<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:29950.wais]
GAO REPORT ON NOAA'S
WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 29, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-66
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JO BONNER, Alabama JIM MATHESON, Utah
TOM FEENEY, Florida JIM COSTA, California
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas AL GREEN, Texas
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana DORIS MATSUI, California
JOHN J.H. ``JOE'' SCHWARZ, Michigan
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
C O N T E N T S
September 29, 2006
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 8
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Minority Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 10
Written Statement............................................ 11
Statement by Representative Vernon J. Ehlers, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 12
Written Statement............................................ 13
Prepared Statement by Representative David Wu, Minority Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 14
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 14
Witnesses:
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. (Ret.), Under Secretary
of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 15
Written Statement............................................ 17
Biography.................................................... 21
Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 22
Written Statement............................................ 24
Discussion
Estimated Cost of GOES-R Program............................... 37
Congress' Continuing Oversight Role............................ 37
Risk of NOAA's Sole Procurement Responsibilities............... 39
Price Estimates................................................ 39
Improvements Over NPOESS Program............................... 40
Concerns About GOES-R and Similarities to NPOESS............... 41
New Technologies and Increasing Costs.......................... 42
Contractors Role in the GOES-R Project......................... 43
Data Continuity................................................ 44
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. (Ret.), Under Secretary
of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration..................................... 48
Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, Government Accountability Office....................... 57
GAO REPORT ON NOAA'S WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM
----------
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.
Boehlert [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
GAO Report on NOAA's
Weather Satellite Program
friday, september 29, 2006
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
On September 29, 2006 at 10:00 a.m., the House Science Committee
will hold a hearing about the status of a critical weather satellite
program, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA)
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) system. NOAA
is beginning the process of purchasing the next generation of the GOES
system, which has been designated GOES-R. Cost estimates for the system
have escalated, and NOAA has already announced the elimination of one
new sensor that was to be part of the satellite. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) recently completed a report about GOES-R,
``Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in
Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs.'' The GAO
report will be officially released at the hearing. (An embargoed copy
of the Executive Summary of the report is attached as Appendix I.)
Geostationary satellites maintain a fixed position above the Earth
and provide a constant view of weather conditions. NOAA operates a two-
satellite geostationary system to provide continuous and complete
coverage of the continental Unites States. This system provides vital
real-time data for NOAA's weather forecasting and warning operations.
Government satellite programs have a history of technical problems
and major cost overruns. Most recently, NOAA and its government
partners (the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration) have experienced massive cost overruns on another
weather satellite program, the National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). In June, government officials
testified to the Science Committee that the NPOESS program needs to be
completely restructured, resulting in delays, higher costs, and more
limited capabilities than were originally planned for the satellite.
The GOES-R program is at a much earlier stage than NPOESS is at
this point. NOAA has nearly completed the preliminary design of GOES-R.
The GOES-R satellite series is intended to maintain the continuity of
weather forecasting data through 2028 and provide the first major
technical advance in geostationary instrumentation since 1994. Original
estimates for GOES-R placed the total cost at $6.2 billion, but as of
May 2006 the program office estimated costs could be as high as $11.4
billion. In an effort to lessen these costs, NOAA is currently looking
at options to reduce the scope and capabilities of GOES-R.
The GAO report, requested by the Committee, examines the status of
the GOES-R program and reasons for the cost increases and problems to
date, and identifies program management actions NOAA should take to
ensure past problems with satellite programs are not repeated with
GOES-R. GAO identified four major lessons from previous satellite
programs and found that, while NOAA has some plans to address those
lessons, actions remain for NOAA to fully implement the lessons and
decrease the risk of future cost overruns and technical problems.
Witnesses:
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher (ret.), Administrator, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Mr. David Powner, Director of Information Technology Management Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office
Background About GOES-R
The GOES-R satellites are designed to maintain a fixed position at
high altitude above the Earth and provide a constant view of weather
conditions in the United States. They orbit at the same speed as the
Earth rotates, and so appear to hover above a set position on the
ground. They complement other weather satellites (polar-orbiting
satellites) that circle the Earth at low altitude and provide global
coverage of weather and climate conditions. NOAA has flown
geostationary satellites since 1970.
GOES-R satellites are being built to carry instruments, or sensors,
to measure a number of atmospheric features important to real-time
detection and tracking of severe weather such as thunderstorms and
hurricanes. GOES satellites are also important for NOAA's daily and
hourly weather forecasts. Original plans for GOES-R included four
satellites, each carrying five sensors, described in detail below.
GOES-R will be the first major technical upgrade for NOAA's
geostationary satellites since 1994. (New GOES satellites have been
launched since 1994, but they have not been more advanced than their
predecessors.)
Originally Planned GOES-R Sensors
Original plans for GOES-R, developed in 2003, included three
sensors for weather forecasting and two for detecting solar flares that
can interfere with communications and other electrical systems. The key
sensors for weather data are the Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI) and the
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (HES). ABI will provide images of the
Earth's surface, atmosphere and cloud cover that help track severe
weather and support regular weather forecasts. ABI will provide higher
resolution and faster coverage than the current capabilities. For
example, current GOES satellites provide updated pictures every 25
minutes and ABI is to provide updated images every five minutes.
HES was supposed to provide significantly advanced ``sounder''
information compared to capabilities on current satellites. Sounders
like HES provide three-dimensional vertical profiles of atmospheric
temperature and humidity. These profiles are fundamental information
for the computer models used to provide daily weather forecasts.
Original GOES-R plans also called for HES to provide images of coastal
waters to help scientists monitor events like harmful algal blooms or
assist in fisheries management.
Earlier this month, NOAA decided HES was too complicated and the
technology was not mature enough to include it on GOES-R. NOAA is
currently examining other options to provide sounder capabilities on
GOES-R.
The third weather forecasting sensor on GOES-R will be the
Geostationary Lightning Mapper (GLM). In the past, the government has
flown lightning mappers on polar-satellites for research purposes, but
GOES-R will be the first time the U.S. flies a lightning mapper on a
geostationary satellite for operational purposes. NOAA expects that the
GLM will provide improved capabilities for tracking thunderstorms and
severe weather events.
The other two sensors planned for GOES-R are the Space
Environmental In-Situ Suite (SEISS) and the Solar Imaging Suite (SIS).
Together these sensors will detect solar storms and track dangerous
solar flares that come towards the Earth. NOAA forecasts and warns
about solar storms because the storms can: cause damage to
communication satellites, electric transmission lines and electric
transformers; interfere in ground-based communications with airline
pilots; be fatal to astronauts on space flights and in the
International Space Station; and potentially harm airplane passengers
flying polar routes.
GOES-R Management, Timeline, and Budget
GOES-R is the first time NOAA is taking on primary responsibility
for managing the procurement of a major weather satellite. In the past,
NOAA relied on NASA to procure and launch the GOES satellites. For
GOES-R, NOAA is responsible for the overall satellite, while NASA will
assist in procuring individual instruments.
NOAA expects the current GOES satellites to last at least until
2016. Current plans for GOES-R will launch the first satellite in 2014,
leaving two years for calibrating the new satellite before it needs to
be fully operational. This timeline is consistent with how NOAA
typically schedules geostationary satellite launches and calibration.
NOAA began internal design of and planning for GOES-R in 2003. In
October 2005, NOAA awarded three contracts for the preliminary design
phase of GOES-R. During this phase of the program, the three private
contractors develop detailed technical, schedule and cost plans for the
overall GOES-R system based on the original design described above. The
preliminary design phase ends in December 2006. Based on work performed
during the preliminary design phase, NOAA will issue a Request for
Proposals for system acquisition and operations and then will make a
final decision on the prime contractor for GOES-R.
However, results thus far from the preliminary design phase
indicate that NOAA underestimated the cost and technical complexity of
the GOES-R satellites and sensors. The original cost for a series
consisting of four satellites and five sensors was estimated at $6.2
billion. However, more recent and more detailed cost estimates indicate
that costs would be close to $12 billion. Also, based on preliminary
design work, NOAA decided earlier this month that HES was too
complicated and the technology was not mature enough to include it on
GOES-R. Given the rising cost estimates and technical challenges, NOAA
is currently examining options for scaling back the GOES-R program.
NOAA is looking at options that include building only two satellites,
and removing HES and providing less advanced sounder capabilities.
Originally, NOAA planned to select the prime contractor by July
2007. The process of re-designing the satellite will delay that
selection until May 2008.
In addition to selecting a prime contractor, NOAA will also issue
contracts for the individual sensors on GOES-R. NOAA has already
selected a contractor for building ABI and for SEISS, and expects to
select the contractor for SIS in spring 2007. By starting work on key
sensors now, NOAA hopes to allow plenty of time to mitigate any
technical problems that may occur while developing the equipment.
Lessons Learned from Past Problems with Government Satellites
Government satellite programs have a history of technical problems
and major cost overruns. GAO examined four major satellite procurement
programs and identified key lessons learned from those procurements
that it recommends NOAA apply to the GOES-R procurement.
Lesson #1: Establish Realistic Cost and Schedule Estimates
Many experts have found that satellite acquisition programs tend to
produce unrealistically low cost and schedule estimates. Contractors
have incentive to come in with low estimates to make their bids more
competitive, and agencies have incentive to produce low estimates to
make the programs appealing to budget reviewers and the Congress.
For GOES-R, NOAA has commissioned three costs estimates (one by
GOES-R officials, one by NOAA's budget office, and one by an
independent cost estimating group), but currently has no firm plans for
how to reconcile the government and independent life-cycle cost
estimates once the program requirements are completed. Thus, GAO
recommends NOAA establish a formal process for objectively evaluating
and reconciling the government and independent life cycle cost
estimates for the program.
Lesson #2: Ensure Sufficient Technical Readiness of the System's
Components Prior to Key Decisions
Satellite programs are technically complex and often experience
problems as equipment is being built. To mitigate the technical risk,
managers establish key decision points to make sure the technology
meets certain requirements before moving on in the program. However, in
past programs adequate requirements were not always established for key
decision points. For example, for the most problematic sensor in the
NPOESS program (VIIRS), a key decision point known as the critical
design review proceeded with officials reviewing only a paper design
for the sensor. Most experts agree that normally a critical design
review should include building a model unit, not just reviewing designs
on paper.
NOAA has performed preliminary studies of some of the GOES-R
technologies but GAO recommends much more extensive reviews by
technical experts before sensors go into production. In particular, GAO
is concerned about the Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI). ABI is similar
to VIIRS and is based on the same legacy NASA sensor (MODIS). ABI will
cost $360 million and has already experienced technical problems that
led to cost overruns of $6 million, so far. GAO projects those overruns
could reach as high as $23 million if NOAA does not put in place more
rigorous technical and management review milestones for ABI.
Lesson #3: Provide Sufficient Management at Government- and Contractor-
Levels
Another problem systemic in satellite procurement is poor
management. On the government side, this can mean inadequate expertise
in systems engineering and project management, inappropriate contractor
award fees, inadequate reserve funds, and lack of close oversight of
the contractor.
For GOES-R, NOAA plans to increase the number of resident systems
engineers and project management experts and to place government staff
at each of the contractors' locations to more closely oversee day-to-
day program management. Additionally, NOAA intends to structure the
award fee process for GOES-R in a manner consistent with
recommendations from a recent report by the Department of Commerce
Inspector General and other experts.
The GAO report commends NOAA for the management action taken to
date, but points out that, especially since GOES-R marks the first time
NOAA is taking on a major satellite acquisition by itself, NOAA may
need more technical experts than it currently plans to hire.
Lesson #4: Perform Adequate Senior Executive Oversight to Ensure
Mission Success
Timely and informed decisions from senior officials are vital to
successful satellite programs. GAO and others have stated that the lack
of timely decisions by senior management in the NPOESS was a major
factor in the large cost overruns and schedule delays for that program.
With GOES-R, NOAA has established a council of high-level officials who
meet monthly to review the program. GAO recommends that this council
closely review the results of all preliminary studies and independent
assessments of the program.
Witness Questions:
The witnesses were asked to address the following questions in
their testimony.
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher (ret.), Administrator, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
1. What new processes for satellite procurement has NOAA
implemented as a result of lessons learned from previous
programs, such as the National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System?
2. Do you agree with the following recommendations from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO)'s report,
``Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps
Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite
Programs?''
a. Develop a process to evaluate and reconcile the
independent and program cost estimates once final
program decisions are made.
b. Develop a process to validate the level of
technical maturity and contractor management procedures
achieved on the Advanced Baseline Imager prior to
critical design reviews.
c. Determine the appropriate level of resources needed
to adequately track and oversee the GOES-R program.
d. Ensure that the NOAA Program Management Council
reviews all preliminary studies and independent
assessments on technical maturity of the system and its
components so that an informed decision can be made
about the level of technical complexity it is taking on
when proceeding past key decision milestones.
3. What specific steps have you taken and will you take to
address each of GAO's recommendations listed in question two?
Mr. David Powner, Director of Information Technology Management Issues,
Government Accountability Office
1. Please outline the major findings and recommendations of
your report, ``Geostationary Operational Environmental
Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from
Other Satellite Programs.''
2. Given its current schedule and procedures, what are the
greatest risks facing the GOES-R program as it moves ahead?
3. What information should Congress and the public have to
ensure the GOES-R program remains on track?
Appendix I: Executive Summary from GAO Report
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Chairman Boehlert. The hearing will come to order. Just let
me outline what we expect this morning. We will probably just
get through a couple of opening statements, mine and Mr.
Gordon's, and then the bells will ring. So it is going to be a
hectic morning, and Admiral and Mr. Powner, you understand how
this place operates, and this is the getaway day. It may be 30
hours in length, but in any event it is going to be a rather
hectic day, so with your indulgence we will try to proceed in
an orderly manner. The Speaker doesn't really accede to our
wishes all the time, and we would go forward without any
interruption.
This may well be the last hearing for me as Chairman, and
for the Committee in this session because we are due to
complete our business today and then go off back to the
districts and then come back for what is affectionately
referred to as a lame duck session, and so we are unlikely to
have hearings then. But I want to take the privilege of the
Chair at the last hearing to thank our very capable
professional staff led by the Chief of Staff, Mr. David
Goldston, and Mr. Chuck Atkins, the Chief of Staff for the
minority. These guys and their entire team have been absolutely
magnificent.
And I think, Admiral, you would have to acknowledge that
while they are persistent in their probing but they are just so
professional in their daily conduct, and I think all of us owe
them a debt of gratitude. And then I am sorry that it is so
hectic because usually we have a full complement here, but we
don't today because everybody is scattered to the wind and
doing a lot of last minute things before departing the Nation's
Capitol. But I want to say to Mr. Gordon, I could not have had
a better partner in this endeavor, and I think this Science
Committee has done itself proud. And I am fond of saying, and
many of you have heard me say this, that when legislation is
reported out of this committee, and significant legislations
has year after year, I take pride in saying the fingerprints of
just about everybody is all over the legislation.
We listen to our Democrat colleagues. We don't always agree
but we always listen and we always have a dialogue, and so I
couldn't be prouder than I am as I begin to take leave from
this institution of their performance of all Members of this
committee, Republican and Democrat alike. Mr. Gordon, I thank
you.
Mr. Gordon. Mr. Chairman, if you would, just allow me just
a moment. As usual, I often times concur with your remarks, and
I once again concur with them today, but also to let you know
that there was a rumor that this meeting called on the last day
of our session was potentially an attempt to continue the
goodbye tour for additional accolades, and I am sure this
goodbye tour is not going to be over with any time soon but you
will be less staffed.
And so what I wanted to do, I am glad that Mary Ann is here
today because I know she is going to be staffing the Sherry's
goodbye tour, and this is for the road staff. So if you would
take that over to Mary Ann, we would appreciate that.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, and thank you for
acknowledging my bride who is, I tell everyone, my biggest
booster and most constructive critic. Ladies and gentlemen, let
me proudly present the First Lady of the Science Committee.
Mary Ann, you are being introduced. Thank you very much. With
that, let us get right on to the business as is the usual in
this committee. I want to welcome everyone here for what may
very well be the final hearing of my tenure, and we picked a
vital and future-looking subject for this hearing, the
procurement of the next generation of weather satellites known
as GOES-R.
As I think everyone knows, our past hearings on weather
satellites have not been very happy occasions for everybody.
The polar satellite program, NPOESS, was entirely to use a
description of one of my grandsons, out of whack, over budget,
behind schedule, losing capability, and, quite honestly, we
have to concede grossly mismanagement, and there is shared
blame all the way around. One reason the NPOESS program got
that way was inadequate oversight, and that includes inadequate
oversight by the leadership at the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, and inadequate oversight by those
of us who have the responsibility in the Congress.
In the case of NPOESS, we are now getting monthly updates
from NOAA, and I hope the Committee will have periodic hearings
to keep the NPOESS procurement process transparent, the public
informed, and the agency and its contractors on its toes. And
now early on in the procurement process, we are going to
inaugurate that same open continued oversight approach for
GOES-R. This should be the first of many hearings on this
critical weather satellite program. The GOES-R hearings ought
to go better than NPOESS hearings have so far. I am happy to
say that it now appears that NOAA has indeed been learning from
past mistakes, and I want to compliment Admiral Lautenbacher
for that, his openness, his willingness to interact with us,
his providing of vital information so that we can assess it in
a timely fashion.
