<DOC>
[109th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:20711.wais]
OCTOBER 2005 STATUTORY DEADLINE FOR VISA WAIVER PROGRAM COUNTRIES TO
PRODUCE SECURE PASSPORTS: WHY IT MATTERS TO HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION,
BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 21, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-23
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
20-711 WASHINGTON : 2005
_________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free
(866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail:
Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
CHRIS CANNON, Utah MAXINE WATERS, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
RIC KELLER, Florida ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DARRELL ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE PENCE, Indiana CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
STEVE KING, Iowa
TOM FEENEY, Florida
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Philip G. Kiko, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana, Chairman
STEVE KING, Iowa SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
ELTON GALLEGLY, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia MAXINE WATERS, California
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
DARRELL ISSA, California
George Fishman, Chief Counsel
Art Arthur, Counsel
Luke Bellocchi, Full Committee Counsel
Cindy Blackston, Professional Staff
Nolan Rappaport, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
APRIL 21, 2005
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable John N. Hostettler, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Indiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims....................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims....................... 3
The Honorable Dan Lungren, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California............................................ 28
The Honorable Howard Berman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California........................................ 30
The Honorable Jeff Flake, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Arizona............................................... 31
The Honorable Louie Gohmert, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas............................................. 33
The Honorable Steve King, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Iowa.................................................. 34
The Honorable Maxine Waters, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California........................................ 40
WITNESSES
Mr. Rudi Veestraeten, Director General for Consular Affairs,
Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oral Testimony................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Ms. Elaine Dezenski, Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy and
Planning, Border and Transportation Security Directors, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Testimony................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Richard L. Skinner, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security
Oral Testimony................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. Joel F. Shaw, President and Chief Executive Officer,
BioDentity Systems Corporation
Oral Testimony................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Response to Chairman Hostettler's Question posed to Ms. Elaine
Dezenski at the hearing, submitted by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 46
Prepared Statement of the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin and
Chairman, House Judiciary Committee............................ 46
Questions for the Record submitted to the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security by Chairman John N. Hostettler............... 48
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas............. 50
Letter from the Travel Business Roundtable, Travel Industry
Association of America, and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, submitted
by the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee............................ 52
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Maxine Waters, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California........ 53
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Elton Gallegly, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Califonia......... 54
OCTOBER 2005 STATUTORY DEADLINE FOR VISA WAIVER PROGRAM COUNTRIES TO
PRODUCE SECURE PASSPORTS: WHY IT MATTERS TO HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 21, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:09 p.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John H.
Hostettler (Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Hostettler. Good afternoon. Today we meet to determine
whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is prepared
to address the October 26, 2005, deadlines mandated by law that
come into effect on that date with regard to countries in the
Visa Waiver Program.
This program allows travelers from certain designated
countries to come to the United States as temporary visitors
for business or pleasure without having to obtain a non-
immigrant visa. There are currently 27 countries participating,
and it is estimated that as many as 20 million foreign visitors
entered the U.S. under the program in 2004. Clearly, it is of
great importance to the U.S. travel and tourism industry and to
the 22 million Americans employed in that industry.
Since its creation in 1986, the program has greatly
facilitated travel to the United States from program countries.
Through reciprocal arrangements, the program also benefits
American international travelers.
The Visa Waiver Program was established on the premise that
nationals of participating countries pose little risk of being
security threats or overstaying the period of their admittance.
Rules for eligible countries include the security of the travel
documents they issue, among others, which is evaluated by the
U.S. Government to validate continued participation.
The presumption is, because of the evaluation by DHS of the
respective country's management of its travel documents, there
is no need for pre-screening by State Department consular
officers abroad. Without the exemption provided by the Visa
Waiver Program, the consular officers would need to review
documents provided by a visa applicant and interview the
applicant to determine whether he or she posed a danger or was
likely to overstay.
This premise may have been true in years past. It is not
the case today. In December 2004, a ``Review of the Use of
Stolen Passports from Visa Waiver Countries to Enter the United
States,'' issued by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG),
painted a rather frightening picture. The OIG report said that
aliens using stolen passports have little reason to fear being
caught, are usually admitted, and that has made only a small
difference whether the stolen passports were posted in the
lookout system. When the results of that report are combined
with continuing revelations of stolen blank passports, such as
the thousands stolen in France last year, it seems to me that
Congress needs to look again at DHS' security management of the
program.
The Enhanced Visa Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002 levied a series of requirements and deadlines to address
the threats from terrorism from visitors entering as tourists
and foreign students. Among these, it requires that by no later
than October 26, 2004, the governments of Visa Waiver Program
countries certify that they have programs to issue to their
nationals machine-readable passports that are tamper-resistant
and that incorporate biometric identifiers that comply with
biometric identifier standards established by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). On or after this date, any
alien applying for admission under the program must present a
passport that meets these standards, unless the passport was
issued prior to the date.
Last year, Congress acted to extend that important deadline
for 1 year, in response to a request from the Administration,
and promises by the Secretary of Homeland Security to
strengthen inspections of visa waiver country programs for
strengthening passport security.
This requirement would allow DHS inspectors at ports of
entry to determine whether a passport properly identifies its
bearer. This will combat terrorist imposters and prevent them
from defeating lookout lists on which they are posted. Second,
it will make passports harder to alter or counterfeit. Third,
in conjunction with the planned installation of scanners at
ports of entry to read the passports, DHS can track the arrival
and departure of travelers and identify those who overstay
their visas.
I would like to clarify for the record that the Border
Security Act of 2002 required only that Visa Waiver Program
countries issue passports for which the biometric identifiers
and document security standards met ICAO standards and that
were machine-readable. There was no requirement for a chip to
be placed in a passport or in a visa in that Act. Nor did the
legislative history nor any subsequent action by the Committee
on the Judiciary or any part of the body of Congress call for a
chip to become an integral part of the travel document security
required for Visa Waiver Program countries. The act addressed
the machine-readable ICAO standards that were in place at the
time of passage in 2002.
The ``chip standards'' referred to in newspaper accounts
which are effecting the delay are those established by the
European Union, to apply to its member countries. If a visa
waiver country decides to employ a chip as a security
improvement to confirm identity, then the law requires it to
comply with ICAO standards, but it is not currently a
requirement of U.S. law or of published U.S. Government rules
of the program.
Once the chip technology is refined and becomes a reliable
and proven means to improve passport security, it will be a
useful and welcome tool for port of entry inspections. But a
chip is not essential to enforcing the requirement established
by Congress. The Border Security Act required only a biometric
identifier and document security that met, once again, current
ICAO standards at that time. The European Union's efforts to
improve security are laudable, but the deadline is important to
assure the public that we're serious about border security and
about protecting against future terrorist attacks potentially
launched from Europe.
Belgium has been issuing a viable passport since 2004 that
appears to fully comply with the act's requirements. Our first
witness today will provide us with the details of Belgium's
success story.
The U.S. needs to establish specific and unambiguous
requirements for biometric identifiers on travel documents
presented by foreign governments in the Visa Waiver Program. It
is the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security to
set those requirements and notify Visa Waiver Program countries
what it is we will expect of them on October 26 of this year.
Mr. Hostettler. At this time I turn and recognize the
gentlelady from Texas, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman for holding this
hearing sufficiently in time that we can have a collective and
reasoned voice on this question, and hopefully we will have
sufficient insight from the witnesses to recognize that
although we have a responsibility for homeland security in this
Subcommittee as it relates to our responsibilities and benefit,
we also have the responsibility, I think, to keep an open
understanding of the non-immigrant program, which includes the
Visa Waiver Program, and at the same time we can acknowledge
that we have made some steps of success toward securing the
homeland. Therefore, this should allow us, although we're not
perfect, to have some latitude, some reason to the expectation
that all of the countries that are presently in the Visa Waiver
Program will meet the necessary deadline, but at the same time
that we would wish to deny them that right, longstanding allies
and friends, simply because we were not willing to extend a
deadline.
The Visa Waiver Program allows nationals from 27 countries
to enter the United States as non-immigrant visitors for
business or pleasure without first obtaining a visa from a
United States consular office. This facilitates international
travel and commerce and caseloads in consular offices. The
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002
mandated that by October 26, 2004, the Government of each VWP
country would have to certify that it had established a program
to issue machine-readable passports that are tamper-resistant
and incorporate a biometric identifier.
We extended that deadline to October 26, 2005, last year. I
think we were frugal and cautious by extending it by just a
year, not necessarily determining that it would take only a
year for them to complete their task and their assignment. The
extension was necessary to avoid potential disruption of
international travel and to provide the international community
adequate time to develop viable programs for producing a
biometrically enabled passport.
According to the State Department, only 14 of the 27 VWP
countries expect to comply with the revised deadline. Brunei,
Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom expect to come into compliance several months after the
deadline. Long delays are expected by France, Japan, Denmark,
Italy, Liechtenstein, and the Netherlands. Most of the
countries that expect to meet the deadline are small countries
that have small passport production numbers and centralized
production processes. Hooray for them. Those with large
passport production numbers are the ones who have the greatest
difficulty in meeting the deadline. Many of them, for those who
recognized some of the needs in Iraq early on, did coalesce
with this nation in Iraq. The countries include France, Japan,
Germany, and the United Kingdom, make up more than 80 percent
of the VWP travelers, and as we well know, the United Kingdom,
Great Britain, was an ally in the war in Iraq.
If the deadline is not extended, the VWP countries that
fail to meet it will lose the privilege of participating in the
program, and the nationals of those countries will need visas
to enter the United States. The State Department has estimated
that this would result in a sudden need to process millions of
additional visas which would impose a severe challenge on its
resources. I am concerned about the effect that even a
temporary disruption of the Visa Waiver Program would have on
the international tourist industry. In 2002, approximately 13
million international visitors entered the United States on the
Visa Waiver Program. They spent nearly $40 billion and
supported the jobs of hundreds of thousands of American
workers. A disruption to the Visa Waiver Program would
discourage international visitors. Many of them would choose to
travel to other international destinations.
I am particularly concerned about the effect that this
might have on the State of Texas. In the year 2000, Texas
received revenue from the international tourist industry that
totaled $3,751.3 million. This included $410.6 million in
public transportation that was $3 billion, $111 million on
automobile transportation, $1 million on lodging, and $731
million on--$1 billion on lodging and $731 million on food
services, 320 on entertainment and general trade.
Also, the technology for the biometric feature needs to be
fully developed and tested before it is put into use. I am
afraid that rushing the VWP countries into compliance could
result in passports that have unreliable biometric identifiers
which will not provide the expected increase.
Mr. Chairman, I think it is important that we hold this
hearing. I think it is important that we make the statement
that we are serious. It is equally important that we void or
make prohibitive the ability for terrorists to come on our
soil. That is the first line of defense. It is also important
that we have balance, recognize our allies, and work with our
allies to ensure that they participate in this very important
program.
As you well know, we have implemented the US-VISIT program
that collects fingerprints electronically and compares
individuals to a U.S.--to a watch list. The Advanced Passenger
Information System provides information on international
visitors before they arrive, and these efforts are augmented by
United States law enforcement and intelligence operations.
Nevertheless, I want the biometric requirement to be met as
soon as possible. I would only hope that we would extend or
look at extending these in a reasonable fashion, that we will
listen to the witnesses as they provide us insight on this
very, very important question. Security is important, and we
must do so in the current atmosphere of the 21st century with a
number of our allies and those who have been part of the
exchange in the United States in a fair and admirable way.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady.
Without objection, all Members' statements, opening
statements, will be made a part of the record, including an
opening statement by the Chairman of the Full Committee, Mr.
Sensenbrenner, who had wanted to be here today, but his
schedule overtook him, and he most definitely regrets not being
able to make it. This is an issue that is of tremendous
importance to the Chairman personally and was the subject of an
extensive hearing in the recent past in the Full Committee.
Mr. Hostettler. At this time I would like to introduce the
members of our panel.
Rudi Veestraeten was appointed Director General for
Consular Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on
December 20, 2002. Before taking up his new position, Mr.
Veestraeten served in Belgian diplomatic missions in Niamey,
Sofia, Bangkok, Nairobi, and Washington, D.C. He also held the
position of Advisor to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs
between 1997 and 1999. Mr. Veestraeten has successfully
reorganized Belgian passport issuance to improve its security.
In fact, Belgium obtained the 2003 Interpol award for the best
and most secure passport in the world. Mr. Veestraeten schooled
in Roman languages at the University of Leuven in Belgium, and
his wife, Mireille, and their two daughters live with him in
Ulbeek, Belgium. Welcome, Mr. Veestraeten.
On March 4, 2005, Elaine Dezenski was appointed Acting
Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning within the Border
and Transportation Security Directorate, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. Ms. Dezenski joined BTS from the
Transportation Security Administration. Prior to joining the
TSA, Ms. Dezenski served as a special assistant to the
Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration. Ms.
Dezenski also served as a Brookings Institution LEGIS fellow
for Congressman Sherwood Boehlert. She holds a master's degree
in public policy from Georgetown University and a bachelor's
degree in international relations from Wheaton College, Norton,
Massachusetts.
Richard Skinner is the Acting Inspector General at the
Department of Homeland Security. He has also served as the
Acting Inspector General at the Federal Emergency Management
Agency. Mr. Skinner went to FEMA in 1991 from the U.S.
Department of State where he served as the Inspector General's
representative to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Prior to that, Mr. Skinner managed the Inspector General's
International Trade Division at the U.S. Department of
Commerce. Mr. Skinner holds a B.S. degree in business
administration with an MPA degree from George Washington
University.
Joel F. Shaw is President and CEO of BioDentity Systems
Corporation. He is a recognized expert in the fields of
official documents of identity, related technology systems, and
border clearance systems. Mr. Shaw is the convener of the
International Standards Organization Working Group responsible
for development and maintenance of Standards for Machine
Readable Travel Documents. He also coordinates and provides
ISO's liaison with the International Civil Aviation
Organization.
