
conservation, clean fuels, and alternative energy; it can
prepare for military responses to new geopolitical realities;
it can be proactive in building regional capabilities, and
alliances to create climate change resilience and preserve
regional stability. These missions make sense and will result
in major sources of savings for energy, waste disposal and
combat force deployments. However, DOD should not assume the
climate change responsibilities of other agencies.
<bullet> The White House and Congress should insist on
properly resourcing agencies such as the Department of State,
USAID, USGS, EPA and NOAA so that they may properly execute
these climate change missions. The current limitations of DOS
and USAID in reconstruction and stabilization should not become
a model for the DOD role in addressing climate change.
Biography for Kent Hughes Butts
KENT HUGHES BUTTS is Professor of Political Military Strategy and
the Director of the National Security Issues Group at the Center for
Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College. He leads the Center's
Combatant Command support efforts, focusing extensively on
destabilizing environmental security issues. His prior positions
include: Research Professor in the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of
the Army War College, Associate Professor, Science Research Laboratory,
U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and United States Defense and Army
Attache and Security Assistance Officer in Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi.
A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he holds a Master's Degree in
Business Administration from Boston University, an M.A. and Ph.D. in
Geography from the University of Washington, and was a John M. Olin
Post-Doctoral Fellow in National Security at the Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University. He is a graduate of the
Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and the U.S. Army
War College, and formerly held the Army War College George C. Marshall
Chair of Military Studies. Dr. Butts teaches the Army War College
Environmental Security, Geography and National Security, Weapons of
Mass Destruction, and Strategic Planning elective courses and has
organized and conducted international conferences, workshops or games
on environmental security in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and Latin
America. He headed the U.S. delegation and co-chaired the NATO
Environmental Security Pilot Study Meetings in Warsaw and Prague, and
was a member of the U.S. delegation to the OSCE Economic Forum
(Prague). He has been interviewed by the BBC, Washington Post,
Baltimore Sun and other media on the topic of Climate Change and
Security. Dr. Butts was appointed a principal member of TRADOC's
Homeland Defense Council and was a member of the Chemical and
Biological Defense Command, Nunn-Lugar, Biological Improved Response
Task Force. He is author or editor of numerous national security
publications, and co-author of the book, Geopolitics of Southern
Africa: South Africa as Regional Superpower, published by Westview
Press. His military awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal
and the Legion of Merit.
Discussion
Ms. Hooley. And thank you very much.
I do have some questions. Again, very interesting
testimony. Would like to talk to you further about the work
that you are doing.
Are Current Multinational Structures Sufficient?
First of all, this is a question to all three of you. Are
the multinational structures for cooperation that we have in
place adequate to meet the scope of the challenges. Are we
facing a moment in the not-too-distant future when new
institutions will be needed? Has the time come when we should
be thinking about designing and creating them?
And you can go in any order you want, anyone that wants to
answer first. Don't be bashful.
Dr. Butts. Madam Chairman.
Ms. Hooley. Yes. Dr. Butts. Yes.
Dr. Butts. I think we have the institutions in place that
we need to work the problem. It is a matter of assigning a
priority and resources. That is not to say that for all
security issues we shouldn't have a re-architecturing of our
security apparatus; but in terms of dealing with this issue
from my perspective, I think we can go a long way towards
solving many of these problems and promoting resilience and
dealing with the stability aspects of this by creatively using
the institutional resources that we have in place.
Dr. Price-Smith. I will go next if that is fine, Alex. I
would say in the realm of global public health, no. I don't
think that global institutional structures and institutions are
adequate to deal with the issue at this point in time, and the
analogy would be looking at the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, which
has ravaged much of the developing world over the last few
years. It continues to expand.
In recent work I have done on the HIV/AIDS epidemic, UNAIDS
has painted a very rosy picture for you. But in fact, when you
take the data and crunch it and look at it, the epidemic
continues to expand in South Asia, in East Asia, certainly in
Russia and the former Soviet Republics, and other regions of
the planet as well. So even though there has been some decline
in HIV, it is not uniform. In fact, it continues to expand.
Malaria is not under control whatsoever. Dengue fever is
restricted right now by temperature radiance and vectors, but
it may expand.
And I am very concerned about the lack of funding for the
WHO, the World Health Organization. I am very concerned about
the lack of human capital within that organization. I think
that organization has suffered historically from some rather
poor leadership in recent years. I know I am not going to be
invited to their parties anymore for saying this, but I have my
concerns.
And so I think that the United States in particular needs
to truly reassess the WHO and try to augment its capacity to
deal with some of the changes that I foresee.
Ms. Hooley. If you were king for a day--I just want to
follow up on your answer--how would you organize it? What do
you think we need to do?
Dr. Price-Smith. Wow. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would
look at the politicization of that organization over the years,
and I would try to address some of the things that have gone on
there in terms of demoting key personnel for what I see as
political reasons. I will give you one example.
Dr. David Heymann was in charge of the Polio Eradication
Initiative for many, many years. He achieved spectacular
successes, and yet because of his successes he was, I won't say
demoted, but removed from that position. And of course, polio
has exploded out of Sub-Saharan Africa back into South Asia, I
believe largely as a result of that.
So I think that a study should be undertaken to look at
that type of reorganization. And if the Congress was going to
task us with something, we would be pleased to undertake that.
Ms. Hooley. Thank you. Dr. Lennon.
Dr. Lennon. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I come at this more
from a geopolitical angle, and one of the things that has
struck me in my brief analysis of climate change is how
incredibly quickly this issue has jumped up on the
international scene.
And I think about your question in two ways: institutions
to address the causes of climate change and institutions to
address the consequences of climate change. I think for most
analysts, you hear the words ``mitigation'' and ``adaptation''
come up, and there is an increasing sense that some of both is
going to be needed to address the challenge as it emerges and
as it becomes clearer what we are dealing with over time.
On the front end of dealing with the causes of climate
change, I think you are only beginning to see existing
international institutions deal with the issue. You had it at
the US-EU Summit in April, at the G-8 Summit in June, at the
APEC meeting in September. You now have a new Major Emitters
Conference today and tomorrow. All of this proliferation within
existing institutions I think is probably the right way to
manage the issues, as well as supplement it with new bilateral
conversations.
To my knowledge there is no bilateral conversation with
China, for example. The focus is exclusively on climate change
as an issue. It is dealt with as a subset of the senior
economic dialogue or as an energy issue exclusively rather than
as the broader consequences that may be involved with climate
change.
On the consequence side I think Dr. Butts is better
equipped than I am to answer it. You have seen some initial
cooperation in things like the response to the Indian Ocean
Summit that has to jump up on a regional basis. But the pre-
positioning of some form of, if not institutional cooperation,
at least informal cooperation that could be drawn upon when a
crisis emerges, could be beneficial to deal with future events
like an Indian Ocean tsunami if they occur in the future.