With GOES-R, NOAA is trying to evaluate its technology
assumptions early and trying not to overreach. NOAA has put
together stellar independent cost review teams and what looks
like an appropriate senior management team. Once again,
congratulations. Neither of these steps was taken in the case
of NPOESS, and NOAA is taking action now for GOES-R precisely
to avoid repeating past mistakes and that is reassuring. At the
same time, there are some red flags already for us. The budget
estimates for GOES-R are already close to doubling. Now this is
very early in the process exactly when NOAA can make design
changes to control costs in the end but still it is not
comforting that the estimates were so far off so early.
Also, NOAA is already dropping an advanced sensor. Again,
this in many ways might be a good thing. Untried, problematic
technology shouldn't be used on operational satellites but it
means that GOES-R may represent much less of a technical
advance than had been hoped. So one of our tasks today is to
get a clear fix on the current status of GOES-R, its cost and
capabilities, with the understanding that this information will
continue to change. But our most important task is to set up a
system of congressional oversight. That is our responsibility,
and, quite frankly, we have not measured up to the task in the
past with respect to NPOESS, and we must concede that.
We have got to make sure that NOAA has set up a system of
internal oversight to prevent future problems. The very helpful
Government Accountability Office study that is being released
today should guide NOAA and this committee as we insure that
NOAA has taken all the steps necessary to increase the chances
of success, and as we determine what information Congress and
the public need as the project moves ahead. The data from
weather satellites have become features of our every day lives
and they help protect life and property, but we need to be sure
that we are getting the best satellite feasible for the lowest
possible cost. That is our responsibility. That requires
constant vigilance and today we start that oversight. Mr.
Gordon.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
I want to welcome everyone here for what may very well be the final
hearing of my tenure. And we picked a vital and future-looking subject
for this hearing--the procurement of the next generation of weather
satellites, known as GOES-R.
As I think everyone knows, our past hearings on weather satellites
have not been very happy occasions for anybody. The polar satellite
program, NPOESS, was entirely out of whack--over budget, behind
schedule, losing capability and grossly mismanaged.
One reason the NPOESS program got that way was inadequate
oversight--and that includes inadequate oversight by the leadership at
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and
inadequate oversight by us. We are asking NOAA to learn from its
mistakes, and we're going to try to do the same.
In the case of NPOESS, we are now getting monthly updates from
NOAA, and I hope the Committee will have periodic hearings to keep the
NPOESS procurement process transparent, the public informed and the
agency and its contractors on their toes. And now, early on in the
procurement process, we are going to inaugurate that same open,
continual oversight approach for GOES-R. This should be the first of
many hearings on this critical weather satellite program.
The GOES-R hearings ought to go better than NPOESS hearings have so
far. I am happy to say that it appears that NOAA has indeed been
learning from its mistakes, and I want to compliment Admiral
Lautenbacher for that.
With GOES-R, NOAA is trying to evaluate its technology assumptions
early and not overreach. NOAA has put together stellar independent cost
review teams and what looks like an appropriate senior management team.
Neither of these steps was taken in the case of NPOESS, and NOAA is
taking action now for GOES-R precisely to avoid repeating past
mistakes. That's reassuring.
At the same time, there are some red flags already for us. The
budget estimates for GOES-R are already close to doubling. Now, this is
very early in the process--exactly when NOAA can make design changes to
control costs in the end. But still, it's not comforting that the
estimates were so far off so early. Also, NOAA is already dropping an
advanced sensor. Again, this is in many ways a good thing--untried,
problematic technology shouldn't be used on operational satellites. But
it means that GOES-R may represent much less of a technological advance
than had been hoped.
So one of our tasks today is to get a clear fix on the current
status of GOES-R--its costs and capabilities--with the understanding
that that information will continue to change. But our more important
task is to set up a system of Congressional oversight and to make sure
that NOAA has set up a system of internal oversight to prevent future
problems.
The very helpful Government Accountability Office (GAO) study that
is being released at today's hearing should guide NOAA and this
committee as we ensure that NOAA has taken all the steps necessary to
increase the chances of success, and as we determine what information
Congress and the public need as the project moves ahead.
The data from weather satellites have become features of our
everyday lives, and they help protect life and property. But we need to
be sure that we are getting the best satellites feasible for the lowest
cost possible. That requires constant vigilance, and today we start
that oversight.
Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As usual, you have
well set forth that this morning's hearing is to hear testimony
on NOAA's plans to require the next series of Geostationary
Environmental Satellites, a series known as GOES-R. The
satellite pictures are a familiar site to anyone viewing a
weather forecast. These satellites are essential to monitoring
the development of severe storms. Whenever a hurricane is
threatening our coastal areas it is the GOES image that we see
the eye and the rotating clouds of the storm. We simply must
insure continuity of this satellite information to maintain our
ability to accurately forecast this weather.
We are still at a very early stage of this program. We have
an opportunity to take steps to avoid problems with this
acquisition such as the problems you put forth and that we
experienced with the polar satellite procurement or NPOESS. We
simply cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the polar
program. The Administration has taken initial steps to obtain
realistic cost estimates and to determine the degree of
technical difficulty associated with the planned sensors for
this system. The Administration has also taken steps to hire
technical experts and to establish an executive oversight
committee for this program.
I commend you, Admiral Lautenbacher, for these actions.
However, Mr. Powner of the Government Accountability Office
will testify this morning additional steps must be taken to
limit risk of cost and schedule overruns. We expect to see a
realistic cost assessment for this program before the system
contract is awarded. We expect a realistic assessment of the
technical challenges associated with the development of the
sensors and adequate reserves to be able--or be put aside to
deal with the problems that will inevitably arise.
Finally, we expect the Executive Committee overseeing this
program to pay attention to its development and to act
decisively and expeditiously when problems are identified.
Again, I would like to thank Mr. Powner and members of the GAO
team for his fine work and assistance to the Committee in our
oversight of NOAA's satellite programs. The Committee will
continue to watch the development of this program closely over
the next few years. I hope we can work cooperatively to achieve
our common goal of delivering important and improved weather
forecasting information. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bart Gordon
We are here this morning to hear testimony on NOAA's plans to
acquire the next series of geostationary environmental satellites--the
series known as GOES-R.
The GOES satellite pictures are a familiar sight to anyone viewing
a weather forecast. These satellites are essential to monitoring the
development of severe storms. Whenever a hurricane is threatening our
coastal areas, it is the GOES images that we see of the eye and the
rotating clouds of the storm.
We simply must ensure continuity of this satellite information to
maintain our ability to accurately forecast the weather.
We are still at a very early stage of this program. We have an
opportunity to take steps to avoid problems with this acquisition such
as the problems we are experiencing with the polar satellite
procurement--NPOESS. We simply cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of
the polar program.
The Administration has taken initial steps to obtain realistic cost
estimates and to determine the degree of technical difficulty
associated with the planned sensors for this system. The Administration
has also taken steps to hire technical experts and to establish an
executive oversight committee for this program.
I commend you, Admiral Lautenbacher, for these actions.
However, as David Powner of the Government Accountability Office
will testify this morning, additional steps must be taken to limit
risks of cost and schedule overruns.
We expect to see a realistic cost estimate for this program before
a system contract is awarded. We expect a realistic assessment of the
technical challenges associated with the development of the sensors and
adequate reserves to be put aside to deal with the problems that will
inevitably arise.
Finally, we expect the Executive Committee overseeing this program
to pay attention to its development and to act decisively and
expeditiously when problems are identified.
I would like to thank David Powner and the member of his GAO team
for their fine work and assistance to the Committee in our oversight of
NOAA's satellite programs. The Committee will continue to watch the
development of this program closely over the next few years. I hope we
can work cooperatively to achieve our common goal of delivering
improved weather forecasting to the Nation.
Chairman Boehlert. Now for the distinguished Chairman of
the Subcommittee, Dr. Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased that
the Committee is holding this hearing today on another of the
Nation's critical weather satellite programs, the next
generation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's Geostationary Operational Environmental
Satellite, known as GOES-R. But first, Mr. Chairman, on this
occasion of your presumably last hearing as Chair, I want to
thank you from the bottom of my heart for the incomparable
leadership you have given this committee. Your unwavering
support for science and technology has warmed the cockles of my
scientific heart, and with your easy manner and open-minded
approach to every issue you tackle, you have served this
committee, this Congress, and the American people well, and I
thank you for it.
The fact that the last hearing of Chairman Boehlert's
tenure is on this satellite program should help us focus our
attention on the importance of GOES-R, and how seriously we
need to take our role in ensuring its success. NOAA has
operated geostationary weather satellites since the 1970s. It
is not hyperbole to say that these satellites save lives, many
lives. They help the National Weather Service to better
understand and monitor severe weather events such as tornadoes
and hurricanes and of course the resultant floods, and they are
critical to the timely delivery of the alerts and warnings that
lead people to safety before disaster strikes.
I am frequently reminded of my childhood in Minnesota where
we had the storms, we called them cyclones at that time, but
the tornadoes, the storms, came up unexpectedly. The only
warning was to look at the sky and see what was happening. We
had a number of lives lost in the communities I have lived in
simply because there was no warning system. People had to use
their own eyes and ears and often could not reach shelter in
time. Today, we don't have. The ongoing problems with other
satellite programs have made it clear that we in Congress must
take our oversight responsibilities seriously. Failure to do so
can cost our communities dearly. Therefore, I look forward to
hearing what the Government Accountability Office will tell us
about the state of GOES-R and how NOAA is applying lessons to
learn from past satellite programs.
I also look forward to hearing from NOAA about what they
see as the biggest challenges to the success of GOES-R, and,
most importantly, how they will address these challenges. I am
particularly concerned about how NOAA will move the program
forward in light of the recent cancellation of HES, the
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite. The way NOAA fills the gap
left by this instrument will affect how our nation observes and
forecasts weather for the next two decades, so it is critical
that we get this right.
I believe that NOAA is earnest. They are trying to get this
program right and I applaud their efforts. However, good
intentions are not enough. We all have to work on this
together. I expect this hearing to be the beginning of an
ongoing dialogue with NOAA, the GAO, and our committee as we
all work together as one to ensure the success of this
important program. I thank out witnesses for being here. I
would love to stay. Unfortunately, I have to go and dedicate
the new botanic garden with Ms. Bush, but I will return as soon
as I can, and perhaps I could even persuade to come along and
enjoy the rest of the hearing with us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ehlers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Vernon J. Ehlers
Thank you Chairman Boehlert. I am pleased the Committee is holding
this hearing today on another of this nation's critical weather
satellite programs: the next generation of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's Geostationary Operational Environmental
Satellite, known as GOES-R.
But first, on the occasion of his last hearing as Chair, I thank my
friend, Sherry Boehlert, for his incomparable leadership of our
committee. His unwavering support for science and technology, along
with his easy manner and open-minded approach to every issue he
tackles, has served this committee, this Congress, and the American
people well.
The fact that the last hearing of Chairman Boehlert's tenure is on
this satellite program should help focus our attention on the
importance of GOES-R, and how seriously we need to take our role in
ensuring its success. NOAA has operated geostationary weather
satellites since the 1970's. It is not hyperbole to say these
satellites save lives--they help the National Weather Service to better
understand and monitor severe weather events such as tornadoes and
hurricanes and are critical to the timely delivery of the alerts and
warnings that lead people to safety before disaster strikes.
The ongoing problems with other satellite programs have made it
clear that we in Congress must take our oversight responsibilities
seriously--failure to do so can cost our communities dearly. Therefore,
I look forward to hearing what the Government Accountability Office
will tell us today about the state of GOES-R, and how NOAA is applying
lessons learned from past satellite programs. I also look forward to
hearing from NOAA about what they see as the biggest challenges to the
success of GOES-R, and--most importantly--how they will address those
challenges. I am particularly concerned about how NOAA will move the
program forward in light of the recent cancellation of HES, the
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite. The way NOAA fills the gap left by
this instrument will affect how our nation observes and forecasts
weather for the next two decades, so it is critical that we get this
right.
I believe that NOAA is earnest--they are trying to get this program
right and I applaud their efforts so far. However, good intentions are
not enough. I expect this hearing to be the beginning of an ongoing
dialogue between NOAA, the GAO, and our committee as we all work to
ensure the success of this important program.
I thank our excellent witnesses for being here, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Chairman Boehlert. Dr. Ehlers, don't go too far. We are
advised that in five to seven minutes a vote will start on the
Floor, so we are going to get right to the opening statements.
Before doing so, I want to acknowledge something that is going
to happen. The Nation has been well served by a very
distinguished government employee, Max Mayfield, who at the end
of this year has announced his intention to retire. He is the
Director of the National Hurricane Center in Miami, one of the
true stars in the otherwise sorry saga of Hurricane Katrina.
Just an absolutely able, committed, professional public
servant. And, Admiral Lautenbacher, you know how good he is.
And very dependent on weather satellites.
And my wife reports to me, and she knows, that he is also a
matinee idol because all over America during Hurricane Katrina
the TV sets were on and people were glued to it, and the most
credible information came from this dedicated and able guy, and
we thank him. With that, Admiral, you are up.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative David Wu
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing today.
The GOES program has provided us with vital weather forecasting
information for the past four decades. The last significant
technological improvements to GOES were adopted in 1994. It is
reasonable to expect that we could consider expanding our capabilities
for an expected launch of the GOES-R series in 2012.
We all realize that increased capabilities come at a price--in the
case of satellite systems at a significant price. I am in agreement
with Ranking Member Gordon that we must have realistic cost estimates
and technology assessments of any upgraded sensor capabilities so that
we can make an informed judgment about how much technological
improvement we need and can afford. Expanded technological capabilities
require not only improvements to satellite instrumentation, but
expanded ground systems and data management and analytical capabilities
to get full value for our money.
In all of these considerations, continuity of service must be the
top priority.
I encourage you, Admiral Lautenbacher, to heed the recommendations
included in the GAO report we are releasing today. I also encourage you
to maintain open, frank communication with this committee as the
program moves forward.
Mr. Powner, I would also like to express my thanks to you and your
team for this report and for the other fine work you have done for us
on NOAA's satellite programs.
I thank the witnesses for appearing before us today and I look
forward to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before
our committee to discuss the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA)'s next generation Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellite Program, known as GOES-R.
Since the 1960s, NOAA has operated geostationary satellites that
provide images and data on atmospheric, oceanic, and climatic
conditions over the continental United States and Hawaii. These
satellites are best known for creating the hurricane pictures you see
on television and the data to help forecast the weather. Providing our
communities with accurate and timely information to predict and track
weather and natural disasters is critical to our economic security and
national safety.
This past summer, my congressional district suffered from severe
thunderstorms and rain, causing damage and destruction throughout our
communities. I know how beneficial weather forecasts and warnings to
help communities prepare for a natural disaster. However, these
predictions are not perfect and there are instances when the scale and
magnitude of some storms are not accurate. I am pleased NOAA continues
to take steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite
programs, and acknowledges that more remains to be done.
Today's hearing focuses on NOAA's plan for the GOES-R program to
replace the current series of satellites before they reach the end of
their usefulness by approximately 2012. Chairman Boehlert and Ranking
Member Gordon requested the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to
determine the status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement and
identify and evaluate the actions that the program management team is
taking to ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other
satellite programs are not repeated.
I look forward to hearing from GAO on its findings and
recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL CONRAD C. LAUTENBACHER, JR. (RET.),
UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, NATIONAL
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION
Admiral Lautenbacher. Thank you very much. Chairman
Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon, distinguished Members of the
Committee and staff, I appreciate the opportunity to engage in
a discussion of GOES-R and to report on our progress. Before I
start talking about the satellite programs, allow me to express
my appreciation to the Chairman for his leadership and his
conduct of hearings and oversight of NOAA in the past during
his tenure. We have gone through the tenure together. At the
time that I started was about the time when I started with
CORE. Chairman Boehlert was coming on line. I appreciate the
truly bipartisan nature of the hearings and the interest in our
programs, and I appreciate your leadership. On behalf of all of
NOAA, we thank you for your interest in our programs and their
value to the country.
I also want to thank Chairman Ehlers before he goes to the
botanical gardens. His personal leadership allowed the passing
of a NOAA Organic Act on the House floor, truly a historic
occasion. Congressmen have been trying for years to do that,
and we thank you. As the Committee knows if there is any one
piece of legislation that I believe would help us to manage
better and to release and unleash the power of the NOAA concept
is an Organic Act agreed to by Congress. So thank you very
much. We appreciate your leadership. You have been a great
inspiration to those of us in the agency.
Because of the bipartisan nature and because I really
believe this, I want to thank Congressman Gordon and
Congressman Wu as well for the partnership because if you
didn't care about these programs they wouldn't get any air time
at all, so I am very pleased to be here with you and to discuss
these and have the future laid out and work on the best
solution for the country, so thank you.
As mentioned in the opening statements, the Committee is
familiar with the NPOESS program. We have had several hearings
on it. This is a discussion on the next generation
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Program. It
is called GOES-R. We name them by letters as they--before they
are launched, and when they are launched and successful they
become numbers so if you hear the numbers when they are in
orbit they become numbers. These satellites, remember, are geo
positioned. They are 23,000 miles above the equator. We have
two of them that are constantly looking at the Atlantic and the
Pacific, and they do give you these spectacular pictures that
you see of hurricanes. They also help us to provide information
for forecasts and warnings for severe weather, as mentioned,
such as thunderstorms and beginning of the fronts that can
create tornadoes and that sort of thing.