Will the witnesses please rise to take the oath?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you. You may be seated.
Please let the record reflect that the witnesses responded
in the affirmative.
Mr. Veestraeten, please begin your testimony. We have a
light system that is for a total of about 5 minutes. Your
entire written statement will be made a part of the record. We
very much appreciate your presence here today and look forward
to your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF RUDI VEESTRAETEN, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, BELGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Mr. Veestraeten. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank
you for giving me the occasion to testify before this
Subcommittee. I presume that I have been invited because today
Belgium is the first and the only country which completed the
rollout of an ICAO-compliant electronic passport. I would like
to share with you our views and achievements.
I'm going to make some comments as a complement to the
notes I deposited earlier. I would like to apologize for any
linguistic flaws in my wording, both in the notes and before
the esteemed Subcommittee. Although I had the honor and the
pleasure to serve here in Washington, D.C., I never really
achieved the level of fluency and accuracy, but my daughters
did while staying here a couple of years ago.
However, I would very much like to highlight some aspects
of the Belgian achievements in the field of passport security.
I truly believe we did a good job as a middle-sized country,
and even better securing our national passports, after we
received the Interpol award for having realized the world's
best passport in 2003. This was, to be precise, sometime before
we decided to take our national travel document a step further
and to include the new technology of the computer chip into the
already fine passport.
First of all, I would like to refer to the note regarding
our passports, which includes technical specifications. We
wanted a solid solution, surviving genuine Belgian travelers'
behavior, and I'm confident Belgians don't behave better or
worse than other citizens. So we developed tests, including
chemical exposures to set a new standard. Our passport passed
all of these tests, of course.
Secondly, we did not only deploy a passport but also
passport readers, not only classical readers you plug into a
computer, but also a new, affordable, mobile reader. I believe
our approach based on an off-the-shelf solution is also
innovative.
The Belgian federal police, in charge of border control,
already deployed these readers in the Brussels airport, in the
port of Antwerp, and we are, of course, very much willing to
share our experience in this field with all the partners. I had
several meetings this week with my American colleagues in this
regard.
In the third place, I want to stress how much we want to
make sure that new high-tech passports do not fall in the hands
of the wrong persons. Belgium has developed over the past
decennium a quite unique system of registration of its
citizens. When I had the honor to serve in your country some
years ago, I appeared before this Congress' standing Committee
on Citizenship and Immigration on November 16, 2001, to testify
about the national identity cards and the Belgian registration
process of citizens. You might find it useful to consult that
information, which is still valid today. The system has not
changed since then.
Finally, and not least, I also wanted to make sure that
lost and stolen passport information is readily available to
all concerned. This is why we developed a new approach to this
problem. We published an Internet-based consultation tool. You
can now check a given Belgian passport number against a daily
updated list of stolen and lost documents and learn whether it
has been reported stolen or lost or not. Nothing more, nothing
less.
I brought a fresh text today to this meeting on this new
tool. The tool is still experimental, and this tool might be
improved after input by our partners.
We also offer a so-called web service to this--to our
international partners to this tool, which means that others,
like U.S. Immigration, can automate the consultation of this
online list of lost and stolen passports. This new approach has
been very well received by my American colleagues this week,
and we are also willing to share this with all countries which
are interested.
Five minutes, Mr. Chairman, is not a long time, especially
for a complex issue like passport security. I hope I made it
clear that all the aspects I mentioned above are equally
important and that my country has gone a long way to address
them all. We did not just put a chip in the passport. We did a
lot more.
Now, Belgium is not alone in this, and it is a bit odd to
see that we already have today around 170,000 ePassports in
circulation, the number growing by 40,000 each month, and by
the end of this year, Belgium alone will already have more than
half a million passports with a chip in circulation. Currently,
no country, except Belgium itself, has deployed ePassport
readers. Of course, it is essential that we all build the
capacity to read the chip.
Belgium is not alone, I said. I am wearing a special tie
today, a necktie, the tie of the Luxembourg Presidency of the
European Union. Let it be the symbol of this message: that I
truly believe that only an inclusive approach in which all
well-meaning countries are involved and accepted can lead to
better travel and passport security. With the authority of my
achievements, I want to plead for inclusion and not for
exclusion. It is not a good policy to leave countries out. We
all face the same difficulties and challenges in Europe and
outside Europe, and we can surely learn from each other.
I want to conclude on this, an appeal for inclusiveness,
for continued high standards for security, and for close
cooperation between all countries involved.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, esteemed Members of the
Committee, for this occasion to speak out.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Veestraeten follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rudi Veestraeten
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Mr. Veestraeten.
Ms. Dezenski.
TESTIMONY OF ELAINE DEZENSKI, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
POLICY AND PLANNING, BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Dezenski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Jackson Lee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. I'm
going to talk a little bit in my oral remarks about combating
illegal travel with a specific focus on lost and stolen
passports, and we'll get to a nexus with VWP as well.
First I'd like to request that my written testimony be
submitted for the record. Thank you.
Mr. Hostettler. Without objection.
Ms. Dezenski. Thank you.
Let me start by talking about the layered solution. DHS, in
cooperation with the Department of State, and many of our
international partners rely on a layered strategy to combat the
threats of illegal travel, most significantly, of course,
terrorist travel. In the air and sea environments, our approach
to this problem begins well before a foreign national arrives
in the U.S. through the transmission of advanced passenger
information, and it continues as travelers seek admission at
the border. It is completed upon exit where many foreign
nationals are or will soon be subject to biometric exit
procedures under the US-VISIT program.
At the land border, we are completing implementation of US-
VISIT entry capabilities, implementing additional systems to
verify a person's identity, exploring the use of technologies
to automatically capture arrival and departure information, and
we are developing new documentation requirements as part of our
Western Hemisphere Travel Document Initiative. So there are
many layers to this approach.
Within this layered solution, we have also worked
diligently to implement each of the IG's recommendations from
its 2004 report on lost and stolen passports. Since the
completion of that audit, DHS has taken action on each of those
recommendations--there were eight--and all are now considered
either closed or otherwise resolved. As a result of this
effort, today when State or DHS receives information on lost or
stolen passports, that information is entered into our lookout
systems within 72 hours, but normally much faster than that.
Information is primarily entered by State into their system
called CLASS, or the Consular Lookout and Support System, and
electronically transferred within an hour to the DHS
Interagency Border Inspection System, or IBIS, which is at all
of our ports of entry.
Several actions can then take place. Our border inspectors
have access to this information through IBIS at the primary
inspection point. When we find a match that individual is given
a mandatory secondary inspection. Those who attempt, knowingly
or otherwise, to enter with a lost or stolen passport are not
admitted to this country, no exceptions. And the false passport
is confiscated and sent to CBP, to our new fraudulent document
analysis. Again, no exceptions.
In addition, the National Targeting Center will analyze
this information to ensure that no one has already entered on
that lost or stolen document. If we find that someone was
admitted prior to our knowledge of that lost or stolen piece of
information, the Investigation and Customs Enforcement
Directorate initiates their investigation process immediately.
And for all cases where we have a lost or stolen passport and
there's potential of link to terrorist activity, we refer that
case to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution.
In order for the system to work, we need to obtain data
from our international partners. State and DHS rely on dual
reporting regimes to ensure that we obtain that type of
information in a timely manner. First, we work with the
international community to promote universal reporting of lost
and stolen passports through the Interpol Lost and Stolen
Document Database, thereby centralizing the way that that
information is handled. To date, the U.S. has provided over
500,000 such records on our lost and stolen data. We've
excluded personal information for the holder, but have provided
that information to help build that database. And we've
obtained agreement from our G-8 partners to utilize the
database for their information as well.
In addition, statute now requires Visa Waiver Program
countries to report lost and stolen blank passport information
to us in a more timely manner. This requirement is in addition
to the mandate that these countries begin issuing biometric
passports by October 26, 2005. While scientific and technical
challenges have contributed to slowing the implementation of
the biometric requirements, we have received significant
cooperation and moved forward on lost and stolen passport
reporting issue. How a VWP country continues to handle this
important responsibility is a critical test in our
determination if a country should remain eligible for the
program.
DHS has recently concluded its review of the VWP program as
mandated by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act of 2002, and a draft report to Congress is being prepared
and finalized for transmission to the Hill. We look forward to
briefing you further on this important effort once that report
is cleared.
As Secretaries Ridge and Powell indicated in their
testimony last year, a clearly stated goal of the international
community is to establish an integrated chip in the passport to
verify both the biometric identifier and validity. DHS and
State remain committed to this goal and more broadly to
pursuing the best possible biometric solutions that can be
adopted and utilized on an international basis.
By implementing the IG's recommendations, improving our
access and use of data, and strengthening the security features
of the passport, we are creating important obstacles to
terrorists and criminals who seek to circumvent our border
control efforts. Many challenges remain, but we look forward to
working with the Committee to ensure robust solutions are
implemented as soon as practical.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dezenski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Elaine Dezenski
Chairman Hostettler and Ranking Member Jackson Lee and other
distinguished Members, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss the actions that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
taken to address the issue of the use of lost or stolen passports for
illegal travel to the United States and minimize, if not eliminate,
related security risks. I will also provide an overview of the steps
taken to enhance the security of the Visa Waiver Program.
DHS has taken a variety of actions to address concerns raised by
the DHS Office of the Inspector General in its 2004 Report,
specifically regarding the functions of the National Targeting Center
(NTC), our efforts to detect fraudulent travel documents, and our US-
VISIT biometric screening system which helps to ``fix'' the identities
of individuals entering and departing the United States by capturing
biometric information at the time of inspection, comparing it to any
biometric identification information previously collected during the
visa issuance process and confirming it upon departure, when possible,
through US-VISIT.
layered security
DHS and DOS together have created a continuum of security measures
that begins before individuals enter the United States. Identity
verification measures begin overseas and continue upon entry and exit
from this country. This layered system, described below, includes the
secure storage of biometric and biographic data and uses travel and
identity documents to access that information for identity verification
and watchlist checks.
Advance Passenger Information (API) data transmitted by air
carriers and cruise ships is queried against the lookout databases at
the NTC prior to the travelers' arrival in the United States. The NTC
has access to additional information to assist in the analysis of the
API and identify potential lookout subjects, holders of passports
reported as lost or stolen, criminals, and other immigration violators.
In addition, biometric and biographic information is also checked
against various databases linked under US-VISIT which contain visa
issuance information, terrorist (through the Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB) and criminal watchlists, and immigration status
information through US-VISIT. That information allows a Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) Officer at the border to verify the identity of
the traveler and check terrorist, criminal, and immigration violator
watchlists.
Since January 5, 2004, 20.5 million entries have been recorded
through US-VISIT and 471 criminals and immigration violators have been
denied entry based on biometric information. On September 30, 2004, we
began enrolling nationals from Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries in
US-VISIT when they travel to the United States and on December 29,
2004, US-VISIT was rolled out to the 50 busiest land border ports of
entry.
We are also reviewing how travel documents are produced and
reviewed by foreign governments so that Consular Officers at embassies
and consulates and Border Inspectors at the ports of entry can better
detect altered and counterfeit documents, improve and expand watch
lists and how they are vetted, and explore ways to share data with our
counterparts that can help identify and thwart those attempting to use
such documents to enter the United States illegally, particularly
terrorists. Additionally, we continue to promote appropriate security
and privacy controls to protect the information contained within our
databases and on the travel documents we issue.
lost and stolen passport data
DHS, in cooperation with the Department of State (DOS),
international organizations and our allies abroad, is making strides to
address the issue of lost and stolen passports. First, here at home, as
information on lost and stolen foreign passports becomes available, DOS
and DHS' CBP personnel officers enter this information into the
government's lookout systems within 72 hours, as required by the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (EBSA) of 2002. CBP
incorporates lost and stolen passport information into its systems to
aid in the detection and interception of persons using lost and stolen
documents.
Second, across the globe, we are making headway in our efforts to
encourage governments to collect and share data on lost or stolen
passports. International border control authorities traditionally seek
timely and accurate information concerning the validity of travel
documents presented at embassies and consulates and at ports of entry.
In most cases, countries are able to recognize the misuse of their own
documents. However, because of concerns about the use of personal data,
many nations have been reluctant to share data on lost or stolen travel
documents with other governments or international agencies. Through the
efforts of the DOS and the Department of Justice, the United States has
taken the lead in providing information on lost and stolen passports,
with over 500,000 records of lost and stolen passports provided to the
Interpol's lost and stolen document database, which is available to
border authorities worldwide. Many other countries are doing the same
and efforts are under way internationally to enhance such exchanges of
information. At the June 2004 G8 Summit, G8 partners agreed to a U.S.
proposal to start providing information on lost and stolen passports to
the Interpol database by December 2004. Some European Union countries
have started providing comprehensive information on lost and stolen
passports to Interpol. We want to advance this effort beyond the G8 and
encourage all countries to submit relevant information to the Interpol
database. We are promoting a comparable initiative among the APEC
economies to develop a Regional Movement Alert System.
Similarly, on a bilateral basis, we worked with our colleagues at
DOS to exchange information with the Government of Australia on lost
and stolen passports. A bilateral agreement--the first of its kind--was
just signed to allow bilateral exchange of lost and stolen passport
information.
deterring the use of fraudulent documents
In the border and immigration enforcement arenas, biometric
identifiers are tools that help prevent the use of fraudulent
identities and travel documents. The purpose of the biometric
identifier is to verify a person's identity in order to run his/her
information against Terrorist Lookout or Watchlist data, to do a
criminal history check against extracts from the FBI's IAFIS system and
to ensure that an individual cannot apply and/or be granted benefits
under an assumed identity. Biometric visas issued by the DOS to
travelers to the United States allow one-to-one matches, to verify that
the person presenting the visa is the person who was issued the visa,
and one-to-many matches, to ensure that the bearer is not the subject
of a biometric lookout or enrolled in the system under another name.