Disease Vectors
Ms. Hooley. Thank you. Dr. Price-Smith, in your written
testimony you say the balance of available evidence indicates
that global climate change will shift the distribution of
disease vectors into new regions and thereby afflict previously
uninfected populations. Can you state some cases in which this
process is already underway or, given the existing trends in
global warming, appears likely?
Dr. Price-Smith. Yes, Madam Chairman. In fact, one of the
best examples of this has been the expansion of mosquito-borne
malaria into the city of Nairobi in Kenya, which
epidemiologists that I am familiar with attribute directly to
the increasing temperatures--nighttime temperatures in
particular--of Nairobi, which have allowed the mosquitoes to
thrive at that altitude.
There is not sufficient information across all types of
pathogens, so we need to do greater studies. I can give you
another: There is evidence that cholera is responsive to
temperature. And cholera tends to be transported throughout the
oceans in the form of algal blooms. So the cholera bacilli
actually go into the algae blooms, and then they drift across
the ocean currents. What tends to happen is that it is
associated with non-linear progressions of sea-surface
temperature. But as sea-surface temperature increases to a
certain threshold point, you will suddenly see an explosion of
algae, and that explosion of algae correlates with an explosion
in cholera bacteria.
And so, again, we may see, you know, not a lot of cholera
for some time, and then suddenly you will hit that threshold
point, and you may see an explosion of it.
DOD Thinking About Climate Change
Ms. Hooley. Thank you. Dr. Butts, according to your written
testimony the Defense Department has no overarching directive
or policy guidance that directs DOD organizations to address
the security threats of climate change or act to mitigate its
effects. Does this mean that the Department has applied no
strategic thinking to how it would deal with problems of
climate change, that climate change may provoke? If so, what
steps in your view could be taken to remedy this?
Dr. Butts. Well, this morning I think we heard General
Sullivan address the fact that he thought that many of the
leaders at Department of Defense were actively thinking about
climate change and had undertaken activities that were related
to it. And I would agree.
The results of that Defense Science Board study that Mr.
Woolsey is on will demonstrate that there is much thinking
going on in energy. You can look at the work of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and
Environment, Mr. Tad Davis's work on sustainability and the
ability there to reduce energy consumption and promote the use
of scarce resources in an efficient fashion.
But most of these efforts have been driven by economics and
national security, reduce dependence on unstable sources of
energy supply, reduce our expenditures on energy, reduce the
vulnerability of task forces that must carry supplies of fuel
to the front.
What is missing is an overarching set of guidelines that
tell all elements of the Department of Defense to examine the
security dimensions of the climate change phenomenon and apply
it to their work. And if this were to reflect a national
security strategy mention or directive to do so, then
Department of Defense would address it through its own
strategic documentation, and we could get a greater return on
investment.
It is being done in a decentralized fashion. There are many
things that are being done, but they haven't been coordinated.
It hasn't been applied universally across all of our combatant
commands, for example, and I think improvements can be made.
Ms. Hooley. Let me just ask a follow-up question to you. Is
the Department of Defense--you talk about that they have done
some things in terms of global climate change, but has there
been sort of an overall directive in terms of, ``Here are all
the things that you can do to make your buildings more energy
effective''? ``When you build new buildings, this is what you
need to do.'' I know the number of vehicles you have trying to
cut down on clearly using oil, gas.
But is there a Department, or people at the top level,
saying, ``We have to do this''? Okay.
Dr. Butts. Not that I know of, Madam Chairman. And I think,
though----
Ms. Hooley. But it would be a good idea?
Dr. Butts. Yes, ma'am. I agree, and I think that it takes a
certain amount of time for these new strategic issues to take
hold in the security community. Dr. Lennon pointed out that the
focus on the security dimensions of climate change is rather
recent.
Ms. Hooley. Right.
Dr. Butts. The CNA Military Advisory Report that General
Sullivan shared was only brought out in June. The NIE on
climate change and security hasn't been published yet. So these
are drivers that bring the attention of people in key
leadership positions so that they will begin to consider it and
apply it across the board.
But at this point, to my knowledge there isn't anything
that speaks to climate change in an overarching fashion at
Department of Defense.
More on the IPCC Report
Ms. Hooley. Thank you. Dr. Lennon, the draft of the chapter
by John Podesta and Peter Ogden, on which your testimony
concentrates, declares inevitable the A1B greenhouse gas
emission scenario of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change. It is a scenario that includes massive food and water
shortages, devastating natural disasters, and deadly disease
outbreaks. The draft chapter further states that there is no
foreseeable political or technological solution that will
enable us to avert the majority of the climate impacts
projected in the IPCC scenario.
If this is so, what are we to do, and where do we begin?
Dr. Lennon. As you mentioned, the work that John Podesta
and Peter Ogden had done focuses in part on the consequences
over the next 30 years, and in that time, in the generation
from our interaction with scientists that work with the
committee, one of the things that surprised me was their advice
that essentially over that period of time we know what is
likely to come about. It could be even worse than that if you
get these negative, or ``positive,'' feedback effects,
ironically titled, that Jim Woolsey spoke about this morning.
I think it is likely that those will come about based on
the science coming in. One of the sort of clashes at the
communities that we found in our study was that a lot of the
national security community was frustrated with how cautious
the scientific community was--obviously, or somewhat
ironically, because they wanted the scientific community to
give more definitive answers, which someone in the position of
government would require from their staff even in imperfect
information, which is what the national security community is
used to dealing with. The scientific community didn't have that
pressure, so they didn't face that.
That, I think, was the presumption behind Podesta and
Ogden's--I don't want to speak for them--but behind their
assessment that it was inevitable and that it may be even worse
than the IPCC assessment because of the natural cautiousness
built into the scientific community in a consensus-driven
process--as opposed to those in the national security community
that are used to working with imperfect information and what to
do about it.
Now, the answer to the question what to do about it frankly
goes beyond the scope of what we did in the project. We
essentially peeled off the front end of whether it is occurring
from the back end of what to do about it. But it did raise
consequences that brought concern to the national security
community in a way that the project was designed, to try and
raise the issues and what they should begin to be thinking
about, rather than what to do about it as quickly as possible.
Policy Measures to Reduce Spread of Disease
Ms. Hooley. Dr. Price-Smith, are there policy measures
besides those designed to arrest or reverse climate change
itself that can help forestall or mitigate the effects of the
changes in disease incidence and prevalence that are likely to
result from that?
Dr. Price-Smith. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Yeah. That is
an interesting question: What can we do in terms of policy?
Before I answer that, if I can return to your prior
question on evidence, and then we can proceed from there into
the policy realm. I have been thinking about it a little bit
more. In fact, there is considerable data now coming out of
Bangladesh, and what the scientific, the epidemiologist, what
the scientific community has been doing is using the El Nino
Southern Oscillation effect to model long-term climate change,
but to truncate it temporally and to measure the short-term
changes and try to project from them the impacts on infectious
disease.