Now we are in the early stages of the acquisition process
for the next generation of GOES satellites called GOES-R. So we
are about five years ahead of where we were on NPOESS, and this
is the opportunity that we have to have this discussion at this
point to define the system to make sure it is the best possible
system technologically for the cost and the money that the
Nation is willing to pay for it so I appreciate this
opportunity. We have made significant changes to our GOES-R
program management, as I hope to demonstrate as I go through
here. Because of the direction from this committee, the reviews
from the GAO, and the DOC inspector general, the reason recent
Nunn-McCurdy certification process and our own internal
reviews.
We have made those changes not because of today's hearing
necessarily but because we believe they are right, and we have
been doing them for the past several years as the lessons have
been coming out. We have been modifying our approach to GOES-R
and trying to incorporate in a very timely manner the right
way, the best way, to manage these programs for the future.
Should I stop? Go ahead? All right.
Chairman Boehlert. Go right ahead.
Admiral Lautenbacher. There are bells ringing, and just to
make sure. Some of the changes that we have made include the
creation of a NOAA program management council. This is
something that NOAA has not had before. This is to back stop
our normal chain of command process, which I am sure you are
aware of, but this is a senior management council. It is made
up of our senior NOAA personnel, the leaders that are
responsible for cost, schedule and performance technically
budgetarily and administratively. It also includes NASA experts
who meet. They come, we meet--have this council meet monthly to
review this program. We have also created a group of users of
satellite data, a broad-based group, which developed the
initial recommendation for the requirements and they also meet
regularly to assess the preliminary design.
My deputy and I meet regularly to discuss the
recommendations from these two groups, and we make decisions
based on these recommendations. We provide the Department of
Commerce with quarterly briefings on the program, and I brief
the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary of Commerce as needed.
In fact, there is a schedule to brief them very shortly on the
current status. We are using the full capabilities and
processes at NASA for the development of the GOES-R system,
including their independent technical and engineering reviews,
and also NASA will manage the sensor contracts. We have hired
teams of independent satellite experts and independent cost
estimators to provide periodic reviews and address the concerns
raised by NOAA senior leadership.
We have also hired a highly competent and respected former
NASA program manager for the GOES-R program. The program office
is increasing staff to support robust systems engineering and
oversight of the contractors, which will include on site
representatives at the contractor and major subcontractors.
Presently, we have three contractor teams developing
preliminary designs and identifying program risks. When they
are finished, NOAA and the Department of Commerce will decide
on a system design and award a contract. Our three contractor
teams and our independent review team have provided feedback on
preliminary design concepts, and they are three in nature.
First of all, to realize and actually build this concept
that we had been working on for GOES-R would be much more
expensive and much riskier than we had first thought. Number
two, one of the proposed sensors of the five that are on this--
projected to be on this satellite, the HES or Hyperspectral
Environmental Suite, is not technically mature enough that
would impact the spacecraft, the ground systems, and it would
jeopardize a launch in 2014, which is the right time to launch
for continued continuity. And, third of all, based on our
conversations with GAO and our continued internal review, we
can make further improvements in the way the acquisition will
be managed, and we are doing so.
We are revising our plans to insure we have a program that
maintains data continuity, allows for technical advances, and
is affordable. Regarding the cost, preliminary cost estimates,
and there were rough cost estimates that were created before we
had full requirements in line, increased from a number of
roughly $6.2 billion to a potential of $11.4 billion, learned
from these studies that the contractors are doing for us. Most
of this increase in required budget was because we revised
inflation assumptions in our cost models. Cost models at
inflation which was well out of date, that is about $2.6
billion of the increase as inflation changes. The revised
estimate also would provide for $800 million for increased
management reserves based on expert recommendations and lessons
learned from NPOESS.
In addition, the cost of the spacecraft ground system and
sensors from the technological complexity increased by about
$1.5 billion. That was the rough orders of magnitude of the
issues that we are tacking at this point. In response to those
increased cost estimates, the program office assembled a team
of experts to develop multiple program options to reduce cost
and risk and to look at a optimal solution. The team provided
information to the program management council and the user
group, which examined the option and provided me with
recommendations. We are still in that process but to date the
following items have been accomplished.
While the Hyperspectral Environmental Sensor potentially
could have provided a major improvement in our ability to
characterize the atmosphere and the coastal environment we have
decided not to award a contract to build the HES sensor at this
time for this satellite. It does not mean we are giving up on
HES. It means we are deferring it and trying to build the
proper technological base before it can be instituted and put
on an operational satellite.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Lautenbacher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
Introduction
Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon, and Members of the
Committee, I am Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Under Secretary for Oceans and
Atmosphere at the Department of Commerce (DOC) and head of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Before I talk about satellites, I would like to thank Chairman
Boehlert for his thoughtful leadership and friendship over the past
several years. I truly appreciate the bipartisan manner in which you
conduct the Science Committee and your strong support for NOAA. You and
your staff have been good to work with--always thorough and fair. We
will miss your leadership and wish you the best in retirement. I also
want to thank Chairman Ehlers who, although he is not retiring, will no
longer be our Subcommittee Chairman in the next Congress. Chairman
Ehlers has invested a considerable amount of time and effort into
learning our issues and become quite an expert on our agency. I
personally appreciate your leadership and efforts to pass a NOAA
Organic Act. By passing the Organic Act on the House Floor last week,
you accomplished something many Members had tried and failed to do over
the last 20 years. It was a testament to your dedication and your
abilities, and I thank you.
What are geostationary satellites?
While the Committee is familiar with NOAA's next generation polar-
orbiting environmental satellite program (NPOESS), I am here to discuss
NOAA's next generation Geostationary Operational Environmental
Satellite Program, known as GOES-R. NOAA has operated geostationary
satellites since the 1970s. These satellites--located more than 22,000
miles above the equator--provide images and data on atmospheric,
oceanic, and climatic conditions over the continental United States and
Hawaii. These satellites are best known for creating the hurricane
pictures you see on television, but they also provide data to help
forecast the weather and provide warnings for severe weather such as
thunderstorms. We operate two geostationary satellites, one over the
east coast and the other over the west coast. To protect against a loss
of satellite coverage, we maintain a spare satellite on-orbit that can
be repositioned to take the place of a failed satellite.
What is GOES-R?
The final two GOES satellites in the current GOES-N series have
been built. We are in the early stages of the acquisition process for
the next generation of GOES satellites, called GOES-R. Given the long
lead time needed for satellite development, acquisition work is
required now to ensure continuity of satellite coverage.
At first, we envisioned GOES-R as a satellite series that would
contain significant technological advancements. We looked at ways to
expand the use of GOES data for other NOAA missions, such as ocean and
coastal observations that support fisheries management and marine
research. The 2003 preliminary system design concept was for a
combination of the five sensors to be flown on as many as eight
satellites. The preliminary cost estimate of $6.2 billion identified in
the GAO report was developed in 2004 and presented in the FY 2006
President's Budget. This figure has been revised over time as the
program has moved forward.
The five sensors included an advanced imager, a hyperspectral
suite, two solar weather sensors, and a lightning mapper. The Advanced
Baseline Imager (or A-B-I) is the main sensor which fulfills NOAA's
critical mission requirements. This sensor will provide significant
advancements over current GOES imagers by taking pictures five times
faster and have the ability to zoom in to view specific severe weather
events, while at the same time continue to look at the rest of the
United States. We currently do not have this capability and must
constantly make decisions about what to focus on, which impacts our
ability to forecast weather. The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite
(HES) was conceived as an advanced sounder and coastal water imager
that would provide a profile of atmospheric temperature and moisture
content used in weather forecasting and take images of coastal areas
for water quality monitoring and coastal hazard assessment. The Solar
Imaging Suite (SIS) will provide pictures of the sun to detect solar
flares, while the Space Environmental in-Situ Suite (SEISS) will
measure the space radiation environment. The Geostationary Lightning
Mapper (GLM) will help us better detect lightning and improve our
capabilities to forecast and track severe weather.
The planned launch readiness date--based on the projected life
expectancy of current satellites and the requirement to preserve
continuity of the imaging mission--was projected to be in 2012. NOAA
reevaluates the need date for GOES-R based on the performance of the
operational satellites; this analysis has led to revisions of the GOES-
R launch date. Continuing analyses of our current satellites indicates
that the on-orbit GOES satellites are lasting longer than predicted and
a 2014 launch readiness date is now warranted.
As noted earlier, GOES-R is still in the design phase and we have
yet to award a prime contract for acquisition of this satellite series.
Presently, three contractor teams are developing preliminary designs
and identifying program risks, and when they are finished, NOAA and the
Department of Commerce will decide on the system design and award a
contract. The ABI instrument is under contract and being developed, and
the contract for development of the SEISS instrument was just signed.
NASA is managing all of our sensor contracts and is providing technical
guidance and support for the whole program.
Lessons Learned from NPOESS and Other Reviews
NOAA is applying lessons learned from the NPOESS program and other
recent reviews of space systems. We are implementing these lessons into
our management and acquisition strategy. We have made significant
changes to our GOES-R program management and oversight based on
direction from this committee, reviews from the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the DOC Inspector General, the recent
NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy certification process, and our own internal
reviews.
I created a NOAA Program Management Council chaired by my Deputy,
which is made up of senior NOAA and NASA personnel and meets monthly to
review the program. This group assesses the technical, budget, and
schedule performance of the program. It reviews proposed new activities
and/or changes in scope of the program to ensure risk and budget
impacts to existing programs are understood and realistic. This group
provides recommendations on whether the program should move forward at
all major milestones, such as contract award, critical design reviews,
test readiness reviews and launch readiness. The PMC can also recommend
alternative actions including terminations. During these monthly
meetings members openly question the program director and can request
further information or actions the program office must fulfill. Each
meeting begins with a review of any open action item.
In addition, I have a group consisting of the NOAA users of the
satellite data, which also reports to my Deputy. As we designed the
original concept for GOES-R, the user group developed the initial
requirements and meets regularly to assess the extent to which the
preliminary designs meet the requirements. This group is critical as we
move forward with finalizing sensors and the satellite system to ensure
GOES-R will meet NOAA's requirements for data and products.
As both of the groups report to my Deputy, it is his job to
arbitrate any differences of opinions between the two groups. My Deputy
and I meet regularly to discuss the recommendations from the groups and
I make decisions based on these recommendations. We provide the
Department of Commerce with quarterly briefings on the program and I
brief the Deputy Secretary and Secretary as needed.
We have co-located the GOES-R program office at NASA Goddard Space
Flight Center and are using the full capabilities and processes at NASA
for the development of the GOES-R system. This includes NASA's
processes for independent technical and engineering reviews. The
program reports on a monthly basis to a NASA Program Management Council
which is chaired by the Goddard Deputy Director.
We hired a team of independent satellite experts to provide
periodic reviews and address specific concerns raised by NOAA senior
leadership. We also hired two cost estimating teams to independently
develop the program estimates. One will work for the GOES-R program
office and develop the Program Office Estimate. The other cost
estimating team works for the NOAA Chief Financial Officer, who reports
to my Deputy, to provide an Independent Cost Estimate. Our goal is to
ensure that the program will have a realistic and executable budget in
place that provides sufficient reserves to handle development issues
that arise. NOAA also hired a highly competent and respected former
NASA program manager, Anthony Comberiate, for the GOES-R program. The
GOES-R program has increased staff to support robust systems
engineering and oversight of the contractors, including on-site
representatives at the prime contractors and at major subcontractors.
What did we learn about GOES-R?
As we proceed through the preliminary design phase, our three
contractor teams and our Independent Review Team have provided feedback
on our design concepts:
1. To actually build our concept for GOES-R would be much more
expensive and riskier than we first thought;
2. One of the proposed sensors, the Hyperspectral
Environmental Suite (HES) is not technologically mature enough,
would impact the spacecraft and the ground systems, and would
not allow us to launch in 2014; and
3. Further improvements could be made in the way the
acquisition will be managed.
Based on this information we are revising our plans to ensure we
have a program that maintains data continuity, allows for technical
advances, and is affordable. The good news is that this is the right
time to make changes to the plans--before we let a contract to build
the satellites.
Why have the cost estimates increased so much?
The preliminary cost estimates to build this new system went from
$6.2 billion to around $11.4 billion. Most of the increase was because
we revised the inflation assumptions in our cost models, which added
about $2.6 billion to the total. The estimates were also revised to
provide for increased management reserves/margins based on expert
recommendations and lessons learned from NPOESS. This added an
additional $800 million. The cost of spacecraft, ground system and
sensors increased about $1.5 billion. The remaining increase covers the
launch, operation and support segments of GOES-R. This increase in the
life cycle cost estimate reflects new inputs from NASA and others.
In response to the increasing cost estimates for the program, the
program office assembled a team of cost and technical experts and
developed multiple program options to reduce cost and risk. The team
provided information to the PMC and the user group, which examined the
options and provided me with recommendations. These recommendations are
being considered and decisions will be incorporated in the FY 2008
President's Budget.
Why not build HES?
One decision we have made is not to award a contract to build the
HES sensor given its risks and technological challenges. HES is a large
and complex instrument. The combination of instrument development
challenges, magnitude of required spacecraft accommodations, and ground
product implications, provided a high level of risk. Given input from
the Program Management Council, input from the program office, the
contractor and the independent review team, I determined HES created
too much risk for the GOES-R program. While HES potentially could have
provided a major improvement in our ability to characterize the
atmosphere and the coastal environment, we did not think it was prudent
to accept that much risk in an operational satellite for an acquisition
program. We are examining alternate ways to maintain today's sounding
capability for GOES-R. While not including the HES on GOES-R we are
going to complete the HES preliminary design and risk reduction work
that is currently under contract. This work will be of value to the
user group which is actively working this issue with the program office
as I have also asked the program office to look at alternatives to add
a HES-like instrument on research satellites or future GOES satellites.
Fulfilling the coastal waters component of the sounder capability
remains a NOAA priority. NOAA has initiated a separate analysis of
alternatives to examine possible future approaches for providing
hyperspectral sounding and coastal waters imaging.
In addition to architectural changes, we have decided to provide
the sensors to the prime contractor as Government Furnished Equipment.
This will ensure more direct Government oversight of these critical
developments allowing the prime contractor to focus on the spacecraft,
ground system, and integration. We are also examining the division of
labor between NOAA and NASA. In the past, NOAA has provided the funding
and NASA managed the contract for NOAA. We are discussing with NASA
whether this model is the most appropriate one for the GOES-R Program.
The GAO Report
We have also provided information to the GAO about GOES-R, which is
why we are here today. I am pleased the GAO report recognizes we
continue to incorporate the lessons learned from problems of other
satellite programs into the GOES-R procurement. I realize more remains
to be done and I am committed to doing it.
Specifically, the GAO provided three recommendations:
Recommendation number one: Once the scope of the program has been
finalized, establish a process for objectively evaluating and
reconciling the government and independent life cycle cost estimates.
We will establish a process to reconcile the cost estimates, and I
will ensure this process is reviewed by our Independent Review Team. We
will examine how NASA and the Department of Defense reconcile cost
estimates and tailor a process that is most appropriate for NOAA.
Recommendation number two: Perform a comprehensive review of the
Advanced Baseline Imaginer Sensor (called A-B-I) before it enters
production.
The report highlights the problems the contractor is experiencing
with ABI, the one sensor in actual development. This sensor fulfills
our mission critical imaging requirements. NOAA and NASA are working
closely to ensure performance of the instrument meets these
requirements. We believe we understand the current technical problems
and the contractor has a realistic plan to develop the sensor. Given
the importance of this instrument and lessons learned from the NPOESS
Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor, I agree with
GAO that we need to ensure we are technologically ready to move forward
through the critical milestones of development and production. NASA has
several reviews of the sensor planned by government experts outside of
the program, and NOAA will have independent experts regularly assess
the progress of the sensor development at critical phases along with
reviews by the NOAA PMC. GAO was also concerned about the potential for
ABI cost overruns and schedule delays. We agree with GAO and we have
budgeted for additional cost and schedule contingencies in line with
GAO estimates to cover these challenges. We believe these actions will
ensure the sensor will be ready to fly in 2014.
Recommendation number three: Seek assistance from an independent review
team to determine the appropriate level of people and resources needed
to track and oversee the contractor's performance using specific
metrics.
We agree with GAO about the importance of monitoring critical
metrics that help illuminate the cost and schedule performance of the
contractors. NOAA is hiring at least three additional people to aid in
the implementation of Earned Value Management program management. As
the program grows, we will adjust accordingly while seeking input and
advice from NASA experts and our Independent Review Team.
What are NOAA's next steps?
Given the analysis that our preliminary concepts for GOES-R are
significantly riskier and more expensive than previously thought and
would likely not be ready for a 2014 launch, NOAA and DOC are
reevaluating the GOES-R program. As we evaluate and attempt to balance
cost, schedule, risk, and performance, our number one priority is to
ensure continuity of existing imagery data.
We are providing the three contractor teams developing the
preliminary designs for GOES-R three additional months. We want them to
refine their designs by removing the HES sensor and providing at least
existing sounding capability. We instructed them to develop a system
that will have the remaining four sensor suites on each satellite, thus
reducing the minimum number of satellites needed from three to two. We
expect to have the preliminary design proposals at the end of this
year. Then the program office, the PMC and the user group will provide
me with recommendations on the final design for GOES-R, which will
include the cost, schedule, performance and risk for the program. I
will then provide my recommendations to the Secretary who will decide
whether to move forward with a contract. It will then be about one year
to develop and award a contract, which would occur in the summer of
2008.