Like the biometric visa process at time of visa issuance, US-VISIT
enrollment ``fixes'' a person's identity at the port of entry. When a
VWP traveler enrolls in US-VISIT, the person's fingerprints are
electronically linked to the passport in the US-VISIT database thus
preventing another person from fraudulently using that passport at a
port of entry with US VISIT by freezing identities at the border and
ensuring that the person is not enrolled under another name.
While advances in technology allow our dedicated and hardworking
CBP Officers to examine and validate documents presented for reentry,
that same technology also enables the perpetrators of fraud to produce,
relatively inexpensively, high-quality fraudulent documents. Forgers
and counterfeiters can produce high-quality fake birth certificates and
driver's licenses with off-the-shelf software programs and materials
that are difficult to detect without sensitive instruments and
sufficient time to examine them.
Our CBP Officers are also charged with detecting look-a-likes or
impostors who attempt to use valid documents which belong to another
person. This is one of the fastest growing phenomena in travel document
abuse. Document vendors solicit genuine, unaltered documents and match
them up with ``look-a-likes.'' DHS' Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) has developed a training program to detect impostor documents,
which it has conducted for both U.S. and foreign immigration and border
officers around the world.
national targeting center
The NTC is primarily staffed by CBP. The NTC staff consists of CBP
Officers and field analysis specialists who are experts in passenger
and cargo targeting for air, sea, and land operations in the inbound
and outbound environments. The NTC develops tactical targets--
potentially high-risk people and shipments that should be subject to
additional scrutiny by CBP personnel--and it develops these targets
from raw intelligence, trade, travel, and law enforcement data.
The NTC has access to over 20 critical anti-terrorism, border
security and law enforcement databases, including the Terrorist
Screening Data Base (TSDB) maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC), and receives strategic intelligence daily from CBP's Office of
Intelligence, our IAIP Directorate, and other law enforcement and
intelligence entities. The NTC includes representatives from ICE, the
FBI, the intelligence community, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), US-VISIT, the Department of Energy, the
Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, and the
United States Coast Guard.
NTC supports DHS field elements, here and overseas, including the
Visa Security Program, and the Immigration Advisory Program, currently
operating at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam and Warsaw, Poland, where
teams of CBP officers are deployed to work with local authorities in
preventing the onward movement of people identified as attempting to
travel using fraudulent documents or presenting a security threat to
the carrier or passengers on international flights destined to the U.S
CBP Officers at all of our ports of entry,.
During the period of heightened alert in December 2003, the NTC
played a pivotal role in analyzing advanced passenger information
system (APIS) manifests related to several international flights that
were determined to be at risk, in order to ensure that passengers on
board did not pose risks to the flights.
DHS is committed to improving the current collection of passenger
manifest information over the coming months by standardizing entry
information formats, requiring departure information, and finalizing
crew manifest requirements.
The United States and the European Commission signed an
international agreement on May 28, 2004 permitting DHS to access
passenger name record (PNR) data to be used for screening passengers.
PNR data is an essential tool allowing DHS to accomplish key goals. PNR
data helps us make a determination of whether a passenger may pose a
significant risk to the safety and security of the United States and to
fellow passengers on a plane and PNR data is essential to terrorism and
criminal investigations by allowing us to link information about known
terrorists and serious criminals to co-conspirators and others involved
in their plots, as well as to potential victims. Sometimes these links
may be developed before a person's travel, but at other times these
leads only become available days or weeks or months later. In short,
PNR data helps DHS fulfill its anti-terrorism and law enforcement
missions and allows for more efficient and timely facilitation of
travel for the vast majority of legitimate travelers to and through the
United States. At this time, CBP is receiving PNR data, which is
enabling us to link information about known terrorists.
visa waiver program
The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) currently enables citizens of 27
countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for
ninety days or less without obtaining a visa. While the VWP encourages
travel and trade, it is also an attractive means of entering the United
States for those wishing to avoid visa-security checks conducted at
U.S. consulates abroad. To mitigate the vulnerability posed by the
misuse of the VWP as of September 30, 2004, DHS began to enroll VWP
applicants in US-VISIT. This step narrowed security gaps by providing
biometric watchlist checks and identity verification for subsequent
visits to the United States.
By law, DHS, in consultation with DOS, is required to review all
participating countries periodically for continued participation in the
VWP and report to Congress. Several countries (Slovenia, Belgium,
Italy, Portugal, Uruguay, and Argentina) were reviewed by the legacy
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and two (Argentina (2002)
and Uruguay (2003)) were removed from the program. DHS, in coordination
with the Department of State, is finalizing the current reviews for the
remainder of the countries. This is the first comprehensive review of
the countries and will form the ``baseline'' for future reviews.
In addition, as DHS and DOS conduct the required reviews of
countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program, each country has
provided detailed information about lost and stolen passports, their
law enforcement response to such incidents, and efforts made to tighten
distribution and document security processes. How a country handles
this key issue will be an important factor in how DHS, working with
interagency teams, determines whether VWP countries remain eligible for
the program. These reviews are being finalized and the Report to
Congress is being prepared.
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act (EBSA) of 2002
required that, beginning on October 26, 2004, VWP countries each
certify that they have a program in place to issue to their nationals
machine-readable passports that are tamper-resistant and incorporate
biometric and document authentication identifiers that comply with
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards as a
condition of continued participation in the VWP program. The law also
required that visitors coming to the United States under the VWP
present machine-readable, tamper-resistant passports that incorporate
biometric and document authentication identifiers, if the passport is
issued on or after October 26, 2004. Furthermore, DHS is required to
install equipment and software at all ports of entry to allow biometric
comparison and authentication of these passports. Prior to the October
26, 2004, deadline, and at the request of the Administration, Congress
enacted an extension of the deadline for both VWP travelers to use
biometric passports and for the U.S. Government to install the
equipment to read the passports. The current extension deadline is
October 26, 2005.
conclusion
We have made much progress to deter the travel of individuals using
fraudulent or stolen passports and other travel document and identify
potential travel facilitators. Our colleagues at DOS have also made
great strides in developing new electronic passports that include
internationally developed technology. In addition to the initiatives
described above, we are working aggressively with our USG colleagues,
and international partners to improve standards for travel documents,
enhance aviation safety and port security, and speed the exchange of
identifying information.
I would be happy to answer any questions you have at this time.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Ms. Dezenski.
Mr. Skinner.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD L. SKINNER, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Skinner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member----
Mr. Hostettler. Could you push the button on your
microphone?
Mr. Skinner. Let's do that.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you.
Mr. Skinner. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Subcommittee, I'm pleased to be here today. I've provided the
Subcommittee with a written statement for the record. I'll
summarize it in these remarks, if I may.
In December 2004, our office issued an inspection report,
``A Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from Visa Waiver
Countries to Enter the United States.'' The Visa Waiver Program
began as a pilot program in 1986 and has evolved into a
permanent program in which 27 nations participate. The program
enables most citizens of these countries to travel to the
United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less
without obtaining a visa. From the beginning, the program
involved the balancing of security risks and benefits to
commerce, tourism, foreign relations, and the workload of the
Department of State.
Virtually all of those familiar with the Visa Waiver
Program told us that lost and stolen passports are the greatest
security problem associated with the Visa Waiver Program. In
response to these concerns, we examined all reported stolen
passports from six visa waiver countries--France, Spain,
Germany, Portugal, Belgium, and Italy--for a 5-year period,
February '98 to February 2003. There were 3,987 reported
passports stolen; some were presented 176 times at American
ports of entry.
We concluded that our country was vulnerable because of
gaps in our treatment of lost and stolen passports. To be
specific, the Department did not have a process to check lost
and stolen passport information against entry and exit
information to determine the scope of fraud. Upon receipt of a
new report that passports had been stolen, it did not check to
determine whether they had been used already to enter the
United States, nor did it have a formal procedure to notify the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement of the use of a
stolen passport in order to facilitate an effort to apprehend
the traveler.
Also, there continue to be problems with how the United
States obtains lost and stolen passport information from visa
waiver governments and the manner in which that information is
collected. In at least one foreign country that we visited,
there was uncertainty over how to report thefts of passports to
the United States.
Even when lost and stolen passports were reported to the
United States and entered into the U.S. lookout systems, they
still may be used to enter through our ports of entry or to the
U.S. It made little difference whether a passport had been
listed in a lookout or not. Travelers using stolen passports
that had not been posted to the lookout were admitted 81
percent of the time, 79 times out of 98 attempts. Travelers
using passports that had been posted to the lookout were
admitted 73 percent of the time, or 57 times out of 78
attempts. Thirty-three of these occurred after 9/11. Most
disturbing, some came from stacks of stolen passports that were
associated with events possibly linked to al Qaeda.
Some stolen passports were used multiple times to enter the
U.S., even after being posted on the lookout system. Due to the
limited data collected by inspectors at ports of entry, we were
often unable to determine the inspector's rationale for having
admitted the aliens.
We made seven recommendations to address the
vulnerabilities that we noted. The Department agreed with each
of our recommendations.
One of the most significant steps taken by the Department
is the processing of visa waiver travelers through the US-VISIT
program. This will permit additional screening, identification,
and extra control features for all travelers from visa waiver
countries.
A second and equally important concern was the ill-fated
process by which information about a country's stolen and lost
passports are reported and disseminated among other countries.
We are, therefore, pleased to learn of the Interpol plan to
consolidate and to report lost and stolen passports. This
initiative should be of great benefit when fully implemented
and when all nations participate.
Even with the completion of the corrective actions that we
recommended, the Visa Waiver Program will always pose some
security risk. The fundamental premise of the program is that
millions of people, about whom we know very little, can be
exempted from the more vigorous--or rigorous visa procedures
and permitted to enter the United States. As we said in our
Visa Waiver Program report--that was dated in--that was issued
in April 2004, ``The visa is more than a mere stamp in a
passport. It is the end result of a rigorous screening process
that the applicant must undergo before entering the United
States.'' By the end of the U.S.--or by the end of the visa
interview, the Department of State has collected and stored
considerable information about the traveler and the traveler's
planned journey. It has introduced biometric features into its
visas, shares data from its visa records with our port of entry
systems, and significantly increased the percentage of
applicants subject to a careful interview. In contrast, the
visa waiver traveler is interviewed briefly, and the passport
examined, again briefly, by an inspector who may be--or may not
be familiar with passports from the issuing country.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I'll be happy to
answer any questions you or the Committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skinner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard L. Skinner
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee:
I'm pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the findings of our December 2004 review of the use of stolen
passports from Visa Waiver countries to enter the United States and the
threat that stolen Visa Waiver Program (VWP) passports pose to that
program. More broadly, this is a threat posed to our national security
as well. Copies of the report have been provided to the Subcommittee
and are available to the public on our website.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``A Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from Visa Waiver
Countries to Enter the United States'' (OIG-05-07) December 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What did we inspect?
The VWP began in 1986. It enables most citizens from 27 countries
to travel to the United States for tourism or business purposes for 90
days or less without obtaining a visa. From the beginning, the program
involved a balancing of security risks and benefits to commerce,
tourism, foreign relations, and the workload of the Department of
State. In late 2003 and early 2004 we studied the security implications
of the visa waiver program and released a report in April 2004. Copies
of that report also have been provided to the Subcommittee and are
available to the public on our website.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``An Evaluation of the Security Implications of the Visa Waiver
Program'' (OIG-04-26) April 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virtually all those familiar with the Visa Waiver Program told us
at that time that the lost and stolen passport problem is the greatest
security vulnerability associated with it. During the course of our VWP
review we obtained documents that recorded instances in which blank,
bona fide passports from VWP countries were stolen and, as determined
from their serial numbers, later used to enter the United States,
sometimes on multiple occasions. In some instances, entry was permitted
even after the stolen passport had been posted in the lookout system.
We therefore began a subsequent inspection of the specific problem
posed by stolen VWP passports and issued a report in late December
2004.
What did the data show?
We examined all reported stolen passports from six VWP countries--
France, Spain, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, and Italy--for a 5-year
period--February 10, 1998, to February 12, 2003. There were 3,987
reported passports stolen; some were presented 176 times at Ports of
Entry (POE).
Aliens applying for admission to the United States using stolen
passports had little reason to fear being caught and usually were
admitted, even if the stolen passport had been posted previously to
CBP's lookout systems. Also, when DHS received new reports of stolen
passports, it listed the passport number into its lookout system for
future protection but did not check to determine whether a traveler had
already used any of the newly reported passports. Finally, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not have a sound procedure to
ensure that when CBP records show a successful entry using a stolen
passport, the event is referred to Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) investigators to seek out and apprehend the user.
It made little difference whether the passport had been listed in a
CBP lookout or not. Travelers using stolen passports, which had not
been posted to the lookout, were admitted 81% of the time; travelers
using stolen passports that had been posted to the lookout were
admitted 73% of the time.
With respect to travelers whose passports had already been posted
to a lookout as stolen, half were referred to ``secondary inspection''
for a more thorough examination. However, most referrals were for other
reasons. The use of a stolen passport was not a recorded basis for the
referral. Thus, after examination in secondary, half of the travelers
were permitted entry. Some passports were used successfully multiple
times to enter, despite being posted on the lookout system. We could
not determine the inspectors' rationale for admitting the aliens with
lookouts for the stolen passports. The records of the secondary
inspections often were nonexistent or so sketchy that they were not
useful.
Of the admissions on stolen passports, 33 occurred after September
11, 2001. Most disturbing, some passports that were used successfully
came from blocks of stolen passports, which were associated with events
or locations possibly linked to Al Qaeda.
DHS did not have a process to check lost and stolen passport
information against entry and exit information. Upon receipt of a new
report that passports have been stolen, CBP did not check to determine
whether they have been used to enter the United States, nor did it have
formal procedures to notify ICE of the use of a stolen passport so that
an effort may be initiated to apprehend the traveler.