And what Rodo and others have found is that in Bangladesh a
lot of diseases, in fact, correlate very highly with El Nino
Southern Oscillation changes. Similarly, in Peru there is
evidence as well that diarrheal diseases and other intestinal
diseases respond to changes in winter temperatures.
And, again, this is a very nascent field, and I am a
political scientist, so it is unusual that I am speaking on
those issues. But as the evidence accumulates, we will be able
to provide you with far better answers as to how these things
may be correlated.
Now, what I am actually proposing in terms of a policy
measure is, we need to establish these empirical links. Are
these empirical links, in fact, generalizable around the world?
To do that, what would need to happen is that Congress or
another body might establish a task force on this issue, and we
would actually go out and measure these changes in
epidemiological indicators such as vectors and pathogens. And
this would involve the formation of an inter-disciplinary team
of researchers including epidemiologists, economists, political
scientists, and so forth to see, all right, how do these
changes occur and what are the consequences in a short span of
time for those territories? And we could do that.
In terms of policy measures, once we have established that,
in fact, these correlations hold over the globe, sure, there
are some things we can do. We can, in fact, ask the WHO to
reprioritize its budgetary expenditures--because for a long,
long time the WHO has been fixated upon chronic illnesses and
not necessarily upon infectious diseases. And so I suggest that
we might approach the WHO and say: ``Look, we would like you to
target a little more funding towards areas X, Y, and Z in the
realm of pathogens.''
Additional policy measures: I think that funding USAID and
its initiatives to deal with diseases like malaria, dengue,
diarrheal diseases, and so forth is excellent but should
continue perhaps at a greater level. So I would advocate that.
And in general, I think that the U.S. Federal Government
needs to be more cognizant of the role that disease plays in
instability throughout the developing world. If you look at a
Mercator projection map of the planet, you will notice that
most of the industrialized nations in the world happen to be in
the temperate zones and not in the tropical regions. And as
many historians of public health have argued, such as Alfred
Crosby and William McNeill, there is a correlation between the
burden of disease in the tropics and not only the economic
underdevelopment of those societies, but also perhaps the
political stability of those regions, or the political
instability of those regions.
Thank you.
U.S. Assistance in Major Global Disasters and Emergencies
Ms. Hooley. Thank you very much. Dr. Lennon, in your
written testimony you predicted that the United States will
often be sought as a global first responder in the immediate
aftermath of a major natural disaster or humanitarian
emergency. What should be the limits of U.S. participation, and
are there mechanisms either existing or yet to be created
whereby such responsibility might be shared? Should the United
States develop a policy regarding its fulfillment of this role,
or is it inevitable that this will be determined on a case-by-
case basis?
Dr. Lennon. Thank you. I think it is both inevitable that
the U.S. will be sought for its assistance in response to a
disaster, primarily because the U.S. military is the only one
capable of pulling off the size of an operation that would be
required in some of these cases, as it was after the tsunami in
the Indian Ocean in 2004. But I also think that in some cases
the United States will want to step up to that role in its
position as a global leader.
There is no question that there are limits to what the
United States should do. I would probably phrase those as
guidelines that should guide U.S. responses. If there are
incidents in some countries, not only may the U.S. not want to
respond to it, but it may be the case that those countries
wouldn't accept responses from the United States if there are
particularly bad relations with that country. It may be an
opportunity to improve relations with those countries, at least
by offering assistance, but it is unlikely to be accepted for
political reasons within those countries
And a couple of examples: Again, the institutions that
exist, I think, are less formal and more--if not ad hoc, then
they are more informal. In the Asian cases I think we have had
the informal cooperation that was quickly sought from other
countries--such as Japan, India, Australia, possibly South
Korea--that could serve as an informal regional factor to be
able to respond to the demands of any crisis in the region.
I think if something were to happen in Europe or the Middle
East, the European Union would seek to respond sometimes by
themselves, sometimes in cooperation with the U.S., depending
on the demands.
But, and to directly answer your question, I think there is
no question that some of the responses are going to have to be
made up as we go along based on the severity of the
consequences themselves. But we could go further in developing
the types of guidelines to understand the size of the
operations that would require U.S. help and the political
benefits as well as risks of doing so in those cases.
Ms. Hooley. Yes. Dr. Butts.
Dr. Butts. I wondered if I might add to that.
Ms. Hooley. Absolutely.
Dr. Butts. The Department of Defense has security and
cooperation programs through its regional combatant commanders
to deal with the militaries in their regions and build their
capacities. And their capacities quite often, as it relates to
climate change and environmental security, has to do with the
issue of disaster response and preparedness.
We quite often try to--we meaning Department of Defense or
the military--try to reach out to regional security
organizations, ASEAN--or the ASEAN Regional Forum, which is the
military element of that--to see if they might take a leading
role in encouraging that type of response. So that it doesn't
require the United States to come back and be the lead agent in
each instance.
So the Pacific command, for example, developed a
Multinational Planning Augmentation Team, the MPAT, that worked
with regional countries to draft a multinational disaster
response SOP that deals with these types of issues. And then,
through their exercises every year--Cobra Gold, for example,
that is held in Thailand--they train against those new SOPs and
reinforce that.
By focusing the guidance from Department of Defense to the
regional combatant commanders on these types of issues, putting
wording in there that encourages them to do more, we can
strengthen those regional organizations and strengthen the
military element of power within many of these developing
countries--and use what is almost always the best-resourced
agency within those governments to address that humanitarian
dimension of climate change or other natural disasters.
More on Disease Vectors
Dr. Price-Smith. I would like to buttress my comments to
your further question. Or, sorry, your prior question.
And one thing that I think we might also do in terms of
policy measures is that we might focus on social ingenuity and
not necessarily technical ingenuity. Now, in this society we
have a proclivity to focus on technological silver bullets and
quick fixes and new vaccines and so forth. When the reality is
dealing with infectious agents across the world, we might want
to look at social relationships and changing patterns of
behavior. Particularly in terms of dealing with viruses, the
reason being that viruses don't respond to antibiotics, as we
all know.
And so a great historical example comes from the 1918
influenza, which I have been doing a lot of work on recently,
and one of the best ways of dealing with pandemic influenza is
not to go hunting for a vaccine or to rely upon tamiflu but
rather to engage in what we call ``social distancing.'' In
other words, people were told, ``Don't go to movie theatres, do
not go to ballgames,'' and so forth.
All right: Voluntary quarantine. And one of the best social
measures that existed at the time was, in fact, the Civil
Defense Associations that had been formed in response to the
First World War. And those Civil Defense Associations went out
and actually enabled communities to deal with that pandemic
from a grassroots level.
Now, similarly, you might say, ``Well, in terms of malaria
we need bed nets, and we need various other forms of
prophylaxes.'' But one thing that disturbs me is there is a
perennial focus upon technical ingenuity and money when it
comes to dealing with global health issues. And there is almost
never a serious focus upon involving social measures and social
scientists in terms of dealing with issues of contagion. And I
think that really needs to be addressed.