Conclusion
As I have said before, satellites are very complicated and
difficult machines to build. But, their capabilities are critical to
NOAA's mission to predict the Earth's environment. I believe we are
making significant strides in developing a better process for designing
and acquiring our satellites. My goal is to have a process in place
that will provide my successors with the best information to make the
best decisions.
Once again, I appreciate the efforts of the Committee, in
particular Chairman Boehlert, in working with us as we develop this
process. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Biography for Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
A native of Philadelphia, Pa., retired Navy Vice Admiral Conrad C.
Lautenbacher, Ph.D., is serving as the undersecretary of commerce for
oceans and atmosphere. He was appointed Dec. 19, 2001. Along with this
title comes the added distinction of serving as the eighth
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
He holds an M.S. and Ph.D. from Harvard University in applied
mathematics.
Lautenbacher oversees the day-to-day functions of NOAA, as well as
laying out its strategic and operational future. The agency manages an
annual budget of $4 billion. The agency includes, and is comprised of,
the National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Services;
National Marine Fisheries Service; National Ocean Service; National
Weather Service; Oceanic and Atmospheric Research; Marine and Aviation
Operations; and the NOAA Corps, the Nation's seventh uniformed service.
He directed an extensive review and reorganization of the NOAA
corporate structure to meet the environmental challenges of the 21st
century.
As the NOAA Administrator, Lautenbacher spearheaded the first-ever
Earth Observation Summit, which hosted ministerial-level representation
from several dozen of the world's nations in Washington July 2003.
Through subsequent international summits and working groups, he worked
to encourage world scientific and policy leaders to work toward a
common goal of building a sustained Global Earth Observation System of
Systems (GEOSS) that would collect and disseminate data, information
and models to stakeholders and decision makers for the benefit of all
nations individually and the world community collectively. The effort
culminated in an agreement for a 10-year implementation plan for GEOSS
reached by the 55 member countries of the Group on Earth Observations
at the Third Observation Summit held in Brussels February 2005.
He also has headed numerous delegations at international
governmental summits and conferences around the world, including the
U.S. delegation to 2002 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Ocean
Ministerial Meeting in Korea, and 2002 and 2003 meetings of the World
Meteorological Organization and Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission in Switzerland and France, as well as leading the Commerce
delegation to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in South
Africa.
Before joining NOAA, Lautenbacher formed his own management
consultant business, and worked principally for Technology, Strategies
& Alliances Inc. He was president and CEO of the Consortium for
Oceanographic Research and Education (CORE). This not-for-profit
organization has a membership of 76 institutions of higher learning and
a mission to increase basic knowledge and public support across the
spectrum of ocean sciences.
Lautenbacher is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (Class of
1964), and has won accolades for his performance in a broad range of
operational, command and staff positions both ashore and afloat. He
retired after 40 years of service in the Navy. His military career was
marked by skilled fiscal management and significant improvements in
operations through performance-based evaluations of processes.
During his time in the Navy, he was selected as a Federal Executive
Fellow and served at the Brookings Institution. He served as a guest
lecturer on numerous occasions at the Naval War College, the Army War
College, the Air War College, The Fletcher School of Diplomacy, and the
components of the National Defense University.
His Navy experience includes tours as Commanding Officer of USS
HEWITT (DD-966), Commander Naval Station Norfolk; Commander of Cruiser-
Destroyer Group Five with additional duties as Commander U.S. Naval
Forces Central Command Riyadh during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, where he was in charge of Navy planning and participation
in the air campaign. As Commander U.S. Third Fleet, he introduced joint
training to the Pacific with the initiation of the first West Coast
Joint Task Force Training Exercises (JTFEXs).
A leader in the introduction of cutting-edge information
technology, he pioneered the use of information technology to mount
large-scale operations using sea-based command and control. As
Assistant for Strategy with the Chief of Naval Operations Executive
Panel, and Program Planning Branch Head in the Navy Program Planning
Directorate, he continued to hone his analytic skills resulting in
designation as a specialist both in Operations Analysis and Financial
Management. During his final tour of duty, he served as Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments) in
charge of Navy programs and budget.
Lautenbacher lives in Northern Virginia with his wife Susan who is
a life-long high school and middle school science teacher.
Chairman Boehlert. Admiral, under the circumstances that is
a good place to stop. And I applaud that last statement, and
all of your statement. Here is what we plan to do. We are going
to give Mr. Powner an opportunity for his full five-minute
statement, and then we are going to recess, go over and answer
the call at the House. There are two votes. We should be back
in about 20 minutes or so, and then we will have some limited
questioning because we have your full statements. And we have
the open dialogue back and forth and so we will follow it up
with that open dialogue and some written questions. Mr. Powner.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Powner. Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon, and
Members of the Committee, we appreciate the opportunity to
testify this morning on our GOES-R report completed at your
request. The next generation of geostationary environmental
satellites is critical for future weather forecasting and
tracking severe weather. NOAA is currently early in the
acquisition cycle as the prime contract is expected to be
awarded in 2008. Your early oversight, Mr. Chairman, has been
essential to insure that NOAA is establishing a management team
and processes that will help to avoid repeating the problems
recently experienced on NPOESS and other major satellite
acquisition
Today, as requested, I will summarize three key points
starting with the current cost and schedule estimate of GOES-R,
lessons learned from previous satellite acquisitions and
recommendations going forward. GOES-R acquisition is the fourth
series of GOES satellites that have been acquired since 1970.
As originally planned, this acquisition is to consist of four
satellites that would each contain five sensors that are
expected to significantly increase the amount and precision of
environmental data. NOAA has three vendors currently working on
preliminary designs and plans to award a contract to one of
them in May, 2008.
NASA is responsible for the sensors having awarded final
contracts on two of the five and preliminary design contracts
on the remaining three. The first GOES-R satellite is expected
to be launched in 2014, and the final one is to provide
coverage through 2028. Regarding costs, Mr. Chairman, when we
began our review for you the life cycle cost was reported at
6.2 for four satellites. During our review, we learned that the
cost could be in the $11 billion to $12 billion range, double
the original estimate. We concluded our review last month with
the future scope and direction in limbo, and a commitment from
NOAA that a decision would be made by the end of this month.
NOAA last week told us that the GOES-R life cycle cost could be
close to the original $6.2 billion range, but now it only
includes two satellites, and we dropped one of the technically
complex sensors, HES.
Although the cost per satellite is not good news, NOAA's
early attention to reducing this acquisition's technical
complexity and more fully understanding its requirements prior
to awarding the prime contract is. Our review also showed that
NOAA's management team is taking into consideration key lessons
learned from the recent NPOESS and prior GOES experiences, but
that even more attention to past problems is needed. Past
problems experienced with these acquisitions include poor cost
and schedule estimates, technical complexity that exceeds the
contractors' and government's abilities to deliver,
insufficient contract oversight, and ineffective executive
involvement.
NOAA has established plans to address many of the past
problems that focus on conducting independent cost estimates,
performing preliminary studies of key technologies, placing
resident government offices at key contractor locations and
establishing a senior executive oversight committee. However,
additional actions are needed to better position NOAA for
success. We made a number of recommendations to address these
actions that include establishing processes to insure that NOAA
has an accurate independent life cycle estimate, performing a
comprehensive review of one of the critical sensors to fully
understand the level of technical complexity and having an
independent review team assess the adequacy of key resources
needed to oversee the contractor's performance.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, NOAA's attention to requirements
and this acquisition's technical complexity prior to contract
award is commendable but recent direction still leaves our
government with an extremely costly and complex acquisition
that is essential for our nation's warning and forecasting
operations through nearly 2030. Key risks facing this program
include obtaining an accurate cost estimate and realistic
schedule, balancing the pressure to increase the level of
technical complexity to advance science with budget realities
and the need to control costs and schedules, securing adequate
systems engineering expertise to oversee contractor
performance, and having early and frequent executive level
involvement that holds both contractor and government personnel
accountable.
There is also additional risk in that NOAA is for the first
time responsible for managing a satellite acquisition instead
of NASA. Given this, it will be important to leverage NASA's
expertise and to aggressively and continuously manage the risks
that always seem to plague these large satellite acquisitions.
This concludes my statement. Chairman Boehlert, thank you for
your many years of service to our nation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
Prepared Statement of David A. Powner
GEOSTATIONARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITES
Additional Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons Learned from Other
Satellite Programs
Why GAO Did This Study
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) plans to
procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental
satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental
Satellites-R series (GOES-R). This new series is considered critical to
the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required
for weather forecasting through the year 2028.
GAO was asked to summarize and update its report previously issued
to the Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards--
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in
Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO-06-993
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). This report (1) determines the
status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement, and (2)
identifies and evaluates the actions that the program management team
is taking to ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other
satellite programs are not repeated.
What GAO Recommends
In our report, we make recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce
to improve NOAA's ability to effectively manage the GOES-R procurement.
In written comments, the Department of Commerce agreed with the
recommendations and identified plans for implementing them.
What GAO Found
At the time of our review, NOAA was nearing the end of the
preliminary design phase of its GOES-R system--which was estimated to
cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for
launch in 2012. It expected to award a contract in August 2007 to
develop this system. However, recent analyses of the GOES-R program
cost--which in May 2006 the program office estimated could reach $11.4
billion--have led the agency to consider reducing the scope of
requirements for the satellite series. Since our report was issued,
NOAA officials told GAO that the agency has made a decision to reduce
the scope of the program to a minimum of two satellites and to reduce
the complexity of the program by canceling a technically complex
instrument.
NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past
satellite programs, but more remains to be done. Prior satellite
programs--including a prior GOES series, a polar-orbiting environmental
satellite series, and various military satellite programs--often
experienced technical challenges, cost overruns, and schedule delays.
Key lessons from these programs include the need to (1) establish
realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical
readiness of the system's components prior to key decisions, (3)
provide sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and
(4) perform adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission
success. NOAA has established plans to address these lessons by
conducting independent cost estimates, performing preliminary studies
of key technologies, placing resident government offices at key
contractor locations, and establishing a senior executive oversight
committee. However, many steps remain to fully address these lessons
(see table). Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an
increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost,
schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past
procurements.
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on
the planned Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R (GOES-
R) program. The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of
satellites which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful
lives in approximately 2012. This new series is expected to mark the
first major technological advance in GOES instrumentation since 1994.
It is also considered critical to the United States' ability to
maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting
through the year 2028.
As requested, our testimony summarizes and updates a report we
previously issued to your subcommittee that (1) determines the status
of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement, and (2) identifies and
evaluates the actions that the program management team is taking to
ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other satellite
programs are not repeated.\1\ In preparing for this testimony, we
relied on our work supporting the accompanying report. That report
contains a detailed overview of our scope and methodology. All the work
on which this testimony is based was performed in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps
Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs,
GAO-06-993 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Results in Brief
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is
nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R system,
which was initially estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to
have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. At the time of our
review, NOAA had issued contracts for the preliminary design of the
overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expected to award a contract
to one of these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. In
addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing new
instruments, NOAA issued contracts for the early development of two
instruments and for the preliminary designs of three other instruments.
The agency plans to turn these instrument contracts over to the vendor
that is awarded the contract for the overall GOES-R program. However,
recent analyses of the GOES-R program cost--which in May 2006 the
program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion--have led the agency
to consider reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite
series. At the time of our review, NOAA officials estimated that a
decision on the future scope and direction of the program could be made
by the end of September 2006. Since then, NOAA officials told us that
the agency has made a decision to reduce the scope and complexity of
the GOES-R program by reducing the number of satellites and canceling a
technically complex instrument.
NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past
satellite programs, but more remains to be done. Prior satellite
programs--including a prior GOES series, a polar-orbiting environmental
satellite series, and various military satellite programs--often
experience technical challenges, cost overruns, and schedule delays.
Key lessons from these programs include the need to (1) establish
realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical
readiness of the system's components prior to key decisions, (3)
provide sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and
(4) perform adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission
success. NOAA has established plans to address these lessons by
conducting independent cost estimates, performing preliminary studies
of key technologies, placing resident government offices at key
contractor locations, and establishing a senior executive oversight
committee. However, many steps remain to fully address these lessons.
Specifically, NOAA has not yet developed a process to evaluate and
reconcile the independent and government cost estimates. In addition,
NOAA has not yet determined how it will ensure that a sufficient level
of technical maturity will be achieved in time for an upcoming decision
milestone, nor has it determined the appropriate level of resources it
needs to adequately track and oversee the program using earned value
management.\2\ Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an
increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost,
schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past
procurements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Earned value management is a method that compares the value of
work accomplished during a given period with that of the work expected
in that period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To improve NOAA's ability to effectively manage the GOES-R
procurement, in our accompanying report,\3\ we made recommendations to
the Secretary of Commerce to direct its NOAA Program Management Council
to establish a process for objectively evaluating and reconciling the
government and independent life cycle cost estimates once the program
requirements are finalized; to establish a team of system engineering
experts to perform a comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline
Imager instrument to determine the level of technical maturity achieved
on the instrument before moving the instrument into production; and to
seek assistance in determining the appropriate levels of resources
needed at the program office to adequately track and oversee the
contractor's earned value management data. In written comments, the
Department of Commerce agreed with our recommendations and provided
information on its plans to implement our recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO-06-993.
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Background
Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting environmental
satellites have been used by the United States to provide
meteorological data for weather observation, research, and forecasting.
NOAA's National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service
(NESDIS) is responsible for managing the civilian geostationary and
polar-orbiting satellite systems as two separate programs, called GOES
and the Polar Operational Environmental Satellites, respectively.
Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth
in a relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain
a constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in
space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily
focused on the United States (see Fig. 1). These satellites are
uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data to
meteorologists and their audiences on the earth's atmosphere, its
surface, cloud cover, and the space environment. They also observe the
development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes and severe
thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to reduce or
avoid major losses of property and life. Furthermore, the satellites'
ability to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of atmospheric
conditions over land and oceans is important to NOAA's weather
forecasting operations.
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To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several
satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites
every few years (see Table 1).
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Three satellites--GOES-11, GOES-12, and GOES-13--are currently in
orbit. Both GOES-11 and GOES-12 are operational satellites, while GOES-
13 is in an on-orbit storage mode. It is a backup for the other two
satellites should they experience any degradation in service. The
others in the series, GOES-O and GOES-P, are planned for launch over
the next few years.\4\ NOAA is also planning a future generation of
satellites, known as the GOES-R series, which are planned for launch
beginning in 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Satellites in a series are identified by letters of the
alphabet when they are on the ground and by numbers once they are in
orbit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously
transmits raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are
processed at these ground stations and transmitted back to the
satellite for broadcast to primary weather services both in the United
States and around the world, including the global research community.
Raw and processed data are also distributed to users via ground
stations through other communication channels, such as dedicated
private communication lines and the Internet. Figure 2 depicts a
generic data relay pattern from the geostationary satellites to the
ground stations and commercial terminals.
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GOES-R Program--An Overview
NOAA is planning for the GOES-R program to improve on the
technology of prior GOES series, in terms of both system and instrument
improvements. The system improvements are expected to fulfill more
demanding user requirements and to provide more rapid information
updates. Table 2 highlights key system-related improvements GOES-R is
expected to make to the geostationary satellite program.
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The instruments on the GOES-R series are expected to increase the
clarity and precision of the observed environmental data. NOAA plans to
acquire five different types of instruments. The program office
considered two of the instruments--the Advanced Baseline Imager and the
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite--to be most critical because they
would provide data for key weather products.\5\ Table 3 summarizes the
originally planned instruments and their expected capabilities.
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\5\ After our report was issued on September 6, 2006, NOAA
officials told us that the agency has decided to cancel its plans for
the development of the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite but expects to
explore options that will ensure continuity of data provided by the
current GOES series.
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GOES-R Program Office Structure
The program management structure for the GOES-R program differs
from past GOES programs. Prior to the GOES-R series, NOAA was
responsible for program funding, procurement of the ground elements,
and on-orbit operation of the satellites, while NASA was responsible
for the procurement of the spacecraft, instruments, and launch
services. NOAA officials stated that this approach limited the agency's
insight and management involvement in the procurement of major elements
of the system.
Alternatively, under the GOES-R management structure, NOAA has
responsibility for the procurement and operation of the overall
system--including spacecraft, instruments, and launch services. NASA is
responsible for the procurement of the individual instruments until
they are transferred to the overall GOES-R system contractor for
completion and integration onto the spacecraft. Additionally, to take
advantage of NASA's acquisition experience and technical expertise,
NOAA located the GOES-R program office at NASA's Goddard Space Flight
Center. It also designated key program management positions to be
filled with NASA personnel. These positions include the deputy system
program director role for advanced instrument and technology infusion,
the project manager for the flight portion of the system, and the
deputy project manager for the ground and operations portion of the
system. NOAA officials explained that they changed the management
structure for the GOES-R program in order to streamline oversight and
fiduciary responsibilities, but that they still plan to rely on NASA's
expertise in space system acquisitions.