We recommended that CBP:
1. Require inspectors to refer aliens to secondary inspections
when the passports are the subjects of lookouts;
2. Require that inspectors record in detail the results of the
secondary inspections and justifications for subsequent
admissions;
3. Require that a supervisor review and approve an inspector's
decision to admit an alien who was the subject of a lookout,
and that the review be recorded as part of the secondary
inspections record;
4. Initiate routine reviews of admission records to identify
prior uses of stolen passports; and,
5. Report information on the successful use of stolen
passports to enter the United States to ICE for investigation.
We recommended that ICE:
1. Develop procedures to investigate, locate, and remove from
the United States persons that have used stolen passports to
gain entry to the country and to report the outcomes of its
investigations to CBP; and,
2. Investigate the activities while in the United States of
the aliens that used certain stolen passports and determine
their current whereabouts.
CBP and ICE concurred with all of our recommendations and plan
appropriate corrective actions. While our office believes that these
actions have been undertaken, we have not performed any formal
compliance review.
One concern noted in our report is international in scope, and will
require an international solution, i.e., the ill-defined process by
which each country's stolen and lost passport information is reported
and disseminated among all the other countries. The department's
information about stolen passports is often incomplete. It's our
understanding that INTERPOL plans to expand and regularize the
reporting of lost and stolen passports. This initiative, when fully
implemented with all nations participating, should permit automatic
checking at the port of entry to determine whether the traveler is
presenting a lost or stolen passport.
Even with the completion of the corrective action we recommended,
the VWP will always pose some security risk. The fundamental premise of
the program is that millions of persons, about whom we know little, can
be exempted from DOS' ever more rigorous visa procedures and permitted
to board U.S.-bound planes. As we said in our report, ``The visa is
more than a mere stamp in a passport. It is the end result of a
rigorous screening process the bearer must undergo before travel.'' By
the end of the visa interview DOS has collected and stored considerable
information about the traveler and the traveler's planned journey. DOS
has introduced biometric features into its visas, shares data from its
visa records with DHS port of entry systems, and significantly
increased the percentage of applicants subject to a careful interview.
In contrast, the visa waiver traveler is interviewed briefly, and the
passport examined, again briefly by an inspector who may be unfamiliar
with even valid passports from the issuing country.
One of the most significant corrective actions responsive to the
concerns stated in our report is the processing of visa waiver
travelers through U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology (US-VISIT). As implemented in December 2003, US-VISIT
excluded visa waiver travelers from its scope. We strongly recommended
that visa waiver travelers be added to the US-VISIT program because of
the additional screening, identification, and exit control features it
offers. On April 21, 2004, DHS Secretary Ridge announced that BTS would
begin to process visa waiver travelers through US-VISIT by September
30, 2004.
This brings me to another pressing border security matter much in
the news recently--our land borders.
US-VISIT at the Borders
In February 2005 we released our inspection report on the
implementation of US-VISIT at land border ports of entry.\3\ The report
was written because legislation mandated the implementation of an
automated, integrated entry exit system at the 50 highest volume land
ports of entry by December 31, 2004. We reviewed efforts undertaken by
the US-VISIT Program Office to meet this deadline, develop
implementation and deployment plans, modify existing facilities,
conduct or plan pilot testing of systems and new technology, and
achieve program goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology Program at Land Border Ports of Entry''
(OIG-05-11) February 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The examination of entering travelers at land POEs presents special
problems. For one, CBP officers do not have an opportunity to prescreen
using aircraft and ship passenger manifests. At land POEs there is less
use of automation to check watch lists and other databases as part of
the screening process. Indeed, name checks are not run at all on the
vast majority of entrants. At present, travelers entering the United
States at a land Port of Entry are only processed through US-VISIT if
they enter on the basis of a visa. This is a very small percentage of
travelers. The US-VISIT enrollment at land ports of entry will include
approximately 2.7 % of the foreign visitor population. Why is this
percentage so small? There are several reasons.
Mexican Border Crossing Card (BCC) holders entering the United
States are not likely to have their entry electronically captured, nor
their identity verified. Most BCC cards are visually inspected by
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, not scanned at primary
inspection. As a result, the BCC holder's identity is not verified nor
the entry electronically recorded. BCC holders accounted for nearly
43.8% of foreign national land border crossings in FY 2002.
Visa exempt Canadians, who represent approximately 22% of foreign
national land border crossings in FY 2002, are also exempt from US-
VISIT enrollment. They are able to gain admission to the United States
by providing documents with limited information to verify their
identities. The procedure is similar to that for BCC entrants--visa-
exempt Canadians are not likely to have their entry recorded, or their
name checked against any watch list.
Lawful permanent residents (holders of green cards) represent 32%
of all foreign entrants. It is not standard procedure at a land POE to
screen their names or record their entries.
Together all of these categories of foreign entrants represent two-
thirds of the total at the land POEs; the other third are American
citizens. American names are not screened against watch lists, and
their entries are not recorded. The problem for border security is the
possibility that someone is posing as an American, who is not an
American. Detection of such imposters is weakened by the absence of
automated and biometric checks.
Thus, while US-VISIT offers potential, few travelers are actually
covered. Moreover, while US-VISIT may have met minimum statutory
requirements for implementation at land borders, it lacks the exit
component necessary to identify those who overstay the terms of their
admission.
In addition, when trying to establish an individual's identity and
determine admissibility, CBP officers currently perform queries of
multiple information technology systems, many of which employ old
technology and cannot interface. Achieving system integration becomes
particularly important at land ports because inspection time is limited
and there is no advance passenger information.
Fully implementing a comprehensive solution of integrated systems,
processes, and data for electronically tracking the pre-entry, entry,
status management, and exit of all classes of foreign national visitors
seeking admission to the United States will be a complex,
technologically challenging, and expensive project that will not be
realized for at least five to ten years.
Current Initiatives
The recently enacted Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 requires that, by January 1, 2008, all travelers must
provide evidence to establish identity and citizenship when entering
the United States. Specifically, it requires that DHS develop and
implement, as expeditiously as possible, a plan that requires a
passport or other document, or combination of documents that
sufficiently denotes the identity and citizenship for all travelers
entering the United States. This includes not only those categories of
individuals for whom documentation requirements had been waived
previously but also U.S. citizens.
This represents a bold step towards exercising better control of
our borders. As the GAO clearly documented in its unclassified
testimony GAO-03-713T ``Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United
States From Certain Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected'', and
its Limited Official Use report GAO-03-782 ``Land Border Ports of
Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the Inspections Process'',
our land borders are easily breached by imposters with phony birth
certificates and driver's licenses.
The dialogue over how to improve document integrity, to track
arrivals and departures, to employ biometric identifiers, which
biometric identifiers to rely on, and how to automate screening
transactions will continue. So will our office's monitoring of these
very important programs.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I will be pleased to
answer any questions the Subcommittee may have.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Mr. Skinner.
Mr. Shaw.
TESTIMONY OF JOEL F. SHAW, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, BIODENTITY SYSTEMS CORPORATION
Mr. Shaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you indicated in your opening remarks, I am the Convenor
of the International Standards Organization (ISO) Working Group
that is working with the International Civil Aviation
Organization. As Convenor, I'm coordinating ISO's contributions
to the realization of the new biometric passport.
Introducing a new passport, especially one integrating such
a significant number of new technologies, while conforming to a
new global standard and guaranteeing successful operation
throughout the life of that passport is a very complex
undertaking indeed. The level of complexity increases
significantly in this case because a computer chip is being
introduced into a traditional passport book, and that is being
done to ensure that the data that is being carried for
biometric identification is globally interoperable across the
entire world. Our goal in doing this is to improve facilitation
while strengthening security for international travel and
border clearance.
Governments involved in introducing the new biometric
passport have been required to contribute to the creation of an
extensive array and set of international specifications and
standards. They have had to introduce enabling legislation to
deal with the capture and processing and holding and sharing of
biometric data on their citizens. They have had to become
proficient in a range of new technologies which have been
deemed until this effort began as completely foreign to
passport fabrication. They have had to integrate a computer
chip into the passport book and introduce new machines
supporting assembly. They have had to introduce the entire
technological and process components to support the biometric
capture. And they have had to do the very same thing to ensure
that the standardized security schema is in place to protect
the data that is on that chip. And they have had to as well
introduce new processes and technologies across their entire
issuance process supporting passports.
In addition, those people that are doing inspections have
had to introduce processes and technology to realize a new
process of inspection, one offering both improved facilitation
and enhanced security.
Any nation that would undertake such renewal of its
passport and issuance operation would do so over many years.
Visa waiver nations have been asked to undertake all of this
work adopting a very challenging time line.
I cannot comment on all of the visa waiver nations, but
those that I am familiar with have chosen to deliver a new
passport that works and can be counted on to deliver the
enhanced level of security demanded by a post-9/11 world. I
think it's important to share with this Committee that the new
international standard for biometric passport provides for
deployment of a series of escalating security measures.
First, it contributes a preemptive measure in the form of
new checks that can be implemented by an issuing state to
prevent persons from securing a passport fraudulently. This is
a accomplished by using the globally standardized face
biometric technology to confirm the person renewing the
passport is the rightful holder of the previous issued passport
and to carry out lookout and fraud checks on each and every
passport applicant.
Second, it provides an immediate detection measure in the
form of a face-based lookout check that can be implemented by a
receiving state on all persons seeking entry into the state.
This new type of lookout check is not dependent on the
availability of the new biometric passport. It simply requires
the receiving state to install the face biometric capture
technology and activate a check for persons deemed to be of
concern to the state.
Third, it provides an escalating measure in the form of a
positive identity confirmation check that can be implemented by
a receiving state when persons present a new biometric passport
during border inspection. This measure increases in security
value as more and more traditional passports are converted to
the new biometric type.
Although not part of the biometric program per se, ICAO is
contributing an important fourth measure: It is working with
Interpol to create a mechanism whereby receiving states can be
informed immediately of lost and stolen passport numbers. This
will ensure that reuse of stolen traditional passports,
including blank books, can be detected immediately.
The question this Committee is being asked to consider is
whether to extend the date of the 26th of October 2005. Based
on the knowledge of the issues being faced that I'm familiar
with and the understanding of the significant benefits that
will be realized both for facilitation and security, I
encourage the Committee to recommend the following:
The date of 26 October 2005 remain unchanged, but if
exceptions are needed they should be made on an individual
case-by-case basis;
Visa waiver nations that need more time to introduce their
biometric passport be required to specify what they still need
to do to come into compliance and propose a timetable for
completing those tasks, and that extensions, if necessary, be
granted on merit;
The visa waiver privilege be continued while the country
comes into compliance;
And a far more prescriptive requirement be applied
governing immediate sharing of lost and stolen passport
information using the new computerized system established by
Interpol.
I would like to thank you for this opportunity to address
the Committee, and I'm very pleased to answer any questions you
might have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shaw follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joel Shaw
Good afternoon. My name is Joel Shaw and I am the Chief Executive
Officer of BioDentity Systems Corporation. I recognize the importance
of the issue being considered by this Committee and the impact the
outcome will have, not only for those countries designated as US Visa
Waiver Program nations, but equally, those countries that are moving to
strength their own travel document issuance process and border
controls.
I can offer this Committee a unique perspective; for in addition to
being the CEO of BioDentity I am also the Convenor of the Working Group
set up by the International Standards Organization (ISO) [headquartered
in Geneva] to work with the UN's International Civil Aviation
Organization to create international specifications and standards for
official travel documents such as passports, visas and Official
Documents of Identity. As Working Group Convenor I am coordinating
ISO's contributions towards the realization of the new biometric
passport. I am equally an experienced practitioner, having assisted the
US Customs Service create and deploy the first passport readers used
for border inspection, as well as help INS create and deploy their
first computerized entry inspection system.
Introducing a new passport, especially one integrating such a
significant number of new technologies, while conforming to a new
global standard and guaranteeing successful operation throughout the
life of the passport is a complex undertaking indeed. The level of
complexity increases significantly in this case because a computer chip
is being introduced into a traditional passport book, one that will
hold biometric details enabling deployment of machine-assisted identity
confirmation designed to improve facilitation while strengthening
security for international travel and border clearance.
Governments involved in introducing the new biometric passport have
been required to:
<bullet> Contribute to the creation of an extensive set of
specifications that will ensure that the new passport can be
read no matter where it is presented in the world;
<bullet> Introduce enabling legislation to support the
capture, use, retention and sharing of biometric data on their
citizens;
<bullet> Become proficient in a range of new technologies,
which had been deemed, until this effort began, as completely
foreign to passport fabrication;
<bullet> Integrate a computer chip into a passport book and
introduce new machines supporting assembly, while at the same
time ensuring long term durability and of course, successful
operation;
<bullet> Introduce face biometric capture, create and deploy
quality assurance standards and introduce new technology
designed to ensure the highest quality biometric sample is
recorded in the passport;
<bullet> Introduce the necessary processes and tools to
address the standardized security schema to protect the data
recorded in the computer chip;
<bullet> Introduce the necessary processes and technology to
establish a new issuance process;
And for those wishing to inspect persons presenting these new
passports,
<bullet> Introduce the necessary processes and technology to
realize a new process of inspection: one offering both improved
facilitation and enhanced security.
Any nation that would undertake such renewal of its passport and
issuance operation would do so over many years. Visa Waiver Program
nations have been asked to undertake all of this work adopting a very
challenging time line!
I can not comment on all Visa Waiver nations, but those that I am
familiar with have chosen to deliver a new passport that works and can
be counted on to deliver the enhanced level of security demanded by a
post 9/11 world. The new international standard for biometric passports
provides for deployment of a series of escalating security measures.
First, it contributes a pre-emptive measure in the form of new
checks that can implemented by an Issuing State to prevent persons from
securing a passport, or any form of travel document, fraudulently. This
is accomplished by using the globally standardized face biometric
technology to confirm the person renewing a passport as the rightful
holder of the previously issued passport, and to carry out Lookout and
Fraud Checks on each passport applicant.