Thank you.
Ms. Hooley. First of all, I want to thank all of our
witnesses. You did a terrific job, and again, bringing us a
little different perspective on global warming. Appreciate all
of your comments.
Changes in arctic ice, drought in Africa, these are real,
contemporary events that our witnesses suggest are a mere
foreshadowing of what will come over the coming century.
The witnesses have articulated the threats very clearly.
They have offered some suggestions for action that may
contribute to the mitigation of global warming. But this is
just a start. We need to be better, and we need to better
understand the full range of global warming consequences.
We also need to work harder to build support for positive
steps.
Again, thank you for your time. I hope you will continue to
engage with the Committee and with Congress. I think you have a
lot to offer, a lot to contribute, and hopefully we will see
some changes made.
So, again, thank you very much for your time.
[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
<SKIP PAGES = 000>
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by R. James Woolsey, Vice President, Booz Allen Hamilton
Questions submitted by Chairman Brad Miller
Q1. Are the multinational structures for cooperation that we have in
place adequate to meet the scope of the challenges that you expect
climate change will pose? Are we facing a moment in the not-too-distant
future when new institutions will be needed? Do you have any
suggestions for designing and creating them?
A1. The current multinational structures to meet climate change
challenges are, in my view, inadequate. The most urgent need is to
development international machinery that could manage a carbon cap-and-
trade system. The European system has not worked well in the last few
years and has produced a very low price for carbon dioxide, one that
will have, at best, negligible effect on carbon emissions. Our own
national system of cap-and-trade for certain sulfur emissions to deal
with the problem of acid rain has worked much better, probably in part
because it only applies to one country and those involved in the system
can have confidence that other parties will fulfill their obligations.
Q2. Will government and business require new ways of working together
in meeting the challenges of rebuilding and development that climate
change may bring to some areas of the world? How do you see the two
sectors' current roles and models for cooperation changing?
A2. We need to learn from the history of success, and there has been
some, of international public and private cooperation benefiting the
environment. For example, former Secretary of State George Shultz has
written persuasively of the possibility of using the Montreal Protocol,
which set up an international public-private system for dealing with
chlorofluorocarbons, as a model for partnership to address climate
change.
Q3. In your written testimony, you state: ``We have to learn to think
about phenomena the way they in fact occur--nature is not always going
to behave in linear fashion because our minds tend to think that way.''
Can you provide some suggestions as to how our citizens and our policy-
makers can go about learning this new way of thinking?
A3. This is a very difficult challenge. Perhaps seminars at
universities and think tanks conducted by climatologists and other
scientists (I would nominate Ray Kurzweil to be a leading figure) with
journalists in attendance would be useful. We are mainly informed of
these matters by the press and particularly those journalists who cover
climate and related issues for major national publications. They should
have priority in attending such seminars.
Questions submitted by Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Q1. Climate change is just one of many threats facing our nation
today. Where does it stand as a priority in relation to other
transnational threats such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug
trafficking, smuggling, and organized crime?
A1. I believe that climate change (although a ``malignant'' as distinct
from a ``malevolent'' threat as set out in my testimony) is an
extraordinarily serious issue that can affect the lives of all of us,
or at least our grandchildren. Thus I would put it more in the category
of such threats as the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons
and large-scale terrorism, above the level of (still-serious) drug
trafficking and organized crime. The key point, however, as my
testimony sets out is that there are many things we can do that will
address, and improve the resilience of our society to, both climate
change and large-scale terrorism--particularly potential terrorist
attacks on our energy systems. Thus if we are smart we may be able to
deal with more than one major threat with each of a number of steps--
for example, moving away from oil's monopoly on transportation fuel and
moving both toward substantially greater energy efficiency and
distributed generation and production of electricity and fuels.
Q2. What types of information are needed by national security
officials to appropriately characterize the potential effects of
climate change on national security, and prepare for how to respond to
those challenges?
A2. It seems to me there are two types of relevant information. One is
the likely effect on our and others' behavior and infrastructure
insofar as it may require us to take steps to make our armed forces
more effective. For example, we may need to take account in our design
of our forces how to deal with refugee crises caused by increasing
emigration out of nations whose water supply and crops become affected
by climate change. Second, we may find that there are opportunities to
build resilience into our military infrastructure--e.g., to make our
military bases less vulnerable to terrorist assaults on our electricity
grid--at the same time the military contributes to a reduction in
CO<INF>2</INF> emissions by developing affordable and efficient methods
of using renewables or small nuclear reactors for on-base power.
Q3. When you were the Director of Central Intelligence from 1993-1995
you presumably were tasked with establishing a budget for many of the
intelligence agencies. Where did climate change fall as a priority
within your budget? Where would you place it as a priority now? What
types of other threats would you consider a higher priority? What types
of other threats would you consider a lower priority?
A3. Between February 1993 and January 1995, the two years I was DCI,
climate change was not a particular priority in the intelligence
community; humanitarian crises such as those in Bosnia and Somalia were
front and center. We also did our best to assess trends in
proliferation, terrorism, and international organized crime. The
exception was that we continued the evolution of using our national
intelligence collection systems, such as reconnaissance satellites, to
improve the country's knowledge of the environment. This was a matter
of, principally, pulling together material that had been collected for
other purposes or incidentally (a record of the shoreline of the
Caspian Sea, e.g.). So what we were doing regarding climate change and
related issues was unique and useful, but entailed very little
additional budgetary cost. The priority I would assign today is set
forth in answer to Question 1, above.
Q4. Many of the issues that climate change will exacerbate such as
famine, disease, resource scarcity, and refugee migration are already
issues that national security leaders have to deal with today. Would it
be prudent to address these specific effects of climate change
individually rather than in a generalized manner so that we can
prioritize resources appropriately and direct resources to the issues
that are more immediate or more threatening? Does an issue-by-issue
``menu'' approach give us more flexibility in responding to challenges
than attempting an all-or-nothing approach to climate change as a
whole?
A4. Intelligence collection, typically the most expensive part of the
intelligence process by far, can rarely be prioritized in budget terms
except by target. The choice of target is, in turn, affected by both
the seriousness of the threat and the difficulty of penetrating it--
e.g., we spend much more effort on collecting against Iran and North
Korea than against less virulent and closed regimes, even ones that are
somewhat hostile to us. Climate change, being a ``malignant'' as
distinct from a ``malevolent'' threat typically presents no collection
target such as a hostile and closed regime from which we need to steal
secrets. Normally with respect to climate change one is simply taking
information collected by the Intelligence Community for other purposes
(such as the record of the shore line of the Caspian), adding to it
publicly available information, and using it to assess both individual
subjects (enhanced risk of mass emigrations) and the overall phenomenon
(can we improve our judgment about when the tundra may begin to melt,
release methane, and possibly speed up climate change in general). It
seems to me it is important that both of these tasks be done, and the
cost of emphasizing one over the other is largely just a matter of
allocating the time of analysts, not a costly matter of allocating
collection resources. But except for the ready access to the satellite
data it is not a matter of certainty that the Intelligence Community
need be the institution in government that does either or both
analytical tasks. If, e.g., the Department of State had the analysts
familiar with these issues and there were some reason to assign the
tasks to them rather than to the Intelligence Community that could be a
reasonable option.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Alexander T.J. Lennon, Research Fellow, International
Security Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies; Editor-in-Chief, The Washington Quarterly
In many cases, the answers to the questions are addressed in the
longer report, released in early November, which I co-directed with
Kurt Campbell, CEO from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS),
and Julianne Smith, Director of the CSIS Europe program. These answers
are drawn from The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National
Security Implications of Global Climate Change.