Satellite Programs Often Experience Technical Problems, Cost Overruns,
and Schedule Delays
Satellite programs are often technically complex and risky
undertakings, and as a result, they often experience technical
problems, cost overruns, and schedule delays. We and others have
reported on a historical pattern of repeated missteps in the
procurement of major satellite systems, including the National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), the GOES
I-M series, the Space Based Infrared System High Program (SBIRS-High),
and the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite System (AEHF).\6\
Table 4 lists key problems experienced with these programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Space System Acquisition Risks and
Keys to Addressing Them, GAO-06-776R (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2006);
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases
Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, GAO-06-573T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and
Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, GAO-06-
249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005); Polar-orbiting Environmental
Satellites: Information on Program Cost and Schedule Changes, GAO-04-
1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004); Defense Acquisitions: Despite
Restructuring, SBIRS High Program Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule
Overruns, GAO-04-48 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2003); Military Space
Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related
Acquisitions, GAO-03-825R (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2003); Defense
Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, GAO-03-476
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003); Weather Satellites: Action Needed to
Resolve Status of the U.S. Geostationary Satellite Program, GAO/NSIAD-
91-252 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1991). Defense Science Board/Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force, Report on the
Acquisition of National Security Space Programs (May 2003).
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GOES-R Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System Requirements
and Cost Estimates Are Changing
At the time of our review, NOAA was nearing the end of the
preliminary design phase on its GOES-R program and planned to award a
contract for the system's development in August 2007. However, because
of concerns with potential cost growth, NOAA's plans for the GOES-R
procurement are changing. To date, NOAA has issued contracts for the
preliminary design of the overall GOES-R system to three vendors and
expects to award a contract to one of these vendors to develop the
system. In addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing new
instruments, NASA has issued contracts for the early development of two
instruments and for the preliminary designs of three other
instruments.\7\ The agency plans to award these contracts and then turn
them over to the contractor responsible for the overall GOES-R program.
However, this approach is under review and NOAA may wait until the
instruments are fully developed before turning them over to the system
contractor. Table 5 provides a summary of the status of contracts for
the GOES-R program.
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\7\ The development contract for the Space Environmental In-Situ
Suite instrument was issued after we completed our review.
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According to program documentation provided to the Office of
Management and Budget in 2005, the official life cycle cost estimate
for GOES-R was approximately $6.2 billion (see Table 6). However,
program officials reported that this estimate was over two years old
and under review.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
At the time of our review, NOAA was planning to launch the first
GOES-R series satellite in September 2012.\8\ The development of the
schedule for launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that
the satellites be available to back up the last remaining GOES
satellites (GOES-O and GOES-P) should anything go wrong during the
planned launches of these satellites. Table 7 provides a summary of the
planned launch schedule for the originally planned GOES-R series.
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\8\ After our report was issued on September 6, 2006, NOAA
officials told us that the planned launch schedule was being delayed.
The expected launch of the first GOES-R series satellite is now planned
for December 2014.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
However, NOAA's plans for the GOES-R procurement are changing
because of concerns with potential cost growth. Given its experiences
with cost growth on the NPOESS acquisition, NOAA asked program
officials to recalculate the total cost of the estimated $6.2 billion
GOES-R program. In May 2006, program officials estimated that the life
cycle cost could reach $11.4 billion. The agency then requested that
the program identify options for reducing the scope of requirements for
the satellite series. Program officials reported that there were over
10 viable options under consideration, including options for removing
one or more of the planned instruments. The program office also
reevaluated its planned acquisition schedule based on the potential
program options. Specifically, program officials stated that if there
was a decision to make a major change in system requirements, they
would likely extend the preliminary design phase, delay the decision to
proceed into the development and production phase, and delay the
contract award date. At the time of our review, NOAA officials
estimated that a decision on the future scope and direction of the
program could be made by the end of September 2006.
Recent NOAA Decision on the Direction and Scope of the GOES-R Program
In mid-September 2006, NOAA officials reported that a decision on
the future scope and direction of GOES-R had been made--and involved a
reduction in the number of satellites and in planned program
capabilities, a revised life cycle cost estimate, and the delay of key
programmatic milestones. Specifically, NOAA reduced the minimum number
of satellites to two. In addition, plans for developing the
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite--which was once considered a critical
instrument by the agency--were canceled. Instead, the program office is
exploring options that will ensure continuity of sounding data
currently provided by the current GOES series.\9\ NOAA officials
reported that the cost of the restructured program is not known, but
some anticipate it will be close to the original program estimate of
$6.2 billion. The contract award for the GOES-R system has been pushed
out to May 2008. Finally, the planned launch date of the first
satellite in the GOES-R series has been delayed until December 2014.
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\9\ The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was intended to be the
successor to the sounder instrument on-board the current GOES series.
The sounder measures radiated energy at different depths (altitudes)
and also records surface and cloud-top temperatures and ozone
distribution.
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The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Past Lessons
Learned, But Significant Actions Remain
NOAA has taken steps to apply lessons learned from problems
encountered on other satellite programs to the GOES-R procurement. Key
lessons include (1) establishing realistic cost and schedule estimates,
(2) ensuring sufficient technical readiness of the system's components
prior to key decisions, (3) providing sufficient management at
government and contractor levels, and (4) performing adequate senior
executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA has established
plans designed to mitigate the problems faced in past acquisitions;
however, many activities remain to fully address these lessons. Until
it completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the
GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and
performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements.
Efforts to Improve Reliability of Cost and Schedule Estimates are Under
Way, But Key Steps Remain in Reconciling Cost
Estimates
We and others have reported that space system acquisitions are
strongly biased to produce unrealistically low cost and schedule
estimates in the acquisition process.\10\ Our past work on military
space acquisitions has indicated that during program formulation, the
competition to win funding is intense and has led program sponsors to
minimize their program cost estimates. NOAA programs face similar
unrealistic estimates. For example, the total development cost of the
GOES I-M acquisition was over three times greater than planned,
escalating from $640 million to $2 billion. Additionally, the delivery
of the first satellite was delayed by five years.
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\10\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and
Investment Planning Needed to Address Continuing Problems, GAO-05-891T
(Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005). Defense Science Board/Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force, Report on the Acquisition
of National Security Space Programs (May 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOAA has several efforts under way to improve the reliability of
its cost and schedule estimates for the GOES-R program. NOAA's Chief
Financial Officer has contracted with a cost-estimating firm to
complete an independent cost estimate, while the GOES-R program office
has hired a support contractor to assist with its internal program cost
estimating. The program office is re-assessing its estimates based on
preliminary information from the three vendors contracted to develop
preliminary designs for the overall GOES-R system. Once the program
office and independent cost estimates are completed, program officials
intend to compare them and to develop a revised programmatic cost
estimate that will be used in its decision on whether to proceed into
system development and production. In addition, NOAA has planned for an
independent review team--consisting of former senior industry and
government space acquisition experts--to provide an assessment of the
program office and independent cost estimates for this decision
milestone. To improve its schedule reliability, the program office is
currently conducting a schedule risk analysis in order to estimate the
amount of adequate reserve funds and schedule margin needed to deal
with unexpected problems and setbacks. Finally, the NOAA Observing
System Council\11\ submitted a prioritized list of GOES-R system
requirements to the Commerce Under Secretary for approval. This list is
expected to allow the program office to act quickly in deleting lower
priority requirements in the event of severe technical challenges or
shifting funding streams.
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\11\ NOAA's Observing System Council is the principal advisory
council for NOAA's Earth observation and data management activities. It
includes members from each NOAA line office, other relevant councils,
and program offices. The Assistant Administrator for Satellite and
Information Services and the Assistant Administrator for Weather
Services serve as the co-chairs of the council.
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While NOAA acknowledges the need to establish realistic cost and
schedule estimates, several hurdles remain. As discussed earlier, the
agency was considering--during the time of our review--reducing the
requirements for the GOES-R program to mitigate the increased cost
estimates for the program. Prior to this decision, the agency's efforts
to establish realistic cost estimates could not be fully effective in
addressing this lesson. In addition, NOAA suspended the work being
performed by its independent cost estimator. Now that the program scope
and direction is being further defined, it will be important for the
agency to restart this work. Further, the agency has not yet developed
a process to evaluate and reconcile the independent and program office
cost estimates once final program decisions are made. Without this
process, the agency may lack the objectivity necessary to counter the
optimism of program sponsors and is more likely to move forward with an
unreliable estimate. Until it completes this activity, NOAA faces an
increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the cost increases
and schedule delays that have plagued past procurements.
Preliminary Studies Are Under Way, But Steps Remain in Determining
Components' Technical Maturity
Space programs often experience unforeseen technical problems in
the development of critical components as a result of having
insufficient knowledge of the components and their supporting
technologies prior to key decision points. One key decision point is
when an agency decides on whether the component is sufficiently ready
to proceed from a preliminary study phase into a development phase;
this decision point results in the award of the development contract.
Another key decision point occurs during the development phase when an
agency decides whether the component is ready to proceed from design
into production (also called the critical design review). Without
sufficient technical readiness at these milestones, agencies could
proceed into development contracts on components that are not well
understood and enter into the production phase of development with
technologies that are not yet mature.
In 1997, NOAA began preliminary studies on technologies that could
be used on the GOES-R instruments. These studies target existing
technologies and assessed how they could be expanded for GOES-R. The
program office is also conducting detailed trade-off studies on the
integrated system to improve its ability to make decisions that balance
performance, affordability, risk, and schedule. For instance, the
program office is analyzing the potential architectures for the GOES-R
constellation of satellites--the quantity and configuration of
satellites, including how the instruments will be distributed over
these satellites. These studies are expected to allow for a more mature
definition of the system specifications.
NOAA has also developed plans to have an independent review team
assess project status on an annual basis once the overall system
contract has been awarded. In particular, this team will review
technical, programmatic, and management areas; identify any outstanding
risks; and recommend corrective actions. This measure is designed to
ensure that sufficient technical readiness has been reached prior to
the critical design review milestone. The program office's ongoing
studies and plans are expected to provide greater insight into the
technical requirements for key system components and to mitigate the
risk of unforeseen problems in later acquisition phases.
However, the progress currently being made on a key instrument
currently under development--the Advanced Baseline Imager--has
experienced technical problems and could be an indication of more
problems to come in the future. These problems relate to, among other
things, the design complexity of the instrument's detectors and
electronics. As a result, the contractor is experiencing negative cost
and schedule performance trends. As of May 2006, the contractor
incurred a total cost overrun of almost $6 million with the
instrument's development only 28 percent complete. In addition, from
June 2005 to May 2006, it was unable to complete approximately $3.3
million worth of work. Unless risk mitigation actions are aggressively
pursued to reverse these trends, we project the cost overrun at
completion to be about $23 million.
While NOAA expects to make a decision on whether to move the
instrument into production (a milestone called the critical design
review) in January 2007, the contractor's current performance raises
questions as to whether the instrument designs will be sufficiently
mature by that time. Further, the agency does not have a process to
validate the level of technical maturity achieved on this instrument or
to determine whether the contractor has implemented sound management
and process engineering to ensure that the appropriate level of
technical readiness can be achieved prior to the decision milestone.
Until it does so, NOAA risks making a poor decision based on inaccurate
or insufficient information--which could lead to unforeseen technical
problems in the development of this instrument.
Efforts to Strengthen Government and Contractor Management Are Under
Way, But Significant Work on Program Controls
Remain
In the past, we have reported on poor performance in the management
of satellite acquisitions.\12\ The key drivers of poor management
included inadequate systems engineering and earned value management\13\
capabilities, unsuitable allocation of contract award fees, inadequate
levels of management reserve, and inefficient decision-making and
reporting structure within the program office.
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\12\ GAO-06-573T, GAO-06-249T, GAO/NSIAD-91-252, Defense
Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees
Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-06-66 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
19, 2005), and Weather Satellites: Cost Growth and Development Delays
Jeopardize U.S. Forecasting Ability, GAO/NSIAD-89-169 (Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 1989).
\13\ Earned value management is a method, used by DOD for several
decades, to track a contractor's progress in meeting project
deliverables. It compares the value of work accomplished during a given
period with that of the work expected in that period. Differences from
expectations are measured in both cost and schedule variances.
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NOAA has taken numerous steps to restructure its management
approach on the GOES-R procurement in an effort to improve performance
and to avoid past mistakes. These steps include:
<bullet> The program office revised its staffing profile to
provide for government staff to be located on-site at prime
contractor and key subcontractor locations.
<bullet> The program office plans to increase the number of
resident systems engineers from 31 to 54 to provide adequate
government oversight of the contractor's system engineering,
including verification and validation of engineering designs at
key decision points (such as the critical design review
milestone).
<bullet> The program office has better defined the role and
responsibilities of the program scientist, the individual who
is expected to maintain an independent voice with regard to
scientific matters and advise the program manager on related
technical issues and risks.
<bullet> The program office also intends to add three resident
specialists in earned value management to monitor contractor
cost and schedule performance.
<bullet> NOAA has work under way to develop the GOES-R
contract award fee structure and the award fee review board
that is consistent with our recent findings, the Commerce
Inspector General's findings, and other best practices, such as
designating a non-program executive as the fee-determining
official to ensure objectivity in the allocation of award fees.
<bullet> NOAA and NASA have implemented a more integrated
management approach that is designed to draw on NASA's
expertise in satellite acquisitions and increase NOAA's
involvement on all major components of the acquisition.
<bullet> The program office reported that it intended to
establish a management reserve of 25 percent consistent with
the recommendations of the Defense Science Board Report on
Acquisition of National Security Space Programs.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
Joint Task Force, Report on the Acquisition of National Security Space
Programs (May 2003).
While these steps should provide more robust government oversight
and independent analysis capabilities, more work remains to be done to
fully address this lesson. Specifically, the program office has not
determined the appropriate level of resources it needs to adequately
track and oversee the program and the planned addition of three earned
value management specialists may not be enough as acquisition
activities increase. By contrast, after its recent problems and in
response to the independent review team findings, NPOESS program
officials plan to add 10 program staff dedicated to earned value, cost,
and schedule analysis. An insufficient level of established
capabilities in earned value management places the GOES-R program
office at risk of making poor decisions based on inaccurate and
potentially misleading information. Finally, while NOAA officials
believe that assuming sole responsibility for the acquisition of GOES-R
will improve their ability to manage the program effectively, this
change also elevates NOAA's risk for mission success. Specifically,
NOAA is taking on its first major system acquisition and an increased
risk due to its lack of experience. Until it fully addresses the lesson
of ensuring an appropriate level of resources to oversee its
contractor, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will
repeat the management and contractor performance shortfalls that have
plagued past procurements.
NOAA Has Established a Senior Executive Committee to Perform Oversight
Role
We and others have reported on NOAA's significant deficiencies in
its senior executive oversight of NPOESS.\15\ The lack of timely
decisions and regular involvement of senior executive management was a
critical factor in the program's rapid cost and schedule growth.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ GAO-06-573T; Department of Commerce Office of Inspector
General, Poor Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave
NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-0001
(May 8, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOAA formed its program management council in response to the lack
of adequate senior executive oversight on NPOESS. In particular, this
council is expected to provide regular reviews and assessments of
selected NOAA programs and projects--the first of which is the GOES-R
program. The council is headed by the NOAA Deputy Undersecretary and
includes senior officials from Commerce and NASA. The council is
expected to hold meetings to discuss GOES-R program status on a monthly
basis and to approve the program's entry into subsequent acquisition
phases at key decision milestones--including contract award and
critical design reviews, among others. Since its establishment in
January 2006, the council has met regularly and has established a
mechanism for tracking action items to closure.
The establishment of the NOAA Program Management Council is a
positive action that should support the agency's senior-level
governance of the GOES-R program. In moving forward, it is important
that this council continue to meet on a regular basis and exercise
diligence in questioning the data presented to it and making difficult
decisions. In particular, it will be essential that the results of all
preliminary studies and independent assessments on technical maturity
of the system and its components be reviewed by this council so that an
informed decision can be made about the level of technical complexity
it is taking on when proceeding past these key decision milestones. In
light of the recent uncertainty regarding the future scope and cost of
the GOES-R program, the council's governance will be critical in making
those difficult decisions in a timely manner.
Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Improve NOAA's Efforts to
Implement Lessons Learned
To improve NOAA's ability to effectively manage the GOES-R
procurement, in our accompanying report,\16\ we recommended that the
Secretary direct its NOAA Program Management Council to take the
following three actions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ GAO-06-993.
<bullet> Once the scope of the program has been finalized,
establish a process for objectively evaluating and reconciling
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the government and independent life cycle cost estimates.
<bullet> Perform a comprehensive review of the Advanced
Baseline Imager, using system engineering experts, to determine
the level of technical maturity achieved on the instrument, to
assess whether the contractor has implemented sound management
and process engineering, and to assert that the technology is
sufficiently mature before moving the instrument into
production.
<bullet> Seek assistance from an independent review team to
determine the appropriate level of resources needed at the
program office to adequately track and oversee the contractor's
earned value management. Among other things, the program office
should be able to perform a comprehensive integrated baseline
review after system development contract award, provide
surveillance of contractor earned value management systems, and
perform project scheduling analyses and cost estimates.
In written comments, Commerce agreed with our recommendations and
provided information on its plans to implement our recommendations. In
particular, Commerce intends to establish a process for evaluating and
reconciling the various cost estimates and to analyze this process and
the results with an independent review team comprised of recognized
satellite acquisition experts. The agency is also planning to have this
independent review team provide assessments of the Advanced Baseline
Imager's technical maturity and the adequacy of the program
management's staffing plans.