Second, it provides an immediate detection measure in the form of a
face based Lookout Check that can be implemented by a Receiving State
on all persons seeking entry into the State. This new type of Lookout
Check is not dependent upon the availability of the new biometric
passport, it simply requires the Receiving State to install the face
biometric capture technology and activate a check for persons deemed to
be of concern to the State.
Third, it provides an escalating measure in the form of a positive
identity confirmation check that can be implemented by a Receiving
State when persons present a new biometric passport during border
inspection. This measure increases in security value as more and more
traditional passports are converted to the new biometric type.
Although not part of the biometric program, per se, ICAO has
contributed an important fourth measure--it is working with INTERPOL to
create a mechanism whereby Receiving States could be informed
immediately of lost and stolen passport numbers. This will ensure that
reuse of stolen traditional passports, including blank books, can be
immediately detected.
The question this Committee is being asked to consider is whether
to extend the date of 26 October 2005, and in so doing grant an
extension to those Visa Waiver Program nations that are still dealing
with their deployment challenges.
Based on an extensive knowledge of the issues being faced and an
understanding of the significant benefits that will be realized both
for facilitation and security when this program is successfully
completed, I encourage the Committee to recommend:
<bullet> The date of 26 October 2005 remain unchanged, but if
exceptions are needed they should be made on an individual case
by case basis;
<bullet> Visa Waiver Program nations that need more time to
introduce their biometric passport be required to specify what
they still need to do to come into compliance and propose a
time table for completing those tasks, with extensions to the
date being granted based on merit;
<bullet> The Visa Waiver privilege be continued while the
country with the exception comes into compliance; and
<bullet> A more prescriptive requirement be applied governing
immediate sharing of lost and stolen passport information using
the new computerized system being established by INTERPOL.
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to address the
Committee. Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions the
committee might have.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Mr. Shaw.
At this time we will turn to questions from Members of the
Subcommittee. First of all, Ms. Dezenski, in your oral
testimony, I believe you stated this, but just to clarify. The
Department of Homeland Security has incorporated many of, if
not all, the recommendations of the IG's report. Does one of
those include a formal process of informing ICE when a
fraudulent passport has been used at a port of entry but the
individual has made their way into the country because we did
not have notification that their passport was lost or stolen
until after the point?
Ms. Dezenski. Yes, each of the recommendations that we
received from the IG have been addressed, including that one,
so there are formal processes now for those referrals. We've
strengthened both in terms of what do we do if we get a lookout
hit and we have to deal with that person at secondary, and what
do we do if that information on lost and stolen passports comes
after the fact and we do a check and realize that that document
may have been used.
Mr. Hostettler. Do you know how many times you've had to do
that, how many times you've had to inform ICE of that?
Ms. Dezenski. That's a great question. I don't have that
number, but we can follow up and get back to you.
Mr. Hostettler. If you would please, for the record.
Mr. Skinner, how many stolen passports have been found in
the hands of terrorists or potential terrorists trying to enter
the country? For example, did not three British nationals just
recently indicted for trying to blow up financial institutions
in the U.S. enter on the Visa Waiver Program?
Mr. Skinner. Our work that we have performed, hasn't
identified that type of information, but, yes, you are correct.
The three British nationals that were arrested recently did, in
fact, have passports. But let's keep in mind these were not
stolen passports. These were legitimate passports. In fact,
some came through on, I believe, student passports, but we have
not validated that. But they were, in fact, legitimate
passports. These were nationals and citizens of the U.K.
Mr. Hostettler. Okay. Have al Qaeda terrorists anywhere in
the world been found with stolen passports from visa waiver
countries?
Mr. Skinner. Well, to say they're terrorists, I don't want
to go so far as to say they're terrorists because we don't have
that type of evidence. But there is--there are coincidences.
For example, there was the assassination in Afghanistan a
couple years ago, and those individuals were apprehended. They
had passports that were stolen from a batch of 46 passports.
We learned that, from that same batch of 46 passports,
five--or at least six of those passports were used to attempt
to enter the United States. Five of them were used
successfully; one was, in fact, caught. But there are five
individuals that were able to get through our U.S. ports of
entry with stolen passports. They came from the same batch that
was used by al Qaeda or individuals that were associated with
al Qaeda in the assassination in Afghanistan.
Mr. Hostettler. Is there any reason to believe that they
still may be in the country?
Mr. Skinner. I don't have any--you'll have to ask--I
believe ICE might be able to give you the status of where those
individuals are. But at the time of our review, yes, they were
still in the country, or there's no evidence that they had
exited the country.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you.
Mr. Veestraeten, when did Belgium--if I could get a
timeline, when did Belgium begin your program to produce
tamper-proof passports with biometric identifiers? And how long
did it take you to put--to roll those first sets of passports
out?
Mr. Veestraeten. Mr. Chairman, after the PATRIOT Act was
adopted in the U.S., we became conscious of the fact that we
would have to move quickly to tackle this issue. I believe that
I was here in Washington, D.C., in November 2003 for a first
round of consultations with the American authorities--State
Department, DHS--and so I think that we then made this--we
engaged ourselves to be ready by--in the time frame of 1 year.
We have aimed for October 26, 2004, which was the original
deadline in the bill, and I think we were actually ready. We
delayed a little bit. We started November 15, 2004, with the
first deployment, and we had the full rollouts January 30. That
was basically because of internal Belgium reasons. Because we
still had a stock of non-electronic passports, we wanted to use
the very last one of those in order not to waste taxpayers'
money. So we were effectively ready by October 26, 2004, for
the rollout of these ePassports. It took us about a year, I
would say.
Mr. Hostettler. Very good. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member from Texas for
5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I also
want to acknowledge my colleagues who have joined us,
Congressman Berman and Congresswoman Waters, who are here part
of the hearing.
I'd like to, before I start, Mr. Chairman, ask unanimous
consent to have submitted into the record the TIA letter,
Travel Business Roundtable, dated April 21, 2005.
Mr. Hostettler. Without objection.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, this is an important
hearing, and I think we have the opportunity for additional
hearings. I'd like to ask the Chairman his--or request that we
have an opportunity to hear from the State Department and ask
the Chairman whether or not he asked the State Department to
participate in this hearing, whether or not we'll have a second
hearing, whether or not the State Department will be present.
Mr. Hostettler. It's very possible that we could have
another hearing on this issue. We have a limited number of
seats, according to Committee rules, and we felt that this was
an excellent mix. But the State Department would obviously have
excellent input and insight on this very important issue. It's
possible that we may have a hearing in the future.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, then let me orally make a
formal request for the State Department's participation, and I
will be instructed by your staff how to make that in writing or
a more formal request. But let me for the record ask that we do
have an additional hearing that will allow for opportunities
for possibly other visa waiver representative--meaning
countries, their representatives be present and/or the State
Department--not and/or but and the State Department. I think
that would be a crucial part to part of the work that we're
trying to do, particularly in asking them direct questions
about the issue of their protection of stolen passports.
Mr. Hostettler. We will take that under consultation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman. I hope in the course
of the dialogue with staff it hasn't gone from consultation to
a good possibility of a hearing, but I thank you very much and
I will be engaged with you on that item.
Let me--Mr. Veestraeten, if I'm getting it almost right,
welcome. I wanted to just to your point, if you can explain or
elaborate. You said let's look to inclusiveness and not
exclusiveness. Why don't you expand on that for me, please?
Mr. Veestraeten. Well, what I want to say is that we are
all in the same struggle to bring the technology into the
passports, that is, the whole of the European Union, not only
Belgium, that is, including the U.S., Canada, Australia, New
Zealand. All those countries are working hard on electronic
passports and on the compatibility with ICAO standards.
Some countries have had more difficulties than others for
different reasons. Historic background may be one also. There
are also different mechanisms in different countries for
changing the way a passport is produced. Some countries were
already in a completely centralized system like we were lucky
to be there. So it was easier for us to implement new
technology than other countries which do not yet have a
completely centralized system for passport issuance.
All these things are important. What I want to say is that
we all are there together. The Visa Waiver Program is for
Europe of the utmost importance. It is a reciprocal facility to
travel for Americans and for the Europeans. I would very much
regret that while we are all doing our best to get where we
want altogether to be, that at such a moment the program itself
might be in danger. That is what I mean with those words.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You want us to be able to find as
reasonable a solution as possible, keeping in mind the needs of
security. And I might add for the record that both Spain and
Italy, which were also allies in the Iraq war, are included in
the possible denial of the extension.
Let me ask Ms. Dezenski about the issue dealing with your--
the lookout system and if Mr. Skinner would comment after you
comment. You believe you've made some progress, and let me
applaud you. I believe there have been some steps. But there
are criticisms. How committed are you or how convinced is DHS
that they are working through the problems of the lookout
system and they've really met the standards, the test that the
IG has offered in his report?
Ms. Dezenski. We do think that there has been marked
improvement in terms of the type of information that we're
getting, particularly through the Interpol process, and then
being able to implement that into our systems and get that out
to our border inspectors in a quicker fashion, and it's more
comprehensive information. So I think we feel cautiously
optimistic that this is moving in the right direction.
Now, we will be monitoring this very closely. We've stood
up a new organization within DHS called the Office of
International Enforcement, and their primary goal is to monitor
the VWP program and ensure that the criteria are being met.
And, in fact, I mentioned in my oral statement that we're just
completing our review of the countries, and that happens on a
2-year basis. So once we complete this, we'll be just about
ready to start the next review.
So it's an iterative process of ensuring that these foreign
partners are living up to the standards, and with specific
respect to the lookout system, we think that the types of
information we're getting are better and we're making progress.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Skinner?
Mr. Skinner. Yes, I must agree. The Department is, in fact,
making progress and it is getting better on a monthly basis. It
does take time, but other elements within the Government are
now contributing more. We're getting more concise data. The
issue with the Interpol is probably one of the things that
we're most pleased about, to get those countries participating.
I would like to point out, however, it's not necessarily
always the lookout system that's at fault here, because they
are getting information and they are developing a huge
inventory.
One of the underlying problems here is the two numbers that
we use on our passports and that this country as well as other
countries use. And this is particularly important when you're
dealing with stolen blank passports, because what is reported
is the blank--or is the passport inventory control number, not
necessarily the passport number. So once that document is
forged and used to come into this country, our capability to
identify or to match the passport number with the inventory
control number currently doesn't exist. And therein lies the
problem, and until we start using one number on our passports
for the inventory control number as well as the passport
number, we're going to continue to have problems and people are
going to still continue to get these passports or use these
passports to get into this country illegally.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Lungren, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate this, and I appreciate the fact that you have set up
this meeting. This is an extremely important issue.
Mr. Shaw, you indicated in your written testimony and in
your oral testimony that this is a complicated process, that
is, what we are asking to be done with respect to these
enhanced passports. I understand that. I also remember the
Manhattan Project may not have taken as long as many of the
things we're asking us to do in these days.
I came back here because of 9/11. I came back after being
gone 16 years because it seems to me the world had changed and
we needed to act as if the world has changed. And one of the
big disappointments I have is not everybody seems to act that
way.
How long is reasonable? I mean, in your written testimony
you said the date of 26 October 2005 should remain unchanged,
but exceptions, if needed, should be made on an individual
case-by-case basis. So, it sounds like you expect that there
are exceptions, there should be exceptions. How long should we
expect to wait? And is it because in your estimation, not the
complexity because you say keep the date there, but the lack of
political will or practical will? Or what is it we're facing
here?
Mr. Shaw. Well, I cannot speak on the political will for
the various countries, but I can speak on the technical
complications.
I would say, first of all, that within a year after that
date you should expect all of these countries to be in complete
compliance. No longer than that.
Mr. Lungren. So that the outside date would be 26 October
2006, as far as you're concerned, for any and all----
Mr. Shaw. Of the countries, absolutely. I think the issue
is that each one is facing a different situation, and what
we're really asking the various countries to do is to get in
lockstep. This data that is being put on the passports, which
is the biometric data, has to be able to be used and
interpreted all over the world. And I think this is where the
complexity lies because the books are all different. There's an
individual way that these countries make passports. You're
trying to integrate the chip into the book and at the same time
to introduce biometric capture and have a mass public
participation and a machine-assisted confirmation scheme and
have no mistakes in it. When they arrive in this country,
they're to work.
Mr. Lungren. I appreciate that, and I understand the
complexity and the difficulties of all sorts of countries
marching in lockstep. General Eisenhower had to confront that
on D-Day. Thank God he didn't have extension--in fact, he
didn't extend the time beyond one day, as I recall.
If I could ask the representative from Belgium, the
Director General from Belgium, you folks seem to have been able
to complete this mission. Can you tell me from the standpoint
of your government, what were the most difficult challenges?
Were there legal challenges, practical challenges, or political
challenges in making sure that you were able to accomplish this
task?
Mr. Veestraeten. I think for us it was practical. Most
difficult was the practical challenge. Political challenge, we
knew we were--the government was very much convinced of the
fact that we needed to be in compliance. I think the problem
was mostly practical.
I just wanted to point out for your information two
elements. First is that indeed we do have only one passport
number. I didn't know the countries had two different passport
numbers in their passports. This seems to be indeed the reason
for confusion. So since a long time, we only have one single.
The second thing is that there is a deadline, not a U.S.
but the European deadline, for passports with a computer chip,
and that deadline has been set by the European Commission and
the member states. It is August 28, 2006. So by the end of
August 2006, there is an internal European regulation which
puts a final deadline for all member states, all 25, not only
the Visa Waiver Programs, to include a computer chip in all
individual passports issued after that date.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Ms. Dezenski, if, in fact, we get everybody to cooperate,
at whatever date we do, is the Department of Homeland Security
prepared to actually utilize this? That is, do we have the
equipment purchased? Do we have the efforts in place so that we
can actually read these things and make sure that they are
functioning so that we don't on our end have a delay?