Questions submitted by Chairman Brad Miller
Q1. In your testimony, you said that ``the geopolitical significance
of China and the water shortages, desertification, migration, and
public unrest that it may face over the next 30 years could undermine
any fragile progress in economic and political modernization in that
country or Beijing's ability to act as a responsible stakeholder in the
international system.'' Can you elaborate on this statement, perhaps
sketching the path or paths you envision to either or both of the
outcomes?
A1. The key to China's stable growth and ability to act as a
responsible stakeholder in international affairs rests on both economic
progress and domestic stability. As mentioned in the submitted
testimony, John Podesta and Peter Ogden raised concerns about climate
change causing water shortages, desertification, potentially drastic
declines in crop yields, and migration exacerbating urbanization and
crowding in China's cities. In the last few years, environmental
concerns such as these have led to demonstrations in China which raise
concerns about social stability, threatening their ability to act as a
responsible stakeholder.
Q2. Much of your testimony focuses on the weaknesses that climate
change may cause in other states. Are the effects that climate change
may have on strong powers such as Russia likely to hold implications
for U.S. national security as well?
A2. The principal national security concern raised, in my opinion, is
that climate change will cause weakness in states which will threaten
U.S. interests. Even though temperature changes will be greatest toward
the poles, it is the weaker states that will not be able to adapt to
even relatively milder changes in temperature. Kurt Campbell wrote in
our study that, ``A breakdown in state authority and capabilities is
only one of the more alarming potential prospects of dramatic climate
change. It is clear that large-scale migrations and movements of people
will trigger deep insecurity in some communities, but it is far from
clear whether these anxieties will trigger a traditional `national
security response.' Under certain scenarios, a well-armed nation
experiencing the environmental ravages brought on by climate change
might conceivably seize by force another country's milder, more fertile
territory. Yet a broader range of potential problems, including
disease, uncontrolled migration, and crop failure, are more likely to
overwhelm the traditional instruments of national security (the
military in particular) than cause them to be used [to acquire
resources].''
On Russia specifically, Campbell wrote that ``attention will
inevitably turn to potential climate change `winners' and `losers,' and
there may indeed be some early gains to be had. Some reports have
suggested that Russia and Canada, among others, may emerge as the
national winners in a world marked by a modest warming trend. Yet, our
group determined that it is virtually impossible to predict genuine
`winners' over the medium- and long-term. Even if the most dramatic
climate change effects are likely to be localized, in all probability,
there will be cascading and reinforcing global implications. So, even
if growing seasons increase in some areas or frozen seaways open to new
maritime traffic in others, there are likely to be negative offsetting
consequences--such as a collapse of ocean systems and with it global
fisheries, massive species extinctions, and profound water shortages--
that will easily mitigate any perceived local or national advantages. .
.. In such a dynamic and unstable environment, it is the height of
folly to be thinking in terms of `winners.' ''
Q3. Underlying all witnesses' testimony is a perceived need for the
U.S. to continue as a global leader in helping countries and peoples
deal with humanitarian crises, but in a future when these crises arise
as a consequence of global warming. If we are the largest industrial
country resisting aggressive action to reduce our reliance on carbon,
as well as mandatory targets for reducing carbon emissions, are we
providing effective leadership on global warming in our time?
A3. Dealing with global warming will require both mitigation and
adaptation strategies. As Podesta and Ogden wrote in our study, ``While
some of the emergencies created or worsened by climate change may
ultimately be managed by the United Nations, the United States will be
looked to as a `first responder' in the immediate aftermath of a major
natural disaster or humanitarian emergency. The larger and more
logistically difficult the operation, the more urgent the appeal will
be.
The question of if and how to respond will be a recurring one for
the United States, each time raising a difficult set of questions with
important national security and foreign policy implications: How much
financial assistance should the United States pledge and how quickly?
With which other countries should the United States seek to coordinate
its response, either operationally or diplomatically? Should the U.S.
military participate directly, and, if so, in what capacity and on what
scale? . . .Ultimately, the threat of desensitization could prove one
of the gravest threats of all, for it is clear that the national
security and foreign policy challenges posed by climate change are
tightly interwoven with the moral challenge of helping those least
responsible to cope with its effects.'' U.S. leadership will be
challenged over the next generation to continually provide assistance
for those in need.
Q4. If national governments are unable to cope on their own with such
massive and acute problems as shortages of food and water or mass
migration, what will be the future of governance in regions heavily
affected by climate change? Might nation-states give way to regional
forms of government, or formal governmental functions be exercised by
multilateral organizations?
A4. This is one of the key unknown aspects of our study. In the milder,
expected scenario, Podesta and Ogden discussed the potential for
international cooperation to increase to address the effects of climate
change, bringing countries together to face a common security
challenge. On the other hand, in the more extreme scenario, Leon Fuerth
speculated that demands may become so constant that people and
countries will become desensitized and retreat into isolationism, to
fend for themselves. It is simply uncertain but, in either case,
governance will change dramatically: either increasing cooperation or
increasing isolationism and near anarchy.
Podesta and Ogden, discussing the milder scenario, wrote ``the
United Nations and other multinational organizations will be called on
with increased frequency to help manage refugee flows, food aid
distribution, disaster relief, and other emergencies.'' The European
Union specifically would likely ``cement its position as the most
responsible and united regional organization on the issue of climate
change.''
Fuerth, analyzing a more extreme scenario, wrote that in that case,
``alliance systems and multilateral institutions may collapse-among
them, the UN, as the Security Council fractures beyond compromise or
repair.'' He summarized that ``the consequences of even relatively low-
end global climate change include the loosening and disruption of
societal networks. At higher ranges of the spectrum, chaos awaits. The
question is whether a threat of this magnitude will dishearten
humankind, or cause it to rally in a tremendous, generational struggle
for survival and reconstruction. If that rally does not occur
relatively early on, then chances increase that the world will be
committed irrevocably to severe and permanent global climate change at
profoundly disruptive levels.''