In summary, the procurement of the next series of geostationary
environmental satellites--called the GOES-R series--is at a critical
juncture. Recent concerns about the potential for cost growth on the
GOES-R procurement have led the agency to reduce the scope of
requirements for the satellite series. According to NOAA officials, the
current plans call for acquiring two satellites and moving away from a
technically complex new instrument in favor of existing technologies.
While reducing the technical complexity of the system prior to contract
award and defining an affordable program are sound business practices,
it will be important for NOAA to balance these actions with the
agencies' long-term need for improving geostationary satellites over
time.
While NOAA is positioning itself to improve the acquisition of this
system by incorporating the lessons learned from other satellite
procurements including the need to establish realistic cost estimates,
ensure sufficient government and contractor management, and obtain
effective executive oversight, further steps remain to fully address
selected lessons and thereby mitigate program risks. Specifically, NOAA
has not yet developed a process to evaluate and reconcile the
independent and government cost estimates. In addition, NOAA has not
yet determined how it will ensure that a sufficient level of technical
maturity will be achieved in time for an upcoming decision milestone or
determined the appropriate level of resources it needs to adequately
track and oversee the program using earned value management. Moreover,
problems that are frequently experienced on major satellite
acquisitions, including insufficient technical maturity, overly
aggressive schedules, inadequate systems engineering capabilities, and
insufficient management reserve will need to be closely monitored
throughout this critical acquisition's life cycle. To NOAA's credit, it
has begun to develop plans for implementing our recommendations. These
plans include, among other things, establishing a process to evaluate
and reconcile the various cost estimates and obtaining assessments from
an independent review team on the technical maturity of a key
instrument in development and the adequacy of the program management's
staffing plans. However, until it addresses these lessons, NOAA faces
an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased
cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued
past procurements.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have at
this time.
Discussion
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. And as evidence of the high
degree of professionalism we have come to expect from GAO, you
finished exactly on the five-minute mark. And so I want to
thank you for your testimony, and I want to thank you and your
colleagues at the GAO for the outstanding work you do. Now we
are going to recess. We have for the benefit of my colleagues
three minutes and fifteen seconds to get over to the floor. We
will get back as soon as we can. Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Estimated Cost of GOES-R Program
Chairman Boehlert. We will resume. Admiral, right to you.
Based on NOAA's scrub of program requirements, what is the
estimated cost for the restructured GOES-R program? Are you
trying to stay near the original $6.2 billion estimate, and, if
so, are you sacrificing technical capability or advances to
stay within this number?
Admiral Lautenbacher. We are trying to look at a range of
options so that we can provide enough information for the
Secretary and for OMB, for the decision-makers with the
Administration, as well as Congress in oversight role to insure
that we have the best program that is technologically risk--
levels of risk that we can live with, that the cost is
reasonable. We are trying to obviously look for options that
are less than the full cost of the 11--roughly $11.2 or $0.4
billion that----
Chairman Boehlert. Is it closer to $6.2 billion or are you
just giving us a broad range of $5 billion----
Admiral Lautenbacher. I am, and we are at a point where it
is hard to sit here and say that. If you ask me personally what
I am trying to do, I am trying to keep it within about seven to
nine. I would like to at least have a range in there for us to
discuss as we go through the process as to what is reasonable
based on what I know about the program now.
Chairman Boehlert. Do you have some feel of the time table
of when this analysis might be concluded?
Admiral Lautenbacher. We have to conclude this analysis in
the spring time because we expect to get the concept studies--
we have extended the contractors for three months so that we
can get more information based on the fact--based on this cost
information. Then we will do the independent cost estimates and
set up a program base line. There is no program base line for
this. And then go to the Secretary of Commerce for a decision
this summer, June to July of 2007. So that is the time frame.
Congress' Continuing Oversight Role
Chairman Boehlert. Let me ask Mr. Powner, what questions
should this committee and Congress as a whole continue to ask
about GOES-R as the program moves forward to insure it remains
on track?
Mr. Powner. Well, first of all, with that cost estimate, I
think there is a fundamental question when we start throwing
out numbers how many satellites we are considering. That is the
first thing that I think we want to get clear in terms of
whether it is four satellites, two satellites, are we at eleven
or are we at six or are we at the seven to nine range, so that
is quite unclear right now. Going forward, I think there are a
couple of things that we need to make sure. We have a number of
recommendations in our report that talks about reconciling
different cost estimates. We need a real clear independent cost
estimate that is real and that is realistic and not optimistic,
so that is the first thing.
The other thing we need going forward is to insure that we
have adequate systems engineering on this program. This is a
program that is going to compete with resources with the NPOESS
program. The NPOESS program still doesn't have that management
team build out, so that is going to be real key when we start
holding contractors' fee to the fire from a technical
perspective. One other thing to consider going forward is the
arrangement with NASA. NASA right now is responsible for the
sensors. In terms of what NASA's role is going forward that is
still being negotiated, and given NOAA's lack of experience in
acquiring these large satellite acquisitions, it would make
sense for NASA to stay on board as long as possible and help
NOAA in this endeavor.
Chairman Boehlert. Admiral, what do you say in response to
that?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I agree with everything that has been
said. I think that we should be able to do all the things that
he has asked and----
Chairman Boehlert. So the two of you are on the same wave
length?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I believe we are on the same wave
length, and we appreciate the independent view, and we got
another team of independent experts and we want the independent
view so that we are doing the most logical thing that we can do
to make this program come in.
Chairman Boehlert. So you will continue to let the GAO
report be a guide for you?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Oh, absolutely. Absolutely.
Chairman Boehlert. Any further recommendations, Mr. Powner,
that were not contained in your recommendations?
Mr. Powner. A couple other things to consider. If you look
at what has happened with dropping the HES satellite, you know,
historically DOD has gone to this approach where they are
moving more to an incremental development with satellites. That
is something that is very common in the technology world where
you deploy lesser chunks of functionality more quickly. That
hasn't been well accepted or associated with satellite
acquisitions because typically the acquisition cycle is so
long. But what we ought to consider is taking--we always talk
about these leaps in technology. We ought to consider smaller
steps advancing the technology, and maybe that would be more
realistic going forward.
One other thing, Mr. Chairman, I think that is important to
consider is with NOAA not having much experience leading
acquisitions in the satellite world there are critical design
reviews throughout the process that are extremely important
when we go from preliminary design to development or from
development into production modes, and it would be very
important that there is clear criteria that they follow at all
those key meetings and if that is done with rigor, it ought to
go on in a forward basis.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. Mr. Gordon.
Risk of NOAA's Sole Procurement Responsibilities
Mr. Gordon. Mr. Powner, you and your colleagues serve a
great function for our country and Congress, and I want to
thank you. You have talked, I guess, generally about this but
just specifically what do you believe are the greatest risks
associated with NOAA's decision to take on sole procurement
responsibilities and what information should Congress and the
public have to insure that GOES program remains on track?
Mr. Powner. A couple of key risks going forward. One, I
think it starts with executive level involvement. We have a
good structure in place right now. It will get more difficult
going forward because as the bad news goes up the chain
typically that bad news isn't escalated well. So that executive
level involvement will need to be in place and we will need to
hold both government and contractor personnel accountable, so
that is one of the key risks is maintaining that involvement
throughout.
Another key area is continuing to keep the technical
complexity within the bounds that are doable. I think we have
seen that on the HES sensor but there would also be other
technical issues coming up with the other sensors. In terms of
what the public needs, what the Congress and the public needs
going forward, I think information coming out of these monthly
executive meetings, we can start with that. We have looked at
some of that information. There is clear identification of
risks, what is being done to mitigate those risks.
Mr. Gordon. Excuse me. Are you copied on those? Do you get
pretty much those minutes of those reviews?
Mr. Powner. Yes, we get those and as part of our reviews we
request those and get those key minutes.
Mr. Gordon. Is it pretty much the same time or is it--how
much lag time?
Mr. Powner. Usually there is some lag time but it differs.
I mean if we look at the NPOESS program, we actually get
invited now to those executive meetings where we are in
attendance and that is a step in the right direction where we
get timely information that we share with your staff.
Price Estimates
Mr. Gordon. And we talked a little bit earlier about NPOESS
and since you got an understanding in this area, I am a little
skeptical of the estimate of the $11.4 billion. What is your
feeling on that number now?
Mr. Powner. We have very little details behind the 11.4. I
think these numbers that are being thrown out, the 6.2, the
11.4, the seven to nine, I mean there are rough order of
magnitudes right now, and we don't have detailed information
behind those so we don't have great confidence in those
numbers.
Mr. Gordon. Again, thank you for your service.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Gutknecht.
Mr. Gutknecht. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also serve on the
Government Reform Committee, and yesterday we had what amounted
to our seventh hearing on some of the waste and mismanagement
in terms of the contracting relative to reconstruction efforts
in Iraq. And so compared to those hearings this is like a walk
in the park, but nonetheless it seems to me that this committee
has a special obligation to see that America's taxpayers are
well served and we get fair value for the amount of money that
we pay for these things. Admiral Lautenbacher, let me ask you a
fairly simple question but I hope you can give us a fairly
sophisticated answer.
Improvements Over NPOESS Program
What assurances do we have that senior executive reviews of
the GOES-R will be better than we experienced with the NPOESS
project?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I think that we have put in place
much more auditable processes, and that we have a flow of
information which is, first of all, there are duplicate
channels of information coming up. The flow is much faster. And
we have minutes, and we are having reportable types of events
so it is not trust me that we are doing this. So these will be
there for people to see. We will continue to work with the GAO,
the IG in the Department of Commerce, and to make sure that
what we have is open and available and it can be part of a
dialogue to insure that everybody is comfortable with doing the
best we can.
Mr. Gutknecht. Mr. Powner, let me come back to something,
and I think this is really about overall management.
Essentially what GAO says is that the performance of the senior
executive council was really not up to par, and maybe I am
being a little harsh on that. What assurances can you give us
that they will now figure out how to better manage this project
and the money that they are given?
Mr. Powner. Well, we clearly had those findings related to
the NPOESS acquisition. Concerning the GOES acquisition, we are
early in the acquisition cycle, and what we have seen on GOES
is there is a program management council made up of key
executives, and they report to the Admiral. The frequency of
those meetings and the makeup of that team, we have actually
been complimentary to date of the structure. I think there are
many lessons learned from the NPOESS experience so we are
actually--we have not been critical of the executive level
oversight on GOES to date.
Mr. Gutknecht. Thank you.
Mr. Schwarz. [Presiding] The gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Wu.
Mr. Wu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to enter my
original opening statement into the record.
Mr. Schwarz. Without objection.
Concerns About GOES-R and Similarities to NPOESS
Mr. Wu. And I would like to just make a few comments based
on what I have read about GOES-R, what I have been briefed on
about GOES-R, and our prior experiences with NPOESS. And the
chairman, Ranking Member Gordon, Vern Ehlers, and I, have
worked very, very hard to try to understand what happened with
NPOESS, not so much with the rear view mirror perspective of
who to blame but primarily looking out the windshield to try to
find what we are to learn from the NPOESS experience and how to
apply that to future acquisition programs. And from that
perspective, I remain concerned. I remain very, very concerned.
The GAO report and other materials seem to indicate that some
of the problems which occurred with NPOESS continue to plague
GOES-R.
Some of those very, very important ones are that the level
of risk in some of the primary instruments, to mention ABI for
one, is very, very high, that some of the instrument
development and the contracts are being let before a prime
contractor is selected, and that puts the prime contractor
sometimes in a position of accepting what people assure them
will happen with the instruments and their compatibility and
their interference with each other, and that was a problem with
NPOESS and that seems to be repeated here with GOES-R. The
primary instrument is already demonstrating cost overruns as is
the overall program, and I have yet to see a layout of what the
probability of success is, whether we are facing an S-shaped
curve, a flat curve or a very steep linear curve and whether
these cost estimates, which have already moved on us, whether
they are at the 50 percent point, at the 20 percent point or
the 80 percent point, and the determination of the shape of
that curve should guide us as to whether some of these
contracts should be fixed cost contracts or whether they should
be cost plus contracts.
And I for one have not been privy to any of that
information. To the extent that this committee has not been
briefed in to that information, I would very much like to see
that and I would like to turn it over to Mr. Powner and
Administrator Lautenbacher for your comment and answer.
Admiral Lautenbacher. You touched on a lot of subjects, and
remind me, I probably will not remember all that you brought
up, but let us talk about the GFE versus CFE. What we learned
on NPOESS, first of all, we did try to start the contracts on
the instruments in NPOESS early enough. It turns out it wasn't
early enough to meet the schedule given the technological
underestimation that was made at the time when people thought
they could build these instruments, so we have started the
instruments. Actually there is more time for the GOES-R
instruments to be developed based on NPOESS. Now the issue of
the prime contractor being able to manage this subcontractor is
a huge one, and it is a huge problem we had with NPOESS.
The concept at this point, and I won't say--it could change
because we are still in the preliminary design phase, is that
these instruments will be GFE. They will be managed by the
technical experts in NASA and they will have government
oversight clearly on them and we will not be reliant on
contractors to do all of that work which has not turned out
well in the case of NPOESS. So the concept is to go in that
direction. As far as the cost goes, these are preliminary
estimates. We are still--there is no cost overrun in the sense
there is no baseline yet and nobody is committed to spending
money that is overrunning. So we can decide that now. We are in
that debate. We are in that formative phase and we want to work
with you and provide you as much information as we can so we
can have your thoughts on that.
Mr. Wu. Well, thank you very much, and I will take as many
of your responses as you can in writing. The red light is on
already. But I am deeply concerned about this because you all
are going to try to do this on your own, and, you know, when I
stepped into medical school the dean in the medical school
said, you know, the only true reward for hard work and success
is a harder job. What he didn't say is if you screw up one
patient or damage one patient, you get to work on the President
of the United States next. Now your track record with NPOESS
has been less than dramatically successful, and you are asking
us to trust you with a larger project in essence.
I, for one, have my deep concerns at this point in time,
but I look forward to staying closely in the loop, as I am sure
you do, to closely manage this project and this committee to
exert the proper oversight.
Admiral Lautenbacher. I agree with you, and this is a big
project, and we will do everything we can to make it
successful. Thank you.
Mr. Wu. Thank you.
Mr. Schwarz. The gentleman's recollection of medical school
is a little different than my own. I spent four years trying
assiduously to avoid the dean. The gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Neugebauer.
New Technologies and Increasing Costs
Mr. Neugebauer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to back up
to Mr. Wu's testimony--the thing that I think concerns me is I
have looked back over the track record and history here is the
number of satellites keeps going down and the number--the cost
keeps going up. What kind of benchmarks, number one, are you
putting in place, and, secondly, are we trying to make this a
Cadillac when a Chevrolet will do? In other words, how much
incremental benefit are we getting of striving for these new
technologies over what the current technologies are?
Admiral Lautenbacher. We are absolutely not trying to make
it a Cadillac, and that is why we have taken a decision to
defer one of these instruments that we know now. I mean we
have--at least I am convinced that it is just too much of a
step forward without the proper development being done so we
need to go back and do more development. I am going to work
with NASA on trying to get more development. In terms of the
number of satellites, the concept is service on orbit so the
contractor can give us options as to having more satellites
that have less reliability or fewer satellites that have
greater reliability and coverage. And part of that is what we
are trying to figure out now. That is what these three teams of
contractors are doing. They are coming in with ideas on what
should the number of satellites be. Our concept is for a
coverage of a certain number of years.
We want to maintain coverage, full coverage, of the United
States for severe weather and our weather models for a certain
period of time. And so some contractors say, well, we can make
our satellites last longer and it is cheaper to us. We need to
examine that when they come in there with their proposals, so
we are not trying to predetermine the number of satellites. We
are trying to predetermine the level of service to the United
States.
Contractors Role in the GOES-R Project
Mr. Neugebauer. Well, and it does nothing--I guess the
question is as you look at the different models maybe a smaller
number, better coverage, at what point in time will there be
one contractor that will then provide all of those satellites
or are you looking at saying here are some long-term solutions,
here are short-term solutions, where are you headed?
Admiral Lautenbacher. The way this usually operates, and I
am not saying it can't be changed or shouldn't be changed
necessarily but we have a series of contractors that compete at
a preliminary design stage to come in with the best concept,
the best idea, and then we take that information, put our
independent review teams on it, cost teams, technical experts,
and come up with an RFP to come in for people to--and they will
then compete for one contract. That has been the model in
satellites that has worked most efficiently rather than having
saying two manufacturers that are producing satellites. The
business isn't big enough to do that so we end up necking down
to one contractor for a series which may last for 16 to 20
years of coverage and then you go on to the next one.
Mr. Neugebauer. And in that process, what kind of criteria
are you looking for, in other words, one, ability to develop
the product that you ordered but secondly the track record of
that company's ability to deliver that. Particularly you
deliver it within the budget constraints or the price. And I
think the question, and I didn't hear you answer that, whether
that was going to be a fixed price or if that was going to be a
cost plus.
Admiral Lautenbacher. In terms of the contract for the RFP
that we will put out have not been set yet so our contracting
experts or acquisition experts will sit down and look at it.
Previous contracts have been cost plus because of the
technological increases in this. We have had a fixed price
contract for the current series that is up there now that goes
in which we are just starting to launch. Unfortunately, the
contractor lost money on that and there was some long
discussion about how to deal with that. So we have--all of the
concepts are in play for either fixed price. A contractor won't
take on huge leaps in technology obviously for a fixed price.
My opinion again. We are still in the early part of it, but
most of the time these have been cost plus types of contracts.