Ms. Dezenski. One of the most challenging pieces of this
has been the reader technology and ensuring that we procure the
right readers to read the right types of identifiers. We have a
pretty robust process over the next 3 months to continue
testing in live operational environments several different
types of reader technologies so we can make a procurement
decision that reflects some data, that will give us a better
sense for what will survive in a very busy environment. So we
are moving forward with that and certainly are committed to
getting those readers out----
Mr. Lungren. What is the date certain?
Ms. Dezenski. --as soon as we can. I can't give you a date
certain.
Mr. Lungren. I know. You told me the process is robust. You
told me as soon as possible. You told me you're doing all those
things--I love all that. But if I were in a courtroom, and I
asked you that question under oath, the judge would probably
tell you these were insufficient answers.
Ms. Dezenski. I can tell you that we will not have all
readers deployed by October 26, 2005.
Mr. Lungren. Will not.
Ms. Dezenski. We will not make that deadline.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California for 5
minutes, Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
congratulate you on having this hearing. My colleague from
California, Mr. Lungren, made reference to General Eisenhower
in meeting a deadline. Of course, U.S. troops were part of
group that had to meet that deadline. He wasn't just telling
the allies to meet that deadline. So my question is: Does the
State Department now issue passports that meet the standards we
are requiring as of next October, that is, a digital photo for
facial recognition, plus optional biometrics of fingers and/or
eyes which are stored on contactless integrated circuit chips?
Do we now issue those passports to our citizens?
Ms. Dezenski. Obviously, the Department of State is not
here to answer that for themselves----
Mr. Berman. But I'll bet you know.
Ms. Dezenski. I do know and, sir, no, they do not yet issue
those.
Mr. Berman. Okay, so----
Ms. Dezenski. They are in the process of deploying a new
passport which will go out for the first test phase, if you
will, this summer. It will only be issued to Government
employees. And then depending on how that process goes, they'll
continue with deploying the new document to the broader public
after that initial phase.
Mr. Berman. So if the Europeans imposed the standard on us
and the other visa waiver countries imposed the standard that
we're imposing on them, the U.S. would not be in compliance.
American citizens would have to obtain visas at European
consulates around this country in order to go to those
countries.
Ms. Dezenski. We would not meet a requirement that would
include a biometric chip within the passport document.
Mr. Berman. But that is our requirement for them, isn't it?
Ms. Dezenski. Correct.
Mr. Berman. Okay. Assuming the deadline passes, I mean,
from what you've said, Belgium is ahead of the United States on
this issue. Am I right?
Ms. Dezenski. I think the comments from the gentleman to my
right would indicate that Belgium is leading the pack amongst
VWP countries in terms of those biometric requirements, yes.
Mr. Berman. But for the countries that don't meet it, what
will the State Department be faced with following the October
deadline in terms of applications, manpower needs, things like
this?
Ms. Dezenski. Sure, I think there's probably a couple of
things to consider, and the first would be if the deadline
continues as is, it would require a significant number of
people to obtain visas before they come into the country. Right
now we have about 40,000 people who come into the U.S. every
day under the VWP program. So for those who are not in
compliance with the requirement, they would be needing to go to
the consular offices and obtain that visa to enter the country.
So there's that issue.
There also issues in terms of workload associated with that
that the Department of State would probably be better suited to
answer and I know they've thought about some of those
implications. But obviously there's a lot of back-end work to
be able to accommodate that additional group of people.
And the other thing to consider from a travel and from a
tourism perspective, the more layers that we have from a
security perspective, we have to be even more cognizant of
whether people will simply talk with their feet and decide not
to travel to Disney World, not to travel to locations, because
there are now one or two extra steps to go through to get the
family here.
So those are the types of implications that we would need
to keep in mind.
Mr. Berman. The Japanese Embassy has said that
approximately 670,000 Japanese citizens will have to apply for
visas based on current travel, 670,000 between October 26 of
2005 and March 2006. That will be, that particular country,
quite a workload on our embassy and consulates there.
My final question then is: You're here on behalf of the
Administration. Has the Administration--you've indicated the
U.S. won't have such a passport ready by October 26. It's clear
a number of other visa waiver countries won't. Has the
Administration taken a position on the October 26 deadline?
Ms. Dezenski. Well, I don't have a mandate today to tell
you about any shift in policy from what we've been pursuing
thus far. Secretary Chertoff intends to be up here in early May
to speak with Chairman Sensenbrenner about some additional----
Mr. Berman. About why he needs an extension.
Ms. Dezenski. About some additional details on what we
think the recommended path forward might be.
Mr. Berman. Thank you.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona for 5
minutes.
Mr. Flake. I thank the Chairman for calling this very
important hearing. When we extended for a year last time, I
stated at the time that it ought to be 2 years which the
Administration asked for. Now we're seeing why that needed to
be the case. And if nobody else is prepared to, I'm prepared to
introduce legislation to go for another year, or two if we need
to.
I met with the travel industry yesterday, and our economy
is really taking it here because of this and many other things.
It's the certainty going ahead. Our friends from Europe and
other visa waiver countries simply don't have certainty going
forward, so they don't plan convention visits or anything else.
And it has to do with procurement of U.S. goods and everything
else because they can't travel here or feel they may not be
able to. And it's really hurting us, and I don't know what
we're gaining by not extending it again or indicating that we
are. So I hope that we move quickly to give countries more
certainty, and I applaud the Belgians for moving ahead more
quickly than anybody else. But when they're ahead of us, I
can't imagine that we could expect the others to move any
faster than that.
So, anyway, I just want to indicate my willingness to push
ahead with another extension. I think that is what needs to be
on the table, and then let's decide how long that extension
needs to be. But we can't expect others to do what we're
unprepared to do ourselves, and that's the bottom line.
I thank the Chairman.
Mr. Hostettler. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady
from California, Ms. Waters, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members.
I'm just really remembering the last hearing that we had on
this issue and some of the concerns that I had at that time.
First, let me just say that I understand that the
technology for the development of the biometrics that's needed
is not really complete, it's not reliable at this time. Is that
correct?
Mr. Hostettler. If the gentlelady will yield, this is an
excellent----
Mr. Shaw. I yield to the----
Mr. Hostettler. --opportunity to clarify that the standard
that is being required by October 26 of this year is the
standard, once again, that was in place in 2002, which was the
biometric facial standard. This technology is in place. It's
capable. The technology that you might be considering is the
chip technology that is still----
Ms. Waters. Yes, I'm talking about the chip.
Mr. Hostettler. Right, but it is not required in current
law. The country of Belgium spent about a year and was able to
meet the requirements under law, the previous requirements
under law. And so the technology that is required by law for
the deadline is in place and can be used. So there's not a
question of technology--and let's clarify that. There's not a
question about technology or the standards that are required to
meet the October 26, 2005, deadline. And I yield back.
Ms. Waters. All right. Well, I mean, I think this hearing
is very important, but I suspect that we are not prepared to
disrupt the tourism and the trade and everything else that goes
along with, you know, people being able to come to this
country. So I'm not really focused on that so much. I'm glad
that we're talking about it. I think that probably the
extension is going to happen. I don't see any signs that
anybody's willing to hold that up.
What I asked before is about the countries that participate
in the Visa Waiver Program. Where is Andorra? What is it? Where
is it? Anybody know? I know about these little places like
Monaco and Brunei. But I see a number of countries on here that
I don't know very much about.
I'm concerned about countries like South Africa. We have a
major trade agreement, the African Growth and Opportunity Act,
with South Africa. And, of course, there are no countries of
color much in this list, but I'm concerned about what we can do
to open up opportunities with the expansion, with the extension
that we're going to give. I'm concerned about opening up
opportunities to countries that are not listed. I know Andorra
and Monaco may be very, very important, but places like South
Africa I think are very important, too.
What can we do as we give the extension, what can do to
open this up?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentlelady just yield for a
moment?
Ms. Waters. Sure. I yield to the gentlelady from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We have--I think what you have just opened
up is the question of an overall review. Through the years of
my service on this Committee, I've raised that very question on
South Africa and a number of other countries that are again
being our trade partners but also our allies in war and peace.
So I yield back to you by saying that this is why I believe
this is an important hearing, but I think also we will need to
assess what we're doing here today because we're either going
to break the system by burdening offices around the world who
cannot face the large numbers of visa requests, and then, of
course, we've never addressed the question of whether or not
that list can be expanded or diversified. You raise a very good
question. I think we need ongoing hearings on this subject.
I yield back.
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. And, of
course, I would be willing to join with my colleagues for an
extension, as the President of the United States and everybody
else is going to do, but I would not be willing to do it
without taking a look at how we expand this list, particularly
to countries that we have trade agreements with, such as South
Africa, where it's important for them to have this opportunity
also.
So I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Gohmert, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate this
opportunity. I appreciate you all coming forward to testify.
Having been a judge for so many years, I'm familiar with what
it takes to come forward and testify. I've done it myself.
But, Ms. Dezenski, Mr. Skinner, did you all ever see the
original ``Jaws'' movie? You know what I'm talking about?
Mr. Skinner. Yes, I do.
Ms. Dezenski. I've seen it.
Mr. Skinner. I did.
Mr. Gohmert. And do you remember how the police chief was
really concerned about the public safety and that they had a
real menace out there waiting to kill people, and the city
council and the mayor, they just wanted to protect the tourism.
And they got so concerned about the tourism that they quit
worrying about public safety, and as a result, people got
killed.
Now, it's my belief and my feeling from people in the
district in Texas--and we have a huge number of folks, though
I'm a Republican, that often vote Democrat for other
positions--but I feel a huge sense of concern about this
Government doing one of its principal functions, and that is,
providing for the common defense.
If there is another attack and it turns out that once again
we have been derelict in who had visas, who wasn't collected
and gotten rid of, gotten out of the country, then I think
there will be a wholesale change in Congress. If I am allowed
to come back if that were to happen, I'm going to be looking to
help there be a wholesale change in those that did not have a
sense of urgency about the safety of this country. That
includes with contractors, that includes with people within the
Government, because I think we should have a sense of urgency.
And that's where I'm coming from.
So with that understanding, I'm curious, and you may have
answered and I haven't heard. I came late from the floor. But
how many VWP countries do you think will be able to meet the
October 2005 deadline?
Ms. Dezenski. I'm consulting my cheat sheet here. We think
that there are about 14 countries who are on track to be close
to the deadline. One thing to keep in mind--this was touched on
a little bit earlier. Based on that list of those countries,
that's about 21 percent of the folks coming in under the VWP
program. So the biggies, if you will--France, the U.K., et
cetera--are further down in the list. So about 80 percent of
the volume coming in under the VWP program would not be in
compliance by that date.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. What's your assessment of how diligent
those who will be in non-compliance have been?
Ms. Dezenski. I think there's been a tremendous good-faith
effort. We've been working closely with these countries over
the last--specifically over the last 2\1/2\ years on some of
the things we're talking about today but more broadly over 6
years on improving the security of passport documentation. And
I don't think that there's any lack of good faith, as I said,
to meet these requirements. I think that it's technical and
operational in nature, and we need to make sure that as we move
forward we're deploying the right type of technology. We do not
want to be in a position to procure readers, for example, that
don't get us to the system that we need, both to facilitate
people moving through the border inspection process and to
ensure that, you know, we're able to read the documentation
that we're now requiring.
So these are tough issues, and I don't think anybody wants
to be in the position of not meeting a deadline, including our
foreign partners. So I think there has, again, been a very
concerted effort to move forward as quickly as we can.
Mr. Gohmert. Let me ask Mr. Veestraeten, what kinds of
problems have you had, if any, with your readers? Since you are
out front, usually that's where problems make themselves known.
Mr. Veestraeten. I don't think that we have had problems
with the readers at the moment. They seem to work fine. We have
deployed the readers at the national airports, and we have
asked the police, the Belgian Federal police, to give us weekly
reports on the results of those readings of chips. We're
starting to get the first reports now, I think two, three weeks
ago, and so far the passports which have been checked were
fine.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa for 5
minutes.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the
panelists as well. I came in here at the tail end of this
testimony, and so I'm kind of picking this up on the run. And I
want to also reiterate the metaphor that Mr. Gohmert used. I'm
sitting here trying to think of one, and he brought one up. But
it does occur to me that there's a reason why we are doing
this, and we had lost track in this discussion as to why we
have established the Visa Waiver Program and set up this
structure.
As I sit here and listen to the answers to the questions
and what little I know about this history of this event--and
it's probably not all that minor--I have to ask myself this
question. There's an advocacy here for an extension for the
sake of the tourism industry, and particularly 670,000
Japanese. That's a pretty significant number and reason to
consider this, and I've heard that issue come up several times.
We recognize that in the European Union there will be a number
of countries that won't be able to comply.
I see this date of August 28, 2006, where it looks like all
the EU will be in compliance. So I also want to ask my first
question to Mr. Veestraeten in case he may know that, or
whoever else on the panel. Is that a date that will be met, do
you believe, by all 25 members of the EU?
Mr. Veestraeten. Well, to be honest, I'm not sure. I cannot
talk for each of the individual countries. What I can point
out, if you'll allow me for these deadlines, that the U.S.
deadline is a deadline of another nature than, for instance,
the previous one on the machine-readable zone. The machine-
readable zone deadline in the U.S. legislation was one which
brought an obligation both to foreign countries and to the U.S.
Government to have this--obligation to have this technique
incorporated in the passports. This is not the case for the
chip, as you very well know.
There is, of course--and I don't want to qualify--to make a
difference of which is the better way to go. There's another
way to go which we have now adopted in Europe, which is to set
a deadline for ourselves, but we have not yet developed any
deadline for third countries at this point.
So I think that the fact that this is an internal deadline,
it is, first of all, also a way to go. I did want to point it
out. But it's also, I think, another nature of obligation
because I think that countries will be--will feel compelled to
also respect this deadline. I think there is an extra
motivational element there. So I think that, yes, first of all,
the date is a bit farther away, so it gives a little more room,
about 10 months. But, secondly, I think that the motivation is
there also for the whole of Europe to really be there by that
time.