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Andrew T. Price-Smith, Assistant Professor, Department of
Political Science, Colorado College; Director, Project on
Health, Environment, and Global Affairs, Colorado College/
University of Colorado-Colorado Springs; Senior Advisor, Center
for Homeland Security, University of Colorado
Questions submitted by Chairman Brad Miller
Q1. Which of the world's nations or regions do you see as most
immediately vulnerable to the changes in disease prevalence that
climate change can bring? How do you see their own security and that of
other nations, including the U.S., being affected as a result of
instability and other problems that climate change can cause?
A1. Those regions that exhibit the greatest level of vulnerability to
GCC-induced disease prevalence are the tropical though temperate zones,
particularly in those nations that lack established public health and
medical infrastructure and/or access to health services. Thus, we
should be concerned about South Asia (Pakistan and Northern India in
particular), South-East and East Asia, sub-tropical regions of South
America, and much of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Disease-induced poverty, and socio-political instability may
undercut effective governance within affected polities, and contribute
to macro-level political destabilization over the longer term. Failing
or failed states may then generate externalities such as the
destabilization of their contiguous neighbors, or may serve as bases of
operations for radical organizations (i.e., terrorists) who may then
pursue operations against the United States and her allies.
Q2. What public health risks will the U.S. face due to changing
pathogen behavior in the next 30 years?
A2. Largely unknown, although we can speculate that we will see
increasing levels of vector borne disease in Mexico and the Caribbean.
Ergo the U.S. southern border regions will likely see increasing levels
of malaria, dengue. The transmission of such pathogens will be enhanced
by poverty, and the cross-border movement of peoples in the region.
Perhaps the most important concern is that climate change will
combine with other facets of globalization (i.e., trade, migration) to
result in the emergence of entirely novel pathogens, to which we have
little or no natural immunity, nor vaccines or other forms of
prophylaxis.
Q3. Are there diseases in addition to malaria or cholera whose
incidence can be predicted from Sea Surface Temperatures or other
phenomena affected by global climate change?
A3. Yes, apparently diarrhea (and presumably dysentery) is also highly
correlated with Sea Surface Temperature, with preliminary evidence from
Peru. Further investigation into the relationship between SST and other
diseases is required.
Q4. Has climate change played a role in the emergence of new diseases,
or have its effects to date been confined to augmenting and/or shifting
the prevalence of existing diseases?
A4. GCC has not yet played a causal role in the emergence of new
pathogens, rather it has generally resulted in shifting the burden of
various vector-borne pathogens from the tropics towards the polar
regions, or to higher altitudes.
Q5. Could extreme weather events, whose frequency seems to rise with
global temperatures, become significant factors in the emergence and/or
proliferation of vector borne diseases? Could new diseases emerge as a
result of such events?
A5. Extreme weather events (particularly those involving exceptional
precipitation) are correlated with the emergence of encephalitis within
the United States. Certainly, they may contribute to other vector/
pathogen combinations as well, although more study is required in this
area. It is conceivable that extreme weather events could combine with
other factors (i.e., population density) to result in the emergence of
novel pathogens although this has not occurred to date.
Q6. What role can the U.S. play in combating the emergence and
proliferation of new diseases, or old diseases given new energy by GCC?
A6. An enormous subject. Briefly, the U.S. must exhibit global
leadership by acknowledging the threat posed by the GCC-induced spread
of disease. Washington must then provide R&D support for the
investigation of the relationship between environmental change, disease
proliferation, and the economic and political consequences of such
changes. Such analyses will permit the development of concrete policy
recommendations to inform Washington and the global community. In the
short-term, the U.S. should take immediate action to slow the processes
of GCC, preferably by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and promoting
renewable domestic sources of energy including wind power, biomass
fuels, etc. Ultimately, the U.S. must provide a much greater level of
global leadership on a range of environmental issues including GCC.
Q7. What will be the future of governance in regions heavily affected
by climate change? Might nation states give way to regional forms of
government, or formal governmental functions be exercised by
multilateral organizations?
A7. Possibly, although the outcomes are likely dependent on state
capacity and shared norms in affected regions. Given that the most
affected states are developing nations with low levels of state
capacity (i.e., resilience), a more likely outcome is that GCC will
erode effective governance, with many states devolving into quasi-
states or failed states (e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Somalia). Such states will retain sovereignty in a de jure sense, but
lack any de facto capacity for self-regulation. In some cases they may
become wards of multilateral institutions such as the UN.
Q8. Are there neglected areas of technology that we should invest in
to prepare for or avert problems related to climate change? Are there
existing areas that are deserving of more emphasis?
A8. Again we should certainly invest greater resources in the
generation of renewable energy on a domestic level, and with our allies
(such as Canada). However, a central problem is our fixation upon
technological ingenuity, while we typically neglect those advances that
could be made through a focus on social ingenuity. Social ingenuity
involves reconfiguring markets to accurately price the costs of fossil
fuels (including externalities such as health costs, and defense
expenditures), and reformulating structures of governance (both
domestic and international) to permit greater levels of adaptation in
the face of profound changes. Finally, we need to invest in training a
new generation of policy-makers in consilient (interdisciplinary) modes
of analysis that combine expertise in the natural and social sciences.
Q9. Are there relevant areas of scientific research that might merit
increased federal support to prepare for, or avert, climate change?
A9. Averting GCC is ostensibly impossible at this point. Thus, the U.S.
Federal Government should provide considerable support for those
projects that seek to ameliorate (or limit) the damage generated by
GCC. To that end, Congress and the Administration should focus on
providing support to interdisciplinary research projects that combine
the social and natural sciences, in an effort to augment the adaptive
capacity of the U.S. and affected nations. The Project on Health,
Environment, and Global Affairs which involves collaboration between
Colorado College and the Center for Homeland Security at the University
of Colorado, Colorado Springs is one such initiative. The U.S.
government should also consider funding the construction of an
interdisciplinary research network involving several major regional
universities in order to generate solutions to such grave problems. An
optimal network for applied research on the nexus between GCC, health,
and security would involve (in addition to the Project detailed above);
Columbia University, Colorado State University, the University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill, the University of South Florida, the University
of California, and the University of Washington.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Kent Hughes Butts, Professor of Political Military
Strategy; Director, National Security Issues, Center for
Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College
Questions submitted by Chairman Brad Miller
Q1. According to your testimony, DOD Directive 3000.05 declares that
``stability operations are a core U.S. military mission. . .they shall
be given priority comparable to combat operations.'' How long has this
relationship of parity between stability operations and combat
operations been the stated policy of the Department of Defense? With
particular reference to the potential and actual problems associated
with climate change, what has been its practical effect?
A1. The 2005 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
institutionalizing stability operations within the Department of
Defense provided substantial impetus for DOD Directive 3000.05, which
was published in 2006. It has been DOD's stated policy since that time.
That stability operations were critical to the success of military
operations and regional stability has been well known to the Special
Operations Community and historians concerned with such previous
conflicts as the Vietnam War. However, it was only with the detailed
reviews of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that the broader
military community became convinced that success depended upon well
planned and resourced stability operations in pre- and post-conflict
phases.