Mr. Neugebauer. Mr. Powner, is that right, I'm sorry, what
is the GAO's experience in that arena of your recommendation
fixed price versus cost plus?
Mr. Powner. Well, I think it depends on the circumstances.
Whenever you can push for a fixed price, you clearly want to do
that. And there is a question here in terms of how well defined
the technical complexity is going forward on these sensors in
the program, whether it allows for a fixed price, or whether
there is some unknowns that the contractors aren't going to be
real receptive to accepting a fixed price consistent with what
the Admiral mentioned.
Mr. Neugebauer. Thank you.
Mr. Schwarz. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you. And I thank the Ranking Member and
the Chairman. And, if I may, I would like to make a special
presentation on behalf of the Members on my side of the aisle
who are here today, and with the consent of my Ranking Member.
It has been a preeminent privilege for me to serve on this
committee under the leadership of Chairman Boehlert, and I
would like to as a small expression of appreciation present to
him this certificate and it has a flag with it, and I shall
read what the certificate bears.
It reads, ``This flag was flown over the United States
Capitol and presented to the Honorable Sherwood Boehlert,
Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Science in recognition of his outstanding service to his
country and his leadership in the advancement of science and
technology.'' We do this for several reasons. One, of course,
is that he has served us well. Yesterday was his birthday, as I
understand it, his 30th for the second or third time, but also
because he is leaving us. And he has been a real uniter. I have
admired the way he and my Ranking Member, soon to be Chairman,
how they have worked well together. And I am just so honored to
be here and to do this, and so I would like to present this to
his staff member at this time in his absence. And I trust that
wherever you are, sir, you will remember that there are those
of us who will be here, and we will try to as best we can carry
on your good work, and I thank you very much. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Data Continuity
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Green yields back. Thank you, Mr. Green.
That is a very kind gesture on your part. My understanding is
that neither Mr. Inglis nor Mr. Diaz-Balart have any questions.
For the record, I don't want to imply by asking these questions
that I have any extraordinarily sophisticated knowledge of this
topic. I am on the learning curve. But for the record, I have a
couple of questions, Admiral Lautenbacher, if you don't mind.
First, what options are being explored to insure data
continuity for the cancelled sensor? Are you considering still
providing improvements over current capabilities, just maybe
not as much of an improvement as you had hoped for?
Admiral Lautenbacher. And the answer to that is yes. We
want as an absolute minimum continuation of the current
capability and data. We have begun a study of alternatives to
look to see what is possible for improvements that will be
within the ability of the technical community to deliver at a
cost and schedule. So we are doing a complex study or complete
study analysis of alternatives so we can get somewhere in
between hopefully.
Mr. Schwarz. And the next question has to do with the users
of the data that is produced. How will you involve the user
group in the analysis of alternatives for the new GOES-R
program scope? Please be specific about the process you will
use to get input from all users of geostationary satellite
data.
Admiral Lautenbacher. We have a users group which includes
all the users of geostationary satellite data. It has a leader
and a chairman, co-chairman, and a process to collect the
information. The information is reported to my deputy who then
brings it into the program office and with our program
management council. The requirements will be then bounced
against the studies that come in from the contractors, and we
will look at the best arrangement of requirements versus cost
and schedule and performance in that arena.
Mr. Schwarz. Thank you. Mr. Gordon, any further comments?
Before we bring the hearing to a close, I want to thank our
panelists, Admiral Lautenbacher, Mr. Powner, for testifying
before the committee today in the stead of Chairman Boehlert.
If there is no objection, the record will remain open for
additional statements from the Members and for answers to any
follow-up questions the Subcommittee may ask of the panelists.
Without objection, so ordered. The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. (Ret.), Under
Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. In past Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES)
procurements, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
has managed the procurement on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) behalf. In the past, for GOES-R you have stated
that NOAA will manage the procurement, but your testimony for this
hearing states that NOAA is still discussing the procurement model with
NASA.
Q1a. Does this mean you are considering returning to having NASA
manage the entire procurement?
A1a. No. Previous GOES acquisition and operations programs included
both NOAA and NASA contracts for the end-to-end space and ground
systems. For the GOES-R program, NOAA and NASA agree that we must
leverage the unique expertise of each organization. We are also in
general agreement that the chosen management approach must include a
stronger NOAA system program management role than in prior GOES
procurements. However, as part of managing program risks, the
acquisition strategy is one of the things being discussed with NASA and
reviewed by our Independent Review Team.
Q1b. What options are you reviewing concerning the assignment of
specific tasks to NOAA and NASA?
A1b. NOAA and NASA have agreed in principle on a framework in which
NOAA retains overall program management authority. As noted in our
testimony, the spacecraft instruments will now be treated as Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) and NASA will continue to manage those
procurements. The options under consideration with NASA and the
Independent Review Team involve management structure and acquisition
strategy. Any recommendations resulting from this process will need to
be reviewed by NOAA senior management, the Department, and NASA policy
officials before any decisions are made.
Q1c. When do you expect the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between
the agencies to be completed and signed?
A1c. We are working to get the Interagency Agreement in place as soon
as possible.
Q1d. If the details of the MOU are already generally in place, please
clarify the relationship between NOAA and NASA with regard to the GOES-
R procurement by specifically explaining each agency's responsibility
for each component of the program, including the overall procurement,
and provide specific details regarding the proposed MOU between the
agencies that will govern the relationship.
A1d. The proposed MOU will be signed by the NOAA Deputy Under Secretary
and the NASA Deputy Administrator and will govern all managerial and
acquisition aspects of the NOAA/NASA GOES-R relationship. Its content
is very similar in scope to NOAA/NASA MOUs governing the current NOAA/
NASA relationship for existing operational environmental satellite
programs.
Specific roles and responsibilities of NOAA and NASA will be
delineated and formally documented. While specific details are being
negotiated, it is agreed that NOAA will provide the overall System
Program Director (SPD), who will be responsible for overall program
management. NASA will provide key project leads supporting the SPD. The
MOU outlines funding responsibilities, agreement on payment of NASA
administrative fees, and in-kind provisions such as sufficient office
space at the Goddard Spaceflight Center for the GOES-R program office.
In addition to the MOU, NOAA and NASA will complete lower-level
management plans that will implement the MOU.
Q2. Did you ask for feedback from users or contractors prior to making
the decision not to let the contract for the Hyperspectral
Environmental Suite (HES)? If so, what was the process and timeline for
soliciting feedback from users or contractors? What specific reaction
to the decision, if any, did you receive from the users and
contractors?
A2. The process we used to address the GOES-R affordability issue this
spring and summer included user representation at every step.
Government users were represented on the NOAA/NASA Team that developed
and analyzed the baseline program and possible alternatives. The review
process for the results of the Team effort included the GOES-R
Operational Requirements Working Group (GORWG) and NOAA Observing
Systems Council (NOSC). Contractor data regarding the technical risks
and costs of HES and reduced capability alternatives, such as the
removal of the coastal waters requirements, was utilized in the
assessment of the costs and benefits of the GOES-R alternatives.
The users strongly endorsed having advanced sounding capabilities
like HES but also endorsed the decisions regarding HES in the context
of the GOES-R requirements priorities, resources available, associated
risks, and the programmatic alternatives available. The contractors
were disappointed with the decision and have expressed interest in
supporting efforts to continue advanced sounding efforts.
Q3. Did you consider making minor changes to the HES requirements
instead of outright cancellation? If so, why didn't those minor changes
work to reduce the risk and expense?
A3. During the on-going HES Program Definition and Risk Reduction
(PDRR) phase a number of studies were conducted looking at ways to
reduce the cost of HES including changes and/or reductions. However,
the core requirements for the sounding and coastal waters capabilities
results in an instrument architecture with a certain size and technical
complexity. This instrument complexity along with the spacecraft
accommodations and ground processing to produce the associated products
resulted in a risk that was inconsistent with NOAA's operational
requirements.
Q4. One of the GOES-R independent review teams has been looking at HES
and is due to report to about it this fall. Also, the contractors
competing to build HES have until December 2006 to complete their
preliminary design concepts for the instrument. You made the decision
to cancel this sensor before the independent review team gave you their
final report and before the contractors completed their preliminary
design concepts for the instrument.
Q4a. When you made the decision to cancel HES, what information did
you consider with respect to cost, schedule and technical issues and
minimum user requirements?
A4a. We assessed the technical, cost and schedule risks associated with
the entire HES system, which included the instrument, spacecraft
integration and ground data processing risks. Assessment participants
included the full range of GOES-R program participants: NOAA and NASA
government personnel, the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR)
contractor teams, and in-house support contractors. We considered the
schedule for HES, which did not support the first GOES-R launch date.
Our conclusion was that the technical maturity of the HES design was
not sufficient enough to be flown on an operational spacecraft. We
retained the requirement to maintain sounding capability equivalent to
that of the present GOES spacecraft. Together with our users, we are
presently assessing alternative technical solutions to meet these
requirements. This assessment is on-going and is in the initial stages.
When completed in February 2007, it will allow NOAA to determine what
alternatives might go forward for further study. Mechanisms for
external agencies to provide input is through the GOES-R Operational
Requirements Working Group (GORWG), the NOAA Observing Systems Council
(NOSC), various NOAA Goal Teams, as well as the NOAA Cooperative
Institutes at the University of Wisconsin, Colorado State University,
and Oregon State University.
Q4b. Why didn't you wait until the independent review and the final
designs were available to make your decision about HES?
A4b. Concerns about HES technical, cost, and schedule risks became
apparent following the PDRR System Requirement Reviews (SRRs) which
occurred in the spring of 2006. Each of the three contractor teams
expressed concerns about the HES and recommended that the GOES-R
program office make a decision about HES as soon as possible. The
Independent Review Team had also begun its work at that time and had
also raised concerns about the HES risks. Subsequent work in-house and
with the contractors refined those initial concerns. We used this
information to make the decision to remove HES from GOES-R.
By making the decision in the late summer, we minimized impacts on
the PDRR contracts and were able to provide direction to the
contractors to modify their concepts to reflect the re-scoping
decisions. The timing of our decision took into account detailed
technical analysis that confirmed earlier concerns, minimized impacts
to the PDRR contracts and overall program schedule.
Q4c. Did you seek the input of this independent review team and/or the
contractors in making that decision?
A4c. Following the first two Independent Review Team reviews of the
GOES-R program, the IRT expressed concern about the HES risks and
suggested that development risks for HES exceeded those of an
operational satellite system. Concurrently, our program definition and
risk reduction (PDRR) prime contractor competitive teams had each
expressed concern about HES development risk. Both of these inputs
weighed heavily in our decision.
Q5. In your testimony you mentioned that one of the reasons for not
building HES is that it will affect the ground system. Please provide
specific examples of how HES would affect the GOES-R ground system and
why this led to your decision to not build the sensor.
A5. The magnitude and complexity of the additional software and
hardware required to produce the HES sounder and coastal waters
products was one of several factors influencing our decision to
eliminate the HES. By taking an overall systems approach to the HES
decision, we were able to make a system-level determination of HES
risks. GOES-R ground system experts determined that eliminating HES-
related algorithms and supporting computer hardware and software
accounted for an approximate 40 percent decrease in ground system
complexity. In addition to non-recurring development costs, recurring
costs which required periodic upgrade and maintenance of the ground
system were proportionally reduced.
Q6. In your testimony you stated that the GOES-R User Group meets
regularly to review the program.
Q6a. Please supply a list of members of the User Group.
A6a. The primary User Group is the GOES Operational Requirements
Working Group (GORWG); membership consists of:
<bullet> Senior Representative from primary user National
Weather Service (Chair)
<bullet> GOES-R Senior Scientist
<bullet> Senior representatives from the four Major NOAA Goal
Teams:
<bullet> Weather and Water
<bullet> Climate
<bullet> Commerce and Transportation
<bullet> Ecosystems
<bullet> Senior representatives from NOAA HQ staff elements
and Operating Branches:
<bullet> Program Planning and Integration
<bullet> Programs, Analysis, and Evaluation
The GORWG reports to the NOAA Observing Systems Council (NOSC). The
NOSC consists of:
<bullet> Assistant Administrator (AA) for Weather Services
(Co-Chair)
<bullet> Assistant Administrator for Satellite and Information
Services (Co-Chair) and senior staff members
<bullet> Senior Representatives from NOAA Line Offices and
staffs:
<bullet> Chief Information Officer
<bullet> Office of Marine and Aviation Operations
<bullet> National Marine Fisheries Service
<bullet> National Ocean Service
<bullet> National Weather Service
<bullet> Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research
<bullet> Programs, Analysis, and Evaluation
<bullet> Plans, Programs, and Integration
Q6b. How often does the User Group meet?
A6b. Currently the GORWG meets every two weeks. The NOSC meets monthly
or as necessary.
Q6c. What type of information does the User Group review?
A6c. The GORWG reviews information at all phases of the GOES-R program.
<bullet> Requirements Identification Phase: Reviews higher-
level user observational requirements for possible allocation
to geostationary satellite systems such as GOES-R.
<bullet> Program Definition and Design Risk Reduction (PDRR)
Phase: Reviews system alternatives proposed by the GOES Program
Office (GPO) to assure requirements are satisfied.
<bullet> Acquisition and Operations (A&O) Phase: Will monitor
and assess the program during manufacturing and test to assess
the ability of the program to meet requirements.
Q6d. Is there a standard procedure in place for the GOES-R program
office to seek the input of the User Group regarding possible
modifications to user requirements if the GOES-R program encounters
cost, schedule or technical problems going forward?
A6d. Yes. The primary senior management decision-making body for GOES-R
is the NOAA Program Management Council (PMC). Many of the same
organizations who have members on the NOSC, also have members on the
PMC. The NOAA Deputy Under Secretary (DUS) is the PMC chair.
GOES-R issues surfacing at the PMC meetings requiring user input
are assigned as action items to the NOSC, which evaluates all user-
specific concerns and makes a recommendation to the DUS. The DUS brings
the recommendation to the PMC for a decision. Similarly, issues arising
through the NOSC affecting GOES-R are sent to the PMC for resolution.
Q6e. Is there a process for the User Group to submit grievances about
GOES-R program decisions? If so, what is this procedure? If not, do you
think such a procedure would benefit the program?
A6e. Yes, a process exists. Users can independently raise issues about
GOES-R decisions through the GORWG and NOSC if consensus cannot be
reached at the working level. The decision authority is the NOAA
Administrator (Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere).
Q6f. Does the User Group operate under the Federal Advisory Committee
Act?
A6f. No. The NOSC and GORWG were organized by direction and authority
of the NOAA Administrator. These groups are not required to be
established under FACA since their members are all federal employees.
Q7. What has NOAA done to identify a minimum set of requirements for
Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI) and other critical sensors on GOES-R? If
you run into serious technical problems with ABI, will you consider
scaling back the requirements for the sensor? If so, do you have a
strategy choosing which requirements will be reduced or eliminated?
A7. NOAA has identified GOES-R top-level system requirements in the
GOES-R Level 1 requirements document which is presently in draft form.
Following completion of the PDRR phase of the GOES-R acquisition
program, the Deputy Under Secretary (DUS) will approve the Level 1
requirements document in its final form after NOSC formal review and
concurrence. If we consider reducing ABI requirements in the future, we
would follow the same procedures as we did for the HES, which would
result in a coordinated approach presented to the DUS for approval.
Q8. In your testimony you explained that a group of senior NOAA
officials, the NOAA Program Management Council, meets monthly to review
GOES-R.
Q8a. What kind of information does the Council review?
A8a. The NOAA Program Management Council (PMC) provides the forum for
regular review and assessment of selected NOAA programs and projects.
The PMC is a decision-making body which is chaired by the Deputy Under
Secretary.
The PMC is briefed on monthly assessments of performance versus
plan in the following areas:
<bullet> Technical Performance--actual versus planned
performance, risk identification and mitigation strategies
<bullet> Budget Performance--actual versus planned costs
(Earned value), status of funds, budget threats, budget
reserves posture
<bullet> Schedule Performance--critical path analysis, changes
since last month, schedule threats, schedule reserves posture
Additional responsibilities include:
<bullet> Reviewing proposed new activities and/or scope to
ensure risk, schedule, integration and budget impacts to
existing programs are understood and realistic
<bullet> Commissioning independent assessments as needed, and
reviewing both the results of the independent assessment and
reviewing and approving the program/project's proposed response
plan
<bullet> Recommending alternative actions, including
termination of programs/projects or activities within programs/
projects, when appropriate.
Q8b. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommends this group
review the results of all preliminary studies and independent
assessments on technical maturity of the satellite instruments. Will
the Council review those studies and assessments? If not, why not?
A8b. NOAA agreed with the GAO recommendation and noted that the PMC has
already addressed GOES-R schedule, technical and cost issues.
Instrument design and acquisition status is reviewed at every PMC.
Q9. In your testimony you say that you meet regularly with your Deputy
to discuss GOES-R. How often do these meetings occur? What materials do
you review at these meetings? For example, do you review the
independent review team reports and cost estimates, or do you review
summaries of the reports and cost estimates?