Mr. King. I thank you. And, Ms. Dezenski, then to complete
this circle of questions in a way, and that is, are we looking
for an extension for the countries that aren't going to be able
to comply for the tourism industry in the United States or for
the Department of Homeland Security?
Ms. Dezenski. As I stated earlier, my goal today is not to
broach that subject. The Secretary is planning to meet with
Chairman Sensenbrenner in the beginning of May to chart out a
more detailed path.
Mr. King. Then I would state to the panel that it appears
to me that our sense of urgency has dissipated over the last 3
years, 3\1/2\ years, and again reiterate Mr. Gohmert's remarks
with the necessity for this, the reason that we are--we have
moved forward on this. And if we can move forward at a pace
that's comfortable to all of us, that wouldn't be a pace that I
would be comfortable with if that means that the security of
this nation is put at risk.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentleman.
Because of some desire from some Members of the
Subcommittee, we're going to go for a second round of
questions. I don't know how many we'll have. I will give myself
5 minutes to begin that, and I would like to for the record
clarify that every individual in a Visa Waiver Program country
that has a valid visa today, if their visa does not come out of
deadline by October--if it does not expire by October 26, 2005,
will be able to use that passport subsequent to October 26,
2005. The deadline is for new issuance of visas. So of the
700,000 or so Japanese, of which we have a tremendous concern
today that have a passport today, their passports are going to
be able to be used after October 26, once again, until such
time as they expire after that time.
Mr. Skinner, I'd like to ask you questions as well with
regard to the lost and stolen passport database. Except for
times when countries report that there have been a significant
number of passports stolen from Government agencies, Government
facilities, we, in fact, depend on individuals in Visa Waiver
Program countries to report their passports as being lost of
stolen. Is that not correct?
Mr. Skinner. Yes, that's true.
Mr. Hostettler. So they could be lost or stolen for a long
period of time before the individual would report it to their
government and then their government could virtually
immediately report it to us. But there could be a significant
amount of time theoretically that would----
Mr. Skinner. Yes.
Mr. Hostettler. --transpire between that time.
Mr. Skinner. Yes, that's true, if they report it at all.
They may not even report it.
Mr. Hostettler. Exactly. And do we also not know that from
time to time there are instances of individuals selling their
passport and they would not have a desire to report that.
Mr. Skinner. That's possible, yes.
Mr. Hostettler. If they sold their passport.
Mr. Skinner. Sure, that would be possible. That's not
something that we investigated or that we included in our
assessment. But, sure, that's possible.
Mr. Hostettler. So there is this universe of possibilities,
of potential situations that are out there that your
recommendations and DHS' subsequent implementation, there is a
universe that will not be covered, potentially not be covered
by these suggestions.
Mr. Skinner. Yes, that's true. But we should point out that
when you're dealing with a passport that has been issued, they
are very, very difficult then to alter. And if they are altered
to enter the United States, then I think our inspectors are
very well trained to identify them. So they're a lot harder to
use, unlike the blank passport, wherein those can be more
easily altered. But when you're dealing with someone's picture
that has to be altered, a lot of these passports that are used
today are digital photos, that's almost virtually impossible
to--without destroying the passport itself--to alter.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you.
Mr. Skinner. So it makes it very difficult.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you.
Mr. Veestraeten, how does Belgium deal with the illegal
sale of passports? Do you have a statute, do you have a law in
place that deals with that?
Mr. Veestraeten. Yes, of course, Mr. Chairman, we have laws
against fraudulent documents, people who make them and so on.
We prosecute people who we find trafficking documents or
altering documents.
Mr. Hostettler. Very good. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. We've heard a wide range of
testimony today, and we've even had one of our artistic giants
in the movie industry being utilized to explain the need for
homeland security. I am trying to think of one equally popular
and comes to mind ``Beauty and the Beast,'' which was a popular
movie as well. And I think when we talk about making choices,
it should be a practical discussion. And, frankly, the Visa
Waiver Program was a practical program that dealt with the
comings and goings of countries that had longstanding
relationships.
At the same time let me be very pointed. Democrats have
been very strong on homeland security and remain so, and I
think it is important to note--Mr. Skinner, you were in another
hearing that I managed to come in because I was in Judiciary,
but we spoke about the management issues. And I believe I
raised--though you did not have an opportunity to speak to my
question--the challenge of integrating 180,000 persons in the
Department of Homeland Security. And so I understand Ms.
Dezenski's step-by-step effort to respond to your concerns out
of the IG, but we must be practical and realistic.
I guess let me just ask this one question to you. Does the
Visa Waiver Program equate to you to equal terrorism?
Mr. Skinner. No. I would not go so far as to say that.
There are risks out there with the Visa Waiver Program. As I
said earlier, the mere fact that you don't have to go through
the rigors of a visa review process coupled with the laws of
our partners in other countries, to be able to be naturalized,
that presents a problem for people such as Reid who tried to
bomb a plane with a shoe bomb. He was a naturalized citizen.
The three individuals who were apprehended in England who had
visited this country on multiple occasions, who had been
associated with al Qaeda, I think two of those three were
naturalized citizens. And I think those issues----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Those are problems that we have.
Mr. Skinner. Yes. These people, and those issues are the
types of things that we need to be concerned about, and there's
where we get into our intelligence operations. We have to have
a very robust intelligence program to be able to be prepared to
address those type of issues.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate that distinction, that the
program itself is not the problem. It is obviously a program we
have to give great oversight, but we need other integrated
functions, such as intelligence, to discern the difference
between individuals coming for good and individuals coming to
do harm.
Mr. Shaw, you gave solutions, and I thank you for being a
witness today. Would you re-emphasize those solutions? In fact,
I think the interest is--one main question that I have, if I
can just share it with you, and if you can answer the question.
What can go wrong if visa waiver countries are rushed to meet
the deadline? You offer some technological solutions, and if
you can include that in your answer.
Mr. Shaw. Well, I think the biggest problem will be they'll
all show up with a passport that won't work because,
irrespective of what is happening, the new biometric passport
has one incremental, additional component. It's allowing
machine-assisted identity confirmation. You'll have chaos at
Homeland Security because they'll show up, and it says I can't
read the data from the chip, I can't identify the person, then
immediately the person is suspect. Is it because they've done
something to the chip, or what is it? And I think that this is
what I'm seeing now in the work that I'm doing across the
world, that countries are vigorously trying to make sure that
that identity detail that goes onto that document works when
they arrive in the United States.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So what you're seeing across the world is
that the countries in particular dealing with the visa waiver
are making efforts, are working through the technology, are
trying to get a refined process. Is that my understanding?
Mr. Shaw. Absolutely, and are vigorously testing and
experimenting. One of the countries that's been mentioned--I
won't be specific--that is going to be delayed actually has
conducted a major test of not only facial but fingerprint
technology recently. And so they're going to through an
extensive array of testing to make sure that that one thing
that is supposed to happen when they arrive in this country
works and that is that they can confirm identity.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I guess the idea is that if we don't
focus on allowing that technology to be improved, we may create
a greater nightmare than what we would have.
Mr. Shaw. I would say so, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And that speaks to your suggestion that
let them be in an ongoing process of compliance by making an
ongoing assessment of their work toward being in compliance.
Mr. Shaw. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And not shut the door completely on that.
If I can make this final point, Mr. Chairman, I was
speaking with some individuals earlier today about some
technology that might be used inside the United States, because
people do come in and then travel around. The potential of
being able to discover very quickly whether or not a Sheila
Jackson Lee boarded a plane in Chicago and then all of a sudden
showed up at the L.A. airport in not sufficient time to have
gotten in both places, technology would immediately hold one of
us. I think the key is you'd want the technology to work so
that it's either holding the right person or there was not a
confusion in the name. That's only a simple explanation of what
I think I hear you saying and what these international entities
are trying to do and that we do need to pay attention to what
would happen stateside if they came with the wrong technology
or the inappropriate document.
Mr. Shaw. Absolutely. I heard an official at one point in
the international meetings we were in say that if the biometric
doesn't work, we're going to send them to secondary. And the
response was you're going to have a crowded secondary, because
the technology is an empowerment tool for the border inspector.
They can look at the image that's on that screen and confirm
that the person standing before them is exactly who they say
they are. That's why face was chosen, because it's a redundant
capability. You've got to have this capability if the equipment
fails, and that's what this is all about. So you want to make
sure it does work.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5
minutes.
Mr. Gohmert. I'm going to yield back the time to the
Chairman.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Shaw, if I can ask you one question, with regard to the
use of technology for screening devices that will accept--
essentially readers that will accept the passports, the
presence of a chip will not preclude a level of technology or a
generation of reader that simply recognizes facial biometrics.
The presence of a chip, regardless of its status, whether it's
maturer technology or not, will not preclude the use of a
facial biometric identifier and reader to operate properly. Is
that correct?
Mr. Shaw. No, it will not.
Mr. Hostettler. Okay. So even for countries that--I said I
was going to ask you one. Here's two. Even for countries that
are looking for advanced technology such as the chip, if they
simply meet the requirement of the facial biometric and the
other requirements according to the 2002 act, those passports
will still be usable in the United States given that we have
the technology to read those passports, correct? Regardless of
the presence of a chip or what type of chip or the maturity of
the technology or anything like that.
Mr. Shaw. If I understand you correctly, the chip was
chosen because we had to have the capacity, a large block of
memory, to put data on in a way that was globally
interoperable. There are many, many facial recognition
algorithms, and if we put down the mathematical representation,
let's call it, the template, then you'd have to buy proprietary
technology and have a row of different reading devices to
analyze that data.
So what happened was that we went to a globally
interoperable representation, which is the facial image, and
that increased the capacity. There was also the potential of
incorporating fingerprint, potentially iris data, increase the
size of the tank even more.
So one of the reasons a chip was chosen, because it's
forward-looking, is it allows the capacity to be expanded, and
allows someone to put on all three biometrics if they want, or
just one. And that was one of the reasons why we went to the
chip and it has been a cornerstone of the ICAO decision. And
it's been done for one reason: global interoperability.
If the gentleman will continue to yield for just one more
question. But the chip is not required for the fundamental
reading of the facial biometric.
Mr. Shaw. If the data is put on the chip--or onto the
passport, recorded on the passport, yes, the chip is required,
because that's where the encoded data is, is in the chip.
Mr. Hostettler. But it's--all right. I'll have questions
I'll submit.
Mr. Gohmert. No, go ahead.
Mr. Hostettler. Well, but we do not require the chip by
law. The chip is additional to the law and can be used for
supplemental information and later generational technology
information. But to actually read the facial biometric for a
reader you don't need the chip to talk to the reader. You
simply need the facial photograph, correct?
Mr. Shaw. The original convention had three basic potential
ways of dealing with this.
First of all, you could take and scan the photograph that's
in the data page of the passport. That requires a special
reader. The chip is used to encode it in a way that gets around
some of the problems of scanning through laminate and security
features and things like that.
Mr. Hostettler. Right.
Mr. Shaw. But the other aspect of it is that if you're not
going to do a positive identification--in other words,
identifying you as who you say you are, then the facial
recognition technology can run a lookout check. In other words,
they wouldn't be looking for you. They'd be looking for the bad
guy and identify that. So that is there.
But if you're going to do a positive identification check,
you either have to scan the photograph on the data page, or you
have to read it from the chip.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Hostettler. Excuse me. The gentleman from Texas has the
time.
Mr. Gohmert. I'd yield to the gentlelady from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished--my new
colleague, the distinguished gentleman.
Mr. Shaw, then, but the intent of getting a program
biometric is, in fact--or part of the intent is to get that
pure identification.
Mr. Shaw. That's correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is it not?
Mr. Shaw. That's correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I think that is important.
Mr. Shaw. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Thank you, I yield.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms.
Waters, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think it's
important for me to say that every Member of Congress is
equally concerned about homeland security. We all are very
hopeful and work toward--bring everything that we can to secure
the homeland. So when we talk realistically about problems such
as this one, and if we may not agree on whether or not there
should be an extension of these countries, it's not because we
are less concerned. It is because we are just realistic about
what could and could not happen.
I'm looking at a Los Angeles Times article that says this--
the last paragraph of the article says, ``Meanwhile''--as it
discusses changes in passports here and abroad. ``Meanwhile,
the European Union hinted it might require visas of U.S.
citizens if Congress refuses to extend an October deadline
requiring machine-readable biometric passports for citizens of
27 visa waiver nations, mostly in Europe. It said many of its
nations would not be ready with the passports by then.''
This would be worse than a trade war if, in fact, the
European Union decided that it would require of us what we're
requiring of them. I think Mr. Berman pointed out that we could
not meet that requirement should it be placed on us. So I think
it's always very necessary, no matter how concerned we are
about homeland security, that we recognize that there are some
things that are just going to take time and work and effort. It
seems to me there are a number of questions here--technology,
retaliation, other kinds of issues.
So when I said earlier that based on my evaluation of this
problem that I'm convinced that we will have to extend the
deadline, it's because based on how things work and how this
Congress works and how we work out problems is just not a
question in my mind.
So I thought it would be important for me to just, number
one, reiterate the fact that we're all concerned about homeland
security, but I'm sure many of these other countries are
concerned about their homeland security also. And I suspect
everybody's working very hard to meet the deadline, but
probably it will be missed. And it is at that point--at some
point that we're going to have to come to grips with reality
and simply extend the deadline in the interest of our
relationships with the world and with the European Union in
particular.
Having said that, I'm wondering from Mr. Veestraeten
whether or not other countries have sought your country's help
and assistance in developing their technology and if its
technology that is offered can be accessed by other countries.
Mr. Veestraeten. Yes, indeed, I've been contacted recently
by Portugal, by Ireland, and by some other member states to see
where we can better work together.