The practical effect of DOD Directive 3000.05 has been to involve
an increasing number of Department of Defense organizations in
stability operations doctrine and planning. The Army Action Plan for
Stability Operations, for example, directs the Army service components
for the combatant commands, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, and even the U.S. Army Materiel Command
to integrate support for stability operations into their missions. It
also had the effect of encouraging those policy-makers and strategists
in the Pentagon who believe that the Department of Defense should take
a pro-active role in addressing stability and security issues in an
effort to prevent conflict rather than restrict the U.S. military to
more traditional war-fighting and crisis-response missions. While these
actions facilitate the involvement of DOD organizations and military
forces in addressing climate change issues that threaten regional
stability, there is rarely any direct mention of climate change or the
effects of global warming. A notable exception was the recent
``Strength of the Nation'' article by the Army Chief of Staff, General
George W. Casey Jr. In it, General Casey characterized a future of
persistent conflict fueled by emerging global trends such as climate
change, natural disasters and resource demand that would promote
violent confrontation by exacerbating existing frictions and tensions,
``thus creating conditions ripe for exploitation by extremist groups
attempting to undermine and destroy the societies and values we are
attempting to nurture and sustain.''
Q2. Can you give us any insights into the current state of U.S.
strategic thinking or contingency planning focused on the Arctic?
A2. In December of 2004 President Bush issued an executive order
establishing the Committee on Ocean Policy, chaired by the Council on
Environmental Quality. This committee generated momentum and manages a
series of subcommittees, interagency working groups and the Interagency
Committee on Ocean Science and Resource Management Integration
(ICOSRMI). This process has begun to examine offshore land and water
issues and is developing a framework process and management regime.
Although primarily domestically focused, the process has generated
important action to improve U.S. security interests in the Arctic.
In 2007, the President urged Congress to act favorably on U.S.
accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; this
watershed action, when completed, will greatly enhance the position of
the United States in negotiations for territory and resource access in
the Arctic. In addition, the administration has undertaken a review
process for United States Arctic policy. This process establishes a
working group co-chaired by the Department of State and National
Security Council, with representation from the U.S. Coast Guard, DOD,
DOE, Interior, DOC and EPA, that recognizes that the changes in the
Arctic environment during the next 20 years will alter human activity
in the region and affect U.S. national security interests. The Arctic
Policy Working Group will have four subgroups dedicated to:
international governance, territorial and scientific issues; shipping,
defense and national security issues; energy, environmental and
economic issues; and identifying government resources required for
Arctic activity. This group will be closely associated with the ICOSRMI
process and by January of 2008 should present a recommendations paper
to an NSC PCC. It is thought that this will generate a new Arctic
Policy NSPD that will replace the 1983 NSDD 90 document (U.S. Arctic
Policy).
Q3. What limits would you place on the military's role in disaster
relief? How would you divide up the various responsibilities involved
between the military and other U.S. and multilateral entities?
A3. As a general rule, the military is used as a supplement to state
and local civilian emergency management forces and police that have the
primary responsibility for planning for and managing disasters,
becoming involved when the capabilities of these forces are overwhelmed
by the emergency. Reserve Component (RC) forces such as the National
Guard, which can be called up by the state governors, would be the
first military involved, with the active forces joining relief efforts
if they had unique and critical capabilities or the scope of the
disaster exceeded RC capabilities. This approach has the potential to
work well if proper planning and rehearsals, and a clear chain of
command, are given priority.
Internationally the role of the military in disaster preparedness
varies with country; however, models similar to that of the United
States are not uncommon. Disaster preparedness to manage natural or
man-made disasters offers a valuable opportunity for multilateral
cooperation and confidence building. The combatant commands have well-
developed disaster preparedness programs that serve as security
cooperation and engagement vehicles. Disaster preparedness offers an
irresistible reason for working with the United States and allows U.S.
forces to build critical capabilities and capacities in host-nation
militaries that enable those forces to support civil authority, often
at deterministic nodes when demands placed upon the political system
could easily cause it to fail.
The value of having the military involved in disaster preparedness
work was demonstrated in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami
that cost over 130,000 Indonesian lives. When the United States and
other donor countries and organizations responded to the massive
devastation in the Aceh Province of Indonesia, it created goodwill and
eroded support for the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiah (JI), an
Al Qaeda franchise. In fact, the spiritual leader of JI, Abu Bakar
Bashir, said that as a result of the U.S. military relief effort, he
was losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the people. In polls
taken after the relief effort, the positive perception of the United
States rose by over 30 percent, while the popularity of Al Qaeda
dropped 20 percent. Although not a climate change disaster, the tsunami
demonstrated the value of disaster preparedness in advancing U.S.
foreign policy objectives.
In terms of limitations on the military's role in disaster relief,
it is important to understand that the military, both domestically and
internationally, should not be the lead organization. A civilian entity
should be in charge. In both situations, before the military begins
operations or enters a foreign country, an exit strategy should already
be developed, with one of the objectives being to strengthen the
capacities of local forces so that they may accrue legitimacy in the
eyes of the population.
Q4. Underlying all witnesses' testimony is a perceived need for the
U.S. to continue as a global leader in helping countries and peoples
deal with humanitarian crises, but in a future when these crises arise
as a consequence of global warming. If we are the largest industrial
country resisting aggressive action to reduce our reliance on carbon,
as well as mandatory targets for reducing carbon emissions, are we
providing effective leadership on global warming in our own time?
A4. The international community believes the United States should
provide strong leadership on climate change. As the country with the
highest per capita consumption of energy resources and emissions of
carbon, the decision of the United States not to press for mandatory
targets in carbon emissions undermines its efforts to claim the moral
high ground as it competes for influence in the world. Moreover, this
provides an excuse for the largest carbon emitter, China, to refrain
from making the reduction of carbon emissions a national priority at a
time when its growing economy necessitates the building of a coal-fired
power plant every week to ten days. More effective US leadership on a
global effort to reduce dependence on carbon fuels and limit carbon
emissions would facilitate greater cooperation between regionally
influential countries and the United States on other issues critical to
U.S. national security. Making this a priority would also contribute to
the air quality in the United States and reduce a significant health
threat, curtail the growing U.S. foreign exchange deficit, limit U.S.
dependence on politically unstable sources of petroleum supply, and
slow the inflationary increase in resource commodity prices. It would
also provide a much needed time period for energy exploration and
alternative energy research and development.
Q5. If national governments were unable to cope on their own with such
massive and acute problems as shortages of food and water or mass
migration, what will be the future of governance in regions heavily
affected by climate change? Might nation-states give weight to regional
forms of government, or formal governmental functions be exercised by
multilateral organizations?