A9. The NOAA Deputy Under Secretary (DUS) is in charge of the Program
Management Council (PMC), which oversees management of the GOES-R
Program at its monthly meetings. The DUS and Under Secretary of
Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere meet weekly to discuss a range of
issues, including GOES-R. In these meetings, they discuss information
from the PMC, as well as available updated information. The Under
Secretary also holds meetings on key GOES-R related topics--such as on
information from the independent review team or regarding the
restructure of the GOES-R program--as often as necessary. The Under
Secretary has had discussions directly with Tom Young, the Chair of the
Independent Review Team, twice. Monthly satellite-related meetings are
being formalized where the Assistant Administrator for Satellite and
Information Services can brief the Under Secretary and the DUS on
current issues pertaining to NOAA's satellite programs.
Q10. In the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS) program, the critical design review (CDR) for
the Visible Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite was conducted without
building a full engineering design unit. Now GAO has expressed concern
about inadequate plans for technical review of the key GOES-R sensor,
the ABI, especially at important decision points. Will a full
engineering design unit be built prior to CDR's of the GOES-R sensors,
in particular of ABI? If not, why not and in that case what specific
steps will be taken to ensure that the CDR's are sufficiently rigorous?
A10. Yes, for GOES-R, more rigorous design reviews are already
incorporated.
Additionally, we are applying NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
(GSFC) Office of Systems Safety and Mission Assurance Systems Review
Office guidelines, and have adopted all NASA and NASA GSFC technical,
management, safety, and mission assurance processes into the GOES-R
program management structure and processes.
The decision to build an engineering development unit (EDU) is tied
to the instrument's complexity and cost. The Advanced Baseline Imager
(ABI) development contract includes a requirement for an EDU, as well
as additional engineering models of critical components. EDUs will also
be developed for each instrument in the Solar Imaging Suite (SIS) and
the Space Environment In-Situ Suite (SEISS).
Because the final instrument, the Geostationary Lightning Mapper
(GLM), is still in the formulation phase, we have not yet determined if
complexity, cost and technical risk requires an EDU.
Q11. In your testimony you say you have hired a team of independent
satellite experts to provide periodic reviews of GOES-R.
Q11a. How often will the independent team review the program? On a
regular basis or just at key decision points?
A11a. NOAA has established a GOES-R Independent Review Team (IRT)
comprised of senior industry and government space acquisition experts.
This group will support four review tasks:
1) adequacy of current activities to support GOES-R
objectives,
2) readiness of program to proceed into development phase,
3) annual progress reviews during development phase, and
4) review of major development milestones.
The IRT will meet and provide advice to support all major program
decisions. Additionally, the IRT Chairman has held one-on-one meetings
with senior Department of Commerce officials, and the Under Secretary
of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and the Deputy Under Secretary.
Q11b. What aspects of GOES-R will the independent team review--i.e.,
the entire program, specific issues or sensors?
A11b. The independent reviews will address the entire GOES-R program
and consider, as appropriate, technical, programmatic, and management
areas to highlight risks and recommend actions.
Q11c. What type of products will the independent team provide to NOAA?
A11c. The IRT will produce recommendations that will be presented to
NOAA and NASA management through their respective Program Management
Councils.
Q12. In May 2006 you testified to this committee about an Inspector
General report on NPOESS. As part of that report, NOAA is required to
develop a Corrective Action Plan about how it will implement the IG
recommendations. That plan, required by July 11, is still not complete.
When do you expect to finish the Corrective Action Plan for NPOESS and
why has it been delayed?
A12. The original action plan was transmitted from the NOAA
Administrator to the Department of Commerce Inspector General on July
7, 2006. The plan was modified and resubmitted for IG approval on
September 29, 2006. The revision was necessary to clarify details in
the action plan.
Q13. GOES-R was originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion. During the
hearing, you attributed the cost estimate growing to roughly $11
billion to (1) a $2.6 billion inflation cost, (2) $800,000 for
management reserve, and (3) $1.58 billion more for sensor development.
Also, you said that now NOAA is restructuring the program and that you
expect costs of the restructured program to be between $7-$9 billion.
Since the three growth factors (inflation, management reserves, and
complex sensor development) are likely to still be factors under the
restructured program, what, if any, cost reduction on these factors do
you expect by restructuring the program?
A13. The restructured program resulted in the elimination of the HES
and a reduction in the number of spacecraft. The reduction in
satellites, and instruments, impacted costs for ground operations and
life cycle support costs. The $11 billion figure was a preliminary
estimate for one potential system configuration. The restructuring
addresses not only configuration changes, but also the assumptions used
in the preliminary cost estimate. While inflation and management
reserve costs are likely to still be growth factors under the
restructured program, improvements in the cost assumptions could result
in reductions from the preliminary estimate.
Q14. NOAA's restructured program reduces the numbers of satellites
purchased from four to two. Since the Nation will still need those
later two satellites, isn't this exercise simply deferring the costs in
order to come up with an acceptably low cost estimate? What are the
benefits of purchasing two instead of four satellites, other than
reducing the program's overall cost?
A14. No. Given the longer on-orbit design life planned for the GOES-R
series satellites, the two satellites are designed to provide
continuous GOES operational coverage for a period comparable to that
expected of the GOES-N series with three satellites. Two is considered
a minimum number of satellites for the initial buy. The second
satellite must be in production and available in case there is a
problem with the launch of the first satellite. This approach supports
our initial acquisition needs and provides an opportunity for
performance based decisions associated with the procurement of
additional satellites.
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. NOAA had an option with the current GOES series contractor to
purchase an additional satellite--Q--in the current series.
Q1a. Why did NOAA choose not to exercise the option to build this
satellite?
A1a. The following considerations influenced NOAA's decision to not
exercise the option on the GOES-N series contract for a GOES Q
satellite:
<bullet> The GOES I-M series of satellites were lasting longer
than originally planned. NOAA wanted to delay launching the
GOES N series satellites, but given the fixed price contract
for these satellites, delaying launches would have required
renegotiating the contract with Boeing and would have increased
the costs of the satellites.
<bullet> During this same timeframe, Boeing approached the
government with an offer to upgrade the GOES N series launch
vehicles from Delta III's to the newer Delta IV's in exchange
for not exercising the GOES Q option. The switch to the larger
launch vehicle was attractive to the government--the larger
launch vehicle was able to accommodate a heavier satellite with
more fuel. The additional fuel would allow us to extend the on-
orbit life of each of the GOES N, O and P satellites by three
to four years. This would have allowed us to launch each
satellite as contracted for, but to store them longer and put
them in to operation only when they were needed--when the GOES
I series satellites were failing. Moving to the Delta IV,
although more expensive, was overall more advantageous to the
GOES program, and the on-orbit life of the satellites.
Given these considerations, NOAA decided to accept the offer to
move the GOES-N series to the larger launch vehicle in exchange for not
exercising the Q option.
Q1b. What was the incremental cost for the additional satellite?
A1b. The cost to exercise the GOES Q option in the GOES-N series
contract was $185 million. This option is no longer available to be
exercised.
Q1c. How many more years would the current GOES series have extended
had NOAA bought GOES-Q? Given the large initial cost for any new
satellite series, why shouldn't we purchase more satellites in a series
to achieve some economy of scale?
A1c. Based on a detailed technical and parametric analysis of actual
and projected spacecraft lifetime, the final spacecraft in the GOES-N
series (GOES-P) was predicted to reach its end of life in approximately
the spring of 2019. The option to purchase and launch an additional
GOES-N class spacecraft would provide an additional five years of
design life, but since there are two operational spacecraft at a time
it would extend the projected end of the GOES-N class constellation
lifetime only slightly more than two years, requiring a GOES-R launch
readiness date of April 2016. In addition, extending the GOES-N series
by exercising the option on GOES Q would have delayed the opportunity
to introduce new technology in the next series, such as the improved
imaging capability of the ABI.
Q2. Weather forecasting can be improved with improved observations and
data collection--essentially by building more advanced satellite
systems--but we can also improve weather forecasting by using the data
we already collect in new ways through improvement of our forecast
models.
Q2a. How do these different investments compare in terms of their cost
effectiveness?
A2a. Investments in geostationary satellite observations have shown
value in both numerical weather prediction and nowcasting (forecasting
based on satellite analysis and interpretation). In order to continue
with this level of improvement, new satellites with increased
capabilities are needed to meet requirements of the user community.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any study conducted to quantify
the percentage of improvements in weather forecasting expected from the
improved data (resolution, quality and speed of transmission) as
satellite technology has advanced (e.g., as we transition from the
GOES-I series to the GOES-N series).
Q2b. How much improvement in forecasting could we achieve with more
investment in data analysis and forecast modeling?
A2b. Targeted investments, as we have made over the years, have
improved forecast accuracy as reflected in our improving performance
measures. These are published annually by the Department in NOAA's
annual performance plan that is integrated with the President's Budget
submission. Much of the improvement has come from investments in human
resources to support data analysis and modeling as well as investments
in better observation systems.
Q2c. What is NOAA's estimate of improvements in weather forecasting
from the technological advancements incorporated into GOES-R?
A2c. GOES-R will provide increased and more rapid area coverage with
improved resolution and additional spectral coverage using Advanced
Baseline Imager (ABI) and provide lightning data from the GOES
Lightning Mapper (GLM). These improved capabilities provide more
frequent, accurate and timely products supporting:
<bullet> two to ten percent improvement in hurricane track
forecast
<bullet> Ability to track severe storms while simultaneously
maintaining coverage of the entire hemisphere
Q2d. How much has NOAA invested in research on model improvement
during the past decade?
A2d. During the period 1997 to 2006, NOAA invested the following in
operational weather model improvements:
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
In the FY 2007 President's Budget, NOAA investment in operational
weather model improvements is as follows:
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Q3. The development and incorporation of new sensors into an
operational system assumes some demonstration of their feasibility
through research and development programs. What is the state of these
research and development programs? Exactly how much does heritage
design inform the development of each new sensor for GOES-R?
A3. The Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI) provides significantly improved
and new capabilities and contains the majority of the GOES-R technical
risk. The technical risk for ABI derives from the specific engineering
applications of the proven space-qualified components that have flown
before. For example, the technology for critical ABI elements such as
detectors and high data rate interfaces, have been used before in space
instruments.
The Solar Environmental in Situ Suite (SEISS) and Solar Imaging
Suite (SIS) represent evolutionary extensions of prior SEISS and SIS
instruments with modest enhancements.
The GOES Lightning Mapper (GLM) is based on instruments that have
flown previously in polar-orbits. We will not be able to determine the
extent to which heritage design can be used until the completion of the
GLM formulation phase in 2007.
Q4. How are changing priorities in earth science programs at NASA
affecting NOAA's ability to improve sensor design, given NOAA's
reliance on NASA's technical support in GOES satellite development, and
the use of NASA missions to test prototype sensor performance?
A4. One benefit GOES-R received from previous NASA Earth science
missions is data from those missions incorporated into algorithms and
computer simulations in order to predict performance of GOES-R
instruments and to assess design options. In addition, NOAA and NASA
have been working together to develop a Geosynchronous Imaging Fourier
Transform Spectrometer (GIFTS) Engineering Development Unit (EDU) to
validate key technologies and algorithms for potential use in advanced
weather observing systems, including GOES-R; this GIFTS EDU activity
was intended, in part, to provide risk reduction for the GOES-R
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (HES) acquisition. While originally
designed as a full flight mission, the project had to be rescoped
following the withdrawal from the program of the U.S. Navy. A NOAA-
NASA/Langley Research Center Interagency Agreement to build and test
the GIFTS EDU was signed in late 2004. All activities associated with
the GIFTS EDU should be completed by the end of December 2006. The
first-ever Decadal Survey in Earth Science by the National Research
Council is nearing completion. When released, this decadal survey will
provide the U.S. Earth science community's priorities for the next
decade. Any impact of those priorities on the development of sensors
for geostationary operational satellites will not be known until after
the Decadal Survey is released and the resulting missions are fully
understood and integrated into NASA's long-range planning.
Q5. Your testimony stated that NOAA has decided to provide individual
sensors to the prime contractor as Government Furnished Equipment
(GFE). What are the benefits of this type of arrangement? What are the
risks associated with this type of arrangement?
A5. GOES-R instruments are being delivered to the future prime
contractor as government-furnished equipment. The dominant major
benefit is direct government visibility of instrument design status and
technical issues that would not be readily available if the prime
contractor was delivering instruments through subcontracts.
The resulting risk to the GFE approach is that the government must
possess the necessary level of expertise to perform technical
oversight. The capabilities and existing resources of the NASA Goddard
Space Flight Center to perform this function mitigate this risk.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology
Management Issues, Government Accountability Office
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. Admiral Lautenbacher's testimony indicated that NOAA has decided
to provide individual sensors to the prime contractor as Government
Furnished Equipment What are the benefits of this type of arrangement?
What are the risks of this type of arrangement?
A1. An arrangement in which critical components are provided to the
prime contractor as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) is designed to
provide the government with a better view into the development of those
components. If executed properly, this arrangement could be an
effective and efficient approach for NOAA to take and could help the
agency avoid several of the key management problems experienced on the
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS). Specifically, on the NPOESS program, the prime contractor had
the lead responsibility for overseeing subcontractors' development of
critical sensors and the government had limited insight into important
acquisition management and program control functions, including the
execution of the master schedule, earned value management system, and
independent cost estimating. A GFE arrangement could improve NOAA's
role in the timely identification and resolution of emerging technical
and schedule problems, management of reserve funds, and decision making
processes.
While the potential benefits of a GFE arrangement are significant,
there are also risks associated with this approach if the government
does not have sufficient technical capacity and skills. In particular,
NOAA needs to have adequate and effective program control capabilities
in the areas of systems engineering and earned value management in
order to effectively oversee contractor performance in the development
of the sensors.
Q2. NOAA is proposing to reduce the number of satellites in the GOES-R
series and simplify them. However, the current unofficial estimate
appears to be in the range of the original estimate for four satellites
with more advanced sensors (over $6 billion). This estimate appears to
be high for two satellites. What factors do you believe are driving the
costs of these systems up to these levels?
A2. Senior NOAA officials stated that they are unable to provide a
current unofficial estimate of the restructured GOES-R program, noting
that they need more analysis to determine this cost. Thus, the factors
that affect the cost of the system are still being determined. However,
based on discussions with the agency, we believe the original estimate
of $6.2 billion (for four satellites) was low because of optimistic
assumptions made on the technical complexity of the system's
components, including key sensors.
Q3. Your testimony included several things that NOAA still needs to do
to implement the lessons learned from other satellite programs. One of
these is that NOAA needs to determine how to ensure that a sufficient
level of technical maturity will be achieved in time for a decision
milestone. Are there particular methods, processes or other steps NOAA
should take to address this issue?
A3. Our work on lessons learned from other satellite acquisitions noted
the importance of fully understanding the technology before awarding a
contract to develop that technology, and ensuring that there has been
sufficient design work and technical maturity prior to deciding to move
the technology into production. The processes that should be taken to
ensure a sufficient amount of technical readiness\1\ include the review
of engineering hardware design, development approach, and test results
for the development phase, and the subsequent assessment of technical
maturity that has been achieved for the production phase. In moving
forward, it will be important for NOAA to ensure that the exit criteria
for key decision milestones--called the preliminary and critical design
reviews, respectively--include these processes and are clearly defined
and measurable. NOAA has taken positive steps to address this lesson by
obtaining the services of an independent review team to verify and
validate program office decisions on technical maturity. However, NOAA
should also ensure that there is effective executive oversight of what
is accomplished at key decision points. In particular, it is important
that the executive leadership exercise diligence in questioning program
office data associated with these areas.
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\1\ The GOES-R program office uses a tool known as Technology
Readiness Levels (TRL) to measure the level of technical maturity of
technologies that reside in key satellite components. The levels of
maturity range from 1 to 9 based on the demonstrated performance of
these technologies-from paper studies to proven performance on the
intended product.
Q4. One of the problems within the NPOESS program was resistance to
reducing requirements even in the face of escalating costs, schedule
slips, and serious technical problems with sensor development. Has NOAA
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set up a better decision process for addressing his type of issue?
A4. In our testimony statement, we credited NOAA with its decision to
review requirements and to restructure the scope of the program as the
GOES-R system's technical complexity became better understood. However,
we did not assess NOAA's decision process--including what analysis has
been done, which users are involved, or what alternatives were
considered leading to its decision to reduce the scope of the program--
because it was outside the scope of our review. Until this information
is available and a baselined set of validated requirements is
developed, it remains to be seen whether this is an improved decision
process.
Q5. How can we ensure that the process of reconciling the different
cost estimates for this program will be objective and result in a
realistic cost estimate for GOES-R? How confident should we be that the
cost models employed, both by the program office and by the independent
estimator, provide accurate and complete estimates given the recurring
problems with cost estimation in NOAA's previous programs?
A5. In our statement, we recommended that NOAA establish a process for
objectively evaluating and reconciling the government and independent
life cycle cost estimates once the scope of the GOES-R program has been
finalized. To ensure this process will be objective, it is important
that this process be transparent to all affected entities--from the
program office up to all oversight organizations. In addition, NOAA
should use realistic assumptions, a high confidence factor, and that
same confidence factor across all cost estimates for an even
comparison.
Given that the GOES-R system is still in the preliminary design
phase and requirements are still being finalized, the cost estimates
for this program will be somewhat imprecise. The accuracy of the cost
estimates are contingent on the cost models and the comprehensiveness
of the independent cost estimator's analysis. We plan to further
evaluate the completed cost estimates by the independent estimator and
program office in a follow-on review.
In responding to these questions, we relied on previously reported
information on GOES-R and other satellite programs, as well as agency
documentation describing GOES-R management responsibilities. We
performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards during October 2006.