This being said, we all have our established relationships
with national printing offices, national banks, with companies,
so there is a different tradition at each different country for
production of passports. Don't forget that the passport
essentially remains a paper document. There is a chip in it
now, but it essentially remains a very specific paper document
with a lot of security features in the printing and in the
paper. So that remains. It doesn't change. The way we all work,
all governments work with those who produce the passports is
different as a historic background. But I was indeed asked to
see how we can better cooperate by the countries I mentioned.
Ms. Waters. Thank you. And of the panel, have you found
that most countries are working very hard to try and meet the
deadline? Are they really attempting to do it? Is that true?
Ms. Dezenski. We would agree with that. We've been very
active in the ICAO process, working closely with folks. And as
I said earlier, I think there's been very much a good-faith
effort to reach these deadlines and to do it as quickly as
possible. And there's most definitely a sense of urgency in
that process as well.
Ms. Waters. Anybody else?
Mr. Skinner. Congresswoman, we have not looked at that
particular issue. In countries we did visit, however, we did
determine that they were very diligent in their efforts to
safeguard the integrity of their passport systems.
Ms. Waters. What about you?
Mr. Shaw. Based on the experiences I've had with a number
of countries, probably over a dozen, yes, they are. And they're
encountering a range of different issues that they're facing,
but they are all diligently working and trying to do one thing:
make sure that the passport that is handed over at Homeland
Security works. And that seems to be what they're trying to do.
Ms. Waters. And, finally, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I know
the red light is on, if you would grant me just another minute
here.
Mr. Hostettler. Without objection.
Ms. Waters. Has there been a recommendation from anybody,
any agency--Homeland Security, State Department, Immigration,
anybody--to hold fast to this deadline and not to waver one bit
that we can afford to extend the deadline? Have we heard that
recommendation from anybody, anytime, anyplace, anywhere?
Ms. Dezenski. The Secretary is going to be coming up to
talk to Chairman Sensenbrenner in a couple weeks, and I think
we'll be able to be a little bit more specific. We have not at
this point made any specific statements on changing the policy
direction.
Ms. Waters. Have you been advised by anyone to do that?
Ms. Dezenski. Not formally, no.
Ms. Waters. Thank you all very much.
Mr. Hostettler. The gentlelady's time has expired.
I make unanimous consent--I will allow the gentleman from
Texas, who graciously gave up his time a few moments ago to
myself and the Ranking Member, for 5 minutes for one last set
of questions. And I very much appreciate the indulgence of the
panel.
The gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was just curious, Mr. Veestraeten. Does the identifier
you're using, does it have a biometric chip to it?
Mr. Gohmert. Yes, indeed. Our passport contains--I think
that the notes I deposited earlier this week contain some
technical information. It contains a computer chip, and on the
chip are stored all the data printed in the passport, like
name, first name and so on, and a picture, a digitized picture
of the bearer.
There is also room for another feature in the future,
because you know that in Europe we have decided to go beyond
the chip and the picture. We have decided with the second
deadline, February 2008, to also include the second biometric
feature. So this goes beyond the PATRIOT Act at the moment, and
so there is another deadline we imposed on ourselves for
further steps to be taken.
Mr. Gohmert. Who produces the chip that you utilize?
Mr. Veestraeten. It's a Phillips chip, as far as I know,
but I'm not a specialist of the real technique. But the chip is
Phillips. The antenna is a printed serigraphic antenna.
Mr. Gohmert. Who produces the reader that you use that
you've had no problems with?
Mr. Veestraeten. The reader is a standard PDA, a pocket PC,
and the reader antenna which is inserted is created by ACG,
which is a company at the moment in Austria. It is produced in
Austria.
Mr. Gohmert. I see. Okay. Thank you. And I do appreciate
you-all's testimony and your indulgence. But I do look at
homeland security basically, to use the analogy, I mean, you're
our police chief. That's your main job. We're looking to you to
protect us. And I appreciate all the efforts that you will make
on our behalf to do just that.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you yield just for a moment?
Mr. Gohmert. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Dezenski, you said that--I just want
to get a qualification. I know that the Secretary will be
coming up, but you have--there is no pronounced policy right
now in the Department of Homeland Security about not extending
the Visa Waiver Program deadline.
Ms. Dezenski. That's correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And so that means that as a witness here,
you're also willing to accept, I assume, comment or insight
from the affected persons and consult with State along with
Members of Congress.
Ms. Dezenski. Absolutely, and that process is already
underway.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Thank you very much. I yield
back.
Mr. Gohmert. She yielded back. Let me just say I also look
at you as representing the Beauty, Ms. Liberty, and I hope you
won't embrace the Beast. [Laughter.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. Now, Mr. Chairman, I really have to have
him yield back. [Laughter.]
The choice is between the Beauty and the Beast, and I hope
that we'll accept the Beauty, which is to work with this
problem for the betterment of our international relations and
the homeland security, which we as Democrats and friends on the
other side of the aisle have as one of our number one agenda
items.
I yield back.
Mr. Hostettler. And with that, we bring this Subcommittee
hearing to a conclusion.
I would like to inform the witnesses that we will be
following up with some questions to some of you. We would
appreciate a timely response, within approximately 3 weeks, to
have this added to the record. And all Members will have 5
legislative days to include extraneous remarks into the record,
as well as questions for the panel members.
I want to once again thank all the members of the panel,
especially you, Mr. Veestraeten, for being here and for taking
time to help us, and this, as you can imagine from the
participation, that your being here and your input is very
valuable and will be extremely valuable as we continue to
develop policy in this area.
Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman, I'd like unanimous consent to
submit my statement for the record.
Mr. Hostettler. Without objection.
Mr. Hostettler. The business before the Subcommittee being
completed, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:59 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
response to chairman john hostettler's question posed to ms. elaine
dezenski at the hearing, submitted by the u.s. department of homeland
security
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
----------
Prepared Statement of the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a
Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin and Chairman,
House Judiciary Committee
On September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked by 19
terrorists who flew planes into American landmarks, resulting in the
largest single terrorist-related loss of American life in our history.
The leaders of that terrorist attack either lived in Europe as resident
aliens prior to the attack or traveled directly from Europe en route to
the execution of this awful assault. Subsequent arrests in Spain,
combined with examination of the terrorists' travels, have confirmed
that the attacks were planned in Europe, in countries enjoying Visa
Waiver Program status. Zacarias Moussaiou, the ``20th terrorist'' who
has just this week announced he wants to plead guilty to the terrorist
charges against him, came to the U.S. from France with a French
passport under the Visa Waiver Program. These sobering facts are no
less relevant today than they were three years ago.
I authored the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
of 2002 to address several of our Nation's vulnerabilities to
terrorism. The need for the legislation was clear to everyone in
Congress at the time, as evidenced by its virtually unanimous passage.
The need for including the passport and visa requirements was not in
dispute then, and should not be in dispute now.
One requirement of that Act, was that by no later than October 26,
2004, the governments of visa waiver program countries certify that
they have programs to issue their nationals machine readable passports
that are tamper-resistant and incorporate biometric identifiers that
comply with biometric identifier standards established by the
International Civil Aviation Organization. Because the 2002 ICAO
standards seemed straightforward at the time, the only obstacle to Visa
Waiver Program countries meeting the 2004 deadline was for ICAO to
update standards for digital photographs of the facial images contained
in passports, and possibly address some software and camera
technicalities relating to how the photos could be read by machine
standards for purposes of validation.
My goal in selecting the October, 2004, deadline was to push
countries to act promptly to modernize their passports. Unfortunately,
only a few countries took the deadline seriously, and for that I partly
blame weak efforts by the Department of State and the Department of
Homeland Security to convince the effected countries that we were
serious.
The Border Security Act stipulated only that biometric identifiers
and documents meet ICAO standards, and that the passport be ``machine-
readable.'' Congress, in passing the Act, anticipated that ICAO would
establish reasonable, cost-effective standards which relied upon
existing technology. That the ICAO would become enmeshed in new and
unproven technology, and that the EU should choose an elaborate and
expensive path to meet the requirement has led to consequences that are
regrettable, but not insurmountable.
Visa Waiver Program countries have had since the spring of 2002,
one year more than initially set, to move forward to produce passports
meeting those requirements. Some Visa Waiver countries have acted
promptly to initiate the necessary processes, while others delayed.
Recently, I asked Visa Waiver countries to update me on their progress
toward meeting the requirements. From the responses received thus far,
it appears at least twelve countries will have a viable program in
effect prior to the October deadline. In the order responses were
received, these include: Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Belgium,
Australia, Italy, Singapore, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
VWP countries failing to meet the deadline delays will impose
burden on their citizens as well as costs on the United States, as our
State Department will be required to staff up foreign posts to handle
this visa demand. As I receive more letters, and further clarification
on some of the letters received, I hope to find that all or nearly all
of the Visa Waiver Program countries are moving forward quickly to meet
the deadline.
----------
questions for the record submitted to the u.s. department of homeland
security by chairman john n. hostettler
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
----------
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas
The visa waiver program (VWP) allows nationals from 27 countries to
enter the United States as nonimmigrant visitors for business or
pleasure without first obtaining a visa from a United States consulate
office. This facilitates international travel and commerce and eases
consular office workloads.
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002
mandated that by October 26, 2004, the government of each VWP country
would have to certify that it had established a program to issue
machine-readable passports that are tamper-resistant and incorporate a
biometric identifier. We extended that deadline to October 26, 2005,
last year. The extension was necessary to avoid potential disruption of
international travel and to provide the international community
adequate time to develop viable programs for producing a biometrically
enabled passport.
According to the State Department, only 14 of the 27 VWP countries
expect to comply with the revised deadline. Brunei, Finland, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom expect to come
into compliance several months after the deadline. Longer delays are
anticipated by France, Japan, Denmark, Italy, Liechtenstein, and the
Netherlands.
Most of the countries that expect to meet the deadline are small
countries that have small passport production numbers and centralized
production processes. Those with large passport production numbers are
the ones having greatest difficulty in meeting the deadline. France,
Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom make up more than 80% of VWP
travelers.
If the deadline is not extended, the VWP countries that fail to
meet it will lose the privilege of participating in the program, and
the nationals of those countries will need visas to enter the United
States. The State Department has estimated that this would result in a
sudden need to process millions of additional visas, which would impose
a severe challenge on its resources.
I am concerned about the effect that even a temporary disruption of
the visa waiver program could have on the international tourist
industry. In 2002, approximately 13 million international visitors
entered the United States on the Visa Waiver Program. They spent nearly
$40 billion and supported the jobs of hundreds of thousands of American
workers. A disruption to the Visa Waiver Program would discourage
international visitors. Many of them would choose to travel to other
international destinations.
I am particularly concerned about the effect that this might have
on the State of Texas. In the year 2000, Texas received revenue from
the international tourist industry that totaled $3,751.3 million. This
included $410.6 million on public transportation, $111.1 million on
automobile transportation, $1,029.2 million on lodging, $731.4 million
on food services, $320.2 million on entertainment and recreation, and
$1,148.9 million in general trade.
Also, the technology for the biometric feature needs to be fully
developed and tested before it is put into use. I am afraid that
rushing the VWP countries into compliance could result in passports
that have unreliable biometric identifiers, which would not provide the
expected increase in our security.
It is not a crisis if we have to permit some short extensions to
the present deadline. The biometric passport is important, but we have
other security measures that are already in place. Since September 30,
2004, all VWP travelers entering the United States have had their
fingerprints electronically collected and compared against watch-lists
through the US- VISIT program. The Advanced Passenger Information
System (APIS), provides information on international visitors before
they arrive. And these efforts are augmented by United States law
enforcement and intelligence operations.
Nevertheless, I want the biometric requirement to be met as soon as
possible. I would only favor granting additional extensions on a case-
by-case basis, and I would expect the countries requesting additional
time to support their requests with a detailed time table for achieving
compliance within the time requested.
Thank you.
----------
letter from the travel business roundtable, travel industry association
of america, and u.s. chamber of commerce, submitted by the honorable
sheila jackson lee
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
__________
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Maxine Waters, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California
Mr. Chairman, our Visa Waiver Program needs vast and extensive
improvement. In today's climate of terrorism, our ports of entry and
the immigrants allowed into the country through the Visa Waiver
Program, needs to be rigorously modified and monitored.
When evaluating the Visa Waiver Program, procedures for
ascertaining INS's ability to account for nonimmigrant overstays,
stolen passports from Visa Waiver Program countries, falsified
passports, and INS's ability to correctly and consistently check
applicants against the Terrorist lookout system or Watchlist data, seem
chaotic and lax. This is not acceptable in today's climate.
Mr. Chairman, the Visa Waiver Program does bring in a significant
financial gain to America's tourism industry, hence boosting America's
overall economy, but I'm not sure those financial gains are worth the
threat of terrorism and illegal activity.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses to learn more
about the Visa Waiver Program and how its procedures have progressed.
For it is a valuable program, if we can rigorously and thoroughly
protect our ports of entry and integrate procedures that will
effectively prevent criminals and terrorists into America.
I yield back the balance of my time.
----------
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California
Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman.
I introduced legislation in the 107th Congress that included a
requirement that all visa waiver countries redesign their passports to
be machine-readable and contain biometric identifiers as a condition of
their continued participation in the visa waiver program. My bill was
the model for such requirements included in the ``Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002,'' that are now the subject
of this hearing.
I am disturbed that our visa waiver partners did not meet the
original deadline and to this day have not implemented the biometric
and machine readability requirements. I am particularly concerned about
how the failure to meet this deadline will impact the national security
of the United States.
Though I understand that there are constraints, and coordination on
a worldwide level is not a simple matter. However, I wish to implore
our visa waiver partners to treat security improvements with the utmost
urgency.
Again, thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to hearing from the witnesses about the reasons for the delay
and, most importantly, when we can expect them begin to issue
biometric, machine-readable documents.
I yield back my time.
<all>