A5. I do not see a trend away from state-centric regional governance to
regional forms of government. Although there may be rare instances of
the external administration of a failed state, I believe these would be
ephemeral. U.S. foreign policy seeks to support regional organizations
in addressing regional issues and promoting stability. However, many of
these organizations are ineffectual and limited in their ability to
develop consensus for regional policies and to enforce them. In Africa,
where the effects of climate change are pronounced, the African Union
continues to struggle. The Southern African Development Community lost
much of its raison d'etre with the end of apartheid in South Africa.
While it does have some effective programs, it finds its unity
challenged by such divisive issues as Zimbabwe and support for United
States policies. Even the Economic Community of West African States,
which has had some degree of success in dealing with regional security
issues, turns on the stability and leadership of the increasingly
troubled country of Nigeria. It is for good reason that U.S. foreign
policy and the objectives of military organizations such as the new
Africa Command continue to prioritize developing good governance and
state capacity; for where go state legitimacy and effective governance,
go regional stability and security.
Climate change will have some impact upon the global system of
governance. Migration pressures on Europe could create a Fortress
Europe at odds with and less willing to help the regional
organizations, and split by divisiveness among allies. Moreover,
natural disasters can erode the power of insurgent organizations, as
was seen in Aceh, Indonesia, when the Free Aceh movement suffered
severe losses in the tsunami and the Indonesian government's disaster
response gained it legitimacy in the eyes of the Aceh people. One could
also argue that it is far easier to influence the behavior and increase
the capacity of a small group of regionally influential states than it
is to build unanimity of purpose within regional organizations. For
this reason, it is essential that organizations dedicated to
strengthening nation-states and promoting stability, such the
Department of State and its Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/RS) and USAID, be recognized as
leaders in the deterministic struggle for regional stability and
security and the protection of U.S. national security interests, and be
adequately resourced by Congress and the Administration.
Q6. Are there neglected areas of technology that we should begin to
invest in to prepare for or avert problems related to climate change?
Are their existing areas that are deserving of more emphasis? Are there
relevant areas of scientific research that might merit increased
federal support to prepare for or avert climate change?
A6. There are numerous technologies that demonstrate great promise for
dealing with elements of the climate change problem. It would be doing
a disservice to the United States to take any of these off the table.
However, there are several areas where priority makes sense. Petroleum
was a significant factor in the strategic decisions of World War II.
The OPEC oil embargo demonstrated the U.S.'s inability to meet domestic
demand from U.S. sources of supply, its strategic vulnerability to
political decisions, and instability in oil-producing countries.
Knowing that in approximately two decades China's and India's petroleum
imports will equal the current U.S. and Japanese petroleum imports, and
that the price of oil is nearing $100 a barrel, it makes sense to begin
reducing the hidden subsidies for fossil fuels and to change the rules
of the Great Game by speeding the transition to alternative fuels. This
effort would benefit from increased federal support. So too would
reducing carbon emissions. Other areas where federal support is
warranted include: carbon sequestration technology, concentrating
solar-power technology, and hydrogen technology. Whether it is the
Manhattan Project or NASA missions, the Federal Government has the
capacity to jump-start technological development when it makes research
a national priority.
Questions submitted by Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Q1. Climate change is just one of many threats facing our nation
today. Where does it stand as a priority in relation to other
transnational threats such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug
trafficking, smuggling, and organized crime?
A1. The threats that you mention--terrorism, weapons proliferation,
drug trafficking, smuggling, and organized crime--are transnational
problems that the United States has been attempting to manage for many
years. Many of these issues struggle for adequate leadership, priority
and resources, in part because they are international in nature and the
American people consistently demonstrate a relative lack of interest in
and understanding of international affairs. Even terrorism, which is
listed in the National Security Strategy as the Nation's number one
national security threat, lacks a central point of leadership,
dedicated financial resources and a process to synchronize all
terrorism-combating activities. Climate change has a limited history of
public acceptance as a security issue. And, while its constituency is
growing as its perceived phenomena--such as the drought in the
Southeast, large powerful storms, and reduced snowfall--begin to
directly affect the American people, it will take some time before
pressure mounts to make it the number one national security issue here
as it is in Great Britain.
Q2. What types of information are needed by national security
officials to appropriately characterize the potential effects of
climate change on national security and to prepare for how to respond
to those challenges?
A2. The chief impediment to making climate change a priority issue is
its lingering role as a partisan issue. Characterizing climate change
as a security issue that is currently threatening U.S. national
security interests allows the United States to move beyond this barrier
and take advantage of science that allows us to predict where climate
change forces will stress weak and failing states and thereby threaten
regional stability. Therefore, information that demonstrates the
relationship between climate change phenomena and regional instability
(the chief threat to U.S. national security), the underlying conditions
of terrorism, natural disasters and the economic vitality of the United
States would allow national security officials to characterize the
importance of climate change to the American people and better identify
concepts for dealing with the challenges.
Q3. Many of the issues that climate change will exacerbate such as
famine, disease, resource scarcity, and refugee migration are already
issues that national security leaders have to deal with today. Would it
be prudent to address the specific effects of climate change
individually rather than in a generalized manner so that we can
prioritize resources appropriately and direct resources to the issues
that are more immediate or more threatening? Does an issue-by-issue,
``menu'' approach give us more flexibility in responding to challenges
than attempting an all-or-nothing approach to climate change as a
whole?
A3. I believe both approaches are necessary if the United States is to
have success in addressing the security elements of climate change in a
timely fashion. Bundling all climate change-related security issues
runs the risk of minimizing the individual contributions of the
multiple organizations already actively involved in addressing these
issues. Moreover, choosing a generalized approach could affect the
interests of Congressional Committees and other stakeholders
responsible for the various elements of the initiative and run the risk
of incurring resistance--as we have seen with other national security
priorities. The smaller the resources, the more intense the
bureaucratic competition and the less likely there will be cooperation,
coordination and synchronization among the U.S. agencies attempting to
apply these scarce resources. Nevertheless, a generalized approach has
benefits.
The point to which I alluded earlier concerning the lack of
understanding among the American people for funding efforts to shape
the international security milieu is salient and bears repeating. It is
unlikely that meaningful resources, a sound strategy and a clear end-
state for dealing with the security aspects of climate change will be
forthcoming from the United States government until such time as the
American people fully understand their importance and demand them. The
resources with which to address the security dimensions of climate
change are lightly funded and lack strong constituencies in the
Congress. The foreign assistance account, security assistance funding,
monitoring agencies (such as the Environmental Protection Agency and
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) and leadership
agencies (such as the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development) struggle for resources. A generalized
approach to climate change and security should be undertaken, as it is
an excellent first step in raising awareness of climate change and
security among the American people and among congressional and
administration leaders in Washington, DC. A framing document for this
effort could be a new, regionally based National Security Strategy that
clearly articulates the security dimensions of climate change,
identifies the resources necessary to successfully address these issues
and makes agencies of the United States government responsible for
them. However, until such time as this approach bears fruit, we should
not forget the foot soldiers that are currently waging the fight and
their need for increased resources.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record
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